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ntr-o msur chiar mai mare dect Polonia, Romnia a reuit s uite
de dictatele strategice i diplomatice. A muncit din greu pentru a intra
n NATO. A adus contribuii operaiunilor conduse de SUA n
Afganistan. Dar nu a fost nevoie s-i fac griji cu privire la nivelul de
baz/fundamental al geopoliticii, acela de a asigura statul i teritoriul su
mpotriva unei invazii, a constrngerilor sau mpotriva extinc iei n minile
puterilor ostile. Securitatea teritoriului romnesc, integritatea sistemului su
guvernamental, stabilitatea mediului su pentru atragerea de investiii i
dezvoltare toate aceste condiii prealabile pentru succesul statului romn
modern au fost asigurate n numele su, n mare msur, de puteri din
exterior.
Aceast perioad linitit a istoriei a fost o mare realizare att pentru
Romnia, ct i pentru Occident ca un ntreg, care acum pot srbtori
25 de ani de la tranziia din comunism.
Dar condiiile care au fcut posibil aceast vacan de geopolitic se
apropie de sfrit.
Invazia ruseasc din Ucraina reprezint o provocare direct i foarte violent
la adresa bazelor juridice i teritoriale ale securitii spaiului european.
Aceasta semnaleaz modificri ale peisajului geopolitic din sud-estul Europei
care vor modifica, la rndul lor, profund i permanent, mediul extern al
Romniei n moduri care vor pune sub semnul ntrebrii succesul su continuu
ca stat european democratic n curs de dezvoltare.
Pentru prima dat n aceast generaie, Romnia are un prdtor n
ecosistemul su. Sub conducerea lui Vladimir Putin, Rusia a reaprut
ca un stat nemulumit din punct de vedere teritorial, capabil militar i
ideologic antioccidental, cu capacitile i inteniile de a rsturna
soluionarea post-1991 n vecintatea sa. Rzboiul din Ucraina arat
c Rusia este dispus s joace acest rol, folosind nu doar tactici de
subversiune, luare de mit i intimidare, ci i prin utilizarea for ei
militare mpotriva vecinilor si.
n multe feluri, Vladimir Putin este deja n rzboi cu Occidentul i c tig. Nu a
ntmpinat nimic n rspunsul naiunilor occidentale care s-l descurajeze s
foloseasc aceleai tehnici pentru a teroriza, a destabiliza i a rearanja alte
state de-a lungul frontierei de est a Europei.
Renaterea Rusiei vine ntr-un moment de slbiciune pentru Occident,
atunci cnd Pax Occidentalis nseamn din ce n ce mai puin pentru
Romnia. SUA sunt un aliat prin tratat al Romniei; sunt i vor rmne
ferm angajate n aprarea sa. Dar natura influenei Americii n Europa
Central se schimb: bugetele noastre de aprare sunt n scdere,
presiunile strategice de gestionare a mai multor regiuni la nivel
mondial sunt n cretere i, teoretic, pe orice plan, iar influen a
Americii n sud-estul Europei este nlocuit de alte puteri.
Vladimir Putin i Viktor Orban au invocat diferite versiuni ale aceleea i teze:
ordinea democratic pe care am construit-o n Europa Central dup 1989 a
fost temporar c aceasta poate fi contestat i chiar nlocuit dac suntem
dispui s nclcm regulile, fie c se utilizeaz bani murdari, tancuri sau urne
de vot.
Succesul Romniei este contra-dovada esenial a acestei teze.
Romnia este o dovad c idealurile i instituiile occidentale
funcioneaz ntr-un moment din istorie n care avem nevoie cu
disperare de exemple de succes ale Occidentului la nivel mondial.
Gndii-v pentru o clip la cum ar putea arta viitorul Romniei dac
aceasta ar atinge potenialul su maxim: al 6-lea stat ca mrime din
Europa, cu 20 de milioane de oameni, i a treia cea mai mare rezerv
de gaze n UE, toate acestea ca o democraie consolidat n inima sudestului Europei, cu instituii stabile, un standard de trai n cre tere,
investiii stabile din Vest i un sector energetic n plin expansiune.
Aceasta este o Romnie cu viziune transatlantic, care ar fi un exemplu
puternic de stabilitate, de soluii de energie i democraie n faa vecinilor si.
Aceasta este Romnia de care are nevoie Occidentul, din punct de
vedere strategic, n aceste vremuri. Ne ateapt n anii urmtori o
competiie geopolitic i ideologic global mai crncen dect ne-am
fi putut imagina oricare dintre noi n urm cu 25 de ani. America va
avea nevoie de aliai maturi care sunt capabili s ofere securitate regiunii lor i
s modeleze succesul ordinii Vestice. Angajamentul nostru strategic i
economic va fi cu att mai mare pentru aliaii care reuesc cel mai mult n
aceste domenii. Cu ct Romnia va avea mai mult succes, cu att mai mult
Statele Unite vor fi prezente n ara i n regiunea dumneavoastr.
