Octavian GORDON,

Alexandru MIHIL (Eds.)

Via lui Nabot / Naboth’s Vineyard

– studia theologica recentiora –
Octavian GORDON Alexandru MIHIL
(Eds.)

VIA LUI NABOT

NABOTH’S VINEYARD
– studia theologica recentiora –

Presa Universitar Clujean

2012
Refereni tiinifici:
Pr. Conf. Dr. Picu Ocoleanu
Conf. Dr. Sebastian Moldovan

Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naionale a României

Via lui Nabot = Naboth's Vineyard : studia theologica recentiora /
ed.: Octavian Gordon, Alexandru Mihil. - Cluj-Napoca: Presa
Universitar Clujean, 2012
Bibliogr.
ISBN 978-973-595-390-4
I. Gordon, Octavian (ed.)
II. Mihil, Alexandru (ed.)

© 2012 Editorii volumului. Toate drepturile rezervate.

Reproducerea integral sau parial a textului, prin orice
mijloace, fr acordul editorilor, este interzis i se pedepsete
conform legii.

Redactor: Ilie Chicari

Corectura: Sebastian Nazâru, Anca Ionescu
Consultant limba englez i traducere rezumate: Maria Bncil
Tehnoredactarea: Alexandru Mihil
Coperta: Raluca Mocanu

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 Cuprinsul / Table of Contents
Cuvânt înainte .......................................................................................................... 7
Foreword ................................................................................................................ 11

Studii de Teologie Biblică

Ilie CHIŞCARI
L’esaltazione del Servo di Dio: Is 52,13-53,12 – analisi sintattica del testo
masoretico .............................................................................................................. 17

Cristinel IATAN
Slujirea preoţilor (kōhănîm) în Israelul antic şi implicaţiile ei. „…fiii lui Aaron, cei
unşi preoţi ale căror mâini s-au sfinţit spre slujba preoţiei” (Nm. 3,3) .................. 75

Delia Cristina PETREANU

Îngerul Domnului, chip al Tainei Întrupării. Fc. 16, 7-14 şi Fc. 21, 14-21 ......... 107

Teodora TECULESCU
Mărturia vechi-testamentară despre moarte şi înviere ......................................... 153

Rev. Bogdan BUCUR

Scholarly Frameworks for Reading 2 Cor 12:1-10. A Critical Presentation ....... 175

Justin A. MIHOC
Καὶ ἀνεφέρετο εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν. A Comparison between the Two Lukan Ascension
Accounts .............................................................................................................. 191

P. Constantin PREDA
Giovanni Battista tra Flavio Giuseppe e Luca ..................................................... 207

Diak. Cosmin PRICOP

Literarkritische Untersuchung in den synoptischen Verklärungstexten .............. 239

Studii de Teologie Patristică, Filozofie şi Istoria Bisericii

Adrian AGACHI
An Analysis on The Mystical Theology and the Commentaries of John of
Scythopolis and Fr. Dumitru Stăniloae ................................................................ 259
6 Cuprins

Arhid. Ioan I. ICĂ jr.

Mystagogia Sfântului Maxim Mărturisitorul – Itinerarul ediţiilor şi
interpretărilor ....................................................................................................... 271

Marius PORTARU
The Vocabulary of Participation in the Works of Saint Maximus the
Confessor ............................................................................................................. 295

Nicolae DRĂGUŞIN
Elemente ale concepţiei lockeene despre păcatul originar .................................. 319

Mihai-D. GRIGORE
„Ante omnia pacem et justitiam observari monebant”: Politischer Kantianismus vor
Kant? Überlegungen zu den politischen Kategorien des Gottesfriedens und
Kants .................................................................................................................... 335

Adrian MURARU
Logos & episteme: Traducerile textelor premoderne. Câteva observaţii aplicate
primei traduceri integrale în română a lui Toma de Aquino, Summa
Theologica, I ........................................................................................................ 363

Pr. Mihai SĂSĂUJAN

Conceptul de autonomie bisericească naţională la românii ortodocşi din monarhia
austriacă, la mijlocul secolului al XIX-lea .......................................................... 375
 The Vocabulary of Participation in the
Works of Saint Maximus the Confessor
Marius Portaru
(Patristic Institute “Augustinianum”, Rome)

Keywords: Maximus the Confessor, participation, divine energies,

deification, Neoplatonic philosophy.

Modern scholars have written about the doctrine of participation in St Maximus the Confessor
without paying enough attention to the vocabulary Maximus used to express it. The present study
undertakes this missing analysis. As a result, I was able to avoid the extreme of platonizing Maximus
(Perl) and of denying the existence of the doctrine of participation in Maximus (Larchet). Maximus’
terminology is linguistically close to Neoplatonic philosophy, especially to Proclus, but his views are
completely different, Christian. Maximus gave a new meaning to the classical philosophical terminol-
ogy of participation. His sacramental - soteriological concern stands at the heart of this new vision.

Introduction

Many years ago, projecting a study of the doctrine of participation in St

Maximus the Confessor, Polycarp Sherwood made this brief observation: “Great
attention would have to be given to the often ambiguous terminology of
participation.”1 It is not clear if this brilliant Maximus scholar speaks about the
“ambiguous terminology of participation” in general or only in relation to
Maximus. It is of course ambiguous to speak about ambiguous terminology in
itself, because usually it is not the terminology as such that is ambiguous, but rather
the thinking it strives to express. If someone understands his own thoughts well, he
will normally express them clearly. If the idea to be expressed is not yet defined in
all necessary aspects, then its verbal expression will not be well defined. Be it as it
may, the subsequent studies of participation in Maximus are sufficient evidence
that Sherwood was right. Without having paid the necessary attention to the
terminology of participation, these studies either reduced the doctrine of

I would like to express my appreciation to all those who helped me to write this study.
I am particularly grateful to Adina Răducanu, who reviewed and corrected the final draft.
1
Polycarp SHERWOOD, “Survey of Recent Work on St. Maximus the Confessor,” Tradi-
tio, XX (1964), p. 435.
296 Marius PORTARU

participation in Maximus to ontology (Perl’s2 and Tollefsen’s3), or simply denied

its existence – despite the “occasional” use of the vocabulary – through its
substitution with the doctrine of deification (Larchet’s4). But for Maximus,
deification is the supreme form of participation, the perfect participation. If Larchet
sees an opposition between them, he implicitly understands participation only as
some Greek philosophical conception. The ancient Platonic doctrine is instead a
specific answer to the more general question of how the universe and its ground are
connected.
A methodological question thus arises. To obtain the best results a scholar
must take at least three necessary steps: a) he must have in mind a definition of
participation which is as general as possible; b) he must have a first general
impression about what ‘participation’ in Maximus could mean; c) applying these
two prerequisites in reading the texts, he must identify expressions of participation
and then obtain a more precise understanding of participation, formulating specific
ways in which it will be studied, so as to propose a completely objective account of
Maximus’ theory. This is the method I intend to use in the present study. I
understand by ‘participation’ the relation between the One and the many, existence
and its principle and how the connection between them is made. This is, I think, the
most general and open philosophical understanding of participation. In Maximus
the context is that of a Christian theologian; that is, beside the ontological
dimension of participation, there is also at least the soteriological dimension of the
historia salutis that is present: God must save his fallen creatures: humankind and
the cosmos. This is, I think, the most general way in which Christian theology can
be understood, as an expression of historia salutis. This methodological approach
will allow me to consider Maximus’ diverse and extended vocabulary of
participation. I will pay attention to every word that supposes or indicates in any
way some kind of relation between God and the faithful, the angels or the world. I
shall be able to show that the terminology of participation in Maximus is neither
“ambiguous” (Sherwood) - but diverse - nor “occasional” (Larchet)5, but present in
all the works of Maximus6 and at the heart of key-texts. Since the purpose of this
study is to interpret the vocabulary of participation, my concern with terminology
2
Eric David PERL, Methexis: Creation, Incarnation, Deification in Saint Maximus the
Confessor, PhD Dissertation, Yale University 1991; “Metaphysics and Christology in
Maximus Confessor and Eriugena,” Eriugena: East and West. Papers of the Eight Inter-
national Colloquium of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies, Chicago
and Notre Dame, 18-20 October 1991, Bernard McGinn, Willemien Otten (eds.) (Notre
Dame Conferences in Medieval Studies 5), Notre Dame/London, 1994, p. 253-270.
3
Torstein Theodore TOLLEFSEN, The Christocentric Cosmology of St. Maximus the Con-
fessor (Oxford Early Christian Studies), Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York,
2008.
4
Jean-Claude LARCHET, La divinisation de l’homme selon Saint Maxime le Confesseur,
Cerf, Paris, 1996, p. 600-601.
5
J.-Cl. LARCHET, La divinisation de l’homme…, p. 601, n. 305: “Il nous semble au total
que la notion de participation n’intervient qu’occasionellement dans l’oeuvre de Maxime
[…].”
6
There are only two exceptions: Expositio in Psalmum LIX and Quaestiones ad
Theopemptum.
The Vocabulary of Participation in the Works of Saint Maximus the Confessor 297

is not to make some kind of concordance of the occurrences of different terms

(which would be irrelevant in itself). My aim here is to offer a strong argument in
favor of a new understanding of the doctrine of participation, an understanding
focused on “anthropology”: in Maximus’ theological discourse, man has the
natural power (as σύνδεσμός τις φυσικός) to unify creation;7 in the present fallen
condition of humankind, he must strive for his own salvation through ascetical
effort in order to accomplish, in Christ, his original vocation of a unifier between
the parts of a creation and a mediator between unified creation and God. This
anthropological lecture of the doctrine of participation might be a via media
between the overemphasis of ontology or of deification.

