Caiet Seminar Icu

Caietdeistorie
contemporanuniversal
suport de seminar -
Mihai Croitor
Manuela Marin
CLUJNAPOCA
2007
Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin Caiet de istorie contemporan universal
Precizri generale
I Modul de evaluare:
- examen scris din temele cursului i bibliografia obligatorie: 60%

- elaborarea unei prezentri de seminar, precum i a unui referat: 20%
- prezena i activitatea la seminar: 20%
- referatele se ntocmesc pentru seminariile 4 i 5 ; 13 i 14 i se predau
profesorului responsabil cu activitatea de seminar cu o sptmn nainte de
seminarul 4 i 13.
II Detalii organizatorice, gestionarea situaiilor excepionale:

- prezena la seminarii este obligatorie. Frecvena minim pentru acceptarea la
examinarea scris este de 75% din orele de seminar.
- plagiatul este interzis i se pedepsete n acord cu reglementrile prezente n Carta
UBB.
- orice ncercare de fraud la examen sau la verificrile pe parcurs duce la aplicarea
reglementrilor de contractul de studii i Carta UBB.
III Tematica i bibliografia seminarului de istorie contemporan

universal
SEMINAR NR. 1
- organizarea activitilor de seminar ; prezentarea temelor i
bibliografiei ; metodologia i sursele istoriei contemporane ; definirea
diacronic, epistemologic i structural a problemelor ce urmeaz a
fi studiate.
SEMINAR NR. 2
* pentru uz intern 1
Conferina de pace de la Paris (1919-1920). Sistemul tratatelor de la Versailles

Organizarea Conferinei de pace i relaiile dintre statele participante. Organisme de
lucru n cadrul conferinei
Tratatele de pace (Versailles, Saint-Germain, Sevres, Trianon, Paris)
Pactul Ligii Naiunilor - Societatea Naiunilor i principiile care au guvernat relaiile
internaionale dup Primul Rzboi Mondial
Bibliografie:
Ch. Zorgbibe, Histoire des relations internationales, Paris, 1994, vol. II (De la paix de
Versailles la Grande Alliance contre Hitler 1918-1945), p. 4-94. (BIG 11554)
M. Iacobescu, Romnia la Societatea Naiunilor, Bucureti, 1988, p. 16-56, 68-78. (F
3237 a/b)
Pierre Gerbert (coord.), Socit des Nations et Organisation des Nations Unies, Paris,
Edition Richelieu, 1973, p. 5-30. (BIG 10209)
SEMINAR NR. 3
Relaiile internaionale n perioada interbelic. 1919-1939

Conferina de la Washington 1921-1922
Relaiile sovieto-germane: tratatul de la Rapallo, 1922; tratatul de la
Berlin, 1926 - semnificaia
Problema dezarmrii in deceniul III al sec. XX - Geneva, 1924-1925;
Pactul Briand Kellogg, 1928
Acordurile de la Locarno (1925) i restabilirea echilibrului politic n
Europa
Marea criz economic i impactul su asupra relaiilor internaionale
Proiecte ale Ligii Naiunilor: conferina dezarmrii de la Geneva 1932-
1934
Proiecte ale statelor revizioniste: agresiunile Japoniei n Extremul
Orient, ale Germaniei naziste n Europa (reintroducerea serviciului
militar obligatoriu, remilitarizarea Renaniei, Anschluss-ul i

dezmembrarea Cehoslovaciei), i ale Italiei fasciste n Africa (Etiopia)
Bibliografie:
Charles Zorgbibe, op. cit., p. 97-109, 177-184, 193-240.
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, London, 1988, p. 296-353.
P. Milza, S. Berstein, Istoria secolului XX, Bucureti, 1999, vol. I. (BIG 12215) (paginile
referitoare la problematic)
Jean- Baptiste Duroselle, Istoria relaiilor internaionale 1919-1947, vol.I, Editura
tiinelor Sociale i Poltice, Bucureti, 2006 (paginile referitoare la problematic)
SEMINAR NR. 4 I 5
Regimurile politice interbelice: democraie liberal versus totalitarism

Ideologie i regim politic
State democratice: ideologie, regim politic, caracteristici, studii de caz (SUA, Europa
Occidental, Europa Central)
State autoritare, dictatoriale i totalitare (Europa Occidental, Europa Central,
URSS, Asia)
Studii de caz : Marea Britanie (sistemul constituional; evoluia regimului politic

monarhia, partidele politice, guvernele interbelice; imperiul britanic); Frana (sistemul
constituional; partidele politice, etapele guvernrii i activitatea guvernelor); Republica
de la Weimar (regimul politic preedinia, partidele politice, guvernele i activitatea
lor); SUA (evoluii politice n era prosperitii; marea criz economic i consecinele
sale; evoluii politice n deceniul patru); Italia fascist, Germania nazist, URSS n
perioada interbelic (caracteristicile i evoluia regimului-ideologia, instituiile i
funcionarea acestora-perspectiv comparativ).
Bibliografie general:
Paul Johnson, Histoire du monde moderne, 1980, tome I. (paginile referitoare la

problematic)
P. Milza, S. Berstein, op. cit., vol. I. (BIG 12215) (paginile referitoare la problematic)
Politics in Western Europe, St. 1991. (BIG 10797) (paginile referitoare la problematic)
P. Kenedy, op. cit. (paginile referitoare la tematic-ideologia regimurilor politice)
E. Hobsbawm, O istorie a secolului XX. Era extremelor. 1914-1991, Chiinu, Editura
Cartier, 1999.
Bibliografie suplimentar pt. studiile de caz:

A.J.P. Taylor, English History: 1914-1945, New York, 1965, 708 p. (BIG 13041)
(paginile referitoare la problematic)
Andr Maurois, Istoria Angliei, Bucureti, Editura Orizonturi, 1996, 704 p. (BIG 11063)
David Lindsay Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain: 1485-1937, London,
1947, 568 p. (BIG 9256) (paginile referitoare la problematic)
G.M. Trevelyan, Istoria ilustrat a Angliei, Bucureti, Ed. tiinific, 1975, 869 p. (BIG
72211) (paginile referitoare la problematic)
G. Brown Tindall, E. David Shi, America: o istorie narativ, Bucureti, Editura

Enciclopedic, 1996, vol. III (BIG 11392)
Ren Rmond, Istoria Statelor Unite ale Americii, Corint, 1999, p. 108-133. (BIG 12708)
Scurt istorie a Statelor Unite ale Americii, Bucureti, Silex, 1995, 192 p. (BIG 10781)
Henry F. Graff, History of the USA, vol. 10, 11, BIG 6019.
Jacques Nr, La troisime Republique 1919-1940, Paris, A. Colin, 1965 (BIG 9709)
Jacques Madaule, Istoria Franei, Bucureti, Editura politic, 1973, vol. III (De la
Republica a III-a la Republica a V-a) (857670, BIG 6955)
Jacques Droz, Istoria Germaniei, Corint, 2000, cap. V : Republica de la Weimar ; cap.
VI : Germania hitlerist. (BIG 12814)
Claude David, Hitler i nazismul, Corint, 2002, partea I-ascensiunea lui Hither i a
nazismului, Germania 1919-1933 (p. 7-77); partea a II-a: Hitlerismul la putere (1934-
1945) : stuctura statului : puterea central, statele, partidul, poliii i organizaii militare,
Lagre de concentrare, Instituii fundamentale ale statului (justiia, propaganda, formarea
tineretului, organizarea muncii. Politica social) (p. 79-91) ; Politica economic (p. 93-
102) ; Politica intern. Persecuii i crize (p. 103-130).
Max Gallo, Italia lui Mussolini, Bucureti, 1969. (BIG 6292, 854487)
Giuliano Procacci, Istoria italienilor, Bucureti, Editura politic, 1975, p. 431-438, 452-
468. (BIG 7194)
Martin Clark, Modern Italy: 1871-1982, London, New York: Longman, 1993 (BIG
11319) (paginile referitoare la tematic)
Michael Lynch, Stalin i Huciov URSS, 1924-1964, Bucureti, BIC ALL, 1991.
N. Werth, Istoria Uniunii Sovietice de la Lenin la Stalin (1917-1953), Bucureti, Corint,
2000. (paginile referitoare la problematic)
Facultativ :
Chantal Millon-Delsol, Ideile politice ale secolului XX, Iai, Polirom, 2002, p. 24-51; p.
53-91; p. 118-121.
Gh. Rdulescu, Spania, Bucureti, 1997, p. 210-216, 225-254, 266-273. (761900)
A. H. de Oliveira Marques, Istoria Portugaliei, Bucureti, 1996, p. 145-172. (725024)
J. Gernet, Lumea chinez, vol. II, Bucureti, Editura Meridiane, 1985 (BIG 8176)
Hani Goro, Istoria poporului japonez, Bucureti, Editura politic, 1964 (BIG 5543)
V. Cristian, Istoria Asiei, Corint, 2002. (paginile referitoare la problematic)
SEMINAR NR. 6
Evoluia relaiilor interaliate n timpul celui de-al doilea rzboi mondial:

1939-1945
- relaiile anglo-americane. Semnarea Cartei Atlanticului, 14 august 1941

- relaiile Marii Britanii i ale SUA cu URSS: Declaraia Naiunilor Unite,
ianuarie 1942:
tratatul anglo-rus, 26 mai 1942
tratatul americano-rus, 11 iunie 1942
- conferine interaliate:
Casablanca i ideea capitulrii necondiionate a puterilor Axei
(13-24 ianuarie 1943)
Moscova, Cairo, Teheran (1943) i problema deschiderii celui
de-al doilea front
Yalta (4-11 februarie 1945)
San Francisco i constituirea ONU
Potsdam (17 iulie-2 august 1945) i adncirea crizei n interiorul
coaliiei anglo- americano-sovietice
Bibliografie:
Leonida Loghin, Mari conferine internaionale 1939-1945, Bucureti, Editura Politic,
1989 (paginile referitoare la problematic)
Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. II, p. 273-295, vol. III (Du system de Ialta aux missiles de
Cuba 1945-1962), p. 7-39.
Marea conflagraie a secolului XX, p. 188-197. (BIG 6611 a/b)
R. G. Feltham, Diplomatic Handbook, London and New York, 1982, p. 61-85. (BIG
9786)
Pierre Gerbert (coord.), op. cit., (BIG 10209) (paginile referitoare la problematic)
SEMINAR NR. 7
Relaiile dintre fotii aliai i debutul rzboiului rece 1945-1947.

Definirea rzboiului rece
Fundamentele ideologice ale rzboiului rece i expresia lor politic n documentele
marilor puteri:
Discursul lui Stalin, 9 februarie 1946
Discursul lui Churchill de la Fulton, 5 martie 1946
Telegrama cea lung a lui G. Kennan i doctrina de containment
Telegrama Novikov
Doctrina Truman, 12 martie 1947
Planul Marshall
Crearea Cominformului (septembrie 1947) i teoria lui Jdanov privind
mprirea lumii n cele dou blocuri
Bibliografie:
Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. III, p. 7-65.
H. Kissinger, Diplomaia, Bucureti, 1998, p. 385-429 (BIG12223)
Andr Fontaine, Istoria rzboiului rece : de la Revoluia din Octombrie la rzboiul din
Coreea : 1917-1950, Bucureti, Editura militar, 1991, vol. III (BIG 10175/723483)
SEMINAR NR. 8
Evoluii n perioada rzboiului rece (1948-1962)

Definirea sferelor de influen n Europa central-estic. Satelizarea. Conveniile
de armistiiu ; Conferina de pace de la Paris (1946-1947) ; tratatele bilaterale
ntre URSS i satelii ;
Sovietizarea - mecanisme i instituii
Formarea blocului vestic: OECD, NATO
Bibliografie:
Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, London, 1991. (BIG 5346) (paginile
referitoare la problematic)
Peter Calvocoressi, Politica mondial dup 1945 , Editura ALLFA , Bucureti , 2000
Joseph Rothschild, ntoarcerea la diversitate. Istoria politic a Europei Centrale i de
Est dup al Doilea Rzboi Mondial, Oradea, Editura Antet, 1997, cap. 3 (Comunitii
preiau puterea), cap. 4 (Dialectica stalinismului i a titoismului)
SEMINAR NR. 9
Crizele rzboiului rece (1948-1962). Evoluii n blocul comunist

- conceptul de criza i expresia ei politic n relaiile dintre marile puteri:
Crizele din blocul estic: crizele Berlinului ; Polonia i Ungaria, 1956
Defeciunea iugoslav
Crearea CAER
Bibliografie:
Andr Fontaine, op. cit., vol. IV, De la Rzboiul din Coreea la criza alianelor: 1950-
1967, Bucureti, 1994. (BIG 10175/723483) (paginile referitoare la problematic)
Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. III, p. 67-128, 166-187.
H. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 429-538, 586-589.
Jean-Louis Dufour, Crizele internaionale. De la Beijing (1900) la Kosovo (1999),
Corint, 2002. [Blocada Berlinului (1948-1949) (p. 93-96) ; Insurecia ungar (1956) (p.
96-98) ;
SEMINAR NR. 10
- conceptul de criza i expresia ei politic n relaiile dintre marile puteri:

Rzboiul din Coreea
Criza Suezului, 1956
Destinderea relativ i definirea regulilor de funcionare a bipolarismului-mecanisme

de comunicarea i reglementare n perioada destinderii relative: Kennedy i riposta
gradual i flexibil
Criza cubanez i necesitatea destinderii
Bibliografie:
Andr Fontaine, op. cit., vol. IV, De la Rzboiul din Coreea la criza alianelor: 1950-
1967, Bucureti, 1994. (BIG 10175/723483) (paginile referitoare la problematic)
Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. III, p. 67-128, 166-187.
H. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 429-538, 586-589.
Jean-Louis Dufour, op. cit., [Naionalizarea Companiei Universale a canalului Suez
(1956) (p. 98-101) ; Rachetele din Cuba (1962) (p. 115-117)
SEMINAR NR. 11
Evoluii n perioada rzboiului rece 1962-1989---perioada destinderii
- 1962-1975: De la criza rachetelor din Cuba la Actul final de la Helsinki.

Instituionalizarea destinderii:
Tentativele de limitare a folosirii i experimentrii armamentului
nuclear: SALT I i II
Crize periferice i de sistem: rolul Chinei n confruntarea celor dou
puteri, SUA i URSS, conflictele din Orientul Apropiat i crizele energiei
(1973, 1978), rzboiul din Vietnam
Criza cehoslovac i suveranitatea limitat n blocul estic
De la Ostpolitik la Actul final de la Helsinki
Bibliografie:
Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p. 538-689.
Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. III, p. 307-326, vol. IV (Du schisme Moscou-Pkin laprs
guerre froide : 1962 nos jours), p. 7-11, 51-64, 142-144, 178-211.
Andr Fontaine, op. cit., vol. IV. (BIG 10175/723483) (paginile referitoare la
problematic)
Jean-Louis Dufour, op. cit., [Rzboiul de ase zile i reaciile comunitii internaionale
(1967) (p. 120-122) ; Primvara de la Praga i intervenia sovietic (1968) (p. 122-125) ;
Urmrile internaionale ale Rzboiului de Yom Kippur (1973) (p. 127-130)
SEMINAR NR. 12
Evoluii n perioada rzboiului rece 1962-1989-sfritul rzboiului rece
1975-1989: Tensionarea relaiilor Est-Vest i politica ripostei totale a lui

Ronald Reagan
Intervenia militar sovietic n Afganistan 1979 i riposta american
(Rzboiul stelelor)
Evoluii n blocul comunist n deceniile VIII-IX
Bibliografie:
Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p. 689-727.
Franoise Thom, Sfriturile comunismului, Polirom, Iai, p. 35-91.
Joseph Rothschild, op. cit., cap. 7 (Finaluri de partid), cap. 8 (Epilog)
Peter Calvocoressi, op. cit. (paginile referitoare la problematic)
Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 341-350.
Jean-Louis Dufour, op. cit., [Intervenia sovietic n Afganistan (1979) (p. 154-156) ;
Stare de rzboi n Polonia (1981) (p. 159-162)]
SEMINAR NR. 13 I NR. 14
Caracteristicile generale ale regimurilor politice postbelice
State democratice i totalitare

Ideologie i regim politic
Studii de caz : URSS dup al doilea rzboi mondial, China, Europa de Est, Europa
de Vest, , SUA,
Bibliografie general:
Paul Johnson, op. cit., vol. II. (paginile referitoare la problematic)
Norman Davis, Europe A History, Oxford and New York Univ. Press, p. 1057-1137 (cap.
12) (BIG 12476)
Pierre Milza, S. Berstein, op. cit., vol. II, vol. III. (paginile referitoare la problematic)
Peter Calvocoressi, op. cit. (paginile referitoare la problematic)
Bibliografie pt. studiile de caz:

Andr Maurois, op.cit., (BIG 11063) (paginile referitoare la problematic)
G.M. Trevelyan, op. cit., (BIG 72211) (paginile referitoare la problematic)
C.J. Bartlett, A history of postwar Britain 1945-1974, London, Longman, 1977 (BIG
7660)
Ren duc de Castris, Histoire de la France : des origines 1981, p. 575-599. (BIG 9859)
J. Madaule, op. cit., vol. III. (paginile referitoare la tematic)
P. Courtier, La quatrime republique, Paris, 1989, 126 p. (BIG 9025)
H. Mendras, La sconde revolution franaise : 1965-1984, Paris, Gallimard, 1988 (BIG
9498)
Allan M. Winkler , Trecutul apropiat, eseuri si documente despre America dupa al doilea
razboi mondial,
Garson Robert, The Uncertain Power : A Political History of the USA since 1929, (BIG
9777)
G. Brown Tindall, E. David Shi, America: o istorie narativ, Bucureti, Editura
Enciclopedic, 1996, vol. III (BIG 11392)
Andr Kaspi, Histoire des Etats Unis de lAmerique, p. 383-547
Camil Murean, Al. Vianu, Preedinte la Casa Alb, Bucureti, Editura politic, 1974, p.
525-637. (BIG 7091)
Ren Rmond, Istoria Statelor Unite ale Americii, Corint, 1999, p. 135-148.
Michael Lynch, Stalin i Huciov URSS, 1924-1964, Bucureti, BIC ALL, 1991.
N. Werth, Istoria Uniunii Sovietice de la Lenin la Stalin (1917-1953), Corint, 2000.
Nicolas Werth, Istoria Uniunii Sovietice de la Hruciov la Gorbaciov (1953-1985),
Bucureti, Corint, 2000.
Pascal Lorot, Perestroika. URSS sub Gorbaciov (1985-1991), Bucureti, Corint, 2002.
Jacques Droz, Istoria Germaniei, Corint, 2000, cap. VII: Germania divizat, cap. VIII:
Reunificarea
Martin Clark, op. cit. (paginile referitoare la tematic)
Seminar nr. 2
Conferina de pace de la Paris (1919-1920). Sistemul tratatelor

de la Versailles
I ncheierea ostilitilor militare:
FRONTUL DE EST: EFECTELE IEIRII RUSIEI DIN RZBOI

A. RUSIA, tratative la Brest-Litovsk din 15 decembrie 1917, finalizate prin Tratatul
ncheiat la 3 martie 1918;
B. Romnia, preliminarii semnate la Buftea n 5 martie 1918, Tratatul semnat la
Bucureti, 7 mai 1918.
FRONTUL DE VEST I SUD-EST
a. BULGARIA, 29-30 SEPTEMBRIE 1918, SALONIC
b. TURCIA, 30-31 OCTOMBRIE 1918, MOUDROS
c. AUSTRO-UNGARIA, 3-4 NOIEMBRIE 1918, VILA GIUSTI lng PADOVA
d. GERMANIA, 11 NOIEMBRIE 1918, PARIS
II. Negocierea pcii la Paris, Versailles
- noua diplomaie, noul tip de negociere, perspectivele naionale asupra pcii.

a. pregtirea, deschiderea, definirea organizrii i procedurilor de lucru 18 ianuarie -
7 mai 1919.
b. 27 de puteri prezente la Paris, 70 de reprezentani ai puterilor nvingtoare, aliate
i asociate; neoficial alte 15 state au avut reprezentani; statele nvinse nu au fost
invitate la negocieri.
c. Prima faz a conferinei: 18 ianuarie-15 februarie: pregtirea proiectului
statutului Ligii (Societii) Naiunilor n cadrul Consiliului celor 10 (Clemenceau
i Pichon pentru Frana, Wilson i colonelul House pentru SUA, Lloyd George i
Balfour pentru Anglia, Orlando i Sonnino pentru Italia, Saionji i Makino pentru
Japonia).
d. Fiecare delegaie a fost nsoit de numeroi experi i profesioniti, care aveau
misiunea de a prepara tehnic negocierea tratatelor.
e. Au funcionat 52 de comisii pentru reglementarea problemelor specifice: Liga
Naiunilor, Responsabilitatea pentru Rzboi i Garanii, Reparaii, pentru
minoriti, Oraganizaia Internaional a Muncii, etc. Toate erau subordonate i
coordinate de Consiliul celor zece
f. A doua faz a conferinei: 14 martie- sfritul lunii aprilie 1919
g. Pregtirea i adoptarea formei finale a Statutului (Conventului) Ligii Naiunilor,
negocierea termenilor tratatului de la Versailles.
h. Coordonarea activitilor a fost transferat Consiliului celor 4, apoi dup criza
din Fiume celor 3, care a luat toate deciziile finale pentru cele cinic tratate de
pace.
i. Crize aprute n negociere ntre puterile aliate: statutul zonei Rhin-ului, a oraului
Fiume sau asupra Shantungului.
j. Pregtirea tratatelor dificil: multe comisii de specialitate implicate, lips de
coordonare ntre acestea: munc laborioas i dificil de evaluat la nivelul ultim
decizional: exemplu, Tratatul cu Germania, 200 pagini, 440 articole organizate n
15 capitole, fiecare dependent de munca mai multor comisii. Ca urmare, Consiliul
celor 4 nu a vzut textul n ntregime dect n 7 mai 1919 doar cu puine ore
nainte de transmiterea acestuia ctre delegaia german.
k. Semnarea tratatului de la Versailles a ncheiat misiunea principal a Conferinei;
de acum preparativele pentru ncheierea tratatelor cu Austria, Ungaria, Bulgaria a
fost lsat n sarcina Consiliului Suprem organizat la Versailles; termenii
tratatului cu Turcia au fost precizai la Londra i semnarea a avut loc la Sevres, 20
august 1920.
III. Tratatele de Pace
a. Germania, Versailles, 28 iunie 1919

- preambul, convenantul Ligii Naiunilor, care devinea responsabil pentru
aplicarea unora dintre clause: organizarea plebiscitelor, numirea
administraiei n Saar i Danzig; mandatele i statutul minoritilor;
- frontierele Germaniei n Europa i lume: Belgia primea teritorii n zona
Malmedy i Eupen; Alsacia i Lorena revin Franei; situaia Rhine-
landului; independena Austriei; Cehoslovacia a primit o zon restrns
lng Tropau; cedarea coridorului Poloniei, a regiunii Poznan i a unei
mari pri din vestul Prusiei; Germania obligat s renune la toate
drepturile i titlurile avute n lume; Memel i Danzig devineau orae
libere; se vor ine plebiscite n Silezia superioar, Estul Prusiei, Schleswig
pentru determinarea frontierelor cu Danemarca.
- Dezarmarea, reducerea armatei la mai puin de 100 000 oameni, pe baze
voluntare pe o perioad de 12 ani; producerea muniiei i a armamentului
proporional cu mrimea armatei; 10 vase de lupt, ase crucitoare
uoare, 12 distrugtoare i 12 torpiloare urmau s compun flota
Germaniei (interdicie pentru submarine).
- Reparaii, penaliti i reparaii pentru agresiuni i distrugeri; 20 miliarde
mrci germane ctre Puterile aliate pn n mai 1921; materii prime,
crbune, lemn pentru Frana i Belgia; nave pentru Marea Britanie;
libertatea de circulaie pe rurile i n porturile germane.
- Garanii, ocuparea Rhin-landului pentru 15 ani, reducerea prezenei
armate aliate la cinci ani sub condiia ndeplinirii clauzelor din tratat, etc.
b. Austria, St. Germain, 10 septembrie 1919
- delegaia Austriei ajunge la St. Germain en Laye, 14 mai 1919
- problema definirii Austriei
- clauze modelate dup tratatul de la Versailles: de ilustrat frontiere, dezarmare,
reparaii, etc.
c. Bulgaria, Neuilly sur Seine, 27 noiembrie 1919

reparaii, etc.
d. Ungaria, Trianon, 4 iunie 1920

reparaii, etc.
- poziia delegaiei Romniei fa de acest tratat
e. Turcia, Sevres, 10 august 1920

reparaii, etc.
- poziia Turciei fa de coninutul tratatului
- evidenierea cauzelor care au determinat nlocuirea acestui tratat cu cel de la
Lausanne (24 iulie 1923); de ilustrat principalele prevederile ale acestui nou tratat semnat
de Turcia.
f. Problema mandatelor coloniale

- evidenierea principalelor puteri care au obinut mandate asupra unor teritorii
coloniale.
IV. Liga / Societatea Naiunilor
A) Formarea Societii Naiunilor
- aceast organizaie este menionat n ultimul punct din cele 14 evideniate de

preedintele american Woodrow Wilson n discursul su din 1918
- planuri pentru crearea Societii Naiunilor:
a) planul HoauseWilson: multiplicarea instituiilor internaionale dup modelul
statelor naiune, avnd un parlament, guvern etc.
b) planul britanic Phillimore: o alian diplomatic ntrit de un sistem de arbitraj
c) planul francez Leon Bourgeois: crearea unei fore militare internaionale , avnd un
stat major permanent
- Comisia pentru Societatea Naiunilor a acceptat proiectul comun anglo american
Hurst Miller, ca baz a discuiilor
- 28 aprilie 1919 - acceptarea regulamentului Societii Naiunilor prin adunarea
plenar a Conferinei de pace de la Versailles
- 28 iunie 1919 semnarea regulamentului alctuit din 26 de articole de ctre statele
fondatoare, care sunt i semnatare ale tratatului de pace. Regulamentul devine parte
integrant a Tratatului de la Versailles
- ianuarie 1920 Societatea Naiunilor i ncepe activitatea.
B) Structura:
1) Adunarea general
- se ntrunete o dat pe an la Geneva
- n cadrul ei, fiecare stat are drept de vot
2) Consiliul:
- alctuit iniial din 5 membri permaneni i 4 membrii provizorii alei de Adunarea
general
- Germania intr n Societatea Naiunilor n 1926 i tot atunci devine membru
permanent; dup retragerea sa n 1933, locul su este preluat de Uniunea Sovietic
- crete numrul membrilor provizorii de la 6 n 1922, la 9 n 1926 pentru ca n 1936,
numrul lor s ajung la 11
- atribuii: decide n caz de conflict care este agresorul i preconizeaz eventualele
sanciuni
3) Secretariatul general
- condus de un secretar general permanent
- pregtete documentele i rapoartele pentru Adunarea general i Consiliu
4) Curtea permanent de justiiei internaional de la Haga

- constituit n 1922
- format din 21 de magistraii, alei din toate naiunile, numii pe o durat de 9 ani,
reeligibili
- judeca diferendele cu caracter internaional supuse ei de prile n litigiu
- au existat o serie de organizaii specializate alipite Societii Naiunilor care erau

nsrcinate s extind cooperarea internaional n domeniul problemelor sociale
(Biroul Internaional al Muncii), financiare (Banca Reglementrilor Internaionale),
intelectuale (Centrul Internaional de Cooperare Intelectual), precum i o serie de
comisii de studiu (de exemplu, comisia dezarmrii)
C ) Scopul:
- crearea i garantarea securitii colective prin mijloace specifice specificate n
statutul Societii (arbitraj, sanciuni morale, economice, militare)
- dezvoltarea cooperrii ntre state
- reducerea narmrilor
D ) Eecul Societii Naiunilor:

- evidenierea cauzelor eecului Societii Naiunilor
- poziia Societii Naiunilor fa de:
problema securitii colective (Protocolul de la Geneva din 1924)
problema dezarmrii (Conferina de la Geneva 1932-1934)
agresiunea Japoniei n Manciuria (septembrie 1931)
agresiunea Italiei n Abisinia (octombrie 1935)
Germania prsete Societatea Naiunilor (19 octombrie 1933)
primirea Uniunii Sovietice n Societatea Naiunilor (18 septembrie 1934)
Italia prsete Societatea Naiunilor (1937)
neintervenia Societii Naiunii mpotriva politicii expansioniste a
Germaniei ( reintroducerea serviciului militar obligatoriu, 16 martie 1935;
remilitarizarea Renaniei, 7 martie 1936; anexarea Austriei sau Anschluss,

martie 1938; dezmembrarea Cehoslovaciei)
dizolvarea Societii Naiunilor prin hotrrea Adunrii generale (18 aprilie
1946)
Dicionar:
armistiiu: suspendarea temporar a aciunilor militare n urma unui acord ncheiat
ntre prile beligerante
clauz: dispoziie prevzut ntr-o convenie sau tratat
demilitarizare: desfiinarea, n urma unei convenii sau a unui tratat, a oricrei
armate i excluderea armamentului sau a instalaiilor militare de pe un anumit
teritoriu
plebiscit / referendum: consultarea prealabil a cetenilor, care urmeaz s se
pronune prin da sau nu asupra unui act de stat de importan deosebit
preambul: parte introductiv a unui act important, a unui tratat internaional, care
lmurete utilitatea sau necesitatea lui sau care prezint sumar dispoziiile lui
generale; expunere de motive (a unui proiect de lege)
reparaii de rzboi: despgubiri pltite pentru compensarea pagubelor economice
datorate unui rzboi
securitate colectiv: component a relaiilor internaionale, concretizat prin msuri
comune, luate de ctre toate statele i care vizeaz meninerea pcii i respectarea
angajamentelor
teritoriu sub mandat: teritoriu administrat de o ar strin n baza hotrrii unui for
internaional
tratat: nelegere scris ncheiat ntre dou sau mai multe state, n vederea
determinrii, ntr-un anumit domeniu, a drepturilor i a obligaiilor prilor
contractante sau n scopul stabilirii unor norme juridice; acord internaional,
convenie internaional
V Suport documentar
Document 1: Cele 14 puncte ale preedintelui Woodrow Wilson , 8 ianuarie 1918
1. Convenii de pace publice, ncheiate deschis, dup care nu vor mai exista acorduri
internaionale private de nici un fel, ci o diplomaie care va aciona ntotdeauna cu
sinceritate n vzul tuturor.
2. Libertatea absolut de navigaie pe mri n afara apelor teritoriale, att pe timp de pace
ct i n timp de rzboi, n afar de mrile care ar putea fi nchise total sau n parte printr-
o aciune internaional n vederea executrii acordurilor internaionale.
3. Suprimarea, att ct va fi posibil, a tuturor barierelor economice; stabilirea de condiii
comerciale egale ntre toate naiunile care sunt de acord cu pacea i se asociaz pentru a o
menine.
4. Garanii convenabile, date i luate, c armamentele naionale vor fi reduse pn la
ultimul punct compatibil cu securitatea rii.
5. nelegerea liber, ntr-un spirit larg i absolut a tuturor revendicrilor coloniale, bazat
pe respectarea i pe principiul strict c, n fixarea tuturor chestiunilor de suveranitate,
interesele populaiilor n cauz vor trebui s aib o pondere egal cu aceea a cererilor
echitabile ale guvernului al crui titlu trebuie s fie hotrt.
6. Evacuarea tuturor teritoriilor ruse i reglementarea tuturor chestiunilor privitoare la
Rusia, care vor asigura cea mai buna i mai liber cooperare a celorlalte naiuni, pentru a
da Rusiei prilejul s hotrasc, fr s fie mpiedicat sau stnjenit, pentru independena
propriei sale dezvoltri i a politicii sale naionale i pentru a i se asigura o sincer bun
primire n Societatea naiunilor libere, sub instituiile alese de ea singur i, mai mult
dect o primire, ntregul ajutor de care ea ar avea nevoie i pe care l-ar dori.
Tratamentul acordat Rusiei de ctre naiunile surori n lunile ce urmeaz va fi piatra de
ncercare a bunvoinei lor i a nelegerii nevoilor ei, abstracie fcnd de propriile lor
interese i de simpatia lor dezinteresat.
7. Belgia. ntreaga lume va fi de acord c ea trebuie evacuat i restaurat fr nici o

tentativ de a limita suveranitatea de care ea se bucur mpreun cu alte naiuni libere.
Nici un act nu va servi att ca acela al restabilirii ncrederii printre naiuni n legile pe
care le-au stabilit i fixat ele nsele pentru a dirigui relaiile dintre ele. Fr acest act
salutar, orice structur, precum i validitatea legilor internaionale vor fi pentru totdeauna
slbite.
8. ntregul teritoriu francez va trebui s fie liber i regiunile invadate vor trebui restaurate.
Rul fcut Franei de ctre Prusia n 1871, n ce privete Alsacia Lorena, care a tulburat
pacea lumii vreme de aproape cincizeci de ani, va trebui s fie reparat, astfel ca pacea s
poat, odat mai mult, s fie asigurat n interesul tuturor.
9. O reglementare a frontierei italiene va trebui s fie efectuat de-a lungul liniilor
naionalitilor clar recognoscibile.
10. Popoarele Austro Ungariei, crora noi dorim s le vedem locul salvat i asigurat
printre naiuni, va trebui s li se dea mai larg ocazia unei dezvoltri autonome.
11. Romnia, Serbia i Muntenegru vor trebui s fie evacuate, i teritoriile lor ocupate vor
trebui s fie restituite; Serbiei va trebui s i se acorde acces liber i sigur la mare; i
relaiile ntre diverse state balcanice vor trebui s fie fixate la sfaturile prieteneti ale
Puterilor i dup liniile stabilite istoricete: credin i naionalitate. Se vor da acestor
State balcanice garanii de independen politic i economic i de integrare a teritoriile
lor.
12. O suveranitate cert va trebui s fie asigurat prilor turceti ale Imperiului otoman
actual, dar celelalte naionaliti care se afl, n acest moment, sub dominaie turc vor
trebui s fie asigurate de o securitate nendoielnic a vieii i de posibilitatea nengrdit
de a se dezvolta n mod autonom. Dardanele vor trebuie s fie deschise, n permanen,
constituind o trecere liber pentru navale i comerul tuturor naiunilor, sub garanii
internaionale.
13. Un stat polonez independent va trebui creat. El va trebui s cuprind teritoriile locuite
indiscutabil de populaiile poloneze, cruia trebuie s i se asigure accesul liber la mare i
a crui independen politic i economic, ca i integritate teritorial, va trebui s fie
garantat printr-un acord internaional.
14. O asociaie general de naiuni va trebui s fie format prin convenii speciale, n
scopul de a da garanii mutuale de independen politic i integritate teritorial statelor
mari, ca i celor mici.
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Bue, Gheorghe
Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura
Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1974, pp.12- 14
Document 2: Tratatul de pace cu Germania de la Versailles , 28 iunie 1919 (excerpt)
Partea I
Pactul Societii Naiunilor
naltele pri contractante, considernd c, pentru a dezvolta cooperarea ntre naiuni i

pentru a le garanta pacea i sigurana, este necesar s se accepte anumite obligaiuni, de a
nu recurge la rzboi, s se ntrein la lumina zilei relaiuni internaionale bazate pe
justiie i onoare, s se observe riguros prescripiunile dreptului internaional, recunoscute
aici nainte ca regul efectiv a guvernelor, s se fac s domneasc dreptatea i s se
respecte cu sfinenie toate obligaiile tratatelor, n raporturile mutuale dintre popoarele
organizate.
Adopt prezentul pact, care instituie Societatea Naiunilor.
Articolul 1
Sunt membri originari ai Societii Naiunilor, acei dintre semnatari al cror nume
figureaz n anexa prezentului Pact, precum i statele, de asemenea numite n Anex, care
vor fi aderat la prezentul Pact fr nici o rezerv, prin declaraiune, depus la Secretariat,
n cursul celor dou luni de la intrarea n vigoare a Pactului i despre care se va face
notificare celorlali membri ai societii.
Orice stat, dominion sau colonie care se guverneaz liber i care nu este menionat n
anex, poate deveni membru al Societii, dac admiterea sa este pronunat de cele dou
treimi ale adunrii, cu condiia s dea garanii efective de intenia sa sincer de a observa
angajamentele sale internaionale i de a accepta regulamentul stabilit de Societate, n
ceea ce privete forele i armamentele sale militare, navale i aeriene.
Orice membru al Societii poate, dup o prealabil ntiinare fcut cu doi ani nainte,
s se retrag din Societate, cu condiia de a fi ndeplinit, n acel moment, toate
obligaiunile sale internaionale, inclusiv cele prevzute n prezentul Pact.
Articolul 2
Aciunea Societii, astfel cum este definit n prezentul Pact, se exercit de o Adunare i
de un Consiliu asistai de un secretariat permanent.
Articolul 3
Adunarea se compune din reprezentani ai membrilor Societii. Ea se ntrunete la epoci
fixate i la orice moment, dac mprejurrile o cer, la sediul Societii sau n vreun alt loc
care ar putea fi desemnat.
Adunarea are cderea de a se pronuna asupra oricrei chestiuni care intr n sfera de
activitate a Societii sau care atinge pacea lumii.
Fiecare membru al Societii nu poate avea mai mult de trei reprezentani n Adunare i
nu dispune dect de un vot.
Articolul 4
Consiliul se compune din reprezentani ai principalelor Puteri aliate i asociate, precum i
din reprezentani ai altor patru membri ai Societii. Aceti patru membrii sunt desemnai
n mod liber, de Adunare, i la datele ce se va crede de cuviin. (...)
Cu aprobarea majoritii Adunrii, Consiliul poate desemna pe ali membrii ai Societii a
cror reprezentare va fi de aici nainte permanent.
El poate, cu aceeai aprobare, s sporeasc numrul membrilor Societii care vor fi alei
de adunare pentru a fi reprezentai n Consiliu.
Consiliul se ntrunete cnd o cer mprejurrile i cel puin o dat pe an, la sediul
Societii, sau n orice alt loc care ar putea fi desemnat.
Orice chestiune intrnd n sfera de activitate a Societii sau privitoare la pacea lumii e de
cderea Consiliului.
Orice membru al Societii care nu este reprezentat n Consiliu este invitat s trimit un
reprezentant, spre a lua parte n Consiliu, atunci cnd o chestiune care l intereseaz n
particular e adus naintea Consiliului.
Fiecare membru al Societii reprezentat n Consiliu nu dispune dect de un vot i nu are
dect un singur reprezentant.
Articolul 5
Afar de vreo dispoziiune hotrt contra acestui Pact, sau clauzelor prezentului tratat,
hotrrile Adunrii sau ale Consiliului sunt date de unanimitatea membrilor Societii
reprezentani n Adunare. (...)
Articolul 6
Secretariatul permanent este stabilit la sediul societii. El se compune dintr-un Secretar
general, din secretari i din personalul necesar. (...)
Articolul 7
Sediul Societii este stabilit la Geneva. (...)
Articolul 8
Membrii Societii recunosc c meninerea pcii cere reducerea armamentului naional la
minimul compatibil cu sigurana naional i cu executarea obligaiunilor internaionale
impuse printr-o aciune comun. (...)
Dup adoptarea lor de diversele guverne, limita armamentelor astfel fixate nu poate fi
depit fr consimmntul Consiliului. (...)
Articolul 10
Membrii Societii i iau ndatorirea s respecte i s menin n contra oricrei
agresiuni externe integritatea teritorial i independena politic existent a tuturor
membrilor Societii. n caz de agresiune, Consiliul avizeaz asupra mijloacelor de a

asigura executarea acestei obligaiuni.
Articolul 11
Se declar n mod hotrt c orice rzboi sau ameninare de rzboi, fie c ar atinge direct
sau indirect pe unul dintre membrii Societii, intereseaz ntreaga Societate i c aceasta
trebuie s ia msurile proprii pentru a salva n mod eficace pacea Naiunilor. n asemenea
caz, Secretariatul general convoac imediat Consiliul, la cererea oricrui membru al
Societii.
n afar de aceasta se mai declar c orice membru al Societii are dreptul s atrag, n
mod amical, ateniunea Adunri sau a Consiliului asupra oricrei mprejurri de natur s
ating relaiunile internaionale i care amenin n urm s tulbure pacea, sau buna
nelegere ntre naiuni, de care depinde pacea.
Articolul 12
Toi membrii societii convin c, dac se ivete ntre ei un diferend susceptibil s aduc
o ruptur, l vor supune fie procedurii arbitrajului, fie examinrii Consiliului. Ei mai
convin c, n nici un caz, nu trebuie s recurg la rzboi nainte de expirarea unui termen
de trei luni dup darea sentinei arbitrilor sau dup raportul Consiliului. (...)
Articolul 13
Membrii Societii convin c dac s-ar ivi ntre ei un diferend susceptibil, dup prerea
lor, de o soluie arbitrar i dac acestui diferend nu i se poate pune capt n mod
satisfctor, pe cale diplomatic, chestiunea va fi supus n ntregime arbitrajului.
Printre diferendele care sunt n general susceptibile de o soluie arbitrar se declar: toate
diferendele privitoare la interpretarea unui tratat, la orice chestiune de drept internaional,
al orice fapt care dac s-ar realiza ar constitui ruptura unui angajament internaional,
precum i diferendele relative la ntinderea sau la natura reparaiilor datorate pentru o
asemenea ruptur.
Articolul 14
Consiliul este nsrcinat s prepare un proiect de Curtea permanent de justiie
internaional i s-l supun membrilor Societii. Aceast Curte va fi competent de a
judeca toate diferendele cu caracter internaional ce prile i le vor supune. Ea va da, de
asemenea, avize consultative asupra oricrui diferend sau oricrui punct ce va fi adus
naintea ei de ctre Consiliu sau de Adunare.
Articolul 15
Dac se ivete ntre membrii societii un diferend susceptibil a atrage dup sine o ruptur
i dac acest diferend nu este supus arbitrajului prevzut prin articolul 13, membrii
Societii convin s-l aduc n faa Consiliului. n acest scop este de ajuns ca unul dintre
ei s aduc acest diferend la cunotina Secretariatului general, care ia orice dispoziiuni
n vederea unei anchete i a unei examinri complete. (...)
Articolul 16
Dac un membru al Societii recurge la rzboi contra angajamentelor luate prin
articolele 12, 13 sau 15 este de ipso facto considerat c a comis un act de rzboi n contra
tuturor celorlali membri ai Societii. Acetia se ndatoreaz s rup imediat cu el orice
relaiuni comerciale sau financiare, s interzic orice raporturi ntre naionali lor i aceia
ai statului care a clcat Pactul, i s fac s nceteze orice comunicaiuni financiare,
comerciale sau personale ntre naionalii acestui stat i aceia a oricrui alt stat sau nu al
societii.
n acest caz, Consiliul are datoria de a recomanda diferitelor guverne interesate efectivele
militare, navale sau aeriene cu care membrii Societii vor contribui, fiecare n parte, la
forele armate destinate respectrii angajamentelor Societii.
Membrii Societii mai convin, n afar de aceasta, de a-i da sprijin reciproc pentru
aplicarea msurilor economice i financiare ce urmeaz a se lua n virtutea prezentului
articol, pentru a reduce la minimum pierderile i neajunsurile ce ar putea rezulta. i dau,
de asemenea, sprijin reciproc pentru a rezista mpotriva oricrei msuri speciale
ndreptate n contra unuia dintre ei, de ctre statul care a clcat Pactul.
Ei iau dispoziiunile necesare pentru a nlesni trecerea prin teritoriul lor a forelor oricrui
membru al Societii, care ia parte la o aciune comun pentru a obine respectarea
angajamentelor luate de Societate.
Poate fi exclus din Societate orice membru care s-a fcut vinovat de violarea vreunuia din
angajamentele ce rezult din Pact. Excluderea este pronunat prin votul tuturor celorlali
membrii ai Societii reprezentai n Consiliu.
Articolul 17
n caz de diferend ntre dou state, dintre care numai unul singur este membru al
Societii sau ntre dou state care nu fac parte din Societate, statul sau statele care nu
sunt membrii si Societii sunt invitate s se supun obligaiunilor impuse membrilor ei,
pentru soluionarea diferendului n condiiile socotite drepte de Consiliu. Dac aceast
invitaie este primit, dispoziiunile articolelor 12-16 se aplic sub rezerva modificrilor
considerate ca necesare de Consiliu.
Din momentul trimiterii acestei invitaiuni, Consiliul deschide o anchet asupra
mprejurrilor diferendului i propune msura care i se pare cea mai nimerit i cea mai
eficace n acea mprejurare.
Dac statul invitat refuz s primeasc obligaiunile de membru al societii, n scopul
soluionrii diferendului i recurge la rzboi n contra vreunui membru al Societii, i
sunt aplicabile dispoziiunile articolului 16.
Dac cele dou pri invitate refuz s primeasc obligaiunile de membri ai societii, n
scopul soluionrii diferendului, Consiliul poate s ai toate msurile i s fac propuneri
de natur a preveni ostilitile i a pune capt conflictului.
Articolul 18
Orice tratat sau angajament internaional ncheiat n viitor de un membru al Societii va
trebui imediat nregistrat de Secretariat i publicat de el ct mai curnd posibil. Nici unul
dintre aceste tratate sau angajamente nu va fi obligatoriu nainte de a fi fost nregistrat.
(...)
Articolul 20
Membrii Societii recunosc, fiecare n ce-l privete, c prezentul Pact abrog orice
obligaiuni sau nelegeri inter se, incompatibile cu dispoziiunile sale i se leag n
mod solemn s nu mai contracteze n viitor altele de acest fel.
Dac nainte de intrarea sa n Societate un membru a luat asupr-i obligaiuni
incompatibile cu dispoziiunile Pactului, dnsul trebuie s ia msuri imediate pentru a se
desface de aceste obligaiuni.(...)
Articolul 21
Principiile urmtoare se aplic coloniilor i teritoriilor care n urma rzboiului au ncetat a
fi sub suveranitatea Statelor care le guvernau mai nainte i care sunt locuite de popoare
nc incapabile de a se conduce ele nsele, date fiind condiiunile deosebit de grele ale
lumii moderne. Bunstarea i dezvoltarea acestor popoare formnd o misiune sfnt a
civilizaiei, este necesar s se ncorporeze n prezentul Pact garanii pentru ndeplinirea
acestei misiuni.
Cea mai bun metod pentru realizarea n mod practic a acestui principiu este de a
ncredina tutela acestor popoare naiunilor mai naintate care, prin resursele, experiena
sau poziiunea lor geografic sunt cele mai n msur s-i ia aceast rspundere i care
consimt s o primeasc: ele ar exercita aceast tutel n calitate de mandatare i n numele
Societii.
Caracterul mandatului trebuie s difere, dup gradul de dezvoltare al poporului, dup
situaia geografic a teritoriului, dup orice alte circumstane asemntoare (....)
Articolul 26
Modificrile Pactului de fa vor intra n vigoare din momentul ratificrii lor de ctre
membrii Societii, ai crei reprezentani compun Consiliul, i de ctre majoritatea
acelora ai crei reprezentani formeaz Adunarea.
Orice membru al societii este liber a nu primi amendamentele aduse Pactului, n care
caz el nceteaz a mai face parte din Societate.
Partea a II-a
Tratatul de pace cu Germania
Partea a III-a
Clauze politice europene
Seciunea I Belgia
Articolul 32
Germania recunoate deplina suveranitate a Belgiei asupra ansamblului teritoriului
contestat Moresnet (zis Moresnet neutru) (...)
Articolul 33
Germania renun n favoarea Belgiei la orice drept i titlu asupra teritoriilor ce cuprind
ansamblul inuturilor (Kreise) Eupen i Malmedy. (...)
Seciunea a II-a Luxemburg
Articolul 40
Germania recunoate c Marele Ducat de Luxemburg a ncetat a mai face parte din
Uniunea vamal german, cu ncepere de la 1 ianuarie 1919; renun la orice drepturi
asupra cilor ferate; ader la abrogarea regimului de neutralitate a Marelui Ducat i
accept dinainte toate aranjamentele internaionale ncheiate de ctre Puterile aliate i
asociate cu privire la Marele Ducat (...).
Seciunea a III-a Malul stng al Rinului
Articolul 42
Se interzice Germaniei de a menine sau de a construi fortificaii, fie pe malul stng al