Despre Romnia interbelic s-a spus c a reprezentat o stare de
necesitate. Aceasta este valabil i pentru Romnia de astzi. Sunte i
ntr-o stare de necesitate pentru America i pentru aliana
occidental. Au fost momente n istorie cnd cel mai sigur lucru pentru
Romnia a fost s pstreze un profil sczut i s acioneze ca un stat
mai mic (nensemnat) dect n realitate. Acum nu ne aflm ntr-unul din
acele momente. Acesta este un moment n care romnii trebuie s fie
subiecte mai degrab dect obiecte ale istoriei. Un moment n care s
conducei n regiunea dvs. n guvernare, securitate i energie n
ciuda faptului c totul n jurul vostru se mic n direc ia opus.
Eu cred c Romnia este pregtit pentru acest moment. Dispune i de
instituii mai stabile, de resurse financiare mai mari i de aliai mai
buni dect dispunea statul romn n perioada interbelic. Ultimii 25 de
ani au oferit toate ingredientele necesare succesului dumneavoastr.
Tot ceea ce avei nevoie acum este ncrederea. Alegerea este a
dumneavoastr, n cele din urm. Dar Occidentul are nevoie de
Romnia pentru a reui, pentru viitorul vostru i pentru viitorul
nostru.
V mulumesc.
Nota: sublinierile mi aparin. Traducerea din textul originar a fost realizat n
timp record cu sprijinul unor colaboratori crora in s le mul umesc i pe
aceast cale. mi asum eu, ns, n cazul n care apar mici stngcii de
exprimare, orice posibil greeal. Pentru conformitate i confruntare cu textul
originar voi posta la final i textul n limba englez.
Despre autor: A. Wess Mitchell is President and Co-Founder of the Center for
European Policy Analysis (CEPA), a U.S. foreign policy institute dedicated to
the study of Central Europe. At CEPA, he leads in the strategic direction of the
institute, the intellectual and financial development of major programs, and
the executive management of Center resources and staff. In helping to form
CEPA, Mitchell has sought to reinforce Central Europes position in U.S. global
strategy and strengthen Americas diplomatic, commercial and security
relationships with key allies in the region.
Mitchell co-founded CEPA in 2005 with its Chairman Larry Hirsch, and has
played a critical role in the institutes formulation and growth as a successful
501(c)(3) startup organization. As President and CEO, he has helped to build
CEPA into the largest concentration of expertise on the Central European
region in the United States, establishing effective strategic partnerships with
transatlantic governments and universities and leading capital growth
campaigns that have attracted funding from major corporate, foundation, and
private sponsors. Under his tenure, CEPA has become one of Washingtons
fastest growing think tanks with a wide following in senior policy circles in
Europe and the United States.
Mitchell is a frequent public commentator whose articles and interviews have
appeared in The Wall Street Journal, New York Times, International Herald
Tribune, Washington Post, BBC, Gazeta Wyborcza, Der Spiegel, Harpers
Weekly, American Interest, National Inter-est, National Review, Orbis, and
Internationale Politik, among others. He is a frequent consultant to U.S. and
European governments, and has given briefings and lectures at the Central
Intelligence Agency, U.S. State Department, Johns Hopkins SAIS University,
Har-vard, UC-Berkley and elsewhere. During the 2012 U.S. Presidential
elections, he worked for the Mitt Romney presidential campaign, serving on
both the National Security Transition Team and the European Policy Working
Group.
A Texas native, Mitchell began his career as an intern in the office of
Congressman Larry Combest. He holds a Masters Degree from Georgetown
Universitys Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, where he was
awarded the 2004 Hopper Award for his work on American grand strategy. He
has completed research for a doctoral dissertation, has lived and studied in
England and Germany, and is member of the editorial board of International
Politics Reviews in London. He is a member of the CEPA Board of Directors
and serves on the advisory councils of the Richard G. Lugar Institute of the
German Marshall Fund, the Slovak Atlantic Commission, the Prague Center for
Transatlantic Relations, Atlantische Initiative Berlin, and the Alexander
Hamilton Society of Washington. He is currently completing his second book,
examining U.S. global alliances and 21st Century geopolitics, with Professor
Jakub Grygiel of Johns Hopkins University SAIS.
