Ney Ora ig the Survei ed erg ti CE FEC ee |LEARNING HISTORY THROUGH PAST EXPERIENCES: Ordinary Citizens under the Surveillance of Securitate during the 1970s-1980s CNSAS Publishing House Bucharest 2009‘This book is partaf the LEARNING HISTORY THROUGH PAST EXPERIENCES: ‘Ordinary Citizens under Surveillance by the Securitate during the 1970's - 1980's project (REM-2008-052), and is co financed by the European Union (Education, Andiovisual and Culture Executive Agency -EACEA) throngh the “EUROPE, FOR CITIZENS” — 2007-2013 — Action 4 "Active European Remembrance” Programme. Project coordinator: Associate Professor, Ph. D., Virgiliu Tartu Members of the team: Cristina Anisescu (Executive Manager) Florentina Budeanci Livin Burlacu Daniela lamandi Cipriana Moisa Adelina Oana Stefan Scientific advisers: Associate Professor, Ph. D., Smaranda Vultur (The West University of Timisoara) Associate Professor, Ph. T., Tonut Costea (Babes-Balyai University, Cluj-Napoca) Associate Professor, Ph. 1D., loan Marius Bucur (Babes-Rolyai University, Cluj-Napoca) Scientific researcher: Ioan Ciupea (The National Museum of Transylvanian History, Cluj-Napoca) Editorial committee: Virgiliu Tartu Cristina Anisescu ‘Translation: Vlad Petrea Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Nationale a RomAniei Learning History Through past Experiences : Ordinary Citizens under Surveillance by the Securitate during the 1970's-1980’s / Cristina Anisescu, Florentina Budeanc#, Liviu Burlacu, ... ; coord.: Virgiliu Leon Tariiu ; trad.: Vlad Petrea. - Bucuresti : Editura CNSAS, 2009 ISBN 978-973-88289-3-3 L Anisescu, Cristina IL Budeanci, Florentina i Burlacu, Liviu Iv. ‘Tarim, Virgilin [eon (coord,) v. Petrea, Vlad (trad.) 351,746.1(498)" 1970/1980" ISBN: 978-973-88289-3-3 Copyright ® 2009-CNSAS: All rights reserved. This publication may not be reproduced, stored in retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, pho- tocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the. publishers.LEARNING HISTORY THROUGH PAST EXPERIENCES: Ordinary Citizens under the Surveillance of Securitate during the 1970s-1980s ‘Coordinator: Virgiliu Tarau Authors: Cristina Anisescu Florentina Budeanca Liviu Burlacu Daniela Tamandi Cipriana Moisa Adelina Oana Stefan Translation: Vlad Petrea ‘CNSAS Publishing House Bucharest 2009CONTENTS Daily life under surveillance. A foreword. {Virgiliu Jardu, Ph.D., Vicepresident of the National Council for the Study of the Securitatc Archives) Part I. Ways to perform surveillance during the 1970's and 1980's I. 1. Reasons for the surveillance of ordinary citizens. (Cipriana Moisa) I. 2. Securitate’s methods, means and techniques of performing surveillance. (Liviu Burlacu) 1.3. Securitate's informers - from recruitment to abandonment. (Cristina Aniseseu) 1. 4. Surveillance of the population by audio and video means Operative Technique. (Dana lamandi) I. 5. The stakeout: means of informative investigation, (Adelina Oana Stefan) LG. The secret control and censorship of correspondence. (Denisa Bodeanu) 17. The searches, (Denisa Bodeanu) 1. 8. Investigations done by the Securitate within the last decades of communism. (Dana lamandi) L. 9. Preventive measures used by the Securitate. (Liviu Burlacu) 1.10. The ban on leaving the country. (Adelina Oana Stefan) Part IT. Documents from the CNSAS archive regarding methods of citizens surveillance during 1970 — 1980 Part II]. Fragments from interviewees’ confessions Part IV. The impact of reading the Securitate file on the person previously under surveillance (Denisa Rodeanu) Bibliography Abbreviation list We would like io thank all the people interviewed during this project ! 39 49 58 67 69 9 89 8 105Daily life under surveillance. A foreword. Tn the final scene of the movie Other people's lives, taking place in a big library in Berlin, the former STAS/ officer who had been in charge of the Laszlo case buys a book, which had been dedicated to him by the person he kept under surveillance. As the salesman asks whether the book is to be a present for someone, the answer is short: No, it is for me. One way or the other, the sonnets for good people would close the relationship circle between past and present. The book's author would make that which he had understood of his life under the STASI surveillance, publicly known, and the officer who protected him, without being able to guard him against the loss of the loved one, would reccive anonymously, the gratitude of the one under surveillance. It was a book. We can suspect what was written in the novel's pages. Or we can only wonder. That which becomes relevant is the fact that the book's two covers contained not only other people's lives. But also the lives of the ones who lived under communism, whose destinies had been influenced by the way STASI, the fearsome political police of the German Democratic Republic, acted in order to control their lives. Vie- tims and executioners alike, people under surveillance, informers and officers would exit the vicious circle of the past in order to try and reconcile with it, And it, the past, cannot be understood unless it is known. As much as possible, and not in black and white, but in many shades of grey, painted on the yellow pages of the files that record the every day life of those under surveillance during the communist re- gime. In a similar yet distinct manner, by means of a documentary (Under surveillance by the Securitate, the 1970's and 1980's) and the studies contained in this book, we tried to tackle this problem, offering a nuanced reading on the lives of ordinary people under the surveil- lance of the Securitate, during the last two communist decades in Ro- mania. We assumed from the very beginning that the surveillance is a 7limited subject, which cannot answer all the legitimate questions from an epistemological point of view. As a result, we have only strived in ‘this project to illustrate and explain the way it was done, the way it was perceived and understood by those who experienced it after they have been exposed to their own destiny described in the Securitate files. For that reason, our approach does not include other specific dimensions of the Securitate’s actions. These will undoubtedly be the aim of future CNSAS initiatives. ‘The base of this undertaking has been structured with the aid of the information and documents stored in the archives of the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (CNSAS). Used as primary historical sources, as well as. catalysts of individual memory, the files stored in the archive of the former Securitate illustrate specific dimensions of the way in which this institution and its employees have kept the Romanian society under surveillance during last century's 1970's and 1980's. Without trying to document exemplary biographies, elite personalities of that age, the project aims to bring into focus the documented voices of ordinary people from that time. Of those people who, while trying to recover their past through accessing their own file, understood that it must be shared with others, beyond the borders of individual memory. In fact, the research project has two complementary objectives, materialized into a double dimension, as a documentary and historical study. The first is to try to explain the way in which a key institution of the communist state in Romania, the Securitate, has acted during last century's 1970's and 1980's, to control, keep under surveillance and repress the citizens in order to domesticate them ideologically. The sec- ond, complementary objective is not only to allow ordinary voices to tell their experience of that time, but especially to remember it within