Rinului, fie pe malul drept, la vest de o linie trasat la 50 de km de acest fluviu.
Articolul 43
Sunt de asemenea interzise, n zona definit de articolul 42, ntreinerea sau adunarea de
fore armate, fie cu caracter permanent, fie cu caracter temporar, precum i orice manevre
militare, de orice natur ar fi, i meninerea oricror mijloace materiale de mobilizare.
Seciunea a III-a Bazinul Saar

Articolul 45
n compensarea minelor de crbuni distruse n Nordul Franei i n contul sumei de
reparaii, pentru pagube de rzboi, datorate de Germania, aceasta cedeaz Franei
proprietatea integral i absolut, liber de orice datorii sau sarcini, cu dreptul exclusiv de
exploatare a minelor de crbuni situate n bazinul Saar. (...)
Articolul 49
Germania renun n favoarea Societii Naiunilor (...)la guvernarea teritoriului specificat
mai sus.
Dup expirarea unui termen de 15 ani, socotit de la data intrrii n vigoare a prezentului
tratat, populaia sus zisului teritoriu va fi chemat s se pronune asupra suveranitii
sub care ar dori s fie pus.
Seciunea a V-a Alsacia - Lorena
Articolul 51
Teritoriile cedate Germaniei [ Alsacia i Lorena ] n virtutea Preliminariilor de pace
semnate la Versailles la 26 februarie 1871 i Tratatului de la Frankfurt de la 10 mai 1871,
se reintegreaz n suveranitatea francez, cu ncepere de la armistiiul din 11 noiembrie
1918. (...)
Seciunea a VI-a Austria
Articolul 80
Germania recunoate i va respecta cu strictee independena Austriei, ntre frontierele
care se vor fixa printr-un tratat ce se va ncheia ntre aceast ar i principalele Puteri
aliate i asociate.
Seciunea a VII-a Statul cehoslovac
Articolul 8
Germania recunoate, dup cum au fcut-o de acum Puterile aliate i asociate, completa
independen a statului cehoslovac (...). Ea declar c este de acord cu frontierele acestui
stat, aa cum vor fi ele determinate de ctre principalele Puteri aliate i asociate, si
celelalte state interesate.
Articolul 83
Germania renun n favoarea statului cehoslovac la toate drepturile i titlurile sale asupra
prii din teritoriul silezian (...).
Seciunea a VIII-a Polonia
Articolul 87
Germania recunoate, dup cum au fcut-o de acum Puterile aliate i asociate, completa
independen a Poloniei i renun n favoarea Poloniei la orice drepturi i titluri asupra
teritoriilor delimitate de Marea Baltic, frontiera estic a Germaniei (...).
Partea a IV-a
Drepturile i interesele germane n afara Germaniei
Seciunea I Coloniile germane
Articolul 119
Germania renun n favoarea principalelor Puteri aliate i asociate la toate drepturile i
titlurile sale asupra posesiunilor sale de peste mare.(...)
Partea a V-a
Clauze militare, navale i aeriene
Articolul 160
Cu ncepere de la 31 martie 1920 cel mai trziu, armata german nu va trebui s cuprind
mai mult de apte divizii de infanterie i trei divizii de cavalerie.
ncepnd din acest moment, totalul efectivelor armatei statelor care constituie Germania
nu va trebui s depeasc o sut de mii de oameni, inclusiv ofieri i necombatani, i va
fi destinat exclusiv la meninerea ordinii pe teritoriu i la poliia frontierelor.
Efectivul total de ofieri, inclusiv personalul Statelor majore, oricare ar fi alctuirea
acestora, nu va trebui s depeasc patru mii (...) Marele Stat major german i alte
formaiuni similare vor fi dizolvate i nu vor putea fi reconstituite sub nici o form (...).
Articolul 173
Orice fel de serviciu militar obligatoriu va fi desfiinat n Germania. Armata german nu
va putea fi construit i recrutat dect prin angajri voluntare.(...)
Articolul 180
Toate fortificaiile, fortreele i locurile ntrite, situate pe teritoriul german, la vestul
unei linii trasate de 50 km est de Rin, vor fi dezarmate i drmate (...)
Articolul 181
Dup expirarea unui termen de dou luni, socotit de la punerea n vigoare a Tratatului,
forele flotei de rzboi germane nu vor trebui s depeasc n nave narmate:6 cuirasate,
6 crucitoare uoare, 12 distrugtoare, 12 torpilatoare sau un numr egal de vase de
nlocuire (...). Ele nu vor trebui s includ nici un vas submarin.(...)
Articolul 191
Construcia i achiziia oricrui fel de vas submarin, chiar de comer, vor fi interzise n
Germania. (...)
Articolul 198
Forele militare ale Germaniei nu vor trebui s cuprind nici o aviaie militar sau
marin.(...)
Seciunea a VI-a Comisiuni interaliate de control
Articolul 203
Toate clauzele militare, navale i aeronautice coninute n prezentul Tratat i pentru
executarea crora s-a fixat o limit de timp vor fi executate de Germania sub controlul
unor Comisiuni interaliate, special numite n acest scop de ctre principalele Puteri aliate
i asociate (...)
Partea a VIII-a
Reparaii
Articolul 231
Guvernele aliate i asociate declar, iar Germania recunoate, c Germania i aliaii si
sunt rspunztori pentru c le-au cauzat - de toate pierderile i de toate daunele suferite
de guvernele aliate i asociate, precum i de naionalii lor, ca urmare a rzboiului ce le-a

fost impus prin agresiunea Germaniei i a aliailor si (...).
Articolul 233
Valoarea pagubelor sus menionate, pentru care Germania datoreaz reparaii, va fi
fixat de o Comisie interaliat, care va lua denumirea de Comisiunea reparaiilor (...)
Comisiunea va stabili un stat de plat, prevznd termenele i modalitile de achitare de
ctre Germania a ntregii sale datorii, n decursul unei perioade de 30 de ani, cu ncepere
de la 1 mai 1921. (...)
Articolul 235
(...) n cursul anilor 1919 i 1920, precum i n primele patru luni ale anului 1921,
Germania va plti echivalentul a 20 miliarde mrci aur, n vrsminte i n condiiile pe
care le va fixa Comisiunea reparaiilor (n aur, mrfuri, vapoare, hrtii de valoare saul
altfel) (...)
Articolul 249
Costul total al ntreinerii tuturor armatelor aliate i asociate n teritoriile germane ocupate
va fi n sarcina Germaniei cu ncepere de la semnarea armistiiului de la 11 noiembrie
1918 (...).
Partea a XII-a
Porturi, ci fluviale i ci ferate
Articolul 331
Sunt declarate internaionale: Elba (...), Oder (...), Niemen (...), Dunrea (...).
Partea a XIV-a
Garanii de executare
Articolul 428
Drept garanie pentru executarea prezentului Tratat de ctre Germania, teritoriile germane
aflate la Vest de Rin, mpreun cu capetele de pod, vor fi ocupate de trupele Puterilor
aliate i asociate timp de 15 ani, socotii de la intrarea n vigoare a prezentului Tratat (...)
Articolul 430
n cazul n care, fie n timpul ocupaiei, fie dup expirarea celor 15 ani sus artai,
Comisia reparaiilor ar recunoate ca Germania refuz s respecte n totul sau n parte
obligaiunile ce rezult pentru ea din prezentul Tratat cu privire la reparaii, ntreaga sau o
parte din zona specificat (...) va fi imediat ocupat din nou de ctre forele aliate i
asociate.
Articolul 431
Dac Germania i va ndeplini toate angajamentele pe care i le-a luat prin prezentul
Tratat, nainte de expirarea perioadei de 15 ani, trupele de ocupaie vor fi retrase imediat
(...).
Seciunea a II-a Europa Oriental
Articolul 433
Drept garanie pentru executarea dispoziiunilor prezentului tratat, prin care Germania
recunoate n mod definitiv abrogarea Tratatului de la Brest Litovsk i a tuturor
tratatelor, conveniilor i aranjamentelor pe care le-a ncheiat cu guvernul maximalist din
Rusia, precum i n vederea asigurrii restabilirii pcii i a unui guvern bun n provinciile
baltice i n Lituania, - toate trupele germane, care se afl actualmente n menionatele
teritorii, se vor napoia ntre hotarele Germaniei de ndat ce guvernele principalelor
Puteri aliate i asociate vor socoti c este momentul potrivit, fa de situaia intern din
aceste teritorii.
SURSA: Al. Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, C-tin Bue, Relaii internaionale n acte i
documente, vol. I (1917-1939), Bucureti, Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti,
1974, pp. 27- 32.
Document 3: Tratatul de pace cu Austria (excerpt)
Saint Germain en Laye, 10 septembrie 1919
(...)
Articolul 59
Austria renun, n ce-o privete, n favoarea Romniei la orice drepturi i titluri asupra
prii din fostul ducat al Bucovinei aflat dincoace de frontierele Romniei, aa cum vor
fi fixate ulterior de ctre principalele Puteri aliate i asociate.(...)
Articolul 87
Austria recunoate i se angajeaz s respecte, ca permanent i inalienabil,
independena tuturor teritoriilor ce fceau parte din fostul imperiu al Rusiei la 1 august
1914 (...)
Articolul 88
Independena Austriei este inalienabil numai cu consimmntul Consiliului Societii
Naiunilor. n consecin, Austria se angajeaz s se abin n afar de cazul cnd ar
avea consimmntul zisului Consiliu (...)
Austria declar de pe acum c recunoate i accept frontierele Bulgariei, Greciei,
Ungariei, Poloniei, Romniei, ale Statului Srbo- Croato- Sloven i ale Statului
cehoslovac, aa cum aceste vor fi stabilite de ctre principalele Puteri aliate i
asociate.(...)
Articolul 120
Numrul total al forelor militare n armata austriac nu va trebui s depeasc 30.000 de
oameni, inclusiv ofieri i trupe auxiliare.(...)
Armata austriac va trebui s fie folosit n mod exclusiv la meninerea ordinii pe
ntinderea teritoriului Austriei i la poliia frontierelor sale (...)
Articolul 177
Guvernele aliate i asociate declar, i Austria recunoate, c Austria i aliaii si sunt
rspunztori pentru a le fi cauzat de pierderile i pagubele suferite de Guvernele aliate
i asociate i naionalii lor, ca urmare a rzboiului ce le-a fost impus prin agresiunea
Austro Ungariei i a aliailor si. (...)
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Bue, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii
internaionale n acte i documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic,
Bucureti, 1974, pp.35-36.
Document 4: Tratatul de pace cu Bulgaria (excerpt)
Neuilly sur Seine, 27 noiembrie 1919
(...)
Articolul 27
Frontierele Bulgariei vor fi stabilite dup cum urmeaz: cu Romnia: de la Marea Neagr
pn la Dunre frontiera aa cum era la 1 august 1914; de acolo pn la confluena
Timocului cu Dunrea; partea principal de navigaie a Dunrii n amont (...).
Articolul 36
Bulgaria recunoate, aa cum au fcut-o deja Puterile aliate i asociate, Statul Srbo-
Croato- Sloven (...).
Articolul 48
(...) Puterile aliate i asociate se angajeaz ca libertatea accesului economic al Bulgariei la
Marea Egee s fie garantat. (...)
[Ulterior Tracia a fost cedat Greciei, iar Bulgaria a pierdut ieirea la Marea Egee ]
Articolul 66
(...) Numrul total al forelor militare n armata bulgar nu va trebui s depeasc 20.000
de oameni, inclusiv ofieri i trupele auxiliare (...).
Articolul 122
Bulgaria recunoate c, alturndu-se rzboiului de agresiune pe care Germania i
Austro-Ungaria le-au pornit mpotriva Puterilor aliate i asociate, le-a cauzat acestora din
urm pierderi i sacrificii de tot felul (...).
n consecin, Bulgaria se angajeaz s plteasc (...) suma de dou miliarde dou sute
cincizeci milioane franci aur, reprezentnd reparaiile(...). Plata acestei sume se va face
prin vrsminte semestriale (...) fiecare cuprinznd (...)suma necesar amortizrii n 37 de
ani (...) a sumei datorate de Bulgaria (...).
Bucureti, 1974, pp.37-38
Document 5: Tratatul de pace cu Ungaria (excerpt)
Trianon, 4 iunie 1920
(...)
Articolul 45
Ungaria renun, n ce-o privete, n favoarea Romniei, la orice drepturi i titluri asupra
teritoriilor din fosta monarhie austro ungar, situate dincolo de frontierele Ungariei (...).
Articolul 73
Ungaria declar de pe acum c recunoate i primete fruntariile Austriei, Bulgariei,
Greciei, Poloniei, Romniei, Statului Srbo Croato Sloven i ale Statului Cehoslovac,
astfel cum aceste fruntarii vor fi fixate de ctre Principalele puteri aliate i asociate.
Articolul 104
(...) Numrul total al forelor militare n armata ungar nu va trebui s depeasc 30.000
de oameni, inclusiv ofieri i trupele auxiliare (...).
Articolul 161
Ungaria recunoate c ea i aliaii si sunt rspunztori, pentru a le fi cauzat, de pierderile
i pagubele suferite de Guvernele aliate i asociate i de ctre conaionalii lor, ca urmare a
rzboiului care le-a fost impus, prin agresiunea Austro Ungaria i a aliailor si (...).
Bucureti, 1974, pp.39-40
Seminar nr. 3
Relaiile internaionale n perioada interbelic. 1919-1939
I Conferina de la Washington, 12 noiembrie 1921- 6 februarie 1922
- 24 august 1921- Statele Unite au semnat un tratat de pace separat cu Germania

- scopul conferinei :
- dezarmarea general, i n special dezarmarea naval
- soluionarea problemelor din zona Pacificului i Extremului Orient
- s-au ncheiat 3 tratate, dup cum urmeaz:
I. Tratatul celor Patru Puteri (Anglia, Frana, Japonia, SUA), 13 decembrie 1921,
valabil pe o perioad de 6 ani
- prile semnatare conveneau s-i respecte reciproc posesiunile din Pacific i s supun
consultrilor orice dispute sau ameninri din exterior
* De ilustrat principalele prevederi, precum i semnificaia tratatului pentru evoluia
ulterioar a evenimentelor
II. Tratatul naval al celor cinci puteri sau tratatul asupra limitrii armamentului
naval (Anglia, Frana, Japonia, SUA, Italia), 6 februarie 1922, valabil pe o perioad de
15 ani
- stabilea un sistem de limitare a tonajelor flotelor
- prile semnatare se angajau s menin status-quo-ul n zona Pacificului
* De ilustrat principalele prevederi, precum i semnificaia tratatului pentru evoluia
ulterioar a evenimentelor
III. Tratatul celor nou (Anglia, Frana, Japonia, SUA, Italia, China, Belgia, Olanda,
Portugalia)
- garanta independena Chinei
- Japonia retroceda Chinei Shandong i Kiaochou
- angajamentul formal al prilor de a sprijini politica porilor deschise
II Relaiile sovieto-germane
Acord comercial, 6 mai 1921

- prin acest acord Republica de la Weimar recunotea pe cea a Sovietelor i iniia legturi
comerciale cu aceasta
Tratatul de la Rapallo, 16 aprilie 1922

- semnarea acestui tratat a marcat sfritul izolrii Uniunii Sovietice i a Germaniei
pe plan economic i politico-diplomatic
- tratatul prevedea restabilirea relaiilor diplomatice i renunarea reciproc la
despgubirile de rzboi
de ilustrat contextul n care s-a semnat tratatul, principale prevederi, precum i
semnificaia sa
Tratatul de la Berlin, 1926

- pact de prietenie germano - rus
- urmeaz linia nceput la Rapallo
- se ajunge la o nelegere n probleme de politic i economie, partenerii i promit
neutralitatea n cazul atacului din partea unei tere puteri
Pactul Ribbentrop Molotov, 23 august 1939

- a fost un tratat de neagresiune germano sovietic
- cele dou pri se angajau s se abin de la violen i de la orice atac ndreptat
mpotriva celeilalte
- coninea un protocol adiional secret prin care erau stabilite sferele de influen
* De ilustrat contextul n care s-a semnat tratatul, principalele prevederi, precum i
semnificaia sa pentru evoluia ulterioar a evenimentelor
Pactul germano sovietic de prietenie i frontier, 28 septembrie 1939

- URSS i Germania i mpreau Polonia i stabileau dispariia ei de pe harta politic a
Europei
*De ilustrat contextul n care s-a semnat tratatul, principalele prevederi, precum i
semnificaia sa pentru evoluia ulterioar a evenimentelor
III Problema dezarmrii
Geneva, 1924-1925
- Protocolul de la Geneva sau Protocolul pentru reglementarea panic a diferendelor
dintre state viza:
- realizarea securitii colective prin dezarmare
- introducea un element nou: arbitrajul obligatoriu
- stabilea o legtur ntre cei trei termeni: arbitraj, securitate, dezarmare
De ilustrat contextul n care s-a a fost elaborat documentul, principalele prevederi,
cauzele eecului acestei iniiative
Pactul Briand-Kellogg (sau pactul de renunare la rzboi), Paris, 27 august 1928

- pactul obliga prile semnatare s renune la rzboi ca instrument al politicii
naionale i ca mijloc de reglementare a litigiilor internaionale, angajndu-se s
rezolve diferendele dintre ele numai prin mijloace panice
* De ilustrat prile semnatare, contextul n care a fost elaborat documentul,
principalele prevederi, eventualele lipsuri ale noului act
Protocolul Litvinov sau acordul de la Moscova, 9 februarie 1929

- o aplicare, pe plan regional a Pactului Briand-Kellogg
- a fost o propunere sovietic: ministrul de externe sovietic, Maxim Litvinov, a

propus un document pe aceeai idee a renunrii la rzboi ca mijloc de reglementare
a conflictelor, urmtoarelor state: Romnia, Polonia, Estonia i Letonia
IV Problema reparaiilor
- a revenit unei Comisii a reparaiilor, care trebuia s urmreasc modul n care Germania
i onoreaz obligaiile asumate
- Germania intr n incapacitate de plat a datoriilor sale problema datoriilor germane
a fost discutat la Conferina de la Spaa din iulie 1920
Conferina de la Spaa
- a stabilit cotele ce trebuiau s revin fiecrui nvingtor
- distribuia cotele care cdeau n sarcina Austriei, Ungariei, Bulgariei i Turciei
*De ilustrat principalele hotrri ale conferinei
- Comisia de reparaii (Londra, aprilie mai 1921) a fixat cuantumul reparaiilor datorate
de Germania la suma de 132 miliarde mrci aur sub ameninarea ocuprii Ruhrului de
ctre trupele aliate, guvernul german este nevoit s accepte aceast decizie, fr a putea
achita traneele respective 11 ianuarie 1923 trupele franceze i belgiene ocup bazinul
carbonifer al Ruhrului
- rezolvarea crizei Ruhrului s-a realizat prin planul Dawes, 1924
Planul Dawes
- se preconiza:
1) o reealonare a datoriilor Germaniei pe 5 ani
2) depunerile germane erau garantate printr-o ipotec asupra cilor ferate i industriei
* De ilustrat principalele prevederi ale planului
- ntre 1 iulie 17 august 1925 trupele belgine i cele franceze au evacuat zona Ruhrului
- planul Dawes este nlocuit cu planul Young, 1930
Planul Young
- se prevedea reducerea datoriilor Germaniei la 38 miliarde mrci aur, pltibile n 59 de
ani
* De ilustrat principalele prevederi ale planului
- moratoriu Hoover, 1931 prevedea suspendarea pe o durat de un an a plii tuturor
reparaiilor de rzboi
- Conferina de la Laussane, 16 iunie 19 iulie 1932, care a marcat sfritul problemei
reparaiilor pentru c Germaniei i s-a impus s plteasc doar 3 miliarde mrci aur i
numai n msura n care situaia ei economic i permitea acest lucru
V Acordurile de la Locarno (5 -16 octombrie 1925)
- s-au semnat mai multe documente, dup cum urmeaz:

Pactul renan de garanie care asigura inviolabilitatea granielor franco germano
belgiene, garantat de Marea Britanie i Italia
convenii de arbitraj ntre Germania, pe de o parte, i Frana, Belgia, Polonia,
Cehoslovacia, pe de alt parte
tratate de alian franco polonez, respectiv franco - cehoslovac
* De ilustrat contextul evenimentului, principalele prevederi, precum i semnificaia
acestor documente pentru evoluia ulterioar a evenimentelor
VI Marea criz economic
- s-a declanat n SUA n octombrie 1929

- debuteaz printr-un crah bursier i se transform ntr-o criz economic
a) cauzele crizei economice

- agricultura sufer din cauza scderii preurilor la produsele agricole determinat
de o supraproducie, n timp ce preurile pentru mainile agricole continu s creasc
pentru c veniturile lor scad, agricultorii contracteaz mprumuturi
- contractarea unor credite de ctre personale fizice pentru satisfacerea nevoilor
personale
- saturarea pieei de produse industriale (automobile, produse electronice) ceea ce
d natere unui dezechilibru ntre producie i consum
- rile care importau mrfuri din SUA achitau deseori contravaloarea acestora cu
bani mprumutai de la bncile americane
- creterea speculailor bursiere care n 1929 ating o cifr record
- creterea artificial a cursului unor aciuni
b) declanarea crizei economice

- marea criz economic a debutat pe fondul unei scderi a preurilor la minereurile de
fier, la oel, dar i a unei reduceri a beneficilor industriale nete n sectorul construciilor
de maini
- speculanii bursieri au ncercat s-i vnd titlurile imediat i la un curs ct se poate de
mare
- pe 24 octombrie 1929 are loc o acumulare a ordinelor de vnzare, care determin
prbuirea cursurilor
c) efectele crizei economice

- primele semne ale crizei se resimt n SUA:
prbuirea sistemului de credit
supraproducia devine considerabil n condiiile scderii drastice a cererii
interne i a restrngerii posibilitilor de mprumuturi
supraproducia determin falimentul a numeroase ntreprinderi, o cretere a
ratei omajului i o nou scdere a consumului
- mondializarea crizei economice este determinat de:

retragerea capitalurilor europene de ctre bncile americane care a determinat
falimentul bncilor austriece i germane
reducerea exportului european ctre SUA datorit diminurii cererii de produse
i ntrirea msurilor protecioniste americane
- efectele crizei n domeniul economic:
scderea preurilor
scderea produciei
prbuirea comerului internaional evideniat de scderea valorii schimburilor
internaionale, care d natere la importante deficite bugetare
renunarea la etalonul aur de ctre toate statele afectate de criz
- efectele crizei n domeniul social:

creterea omajului
pauperizarea agricultorilor crora bncile le confisc terenurile cu care au girat
mprumuturile
scdere demografic
manifestri de violen (greve, maruri ale foamei)
- efectele crizei n domeniul politic:
liberalismul economic i regimul democratic devin inta unei profunde
nencrederi
instaurarea unor regimuri autoritare totalitare ca o alternativ credibil la
sistemul democratic care euase
ascensiunea micrilor de extrem dreapta (a se vedea de exemplu, cazul
Germaniei)
ascensiunea stngii politice pe plan european
d) lupta mpotriva crizei
* politica de tip liberal

- urmrete o redresare pe termen scurt i mediu
- consider c lucrurile ar trebui s mearg de la sine: scderea preurilor materiilor prime

i utilajelor, a salariilor (rezultat al creterii omajului) i a dobnzilor (bncile nu mai au
cui s mprumute iar dobnzile scad automat), concentrarea ntreprinderilor
- rolul statutului este redus la restabilirea echilibrului bugetar (diminund cheltuielile
publice) i la impunerea scderilor salariale necesare reducerii costurilor de producie ale
ntreprinderilor
- nu se bucur de succes pentru c pieele externe sunt blocate i nu face altceva dect s
diminueze i mai mult puterea de cumprare pe plan intern
* politica de tip keynesian

- J.M. Keynes n lucrarea sa Teoria general a folosirii forei de munc, a dobnzii i a
banilor a teoretizat necesitatea interveniei statului n rezolvarea crizei economice
- n opinia acestui economist, rezolvarea crizei depinde de relansarea consumului: statul
trebuie s adopte o politic de lucrri ample (capabil s ofere locuri de munc), s dea
ajutor de omaj, s fixeze un salariu minim pentru a relansa puterea de cumprare;
acceptarea deficitului bugetar; devalorizarea monedei pentru a facilita exportul
- aplicat n SUA politica New Deal
* politica de tip fascist

- statul intervine pentru a:
lansa o politic prin care se ncurajeaz lucrrile de amploare
dezvolta industria de armament
determina scderi substaniale ale salariilor muncitorilor care s permit
ntreprinderilor s-i sporeasc veniturile
- necesarul de materii prime, gsirea unor piee de desfacere pentru produsele lor,
gsirea unor soluii pentru rezolvarea problemelor bugetare au determinat
angajarea statelor n urmrirea unei politici expansioniste
VII Conferina dezarmrii de la Geneva, 1932-1934
- s-a deschis la 2 februarie 1932, cu participarea a 62 de state

- n ciuda scopului proclamat al conferinei, marile puteri doreau s-i justifice politica n
domeniul militar i al narmrilor
- au fost prezentate mai multe planuri pentru realizarea dezarmrii:
a) Planul Tardieu care viza crearea unei fore multinaionale aflate sub egida Societii
Naiunilor, precum i acordarea unor garanii de securitate
b) Planul Hoover propunere de reducere a armamentului: efectivele terestre urmau a fi
reduse cu o treime (tancurile i artileria grea urmau a fi eliminate total); pe mare,
reducerea cu o treime a tonajului i numrului de cuirasate , crucitoare i
contratorpiloare; forele aeriene eliminarea avioanelor de bombardament
- 16 septembrie 1932, Germania, pretinznd c egalitatea drepturilor n domeniul

dezarmrii nu era acordat, prsete conferina
- la 11 decembrie 1932, o conferin a celor cinci (Frana, Anglia, Germania, Italia, SUA)
recunoate Germaniei egalitatea n drepturi ntr-un sistem care s asigure securitatea
tuturor naiunilor
- la noua sesiune a conferinei au fost prezentate din nou dou planuri:
1) planul francez Herriot Bancour care prevedea reducerea tuturor armatelor
europene la un tip uniform de poliie
2) planul englez MacDonald care fixa la 200.000 de oameni efectivele armate ale
principalelor ri de pe continent
- planul britanic este acceptat, n principiu de Hitler, n discursul su din 17 mai 1933
- la reluarea conferinei, Frana i Anglia au susinut ideea c dezarmarea trebuia
precedat de un control al armamentelor
- teza german era, dimpotriv, c trebuia s se nceap cu dezarmarea, apoi s se treac
la controlul armelor
- poziia ireconciliabil a celor dou pri a determinat retragerea Germaniei de la
conferin, iar la 19 octombrie 1933 din Societatea Naiunilor
- eecul conferinei
VIII Proiectul Pactul oriental (aprilie 1934)
- dup retragerea Germaniei din Societatea Naiunilor, Frana a ncercat s organizeze un

sistem de securitate colectiv prin Pactul Oriental, iniiativa aparinnd ministrului de
externe francez, Louis Barthou
- n aprilie 1934, acesta a propus URSS proiectul unui Pact care s grupeze URSS,
Finlanda, Estonia, Polonia i Cehoslovacia
*De ilustrat contextul propunerii franceze, principalele prevederi ale proiectului i
cauzele eecului su
IX Acordurile de la Stresa, aprilie mai 1935
- acordurile de la Stresa au fost o reacie fa de reintroducerea, n martie 1935, a

serviciul militar obligatoriu n Germania
- s-au semnat trei acorduri internaionale:
1) 11aprilie 1935- acord francoangloitalian care viza constituirea unui front antigerman
de ctre aceste trei
2) 2 mai 1935 tratatul franco sovietic
3) 16 mai 1935 - tratatul sovieto cehoslovac
- prbuirea sistemului creat la Stresa a fost generat de dou evenimente:
a) tratatul anglo american prin care se permitea flotei germane s-i ridice tonajul flotei
b) agresiunea Italiei n Etiopia
*De ilustrat contextul semnrii acestor acorduri i principalele prevederi ale acestora
X Agresiunea Germaniei asupra Austriei (sau Anschluss-ul)
- agresiunea final a Germaniei asupra Austriei a fost precedat de cteva tentative

nereuite:
a) 14 martie 1931, ministrul de externe german, Curtius i cel austriac, Schober, au
semnat un proiect privind asimilarea condiiilor vamale i politic comerciale ntre
Germania i Austria
b) asasinarea cancelarului austriac Dollfuss de ctre un comando de naziti austrieci,

iunie 1934 n 1936, ambasadorul german n Austria, von Papen, va ncheia cu
cancelarul austriac Schusnigg, a gentlemen`s agreement
c) memorandumul Hossbach din 5 noiembrie 1937: stenogram unei edinei lui Hitler
cu o serie de consilieri, n timpul creia liderul german ar fi vorbit despre planurile de
cucerire a lumii, propunnd mai nti cucerirea Cehoslovacia i doar apoi a Austriei
- pregtirile Germaniei pentru Anschluss
- tatonarea poziiei aliatului italian: la 6 noiembrie 1937, ntlnire dintre Mussolini
i Ribbentrop
- noiembrie 1937: ntlnirea dintre lordul Halifax i Hitler la Berchtesgaden
- ianuarie 1938, n timpul unei percheziii la sediile naziste au fost descoperite
planuri de rebeliune militar ale nazitilor austrieci
- 13 februarie 1938 cancelarul austriac, Schuschnigg, se ntlnete cu Hitler la
Berchtesgaden; ultimatumul lui Hitler
- martie 1938 cancelarul austriac, Schuschnigg anun organizarea unui plebiscit
pentru independena Austriei precipitarea evenimentelor i ocuparea Austriei de ctre
trupele germane
-12 martie 1938 Hitler declara, la Linz, n mod oficial, alipirea Austriei la
Germania, confirmat i printr-un plebiscit
* De ilustrat pe larg coninutul fiecrei etape a agresiunii Germaniei asupra Austriei,
precum i reacia marilor puteri.
XI Agresiunea Germaniei asupra Cehoslovaciei
- memorandumul Hossbach din 5 noiembrie 1937: n timpul unei edine Hitler cu o serie
de consilieri, acesta ar fi vorbit despre planurile de cucerire a lumii, propunnd mai nti
cucerirea Cehoslovacia i doar apoi a Austriei
- lipsa unei coeziuni interne a statului generat de nemulumirile minoritilor naionale
- poziia geografic nefavorabil a rii n contextul unui conflict
- existena unei micri a germanilor din regiunea sudet
-24 aprilie 1938, Programul de la Karlsbad lipsa de reacie a Franei i, implicit a

URSS
- Marea Britanie trimite ca mediator pe lordul Runciman
- 1 septembrie 1938 Hitler l primete pe Konrad Helein, liderul germanilor sudei i i
vorbete acestuia despre armonia perfect ntre opiniile lor
- 4 septembrie 1938 are loc o ntlnire ntre Benes i liderii germanilor sudei
- 12 septembrie 1938, discursul lui Hitler de la Nrnberg 13 septembrie, liderii
germani sudei au ntrerupt convorbirile cu autoritile cehoslovace i au ncercat o
revolt, care a fost rapid reprimat de guvernul cehoslovac
- 15 septembrie 1938 Chamberlain i Sir Horace Wilson s-au ntlnit cu Hitler la
Berchtesgaden
- pe 20 septembrie 1938, guvernul cehoslovac a respins memoriu franco britanic
privind mprirea rii
- pe 21 septembrie 1938, guvernul cehoslovac accept condiiile impuse, ca urmarea a
unui ultimatum franco britanic
- 22 septembrie 1938, Chamberlain s-a ntlnit din nou cu Hitler, la Godesberg, liderul
german declarnd c nu este de acord cu condiiile primite, germanii sudei fiind
maltratai, regiunea trebuia anexat Germaniei
- 29 septembrie 1938 Conferina de la Mnchen i mprirea statului cehoslovac
apogeul conciliatorismului
- 30 septembrie 1938 Chamberlain i Hitler au semnat o declaraie de neagresiune
considerat de toat lumea ca menit s aduc pacea n Europa
- la 2 octombrie 1938 Polonia colonelului Beck a ocupat regiunea Teschen
-la 2 noiembrie 1938, n urma primul dictat de la Viena, Ungaria primete sudul Slovaciei
- martie 1939, preedintele cehoslovac Hacha (succesorul lui Benes) se ntlnete cu
Hitler i sub presiune, accept protectoratul german asupra Boemiei i Moraviei
- 15 martie 1939, Slovacia i declar independena, iar la 16 martie 1939 accept
protectoratul german
* De ilustrat pe larg coninutul fiecrei etape a agresiunii Germaniei asupra
Cehoslovaciei, precum i reacia marilor puteri.
XII Agresiunea Japoniei n Extremul Orient
- n contextul unei crize economice resimite de Japonia, militarii niponi propun ca soluie
la aceast situaie o politic de cuceriri profitnd de un incident minor la cile ferate
japoneze (18 septembrie 1931), trupele japoneze au ocupat principalele orae din
Manciuria, o bogat regiune minier i agricol din nordul Chinei
- guvernul chinez refuz s negocieze, face apel la Societatea Naiunilor, ordon boicot
mpotriva mrfurilor japoneze, dar nu declar rzboi Japoniei, din cauza pregtirilor
militare insuficiente
- septembrie decembrie 1931, Consiliul Societii Naiunilor a examinat plngerea
chinez decembrie 1931 s-a creat comisia Laytton,
- ntre timp continu agresiunea japonez n China, ocupnd noi provincii i afectnd, n
acest mod, interesele americane i engleze doctrina Stimson, prin care fcea cunoscut
decizia SUA de a nu recunoate nici un fel de anexri teritoriale sau tratate acorduri care
ar consimi aceste contropiri; de asemenea, n not se protesta mpotriva oricror msuri
care ar leza interesele americane n China sau ar veni n contradicie cu principiul porilor
deschise
- la 18 februarie 1832, japonezii au proclamat independena Manciuriei, sub numele de
Manciuko
- la 9 martie 1932, n fruntea statutului marionet creat de japonezi era impus ca regent,
apoi ncoronat ca mprat la 1 mai 1932, Pu I (cel care fusese forat s abdice de pe tronul
Chinei n 1912)
- septembrie 1932, Comisia Laytton ia prezentat raportul, discutat n Adunarea
General a Societii Naiunilor dup dezbateri prelungite, la 24 februarie 1933 s-a
adoptat o rezoluie n spiritul recomandrilor Comisiei Laytton:
- nu se aplicau nici un fel de sanciuni Japoniei agresive
- se recunoteau aa zisele drepturi i interese speciale ale acesteia n nord
estul Chinei
- se constata nclcarea de ctre Japonia a Tratatului celor nou puteri
- nu se recunotea existena statului Manciuko
- la 27 martie 1933, Japonia prsete Societatea Naiunilor, nemulumit de coninutul

rezoluiei Adunrii Generale
- Japonia invadeaz Jehol, o regiune din China cuprins ntre Manciuria i Marele Zid
Chinezesc
- la 7 iulie 1936, trupele japoneze lanseaz o nou ofensiv n China: dup cucerirea
Pekinului (26-27 iulie), ele invadeaz China de nord est
- la sfritul anului 1937, trupele japonez controleaz porturile importante, prin care
Shanghai
- singura regiune care le scap japonezilor este cea din centrul rii, controlat de armate
a lui Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai shek), are a fcut din oraul Chongqing (Tchoung King)
capitala sa provizorie
- japonezii decid s pun capt rezistenei chineze, tind drumurile prin care aceasta
primea arme din URSS (pn n 1938), apoi din SUA
*De ilustrat pe larg coninutul fiecrei etape a agresiunii Japoniei asupra Chinei
XIII Agresiunea Italiei n Albania
- Ahmed Zogu, protejat iugoslav, s-a alturat italienilor, dup ce l-a izgonit pe
predecesorul su
- ales preedinte pe 7 ani, acesta l-a informat pe Mussolini, n ianuarie 1925, c inteniona
s realizeze un guvern solid n Albania pentru a contribui la pacea din Balcani, iar liderul
fascist italian l-a recunoscut imediat
- 27 noiembrie 1926 s-a semnat primul tratat italo-albanez, n fapt un pact de prietenie i
securitate
- Mussolini a perceput Acordul de la Paris dintre Iugoslavia i Frana (11 noiembrie
1927) ca fiind unul ndreptat mpotriva Italiei 22 noiembrie 1927, Mussolini a ripostat,
semnnd cu Albania un al doilea tratat la Tirana
- n septembrie 1928, Ahmed Zogu a fost ncoronat regele al albanezilor, cu aprobarea
Italiei
- la 7 aprilie 1939, urmnd exemplul lui Hitler, Mussolini a ordonat trupelor sale s
invadeze Albania
- regele Zogu a prsit ara

- la 8 aprilie 1939, Albania a devenit protectorat italian i, la cererea albanezilor italofili,
cele dou Coroane au fost unite
* De ilustrat pe larg coninutul fiecrei etape a agresiunii Italiei asupra Albaniei
XIV Agresiunea Italiei n Etiopia
- Etiopia era un stat independent african, membru al Societii Naiunilor din 1923,
admiterea sa fiind susinut de Frana i Italia un acord privind zonele de influen n
Etiopia, plecnd mai degrab de la o serie de considerente de ordin economic
- Frana a protestat mpotriva acestui acord n numele unui tratat din 1906, care prevedea
meninerea drepturilor suverane ale mpratului Etiopiei
- n iunie 1926, Etiopia a protestat, la rndul ei, pe lng Societatea Naiunilor, declarnd
c acordul este o ameninare pentru suveranitatea etiopian
- Italia reuete s liniteasc guvernul etiopian i s semneze mpreun pe 2 august 1928
un tratat de prietenie, de conciliere i arbitraj
- ideea lui Mussolini de a cuceri Etiopia dateaz cel puin din toamna anului 1933
- incidentul de care s-a servit Mussolini s-a desfurat la Ual-Ual, la 5 decembrie 1934, la
frontiera dintre Eritreea i Etiopia
- guvernul etiopian a propus ca incidentul s fie supus arbitrajului, conform tratatului din
1928, ns Italia a refuzat (15 decembrie 1934)
- imediat guvernul etiopian a fcut la Societatea Naiunilor; n aceste condiii, guvernul
italian a revenit asupra deciziei sale i a acceptat arbitrajul, da acesta a euat
- pentru c pregtirile militare ale Italiei n Eritreea au cptat dimensiuni considerabile,
la 17 martie 1935, Etiopia a fcut din nou apel la Societatea Naiunilor
- poziia dificil a guvernelor englez i francez generat de renarmarea Germaniei i de
interesele lor specifice legate de aceast zon
- negocierile stagnau
- ncercrile de compromis ale lui Eden, ale conferinei tripartite franco anglo- italian,
ale Consiliul Societii Naiunilor respinse de Mussolini
- cu toate manevrele de intimidare ale Marii Britanii n Mediterana i contient de voina

pacifist a guvernului englez, la 3 octombrie 1935, Mussolini a nceput operaiunile
militare n Etiopia
- Frana i Anglia au ncercat o soluie proprie pentru a pune capt crizei etiopiene: planul
Laval Hoare (decembrie 1935)
- Mussolini accept n principiu planul, dar acesta eueaz din cauza protestelor opiniei
publice engleze informat asupra prevederilor panului
- la iniiativa statelor democratice, Societatea Naiunilor hotrte s impun sanciuni
economice Italiei (ridicate n 1936), n vreme ce Germania i furnizeaz Italiei crbunele
de care are nevoie, iar SUA petrolul necesar marinei i aviaiei
- la 28 decembrie 1935 Mussolini a denunat acordurile de la Stresa i Roma
- la 5 mai 1936, Negusul Etiopiei a cerut pacea dup victoria italian de la lacul Achianga
- la 7 martie 1936, Mussolini s-a artat dispus s negocieze, dar denunarea tratatului de
la Locarno de ctre Germania n aceeai zi, a distras atenia internaional de la afacerea
etiopian i i-a permis Ducelui s obin victoria
- la 9 mai 1936, un decret al lui Mussolini proclama anexarea Etiopiei de ctre Italia, iar
regele Italiei devenea mpratul Etiopiei
- la 4 iulie 1936, Adunarea Naiunilor Unite a votat o rezoluie prin care erau ridicate
sanciunile economice i financiare luate mpotriva Italiei
*De ilustrat pe larg coninutul fiecrei etape a agresiunii Italiei asupra Etiopiei
XV Rzboiul civil din Spania
- n 1931 Spania devine republic

