ETIC CRP III

CULEGERE DE TEXTE

2017
 Culegerea de fa reunete cteva texte menite a oferi noiuni i a dezbate probleme
de etic n comunicare. Au fost alese att texte clasice, indispensabile problematicii
de fa, ct i comentarii recente ale situaiei eticii comunicrii i relaiilor publice.
Ordinea textelor (fragmente i articole tiinifice) este urmtoarea:

1. I. Kant, Bazele metafizicii moravurilor (fragment)

2. J. St. Mill, Utilitarismul (capitolul II)
3. S. Baker, Five Baselines for Justification in Persuasion (articol)
4. C.W. Marsh, Public Relations Ethics: Contrasting Models from the
Rhetorics of Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates (articol)
5. S. A. Roschwalb, The Hill & Knowlton Cases: A Brief on the Controversy
(articol)

***

Examenul va presupune tratarea unor subiecte construite n jurul urmtoarelor teme:

Imperativul categoric kantian (Kant)

Utilitarismul (Mill)
Critici la adresa utilitarismului (Mill)
Cele cinci modele etice ale comunicrii (Baker)
Compararea modelelor etice ale comunicrii (Baker)
Modelul bidirecional asimetric (Marsh)
Modelul bidirecional simetric (Marsh)
Asemnarea dintre relaii publice i retoric (Marsh)
Controverse ale relaiilor publice: problema moral a reprezentrii clienilor
(Roschwalb)
 Capitolul II

CE ESTE UTILITARISMUL

1 (X: 209) Doar o remarc trec toare merit s facem n leg tur cu gafa ignorant de a
presupune c aceia care sus in utilitatea ca test al corectitudinii i incorectitudinii folosesc
termenul n sensul restrictiv i doar colocvial n care utilitatea e opus pl cerii. Adres m scuze
filosofilor care se opun utilitarismului pentru impresia, fie ea i momentan , de a fi confunda i cu
cei ce snt capabili de o eroare att de absurd ; eroare care e cu att mai bizar cu ct acuza
contrar , de a raporta totul la pl cere, i nc n forma ei cea mai grosolan , este o alt imputare
uzual adresat utilitarismului; i, cum a remarcat cu acuitate un autor nzestrat, acelai gen de
persoane, ba adesea chiar aceleai persoane, denun teoria "ca fiind de o ariditate inaplicabil
atunci cnd cuvntul utilitate precede cuvntul pl cere i de o voluptate mult prea aplicabil
atunci cnd cuvntul pl cere precede cuvntul utilitate". Cei ce tiu cte ceva despre acest subiect
snt contien i de faptul c fiecare autor care a sus inut teoria utilit ii, de la Epicur la Bentham, a
n eles prin utilitate nu ceva deosebit de pl cere, ci pl cerea ns i, laolalt cu evitarea durerii, i
n loc s opun utilul agreabilului sau ornamentalului, ei au declarat ntotdeauna c utilul
nseamn , ntre altele, i aceste lucruri. Cu toate acestea, gloata, inclusiv gloata celor ce scriu, i
scriu nu doar n ziare i periodice, ci i n c r i cu greutate i preten ii, cade n mod constant n
aceast eroare superficial . Prelund cuvntul "utilitarist", dar netiind nimic despre el n afara
felului cum sun , ei exprim de regul prin acest cuvnt respingerea sau neglijarea pl cerii n
unele din formele sale, anume a frumosului, a decorativului, a delect rii. Dar termenul nostru nu
e, dintr-o asemenea ignoran , aplicat greit doar ntr-un sens depreciativ, ci, cteodat , i n unul
laudativ: ca i cum el ar presupune o anumit superioritate fa de frivolitate i fa de simplele
pl ceri ale momentului. Iar aceast utilizare pervertit e singura n care cuvntul e popularizat i
singura n leg tur cu care noile genera ii i formeaz o idee cu privire la n elesul s u. Cei ce au
introdus cuvntul, dar care timp de mul i ani s-au lep dat de el ca apelativ distinctiv, ar putea s
se simt acum chema i s -l reia, dac pot spera, n acest fel, s contribuie cu ceva la salvarea sa
de la o asemenea degradare cumplit .
2 (X: 210) Crezul care accept ca fundament al moralei utilitatea sau principiul celei
mai mari fericiri, sus ine c ac iunile snt corecte propor ional cu tendin a lor de a promova
fericirea i snt incorecte n m sura n care tind s produc inversul fericirii. Prin fericire se
n elege pl cerea i absen a durerii; prin nefericire, durerea i privarea de pl cere. Pentru a oferi
o prezentare clar a standardului moral formulat de aceast teorie, ar trebui spuse multe alte
lucruri; n particular, ce anume includem sub ideile de durere i pl cere i n ce m sur aceasta e
l sat ca o problem deschis . Dar asemenea explica ii suplimentare nu afecteaz teoria vie ii
(theory of life) pe care e bazat aceast teorie a moralit ii - anume c pl cerea i absen a durerii
snt singurele lucruri dezirabile ca scopuri i c toate lucrurile dezirabile (care snt, n schema

Autorul acestui eseu are temeiuri s se considere ca prima persoan care a pus n uz cuvntul "utilitarist". El nu l-a
inventat, ci l-a adoptat dintr-o expresie uzitat n treac t de dl. Galt n Annals of the Parish (1821). Dup folosirea sa
timp de mai mul i ani ca nume distinctiv, el i al ii l-au abandonat dintr-un dezgust tot mai accentuat pentru tot ce
sem na cu o lozinc sau emblem de tip sectar. Dar ca nume pentru o anumit opinie, nu pentru o mul ime de opinii
denotnd recunoaterea utilit ii ca standard i nu vreo cale concret de aplicare a lui termenul satisface o nevoie de
limbaj i ofer , n multe cazuri, un mijloc convenabil de a evita perifraze obositoare.

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 utilitarist , la fel de numeroase ca n orice alt schem ) snt dezirabile fie pentru pl cerea
inerent lor, fie ca mijloc de promovare a pl cerii i de prevenire a durerii.
3 Ei bine, o asemenea teorie a vie ii suscit n multe min i, ntre care unele dintre cele mai
demne de stim pentru tr irile i elurile lor, o repulsie tenace. A presupune c via a nu are (cum
spun ei nii) nici un alt scop mai nalt dect pl cerea nici un alt obiect mai bun i mai nobil al
dorin ei i str daniei e considerat a fi absolut jalnic i umilitor, o doctrin demn doar de porci,
cu care urmaii lui Epicur erau asem na i, dispre uitor, nc de timpuriu; iar sus in torii moderni
ai doctrinei snt cteodat subiectul unor compara ii la fel de politicoase din partea adversarilor
lor germani, francezi sau englezi.
4 Cnd au fost astfel ataca i, epicureenii au r spuns mereu c nu ei, ci acuzatorii lor prezint
natura uman ntr-o lumin degradant , deoarece acuza ia acestora din urm presupune c
fiin ele umane nu snt capabile de alte pl ceri n afara acelora de care snt capabili porcii. Dac o
asemenea presupunere ar fi adev rat , acuza respectiv nu ar putea fi contestat , dar nici nu ar
mai putea fi atunci o imputare; c ci dac sursele pl cerii ar fi aceleai la fiin ele umane i la
porci, regula vie ii care e ndeajuns de bun pentru unii ar fi ndeajuns de bun i pentru ceilal i.
Compararea vie ii epicureice cu aceea a dobitoacelor e privit ca degradant tocmai pentru c
pl cerile animalice nu se potrivesc cu viziunea fiin ei umane privitoare la fericire. Fiin ele umane
au facult i mai elevate dect poftele animalelor i, odat ce au devenit contiente de ele, nu
privesc drept fericire nimic ce nu include satisfacerea lor. (X: 211) Eu nu consider c epicureenii
au fost f r cusur n felul n care au stabilit sistemul consecin elor principiului utilitarist. A face
acest lucru ntr-o manier ct de ct satisf c toare presupune a lua n considerare multe alte
elemente, stoice i cretine. Dar nu exist nici o teorie epicurean cunoscut a vie ii care s nu
atribuie pl cerilor intelectului, ale tr irii i imagina iei, ca i acelora ale sentimentelor morale, o
valoare mult mai mare, ca pl ceri, dect celor ale simplei senza ii. Totui, trebuie admis c , n
general, scriitorii utilitariti au pus superioritatea pl cerilor mintale asupra celor corporale n
primul rnd pe seama caracterului lor mai stabil, mai sigur, mai pu in costisitor etc. adic pe
seama avantajelor lor circumstan iale mai degrab dect pe aceea a naturii lor intrinseci. i, sub
toate aceste aspecte, utilitaritii i-au demonstrat ntru totul pozi ia; dar ei s-ar fi putut plasa cu
total consecven i pe o alt pozi ie, mai nalt (higher ground), cum s-ar spune. C ci
recunoaterea faptului c unele genuri de pl cere snt mai dezirabile i mai valoroase dect altele
e pe deplin compatibil cu principiul utilit ii. n condi iile n care, atunci cnd evalu m orice alt
lucru, o facem att din punctul de vedere al cantit ii ct i al calit ii, ar fi absurd s presupunem
c evaluarea pl cerilor ar depinde numai de cantitate.
5 Dac snt ntrebat ce n eleg prin diferen a calitativ a pl cerilor sau ce anume face ca o
pl cere s fie mai valoroas dect alta, pur i simplu ca pl cere, deci f cnd abstrac ie de
cantitatea ei mai mare, nu v d dect un singur r spuns posibil. Dintre dou pl ceri, dac exist
una c reia i-au dat o categoric preferin to i sau aproape to i aceia care au avut experien a
amndurora, f cnd abstrac ie de orice sentiment de obliga ie moral care le-ar cere s o prefere,
apoi aceea este pl cerea mai dezirabil . Dac una dintre cele dou pl ceri este plasat - de c tre
aceia care snt cunosc tori compenten i ai amndurora att de sus deasupra celeilalte nct ei o
prefer chiar dac tiu c ob inerea sa e f cut cu pre ul unei cantit i mai mari de nemul umire i
nu renun la ob inerea sa pentru nici o cantitate din cealalt pl cere de care natura lor e capabil ,
atunci sntem ndrept i i s atribuim acestei delect ri preferate o superioritate calitativ ce
covrete att de mult cantitatea, nct o face, comparativ, de mic importan (of small account).
6 E, acum, un fapt indiscutabil c aceia care snt la fel de obinui i cu amndou i la fel de
capabili s le aprecieze i s se bucure de ele, manifest cea mai clar preferin pentru acel mod
de existen care le pune la lucru facult ile superioare. Pu ine f pturi umane vor fi de acord s
fie transformate n vreunul din animalele inferioare n schimbul promisiunii celei mai
ndestul toare ra ii de pl ceri animalice; nici o fiin uman inteligent nu ar consim i s devin
un nebun, nici o persoan instruit s devin ignorant , nici o persoan apt de tr iri i avnd o
contiin s devin egoist i infam , chiar dac ar fi convins c nebunul, n tngul ori tic losul
snt mai satisf cu i cu propria lor soart dect e ea cu a sa. Ea nu va renun a la ceea ce posed n

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 plus fa de aceste fiin e nici m car n schimbul celei mai depline satisfaceri a tuturor dorin elor
pe care le au n comun. Dac i-ar imagina vreodat aa ceva, ar fi numai n cazul unei att de
mari nefericiri nct, pentru a sc pa de ea, i-ar schimba soarta pe aproape oricare alta, orict de
indezirabil (X: 212) ar fi aceasta n ochii ei. O fiin dotat cu facult i superioare are nevoie de
mai multe lucruri pentru a fi fericit , e capabil , probabil, de suferin e mai profunde i, cu
siguran , e mai vulnerabil n fa a acestora dect o fiin de un tip inferior; dar n ciuda acestei
fragilit i, ea nu poate niciodat dori cu adev rat s se scufunde n ceea ce ea simte a fi un nivel
inferior de existen . Putem da ce explica ie vrem acestei lipse de dorin ; o putem atribui
mndriei (pride), un nume ce se d n mod indistinct unora dintre tr irile cele mai stimabile i,
totodat , cele mai pu in stimabile de care e capabil umanitatea; o putem lega de dragostea de
libertate i de independen personal , apelul la aceasta fiind, la stoici, unul din mijloacele cele
mai eficace de inculcare a ei; de dragostea de putere ori de dragostea tr irii exaltate (excitement),
ambele intrnd cu adev rat n con inutul ei i contribuind la ea; dar denumirea cea mai potrivit
este aceea de sim al demnit ii, pe care toate fiin ele umane l posed ntr-o form sau alta i
care se afl ntr-o anume propor ie, dei n nici un caz ntr-una exact , cu facult ile lor
superioare; acest sim este o parte att de esen ial a fericirii celor n care el se manifest cu
putere nct nimic din ce intr n conflict cu el nu poate fi, dect cu totul trec tor, obiect al
dorin ei lor. Oricine presupune c aceast preferin are loc cu pre ul sacrific rii fericirii c
fiin a superioar , n circumstan e m car aproximativ egale, nu e mai fericit dect cea inferioar -
confund cele dou no iuni, foarte diferite, de fericire (happiness) i de mul umire (content).
Este indiscutabil c fiin a ale c rei capacit i de delectare (enjoyment) snt inferioare are ansele
cele mai mari s i le vad pe deplin satisf cute; iar o fiin dotat superior va sim i ntotdeauna
c orice fericire ar c uta n lumea aa cum este ea, aceast fericire e inevitabil imperfect . Dar ea
poate nv a s suporte aceste imperfec iuni, n m sura n care e vorba de imperfec iuni
suportabile; prezen a acestora nu o va face s invidieze fiin a care e lipsit de contiin a lor, fie i
numai pentru c aceasta din urm nu simte deloc binele pe care respectivele imperfec iuni l
circumscriu. E mai bine s fii o fiin uman nesatisf cut dect un porc satisf cut; e mai bine s
fii un Socrate nesatisf cut dect un nebun satisf cut. Iar dac nebunul sau porcul snt de alt
p rere, aceasta se datoreaz faptului c ei cunosc numai latura lor a problemei. Cei cu care i
compar m cunosc ambele laturi.
7 S-ar putea obiecta c mul i dintre cei ap i de pl ceri superioare le amn , uneori, sub
influen a tenta iei, n favoarea celor inferioare. Dar acest fapt e ntru totul compatibil cu o
deplin recunoatere a superiorit ii intrinseci a pl cerilor superioare. Din cauza unor sl biciuni
de caracter, oamenii aleg adesea binele cel mai la ndemn dei tiu c el e de mai mic valoare;
i aceasta nu numai atunci cnd e vorba de a alege ntre dou pl ceri ale corpului, ci i atunci
cnd e vorba de a alege ntre pl cerile trupeti i cele mentale (mental). Ei caut r sf ul
sim urilor cu pre ul afect rii s n t ii dei snt perfect contien i c s n tatea e binele mai mare.
S-ar mai putea aduce obiec ia c mul i dintre aceia care ncep prin a fi de un entuziasm tineresc
pentru tot ce e nobil, pe m sur ce avanseaz n vrst se scufund n nep sare i egoism. Dar eu
nu cred c aceia care sufer o asemenea obinuit schimbare aleg n mod voluntar (X: 213)
pl cerile inferioare n locul celor superioare. Cred c , nainte ca ei s se dedice exclusiv unora,
au devenit deja incapabili de celelalte. Capacitatea de a ncerca tr iri mai nobile este, n cele mai
multe naturi, o plant firav , uor ucis nu doar de influen ele ostile, ci de chiar lipsa hranei; i n
cazul majorit ii persoanelor tinere ea moare repede dac preocup rile c rora li s-au dedicat i
societatea n mijlocul c reia au fost aruncate nu snt favorabile exerci iului acestei capacit i
superioare. Oamenii i pierd aspira iile nalte, cum i pierd i gusturile intelecutale, din cauz c
nu au timpul necesar sau prilejul favorabil de a i le satisface; i se dedau pl cerilor inferioare nu
att pentru c le-ar prefera deliberat, ci deoarece fie c acestea snt singurele la care au acces, fie
snt singurele de care se mai simt capabili s se bucure. Ne-am putea ndoi c a existat cineva
care, sensibil la ambele clase de pl ceri, a preferat vreodat pe cele inferioare cu bun tiin i
cu deplin cump nire, dei mul i, la toate vrstele, s-au epuizat ncercnd zadarnic s le combine
pe amndou .

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 8 n fa a acestui verdict al singurilor judec tori competen i cred c nu mai e loc de apel. La
ntrebarea care dintre cele dou pl ceri e cel mai bine s fie ob inut sau care dintre cele dou
moduri de existen este cel mai reconfortant pentru tr irile noastre abstrac ie f cnd de
atributele sale morale i de consecin ele sale trebuie acceptat ca final judecata celor ce sunt
califica i ntru aceasta prin cunoaterea ambelor cazuri sau, dac acetia difer n p reri, judecata
majorit ii lor. i trebuie s nu avem nici cea mai mic ezitare n a accepta aceast judecat cu
privire la calitatea pl cerilor deoarece nu exist vreun alt tribunal la care s apel m nici m car n
chestiunea cantit ii. C ci ce alt mijloc exist de a determina care dintre dou dureri e mai acut
sau care dintre dou senza ii pl cute e mai intens n afara sufragiului general al celor ce sunt
familiariza i cu amndou ? Nici pl cerile i nici durerile nu sunt omogene, iar durerea e
ntotdeauna eterogen n raport cu pl cerea. Ce ar putea decide dac o anumit pl cere merit s
fie dobndit cu pre ul unei anumite dureri dact tr irile i judecata celor experimenta i? Cnd,
prin urmare, tr irile i judecata acestora consider c pl cerile derivate din facult ile superioare
sunt preferabile ca gen, indiferent de intensitatea lor, celor de care e capabil natura animal ,
lipsit de facult ile superioare, ele merit s se bucure, n aceast privin , de aceeai
considera ie.
9 Am z bovit asupra acestui punct pentru c el e o parte necesar a unei concep ii perfect juste
cu privire la utilitate sau fericire privit ca regul directoare a conduitei umane. Dar el nu e
nici pe departe o condi ie indispensabil pentru acceptarea standardului utilitarist; c ci acest
standard nu vizeaz cea mai mare fericire a nsui agentului, ci cea mai mare cantitate de fericire
n total (altogether); i dac se poate pune sub semnul ndoielii faptul c un caracter nobil e
ntotdeauna mai fericit dect altele gra ie noble ii sale, nu poate exista nici o ndoial c el face
mai ferici i al i oameni i c lumea n genere se afl ntr-un imens ctig datorit lui. Aadar,
utilitarismul (X: 214) i poate atinge scopul numai prin cultivarea general a noble ii de
caracter, chiar dac fiecare individ ar beneficia doar de noble ea altora, iar propria sa noble e, sub
aspectul fericirii, ar fi pur i simplu sc zut din beneficiul astfel ob inut. Dar simpla enun are a
unei absurdit i cum e acesta din urm face superflu orice ncercare de respingere a ei.