the context of reading the Securitate file. Thus, the storytelling of the past, combined in the video, text, documentary, sound equation be- comes - we hope - believable, and especially, nuanced, In such a context, it is perhaps useful to remind of the fact that any documentary is subjective in essence. Although all documentaries aim at presenting the truth about the past, in light of the accessible and usable sources, the undertaking remains partial, and implicitly, subjec- tive. The decisions that underlie its creation - from choosing the sub-ject, to the actors who bring the past to life, unto the way the editing is done or the sound if chosen-belong to those who directly participated in its making: producers, researchers, camera operators, script writers and director, Moreover, the resource for its creation - be it documental, video, or otherwise -, is fragmentary, it being selected and used to achieve the aims of the film making crew, It is, in fact, a different way of presenting history. This however, as the honored American historian Arthur Schlesinger used to say, “Cannot happen on its own, You can not insert a coin into a machine for history to pop out of it”. History is written by historians for their peers, with the aim of explaining not only the past, but also the present. The situation is similar in the casc of documentaries, which however have certain features pertaining the means and methods em- ployed to making them. In fact, using the array of sources which even the historians use to reconstruct and explain the past, these films tell a story about it, one in which the storytelling gains in persuasiveness not only due to the text, but also due to the sound and image. It is a work of art which, if made in good faith, and with professionalism, can offer the public more than an exclusivist version of the past — one in which propaganda or ideologically set films excel — but a balanced one, in which its voices become complementary and illuminating in relation to the multiple facets of the time or subjects in question. The characters in this film are the ordinary people and the Securitate. The script is written based on memories of the people and on the archive left by the former Securitate. The script and the directing of the movie have been constructed gradually, as the research advanced, being influenced by the overlapping of the images deriving from the ‘written past and the memory’s present. The result is meant to be a con- tribution to the more profound and nuanced understanding of a past, which seems to never end. Beyond the exemplarity of individual destinies, the actors in our film are collective characters, pluralized on an institutional level through the collective memory and institutional memory — when it comes to the archive of the Securitate. The recollection, remembrance and discovery mediated by the documents created by the former Sccuritate regarding the subjects of its activitics transform individual destinies into distinct voices of collective memory. These small clarifications are meant to explain the essence of 9our approach. The documentary was created after hundreds, perhaps thousands of hours of study, during which the members of the project have researched, analyzed and selected information from the archive of the former Securitate. Then, in order to keep the project away from getting stuck on the level of documents and photographs that were discovered, the same researchers, along with the director and the pro- duction team, took more than 50 interviews of people who, knowingly — after consulting their own Securitate file — accepted to narrate their personal experiences during the communist period. The research team deliberately chose not to interview people with a political pre eminence during that time, but ordinary people who visited the research room of the CNSAS. Still, in order to cover some punctual aspects, but also the his- torical context, according to the way any documentary is made; aca- demic personnel (historians and specialists) whose expertise could make the connection between individual experience and social memory have been interviewed. Although we have tried to contact those on the other side of the barricade — information officers of the time — our attempts have not been successful. Thus, we have made the decision to complete the film with documents and analysis that can illustrate the specificity of the surveillance activities, in order for those who are interested to be able to discover and understand, at the crossing between memory, docu- ment and historical reconstruction, their content during the communist regime's mature period in Romania. They are contained in a volume, which completes and explains the contents of the doumentary. The studies found within, based on the archive research and oral historic investigation, illustrate dimensions that are specific to the activities of surveillance undertaken by the Securitate against ordinary citizens. The selection of documents, their typology, as well as the fragments from the shown interviews, are meant to clarify the formal contents as well as the symbolical dimensions of the informative surveillance. The book’s ten chapters are dedicated to the techniques cm- ployed by the Securitate in order to keep watch on the Romanian soci- ety. Without having any of the colleagues try to illustrate one of these exhaustively, the efforts to organize and categorize the elements spe- cific to the activity of informative surveillance are worth noting. From the reasons underlying the triggering of such an action, continuing with 10the means, methods and techniques used (informative network, con- trol of correspondence, stakeout, audio-video recording, searches, in- vestigations) and ending with the effects of such an action (preventive or punitive measures), the interested reader will be offered the full pic- ture of political, technical and police like scaffolding of an Informative Surveillance File. Just like in the film's case, in researching for the book, the team was motivated by finding general elements, in their diversity, typical cases, not exemplary ones, in order to be able to illus- trate the structural frame of informative surveillance. Because the book was designed also with teaching purposes in mind, beyond its scientifical base, we have chosen a splitting of each article in three parts. In the first one, the structural elements of the sub- ject under surveillance are analyzed from a historical, legal and politi- cal perspective. The concepts and typical operations are defined within this context, with an emphasis on the mutations typical to the analyzed time frame. The second part is dedicated to the historical sources. Each author has selected from the documentary materials, respectively from the project's oral history archive, those materials that illustrate the spe- cific aspects of the informative surveillance. The last part is the one in which the authors — trying to offer a didactic dimension to their work — call upon the critical thinking of the public, in order to set the notions, concepts or operations described, based on the documentary material that was used, ‘The final chapter of this book emphasizes the personal experi- ence of those who were interviewed after they have read their file. Beyond the life stery, present with cach speech, within this chapter are brought to light the subjective and objective aspects of the contact with one's own file: from the bureaucratic-administrative ones, to the ones pertaining personal motivations or finding answers within the contents of the informative surveillance file. It is a captatio