- alegerile din februarie 1936 sunt ctigate de Frontul Popular constituit din forele de
stnga spaniole imediat se declaneaz un val de greve revoluionare, ranii ocup
pmnturile, violenele se generalizeaz
- la 13 iulie 1936 liderul monarhist Calvo Sotelo este asasinat, ceea ce a dat semnalul
loviturii militare de stat, Franco devenind eful micrii naionaliste
- va ncepe un rzboi civil ce va dura 3 ani, n care s-au confruntat dou tabere:
a) naionalitii sprijinii de armata permanent, de Falang, de majoritatea clerului catolic

i de clasa conductoare
b) republicanii susinui de muncitori, de mica burghezie radical, de o parte a rnimii
- n aprilie 1938, Franco reuete s izoleze Madridul de Barcelona, pe 28 martie 1939 va
ocupa Madridul, unde n octombrie i va instala propriul guvern
- rzboiul din Spania s-a transformat ntr-un conflict internaional, o adevrat repetiie
general a rzboiului mondial
* De ilustrat aceast ultim idee, n fapt, poziia marilor puteri fa de conflictul din
Spania, precum i posibilele consecine pe plan internaional ale acestui conflict
XVI Aliane
- formarea Micii nelegeri (Cehoslovacia, Iugoslavia, Romnia), 1921 de ilustrat

scopurile constituirii acestei aliane
- 9 februarie 1934, la Atena, a fost semnat Pactul nelegerii Balcanice (Turcia,
Iugoslavia, Romnia, Grecia) - de ilustrat scopurile constituirii acestei aliane
- Axa Berlin Roma Tokio:
octombrie 1936 protocol semnat ntre Germania i Italia
25 noiembrie 1936 Germania i Japonia semnau Pactul Anticomintern
6 noiembrie 1937 Italia ader la Pactul Anticomintern
24 februarie 1939 Ungaria i statul Manciuko se altur Pactului Anticomintern
27 februarie 1939 Spania se altur Pactului Anticomintern
* De ilustrat principalele prevederi, precum i semnificaia acestor documente pentru
evoluia ulterioar a evenimentelor
Dicionar:
conciliatorism: atitudine care duce spre mpcare, spre realizarea unui acord sau a unui
compromis
crah: fenomen economic manifestat prin lipsa acut a creditului pe pia, prin scderea
brusc a cursului aciunilor la burs i prin devalorizarea monedei
credit: capital provenit prin mprumut, pe baza ncrederii i solvabilitii
deficit bugetar: sum cu care cheltuielile depesc veniturile
moratoriu: amnarea plii datoriilor unui debitor; amnarea legal a executrii
obligaiilor financiare internaionale, determinate de o situaie excepional (criz
economic, rzboi etc.)
pact de neagresiune: tratat prin care dou sau mai multe state se oblig s nu ntreprind
aciuni dumnoase unul fa de cellalt
securitate colectiv: component a relaiilor internaionale, concretizat prin msuri
comune, luate de ctre toate statele i care vizeaz meninerea pcii i respectarea
angajamentelor
reparaii de rzboi: despgubiri pltite pentru compensarea pagubelor economice
datorate unui rzboi
revizionism: curent politic care i propune modificarea (revizuirea) unor tratate
internaionale
XVII Suport documentar
Document 1: Moratoriu Hoover Declaraia preedintelui Herbert Hoover , 20

iunie 1931 (excerpt)
Guvernul american propune amnarea pe o durat de un an a tuturor plilor

datoriilor interguvernamentale, a datoriilor reparaiilor i a celor contractate n virtutea
mprumuturilor pentru ajutor de dup rzboi (...)
Eu nu aprob deloc, chiar n sensul cel mai larg, anularea datoriilor care ni se
cuvin. ncrederea internaional nu ar spori prin aceasta. Nici una din naiunile care ne
sunt debitoare nu a sugerat-o vreodat, dar acum baza reglementrii acestor datorii const
n capacitatea de plat a debitorilor n condiii normale, noi acionm n deplin
concordan cu politica i principiile noastre, lund n consideraie situaia anormal
existent actualmente n lume.
Esena prezentei propuneri este de a da rgaz guvernelor debitoare, s-i refac
prosperitatea naional. (...)
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Bue, Gheorghe Bdescu,

Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura Didactic i
Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1974, Vol.I, p.74
Document 2: Tratatul de la Rapallo ntre Republica Sovietic Federativ Rus i

Germania , 16 aprilie 1922 (excerpt)
Articolul 1
Cele dou guverne sunt de acord ca divergenele dintre Germania i Republica Sovietic
Rus, n probleme ce au aprut n timpul cnd aceste state au fost n stare de rzboi, s se
reglementeze pe urmtoarele baze:
a) Statul german i RSFSR renun, n mod reciproc, la despgubirea pentru cheltuielile
de rzboi, precum i la dezdunarea pagubelor de rzboi, adic a acelor pagube care le-a
fost cauzate, lor i cetenilor respectivi, n regiunile operaiunilor de rzboi i ca urmare
a msurilor de rzboi, inclusiv rechiziiile fcute pe teritoriul Prii potrivnice.
Ambele pri renun, de asemenea, la dezdunarea pagubelor cauzate cetenilor unei
din Pri, nu de rzboi, ci prin aa-numitele legi excepionale de rzboi i prin msurile
forate luate de organele de stat ale celeilalte Pri.
b) Germania i Rusia renun, n mod reciproc, la despgubiri pentru cheltuielile ce le-au
avut cu prizonierii de rzboi. Guvernul german renun, de asemenea, la despgubiri,
pentru cheltuielile fcute cu internarea n Germania a unei pri din Armata Roie.
Guvernul rus renun, la rndul su, la restituirea sumelor ctigate de Germania din
vnzarea bunurilor militare introduse de Germania de ctre unitile internate.
Articolul 2
Germania renun la preteniile izvornd din faptul aplicrii, pn n prezent, a legilor i
msurilor RSFSR unor ceteni germani i drepturilor lor private, precum i drepturile
Germaniei i ale statelor germane fa de Rusia; de asemenea renun la preteniunile ce
izvorsc, n general, din msurile luate de RSFSR sau de organele ei fa de cetenii
germani sau fa de drepturile lor private, - sub condiia c guvernul RSFSR nu va
satisface preteniuni analoge ale altor state.
Articolul 3
Relaiile diplomatice i consulare ntre Germania i R.S.F.S.R. se reiau fr ntrziere.
Articolul 4
Ambele guverne sunt de acord mai departe s aplice clauza naiunii celei mai favorizate,
cu privire la situaia juridic general a cetenilor uneia din Pri pe teritoriul celeilalte i
n reglementarea general a relaiilor economice i comerciale reciproce.
Articolul 5
Cele dou guverne vor lua n considerare cu bunvoin, n mod reciproc, nevoile
economice ale ambelor pri.
Guvernul german se declar gata s sprijine, pe ct posibil, conveniile proiectate de
unele firme particulare, - care i-au fost aduse la cunotin n ultima vreme, i s
nlesneasc executarea lor (...).
Bucureti, 1974, Vol.I, pp. 98-99.
Document 3: Pactul Ribbentrop Molotov ( Pactul de neagresiune germano -

sovietic) , 23 august 1939
Articolul 1
Ambele pri contractante se oblig a se abine de la orice violen, de la orice aciune
agresiv i orice atac una mpotriva celeilalte, att izolat, ct i n comun cu alte puteri.
Articolul 2
n cazul cnd una din Prile contractante devine obiect al aciunilor militare din partea
unei tere puteri, cealalt parte contractant nu va susine sub nici o form aceast putere.
Articolul 3
Guvernele ambelor Pri contractante rmn s in contact ntre ele pe viitor pentru
consultaii, ca s se informeze reciproc asupra chestiunilor ce privesc interesele lor
comune.
Articolul 4
Nici una din Prile contractante nu va participa la orice grupare de puteri ndreptat,
direct sau indirect, mpotriva altei pri.
Articolul 5
n caz de izbucnire a litigiilor sau conflictelor ntre prile contractante ntr-un fel sau
altul de chestiuni, ambele pri vor rezolva aceste litigii i conflicte exclusiv pe cale
panic, fcnd schimb prietenesc de opinii sau, n cazuri necesare, pe calea crerii unei
comisii pentru aplanarea conflictului.
Articolul 6
Tratatul de fa este ncheiat pe un termen de zece ani. Dac una din prile contractante
nu-l va denuna cu un an nainte de expirarea termenului, durata pactului s fie
considerat n mod automat pe urmtorii cinci ani.
Articolul 7
Tratatul de fa urmeaz s fie ratificat ntr-un termen ct mai scurt posibil. Schimbul de
instrumente de ratificare trebuie s aib loc la Berlin. Tratatul ntr n vigoare imediat
dup semnarea lui.
Protocolul adiional secret
Cu ocazia semnrii Tratatului de neagresiune dintre Reichul german i Uniunea

Republicilor Sovietice Socialiste, plenipoteniarii semnatari din partea celor dou pri
au discutat, n cadrul unor convorbiri strict confideniale, problema delimitrii sferelor
lor respective de interes n Europa Rsritean. Aceste convorbiri au dus la urmtorul
rezultat:
1. n cazul unor transformri teritoriale i politice ale teritoriilor aparinnd
statelor baltice (Finlanda, Estonia, Letonia, Lituania), frontiera nordic a Lituaniei va
reprezenta frontiera sferelor de interes att ale Germaniei, ct i ale URSS. n legtur cu
aceasta, interesul Lituaniei fa de teritoriul Vilno este recunoscut de ambele pri.
2. n cazul unor transformri teritoriale i politice ale teritoriilor aparinnd
statului polonez, sferele de interes, att ale Germaniei, ct i ale URSS, vor fi delimitate
aproximativ pe linia rurilor Narev, Vistula i San.
Problema dac n interesele ambelor pri ar fi de dorit meninerea unui stat
polonez i independent i a modului n care vor fi trasate frontierele acestui stat poate fi
soluionat definitiv numai n cursul evenimentelor politice ulterioare.
n orice caz, ambele guverne vor rezolva aceast problem pe calea unor
nelegeri prieteneti.
3. n privina Europei de Sud Est, partea sovietic subliniaz interesul pe care-l

manifest pentru Basarabia. Partea german i declar totalul dezinteres fa de aceste
teritorii.
4. Acest protocol va fi considerat de ambele pri ca strict secret.
SURSA: Gheorghe Onioru, Istoria contemporan universal 1917 1945, Editura

Fundaiei Romnia de Mine, Bucureti 2005, pp.43-45.
Document 4: Pactul germano sovietic de prietenie i frontier , Moscova, 28

septembrie 1939 (excerpt)
Articolul 1
Guvernul URSS i guvernul german stabilesc ca frontierele ntre cele dou state
interesate, pe teritoriul fostului stat polonez, linia trasat pe harta alturat, ce va fi
descris mai amnunit n protocolul suplimentar (...).
Articolul 3
Reconstruirea de stat necesar pe teritoriul de vest de la linia artat la articolul 1 o va
face guvernul german, pe teritoriul de la rsrit de aceast linie - guvernul URSS.
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii
internaionale n acte i documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactic i
Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1976, p.19.
Document 5: Pactul Briand Kellogg sau Pactul de la Paris , 27 august 1928

(excerpt)
Articolul 1
naltele pri contractante declar solemn n numele popoarelor lor respective c
condamn recursul la rzboi pentru regularea diferendelor internaionale i renun la el
ca instrument de politic naional n relaiunile lor mutuale
Articolul 2
naltele pri contractante recunosc c regularea sau rezolvarea tuturor diferendelor sau
conflictelor de orice natur sau de orice origine ar fi ele care se vor putea ivi ntre ele, nu
va trebui niciodat urmrit dect prin mijloace pacifiste.
(...)
Bucureti, 1974, p.134.
Document 6: Tratatele de la Locarno cu privire la garantarea frontierelor germano

franceze i germano belgiene, 16 octombrie 1925 (excerpt)
Pactul de garanie renan

Articolul 1
naltele pri contractante garanteaz fiecare pentru sine i toate mpreun (...)
meninerea statu qou-ului teritorial care rezult din frontierele dintre Germania i
Frana, inviolabilitatea acestor frontiere, aa cum au fost stabilite prin Tratatul de pace
semnat la Versailles la 28 iunie 1919, sau aa cum au fost stabilite n executarea acestuia,
precum i respectarea prevederilor articolelor 42 i 43 din menionatul tratat, referitoare
la zona demilitarizat.
Articolul 2
Germania i Belgia, precum i Germania i Frana se oblig n mod reciproc ca, n
raporturile lor, s nu recurg n nici un caz la agresiune i cotropire i s nu recurg la
rzboi una mpotriva celeilalte (...).
Articolul 3
Fa de obligaiile reciproce pe care i le-au asumat prin articolul 2, Germania i Belgia,
precum i Germania i Frana, se oblig s rezolve pe cale panic toate problemele, de
orice natur ar fi, care le despart i care ar putea fi soluionate prin obinuitele ci
diplomatice (...).
Articolul 4
n cazul unei nclcri a articolului 2 din prezentul tratat sau a nerespectrii vdite a
articolelor 42 sau 43 din Tratatul de la Versailles, de ctre una din naltele pri
contractante, fiecare din celelalte Puteri contractante se oblig de pe acum ca, de ndat
ce va afla c acea nclcare sau nerespectare constituie un act de agresiune neprovocat i
c sunt necesare aciuni imediate din cauza trecerii frontierei, sau a nceperii aciunilor de
rzboi, sau a concentrrii de fore armate n zona demilitarizat, s acorde fr ntrziere
sprijinul su acelei Pri fa de care s-a svrit o astfel de nclcare sau o astfel de
nclcare (...).
Articolul 5
Dispoziia din articolul 3 al prezentului tratat se pune sub garania naltelor pri
contractante, dup cum urmeaz:
n cazul n care una din Puterile indicate n articolul 3 refuz s se conformeze regulilor
panice sau s execute o hotrre arbitral sau judectoreasc, i ar viola articolul 3 al
prezentului tratat, sau nu ar respecta articolele 42 sau 43 din Tratatul de la Versailles, ea
va fi supus aplicrii prevederilor din articolul 4 al prezentului tratat (...).
Articolul 6
Dispoziiunile prezentului Tratat nu aduc nici o atingere drepturilor i obligaiunilor ce
decurg pentru naltele pri contractante din Tratatul de pace de la Versailles, precum i
din conveniile complementare, inclusiv aceea din 30 august 1924 semnat la Londra (...).
Tratatul ntre Frana i Polonia (sau tratat de garanie franco - polon)
Articolul 1
n cazul n care Polonia sau Frana ar avea de suferit de pe urma nerespectrii
angajamentelor, intervenite astzi ntre ele i Germania n vederea meninerii pcii
generale, Frana, i n mod reciproc Polonia, acionnd n aplicarea articolul 16 din Pactul
Societii Naiunilor, se angajeaz s-i dea imediat ajutor i asisten, dac o asemenea
nerespectare va fi nsoit de o folosire a armelor ce n-ar fi fost provocat (...).
Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1976, pp. p.113-115
Seminarul nr. 6
Evoluia relaiilor interaliate n timpul celui de-al doilea rzboi

mondial: 1939-1945
I Formarea coaliiei Naiunilor Unite
1) 22 iunie 1941, discursul lui Winston Churchill la radio prin care fcea cunoscut
poporului englez, agresiunea Germaniei mpotriva Uniunii Sovietice i justifica, din
perspectiva necesitii eliminrii agresiunii militare fasciste, aliana cu URSS, depind
astfel orice diferene ideologice
2) 12 iulie 1941, la Moscova era semnat acordul sovieto englez, intitulat Cu privire la
aciunile comune de rzboi mpotriva Germaniei
3) stabilirea modalitilor concrete de ajutorare a Uniunii Sovietice misiunea H.

Hopkins, schimbul de scrisori ntre Stalin i Franklin Roosevelt din 30 octombrie,
respectiv 6 noiembrie 1941
4) 14 august 1941, Carta Atlanticului
5) 24 septembrie 1941 URSS ader la Carta Atlanticului
6) conferina de la Moscova (29 septembrie 1 octombrie 1941) care a stabilit

modalitile de realizare i proporiile colaborrii ntre URSS i aliaii si anglo-saxoni
7) la nceputul lunii noiembrie 1941, Congresul american a hotrt s extind prevederile

legii lend and lease i asupra schimburilor fcute cu SUA de ctre URSS, i n acest
scop, a acordat un credit iniial de 1 miliard de dolari, iar n februarie 1942, un alt fond de
aceeai valoare
8) colaborarea anglo sovietic din Iran

- refuzul ahul Reza, cunoscut pentru poziia sa progerman, de a expulza pe resortisanii
germani, poziia strategic a Iranului pentru frontul sovietic, precum i interesele
economice britanice n aceast ar, au constituit principale motive ale atacrii Iranului de
ctre trupele sovietice i engleze (vara toamna 1941)
- ocuparea Iranului nu a fost nsoit de ncercri de subminare a integritii teritoriale,
suveranitii i independenei sale politice
9) a doua zi dup atacul de la Pearl Harbour, la 8 decembrie 1941 SUA i Anglia au

declarat rzboi Japoniei
10) 11 decembrie 1941, Germania i Italia au declarat rzboi SUA
11) 1 ianuarie 1942 a fost semnat la Casa Alb, Declaraia Naiunilor Unite de ctre
reprezentanii celor 26 de state care au participat la Conferina de la Washington (22
decembrie 1941 14 ianuarie 1942)
12) 26 mai 1942 s-a semnat la Londra, tratatul de alian anglo sovietic, intitulat Cu
privire la principiile ajutorului reciproc n rzboiul mpotriva agresorului
13) 11 iunie 1942 s-a semnat la Washington acordul sovieto american care reglementa
relaiile economice i financiare pe baza legii lend and lease
De ilustrat, pe larg, coninutul fiecrei etape, din formarea coaliiei Naiunilor Unite.
II Formarea alianei anglo americane
- n perioada rzboiului ciudat, SUA au susinut pasivitatea manifestat de

guvernele francez, englez mpotriva Germaniei i au fost de acord cu planuri de
operaii pentru ajutorarea Finlandei mpotriva URSS
- n februarie 1940, preedintele american F. Roosevelt l-a trimis pe Summer
Welles, adjunct al Secretarului de Stat, n Europa, pentru a sonda posibilitatea ca
Anglia i Frana s ncheie pace cu Germania misiunea eueaz
- victoriile obinute de aliana fascist i capitularea Franei au determinat
Congresul SUA s acorde de urgen credite sporite pentru armament
- ntre iunie 1940 iulie 1941 au fost livrate Angliei de ctre SUA cantiti
importante de arme, muniie, avioane
- 2 septembrie 1940 s-a semnat un tratat anglo american prin care Marea
Britanie, n schimbul a 50 de crucitoare americane i a obligaiei SUA de a apra
posesiunile engleze n emisfera occidental, arenda Statelor Unite, pe termen de 99
de ani, baze n insulele Newfoundland, Bermude, Bahamas, Jamaica, Santa Lucia,
Trinitii, Antigua, pe litoralul Guineiei britanice
- 15 iunie 1940, F. Roosevelt a semnat ordinul de creare a Comitetului pentru
cercetrile n domeniul folosirii energiei atomice n scopuri militare
- 16 septembrie 1940 SUA au adoptat legea privind obligativitatea serviciului
militar obligatoriu
- 6 ianuarie 1941, n mesajul pe care preedintele american F. Roosevelt l-a adresat
Congresului, a propus adoptarea legii lend and lease
- 11 martie 1941 a intrat n vigoare legea lend and lease
De ilustrat, pe larg, coninutul fiecrei etape, din formarea coaliiei anglo-americane.
III Conferinele interaliate
1) Conferina de la Casablanca (13-24 ianuarie 1943)
- au participat premierul britanic, Winston Churchill i preedintele american,

Franklin Roosevelt
- se amn deschiderea celui de al doilea front pentru primvara anului 1944
- s-a hotrt ca dup ncheierea operaiunilor din Africa de Nord s se pun n
aplicare planul de debarcare a trupelor anglo americane n Sicilia
- pentru a amna impresia defavorabil lsat de aceast nou amnare s-a adoptat
principiul capitulrii necondiionate pentru puterile Axei
2) Conferina de Quebec (august 1943)
- redactat un proiect comun de declaraie a celor patru puteri (SUA, URSS, Marea
Britanie, China)
- s-a confirmat decizia de fixare a deschiderii celui de al doilea front n Frana la 1
mai 1944
- s-a fixat o operaiune de debarcare n sudul Franei, aa- numita operaiune Anvil
- problema rzboiului din Pacific s-a aprobat planul de operaiuni americane
pentru perioada 1943-1944, care prevedea ocuparea arhipelagurilor Marshall,
Caroline, Mariane
- august 1943 s-a semnat un acord anglo-american n domeniul cercetrii atomice
3) Conferina de la Moscova (19-30 octombrie 1943)
- o conferin a minitrilor de externe ai Marii Britanii, Uniunii Sovietice i Statelor

Unite ale Americii
- au fost date din nou asigurri ca n mai 1944 se va deschide cel de al doilea front
- delegaii britanici i americani au propus unele proiecte de federalizare a rilor

mici din Europa central, de sud est respinse de guvernul sovietic
- au fost adoptate:
Declaraia cu privire la Austria
Declaraia cu privire la Italia
Declaraia cu privire la rspunderea nazitilor pentru atrocitilor comise
Declaraia celor patru
4) Conferina de la Cairo (26-27 noiembrie 1943)
- premierul britanic, Winston Churchill i preedintele american, Franklin

Roosevelt s-au ntlnit la Cairo
- la 1 decembrie 1943, acetia, mpreun cu Chiang Kai -shek, au dat publicitii
Declaraia tripartit anglo americano chinez n legturile cu reglementrile
din Extremul Orient
5) Conferina de la Teheran (28 noiembrie 1 decembrie 1943)
- reprezentanii sovietici au insistat asupra oportunitii unor operaiuni de

anvergur n Occident, peste Canalul Mnecii, ca soluie pentru grbirea nfrngerii
Germaniei i scurtarea duratei rzboiului
- Chruchill a susinut varianta balcanic: un avans rapid al aliailor n Italia, care
ar fi adus rzboiul n regiunea Bosforului sau n Balcani respins de Roosevelt i
Stalin
- Stalin a insistat s se acorde prioritate debarcrii n Frana, adic operaiunilor
Overlord i Anvil
- s-a discutat statutul postbelic al Germaniei:
a) Roosevelt a prezentat un plan de mprire a Germaniei n cinci state autonome
sub control internaional
b) Churchill a propus:
separarea Prusiei militariste de restul rii
desprinderea unor regiuni din sudul Germaniei pentru includerea lor, alturi de alte
state din Europa Central n o Federaie dunrean guvernul sovietic s-a opus, iar
preedintele american a propus ca problema s fie discutat n Comisia consultativ
european
- n ceea ce privete chestiunea polonez, Churchill a acceptat soluia de a mpinge
Polonia spre vest, teritoriul polonez trebuind a fi delimitat de linia Curzon i Oder,
inclusiv Prusia Oriental i Oppeln URSS ncorpora teritoriile atribuite prin
acordul germano sovietic din 1939, iar Polonia primea n schimb, n compensaie,
Prusia Oriental, Pomerania, Silezia
- Finlanda Stalin a artat c Finlanda
trebuia s revin la frontierele din 1940
s cedeze Uniunii Sovietice, Petsamo
s alunge trupele germane de pe teritoriul su
s plteasc Uniunii Sovietice, reparaii de rzboi
- Oceanul Pacific URSS a considerat c este posibil s nceap operaiunile
militare mpotriva Japoniei, la 6 luni dup terminarea conflictului din Europa
- organizarea securitii colective:
a) Churchill a propus un sistem regionalist construit n jurul a trei organisme
continentale din Europa, Asia i America
b) Stalin a imaginat o instituie mondial cu trei nivele de operaionalizare:
o adunare, la care s participe toate statele suverane
un comitet executiv care s administreze serviciile publice internaionale
un directoriat al celor patru mari puteri (SUA, URSS, Anglia, China)
care s menin ordinea internaional
- a fost adoptat: Declaraia cu privire la Iran (1 decembrie 1943)
7) Conferina de la Moscova (9-18 octombrie 1944)

- n cursul acestei ntlniri, Churchill i-a propus lui Stalin s stabileasc sferele de
influen n Balcani aa numitul acord al procentajelor:
Romnia 90% sovieticii Grecia 90% Marea Britanie

10% alii 10% Uniunea Sovietic
Ungaria i Iugoslavia 50% influen occidental

50% influen sovietic
Bulgaria 75% influen occidental

25% influen sovietic
8) Conferina de la Yalta (4-11 februarie 1945)
- au participat Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt, Churchill, minitrii de externe american

i englez, consilieri militari
- s-au luat decizii referitoare la:
A) problema german
- principiul capitulrii necondiionate
- punerea Germaniei n imposibilitatea de a mai provoca rzboi
a) mprirea Germaniei i conducerea acesteia n perioada postbelic
b) stabilirea plii unor reparaii de rzboi
delegaia sovietic a prezentat cteva principii privind perceperea reparaiilor n
natur, nu n bani, prin confiscarea de maini de maini i utilaje, prin livrri anuale de
mrfuri, termenul de lichidare fiind fixat la 10 ani
nu s-a ajuns la un acord n privina reparaiilor rezolvarea problemei a fost
ncredinat unei comisii de reparaii cu sediul la Moscova, incluznd trei reprezentani
(englez, sovietic i american)
propunerea sovietic: comisia de reparaii cu sediul la Moscova trebuia s aib ca
baz de discuie suma total de 22 de miliarde de dolari, din care jumtate trebuia s
revin Uniunii Sovietice, urmnd a fi acoperit din producia curent, utilaj industrial
demontat din zona sovietic i occidental, proprietile germane din afara teritoriului
german, folosirea mnii de lucru germane
B) problema polonez
- problema constituirii unui guvern polonez
- stabilirea frontierelor statului polonez
C) problema iugoslav
- problema constituirii unui guvern iugoslav
D) problema strmtorilor
E) problema Japoniei
F) Declaraia Europei eliberate
G) Organizaia mondial
- s-a stabilit convocarea unei conferine a Naiunilor Unite pentru constituirea unei
organizaii mondiale la data de 25 aprilie 1945 n Statele Unite ale Americii
9) Conferina de la Postdam ( 17 iulie 2 august 1945)

- au participat Stalin, Truman, Churchill, nlocuit cu Atlee
- scopul conferinei era acela de a stabili organizarea postbelic a lumii:
a) s-a creat un Consiliu al minitrilor de Externe englez, francez, chinez, american i

sovietic
b) problema german
- organizarea postbelic a Germaniei prin mprirea ei n zone de ocupaie
- transformarea Germaniei ntr-un stat democratic i panic prin:
denazificare
democratizare
demilitarizare
- stabilirea modului de percepere a reparaiilor germane de ctre URSS, Marea

Britanie, SUA
c) problema Italiei
- preedintele american Truman a propus ncheierea ct mai repede posibil a pcii
cu Italia pentru a se putea ncepe ct mai repede procesul de refacere i edificare a
vieii statele democratice
- Churchill s-a opus acestei propuneri, amintind c Italia a fost mult vreme n
tabra fascist
d) problema polonez
- problema tezaurului aflat al Londra: Churchill a afirmat c valoarea sa nu
acoperea cheltuielile fcute de Marea Britanie pentru organizarea i ntreinerea
trupelor poloneze, pentru ntreinerea guvernului polonez aflat n exil i a emigraiei
- problema frontierelor:
anglo saxonii au promis s sprijine transferul ctre URSS a oraului
Koenigsberg i a unei pri din Prusia oriental
cealalt parte a Prusiei Orientale i oraul Danzig trebuiau s revin Poloniei
teritoriul de la est de linia Oder-Neisse s fie administrat provizoriu de Polonia
e) strmutarea populaiilor germane n Germania din Prusia Oriental, Polonia,

Cehoslovacia, Ungaria
f) s-a adoptat o declaraie comun anglo americano chinez prin care se cerea
Japoniei s capituleze necondiionat, creia i se va altura, ulterior, i partea sovietic
De ilustrat, pe baza documentelor incluse n acest caiet de seminar, deciziile luate n

cursul conferinelor interaliate asupra problemelor identificate mai sus.
IV Crearea Organizaiei Naiunilor Unite
Geneza:
- n ianuarie 1941, n mesajul su adresat Congresul SUA, preedintele american
Roosevelt proclama cele patru drepturi:
dreptul la expresie i de opinie
dreptul de liber exercitare a credinei
dreptul de a fi ferit de srcie
dreptul de a fi ferit de teroare
- 14 august 1941, Carta Atlanticului realizarea unui sistem mai larg i
permanent de securitate general
- 1 ianuarie 1942 a fost semnat la Casa Alb, Declaraia Naiunilor Unite de ctre
reprezentanii celor 26 de state care au participat la Conferina de la Washington
(22 decembrie 1941 14 ianuarie 1942); Aliaii i spun pentru prima oar
Naiunile Unite
- 1943 Conferina minitrilor de Externe de la Washington a hotrt crearea unui
organism internaional pentru asigurarea pcii i securitii
- ntre 21 august -7 octombrie 1944 s-a desfurat Conferina de la Dumbarton
Oaks, n cadrul creia s-au elaborat propunerile privind statutul O.N.U. i s-au
stabilit principiile generale de organizare
- la Conferina de la Yalta din 4-11 februarie 1945 s-a stabilit, printre altele:
c membrii permaneni ai Consiliului de Securitate primesc drept de veto
convocarea unei conferine a Naiunilor Unite privind constituirea organizaiei mondiale
la data de 25 aprilie 1945 n Statele Unite ale Americii
- la 26 aprilie 1945 s-a deschis Conferina de la San Francisco, cu participarea a 50

de state
- dup negocierile din cadrul acestei conferine (aprilie iunie 1945), la 26 iunie
1945, ntemeierea O.N.U.: reprezentanii celor 50 de state au semnat Carta
Naiunilor Unite
- la 15 octombrie 1945, Polonia (al 51-lea stat fondator) ratific Carta
- 24 octombrie 1945, Carta intr n vigoare (Ziua Naiunilor Unite)
Organizaia Naiunilor Unite
- funcionarea i activitatea ei este reglementat pe baza Cartei O.N.U.

- obiectivele organizaiei
- membrii
calitatea de membru
obligaiile membrilor
numrul statelor membre: n 1945 erau 51 de state membre, crora li s-au
adugat rile din Africa i din Asia, care i-au dobndit independena, fotii aliai ai
Germaniei (1955 - 1956), apoi China comunist (1971), cele dou state germane (1973),
statele rezultate n urma desfiinrii URSS
- organizarea:
1) Adunarea General
2) Consiliul de Securitate
3) Secretarul General
4) Curtea Internaional de Justiie de la Haga
5) Consiliul de Tutel
6) Consiliul Economic i Social (ECOSOC)

- se ocup de creterea general a nivelului de trai, servindu-se n acest, scop de alte
agenii i comisii speciale ale O.N.U.:
- O.M.S. (Organizaia Mondial a Sntii), cu sediul la Geneva
- O.I.M. (Organizaia Internaional a Muncii), cu sediul la Geneva
- F.M.I. (Fondul Monetar Internaional), cu sediul la Washington
- F.A.O. (Organizaia pentru Alimentaie i Agricultur), cu sediul la Roma

- U.N.I.C.E.F. (Fondul Internaional pentru Urgene ale Copiilor al Naiunilor
Unite), cu sediul la New -York
- U.N.E.S.C.O. (Organizaia Naiunilor Unite pentru Educaie, tiin i Cultur),
cu sediul la Paris
- B.I.R.D. (Banca Internaional pentru Reconstrucie i Dezvoltare)
-U.N.C.T.A.D. (Comisia Naiunilor Unite pentru Comer i Dezvoltare)
* De ilustrat principalele atribuii ale organismelor O.N.U., menionate mai sus.
V Suport documentar
Document 1: Winston Churchill despre agresiunea Germaniei mpotriva Uniunii

Sovietice (excerpt)
Londra, 22 iunie 1944
Nimeni mai mult dect mine nu a fost un adversar mai statornic al comunismului, n
cursul ultimilor 25 de ani. Nu voi retrage nici un cuvnt din cele ce am spus despre acest
subiect (...).
Nu avem dect un singur el, un singur scop irevocabil. Suntem hotri s distrugem pe
Hitler i orice urm de a regimului nazist. Nimic nu ne va ndeprta de la aceast hotrre
nimic! (...) orice om i orice stat care lupt mpotriva nazismului va avea sprijinul
nostru. Orice om i orice stat care merge cu Hitler este dumanul nostru (...).
Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1976, pp.91-92.
Document 2: Acord ntre guvernele URSS i Marii Britanii cu privire la aciunile

comune mpotriva Germaniei (excerpt)
Moscova, 12 iulie 1941
(...) Guvernul URSS i guvernul Majestii Sale a Regatului Unit au ncheiat prezentul
acord i declar urmtoarele:
1. Ambele guverne se oblig reciproc s-i acorde unul altuia ajutor i sprijin de orice
natur n actualul rzboi mpotriva Germaniei hitleriste.
2. Ele se oblig de asemenea ca n continuarea acestui rzboi s nu duc tratative, s nu

ncheie armistiiu sau tratat de pace fr acordul celuilalt (...).
Document 3:Carta Atlanticului
14 august 1941
Preedintele Statelor Unite ale Americii i Dl. Churchill, prim ministru, reprezentnd
guvernul Majestii Sale n Regatul Unit, ntlnindu-se pe mare, consider c trebuie
fcute cunoscute unele dintre principiile pe care i bazeaz speranele ntr-u viitor mai
bun pentru omenire i care sunt comune politicii naionale a rilor respective.
1. rile lor nu urmresc nici o mrire teritorial sau de alt natur.
2. Ei nu doresc s vad nici o modificare teritorial care s nu fie n acord cu voinele
liber exprimate ale popoarelor interesate.
3. Ei respect dreptul ce are fiecare popor de a alege forma de guvernmnt sub care vrea
s triasc; ei doresc s fie redate drepturile suverane i liberul exerciiu de guvernare
celor care au fost privai de ele prin for.
4. Ei se strduiesc, innd seama de obligaiile pe care i le-au asumat deja, s deschid
tuturor statelor, mari sau mici, nvingtori sau nvini, accesul la materii prime ale lumii
i tranzaciilor comerciale care sunt necesare prosperitii lor.
5. Ei doresc s realizeze ntre toate naiunile colaborarea cea mai complet n domeniul
economic, cu scopul de a garanta tuturor ameliorarea condiiei muncii, progresul
economic i securitatea social.
6. Dup distrugerea final a tiraniei naziste, ei sper s vad stabilindu-se o pace care va
permite tuturor naiunilor s se afle n securitate n interiorul propriilor lor frontiere i va
garanta tuturor oamenilor din toate rile o existen eliberat de orice team i de lipsuri.
7. O asemenea pace va permite tuturor oamenilor s navigheze fr fric pe mare.
8. Ei sunt convini c toate naiunile lumii, att din motive de ordin practic ct i de ordin
spiritual, vor trebui s renune n cele din urm la folosirea forei. i din moment ce este
imposibil de a salva pacea viitoare atta vreme ct unele naiuni care o amenin sau ar
putea s o amenine posed arme pe mare, pe uscat i n aer, ei consider c, ateptnd
s poate stabili un sistem larg i permanent de securitate general, dezarmarea acestor
naiuni se impune. Totodat, ei vor ajuta i ncuraja toate celelalte msuri susceptibile s
uureze povara zdrobitoare a armamentelor care copleete popoarele panice.
Document 4 :Declaraia Naiunilor Unite
Washington 1 ianuarie 1942
Guvernele semnatare,
Subscriind la principiile i obiectivele definite n programul comun, cuprins n Declaraia

comun a Preedintelui Statelor Unite ale Americii i a primului Ministru al Regatului
Unit al Marii Britanii i Irlandei de Nord, cu data de 14 august 1941, Declaraia
cunoscut sub numele de Carta Atlanticului.
Convini c victoria complet asupra inamicilor este indispensabil aprrii existenei lor,
a libertii, a independenei i a libertii religioase, precum i a aprrii drepturilor i
dreptii omeneti, att n rile lor, ct i n celelalte ri, convini de asemenea c ei sunt
angajai ntr-o lupt comun contra forelor slbatice i brutale care ncearc s
aserveasc lumea.
1) Fiecare guvern se angajeaz s ntrebuineaz toate resursele sale, militare sau
economice, contra acelor membri ai Pactului Tripartit i contra acelor adereni ai acestui
din urm Pact, cu care unul din aceste guvernele semnatare se gsete n stare de rzboi.
2) Fiecare guvern se angajeaz s colaboreze cu guvernele semnatare i se oblig s nu
semneze cu inamicul un armistiiu separat sau o pace separat.
Toate naiunile care dau sau vor da asisten, care dau sau vor da contribuia lor la lupta
pentru victoria asupra hitlerismului, vor putea adera la prezenta declaraie.
Document 5: Twenty-Year Mutual Assistance Agreement Between the United

Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics : May 26, 1942 (excerpt)
London, May 26, 1942
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN, IRELAND AND BRITISH

DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA, AND THE PRESIDIUM
OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS:
Desiring to confirm the stipulations of the agreement between His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics for joint action in the war against Germany signed at Moscow, July 12, 1941,
and to replace them by formal treaty ()
PART ONE
ARTICLE I
In virtue of the alliance established between the United Kingdom and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the high contracting parties mutually undertake to afford one
another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in war against Germany and
all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.
ARTICLE II
The high contracting parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with the
Hitlerite Government or any other government in Germany that does not clearly renounce
all aggression intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude, except by mutual consent, any
armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated with her in acts of
aggression in Europe.
PART TWO
ARTICLE III
1. The high contracting parties declare their desire to unite with other like-minded
States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in
the post-war period.
2. Pending adoption of such proposals, they will after termination of hostilities take all
measures in their power to render impossible the repetition of aggression and violation of
peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in
Europe.
ARTICLE IV
Should either of the high contracting parties during the postwar period become
involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in Article III, Section
2, in consequence of the attack by that State against that party, the other high contracting
party will at once give to the contracting party so involved in hostilities all military and
other support and assistance in his power. ()
ARTICLE V
The high contracting parties, having regard to the interests of security of each of them,
agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after re-establishment of peace
for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe.
They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects and
they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial
aggrandizement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
States.
ARTICLE VI
The high contracting parties agree to render one another all possible economic
assistance after the war.
ARTICLE VII
Each contracting party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in
any coalition directed against the other high contracting party.
SURSA: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/brsov42.htm , 15.01.2007
Document 6: Acord ntre guvernele URSS i SUA asupra principiilor aplicabile

ajutorului reciproc n vederea rzboiului mpotriva agresiunii
Washington, 11 iunie 1942
Articolul 1
Guvernul SUA va continua s aprovizioneze guvernul URSS cu acele materiale de
aprare, de asisten medical i informaii pe care preedintele SUA a dispus s i le
transmit sau s i le pun la dispoziie.
Articolul 2
Guvernul URSS va continua s contribuie la aprarea SUA i la ntrirea lor i s le
furnizeze materiale, asisten, avantaje i informaii n msura posibilitilor sale (...).
Document 7: Legea de mprumut i nchiriere (excerpt)
Washington, 11 martie 1941
Se stabilete prin prezenta, c aceast lege se va numi Legea despre ntrirea aprrii
Statelor Unite (...).
Seciunea 3
a) Independent de prevederile cuprinse n orice alt lege, preedintele poate, atunci cnd
socoate ca necesar, n interesele aprrii naionale, s mputerniceasc pe Secretarul de
rzboi, Secretarul flotei maritime de rzboi sau pe conductorul oricrui alt minister sau
instituie guvernamental:
1) n limitele mijloacelor alocate pentru acest scop, sau contractelor aprobate din
timp de ctre Congres, s produc n arsenalele, fabricile i antierele aflate n subordinea
lor sau s procure pe orice alt cale orice materiale de aprare pentru guvernul fiecrei
ri a crui aprare preedintele o consider vital necesar pentru securitatea Statelor
Unite.
2) S vnd, s transfere dreptul, s schimbe, s dea n arend, s dea n folosin
sau s predea n orice alt mod unui astfel de guvern orice materiale de aprare care nu
sunt produse i procurate n conformitate cu paragraful 1(...).
b) Termenele i condiiile n care oricare astfel de guvern strin va primi oricare din
ajutoarele autorizate conform cu subseciunea a) vor fi stabilite de ctre preedinte;
pentru livrrile efectuate, Statele Unite vor primi plata sau compensarea fie direct sub
forma de sume de bani, fie sub forma de orice fel de proprietate pe care le va stabili
preedintele (...).
Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1976, pp. 81-83 .
Document 8: Casablanca Conference 1943 (excerpt)
Feb 12, 1943
()
We have lately concluded a long, hard battle in the Southwest Pacific and we have
made notable gains. That battle started in the Solomons and New Guinea last summer. It
has demonstrated our superior power in planes and, most importantly, in the fighting
qualities of our individual soldiers and sailors.
American armed forces in the Southwest Pacific are receiving powerful aid from
Australia and New Zealand and also directly from the British themselves.
We do not expect to spend the time it would take to bring Japan to final defeat merely
by inching our way forward from island to island across the vast expanse of the Pacific.
Great and decisive actions against the Japanese will be taken to drive the invader from
the soil of China. Important actions will be taken in the skies over China-and over Japan
itself.
The discussions at Casablanca have been continued in Chungking with the
Generalissimo by General Arnold and have resulted in definite plans for offensive
operations.
There are many roads which lead right to Tokyo. We shall neglect none of them.
In an attempt to ward off the inevitable disaster, the Axis propagandists are trying all
of their old tricks in order to divide the United Nations. They seek to create the idea that
if we win this war, Russia, England, China, and the United States are going to get into a
cat-and-dog fight.
This is their final effort to turn one nation against another, in the vain hope that they
may settle with one or two at a time-that any of us may be so gullible and so forgetful as
to be duped into making "deals" at the expense of our Allies.
To these panicky attempts to escape the consequences of their crimes we say-all the
United Nations say-that the only terms on which we shall deal with an Axis government
or any Axis factions are the terms proclaimed at Casablanca: "Unconditional Surrender."
In our uncompromising policy we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis
nations. But we do mean to impose punishment and retribution in full upon their guilty,
barbaric leaders...
In the years of the American and French revolutions the fundamental principle guiding
our democracies was established. The cornerstone of our whole democratic edifice was
the principle that from the people and the people alone flows the authority of
government.
It is one of our war aims, as expressed in the Atlantic Charter, that the conquered
populations of today be again the masters of their destiny. There must be no doubt
anywhere that it is the unalterable purpose of the United Nations to restore to conquered
peoples their sacred rights.
SURSA: Casablanca Conference 1943 ,

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/casablan.htm , 15.01.2007
Document 9 :The Quebec Conference, August 17-24, 1943
Joint Statement by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt, August At,
1943
The Anglo-American war conference, which opened at Quebec on August 11, under
the hospitable auspices of the Canadian Government, has now concluded its work.
The whole field of world operations has been surveyed in the light of the many
gratifying events which have taken place since the meeting of the President and the Prime
Minister in Washington at the end of May, and the necessary decisions have been taken
to provide for the forward action of the fleets, armies, and air forces of the two nations.
Considering that these forces are intermingled in continuous action against the enemy
in several quarters of the globe, it is indispensable that entire unity of aim and method
should be maintained at the summit of the war direction.
Further conferences will be needed, probably at shorter intervals than before, as the
war effort of the United States and British Commonwealth and Empire against the enemy
spreads and deepens.
It would not be helpful to the fighting troops to make any announcement of the
decisions which have been reached. These can only emerge in action.
It may, however, be stated that the military discussions of the chiefs of staff turned
very largely upon the war against Japan and the bringing of effective aid to China. Dr. T.
V. Soong, representing the Generalissimo Kai-shek, was a party to the discussions. In this
field, as in the European, the President and the Prime Minister were able to receive and
approve the unanimous recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Agreements
were also reached upon the political issues underlying or arising out of the military
operations.
It was resolved to hold another conference before the end of the year between the
British and American authorities, in addition to any tri-partite meeting which it may be
possible to arrange with Soviet Russia. Full reports of the decisions so far as they affect
the war against Germany and Italy will be furnished to the Soviet Government.
Consideration has been given during the Conference to the question of relations with
the French Committee of Liberation, and it is understood that an announcement by a
number of governments will be made in the latter part of the week.
SURSA: The Quebec Conference, August 17-24, 1943 ,

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade06.htm , 15.01.2007
Document 10:The Moscow Conference; October 1943 (excerpt)
JOINT FOUR-NATION DECLARATION
The governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union,
and China;
United in their determination, in accordance with the declaration by the United
Nations of January, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against
those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid
down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;
Conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples
allied with them from the menace of aggression;
Recognizing the necessity of insuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace
and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least
diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;
Jointly declare:
1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their
respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and
security.
2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters
relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.
3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against
any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.
4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a
general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all
peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-
establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security they
will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United
Nations, with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.
6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces
within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration
and after joint consultation.
7. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the
United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the
regulation of armaments in the post-war period.
DECLARATION REGARDING ITALY
The Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union have established that their three governments are in complete agreement that
Allied policy toward Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism
and all its evil influence and configuration shall be completely destroyed and that the
Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other
institutions based on democratic principles. ()
In furtherance of this policy in the future the Foreign Secretaries of the three
governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into
effect:
1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by
inclusion of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always
opposed Fascism.
2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public
meeting, shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall be entitled to
form anti-Fascist political groups.
3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed.
4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and
from institutions and organizations of a public character.
5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded full
amnesty.
6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.
7. Fascist chiefs and army generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be
arrested and handed over to justice. ()
DECLARATION ON AUSTRIA
The governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of
America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite
aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.
They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938, as
null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any charges effected in
Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-established a free and
independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as
well as those neighboring States which will be face with similar problems, to find that
political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace. Austria is
reminded, however that she has a responsibility, which she cannot evade, for
participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement
account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.
STATEMENT ON ATROCITIES
Signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin.
The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from
many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which
are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and
from which they are now being steadily expelled. ()
Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied powers, speaking in the interest of the thirty-
two United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as
follows:
At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in
Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been
responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and
executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done
in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated
countries and of free governments which will be erected therein. ()
SURSA: The Moscow Conference; October 1943