10 Conform principiului celei mai mari fericiri, aa cum a fost explicat mai sus, scopul ultim,
n raport cu care i pentru atingerea c ruia toate celelalte lucruri sunt dezirabile (fie c avem n
vedere propriul nostru bine sau pe al altora) este o existen scutit ct se poate de mult de durere
i bogat ct se poate de mult n delect ri (enjoyments), att sub aspect cantitativ ct i calitativ,
testul calit ii i regula de a m sura calitatea n raport cu cantitatea fiind preferin a resim it de
aceia care datorit ocaziilor pe care le-au avut de a tr i aceste experien e, la care mai trebuie s
ad ug m deprinderile lor de a se auto-analiza i auto-observa sunt cei mai nzestra i cu
mijloacele necesare compar rii. Acesta fiind, conform opiniei utilitariste, scopul ac iunii umane,
el e, totodat , n mod necesar, standardul moralit ii; moralitate care poate fi definit
corespunz tor: regulile i preceptele conduitei umane prin subordonare la care se poate asigura
ntregii omeniri, n cea mai mare m sur posibil , o existen aa cum a fost ea descris aici; i
nu numai omenirii, ci n m sura n care natura lucrurilor o admite, ntregii crea ii capabile de
sim ire.

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11 Contra acestei doctrine se ridic , totui, un alt grup de critici care spun c fericirea, n orice
form a ei, nu poate fi elul (purpose) ra ional al vie ii i ac iunii umane deoarece, nainte de
toate, el nu poate fi atins; ei ntreab cu dispre : Ce drept ave i voi s fi i ferici i? o ntrebare pe
care dl. Carlyle o des vrete cu adaosul: Ce drept a i avut voi, cu ctva timp n urm , chiar s
fii? Apoi ei spun c oamenii pot s tr iasc i fr fericire; c toate fiin ele umane nobile au
sim it acest lucru i nu ar fi putut deveni nobile dect nv nd lec ia lui Entsagen sau a
renun rii, lec ie care, dac e nv at i urmat cu grij , afirm ei, reprezint nceputul i
condi ia necesar a oric rei virtu i.

12 Prima din aceste obiec ii, dac ar fi ntemeiat , ar merge chiar la r d cina chestiunii: c ci
dac fericirea nu ar fi accesibil de loc fiin elor umane, atunci dobndirea ei nu ar putea fi scopul
moralit ii sau al conduitei ra ionale n general. Totui, chiar i n acest caz, ceva ar putea fi spus
n favoarea teoriei utilitariste: c ci utilitatea include nu doar urm rirea fericirii, ci i prevenirea
sau micorarea nefericirii; i chiar dac prima int (aim) ar fi himeric , va r mne cu att mai
mult loc i va fi resim it o nevoie cu att mai imperativ pentru cea din urm , cel pu in atta
vreme ct omenirea g sete potrivit s tr iasc i nu caut refugiu n actul simultan de
sinucidere, recomandat n anumite condi ii de Novalis. Totui, atunci (X: 215) cnd se sus ine
att de hot rt imposibilitatea ca via a uman s fie fericit , aceast aser iune, dac nu e un
simplu joc de cuvinte, este cel pu in o exagerare. Dac prin fericire se n elege o continu
exaltare a pl cerilor superioare (a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement), atunci e destul de
clar c aa ceva este imposibil. O stare de pl cere exaltat dureaz numai cteva momente sau, n
unele cazuri, cu intermiten e, ore sau zile; ea e ocazionalul fulger str lucitor al delect rii, nu
flac ra ei durabil i linitit . De acest lucru au fost pe deplin contien i att filosofii care au
pretins c fericirea este scopul vie ii, ct i aceia care i-au luat n derdere. Fericirea pe care o
aveau ei n vedere nu se referea la o via de extaz, ci la momente de acest fel, ntr-o existen
format din pu ine i trec toare dureri, din multe i variate pl ceri, cu o clar predominare a
activit ii asupra pasivit ii i avnd ca fundament al ntregului ideea de a nu atepta de la via
mai mult dect e capabil s - i ofere. O asemenea via a p rut ntotdeauna celor ce au avut
destul noroc s o tr iasc demn de numele de fericire. Iar o asemenea existen este i acum
soarta multora, de-a lungul unor por iuni considerabile ale vie ii lor. Jalnica educa ie actual i
jalnicele rnduieli sociale de azi sunt singurele piedici reale n calea atingerii ei de aproape toat
lumea.

13 Criticii s-ar putea s se ndoiasc de faptul c fiin ele umane, odat nv ate s considere
fericirea drept scop al vie ii, vor fi satisf cute cu o parte att de modest a ei. ns o mare parte a
omenirii a fost satisf cut cu mult mai pu in dect att. Principalele elemente constitutive ale unei

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 vie i satisf c toare par a fi dou , fiecare fiind adesea considerat suficient, n sine, pentru
atingerea elului: linitea (tranquility) i exaltarea emo ional (excitement). Dac au mult linite,
mul i consider c pot fi mul umi i cu foarte pu ine pl ceri; n plin exaltare emo ional mul i pot
s suporte mai uor o cantitate mare de durere. Nu exist , desigur, o imposibilitate inerent care
s interzic , chiar i masei de oameni, s uneasc aceste dou elemente, c ci ele sunt att de
departe de a fi incomptibile nct se afl ntr-o alian natural , prelungirea oric reia fiind o
preg tire i o strnire a dorin ei pentru cealalt . Doar aceia pentru care nep sarea a ajuns un
viciu nu doresc exaltarea emo iilor dup un r stimp de tihn ; doar aceia n care nevoia de
exaltare emo ional e o boal consider c linitea care urmeaz acesteia e plictisitoare i
insipid , iar nu pl cut n propor ie direct cu exaltarea emo ional ce a precedat-o. Atunci cnd
oamenii care snt relativ favoriza i de soarta lor aparent nu g sesc suficient bucurie n via
pentru a o face s fie valoroas pentru ei, cauza e, n general, aceea c lor nu le pas dect de ei
nii. Pentru cei ce sunt lipsi i de capacit i afective, publice ori private, exaltarea emo iilor
oferit de via e mult diminuat i, n orice caz, scade ca valoare pe m sur ce se apropie
vremea cnd toate interesele egoiste trebuie s -i g seasc sfritul n moarte; pe cnd aceia care
las n urma lor motive de afec iune personal i, mai ales, aceia care au cultivat totodat un
sentiment de amici ie (fellow feeling) cu interesele colective ale omenirii, vor p stra un tot att
un viu interes pentru via n ajunul mor ii pe ct l-au avut n plin tatea tinere ii i s n t ii lor.
Dup egoism, cauz principal care face via a nesatisf c toare e lipsa cultiv rii min ii. (X: 216)
O minte cultivat nu m refer la cea a filosofului, ci la orice minte pentru care s-au deschis
fntnile cunoaterii i care a fost nv at , ct de ct, s -i foloseasc facult ile g sete izvor
de inepuizabil interes n tot ceea ce o nconjoar : n obiectele naturii, n realiz rile artei, n
nchipuirile poeziei, n ntmpl rile istoriei, n c ile, trecute i prezente, parcurse de umanitate,
ca i n perspectivele ei viitoare. E posibil, desigur, s devii indiferent la toate acestea, i asta f r
s fi epuizat nici a mia parte din ele, dar un asemenea lucru nu se poate ntmpla dect atunci
cnd nu ai avut de la bun nceput nici un fel de interes moral sau uman pentru asemenea
chestiuni i ai v zut n ele doar un prilej de satisfacere a curiozit ii.

14 Nu exist absolut nici un temei care s in de natura lucrurilor pentru care un anume grad
de cultivare a min ii, suficient pentru a trezi un interes intelectual pentru asemenea teme de
contemplare, nu ar fi o motenire a oric rei persoane n scut ntr-o ar civilizat . Tot att de
pu in e inerent necesar ca toate fiin ele umane s fie de tipul egocentricului egoist (selfish
egotist), golite de orice tr ire i lipsite de orice preocupare n afara acelora orientate spre propria
lor individualitate meschin . Ceva cu mult superior acestei situa ii e un lucru destul de obinuit
chiar i n zilele noastre, dnd seama cu elocven de ceea ce poate deveni specia uman . Orice
fiin uman bine crescut e capabil , dei n grade inegale, de afecte private autentice i de un

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 interes sincer fa de binele public. ntr-o lume n care sunt attea lucruri demne de interes, attea
motive de bucurie, dar i attea de ndreptat i de mbun t it, oricine posed ct de ct aceste
elemente morale i intelectuale e apt s duc o existen ce poate fi numit pe drept cuvnt de
invidiat; i n m sura n care unei asemenea persoane nu-i e interzis libertatea de a se folosi de
izvoarele fericirii aflate la ndemna ei prin legi rele sau prin supunerea la voin a altora ea nu
va rata ansa de a tr i o asemenea existen demn de invidiat cu condi ia s scape de
adev ratele rele ale vie ii, de marile surse ale suferin ei fizice i mintale, cum sunt s r cia, boala,
ca i lipsa de omenie, bicisnicia sau pierderea prematur a fiin elor dragi. Principalul aspect al
problemei const , aadar, n lupta cu aceste vitregii de care numai rar i cu mult noroc po i sc pa
n ntregime i care, dup cum stau lucrurile acum, nu pot fi prentmpinate i adesea nici m car
diminuate n vreo m sur semnificativ . Totui, nici unul dintre aceia ale c ror p reri merit s
fie ascultate nu se ndoiesc c cele mai multe dintre aceste mari p cate ale lumii sunt n sine
extirpabile i c ele vor fi, pn la urm , reduse ntre nite limite nguste dac treburile umane
vor continua s se mbun t easc . S r cia, ce presupune n orice sens al ei suferin , poate fi
complet eliminat gra ie n elepciunii societ ii combinat cu bunul sim i cu spiritul de
prevedere al indivizilor. Pn i cel mai de temut dintre dumani, boala, poate fi redus la
nesfrit ca amploare printr-o bun educa ie fizic i moral i printr-un control adecvat al
influen elor nocive; n plus, progresul tiin ei ne ofer promisiunea ca n viitor s repurt m
victorii mai directe asupra acestui inamic detestabil. Fiecare pas f cut n aceast direc ie ne
p zete nu numai de acei factori care ne-ar scurta via a, ci, nc mai demn de interes, de aceia
care ne-ar lipsi (X: 217) de persoanele de care e legat fericirea noastr . Ct privete
vicisitudinile ansei, precum i celelalte dezam giri legate de mprejur rile lumeti, ele sunt, n
principal, fie efectul unei mari impruden e, fie al unor r u st pnite dorin i, fie al unor institu ii
sociale rele sau imperfecte. Pe scurt, toate marile surse ale suferin ei umane pot fi nvinse n
bun m sur , unele chiar n totalitate, prin grij pentru oameni i prin efort; i cu toate c
ndep rtarea lor este dureros de nceat cu toate c un lung ir de genera ii vor pieri nainte de a
se ob ine victoria i nainte ca aceast lume s devin ceea ce ar putea cu uurin deveni dac nu
ar lipsi voin a i priceperea totui orice inteligen suficient de dotat i suficient de generoas
pentru a lua parte, n orict de mic m sur i cu orict de pu in ostenta ie, la o asemenea
str danie, va resim i o nobil bucurie prin chiar participarea la lupt , bucurie de care nu ar
consim i s se lipseasc n schimbul nici unui privilegiu egoist.

15 Aceste considera ii ne duc la adev rata evaluare a ceea ce spun acei critici care sus in c e
posibil, i chiar obligatoriu, s nv m s tr im f r fericire. Nendoielnic e posibil s tr im f r
fericire; o fac involuntar nou sprezece oameni din dou zeci, chiar n acele p r i ale lumii care
sunt cel mai pu in adncite n barbarie; o face adesea, n mod voluntar, eroul sau martirul, de

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 dragul a ceva ce el pre uiete mai mult dect fericirea lui individual . Dar ce este acest ceva dac
nu fericirea altora sau unele din condi iile necesare fericirii? E un lucru nobil s fii capabil s
abandonezi cu totul propria- i por ie de fericire sau ansa de a o avea; dar acest sacrificiu trebuie
f cut, pn la urm , cu un anume scop; el nu e propriul s u scop; i dac ni se spune c acest
scop nu e fericirea ci virtutea, care e mai bun dect fericirea, atunci ntreb: s-ar face oare acest
sacrificiu dac eroul sau martirul nu ar crede c el va scuti astfel pe al ii de sacrificii similare? S-
ar face oare acest sacrificiu dac el ar crede c renun area la fericirea proprie nu ar produce nici
un fruct pentru semenii s i, ci i-ar aduce chiar n situa ia sa, adic n condi ia unei persoane care
a renun at la fericire? Toate onorurile pentru cei ce pot s -i refuze pl cerile vie ii atunci cnd
prin aceast renun are contribuie cu succes la sporirea cantit ii de fericire din lume; dar cel ce
face acest lucru sau propov duiete facerea lui pentru orice alt el, nu e mai demn de admira ie
dect ascetul urcat pe stlpul s u. El poate fi o demonstra ie ncurajatoare a ceea ce poate face
omul, dar cu siguran nu un exemplu de ceea ce trebuie el s fac .

16 Cu toate c numai ntr-o stare foarte imperfect a ordinii lumii modul cel mai bun de a servi
fericirea altora e prin sacrificiul absolut al propriei fericiri, atta vreme ct lumea se afl n
aceast stare imperfect sunt ntru totul de acord c a fi gata s faci un asemenea sacrificiu
reprezint virtutea cea mai nalt ce poate fi g sit la om. Voi ad uga c , n aceast stare a lumii,
orict de paradoxal ar suna cuvintele mele, capacitatea contient de a tr i lipsit de fericire d
ansele cele mai mari de a realiza fericirea n limitele a ceea ce este accesibil. C ci (X: 218)
nimic n afara acestei contiin e nu poate ridica o persoan deasupra hazardurilor vie ii, f cnd-o
s simt c , orict de potrivnice i-ar fi soarta i norocul, ele nu au puterea de a o supune; acest
sentiment odat posedat, o elibereaz de prea multa nelinite cauzat de relele vie ii i i permite
s cultive n linite, ca stoicii n vremurile grele ale imperiului roman, izvoarele de satisfac ie
accesibile ei, f r s se preocupe de incertitudinile legate de durata lor sau de sfritul lor
inevitabil.

17 Utilitaritii nu au ncetat niciodat s sus in c moralitatea devotamentului personal le

apar ine cu tot atta ndrept ire ca i stoicilor sau transcendentalitilor. Moralitatea utilitarist
recunoate n fiin ele umane capacitatea de a sacrifica propriul lor bine mai mare pentru binele
altora. Ea refuz doar s admit c sacrificiul este el nsui un bine. Un sacrificu care nu sporete
sau nu tinde s sporeasc suma total a fericirii e considerat a fi f cut degeaba. Singura renun are
acceptat e devo iunea fa de fericirea altora sau fa de unele din mijloacele care asigur
aceast fericire, fiind vorba aici fie de fericirea omenirii n sens colectiv, fie de cea a indivizilor
n limitele impuse de interesele colective ale omenirii.

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18 Trebuie s repet din nou ceva ce adversarii utilitarismului au rareori capacitatea s
recunoasc , anume c fericirea care constituie standardul utilitarist al conduitei corecte nu e
fericirea proprie a agentului, ci aceea a tuturor celor afecta i (all concerned). Iar n tratarea
propriei fericiri n raport cu fericirea altora, utilitarismul i pretinde s fie tot att de riguros
impar ial precum un spectator dezinteresat i binevoitor. n regula de aur a lui Isus din Nazaret
putem g si ntregul spirit al eticii utilit ii. S faci altora aa cum vrei s i se fac ie i s - i
iubeti aproapele ca pe tine nsu i - iat perfec iunea ideal a moralei utilitariste. Ct privete
mijloacele de a ne apropia de acest ideal, utilitarismul preconizeaz , mai nti, ca legile i
rnduielile sociale s pun fericirea sau (altfel zis, ntr-un sens mai practic) interesul fiec rui
individ ct mai n armonie cu interesul tuturor; n al doilea rnd, ca educa ia i opinia, care au o
att de mare influen asupra caracterului omenesc, s -i foloseasc aceast influen pentru a
s di n mintea fiec rui individ o asociere indisolubil ntre propria sa fericire i binele tuturor,
mai cu seam ntre propria fericire i practicarea acelor moduri de conduit , negative i pozitive,
care sunt prescrise de preocuparea pentru fericirea universal ; i aceasta astfel nct el nu numai
s nu fie capabil s conceap posibilitatea unei fericiri personale asociat cu o conduit opus
binelui general, dar, mai mult, impulsul direct spre promovarea binelui general s fie unul din
motivele habituale ale ac iunii sale iar sentimentele legate de acest impuls s ocupe un loc
important n existen a sensibil a oric rei fiin e umane. Dac cei ce contest moralitatea
utilitarist (X: 219) i-ar reprezent-o n adev rata ei nf iare, care e aceasta, nu tiu dac ar
putea spune c -i lipsete vreuna din calit ile care recomand orice alt moralitate; c ci care
sistem etic favorizeaz o mai frumoas i mai n l toare dezvoltare a naturii umane? Sau care
sunt acele resorturi ale ac iunii, inaccesibile utilitaristului, pe care se bazeaz asemenea sisteme
spre a ajunge la realizarea obiectivelor lor ?