benevolentiae, which, although has an atypical, perhaps even oxymoronic — if we may say so — position, being situated at the end of the book, aims to be an incen- tive for the reader to contact the CNSAS in order to access their own file, to fulfill their right to knowledge and understanding through past experiences. ae The end of the cold war and that of the Eastern and Central 1Europe communist regimes opened up the access to the archives of former information agencies. Confronting the past had become pos- sible from the perspective of such information as well, and has contrib- uted to the states’ philosophy shift regarding the administration of these documentary resources which are fundamental to recovering the ideo- logically corrupted memory, Opening these archives, making them publicly available by creating institutions that would realize their his- torical potential, respectively the one specific to a transitional institu- tion, has become a reality in most states which have crossed over from an autocratic regime to the democratic one. In fact, the inheritance of the past has become a theme, which the states have tackled from the perspective of a memory policy. Official documents have been elaborated by representative in- stitutions (parliamentary committee) or by professional members of civil society (historians and social sciences specialists), which contain reparatory measures for the autocracies’ victims as well as principles of social reconciliation through the retrieval of historical memory. Its re- covery, beyond public assumptions, legal implications or symbolical- commemorative gestures, is — as proven — a continual process, which makes the information created and managed by the repressive struc- tures of the autocratic state, a belonging of democracy. Within this con- text, cooperation between the democratic state and civil society has the purpose of contributing, not just to the reconciling with the political past, with its inheritance in various social spaces, but also to reconcile the society by knowing all the traumas it has been subjected to during, the totalitarian period. Beyond official, legal, historical or institutional initiatives of recovering the historical truth, it has become obvious that the miracu- lous remedy for social reconciliation can not be administered in unique doses, that the deep wounds of the past cannot be erased only by pub- lic assumptions, without serious debate, where all those who are inter- ested and affected by the past would attend. This project aims to be a contribution to this knowledge by debate, by appealing to document and memory. It is not a vindictive contribution, but one which, through the confrontation with the traces of the past (memories, documents, images, opinions), offers the possi- bility to understand and most importantly, to explain. 12weak Many of the former Securitate employees have tricd, @ poste- riori, to express the qualitative existence of two such institutions dur- ing the communist regime in Romania. An evil one, allogeneic, subor- dinated to a foreign power, responsible for the repression time and the abuse on the Romanian citizens (beginning with the 1940's until the beginning of the seventh decade), and another one, good, nationalis- tic, legitimate, made out of patriots who tried to defend the interests and security of the Romanian state, which manifested during the last two decades of the communist regime. Without arguing with this inter- pretation — this will be the aim of a future monograph dedicated to the Securitate, which we hope will be ready in 2010 — we will try to posi- tion ourselves within our project in a social dimension, at the level of analysis and historical reconstruction. With the necessary methodological precautions, with a wide documentary basis for making arguments, with the extensive use of the oral history interviews, we hope we will overcome the sketchiness of a valuable judgement, specific to such an interpretation, while try- ing to illustrate the structural and operational components of informa- tive surveillance. Or, to put it otherwise, we will analyze an aspect from a future history of the Securitate, made from the perspective of those under surveillance, while trying to find out what was to be found at the origin of triggering such an action, what kind of dangers would initiate the opening of a file, how would it materialize — in distinct stages and operations — and what effects would that have on the subjects under surveillance. We have chosen ordinary people from the Romania of the time as actors for our project, all of them subject to informative surveillance: workers or intellectuals, former political prisoners, people without political inclinations who aren't party members, both women and men, young or older. The criteria which we based our selection of actors upon, had to take into account their voluntary agreement, after they had consulted their own file at the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives, as well as respect all the elements regarding the protection of private information, ethics and professional deontological norms within scientific research. We cannot end without thanking the team of researchers who participated in all the stages of project development. A word of appre- ciation and thanks goes out to all those who accepted to be interviewed, 13sharing their life's story with us. Gratitude and the hope for future col- laboration go to the director Nicolae Mirgineanu, the one who knew how to masterfully harness — along with his excellent associates — the research that was done and make the documentary. Finally yet importantly, thanks go to the institutions that sup- ported the development of this project, both logistically and financially. Especially to the “Europe for citizens” program of the Education, Au- diovisual and Culture Agency which provided part of the project's fi- nancing. To the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Ar- chives and all its employees who helped finalize the project from an economical, legal or administrative perspective. To the National Film Archive, for the fruitful cooperation in making the documentary. Also, to the partner institutions for the initial dissemination of the project's result, the History and Philosophy faculty of the Babes-Bolyai Univer- sity in Cluj and the The Office of the Federal Commissioner in Berlin (“Bundesbeauftragte fiir die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der chemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik”). Without all this support, our initiative would have probably re- mained a draft. Bucharest, September 2009 Virgiliu Tariu 14Part I. Ways to perform surveillance during the 1970's and 1980's 1.1. Reasons for the surveillance of ordinary citizens. Informative surveillance was, according to the Securitate rheto- ric, an activity of complex verification of information regarding the planning or committing of crimes against state security, which was meant to prevent, uncover and eliminate them. Beyond the official lingo, the surveillance activities were de- signed to identify any threat, be it potential or real, to the Party, its leaders and the communist state. The political subordination of all the institutions and social cat- egorics to only one objective - the perpetuation of the regime — has been constant in Romania during the 1960's — 1980's. In such a con- text, the Securitate’s mission was not only a prophylactic one, but also one that would narrow individual, constitutionally cstablished rights. As such, the informative surveillance activity was being orga- nized and taking place in all the targets, places