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/moscow.htm , 15.01.2007
Document 11: Cairo Conference 1943 , November, 1943 , Released December 1,

1943
The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against
Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure
against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already mounting.
The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of
Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.
It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which
she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that
all the territories Japan has stolen form the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the
Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.
Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence
and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of
Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.
With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United
Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged
operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.
SURSA: : Cairo Conference 1943 , November, 1943 , Released December 1, 1943

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/cairo.htm , 15.01.2007
Document 12:The Tehran Conference
THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 28-DECEMBER 1, 1943
(a) Declaration of the Three Powers, December 1, 1943
We the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the
Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past, in this, the Capital of our
Ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.
We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the
peace that will follow..
As to war-our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have
concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete
agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east,
west and south. ()
No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U
Boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.
Our attack will be relentless and increasing.
Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with confidence to the day when all
peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their
varying desires and their own consciences.
We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit
and in purpose.
ROOSEVELT, CHHRCHILL and STALIN
Signed at Tehran, December 1, 1943
(b) Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran, December 1, 1943
The President of the United States, the Premier of the U. S. S. R. and the Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime
Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments
regarding their relations with Iran.
The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom
recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the
common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas
to the Soviet Union.
The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties
for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government
of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands
made upon them by their world-wide military operations, and to the world-wide shortage
of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.
With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U. S. S.
R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any
economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full
consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences
or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.
The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are at
one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran They count upon the participation of Iran,
together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace,
security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic
Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.
WINSTON S.CHURCHILL
J. STALIN
FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT
(c) Military Conclusions of the Tehran Conference
The Conference:-
(1) Agreed that the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and
equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando operations ()
(4) Took note that Operation OVERLORD would be launched during May 1944, in
conjunction with an operation against Southern France. ()
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
JOSEPH V. STALIN
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
TEHRAN, December 1, 1943.
SURSA: The Tehran Conference , http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/tehran.htm ,

15.01.2007
Documentul 13:The Yalta Conference

February, 1945
Washington, March 24 - The text of the agreements reached at the Crimea (Yalta)
Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo
Stalin, as released by the State Department today, follows:
PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS OF CRIMEA CONFERENCE

The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the United States of
America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took
place from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions:
I. WORLD ORGANIZATION
It was decided:
1. That a United Nations conference on the proposed world organization should be
summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of
America.
2. The nations to be invited to this conference should be:
(a) the United Nations as they existed on 8 Feb., 1945; and
(b) Such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1
March, 1945. (For this purpose, by the term "Associated Nations" was meant the eight
Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the conference on world organization is held, the
delegates of the United Kingdom and United State of America will support a proposal to
admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White
Russia.
3. That the United States Government, on behalf of the three powers, should consult
the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to decisions
taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.
4. That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part
in the United Nations conference should be as follows:
"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the
Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics and the
Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic invite the
Government of -------- to send representatives to a conference to be held on 25 April,
1945, or soon thereafter , at San Francisco, in the United States of America, to prepare a
charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace
and security.
"The above-named Governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a
basis for such a Charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international
organization which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks
conference and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for
Section C of Chapter VI:
C. Voting
"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an
affirmative vote of seven members.
"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all matters should be made by an affirmative
vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members;
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence
of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from

voting.'
"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.
"In the event that the Government of -------- desires in advance of the conference to
present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United
States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other
participating Governments."
Territorial trusteeship:
It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent seats on the Security
Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations conference on the question
of territorial trusteeship.
The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that
territorial trusteeship will only apply to
(a) existing mandates of the League of Nations;
(b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war;
(c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship;
and
(d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming
United Nations conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a
matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories
will be place under trusteeship.
II. Declaraia asupra Europei eliberate
Urmtoarea declaraie a fost aprobat:

Preedintele Consiliului de Minitri ai URSS, primul Ministru al Regatului Unit i
Preedintele SUA s-au consultat n interesul comun al popoarelor rilor lor i al tuturor
popoarelor Europei eliberate. Ei afirm acordul comun de a duce o politic comun din
partea celor trei guverne ale lor n timpul perioadei temporare de instabilitate n Europa
eliberat i acela de a ajuta popoarele Europei eliberate de sub dominaia Germaniei
naziste i popoarele fostelor state satelite ale Axei, s rezolve prin mijloace democratice
probleme lor politice i economice cel mai urgente.
Stabilirea ordinii n Europa i reconstrucia economiei naionale trebuie s fie realizat
prin mijloace care s permit popoarelor eliberate de a lichida ultimele vestigii ale
nazismului i fascismului, de a stabili instituii democratice alese de ele. Acestea
corespund principiilor Cartei Atlanticului dreptul tuturor popoarelor de a-i alege forma
de guvernmnt n care doresc s triasc restaurarea drepturilor suverane i de
autoguvernare n profitul popoarelor care au fost private de aceste drepturi prin acte de
agresiune.
n scopul de a crea condiiile n care popoarele eliberate s poat s-i exercite aceste
drepturi, cele trei guverne vor asiste mpreun popoarele oricrui stat european, fost
satelit al Axei, de fiecare dat cnd ele vor crede c situaia o impune:
a) crearea condiiilor de pace intern;
b) s ia masurile de urgen pentru a ajuta popoarele aflate n pericol;
c) s constituie autoriti guvernamentale provizorii n mod larg reprezentative ale tuturor
forelor democratice ale acestor populaii i care se vor angaja s stabileasc, ct mai
curnd posibil, prin alegeri libere, guverne care s fie expresia voinei popoarelor i,
d) s faciliteze, oriunde va fi necesar, astfel de alegeri.
Cele trei guverne vor constata c situaia dintr-un stat eliberat din europa sau ntr-un fost
satelit al axei, impune o asemenea aciune necesar, ele se vor consulta asupra msurilor
de luat pentru a-i asuma rspunderea comun definit prin prezenta declaraie.
III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY
() "The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the
exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete
dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."
The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a
committee consisting of Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. John Winant, and Mr. Fedor T. Gusev.
This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.
IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL

FOR GERMANY.
It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be
allocated France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and
its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French
Provisional Government.
It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to
become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.
V. REPARATION
The following protocol has been approved:

Protocol
On the Talks between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on
the Question of the German Reparations in Kind
1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the
course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries
which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have
organized victory over the enemy.
2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:
(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation
of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the
territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment,
machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of
industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to

be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of
Germany.
(b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be
fixed.
(c) Use of German labor.
3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of
reparation from Germany an Allied reparation commission will be set up in Moscow. It
will consist of three representatives - one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.
4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the
distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression, the
Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:
"The Moscow reparation commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for
discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in
accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2 should be 22 billion dollars and
that 50 per cent should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending consideration of the reparation
question by the Moscow reparation commission, no figures of reparation should be
mentioned.
The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow reparation
commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the commission.
VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the
subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close
of the conference.
VII. POLAND
(.)The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should

therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic
leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be
called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
()This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the
holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal
suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall
have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. ()
"The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should
follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight
kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial
accessions in territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish
Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course of the extent
of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should
thereafter await the peace conference."
VIII. YUGOSLAVIA
It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Ivan Subasitch: ()
(b) That as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:
(I) That the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be extended
to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised
themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a
temporary Parliament and
(II) That legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation
(AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; and that
this statement should be published in the communiqu of the conference.
()

XI. SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the
following subjects:
(a) The Control Commission in Bulgaria.
(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to
reparations.
(c) Oil equipment in Rumania.
(..)
XIV. THE MONTREAUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in
London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government
would put forward in relation to the Montreaux Convention, and report to their
Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.
The forgoing protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the
Crimean Conference Feb. 11, 1945.
E. R. Stettinius Jr.
M. Molotov
Anthony Eden
AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN
The leaders of the three great powers the Soviet Union, the United States of America
and Great Britain have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has
surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war
against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:
1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian Peoples Republic) shall
be preserved.

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in

1904 shall be restored, viz.:
(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be
returned to the Soviet Union;
(b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent
interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of
Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;
The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which
provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a
joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent
interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain
sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.
(.)
Joseph Stalin
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Winston S. Churchill
February 11, 1945.
SURSA: The Yalta Conference, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/yalta.htm ,

15.01.2007
Document 14: Potsdam Conference (excerpt)
July 17-August 2, 1945
()
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS.
A. The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of
Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements:

" (1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the
United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United
States.
"(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London which shall be the permanent seat
of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be
accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the
Council in the absence of his Foreign Ministers, and by a small staff of technical
advisers.
" (ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September
1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed
from time to time.
" (3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorized to draw up,
with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy,
Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial
questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be
utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the
Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.
()
II. THE PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY IN THE

INITIAL CONTROL PERIOD
A. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme
authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by
the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the
United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each
in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole,
in their capacity as members of the Control Council.
2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German
population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be
guided are:
(i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or
control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:-
(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the SS., SA., SD., and Gestapo, with all
their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers'
Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military
and semi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to
keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in
such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German
militarism and Nazism;
(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their
production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and
production of all aircraft and all arms. ammunition and implements of war shall be
prevented.
(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and
that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since
their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German
economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.
(iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised
organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any
form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.
(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a
democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.
4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established
discriminations on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such
discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.
5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi
enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought
to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi

organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its
objectives shall be arrested and interned.
6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its
activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public
and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private
undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral
qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions
in Germany.
7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and
militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.
8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of
democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of
race, nationality or religion.
9. The administration in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of
the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:-
(i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic
principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with
military security and the purposes of military occupation;
(ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion
shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;
(iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial
and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful
application of these principles in local self-government;
(iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established.
Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative
departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of
finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act
under the direction of the Control Council.
10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press
and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject

likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall
be permitted.
B. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES.
11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition
and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be
prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items
that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to
Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph
15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in
accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on
Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be
destroyed.
12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the
purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as
exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic
arrangements.
13. In organizing the German Economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the
development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. ()
III. REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY.

1. Reparation claims of the U. S. S. R. shall be met by removals from the zone of
Germany occupied by the U. S. S. R., and from appropriate German external assets.
2. The U. S. S. R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own
share of reparations.
3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries
entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German
external assets.
4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U. S. S. R. from its own zone of
occupation, the U. S. S. R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones:

(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first
place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is
unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western
Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc,
timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed
upon.
(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German
peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the
Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in
return.
Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made
simultaneously. ()
8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of
German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of Germany as well as to
German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below.
9. The Governments of the U. K. and U. S. A. renounce all claims in respect of
reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of
occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland,
Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.
10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in
Germany.
IV. DISPOSAL OF THE GERMAN NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE

A. The following principles for the distribution of the German Navy were agreed:
(1) The total strength of the German surface navy, excluding ships sunk and those
taken over from Allied Nations, but including ships under construction or repair, shall be
divided equally among the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. A.
(2) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair
may be (3) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than
thirty submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the U. S. S. R., U.
K., and U. S. A. for experimental and technical purposes.

(4) All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy
appertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) hereof shall be
handed over to the respective powers receiving such ships. ()
B. The following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine were
agreed:-
(1) The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever
located, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., the U. K., and the U. S. A. ()
V. CITY 0F KOENIGSBERG AND THE ADJACENT AREA.

()The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government
concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the
area adjacent ()
The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that
they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.
VI. WAR CRIMINALS.

() The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring these criminals to swift
and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy
agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great
importance that the trial of these major criminals should begin at the earliest possible
date. The first list of defendants will be published before 1st September.
VII. AUSTRIA.
The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of

the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria. ()
It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria.
VIII. POLAND.
A. DECLARATION.
We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative
Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with

the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of

National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. ()
The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government of National
Unity in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who
wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine.
They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property
rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens
The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, in
accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, has agreed to the holding of
free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and
secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part
and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full
freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the
elections.
B. WESTERN FRONTIER OF POLAND.

() The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation
of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.
The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of
Poland's western frontier, the former German territories cast of a line running from the
Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinamunde, and thence along the Oder River to the
confluence of the western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the
Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the
administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the
understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of
Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should
not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

IX. CONCLUSION on PEACE TREATIES AND ADMISSION TO THE UNITED

NATIONS ORGANIZATION.
()The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with
the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The
conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic governments in these States
will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for
membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each
separately in the near future in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the
establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to
the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.
The three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting
from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy
full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary
and Finland.
As regards the admission of other States into the United Nations Organization, Article
4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who
accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the
organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;
2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be
effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security
Council.
The three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for
membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which
fulfill the qualifications set out above. ()
XII. ORDERLY TRANSFER OF GERMAN POPULATIONS.

The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize
that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in

Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any
transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner. ()
XIV. IRAN.
It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and
that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945.
XVI. THE BLACK SEA STRAITS.

The Three Governments recognized that the Convention concluded at Montreux
should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions.
It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct
conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government. ()
SURSA: Potsdam Conference,

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade17.htm , 15.01.2007
Document 15: Charter of the United Nations; June 26, 1945 (excerpt)
CHAPTER I
PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these
common ends.
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1,
shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from
membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance
with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and. justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state
against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United
Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or

shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter;
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
CHAPTER II
MEMBERSHIP
()
Article 4
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to a other peace-loving states which
accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the
Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. ()
CHAPTER III
ORGANS
Article 7
1. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General
Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council,
an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.
2. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in
accordance with the present Charter. ()
CHAPTER IV
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Composition
Article 9
1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.
2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General
Assembly.

Functions and Powers
()
Article 11
1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the
maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing
disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with
regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations,
or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United () may
make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned
or to the Security Council or to both. ()
Voting
Article 18
1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-
thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include:
recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the
election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the
members of the Economic and Social Council, () the admission of new Members to
the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the
expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and
budgetary questions.
Procedure
Article 20
The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special
sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-

General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the
United Nations.
Article 21
The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its
President for each session.
Article 22
The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for
the performance of its functions.
CHAPTER V
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Composition
Article 23
1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The
Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist , the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent
members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members
of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council ().
2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of
two years. In the first election of the non- permanent members after the increase of the
membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional
members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible
for immediate re-election.
3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.


Article 24
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the
Security Council acts on their behalf. ()
Voting
Article 27
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members. ()
Procedure
Article 28
1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously.
Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at times at the
seat of the Organization. ()
CAPTER VI
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of a, seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle
their dispute by such means.
Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead
to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the
continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security.
Article 35
l. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the
nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General
Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of
the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it
accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement
provided in the present Charter. ()
CHAPTER VII
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF

THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
()
Article 44
When Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a
Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations
assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in
the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that
Member's armed forces.

Article 45
In order to enable the Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold
immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international
enforcement action. ()
Article 46
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with
the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. (.)
Article 48
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the
United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly
and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are
members.
Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in
carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council. ()
CHAPTER X
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
Composition
Article 61
1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of fifty-four Members of the United
Nations elected by the General Assembly.

2. () eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each
year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-
election. ()
4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.
Article 62
1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with
respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters
and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General
Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies
concerned. ()
Voting
Article 67
1. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the
members present and voting. ()
CHAPTER XIV
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Article 92
The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations.()
Article 96
1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court
of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any
time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of
the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.
CHAPTER XV
THE SECRETARIAT
Article 97
The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary- General and such staff as the Organization
may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon
the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer
of the Organization.
Article 98
The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General
Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the
Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by
these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General
Assembly on the work of the Organization.
Article 99
The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter
which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.
()
SURSA: Charter of the United Nations; June 26, 1945,

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/unchart.htm , 15.01.2007

Seminar nr. 7
Relaiile dintre fotii aliai i debutul rzboiului rece 1945-1947
I Definirea rzboiului rece
- termen general acceptat , desemnnd conflictul ideologic , politic , psihologic

i militar de dup 1945 dintre aliaii occidentali ( condui de SUA ) pe de o
parte i blocul comunist ( n frunte cu URSS ) pe de alt parte.
- paternitatea expresiei n cauz este atribuit regentului Castiliei i Leonului ,
prinul Juan Manuel , care n secolul al XIV - lea a utilizat sintagma de rzboi
rece pentru a descrie conflictul din Spania , dintre cretini i musulmani. Spre
deosebire de rzboaiele clasice , un atare rzboi ncepe fr o declaraie de
rzboi i se ncheie fr un tratat de pace.
- reactualizarea termenului de Rzboi Rece , o datorm jurnalistului american
Walter Lippmann , care n 1947 public o carte cu acelai nume.
De ilustrat, pe larg , principalele teorii privitoare la originile rzboiului rece.
II Fundamentele ideologice ale rzboiului rece i expresia lor politic n

documentele marilor puteri
A. Discursul lui Stalin, 9 februarie 1946
- un discurs electoral
- Stalin aducea elogii sistemului sovietic care a ieit nvingtor din rzboi, fapt
care demonstra, din perspectiva sa, c sistemul social sovietic era o form de
organizare mai bun dect orice alt sistem social ne-sovietic
- descriind cauzele celui de al doilea rzboi mondial, liderul sovietic invoca o
norm comunist clasic, i anume c rzboiul nu ar fi fost provocat de Hitler

sau de ali efi de stat, ci de funcionarea defectuoas, generatoare de

inegaliti economice a sistemului de tip capitalist
- liderul sovietic sublinia inevitabilitatea unui nou rzboi cu rile din sistemul
capitalist i n acest context, el afirma necesitatea ntririi interne a Uniunii
Sovietice pentru a putea face fa acestui nou conflict
B. Discursul lui Churchill de la Fulton , Missouri , 5 martie 1946

- nc din 12 mai 1945 , ntr-o telegram adresat preedintelui Truman ( care i
succedase lui Roosevelt la 12 aprilie 1945 ) , Winston Churchill i exprima
ngrijorarea cu privire la lipsa de transparen din zonele ocupate de sovietici ,
afirmnd : a fost tras o cortin de fier n faa aliailor vestici.
- n timpul Conferinei de la Potsdam , Churchill , utiliznd o expresie
metaforic , protesteaz fa de mprejmuirea de ctre sovietici , cu un gard de
fier , a misiunii britanice din Romnia. n iulie 1945 , n urma alegerilor
generale din Marea Britanie , la mijlocul Conferinei de la Potsdam , Winston
Churchill este nlocuit de noul prim-ministru Clement Attlee.
- 5 martie 1946 - invitat la Westminister College , Winston Churchill utilizeaz
pentru prima dat , n public , sintagma cortin de fier, afirmnd : De la
Stettin , de pe coasta Balticii pn la Triest , de pe coasta Adriaticii , o
cortin de fier a cobort tind n dou continentul. ( )
- reaciile la discursul rostit de Churchill nu au ntrziat s apar. Guvernul
britanic, condus de Attlee a dezavuat discursul fostului prim ministru britanic.
La 15 martie 1946 , a urmat replica sovietic , prin discursul rostit de Stalin .
Vizibil deranjat de discursul de la Fulton , liderul de la Kremlin a inut s
precizeze c ascensiunea comunitilor n sud-estul Europei nu este una
accidental, ci o consecin fireasc a sacrificiului pe care acetia l-au dovedit
n lupta cu regimurile fasciste.
De ilustrat , pe larg , semnificaiile discursului de la Fulton.

C. Telegrama cea lung a lui G. Kennan i doctrina de containment

- diplomat de carier , n 1944 George Kennan se rentoarce la Moscova ( unde
activase anterior ntre 1933-1937 ) , n calitate de ministru-consilier , devenind
unul dintre consultaii ambasadorului Averell Harriman.
- 22 februarie 1946 - Kennan expediaz telegrama cea lung - un studiu de
8 000 de cuvinte, pe parcursul cruia realizeaz o radiografie total a
comportamentului i politicii externe promovate de Stalin.
- iulie 1947 - trimestrialul Foreign Affairs public Articolul X, Factorii care
determin comportamentul sovietic , sub semntura X. Noul document
elaborat de Kennan prezenta necesitatea aplicrii doctrinei de containment
(stvilire) i a devenit imediat un punct de reper pentru susintorii acesteia. n
esen, doctrina de containment viza o politic ferm din partea SUA, care s
nu permit sovieticilor obinerea unor noi poziii.
De ilustrat relevana prezentei telegrame , n conturarea politicii externe americane.
D. Telegrama Novikov
- septembrie 1946 - ambasadorul sovietic la Washington , Nikolai Novikov
elaboreaz o telegram n care atrgea atenia factorilor politici de la Moscova
asupra pericolului politicii americane de dominare economic i militar a
lumii.
E. Doctrina Truman , 12 martie 1947

- 21 februarie 1947 - cabinetul britanic , condus de Clement Attlee , l
informeaz pe preedintele Truman de faptul c partea britanic se afl n
imposibilitatea de a-i mai onora angajamentele luate fa de Grecia i Turcia.
- 24 februarie 1947 - preedintele Truman ia hotrrea ca aceste angajamente s
fie preluate de SUA.
- 26 februarie 1947 are loc o ntlnire tensionat n Biroul Oval , ntre
preedintele Truman i principalii congresmeni ( la ntlnire au luat parte i
gen. George C. Marshall i secretarul de stat Dean Acheson ). n cursul

ntlnirii , preedintele american i-a prezentat intenia de a prelua

angajamentele britanicilor din Mediterana Rsritean , justificndu-i poziia
prin necesitatea stoprii expansionismului sovietic.
- 12 martie 1947 n faa Congresului , preedintele Truman solicit un ajutor
economic de 400 mil. $ pentru ajutorarea celor dou ri , precum i trimiterea
de experi civili i militari americani.
De ilustrat importana acestei doctrine , din perspectiva izolaionismului american.
F. Planul Marshall , 5 iunie 1947

- la nceputul anului 1947 , datorit aciunilor energice promovate de George C.
Marshall i Dean Acheson , factorii politici americani contientizeaz faptul
c situaia economic disperat din Europa cerea un ajutor american de
avergur.
- n cadrul Departatmentului de Stat se constituie un grup de specialiti , sub
conducerea efului nou-creatului Oficiu de Planificare Politic , George
Kennan , cu scopul de gsii soluii viabile pentru mbuntirea situaiei
economice a Europei. Raportul naintat de Kennan susinea necesitatea unui
ajutor din partea SUA pentru nsntoirea economic a Europei.
- 5 iunie 1947 prin discursul su de la Universitatea Harvard , George
Marshall anun noul proiect.
- dei adresat tuturor rilor europene , rile din sfera de influen sovietic au
declinat propunerea american ( dei Polonia i Cehoslovacia i
manifestaser iniial intenia de a participa la discuii , reacia URSS a
determinat abandonarea acestei intenii ).
- programul a nceput n iulie 1948 , a continuat pn n 1952 i a costat
guvernul american 10,2 miliarde $ .
De ilustrat rezultatele implementrii Planului Marshall

G. Crearea Cominformului (septembrie 1947) i teoria lui Jdanov privind

mprirea lumii n cele dou blocuri
- 1943 din ordinul lui Stalin Comintern-ul este desfiinat , aceast msur ,
aparent radical , avnd menirea de a-i convinge pe aliaii occidentali de
faptul c URSS a renunat la ideea revoluiei mondiale.
- 22 septembrie 1947 este creat Cominformul . n discursul inaugural , Andrei
Jdanov , dup ce prezint Cominform-ul drept o reacie direct la propunerea
de acceptare a Planului Marshall , proclam mprirea oficial a lumii n dou
tabere:
tabra imperialist i antidemocratic al crei
scop rezid n sprijinirea regimurilor
reacionare i pro-faciste.
tabra antiimperialist i democratic , avnd
drept scop consolidarea democraiei , eliminarea
ultimelor vestigii ale fascismului , rezistnd
totodat expansiunii imperialiste.
- ulterior a avut menirea de a pregti terenul extirprii abcesului titoist.
III Suport documentar
Document 1: Discursul lui Stalin , 9 februarie 1946 (excerpt)
Comrades!
()
It would be wrong to believe that the Second War broke out accidentally or as a
result of the mistakes of some or other statesmen, through mistakes certainly were made.
In reality, the war broke out as an inevitable result of the development of the world
economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism.

Marxists have stated more than once that the capitalist system of world economy
conceals in itself the elements of general crisis and military clashes, that in view of this in
our time the development of world capitalism takes place not as a smooth and even
advance but through crises and war catastrophes.
The reason is that the unevenness of the development of capitalist countries
usually results, as time passes, in an abrupt disruption of the equilibrium within the world
system of capitalism, and that a group of capitalist countries which believes itself to be
less supplied with raw materials and markets usually attempts to alter the situation and
re-divide the spheres of influence in its own favour by means of armed forces.
This results in the splitting of the capitalist world in two hostile camps and in war
between them. ()
Thus the first crisis of the capitalist system of the world economy resulted in the
First World War, and the second crisis resulted in the Second World War.
This does not mean, of course, that the Second World War was an exact replica of the
first. On the contrary, the Second World War substantially differs in its nature from the
first. ()
The Second World War from the very outset assumed the nature of an anti
Fascist war, a war of liberation, one of the tasks of which was also to reestablish
democratic liberties. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the Axis States
could only strengthen and actually did strengthen the anti fascist and liberating
character of the Second World War.
It was on this basis that the anti-fascist coalition of the Soviet Union, the United
States of America, Great Britain and other freedom loving States took shape, a collation
which later played a decisive part in routing the armed forces of the Axis States. This is
how matters stand with regard to the question of the origin and nature of the Second
World War. ()
But the war was not only a curse. It was at the same time a great school in which
all the forces of the people were tried and tested. The war laid bare all the facts and
events in the rear and at the front, it mercilessly tore off the veils and covers which had
concealed the true faces of the States, governments, and parties, and placed them on the
stage without masks, without embellishments, with all their shortcomings and virtues.

The war set something in the nature of an examination for our Soviet system, our State,
our Government, our Communist Party, and summed up the results of their work as if
telling us: here they are, your people and organizations, their deeds and days look at
them closely and reward them according to their deserts. This is one of the positive
aspects of the war. ()
There is one main result which served as a basis for all other results. This result is
that at the end of the war the enemies suffered defeat and we, together with our Allies,
emerged as victors. We ended the war in complete victory over the enemy this is the
principal result of the war. But this is too general as a result, and we cannot stop at that.
()
Our victory means, in the first place, that our Soviet social system has won, that
the Soviet social system successfully withstood the trial in the flames of war and proved
its perfect viability. () The war has shown that the Soviet social system is a truly
popular system, which has grown from the people and enjoys its powerful support, that
the Soviet social system is a perfectly viable and stable from of organization of society.
More that that, the point is now not whether the Soviet social system is viable or not,
since after the objective lessons of the war no single skeptic now ventures to come out
with doubts concerning the viability of the Soviet social system. The point is that the
Soviet social system has proved more viable and stable that a non-Soviet social system,
that the Soviet social system is a better form of organization of society than any non-
Soviet social system. ()
Secondly, our victory means that our Soviet State System has won, that our multi-
national Soviet State withstood all the trials of war and proved its viability. ()
Thirdly, or victory means that the Soviet armed forces have won, that our Red Army has
won, that the Red Army heroically withstood all the adversities of war, utterly routed the
armies of our enemies and emerged from the war as victor. ()
These are the main results of the war.
SURSA: Stalins Speech , 9 Febrary , 1946

http://humanities.uwe.ac.uk/corehistorians/powers/twxt/s28stali.htm, accesat 12 august
2001.

Document 2 , Discursul lui Churchill de la Fulton , Missouri , 5 martie 1946

(excerpt)
( ) A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately light by the Allied victory.
Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends
to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and
proselytizing tendencies. I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian
people and for my wartime comrade, Marshall Stalin. There is deep sympathy and
goodwill in Britain -- and I doubt not here also -- towards the peoples of all the Russias
and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting
friendships. We understand the Russian need to be secure on her western frontiers by the
removal of all possibility of German aggression. We welcome Russia to her rightful place
among the leading nations of the world. We welcome her flag upon the seas. Above all,
we welcome, or should welcome, constant, frequent and growing contacts between the
Russian people and our own people on both sides of the Atlantic. It is my duty however,
for I am sure you would wish me to state the facts as I see them to you. It is my duty to
place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe.
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended
across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central
and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest
and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call
the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence
but to a very high and, in some cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.
Athens alone -- Greece with its immortal glories -- is free to decide its future at an
election under British, American and French observation. The Russian-dominated Polish
Government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon
Germany, and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and
undreamed-of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all
these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond
their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police

governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia,
there is no true democracy.
Turkey and Persia are both profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims which
are being made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow Government.
An attempt is being made by the Russians in Berlin to build up a quasi-Communist party
in their zone of occupied Germany by showing special favors to groups of left-wing
German leaders. At the end of the fighting last June, the American and British Armies
withdrew westward, in accordance with an earlier agreement, to a depth at some points of
150 miles upon a front of nearly four hundred miles, in order to allow our Russian allies
to occupy this vast expanse of territory which the Western Democracies had conquered.
If no the Soviet Government tries, by separate action , to build up a pro-
Communist Germany in their areas, this will cause new serious difficulties in the
American and British zones, and will give the defeated Germans the power of putting
themselves up to auction between the Soviets and the Western Democracies. Whatever
conclusions may be drawn from these facts -- and facts they are -- this is certainly not the
Liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of
permanent peace. ( )
SURSA: Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech,

http://www.historyguide.org/europe/churchill.html , 12.01.2007
Document 3 , Percepia lui Stalin asupra discursului de la Fulton ( excerpt )
( ) In substance , Mr. Churchill now stands in the position of a firebrand of

war. And Mr. Churchill is not alone. He has friends not only in England but also in the
United States of America.
In this respect , one is reminded remarkably of Hitler and his friends. Hitler began
to set war loose by announcing his racial theory , declaring that only people speaking the
German language represent a fully valuable nation. Mr. Churchill begins to set war loose,

also by racial theory , maintaining that only nations speaking the English language are
fully valuable nations , called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world.
( ) As a result of the German invasion , the Soviet Union has irrevocably lost in
battles with the Germans , and also during the German ocupation and through the
expulsion of Soviet citizens to German slave labor camps , about 7 000 000 people. In
other words , the Soviet Union has lost in men several times more then Britain and the
United States together.
It may be that some quarters are trying to push into oblivion these sacrifices of the
Soviet people which insured the liberation of Europe frome the Hitlerite yoke.
But the Soviet Union cannot forget them. One can ask therefore , what can be
surprising in the fact that the Soviet Union , in a desire to ensure its security for the
future, tries to achieve that these countries should have governments whose relations to
the Soviet Union are loyal? How can one , without having lost ones reason , qualify this
peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union as expansionist tendencies of our
Government?
( ) Mr. Churchill wanders around the truth when he speaks of the growth of the
influence of the Communist parties in Easter Europe ( ) The growth of the influence of
the Communism cannot be considered accidental. It is a normal function. The influence
of the Comunists grew because during the hard years of the mastery of fascism in Europe
, Communists showed themselves to be reliable , daring and self-sacrificing fighters
against fascist regimes for the liberty of peoples.
SURSA: Jussi Hanhimaki , Odd Arne Westad , The Cold War , A History in
Documents and Eyewitness Accounts , Oxford University Press , 2004 , p.48-49
Document 4 , Telegrama cea lung a lui G. Kennan , 22 februarie 1946 ( excerpt )
( ) In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the

belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and
necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life

be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be

secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of
world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne
along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an
elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an
apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience
and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is
seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast
fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which
outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual
items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already
preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this
force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably
greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political
general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same
thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary,
with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here.
But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and
that without recourse to any general military conflict.. And in support of this conviction
there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:
(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor
adventunstic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks.
Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it
can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point.
Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he
rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging
showdowns.
(2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker
force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor
which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to
influence.

(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven.
It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of
power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and
its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be
second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected,
by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved
severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war
have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of
Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for
the moment--highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to
be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of
movement need not yet be regarded as assured.
(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and
destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and
really constructive program.
For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem
of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to
advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:
(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of
the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage,
detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or
unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.
(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I
cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done
mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on
practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I
am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today
if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as
dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more
information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-
American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we

should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be
risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of
our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to
guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to
preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am
convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and
if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.
(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is
like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which
domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to solve
internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and
community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a
thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqus. If we cannot abandon fatalism and
indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit--Moscow
cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.
(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive
and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward
in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own.
Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past,
and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance
rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And
unless we do, Russians certainly will.
(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own
methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, the greatest danger that can befall
us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to
become like those with whom we are coping.
SURSA: The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State ,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm , 12.01.2007

Document 5 , George Kennan , Sursele comportamentului sovietic , iulie 1947 ,

(excerpt )
( ) In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States
policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant
containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such
a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or
superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in
its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of
prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening
gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated
by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as
such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of
strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For
these reasons it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign
government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands
on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a
compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.
In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the
free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and
vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and
political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which
cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of
infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be
borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a
minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the
world community.
But if the ideology convinces the rulers of Russia that truth is on their side and
they they can therefore afford to wait, those of us on whom that ideology has no claim are
free to examine objectively the validity of that premise. The Soviet thesis not only

implies complete lack of control by the west over its own economic destiny, it likewise
assumes Russian unity, discipline and patience over an infinite period. Let us bring this
apocalyptic vision down to earth, and suppose that the western world finds the strength
and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years. What
does that spell for Russia itself?
The Soviet leaders, taking advantage of the contributions of modern techniques to
the arts of despotism, have solved the question of obedience within the confines of their
power. Few challenge their authority; and even those who do are unable to make that
challenge valid as against the organs of suppression of the state.
The Kremlin has also proved able to accomplish its purpose of building up
Russia, regardless of the interests of the inhabitants, and industrial foundation of heavy
metallurgy, which is, to be sure, not yet complete but which is nevertheless continuing to
grow and is approaching those of the other major industrial countries. All of this,
however, both the maintenance of internal political security and the building of heavy
industry, has been carried out at a terrible cost in human life and in human hopes and
energies. It has necessitated the use of forced labor on a scale unprecedented in modern
times under conditions of peace. It has involved the neglect or abuse of other phases of
Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, consumers' goods production, housing and
transportation.
To all that, the war has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human
exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in Russia today a population which is
physically and spiritually tired. The mass of the people are disillusioned, skeptical and no
longer as accessible as they once were to the magical attraction which Soviet power still
radiates to its followers abroad. The avidity with which people seized upon the slight
respite accorded to the Church for tactical reasons during the war was eloquent testimony
to the fact that their capacity for faith and devotion found little expression in the purposes
of the regime.
In these circumstances, there are limits to the physical and nervous strength of
people themselves. These limits are absolute ones, and are binding even for the cruelest
dictatorship, because beyond them people cannot be driven. The forced labor camps and
the other agencies of constraint provide temporary means of compelling people to work

longer hours than their own volition or mere economic pressure would dictate; but if
people survive them at all they become old before their time and must be considered as
human casualties to the demands of dictatorship. In either case their best powers are no
longer available to society and can no longer be enlisted in the service of the state.
It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy
political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a
rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies
will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a
permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious,
persistent pressure toward the disruption and, weakening of all rival influence and rival
power.
Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in
general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that
Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total
potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable
confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with
unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon he
interests of a peaceful and stable world. ()
SURSA: George Kennan , The Sources of Soviet Conduct ,

http://www.historyguide.org/europe/kennan.html,
12.01.2007
Document 6 , Telegrama lui Novikov , septembrie 1946 (excerpt )
The foreign policy of the United States, which reflects the imperialist tendencies
of American monopolistic capital, is characterized in the postwar period by a striving for

world supremacy. This is the real meaning of the many statements by President Truman
and other representatives of American ruling circles; that the United States has the right
to lead the world. All the forces of American diplomacy -- the army, the air force, the
navy, industry, and science -- are enlisted in the service of this foreign policy. For this
purpose broad plans for expansion have been developed and are being implemented
through diplomacy and the establishment of a system of naval and air bases stretching far
beyond the boundaries of the United States, through the arms race, and through the
creation of ever newer types of weapons.
1. a) The foreign policy of the United States is conducted now in a situation that
differs greatly from the one that existed in the prewar period. This situation does not fully
conform to the calculations of those reactionary circles which hoped that during the
Second World War they would succeed in avoiding, at least for a long time, the main
battles in Europe and Asia. They calculated that the United States of America, if it was
unsuccessful in completely avoiding direct participation in the war, would enter it only at
the last minute, when it could easily affect the outcome of the war, completely ensuring
its interests.
In this regard, it was thought that the main competitors of the United States would
be crushed or greatly weakened in the war, and the United States by virtue of this
circumstance would assume the role of the most powerful factor in resolving the
fundamental questions of the postwar world. These calculations were also based on the
assumption, which was very widespread in the United States in the initial stages of the
war, that the Soviet Union, which had been subjected to the attack of German Fascism in
June 1941, would also be exhausted or even completely destroyed as a result of the war.
Reality did not bear out the calculations of the American imperialists.
b) The two main aggressive powers, fascist Germany and militarist Japan, which
were at the same time the main competitors of the United States in both the economic and
foreign policy fields, were thoroughly defeated. The third great power, Great Britain,
which had taken heavy blows during the war, now faces enormous economic and political
difficulties. The political foundations of the British Empire were appreciably shaken, and
crises arose, for example, in India, Palestine, and Egypt.

Europe has come out of the war with a completely dislocated economy, and the
economic devastation that occurred in the course of the war cannot be overcome in a
short time. All of the countries of Europe and Asia are experiencing a colossal need for
consumer goods, industrial and transportation equipment, etc. Such a situation provides
American monopolistic capital with prospects for enormous shipments of goods and the
importation of capital into these countries -- a circumstance that would permit it to
infiltrate their national economies.
Such a development would mean a serious strengthening of the economic position
of the United States in the whole world and would be a stage on the road to world
domination by the United States.

3. Obvious indications of the U.S. effort to establish world dominance are also to be
found in the increase in military potential in peacetime and in the establishment of a large
number of naval and air bases both in the United States and beyond its borders.
In the summer of 1946, for the first time in the history of the country, Congress
passed a law on the establishment of a peacetime army, not on a volunteer basis but on
the basis of universal military service. The size of the army, which is supposed to amount
to about one million persons as of July 1, 1947, was also increased significantly. The size
of the navy at the conclusion of the war decreased quite insignificantly in comparison
with wartime. At the present time, the American navy occupies first place in the world,
leaving England's navy far behind, to say nothing of those of other countries.
Expenditures on the army and navy have risen colossally, amounting to $13
billion according to the budget for 1946-47 (about 40 percent of the total budget of $36
billion). This is more than 10 times greater than corresponding expenditures in the budget
for 1938, which did not amount to even $1 billion.
...
In recent years American capital has penetrated very intensively into the economy
of the Near Eastern countries, in particular into the oil industry. At present there are
American oil concessions in all of the Near Eastern countries that have oil deposits (Iraq,
Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia). American capital, which made its first
appearance in the oil industry of the Near East, only in 1927, now controls 42 percent of

all proven reserves in the Near East, excluding Iran. Of the total proven reserves of 26.8
billion barrels, over 11 billion barrels are owned by U.S. concessions. Striving to ensure
further development of their concessions in different countries (which are often very
large--Saudi Arabia, for example), the American oil companies plan to build a trans-
Arabian pipeline to transport oil from the American concession in Saudi Arabia and in
other countries on the southeastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea to ports in Palestine
and Egypt.
In expanding in the Near East, American capital has English capital as its greatest
and most stubborn competitor. The fierce competition between them is the chief factor
preventing England and the United States from reaching an understanding on the division
of spheres of influence in the Near East, a division of that can occur only at the expense
of direct British interests in this region. ( )
SURSA: The Novikov Telegram,

http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/02/documents/novikov/, 12.01.2007
Document 7 , Discursul preedintelui Harry S. Truman , 12 martie 1947
The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my
appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national
security of this country are involved.
One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your
consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey.
The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for
financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic
Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece
corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if
Greece is to survive as a free nation.
I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to
the appeal of the Greek Government.

Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the
Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious and
peace loving country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and
bitter internal strife.
When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had
destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant
marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five per cent of the
children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had almost disappeared.
Inflation had wiped out practically all savings.
As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and
misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery
impossible.
Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are
essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances the people of Greece cannot
make progress in solving their problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate need of
financial and economic assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel
and seeds. These are indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable
only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods necessary to restore
internal order and security, so essential for economic and political recovery.
The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American
administrators, economists and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given
to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in
improving its public administration.
The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of
several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority at
a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A Commission appointed
by the United Nations security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in
northern Greece and alleged border violations along the frontier between Greece on the
one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other.
................................................................................................................................................
Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention.

The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no

less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The
circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of
Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war,
the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid.
Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support.
Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the
United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the
maintenance of its national integrity.
That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.
The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties can no
longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey.
As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States
must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.
I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends
assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this
time.
I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey
in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these
funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which
would be furnished to Greece out of the $350,000,000 which I recently requested that the
Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated
by the war.
In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian
and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in
the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial
and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided
for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.

Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and
most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such
funds as may be authorized. ( )
SURSA: President Harry S. Truman's address before a Joint Session of Congress,

March 12, 1947 , http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm , 12.01.2007.
Document 8 , Discursul de la Harvard al generalului Marshall (5 iunie 1947)
Nu trebuie s v spun, Domnilor, c situaia mondial este foarte grav. Acest

lucru este absolut evident pentru orice om inteligent. Cred c una dintre cele mai serioase
dificulti este c problema e de o att de mare complexitate nct chiar masa faptelor
prezentate publicului prin pres i radio fac extrem de dificil pentru omul de pe strad o
evaluare clar a situaiei. n plus, populaia acestei ri se afl foarte departe de regiunile
ntunecate ale globului i este foarte greu s-i imagineze mizeria, reaciile ce o nsoesc
la popoarele care au suferit ndelung i efectul pe care aceste reacii l au asupra
guvernelor n cursul ncercrilor noastre de a restabili pacea n lume.
Atunci cnd am cercetat necesarul pentru reconstrucia Europei, pierderile n viei
omeneti, distrugerea satelor, uzinelor, minelor i a cilor ferate au fost estimate destul de
exact, ns a devenit evident, n cursul lunilor care tocmai s-au scurs, c aceste distrugeri
vizibile sunt probabil mai puin grave dect dislocarea ntregii structuri a economiei
europene. De zece ani, situaia este absolut anormal. Pregtirile febrile pentru rzboi i
activitatea i mai febril pentru susinerea efortului de rzboi au distrus toate ramurile
economiilor naionale. Utilajul industrial n-a fost ntreinut, a fost deteriorat sau este
complet depit. Sub dominaia arbitrar i distrugtoare a nazitilor, aproape toate
ntreprinderile au fost nhmate la maina de rzboi german. Vechile relaii comerciale,
instituiile private, bncile, companiile de asigurri i companiile de navigaie au disprut,
din lips de capital, ca urmare a absorbirii lor atunci cnd au fost naionalizate sau pentru

c au fost pur i simplu distruse. n multe ri, ncrederea n moneda national a fost grav
zdruncinat. Prbuirea structurii comerciale a Europei s-a produs n timpul rzboiului.
Renvierea economic a fost serios ntrziat datorit faptului c doi ani dup
ncetarea ostilitilor acordul cu privire la tratatele de pace cu Germania i Austria n-a
fost nc stabilit. Unul dintre aspectele acestei probleme este n acelai timp interesant i
grav: fermierul a produs ntotdeauna bunuri alimentare pe care le poate schimba cu
orenii contra altor lucruri necesare vietii. Aceast diviziune a muncii reprezint baza
civilizatiei moderne. La ora actual, ea e ameninat de ruin. lndustriile oraelor nu
produc suficiente mrfuri necesare schimbului cu fermierii productori de produse
alimentare. Lipsesc materiile prime i combustibilul. Utilajul industrial lipsete sau este
prea uzat. Fermierul i ranul nu pot s gseasc pe pia mrfurile pe care vor s le
cumpere, astfel nct vnzarea produselor lor n schimbul banilor pe care nu pot s-i
utilizeze le pare o tranzactie lipsit de interes. Deci, ei au ncetat s mai cultive intensiv
cmpul pentru a obine nutre n ciuda faptului c le lipsete mbrcmintea i alte
produse ale civilizaiei. n acelai timp, locuitorilor oraelor le lipsesc hrana i
combustibilul. Guvernele sunt deci forate s se serveasc de resursele n devize strine i
de credite pentru a cumpra din strintate aceste produse indispensabile, epuiznd astfel
fondurile de care au o nevoie urgent pentru reconstrucie. Deci, se creeaz rapid o
situaie foarte grav care este de ru augur pentru ntreaga lume. Sistemul modern care se
bazeaz pe diviziunea muncii i pe schimbul de produse este n pericol de a se prbui.
Adevrul este c nevoile Europei de hran i de alte produse eseniale importate
din strintate - i mai ales din America - pentru urmtorii trei sau patru ani sunt mult mai
mari dect capacitatea sa actual de plat, nct ea va trebui s primeasc un ajutor
suplimentar foarte important sau s se expun unei dislocri economice, sociale i
politice foarte grave.
Remediul acestei situaii const n sfrmarea cercului vicios i n restaurarea
ncrederii locuitorilor ntregii Europe. Fabricantul i fermierul din multe regiuni trebuie
s poat i s vrea s-i schimbe produsele contra monede a cror valoare constant s fie
fr dubiu.
n afar de efectul demoralizant pe care disperarea popoarelor n chestiune o are
asupra ntregii lumi i a tulburrilor pe care aceasta le poate provoca, ar trebui s fie

evidente pentru toi i consecinele acestei situaii pentru economia Statelor Unite. Este
logic c Statele Unite ar trebui s fac tot ceea ce pot pentru a sprijini restabilirea
sntii economice a lumii, n lipsa creia stabilitatea politic i pacea sunt imposibile.
Politica noastr nu este dirijat mpotriva nici unei ri, mpotriva nici unei doctrine ci
contra foametei, srciei, disperrii i haosului. Scopul su trebuie s fie renaterea unei
economii active n lume pentru a crea condiiile politice i sociale n care s poat s
existe instituii libere. Acest ajutor, sunt convins, nu trebuie acordat cu zgrcenie, de
fiecare dat cnd survin crize. Orice ajutor pe care acest guvern ar putea s-l dea n viitor
ar trebui s fie mai mult un remediu dect un simplu paleativ. Orice guvern care vrea s
sprijine relansarea economic se va bucura, sunt sigur de acest lucru, de ntreaga
cooperare din partea guvernului Statelor Unite. Orice guvern care va ncerca mpiedicarea
relansrii economice a altor ri nu poate spera s primeasc ajutorul nostru. n plus,
guvernele, partidele i gruprile politice care caut s perpetueze mizeria uman pentru a
avea un profit pe plan politic sau pe alte planuri se vor ciocni de opoziia Statelor Unite.
Este deja evident c nainte ca guvernul Statelor Unite s poat s continue
eforturile pentru remedierea situaiei i sprijinirea Europei pe calea nsntoirii, ar trebui
s se realizeze un acord de ctre rile Europei, asupra nevoilor lor actuale i asupra ceea
ce aceste ri ale Europei vor face ele nsele pentru a eficientiza toate msurile pe care
acest guvern ar putea s le ia. Nu ar fi nici bine, nici util ca guvernul Statelor Unite s
stabileasc el nsui un program destinat punerii pe picioare a economiei europene.
Aceasta este problema europenilor. Dup prerea mea, iniiativa trebuie s vin din partea
Europei.
Rolul Americii trebuie s constea n oferirea unui ajutor prietenesc la stabilirea
unui program european i s ajute apoi la aplicarea acestuia n msura n care va fi posibil
s o fac. Acest program va trebui s fie unul general, stabilit n comun mcar de ctre un
mare numr de naiuni europene, dac nu de toate.
SURSA: Charles Zorgbibe, Construcia european. Trecut, prezent, viitor, Ed. Trei,
Bucureti, 1998 , p. 26-28.

Document 9 , Discursul lui Andrei Jdanov la edina inaugural a Cominform-ului
Andrei Zhdanov September 22, 1947

The fundamental changes caused by the war on the international scene and in the
position of individual countries has entirely changed the political landscape of the world.
A new alignment of political forces has arisen. The more the war recedes into the past,
the more distinct becomes two major trends in postwar international policy,
corresponding to the division of the political forces operating on the international arena
into two major camps: the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and
the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other. The principal driving force of the
imperialist camp is the U.S.A. Allied with it are Great Britain and France. ... The
imperialist camp is also supported by colony-owning countries, such as Belgium and
Holland, by countries with reactionary anti-democratic regimes, such as Turkey and
Greece, and by countries politically and economically dependent upon the United States,
such as the Near Eastern and South American countries and China.
The cardinal purpose of the imperialist camp is to strengthen imperialism, to
hatch a new imperialist war, to combat socialism and democracy, and to support
reactionary and anti-democratic pro-fascist regimes and movements everywhere.
In the pursuit of these ends the imperialist camp is prepared to rely on reactionary
and anti-democratic forces in all countries, and to support its former adversaries in the
war against its wartime allies.
The anti-fascist forces comprise the second camp. This camp is based on the
U.S.S.R. and the new democracies. It also includes countries that have broken with
imperialism and have firmly set foot on the path of democratic development, such as
Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Indonesia and Vietnam are associated with it; it has the
sympathy of India, Egypt and Syria. The anti-imperialist camp is backed by the labor and
democratic movement and by the fraternal Communist parties in all countries, by the
fighters for national liberation in the colonies and dependencies, by all progressive and
democratic forces in every country. The purpose of this camp is to resist the threat of new
wars and imperialist expansion, to strengthen democracy and to extirpate the vestiges of
fascism.

The end of the Second World War confronted all the freedom-loving nations with
the cardinal task of securing a lasting democratic peace sealing victory over fascism. In
the accomplishment of this fundamental task of the postwar period the Soviet Union and
its foreign policy are playing a leading role. This follows from the very nature of the
Soviet socialist state, to which motives of aggression and exploitation are utterly alien,
and which is interested in creating the most favorable conditions for the building of a
communist society. One of these conditions is external peace. As embodiment of a new
and superior social system, the Soviet Union reflects in its foreign policy the aspirations
of progressive mankind, which desires lasting peace and has nothing to gain from a new
war hatched by capitalism. The Soviet Union is a staunch champion of liberty and
independence of all nations, and a foe of national and racial oppression and colonial
exploitation in any shape or form. The change in the general alignment of forces between
the capitalist world and the socialist world brought about by the war has still further
enhanced the significance of the foreign policy of the Soviet state and enlarged the scope
of its activity on the international arena.
The successes and the growing international prestige of the democratic camp were
not to the liking of the imperialists. Even while World War II was still on, reactionary
forces in Great Britain and the United States became increasingly active, striving to
prevent concerted action by the Allied powers, to protract the war, to bleed the U.S.S.R.,
and to save the fascist aggressors from utter defeat. The sabotage of the Second Front by
the Anglo-Saxon imperialists, headed by Churchill, was a clear reflection of this
tendency, which was in point of fact a continuation of the Munich policy in the new and
changed conditions. But while the war was still in progress British and American
reactionary circles did not venture to come out openly against the Soviet Union and the
democratic countries, realizing that they had the undivided sympathy of the masses all
over the world. But in the concluding months of the war the situation began to change.
The British and American imperialists already manifested their willingness to respect the
legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and the democratic countries at the Potsdam
tripartite conference in July 1945.
The foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the democratic countries in these two
past years has been a policy of consistently working for the observance of the democratic

principles in the postwar settlement. The countries of the anti-imperialist camp have
loyally and consistently striven for the implementation of these principles, without
deviating from them one iota. Consequently, the major objective of the postwar foreign
policy of the democratic states has been a democratic peace, the eradication of the
vestiges of fascism and the prevention of a resurgence of fascist imperialist aggression,
the recognition of the principle of the equality of nations and respect for their
sovereignty, and general reduction of all armaments and the outlawing of the most
destructive weapons, those designed for the mass slaughter of the civilian population. ...
Of immense importance are the joint efforts of the diplomacy of the U.S.S.R. and
that of the other democratic countries to secure a reduction of armaments and the
outlawing of the most destructive of them -- the atomic bomb.
Soviet foreign policy proceeds from the fact of the coexistence for a long period of
the two systems -- capitalism and socialism. From this it follows that cooperation
between the U.S.S.R. and countries with other systems is possible, provided that the
principle of reciprocity is observed and that obligations once assumed are honored.
Everyone knows that the U.S.S.R. has always honored the obligations it has assumed. The
Soviet Union has demonstrated its will and desire for cooperation.
SURSA: Report on the international situation to the Cominform ,

http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/04/documents/cominform.html,
12.01.2007

Seminar nr. 8
Evoluii n perioada rzboiului rece (1948-1962)
I Procesul de sovietizare i satelizare
- din punctul de vedere al evoluiei comunismului, perioada 1944-1948 a marcat

trecerea de la stadiul de socialism ntr-o singur ar la cel de socialism ntr-o singur
regiune
- au existat dou procese prin care sovieticii i-au subordonat ntregul spaiu al
Europei Centrale i de Est, procese care s-au desfurat simultan:
A) satelizare:
- procesul prin care rile din aceast regiune s-au subordonat intereselor politicii
externe sovietice
- a nceput odat cu intrarea Armatei Roii n regiune n 1944 i a continuat cu
a) semnarea tratatelor de pace i colaborare dintre aceste ri, devenite democraii
populare, i Uniunea Sovietic
b) prin nchegarea tot mai coerent a blocului, prin constituirea n septembrie 1947, a
Cominformului
B) sovietizare:
- a nceput n 1944 /1945
- a cunoscut o definire treptat n funcie de evoluiile internaionale
- a constat n impunerea i acceptarea transformrii statelor dup modelul sovietic
viznd regimul politic, valorile societii, economia, structurile sociale, instituiile, omul
- impunerea modelului sovietic a fost legat de prezena Armatei Roii, cu excepia
Iugoslaviei i Albaniei

- Virgiliu ru a introdus termenul de fidelizare pentru a desemna instituirea unei

hegemonii sovietice n planul politicii externe (satelizare), ci i adoptarea unor instituii,
mecanisme i procese politice similare cu cele din Uniunea Sovietic
- Hugh Seaton-Watson menioneaz 3 etape ale procesului de comunizare innd seama

de particularitile statelor:
I. coaliia veritabil
- presupune existena unor multor partide politice
- o colaborare veritabil a comunitilor cu partidele necomuniste
- controlul comunist asupra puterii este foarte sczut
- meninerea libertii cuvntului i ntrunirilor
- cenzura politic este redus
II. coaliia mltinoas

- hruirea i marginalizarea partidelor politice necomuniste
- folosirea de ctre comuniti n relaiile lor cu celelalte partide politice a dou tactici:
tactica salamului i tactica calului troian
- guvernul este format din comuniti i necomuniti selectai de ctre comuniti
- extinderea controlului asupra puterii
- restrngerea libertii presei, a cuvntului i ntrunirilor
III. apariia blocului monolitic

- suprimarea opoziiei prin exilarea i arestarea liderilor ei
- afirmarea frontului condus de comuniti
- lichidarea democraiei burgheze
- aceast etap se ncheie prin instaurarea unor regimuri staliniste, prin acapararea puterii
depline de ctre partidele comuniste, prin impunerea regimului democraiei populare,
organizarea unor epurri n partidele comuniste

- Romnia, Bulgaria I III

- Iugoslavia, Albania III
- Polonia II-III
- Ungaria, Cehoslovacia I-II
- Sten Berglund i Frank Aarebot au identificat 4 submodele angajate de sovietici n
procesul de comunizare, caracterizate de elemente structurale legate de: efectele
rzboiului asupra societii, asupra economiei, poziiei elitelor politice tradiionale i
poziia Partidului Comunist i de considerentele externe ale procesului:
Modelul de preluare Structura modelului Poziia Partidului ara

a puterii Comunist
Rzboi, criz
economic, conflicte Puternic
Modelul lui Lenin Cehoslovacia
inter-elitare
Rzboi, criz
economic, forele Slab, suport puternic al
Modelul regimului Estonia, Letonia,
politice de centru i de Armatei Roii
marionet Lituania, RDG
dreapta sunt lipsite de
legitimitate
Modelul imperialist Rzboi, criz Polonia, Ungaria,

economic, conflicte Slab, suport puternic al
sovietic: democraie Romnia, Bulgaria
ntre elitele politice Armatei Roii
ghidat
Rzboi, criz
economic, vechile elite Puternic, control prin
Modelul Iugoslavia i
decimate i delegitimate armata de partizani
partizanilor Albania
de rzboi sau de asupra societii
epurrile de dup
(Sten Berglund i Frank Aarebot, The Political History of the Eastern Europe in the 20th
Century. The Struggle between Democracy and Dictatorship, Edward Elgar, Celtenham
UK, 1997, p.65 apud. Virgiliu ru, Alegeri fr opiune. Primele scrutinuri
parlamentare din Centrul i Estul Europei dup cel de-al Doilea Rzboi Mondial,
Editura Eikon, Cluj Napoca, 2005, p.55 )

* De ilustrat, plecnd de la modele teoretice menionate mai sus i pe baza bibliografiei

indicate, modul de preluare a puterii de ctre comuniti n Europa de Central i de Est.
A) satelizare:
- etape:
a) semnarea conveniilor de armistiiu
Armistiiu cu Italia, septembrie 1943
Armistiiu cu Romnia, 12 septembrie 1944
Armistiiu cu Bulgaria, 28 octombrie 1944
* De ilustrat structura acestor convenii de armistiiu i rolul lor n mecanismul de
sovietizare
b) Conferina de pace de la Paris (1946-1947)

- s-a deschis la 26 iulie 1946, n Palatul Luxemburg
- au participat reprezentanii celor cinci mari puteri, 16 state care i trimiser trupe n
Europa, precum Cehoslovacia, i un numr de state invitate; au participat i delegaii ale
Italiei, Finlandei, Bulgariei, Romniei i Ungariei
- au fost semnate tratatele de pace pe baza proiectelor ntocmite de Consiliul Minitrilor
de Externe
- structura tratatelor:
clauze politice: vizau excluderea organizaiilor fasciste i crearea unui cadrul
democratic
clauze economice: se refer la reparaii i restituiri
clauze militare cu privire la prizonieri, dezarmare, reducerea armatei, aviaiei
etc.; URSS i rezerva dreptul de a-i menine forele militare n vederea asigurrii
liniilor de comunicaii cu zonele sovietice de ocupaie din Austria
clauze teritoriale
- nu s-a semnat un tratat de pace cu Germania
- Japonia: 1951, Statele Unite ale Americii a organizat o Conferin de pace, la care nu au
participat Uniunii Sovietice i statele satelit; SUA i Marea Britanie au semnat un tratat,
Japoniei fiindu-i recunoscut independen i suveranitatea; Statele Unite aveau dreptul

de a pstra armata n Okinawa, iar Japonia i lua obligaia de a renuna la for i la

ameninarea cu fora
- 14 mai 1955, Viena s-a semnat tratatul de pace cu Austria
* De ilustrat structura cu date concrete coninutul clauzelor tratatelor i rolul lor n
mecanismul de sovietizare
c) tratatele bilaterale ntre URSS i satelii

- semnate ntre URSS cu Cehoslovacia (12 decembrie 1943), cu Iugoslavia (12 aprilie
1945), cu Polonia (21 aprilie 1945), Romnia (4 februarie 1948), cu Ungaria (18
februarie 1948), cu Bulgaria (18 martie 1948)
- aceste tratate prevedeau organizarea unei aprri comune mpotriva Germaniei, erau
orientate mpotriva puterilor occidentale i urmreau ntrirea militar i diplomatic a
blocului sovietic european
B) sovietizare:
- transformarea intern a societilor din Europa de Central i de Est s-a bazat pe tiparele
staliniste aplicate de n URSS, n anii 1930
-Zbigniev Brzezinski: Stalin cuta securitatea, n faa unui posibil conflict cu Occidentul,
n aplicarea rigid a experienei sale trecute la fiecare nou situaie, creznd c
loialitatea va fi obinut ntr-o msur mai mare prin duplicarea structurii sovietice n
Europa Central i de Est
a) viaa politic:
- partidele socialiste au fost absorbite de ctre partidele comuniste
- opoziia deschis a fost dispersat, nchis sau lichidat
- partidele non comuniste au fost dizolvate sau incluse n fronturile patriotice i
naionale
- creterea numeric iniial a partidelor comuniste a fost urmat de epurri n
mas a membrilor de partid, dar i a unor lideri de partid, care fceau parte din diferite
fraciuni ale aceluiai partid comunist
- impunerea regimului politic de democraie popular

b) viaa cultural:
- controlul comunist asupra sistemului de nvmnt epurarea corpului
profesoral, eliminarea unor discipline i introducerea unora noi (de exemplu, cursurile de
marxism -leninism)
- realismul socialist a fost proclamat ca norm n art, arhitectur etc.
c) viaa economic:
- naionalizarea principalelor mijloace de producie
- colectivizarea forat a agriculturii
- adoptarea unui model de industrializare rapid, de inspiraie sovietic bazat pe:
impunerea unui model centralizat de planificare
predominarea sectorului de stat
accentul pus pe industria grea
dezvoltarea sistemului comercial ntre statele blocului sovietic
d) viaa social:
- apariia unui clase muncitoare antrenate n domeniul industriei, extrase n marea
sa majoritate din mediul rural
- modelul urbanizrii comuniste: construirea de orae n jurul marilor centre
industriale, cu un aspect arhitectural specific generat de nevoia stringent de locuine
- conflictul red (membrii de partid) versus expert (intelectualitatea tehnic)
- crearea unor organizaii de mas specializate pentru fiecare categorie social n
parte (femei, copii, tinere etc.)
- eforturi pentru crearea unui tip de om nou, socialist
II. OCDE
- acordarea ajutorului prevzut n planul Marshall era condiionat de ntocmirea

unui plan general de reconstrucie a continentului

- la 16 aprilie 1948 s-a creat, printr-o convenie, Organizaia European de

Cooperare Economic (OECE)
- OECE va fi nlocuit n 1961 de OCDE (Organizaia de Cooperare i Dezvoltare
Economic), compus din SUA, Canada, Japonia i Europa Occidental
III. NATO
- etapele constituirii Organizaiei Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord
1) tratatul de la Dunkerque, martie 1947: semnat ntre Marea Britanie i Frana
2) lrgirea pactului de alian din martie 1947 la 17 martie 1948, la Bruxelles s-a
semnat un nou tratat ntre Marea Britanie, Frana, Belgia, Olanda, Luxemburg
3) 11 iunie 1948 rezoluia Vandenberg care permitea Statelor Unite s intre ntr-un
sistem de alian n afara continentului
4) 4 aprilie 1949 s-a semnat, la Washington, Tratatul Atlanticului de Nord, de

reprezentanii a 12 ri (SUA, Canada, Marea Britanie, Frana, Italia, Islanda, Belgia,
Olanda, Luxemburg, Norvegia, Danemarca, Portugalia)
- structura Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord:
a) preambul
b) 14 articole
* De ilustrat principalele prevederi ale Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord
IV. Alte aliane defensive:
a) Pactul Pacificului (ANZUS)

- septembrie 1951, San Francisco, s-a semnat Pactul Pacificului (ANZUS), de ctre
Australia, Noua Zeeland i SUA
- alian defensiv ndreptat mpotriva atacurilor, respectiv agresiunilor japoneze

b) Organizaia Asiei de SE (SEATO)

- septembrie 1954, la Manila, format din fostele ri din ANZUS i Pakistan, Filipine,
Thailanda, Anglia i Frana
- viza: - aprarea, inclusiv, a statelor care nu fac parte din SEATO
- consultare n cazul infiltrrii comuniste
- manevre militare comune
- organizare:
a) Consiliu permanent al minitrilor, avnd un Secretariat executiv (Bangkok)
b) un organism de planificare militar
c) serviciu de cercetare pentru monitorizarea subversiunii comuniste
- n 1958 stabilete contacte cu NATO i CENTO
c) Organizaia Tratatului Central (CENTO)

- 1955, format din Anglia, Turcia, Iran, Irak, Pakistan
- prevedea pentru statele membre, cooperarea i asisten reciproc, ca i angajamentul de
a nu interveni n politica intern a celorlalte state;
- viza ndiguirea Uniunii Sovietice prin crearea unei linii de state puternice de a lungul
frontierei sud vestice a acesteia
- nu a dispus de o structur de comand militar unificat

V Suport documentar
Document 1: Tratatul de pace cu Italia ( excerpt )

Paris, 10 februarie 1947
(...)
Articolul 21
I. Teritoriul liber al Triestului se recunoate de ctre Puterile Aliate i Unite i Italia, care
sunt de acord c integritatea i independena lui trebuie asigurate de ctre Consiliu de
Securitate al Naiunilor Unite (...).
Articolul 23
I. Italia renun la toate drepturile i legitimitile sale asupra posesiunilor teritoriale
italiene din Africa i anume: Libia, Eritreea i Somalia Italian. (...)
Articolul 27
Italia recunoate i se oblig s respecte suveranitatea i independena statului albanez.
(...)
Articolul 33
Italia recunoate i se oblig s respecte suveranitatea i independena statului etiopian.
(...)
SURSA: Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii
internaionale n acte i documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactic i

Document 2 : Tratatul de pace cu Bulgaria ( excerpt )

Paris, 10 februarie 1947
Partea I
Graniele Bulgariei
Articolul 1
Graniele Bulgariei (...) vor fi aceleai care existau la 1 ianuarie 1941.(...)
Partea a IV-a
Retragerea trupelor aliate (...)
Articolul 2
Toate forele Puterilor aliate i Unite vor fi retrase din Bulgaria n cel mai scurt timp
posibil i n orice caz la nu mai mult de 90 de zile din ziua intrrii n vigoare a
prezentului Tratat (...).
Document 3: Tratatul de pace cu Japonia (excerpt)

San Francisco, 8 septembrie 1951
(...)
Articolul 2
a) Japonia, recunoscnd independena Coreei, renun la toate drepturile, temeiurile
pentru drepturile i preteniile asupra Coreei, incluznd insulele: Quelpart, portul
Hamilton i Dagelet.
b) Japonia renun la toate drepturile, temeiurile pentru drepturi i pretenii asupra
Formozei i insulelor Pescadores.

c) Japonia renun la toate drepturile, temeiurile pentru drepturi i preteniile asupra

insulelor Kurile i asupra acelei pri a Sahalinului i a insulelor nvecinate cu el a cror
suveranitate Japonia a dobndit-o prin tratatul de la Portsmouth din 5 septembrie 1905.
(...)
Articolul 6
a) Toate trupele de ocupaie ale Puterilor Aliate vor fi retrase din Japonia n cel mai scurt
timp posibil dup intrarea n vigoare a prezentului Tratat i n orice caz la nu mai mult de
90 de zile din ziua intrrii n vigoare a prezentului Tratat (...).
Documentul 4: Tratatul de pace cu Austria ( excerpt )
Viena, 15 mai 1955
(...)
Articolul 1
Restaurarea Austriei ca stat liber i independent
Puterile Aliate i Unite recunosc c Austria se reconstituie ca stat suveran, independent i
democratic. (...)
Articolul 4
Puterile Aliate i Unite declar c uniunea politic sau economic ntre Austria i
Germania este interzis. (...)

Articolul 8
Instituii democratice
Austria va avea un guvern democratic, ales n baza dreptului de vot general, liber, egal i
secret al cetenilor (...).
Articolul 9
1. Austria trebuie s desvreasc msurile ncepute prin introducerea legilor
corespunztoare, aprobate de Comisia Aliat pentru Austria, privind lichidarea partidului
naional socialist i a organizaiilor afiliate lui, ori aflate sub controlul acestui partid
(...).
Document 5: North Atlantic Treaty ( excerpt )

Washington DC, 4th April 1949
(...)
ARTICLE 1
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any
international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.
ARTICLE 2
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better
understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by

promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in
their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between
any or all of them.
ARTICLE 3
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties,
separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid,
will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
ARTICLE 4
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the
territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
ARTICLE 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that,
if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or
collective selfdefence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will
assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert
with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be
reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and
security.
ARTICLE 6
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed
to include an armed attack:
- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian
Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction
of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories
or any area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on
the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.
ARTICLE 7
The Treaty does not effect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the
rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United
Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
ARTICLE 8
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between
it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this
Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this
Treaty.
ARTICLE 9
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented to
consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so
organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such
subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a
defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles
3 and 5.
ARTICLE 10
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a party to
the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United

States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of
the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.
ARTICLE 11
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance
with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be
deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America,
which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into
force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratification of the majority
of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and
shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their
ratifications.
ARTICLE 12
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties
shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty,
having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area
including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the
Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
ARTICLE 13
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party
one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United
States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit
of each notice of denunciation.
ARTICLE 14
This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be
deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly

certified copies will be transmitted by that government to the governments of the other
signatories.
SURSA: North Atlantic Treaty , http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/nato.htm ,

15.01.2007
Document 6 Tratatul ncheiat ntre SUA, Australia i Noua Zeeland (excerpt)

San Francisco, 1 septembrie 1951
(...)
Articolul 1
Prile i iau obligaia, n conformitate cu Carta ONU, s soluioneze prin mijloace
panice orice litigiu internaional n care ar fi implicate i s se abin n relaiile lor
internaionale de la folosirea forei n orice mod care nu este compatibil cu elurile ONU.
Articolul 2
Pentru a ndeplini mai efectiv elul acestui tratat, Prile separat sau mpreun pe calea
unui nentrerupt i efectiv ajutor propriu i a ajutorului reciproc, vor continua s
ntreasc capacitatea lor proprie i colectiv de a se opune unei invazii armate. (...)

Seminar nr. 9
Crizele rzboiului rece (1948-1962). Evoluii n blocul comunist
Conceptul de criza i expresia ei politic n relaiile

dintre marile puteri ( I )
I Crizele din blocul estic
A. Crizele Berlinului
1) Blocada Berlinului (1948-1949)
- 1945 Berlinul este administrat n comun de cele patru puteri aliate

(SUA, Marea Britanie , Frana i URSS ). Se nfiineaz Kommandatura ,
alctuit din patru comandani ( cte unul pentru fiecare putere aliat)
- 2 decembrie 1946 acord americano-britanic privind crearea unei uniuni
economice n zona de ocupaie ( Bizonia ) intr n vigoare la 1 ianuarie
1947
- iunie 1948 Conferina de la Londra americanii, britanicii i francezii
hotrsc unirea celor trei zone de ocupaie , organizarea de alegeri pentru
o adunare constituant. Totodat pentru stoparea inflaiei galopante , se ia
hotrrea instituirii unei monede comune marca german. O atare
orientare contravine intereselor sovietice
- 24 iunie 1948 sovieticii blocheaz toate cile terestre de acces spre
Berlinul de Vest

- rspunsul occidentalilor const n organizarea unui pod aerian de

anvergur ( 4 000 10 000 t de mrfuri erau aduse zilnic , pe calea
aerului, n Berlinul de Vest )
- 26 septembrie 1948 occidentalii supun chestiunea crizei Berlinului n
Consiliul de Securitate
- 25 octombrie 1948 URSS uzeaz de dreptul su de veto
- 12 mai 1949 n faa succesului incontestabil al podului aerian , sovieticii
renun la blocad
- 7 septembrie 1949 Republica Federal Germania ( RFG )
- 7 octombrie 1949 Republica Democrat Germania ( RDG )
2) A doua criz a Berlinului (1953)
- 16 iunie 1953 n Berlinul de Vest au loc manifestaii mpotriva msurilor

guvernamentale de intensificare a produciei n industrie
- 17 iunie 1953 datorit lipsurilor alimentare , protestele degenereaz n
revolt
- sovieticii intervin militar i restabilesc ordinea ( bilanul 25 de
demonstrani ucii i 378 rnii )
3) A treia criz a Berlinului (1958-1961)
- 27 noiembrie 1958 - Nikita Hruciov declar c URSS dorete s transfere

guvernului est-german toate responsabilitile guvernului sovietic n
termen de 6 luni
- 31 decembrie 1958 aliaii occidentali resping propunerea sovietic
- 1961 creterea masiv a exodului est-german spre Berlinul de Vest
(numai n luna iulie au trecut aprox. 30 000 de est-germani)
- august 1961 autoritile est-germane ncep construcia Zidului
Berlinului, din blocuri de zgur i srm ghimpat ( au fost pstrate 13
puncte de trecere oficial)

- 26 iunie 1963 , aflat n vizit n Berlinul de Vest , JF Kennedy rostete

celebra sintagm: Ich bin ein Berliner!
B. Revolta polonez ( 1956 )
- 12 martie 1956 Boleslav Bierut moare , fiind nlocuit n fruntea

partidului de Edward Ochab
- 28-29 iunie 1956 are loc revolta muncitorilor de la Poznan , desfurat
sub lozincile: Jos comunismul ! , Vrem pine !
- cauze ale revoltei:
lipsa de alimente i bunuri de consum
condiii insalubre de locuit
reducerea salariului real
practicile birocratice
- armata polonez condus de generalul Konstantin Rokossovsky (sovietic)
a intervenit n for. Intervenia s-a soldat cu mori i rnii n rndurile
protestatarilor.
- n faa presiunii sociale natolitii ( nucleul moscovit al comunitilor
polonezi) au propus cooptarea lui Wladyslaw Gomulka n Biroul Politic.
Gomulka refuz!
- octombrie 1956 vizita lui Nikita Hruciov n Polonia. Gomulka este
readus la putere, devenind premier al Poloniei. Din aceast postur ,
Gomulka a oprit colectivizarea agriculturii. Generalul Rokossovsky a fost
chemat la Moscova. n schimbul indulgenei Moscovei , Gomulka se
angaja s pstreze monopolul comunist al puterii.
C. Revoluia din Ungaria (1956)
- 17 iulie 1956 Anastas Mikoian , asistat telefonic de Nikita Hruciov , l

convinge pe Rakosi s demisioneze din funcia de prim-secretar (motivul

oficial invocat a fost de natur medical hipertensiune ). n locul lui

Rakosi este numit Erno Gero
- 6 octombrie 1956 au loc funeraliile naionale ale lui Laszlo Rajk (fost
ministru de interne , spnzurat n 1949 , din ordinul lui Stalin , sub
acuzaia de titoism ) la care particip 300 000 de oameni
- 22 octombrie 1956 vestea succesului obinut de polonezi i revenirea la
putere a lui Wladyslaw Gomulka au creat la Budapesta impresia
posibilitii crerii unei ci maghiare spre socialism
- 23 octombrie 1956 - studenii din Budapesta organizeaz o manifestaie
de solidaritate cu Polonia
- 23-31 octombrie 1956 prima faz a revoluiei maghiare. Revendicrile
studenilor:
revenirea la putere a lui Imre Nagy
libertatea cuvntului
alegeri libere
suprimarea simbolurilor comuniste
- 24 octombrie 1956 trupele sovietice deschid focul asupra
demonstranilor , creznd c muncitorii nu se vor solidariza cu
studenii.nelndu-se au oprit intervenia.
- 24 octombrie 1956 Imre Nagy este numit premier i se solidarizeaz cu
manifestanii
- 25 octombrie 1956 - Erno Gero este nlocuit cu Janos Kadar
- 30 octombrie 1956 trupele sovietice se retrag din Budapesta
- 2 noiembrie 1956 Imre Nagy anun:
alegeri libere i sfritul partidului unic
retragerea Ungariei din Tratatul de la Varovia
proclam neutralitatea rii i solicit protecia
Naiunilor Unite
- 4 noiembrie 1956 sovieticii declaneaz intervenia militar ( bilanul
2 000 de mori n Budapesta i aprox. 700 n restul rii )

- Imre Nagy i colaboratorii si s-au refugiat la Ambasada Iugoslav din

Budapesta. Dndu-i-se asigurri c poate iei n siguran , Nagy a plecat
n Romnia. A fost arestat i trimis n Ungaria. n 1958 , guvernul maghiar
a anunat execuia lui Imre Nagy. La 31 iulie 1989 , guvernul de la
Budapesta i-a organizat acestuia funeralii naionale.
De relevat impactul acestor crize asupra sistemului internaional
D. Defeciunea iugoslav
- cauze:
refuzul lui Iosip Broz Tito de a fi considerat vasal al Moscovei
sprijinul pe care iugoslavii l-au acordat comunitilor greci n timpul
rzboiului civil
patronarea iugoslav a proiectului unei mari federaii balcanice , ce
urma s includ Ungaria , Romnia , Iugoslavia , Bulgaria , Albania ,
posibil i Grecia
- 10 februarie 1948 Kremlin ntlnirea delegaiilor de partid sovietic ,
iugoslav i bulgar. Stalin ordon crearea unei federaii iugoslavo-
bulgare ( raiunea unui atare ordin rezid n docilitatea fa de Moscova a
liderilor comuniti bulgari )
- 1 martie 1948 Comitetul Central al Partidului Comunist Iugoslav
respinge propunerea sovietic
- 18 martie 1948 Moscova i retrage consilierii militari i civili din
Iugoslavia
- 27 martie 1948 ntr-o scrisoare , Moscova i motiva retragerea
consilierilor:
acetia fuseser tratai de iugoslavi cu ostilitate i
agresivitate

Partidul Comunist Iugoslav czuse prad ereziei

ideologice
comunitii iugoslavi erau intimidai de serviciile de
securitate
conducerea iugoslav se autoinstituise , fr a fi aleas n
mod democratic
- 13 aprilie 1948 rspunsul iugoslav, structurat pe 4 puncte:
Stalin era victima unor dezinformri
comunitii iugoslavi nu erau intimidai de serviciile de
securitate , relaiile dintre acetia fiind solid fundamentate
Partidul Comunist Iugoslav le inoculase maselor iubirea
fa de URSS , proces deloc uor de realizat
construiau socialismul dup un model diferit de URSS ,
ns nu mai puin legitim
- 4 mai 1948 - reacia sovietic atitudinea iugoslav a fost catalogat
drept pueril i arogant
- 28 iunie 1948 excluderea Iugoslaviei din Cominform
II Crearea CAER
- CAER Consiliu de Ajutor Economic Reciproc

- rspunsul sovietic la Planul Marshall s-a concretizat n urmtoarele
organizaii: Planul Molotov , Cominform i CAER
- creat n ianuarie 1949 , CAER-ul avea misiunea de a stimula comerul
dintre rile din blocul estic. n realitate , URSS nu a putut oferi rilor
comuniste un ajutor comparabil cu cel acordat de SUA rilor occidentale

III Suport documentar
Document 1: Raport sovietic cu privire la revolta berlinezilor din 16-19 iunie 1958
(excerpt)
I. The course of events in the GDR

on 17-19 June.
2. Events in Berlin on 16-19 June
( ) During the day of 16 June, there was a marked increase in the activity of
small groups of provocateurs in various parts of East Berlin, carrying out anti-democratic
agitation amongst the populace. In a number of enterprises in East Berlin and in GDR a
slogan was sent forth from West Berlin calling for an immediate strike in solidarity with
the construction workers of Berlin, as well as a slogan calling for a general strike on 17
June. In the evening of 16 June an extra edition of the evening paper Dernbend was
published in West Berlin, with calls for a general strike in the Eastern zone of Germany.
Solidarity strikes started to spread throughout a number of enterprises towards the days
end on 16 June.
In the evening of 16 June the situation in Berlin became more difficult. At 20.00
an extraordinary session of the most active members of the Berlin SED organizations was
held, where, in the presence of the entire CC SED Politburo, Ulbricht and Grotewohl
gave speeches on the new political course of the party and government. The mood of the
active party members, according to members of the Politburo, was good. However, the
GDR leadership said not a word of the strikes that were taking place in the city, and gave
no indication as to what course the active party members ought to take in the near future.
During this time crowds of West Berliners, consisting mostly of youth, began to arrive on
city railcars and other means of transportation as well as on foot. A crowd of some 4-5
thousand people moved in the direction of the Friedrichstadtpalast where a session of the
active members of the party was taking place, thus creating a possible danger that the

members of the CC SED Politburo could become hostages. At the same time, in the
centre of the city at Stalinallee, a crowd of West Berliners numbering some 2 thousand
began throwing rocks at the monument of comr. Stalin, and calling for the overthrow of
the GDR government. The were also shouts by isolated provocateurs, calling for the
killing of Russians.
The GDR police, acting on their instructions, did not actively intervene in these
events. The measures that we undertook (the dispatch of police reserves to the
Friedrichstadtpalast), were
enough to disperse the crowd that was moving in the direction of Friedrichstadtpalast, as
well as the mob at Stalinallee. Following this, various groups of provocateurs and
bandits, principally from West Berlin, took to rioting in various places in the Soviet
sector of Berlin, overturning automobiles, looting shops and apartments of SED activists
on Stalinallee, stopping street traffic, trying to break into the [natural] gas plant and other
important city enterprises. These acts of outrage were carried out by groups that together
numbered approximately 1.5-2 thousand people.
Late in the evening of 16 June, we met with the leadership of CC SED
(Grotewohl, Ulbricht, [secret police chief Wilhelm] Zaisser, [SED Politburo member
Rudolf] Herrnstadt). We turned their attention to the seemingly serious nature of the
disorders that had taken place in the city, pointing out that the slogans thrown out by the
provocateurs at the end of the day calling for a general strike were finding a positive
response within the enterprises of East Berlin and in some other places in GDR, and also
pointing out that it is necessary to take the most decisive measures to maintain order in
the city on 17 June, since one could expect a massive influx into East Berlin of
provocateur bands from West Berlin. We informed our friends of our decision to send
Soviet forces into Berlin. Our friends announced that they did not believe the situation so
serious as to warrant such extraordinary measures, and that, in their opinion, one should
not expect serious unrest in the city on 17 June, though they did not rule out the
possibility of a slight increase in unrest as compared to 16 June. They evaluated the
situation in GDR rather optimistically. We pointed out to the GDR leadership that it is
necessary to be highly prepared and we proposed that detachments of German barracks-
based police from Potsdam and Oranienburg be called out, which they did by the

morning of 17 June. During the day of 16 June we sent a warning telegram to our
regional representatives informing them of the unrest in Berlin and recommending that
they take urgent preventive and preparatory steps to tackle unrest in the regions of
GDR.We advised the friends /Ulbricht/ to also warn the regions about this through CC
SED channels, but they could not think of anything better than to call first secretaries of
regional committees to Berlin on 17 June for instruction, and as a result, during the
unrest of 17 June the regions were left with practically no top party leaders.
At about 7 oclock in the morning of 17 June, in East Berlin and in many cities in
the western and southern parts of GDR, there took place simultaneous mass strikes that
turned into demonstrations, which, in a number of cities /Berlin, Magdeburg, Herlitz, and
others/, in turn became riots.
The provocateurs were not able to call out a general strike in Berlin. However,
according to preliminary figures, on 17 June 80 thousand workers, out of a total number
of 200 thousand, did strike. In addition, the largest enterprises participated in the strike:
the Stalin electrical machinery factory, the Bergman-Borzig factory, the Soviet
enterprises of Siemens-Planya, cable factories, and others.
After stopping work, many workers proceeded in columns towards the city centre
to Straussbergerplatz, where, the day before, the provocateurs called a general city
meeting. At 7:30 about 10 thousand people gathered at this plaza, who proceeded in
separate columns towards the GDR Statehouse, carrying banners
Down with the government, We demand a decrease of norms, We demand a
decrease of prices at KhO by 40%, We demand free elections. At 9 in the morning a
crowd of 30 thousand people gathered outside the GDR Statehouse, a significant part of
which was made up of West Berlin residents, who were the main organizers of the
provocations.
The insurgents were able to break through the line of steadfast policemen, who
did not use weapons during this time, and after throwing rocks at them, they broke into
the Statehouse where a pogrom was committed. The police security force of the
Statehouse was reinforced, and at the time of the attack numbered 500 men.
The Statehouse was recaptured only upon the arrival of the Soviet forces, in
concert with which,

by the way, the German police, having been partially beaten by the crowd, actively
participated
in the reestablishment of order.
At the same time, in the region of Aleksandrplatz (the centre of Berlin) large
columns of demonstrators came together from the regions of Pankov, Vaisenzee, and
Kpenich (the Soviet sector of Berlin).The crowds of demonstrators, with the active
participation of provocateurs, besieged the CC SED building, the Berlin
Polizeipresidium, the main telegraph, the city trade-union administration and other
buildings. At the Aleksandrplatz and in the Pankow region, the demonstrators built
barricades and obstructions. Windows were smashed in a number of GDR government
buildings.
Overall, approximately 66 thousand people, including some 10 thousand West

Berliners, took part in the street demonstrations in East Berlin on 17 June. In addition to
the workers, the demonstration included artisans, merchants, and other members of the
petit bourgeoisie.
During the course of the day on 17 June, there appeared over various parts of the
Soviet sector of Berlin American planes, from which were dropped leaflets containing
calls to the population to participate in the strikes and the unrest, and to work to
overthrow the Government of GDR. On the sector border mobile loudspeakers appeared
on several occasions over which the
insurgents were given orders. After the deployment of guards on the sector border,
several large groups of provocateurs and hooligans from West Berlin broke through to
the Soviet sector. In the
streets Braunekstrasse and Bernauerstrasse, these bands started an exchange of fire with
the German police, as a result of which there were casualties.
In the evening of 17 June, the American radio station RIAS in its transmissions
recommended that the insurgents submit to the orders of Soviet officials, and not clash
with Soviet forces.
On 18 June in Berlin, under the presence of the military situation, many factories
continued to strike. In a number of places there were attempts to resume the

demonstrations and to form picket lines of strikers, which were suppressed by the
decisive actions of the German police and, in part, by the Soviet forces, which secured all
points of importance in the eastern part of the city. In the relations between the populace
and the Soviet military there was [a] significant feeling of alienation; in fact, not until 22
June did the party organize any campaign to
reestablish friendly ties between the populace and our military.
By 19-20 June the strikes in Berlin began to decline sharply and normalcy was
established. ()
SURSA: The course of events in the GDR on 17-19 June n Cold War International
History Project Bulletin , Nr. 5 , Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ,
Washington DC, Spring 1995 , p.17-19
Document 2 : Telegram , N. Firiubin ctre ministrul de externe sovietic , 4

Noiembrie 1956
Strictly secret
Copying is forbidden
Coded Telegram
From BELGRADE
PRIORITY
Kardelj informed me that on the night of November 4, they got in touch with Imre
Nagy, as had been agreed upon with comrade Khrushchev. Imre Nagy, Santo Zoltan and
11 more Hungarian communists are located in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. It is
not yet known, Kardelj said, whether Nagy Imre made his last statement in the name of
the government in Budapest. If he made this statement, they, the Yugoslavs, will try to
get him to announce that he did so under reactionary pressure [nazhim reaktsiia]. They
also intend to come to an agreement with Imre Nagy so that he will make a statement
supporting the government headed by Kadar in Solnok.
In Kardeljs words, such an announcement would facilitate the discussion of the
Hungarian issue in the Security Council and the recognition of Kadars government as

the legal government. Kardelj, on Titos instructions, requested the advice of the CPSU
and the Soviet government as to whether to continue further talks with Imre Nagy. Tito
also asked the Soviet government to convey to Kadars government the request that they
not repress those communists who did not immediately take the correct line during the
recent events in Hungary. Tito, in Kardeljs words, also asked the Soviet government to
take measures to protect the Yugoslav embassy from possible attacks on it, especially if
reactionaries find out that Nagy, who is located in the embassy, is supporting Kadars
government.
4/XI-56 N. FIRIUBIN
SURSA: Cable, N. Firiubin to Soviet Foreign Ministry , 4 November 1956 n Cold

War International History Project Bulletin , Nr. 10 Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars , Washington DC , March 1998 , p.143-144
Document 3 : Statutul Consiliului de Ajutor Economic Reciproc ( excerpt )
()
Articolul I
Obiective i principii
1. Consiliu de Ajutor Economic Recirpoc are ca scop s contribuie , prin unirea i
coordonarea eforturilor rilor-membre ale Consiliului de dezvoltare planic a
economiei naionale , la ridicarea nivelului industrializrii rilor cu o industrie
mai puin dezvoltat, la creterea continu a productivitii muncii i la ridicarea
nencetat a bunstrii popoarelor rilor-membre ale Consiliului.
2. Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc este format pe baza egalitii suverane a
tuturor rilor-membre ale consiliului.
Colaborarea economic i tehnico-tiinific a rilor-membre ale consiliului se
desfoar potrivit principiilor egalitii depline n drepturi, respectrii
suveranitii i intereselor naionale , ale avantajului reciproc tovresc.

