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Daniel Chirot – cateva repere bio-
bibliografice
1964 BA – Harvard
1970 il cunoaste in Romania pe Henri H. Stahl
1973 - PhD in sociologie – Columbia, cu teza: Social Change in a Peripheral Society: The
Creation of a Balkan Colony, coordonata de Immanuel Wallerstein (1976 editia
americana, 2002 traducerea romaneasca)
Devine unul dintre sociologii cei mai cunoscuti pentru lucrarile sale asupra schimbarii
sociale: Social Change in the Twentieth Century (1977), Social Change in the Modern
Era (1986), and How Societies Change (1994)
1985 consultant pentru Radio Europa Libera in limba romana
1986 intemeieaza revista East European Politics and Societies
Devine interesat de subiectele tiraniei si genocidului. Publica:
Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age (1994)
Co-autor, Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder,
2006
Co-autor, The Shape of the New: Four Big Ideas and How They Made the Modern
World, Princeton University Press, 2016
Astazi: Profesor de sociologie si Profesor se studii rusesti si euro-asiatice la
Universitatea din Washington
Teoria lui Wallerstein = neo-marxism + scoala de la Annalles
O teorie sistemica a inegalităţilor provocate de exploatare
O problema metodologica: esecul
comunismului si metoda analitica marxista
Intrebarea cea mai relevant pe care mi-o pot pune acum este in ce masura
armature teoretica a cartii – partial indatorata marxismului, asa cum il
percepeam in acel moment – este in continuare valabila? Esecul regimurilor
politice de inspiratie marxist-leninista din secolul al XX-lea inseamna oare ca
istoriografia de inspiratie marxista trebuie sa fie total abandonata? Raspunsul
trebuie sa fie categoric negative. Continui sa subscriu atat modelului teoretic pe
care l-am utilizat, cat si concluziilor la care am ajuns.
A political economy is characterized by a particular class structure—that is, the way in which a
surplus is extracted from the economy, how and by whom it is distributed, and for what purposes.
The concept of a surplus is central. Harry Pearson has shown that a surplus is not simply an excess
resulting from improved technology; nor is a surplus necessarily the "cause“ of further progress in
cultural and political sophistication. Rather, the surplus is socially and politically defined from the
very start. Though the extent of the surplus is limited by technology within broad bounds, it comes
into being by a political act, by conquest, by the imposition of tribute, of a corvée, or of some
other kind of tax.4 As the nature of the surplus changes, as the way in which it is produced and
collected changes, and as the uses to which it is put change, so do the political economy and the
There are thus four major pieces of evidence that suggest the early Wallachian
villages were communal:
1. the remnants of communal institutions found in the Vrancea and the Vrancea's
traditional distance from the Moldavian state;
2. the fact that, during the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, Wallachia had
mostly a mountain or hill population and was primarily pastoral, just as the
Vrancean population remained until the nineteenth century;
3. signs of the existence of village federations even before the creation of the
state in the thirteenth century which suggest that there existed institutions,
similar to those found in the Vrancea, that regulated the use of land between
communal villages; and
4. the division of village lands into private family plots took place only in the
sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, not before.
The change in trade patterns, the losses involved in the redirection of trade into Turkish
and This completes the list of main causes for the rise of the nobles and the decline of the communal-
trade state. The state lost revenues because of the change in trade patterns. It therefore lost the
ability to reward the nobility, which then began to seize villages in order to extract taxes for itself, and
probably to engage in small-scale commercial activities by exporting village products. Rising Ottoman
taxes further weakened the state, as did Ottoman political interference and, as the population
declined and taxes on free villages became ever more onerous, these villages were unable to maintain
their freedom. The conjunction of circumstances played directly into the nobles hands, and by 1550
they were a dominant seignorial class, in almost permanent revolt against the state and with local
power bases in the villages they controlled
Michael's brief reign was marked by two important changes. The Wallachian
state attempted to reconstitute itself on the basis of the prince's private
ownership of villages, and some time during his reign, Michael passed a law
binding the residents of purchased villages to the land, thus completing the
process of transforming a possible majority of Wallachian villagers into serfs.
This list of social categories clearly shows that the imposition of "serfdom" did not
totally destroy the old social order, although it greatly modified it. Some remnants of
the village communities survived. Nor was the new system stable. Underneath the
complex legal and political changes, Wallachian villagers remained predominantly
pastoral. This precluded the development of a primarily agricultural feudal order, such
as had existed earlier in Western Europe. It also prevented the "hardening" of serfdom
into an inflexible order, thus precluding the development of a peasant society
analogous to that in seventeenth-century Russia, to which Romania has too often
been compared
The changes that took place in the sixteenth century and were consolidated in the seventeenth
amounted to nothing less than the transformation of one mode of production into another. It is
obvious that there was no fundamental technological change. Indeed, as will be shown, Wallachia's
agri-pastoralists continued to use the same general economic techniques practiced since prestate
times. What changed was the political order and, more important, the nature and collection of the
surplus extracted from the society in order to sustain the new system. The state became weaker, the
nobles became more powerful, and the villagers lost their freedom as they became burdened with
the heavier taxes imposed on them.