and areas of interest for defending the state's security, among Romanian or foreign citizens who could have committed any hostile acts. Among the targets protected by surveillance activities, according to the directives of the time, were to be found: defending the national economy and state secrets; identify- ing and countering any potential threats to the state's interests. As such, the Securitate was interested in identifying and annihilating the mani- festations, behavior and connections of Romanian or foreign citizens, which would be under suspicion of being capable of committing crimes against the regime, or any other antisocial acts, but which don’t consti- tute a reason for informative surveillance action yet. The surveillance could take place against a person, a group of people or an institution, 15as long as there were actions identified as jeopardizing to state security. For this purpose, an informative surveillance file would be opened (DUI). Such an opening would mean the identification of a state of danger, based on alerts coming from the agency, the reports from operative agents and the approval of their superiors. Afterwards, a plan of actions would be created, with the aim of thoroughly research- ing the assumed state security endangering acts. With the aid of the informative network, and the typical technique, the officers would record any information that could prove the hatcful actions. The gear put in motion by the surveillance would target the subjects, their entourage (family, relationships, workplace), and all those areas that could be of operative interest. There were common elements between the ones under surveil- lance and those doing the surveillance, both categories being watched and. verified by officers, The possibility of crossing from one category to the other, from informers to being under surveillance and vice-versa, was not an exception among the actions of the Securitate. When some- one became a possible asset to the Securitate, they would be “pin pointed” in order to attempt recruiting them. Their capacity to work was assessed, their past was evaluated, and all the relevant data re- ported by the pin pointed subject would be tested via the informative network. Afterwards, a legend would be devised on how that person was to be met and interrogated regarding their collaboration, According to operative interest, but also to the way the person subjected to recruitment would react to the requests, they would be integrated in the informative network or not, If an informer would cease to prove useful to the Securitate, he would be abandoned, placed into passive mode (the information provided was no longer useful from an ‘operative perspective) or an informative surveillance file (DUI) could be opened, if he was dishonest in his stories, or if their own hateful actions could be discovered, What's interesting is not just the reason for opening the Securitate file — these can be quite diverse (ideas like being under surveillance for telling jokes, listening to Radio Free Europe or The Voice of America, having relatives “outside”, having contacts with strangers have been confirmed by documents) -, but also the fact that, with time, the rea- sons for triggering the surveillance have become more complex, as the communist regime matured. The modifications were highly dependent 16on the stage of the regime, and the higher share of one reason or an- other was directly proportional to the growing discontent of the popu- lation, generated by a political and economical system that functioned like a citadel under siege. As such, during 1945 — 1964 mass repression is established, against all those who, by political, social or economical origin were identified as a danger to the communist regime, The guilt was not based ‘only on present facts, but, especially, on facts of the past. Belonging to historical political parties, manifesting discontent with the party and state rule, the socio-economical category one would belong to, the opposition towards collectivization, these were not only reasons for informative surveillance, but also for arrest, being sent to work camp and colonies, or home dislocation. The sphere of reasons for opening a file after 1965 was bigger, being connected to the actions of preventing, danger against the communist regime by the Securitate. As of 1965, even though the past continued to play a big role in this, the present became decisive for the start of such an operation, Relationships with strangers, listening to forcign radio stations and spreading the news transmitted by them, the intent to elope, making depreciatory com- ments against the regime were all good reasons for opening a DUT. With good or ridiculous reasons, the surveillance aimed at socio- professional categories, groups or people who were potentially dan- gerous for the communist state. A possible classification — selective and partial, but documented — of the reasons behind triggering an in- formative surveillance, based on archive information, but also on con- fessions from the people who read their Securitate files, would reveal: 1. Surveillance based on the General Informative Surveillance plan (of people, strategic targets or in order to assess the “population's mood”) 2. Actions generated because of expressed discontent with party and state rule, with internal and external policy of the communist state, comments regarding the economic, social, cultural conditions, free- dom of speech and that of religion. Also, praising the West, the life quality and freedom which the states in that region would offer, the correspondence with people within that geopolitical area, or the spread of hateful inscriptions was considered just as dangerous. 3. The socio-economical origin, ideologically interpreted, as be- longing to a socio-economical class. Usually, two categories of people 7were targeted: ~ intellectuals, the bourgeois, landlords, bankers, tradesmen, law- yers or other similar categories; - descendents of former legionnaires and of historical party mem- bers 4, Belonging or participating to the creation of parties and illegal organizations: historical parties; groups of armed resistance — par- tisans; groups of various ethnicities; unofficial groups with cultural inclinations etc. 5. Former political detainees, members of the Legion, of masonry (at home or abroad). In the specialized, top-secret Securitate publications, the existence of “criminals” was reported, who “while under arrest as well as after their release, have manifested a preoccupation for initiating political actions of a subversive nature” (The Securitatea Magazine no.3 (55)- 1981. the Ministry of Internal Affairs. State Security Department/ ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 8712, vol. 2, p. 20) 6. Activities considered ,,illegal”, based on religious or conscious- ness beliefs: a) surveillance based on religious grounds focused on the people who were or had been part of various cults, sects or religious groups, and held or had held leadership positions (bishop, priest, preacher and other similar ones) in the greco-catholic cult or in the illegal sects and groups (the Greco-catholic group and other forbidden cults, ,,sects”, missionary activities). b) various groups, practicing martial arts, yoga, transcendental medi- tation or anthroposophy. 