Articolul II
Calitatea de membru
1. Membrii iniiali ai Consiliului de Ajutor Economic Reciproc sunt rile care au
semnatz prezentul statut.
2. Primirea n calitate de membru al Consiliului este deschis pentru alte ri
europene care mprtesc scopurile i principiile Consiliului i i-au exprimat
acordul de a-i asuma obligaiile cuprinse n prezentul Statut
Primirea de noi membrii se face prin hotrrea Sesiunii Consiliului , pe baza
cererilor oficiale ale rilor de a fi primite ca membrii ai Consiliului.
3. Fiecare ar-membr a Consiliului poate s ias din Consiliu , ntiinnd despre
aceasta pe depozitarul prezentului Statut. Aceast ntiinare intr n vigoare dup
ase luni de la data primirii ei de ctre depozitar. Dup primirea unei asemenea
ntiinri , depozitarul va ncunotina despre aceasta rile-membre
4. rile-membre ale Consiliului convin:
a) s asigure ndeplinirea recomandrilor organelor Consiliului, adoptate de ele;
b) s acorde Consiliului i funcionarilor acestuia sprijinul necesar n ndeplinirea
de ctre acetia a atribuilor prevzute n prezentul Statut;
c) s prezinte Consiliului materialele i informaiile necesare pentru realizarea
sarcinilor ce-i sunt ncredinate;
d) s informeze Consiliul asupra mersului ndeplinirii recomandrilor adoptate n
Consiliu.
()
Articolul V
Organe
1. Pentru ndeplinirea atribuiilor i mputernicirilor menionate in articolul III al
prezentului Statut , Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc are urmtoarele
organe de baz:
Sesiunea Consiliului,
Consftuirea Reprezentanilor rilor n Consiliu,
Comisiile permanente,

Secretariatul
2. Alte organe , care se pot dovedi necesare , se instituie potrivit prezentului Statut
()
SURSA: Aurel Preda-Mtsaru , Tratat de Relaii internaionale moderne i
contemporane, vol. III , Ed. Lumina Lex , Bucureti , 2005, p.137-139

Seminar nr. 10
Conceptul de criza i expresia ei politic n relaiile

dintre marile puteri ( II )
I Rzboiul din Coreea
- Declaraia de la Cairo, semnat de Roosevelt, Churchill i Chiang Kai-shek

promitea Coreei, dup ncheierea rzboiului, independena
- dup capitularea trupelor japoneze, trupele sovietice s-au deplasat de urgen la
nord de paralela 38, pe 14 august 1945, fiind urmate abia n septembrie 1945 de
instalarea trupelor americane la sud de paralela 38
- n 1948, Naiunile Unite au adoptat propunerea american care susinea alegeri
libere n ntreaga Coree, alegeri care urmau a decide soarta viitorului stat
- nordul Coreei, aflat sub tutel sovietic a declinat propunerea american, n timp
ce n Sud s-au organizat alegeri libere, Syngman Rhee fiind ales n funcia de
preedinte
- Rspunsul sovietic nu a ntrziat s apar, n nord fiind proclamat Republica
Democrat Popular Coreea (RDPC)
- aceiai hotrre a Naiunilor Unite solicita i retragerea trupelor aflate n Coreea.
Att SUA ct i URSS i-au retras propriile trupe, dar nu integral, ambele lsnd
n Coreea grupuri de consilieri
- la nceputul anului 1950, administraia Truman considera Coreea de Sud ca fiind
insuficient de important din punct de vedere strategic pentru a mandata o actiune
militar american care s previn o eventual invazie din partea Coreei de Nord.
Generalul Mac Arthur i Secretarul de Stat Dean Achenson au ilustrat noua situaie
prin definirea perimetrului de aprare al Statelor Unite ale Americii, perimetru
din care att Coreea ct i Taiwan-ul erau excluse.

- 14 aprilie 1950 NSC-68 - definea clar determinarea american de a ngrdi

rspndirea comunismului, afirmnd explicit c SUA nu va tolera nici o agresiune
din partea Uniunii Sovietice, indiferent unde aceast agresiune s-ar produce
- 25 iunie 1950 - la ora 4:40 a.m. atacul Armatei Populare Nord Coreene (APNC)
asupra Coreei de Sud a nceput. n ciuda realului devotament profesat de ARC
(Armata Republicii Coreea ), APNC profitnd de deficienele militare ale sud-
coreenilor au ocupat capitala Seul pe 29 iunie 1950
- 27 iunie , Washington decizie referitoare la intervenia militar a SUA n Coreea
(preedintele Truman a ordonat forelor militare aeriene i navale ale SUA s
sprijine eforturile de rezisten ale ARC i Flotei a 7-a s ocupe poziii n preajma
strmtorilor Taiwan-ului)
- printr-o surpriz total, Consiliul de Securitate al Naiunilor Unite a votat
susinerea eforturilor SUA de a sprijini Coreea de Sud. Aceasta fusese posibil
datorit absenei reprezentantului URSS, care astfel nu a putut uza de dreptul su
de veto. La 7 iulie 1950, Generalul MacArthur a primit comanda Forelor
Naiunilor Unite (FNU) din Coreea. Dup ce Syngman Rhee a transferat comanda
trupelor sud-coreene lui MacArthur, acesta a devenit comandantul militar suprem
din Coreea de Sud
- 4 iulie 1950 - forele militare americane s-au angajat n lupta cu APNC , ns
rezultatele au fost sub ateptri. Lipsa de experien a armatei americane,
echipamentul militar depit i strategia eronat de lupt au avut drept rezultat o
victorie categoric a nord-coreenilor. n urmtoarele dou luni, armata american
s-a retras aprox. 150 de mile.
- 15 septembrie 1950 - asaltul FNU de la Inchon , reuind s ncercuiasc i s
anihileze Armata 1 i Armata 2 a APNC, nu mai puin de 14 divizii nord-coreene
fiind distruse, FNU cucerind Seulul.
- 14 octombrie 1950 dup mai multe ezitri , Republica Popular China ia decizia
trimiterii n Peninsula Coreana a voluntarilor chinezi ( 200 000 de voluntari
chinezi intr n lupt , la 1 noiembrie )
- 26 noiembrie 1950 trupele chineze ating paralela 38 - 4 ianuarie 1951
cuceresc Seul-ul

- 14 martie 1951 Mac Arthur organizeaz contraofensiva american reuind s

cucereasc Seulul i s-i mping pe comuniti spre paralela 38
- 10 aprilie 1951 Generalul Mac Arthur , datorit unor declaraii hazardate
referitoare la politica extern a SUA ( posibilitatea folosirii armei atomice ) este
nlocuit cu Generalul Matthew B Ridgeway
- 8 iulie 23 august 1951 tratative la Kaesong ntre prile beligerante eueaz
- 28 aprilie 1952 Generalul Matthew B. Ridgeway este nlocuit de Generalul
Mark Clark
- 8 octombrie 1952 un nou set de tratative eueaz
- 26 aprilie 27 iulie discuii finalizate cu semnarea armistiiului de la
Panmunjon
- semnarea armistiiului, mult dorit de ambele pri , la 27 iulie 1953, n
Panmunjom, va face ca grania dintre cele dou state coreene s fie marcat n
acest sat printr-o fie de beton vopsit, lat de un picior
II Criza Suezului
- iulie 1956 secretarul de stat John Foster Dulles anun faptul c SUA i
retrag sprijinul financiar pe care-l promiseser autoritilor egiptene pentru
construirea barajului de la Assuan.
- 26 iulie 1956 Abdel Gamal Nasser ( venit la putere n 1954 ) hotrte
naionalizarea Companiei Universale a Canalului Suez ( companie cu
capital majoritar francez i englez )
- naionalizarea canalului provoac la Paris i Londra indignare. Britanicii
i francezii , mpreun cu israelienii , elaboreaz planul unei riposte:
armata israelian urma s invadeze Egiptul, extinzndu-i controlul asupra
Peninsulei Sinai. Odat declanat conflictul , Frana i Marea Britanie
urmau s trimit n zon trupe de meninere a pcii.
- 29 octombrie 1956 armata israelian atac Egiptul

- 30 octombrie 1956 Londra i Parisul lanseaz un ultimatum potrivit

cruia prile beligerante trebuiau s-i retrag trupele la 16 Km de canal.
Israelul se conformeaz imediat.
- 31 octombrie 1956 aviaia britanic i francez bombardeaz bazele
aeriene egiptene.
- 5 noiembrie 1956 intr n aciune trupele franco-britanice , atacnd
oraul Port Said
- URSS reacioneaz mpotriva interveniei franco-britanice , punnd n
discuie i posibilitatea unor represalii nucleare
- SUA , nemulumite c nu au fost consultate anterior de francezi i englezi,
solicit ncetarea imediat a ostilitilor
- 6 noiembrie 1956 britanicii renun , fiind urmai aproape imediat i de
francezi
- Criza Suezului consacr noul statut al Marii Britanii i Franei puteri de
rangul II
III Destinderea relativ i definirea regulilor de funcionare a

bipolarismului-mecanisme de comunicarea i reglementare n perioada
destinderii relative: Kennedy i riposta gradual i flexibil
A. Massive Retaliation represalii masive
- 12 ianuarie 1954 secretarul de stat John Foster Dulles declar n faa

Consiliului pentru Relaii Externe faptul c SUA posedau mijlocul de
descurajare , care este capacitatea de a trece la represalii masive.
B. Flexible Response riposta gradual i flexibil
- 1959 Maxwell Taylor public The Uncertain Trumpet , carte n care

dezvolt doctrina ripostei graduale i flexibile

- 1962 este numit preedinte al Comitetului Unificat al efilor de Stat-

Major
- ideile formulate de M. Taylor aduceau n discuie posibilitatea unui
rspuns difereniat i a unui rzboi limitat.
* De ilustrat detaliat regulile de funcionare a bipolarismului
IV Criza rachetelor din Cuba ( 1962 )
- Cuba insul situat la 180 Km de coastele Floridei

- 15 aprilie 1961 bombardiere americane B-26 , camuflate n avioane
cubaneze , bombardeaz insula
- 17 aprilie 1961 cteva sute de cubanezi debarc n Bahia de Cochinos
(Golful Porcilor) operaiunea militar eueaz
- 14 octombrie 1962 un avion american U-2F , survolnd insula la mare
nlime , a fotografiat amplasamentele de lansare a rachetelor SS4 i SS5

- 16 octombrie 1962 preedintele Kennedy e informat i au loc dezbateri

cu privire la rspunsul ce trebuia dat aciunilor sovietice din Cuba. Dou
opinii au fost preliminate:
o intervenie chirurgical , respectiv lovirea
amplasamentelor de lansare a rachetelor opinie
susinut de generalul Maxwell Taylor
blocada Cubei idee susinut de George Ball
- s-a optat pentru a doua variant , instituindu-se o carantin n jurul Cubei
(carantin termen lipsit de nuan belicoas)
- 22 octombrie 1962 ntr-un discurs televizat , preedintele Kennedy face
public diferendul americano-sovietic , i afirm c orice atac din Cuba
asupra oricrei ri din Emisfera Vestic va fi considerat drept un atac
URSS mpotriva SUA
- 26 octombrie 1962 ntr-un mesaj adresat preedintelui SUA , Hruciov
propune o soluie de compromis: sovieticii i vor retrage rachetele din
Cuba sub condiia ca SUA s se angajeze c nu va ntreprinde nici un atac
mpotriva Cubei
- 27 octombrie 1962 un alt mesaj trimis de Hruciov , complica lucrurile:
sovieticii solicitau i retragerea rachetelor americane Jupiter din Turcia. n
aceiai zi , un avion american U-2F , ce zbura la joas nlime , a fost
dobort de o rachet sovietic incident major
- 27 octombrie 1962 Kennedy i rspunde lui Hruciov , dndu-i acordul
pentru suspendarea carantinei i dnd asigurri c SUA nu vor invada
Cuba
- 28 octombrie 1962 Hruciov anun c sovieticii vor renuna la
amplasarea rachetelor n Cuba
- SUA i-au informat pe sovietici c rachetele americane din Turcia vor fi
retrase , dar c aceast chestiune nu poate fi menionat n nici un acord
(de altfel autoritile americane stabiliser retragerea acestor rachete
nainte de izbucnirea crizei rachetelor din Cuba , din simplul motiv c

dezvoltarea tehnologiei produciei de rachete permitea acum lansarea

acestora i de pe submarine)
- 7 noiembrie 1962 SUA i URSS au ajuns la un acord , potrivit cruia
navelor americane le era permis inspecia vaselor sovietice aflate n drum
spre cas.
- ca urmare a prezentei crize este instituit un telefon rou ntre Moscova i
Washington
De relevat impactul acestor crize asupra sistemului internaional
V Suport documentar
Document 1: Telegram , Mao Zedong ctre Stalin , 2/3 octombrie - neexpediat
(1) We have decided to send a portion of our troops, under the name of [the
Chinese] Volunteers, to Korea, assisting the Korean comrades to fight the troops of the
United States and its running dog Syngman Rhee. We regarded the mission as necessary.
If Korea were completely occupied by the Americans and the Korean revolutionary force
were fundamentally destroyed, the American invaders would be more rampant, and such
a situation would be very unfavorable to the whole East.
(2) We realize that since we have decided to send Chinese troops to Korea to fight
the Americans, we must first be able to solve the problem, that is, we are prepared to
wipe out the invaders from the United States and from other countries, and [thus] drive
them out [of Korea]; second, since Chinese troops will fight American troops in Korea
(although we will use the name of the Chinese Volunteers), we must be prepared for an
American declaration of war on China. We must be prepared for the possible
bombardments by American air forces of many Chinese cities and industrial bases, and
for attacks by American naval forces on China's coastal areas.

(3) Of the two questions, the first one is whether the Chinese troops would be able
to wipe out American troops in Korea, thus effectively resolving the Korean problem. If
our troops could annihilate American troops in Korea, especially the Eighth Army (a
competent veteran U.S. army), the whole situation would become favorable to the
revolutionary front and China, even though the second question (that the United States
declares war on China) would still remain as a serious question. In other words, the
Korean problem will end in fact with the defeat of American troops (although the war
might not end in name, because the United States would not recognize the victory of
Korea for a long period). If so, even though the Untied States declared war on China, the
confrontation would not be a large-scale one, nor would it last very long. We consider
that the most unfavorable situation would be that the Chinese forces fail to destroy
American troops in large numbers in Korea, thus resulting in a stalemate, and that, at the
same time, the United States openly declares war on China, which would be detrimental
to China's economic reconstruction already under way and would cause dissatisfaction
among the national bourgeoisie and some other sectors of the people (who are absolutely
afraid of war).
(4) Under the current situation, we have decided, starting on October 15, to move
the twelve divisions, which have been earlier transferred to southern Manchuria, into
suitable areas in North Korea (not necessarily close to the 38th parallel); these troops will
only fight the enemy that venture to attack areas north of the 38th parallel; our troops will
maintain a defensive warfare, while fighting with small groups of enemies and learning
about the situation in every respect. Meanwhile, our troops will be awaiting the arrival of
Soviet weapons and to be equipped with those weapons. Only then will our troops, in
cooperation with the Korean comrades, launch a counter-offensive to destroy the
invading American forces.
(5) According to our information, every U.S. army (two infantry divisions and
one mechanized division) is armed with 1500 pieces of artillery of various calibers
ranging from 70mm to 240mm, including tank guns and anti-aircraft guns, while each of
our armies (three divisions) is equipped with only 36 pieces of such artillery. The enemy
would control the air while our air force, which has just started its training, will not be
able to enter the war with some 300 planes until February 1951. Therefore, at present, we

are not assured that our troops are able to wipe out an entire U. S. army once and for all.
But since we have decided to go into the war against the Americans, we should be
prepared so that, when the U.S. high command musters up one complete army to fight us
in one campaign, we should be able to concentrate our forces four times larger than the
enemy (that is, to use four of our armies to fight against one enemy army) and to use a
firing power one and a half to two times stronger than that of the enemy (that is, to use
2200 to 3000 pieces of artillery of 70mm caliber and upward to deal with the enemy's
1500 pieces of artillery of the same calibers), so that we can guarantee a complete and
thorough destruction of one enemy army.
(6) In addition to the above-mentioned twelve divisions, we are transferring
another twenty-four divisions, as the second and third echelons to assist Korea, from the
south of the Yangzi River and the Shannxi-Ganshu areas to the Long-hai, Tianjin-Pukou,
and Beijing-Southern Manchuria railways; we expect to gradually apply these divisions
next spring and summer in accordance with the situation of the time.
SURSA: Chen Jian , Chinas Road to the Korean War , Columbia University Press, New
York , 1994 , http://www.ciaonet.org/book/chen/auth.html , 15.02.2005
Document 2 : Telegrama cifrat , Roshchin ctre Stalin , 3 octombrie 1950
Pentru FILIPPOV ( Stalin )

V transmit rspunsul lui Mao Zedong la telegrama dumneavoastr nr. 4581:
Am primit telegrama dumneavoastr din 1.10.50 (1 octombrie 1950 n.a.). Noi
iniial am plnuit s trimitem cteva divizii de voluntari n Coreea de Nord pentru a oferi
asisten tovarilor coreeni atunci cnd inamicul va avansa la nord de paralela 38.
Cu toate acestea , dup o analiz profund, acum considerm c asemenea aciuni
ar putea avea consecine serioase.
n primul rnd e foarte dificil s rezolvm problema corean cu cteva divizii
(trupele noastre sunt extrem de prost echipate, i nu exist ncredere n succesul

operaiunilor militare mpotriva trupelor americane), iar inamicul ne poate obliga s ne

retragem.
n al doilea rnd e foarte posibil ca aceasta s provoace un conflict deschis ntre
SUA i China, i ca o consecin i Uniunea Sovietic poate fi trt i ea n rzboi, iar
problema va deveni astfel extrem de garv.
Muli tovari din CC al PCC (Comitetul Central al Partidului Comunist Chinez
n.a.) consider c este necesar s dm dovad de precauie aici.
Desigur, netrimiterea trupelor pentru a oferi asisten tovarilor coreeni are un
efect negativ, acetia aflndu-se ntr-o mare dificultate, pe care o simim i noi profund ;
dar dac noi trimitem cteva divizii i inamicul ne foreaz s ne retragem ; i aceasta n
plus va provoca un conflict deschis ntre SUA i China, atunci ntregul nostru plan de
reconstrucie panic va fi distrus i o buna parte a populaiei din ar va fi nemulumit
(rnile inoculate de rzboi populaiei nc nu s-au vindecat, noi avem nevoie de pace).
Prin urmare e mai bine s dm dovad de rbdare acum , s ne abinem de la
trimiterea trupelor i s ne pregtim activ forele noastre , ceea ce va aduce un avantaj n
rzboiul cu inamicul.
Coreea , ct timp va suferi o nfrngere temporar, i va schimba tactica de lupt
spre rzboiul de partizani.
Vom stabili o ntlnire a CC , la care vor fi prezeni principalii tovari din
diferitele structuri politice. O decizie final , referitoare la aceast problem , nu a fost
nc luat. Aceasta este o telegram preliminar, noi dorind s ne consultm cu
dumneavoastr. Dac suntei de acord , noi suntem pregtii s trimitem imediat , pe calea
aerului , pe tovarii Zhou Enlai i Lin Biao s discute cu dumneavoastr aceast
problem i s raporteze evoluiile discuiilor n China i Corea.
Ateptm rspunsul dumneavoastr
MAO ZEDONG 2.10.50
1. Din punctul nostru de vedere, rspunsul lui Mao Zedong indic o schimbare n
poziia iniial , referitoare la chestiunea corean , a conducerii chineze. Aceasta
contrazice poziia anterioar, exprimat n discuiile lui Mao Zedong cu Yudin, Kotov i
Konnov i n discuiile lui Liu Shaoqi cu mine. n aceste discuii acetia au afirmat c
AEP este pregtit s ajute poporul corean, c moralul AEP este ridicat i c aceasta este

capabil, dac e necesar s nving trupele americane, privite ca fiind mai slabe dect cele
japoneze.
2. Guvernul chinez, poate trimite , fr ndoial , nu doar cinci-ase divizii ci chiar
mai multe. i aceasta fr a spune c trupele chineze au nevoie de echipament tehnic n
domeniile antitanc i artilerie.
Motivele acestor schimbri de poziie a chinezilor nu ne sunt clare. Putem
presupune c au fost influenai de situaia internaional , de nrutirea poziiei Coreei
i de intrigile blocului anglo-american prin intermediul ( prim-ministrului indian
Jawaharlal n.a.) Nehru , care i-a ndrumat pe chinezi la rbdare ( n privina
interveniei) , pentru a evita o catastrof.
ROSHCHIN
Nr. 2270 3.10
SURSA: Document 12 : Ciphered Telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to

Filippov (Stalin), 3 October 1950 conveying 2 October 1950 message from Mao to
Stalin n Cold War International History Project Bulletin , ... nr. 6-7, 1995-1996, p. 114-
116
Document 3 : Telegram , Roschin ctre Stalin , 7 octombrie 1950
Rspunsul la nr. 4676

Pe 6 octombrie la 22:30, ora Beijingului , l-am vizitat pe Mao Zedong i i-am
nmnat rspunsul dumneavoastr.
Dup ce m-a ascultat Mao Zedong a declarat c:
1 El este complet de acord cu evaluarea dumneavoastr a situaiei internaionale
prezente i cu perspectivele posibile ale evoluiei ei.

2 El e foarte bucuros c rspunsul dumneavoastr vorbete despre o lupt comun a

Chinei i URSS mpotriva americanilor. El a subliniat faptul c dac cineva merge la
rzboi, atunci fr nici un dubiu acel cineva ar trebui s mearg la rzboi acum. El a mai
adugat c tocmai a prezentat o idee analog la sesiunea Biroului Politic CC al PCC.
3 Ct privete trimiterea trupelor chineze n Coreea, Mao Zedong consider c
trebuiesc trimise nu doar cinci-ase divizii ci cel puin nou divizii. Cu toate acestea el a
subliniat nivelul extrem de sczut al echipamentului militar al acestor divizii, ele deinnd
doar 108 piese de artilerie i nici un tanc.
Mao Zedong de asemenea a remarcat, referindu-se la informaiile primite de la
prietenii coreeni , c n cazul corpurilor de armat SUA ( trei divizii ) aceste dein n jur
de 1 500 de piese de artilerie, de diferite calibre, inclusiv tancuri.
Mao Zedong consider c pentru a nfrnge corpurile de armat americane,
chinezii ar trebui s aib o superioritate de patru la unu n privina forei umane i de trei
la unu n privina echipamentului militar .
Mao Zedong a subliniat faptul c el poate rezolva uor problema infanteriei ,
datorit rezervelor disponibile, dar n ceea ce privete echipamentul tehnologic al trupelor
chineze el se bazeaz categoric pe asistena Uniunii Sovietice.
El a mai precizat c n prezent ei nu au cadre antrenate pentru unitile de artilerie,
tancuri i alte mijloace tehnice.
n ceea ce privete chestiunea momentului intrrii trupelor chineze Mao Zedong a
afirmat c ei sunt gata s-i deplaseze diviziile n zilele urmtoare, dar el crede c nu
trebuie s se fac n grab aceasta; ar fi mai bine s se dea ansa americanilor de a nainta
mai adnc n nord, deoarece acesta ar duce la dispersarea lor i ar facilita nfrngerea lor
pe pri de ctre chinezi.
4 Mao Zedong a acordat o atenie deosebit problemei aviaiei. El a subliniat faptul
c potrivit datelor primite de la prietenii coreeni, americanii au n jur de 1 000 de avioane
pe cmpul de lupt corean , n timp ce chinezii nc nu au aviaie. n opinia lui Mao
Zedong aviaia e necesar pentru:
a) acoperirea trupelor chineze de uscat ce vor fi trimise n Coreea ;
b) pentru operaiunile de lupt de pe front ;

c) pentru acoperirea centrelor industriale mari: Shanghai , Tianjin , Beijing,

Mukden ( Anshan , Fushun ).
Mao Zedong crede c americanii pot , la nceput , s distrug din aer baza
industrial chinez , s dezorganizeze viaa economic i s ncurce comunicaiile. O
asemenea situaie , a spus Mao Zedong , ar putea crea o nemulumire serioas n ar ,
mai ales din partea burgheziei naionale , i s pun guvernmntul popular ntr-o poziie
extrem de dificil. Mao Zedong a declarat faptul c guvernul chinez nu poate asigura
singur acoperirea aerian a trupelor i a centrelor industriale i c echipamentul din
Uniunea Sovietic e esenial.
1 Mao Zedong a atras atenia asupra faptului c n Coreea drumurile i
comunicaiile sunt distruse i aceasta complic misiunea de aprovizionare a armatei. n
acest caz , a spus el , chinezii se pot baza numai pe asistena sovietic n furnizarea
mijloacelor de transport
2 Mao Zedong a declarat faptul c guvernul chinez nu posed suficiente fonduri
pentru achiziionarea armamentului cerut , pentru aviaie i muniie. ntregul buget pe
1951 este de dou miliarde dou sute de milioane de dolari americani , din care numai
dou sute de milioane ar putea fi direcionate pentru armament.
3 Dup ce a afirmat cele de mai sus , Mao Zedong a spus c este necesar
trimiterea imediat a lui Zhou Enlai i a lui Lin Biao pentru a v raporta toate evoluiile i
consideraiile prietenilor chinezi. Zhou Enlai i Lin Biao vor putea pleca pe calea aerului
pe 8 octombrie. Ei vor zbura la Beijing la Irkutsk. Avionul nostru special e cerut n
Irkutsk.
Mao Zedong i-a exprimat dorina ca Zhou Enlai i Lin Biao s fie nsoii de Shi
Zhe i Fedorenko. Au fost prezeni la conversaie: Zhou Enali, U Su Xian i Fedorenko.
Conversaia a durat 1 or i 45 de minute.
Atept instruciunile dumneavoastr.
Roshchin
No. 2318
7.10.50

SURSA: James G. Hershberg , Vladislav Zubok Russian Documents on the

Korean War, 1950-53 , Document No. 7 : Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to
China N.V. Roshchin , to Stalin , 7 October 1950 n Cold War International History
Project Bulletin , ... nr. 14-15, 2003-2004 , p. 377-378
Document 4: Telegrama cifrat , Roshchin ctre Stalin , 14 octombrie 1950
n completarea telegramei nr. 2406 , Mao Zedong a afirmat:

Tovarii notri consider c dac trupele americane nainteaz spre grania
Chinei, atunci Coreea va deveni o pat neagr pentru noi i nord-estul (Chinei n. a.) se
va afla sub o constant ameninare.
Ezitrile anterioare ale tovarilor notri s-au produs datorit faptului c
problemele legate de situaia internaional, problemele legate de asistena sovietic
pentru noi i problemele legate de acoperirea aerian, nu erau clare pentru ei. n prezent
toate aceste probleme au fost clarificate.
Mao Zedong a subliniat faptul c acum este avantajos pentru ei s trimit trupe
chineze n Coreea. Chinezii au obligaia absolut de a trimite trupe n Coreea.
n acest moment ei trimit primul ealon compus din nou divizii. Dei sunt slab
narmate, ele vor fi capabile s lupte mpotriva trupelor lui Syngman Rhee. ntre timp
tovarii chinezi vor trebui s pregteasc al doilea ealon.
Principalul lucru de care noi avem nevoie, spune Mao Zedong, este fora aerian,
care ne va asigura acoperirea aerian. Noi sperm s soseasc ct mai curnd posibil , dar
nu mai trziu de dou luni.
n plus, Tovarul Mao Zedong a subliniat faptul c n prezent guvernul
Republicii Populare China nu poate plti cu bani ghea armament livrat. Ei sper s
primeasc arme pe credit.
Astfel bugetul pe 1951 nu va fi afectat i va fi mai uor pentru ei s eplice aceasta
democrailor.
n concluzie, Mao Zedong a afirmat faptul c tovarii din Comitetul Central al
Partidului Comunist Chinez cred n necesitatea asistenei chineze a tovarilor coreeni, n

dificila lor lupt. Pentru a discuta aceast problem, Zhou Enlai va trebui s se
ntlneasc cu tovarul Filippov din nou.
ROSHCHIN
Nr. 2408
13.10.50
SURSA: Document 19: Ciphered Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov ( Stalin ), 14

October 1950 , re Meeting with Mao Zedong n Cold War International History Project
Bulletin , ... nr. 6-7, 1995-1996, p. 118-119
Document 5: Scrisoare , Kennedy ctre Hruciov , 22 octombrie 1962
Dear Mr. Chairman: A copy of the statement I am making tonight concerning

developments in Cuba and the reaction of my Government thereto has been handed to
your Ambassador in Washington.(1) In view of the gravity of the developments to which
I refer, I want you to know immediately and accurately the position of my Government in
this matter.
In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the one
thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility that your Government would
not correctly understand the will and determination of the United States in any given
situation, since I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear
age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win
and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including
the aggressor.
At our meeting in Vienna and subsequently, I expressed our readiness and desire to
find, through peaceful negotiation, a solution to any and all problems that divide us. At
the same time, I made clear that in view of the objectives of the ideology to which you
adhere, the United States could not tolerate any action on your part which in a major way
disturbed the existing over-all balance of power in the world. I stated that an attempt to

force abandonment of our responsibilities and commitments in Berlin would constitute

such an action and that the United States would resist with all the power at its command.
It was in order to avoid any incorrect assessment on the part of your Government
with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took
place, the United States would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and
that of its allies.
Moreover, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing its support of this declared
policy.(2) Despite this, the rapid development of long-range missile bases and other
offensive weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. I must tell you that the United States
is determined that this threat to the security of this hemisphere be removed. At the same
time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to
remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this
minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any misjudgment on your
part.
I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or
deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful
negotiation.
Sincerely,
JFK(3)
SURSA: Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, Washington,
October 22, 1962,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba044.htm , 12.01.2007
Document 6: Scrisoare , Hruciov ctre Kennedy , 24 octombrie 1962
Dear Mr. President: I have received your letter of October 23,(1) have studied it, and
am answering you.
Just imagine, Mr. President, that we had presented you with the conditions of an
ultimatum which you have presented us by your action. How would you have reacted to

this? I think that you would have been indignant at such a step on our part. And this
would have been understandable to us.
In presenting us with these conditions, you, Mr. President, have flung a challenge at
us. Who asked you to do this? By what right did you do this? Our ties with the Republic
of Cuba, like our relations with other states, regardless of what kind of states they may
be, concern only the two countries between which these relations exist. And if we now
speak of the quarantine to which your letter refers, a quarantine may be established,
according to accepted international practice, only by agreement of states between
themselves, and not by some third party. Quarantines exist, for example, on agricultural
goods and products. But in this case the question is in no way one of quarantine, but
rather of far more serious things, and you yourself understand this.
You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather are setting forth an
ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force.
Consider what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What
would it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean guiding oneself in one's
relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness. You are
no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us.
No, Mr. President, I cannot agree to this, and I think that in your own heart you
recognize that I am correct. I am convinced that in my place you would act the same way.
Reference to the decision of the Organization of American States cannot in any way
substantiate the demands now advanced by the United States. This Organization has
absolutely no authority or basis for adopting decisions such as the one you speak of in
your letter. Therefore, we do not recognize these decisions. International law exists and
universally recognized norms of conduct exist. We firmly adhere to the principles of
international law and observe strictly the norms which regulate navigation on the high
seas, in international waters. We observe these norms and enjoy the rights recognized by
all states.
You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that every sovereign state enjoys, you
are trying to legislate in questions of international law, and you are violating the
universally accepted norms of that law. And you are doing all this not only out of hatred
for the Cuban people and its government, but also because of considerations of the

election campaign in the United States. What morality, what law can justify such an
approach by the American Government to international affairs? No such morality or law
can be found, because the actions of the United States with regard to Cuba constitute
outright banditry or, if you like, the folly of degenerate imperialism. Unfortunately, such
folly can bring grave suffering to the peoples of all countries, and to no lesser degree to
the American people themselves, since the United States has completely lost its former
isolation with the advent of modern types of armament.
Therefore, Mr. President, if you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not
giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the
arbitrary demands of the United States. When you confront us with such conditions, try to
put yourself in our place and consider how the United States would react to these
conditions. I do not doubt that if someone attempted to dictate similar conditions to you--
the United States--you would reject such an attempt. And we also say--no.
The Soviet Government considers that the violation of the freedom to use international
waters and international air space is an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward
the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war. Therefore, the Soviet Government cannot
instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the orders of American
naval forces blockading that Island. Our instructions to Soviet mariners are to observe
strictly the universally accepted norms of navigation in international waters and not to
retreat one step from them. And if the American side violates these rules, it must realize
what responsibility will rest upon it in that case. Naturally we will not simply be
bystanders with regard to piratical acts by American ships on the high seas. We will then
be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary and adequate in order to
protect our rights. We have everything necessary to do so.
Respectfully,
N. Khrushchev(2)
SURSA: Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy , Moscow, October
24, 1962, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba061.htm ,
12.01.2007

Document 7: Mesaj , Hruciov ctre Kennedy , 27 octombrie , 1962
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I have studied with great satisfaction your reply to Mr.
Thant(1) concerning measures that should be taken to avoid contact between our vessels
and thereby avoid irreparable and fatal consequences. This reasonable step on your part
strengthens my belief that you are showing concern for the preservation of peace, which I
note with satisfaction.
Council of Ministers, are concerned solely with having our country develop and
occupy a worthy place among all peoples of the world in economic competition, in the
development of culture and the arts, and in raising the living standard of the people. This
is the most noble and necessary field for competition, and both the victor and the
vanquished will derive only benefit from it, because it means peace and an increase in the
means by which man lives and finds enjoyment.
In your statement you expressed the opinion that the main aim was not simply to come
to an agreement and take measures to prevent contact between our vessels and
consequently a deepening of the crisis which could, as a result of such contacts, spark a
military conflict, after which all negotiations would be superfluous because other forces
and other laws would then come into play--the laws of war. I agree with you that this is
only the first step. The main thing that must be done is to normalize and stabilize the state
of peace among states and among peoples.
I understand your concern for the security of the United States, Mr. President, because
this is the primary duty of a President. But we too are disturbed about these same
questions; I bear these same obligations as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R. You have been alarmed by the fact that we have aided Cuba with weapons, in
order to strengthen its defense capability--precisely defense capability--because whatever
weapons it may possess, Cuba cannot be equated with you since the difference in
magnitude is so great, particularly in view of modern means of destruction. Our aim has
been and is to help Cuba, and no one can dispute the humanity of our motives, which are
oriented toward enabling Cuba to live peacefully and develop in the way its people
desire.

You wish to ensure the security of your country, and this is understandable. But Cuba,
too, wants the same thing; all countries want to maintain their security. But how are we,
the Soviet Union, our Government, to assess your actions which are expressed in the fact
that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases; surrounded our allies
with military bases; placed military bases literally around our country; and stationed your
missile armaments there? This is no secret. Responsible American personages openly
declare that it is so. Your missiles are located in Britain, are located in Italy, and are
aimed against us. Your missiles are located in Turkey.
You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by
sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us; our sentries
patrol back and forth and see each other. Do you consider, then, that you have the right to
demand security for your own country and the removal of the weapons you call
offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? You have placed destructive missile
weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. How then can
recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such unequal relations
between our great states? This is irreconcilable.
It is good, Mr. President, that you have agreed to have our represent-atives meet and
begin talks, apparently through the mediation of U Thant, Acting Secretary General of
the United Nations. Consequently, he to some degree has assumed the role of a mediator
and we consider that he will be able to cope with this responsible mission, provided, of
course, that each party drawn into this controversy displays good will.
I think it would be possible to end the controversy quickly and normalize the situation,
and then the people could breathe more easily, considering that statesmen charged with
responsibility are of sober mind and have an awareness of their responsibility combined
with the ability to solve complex questions and not bring things to a military catastrophe.
I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which
you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the
United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United
States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will
remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach agreement as to the period of time
needed by you and by us to bring this about. And, after that, persons entrusted by the

United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges
made. Of course, the permission of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey is necessary
for the entry into those countries of these representatives and for the inspection of the
fulfillment of the pledge made by each side. Of course it would be best if these
representatives enjoyed the confidence of the Security Council, as well as yours and
mine--both the United States and the Soviet Union--and also that of Turkey and Cuba. I
do not think it would be difficult to select people who would enjoy the trust and respect
of all parties concerned.
We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of the peoples of
Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidence in their security, will make a
statement within the framework of the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet
Government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and
sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to
make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it would also
restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from the
territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey's other neighboring states.
The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework of
the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the
inviolability of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to interfere in its
internal affairs, not to invade Cuba itself or make its territory available as a bridgehead
for such an invasion, and will also restrain those who might contemplate committing
aggression against Cuba, either from the territory of the United States or from the
territory of Cuba's other neighboring states.
Of course, for this we would have to come to an agreement with you and specify a
certain time limit. Let us agree to some period of time, but without unnecessary delay--
say within two or three weeks, not longer than a month.
The means situated in Cuba, of which you speak and which disturb you, as you have
stated, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore, any accidental use of them to the
detriment of the United States is excluded. These means are situated in Cuba at the
request of the Cuban Government and are only for defense purposes. Therefore, if there is
no invasion of Cuba, or attack on the Soviet Union or any of our other allies, then of

course these means are not and will not be a threat to anyone. For they are not for
purposes of attack.
If you are agreeable to my proposal, Mr. President, then we would send our
representatives to New York, to the United Nations, and would give them comprehensive
instructions in order that an agreement may be reached more quickly. If you also select
your people and give them the corresponding instructions, then this question can be
quickly resolved.
Why would I like to do this? Because the whole world is now apprehensive and
expects sensible actions of us. The greatest joy for all peoples would be the
announcement of our agreement and of the eradication of the controversy that has arisen.
I attach great importance to this agreement in so far as it could serve as a good beginning
and could in particular make it easier to reach agreement on banning nuclear weapons
tests. The question of the tests could be solved in parallel fashion, without connecting one
with the other, because these are different issues. However, it is important that agreement
be reached on both these issues so as to present humanity with a fine gift, and also to
gladden it with the news that agreement has been reached on the cessation of nuclear tests
and that consequently the atmosphere will no longer be poisoned. Our position and yours
on this issue are very close together.
All of this could possibly serve as a good impetus toward the finding of mutually
acceptable agreements on other controversial issues on which you and I have been
exchanging views. These views have so far not been resolved, but they are awaiting
urgent solution, which would clear up the international atmosphere. We are prepared for
this.
These are my proposals, Mr. President.
Respectfully yours,
N. Khrushchev(2)
SURSA: Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy , Moscow, October
27, 1962, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba091.htm ,
12.01.2007

Document 8: Mesaj , Departamentul de Stat al SUA ctre Ambasada din URSS , 27

octombrie 1962
1015. Following message from President to Khrushchev should be delivered as soon as

possible to highest available Soviet official. Text has been handed Soviet Embassy in
Washington and has been released to press:
"Dear Mr. Chairman:
I have read your letter of October 26(1) with great care and welcomed the statement of
your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be
done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all
weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under
effective United Nations arrangements.
Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York
instructions that will permit them to work out this week and--in cooperation with the
Acting Secretary General and your representative--an arrangement for a permanent
solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26. As I
read your letter, the key elements of your proposals--which seem generally acceptable as
I understand them--are as follows:
1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate
United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to
halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.
2. We, on our part, would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements
through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these
commitments--(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to
give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and I am confident that other nations of the
Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.
If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we
should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world
within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would
enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments", as
proposed in your second letter which you made public.(2) I would like to say again that

the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race;
and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and
the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.
But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in
Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international
guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning
Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security,
would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of
the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this
letter and in your letter of October 26.
/s/ John F. Kennedy"
Rusk
SURSA: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union ,
Washington, October 27, 1962,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba095.htm , 12.01.2007
Document 9: Mesaj , Hruciov ctre Kennedy , 28 octombrie 1962
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of October 27.(1) I express
my satisfaction and thank you for the sense of proportion you have displayed and for
realization of the responsibility which now devolves on you for the preservation of the
peace of the world.
I regard with great understanding your concern and the concern of the United States
people in connection with the fact that the weapons you describe as offensive are
formidable weapons indeed. Both you and we understand what kind of weapons these
are.
In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of
peace, to give an assurance to all people who crave peace, and to reassure the American
people, who, I am certain, also want peace, as do the people of the Soviet Union, the
Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further

work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which
you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.
Mr. President, I should like to repeat what I had already written to you in my earlier
messages--that the Soviet Government has given economic assistance to the Republic of
Cuba, as well as arms, because Cuba and the Cuban people were constantly under the
continuous threat of an invasion of Cuba.
A piratic vessel had shelled Havana. They say that this shelling was done by
irresponsible Cuban emigres. Perhaps so, however, the question is from where did they
shoot. It is a fact that these Cubans have no territory, they are fugitives from their
country, and they have no means to conduct military operations.
This means that someone put into their hands these weapons for shelling Havana and
for piracy in the Caribbean in Cuban territorial waters. It is impossible in our time not to
notice a piratic ship, considering the concentration in the Caribbean of American ships
from which everything can be seen and observed.
In these conditions, pirate ships freely roam around and shell Cuba and make piratic
attacks on peaceful cargo ships. It is known that they even shelled a British cargo ship. In
a word, Cuba was under the continuous threat of aggressive forces, which did not conceal
their intention to invade its territory.
The Cuban people want to build their life in their own interests without external
interference. This is their right, and they cannot be blamed for wanting to be masters of
their own country and disposing of the fruits of their own labor.
The threat of invasion of Cuba and all other schemes for creating tension over Cuba
are designed to strike the Cuban people with a sense of insecurity, intimidate them, and
prevent them from peacefully building their new life.
Mr. President, I should like to say clearly once more that we could not remain
indifferent to this. The Soviet Government decided to render assistance to Cuba with the
means of defense against aggression--only with means for defense purposes. We have
supplied the defense means which you describe as offensive means. We have supplied
them to prevent an attack on Cuba--to prevent rash acts.
I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27,
1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the

United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you
said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of
such a kind to Cuba disappear.
It is for this reason that we instructed our officers--these means as I had already
informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers--to take appropriate measures
to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to
return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27,(2) we
are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the
dismantling of these means.
Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling,
there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict.
I note with satisfaction that you have responded to the desire I expressed with regard
to elimination of the aforementioned dangerous situation, as well as with regard to
providing conditions for a more thoughtful appraisal of the international situation, fraught
as it is with great dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocketry, spaceships,
global rockets, and other deadly weapons. All people are interested in insuring peace.
Therefore, vested with trust and great responsibility, we must not allow the situation to
become aggravated and must stamp out the centers where a dangerous situation fraught
with grave consequences to the cause of peace has arisen. If we, together with you, and
with the assist-ance of other people of good will, succeed in eliminating this tense
atmosphere, we should also make certain that no other dangerous conflicts which could
lead to a world nuclear catastrophe would arise.
In conclusion, I should like to say something about a detente between NATO and the
Warsaw Treaty countries that you have mentioned. We have spoken about this long since
and are prepared to continue to exchange views on this question with you and to find a
reasonable solution.
We should like to continue the exchange of views on the prohibition of atomic and
thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament, and other problems relating to the
relaxation of international tension.
Although I trust your statement, Mr. President, there are irresponsible people who
would like to invade Cuba now and thus touch off a war. If we do take practical steps and

proclaim the dismantling and evacuation of the means in question from Cuba, in so doing
we, at the same time, want the Cuban people to be certain that we are with them and are
not absolving ourselves of responsibility for rendering assistance to the Cuban people.
We are confident that the people of all countries, like you, Mr. President, will
understand me correctly. We are not threatening. We want nothing but peace. Our
country is now on the upsurge.
Our people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful labor. They have achieved
tremendous successes since the October Revolution, and created the greatest material,
spiritual, and cultural values. Our people are enjoying these values; they want to continue
developing their achievements and insure their further development on the way of peace
and social progress by their persistent labor.
I should like to remind you, Mr. President, that military reconnaissance planes have
violated the borders of the Soviet Union. In connection with this there have been conflicts
between us and notes exchanged. In 1960 we shot down your U-2 plane, whose
reconnaissance flight over the USSR wrecked the summit meeting in Paris. At that time,
you took a correct position and denounced that criminal act of the former U.S.
Administration.
But during your term of office as President another violation of our border has
occurred, by an American U-2 plane in the Sakhalin area. We wrote you about that
violation on 30 August. At that time you replied that that violation had occurred as a
result of poor weather, and gave assurances that this would not be repeated. We trusted
your assurances, because the weather was indeed poor in that area at that time.
But had not your planes been ordered to fly about our territory, even poor weather
could not have brought an American plane into our airspace. Hence, the conclusion that
this is being done with the knowledge of the Pentagon, which tramples on international
norms and violates the borders of other states.
A still more dangerous case occurred on 28 October, when one of your
reconnasissance planes intruded over Soviet borders in the Chukotka Peninsula area in
the north and flew over our territory. The question is, Mr. President: How should we
regard this? What is this: A provocation? One of your planes violates our frontier during
this anxious time we are both experiencing, when everything has been put into combat

readiness. Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a
nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step? And all the more so since the U.S.
Government and Pentagon long ago declared that you are maintaining a continuous
nuclear bomber patrol.
Therefore, you can imagine the responsibility you are assuming, especially now, when
we are living through such anxious times.
I should like to express the following wish; it concerns the Cuban people. You do not
have diplomatic relations. But through my officers in Cuba, I have reports that American
planes are making flights over Cuba.
We are interested that there should be no war in the world, and that the Cuban people
should live in peace. And besides, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have our people in
Cuba. Under such a treaty with the Cuban Government we have sent there officers,
instructors, mostly plain people: specialists, agronomists, zoo technicians, irrigators, land
reclamation specialists, plain workers, tractor drivers, and others. We are concerned
about them.
I should like you to consider, Mr. President, that violation of Cuban airspace by
American planes could also lead to dangerous consequences. And if you do not want this
to happen, it would be better if no cause is given for a dangerous situation to arise.
We must be careful now and refrain from any steps which would not be useful to the
defense of the states involved in the conflict, which could only cause irritation and even
serve as a provocation for a fateful step. Therefore, we must display sanity, reason, and
refrain from such steps.
We value peace perhaps even more than other peoples because we went through a
terrible war with Hitler. But our people will not falter in the face of any test. Our people
trust their Government, and we assure our people and world public opinion that the
Soviet Government will not allow itself to be provoked. But if the provocateurs unleash a
war, they will not evade responsibility and the grave consequences a war would bring
upon them. But we are confident that reason will triumph, that war will not be unleashed
and peace and the security of the peoples will be insured.
In connection with the current negotiations between Acting Secretary General U Thant
and representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Republic of Cuba, the

Soviet Government has sent First Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov to New York
to help U Thant in his noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.
Respectfully yours,
N. Khrushchev(3)
SURSA: Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy , Moscow, October
28, 1962 , http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba102.htm ,
12.01.2007
Document 10: NSC-68 (excerpt)
I. Background of the Present Crisis
() Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced two global wars
of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions--the Russian and the Chinese--
of extreme scope and intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five empires--the Ottoman,
the Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian, and Japanese--and the drastic decline of two
major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the span of one generation,
the international distribution of power has been fundamentally altered. For several
centuries it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength
that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater strength. The
international scene was marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of
sovereign and independent states was maintained, over which no state was able to
achieve hegemony.
Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historic distribution
of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and
French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States and the Soviet
Union in such a way that power increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the
Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith,
anti-thetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the
world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet

Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency.