Previous research

Tollefsen was the first scholar to offer comments about the terminology of
participation in Maximus.8 He considered the following terms: τὸ μεθεκτόν, τὸ
μετέχον, μετέχω, μέθεξις, μετουσία, κοινωνία, παρουσία. As one can see, all these
terms, except perhaps κοινωνία, which is a biblical term, are specific to Platonic
philosophy. Then, he offers some kind of definition of these terms, but it is not
evident on what basis his definition is developed, since no textual references of any
kind are provided. For instance, he defines τὸ μεθεκτόν as “the something which is
portioned out to be shared by receivers – this implies some sort of division of a
participated ‘substance’.”9 But for Plotinus, Proclus and for all Christian
theologians this is surely not the case: the μεθεκτόν is of a spiritual nature, present
in an undivided way to all participants. Plato himself had already criticized
participation understood as a divided presence of the Form in the participants. And
Tollefsen forgets another term present in the ancient Platonic tradition, μετοχή,
used many times by Maximus.10 And not only are these terms not the only ones to
designate participation in Maximus, but they are not examined: how do we know
why Maximus uses one term and not another? Is the context relevant?, etc. This
kind of analysis is one of the keys to interpret participation in Maximus.
Others scholars have also offered a limited analysis of the terminology of
deification in Maximus, but that concept can and must be considered within the
larger area of the terminology of participation. The first to do so was Larchet
(θέωσις, θεόω, θεοποιέω, θεοποιός, θεοποιετικός, ἀποθεόω, ἐκθεόω, ἐκθέωσις,
ἐκθεωτικός, θεουργέω, θεουργία, θεουργός, θεοειδής, θεοειδῶς, θεὸν ποιεῖν, θεὸς
γίγνομαι),11 the second Russell (ἀποθεόω / ἀποθειόω, θεοποιέω – θεοποιΐα –

7
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, XLI, PG 91, 1305bc.
8
T.Th. TOLLEFSEN, The Christocentric Cosmology..., p. 193.
9
T.Th. TOLLEFSEN, The Christocentric Cosmology..., p. 193.
10
I quote only two important passages: St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad
Ioannem, VII, PG 91, 1089b; Ambigua ad Ioannem, X, PG 91, 1108b.
11
J.-Cl. LARCHET, La divinisation de l’homme…, p. 60, n. 334. Larchet observes that
Maximus makes wide use of θέωσις and θεόω. According to the French scholar,
298 Marius PORTARU

θεοποίησις – θεοποιός, ἐκθεόω/ἐκθειόω – ἐκθέωσις – ἐκθεωτικός, θεόω – θέωσις,

ἀποθειάζω – ἐκθειάζω).12

The vocabulary of participation in Maximus

In what follows, I have chosen to classify the terminology on the basis of

different meanings and images, instead of considering every work alone. I have
insisted on the original uses of the terminology and not on what Maximus has in
common with other classical Greek authors.

a. The “spatial” expressions of participation

The “spatial” expressions of participation are well attested. Most likely, they
are of biblical origin: Ef. 2, 22: “in whom (i.e. in the Lord) you also are built into it
for a dwelling place of God in the Spirit (εἰς κατοικητήριον τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν
πνεύματι)”13; Jn. 14, 23: “If a man loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father
will love him, and we will come to him and make our home with him (πρὸς αὐτὸν
ἐλευσόμεθα καὶ μονὴν παρ᾽αὐτῷ ποιησόμεθα).”
In Capita theologica et oeconomica I, 12, Maximus writes:

“God is the ‘sun of justice’, as it is written,14 who shines rays of goodness on simp-
ly everyone. The soul develops according to its free will into either wax because of
its love for God or into mud because of its love of matter. Thus just as by nature the
mud is dried out by the sun and the wax is automatically softened, so also every
soul which loves matter and the world and has fixed its mind far from God is hard-
ened (ἀντιτυποῦσα) as mud according to its free will and by itself advances to its
perdition, as did Pharaoh. However, every soul which loves God is softened as wax,
and receiving divine impressions (τοὺς τῶν θείων τύπους) and characters it be-
comes ‘the dwelling place of God in the Spirit’ (Θεοῦ κατοικητήριον ἐν
πνεῦματι).”15

Maximus borrowed these terms from Dionysius, who used them instead of the classical
Neoplatonic terms θεοποιέω and θεοποίησις. No textual references are provided.
12
Norman RUSSELL, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Ox-
ford Early Christian Studies), Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, 2004, p. 333-
344.
13
For the text of New Testament I used E. NESTLE, K. ALAND, Greek-English New Tes-
tament, Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, Stuttgart, 92001.
14
Mal. 3, 20. Maximus explains this biblical image through Neoplatonic terminology:
“shines rays of goodness (τὰς ἀκτῖνας ἐπιλάμπων τῆς ἀγαθότητος),” which he could have
received through Gregory of Nyssa or Dionysius the Ps.-Areopagite.
15
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, I, 12, PG 90, 1088b
(translation in: MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, Selected Writings, translation and notes by George
C. Berthold, introduction by Jaroslav Pelikan, preface by Irénée-Henri Dalmais, [The
Classics of Western Spirituality], New Jersey, 1985, p. 130-131). Here and in all other
translations, the words in Greek were added by me. Where I have not mentioned the
The Vocabulary of Participation in the Works of Saint Maximus the Confessor 299

Instead of dwelling place (κατοικητήριον), Maximus may use simply “place”

(τόπος), inspired by a biblical verse (Ps. 71, 3), to which he give a metaphysical
exegesis: God is the place of those who are worthy (τόπον ἔχων αὐτὸν τὸν Θεόν)
by grace, beyond the creaturely time and space, as the inheritance of good deeds.16
It seems that for Maximus there is a deep reciprocity between God and man – man
is also said to be the place of God: “in the one concentrated on moral philosophy,
the Lord inhabits (ἐνδημεῖ) through virtues.”17 “The house (οἶκος) of God is a
knowledge composed of many and varied contemplations.”18 This means that the
proper place of God in the human being is the mind (νοῦς) capable of mystical
union with Him:

“The one who spends the sixth day according to the Gospel, having already given
up the first movements of sin, acquires by his virtues the state of detachment which
is removed from all evil; he makes Sabbath in his mind of the simple representa-
tions of the passions. The one who has crossed over the Jordan is transported to the
region of knowledge, where the mind, mystically built by peace as a temple, be-
comes the dwelling-place of God in the Spirit.”19

The mystical union with God according to the mind is direct,20 the
participation in God is without intermediaries.
This spatial imagery might seem very far from the classical terminology of
participation; inasmuch as it expresses the union between man and God, it must be
considered as expressing participation. It actually highlights precisely this
conception of Maximus: the very concrete, biblical meaning of participation.

b. Participation in God through the incorruptibility of the flesh

The mystical union with God realized at the level of the mind has no
Origenistic or Evagrian meaning in Maximus: it does not exclude body and the
cosmos from this union. Participation in God through body starts from the very
beginning of the Christian life:

“Baptized in Christ by the Spirit, we have received the first (πρώτην) incorruptibil-
ity of the flesh; we await the final (ἐσχάτην) incorruptibility of Christ in the Spirit,

author of the translation, I preferred the translation I myself made. When I have – slightly
or throughly – modified the translation made by other scholar, I specified ‘modified’.
16
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, I, 68, PG 90, 1108c.
17
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, II, 58, PG 90, 1149b.
18
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, II, 78, PG 90, 1161c
(transl. G.C. Berthold, p. 165).
19
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, I, 53, PG 90, 1101d-
1104a (transl. Berthold, p. 137).
20
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium LIII (ed. Carl Laga, Carlos G.
Steel, [Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca 7)], Brepols/University Press,
Turnhout/Leuven, 1980, p. 433): ἀμέσως κατὰ νοῦν; Centuriae de charitate, II, 31
(critical edition and Italian translation: Massimo Confessore. Capitoli sulla carita, editi
criticamente con introduzione, versione e note da Aldo Ceresa-Gastaldo, [Verba
seniorum 3], Editrice Studium, Roma, 1963, p. 104).
300 Marius PORTARU

that is in keeping undefiled the first incorruptibility by a free gift of good works and
by a voluntary death (δι᾿ ἐπιδόσεως ἔργων ἀγαθῶν δηλονότι, καὶ τοῦ κατὰ
πρόθεσιν θανάτου); according to this final incorruptibility no one who enjoys it will
lose the benefits (τῶν κτηθέντων ἀγαθῶν) he has acquired.”21

The virtue and knowledge present in mind sanctify the members of the body
and its senses (καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις κατ᾿ ἀρετὴν καὶ
γνῶσιν ἁγιάζων).22 The result of this lifelong process is the full deification and
participation of the body together with the soul in the final glory:

“When it (i.e. the soul) receives through this food (i.e. virtues and contemplations)
eternal blessedness indwelling in it, it becomes God through participation in divine
grace (γίνεται θεὸς τῇ μεθέξει τῆς θεϊκῆς χάριτος) by itself ceasing from all activi-
ties of mind and sense (πασῶν τῶν κατὰ νοῦν καί αἴσθησιν ἐνεργειῶν, αὐτὴ τε
παυσαμένη) and with them the natural activities of the body (καὶ ἑαυτῇ τὰς τοῦ
σώματος συναπαύσασα φυσικὰς ἐνεργείας) which is deified along with it in a par-
ticipation of deification proper to it (συνθεωθέντος αὐτῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογοῦσαν
αὐτῷ μέθεξιν τῆς θεώσεως). In this state only God shines forth through body and
soul, when the abundance of glory (τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς δόξης) overhelms
(νικηθέντων) their natural features (τῶν φυσικῶν γνωρισμάτων).”23

c. Participation depends on the human free will

Let us now observe how the road of humankind to the final participation
necessarily includes the accord of creatures’ free will. To express this, Maximus
generally maintains the Neoplatonic language of participation, but introduces a
new specifically Christian element: the free will of creatures as a metaphysical
condition of participation. Maximus’ conception of the free will, both of creatures
and of creator, is different from the Neoplatonic one, because it presupposes the
doctrine of creation out of nothing. As such, Maximus proposes a distinction
between the participation in being (to exist and to exist eternally, which depends on
the Creator’s power alone) and the participation in freedom as power of self-
constitution.