7. Listening to forbidden radio stations — people who contacted foreign radio stations (Free Europe, Deutsche Welle, B.B.C, etc.) in order to obtain discs or transmit songs to the Romanian speaking shows; reading foreign magazines and newspapers; spreading the news. 8. Consistent contact abroad: - people who requested approval to permanently leave the country or to marry foreigners; - people who traveled abroad for work or personal pleasure and refused to return to the country when their visas expired; - people who had been repatriated or who returned late from their travels abroad; 18- Romanian citizens who visited foreign agencies based in Roma- nia, outside of official framework and those who kept unofficial rela- tionships with foreigners, if the thorough verification of the informa- tion would result in valuable information regarding such activities. 9. Ethnical reasons which would turn into nationalist-irredentist acts, in larger Hungarian circles, especially among intellectuals, many of them lacking any political or criminal history. 10. Attempts to clope — people who were suspected of attempting to clope or remaining abroad illegally, as well as those advised by the Securitate not to leave the country for work or personal interest. Along with the tendency of some doctors, artists and even teachers to not retum from their travels abroad, the number of people consid- ered to be preoccupied with organizing “anarchical" actions aimed at obtaining the approval to leave the country or cross the border illegaly had risen during 1978-1989. 11. The surveillance of a target — institutions, economical or cul- tural units — especially certain socio-professional categories were tar- geted, whose activities could endanger the socialist order and lawful- ness — e.g. gynecologists in the target files. 19I. 2. Securitate’s methods, means and techniques of performing surveillance The informative-operative actions were the essence of Securitate’s activities. In other words, a set of measures and activities were focused on the surveillance of a single person or a group of people in order to record their actions against “state security”. In the C.N.S.A.S. archive, they take the form of individual (DUD), group, target or issue surveillance files. Such activities were not invented by the Securitate, but are char- acteristic to the actions of all secret services. That which is specific to the Sccuritate, as a new institution, created in 1948, is the fact that all the activities were meant to establish and sustain a totalitarian political regime. In this context, its legal mission of “armed hand of the Roma- nian Communist Party” manifests itself as actions aimed against all those who are assumed to be or identified as enemies of the communist ideology and state. Over time, even though the motives remained the same, the changes that occurred are tied to the weight of the actions at a social and individual level. In fact, there was an evolution from mass terror, characteristic in the beginning, to administrative-bureaucratic coercion. Violence and abuse made way for fear build upon bureaucracy. Al- though the reasons for the actions of the Securitate during the 1950's and 1960's made reference to social and ideological categories such as belonging to bourgeois parties, the legionary movement, espionage, economical sabotage within the context of agricultural merging of small producers into cooperatives, beginning with the 1970's, but especially within the next decade, the primary reasons were to become those re- lated to illegally crossing the border, listening to and spreading the news heard on forbidden radio stations, one’s opinion regarding the communist regime and its leaders. 20At the heart of any operative-informative action lay a notice, a referral or any other information of such a nature to attract the attention of the Securitate as a potential threat to the communist regime. Textu- ally, the definition used by the Securitate for the term operative situa- tion was: “the ensemble of known, assessed and evaluated states and circumstances upon which the tasks and concrete measures of preven- tion are established in relation to the targets and attempts made by for- cign espionage services and their agencies, organizations, circles and people from the outside and any other hostile elements to act against the sovereignty, independence, integrity and security of the Romanian state.” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no, 8712, vol. 1, part 13, p. 6-7). In the institution's terminology, this “beginning” was called first referral information. It could be obtained in different ways: denounce- ment, informative research from other surveillance cases, inquiries, or automatically, this last aspect being more likely to happen in the field of economics, Once this situation was under way, depending on its nature (eco- nomic, social, political or cultural), an entire array of personnel and means, typical to the various specialized structures of the Securitate, was mobilized. It is worth mentioning that over time, the Securitate was rebuilt, by the creation and dissolution of services and directions of action, but its essence, the informative-operative activity, has re- mained the same. Depending on the importance given to the first referral infor- mation, a group consisting of Securitate personnel is created, which prepares an opening report for the surveillance file endorsed by the superiors, depending on the case, by the head of service, of Office or of the County Inspectorate. Within its contents can be found the identi- fication data for the person or persons under surveillance, the means of surveillance along with the names of the personnel involved, as well as the precise terms of action (the action plan). Periodically, an cvalua- tion of the case was made, and measures were taken accordingly. In order to solve an operative situation, the informative net- work, tapping technique, stakeout, control of internal or external con- nection channels which could be used for hostile purposes, security reports as well as personal information gathering through official rela- 21tionships and operative connections of Securitate’s officers were used. The means for solving it also implied the use of specific tech- niques. In the language of the Securitate, these were: a) The legendizing — the verisimilar version used to ensure the plotting and secrecy of actions and mislead the enemy. b) The informative combination — the array of informative-op- erative measures, judiciously combined with a well determined tactic, used. for solving more difficult security tasks. c) The infiltration of the informer (or officer) — the legendized infiltration within an entourage, a target or environment which was of interest for the security of the state, d) The secret entry — the legendized or hidden entry of one or more personnel into certain rooms, with the purpose of solving secu- rity operative tasks. ¢) The secret search — the legendized or hidden control of rooms, means of transportation, luggage or objects belonging to people who are of interest to state security, with the purpose of clarifying informa- tion or documents, or research certain elements which hold an opera- tive value. f) The misinforming — the action of placing data and informa- tion, especially modified in order to conceal their lack of authenticity, on the enemy, or deliberately launching influential news and informa- tion in order to sustain and promote operative interests. &) The operative game — the array of informative-operative meth- ods and means usually employed for direct confrontation with espio- nage services, extremist-terrorist organizations, hateful circles or orga- nizations abroad, with the purpose of discovering and thwarting the hostile plans devised or intercepting and maintaining their actions un- der counter-informative control. h) The informative research — the act of clarifying information with a solid evidence of veracity, which