19 Nu se poate spune c adversarii utilitarismului l prezint ntotdeauna pe acesta ntr-o lumin

defavorabil . Dimpotriv , aceia dintre ei care au sesizat ideea caracterului s u dezinteresat, i
reproeaz uneori c standardul s u este prea nalt pentru umanitate. Ei spun c e prea mult s
ceri ca oamenii s ac ioneze ntotdeauna din imboldul de a promova interesele generale ale
societ ii. Dar aceasta nseamn s interpretezi greit chiar n elesul unui standard moral i s
confunzi regula ac iunii cu motivul ac iunii. E treaba eticii s ne spun care ne sunt datoriile sau
prin ce test ni le putem cunoate; dar nici un sistem etic nu cere ca singurul motiv al tot ceea ce
facem s fie sentimentul datoriei (a feeling of duty); dimpotriv , nou zeci i nou la sut din
ac iunile noastre sunt f cute din alte motive i ele snt corecte dac regula datoriei nu le
condamn . A face din aceast nen elegere particular motiv de critic a utilitarismului e cu att
mai nedrept cu ct moralitii utilitariti au mers cel mai departe n a afirma c motivul nu are
nimic de-a face moralitatea ac iunii, dei are de-a face mult cu valoarea (worth) agentului. Cel

13
 ce-i salveaz semenul de la nec face un lucru moralmente corect, indiferent dac motivul s u a
fost datoria sau speran a de a fi pl tit pentru osteneal ; cel ce-i tr deaz prietenul care a crezut
n el e vinovat de nelegiuire (crime), chiar dac menirea sa (his object) a fost s serveasc un alt
prieten, fa de care era mai ndatorat. Dar dac e s vorbim numai de ac iunile (X: 220) f cute
din motivul datoriei i prin supunere direct la principiu, atunci trebuie spus c e o greit
n elegere a modului de gndire utilitarist p rerea c acesta ar presupune c oamenii trebuie s -i
ndrepte aten ia spre o att de larg generalitate precum e lumea sau societate n ansamblul ei.
Marea majoritate a ac iunilor bune nu sunt inten ionate pentru folosul lumii, ci pentru folosul
indivizilor, din care se compune i binele lumii; iar gndurile celui mai virtuos om nu trebuie
neap rat s treac , cu aceste prilejuri, dincolo de cercul persoanelor particulare afectate de
ac iune (concerned), dect n m sura n care e necesar s se asigure c , aducnd foloase acestora,
el nu violeaz drepturile - adic atept rile legitime i autorizate ale - celorlal i. Conform eticii
utilitariste, menirea virtu ii e multiplicarea fericirii; ocaziile n care unei persoane i st n putere
s fac aceast lucru pe scar mare, s fie, cu alte cuvine, un binef c tor public, sunt rare
(excep iile sunt de unu la o mie); doar n asemenea ocazii i se cere ei s ia n considerare
utilitatea public ; n toate celelalte cazuri, ea trebuie s urm resc doar utilitatea privat ,
interesul sau fericirea unui num r mic de persoane. Doar aceia ale c ror ac iuni au o influen
asupra societ ii n ansamblul ei trebuie s se ocupe n mod curent de un scop att de vast. E
adev rat c n cazul ab inerilor adic al acelor lucruri pe care oamenii evit s le fac din
considerente morale, dei consecin ele lor pot fi benefice ntr-un anume caz particular ar fi
nedemn de un agent inteligent s nu aib contiin a faptului c ac iunea apar ine unei clase de
ac iuni care, dac ar fi practicate n general, ar fi n general d un toare, i c aceasta este baza
obliga iei de a ne ab ine s o facem. Cantitatea de preocupare pentru interesul public presupus

Un adversar, a c rui corectitudine intelectual i moral mi face pl cere s-o recunosc (Rev. J. Llewellyn Davies), a
obiectat la aces pasaj spunnd: n mod sigur caracterul corect sau incorect al faptei de a salva un om de la nec depinde
foarte mult de motivul din care a fost f cut fapta. S zicem c un tiran, atunci cnd dumanul s u a s rit n mare ca s
scape de el, l salveaz de la nec doar pentru ca s -i poat aplica torturi i mai violente; va fi oare l muritor s vorbim
n cazul acestei salv ri de o ac iune moralmente corect ? Sau, s presupunem, prelund un exemplu clasic de
problem etic , situa ia n care un om a nelat ncrederea unui prieten care i-a ncredin at spre p strare un bun deoarece
restituirea acelui bun l-ar fi v t mat fatal pe prieten sau pe cei apropia i lui; ne va sili oare utilitarismul s numim
aceast tradare o nelegiuire (a crime), ca atunci cnd ar fi fost f cut din cele mai josnice motive?
Consider c acela care l salveaz pe altul de la nec pentru a-l omor apoi prin tortur nu se deosebete doar prin
motiv de acela care face acelai lucru din datorie sau din bun voin (benevolence); actul nsui e altul. Salvarea unui
om e, n cazul invocat, numai primul pas necesar al unui act mult mai atroce dect ar fi fost acela de a-l l sa s se nece.
Dar dac dl.Davies ar fi zis: Caracterul corect sau incorect al actului de a salva via a unui om de la nec depinde foarte
mult nu de motiv, ci de intenie, atunci nici un utilitarist nu l-ar fi contrazis. Printr-o neglijen mult prea
r spndit pentru a putea fi scuzat , dl. Davies a confundat n acest caz ideile foarte diferite de motiv i intenie. n
leg tur cu nici o alt problem nu au fost depuse de c tre gnditorii utilitariti (i mai ales de Bentham) mai multe
eforturi de ilustrare dect n leg tur cu aceasta. Moralitatea ac iunii depinde n ntregime de inten ie adic de ce vrea
s fac agentul (what the agent wills to do). Dar motivul, adic tr irea (feeling) care-l determin s vrea s fac acel
ceva (makes him will so to do), dac nu schimb nimic cu privire la act, nu schimb nimic nici cu privire la moralitatea
acestuia, dei el influen eaz mult evaluarea moral pe care noi o facem agentului, n special dac indic prezen a unei

14
 de recunoaterea acestei obliga ii nu e mai mare dect aceea cerut de orice alt sistem moral, c ci
toate sistemele cer s ne ab inem de la orice e evident d un tor pentru societate.

20 Aceleai considerente elimin i un alt repro adresat doctrinei utilit ii, repro bazat pe o i
mai mare nen elegere a elului unui standard al moralit ii i a chiar n elesului cuvintelor
corect i incorect. Se afirm adesea c utilitarismul i face pe oameni reci i incapabili de
compasiune; c le sl bete tr irile morale pe care le au fa de indivizii umani; c i face s fie
aten i doar la nregistrarea seac i strict a consecin elor ac iunilor lor, (X: 221) ignornd n
evalu rile lor morale calit ile din care au emanat respectivele ac iuni. Dac aceast aser iune
nseamn c ei nu permit ca judec ile lor cu privire la corectitudinea sau incorectitudinea unei
ac iuni s fie influen ate de opinia pe care o au cu privire la calit ile persoanei care a f cut
ac iunea, atunci aceasta e o plngere nu mpotriva utilitarismului, ci mpotriva posibilit ii
existen ei oric rui standard moral; c ci e clar c nici un standard etic cunoscut nu decide c o
ac iune e bun sau rea pentru c e f cut de un om bun sau r u i cu att mai pu in pentru c e
f cut de un om prietenos, curajos sau binevoitor, ori invers. Asemenea considerente sunt
relevante nu la evaluarea ac iunilor, ci a persoanelor, i nu exist nimic n teoria utilitarist
incompatibil cu afirma ia c exist i alte lucruri care ne intereseaz la oameni n afara
corectitudinii sau incorectitudinii ac iunilor lor. Stoicii, ntr-adev r, cu paradoxala lor utilizare
deformat a limbii, ce f cea parte din sistemul lor i prin care se str duiau s se ridice deasupra
oric ror alte considera ii n afara celor privitoare la virtute, se mndreau s spun c acela care o
posed , posed totul; c acela i numai acela e bogat, e frumos, e un rege. Dar nici o preten ie de
acest gen nu e emis de doctrina utilitarist cu privire la omul virtuos. Utilitaritii sunt perfect
contien i c exist , n afara virtu ii, alte nsuiri i calit i dezirabile i sunt ct se poate de
dispui s confere valoare deplin tuturor acestora. Ei sunt de asemenea contien i c o ac iune
corect nu indic necesarmente un caracter virtuos i c ac iuni blamabile rezult adesea din
calit i de caracter care merit lauda. Cnd e clar c aa stau lucrurile ntr-un anumit caz
particular, aceasta modific evaluarea, dar cu siguran nu a ac iunii, ci a agentului. Cu toate
acestea, sunt de acord c ei cred c , pe termen lung, cea mai bun dovad a unui caracter bun
sunt ac iunile bune i refuz hot rt s aprecieze o dispozi ie mintal ca bun dac tendin a ei
predominant e s produc o conduit rea. Aceasta-i face nepopulari n ochii multor oameni, dar
e vorba de o nepopularitate pe care, vrnd-nevrnd, o mp rt esc cu to i aceia care privesc
deosebirea dintre corect i incorect ntr-un mod serios; iar reproul ca atare nu e unul pe care un
utilitarist onest ar trebui s se gr beasc s -l pareze.

dispoziii habituale bune sau rea adic a unei nclina ii caracteriale din care e probabil s rezulte ac iuni utile sau
d un toare.

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21 Dac nu se reproeaz utilitaritilor altceva dect c mul i dintre ei privesc moralitatea
ac iunilor, n m sura n care e evaluat cu ajutorul standardului utilitarist, ntr-o perspectiv mult
prea ngust i c nu subliniaz ndeajuns celelalte frumuse i ale caracterului care fac n aa fel
ca o fiin uman s fie atr g toare i demn de admira ie atunci acest repro poate fi admis.
Utilitaritii care i-au cultivat tr irile morale, dar nu i capacitatea simpatiei (their sympathies),
nici sensibilitatea artistic (artistic perceptions), ei bine, aceti utilitariti cad ntr-o asemenea
greeal ; i la fel fac to i ceilal i moraliti n condi ii similare. Ceea ce poate fi adus ca scuz
pentru ceilal i moraliti e valabil i pentru acetia, anume c dac e s fie vreo greeal aici,
atunci e mai bine s fie una n acest sens. De fapt, putem afirma c printre utilitariti, ca i printre
aderen ii la alte sisteme, exist toate gradele de rigiditate i de larghe e imaginabile n privin a
aplic rii standardului lor; unii sunt de o rigurozitate puritan , n timp ce (X: 222) al ii sunt
indulgen i pn la limita convenabil p c toilor sau sentimentalilor. Dar, pe ansamblu, o
doctrin care pune nainte de toate interesul pe care-l are omenirea n reprimarea i prevenirea
conduitelor ce violeaz legea moral e improbabil s fie inferioar altor doctrine n ce privete
capacitatea ei de a orienta sanc iunile opiniei publice contra unor asemenea viol ri. E adev rat c
la ntrebarea : Ce anume violeaz legea moral ? cei ce recunosc standarde diferite de
moralitate snt pasibili de a avea uneori r spunsuri diferite. Dar diferen a de opinie n chestiuni
morale nu a fost adus pe lume de utilitarism; aceast doctrin ofer n schimb o modalitate
practic i inteligibil , chiar dac nu ntotdeauna uoar , de a arbitra asemenea divergen e.

22 Poate c nu ar fi de prisos s mai not m cteva interpret ri eronate ale eticii utilitariste, chiar
i dintre acelea care sunt att de evidente i de grosolane nct ar p rea imposibil ca o persoan
onest i inteligent s le cad prad ; c ci oamenii, fie ei i dintre aceia cu o bun nzestrare
intelectual , i dau adesea att de pu in silin s n eleag semnifica ia unei opinii n leg tur
cu care ntre in o prejudecat i sunt, n general, att de pu in contien i de aceast ignoran
voluntar ca defect, nct cele mai vulgare interpret ri greite ale doctrinelor etice se reg sesc
adesea n textele, astfel chibzuite, ale unor persoane cu cele mai nalte preten ii n materie de
principii i de filosofie. Nu rareori auzim nvinurea c doctrina utilitarist e o doctrin pgn
(godless). Dac e cazul s spunem ceva mpotriva unei asemenea presupuneri gratuite, putem
zice c problema depinde de ideea pe care ne-am format-o cu privire la caracterul moral al
divinit ii. Dac e adev rat credin a c Dumnezeu dorete, mai presus de orice, fericirea
creaturilor sale i c acesta a fost scopul s u atunci cnd le-a creat, atunci utilitarismul nu numai
c nu e o doctrin p gn , dar e mai profund religioas dect oricare alta. Dac prin caracter
p gn se n elege c utilitarismul nu recunoate voin a revelat a lui Dumnezeu ca lege suprem
a moralei, r spund c un utilitarist care crede n des vritul bine i n n elepciunea lui
Dumnezeu crede cu necesitate c orice a g sit Dumnezeu de cuviin s ne dezv luie n leg tur

16
 cu morala trebuie s satisfac n cel mai nalt grad cerin ele utilit ii. Dar exist i al ii, diferi i de
utilitariti, care sunt de p rere c revela ia cretin a fost menit i e totodat de natur s umple
inimile i min ile oamenilor de acel spirit care s le permit s descopere singuri ceea ce e corect
i s -i mboldeasc s practice acest lucru, iar nu s le spun (dect, poate, ntr-un sens general)
ce este corectitudinea; ei cred c avem nevoie de o doctrin a eticii, atent ntocmit , care s
interpreteze pentru noi voin a lui Dumnezeu. Nu e cazul s discut aici dac aceast p rere e
corect sau nu, c ci orice ajutor ar putea oferi religia, natural sau relevat , cercet rii etice, el e
accesibil att pentru utilitarist ct i pentru orice alt moralist. El l poate utiliza ca m rturie a lui
Dumnezeu cu privire la utilitatea sau caracterul d un tor al oric rui curs dat al ac iunii, (X: 223)
i aceasta cu tot atta ndrept ire cu ct al ii l pot utiliza pentru a indica existen a unei legi
transcendentale, care nu are nici o leg tur cu utilitatea sau cu fericirea.

23 Pe de alt parte, doctrina utilit ii e adesea stigmatizat sumar ca o doctrin imoral , dndu-
i-se numele de doctrin a "oportunit ii (expendicy) i se profit de sensul popular al acestui
termen pentru a-l pune n opozi ie cu ideea de principiu. Dar oportunul (the expedient), n
m sura n care acest cuvnt e opus lui corect, nseamn , n general, ceva ce este oportun
(expedient) pentru interesul particular al agentului nsui: de exemplu, atunci cnd un ministru
sacrific interesele rii ca s -i p streze scaunul. Cnd acest cuvnt are un sens mai r s rit, el
nseamn ceea ce e oportun (expedient) pentru atingerea unui obiectiv imediat, a unui el
vremelnic, dar care violeaz o regul a c rei respectare e oportun (expedient) ntr-un grad mult
mai nalt. n acest caz, oportunul, n loc s fie acelai lucru cu utilul (useful), e o ramur a
v t m torului (hurtful). Bun oar , poate fi adesea oportun s spunem o minciun atunci cnd
urm rim s ieim dintr-o dificultate momentan sau s ob inem un obiect ce ne e direct util, nou
sau altora. Dar n m sura n care cultivarea n noi nine a unei sensibilit i pentru sinceritate
(veracity) e una din ndeletnicirile cele mai utile, iar sl birea acestei sensibilit i unul dintre cele
mai v t m toare lucruri pe care le poate cauza conduita noastr , n m sura n care orice deviere,
chiar i neinten iont , de la adev r duce la sl birea ncrederii n cuvntul dat (ncredere ce
reprezint nu numai principalul suport al ntregii bun st ri sociale actuale, dar insuficien a c reia
contribuie mai mult dect orice la inerea pe loc a civiliza iei, virtu ii i a tuturor lucrurilor de
care depinde fericirea uman n sensul cel mai larg al acesteia) sim im c violarea, pentru un
avantaj imediat, a unei reguli de o asemenea nalt oportunitate, e inoportun i c acela care,
pentru profitul s u sau al altui individ, face tot ce depinde de el pentru a priva omenirea de acel
bine ce decurge din ncrederea, mai mare sau mai mic , pe care o po i avea n cuvntul altuia, i
a-i provoca acel r u care const n absen a acestei ncrederi, acela ac ioneaz ca unul dintre cei
mai mari dumani ai s i. Totui, faptul c aceast regul , aa sacr cum e, admite unele posibile
excep ii, e recunoscut de to i moralitii; principala excep ie e cazul cnd t inurea unui anume

17
 fapt (cum ar fi o informa ie n fa a unui r uf c tor sau o veste proast n fa a unei persoane atinse
de o boal periculoas ) poate salva un individ (mai ales un individ diferit de sine) de la un r u
mare i nemeritat, iar aceast t inuire poate avea loc numai sub forma neg rii. Dar pentru ca
excep ia s nu se poat extinde mai mult dect e nevoie i s aib cel mai redus efect posibil n
sl birea ncrederii n sinceritate, ea trebuie recunoscut ca atare i, dac se poate, definit n
limitele ei; iar dac principiul utilit ii e bun la ceva, el trebuie s fie bun pentru a cnt ri
reciproc aceste utilit i conflictuale i a delimita regiunea n interiorul c reia predomin una sau
cealalt .

24 (X: 224) Ap r torii doctrinei utilit ii sunt adesea nevoi i s g seasc r spuns la obiec ii
precum aceasta: nu exist suficient timp, nainte de a ac iona, pentru a calcula i cnt ri efectele
asupra fericirii generale ale nici unei linii de conduit . Asta e exact ca i cum ai spune c e
imposibil s ne ghid m conduita conform cretinismului deoarece nu avem indeajuns timp s
citim Vechiul i Noul Testament de fiecare dat cnd facem ceva. R spunsul la aceast obiec ie e
c a existat destul timp, i anume ntreaga istorie trecut a speciei umane. n toat aceast
perioad omenirea a nv at din experient care sunt tendin ele ac iunilor sale; tocmai pe aceast
experien se bazeaz ntreaga sa pruden (prudence) i toat moralitatea vie ii. Oamenii
vorbesc ca i cum nceputul acestei suite de experien e a fost ignorat pn acum, ca i cum n
momentul n care cineva se simte tentat s se amestece n problemele propriet ii sau n via a
altora el ar trebui s reia de la zero auto-interoga iile privitoare la faptul dac omorul sau furtul
sunt d un toare sau nu pentru fericirea uman . Dar chiar i aa, nu cred c el ar ntmpina prea
mari dificult i; oricum, el poate lua acum lucrurile de-a gata. E, ntr-adev r, ciudat supozi ia
c , odat ce omenirea a ajuns la un punct de vedere comun privind considerarea utilit ii drept
test al moralit ii, ea nu a ajuns la nici un acord cu privire la ce este util i nu a luat nici o m sur
pentru a preda tinerilor ideile sale cu privire la acest subiect ori a le impune prin lege sau prin
opinia public . Nu e deloc dificil s dovedeti despre orice standard etic c func ioneaz prost
dac presupui c stupiditatea universal i e asociat ; dar n orice alt ipotez , omenirea trebuia
s -i fi format pn acum convingeri determinate cu privire la efectele unor ac iuni asupra
fericirii oamenilor; iar convingerile care au rezultat n acest fel sunt chiar regulile moralit ii
valabile pentru mul ime, dar i pentru filosof, cel pu in pn cnd acesta va fi n stare s
descopere altele mai bune. Eu admit sau, mai degrab , sus in cu toat convingerea c filosofii pot
face uor acest lucru, chiar i acum, n leg tur cu multe subiecte, c tradi ionalul cod etic nu e
nici pe departe de drept divin i c omenirea mai are nc multe de nv at cu privire la efectele
ac iunilor asupra fericirii generale. Corolarele principiului utilit ii, ca de altfel preceptele
oric rei arte practice, admit nesfrite mbun t iri i, atunci cnd mintea uman e orientat spre
progres, aceste mbun t iri au loc continuu. Dar a considera regulile moralit ii ca perfectibile e

18
 un lucru i a nesocoti complet generaliz rile intermediare, ncercnd s testezi direct fiecare
ac iune individual cu ajutorul primului principiu, e altceva. E stranie ideea c recunoaterea
unui principiu prim ar fi inconsistent cu admiterea unor principii secundare. A informa un
c l tor cu privire la locul ultimei sale destina ii nu nseamn a-i interzice folosirea bornelor i a
indicatoarelor de direc ie de pe drum. Propozi ia c fericirea e scopul (end) i inta (aim)
moralit ii nu nseamn c n-ar trebui s tras m nici o cale pn la acel obiectiv (goal), nici c
persoanele ce merg ntr-acolo n-ar trebui sf tuite (X: 225) s ia o direc ie mai degrab dect alta.
Oamenii ar trebui, pe bun dreptate, s lase la o parte discu iile f r sens pe aceast tem , discu ii
pe care nu le-ar purta, nici nu le-ar asculta, dac ar fi pe alte teme de interes practic. Nimeni nu
argumenteaz c arta naviga iei nu e ntemeiat pe astronomie din cauz c marinarii nu au timp
s calculeze tot Almanahul nautic. Fiind creaturi ra ionale, ei pleac pe mare cu el gata calculat;
i toate creaturile ra ionale pleac pe marea vie ii avnd deja clarificate opiniile cu privire la ceea
ce e corect sau incorect s fac n mod obinuit, ca i cu privire al multe din chestiunile, nc mai
dificile, a ceea ce e n elept, respectiv necugetat s fac . i, n m sura n care prevederea e o
calitate uman , e de presupus c ei vor continua s fac acest lucru. Orice am adopta ca principiu
fundamental al moralit ii, avem nevoie de principii subordonate cu ajutorul c rora s -l aplic m;
imposibilitatea de a-l aplica n lipsa acestora fiind comun tuturor sistemelor, ea nu reprezint un
argument mpotriva nici unuia dintre ele n mod special; dar a sus ine cu gravitate c nu am putea
avea asemenea principii secundare, ca i cum omenirea nu a tras pn acum, i nici nu va trage
vreodat , nici o concluzie general din experien a vie ii, mi se pare o culme nc neatins a
absurdului n disputele filosofice.