“Ὁ μὲν Θεὸς ὡς αὐτοΰπαρξις ὢν καὶ αὐτοαγαθότης καὶ αὐτοσοφία, μᾶλλον δὲ

ἀληθέστερον εἰπεῖν καὶ ὑπὲρ ταῦτα πάντα, οὐδὲν ἔχει τὸ σύνολον ἐναντίον. Τὰ δὲ
κτίσματα, ὡς πάντα μὲν μεθέξει καὶ χάριτι τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἔχοντα, τὰ δὲ λογικὰ καὶ
νοερὰ καὶ τὴν ἀγαθότητος καὶ σοφίας ἐπιτηδειότητα, ἔχουσιν ἐναντία· τῇ μὲν
ὑπάρξει, τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχειν· τῇ δὲ ἀγαθότητος καὶ σοφίας ἐπιτηδειότητι, κακίαν καὶ
ἀγνωσίαν. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀεὶ ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ταῦτα, ἐν τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ

21
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, I, 87, PG 90, 1119b
(transl. Berthold, p. 145).
22
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, II, 32, PG 90, 1149b.
23
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, II, 88, PG 90, 1168a
(transl. Berthold, p. 167, modified).
The Vocabulary of Participation in the Works of Saint Maximus the Confessor 301

πεποιηκότος ἐστί· τὸ δὲ μετέχειν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας ἢ μὴ μετέχειν,
ἐν τῇ βουλήσει τῶν λογικῶν ὑπάρχει.”24

God, as self-existence and as being Himself goodness and wisdom (to speak more
truly, He is above such things), has absolutely no contrary thing. Creatures, inas-
much as all have their existence – and rational, intelligent ones their aptitude for
goodness and wisdom – by participation and grace, do have contrary things. As
contrary to existence they have not to exist; as contrary to their aptitude for good-
ness and wisdom, they have vice and ignorance. That they exist forever or do not
exist, this is in the power of the Maker; to share in His goodness and wisdom, or not
to share, this depends on the will of rational beings.25

For Stephen Gersh, ἐπιτηδειότης is a general term to designate “fitness” or

“suitability’ within Neoplatonism.26 In Proclus it means the participant’s fitness to
receive the participated principle.27 In Ambigua ad Ioannem 7, Maximus points out
about two types of fitness or receptivity, the essential fitness (οὐσιώδης
ἐπιτηδειότης) and the fitness by habituation (ἑκτικὴ ἐπιτηδηιότης).28 Maximus
indicates γνωμικὴ ἐπιτηδηιότης (volitive faculty) as the spiritual creatures’ proper
capacity to freely participate in God.29 We need to observe that this γνωμικὴ
ἐπιτηδειότης (volitive faculty) of receiving/establishing participation in God, which
in the text cited above becomes will (βουλήσει), presupposes a synergy between
human freedom and divine grace and the participation in being. Creatures are
completely free and completely dependent on God; participation is precisely this
convergence of complete freedom and complete dependence. Participation is
complete freedom because it is participation in the supreme freedom of the
Creator, expressed in Christian metaphysics through creation out of nothing;
participation is complete dependence, because without God, creatures cannot even
exist – but if they accept to exist by participation, they will enjoy the divine
freedom.
The question of metaphysical freedom both of Creator and creatures is central
to Maximus’ theological vision; he stresses it particularly in Capita XV:

“Ὁ τοῖς οὖσι μὴ κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ὑπάρχων μεθεκτός, κατ᾿ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον μετέχεσθαι
τοῖς δυναμένοις βουλόμενος, τοῦ κατ᾿ οὐσίαν κρυφίου παντελῶς οὐκ ἐξίσταται·
ὁπότε καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ τρόπος, καθ᾿ ὅν θέλων μετέχεται, μένει διηνεκῶς τοῖς πᾶσιν
24
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Centuriae de charitate, III, 27 (ed. Ceresa-Gastaldo, p.
156).
25
MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, The ascetic life. The four Centuries on Charity, translated and
annotated by Polycarp Sherwood, O.S.B. (Ancient Christian Writers 21), Newman Press,
Westminster, 1955, p. 177-178, modified.
26
Stephen GERSH, From Iamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation of the Prehistory and
Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken
und mittelalterlichen Philosophie 8), Brill, Leiden, 1978, p. 37.
27
PROCLUS, Elem. Th., 39 (The Elements of Theology: a revised text, Eric R. Dodds [ed.],
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p. 40-42). Dodds makes clear that the term means fitness
for participation in causes and also receptive potency in general.
28
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem VII, PG 91, 1080bc.
29
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Centuriae de charitate, III, 25 (ed. Ceresa-Gastaldo,
p. 154).
302 Marius PORTARU

ἀνέκφαντος. Οὐκοῦν, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεὸς θέλων μετέχεται, καθ᾿ ὅν αὐτὸς οἶδε τρόπον·
οὕτω καὶ θέλων ὑπέστησε τὰ μετέχοντα, καθ᾿ ὅν αὐτὸς ἐπίσταται λόγον, δι᾿
ὑπερβάλλουσαν ἀγαθότητος δύναμιν. Οὐκοῦν τὸ θελήσει τοῦ πεποιηκότος
γενόμενον, οὐκ ἄν εἴη ποτέ θελήσαντι αὐτὸ γενέσθαι, συναΐδιον.“30

He, who is participated by creatures not according to his essence, willing to be par-
ticipated in another way by the capable ones, never goes out of his essential hid-
denness; in fact, the mode itself, according to which he wants to be participated,
remains permanently unrevealed to anyone. As God wanted to be participated, in a
way that He alone knows, he also wanted to create the beings that participate in
Him out of his overwhelming power of goodness, according to a reason that He
alone knows. Therefore, how could what is created through the free will of the crea-
tor ever be co-eternal with the one who wanted it to be?

Creatures are not co-eternal with God in any sense, because they do not
participate in the essence of God and because they are brought to existence out of
nothing, out of the (free) will of the creator. The classical Greek conception of the
eternity of matter is thus fully rejected.

d. The subjective dimension of participation

If participation in Maximus depends on the free will of creatures, it has a

particular intensity for every intelligent creature. The desire for God is personal,
depending on the spiritual level of the faithful and as such distinct in every person.
“In the active person, the Word grows fat by the practice of the virtues and
becomes flesh. In the contemplative, it grows lean by spiritual understandings and
becomes as it was in the beginning, God the Word.”31 Maximus could express the
same idea through the notion of analogy,32 widespread in all his works: “The one
who is involved in the moral teaching of the Word through rather earthly examples
and words adapted to the receptive power of his hearers (διὰ τὴν ἀνάλογον τῶν
ἀκουόντων δύναμιν), is making the Word flesh. On the other hand, the one who
expounds mystical theology using the sublimest contemplative experiences is
making the Word spirit.”33 The subjective dimension is further underlined by the
necessity to be worthy of deification (ἡ θέωσις τῶν ἀξιουμένων θεώσεως).34 All

30
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita XV, I, 7, PG 90, 1180c-1181a.
31
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, II, 37, PG 90, 1141cd
(transl. Berthold, p. 156).
32
For the notion of analogy, see Vladimir LOSSKY, “La notion des «analogies» chez De-
nys le Pseudo-Aréopagite,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age, V
(1930), p. 279-309; Ysabel DE ANDIA, Henosis. L’union à Dieu chez Denys l’Aréopagite
(Philosophia Antiqua 71), Brill, Leiden, 1996; J.-Cl. LARCHET, La divinisation de
l’homme…, p. 647-652.
33
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, II, 38, PG 90, 1141d
(transl. Berthold, p. 156, modified).
34
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium, LIX (ed. Carl Laga, Carlos G.
Steel, [Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca 22], Brepols/University Press,
Turnhout/Leuven, 1990, p. 53).
The Vocabulary of Participation in the Works of Saint Maximus the Confessor 303

this presupposes the personal ascetical effort. But does Maximus limit participation
to the subjective dimension of the spiritual life?