With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every
individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the
phase of total war.
On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from the anxiety arising
from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand, any substantial further extension of the
area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition
adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. It is in this
context that this Republic and its citizens in the ascendancy of their strength stand in their
deepest peril.
The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction
not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. They are issues which will not await
our deliberations. With conscience and resolution this Government and the people it
represents must now take new and fateful decisions.
II. Fundamental Purpose of the United States
The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the
Constitution: ". . . to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In essence, the fundamental
purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon
the dignity and worth of the individual.
Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our determination to
maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and
Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and
democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to
defend our way of life, for which as in the Declaration of Independence, "with a firm
reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our
lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."

III. Fundamental Design of the Kremlin
The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the
international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in
the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control. In the minds of the
Soviet leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of
their authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority.
The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of
the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet
world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled
from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of
the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-
Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy
whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if
the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.
IV. The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of ideas and Values between the U.S.
Purpose and the Kremlin Design
A. NATURE OF CONFLICT
The Kremlin regards the United States as the only major threat to the conflict
between idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin, which has come to a
crisis with the polarization of power described in Section I, and the exclusive possession
of atomic weapons by the two protagonists. The idea of freedom, moreover, is peculiarly
and intolerably subversive of the idea of slavery. But the converse is not true. The
implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the
two great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which gives the present polarization of
power the quality of crisis.
The free society values the individual as an end in himself, requiring of him only
that measure of self-discipline and self-restraint which make the rights of each individual
compatible with the rights of every other individual. The freedom of the individual has as

its counterpart, therefore, the negative responsibility of the individual not to exercise his
freedom in ways inconsistent with the freedom of other individuals and the positive
responsibility to make constructive use of his freedom in the building of a just society.
From this idea of freedom with responsibility derives the marvelous diversity, the
deep tolerance, the lawfulness of the free society. This is the explanation of the strength
of free men. It constitutes the integrity and the vitality of a free and democratic system.
The free society attempts to create and maintain an environment in which every
individual has the opportunity to realize his creative powers. It also explains why the free
society tolerates those within it who would use their freedom to destroy it. By the same
token, in relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society is on the
strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all
societies into conformity with it.
For the free society does not fear, it welcomes, diversity. It derives its strength
from its hospitality even to antipathetic ideas. It is a market for free trade in ideas, secure
in its faith that free men will take the best wares, and grow to a fuller and better
realization of their powers in exercising their choice.
The idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than the idea
of submission to authority. For the breadth of freedom cannot be tolerated in a society
which has come under the domination of an individual or group of individuals with a will
to absolute power. Where the despot holds absolute power--the absolute power of the
absolutely powerful will--all other wills must be subjugated in an act of willing
submission, a degradation willed by the individual upon himself under the compulsion of
a perverted faith. It is the first article of this faith that he finds and can only find the
meaning of his existence in serving the ends of the system. The system becomes God,
and submission to the will of God becomes submission to the will of the system. It is not
enough to yield outwardly to the system--even Gandhian non-violence is not acceptable--
for the spirit of resistance and the devotion to a higher authority might then remain, and
the individual would not be wholly submissive.
The same compulsion which demands total power over all men within the Soviet
state without a single exception, demands total power over all Communist Parties and all
states under Soviet domination. Thus Stalin has said that the theory and tactics of

Leninism as expounded by the Bolshevik party are mandatory for the proletarian parties
of all countries. A true internationalist is defined as one who unhesitatingly upholds the
position of the Soviet Union and in the satellite states true patriotism is love of the Soviet
Union. By the same token the "peace policy" of the Soviet Union, described at a Party
Congress as "a more advantageous form of fighting capitalism," is a device to divide and
immobilize the non-Communist world, and the peace the Soviet Union seeks is the peace
of total conformity to Soviet policy.
The antipathy of slavery to freedom explains the iron curtain, the isolation, the
autarchy of the society whose end is absolute power. The existence and persistence of the
idea of freedom is a permanent and continuous threat to the foundation of the slave
society; and it therefore regards as intolerable the long continued existence of freedom in
the world. What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power
which now inescapably confronts the slave society with the free.
The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the
present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat
everywhere. The shock we sustained in the destruction of Czechoslovakia was not in the
measure of Czechoslovakia's material importance to us. In a material sense, her
capabilities were already at Soviet disposal. But when the integrity of Czechoslovak
institutions was destroyed, it was in the intangible scale of values that we registered a loss
more damaging than the material loss we had already suffered.
Thus unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet
system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its
purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and
divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully and powerfully evokes the
elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a
great and growing center of military power.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of a free society are determined by its fundamental values and by the
necessity for maintaining the material environment in which they flourish. Logically and
in fact, therefore, the Kremlin's challenge to the United States is directed not only to our

values but to our physical capacity to protect their environment. It is a challenge which
encompasses both peace and war and our objectives in peace and war must take account
of it.
1. Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way in which we affirm our
values in the conduct of our national life, and in the development of our military
and economic strength.
2. We must lead in building a successfully functioning political and economic
system in the free world. It is only by practical affirmation, abroad as well as at
home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our own integrity, in which
lies the real frustration of the Kremlin design.
3. But beyond thus affirming our values our policy and actions must be such as to
foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, a change toward
which the frustration of the design is the first and perhaps the most important step.
Clearly it will not only be less costly but more effective if this change occurs to a
maximum extent as a result of internal forces in Soviet society.
In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an
adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of order
among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in our own
interests, the responsibility of world leadership. It demands that we make the attempt, and
accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with
the principles of freedom and democracy. We should limit our requirement of the Soviet
Union to its participation with other nations on the basis of equality and respect for the
rights of others. Subject to this requirement, we must with our allies and the former
subject peoples seek to create a world society based on the principle of consent. Its
framework cannot be inflexible. It will consist of many national communities of great and
varying abilities and resources, and hence of war potential. The seeds of conflicts will
inevitably exist or will come into being. To acknowledge this is only to acknowledge the
impossibility of a final solution. Not to acknowledge it can be fatally dangerous in a
world in which there are no final solutions.
All these objectives of a free society are equally valid and necessary in peace and
war. But every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national

security demands that we seek to achieve them by the strategy of the cold war. It is only
by developing the moral and material strength of the free world that the Soviet regime
will become convinced of the falsity of its assumptions and that the pre-conditions for
workable agreements can be created. By practically demonstrating the integrity and
vitality of our system the free world widens the area of possible agreement and thus can
hope gradually to bring about a Soviet acknowledgement of realities which in sum will
eventually constitute a frustration of the Soviet design. Short of this, however, it might be
possible to create a situation which will induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself,
with or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence on tolerable
terms with the non-Soviet world. Such a development would be a triumph for the idea of
freedom and democracy. It must be an immediate objective of United States policy.
There is no reason, in the event of war, for us to alter our overall objectives. They do not
include unconditional surrender, the subjugation of the Russian peoples or a Russia shorn
of its economic potential. Such a course would irrevocably unite the Russian people
behind the regime which enslaves them. Rather these objectives contemplate Soviet
acceptance of the specific and limited conditions requisite to an international
environment in which free institutions can flourish, and in which the Russian peoples will
have a new chance to work out their own destiny. If we can make the Russian people our
allies in the enterprise we will obviously have made our task easier and victory more
certain.
The objectives outlined in NSC 20/4 (November 23, 1948) ... are fully consistent
with the objectives stated in this paper, and they remain valid. The growing intensity of
the conflict which has been imposed upon us, however, requires the changes of emphasis
and the additions that are apparent. Coupled with the probable fission bomb capability
and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union, the intensifying
struggle requires us to face the fact that we can expect no lasting abatement of the crisis
unless and until a change occurs in the nature of the Soviet system. ()
SURSA: NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14,
1950,http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-1.htm , 18.02.2007

Seminar nr. 11
1962-1975: De la criza rachetelor din Cuba la Actul final de la

Helsinki. Instituionalizarea destinderii
I Tentativele de limitare a folosirii i experimentrii armamentului

nuclear: SALT I i II
- 5 august 1963 semnarea Tratatului de Interzicere a Experienelor

Nucleare de ctre SUA , URSS i Mare Britanie. Tratatul stipula acordul
prilor semnatare de a renuna la experimentarea armelor nucleare n
atmosfer , n spaiul cosmic i sub ap. Tratatul n cauz este cunoscut i
sub denumirea de Tratatul Limitat de Interzicere a Experimentelor
Nucleare , deoarece nu coninea nici o prevedere privind experimentele
subterane
- 1 iulie 1968 semnarea Tratatului de Neproliferare Nuclear de ctre
SUA , URSS i Mare Britanie. Tratatul cerea prilor semnatare s se
abin de la facilitarea dobndirii acestor arme de ctre alte ri.
- mai 1972 la Moscova , Richard Nixon i Alexei Kosghin semneaz
SALT I. Tratatul cuprinde dou pri :
un acord , pe 5 ani , care limiteaz numrul rampelor
de lansare a rachetelor balistice la numrul celor care
existau sau erau n construcie la data ncheierii
acordului (nr. rachetelor balistice intercontinentale :
URSS 2 358 ICBMs , SUA 1 710 ICBMs ; rachete
ce pot fi lansate de pe submarin : URSS 62 SLBMs ,
SUA 44 SLBMs). Neajuns se fixeaz o limit

pentru numrul proiectilelor , nu ns , i pentru

ogivele nucleare pe care fiecare proiectil poate s le
duc.
a doua parte a tratatului se refer la proiectilele
antibalistice (ABMs - acestea au menirea de a distruge
proiectilele inamice , nainte ca acestea s-i ating
inta). Acordul , ncheiat pe o perioad nelimitat ,
reduce numrul acestora la o poziie unic de 100 de
proiectile. Invazia sovietic din Afganistan a
determinat Congresul SUA s nu ratifice acest tratat.
- iunie 1979 la Viena , Jimmy Carter i Leonid Brejnev semneaz
SALT II. Prezentul tratat , prevede limita de 2 250 de proiectile pentru
fiecare putere i aduce limitri serioase n privina numrului de ogive
nucleare transportate.
II Crize periferice i de sistem: rolul Chinei n confruntarea celor dou

puteri, SUA i URSS, conflictele din Orientul Apropiat i crizele
energiei (1973, 1978), rzboiul din Vietnam
A. Rolul Chinei n confruntarea celor dou puteri, SUA i URSS
1) Ruptura chino-sovietic :
februarie 1956 Congresul al XX-lea al PCUS i
discursul secret al lui Nikita Hruciov
noiembrie 1957 Consftuirea partidelor comuniste de la
Moscova
31 iulie 3 august 1958 ntlnirile oficiale dintre Mao
Zedong i Nikita Hruciov (Beijing)

impactul atacului chinez asupra insulelor Quemoy i

Matsu asupra relaiilor chino-sovietice
2 octombrie 1959 ntlnirea dintre Nikita Hruciov i
Mao Zedong (Beijing)
18 iulie 1960 retragerea experilor sovietici din China
2 martie , 15 martie 1969 incidentele militare sino-
sovietice de pe insula Damansky ( Zhenbao )
2) Apropierea chino-american :
martie 1971 SUA ridic restricia la paapoarte
cetenilor americani care doresc s cltoreasc n China
6 aprilie 1971 - Diplomaia ping-pong-ului
10 iunie 1971 SUA ridic , dup 22 de ani , embargoul
privind comerul cu Republica Popular China
9-10 iulie 1971 cltoria secret n China efectuat de
Kissinger
25 noiembrie 1971 discursul lui Huang Hua , discurs
petrecut dup primirea Republicii Populare China n ONU
21-28 februarie 1972 vizita preedintelui Nixon n
Republica Popular China
De ilustrat ntr-o manier detaliat , evenimentele mai sus enunate
B. Conflictele din Orientul Apropiat i crizele energiei (1973, 1978)
1) Rzboiul de 6 zile (1967)

- 1967 Abdel Gamal Nasser reuete s obin din partea ONU retragerea
ctilor albastre
- 22 mai 1967 Egiptul refuz accesul navelor sub pavilion israelian n
Golful Aquaba

- 30 mai 1967 Egiptul i Iordania ncheie un tratat de aprare mutual

- 5 iunie Israelul lanseaz un atac preventiv asupra vecinilor si arabi.
Victoria Israelului este total (340 de avioane egiptene sunt distruse,
majoritatea la sol). Israelul ocup teritoriul Gaza
- 7 iunie 1967 israelienii cuceresc nlimile Golan , Cisiordania i
Ierusalimul. Tot acum guvernul israelian se declar dispus a nceta focul
- ncetarea focului , fr nici un fel de condiie, este acceptat de Iordania la
7 iunie , de Egipt la 8 iunie , i de Siria la 10 iunie
- 22 noiembrie 1967 Consiliul de Securitate adopt rezoluia 242 , a crei
formulare ambigu ( retragerea israelian din toate teritoriile sau numai
din unele ) ascunde smburii rzboiului de Yom Kippur
De relevat poziiile SUA i URSS vis-a-vis de aceast criz
2) Rzboiul de Yom Kippur (1973)

- 6 octombrie 1973 Ziua Marii Iertri Evreieti ( Yom Kippur ) egiptenii
atac Peninsula Sinai i nlimile Golan
- egiptenii reuesc s foreze trecerea Canalului Suez , sirienii recuceresc o
partea Podiului Golan
- 12 octombrie 1973 armata israelian organizeaz cu succes o
contraofensiv
- 22 octombrie 1973 Consiliul de Securitate adopt rezoluia 338
( ncetarea focului n 12 ore ) i cere aplicarea rezoluiei 242
- 23 octombrie 1973 armata israelian reia operaiunile militare
- 26 octombrie 1973 Consiliul de Securitate adopt rezoluia 339 i
hotrte organizarea unei fore de urgen.
De relevat poziiile SUA i URSS vis-a-vis de aceast criz precum i principalele

prevederi ale acordului de la Camp David (17 septembrie 1978), dintre Anwar as Sadat i
Menahem Begin

3) Prima criza energetic (1973)

- 6 octombrie 1973 declanarea Rzboiului de Yom Kippur
- 14 octombrie 1973 SUA organizeaz un pod aerian pentru a aproviziona
armata israelian cu material de rzboi , ceea ce provoac o reacie dur
din partea rilor arabe
- 16 octombrie 1973 OPEC decide creterea preului petrolului.
- 19 octombrie 1973 OPEC decide instituirea unui embargo asupra
exportului de petrol n SUA ( preul benzinei crete de la 3$ barilul la
11.65$ n numai trei luni )
- 23-28 octombrie 1973 embargo-ul este extins i asupra Olandei, urmat
la 23 noiembrie de Portugalia i Africa de Sud
- 27 noiembrie 1973 Richard Nixon semneaz Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act ( viza preul i producia de iei )
- 17 martie 1974 OPEC renun la embargo ( excepie face Libia)
4) A doua criz energetic (1978-1979)

- decembrie 1978 violenele radicale din Iran determin oprirea exportului
de petrol
- 16 ianuarie 1979 ahul Iranului este constrns s ia calea exilului
- 1 februarie 1979 ayatolahul Khomeiny instaleaz o Republic islamic
- sub noul regim , exporturile de petrol sunt reluate , ns ntr-o cantitate
mult mai mic dect anterior determin creterea preului ieiului
- 1980 Saddam Hussein invadeaz Iranul exporturile de petrol ale
Iranului sunt oprite , iar cele ale Irakului sunt reduse cu 70% - provoac
creterea preului ieiului

5) Rzboiul din Vietnam
Administraia Truman
- n timpul celui de al doilea rzboi mondial, rezistena mpotriva ocupaiei
japoneze a fost condus de Vietminh (Liga vietnamez pentru
independen ) care a czut sub influena comunitilor condui de Ho i
Min
- la sfritul rzboiului Vietminhul controla nordul Vietnamului, iar n
septembrie 1945 Ho i Min a proclamat nfiinarea Republicii
Democratice Vietnam, cu capitala la Hanoi, recunoscut de Frana n 1946
- la sfritul anului 1946, Ho i Min s-a opus eforturilor franceze de a pune
bazele unui alt regim n sud se declaneaz rzboiul din Indochina
Administraia Einsenhower
- n 1954 fore masive franceze sunt trimise la Dien Bien Phu n nord-vestul
Vietnamului, lng grania cu Laos, pentru a atrage gherila Vietminh n
cmp deschis i a o distruge, ns lipsii de ajutorul american, francezii
sunt ncercuii i asediai, iar Dien Bien Phu cade
- n iulie 1954 se ncheie acordurile de la Geneva, prin care se urmreau
normalizarea situaiei din Vietnam
- n 1956, guvernul Vietnamului de Sud refuz s respecte prevederile
Acordurile de la Geneva i n acest context, forele de gheril ale
Vietcongului declaneaz o serie de atacuri mpotriva regimului
Administraia Kennedy
- Vietcongul este aprovizionat de Nord, prin Laos, prin calea Ho i Min
- preedintele Kennedy trimite doar consilieri militari
- n 1963, Diem, primul ministru sud vietnamez este nlturat printr-o
lovitur de stat, ceea ce a inaugurat o perioad de instabilitate politic

Administraia Jonhson
- la 7 august 1954 rezoluia asupra Golfului Tonkin este votat de Congres
- n februarie 1965 Vietcong a ucis i rnit ceteni americani preedintele
american Jonhson ordon operaiunea Rolling Thunder (bombardarea
asupra Vietnamului de Nord pentru a opri aprovizionarea Vietcong)
- n martie 1965 primele uniti sunt trimise sub pretextul aprrii
aerodromurilor americane
- 31 ianuarie 1968, nerespectnd armistiiul ncheiat pentru srbtori, forele
Vietcong i Nordul declaneaz un atac surpriz mpotriva Sudului, aa
numita ofensiva Tet contraatac american i al forelor Vietnamului de
Sud, ncheiat fr un rezultat clar, de fapt o victorie psihologic pentru
Hanoi ncetarea bombardamentelor
Administraia Nixon
- o nou strategia care viza trei direcii de aciune:
a) convorbiri la Paris
- ajung ntr-un impas datorit poziiilor ireconciliabile ale celor dou pri:
americanii doreau retragerea forelor Vietnamului de Nord i a
Vietcongului din Sud, meninerea regimului sprijinit de ei, n timp ce nord
vietnamezii i Vietcongul doreau meninerea unei prezene militare i
reunificarea Vietnamului sub conducerea unui guvern comunist
b) vietnamizarea conflictului: reducerea implicrii directe americane prin
scderea numrului de soldai americani i transferarea operaiunilor
militare ctre unitile vietnameze, nsoit de un sprijin american pentru
instruirea i echiparea acestora
c) extinderea rzboiului asupra Cambodgiei, aa numita operaiune
Menu (bombardarea ncepnd cu martie 1969 a bazelor comuniste din
Cambodgia)
- dificulti interne generate de o serie de scandalurile legate de operaiunile
militare americane n Vietnam (masacrul de la My Lai , incursiunea din
Cambodgia din 1970, adevrul despre evenimentele din Portul Tokin )

- n decembrie 1972, convorbirile de la Paris s-au ntrerupt americanii

declaneaz aa numitele bombardamente de Crciun
- 27 ianuarie 1973 semnarea unui acord prin care nord vietnamezii obineau
ceea ce ceruser anterior, n timpul negocierilor, iar sud- vietnamezii
acceptau doar datorit promisiunii Statelor Unite c vor interveni dac
acordul este nclcat
- la sfritul lui martie 1973, unitile americane au prsit Vietnamul
- martie 1975, Vietnamul de Nord declaneaz ofensiva mpotriva Sudului;
cererea de ajutor a Vietnamului de Sud este ignorat de Congresul
american
III Criza cehoslovac i suveranitatea limitat n blocul estic
A. cauze:
- eforturile reformitilor de la Praga de a oferi un model de socialism
radical diferit de cel sovietic
- lipsa de legitimitate a elitelor conductoare, asociate cu modelul
anacronic stalinist
- conflict ntre ramura slovac i cea ceh a partidului comunist
ascuirea luptei politice de la vrful conducerii partidului ianuarie 1968,
Novotny este nlocuit de ctre Alexander Dubcek, n fruntea partidului
comunist, iar n martie 1968, demisioneaz din funcia de preedinte al
Republicii, lsndu-i locul generalului Ludvik Svoboda
B. desfurarea evenimentelor:
- Dubcek a ncercat o modernizare a sistemului socialist aprilie 1968 este
adoptat de ctre Comitetul Central al partidului comunist documentul
intitulat Programul de aciune
- au avut loc masive reabilitri politice i ale victimelor represiunii staliniste

- 23 martie 1968 ntlnirea de la Dresda a statelor participante la Tratatul de

la Varovia condamnarea micrii reformiste cehoslovace
- 27 iunie 1968 este publicat Manifestul celor 2000 de cuvinte
- iulie 1968 o nou ntlnire a statelor participante la Tratatul de la
Varovia, fr Romnia i Cehoslovacia s-a ncheiat cu remiterea unei
scrisorii deschise amenintoare adresat liderilor cehoslovaci
- o nou ntlnire a statelor participante la Tratatul de la Varovia la
Bratislava ncercarea sovietic de a-l nltura pe Dubcek, care eueaz
- 21 august 1968 a avut loc invazia Cehoslovaciei de ctre trupele Tratatului
de la Varovia consecine:
impunerea unui guvern pro sovietic
Dubcek, ali lideri cehoslovaci au fost luai ostateci i transportai la o
unitate militar din URSS desfurarea tratativelor de la Moscova
- aprilie 1968 Husak l nlocuiete pe Dubcek
- 13 noiembrie 1968 discursul lui Brejnev doctrina suveranitii limitate
IV De la Ostpolitik la Actul final de la Helsinki
- n 1969, social democratul Willy Brandt pune capt doctrinei Hallstein

(ruperea relaiilor diplomatice cu toate rile care au recunoscut R.D.G.)
- Willy Brandt iniiaz o politic de deschidere spre Est (Ostpolitik), care se
va materializa prin ncheierea urmtoarelor acorduri:
a) august 1970 tratatul germano rus
b) decembrie 1970 tratatul germano rus
c) septembrie 1971 tratatul cvatripartit cu privire la Berlin
d) decembrie 1972 tratatul fundamental dintre cele dou state germane, R.D.G.
i R.F.G.
e) tratat de prietenie cu Cehoslovacia

Actul final de la Helsinki
- s-a semnat la sfritul Conferinei pentru Securitate i Cooperare n Europa,

la 1 august 1975
- ideea ntririi pcii i securitii n Europa i a convocrii unei conferine n
acest sens a fost pentru prima dat inclus n Declaraia cu privire la
ntrirea pcii i securitii n Europa, adoptat la 6 iulie 1966, n cadrul
edinei Comitetului Politic Consultativ al Tratatului de prietenie,
colaborare i asisten mutual de la Varovia
- prima Conferina pentru Securitate i Cooperare n Europa a inclus trei faze:
1) nivelul minitrilor afacerilor externe, avnd sarcina s nregistreze punctele de
vedere ale guvernelor participante n problemele referitoare la securitatea i cooperarea n
Europa, precum i eventualele propuneri ale diferitelor probleme ale ordinii de zi a
conferinei, s-a desfurat la Dipoli (o localitate mic de lng Helsinki) ntre 22
noiembrie 1972- 8 iunie 1973
2) a doua faz, la nivel de experi, consacrat elaborrii documentelor finale sub
form de declaraii, recomandri, rezoluii sau orice alt tip de document final, precum i
pregtirea, fixarea celei de a treia faze s-a desfurat la Geneva, ntre 18 septembrie
1973-21 iulie 1975
3) a treia faz prevzut pentru adoptarea documentelor finale, ntr-un cadru
oficial, la nivelul efilor de stat sau de guvern, s-a desfurat ntre 30 iulie 1 august
1975 la Helsinki
- la CSCE Helsinki au participat 33 de state, membre ale Alianei Nord
Atlantice, Pactului de la Varovia, state nealiniate
- structura Actului final de la Helsinki: trei pri / couri mari
a) probleme politice
b) probleme economice
c) problema drepturilor omului i libera circulaie a ideilor

* De ilustrat principalele prevederi ale Actului final de la Helsinki plecnd de al

direciile indicate mai sus, precum i semnificaia acestui document din punctul de vedere
al evoluiei relaiilor internaionale.
V Dicionar
- ABMs acronim desemnnd Antiballistic Missiles

- diplomaia ping-pong-ului la 6 aprilie 1971 echipa de tenis de mas a
Chinei a invitat echipa de tenis de mas a SUA s fac o vizit n China;
( un prim pas n normalizarea relaiilor dintre cele dou state )
- ICBMs acronim desemnnd Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
- SALT acronim desemnnd Strategic Arms Limitation Talks i ulterior
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
- Shuttle Diplomacy diplomaie de navet n perioada de dup rzboiul
de Yom Kippur , Henry Kissenger fcea cltorii dus-ntors ntre Cairo i
Ierusalim pentru negocieri
VI Suport Documentar
Document 1: Prima conversaie dintre Hruciov i Mao Zedong , 31 iulie 1958

(excerpt )
Mao Zedong: Fr a face prognoze pe termen ndelugat , putem afirma faptul c i

cooperarea noastr este asigurat pentru 10 000 de ani.
Hruciov: n acest caz ne putem ntlni din nou n 9 999 de ani pentru a pune la punct
cooperarea pentru urmtorii 10 000 de ani.
................................................................................................................................................
Mao Zedong: Am neles dup cum urmeaz: dac vrem s obinem asisten sovietic
atunci trebuie s construim o flot comun orientat n principal mpotriva SUA. Am
neles c Hruciov a vrut s rezolve chestiunea flotei comune mpreun cu tovarii
chinezi , avnd n gnd i atragerea Vietnamului.

Hruciov: Am spus c atunci cnd rzboiul ncepe, noi va trebui s folosim zonele de
coast pe scar larg , inclusiv Vietnamul.
Mao Zedong: Am spus anterior c n caz de rzboi Uniunea Sovietic va putea folosi
orice parte a (teritoriului n.a.) Chinei , i marinarii rui vor fi liberi s acioneze n orice
port al Chinei.
Hruciov: Nu a vorbi despre marinari rui. Cnd rzboiul ncepe este nevoie de
eforturi comune. Poate marinarii chinezi vor aciona, poate eforturi comune vor fi
necesare. Dar nu am ridicat problema niciunui teritoriu (chinez n.a.) i a unei baze
(militare sovietice n.a.) acolo.
Mao Zedong: Spre exemplu dac ar fi 100 de soldai n flot ce parte ai deine
dumneavoastr i ce parte noi?
Hruciov: Flota nu se poate afla n proprietatea a dou state. Flota trebuie comandat.
Cnd doi sunt la comand e imposibil de dus un rzboi.
Mao Zedong: Este adevrat.
Hruciov: Putei s nu fii de acord cu noi. Analiznd aceasta ( chestiunea flotei comune
n.a.) putem spune c suntem mpotriv. Dac ne-ai fi sugerat dumneavoastr aceasta
( ideea flotei comune n.a.) am fi fost deasemena mpotriv.
Mao Zedong: Dac este aa atunci toi norii negrii sunt risipii.
................................................................................................................................................
Hruciov: Acum a vrea s vorbesc despre staia radar. Nu a fost nici o decizie a CC n
acest chestiune. Tovarii miliari spun c este necesar o staie radar , pentru ca atunci
cnd e nevoie s putem comanda submarinele sovietice din Pacific. Cred c aceste
consideraii sunt corecte. M-am gndit c pentru realizarea unei atare probleme, am putea
intra n contact cu tovarii chinezi pentru a construi o astfel de staie. Ar fi mai bine dac
tovarii chinezi ar accepta participarea noastr la construcia staiei fie prin intermediul
unui credit, fie n alt mod. Staia este necesar. Noi avem nevoie de ea i dumneavoastr
vei avea nevoie de ea , atunci cnd vei dobndi o flot de submarine. Problema e
exploatarea ( staiei radar n.a.). Cred c nu pot exista doi proprietari asupra acestei
staii. prin urmare , suntem de acord ca pe baze de egalitate ca dumneavoastr s putei
menine prin intermediul acestei staii legtura cu flota dumneavoastr de submarine. Nu
exist nici o problem n legtur cu proprietatea ( staiei radar n.a.). Aceasta trebuie s

fie chinez. A vrea s ajungem la un aranjament de operare ( a staiei radar n.a.) pe

baze de egalitate. Dumneavoastr vei putea opera n staiile noastre din Valdivostok ,
Kurile i zonele nordice de coast. dac nu exist nici o obiecie din partea
dumneavoastr , cred c militarii notrii ar trebui s ia n calcul aceast problem. Dac
RPC refuz , nu vom mai insista ( asupra acestei chestiuni n.a.).
Mao Zedong: Aceast staie poate fi construit. Va fi proprietatea Chinei , construit cu
investiii guvernamentale chineze i o vom putea opera n comun.
Hruciov: Nu n comun , ci numai parial. Nou ne va fi folositoare doar n timp de
rzboi, sau n timpul antrenamentelor. ...
SURSA: Document No. 1 First Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong
Hall of Huaizhentan [Beijing], 31 July 1958 , n Cold War International History Project
Bulletin ... nr.12-13 , 2001, p. 250-260
Document 2: A patra conversaie dintre Hruciov i Mao Zedong , 3 august 1958

(excerpt)
Mao Zedong: A vrea s clarificm dou mici, dar importante probleme. Prima-legat de
interzicerea experienelor de arme atomice. Dumneavoastr ai oprit testarea unilateral ,
dar n Vest continu testarea (armelor nucleare n.a.). Credei c este necesar reluarea
testelor?
Hruciov: Ei ne-au eliberat de orice angajament luat prin faptul c nu au oprit testele lor.
Noi ne-am desfurat testele noastre. Acum continum s lucrm la bombele atomice i
cu hidrogen. Cnd va fi necesar , desigur vom relua testele, sub condiia ca la acea vreme
s nu fie un angajament general cu privire la ncetarea testelor.
Mao Zedong: Acum am neles. Ai spus c rachetele intercontinentale se deplaseaz prin
spaiu. Nu ard cnd reintr n atmosfer?
Hruciov: Nu , aceast probleme e rezolvat.
................................................................................................................................................

Mao Zedong: Cred n continuare faptul c deplasarea dumneavoastr peste grani , cu

ocazia summit-ului efilor de state , e periculoas. V-a sftui s declarai numirea unui
reprezentant n absena dumneavoastr ( de la summit n.a.). Toi suntem ngrijorai cnd
prsii ara ( URSS n.a.).
Hruciov: Da, exist un anumit risc , mai ales dac summit-ul are loc la New-York: acolo
sunt muli maghiari furioi , precum i ali inamici. Condiiile sunt mult mai bune la
Geneva. ...
Mao Zedong: Stalin a refuzat s mearg la Geneva , dar eu am n vedere alt tip de pericol.
Hruciov: Stalin era senil ...
................................................................................................................................................
Mao Zedong: Credei c ( John Foster n.a.) Dulles va rmne n aceiai poziie?
Hruciov: Nu , probabil va pleca , dei e mai bine pentru noi dac va rmne. E mai uor
s te nelegi cu un prost dect cu o persoan inteligent.
Mao Zedong: n opinia dumenavoastr ( candidatul democrat la preedinie n.a.)
Stevenson va deveni preedinte?
Hruciov: E o personalitate mult mai pozitiv.
Mao Zedong: Cel mai probabil , dac Partidul Republican rmne la putere
( vicepreedintele Richard n.a.) Nixon va deveni preedinte.
Hruciov: Da, probabil aa va fi. El va fi mult mai dificil dect Eisenhower. Eisenhower a
intrat pe arena (politic n.a.) ca un erou naional, ca rezultat al rzboiului (celui de-al
doilea rzboi mondial n.a.). Ca politician , nu e printre cei mai buni: i lipsete
experiena politic. i chiar ca i militar nu e prea strlucit. La sfritul rzboiului ,
germanii aproape c l-au nvins n Ardeni. Apoi (Winston) Churchill i-a cerut lui Stalin
s vin n ajutorul aliailor vestici. ...
SURSA: Document No. 2 Fourth Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao

Zedong,Hall of Qinjendiang, 3 August 1958 n Cold War International History Project
Bulletin ... nr.12-13 , 2001, p.260-262

Document 3 : Conversaia dintre Hruciov i Mao Zedong , 2 octombrie 1959

(excerpt )
Mao Zedong: Ne-am pus la curent n legtur cu mesajul lui Eisenhower ctre
Dumneavoastr , Tovare Hruciov , care ne-a fost pus la dispoziie n aceast diminea
Hruciov: Bine. n afar de aceasta am dori s v punem la curent cu unele fragmente
referitoare la China, din discuia mea cu Preedintele D. Eisenhower din 27 septembrie
1959 , i apoi permitei-ne s schimbm opinii n legtur cu vizita mea n SUA i n
legtur cu relaiile cu America. Recomandat ar fi ca fragmentele de conversaie cu
Eisenhower , mai sus menionate , s fi traduse aici oral de interpret.
Interpreii Yang Ming Fu i Li Yue Zhen traduc oral fragmentele de conversaie
cu Eisenhower , mai sus menionate.
Chinezii au acordat o mare importan chestiunii deteniei a cinci americani n
China , ca i remarcii lui Eisenhower n legtur cu motivul pentru care URSS nu a
adoptat aceiai poziie n problema Taiwan-ului ca n cea a Germaniei.
................................................................................................................................................
Hruciov: Nu tiam c RPC deine cinci americani n captivitate. E adevrat? n
conversaia cu Eisenhower am spus c doar sub forma unui sfat prietenesc a putea atige
aceast problem la Beijing.
Zhou Enlai:La 1 august 1956 , americanii i noi , am ajuns la un acord potrivit cruia
americanii care locuiesc de mult timp n RPC (imigranii) se pot ntoarce n SUA. Cu
toate acestea am stipulat faptul c dac aceti oameni comit orice infraciune, ei pot fi
arestai. Dreptul chinez prevede faptul c dac un deinut se poart bine n detenie,
sentina lui poate fi redus. A doua categorie , care potrivit acordului , le era permis s
prseasc RPC erau prizonierii de rzboi.Un avion aparinnd SUA a fost dobort pe
teritoriul Chinei i nu al Coreei.18 militari americani , care se aflau n acest avion au fost
luai prizonieri. ... Noi am luat iniiativa i am eliberat 13 prizonieri de rzboi americani.
Prin urmare la Conferina de la Geneva , americanii nu au avut de ce s ne acuze. Dup
aceasta au mai fost capturai doi americani , Fekto i Downey, care sunt acum n detenie.
Ei sunt ageni ai Ageniei Centrale de Iformaii i au fost prini n flagrant. ... O instan
judectoreasc chinez i-a condamnat la pedepse lungi: unul pe via i altul la 20 de ani

de nchisoare. ... Am avut sub detenie n jur de 90 de americani. Majoritatea au fost

eliberai i numai 5 americani se afl n detenie pe teritoriul RPC. Toi sunt spioni i
potrivit dreptului chinez sunt supui ncarcerrii. ...
................................................................................................................................................
Mao Zedong: Desigur i putem elibera sau nu (pe prizonierii americani-n.a.), dar nu i
vom elibera pe americani acum , ci la momentul oportun.
................................................................................................................................................
Zhou Enlai: n privina chestiunii Taiwan-ului , ar trebui s tragem o linie ntre cele dou
aspecte ale sale: relaiile dintre Republica Popular China i Taiwan sunt o chestiune
intern i relaiile dintre China i America n privina problemei Taiwan-ului , reprezint
aspectul internaional al acestei probleme.
Hruciov: Aa este i n aceast modalitate am vorbit cu Eisenhower, dup cum ai putut
vedea din fragmentele conversaiei mele cu Preedintele. ... Cu ceva vreme n urm ,
Lenin a creat Republica Orientului ndeprtat n Estul ndeprtat al Uniunii Sovietice, i
Lenin i-a recunoscut (suveranitate n.a.).inei minte c aceast republic a fost stabilit
pe teritoriul Uniunii Sovietice. A fost incredibil , dar Lenin pentru o perioad a fcut asta.
Mai trziu , aa cum se cuvenea , Republica Orientului ndeprtat s-a unit cu Uniunea
Sovietic.
................................................................................................................................................
Mao Zedong: Dei am deschis focul asupra insulelor ( Quemoy i Matsu n.a.) noi nu
vom ncerca s le eliberm. Noi de asemenea credem c Statele Unite nu se vor porni un
rzboi doar din cauza acestor insule i a Taiwan-ului.
Hruciov: Da, americanii nu vor porni un rzboi din cauza acestor insule i a Taiwan-
ului. Noi cunoatem coninutulinstruciunilor care i s-au dat lui (John Foster n.a.) Dulles
atunci cnd s-a ntlnit cu Chiang Kai-shek.Dac v intereseaz acest document , vi-l
putem pune la dispoziie. Ct privete atacarea insulelor , dac atacai atunci trebuie s
capturai aceste insule i dac nu considerai necesar capturarea acestora , atunci nu mai
are rost s atacai. Sincer vorbind, am crezut c vei cuceri aceste insule i am fost suprat
cnd am aflat c nu le-ai cucerit.Desigur c este problema dumneavoastr , dar eu
vorbesc despre aceasta n calitate de aliat.
................................................................................................................................................

Hruciov: De ce a trebuit s omori oameni la grania cu India?

Mao Zedong:Ei ne-au atacat mai nti, au trecut grania i au continuat s trag (focuri de
arm) timp de 12 ore.
Zhou Enlai: Cedate informative credei- cele indiene sau ale noastre?
Hruciov: Dei hinduii au atacat primii, nimeni dintre chinezi nu a fost ucis, ci numai
dintre hindui.
Zhou Enlai:Dar ce trebuia s facem dac ei ne-au atacat primii? Nu puteam trage n
aer.Hinduii chiar au trecut linia McMahon. n afar de aceasta , n viitorul apropiat
Vicepreedintele (indian n.a.) Radhakrishnan va sosi n China. Am afirmat aceasta
pentru c am luat msurile de a rezolva aceast chestiune panic, prin negocieri. n
scrisoarea mea ctre Nehru din 9 septembrie , i-am furnizat explicaii detaliate cu privire
la cele ntmplate ntre India i noi.
................................................................................................................................................
Chen Yi: Sunt insultat de declaraia dumneavoastr potrivit creia deteriorarea relaiei
cu India a fost din vina noastr.
Hruciov: i eu sunt insultat de declaraia dumneavoastr potrivit creia noi (sovieticii
n.a.) suntem servili.Ar trebui s-l susinem pe Nehru , s-l ajutm s rmn la putere.
Mao Zedong: Evenimentele din Tibet i conflictul de grani sunt aciuni temporare.
Mai bine terminm discuia acestor probleme acum. Putem evalua relaia noastr dup
cum urmeaz , respectiv c n general suntem unii, iar cele cteva diferene nu stau n
calea prieteniei noastre...
SURSA: Document No. 3 Memorandum of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao

Zedong, Beijing, 2 October 1959 , n Cold War International History Project Bulletin ...
nr.12-13, 2001, p.262-269

Document 4: Not privind retragerea experilor sovietici , Ambasada Sovietic din

Beijing ctre Ministerul de Externe al RPC , 18 iulie 1960
Potrivit Tratatului de Prietenie , Alian i Asisten Reciproc , ncheiat ntre

URSS i RPC , guvernul sovietic a trimis , la cererea guvernului chinez , un numr
considerabil de experi pentru a-i desfura activitatea n China. Pentru acest obiectiv
organismele sovietice au selectat pe cei mai buni i mai experimentai experi , chiar cu
riscul producerii unor dezechilibre ale economiei URSS. (...)
n timpul vizitei liderilor sovietici n RP China , la nceputul lunii august 1958 ,
partea chinez i-a exprimat nemulumirea cu privire la unii experi i consilieri sovietici.
... Recent partea chinez , n contactele cu experii sovietici din RP China, a nceput s
adopte o linie , aparent , neprieteneasc fa de Uniunea Sovietic , ceeaa ce contravine
obligaiilor asumate prin tratat , ca i normelor uzitate ntre statele socialiste. ... Guvernul
sovietic se vede nevoit s declare c aciunile prii chineze , mai sus menionate , sunt
neprietenoase fa de Uniunea Sovietic. Acestea sunt n contradicie cu Tratatul de
Prietenie , Alian i Asisten Reciproc , dintre URSS i RP China , potrivit cruia
ambele pri i-au luat angajamentul reciproc , n spiritul prieteniei i al cooperrii i n
acord cu principiile de egalitate i interese mutuale s dezvolte i s consolideze relaiile
economice i culturale dintre ele. (...)
Ambasada (sovietic de la Beijing n.a.) este instruit s informeze guvernul RP
China, de faptul c experii i consilierii sovietici , inclusiv cei militari , n acord cu
propria lor voin , sunt rechemai n patria-mam. n luarea acestei decizii partea
sovietic a luat n consideraie i faptul c guvernul nui al RP China , n trecut , a
ridicat chestiunea ca un numr de experi sovietici care lucreaz n RP China s se
ntoarc n Uniunea Sovietic. Guvernul Uniunii Sovietice , i exprim sperana c
guvernul RP China va nlege corect cauzele care au dus la o atare decizie.
SURSA: Note: The Soviet Embassy in Beijing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Peoples Republic of China, 18 July 1960 n Cold War International History Project
Bulletin ... nr.8-9 , 1996-1997, p.249-250

Document 5: Raport sovietic cu privire la evenimentele din 2 martie 1969 , ctre

liderii comuniti est-germani , 3 august 1969
La 2 martie 1969 , ora local 11 , chinezii au organizat o provocare pe Insula

Damansky , care este situat pe rul Ussuri , la sud de Khabarovsk , ntre punctele Bikin
i Iman ( Regiunea Primorsky). (...)
Nu exist aezri pe Insula Damansky , care nu are nici o importan economic;
nu se afl sate n vecintate dect la zeci de mile deprtare. Putem trage concluzia c
( Insula Damansky n.a.) a fost aleas ca loc de provocare , deoarece un asemenea plan
putea fi pregtit acolo n secret i prezentat apoi lumii ntr-o versiune favorabil
organizatorilor (planului n.a.). n timpul provocrii , militarii chinezi au comis acte de o
cruditate i brutalitate incredibil mpotriva grnicerilor sovietici rnii. Bazndu-ne pe
inspeciile la faa locului i pe raporturile de expertiz ale comisiei medicale , care a
examinat cadavrele grnicerilor sovietici , putem afirma faptul c rniii au fost mpucai
de chinezi de la distan mic , njunghiai cu baionete i cuite. Faa unor victime a fost
distrus dincolo de posibilitatea de recunoatere , iar alte victime aveau uniformele i
cizmele furate de ctre soldaii chinezi. (...)
SURSA: Document No.1: Soviet Report to GDR Leadership on 2 March 1969 Sino-
Soviet Border Clashes n Cold War International History Project Bulletin ... nr. 6-7,
1995-1996, p.189
Document 6 : Doctrina Brejnev , discursul lui Leonid Brejnev , 13 noiembrie 1968
In connection with the events in Czechoslovakia the question of the correlation

and interdependence of the national interests of the socialist countries and their
international duties acquire particular topical and acute importance. The measures taken
by the Soviet Union, jointly with other socialist countries, in defending the socialist gains
of the Czechoslovak people are of great significance for strengthening the socialist
community, which is the main achievement of the international working class.