25 Restul argumentelor ce se aduc mpotriva utilitarismului constau, n principal, n tentative de

a-i pune n spate infirmit ile obinuite ale naturii umane i dificult ile generale care stnjenesc
persoanele oneste s -i croiasc o cale n via . Ni se spune c un utilitarist e n stare s fac din
propriul s u caz particular o excep ie de la regula moral i, sub influen a ispitei, s vad n
nc lcarea unei reguli o utilitate mai mare dect n respectarea ei. Dar este oare doctrina utilit ii
singurul crez capabil s ne furnizeze scuze pentru actele rele comise i s ne pun la dispozi ie
mijloace pentru a ne am gi propria contiin ? Dimpotriv , acestea sunt furnizate din abunden
de toate doctrinele care recunosc ca fapt existen a unor considerente conflictuale n moral i
acesta e cazul tuturor doctrinelor sus inute de persoane cu bun sim . Faptul c regulile de
conduit nu pot fi astfel alc tuite nct s exclud excep iile i c cu greu s-ar putea afirma cu
certitudine despre vreo ac iune c e ntotdeauna obligatorie sau ntotdeauna condamnabil
acest fapt nu reprezint neajunsul nici unui crez, ci al complicatei naturi a treburilor omeneti.
Nu exist nici un crez etic care s nu tempereze rigiditatea legilor sale oferind agentului o
anumit latitudine, sub rezerva propriei sale responsabilit i, n ce privete adaptarea acestor legi

19
la particularit ile mprejur rilor concrete; i, n cazul oric rui crez, odat operat aceast
deschidere, i fac apari ia autoam girea i cazurile de necinste. Nu exit sistem moral n care s
nu apar cazuri neechivoce de conflict al obliga iilor. Acestea sunt adev ratele dificult i,
punctele nclcite att ale teoriei etice ct i ale ndrum rii conduitei personale de c tre
contiin .Ele sunt dep ite practic, cu mai mult sau mai pu in succes, n func ie de capacitatea
intelectual i de virtutea fiec rui individ; dar s-ar putea cu greu sus ine c acela care posed
standardul ultim la care pot fi raportate drepturile i datoriile conflictuale va fi, prin aceasta, mai
pu in calificat s dep easc asemenea dificult i. (X: 226) Dac utilitatea e izvorul ultim al
obliga iilor morale, ea poate fi invocat pentru a decide ntre ele atunci cnd cerin ele lor sunt
incompatibile. Cu toate c aplicarea standardului se poate dovedi dificil , a-l poseda e mai bine
dect a nu avea nimic; n alte sisteme, ns , deoarece toate legile morale pretind o autoritate
independent , nu exist un arbitru comun care s intervin ntre ele; preten iile lor de prioritate
se bazeaz n cele mai multe cazuri pe sofisme i n m sura n care nu snt determinate, cum se
ntmpl n genere, de influen a nerecunoscut a considerentelor de utilitate, dau cale liber
ac iunii dorin elor personale i p rtinirilor de tot felul. Trebuie s re inem c numai n aceste
cazuri de conflict ntre principiile secundare e necesar s apel m la principiile prime. Nu exist
nici un caz de obliga ie moral n care s nu fie implicat vreun principiu secundar; iar dac m car
unul ar exista, rareori va subzista vreo ndoial real referitoare la care anume este el n mintea
oric rei persoane care recunoate principiul nsui.

20
 Journal of Mass Mr.din Ethics Copyright 1999 by
Volume 14, Number 2, pp. 69- 81 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Five Baselines for

Justification in Persuasion
By Sherry Baker
Brigham Young University
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OAframework 1s introduced cot~sistingof five baselines of ethical justification for

professional pmunsiue communications. The models (selfinterest, entitlemtwt,
enlghtened self-interest, social responsibility, and kingdom of ends) provide a
cor1ceptrd strructurtz b y which to identify and analyze the ethical reasoning,
urrdrrlyirzg ~ n s t f i c n t i o n s ,tnotivations, and declsion tnakitrg in professional
persunsivt~ practicrs (advertisir~g,public relatiotrs, nrarketlrzg). Although the
twphasis of this article 1s on defining the constructs, their ethical soundness as
justlficationfor pers~lasivepractices and their usefulness in establishing direction
ntui rrrethodologwsfor resrnrch in persuasion also are addressed.

Richard Nelson (1994) noted that professional communications lack

a "single common framework for deciding what is ethical and what is
not" (p. 225) and that the field "would do well to re-evaluate the bases
for our ethics" (p. 229). This article is a contribution toward that goal.
Literature on persuasion ethics lacks a comprehensive schema or
framework by which to capture, systematize, and analyze patterns of
thinking about an ethical justification of professional persuasive
communication practices (public relations, advertising, marketing). This
article establishes such a framework. It identifies five models or ethical
baselines for motivation, decision making, and justification in
professional persuasion. These include self-interest, entitlement,
enlightened self-interest, social responsibility, and kingdom of ends.
The models (summarized in Figure 1) combine and represent
clusters of interrelated arguments in professional and academic
discourse about persuasive communications. This article's focus is on
organizing this discourse and on defining the models (or baselines). The
structure implies that each successive baseline represents higher moral
ground than the one preceding. Some discussion, therefore, is included
about the ethical soundness and justifiability of each baseline. The
usefulness of this framework in establishing " directions and
methodologies for research in persuasion also is addressed briefly.
Self-Interest Model
A pure self-interest baseline for decision making in persuasive com-
 70 Baselines
MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
Self-Interest
1. Stonewall egolsm (Look out for number one. Mlk the cash cow for all its worth.)
2. Professional persuaders may use society for their own benefit, even if it is damaging to the
social order
3 Caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) is a morally acceptable position.
Entitlement
1. Includes all of the self-interest model assumptions (see previous)
2 The focus is on rights rather than on responsibilities
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3 All clients, legal products, and causes are entitled to professional assistance and
representation (despite moral indefensibility).
4. Professional persuaders have a right to advocate for legal products and causes, even if they
are harmful.
5. Clients and advocates have no moral responsibility for the negative effects on others that
result from their legal persuasive communications.
6. Professional communicators have a responsibility to serve their clients well despite personal
moral aversion or potential harm to individuals and society.
7 . If it's legal, it's ethical
Enlightened Self-Interest
1. One serves one's self-interest best by ethical behavior
2. Businesses d o well (financially) by doing good (ethically). Ethical behavior makes good
business sense. Doing good gives a corporation a competitive edge. Businesses should
therefore engage in good deeds and ethical behavior
3 Willingness to forego immediate benefits results in future benefits.
4 Ethical behavior will prevent government regulation
Social Responsibility
1. Recognition of the interdependency of persons in society, of persons as communal beings
2 Corporate citizens have a responsibility to the societies in which they operate and from which
they profit; they have obligations of good citizenship in contributing positively to the social,
pohtical, env~ronmental,and economic health of society.
3. Focus is on responsibilities rather than on r~ghts.
Kingdom of Ends
Individuals act as if they were members of a kingdom of ends-an ideal community in which
everyone is always moral, one in which all people are treated as ends in themselves rather
than as means to someone else's ends
Indiwduals treat others as they would wish to be treated and as others would wish to be
treated
Individuals take responsibility for the moral conduct of the organizations with which they
work.
Individuals pursue the moral ideal with dignity and integrity, despite the behavior of those
around them.
Persuasive appeals are made to the decency in people and with respect for their rights as
rational self-determining beings.
Individuals and corporations take responsibility to promote and create the kind of world and
smiety in which they themselves would like to live.
Professional communications should dignify rather than debase society. Communicators
function under the guiding maxims of a moral community engaged in the harmonious and
cooperative pursuit of the good
F~gure1. Five baselines for justification In persuasion.
 Baker 71
munications is easily defined; it is to "look out for number one" (Nelson,
1994, p. 228) and to "milk the cash cow for all its worth" (Gregson, 1994,
p. 42). It assumes a basic "stonewall egoism" (Nelson, 1994, p. 228) and
the perspective that professional persuaders may use society for their
own benefit, even if it is damaging to the social order (Martinson, 1994,
p. 105). I t assumes that caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) is a
legitimate ethical position.
Nantel and Weeks (1996) asserted that "of all the management fields,
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the field of marketing is undoubtedly that which raises the most

controversy when it comes to the question of ethics" (p. 1). Among the
ethical problems in marketing is that studies about consumers'
decisional processes have provided information that can lead to dubious
marketing practices and be used to "frame" (p. 2) or manipulate
consumers. "The understanding of the information processing
mechanisms used by consumers permits the creation of messages which
are sometimes dangerously effective" (p. 2).
In fact, the consumer is substantially in the service of the business
firm. It is to this end that advertising and merchandising in all their cost
and diversity are directed; consumer wants are shaped to the purposes
and notably to the financial interests of the firm (Nantel & Weeks, 1996).
Smith (1995) wrote that post-World War I1 growth market strategies
were subject to the simple rule of caveat emptor, within rule of law.
IF it was legal to sell a product that might be harmful or might not live up
to the seller's promises, then marketing the product was acceptable because
the decision to buy was the consumer's. The consumer was expected to
employ the maxim "buyer beware." (p. 85)
Smith (1995) said, however, that times have changed, that the current
period is an ethics era, and that standards of acceptable marketing
practices have now shifted. Similarly, Nantel and Weeks (1996) pointed
out that, although the goal of marketing is to meet the needs of
consumers, consumers are no longer content with only having their
needs met; they are now concerned with the ethics of how those needs
are met.
- -

This observation gives insight into the changing expectations of the

marketplace and the concern for ethics held by consumers. In addition
to, or aside from, an philosophical arguments that might be advanced
Y
for or against ethica egoism, the self-interest model, with its emphasis
on caveat emptor, represents assumptions about acceptable persuasion
practices increasingly not shared by the buying public.
Entitlement Model
The entitlement model incorporates all assumptions of the self-
interest model and adds the assertion of legal rights. This baseline
assumes that "everybody is entitled to present a point of view and is
 72 Baselines
entitled to professional assistance" (Seitel, 1995, p. ll), that persuasive
communications are forms of professional behavior protected by the
First Amendment, and that "if it's legal, it's ethical" (Black, 1992, p. 242).
From this point of view, the primary duty of persuasional advocates is to
"vigorously defend the client in public arenas" (Barney & Black, 1994, p.
240); "an advocate must relegate societ 's immediate interest to a
secondary position behind that of a client" 6arney & Black, 1994, p. 239).
The model assumes that a professional communicator must distribute
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the client's (or product's) message without concern for balancing

messages (Barney & Black, 1994, p. 243), must wear "the mantle of
single-minded advocate in the arena of public opinion" and not
apologize for it (Barney & Black, 1994, p. 240), and must submerge his or
her own ethical values on behalf of the client (Martinson, 1994),
"accepting any client regardless of character or conscience" (Seitel, 1995,
p. 11).
The entitlement model adopts the position that persuasive
communicators are equivalent to lawyers in advocating the cause of their
clients in an adversarial society (Barney & Black, 1994). Lawyers must
vigorously defend their clients, despite guilt or the heinousness of the
crime, because in an adversarial system, truth and justice are ultimately
best achieved through professional advocacy of all interests. Professional
persuasive advocacy is likewise valuable to society, and it is not the role
of the advocate to censure the messages that will be or should be
communicated.
There is no guarantee in the court of public opinion that adversaries will
square off . . . just as a lawyer has no obligation to be considerate of the
weaknesses of his opponents in court, so the public relations person can
clearly claim it is another's obligation to provide countering messages.
(Barney & Black, 1994, p. 241)
This legal advocacy metaphor suggests a context for professional
persuasive communications in which all organizations and individuals
(clients as well as advocates) have a right to promote legal products;
clients have a right to advocacy, no matter who they are or what they
wish to promote (within the law); and professional communicators have
not only a right to speak for and advocate all legal products and
positions but a duty to serve the client well despite any moral
indefensibility that may inhere in the client's cause. According to this
model, "ethical practitioners will, like lawyers, serve any client with
loyalty whether or not they personally subscribe to the client's position"
(Newsom, Turk, & Kruckeburg, 1996, p. 199).
Baker (in press) asserted at some length that, in the specific
application of the promotion of harmful, though legal, products and
causes (such as the marketing of cigarettes to vulnerable audiences), the
entitlement model is a morally bankrupt position. That assessment is
 Baker 73
based first on a critique of the metaphor that equates persuasive
communications with the practice of law and the attorney-client
relationship and secondly on the application of classical ethics (Kant,
Ross, Rawls, Mill, and religious ethical perspectives) and
communications-specific ethical theory (the two-way symmetrical
perspective, dialogue theory, and communitarian ethics).
In a nutshell, Baker (in press) argued with regard to the legal
persuasion metaphor and the rights-based portion of the model that
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public relations, marketing, and advertising practitioners ethically

cannot adopt the lawyer-client loyalty model because it does not
acknowledge the responsibilities professional persuasive communicators
have for their communications and for their publics. Additionally, Baker
argued the entitlement model fails as a whole as ethical theory because it
cannot meet the tests of beneficence, nonmaleficence, reversibility,
universalizability, and respect for human dignity (treating people as
ends in themselves and not as means to their own ends, and contributing
to their flourishing). Further, the model justifies exploiting the privileged
and powerful circumstances of professional communicators to their own
advantage and fails to protect vulnerable parties.
From a utilitarian perspective, the model does not maximize the
greatest good for the greatest number (in that it serves solely the
interests of the client or corporation); from a religious ethics perspective,
it does not recognize the interconnectedness of human beings, the moral
responsibility for care-taking and loving kindness of others, and
requisite concern for human well-being and the common good. Further,
Baker (in press) argued the model's effects do not benefit all parties of
the communication. It justifies monologic and self-benefiting
communications that are nonrepresentative of mutual interests, and it is
based in the protection and exploitation of individual rights rather than
in mutuality and responsibility to others in the larger community. In
essence, then, the entitlement model protects the rights and interests of
the professional persuader or the client and fails to consider basic ethical
responsibilities for the welfare of others and for the effect of one's
communications on individuals and society.
Enlightened Self-Interest Model
The essence of the enlightened self-interest position is that
businesses do well (financially) by doing good (ethically), and it is,
therefore, in their bottom-line interest to engage in good deeds and
ethical behavior. The following are some articulations of this baseline
from several different business sectors.
In a column about corporate sponsorship of community service
projects, former U S . President Jimmy Carter (1998) wrote the following:
"Many corporations have learned that investing in philanthropy attracts
 74 Baselines
concerned investors, builds brand loyalty among customers, helps
companies recruit and retain employees, [and] enhances corporate
reputations" (p. 13).
Similarly, Raiborn and Payne (1996) suggested that total quality
management (TQM) is essentially
ethical from both utilitarian and Truth and facts (for
Kantian perspectives but then
concluded that company benefits ...
clients) broadens a
business and eXbnces
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from TQM include in part "higher

profits and, thus, happy corporate reputations.
stockholders" (Raiborn & Payne,
1996, p. 970). The Economzst (1995)
reported that a particular business had set "extraordinary ethical
standards for itself" with the result that its "sales have doubled annually
the past six years and its revenue per employee is amongst the highest
anywhere" (p. 64). Sales ethics were encouraged by Roth (1995) because
it makes good business sense, and it "leads to repeat sales, cross sales,
and referral sales" (p. 48). Insurance companies were advised to give
clients truthful and factual information because it "is the best way to
broaden a business" (Ioannides, 1994, p. 64). Finnell and Fleming (1997)
said, also with regard to the insurance industry, "the focus must be on
embracing ethical behavior through the organization by adopting
business objectives that exceed industry standards of conduct" (p. 23).
Why, some might ask, would insurers want to raise performance
standards to such heights, especially in light of persistent pressures to
manage costs? The ironic conclusion is that raising standards enables
companies to focus their resources where they really belong on finding
and keeping satisfied customers. In other words, ethical sales practices are
good for business [italics added]. (Finnell & Fleming, 1997, p. 23)
In addition to the bottom-line profit rationale for ethical behavior,
the enlightened self-interest model includes the argument that ethical
behavior is necessary to preclude regulation. For example, in his article
about advertising ethics, Davidson (1996) said there are two risks in
behaving irresponsibly in advertising: the risk of "losing the goodwill of
our customers" and the risk "that we invite some sort of government
regulation" (p. 12).
Martinson (1994) has discussed enlightened self-interest in depth in
his article "Enlightened Self-Interest Fails as an Ethical Baseline in Public
Relations." He said that, although enlightened self-interest is an attempt
to rise above basic self-interest to achieve a higher ethical ground, it
remains decidedly self interested. It holds, for example, that "a
corporation doing good in the community has a competitive edge" and
that "the environmental and social improvements funded by a
corporation may result in a better climate for its business activities" (pp.
 Baker 75
100-101). This approach assumes all actions will or should result
eventually in a reward to self or corporation.
Martinson (1994) cautioned that enlightened self-interest also ignores
the social dimension of ethics, the concern for the common good. It fails
as an ethical baseline for Martinson because ethics "is about doing what
is right where others, both individually and collectively, are concerned"
(p. 106). A legitimate ethical baseline for persuasive communications,
according to Martinson, should reject self-interest and be built instead on
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respect for self and others.