Textul conferinei n limba englez. Autor: Wess Mitchell
Romania after the Ukraine War: Threats and Opportunities
Thank you all for coming today and for the opportunity to speak here at
Universitatea Bucuresti, Facultatea de Drept. I especially want to thank my
good friend Don Lothrop, whos been an outstanding supporter and mentor of
our entire organization at CEPA. Many of you here may not realize the extent
of the impact that Don is achieving as an ambassador at large for your country
in the United States. Don is making a tremendous difference in Washington in
educating the U.S. government, think-tanks and business community on
Romanias potential and its strategic importance to the United States. Don is a
founding father of our U.S.-Romania Initiative at CEPA, and his work on the
Romania One Initiative has been an inspiration to all of us at CEPA in our
mission as Washingtons only think-tank dedicated to promoting an
economically vibrant, geopolitically stable and politically free Central Europe
with close and enduring ties to the United States.
Today I want to talk about the second part of CEPAs mission statement:
geopolitics.
Within the course of the past 8 months, war has returned to Central and
Eastern Europe. The largest country in Eastern Europea sovereign nation of
45 million people whose borders were guaranteed by the Great Powershas
been subjected to a sustained campaign of state violence, systematic
destabilization and dismemberment at the hands of the Russian Federation.
This country has been repeatedly invaded, its citizens have been murdered, its
territory has been occupied. More than 3,000 people have been killed. Borders
have been redrawn. A civilian airliner has been shot down. And the West has
entered into a prolonged geopolitical contest with Russia. Eastern Europe has
once again in our lifetimes become a reactivated geopolitical and civilizational
frontier.
And all of this has happened in a country that is a few hours drive from where
we sit here today. A country that shares a 600-kilometer border with Romania.
Since this crisis began, most of the focus in Western security policy has been
on North Central Europe, on Poland and the Baltic States. But I want to talk
this afternoon about what the Ukraine war means for the geopolitics of
southeastern Europe and in particular what it means for the people and state
of Romania.
This is not a topic we discuss very often. For most of our lifetimes, geopolitics
is not something that we in the West or Romanians in particular have not had
to think very much about. For 25 years now, we have lived through one of the
most stable and transformative periods in human history. Fat years, years of
peace and prosperity, free from the Old Chaos of geopolitics and Great Power
war.
Central Europe has been the ultimate symbol of that prosperity: this region
has enjoyed greater safety, wealth accumulation and political freedom than at
any point in 1,000 years of history. In the past quarter century, Romania has
gone from being one of the most wretched and oppressed of the captive
nations of the Soviet Bloc to the most successful democracy in the Balkans. Its
GDP has increased by 150 percent. Its attracted more than 170 billion dollars
in foreign investment. Its acheived some of the fastest economic growth rates
in the Western world. And its gone through 7 consecutive, peaceful,
parliamentary transfers of power.
Romanias success was made possible by the courage and ingenuity of its
people. But it was also made possible by an exceptional and historically rare
set of geopolitical circumstances. For 25 years now, Romania has, for the first
time in modern history, not faced a military threat from an outside power. It
has had a security covenant with the most powerful nation on earth. And it
has had the modernizing and reforming influence of the worlds largest trade
bloc.
This set of conditions has created a kind of goldilocks moment for all of
Central Europe that has allowed the countries of this region to heal from the
wounds of Communism and focus on building up the human capital, political
institutions and open economies of modern European states. No nation
deserved this opportunity more than Romania, the victims of the Ceasescu
police state.
What the post-Cold War moment gave to Romania was a suspension of the
normal laws of geography and power that have dominated most of its history
that have subjected it and its neighbors to what Churchill called the tortures
which ancient poets and theologians reserved for the damned.
To an even greater extent than Poland, Romania has been able to forget about
the dictates of strategy and statecraft. Its worked hard to get into NATO. It
made contributions to U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan. But it has not had to
worry about geopolitics at the most fundamental level, of having to secure the
state and its territory against invasion, coercion or extinction at the hands of
hostile powers. The security of Romanian territory, the integrity of its
governmental system, the stability of its environment for attracting investment
and growthall of these preconditions for the success of the modern
Romanian state have been provided for Romania on its behalf, largely by
outside powers.
This tranquil period of history has been a great accomplishment for Romania
and for the West as a whole that is worth celebrating at the 25th anniversary
of the transition from Communism.
But the conditions that made this vacation from geopolitics possible are
ending.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine represents a direct and very violent challenge
to the legal and territorial foundations of the European security order. It
signals changes to the SEE geopolitical landscape that will profoundly and
present grave challenges for its internal economic and political development.
Based on current regional trends, I see 5 emerging risks that Romania is likely
to face:
The risk of a re-activated Eastern military frontier: Russias continued
advance on southern Ukraine places direct pressure on Romania. In the years
ahead, Romania should expect more frequent Russian violations of its
airspace, more Russian maritime harassment of ships and rigs in the
Romanian EEZ, and greater agitation in Moldova and Transnistria.