e. Participation through the Church sacraments

In fact, besides the personal “means” for becoming worthy of deification,

Maximus refers to the sacraments of the Church, as the objective path of receiving
the grace. In the above cited Capita theologica et oeconomica Ι, 87, he speaks
about the incorruptibility of the flesh received through Baptism. But the sacrament
par excellence in Maximus’ doctrine of participation is of course the Eucharist. In
this sense, he uses the Cyrillian syntagm of the life giving body (ἡ σάρξ ἡ
ζωοποιὸς τοῦ κυρίου)35 and the life giving passion of the Lord (ὁ κύριος τὸ
ζωοποιὸν κατεδέξατο πάθος).36 The receiving of the Eucharist makes the receivers
gods by participation and grace and is proportional with their personal power. A
passage from Mystagogia describes the receiving of the mystery, that is the Holy
Eucharist in Neoplatonic terms:

“μεθ᾽ ἥν, ὡς τέλος πάντων, ἡ τοῦ μυστηρίου μετάδοσις γίνεται μεταποιοῦσα πρὸς
ἑαυτὴν καὶ ὁμοίους τῷ κατ᾽ αἰτίαν ἀγαθῷ κατὰ χάριν καὶ μέθεξιν ἀποφαίνουσα
τοὺς ἀξίως μεταλαμβάνοντας, ἐν μηδενὶ αὐτοῦ λειπομένους, κατὰ τὸ ἐφικτὸν
ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον. Ὥστε καὶ αὐτοὺς δύνασθαι εἶναί τε καὶ καλεῖσθαι
θέσει κατὰ τὴν χάριν θεούς, διὰ τὸν αὐτοὺς ὅλως πληρώσαντα ὅλον Θεὸν καὶ
μηδὲν αὐτῶν τῆς αὐτοῦ παρουσίας κενὸν καταλείψαντα.”37

After this [i.e., the chanting of the “One is Holy”], as the climax of everything,
comes the distribution of the sacrament, which transforms into itself and renders
similar to the causal good by grace and participation those who worthily share in it.
They receive it in its wholeness, as far as that is possible and attainable for man, so
that they also can be called gods by adoption through grace because the entire God
entirely fills them and leaves no part of them empty of his presence.38

A term that should be noted is the verb μεταποιέω, which designates a

profound transformation of human being by grace: the whole God fulfills the man
entire (τὸν αὐτοὺς ὅλως πληρώσαντα ὅλον Θεὸν), as much as possible (κατὰ τὸ
ἐφικτὸν ἀνθρώποις). Since the context is the receiving of Eucharist, I believe these
images must be understood literally, not metaphorically.

f. Expressions implying the graduality of participation

In some of the passage quoted above we observe that Maximus admits a

gradual participation. In Capita theologica et oeconomica I, 87 he speaks about a

35
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Quaestiones et dubia, LIV (ed. José H. Declerck, [Corpus
Christianorum. Series Graeca 10], Brepols/University Press, Turnhout/Leuven, 1982, p.
45).
36
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Quaestiones et dubia, LVII (ed. J.H. Declerck, p. 46).
37
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Mystagogia, XXI, PG 91, 697a.
38
Transl. Berthold, p. 203, modified.
304 Marius PORTARU

first incorruptibility, received through baptism, and a final one, received at the end
of our earthly life, according to the model of Christ risen, if we observed the first
one through good deeds. In Centuriae de charitate III, 27, he clearly distinguishes
between a participation in being, conferred by God alone, and a participation
according to the free consent of man – in Ambigua ad Ioannem VII, where
Maximus argues against the Origenian henas, he refers nevertheless to another type
of participation, “the future participation, not one that existed once and was
corrupted, of those worthy in the goodness” (τὴν ἐσομένην, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τὴν
γεγενημένην καὶ παραφθαρεῖσαν, τοῖς ἀξίοις τῆς ἀγαθότητος μετουσίαν), that we
have in this life only through likeness, since what is hoped for is beyond all things
in this world, beyond vision, and hearing and understanding (1 Cor. 2,9-11).39
These three types of participation are synthetically put together in the triad of being
– well being – eternal well-being:

“If then rational beings come into being, surely they are also moved, since they
move from a natural beginning in ‘being’ toward a voluntary end in ‘well-being’.
For the end of the movement of those who are moved is ‘eternal well-being’ itself,
just as its beginning is being itself which is God who is the giver of being as well as
of well-being. For God is the beginning and the end. From him come both our mov-
ing in whatever way from a beginning and our moving in a certain way towards him
as an end.”40

From Capita theologica et oeconomica ΙΙ, 87, it becomes evident that the
complete and proper participation is the last one:

“So long as one is in the present time of this life, even if he be perfect in his earthly
state both in action and in contemplation, he still has knowledge, prophecy, and the
pledge of the Holy Spirit only in part, but not in their fullness. He has yet to come
at the end of the ages to the perfect rest which reveals face to face to those who are
worthy the truth as it is in itself. Then one will possess not just a part of the full-
ness, but rather acquire through participation the entire fullness of grace (ἀλλ᾿ αὐτὸ
τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς χάριτος κατὰ μέθεξιν ὅλον κομίζεσθαι). For the Apostle says, ‘All
of us [i.e., those who are saved], will be that perfect man in the measure of the age
of Christ’s fullness’ (Eph. 4,13); ‘in whom are hidden the treasures of wisdom and
knowledge’ (Col. 2,3); and ‘when he appears what is in part shall pass away’ (1
Cor. 13,10).”41

39
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, VII, PG 91, 1076a. Cf. also καὶ τῶν
μελλόντων ἀλγεινῶν ἐλευθερωθῆναι τῇ μεθέξει τῆς κατ᾽εἶδος τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν
ὑποστάσεως, Expositio orationis dominicae (ed. Peter van Deun, [Corpus Christianorum.
Series Graeca 23], Turnhout/Leuven, Brepols/University Press, 1991, p. 73).
40
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, VII, PG 91, 1073c (transl. by Paul
M. Blowers and Robert Louis Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ. Selected
Writings from St. Maximus the Confessor, [Popular Patristics Series], New York, St.
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003, p. 50-51).
41
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Opuscula theologica et oeconomica, II, 87, PG 90, 1165c
(transl. Berthold, p. 166-167).
The Vocabulary of Participation in the Works of Saint Maximus the Confessor 305

The “perfect rest” Maximus has in mind is “the ceasing from all activities of
mind and sense, and with them the natural activities of the body,”42 that is the
natural activities of human nature come to rest in a state of passive receptivity and
the only energy acting in the deified person is the divine one.43 This is the state of
final divinisation, which is synonym of perfect participation44 and is beyond human
nature: “the deification will be given to those worthy, as being beyond nature (ὑπὲρ
φύσιν) and transforming by grace the participants (τοὺς μετόχους) from men to
gods.”45 As such, in Maximus’ view, deification is not opposed to participation, but
is the perfect participation. What makes the difference between the perfect
participation and the previous two in the above mentioned triad is the distance
between created and uncreated: in the first two stages, human power is active
together with the divine energy (grace), while in the third stage, only the divine
energy is active. Reading through the works of Maximus, I have observed that the
vocabulary of participation is used mostly with reference to this second degree of
perfect participation.46 I believe this is because Maximus gives a very concrete
meaning to the concept of participation: it presupposes for him the mystical
experience, the ekstatic47 presence of grace. As such, the concept of ‘participation’
is very close to the concept of πεῖρα.48

g. Participation and knowledge

Participation as an ekstatic experience of grace could be spoken of in

Centuriae de charitate III, 22, where Maximus points out, referring to the angels,
two kinds of knowledge: the holy powers know God by participation and the
created things by the grasp of the ideas in them:
42
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, II, 88, PG 90, 1168a.
43
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, VII, PG 91, 1076c. Maximus’
sources of deification as the receiving of divine energy might be 1Cor. 3,9 and Dyonisi-
us, Hierachia coelesta III, 2. But he develops it by affirming the graduality of the pres-
ence of the divine energy according to the difference between created and uncreated na-
ture.
44
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, II, 88, PG 90, 1168a:
μέθεξιν τῆς θεώσεως.
45
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Quaestiones et dubia, LXI (ed. J.H. Declerck, p. 48).
46
It is sufficient for the reader to observe most of the texts quoted in the present study.
47
Maximus’ use of the notion of ἔκστασις is quite different from Evagrius’. The latter
limits the sense of ἔκστασις to a going out of created things; the nous does not need to go
out of itself, being capable by nature to know God, cf. Polycarp SHERWOOD, The earlier
Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and his refutation of Origenism (Studia an-
selmiana 36), Orbis Catholicus, Roma, 1955, p. 137-141. Maximus’ understanding of
ἔκστασις is closer to Dionysius’, for whom ἔκστασις means to go out of oneself towards
the beloved one and to live the life of the beloved one, De divinis nominibus IV, 13;
III, 2. But he makes a step forward in respect to Dionysius, and speaks about a third form
of ἔκστασις: the assumption (ἀνάληψις) of the deified one by the divine energy after the
cessation of all natural energies, see J.-Cl. LARCHET, La divnisation de l’homme…,
p. 536. This last sense is the one predominantly present in Ambigua ad Ioannem, VII.
48
See P. MIQUEL, “Contribution à l’étude du vocabulaire de l’expérience religieuse dans
l’œuvre de Maxime le Confesseur,” Texte und Untersuchungen, XCII (1966), p. 355-361.
306 Marius PORTARU