Social Responsibility Model
The social responsibility model as envisioned in this framework is
separate and distinct from the enlightened self-interest model. The
distinction results from differing intentions and motivations. Although
professional and academic discourse may combine and include
self-benefitting results in discussions of social responsibility, the Social
Responsibility Model as presented here is devoid of arguments
stemming from self-interest and does not include the assumptions of the
Enlightened Self-Interest Model. This section relies on discourse about
social responsibility from the perspectives of journalism, business, and
communitarianism to arrive at the model's underlying assumptions.
Social responsibility in journalism appeals to responsibility to
community over self-interest, profit, or careerism; to social ethics over
rampant libertarian individual interests. The essence of social ethics is to
recognize that "humans are accountable to each other, interdependent
and not isolated selves" (Christians, Fackler, & Rotzoll, 1995, p. 330).
Social responsibility ethics recognizes "the human person as a communal
being" (Christians et al., 1995, p. 332). The notion of social responsibility
as an ethic for the press is expressed in the Hutchins' Commission report
of 1947 (Patterson & Wilkins, 1998, p. 189). One "cannot read far into the
writing of Hutchins commissioners" without
finding explicit reference to persons in community as a core element, an
irreducible essential. Human beings are not, in fact, autonomous and
isolated. Neither d o bonds of community submerge the person in the soup
of statism or tribalism, disallowing moral choice and replacing conscience.
Rather, "persons in community" reflects the essential social bonds that
define human life and acknowledges that persons are truly moral agents.
(Christians et al., 1995, p. 332)
Social responsibility for the press includes "a moral obligation to
consider the overall needs of society . . . personal sacrifice for the benefit
of others. . . and a stewardship toward humanity" (Lloyd, 1991, pp.
199-200). Professional communicators are responsible for loyalties to
self, profession, organization and employer, and to society, but loyalty to
society encompasses all of the others (Parsons, 1993). "Responsibility . . .
 76 Baselines
is positive, purposeful, and simultaneously social and personal . . . the
concept of social responsibility sees the press as being free for social
service" (Christians, Ferre, & Fackler, 1993, p. x).
Business ethicists pegged the beginnings of social responsibility as a
business ethic in the 1960s (Leeper, 1996; Pearson, 1989). The social
responsibility movement "implied a recognition by business that it had
an obligation to serve social needs that were not strictly economic and
that were not achieved through the economic mechanism of the free
market" (Pearson, 1989, p. 118). Social responsibility for business
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includes "producing sound products or reliable services that don't

threaten the environment and contributing positively to the social,
political, and economic health of society" (Newsom et al., 1996, p. 227).
Organizations after the social responsibility model are seen as "good
corporate citizens" (Parsons, 1993, p. 49).
The profession of public relations, according to Leeper (1996), can
realize its social responsibilities through a communitarian ethic. Leeper
wrote that companies should be concerned about "the social and
physical fabric of our world" (p. 170), they should assume stewardship
(deep accountability) for "the outcomes of an institution" (p. 171), and
they should "focus on responsibilities over rights" (p. 171) and on "the
interrelationship of the organization to the community" (p. 173).
"Cornmunitarianism would suggest that creation and support of
community must be at the base of those choices, that one has
responsibility for one's actions and for the betterment of community" (p.
173).
Based on perspectives summarized previously, the social
responsibility model in the framework proposed here assumes that
persons in society are interdependent communal beings; that corporate
citizens have a responsibility to the societies in which they operate and
from which they profit, including obligations of good citizenship in
contributing positively to the social, political, environmental, and
economic health of society; and the focus of one's actions and moral
reasoning should be on responsibilities to others and to community
rather than on one's individual rights.
Kingdom of Ends Model
The kingdom of ends is a term taken from the final formulation of
Kant's (1956) famous categorical imperative. Kant provided several
different and progressive formulations of the imperative, including the
following:
Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that
it should become a universal law.
 Baker 77
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always
at the same time as an end.
So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a
kingdom of ends. (pp. 29-35)
The concept of the kingdom of ends grows out of Kant's (1956)
theory that humans choose, rationally and autonomously, how to
behave. "There can only be one reason why human beings must obey the
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moral law, and that is that we give the law to

Act in ways ourselves" (Korsgaard, 1997, p. 23).
Kant (1956) said, "all maxims as
that others proceeding from our own making of laws
should act ought to harmonize with a possible kingdom
of ends as a kingdom of nature" (p. 36).
Autonomous and free, we create and enforce
our own laws of behavior, and are thus legislators in the kingdom of
mankind. "Each of us has a will that makes laws for itself as if for
everyone. Since human beings together legislate the moral law, we form
a moral community: A Kingdom of Ends" (Korsgaard, 1997, p. 23).
The ideal of the kingdom of ends is the "harmonization of all
autonomous wills in a systematic, harmonious community" (Liddell,
1970, p. 168). This is achievable, according to Liddell, because each
person is acting in ways in which he or she would will that all others
should act, and all acts respect the dignity and autonomy of others; it is
achievable because all rational persons acting out of good will would
conduct themselves in such a way as to create and legislate, by their own
actions, an ideal community. In the kingdom of ends, we would
always act according to a maxim which a rational being, living in a
community of rational beings, would will autonomously for the benefit of
every member in the community . . . Since everyone has duties to himself
and to others, it is the duty of everyone to harmonize the performance of
these mutually related duties. (Liddell, 1970, p. 168)
How should we behave, then, personally and professionally? "We
are always to act as if we were legislating for the Kingdom of Ends"
(Korsgaard, 1997, p. 24); as if our very acts, by the mere act of doing
them, made our maxims of behavior universal laws in the kingdom of
ends.
Kant (1956) recognized that the kingdom of ends is an ideal that may
never be fully realized because of the lack of cooperation in the actions of
others and in nature itself. However, its unattainability as a perfect state
should not dissuade us from acting as legislating members of the
kingdom of ends.
In summary, then, the defining characteristic of the kingdom of ends
as a guiding model for behavior in professional communications is that
 78 Baselines
people should always act by those maxims (laws of conduct) to which
they would want everyone to adhere if we all lived in an ideal
community, a community in which everyone always is moral, one in
which all people were treated as ends in themselves rather than as means
to someone else's ends. All professionals would behave as if they lived
within and under the guiding maxims of the kingdom of ends, "a
[moral] community engaged in the harmonious and cooperative pursuit
of the good" (Korsgaard, 1997, p. 23). It makes no difference, from the
kingdom of ends perspective, that others with whom professionals work
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and associate may not live by its maxims. Individuals still should pursue
the moral ideal. They, thus, can create a kingdom of ends within their
own sphere of conduct and influence.
Is the kingdom of ends too idealistic a baseline for behavior in
professional persuasive communications?
Puttnam (1994), former chair of Columbia Pictures, has articulated a
kingdom of ends perspective for film (movies) that is transferrable and
applicable to professional persuasive communications. He said that films
can shape imagination and culture; that "film is an art form that is
capable of uniting in peace that family of man of which we are all a
part."
A movie tinkers inside your brain. It steels up to form or confirm social
attitudes. Movies actually can help to create a healthy, informed,
concerned, and inquisitive society, or a negative, apathetic, and ignorant
one.
Puttnam (1994) discussed the reluctance of movie makers to
acknowledge responsibility for the impact of movies on society. He said
there is a kind of a conspiracy between film makers and society whereby
everyone avoids taking responsibility for the type of world we want to
live in. Movies and the media suffer from poverty of ambition fueled by
interest in the bottom line. "The creative community should be using
their talents and power to push against what is into what may be."
The media, according to Puttnam (1994), can either exploit society
without injecting any positive values, or they can present entertainment
and information that contain intrinsic values for people to gather around
and defend. Communicators are morally accountable to the society
around them. They should ask themselves the following: Who are we?
What do we want to be? Are we moving in that direction?
Audi's (Patterson & Wilkins, 1998) Principle of Sincerity for advocacy
and advertising is a test for decision making that also would operate
comfortably within the kingdom of ends. It requires practitioners to ask
themselves the following questions:
First, is there a sincere need for this particular product within the range of
products and services available? Second, are the reasons given the
consumer for purchasing the product presented in a way that would also
 Baker 74
motivate the person who developed and wrote the ad? (Patterson &
Wilkins, 1998, p. 62.)
The test of sincerit goes beyond the social responsibility model as a
l
rule for governing be avior in advertising. It can be understood within
the Kantian perspective to suggest that, in the kingdom of ends, one
would not promote products and services for which there is no
legitimate need, that would serve no legitimate purpose, or from which
members of the community would not benefit. Further, the test of
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sincerity requires that professional communicators should use only

persuasive methods and arguments that, if directed toward themselves,
would seem legitimate.
Both Puttnam (1994) and Audi (Patterson & Wilkins, 1998) suggest
that, through ethical behavior, communications professionals can begin
to create the kind of world in which they would wish to live in part by
appealing to the rationality and to the better instincts of readers,
listeners, viewers, and target audiences.
Directions for Research
This article suggested a framework comprised of five ethical
baselines or models from which professional persuasive communications
can be justified and from which decisions can be motivated. The models
were defined and discussed, and distinctions were drawn between and
among them.
This framework allows conceptual clarity both about differing
motivations that underlie action in professional persuasive
communication and differing grounds or baselines from which action is
justified. The framework also suggests directions for philosophical
inquiry and ethics-based research for purposes of analysis, evaluation,
and assessment of decision making, moral reasoning, and public and
private justification of behavior. The following brief discussion suggests
possible research directions.
The models might be used to analyze arguments and behaviors and
as the foundation from which to establish qualitative and quantitative
methodologies for assessment. Such tested assessment methods would
be useful, for example, in measuring growth in moral reasoning among
students in ethics classes and others who have received ethical training
in professional persuasive communications.
One area of inquiry might be to explore if and how the baselines
correspond to standard measures of moral reasoning, such as the
Defining Issues Test (DIT). The DIT (Rest & Navarez. 1994) is a
computer-scored test, based on Kohlberg's work, that assesses
participants' stages of moral reasoning (Rest & Narvaez, 1994). Rest and
Narvaez outlined "a complete program of research" in ethics based on
the DIT. Their program is "organized around four themes":
 80 Baselines
(a) describing moral reasoning with existing instruments; (b) discussing
ideas for more effective educational interventions; (c) developing new
measures for moral psychology; and (d) linking judgment to behavior. (p.
213.)
The framework of this article may be developed as a profession-
specific instrument for moral deliberation and development that would
adapt to all of the research directions suggested by Rest and Narvaez
(1994; some already reflected in the topics discussed previously).
The framework itself might also be of value as a point from which to
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explore related philosophical questions and issues. For example, is there

an underlying principle of classification from which the baselines are
derived? How do these baselines relate to the canon of ethical
perspectives most frequently referred to in media and communications
ethics literature? How, for example, does Gilligan's (1993) ethic of care
(with its emphasis on nonviolence and reciprocity) fit into the
framework? What statements can be made about the relative value and
ethical defensibility of each of the models and of the arguments and
behaviors that are based in the models? What arguments or evidence, if
any, can be advanced to establish that one baseline is morally superior to
another, as the framework itself seems to suggest? Can it be asserted that
any one of the models is the most appropriate default position for
professional persuasive communications?
References
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justification of marketing practices. Research in Marketing.
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communications. Public Relations Review, 20, 233-248.
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communication: A guide to better instruction (pp. 235253). New York: Praeger.
Carter, J. (1998, February 24). Corporations can help ease human suffering. The
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Christians, C., Fackler, M., & Rotzoll, K. (1995). Media ethics: Cases and moral
reasoning (4th ed.). New York: Longman.
Christians, C., Ferre, J., & Fackler, P. (1993). Good news: Social ethics 6 the press.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, K. (1996, September 23). When does creativity become deception?
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Gregson, J. (1994, September). The good, the bad, and the ugly. Management
Today, pp. 38-42.
Ioannides, K. (1994). Knowing what's wrong leads to what's right. Best's review:
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Korsgaard, C. (1997). Creating the kingdom of ends. Cambridge, England:
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Leeper, K. (1996). Public relations ethics and communitarianism: A preliminary
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investigation. Public Relations Review, 22, 163-179.

Liddell, B. (1970). Kant on the foundation of morality: A modern version of the
Grundlegung. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Lloyd, S. (1991). A criticism of social responsibility theory: An ethical
perspective. Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 6, 199-209.
Martinson, D. (1994). Enlightened self-interest fails as a n ethical baseline in
public relations. lournal ofMass Media Ethics, 9,100-108.
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utilitarian approach? European lournal of Marketing, 30(5), 9(11). Retrieved
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Nelson, R. (1994). Issues communication and advocacy: Contemporary ethical
challenges. Public Relations Review, 20,225-231.
Newsom, D., Turk, J., & Kruckeberg, D. (1996). This is PR: The realities of public
relations. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
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Review, 1 (9), pp. 49-57.
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McGraw Hill.
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practice and the idea of dialogue. In C. Botan & V. Hazleton, (Eds.), Public
relations theory (pp. 111-131). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Inc.
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Hollywood's role in shaping values [Video]. (Available from Films for the
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1-800-257-5126)
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Business Ethics, 15,963-972.
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applied ethics. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
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Chief executive (U.S.) 107, 46-50. Retrieved January 12, 1998 from the World
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Copyright 2001, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Public Relations Ethics:

Contrasting Models from the
Rhetorics of Plato, Aristotle,
and Isocrates
Charles W. Marsh Jr.
University of Kansas

o As a relatively young profession, public relations seeks a realistic ethics founda-

tion. A continuing debate in public relations has pitted journalistic/objectivity ethics
against the advocacy ethics that may be more appropriate in an adversarial society. As
the journalistic/objectivity influence has waned, the debate has evolved, pitting the
advocacy/adversarial foundation against the two-way symmetrical model of public
relations, which seeks to build consensus and holds that an organization itself, not an
opposing public, sometimes may need to change to build a productive relationship.
A similar battle between adversarial advocacy and symmetry occurred during the
emergence of rhetoric in the Athens of the 4th century B.C. Plato and Aristotle favored
adversarial/advocacy rhetoric, whereas Isocrates favored a symmetrical rhetoric. Four
criteria of comparison of those rhetorics are examined: success of the respective
schools, success of the respective graduates, the evaluation of later Roman rhetori-
cians, and the impact on the future of education. History shows that Isocratess sym-
metrical rhetoric clearly was more effective than its adversarial/advocacy rivals.
Recent studies of the two-way symmetrical model concur, indicating that it may well
be the most effective foundation for public relations ethics.

The significance of a study of rhetoric in Athens is not entirely historical.

However indifferent we may be to Protagoras and Gorgias, we live in a world
of journalists, publicists, advertisers, politicians, diplomats, propagandists,
reformers, educators, salesmen, preachers, lecturers, and popularizers.

E. L. Hunt (1925/1990, p. 161)

One can hardly get through a single day without being exposed dozens of
times to some form of persuasive discourse, the main concern of rhetoric. It is
not too much to claim that rhetoric is the art that governs those human rela-
tionships that are conducted in the medium of spoken and written words.

Corbett (1984/1990b, p. 164)

Marsh 79

Although critics sometimes compare public relations to the oldest pro-

fession, it is, in fact, relatively young. The Publicity Bureau, considered the
first ancestor of modern public relations agencies, opened in 1900 (Cutlip,
1994). In 1923, Edward Bernays and Doris Fleischman first used the term
public relations to describe their fledgling business (Bernays, 1965). The ear-
liest incarnation of the modern Public Relations Society of America was the
National Association of Publicity Directors, founded in 1936 (Cutlip, 1994).
Compared with journalism and advertising, the relative youth of public
relations can be seen in its struggle to define itself. Before offering his own
definition of the profession, Harlow (1976) found and studied almost 500
definitions of public relations. Small wonder, then, that public relations
also wrestles with professional ethics. The Public Relations Society of
America adopted its first Code of Professional Standards in 1950 (Guth &
Marsh, 2000). However, neither that code nor the ethics code of the Interna-
tional Association of Business Communicators (IABC), founded in 1970,
has stilled a continuing debate over the development of a specifically pub-
lic relations ethical philosophy (McBride, 1989, p. 5).
In this article I review the current debate over foundations for public re-
lations ethics. More important, in hopes of offering a solution, I examine a
similar controversy over the emerging art of rhetoric in Athens in the 4th
century B.C.

Definition of Terms
Harlows (1976) near 500 definitions suggest the difficulty of defining
public relations. In this article, I use a recent, succinct summary of several
definitions: Public relations is the management of relationships between
an organization and its publics (Guth & Marsh, 2000, p. 10). Hunt and
Grunig (1994) identified four models of such management:

The press agentry/publicity model, which focuses on gaining favorable

media coverage by fair or foul means.
The public information model, which focuses on the dissemination of
objective, accurate information to parties that request it.
The two-way asymmetrical model, which focuses on researching tar-
geted publics to gain compliance from them.
The two-way symmetrical model, defined later in this section.

In 1992, the IABC Research Foundation, after a 7-year study, concluded

that the most effective model of public relationsthat is, the model that
best advanced organizations toward their expressed goalswas two-way
symmetrical public relations (J. E. Grunig & Grunig, 1992). The foundation
provided this definition for the model:
80 Public Relations Ethics

Two-way symmetrical describes a model of public relations that is based on re-

search and that uses communication to manage conflict and improve under-
standing with strategic publics(J. E. Grunig, 1992, p. 18). With the
symmetrical model, both the organization and the publics can be persuaded;
both also may change their behavior. (J. E. Grunig & White, 1992, p. 39)

Unlike the other models of public relations, two-way symmetry seeks

winwin relationships and incorporates the willingness of an organization
to change to nurture an important relationship.
Like the phrase public relations, the term rhetoric eludes easy definition.
In addressing the significant diversity among different rhetorics, Miller
(1993) declared, We can start by admitting that the rhetorical tradition is a
fiction, and a rather strained one at that (p. 27). Therefore, in this article I
define rhetoric broadly. According to Corbett (1990a), rhetoric is the art or
the discipline that deals with the use of discourse, either spoken or written,
to inform or persuade or motivate an audience, whether that audience is
made up of one person or a group of persons (p. 3). Such a definition fits
well with the four models of public relations.

Review of Literature
Perhaps the clearest early statement of the continuing debate over
the development of a specifically public relations ethical philosophy
(McBride, 1989, p. 5). McBride contrasted public relations dominant yet
dysfunctional (p. 5) adherence to journalistic ethics with Bernayss al-
ternative ethic drawing from more similar professions of paid advo-
cates(p. 15). Because the journalistic ethic means disregarding the
consequences of communications (p. 10), McBride championed Bernays
advocacy foundation, which offers more promise for ethical progress
(p. 6).
The beginnings of the decline of the journalism/objectivity foundation
can be seen in a Wetherell (1989) study that found that although the jour-
nalism-inspired public information model was the second most-practiced
model (behind, unfortunately, press agentry), it ranked last in order of
preference among practitioners (J. E. Grunig & Grunig, 1992). Despite its
decline, however, the journalism/objectivity foundation persists largely
for two reasons:

Veneration for Ivy Lees 1906 Declaration of Principles (Guth &

Marsh, 2000), in which Lee pledged to supply the press and the public of
the United States prompt and accurate information(p. 64). Olasky (1987),
among others, noted the irony of the profound impact of the declaration de-
spite Lees many deviations from even a moderately strict interpretation of
his own words.
Marsh 81

The location of public relations programs within schools of journal-

ism, some of which have added a course or two to existing sequences in
journalism and advertise them as bona fide programs in public relations
(Ehling, 1992, p. 457).