We cannot ignore the assertions, held in some places, that the actions of the five
socialist countries run counter to the Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty and the
rights of nations to self determination. The groundlessness of such reasoning consists
primarily in that it is based on an abstract, nonclass approach to the question of
sovereignty and the rights of nations to self determination.
The peoples of the socialist countries and Communist parties certainly do have
and should have freedom for determining the ways of advance of their respective
countries.
However, none of their decisions should damage either socialism in their country
or the fundamental interests of other socialist countries, and the whole working class
movement, which is working for socialism.
This means that each Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people,
but also to all the socialist countries, to the entire Communist movement. Whoever forget
this, in stressing only the independence of the Communist Party, becomes one-sided. He
deviates from his international duty.
Marxist dialectics are opposed to one-sidedness. They demand that each
phenomenon be examined concretely, in general connection with other phenomena, with
other processes.
Just as, in Lenin's words, a man living in a society cannot be free from the society,
one or another socialist state, staying in a system of other states composing the socialist
community, cannot be free from the common interests of that community.
The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interests of the
world of socialism, of the world revolutionary movement. Lenin demanded that all
Communists fight against small nation narrow-mindedness, seclusion and isolation,
consider the whole and the general, subordinate the particular to the general interest.
The socialist states respect the democratic norms of international law. They have
proved this more than once in practice, by coming out resolutely against the attempts of
imperialism to violate the sovereignty and independence of nations.
It is from these same positions that they reject the leftist, adventurist conception
of "exporting revolution," of "bringing happiness" to other peoples.

However, from a Marxist point of view, the norms of law, including the norms of
mutual relations of the socialist countries, cannot be interpreted narrowly, formally, and
in isolation from the general context of class struggle in the modern world. The socialist
countries resolutely come out against the exporting and importing of counterrevolution.
Each Communist Party is free to apply the basic principles of Marxism, Leninism and
of socialism in its country, but it cannot depart from these principles (assuming, naturally,
that it remains a Communist Party).
Concretely this means, first of all, that in its activity, each Communist Party
cannot but take into account such a decisive fact of our time as the struggle between two
opposing social systems -- capitalism and socialism.
This is an objective struggle, a fact not depending on the will of the people, and
stipulated by the world's being split into two opposite social systems. Lenin said: "Each
man must choose between joining our side or the other side. Any attempt to avoid taking
sides in this issue must end in fiasco."
It has got to be emphasized that when a socialist country seems to adopt a "non-
affiliated" stand, it retains its national independence, in effect, precisely because of the
might of the socialist community, and above all the Soviet Union as a central force,
which also includes the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any of the links in
the world system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries, which cannot
look indifferently upon this.
The antisocialist elements in Czechoslovakia actually covered up the demand for
so-called neutrality and Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the socialist community with
talking about the right of nations to self-determination.
However, the implementation of such "self-determination," in other words,
Czechoslovakia's detachment from the socialist community, would have come into
conflict with its own vital interests and would have been detrimental to the other socialist
states.
Such "self-determination," as a result of which NATO troops would have been
able to come up to the Soviet border, while the community of European socialist
countries would have been split, in effect encroaches upon the vital interests of the

peoples of these countries and conflicts, as the very root of it, with the right of these
people to socialist self-determination.
Discharging their internationalist duty toward the fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia
and defending their own socialist gains, the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist states had to
act decisively and they did act against the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia.
SURSA: Brezhnev Doctrine, Polish United Workers Congress,

http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/14/documents/doctrine/ , 15.02.2007
Document 7 : The CPCz (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia ) Action program,

April 1968 (excerpt)
()
The Leading Role of the Party: A Guarantee of Socialist Progress
At present it is more important that the party adopt a policy fully justifying its
leading role in society. We believe this is a condition for the socialist development of the
country. ()
In the past, the leading role of the party was usually conceived of a monopolistic
concentration of power in the hands of party organs. This concept corresponded with the
false thesis that the party is the instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat. That
harmful conception weakened the initiative and the responsibility of state, economic, and
social institutions, damaged the party authority, and prevented it from carrying out its real
functions. The partys goal is not to become a universal caretaker of society, bind all
organizations, and watch every step taken in fulfillment of its directives. Its mission
instead is primarily to inspire socialist initiative, to demonstrate communist perspectives,
their modes, and to win over all workers by systematic persuasion and the personal
examples of communists. This determines the conceptual side of party activity. Party
organs should not deal with all problems: they should encourage others and suggest
solutions to the most important difficulties. But at the same time the party cannot turn

into an organization that influences society by its ideas and program alone. It must
develop through its members and bodies the practical organizational methods of political
force in society. ()
As a representative of the most progressive section of the society and therefore
the representative of the prospective aims of society the party cannot represent the full
range of social interests. () The party does not want to and will not take the place of
social organizations; on the contrary, it must ensure that their initiative and political
responsibility for the unity of society are revived and can flourish. The role of the party is
to find a way of satisfying the various interests without jeopardizing the interests of
society as a whole, and promoting those interests and creating new progressive ones. The
partys policy must not lead non-communists to feel that their rights and freedom are
limited by the role of the party. ()
For the Development of Socialist Democracy and a New System of the Political
Management of Society
() We must reform the whole political system so that it will permit the dynamic
development of social relations appropriate for socialism, combine broad democracy with
scientific, highly qualified management, strengthen the social order, stabilize the social
order, and maintain social discipline. The basic structure of the political system must, at
the same time, provide firm guarantees against a return to the old methods of
subjectivism and highhandedness. ()
The implementation of the constitutional reforms of assembly and association
must be ensured this year so that the possibility of setting up voluntary organizations,
special - interest associations, societies, and other bodies is guaranteed by law, and so
that the present interests and needs of various sections of our society are tended to
without bureaucratic interference and free from a monopoly by any individual
organization. ()
Legal standards must also set forth a more explicit guarantee of the freedom of
speech for minority interests and opinions. () The constitutional freedom of movement

particularly that of travel abroad for our citizens must be explicitly guaranteed by law.
()
Our entire legal code must gradually come to grips with the problem of how to
protect, in a better and more consistent way, the personal rights and property of citizens,
and we must certainly remove statutes that effectively put individual citizens at a
disadvantage with the state and other institutions. In the future we must prevent various
institutions from disregarding personal rights and the interests of individual citizens as far
as personal ownership of family houses, gardens, and other items is concerned. ()
It is troubling that up to now the rehabilitation of people, both communists and
non- communists, who were the victims of legal transgressions in previous years, has not
always been carried out in full, regarding the political and civic consequences. ()
Socialism Cannot Do without Enterprises
The democratization program of the economy places special emphasis on

ensuring the independence of enterprises and enterprise groupings and their relative
independence from the state bodies; the full implementation of the right of consumers to
determine their consumption patterns and lifestyles; the right to choose jobs freely; and
the right and opportunity of various groups of working people and different social groups
to formulate and to defend their economic interests in shaping economic policy. ()
Decision making about the plan and the economic policy of the state must be
both a process of mutual confrontation and harmonization of different interests, that is,
the interests of enterprises, consumers, employers, different social groups of population,
nation, and so forth. It also must manifest a suitable combination of the log-term
development of the economy and its immediate prosperity. ()
The International Status and Foreign Policy of the Czechoslovak Socialist

Republic
() We stand resolutely on the side of progress, democracy, and socialism in the

struggle by socialist and democratic forces against the aggressive attempts of world

imperialism. It is from this viewpoint that we determine our attitude toward the most
acute international problems of the present and our role in the worldwide struggle against
the forces of imperialist reaction.
Taking, as a point of departure, the existing relationship of international forces
and our awareness that Czechoslovakia is an active component of the revolutionary
process in the world, the SSR (Czechoslovak Socialist Republic ) will formulate its own
position toward the fundamental problems of world politics.
The basic orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy took root at the time of the
struggle for national liberation and in the process of the social reconstruction of the
country. It revolves around the alliance and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the
other socialist states. ()
We will actively pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence vis-avis the advanced
capitalist countries. ()
SURSA: Akn program Komunistick strany eskoslovenska, Rud prvo (Prague),

April 10, 1968, pp.1-6 apud. Jaromr Navrtil and others (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968.
A National Security Archive Documents Reader, CEU Press, 1998, pp.92-95.
Document 8 : The Two Thousand Words Manifesto, June 27, 1968 (excerpt)
Two Thousand Words that Belong to Workers, Farmers, Officials, Scientists, Artists, and
Everybody
The first threat to our national life was from the war. The came the evil days and
events that endangered the nations spiritual well-being and character. Most of the nation
welcomed the socialist program with high hopes. But it fell into the hands of the wrong
people. ()
After enjoying great popular confidence after the war, the communist part by
degrees bartered this confidence away for office, until it had al the offices and nothing
else. () The leaders mistaken policies transformed a political party and an alliance

based on ideas into an organization for exerting power, one that proved highly attractive
to power-hungry individuals eager to wield authority, to cowards who took the safe and
easy route, and to people with bad conscience. The influx of members such as these
affected the character and behavior of the party ().
We bear responsibility for the present state of affairs. But those among us who are
communists bear more than others, and those who acted as components or instruments of
unchecked power bear the greatest responsibility of all. The power they wield was that of
a self-willed group spreading out through the party apparatus into every district and
community. It was this apparatus that decided what might and might not be done: It ran
the cooperative farms for the cooperative farmers, the factories for the workers, and the
National Committees for the public. No organizations, not even communist ones, were
really controlled by their own members. The chief sin and deception of these rulers was
to have explained their own whims as the will of workers. ()
While many workers imagined that they were the rulers, it was a specially trained stratum
of party and state who actually rules in their name. In effect it was these people who
stepped into the shoes of the deposed class and themselves came to constitute the new
authority. Let us say in fairness that some of them long ago realized the evil trick history
had played. () They share our opposition to the retrograde views held by certain party
members. But large proportions of officials have been resistant to change and are still
influential. They still wield the instruments of power, especially at district and
community level, where they can employ them in secret and without fear of prosecution.
()
For after twenty years the communists were the only ones able to conduct some
sort of political activity. It was only the opposition inside the communist party that had
the privilege to voice antagonistic views. The effort and the initiative now displayed by
democratically minded communists are only a partial repayment of the debt owed by
the entire party to the non-communists whom it kept down in an unequal position. ()
But in the days to come we must gird ourselves with our own initiative and make
our own decisions.
To begin with we will oppose the view, sometimes voiced, that a democratic
revival can be achieved without the communists, or even in opposition to them. This

would be unjust and foolish too. The communist already have their organizations in
place, and in these we must support the progressive wing. They have their experienced
officials, and they still have in their hands, after all, the crucial levers and buttons. On the
other hand they have presented an Action Program to the public. ()We must demand
that they produce local Actions Programs in public in every district and community. ()
Although at present one cannot expect more of the central political bodies, it is
vital to achieve more at district and community level. Let us demand the departure of
people who abused their power, damaged public property, and acted dishonorably or
brutally. Ways must be found to compel them to resign. To mention a few: public
criticism, resolutions, demonstrations, demonstrative work brigades, collections to buy
presents for their retirement, strikes, and picketing at their front doors. () Let us
demand public sessions of the national committees. For questions that no one else will
look into, let us set up our own civic committees and commissions ().
There has been great alarm recently over the possibility that foreign forces will
intervene in our development. Whatever superior forces may face us, all we can do is
stick to our own positions, behave decently, and initiate nothing ourselves. We can show
our government that we stand by it, with weapons if need be, if it will do what we give it
a mandate to do. And we can assure our allies that we will observe out treaties of
alliance, friendship and trade. ()
() a great opportunity was given to us once again, as it was after the end of the
war. Again we have the chance to take into our hands our common cause, which for
working purposes we call socialism, and give it a form more appropriate to our once-
good reputation and to the fairly good opinion we used to have of ourselves. The spring is
over and will never return. By winter we will know all. ()
SURSA: Dva tisce slov, Litern listy (Prague), 27 June 1968, p.1 apud. apud. Jaromr
Navrtil and others (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968. A National Security Archive
Documents Reader, CEU Press, 1998, pp.177-181

Document 9 : Alocuiunea preedintelui Consiliului de Stat al Romniei, Nicolae

Ceauescu, rostit la mitingul din Piaa Palatului Republicii, 21 august 1968
(excerpt)
Dragi tovari,
Ceteni ai rii romneti,
n aceste momente grele pentru poporul frate cehoslovac, pentru situaia din
Europa, doresc ca, n numele Comitetului Central, al Consiliului de Stat i al guvernului
s m adresez dvs., exprimnd ncrederea noastr deplin n hotrrea poporului romn
de a asigura construcia panic a socialismului n patria noastr.
Ptrunderea trupelor celor cinci ri socialiste n Cehoslovacia constituie o mare
greeal i o primejdie grav pentru pacea n Europa, pentru soarta socialismului n lume.
Este de neconceput n lumea de astzi, cnd popoarele se ridic la lupt pentru a-i apra
independena naional, pentru egalitatea n drepturi, ca un stat socialist, ca state
socialiste s ncalce libertatea i independena altui stat. Nu exist nici o justificare, nu
poate fi acceptat nici un motiv de a admite, pentru o clip numai, ideea interveniei
militare n treburile unui stat socialist fresc. (...)
Problema alegerii cilor de construcie socialist este o problem a fiecrui
partid, a fiecrui stat, a fiecrui popor. Nimeni nu se poate erija n sftuitor, n ndrumtor
cu privire la felul n care trebuie construit socialismul n alt ar. Noi considerm c
pentru a aeza relaiile dintre rile socialiste, dintre partidele comuniste pe baze cu
adevrat marxist leniniste trebuie, o dat pentru totdeauna, s se pun capt amestecului
n treburile altor partide. (...)
Noi pornim n activitatea noastr de la rspunderea pe care o avem fa de popor,
fa de toi oamenii muncii fr deosebire de naionalitate. Noi cu toii, romni, maghiari,
germani, oameni de alte naionaliti, avem acelai destin, aceleai nzuine furirea
comunismului n patria noastr i suntem hotri, ntr-o unitate deplin, s asigurm
nfptuirea acestui ideal. (...)

SURSA: Ion Ptroiu (coordonator), nghe n plin var. Praga august 1968, Editura
Paideia, Bucureti, 1998, pp.94-96.
Document 10: Document: Tratatul R.F. Germania cu URSS , Moscova, 12 august

1970 (excerpt)
(...)
Articolul 1
Republica Federal Germania i URSS consider cel mai important el al politicii lor s
sprijine pacea internaional i s obin destinderea ncordrii.
Ele i exprim nzuina de a stimula normalizarea situaiei n Europa i dezvoltarea
relaiilor panice ntre toate statele europene, pornind n aceast nzuin de la situaia
real existent n aceast regiune.
Articolul 2
Republica Federal Germania i URSS se vor cluzi n relaiile lor reciproce, precum i
n problemele asigurrii securitii europene i internaionale, dup elurile i principiile
expuse n Carta Naiunilor Unite. Ca urmare, ele i vor soluiona problemele litigioase
exclusiv prin mijloace panice i i asum obligaia s se abin (...) de la ameninarea cu
fora sau de la folosirea forei n probleme care afecteaz securitatea din europa i
securitatea internaional, precum i relaiile lor reciproce.
Articolul 3
n concordan cu elurile i principiile expuse mai sus, Republica Federal Germania i
URSS sunt unanime n a recunoate c pacea n Europa poate fi meninut numai dac
nimeni nu va atenta la graniele actuale.
Ele se oblig s respecte neabtut integritatea teritorial a tuturor statelor din Europa n
graniele lor actuale.
Ele declar c nu au nici un fel de pretenii teritoriale fa de cineva i nu vor ridica
asemenea pretenii nici pe viitor.

Ele consider, n prezent ca i n viitor, graniele tuturor statelor din Europa ca fiind
inviolabile, aa cum exist ele n ziua semnrii acestui tratat, inclusiv linia Oder Neisse,
care constituie grania vestic a Republicii Populare Polone i inclusiv grania ntre
Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German. (....)
Document 11: Tratatul R.F. Germania cu R.P. Polon , Varovia, 7 decembrie 1970
(excerpt)
(...)
Articolul 1
1. Republica Federal Germania i Republica Populare Polon constat n deplin acord c
grania actual, care este trasat n capitolul IX al hotrrilor Conferinei de la Postdam
din 2 august 1945, ncepnd de la Marea Baltic, n imediata apropiere i la vest de
Swinemunde, mergnd de acolo de-a lungul Odrei pn la confluena cu Neisse, iar apoi
de-a lungul rului Neisse pn la grania cu Cehoslovacia, constituie grania de stat
vestic a Republicii Populare Polone.
2. Ele confirm inviolabilitatea granielor lor actuale acum i n viitor i se angajeaz
reciproc s respecte cu strictee integritatea lor teritorial.
3. Ele declar c nu au nici un fel de pretenii teritoriale una fa de cealalt i nu vor
enuna pretenii nici pe viitor.
Articolul 2
1. Republica Federal Germania i Republica Populare Polon se vor conduce n relaiile
lor reciproce, precum i n problemele garantrii suveranitii n Europa i n lume dup
elurile i principiile nscrise n Carta Naiunilor Unite.

2. Ca urmare, corespunztor articolelor I i II din Carta Naiunilor Unite, ele vor rezolva
toate probleme litigioase exclusiv cu mijloace panice i se vor abine n problemele care
afecteaz securitatea european i internaional, precum i n relaiile lor reciproce de la
ameninarea cu fora sau de la utilizarea forei.
Articolul 3
1. Republica Federal Germania i Republica Populare Polon vor ntreprinde noi pai n
direcia deplinei normalizrii i dezvoltri a relaiilor lor reciproce, a cror baz stabil o
constituie acest tratat. (...)
SURSA: Constantin Bue, Zorin zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii
Document 12 : Tratatul privind bazele relaiilor dintre Republica Federal

Germania i Republica Democrat German , Berlin, 21 decembrie 1972 (excerpt)
Articolul 1
Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German dezvolt ntre ele relaii
normale de bun vecintate pe baza egalitii.
Articolul 2
Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German se vor conduce dup
scopurile i principiile nscrise n Carta Naiunilor Unite, mai ales a egalitii suverane a
tuturor statelor, a respectrii independenei, suveranitii i integritii teritoriale, a
dreptului la autodeterminare, a aprrii drepturilor omului i a nediscriminrii.

Articolul 3
n conformitate cu Carta O.N.U., Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat
German vor rezolva probleme lor litigioase n exclusivitate prin mijloace panice i se
vor abine de la ameninarea cu fora sau de la aplicarea forei.
Articolul 4
Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German declar ca nici unul din
cele dou state nu-l reprezint pe cellalt pe plan internaional i nu vorbete n numele
lui.
Articolul 5
Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German vor promova relaii de
prietenie cu statele europene i vor contribui la securitatea i colaborarea european. (...)
Articolul 6
Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German pornesc de la principiul
limitrii forelor n ambele state. Ele respect independena i suveranitatea celor dou
state n treburile lor interne i externe. (...)
Articolul 8
Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German vor efectua un schimb
de reprezentane permanente. (...)

Document 13 : Acordul celor patru puteri cu privire la Berlin , Berlin, 3 septembrie

1972 (excerpt)
(...)
Partea II
Dispoziiuni referitoare la sectoarele occidentale ale Berlinului
a. Guvernul URSS declar c circulaia n tranzit a persoanelor civile i a bunurilor ntre

sectoarele occidentale ale Berlinului i R.F.G. pe osele, ci ferate i ci navigabile peste
teritoriul R.D.G. nu va fi n nici un fel mpiedicat, c aceast circulaie va fi nlesnit n
aa fel nct s se desfoare n modul cel mai simplu i rapid i s se bucure de prioriti.
(...)
b. Guvernele Republicii Franceze, Regatului Unit, SUA declar c legturile ntre

sectoarele occidentale ale Berlinului i R.F.G. vor fi meninute i dezvoltate considernd
c aceste sectoare, ca i pn acum, nu constituie parte constitutiv a R.F.G. i nu vor fi
n viitor administrate de ea. (...)
c. Guvernul URSS declar c liniile de comunicaie ntre sectoarele occidentale ale

Berlinului i inuturile cu care acestea se mrginesc, ct i cu alte inuturi ale R.D.G. cu
care acestea se mrginesc, vor fi mbuntite. Persoanele cu domiciliul stabil n
sectoarele occidentale ale Berlinului vor putea cltori, din motive umanitare, familiale
sau religioase, culturale i comerciale, n aceste inuturi, n aceleai condiii care sunt
valabile pentru celelalte persoane care cltoresc n aceste zone. (...)

Document 14 : Actul final al Conferinei pentru Securitate i Cooperare n Europa,

Helsinki, 1 august 1975 (excerpt)
(...)
Declaraia privind principiile care guverneaz relaiile reciproce dintre statele
participante
Statele participante, (...)
Declar hotrrea lor de a respecta i pune n practic, fiecare dintre ele n relaiile sale cu
toate celelalte state participante, indiferent de sistemul lor politic, economic sau social,
precum i de mrimea lor, situaia lor geografic sau nivelul lor de dezvoltare, principiile
urmtoare (...):
1. Egalitatea suveran, respectarea drepturilor inerente suveranitii (...).
2. Nerecurgerea la for sau la ameninarea cu fora (...).
3. Inviolabilitatea frontierelor
Statele participante consider, fiecare, toate frontierele celuilalt, precum i frontierele
tuturor statelor din Europa, i n consecin ele se vor abine acum i n viitor de la orice
atentat mpotriva acestor frontiere.
n consecin, ele se vor abine, de asemenea, de la orice cerere sau de la orice act de
acaparare i uzurpare a ntregului sau a unei pri a teritoriului oricrui stat participant.
4. Integritatea teritorial a statelor (...).
5. Reglementarea panic a diferendelor (...).
6. Neamestecul n treburile interne

7. Respectarea drepturilor omului i libertilor fundamentale, inclusiv a libertii de

gndire, contiin, religie sau de convingere
Statele participante vor respecta drepturilor i libertilor fundamentale, inclusiv a
libertii de gndire, contiin, religie sau de convingere pentru toi, fr deosebire de
ras, sex, limb sau religie.
Ele vor promova i ncuraja exercitarea efectiv a drepturilor i libertilor civile, politice,
economice, sociale, culturale i altele care decurg toate din demnitatea inerent persoanei
umane i sunt eseniale pentru libera i deplina sa dezvoltare.
n acest cadru, statele participante vor recunoate i respecta libertatea individului de a
profesa i practica, singur sau n comun, religia sau convingerea acionnd dup
imperativele propriei sale contiine.
Statele participante pe teritoriul crora exist minoriti naionale vor respecta dreptul
persoanelor care aparin acestor minoriti la egalitate n faa legii, le vor acorda
posibilitatea deplin de a se bucura n mod efectiv de drepturile i libertile
fundamentale i, n acest mod, vor proteja interesele lor legitime n acest domeniu.
Statele participante recunosc importana universal a drepturilor omului i libertilor
fundamentale, a cror respectare este un factor esenial al pcii, justiiei i bunstrii
necesare pentru a asigura dezvoltarea relaiilor amicale i a cooperrii ntre ele, ca i
ntre toate statele.
Ele vor respecta n mod constant aceste drepturi i liberti n relaiile lor reciproce i se
vor strdui, individual i n comun, inclusiv n cooperare cu Naiunile Unite, s
promoveze respectarea universal i efectiv a lor.
Ele confirm dreptul individului de a cunoate drepturile i ndatoririle sale n acest
domeniu i de a aciona n consecin (...).
8. Egalitatea n drepturi a popoarelor i dreptul popoarelor de a dispune de ele nsele

(...).
9. Cooperarea ntre state (...).

Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1983, p.205-211.
Document 15: Rezoluia Consiliului de Securitate nr. 242 , 22 noiembrie 1967
The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to
work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the
United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the
Charter,
Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just
and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the
following principles:
Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of
every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
Affirms further the necessity
For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State
in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to
the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to
promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of

the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
SURSA: United Nations Security Council Resolution 242,

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/un242.htm , 12.01.2007
Document 16: Rezoluia Consiliului de Securitate nr. 338 , 22 octombrie 1973
The Security Council,

Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military
activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this
decision, in the positions after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the
positions they now occupy; Calls upon all parties concerned to start immediately after the
cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its
parts;
Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start
between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and
durable peace in the Middle East.
SURSA: United Nations Security Council Resolution 338,

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/un338.htm , 12.01.2007

Seminar nr. 12
Evoluii n perioada rzboiului rece 1962-1989 - sfritul

rzboiului rece
I Tensionarea relaiilor Est-Vest i politica ripostei totale a lui Ronald

Reagan
A. URSS
- 10 noiembrie 1982 Leonid Brejnev moare
- 12 noiembrie 1982 CC al PCUS l alege ca secretar general pe Iuri
Andropov , fost ef al KGB
- 9 februarie 1984 Iuri Andropov moare
- 13 februarie 1984 CC al PCUS l alege ca secretar general pe Konstantin
Cernenko
- 11 aprilie 1984 Sovietul Suprem l alege pe Cernenko ca ef al statului
(preedinte al Prezidiului)
- 10 martie 1985 Konstantin Cernenko moare
- 11 martie CC al PCUS l alege n funcia de secretar general pe Mihail
Gorbaciov
- perestroika (restructurare) i glasnost (transparen)
B. SUA
- 2 noiembrie 1976 Jimmy Carter ( fostul guvernator al Georgiei ) devine
al 39-lea preedinte al SUA
- 17 septembrie 1978 Acordurile de la Camp David dintre Anwar as Sadat
i Menahem Begin ( ntlnire mediat de Carter)
- 4 noiembrie 1979 debutul crizei ostatecilor din Iran
- 4 noiembrie 1980 Ronald Reagan este ales al 40-lea preedinte al SUA

- 8 martie 1983 Reagan catalogheaz URSS drept Imperiul Rului

- 23 martie 1983 Reagan propune dezvoltarea i amplasarea unui sistem
antirachet Iniiativa de Aprare Strategic
- 6 noiembrie 1984 - Ronald Reagan este reales n funcia de preedinte
C. Relaii Est-Vest
1. Criza euro-rachetelor
- n 1977 URSS a hotrt s modernizeze i s ntreasc rachetelor sale cu

raz medie de aciune, ncepnd s desfoare rachetele de tip SS20,
mobile dotate fiecare cu cte trei capete nucleare, fiecare putnd s
parcurg mai mult de 5.000 km i deci, cu raz mare de aciune, plecnd
de pe teritoriul sovietic, pn n Europa, bazinul mediteranean, Extremul
Orient (China, Japonia) i chiar Alaska.
- la 14 decembrie 1979, aliana nord atlantic a adoptat dubla decizie
care consta n modernizarea ncepnd sfritul anului 1983, a rachetelor
americane instalate n Europa occidental (euromissiles) prin dotarea cu
rachete de tip Pershing II i rachete de croazier i negocieri cu scaden n
1983, ntre Washington i Moscova n vederea eliminrii rachetelor SS 20,
fcnd astfel inutil amplasarea noilor rachete americane.
- conform acestei duble decizii, la Geneva se vor desfura, ncepnd cu data
de 30 noiembrie 1981, negocierile americano-sovietice n privina acestor
rachete cu raz medie de aciune
- ele stagneaz, URSS propunnd o ngheare a desfurrii rachetelor SS-20
(n schimbul stoprii instalrii noilor rachete americane), dar excluznd
orice lichidare a stocurilor
- la sfritul anului 1983, pentru c negocierile americano-sovietice nu au dat
nici un rezultat, se ncepe instalarea rachetelor Pershing II i a rachetelor
americane de croazier

- la 8 decembrie 1987, preedintele american Ronald Reagan i liderul

sovietic Mihail Gorbaciov au semnat la Washington un tratat prin care se
stabilea distrugerea tuturor rachetelor americane i sovietice cu o raz de
aciune ntre 500 i 5000 de km
2. Doctrina Reagan
- formulat la nceputul preediniei lui Reagan, stipula decizia SUA de a
recurge la fora militar pentru a se opune influenei sovietice n Lumea a
Treia.
3. ntlniri la vrf
- 11-12 octombrie 1986 Reykjavik Ronald Reagan i Mihail Gorbaciov

convin asupra eliminrii rachetelor balistice cu raz medie de aciune din
Europa
- 2-3 decembrie 1989 Malta ntlnire ntre George Bush i Mihail
Gorbaciov , prilej cu care liderul sovietic a declarat c nu va folosi fora
pentru meninerea regimurilor comuniste din Estul Europei.
De ilustrat ntr-o manier detaliat , evenimentele mai sus enunate
II Intervenia militar sovietic n Afganistan 1979
- 27 aprilie 1978 lovitur de stat Mohammed Taraki , conductorul

aripii dure din Partidul Comunist Afgan , ajunge la putere
- 5 decembrie 1978 semnarea tratatului sovieto-afgan
- septembrie 1979 asasinarea lui Taraki (n spatele asasinrii se afl prim-
ministrul Hafizullah Amin )
- 24 decembrie 1979 sovieticii invadeaz Afganistanul
De ilustrat reacia comunitii internaionale fa de invazia sovietic a Afganistanului

III Evoluii n blocul comunist n deceniile VIII-IX
Cauzele revoluilor din 1989

a) cauze economice
- eecul sistemului economic de tip socialist (centralizare, planificare, accent pus pe
industrializarea de tip stalinist, napoierea tehnologic, apariia economiei subterane i a
comerului la negru)
- reconsiderarea de ctre Uniunea Sovietic a relaiilor economice din interiorul blocului
estic: schimbrile din economia mondial, combinate cu crizele petrolului din anii
aptezeci, au transformat statele est- europene dintr-un avantaj ntr-o greutate economic
pentru statul sovietic
- presiunea social crescnd ca urmare a dificultilor economice
- scderea creterii economice, concomitent cu o scdere a resurselor
- crizele petrolului au determinat acute crize financiare, rezultatul fiind reprezentat de
apariia unor noi dezechilibre economice
b) cauze politice
- schimbri n politica extern a blocului occidental: decizia NATO de narmare i decizia
statelor Comunitii Europene de a forma o uniune politic
- factorul CSCE drepturile fundamentale ale cetenilor incluse n cel de al treilea
co al CSCE Helsinki, care deveniser i drepturi pe care cetenii statelor comuniste le
puteau cere, au contribuit la de-legitimarea conducerilor acestor state i la formarea unor
grupuri sociale autohtone
- folosirea prevederilor Actului final de la Helsinki ca o modalitate de presiune
diplomatic asupra rilor est europene
- factorul Gorbaciov reformele impuse de acesta sistemului sovietic; impunerea
doctrinei Sinatra n relaiile Uniunii Sovietice cu rile blocului comunist
- efectul Ioan Paul al II-lea folosirea mesajul cretin avnd la baz adevrul,
solidaritatea i respectarea drepturilor omului ca o form de slbire din interior a
regimurilor comuniste

- o nelegere ntre cele dou mari puteri (Uniunea Sovietic i Statele Unite ale Americii)
ca o modalitate de a se pune capt rzboiului rece, divizrii Europei i a Germaniei
- existena unei fraciuni reformatoare n cadrul partidelor comuniste care va forma
nucleul unei conduceri alternative
- apariia primelor micri de contestare a regimurilor comuniste din partea societii
civile
- pierderea legitimitii partidelor comuniste datorit prelungirii crizei existente
c) cauze morale
- erodarea ideologiei marxist leniniste: scderea ncrederii marii mase a populaiei n
capacitatea elitelor comuniste de a rezolva criza prin metode tipice sistemului;
demoralizarea elitelor comuniste, pierderea ncrederii acestora n viabilitatea unui sistem
de tip socialist
* De ilustrat, pe baza bibliografiei aferente seminarului, evoluiile politice din Estul

Europei n deceniile VIII-IX precum i cazurile concrete ale prbuirii regimurilor
comuniste din urmtoarele ri: R.D.G., Polonia, Cehoslovacia, Ungaria, Romnia,
Bulgaria.
IV Suport documentar
Document 1: Scrisoarea Forumului Civic (Cehoslovacia) ctre George Bush i

Mihail Gorbaciov, 21 noiembrie 1989
Dear Sirs!
On 19 November 1989, the Civic Forum, which feels itself responsible to act as
the mouthpiece of the Czechoslovak public, was established in Prague. In a
demonstration by the Prague populace, attended by hundreds of thousands of people on
Wenceslas Square, the Civic Forum gained a consensus of opinion and therefore is
turning to you also in the name of these people.

The Soviet government has announced a policy of non-involvement in connection

with the democratic movements in Eastern Europe. We must warn you that in the case of
Czechoslovakia, this policy in reality means support for the political leadership which
was installed in the year 1968 by forceful intervention, and which, during the course of
twenty years of rule, has absolutely discredited itself. One of the demands of the mass
demonstration on 21 November was precisely the removal of these politicians from the
political scene.
Dear Sirs, we are of the opinion that the past intervention into Czechoslovak
internal events in the year 1968 should be condemned and decried as an unlawful
encroachment. The silence surrounding the intervention in August de facto means
entanglement into Czechoslovak internal conditions. We besiege you to pay attention to
this question during your negotiations; it is not only important for Czechoslovakia these
days, but also for all of Europe.
The Civic Forum
In Prague on 21 November 1989
SURSA: Document No. 3, Letter from the Civic Forum to US President George Bush
and USSR General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, 21 November 1989 n Cold War
International History Project Bulletin , Nr. 12/13 , , Fall/Winter, 2001, p. 210-211
Document 2: Declaraia Forumului Civic , rostit de Vaclav Havel , Piaa

Wenceslas , 23 noiembrie 1989
The Declaration of The Civic Forum

After twenty years Czechoslovakia once again finds itself at a historical
intersection thanks to the peoples movement, to which all generations and segments of
the population and the majority of the still existing social organizations are quickly
adding themselves. This movement is a movement of both of our nations. Its mouthpiece
has spontaneously become the Civic Forum, which today is the real representative of the
will of the people. Its natural component has become the wellorganized student

movement, which, through its protest demonstration, gave us the impulse for dramatic
social movement. Within it work all the current independent initiatives, artistic unions
headed by the theaterthe first to be in solidarity with the studentsand the renewed
currents in the National Front, including many former and current members of the CPCz.
The Catholic Church supported the Civic Forum through the words of the
cardinal, and other churches in Czechoslovakia. Anyone who agrees with its demands is
joining, and may join, the Civic Forum.
The Civic Forum is prepared to secure a dialogue between the public and the
present leadership immediately and has at its disposal qualified forces [from] all areas of
society, capable of carrying out a free and objective dialogue about real paths toward a
change in the political
and economic conditions in our country. The situation is open now, there are many
opportunities before us, and we have only two certainties.
The first is the certainty that there is no return to the previous totalitarian system
of government, which led our country to the brink of an absolute spiritual, moral,
political, economic and ecological crisis.
Our second certainty is that we want to live in a free, democratic and prosperous
Czechoslovakia, which must return to Europe, and that we will never abandon this ideal,
no matter what transpires in these next few days.
The Civic Forum calls on all citizens of Czechoslovakia to support its
fundamental demands by the demonstration of a general strike declared for Monday, 27
November 1989, at noon. Whether our country sets out in a peaceful way on the road to a
democratic social order, or whether an isolated group of Stalinists, who want at any price
to preserve their power and their privileges disguised as empty phrases about
reconstruction will conquer, may depend upon the success of this strike.
We challenge the leadership of this country to grasp the gravity of this situation,
rid themselves of compromised individuals and prevent all eventual efforts for a violent
revolution.
We call on all the members of the ruling party to join the citizenry and respect its
will.

We challenge all the members of the Peoples Militias to not come out violently
against their comrade workers and thus spit upon all the traditions of worker solidarity.
We challenge all the members of the Police to realize that they are first and
foremost human beings and citizens of this country and only second subordinate to their
superiors.
We challenge the Czechoslovak Peoples Army to stand on the side of the people
and, if necessary, to come out in its defense for the first time.
We call on the public and the governments of all countries to realize that our
homeland is from time immemorial the place where European and world confrontations
have begun and ended, and that in our country it is not only its fate which is at stake, but
the future of all of
Europe. We therefore demand that they support in every way the peoples movement and
the Civic Forum.
We are opponents of violence; we do not want revenge; we want to live as
dignified and free people, who have the right to speak for the fate of their homeland and
who also think of future generations.
The Civic Forum
23 November 1989
SURSA: Document No. 4, The Declaration of Civic Forum Representative Vclav

Havel on Wenceslas Square, Prague, 23 November 1989, 4 p.m. n Cold War
International History Project Bulletin , Nr. 12/13 , , Fall/Winter, 2001, p.211
Document 3: Discuiile Bush-Gorbaciov , Malta , 3 decembrie 1989 (excerpt)
()
G. Bush: I want to clarify one point. You expressed concern about Western values. It
would be understandable if our devotion to certain ideals provoked difficulties in the
USSR or Eastern Europe and interfered with the progressive processes developing there.
But we have never

pursued such goals. Any discussion of Western values in NATO or other Western
organizations are completely natural and do not have destructive intent. But what are
Western values? They are, if you will, glasnost., openness, and heated debates. At the
economic level.incentives to progress and a free market. These values are not something
new or expedient but long-shared by us and the West Europeans, and they unite the West.
We greet the changes in the Soviet Union or in Poland but do not at all set Western
values against them. Therefore I want to understand your point of view as much as
possible in order to avoid any misunderstandings.
M. S. Gorbachev: The main principle which we have adopted and which we follow in our
new thinking is the right of each country to free choice, including the right to reexamine
and change their original choice. This is very painful, but it is a fundamental right. The
right to choose without outside interference. The US is devoted to a certain social and
economic system which the American people have chosen. Let other people decide
themselves, figuratively speaking, what God to pray to. It is important to me that the
tendency toward renewal noted in Eastern and Western Europe is proceeding in the
direction of drawing closer. The result will not be a copy of the Swedish, British, or
Soviet model. No. Something will result which meets the needs of the present stage of
development of human and European civilization. It has been observed now that people
have no fear of choosing one system or the other. They are looking for their unique
version which provides them with the best living conditions. When this choice proceeds
freely thenone can say only one thing: go right ahead.
G. Bush: I do not think that we differ here. We approve of self-determination and the
attendant debates. I want you to understand our approach on a positive level: Western
values do not at all mean imposing our system on Romania, Czechoslovakia, or even the
GDR.
M. S. Gorbachev: This is very important for us. Fundamental changes are occurring and
peoples are drawing closer together. And this is the main thing. I see that several means
of solving problems used by another system are taking root in Eastern Europe.in the
fields of economics, technology, etc. This is natural. If we and you have such a common
understanding, then all practical actions in changing conditions will be adequate and will
begin to have a positive nature. ()

J. Baker: I would like to clarify our approach to selfdetermination. We agree that each
country should have the right of choice. But all of this makes sense only when the people
in the country are actually in a position to choose freely. This is contained in the concept
of .Western values,. and is not at all the right to force their systems on
others.
M. S. Gorbachev: If someone lays claim to the truth. expect disaster.
G. Bush: Absolutely right.
J. Baker: Ive been talking about something else. Let us say, the question of the
reunification of Germany, which is causing nervousness in both our countries, and even
among Europeans. What do we say here about this? So that reunification takes place
according the principles of openness, pluralism, and a free market. We do not at all want
the reunification of Germany done on the model of 1937-1945 which, obviously,
concerns you. The Germany of that time had nothing in common with Western values.
M. S. Gorbachev: This is what [longtime Gorbachev aide] A. N. Yakovlev asks: why are
democracy, openness, and a [free] market .Western. values?
G. Bush: It was not always so. You personally have laid the foundation for these changes,
the movement toward democracy and openness. It is actually considerably clearer today
that you and we share these values than, say, 20 years ago.
M. S. Gorbachev: We ought not be drawn into propaganda battles.
A. N. Yakovlev: When they insist on Western values, then Eastern and Southern
values unavoidably appear. ()
M. S. Gorbachev: Thats it. And you see that ideological confrontations flare up again.
G. Bush: I understand you and agree. Let us avoid careless words and talk more about the
substance of the values themselves. We welcome the changes which are occurring with
all our hearts.
M. S. Gorbachev: This is very important since, as I have said, the main thing is that the
changes lead to greater openness in our relations with one another. We are beginning to
be organically integrated and liberated from everything which divided us. What will this
be called in the final account? I think.a new level of relations. Therefore, for my part, I
support your suggestion.let us

not have a discussion on a theological level. Historically this has always led to religious
wars. ()
SURSA: At Historic Crossroads: Documents on the December 1989 Malta Summit ,2-3
December 1989 n Cold War International History Project Bulletin , Nr. 12/13 , ,
Fall/Winter, 2001, p.240-241

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Regimurile politice interbelice: democraie liberal versus totalitarism

Studii de caz : Marea Britanie (sistemul constituional; evoluia regimului politic

Paul Johnson, Histoire du monde moderne, 1980, tome I. (paginile referitoare la

Bibliografie suplimentar pt. studiile de caz:

G. Brown Tindall, E. David Shi, America: o istorie narativ, Bucureti, Editura

Evoluia relaiilor interaliate n timpul celui de-al doilea rzboi mondial:

- relaiile anglo-americane. Semnarea Cartei Atlanticului, 14 august 1941

Relaiile dintre fotii aliai i debutul rzboiului rece 1945-1947.

Evoluii n perioada rzboiului rece (1948-1962)

Crizele rzboiului rece (1948-1962). Evoluii n blocul comunist

- conceptul de criza i expresia ei politic n relaiile dintre marile puteri:

Destinderea relativ i definirea regulilor de funcionare a bipolarismului-mecanisme

Evoluii n perioada rzboiului rece 1962-1989---perioada destinderii

- 1962-1975: De la criza rachetelor din Cuba la Actul final de la Helsinki.

Evoluii n perioada rzboiului rece 1962-1989-sfritul rzboiului rece

1975-1989: Tensionarea relaiilor Est-Vest i politica ripostei totale a lui

SEMINAR NR. 13 I NR. 14

Caracteristicile generale ale regimurilor politice postbelice

State democratice i totalitare

Bibliografie pt. studiile de caz:

Conferina de pace de la Paris (1919-1920). Sistemul tratatelor

I ncheierea ostilitilor militare:

FRONTUL DE EST: EFECTELE IEIRII RUSIEI DIN RZBOI

II. Negocierea pcii la Paris, Versailles

- noua diplomaie, noul tip de negociere, perspectivele naionale asupra pcii.

III. Tratatele de Pace

a. Germania, Versailles, 28 iunie 1919

c. Bulgaria, Neuilly sur Seine, 27 noiembrie 1919

d. Ungaria, Trianon, 4 iunie 1920

e. Turcia, Sevres, 10 august 1920

f. Problema mandatelor coloniale

IV. Liga / Societatea Naiunilor

A) Formarea Societii Naiunilor

- aceast organizaie este menionat n ultimul punct din cele 14 evideniate de

4) Curtea permanent de justiiei internaional de la Haga

- au existat o serie de organizaii specializate alipite Societii Naiunilor care erau

D ) Eecul Societii Naiunilor:

remilitarizarea Renaniei, 7 martie 1936; anexarea Austriei sau Anschluss,

Document 1: Cele 14 puncte ale preedintelui Woodrow Wilson , 8 ianuarie 1918

7. Belgia. ntreaga lume va fi de acord c ea trebuie evacuat i restaurat fr nici o

Document 2: Tratatul de pace cu Germania de la Versailles , 28 iunie 1919 (excerpt)

naltele pri contractante, considernd c, pentru a dezvolta cooperarea ntre naiuni i

membrilor Societii. n caz de agresiune, Consiliul avizeaz asupra mijloacelor de a

Seciunea a II-a Luxemburg

Seciunea a III-a Malul stng al Rinului

Se interzice Germaniei de a menine sau de a construi fortificaii, fie pe malul stng al

Seciunea a III-a Bazinul Saar

Seciunea a V-a Alsacia - Lorena

Seciunea a VI-a Austria

Seciunea a VII-a Statul cehoslovac

Seciunea a VIII-a Polonia

Seciunea I Coloniile germane

Seciunea a VI-a Comisiuni interaliate de control

de guvernele aliate i asociate, precum i de naionalii lor, ca urmare a rzboiului ce le-a

Seciunea a II-a Europa Oriental

Document 3: Tratatul de pace cu Austria (excerpt)