God knows himself of his own sacred essence, and the things created by him from
his wisdom, through which and in which he made all things. The holy angels, how-
ever, know God by participation (μετοχῇ), though he is beyond participation, and
they know things created by him by the grasp of the ideas in them (ἀναλέψει τῶν ἐν
αὐτοῖς θεωρημάτων).49

Knowledge of God, inasmuch as it is a form of union with God, is

participation in God, and participation in God, as metaphysically necessary to
creatures, conditions and limits the knowledge of God. The distinction between
knowledge by participation and knowledge by logoi of things Maximus proposes
here seems to be original in respect to classical Greek philosophy. We should
observe carefully the parallel in this short text:

God – knows a) himself of his essence

b) the things created from his wisdom
angels – know a) God by participation
b) the things created by grasping the ideas in them

According to this scheme, “of his essence” is somehow connected with “by
participation” and “from his wisdom” with “by grasping the ideas in them.” Do we
have some evidence in Maximus’ work which could support such a parallel? I
believe we do. The wisdom of God, God the Logos, is the origin of all the logoi of
created things; the One Logos is many logoi and the many logoi are one Logos.
God knows the things created as created by Him through the logoi, as definition
and their divine purpose. Intelligent creatures can also know the logoi of created
things, through which they also participate in God.50 But Maximus also underlines
the limits of participation in God through logoi: the union of intelligent creatures
with God is realized, from a certain spiritual level on, through something else too.
“The one who has fulfilled the preparation of the works of justice has arrived at the
rest of gnostic contemplation. In it he divinely comprehends (περιλαβών
θεοπρεπῶς) the principles of beings and rests from movements of the mind about
them.”51 But knowledge of God does not cease with the movement of mind:

“τοὺς ἐν τοῖς οὖσι πάντας λόγους περάσαντας, πρὸς τὴν ἄγνωστον ἀγνώστως διὰ
τοῦ «Εἷς ἅγιος» καὶ τῶν ἑξῆς ἄγει μονάδα, τῇ χάριτι ἑνωθέντας καὶ κατὰ μέθεξιν
πρὸς αὐτὴν ὁμοιωθέντας τῇ κατὰ δύναμιν ἀδιαιρέτῳ ταυτότητι.”52

And again after that, as having through knowledge overcome all the principles in
beings, he leads them beyond knowledge to the unknowable Monad by the hymn

49
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Centuriae de charitate, III, 22 (ed. Ceresa-Gastaldo, p.
152; transl. Berthold, p. 64, modified).
50
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, VII, PG 91, 1077c-1080c.
51
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, I, 59, PG 90, 1104d-
1105a (transl. Berthold, p. 138).
52
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Mystagogia, XIII, PG 91, 692c.
The Vocabulary of Participation in the Works of Saint Maximus the Confessor 307

‘One is Holy’, and so forth, united by grace (τῇ χάριτι ἑνωθέντας) and made like
him by participation (κατὰ μέθεξιν πρὸς αὐτὴν ὁμοιωθέντας) in an indivisible iden-
tity to the extent that this is possible for men.53

It is clear from this last text that knowledge of God by grace is superior to the
knowledge through divine logoi of created things; correspondingly, participation as
mystical union with God by grace is superior to participation through divine logoi
of created things. I consider this an original metaphysical insight of Maximus in
respect to classical Greek philosophy, because he admits a kind of participation
different from that through the Forms (logoi, in Maximus’ language), specific to
Plato and Neoplatonism, and because he uses μετοχή only for this special and
superior participation, while participation through Forms is reduced to knowledge,
ἀνάληψις.54

h. The psychological and the logical sense of participation

Let us now distinguish in Maximus a psychological and a logical use of the

terminology of participation. While the logical indicates that a species belongs to a
genus or an individual to a species, the psychological refers to giving moral support
to someone suffering. The logical use might be explained by the fact that in
Neoplatonism, and also in the Neoplatonic commentaries of Aristotle, there is an
attempt to reconcile the doctrines of Plato with the strong criticism of Aristotle. For
Aristotle participation indicates only the connection between matter and form, and
between genus and species; thus its meaning remains logical. The logical sense is
present, for instance, in Ep. 6: “if someone is provided with reason” (τίς ἄν λόγου
μέτοχος).55 As regards the psychological use, I cannot find any precedent in classical
Greek philosophy. Maximus writes that it is easier for man to endure suffering when
he knows that “God is suffering with him,” Θεόν ἔχων τοῦ πάθους συμμέτοχον.56

i. The things participated (τὰ ὄντα μεθεκτά), the things that participate (τὰ ὄντα
μετέχοντα)

Starting with this section, I will analyze the ontological terminology. Maximus’
most important text in this respect is perhaps Capita theologica et oeconomica
1, 48-50:

53
Transl. Berthold, p. 200, modified.
54
Ἀνάληψις is not a fixed technical term in Maximus. He uses more often κατάληψις and
κατανόησις. A useful comparison between Plato’s doctrine of Forms and Maximus’logoi
of created things can be found in J.-Cl. LARCHET, “La conception maximienne des éner-
gies divines et des logoi et la théorie platonicienne des Idées, in Philoteos IV (2004),
pp. 376-383.
55
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Epistulae, VI, PG 91, 432b. Also Quaestiones ad
Thalassium, LII (ed. C. Laga, C.G. Steel, [Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca 7]
p. 425); Quaestiones ad Thalassium, LIV (ed. C. Laga, C.G. Steel, [Corpus
Christianorum. Series Graeca 7], p. 453).
56
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita X, XXIV, PG 90, 1188d.
308 Marius PORTARU

1.48. Zealous people should look among God’s works (ἔργα) to know which of
them he began to create (ὦν ἤρξατο τῆς γενέσεως ὁ Θεός) and which, on the con-
trary, he did not begin (ὧν οὐκ ἤρξατο). Indeed, if he has rested from all the works
that he began to create, it is clear that he did not rest from those which he did not
create. God’s works which began in time are all beings which exist by participation
(τὰ ὄντα μετέχοντα), for example, the different essences of beings, for they have
nonbeing before being. For there was a time, when beings which exist by participa-
tion were not. The works of God which did not happen to begin to be in time (Θεοῦ
δὲ ἔργα τυχὸν οὐκ ἠργμένα τοῦ εἶναι χρονικῶς) are participated beings (τὰ ὄντα
μεθεκτά), in which beings which exist by participation participate according to
grace (ὧν κατὰ χάριν μετέχουσι τὰ ὄντα μετέχοντα), for example, goodness and all
that the term goodness implies, that is, all life, immortality, simplicity, immutabil-
ity, and infinity and such things which are essentially (οὐσιωδῶς) contemplated
around him (περὶ αὐτόν); they are also God’s works, and yet they did not begin in
time. For the nonbeing is not older than virtue, nor than anything else of what was
just listed, even if beings which participate in them, in these things began their ex-
istence in time. For all virtue is without beginning (Ἄναρχος γὰρ πᾶσα ἀρετή), not
having any time previous to itself. Such things eternally have God alone as the be-
getter of their existence.

1.49. God infinitely transcends all things which participate or are participated
(Πάντων τῶν ὄντων καὶ μετεχόντων καὶ μεθεκτῶν, ἀπειράκις ἀπείρως ὁ Θεὸς
ὑπεξῄρηται). “For if something has an intelligible principle attributed to it is a work
(ἔργον) of God, even if some begin their existence through creation in time and
others are implanted (ἐμπέφυκεν) by grace in creatures as an infused natural power
(δύναμις ἔμφυτος), which clearly proclaims that God is in all things.”

1.50. All immortal things and immortality itself, all living things and life itself, all
holy things and holiness itself, all virtuous things and virtue itself, all good things
and goodness itself, all beings and being itself (τὰ ὄντα πάντα καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ὀντότης),
are clearly found to be works of God. But some began to be in time, for there was a
time when they were not, and others did not begin to be in time. Thus, there was
never a time when there existed neither virtue, nor goodness, nor holiness, nor im-
mortality. Those which began in time are and are said to be what are and are said by
participation in those which did not begin in time (Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἠργμένα χρονικῶς, τῇ
μετοχῇ τῶν οὐκ ἠργμένων χρονικῶς εἰσι καὶ λέγονται τοῦθ᾿ ὅπερ καὶ εἰσί καὶ
λέγονται). God is the creator of all life, immortality, holiness, and virtue, for he
transcends the essence of all which can be thought and said.