The seminal application of the advocacy foundation is Barney and

Blacks (1994) Ethics and Professional Persuasive Communication. Bar-
ney and Black (1994) held that persuasive communication functions in an
adversarial society that, although it cannot condone untruths, must accept
the delivery of selective truths by public relations practitioners:

An adversarial society assumes that spokespersons with alternative views

will emerge to balance the advocate. If that doesnt work, some will argue the
journalist or some other consumer advocate, motivated by an objectivity and
stewardship ethic, will assure some balance in the public messages.
The reality is that there is no guarantee in the court of public opinion that
adversaries will square off. Yet, just as a lawyer has no obligation to be consid-
erate of the weaknesses of his opponents in court, so the public relations per-
son can clearly claim it is anothers obligation to provide countering
messages.
In an adversary society, truth is not so important as the obligation of oppos-
ing counsel to create scenarios that conflict with those of their opponents. (pp.
241, 244)

Five years later, Barney and Black (1999) still classified public relations
practitioners as an adversary group (p. 67) and concluded that persua-
sion needs a body of moral discussion that will provide the moral founda-
tion on which realistic persuasion ethics structures can be built (p. 67).
More recently, Guth and Marsh (2000) rejected the objectivity/advocacy
bifurcation and called the conflict a misleading ethics debate (p. 167):

The entire objectivity-versus-advocacy debate seems to be based on a mis-

leading question: Are public relations practitioners objective communicators
or are they advocates? What if the answer is none of the above? Many prac-
titioners respond to the debate by saying that public relations practitioners
are, first and foremost, relationship builders. Sometimes relationship
building calls for delivering unpopular truths, either to a public or to the orga-
nization itself. And sometimes relationship building involves being an advo-
cateeven if that means advocating the viewpoint of an important public
within your own organization. (pp. 170171)

Guth and Marsh viewed this neither/nor-both/and approach as being

the most consistent with two-way symmetrical public relations (p. 169).
Indeed, an increasing focus on communitarianism within public rela-
tions is shifting the debate from journalism/objectivity versus advocacy to
82 Public Relations Ethics

two-way symmetry versus advocacyor, better said, two-way symmetry

versus two-way asymmetry. Kruckeberg and Starck (1988) clearly rejected
asymmetry in their communitarian view of public relations:

Our theory is that public relations is better defined and practiced as the active
attempt to restore and maintain a sense of community. Only with this goal as a
primary objective can public relations become a full partner in the informa-
tion and communication milieu that forms the lifeblood of U.S. society and, to
a growing extent, the world. (p. xi)

K. A. Leeper (1996) added that businesses increasing focus on quality,

social responsibility, and stewardship (p. 163) argued for a communi-
tarian foundation for public relations ethics. Finally, Culbertson and Chen
(1997) demonstrated that communitarian public relations is a form of the
two-way symmetrical model. Although not directly a communitarian phi-
losophy, Habermas discourse ethics have been offered as a foundation for
public relations ethics (J. E. Grunig & White, 1992; R. Leeper, 1996) and
have been shown to be closely linked to the two-way symmetrical model
(R. Leeper, 1996).
With the IABC Research Foundations endorsement of the idealistic so-
cial role (J. E. Grunig & White, 1992, p. 53) as a foundation for effective
public relations, the debate in public relations ethics clearly has shifted
from an analysis of the merits of journalistic objectivity to a comparison of
the relative merits of advocacy/asymmetry and symmetry.
Baker (1999) offered a five-level schema to capture, systematize, and ana-
lyze patterns of thinking about an ethical justification of professional persuasive
communication practices (public relations, advertising, marketing) (p. 69):

Self-interest model: Look out for number one. Professional per-

suaders may use society for their own benefit, even if it is damaging to the
social order (p. 70). In the argot of public relations, this is an asymmetrical
model.
Entitlement model: If its legal, its ethical. The focus is on rights
rather than responsibilities (p. 70). Again, in public relations, this would
be an asymmetrical model. Baker places Barney and Blacks (1994) advo-
cacy/adversarial society foundation in this model.
Enlightened self-interest model: One serves ones self-interest by ethi-
cal behavior. Businesses do well (financially) by doing good (ethically)
(p. 70). This is a symmetrical public relations model.
Social responsibility model: Focus is on responsibilities rather than
rights. Corporate citizens have a responsibility to the societies in which
they operate and from which they profit (p. 70). In public relations, this is
a symmetrical model.
Marsh 83

Kingdom of ends model: With this models name taken from Kants cat-
egorical imperative,

Individuals and corporations take responsibility to promote and create the

kind of world and society in which they themselves would like to live. Indi-
viduals treat others as they would wish to be treated and as others would
wish to be treated. (p. 70)

This, of course, is a symmetrical public relations model.

Baker (1999) concluded with a call for additional research: One area of
inquiry might be to explore if and how the [five] baselines correspond to
standard measures of moral reasoning (p. 79).

Statement of Purpose
Given this uncertainty over ethical foundationspart of what Pearson
(1992) called the confusing and contradictory present of public rela-
tionsin this article I examine a similar debate over the nature of rhetoric
in 4th-century B.C. Athens. I particularly examine advocacy/adversarial/
asymmetrical rhetoric versus symmetrical/relationship-building rhetoric
with the aim of seeing which ethical foundation fared better.

Classical Rhetorics
Search for an Ethical Foundation
A glib response to public relations search for a resolution of the advo-
cacy-versus-symmetry debate would be to say that time will tell. But per-
haps time already has told. The Athens of Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates
(400300 B.C.) wrestled with developing an acceptable ethical framework
for a new art of discourse called rhetoric. The comparison is not farfetched:
Public relations scholars have long recognized the debt of public relations
to Greek rhetoric. In his history of public relations, Cutlip (1994) held that
persuasive communication is as old as Platos Republic (p. xi). L. A.
Grunig (1992) noted that Aristotle is often considered the first public rela-
tions practitioner (p. 68). In his college textbook The Practice of Public Rela-
tions, Seitel (1998) wrote that the ethical quandaries of public relations may
well have begun with the practice of Greek rhetoric in the 5th century B.C.
(pp. 2526).
Rhetoric was born and flourished in a relentlessly adversarial society. In
the decades just before Isocratess birth in 436 B.C., the city-states of Greece
had united in the Delian League to counter the continual threat from Per-
sia. The internal squabbles and rivalries that undermined the Delian
League led to the Peloponnesian War, which paralleled the first third of
84 Public Relations Ethics

Isocratess life. That war, in turn, led to the reemergence of Persia as a

threat, which ended only when Philip of Macedonia, the father of Alexan-
der the Great, united Greece through conquestdefeating even Athens in
338 B.C., the year of Isocratess death. Within Athens itself, Socrates and
his student Plato were refining the truth-seeking method known as dialec-
tic, a rigorous form of argumentative dialogue between experts (Bizzell
& Herzberg, 1990, p. 29). Even philosophical truths, it seemed, required ad-
versarial relationshipswhich could, indeed, become dangerous. At the
conclusion of Platos dialectical Gorgias (trans. 1925/1975), Callicles
scarcely disguised his threats that accurately forecast the trial and execu-
tion of his opponent, Socrates. Half a century later, Aristotle left Athens for
a decade to avoid a similar fate. The search for an ethical foundation for
rhetoric thus transpired in a decidedly adversarial society.
In his Phaedrus, Plato (trans. 1914/1928) foreshadowed Bakers (1999)
analysis of ethical foundations by outlining three models of rhetoric. In his
earlier Gorgias (trans. 1925/1975), Plato bitterly attacked rhetoric for its im-
morality, for its being some device of persuasion which will make one ap-
pear to those who do not know to know better than those who know
(459C). In the Phaedrus (Plato, trans. 1914/1928), however, Plato offers an
ethical framework for an acceptable rhetoric. Ostensibly about lovers, the
three speeches in the Phaedrus establish, as shown by Weaver (1953), three
possible ethical frameworks for rhetoric: What Plato has succeeded in do-
ing in this dialogue is to give us embodiments of the three types of dis-
course. These are respectively the non-lover, the evil lover, and the noble
lover (p. 6).

The non-lover model: This ironic model is introduced when Socrates

repeats a speech by Lysias, who maintains that the best lover is one who
does not actually love his partner. Therefore, his actions (the lovers of the
dialogue were exclusively male) are disinterested; the relationship is not
worth striving for. Weaver (1953) maintained that Plato equates this rela-
tionship to semantically purified speech that communicates abstract in-
telligence without impulsion. It is a simple instrumentality, showing no
affection for the object of its symbolizing and incapable of inducing bias in
the hearer (p. 7).
This model corresponds to the public information model of public rela-
tions, in which organizations deliver objective information to publics that
request it. The organization makes no other attempt at relationship build-
ing; thus, the model is often ineffective for public relations. Platos Socrates
is so ashamed of repeating a speech that denies the holiness of human rela-
tionships that he covers his head as he speaks the words. Plato clearly re-
jects the disinterested non-lover model as an ethical foundation for
rhetoric.
Marsh 85

The evil-lover model: This model encompasses the rhetoric that Plato
condemned in the Gorgias. The evil lover, Weaver (1953) wrote, creates a
relationship in which he seeks superiority:

He naturally therefore tries to make the beloved inferior to himself in every

respect. He is pleased if the beloved has intellectual limitations because they
have the effect of making him manageable. In brief, the lover is not moti-
vated by benevolence toward the beloved, but by selfish appetite. The
speech is on the single theme of exploitation. (pp. 1011)

The evil lover, Weaver (1953)

wrote, creates a relationship in
which he seeks superiority.

This is the two-way asymmetrical form of rhetoric, a form that promotes

advocacy and selective truth. Weaver concluded, This is what we shall call
base rhetoric because its end is the exploitation which Socrates has been
condemning (p. 11).
The noble-lover model: This, of course, is the model that Plato offers as
the framework for an ethical rhetoric. The noble lover strives to improve his
beloved. In the words of Plato (trans. 1914/1928), noble lovers exhibit no
jealousy or meanness toward the loved one, but endeavour by every means
in their power to lead him to the likeness of the god whom they honor
(253C).

As we shall see, Plato accepted the noble-lover model, with, perhaps,

surprising results. Aristotle rejected the noble-lover model in favor of the
evil-lover model. Isocrates rejected the solutions of both of his contempo-
raries, opting instead for a new definition of the noble-lover model.

Three Schools of Athenian Rhetoric

Though a proliferation of sophists in Athens from 500 B.C. to 300 B.C.
meant a proliferation of different rhetorics, at the height of rhetorical stud-
ies in the 4th century B.C. there were three main schools: that of Isocrates,
founded in 393 B.C.; that of Plato, founded in 385 B.C.; and that of Aris-
totle, founded in 335 B.C. Aristotle earlier taught rhetoric in Platos Acad-
emy (Welch, 1990, p. 127). Isocrates (436338 B.C.) lived long enough to
joust with each of his great competitors. Each, as Clark (1957) noted, taught
a profoundly different kind of rhetoric:
86 Public Relations Ethics

From the beginning, there were three characteristic and divergent views on
rhetoric. There was the moral philosophical view of Plato. There was the
philosophical scientific view of Aristotle, who tried to see the thing as in itself
it really was, who endeavored to devise a theory of rhetoric without moral
praise or blame for it. There was, finally, the practical educational view of the
rhetoricians from Isocrates to Cicero to Quintilian. (pp. 2425)

A brief expansion of Clarks assessment will underscore the profound

differences among the three rhetorics.

Platonic Rhetoric
As seen in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, Plato rejected rhetoric unless
it was in the service of absolute truth. Rhetoric, he believed, should be
the exclusive province of philosophers who, through dialectic, had dis-
covered divine, ultimate truths that predated creation (Kauffman, 1982/
1994). The enlightened few were then to use rhetoric to lead the unen-
lightened masses toward those truthsmuch as the wise, experienced,
noble lover was to lead his young protg to the likeness of the god
whom they honor (Plato, trans. 1914/1928, 253C). Two problems with
Platonic rhetoric, however, have impeded its progress over time: the
near impossibility of ascertaining absolute truth and the rhetorics ag-
gressive intolerance of opposing viewpoints.
Platos insistence on unshakable knowledge of absolute truth as a pre-
requisite to rhetoric is, in the words of Jaeger (1944), repulsive to ordinary
common sense (p. 57). Indeed, in the Gorgias (Plato, trans. 1925/1975,
503B), Socrates can name no one, past or present, capable of such insights,
though Plato surely thought both himself and Socrates to be such worthies.
E. L. Hunt (1925/1990) concluded, The ideal rhetoric sketched in the
Phaedrus is as far from the possibilities of mankind as [Platos] Republic
was from Athens (p. 149).
Platos intolerance of dissent has drawn far more critical fire than his
demand for knowledge of absolute truth. Plato is one of the most dan-
gerous writers in human history, responsible for much of the dogma-
tism, intolerance, and ideological oppression that has characterized
Western history, wrote Kennedy (1994, p. 41). Because the Platonic phi-
losopher had, through dialectic, gained knowledge of absolute truth, dis-
senting opinions were worse than irrelevant; they were dangerous and
were to be quashed. Kauffman (1982/1994) labeled Platonic rhetoric to-
talitarian and repressive (p. 101), and Black (1958/1994) maintained that
it is a form of social control (p. 98). E. L. Hunt (1925/1990) concluded
that although Platonic rhetoric promoted goodness, it was goodness as
Plato conceived it (p. 133).
Marsh 87

Two millennia of critical response, thus, have found Platonic rhetoric to

be based on an impossible prerequisite and to be dangerously asymmetri-
cal. Apart from his categorization of the possible moral foundations for
rhetoric, Platos greatest contribution to persuasive discourse may have
been forcing Aristotle and Isocrates to define and refine reactionary,
real-world rhetorics.

Aristotelian Rhetoric
Aristotle, of course, was Platos student. He heard his masters ideas on
rhetoric, rejected the absolute truth foundation, and became, which may
initially be surprising, the greatest proponent of evil-lover rhetoricin
other words, of the asymmetrical, adversarial, selective truth discourse
that Barney and Black (1994) offered as a logical foundation for modern
public relations. Aristotles (trans. 1954) rejection of the noble-lover frame-
work is immediately apparent in his definition of rhetoric: Rhetoric may
be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means
of persuasion (1355b). Rhetoric, therefore, is not the tool of absolute truth;
it is for persuasion in any given case. Kennedy (1994) explained this
amoral rhetoric by comparing it to Aristotles dispassionate analyses of
plants and animals (p. 56). For Aristotle, rhetoric was simply another topic
for his fertile mind to analyze, organize, and put to use.

Rhetoric may be defined as the

faculty of observing in any given
case the available means of
persuasion (1355b).

Aristotles greatest distance from Platonic rhetoric, and his clearest em-
brace of the evil-lover model, came in his discussions of using deception to
lead an audience to a conclusion that may not be true and may not be so-
cially beneficial. This, indeed, goes beyond selective truth into absolute
falsehood. For example, Aristotle (trans. 1954) taught that ethos, the belief-
inducing character of the speaker, need exist only in the speechnot, nec-
essarily, in reality (1356a). Logos, strategic appeals to the audiences intel-
lect, can include wanton falsification in epideictic [ceremonial] speeches
(Wardy, 1996, p. 80). Pathos, strategic appeals to an audiences emotions,
also can favor appearance over reality:

The aptness of language is one thing that makes people believe in the truth of
your story: their minds draw the false conclusion that you are to be trusted
88 Public Relations Ethics

from the fact that others behave as you do when things are as you describe
them; and therefore they take your story to be true, whether it is so or not. (Ar-
istotle, trans. 1954, 1408a)

Wardy (1996) labeled this last deception a rampant instance of Platos

worst nightmare (p. 79)of rhetoric in the service not of absolute truth,
but of falsehood.
Aristotles analytical amorality was not lost on Cicero (trans. 1990), who, in
De Oratore, had Crassus wonder if orators truly are capable in Aristotelian
fashion to speak on both sides about every subject and by means of knowing
Aristotles rules to reel off two speeches on opposites sides on every case ( iii,
21). E. L. Hunt (1925/1990) noted that in On Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle
classified logical fallacies with the purpose of enabling the rhetorician to
better use them (p. 157). Like Kennedy (1994), E. L. Hunt concluded, Aris-
totles was a scientific and not a moral earnestness. He is concerned with
rhetorical effectiveness and not with moral justifiability (p. 156).

Isocratean Rhetoric
Gwynn (1926/1966) wrote of the radical contrast between the ideals of
Plato and Aristotle, and the ideal expressed by Isocrates (p. 48). The dif-
ferences between Isocratean rhetoric and the rhetorics of his great contem-
poraries are, indeed, striking. Isocrates clearly rejected Platos non-lover
and evil-lover models, but instead of opting for the remaining version of
the noble lover, he crafted a new definition of that third category, one that
is much more symmetrical than Platos uncompromising (Jaeger, 1944,
p. 70) rhetoric. Gillis (1969) maintained that Against the Sophists, Isocrates
first articulation of his schools philosophy, is a declaration of war, noth-
ing less (p. 321) against rhetoric designed to win cases, not necessarily to
serve the truth (p. 329). According to Poulakos (1997), Isocratean rhetoric
is a rhetoric of unification (p. xii); Isocrates made a concerted effort to
dissociate manipulative rhetoric from his educational program (p. 24).
Isocratess (trans. 19281945/19861992) distance from Plato can be
seen in his disbelief, as stated in the Antidosis, in the possibility of discover-
ing absolute truth:

For since it is not in the nature of man to attain a science by the possession of
which we can know positively what we should do or what we should say, in
the next resort I hold that man to be wise who is able by his own powers of
conjecture to arrive generally at the best course. (271)

Because Isocratean rhetoricians seek unification and consensusand

because they cannot be certain of a divinely ordained best course of ac-
tionthey consider the interests and arguments of others in a debate.
Marsh 89

Isocrates (trans. 19281945/19861992) clearly did so in his letter To the

Children of Jason: I myself should be ashamed if, while offering counsel to
others, I should be negligent of their interests and look to my own advan-
tage (p. 14). This clearly is not the asymmetrical, totalitarian rhetoric of
Platos noble lover.
Isocrates distance from Aristotle can best be seen in his concept of
ethos. Although Aristotle, again, believed that only the appearance of
character created during the speech mattered, Isocrates (trans. 19281945/
19861992), in the Antidosis, took a much more comprehensive view:

The man who wishes to persuade people will not be negligent as to the matter
of character; no, on the contrary, he will apply himself above all to establish a
most honourable name among his fellow-citizens; for who does not know
that words carry greater conviction when spoken by men of good repute than
when spoken by men who live under a cloud, and that the argument which is
made by a mans life is of more weight than that which is furnished by words?
Therefore, the stronger a mans desire to persuade his hearers, the more zeal-
ously will he strive to be honourable and to have the esteem of his fellow citi-
zens. (278)

Far from being an adversarial evil lover whose sole motivation in study-
ing rhetoric is to find the successful means of persuasion, the Isocratean
rhetorician seeks to attain goals by building relationships in which both
parties win. As Castle (1961) summarized

[Isocratess] aim was to discover a new ideal that would inform the study of
rhetoric with moral purpose and at the same time preserve its practical rele-
vance to political action. For Isocrates rhetoric is a culture of the mind; it is
the poetry of the political world, through whose study men are made better
men by a humane and general culture (paideia). (pp. 5657)

Castles (1961) focus on practical relevance to political action (p. 56) is

important, for Isocrates was not a wishful idealist who believed a deferen-
tial decency would triumph in all disputes. Instead, Isocrates reinvented
Platos noble lover, crafting a moral, symmetrical, practical rhetoric for the
rough-and-tumble world of Athenian and Greek politics. Kennedy (1963)
noted that Isocrates wove morality into the fabric of broader rhetorical
strategies:

Sharp focus on a single argument and especially argument from expediency

is apparently characteristic of fifth-century deliberative oratory. Toward the
end of the century it began to be abandoned in favor of a synthesis of argu-
ments. In no Greek orator is moral synthesis of arguments so much devel-
oped as in Isocrates. (p. 183)
90 Public Relations Ethics

Isocrates motivation to infuse rhetoric with morality may have been his
realization, born of enlightened self-interest, of the persuasive value of true
integrity (Welch, 1990, p. 123). Whatever his motivation, however, the re-
sults of his philosophy are clear and dramatic: As Marrou (1956) declared,
In the hands of Isocrates rhetoric is gradually transformed into ethics (p.
89).
If it still seems that Isocratean morality (and consequently this article)
strays too far from the grim realties of persuasion in a volatile, adversarial
environment, we must remember that during Isocratess life Athens con-
stantly battled external enemies and that, internally, bitter litigation was vir-
tually a way of life. Isocrates began his career in rhetoric as a speechwriter for
litigants. His Antidosis, the clearest statement of his philosophy of rhetoric,
begins with a fictionalized response to a real lawsuit that he lost. The word
antagonist, in fact comes to English from Greek, with its root of agon, or con-
flict. Isocratess great English translator, George Norlin (Isocrates, 1925
1945/1991), consistently lauded his subjects unwavering devotion to mo-
rality in rhetoricyet Norlin also asserted that Isocratean rhetoric effec-
tively functioned in the turbulence of Athenian society: [Isocrates] was in
reality a political pamphleteer, and has been called the first great publicist of
all time. By almost all accounts, Isocrates developed a moral, functional
rhetoric. However, compared with the competing rhetorics of Plato and Ar-
istotle, how did it fare in what Burke (1969) more recently called the Wran-
gle of the Marketplace (p. 23)?