is done by investigating any person of interest directly or under the cover of other state bodies (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no. 8712, vol, 1, part 13, p. 6-7) ‘The simultaneous use of all methods is not obligatory, the use of one or another is what determines the complexity of a case. Concretely, the act of informative examination or surveillance was divided into three complexity levels, namely: - Informative examination, which produced the examination 22brief, within a period of 6 months at the most, with regular analysis of the level of information clarification. - Informative surveillance, which is organized and conducted for all the targets, places and areas of interest for defending the state security, among Romanian or foreign citizens suitable to committing hostile acts, as well as for defending the national economy, protecting state secrets and identifying and countering any attempts to provoke or recruit for actions against the interests of the Romanian state. - Informative investigation, representing the action of com- plex verification of information regarding the planning or committing of crimes which fall under the competence of the Securitate, targeted at those who are suspect, in order to prevent them from bringing to frui- tion their hostile intents or plans of action and annihilating them be- fore any consequences occur which could damage the state security. (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no. 8712, vol. 1, part 13, p. 6-7) In practice, the informative surveillance started usually with the opening of the examination brief, which could be switched to a more complex form, of informative investigation according to the serious- ness of the acts committed by the subject. The identification of committed acts implies the use of an array of specific means and methods. First, the identification of informers among the people close to the subject was attempted, with an aim to discover any detail regarding the domestic behavior, the activity un- dertaken, opinions, the view on the regime, relatives, Under the guidance of a resident or Securitate’s personnel, grouped into an informative network, the informers were, according to instructions, periodically forwarding written reports known as “infor- mative notes” to the network coordinator about the acts commited by the person under surveillance. The notes were coming together as pieces (documents) in the file of the one under surveillance, and analysis re- ports were periodically prepared based on them, which were made by the personnel responsible with watching the person in question. In the situation where the information obiained from informers would prove insufficient, incomplete or — if the case had a higher de- gree of difficulty to begin with (relationships with foreign citizens, in- subordinate stances against the regime, the spread of documents which criticized the communist regime, etc.) — other methods would be used, with the most usual ones being the interception of correspondence, the 23installation of operative technology for listening in on telephone con- versations, stakeout or the surveillance of the subject in public spaces, doing secret house or workplace searches. The use of these methods was being stipulated in the action plan, along with their duration. It is worth mentioning the fact that within the organization of the Securitate, there were specialized services for applying some spe- cific means and methods; the special Unit for installing and using the operative technique “T”; the special operative technique research, plan- ning and production Unit “P”; the special Unit for screening hidden writings and graphical expertise “S"; the special radio transmission and counterintelligence Unit “R"; the special stakeout and investigations Unit “F"; the “D" service for misinforming (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no. 13219, vol. 4, p.1). The application of orders provided in the action plans implied collaboration between these services, manifesting itsclf as a massive correspondence each other themselves, documents (reports, addresses, investigation notes) which are to be found in the file of the one under surveillance. At the end of operations, one or more reports were pre- pared which would contain the results of the use of special means. Pieces that could be used as evidence, such as intercepted letters, pho- tographs obtained during stakeout along with the identity of the people in the photographs, sketches regarding the configuration of the subject's home marking the spot where the tapping device had been installed, ete, were kept in files, Regardless of the methods, means, or form of surveillance used, the most important aspect was the secrecy of the operations. According to the ,,Securitatea” magazine: “As a peculiarity of researching the al- ready active cases, before beginning the criminal prosecution, we men- tion that it is mandatory for it to take place in secrecy, while strictly abiding to the rules of conspiracy” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no. 8712, vol. 2, part 28, p. 77) Nevertheless, there have been cases where the conspiracy had been broken even by the Securitate’s personnel. The secrecy of the informative actions of the Securitate is best reflected in the confessions of people who used to be under surveil- lance, who, to their surprise, only became aware of the period during which they were under surveillance when they read their file. Once a series of conclusions regarding the deeds of the one 24under surveillance were obtained, a report would be created, suggest- ing the suspect be warned, which, depending on the situation, was followed by the target being placed under debate among his work- place colleagues. When the object of the surveillance was a group of people, usually created as an ad hoc group, whose activity would by-pass the regime's ideology, the measure of entourage collapse would be taken. If the committed acts were found to be of greater seriousness, criminal investigations would be undertaken. It is only now, after threatening and keeping the one in ques- tion under surveillance for the promise of them giving up their “nega- tive” opinions, that the surveillance file is closed, ‘This would imply taking a bureaucratic path. Creating a sur- veillance closure report by the Securitate personnel who had been in charge of the case, its approval by the superiors, in bricf, a process similar to the previously presented ones. In many situations, the closure report is accompanied by rec- ommendations and measures of how the acts and the other people ob- served during the surveillance can be exploited in other informative- operative situations. After the approval of the closure report, the file is classified within the archive of the Securitate and integrated in the in- formative Fund. The subject's data along with the archive file number are being recorded and stored in the general document filing cabinet (C.G.D.), becoming a means of evidence which can be accessed at anytime. Tn the situation when the subject becomes a suspect again, the file is reopened or a new file is opened, with the afferent stages, and with the specification of the reason for the first surveillance. 