Presumably, those serfs who worked entirely for their masters paid no tax; the rising taxes
imposed on boleri during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries suggest that this was the
Wallachian state's way of compensating for the loss of taxes from villagers. This further
complicated the social situation, because there were boieri who themselves were not able
to pay their taxes, were overcome by debt, and who finally sank into the ranks of the free
villagers. This made for a rapid turnover of nobles. Those not holding court office (and
therefore not having the opportunity to intercede with the state for fiscal advantages)
tended to fall out of their class and to be replaced by noble families who held office.
Because the prince could appoint office holders from non-noble families and thus create
new nobles, the status of boxer was frequently precarious
After the collapse of Michael the Brave's reign, the anarchic, insolvent Wallachian state,
torn by rifts between increasingly powerful nobles and a weakening princely state, may
have seemed to be heading toward a sort of political "feudalism" in which the locus of
power would become a legal fiction. This did not happen, because of two coordinate
conditions. Wallachia's seignorialization was linked to the imposition of foreign rule; that
is, Wallachia became a protocolonial society, and the Ottomans wanted to maintain a state
structure capable of raising the necessary tribute. At the same time, the Ottomans did not
want to destroy the system of indirect rule, and thus the Wallachian state structure had to
be preserved in order to avoid the necessity of direct Turkish administration.
The origins of tax farming in the sixteenth century have already been described. During
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the favor of the princes in appointing men to
court positions virtually created a new nobility that also took over the old nobility's power
in rural villages. In a state demanding ever more taxes, the crucial factor for a noble was
whether or not he could get exemptions and whether or not he could supplement his
income with a court or local administrative position.1 2 3 The corrupting influence of this
tradition, particularly for the eighteenth century, cannot be underestimated, and it was to
leave a legacy that still persists in modern Romania.
The period of Ottoman colonialism had fostered a growing export economy and, though
the main beneficiaries were the semi-Greek nobility and the Levantine town merchants,
life in the villages had begun to change. The economy had become more dependent on
cereal cultivation than it previously had been. But all this was just a beginning. In the
nineteenth century most of the colonial characteristics of Wallachian society were to
become more prominent, because once Wallachia was freed from Ottoman domination
and opened to the liberating winds of the Western capitalist economy, its own economy
could be "modernized"—that is, colonialized—much more thoroughly.
During the three and one-half decades between the Treaty of Adrianople and the land
reform of 1864, the Wallachian rural economy shifted from being primarily pastoral to a
primarily cereal-growing economy. Though the change had begun earlier (as noted in
Chapter 5), it was during this period that the Wallachian villager finally was transformed
into an agricultural peasant. A series of major changes resulted from this basic
transformation. The most important one was that the nobility became a true landowning
class, rather than simply a land-controlling class. At the start of the period, there was little
lordly demesne land; by the end of the period, the situation was beginning to change and
lords were drawing an increasing amount of their revenues by actually making the clacasi
work the land, instead of merely paying taxes for the use of land.
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Wallachia (united with Moldavia in the new
Romanian state) became a fully modern colonial society. This does not mean that it was
modernized, in the usual sense of that word, but rather that it took its place as a fairly
important peripheral portion of Western Europe's industrial economies by its provision of
primary products (mostly cereals), and that its economic, political, and social structure was
largely determined by its international economic position. It would be as wrong to call late
nineteenth-century Romania a "traditional" society as it would be to call mid-twentieth-
century African societies "traditional."
Even the term "transitional" is suspect. Certainly, Wallachia was in transition. In fact, it had
been in transition many times before, particularly in the sixteenth century. But it was not
in transition toward the type of society that prevailed in Western Europe. It was not
becoming industrialized; rather, it was becomingmore of a colony. Even the reform of 1864
led in that direction, because the freeing of land from traditional bonds and its
transformation into fully private property helped both the landowners and the export
economy, while furthering the subjugation of the peasants. All this can be verified by
looking at : ( 1 ) patterns of international trade; (2) the changes in class structure; (3) the
changes in rural society; and (4) the nature of the agrarian crisis that resulted at the start
of the twentieth century
By any statistical test, then, Wallachia and Moldavia fit the model of the open economy.
There was growth—indeed, rapid growth—but only in the production of cereals and in the
main enclave of the colonial political economy, Bucharest. That growth deeply affected
rural life and was in turn affected by rural changes.