The Triumph of Isocratean Rhetoric

My challenge now is to compare the relative, respective effectiveness of
the rhetorics of Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates. My questions, in brief, are
these: In the adversarial society of 4th-century B.C. Athens, did one of
these unique rhetorics outperform the others? And, if so, which: one of the
asymmetrical rhetorics of Plato and Aristotle or the symmetrical rhetoric
of Isocrates? Although no established criteria for such a comparison exist,
it seems logical to compare them by what they have in common:

A school with, consequently, a reputation.

Graduates of the schools.
The evaluation of classical Roman rhetoricians, who could survey
the whole of classical Greek rhetoric.
The possibility of shaping future (post 4th-century B.C.) education.

These four criteria do not, of course, directly measure the success of

symmetry versus asymmetry. However, as the scholars cited previously
Gillis (1969), Poulakos (1997), Castle (1961), Kennedy (1963), and Marrou
Marsh 91

(1956)noted, symmetry infuses Isocratean rhetoric; any triumph of

Isocratean rhetoric is de facto a triumph of symmetry. However, because
we cannot directly measure the success of symmetry or asymmetry per se,
we are left to measure what we can: the more concrete embodiments of the
competing rhetorical philosophies such as schools, graduates, and the
written opinions of Roman rhetoricians and modern historians.

The Schools
Following the lead of Cicero (trans. 1878/1970), who in the Brutus pro-
nounced, [Isocratess] house stood open to all Greece as the school of elo-
quence (8), historians have given the laurels in this category to Isocrates.
Of the three schools, Clark (1957) wrote

In Greece of the fourth century B.C. there was a three-cornered quarrel among
the leading teachers concerning what it takes to make a successful speaker.
From this quarrel Isocrates (436338 B.C.) came out triumphant. For forty
years Isocrates was the most influential teacher in Athens. (pp. 5, 58)

Ample critical commentary supports Clarks judgment. Freeman (1907)

asserted that Isokrates was [rhetorics] greatest professor (p. 161). Gwynn
(1926/1966) said that Isocrates reigned high above other teachers of rheto-
ric (p. 48). Isocratess reputation among students outstripped that of Plato (E.
L. Hunt, 1925/1990, p. 147) as well as that of Aristotle (Corbett, 1990b, p.
167).
Venerated as Platos fabled Academy may be, scholars of higher educa-
tion generally agree that Isocrates school was more influential in ancient
Athens than the Academy. Marrou (1956), who clearly felt more loyalty to
Plato (p. 79), grudgingly conceded

There is no doubt that Isocrates has one claim to fame at least, and that is as the
supreme master of oratorical culture. On the whole, it was Isocrates, not
Plato, who educated fourth-century Greece and subsequently the Hellenistic
and Roman worlds. (p. 79)

Significantly, Beck (1964, p. 300) and Gwynn (1926/1966) believed that

the success of Isocratean education and rhetoric ultimately persuaded
Plato to alter both his philosophy of rhetoric and of an ideal, truth-seeking
curriculum. Gwynn (1926/1966)wrote

In the Laws, his last attempt to win Athenian opinion for his social and politi-
cal theories, Plato outlines a programme of educational studies very different
from the earlier programme of the Republic. Metaphysics are no longer men-
tioned; and the study of mathematics is reduced to that elementary acquain-
92 Public Relations Ethics

tance with abstract reasoning which even Isocrates would have considered
desirable. This is a direct concession to public opinion, made by the most
haughtily aristocratic of all Athenian philosophers: a concession, too, which
must have been largely due to the success of the Isocratean programme. (pp.
5051)

There is, thus, compelling evidence that Isocrates had the most effective,
influential, and popular school.

The Graduates
As with the three schools of Athenian rhetoric, the most dramatic as-
sessment of the three teachers students comes from Cicero (trans. 1878/
1970): Then behold Isocrates arose, from whose school, as from the Trojan
horse, none but real heroes proceeded (ii, 22). Ciceros contemporary,
Dionysius of Halicarnassus (trans. 1974), agreed: [Isocrates] becamethe
teacher of the most eminent men at Athens and in Greece at large, both the
best forensic orators, and those who distinguished themselves in politics
and public life. In his Institutio Oratio, Quintilian (trans. 1920/1980)
wrote, The pupils of Isocrates were eminent in every branch of study (iii,
1), adding that it is to the school of Isocrates that we owe the greatest ora-
tors (xii, 10).
Among more recent critics, Jebb (1911) echoed Ciceros praise of
Isocratess students and added an anecdote about a 4th-century B.C.
oratorical competition:

When Mausolus, prince of Caria died in 351 B.C., his widow Artemisia insti-
tuted a contest of panegyrical eloquence in honour of his memory. Among all
the competitors there was not oneif tradition may be trustedwho had not
been the pupil of Isocrates. (p. 877)

Although Aristotle had not yet opened his school at the time of this
competition, he certainly was teaching rhetoric in Platos Academy.
In specific comparisons between the abilities of his students and those
of his rivals, Plato and Aristotle, Isocrates again prevails. Jaeger (1944) said
that there was no near rival to the quality of Isocrates students; of
Platos students, Jaeger said, Most of them were characterized by their in-
ability to do any real service to [the state] and exert any real influence upon
it (p. 137). Of Aristotles students, E. L. Hunt (1925/1990) wrote that Aris-
totles school seems to have been productive of little eloquence (p. 132).
Jebb (as cited in Johnson, 1959) added that Aristotles school produced
not a single orator of note except Demetrius Phalereus; the school of
Isocrates produced a host (p. 25). (Jebb did attribute Isocrates success
Marsh 93

more to his insistence on performance than his actual philosophy of rheto-

ric.) In short, most scholars, past and present, concur with Freeman (1907):
The pupils of Isokrates became the most eminent politicians and the most
eminent prose-writers of the time (p. 186).

Reputation Among Classical Roman Rhetoricians

We already have seen something of the preference of Romes greatest
rhetoriciansCicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Quintilianfor
Isocrates. Their praise of him was effusive, and their preference for his
rhetoric, as opposed to those of Plato or Aristotle, was pronounced. In De
Oratore, Cicero (trans. 1878/1970) labeled Isocrates the father of elo-
quence (ii, 3) and the Master of all rhetoricians (trans. 1990, ii, 22). In the
Brutus, Cicero (trans. 1878/1970) wrote that Isocrates cherished and im-
proved within the walls of an obscure academy, that glory which, in my
opinion, no orator has since acquired. Heexcelled his predecessors (8).
Dionysius (trans. 1974) praised Isocratess unrivalled power to persuade
men and states (9). Quintilian (trans. 1920/1980) called Isocrates the
prince of instructors (ii, 8), and he assigned a higher rank to no one.
Modern critics agree that Isocrates, not Plato or Aristotle, inspired the
central rhetorical theorists of classical Rome. Too (1995) wrote that
Scholars in Antiquity and in the Renaissance regarded Isocrates as
the pre-eminent rhetorician of ancient Athens (p. 1). Katula and
Murphy (1994) asserted that Isocrates school is largely responsible for
making rhetoric the accepted basis of education in Greece and later in
Rome. His is the chief influence on the oratorical style and rhetorical the-
ory of Cicero (p. 46). Welch (1990) noted Isocrates primary influence
on both Ciceros and Quintilians characterizations of the ideal, moral
orator (p. 123).
This preference of the Romans for Isocrates is significant, for the
Romans, like the Greeks, lived in an adversarial society. Ciceros (trans.
1990) De Oratore is redolent with references to what one speaker in that
work called our political hurly-burly (i, 18), a phrase that foreshadows
Burkes (1969) modern Wrangle of the Marketplace (p. 23). De Oratore
(Cicero, trans. 1990), in fact, is a sustained argument in which Crassus,
Ciceros persona, debated the nature of rhetoric with polite but firm ad-
versaries who literally label him an antagonist (i, 20). Even his adver-
saries agreed, however, that Roman society is exhaustingly competitive.
Antonius, for example, confessed to being overwhelmed by the hunt for
office and the business of the Bar (Cicero, trans. 1990, i, 21). Not as for-
tunate as Crassus in his adversaries, Cicero was murdered by his rivals
for power, and his hands and headwhich had written and spoken so
powerfullywere nailed over the rostrum in Rome (Bizzell &
94 Public Relations Ethics

Herzberg, 1990, p. 196). In such a society, Cicero and Quintilian could

not afford ineffective rhetoric. Their clear preference for the symmetrical
rhetoric of Isocrates is its most compelling endorsement.

Influence on Consequent Education

Isocrates school, more than those of Plato and Aristotle, developed a
comprehensive, liberal education, the goal being to prepare orators to
think clearly in a variety of disciplines and to have historical and literary
examples readily at hand. [Isocrates] preached that the whole man must
be brought to bear in the persuasive process said Corbett (1990a), and so
it behooved the aspiring orator to be broadly trained in the liberal arts and
securely grounded in good moral habits (p. 542). The historical impact of
this fusion of liberal studies and rhetoric has been profound and un-
equalled. There is no doubt that since the Renaissance [Isocrates] has ex-
ercised a far greater influence on the educational methods of humanism
than any other Greek or Roman teacher, said Jaeger (1944, p. 46).
Marrou (1956)who literally apologized for praising Isocrates over
Plato (p. 79)once again conceded that history has favored the ideals of
the practical, symmetrical Isocrates over the philosophical, totalitarian
Plato:

It is to Isocrates more than to any other person that the honour and responsi-
bility belong of having inspired in our Western traditional education a pre-
dominantly literary tone. On the level of history, Plato has been defeated:
posterity has not accepted his educational ideals. The victor, generally speak-
ing, was Isocrates. (pp. 7980, 194)

Like Marrou (1956), E. L. Hunt (1925/1990) had mixed feelings regard-

ing the triumph of practicality over speculative philosophy, but he too ac-
corded the victory to Isocrates. Whether for good or ill, the conception of
the aims and purposes of the American liberal college, as set forth by the
most distinguished modern educators, is much closer to Isocrates and
Protagoras than to Plato (p. 135). Corbett (1989), however, was not quite
so guarded in his praise. [Isocrates] might very well be canonized as the
patron saint of all those, then and now, who espouse the merits of a liberal
education (p. 276).
When the merits of the rhetorics of Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates are
compared using the four touchstones of school influence, quality of
graduates, influence on Roman rhetoricians, and impact on history, we
see that the rhetoric of Isocrates was, by far, the most successful, power-
ful, and influential rhetoric of the adversarial society that was classical
Greece.
Marsh 95

Conclusion
Isocrates created a moral, symmetrical rhetoric that proved to be more
effective, immediately and historically, than its asymmetrical rivals in clas-
sical Greece. Were we to cast it as an ethics foundation for modern public
relations and place it into Bakers (1999) schema, it would, at worst, be an
enlightened self-interest model and, at best, a social responsibility model.
Both models rank higher than the entitlement model, in which Baker lo-
cated the advocacy/adversarial society model as articulated by Barney
and Black (1994). As Baker (1999) said, The structure [of the schema] im-
plies that each successive baseline represents a higher moral ground than
the one preceding (p. 69). One possibleindeed probableconclusion,
therefore, is that an effective, achievable ethics foundation for public rela-
tions need not function at the relatively low level of the advocacy/ad-
versarial society model.
Recent studies, in fact, support what Isocrates demonstrated and, 2 mil-
lennia later, the IABC Research Foundation posited that two-way symmet-
rical public relations, with its idealistic social role, is the most effective
model of public relations. Deatherage and Hazletons (1998) survey of the
Public Relations Society of America members concluded that practitioners
who use two-way symmetry build more productive relationships than
those who do not. In summary, public relations need not be adversarial. It
need not adopt an ethics of asymmetrical advocacy. It can, instead, func-
tion admirably (in the several senses of that verb phrase) by following the
foundation of Isocratean rhetoric: to form a genuine we out of diversity
(Poulakos, 1997, p. 3).

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Public Rdations Review, 20(3):267-276 Copyright 8 1994 by JAI Press Inc.
ISSN: 0363-811 I &I rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

The Hill Sc ICnowlton

Cases: A Brief on the
Susanne A.
Roscbwalb Controversy
ABSTRACT: This study examines the ethical controversies raised
by the Hill & Knowlton client list under the stewardship of Robert
Keith Gray, and discusses the ethical issues in relation to three
questions: Should clients be accepted on the basis oftheir ability to
pay? Are all clients entitled to representation? Is it what is doneon
behalf of a client that comes under ethical consideration? It pre-
sents answers in terms of entrepreneurship, professionalism, ethical
codes and guidelines. The third question is relevant to the clients
cited, particularly in relation to Citizens for a Free Kuwait.
Susanne A. Roschwalb is an associate professor of public
communication at The American University in Washington,
D.C. She has been a publicist in Washington, for more than 25
years and has represented 150 clients including nine foreign
governments, three White House conferences and many non-
profit, educational campaigns.

Despite a new enthusiasm for ethics courses at universities

and in corporate America, critics charge the industry with continuing to put
profits first. In the summer of 1993, actions taken by the Public Relations firm
Hill & Knowlton on behalf of headline clients, including Citizens for a Free
Kuwait, the Catholic Bishops anti-abortion campaign, Bank of Credit and
Commerce International and the Church of Scientology, were raising serious
ethical concerns among public relations professionals.
The purpose of this article is to examine the ethical questions surrounding
these Hill & Knowlton clients. It poses three questions to set a framework for
consideration when comparable clients seek representation in the future.

Fall 1994 267

 Public Relations Review

As was pointed out by Davis Young, the public relations reputation issue itself
is not new.2 It was more vigorous in the instances cited above, because it was
more visible. It was more visible because the public relations activities were
occurring in the middle of, or at least around, big issues, for example, the Persian
Gulf War. Many of the issues were controversial and inspired strong emotional
responses. Journalists with large audiences were plugged into the issues. Public
relations itself became part of the story. Certainly, Citizens for a Free Kuwait was
a public relations campaign that fit all of those qualifications.
Hill & Knowlton took on the Citizens account in 1990 after a Kuwaiti
expatriate in New York approached the agency. The stated objective of a national
campaign was to increase awareness in the United States about the dangers to the
democratic government of Kuwait as posed by Saddam Hussein, the dictator in
Iraq. The Citizens for a Free Kuwait account ultimately brought the agency an
estimated $10 million.3
The agency conducted media relations and represented the client to Congres-
sional offices. It produced press kits that included modular inserts to be used as
needed. Some of these: A Chronology of the Kuwait Crisis; Saddam Husseins
History of Human Rights Violations; the Economy, Education, Culture and
Foreign Policy of Kuwait; the History of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions Condemning the Iraqi invasion.4
As part of Hill & Knowltons campaign for the Kuwaitis, the UN Security
Council, the U.S. Houses Human Rights Caucus, and the House Foreign Affairs
Committee were targeted for activities featuring evidence that Iraq had commit-
ted atrocities against Kuwaitis. The events drew heavy coverage by the media,
which largely ignored obvious signs of public relations. Hill & Knowlton ar-
ranged for stories in the news media, helped draw up and place advertisements,
set up speaking engagements for the Kuwaiti group, and produced video releases
that reached millions of viewers. The firm also tried to offset unfavorable publicity
about Kuwaits form of government and human rights record.
Hill & Knowlton received a media black eye when a column on the opinion
page of The New 2ork Times accused the firm of helping its client, Citizens for a
Free Kuwait, spread false tales of Iraqi atrocities that all but prodded the United
States into the Persian Gulf War.6
Charles Eidson, president and CEO of Hill & Knowlton, cited The New IYor&
Times op-ed piece by Harpers publisher John MacArthur, as the beginning of
Hill & Knowltons battle to combat rumors, false charges and accusations
connected with its work for Kuwait.7
MacArthur charged that Hill & Knowlton concealed the identity of a dramatic
witness who testified before a Congressional panel that Iraqi soldiers threw babies
from their hospital incubators in Kuwait City. The witness, who had been
identified only as Nayirah was none other than the daughter of the Kuwaiti
Ambassador to the United States. That information coupled with the fact that
there was no independent verification of her story, led many to question Nayirahs
credibility, and Hill & Knowltons honesty.
The Wall Street Journal followed up with a second-day story based on

268 Vol.20. No. 3

 The Hill 6 Knowlton Cases: A Brief on the Controversy

MacArthurs op-ed piece, which was picked up by the wire services and carried in
papers around the world.*
Despite enlisting the talents of its own staff on its own behalf, Hill & Knowlton
found that it was impossible to stop the wild and irresponsible stories.9
Reports from eyewitnesses in the Kuwaiti hospital, statements by the U.S.
Ambassador in Kuwait, State Department documents and a Kroll Associates study
substantiating the incubator story, did little to staunch the attacks.
The media assault cast Hill & Knowlton as the source of original darkness
and almost brought a great old-line agency to its knees, Eidson said.O
The media that took part in the fray in addition to The New York Timesand the
Wall Street Journal included network television shows, 20/20, and 60 Min-
utes. In addition, stories questioning the public relations ethics of the campaign
were raised regularly in public relations trade publications.
Hill & Knowlton president Eidson tried to draw a distinction between working
for controversial clients as opposed to those that are contemptible. Does the Ku
Klux Klan deserve representation I he asked. Perhaps, but not by my agency.