This is a typical example of how Christian authors imported Neoplatonic

philosophical language to express a different, new conception. The terminology of
Proclus’ The Elements of Theology, chapter XXIII and XXIV,57 τὸ ἀμέθεκτον, τὸ

57
PROCLUS, The Elements of Theology, a revised text, with translation, introduction and
commentary by E.R. Dodds, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p. 27-29: “All that is
unparticipated (τὸ ἀμέθεκτον) produces out of itself the participated (τὸ μετεχόμενον);
and all participated substances are linked by upward tension to existencies not
participated. For, on the one hand, the unparticipated, having the relative status of a
monad (as being its own and not another’s, and as transcending the participants),
generates terms capable of being participated. For either it must remain fixed in sterility
and isolation, and so must lack a place of honour; or else it will give something of itself,
whereof the receiver becomes a participant, whilst the given attains substantial existence
as a participated term. Every participated term, on the other hand, becoming a property of
The Vocabulary of Participation in the Works of Saint Maximus the Confessor 309

μετεχόμενον, τὸ μετέχον, is adopted by Maximus, apparently through Dionysius,

but it is given a new meaning.
Maximus does not use the concept τὸ ἀμέθεκτον, the unparticipated. There are
apparently two possible explanations for this: 1. Maximus implies that God is
unparticipated, when writing that “God infinitely transcends all things which
participate or are participated”; or, 2. he does not think of God as unparticipated. I
believe the second is probably correct. God is said to be above all his works,
participated and participating, but he is not said to be unparticipated. From what
follows, it is clear that Maximus believes that God is present to the things that
participate through the participated things; but in another respect, he is above the
participants. We have already noted his sentence: “He, who is participated by
creatures not according to his essence (Ὁ τοῖς οὖσι μὴ κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ὑπάρχων
μεθεκτός).”58 This is to say that God transcends his works in respect of his essence;
we should also note that in this sentence God, not the participated terms, is said to
be participated (μεθεκτός). Therefore, Maximus does not say that God is
unparticipated because he is not participated in his essence. He simply states that
God is not participated according to his essence. In some other texts, we may read
that “God entire fills (τὸν αὐτοὺς ὅλως πληρώσαντα ὅλον Θεὸν)”59 his creatures
during the mystical union; or “God entire penetrates through goodness in those
worthy entire (Θεοῦ, ὡς ὅλον ὅλοις τοῖς ἀξίοις ἀγαθοπρεπῶς περιχωρήσαντος).”60
In order to understand this antinomy between God’s transcendence and
immanence, we have to consider the rest of the text.

that particular by which it is participated, is secondary to that which in all is equally

present and has filled them all out of its own being. That which is in one is not in the
others; while that which is present to all alike, that it may illuminate all, is not in any one,
but is prior to them all. For either it is in all, or in one out of all, or prior to all. But a
principle which was in all would be divided amongst all, and would itself require a
further principle to unify the divided; and further, all the particulars would no longer par-
ticipate the same principle, but this one and that another, through the diremption of its
unity. And if it be in one out of all, it will be a property no longer of all, but of one.
Inasmuch, then, as it is both common to all that can participate and identical for all, it
must be prior to all: that is, it must be unparticipated. 24. All that participates (τὸ
μετέχον) is inferior to the participated, and this latter to the unparticipated. For the par-
ticipant was incomplete before the participation, and by the participation has been made
complete: it is therefore necessarily subordinate to the participated, inasmuch as it owes
its completeness to the act of participation. As having formerly been incomplete it is in-
ferior to the principle which completes it. Again, the participated, being the property of
one particular and not of all, has a lower mode of substance assigned to it than that which
belongs to all and not to one: for the latter is more nearly akin to the cause of all things,
the former less nearly. The unparticipated, then, precedes the participated, and these, the
participants. For, to express it shortly, the first is a unity prior to the many; the
participated is within the many, and is one yet not-one; while all that participates is not-
one yet one.” [p. 23].
58
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita XV, I, 7, PG 90, 1180c-1181a.
59
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Mystagogia, XXI, PG 91, 697a.
60
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, VII, PG 91, 1076c.
310 Marius PORTARU

The participated terms (τὸ μετεχόμενον) for Maximus are the uncreated (ὧν
οὐκ ἤρξατο [τῆς γενέσεως]) works (ἔργα) of God.61 Regarding these, Maximus
significantly notes: 1. they are without beginning (Ἄναρχος γὰρ πᾶσα ἀρετή; Οὐκ
ἦν γὰρ ποτε, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ἀρετὴ καὶ ἀγαθότης καὶ ἁγιότης καὶ ἀθανασία);62 2. they
are contemplated around God essentially, that is around the essence of God (περὶ
αὐτὸν οὐσιωδῶς θεωρεῖται); 3. the beings that live by participation participate in
them by grace (ὧν κατὰ χάριν μετέχουσι τὰ ὄντα μετέχοντα). From all these we
can deduce – since Maximus does not say that these “works of God” without
beginning exist by participation –, that they are uncreated, distinct from the divine
essence, but not separated.
Finally, τὸ μετέχον for Maximus are the creatures of God.
Though the terminology is almost identical with the Neoplatonic one, the
differences are much deeper, constituting two distinct visions. The differences
concern both the understanding of each of the three terms and their relationship.
Maximus can allow for a real transcendence of God thanks to the doctrine of
creation out of nothing. Proclus affirms that “all that is unparticipated produces
(ὑφίστησιν) out of itself (ἀφ᾽ἑαυτοῦ) the participated.” For Maximus, the
participable terms, the uncreated and beginningless “works” of God are not
separate entities from the essence, are not entities at all. “All participated
substances (ὑποστάσεις) are linked by upward tension to existences not
participated,” continues Proclus. Maximus does not affirm something similar about
the uncreated works of God; he does not say that they exist by participation in the
unparticipated. An upward tension presupposes a separation between the
participated terms and the unparticipated, which is not to be found in Maximus.
Maximus never calls ὑποστάσεις the participated works of God. Further on,
according to Proclus, if the unparticipated does not give anything of itself in order
to establish a relation of participation with the participant, then it will remain in

61
Dionysius the Ps.-Areopagite brings new insights to bear on the Neoplatonist Proclus’
understanding of participation. He unites Proclus’ ‘imparticipable’ One with the
participated forms as the One God. He rejects the notion of the participable terms as
mean terms between the One and the participants. Rather, the mean terms are identified
with God and his creative activity. This is why Dionysius can say that God is both
participable and imparticipable, in De divinis nominibus V, 5 (Corpus Dionysiacum I,
183-184). It is evident that this creative activity of God and His powers (δυνάμεις) have
the same ontological function as Proclus’ intermediate terms, yet they are totally
different, being processions of God himself, while the Proclan mean terms are “certain
divine substances,” cf. I.P. SHELDON-WILLIAMS, “Henads and Angels: Proclus and the
ps.-Dionysius,” Studia Patristica IX / Texte und Untersuchungen CVIII (1972), p. 69-70.
So, while in Proclus the mean terms are separated entities, divine hypostaseis, in Diony-
sius they are not separated from God and are not entities, but processions (πρόοδοι) and
wills (θελήματα) of God. The same holds true for Maximus, in whom one may see Dio-
nysius’ influence: his “mean terms,” taken either from Dionysius, or directly from
Proclus, called “works” (ἔργα) of God, are not separated entities, intermediary between
God and creation, but the works of God, his very divine activity and power. Τὸ
μετεχόμενον is not a separate entity or substance or hypostasis for Maximus.
62
Ἄναρχος is an adjective that Maximus uses only in reference to God throughout all his
works.
The Vocabulary of Participation in the Works of Saint Maximus the Confessor 311

sterility and isolation. This means that the relation of participation is somehow
necessary to the unparticipated, an idea which does not hold true when it comes to
Maximus.
A basic difference between Proclus and Maximus consists in Proclus’
material, physical view. Proclus writes about the unparticipated: “For either it [the
unparticipated] is in all, or in one out of all, or prior to all. But a principle which
was in all would be divided amongst all, and would itself require a further
principle to unify the divided; and further, all the particulars would no longer
participate the same principle, but this one and that another, through the diremption
of its unity. And if it be in one out of all, it will be a property no longer of all but of
one. Inasmuch, then, as it is both common to all that can participate and identical
for all, it must be prior to all: that is, it must be unparticipated.” If not incoherent,
this fragment is difficult to understand: in order to be present to all, the
unparticipated, must be prior to all, that is unparticipated; but it is participated
through the participated terms, which on the other hand, are produced out of its
substance. However, Proclus insufficiently explains what the precise nature of
these participated terms is. In Maximus’ vision, the doctrine of emanation is
substituted by creation out of nothing. Therefore, God’s complete transcendence is
preserved. Creatures do not participate in the divine nature and there is no danger
of sharing in part of it.
As made clear, the fundamental weakness of Proclus’ scheme of participation
is the status of the intermediary participated terms. If they are different entities or
hypostases emanated from the unparticipated One, participating in the One and
being participated by the participants [τὸ δὲ δοθὲν (ἀφ᾽ἑαυτοῦ) ὑπέστη
μετεχομένως] and different from the participants, then what makes the connection
between the One and the participated terms? According to Proclus’ logic, other
entities must be placed between the One and the participated terms. But in this
way, there is nothing which may limit the number of the participated terms, and
hence, the divisio ad infinitum cannot be avoided. This “bureaucratic fallacy” does
not apply to for Maximus’ participated beginningless works of God, because they
are not separate entities from the essence of God, but the participated presence of
the unparticipated divine essence.63

j. Participation in the divine energies and participation in the “good things”

One may wonder at this point, how Gregory Palamas could use the above
passage by Maximus in order to defend the real distinction between the divine
essence and its uncreated energies, since Maximus does not use the word “energy”
(ἐνέργεια) here. Instead he uses “works” (ἔργα) of God. The two words are clearly
very close. I believe the reason for this is the fact that Maximus tries to propose an