25I. 3. Securitate’s informers - from recruitment to abandonment. The two instances of power within the communist state (the party and the Securitate) have had complementary social control and consciousness forming functions, with the predilect use of manipula- tion by indoctrination, terror and fear redistribution, and a climate of general threat. No matter whether it was surveillance, investigations or enquiries, information censorship or the monitoring of citizen's lives, the Securitate was always supported by the multitude of “eyes and cars”, especially recruited to use these mechanisms of punishment and. con- trol, namely, the informative network. I. What is the informative network ? The Informative network (R.I.) represents: ~ the structural and indispensable element of any secret service, used for gathering, verifying and transmitting data; - all the agents, informers, associates, residents etc. — generi- cally called “sources” — used by the Securitate and Police for gathering and transmitting information regarding people or problems that come within their attention; - the main clement in the informative-operative activity of knowl- edge and prevention “of any intent, deed, situation or circumstance meant to bring harm to the interests of defending the state security” (according to The instructions approved during the Board of State Se- curity Department meeting on June 24%, 1987 -ACNSAS, Documen- tary Fund, file 123, vol. 41, p. 3); - ,the infantry from an invisible front, and the main source of information” (Lieutenant - Colonel Constantin Hulubas, Whar reasons did the informer have for accepting the collaboration? ~The “Securitatea” magazine, no, 4 (36), 1976 - ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 2558, vol. 9, p. 56); 26- ,the backbone for supporting all security actions and mea- sures” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 2558, vol. 23, p. 14) In the documents created by the Securitatc, the informative net- work is synonymous to agency. In practice, the agency refers to all the sources of an officer or of a Securitate unit at a given time. TI. The content of the informative network during 1970-1989 1972 — informers, associates, residents, hosts/meeting homes (ac- cording to the "Order regarding the work with the informative network” project in ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 93, vol.6, p. 147-152 ).; 1976 — informers, associates, residents, hosts/mecting homes (see The management of informative network contact, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 15.11.1976 - ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 2524, pp. 1- 31); 1981 -— informers, associates, residents, hosts/meeting homes, trustworthy persons (according to the Project regarding the management and progress of the informative-operative activity af se- curity forces, 11.05.1981, in ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 123, vol. 42, p. 122 ); 1987 — informers, residents, supporters, hosts/mecting homes (ac- cording to Instructions No. D — 00180/ 1987 regarding the activity of creation and use of the Securitate's informative network, ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file nr, 123, vol. 41, pp. 3-25). The term favoured by the Sccuritate was agent or source (dur- ing the first two decades after the creation of the Securitate) and in- former or associate (for the last part of its existence), According to the directives, as well as the actual study of the network files (files of those under surveillance), there is a differentiation between the categories of the informative network, which was made according to the difficulty of tasks, the level of training, the level of culture and according to the level of involvement the one recruited by the Securitate had. Categories of informative network — general characteristics Recruitment candidate — status of one who was of interest to the Securitate and Police bodies as being the most suitable to serve 27their operative interests, in order to lure them into collaboration and nelusion in the informative network. The candidates were verified and studied discreetly, without being aware of the assessment for recruitment. The Securitate Network Record includes associate files with the recruitment candidate status - failed recruitments. Keeping operative track of recruitment candidates demonstrates the perseverance of the Securitate to keep pursuing a person who had been pin pointed as a potential informer and to avoid making the mistake again, not all can- didates proposed for recruitment have files in the operative record, Associate (collaborator) — a person recruited by the Securitate by following the same procedures as for other categories, with limited or occasional possibilities of delivering operative valuable informa- tion, The associate could be upgraded to the superior category of in- formers or, vice-versa, in the inferior one of supporters, according to the value of their results, the information they had access to or the skills demonstrated during their relationship with the officer. Informer — a person with skills and means of gathering infor- mation who would gather valuable data for the Securitate in an orga- nized and secret fashion, transmitting them to the officer or resident, under their direct guidance. ‘The informers were added to the network after a previous study, and were abandoned in case of self-disclosure (willing of accidental), lack of access to the operative valuable data (“were out of possibili- ties"), evasion refusal to transmit information. If their removal from the network was considered inappropriate, they could be downgraded (to supporter or host for a meeting home). Resident (in the internal information activity) - a person be- longing to the informative network who, under the guidance and sup- port of the Securitate. officer, would maintain contact with other people in the network, under conspirative conditions, in order to receive infor- mation from them and deliver it to the liason officer. The resident could not be used for recruiting informers, only for delivering or gathering data on the people under surveillance. They were selected among the reservists of the Securitate, the experienced informers and supporters. The supporter - a person belonging to the informative network used for the verification of data and information in a certain location, environment or for an issue of interest to the Securitate. For example: 28economical targets, dispatchers, command and control points, areas or environments frequented by foreigners within the perimeter of state frontier; communities - construction sites, education, art and culture institutions, military units etc. This category within the informative net- work was introduced in the 1980's with the mission of informative surveillance, gathering and transmitting ,first referral” information. Trustworthy person - a person within the informative network who would voluntarily and seeretly support the Securitate (at the re- quest of Securitate officers) and who, by the nature of their work and contact with people, environments, places and activities, would have the possibility to occasionally deliver information or perform certain tasks such as: positive influence, disinformation, entourage collapse etc, (see ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 123, vol. 42, p.122). The associates - informative sources- members of the P.C.R. were used by the Securitate in the same way as the other categories forming the informative network, except they would not have files opened and there was no signed commitment during the recruiting - the collaboration with the party being considcred a party duty. The recruiting procedure was final after receiving the written consent from the first secretary of the party body they would belong to. Meeting host (home) is the person who, based on a previous agreement with the officer, would accept to have their home, or by case, their workplace, used as a meeting place for informers, residents, or other members of