11 Preventing Groupthink A pretzel-shaped question One obvious way to prevent gro responsible for every important deci fhink is simply to make one person. che problems of would be self- defeating. Only the most authoritarian of leaders fails to recognize the peril in relying solely on his own deliberations, For constructive thinking to go.on, a group must havea fairly high degree of like-mindedness about basic values and mutual respect. The members must. forgo trying to score points in a power struggle or to obtain ego grt by deflating rivals. These basic conditions are not likely to be created policy-making group becomes at least moderately cohesive. But then the quality of the group's deliberations may deteriorate as a result of the concurrence-seeking tendency that gives rise to the symptor Consequently, the problem of preventing cost from sound thinking in decision-making bodies is complicated: How can policy-makers benefit from the cohesiveness of their group without suffering serious losses from groupthink? This sort of intricate psychological issue has been called a pretzel-shaped question ai answers, Therefore, what? The difficulties of making inferential leaps from generalizations about the conditions that foster groupthink to concrete proposals for preventive ac- tion are essentially the same for our pretzel-shaped problem as for any other complicated social problem, such as environmental pollution. F. Kenneth Hare has pointed out that although life scientists have accumulated con- Preventing Groupthink 261 other forms of environmental contaminatio: expertise do not have the competence singl Policies for preventing eco-catastrophes: indedly to prescribe public ‘The greatest hazard in our path is inherent in Lyndon Johnson's acid query ierefore, what?"" which he is said to have theown ata group of professors who had just briefed him on the Middle Eastern situation. The politica {rest in the environment demands proposals for action. ... At present, we are not equipped to make such proposals. The same must be said even more emphatically about the problem of counteracting the psychological pollution of groupthink, for much less is known about the causes and consequences of concurrence-seeking behavior than is known about environmental contaminants. Yet, as Hare points out, the researchers who have the deepest understanding of the problems are noi ing in a socially responsible way if they attempt to withdraw completely from the arena of practical reform. Hare argues that “no import problem is ever simple and none ever lies ful lat instead of evading the issue 1g that ‘this isan interdisciplinary problem," everyone who knows and technical engineering problems. So great is synthesis and multivariate anal ing to Hare, that a marked change is to be expected in the sciences. Whereas the past century has been the era in which each subdiscipline dissected reality in fine detail, Hare foresees that in the next + century scientists will try to understand how complex systems work and how they can be changed. If we are to overhaul the machinery of policy-making in complex gover fare organizations, we must certainly apply Hare advice and stop complaining about the interdisciplinary complexities of the problems and start creating a new discipline that synthesizes whatever is rele- vant from them all. What is urgently needed is a new type of interven research, in which experienced executives familiar with the policy-making, system from the inside and a variety of specialists familiar with various decision-making processes from the outside collaborate to develop viable im. provements. If this type of enterprise materializes, one line of intervention research might be devoted to testing plausible recommendations, inferred from tentative generalizations about the conditions under which groupthink flourishes, for improving the quality of executive decision-makin; My answer to the acid-test question “Therefore, what eavily in- ‘luenced by many prior social psychological experiments and detailed obser- vations bearing on group dynamics, including my own studies of task- oriented groups. In this field of research, we become sensitized to the vagaries of human response to seemingly straightforward treatments for improving the quality of group products—vagaries that often force the invest62 “Turon, INEUCATIONS, AND APPuiCATIONS from undesirable side effects, the new treatments are undoubtedly along way ‘om providing a complete cure. In most cohesive groups, concurrence- ing tendencies are probably much too powerful to be subdued by admin- ‘changes of the type to be proposed. At best, those changes might ig tendencies, thereby icing the frequency of error. But 1¢, and money 0 try to introduce and assess im- fovements with such limited potentialities? The answer depends partly on jow much damage can be expected from collective miscalculations by an rrganization’s policy-making group. When there is no known antibiotic to ‘worthwhile during an epidemic to \e elementary precautions, such as staying away from ‘crowded places, will lower significantly the chances of being infected. The prescriptions I am proposing are perhaps like those elementary precautions; ‘may sometimes help to keep us out of danger while the search for an ef- is with considerable ambivalence, therefore, that I ‘Three prescri effects “The three suggestions for preventing groupthink presented at the end of Chapter 7 have major drawbacks. One reason on the drawbacks ive hypotheses, as we « can arise independently of groupthink. “forming group should assign the role of critical ing the group to give high priority to air- mms and doubts. This practice needs o be reinforced by the leader's ism of his or her own judgments in order to discourage the the proposed practi the chief executive and the other top executives in the organization's hier~ archy, it might help to counteract the spontaneous group pressures that give rise (0 @ premature consensus. This will not happen, however, unless the leader conveys to the members by his own actions that the task of critical ap- praisal is to be given precedence over maintaining traditional forms of Preventing Groupehink ca] deference. It is difficult for the members of an amiable executive group to adopt such a norm, but to pleasing the leader. those who disagree able him or her (o head off disruptive quarrels and demoralizing stalemates depend on the background and personality of the members. A policy-making group of bristling curmudgeons might waste their time on endless reiterations of clashing points of view. Seldom, if ever, do we find in a policy-making com- mittee the ideal type of genuinely reasonable people who can be counted on to function as constructive discussants, to take account of their colleagues’ points of view, and 10 make judicious but principled compromises when the time comes for consensus. Nevertheless, many policy-making groups are probably made up of people who are capable of functioning more effectively in the desired direction if norms that foster critical evaluation are adopted. 