QUESTION NO. 1: ARE ALL CAUSES

ENTITLED TO REPRESENTATION?

Ethics as a term may be understood by ethicists to mean

something different from that understood by business. Corporate executives and
philosophers approach problems in different ways. Academics ponder the intan-
gible and savor the paradoxical. In theory, in the abstract, causes or individuals
can be deemed unsavory. But businesses have difficulty considering the world in
abstract terms. A business may consider itself equipped to represent all who come
seeking professional assistance.
When Hill & Knowlton agreed to represent the Catholic Bishops it justified
their cause by saying their biggest crime was believing in the sanctity of life.12 The
firm took on the $300,000 account as a business and not a moral decision, said
Eidson, who noted that Hill & Knowlton had turned down $11 million in fees
from unacceptable clients in 1992.i3
The contrast between the academic view and the professional view is confirmed
by an evaluation of various corporate codes of ethics, which grouped the prin-
ciples contained therein into three broad categories: Be a dependable organiza-
tion citizen, do not do anything that will harm the organization, and be good to
your customers.*
The shortcomings to this approach to ethics are apparent. By emphasizing
obedience to the law or to a corporate code of conduct, companies tend to
encourage executives to seek ways to get away with as much as they can without
actually incurring legal liability or breaking their code.
The 1980s offered a daily diet of ethical trespasses. The cozy relationships
among lobbyists, Congress, and the executive branch became publicly evident in
one scandal after another. Members of Congress worked in tandem with lobby-

Fall 1994 269

 Public Relations Review

ists to generate grass-roots support for pet issues. Lobbyists formed coalitions
to support the White Houses favorite issues. The White House recruited lobby-
ists to help with controversial appointees needing Senate confirmation. The
Congressional committees or the White House Commissions that were supposed
to be looking out for the peoples interests, who were to oversee the agencies,
who were to clean up the messes when discovered, worked with and were often
comprised of lobbyists and publicists. The very organizations designed to protect
America from an abusive system had become part of the system.
In Washington, D.C., among some public relations firms, money, not ideol-
ogy, matters. l5 A logical starting place is with Robert Keith Gray, former chair-
man of Hill & Knowlton Worldwide and CEO of the Washington office. He said
our job is not to make white black or to cover the truth, but to tell the positive
side regardless of who the client is.16 His goal of combining lobbying and public
relations within one firm was probably not pursued to improve government or to
make the profession more open or honest. He agreed to represent clients based
on their ability to earn a profit for the firm. Advocates of the free enterprise system
argue that the only social responsibility of business is the creation of wealth.
In the late 198Os, Hill & Knowlton developed a specialty for representing, in
addition to those previously mentioned, some particularly unsavory groups. The
Peoples Republic of China after the Tiananmen Square incident; Haiti under
Duvalier, supporters of the Rev. Sun Myung Moon, and British tycoon Robert
Maxwell all were courted aggressively and accepted for representation by Bob
Gray and his corps of high-priced lobbyists and public relations executives.
Such unsocial causes as smoking, drinking, bearing arms, spraying pesticides,
producing acid rain, foreign guerrilla groups and terrorists all seek and can pay for
public relations representation. Within the United States, all citizens are entitled
to legal representation for criminal trials under the Constitution. However, there
is no Constitutional requirement for public relations representation. There is a
right to petition government in the Constitution. Public access to the decision-
making process is central to the American concept of democracy.
What code does exist? The Public Relations Society of Americas Code of
Professional Standards for the Practice of Public Relations sets general guidelines
but does not set forth specific terms that would constitute an unacceptable client.
It does specify unethical activity performed on behalf of a client: A member shall
not intentionally communicate false or misleading information and is obligated to
use care to avoid communication of false or misleading information.17
The concept of adopting a code of ethics has been embraced by almost all
organizations and associations of public communicators. Ethics codes represent a
set of standards and guidelines for members of the association or organization to
work by and also serve the function of demonstrating responsibility to an often
skeptical public. In his criticism of the PRSAs official code, Olasky has taken
PRSA to task over the fact that its practitioners do not actually believe in the
tenets prescribed. I8 According to Olasky, the code has become a tool for public
display to promote an image of public relations practitioners as being ethical. But
the reality is that many members interpret the code in such a way that they might

270 Vol. 20, No. 3

 Ihe Hill 0 Knowlton Casts: A Brief on the Controversy

commit an action that would be unethical under a different interpretation. The

code is simply a tool to keep members in line to an extent. However, discipline
can also be coercive. The summary answer to question No. 1 is that while all
causes are not entitled to representation, there was nothing inherently wrong in
representing Citizens for a Free Kuwait.

QUESTION NO. 2: BATHER THAN THE

CLIENT, IS IT WHAT IS DONE ON BEHALF
OF A CLIENT THAT IS SUBJECT TO
ETHICAL QUESTION?

If a public relations firm is in business to attract clients, it

does not wish to restrict the field. It likely follows the idea that every group or
association is entitled to public relations representation. It should be judged by
what it does on behalf of a client and not by whom it represents.
According to MacArthurs op-ed piece i9 the arguments by President Bush for
military action against Saddam Hussein, made much of the Iraqi leaders cruelty
toward the Kuwaiti people and the Presidents allegations of atrocities generally
went unchallenged.
MacArthur wrote: Some claims were not doubt true, but the most sensational
one-that Iraqi soldiers removed hundreds of Kuwait babies from incubators and
left them to die on hospital floors-was shown to be almost certainly false by an
ABC reporter, John Martin, in March 1991 after the liberation of Kuwait.20
The incubator story seriously distorted the American debate about whether to
support military action. Seven Senators cited the story in speeches backing the
January 12 resolution authorizing war.
The story had been told by Nayirah, a 15 year-old, Kuwaiti girl who testified
before a Congressional Human Rights Caucus on October 10, 1992. Nayirah
was offered to the committee by Hill & Knowlton. The firm said she was not
identified with her last name or as the daughter of the Ambassador at the request
of her father, in order to protect her family from reprisals in Kuwait. The Hill &
Knowlton spokespeople did not respond to questions on whether she was in
Kuwait in August and September of 1990 when she claimed to have witnessed
the atrocities.
According to MacArthur, the more significant question was why the chairman
of the Congressional Committee, Tom Lantos, a California Democrat, and John
Edward Porter, an Illinois Republican did not check Nayirahs story. In fact, both
Congressmen had a close relationship with Hill & Knowlton. Gary Hymel, vice
president of Hill & Knowlton, helped organize the Congressional Human Rights
Caucus hearings in meetings with Rep. Lantos and Rep. Porter and the chairman
of Citizens for a Free Kuwait, Hassan a1-Ebraheem.21
Congressmen Lantos and Porter allowed the Congressional Human Rights
Foundation, a group they founded in 1985 to be housed in Hill & Knowltons
Washington office. The firm provided a contribution to the Foundation in the

Fall 1994 271

 Public Relations Review

form of a $3,000 rent reduction and phone message service. The Congressional
Human Rights Foundation named Hill & Knowltons vice chairman, Frank
Mankiewicz to its Board in October 1991.
It was not that Hill & Knowlton created Citizens for a Free Kuwait as a pseudo
organization to represent a questionable cause. It is the use of the Kuwaiti
Ambassadors daughter in Congressional testimony without full disclosure that
comes in for censure. And it is the connection between Rep. Lantos, the
Congressional Human Rights Foundation, and Hill & Knowltons donated
office space that begged the ethical questions.22
At a November 1993 meeting at the Hill & Knowlton offices in Washington
between Gary Hymel and seven ministers of information from Kuwait and
Bahrain, Hymel was asked to recount the Citizens for a Free Kuwait contro-
versy. 23 According to the Kuwaitis, several discrepancies emerged in his narrative.
Hymel claimed that the leadership for Citizens was non-governmental. The
Kuwaiti Information officers said it was a fact that Hassan al-Ebraheem is and has
been a member of the government. Mr. Hymel claimed that the purpose of the
meetings on Capitol Hill between Citizens, Hill & Knowlton and Congressmen
was to familiarize the Congressmen with the idea that Kuwait was a democracy by
showing copies of its constitution. He could not, however, remember whether
the constitution was presented in English or Arabic, or, if translated, who was
responsible for the translation. The Kuwaiti information ministers said one of Hill
& Knowltons tasks was to translate the constitution into English.
Article 6 of the PRSA Code24 reads: A member shall not engage in any practice
which tends to corrupt the integrity of channels of communication or the
processes of government.
I submit the answer to question No. 2 is clearly yes. What is done on behalf of
a client is what is subject to ethical question, not the client itself.
Hill & Knowlton becomes the focal point for the discussion of ethics because
the basic concerns about public relations, media management and lobbying were
magnified during a time when the country was debating war and Hill & Knowltons
client was a foreign country with a direct interest in the outcome of the debate.
Is there a limit to what the United States should allow foreign agents to spend
on propaganda efforts and government manipulation, especially during war?
Since Hill & Knowlton was a British-owned firm, (Londons WPP Group) what
effect did British concerns-such as the possible collapse of its financial institu-
tions, if the Kuwaiti currency, the dinar, became worthless-have on Hill &
Knowltons efforts? In the end, the question was not whether H&K (Hill &
Knowlton) effectively altered public opinion, but whether the combined efforts
of Americas own government, foreign interests, and private PR and lobbying
campaigns drowned out decent and rational, unemotional debate.25
Instead of admitting mistakes, Hill & Knowlton tried to defend itself. It
released a letter from the U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait, defending the killing-
babies-in-incubators story. The ambassador sent a cable to Rep. Lantos, defend-
ing the contents of Nayirahs testimony. An unusually emotional cable was leaked
from the State Department, attacking human-rights groups for cursory and

272 Vol.20, No. 3

 The HiU &Knowlton Cases: A Brief on the Contrmerq

biased investigations and cynically casting doubt on accounts of atrocities. Mr.

Eidson wrote to The New York Times defending his firm, but the journalist,
MacArthur replied by pointing out inaccuracies in his letter.26

QUESTION NO. 3: IS THE ABILITY TO PAY

A PRIMARY DETERMINANT IN ACCEPTING
A CLIENT?

In August 1992, when Howard Pastor was named the

new general manager of Hill & Knowlton, his first quote in The Washington Post
was that he was hired to help clean up Hill & Knowltons image. One clearly
cannot accept clients because they have a checkbook, he said. When the story
becomes who the client is, youre distracted from serving the interests of your
other clients.
In Washington, D.C., the playing field is riddled with an unappetizing assort-
ment of clients who can pay. A bi weekly review of ODwyers Washington
Reports back page of new FARA Filings lists the firms, foreign principals,
activities and fees for a range of interests. A number of legal, public relations,
promotion and lobbying firms have represented Haiti both to restore democracy
and to oppose Father Aristide. Firms are listed for both Serbia and Bosnia. A
pharmaceutical firm recently spent one half million dollars to promote the use of
a drug even though the Federal Drug Administration was about to report that it
was not in the interest of patients to use it. More than $40 million had been spent
by the end of 1993 on both sides of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Record-breaking amounts for public relations will be spent on both sides of the
health-care debate. Is it ethical and good business to represent all paying clients?
By the end of the 1980s there were approximately 3,000 trade association
offices in Washington, D.C., and 6,000 registered lobbyists.28 Estimates of the
actual number of people engaged in trying to influence legislation-from direct
lobbying to grass roots campaigning-range from 20,000 to 100,000. Fre-
quently, the least desirable clients can be the most lucrative. Victor Kamber,
president of the Kamber Group, says I think we need lobbying reform.29 One
of the evils in Washington is that we dont have proper disclosure rules, that
people dont know who is spending how much to impact public policy.3o
The PRSA Code of Ethics is fairly general on the subject of acceptable or
unacceptable clients. Few codes provide highly specific guidelines. Michael Bayles
offers some interesting models. 3 He suggests that the ethical models are in effect
models of different distributions of authority and responsibility in decision-
making. These range from the Agency model, which exemplifies what has been
called in the legal profession, the ideology of advocacy, to the Fiduciary
model which emphasizes a professionals special obligations to be worthy of
client trust. One of Bayles conclusions is that professionals must be ethically free
and responsible persons. For their own freedom and the protection of others,
they should not abdicate authority and responsibility in decision-making.

Fall 1994 273

 According to Edward Bernays, public relations in its truest sense strives to
relate ethical behavior and social responsibility to the bottom line.32
According to Paul Holmes, the framework known as reputation management
justifies ethical decision-making not as social responsibility, but as a discipline
that maximizes long-term performance. Through this process, management
would consult with legal, financial and operational officers on the consequences
of taking a client. A good client, according to Holmes, is one for whom work will,
in the long run, maintain the reputation of an organization.33
Accepting personal responsibility for professional conduct is a standard eluding
easy codification because it lacks the conformity of objectivity. But it is help&l to
offer professionals a personal checklist of straight-forward statements or good
ethical questions to ask before making decisions. Such a list was created by Bob
Steele, director of the Ethics Program at the Poynter Institute for Media Studies,
on behalf of journalists.34
The Steele list, slightly adapted to public relations situations serves as an ethical
checklist. It reads as follows:

1. What do I know? What do I need to know?

2. What is my public relations purpose?
3. What are my ethical concerns?
4. What organizational pohcies and professional guidelines should I
consider?
5. How can I include other people, with different perspectives and
diverse ideas, in the decision-making process?
6. Who are the stakeholders-those affected by my decision? What are
the motivations? Which are legitimate?
7. What if the roles were reversed? How would I feel if I were in the
shoes of the stakeholders?
8. What are the possible consequences of my actions? Short term? Long
term?
9. What are my alternatives to maximize my truthtelling responsibility
and to minimize harm?
10. Can I clearly and fully justify my thinking and my decision? To my
colleagues? To the stakeholders? To the public?

CONCLUSION

This article offers an overview to help address the question

How Do We Erase the Greedy 1980s ? A leading public relations firm, Hill &
Knowlton, served as a framework for answers because it was intrepid in the way in

274 Vol. 20, No. 3

 7he Hill &Knowlton Cases: A Brief on the Controversy

which it took on controversial clients. This paper poses and answers three
questions:

1. Are all causes entitled to representation?

2. Rather than the client, is it what is done on behalf of a client that is

subject to review?

3. Is the ability to pay the primary determinant in accepting a client?

It offers the rationale that public relations is business. As such, it is concerned

with clients who have the ability to pay. While all causes may want representation,
there is no rule of governance that currently provides entitlement for all causes.
But, a practitioner is accountable for what he or she carries out on behalf of a
client, both in terms of ethics and business. As Paul Holmes reports, public
relations in its truest sense strives to relate ethical behavior and social responsi-
bility to the bottom line. It urges business to recognize that reputation is an asset
the same way that plant, inventory and employees are assets. As an asset, reputa-
tion should be managed to maximize its value and to insure against any damage it
may suffer.
Hill & Knowlton had the right to represent Kuwaiti expatriates and the
Government of Kuwait in an attempt to persuade the American public to go to
war to defend its interests in the Persian Gulf. The firm did not take into account
that intense scrutiny by the media and special interests, whistle blowers and
competitors ultimately would make all of its actions public knowledge. It would
have saved itself serious loss of reputation, business and performance had it
assessed the Kuwaiti campaign in terms of its merits, and with an emphasis on the
consequences.

NOTES

1. Paul Holmes, Why Good PR is More Important than Ethics, Inside PR III
(February 1993), p. 14.
2. Davis Young, Reputation and Ethics in a Cynical Age, Public Relations Journal
(May 1993), p.32.
3. Gary Hymel, Personal Interview, Hill & Knowlton, November 15, 1993; Arthur
Rowse, Flacking for the Emir, The Progvesrive 55 (May 1991) pp. 20-22.
4. Citizins for a Free Kuwait Press Kit. Produced by Hill & Knowlton, Inc.
Washington, DC, April to August 1990. Hill & Knowlton registered under the
Foreign Agents Registration Act, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. #612 with the U.S.
Department of Justice.
5. Arthur Rowse, op. cit.
6. John R MacArthur, Remember Nayirah, witness for Kuwaiti? 7be New York Times
op-ed page, January 6,1992; as cited Joanne Lipman, Advertising: Hill & Knowlton
Faces New Attacks over its PR Tactics, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 7, 1992, B, 6~2.
7. John R, MacArthur, op. cit.
8. Joanne Lipman, op. cit.

Fall 1994 275

 Public Relations Review

9. Jack ODwyer, IX firms under Media Attack Should Fight Back, ODwyevs PR
Services7 (June 1993), p.1.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Paul Holmes, op. cit., p. 15.
15. Susan B. Trento, The Power House: Robert Keith Gray and the Selling of Access and
Influence in Washington (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992).
16. Ibid, p. 347.
17. Article 7, Public Relations Society of America Code of Professional Standards for the
Practice of Public Relations, as quoted in Robert T. Reilly (ed.), Public Relations in
Action, 2nd (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1987), p. 584.
18. Todd Hunt and Andrew Tirpok, Universal Ethics Code: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come, Public Relations Review 19 (Spring 1993), p.5.
19. John R MacArthur, opcit.
20. Ibid.
21. Gary Hymel, personal interview cited.
22. Susan B. Trento, op. cit., p. 387.
23. Gary Hymel, meeting with Rashid Bumjaid, Foreign Media, Ministry of Information,
Bahrain, Adel Al-Mahmeed, News Editor, Gulf News Agency, Bahrain; Mohammed
AI-Badah, Press Officer, Kuwait Information Office, Abdul Aziz Al-Bader, researcher
in international media, Kuwait, Tarek Al-Mizrem, international media, Kuwait, Khaled
Al-Razni, international media, Kuwait, Ogab AI-Zuaabi, press offtcer, Kuwait
Information Officer, Susanne Roschwalb, group leader, Hill &Knowlton, Washington,
DC, November 15,1993.
24. PRSA Code as found in Robert T. Reilly, op. cit. p. 584.
25. Susan B. Trento, op. cit., p. 389.
26. Ibid. , p. 389.
27. J.R ODwyer, New FAR% Filings, n in ODwyers Washington Report, bi-weekly,
New York and Washington, DC.
28. Paul Holmes, The Best of Times, The Worst of Times, Inside PR, III (May/June
1993), p. 21.
29. Ibid., p. 22.
30. Ibid.
31. Michael Bayles, Professional Ethics (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth, 1989).
32. Edward L. Bemays, Public Relations, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1952), pp. 2-6.
33. Paul Holmes, op. cit., p. 16.
34. Bob Steele, Doing Ethics, Ethics Program, Poynter Institute for Media Studies, or
Richard L. Johannesen Ethical Responsibility in Communication, a selected, annotated
bibliography, Northern Illinois University, September 1991, distributed by the Speech
Communication Association, 5105 Backlick Road, Bldg. E., Annandale, VA 22003,
or Deni Elliott, Practical and Professional Ethics: A Bibliography, compiled from the
Ethics Institute Library at Dartmouth College, April 1992.

276 Vol. 20, No. 3