The risk of a re-militarized Black Sea: The annexation of Crimea puts Russia
in a position to disrupt Romanian maritime energy and economic development.
Forty percent of the energy resources in the Romanian EEZ are now subject to
legal dispute by Russia on the basis of the old Ukrainian boundary claims.
Even an unsuccessful challenge to the 2009 ICJ ruling could change the risk
climate for Romanian Black Sea energy development and impede Romanias
plans for energy independence by 2020.
The risk of regional economic uncertainty: Investors dont like wars. CE has
thrived economically because 2 decades of stability have made it a safe haven
among global emerging markets. Lose that stability, and you lose more of the
basis for your future growth than you realize. This is exactly what a recent
EBRD report has warned will happen in CE if the crisis in Ukraine stretches into
a second year.
Fourth, the risk of resurrected regional nationalism: The Ukraine war
reintroduced ethnic-based territorial revisionism to CEE for the first time since
the 1940s. Irredentist nationalists from Transnistria to Transcarpathia and
Transylvania took note of Crimea and are being actively encouraged by
Vladimir Putin and Alexandr Dughin.
The risk of co-optation through corruption: Romania is a battleground state
of the Balkans. The intensification of geopolitical competition increases its
attractiveness as a target for foreign powers who would use corruption in its
political system as a national-security liability.
In every direction around Romania, the Euro-Atlantic order is in retreat. To
your east, a sovereign nation has been invaded to prevent it from moving
closer to the EU; To your West the democratically elected leader of Hungary
has declared the death of liberal democracy; to your south, a fellow NATO/EU
member state has been co-opted by Russian money and its own misgoverance
to such an extent that it is on the verge of virtual state capture.
In this setting, Romania can no longer assume that the benign external
conditions that allowed it to prosper for the past 25 years will continue
indefinitely. It can no longer assume that it will not face an external threat to
its interests or even to its own territory; that a friendly outside power will be
able to ensure the stability in Romanias surrounding environment; or that
unfriendly outside powers will not use its vulnerabilities as strategic weapons
against it.
These are not risks that Romania has had to worry about in any meaningful
way for most of our lifetimes. The danger that they present to Romania at its
current stage of transition is the danger of arrested developmentthe danger
that an inhospitable external environment will slow or impede Romanian
economic growth or political consolidation just as it is arriving at a
breakthrough moment in its post-Communist development.
If this sounds far-fetched, consider Interwar Romania: A large country with
enormous natural resources that was the biggest winner from the post-1919
settlement and one of the worlds largest oil producers behind the US. The
1923 Romanian constitution was said to be a model of liberal democratic
ideals. Within a generation, this 1st experiment in Romanian democracy had
failed. The strategic environment shifted. Romanian leaders purloined state
resources and lost the trust of the people. Western patrons vanished.
Revisionist powers filled the vacuum. Romanians gave up on democracy. State
capture came swiftly, from without and from within.
That will not be the fate of Romania in our time. This is not the 1930s, and
modern Romania has built strong foundations for a successful state. But
Romania also wont be able to behave strategically as if its still the early
2000s. Your geopolitical surroundings are changing, and Romania will need to
adapt if it wants to succeed.
To a greater extent than in the past, Romania will have to play a direct role in
ensuring the external conditions that provide for its economic and political
success. This includes the fundamental strategic pre-requisites of the
Romanian state: limiting Russian military presence east of the Dnieper;
maintaining the Black Sea as an open economic space; containing ethnic
revisionism in the Danubian Basin; and retaining an active Western strategic
alternative in the PSS.
Navigating this new environment will require at least 3 things of Romania that
it didnt have to worry about in earlier stages of the post-Cold War era.
First, Romania will have to have the physical ability to shape its external
environment.
A capable, modern military is the precondition to any future Romanian
strategy. The Romanian military today is widely respected in both Romania
and the United States. However, it also reflects post-Cold War strategic
realities: Small budgets, a preoccupation with out-of-area missions like ISAF
and a prioritization of personnel over capabilities.
Some Romanian forces today use the same equipment they had in 1988,
when I was in the fifth grade and Romania was in the Warsaw Pact. The
modernization program that Romania began in 2007 has stalled. Out of 85
planned acquisitions, the Romanian military has completed 15.
This would be justifiable for a small state. But Romania is not a small state;
it is not Bulgaria or Hungary. Romania is the second largest NATO frontline
state, the anchor of NATOs southeastern flank and alongside Poland, the
linchpin of Western strategy for this entire region.