2. The leaders in an organization's hierarchy, when assigning a polic)- planning mission to @ group, should be impartial instead of stating ns at the ouiset. This practice requires each leader ings to unbiased statements about the scope of the ions of available resources, without advocating speci- fic proposals he or she would like tosee adopted. This allows the conferees the ‘opportunity 10 develop an atmosphere of open inquiry and to explore impar: tially a wide range of policy alternatives. “The expected benefit of this leadership practice is that it avoids setting a group norm that will evoke conformity with the leader's views. Among the hazards, however, is a potential cleavage between the leader and the members, which could become a disruptive power struggle if the chief ex- ecutive regards the emerging consensus among the members as anathema 10is Tarony, IurucATIONS, ax» APPLICATIONS (osteer the group, an inflexible ight with the others, reject their consensus, or disband the if no rift develops, the chief may f becomes more directive than ever. Pethaps the proposed nondirective leader- ship practice will work only when the chief can be genuinely open-minded in I stages of decision-making and values the judgment of the group suffi- ‘ently to abstain from using his power when the others reach a consensus that displeases him.? 3. The organization should routinely follow the administrative practice of setting up several independent policy-planning and evaluation groups 10 work on the same policy question, each carrying out its deliberations under a different leader, This practice—which many specialists in administrative sciences ad- vocate for other reasons—would prevent insulation of an executive in-group trom challenging information and independent judgments by well-qualified outsiders. Many executives object to it, however, on the grounds that the more people consulted, the greater is the risk of a security leak. This risk would have to be tolerated, or the security problem would haveto besolved by ‘adopting measures that could be applied to a larger number of participants without being inordinately costly in ti ency, and morale. Another drawback is that the more organizational units involved Formation, the greater is the opportunity for intraorganizational p. play a determining role. Harold Wilensky has emphasized this drawback in Organizational Intelligence: President Eisenhower . . . made the National Security Coun: Df a ponderous system of boards, staffs and interdepartmental com through which national security policy was supposed 10 rise to the [Schlesinger wrotein A Thousand Days}. Asares Into a forum for policy discord. An ironic feature of such a system is that men of good will are moved to obfuscate their postions and overstate agreements with their rivals, on behalf of an ultimate con- senst ‘When they cannot cope with issues by glittering generalities 1g the lowest common denominator of agreement, such supercom- delay decisions, refer issues to = committees, or engage in logrolling, as when the Navy trades off sup- port for more Air Force wings in return for Air Force support for more Navy carriers, Sharp questions, cogent arguments, minority positions, a clear calculation of gains and costs are lost to view. thermore, when many different planning and evaluation groups leliberate, none of them feels responsible for making a careful assessment of the policy's drawbacks. These are the circumstances that encourage a “let George do i even more pervasive presumption that “George must have already done it.”” Warren Weaver speaks of an org: tion whose top administrators take great pride in the series of scheduled steps Preventing Groupihink 265 they are allowing responsibility to be so diffuse that no one ac- tually takes om the task of making a careful evaluation: “By the time the pro- posal reaches the higher levels of responsibility, the number of examinations and successive interim approvals is so impressive that there is an almost over whelming temptation to assume that the real decision has already been made.” To minimize the risks, guidelines might be formulated that specify the responsibilities of each group and define the role of each participant, em: phasizing that primary loyalty is expected to the organization as a whole rather than to a local unit. Further, it may be possible to select statesmenlike executives capable of surmounting the chronic rivalries that plague every large bureaucracy—men who can be counted on to assess objectively the potential gains and losses for each policy alternative without always giving priority to the special interests of their own unit in its power struggles within, the organization, The fe success of a multiple-group procedure prob- ably depends on whether these and other safeguards can be introduced. Otherwise the multiple-group antidote to groupthink could spawn a virulent form of politicking that is a worse disease than the one it is supposed to pre- vent, More prescriptions to offset insulation Adi jonal prescriptive hypotheses based on inferences from the gen- ‘ions stated in Chapter 10 concerning the conditions under whi least likely to occur might help prevent groupthink. The costs y the same as those just described forthe first he reader will undoubtedly think of additional ones. Suf- ice it to say that all the recommendations pose obvious risks: The proposed procedures may lower group cohesiveness and correspondingly lower the morale of the participants, as consensus continues to elude them. They may also prove to be pri ly costly in taking up the precious time of already overburdened executives. Nevertheless, these prescriptions seem to hold the promise of somewhat reducing the chances of groupthink at a moderate cost, ifthey are implemented flexibly by sensible executives who do not suffer fools gladly and who do not gladly allow themselves to be made into fools. Like the st three, the additional prescriptions offer only a partial cure, ‘The next three prescriptions take account of the need to offset the poten- ly adverse effects of insulation of the policy-making group; they would be especially applicable when the multiple-group structure cannot be im- plemented, 4. Throughout the period when the feasibility and effectiveness of policy «alternatives are being surveyed, the policy-making group should from time 10 time divide into two or more subgroups to meet separately, under different