63
In fact, these three chapters of Maximus were the ones that St Gregory Palamas took as
a proof for his doctrine of the distinction between the essence of God and the uncreated
energies, distinct but not separated from the essence, which proceed from the essence of
God to creation, see Tomus Agioriticus (PG 150, 1232d-1233b).
312 Marius PORTARU

exegesis of the biblical verse Genesis 2, 2: “and God rested in the seventh day from
all his works, which he created (καὶ κατέπαυσεν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ ἑβδόμῃ ἀπὸ πάντων
τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ, ὧν ἐποίησεν).64 It is important to note this, because it shows:
1. that “the works that God did not begin to create” are not considered in any sense
within the created order; 2. that Maximus uses the term “works” (ἔργα) here in
order to point out and explain the biblical verse. In fact, in Capita theologica et
oeconomica I, 47, Maximus refers to “energy” (ἐνέργεια), as he does in Capita
theologica et oeconomica I, 60: these surround Capita theologica et oeconomica
I, 48-50, and are connected with the theme of the days of creation. The term ἔργα,
showing the result of an activity, is not a constant feature of Maximus’
terminology. In other places, he normally focuses on the activity, thus using
ἐνέργεια.
In Disputatio cum Pyrrho, Maximus refers to Moses, David and to all those
that received the divine energy (τῆς θεῖας ἐνεργείας χωρητικοὶ): they all were
moved by their free will (νεύματι), after overcoming the human characteristics.65 In
Ambigua ad Ioannem VII, Maximus describes the final deification as pleasure
(ἡδονήν) because it presupposes a divine way of knowing (τῇ θείᾳ κατανοήσει)
and this is the end of creatures’ natural energies (ὡς τέλος οὖσαν τῶν κατά φύσιν
ἐνεργειῶν). In this state, the entire man is deified through being acted divinely by
the grace / divine energy of God incarnate, of Christ (ὅλος ἄνθρωπος θεωθῇ τῇ τοῦ
ἐνανθρωπήσαντος Θεοῦ χάριτι θεουργούμενος), so that there is only one energy of
God and the saints, or better, of God alone, as penetrating entirely in those worthy
entirely (ὥστε εἶναι μίαν καὶ μόνην διὰ πάντων ἐνέργειαν, τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀξίων
Θεοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ μόνου Θεοῦ, ὡς ὅλον ὅλοις τοῖς ἀξίοις ἀγαθοπρεπῶς
περιχωρήσαντος). The grace or the divine energy will be seen as “the brightness of
the divine glory” (θείαν τῆς μακαρίας δόξης λαμπρότητα).66 More simply, but no
less clearly, Maximus writes that “The one who has shared in God’s rest on the
seventh day for our sake will also share in his activity on the eight day by our
deification (τῆς ἀυτοῦ δι᾽ἡμᾶς μεθέξει κατὰ τὴν θέωσιν ὀγδοατικῆς ἐνεργείας).”67
I would like to suggest further that Maximus expresses participation through
the divine energies in different ways. One of them is as participation “in the good
things” (τῶν ἀγαθῶν). In some texts, this expression may signify the future gifts of
God, which assures the eternal happiness: “and they will be freed from the future
torments, participating in the presence face to face of the future good things” (καὶ
τῶν μελλόντων ἀλγεινῶν ἐλευθερωθῆναι τῇ μεθέξει τῆς κατ᾽εἶδος τῶν μελλόντων
ἀγαθῶν ὑποστάσεως);68 “through faith, you surely walk towards the participation
face to face of the good things” (ἀψευδῶς διὰ πίστεως περιπατεῖς πρὸς τὴν ἐν εἴδει
τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετουσίαν).69 But in some other texts, “the good things” (τῶν ἀγαθῶν)
64
Septuaginta, Alfred Ralhfs (ed.), Stuttgart, 1979, p. 3.
65
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Disputatio cum Pyrrho, PG 91, 297a.
66
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, VII, PG 91, 1076c; 1088a-1089a.
67
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, I, 60, PG 90, 1105a.
68
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Orationis Dominicae expositio (ed. P. van Deun, p. 73).
69
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Epistula ad Thomam (ed. Bart Janssens, [Corpus
Christianorum. Series Graeca 48], Turnhout, Brepols, 2002, p. 38).
The Vocabulary of Participation in the Works of Saint Maximus the Confessor 313

may indicate a sharing in the divine energies: “As for the gnostic, it is fitting that
he cry out endlessly in supplication to turn away evils and to give thanks for the
sharing of good things (τῆς τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετουσίας).”70 The presence of the idea of
ekstasis reinforce my interpretation: θεοὺς χάριτι τοὺς ἀξίους ἀπεργαζόμενος διὰ
τῆς ἐκστατικῆς καὶ μεμεθυσμένης τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετουσίας.71
A further expression used by Maximus, indicating the divine energies is “the
beautiful things” (τῶν καλῶν), which could also be translated as “the good things.”
“God never ceases from good things, as he never began them (παύεται γὰρ
οὐδέποτε τῶν καλῶν ὁ Θεός, ὧν οὐδὲ ἀρχὴν ἔσχεν).”72 The parallel with the
beginningless works of God from Capita theologica et oeconomica I, 48-50 is
clear.
Another expression referring to the divine energies is the participation “in the
things divine (τῶν θεῖων).” In Quaestiones ad Thalassium, Maximus speaks about
“participation in the things divine beyond nature (ἡ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν θείων
μέθεξις).”73 In a chapter of Capita theologica et oeconomica, he writes that every
God-loving soul becomes the place of God in the Holy Spirit, receiving the
impressions (τύπους) and characteristics (χαρακτῆρας) of “the things divine”
(τῶν θείων).74

k. The use of τύπος and derivatives

The last text already raises questions about the effects of the divine energies
in God’s creatures. Maximus’ most significant vocabulary to describe it is derived
from the word τύπος, which means “seal,” “imprint,” “impression.” It constitutes a
basic expression to indicate the presence of the intelligible in the sensible:

“Ὅλος γὰρ ὁ νοητὸς κόσμος ὅλῳ τῷ αἰσθητῷ μυστικῶς τοῖς συμβολικοῖς εἴδεσι
τυπούμενος φαίνεται τοῖς ὁρᾷν δυναμένοις· καὶ ὅλος ὅλῳ τῷ νοητῷ ὁ αἰσθητὸς
γνωστικῶς κατὰ νοῦν τοῖς λόγοις ἁπλούμενος ἐνυπάρχων ἐστίν. Ἐν ἐκείνῳ γὰρ
οὗτος τοῖς λόγοις ἐστί, κἀκεῖνος ἐν τούτῳ τοῖς τύποις· καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν ἕν,
καθὼς ἂν εἴη τροχὸς ἐν τῷ τροχῷ.”75

For the whole spiritual world manifests itself mystically (μυστικῶς) imprinted
(τυπούμενος) on the whole sensible world in symbolic forms (τοῖς συμβολικοῖς
εἴδεσι), for those who are capable of seeing this; and the whole sensible world is
spiritually (γνωστικῶς) unified (ἁπλούμενος), being containted in the logoi of the
created things (τοῖς λόγοις ἐνυπάρχων) – all that is perceived by mind. The sensible
world is in the spiritual through the logoi of the created things (τοῖς λόγοις); the
70
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, I, 30, PG 90, 1093cd
(transl. Berthold, p. 134).
71
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Quaestiones et dubia, CLXXX (ed. J.H Declerck, p. 123).
72
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, I, 35, PG 90.1096c
(transl. Berthold, p. 135).
73
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium, 59 (ed. C. Laga, C.G. Steel,
[Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca 22], p. 53).
74
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, I, 12, PG 90, 1088b.
75
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Mystagogia, II, PG 91, 669c. According to Maximus
himself, the sources of this idea are Iez. 1,16 and Rm. 1,20.
314 Marius PORTARU

spiritual world is in the sensible through impressions (τοῖς τύποις); and their func-
tion is one, like a wheel within a wheel.

In Capita theologica et oeconomica, Maximus writes that every God-loving

soul becomes the place of God in the Holy Spirit, receiving the imprints and
characteristics (τοὺς τύπους καὶ χαρακτῆρας) of “the things divine” (τῶν θείων),
while every matter- and world-loving soul separates itself from God, being
willingly shaped in a manner contrary to virtue (κατὰ τὴν γνώμην ἀντιτυποῦσα).76
Further on in the same work, he writes that the one who, by practicing virtues, puts
an end to the passions in him, is given the basis of another type of imprints, more
divine (θειοτέρων διατυπώσεων). They are the result of the good things without
beginning from God.77
The concrete result of the divine imprints is that human beings receive the
divine qualities: “The mind which attains God and abides with him through prayer
and love becomes wise, good, powerful, benevolent, merciful, and forebearing; in
short, it carries around almost all the divine qualities (περιφέρω τὰ θεῖα ἰδιώματα)
in itself. But when it withdraws from him and goes over to material things it
becomes pleasure-loving like cattle or fights with men like a wild beast over these
things.”78 The culminating point of this ascending way towards God is the
receiving of the “likeness with God (ὁμοίωσις Θεῷ).”79 In Orationis Dominicae
expositio Maximus uses some strong terms to name this profound, ontological
transformation of the human being living in God: μεταποιέω,80 μόρφωσις,81
συγγίνεσθαι.82

l. Some distinct terminology in Ambigua

In Ambigua ad Ioannem the vocabulary in general is more ontological, and

thus the vocabulary of participation is classical Neoplatonic. We encounter the
usual expressions: ἀρετῆς καθ᾽ἕξιν παγίαν μετέχων,83 Θεὸς ὅλος ὅλοις
μετεχόμενος,84 μετοχή,85 τῇ μετοχῇ τοῦ καλοῦ,86 but also some distinct
terminology:

76
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, I, 12, PG 90, 1088b.
77
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Capita theologica et oeconomica, I, 35, PG 90, 1096c.
78
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Centuriae de charitate, II, 52 (ed. Ceresa-Gastaldo, p. 118;
transl. Berthold, p. 54).
79
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Mystagogia, XIII, PG 91, 692cd; Mystagogia, XXI, PG
91, 697a. The expression ὁμοίωσις Θεῷ in this form originates from Plato, Theaetetus
176b.
80
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Orationis Dominicae expositio (ed. P. van Deun, p. 34).
81
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Orationis Dominicae expositio (ed. P. van Deun, p. 47).
82
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Orationis Dominicae expositio (ed. P. van Deun, p. 47).
83
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, VII, PG 91, 1081d.
84
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, VII, PG 91, 1088c.
85
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, VII, PG 91, 1089b.
86
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, X, PG 91, 1108b.
The Vocabulary of Participation in the Works of Saint Maximus the Confessor 315

 ἐνετυπώσαντο:87 as above, through virtue and contemplation, the divine

form is imprinted in the ascetic;
 προσῳκειῶσθαι:88 becoming familiar with God;
 ἐνδίδοσις:89 interpenetration. The Lord entire offers himself to those
worthy through virtue and knowledge, producing the likeness with him in
them, that is, making them sons (υἱοθετῶν) and being made father to them
(τοῖς ἀξίοις πατροθετούμενος).
 ἀμεσιτευτῶς παρέχεται τοῖς ἀξίοις:90 indicates a direct union with those
worthy.
 μεθεκτικῆς δυνάμεως:91 the power of creatures to participate in God
depends on creaturely free will and love and desire for God. This may shed
some light on an original and significant term, ἀμεθεξία, used in Amb. Io.
XLII:92 “the analogical participation or non-participation (ἀμεθεξία) in
being, well being and eternal being.” We have seen that the first and last
elements of the triad depend exclusively on God’s will. How then does
Maximus speak about non-participation with respect to them? The only
explanation I am able to provide is that the creaturely power of self-
determination somehow affects their participation in being. Understood as
such, this term is adapted to describe the otherness of creatures. To my
knowledge, it has never been used in pagan Platonic texts; Proclus affirmed
that the One is imparticipable, ἀμέθεκτος, but in Maximus it is clear that
the ἀμεθεξία depends on the free will of the rational creatures. The use of
the adverb ποσῶς (“in a certain measure”),93 which expresses an analogical
and gradual participation, may shed some light on ἀμεθεξία.

m. Definitions of participation

At the end of this study, we may wonder if, among so many references to
participation, Maximus offers a definition of it? In the whole corpus of his works,
I was able to find only two definitions. The first runs as follows:

“ἀπόλαυσις δὲ διηνεκής καὶ ἀδιάστατος ἡ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν θείων καθέστηκε μέθεξις.
μέθεξις δὲ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν θείων ἐστὶν ἡ πρὸς τὸ μετεχόμενον τῶν μετεχόντων
ὁμοίωσις. ἡ δὲ πρὸς τὸ μετεχόμενον τῶν μετεχόντων ὁμοίωσις ἐστιν ἡ
κατ᾽ἐνέργειαν πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ μετεχόμενον τῶν μετεχόντων δι᾽ὁμοιότητος ἐνδεχομένη

87
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, X, PG 91, 1109b: τῇ κατανοήσει
τοῦ Θεοῦ κατὰ θεωρίαν γνωστικῶς προσανέχοντες ἐμφρόνως κατὰ λόγον διὰ τῶν
ἀρετῶν τὴν θείαν ἑαυτοῖς μορφὴν ἐνετυπώσαντο.
88
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, X, PG 91, 1109d.
89
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, X, PG 91, 1121b.
90
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, XLI, PG 91, 1308b.
91
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, XLII, PG 91, 1329a.
92
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, XLII, PG 91, 1329b: ἡ τοῦ κυρίως
ὄντος καὶ εὖ ὄντος καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἀνάλογος μέθεξις ἢ ἀμεθεξία.
93
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem, XLII, PG 91, 1337b.
316 Marius PORTARU

ταυτότης. ἡ δὲ τῶν μετεχόντων ἐνδεχομένη κατ᾽ἐνέργειαν δι᾽ὁμοιότητος πρὸς τὸ

μετεχόμενον ταυτότης ἐστὶν ἡ θέωσις τῶν ἀξιουμένων θεώσεως.”94

The ceaseless and continuous joy means the participation beyond nature in the
things divine. The participation beyond nature in the things divine is the likeness of
the participants with the participated. The likeness of the participants with the par-
ticipated is the received identity as likeness in act of the participants in respect to
the participated. The received identity as likeness in act of the participants with re-
spect to the participated is the deification of those worthy of it.

The most significant terminological features here, as in Capita theologica et

oeconomica II, 48-50, are of Neoplatonic and Proclan origin (the syntagm
κατ᾽ἐνέργειαν is of course of Aristotelian inspiration), but they are given a new
sense within the Christian doctrine of divinisation. Here Maximus speaks no longer
in terms of uncreated – created works of God, but the participation is: (1) beyond
nature; (2) in the things divine (τῶν θείων). So, τὸ μετεχόμενον is assimilated here
to these “things divine.” Also, the (Platonic) ὁμοίωσις is more intense than in
classical philosophy; it becomes a “received identity” (ἐνδεχομένη ταυτότης) with
these things divine, that is, willingly received. This identity with the things divine,
fully and eternally manifested, is divinisation, according to which the man is all
that God is, except the identity of essence. By participation in the things divine,
Maximus intends to say that it is impossible for man to participate in the divine
essence. Besides, if we consider the expressions ἐνδεχομένη ταυτότης and
κατ᾽ἐνέργειαν, we could conclude that these “things divine,” which assure
participation, confer both the content of the participation (the ταυτότης - θέωσις)
and the capacity of receiving the content (ἐνδεχομένη κατ᾽ἐνέργειαν).
The second definition runs:

Σωτερίαν δὲ ψυχῶν, ὡς οἶμαι, τυχὸν ὁ τῶν ἀποστόλων ἀκρότατος ἔφη Πέτρος, ὡς

πίστεως τέλος, τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν τὴν μέθεξιν).95

The salvation of the souls, as the final end of the faith, as I think, according to the
highest among the apostles, Peter, is the participation in the things beyond nature.

As focused on soteriology, this last definition of participation fully supports

Maximus’ fundamental “anthropological” understanding of participation.

94
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium, LIX (ed. C. Laga, C.G. Steel,
[Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca 22], p. 53).
95
St MAXIMUS the Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium, LIX (ed. C. Laga, C.G. Steel,
[Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca 22], p. 55).
The Vocabulary of Participation in the Works of Saint Maximus the Confessor 317

Conclusions

In the course of this study, I have paid attention to every word that
presupposes or indicates in any way some kind of relationship between God and
humankind, the angels or the world. I have been able to show that the terminology
of participation in Maximus is neither “ambiguous” (so Sherwood) – but diverse –
nor “occasional” (so Larchet), but present in all the works of Maximus and at the
heart of key-texts. There are only two works where it is absent, Expositio in
Psalmum LIX and Quaestiones ad Theopemptum, and even in the Christological
writings, Opuscula theologica et polemica, though rare it is still present. Maximus
has a doctrine of participation at least to the extent that he has a doctrine of
deification, and this is grounded on a profound ontology, inspired by
Neoplatonism; hence, for instance, the Proclan terminology of mean terms can be
recognized, as in Dionysius. Philosophical concepts of Aristotelian inspiration can
also be found. Where Greek philosophical language of participation appears, it is
integrated into a Christian context. It is this fact that Perl has somehow overlooked,
in his treatment of texts which are linguistically very close to Neoplatonic
philosophy.
I have tried to offer a strong argument in favor of a new understanding of the
doctrine of participation in Maximus, an understanding focused on his
“anthropology.” One of the definitions of participation Maximus provides is: “the
salvation of the souls, as the final end of the faith, as I think, according to the
highest among the apostles, Peter, is participation in the things beyond nature”.
As a matter of fact, just by itself the language of participation in Maximus
tells us a lot about the directions one must follow in analysing participation itself. It
is immediately obvious that Maximus admits a direct participation in the uncreated
“works” of God; this appears as a direct union of the mind and the body with the
uncreated participable “works” of God. It is a participation by knowledge and
ekstasis. There is also a “mediated” participation through Christ: Christ is between
God and man, He descended into the flesh in order that man might be deified. We
obtain communion with Christ in the holy Eucharist, when we receive his vivifying
body. Also, Christ is present as model and power in the ascetic struggle of the
faithful. This type of participation is improperly called “mediated,” because Christ
is God and communion with Christ is thus an immediate communion with God. I
have called it so only by comparison with participation in the “uncreated works” or
“things divine” of God. The key of Maximus view of participation resides in his
anthropology. In the center of his anthropology, Maximus puts soteriology: in his
relation to God, man must pass from his fallen condition to an eschatological
deification.