the network, as well as for other current operative tasks. The host of the meeting home would not participate in these activities; neither did they know the identity of the people brought into their homes. HL. Recruiting the informers The recruitment process took place according to a plan, specifying: - the aim and reason for recruiting, - the investigation regarding biographical data of the candidate, - means of conspiracy — conspiralive/code name, passwords, legends, - means of retreat in case of recruitment failure. The efficiency of such an approach depended largely on the quality and results of the study done on the candidate up for recruit- ment, as well as the recruitment method itself. The operative employee/ 29officer responsible for the recruitment had to prepare and execute the entire process. The study of network files (informers’ files) available in the C.N.S.A.S. archive emphasizes the following aspects: - the recruitment was an extremely important stage, one that would influence the collaboration act as a warranty of faithfulness to the system - the multitude of documents referring to this process stands as proof for that (reports of discovering and gradually luring the candi- date into collaborating, contact reports, recruitment proposal reports, recruitment development reports, workplace or home investigation notes and, last but not least, the commitment signed by the associate); - during the last two decades of communism, there was a new informer profile, better trained, culturally superior to the one in the 1950's and 1960's, one who would get into the conspiracy role of source faster, sometimes motivated by other types of needs; - the reasons or aims for recruitment presented a vast diversity: Jack of informers for the targeted objective, the verification of other informers, the verification of information, the prevention of antisocial acts, economical and industrial counterintelligence, the surveillance of foreigners, positively influencing reactionary elements, frontier sur- veillance, ctc.; - the selection criteria used to recruit informers would aim at elements such as: opinion on state and party policy, patriotic feelings, objectivity, means, ability and skills for gathering operative valuable information, the possibility of keeping the collaboration a secret, the spirit of observation and initiative. What were the informer recruitment stages ? * The candidate search and selection. This is the process of identifying the people who could provide information of operative value for solving a case or the surveillance of a target. * The verification of information regarding the candidates pro- posed for recraitment The verification is an operative method that is typical to any secret service. In this case, it started with the recruiting process and would continue even after an informer's exclusion from the network. With this type of action, the Securitate would gather as much information as possible regarding the recruitment candidate (biographical data, fam- 30ily ties, relatives, friends, material means, profession, preference in spending their spare time, qualities and flaws, cultural and political knowledge ctc.), using a vast variety of methods. Officially, information would be obtained from Population Records, Police, Passport service, Romanian Communist Party units, workplace Management, the personnel office at work. Unofficially, information would be gathered from neighbors, friends, relatives, work colleagues, etc. ‘The completion and centralization of the gathered data would bring the process into its next phase - in person meeting and gradual luring into collaboration * The meeting in person and gradual luring into collaboration After the study of the recruitment candidate, the officer was bound to meet the informer in person, by stating a plausible reason, which would decide the method of recruitment. The talks with the future re- cruitment candidate were directed by the Securitate officer in order for the candidate to perceive the collaboration as “a duty towards country and party”, The persuasion methods used in the dialogue with the po- tential informer were extremely diverse - ranging from blackmail, by use of violence and threats, to persuasive means and positive influence - all this according to the candidate’s personality and status. The personal contact was followed by the development and con- solidation of a trustworthy relationship between the Securitate's officer and the recruitment candidate. The allurement is a lengthy process, meant to help the candidate get used to an operative situation, without him being aware of it all the time. © The recruitment itself ‘The recruitment itself was a crucial moment for the candidate as well as the recruiting officer. Based on the data gathered during the verification stage and the reasons for recruiting stated in the Recruit- ment proposal report, the officer would set the time and place where the recruitment would take place. This place was set cither at the Securitate headquarters, the Police station or at the home or workplace of the one recruited. The talk initiated by the officer during recruitment was aimed at work problems, family problems, without Icaving the impression of an investigation, thus verifying the previously gathered information. Ac- cording to the instructions, during recruitment, the following would 31have to be taken into account: a) creating a relaxed atmosphere in order to have a free and open conversation; b) preparing the candidate for receiving the task of collaborating with the Securitate; c) presenting the aim of the collaboration and signing the agree- ment; ) instructing the informer by giving assignments (meeting place, password, the person or target to be kept under surveillance), ‘These conditions were only applicable to the candidates who would accept the collaboration with the Securitate willingly, without any at- tempt to evade or refuse. ‘The recruitment procedure is described in the informers’ personal files, in the document titled: Repert on how the recruitment took place. Within its contents we find: the place, the time and recruitment method used by the Securitate officer, the legend, the candidate's behavior dur- ing and prior to the recruitment, the date the agreement was signed, conspirative name and liason officer. When the Securitate would pin point a candidate, but during the recruitment he/she would refuse to collaborate or the recruitment was inappropriate (due to operative reasons), then a report would be filed containing the reason for failure, with the suggestion of present- ing the report to the record service, In the case of a failed recruitment, a legendized retreat method would be prepared, which would leave the candidate thinking that the reason for the discussion was not that of recruiting an informer. What were the stakes of accepting to secretly collaborate with the Securitate ? In the article “What were the informer’s reasons. for accepting the collaboration ?”, published in the Securitatea Magazine, no. 4 (36), 1976 (see ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 2558, vol. 9, p. 57), Licu- tenant Colonel Constantin Hulubas made a summary of reasons for which people accepted to collaborate with the Securitate. a) when the informers were recruited based on patriotic feel- ings and politico-ideological beliefs, the main personal interests which determined them to accept a “secret and organized” collaboration were: ..the characteristic pleasure (passion) of certain categories 32of people, to engage in such tasks - avoiding the consequences ,,of acts which had broken certain moral norms of social conduit”; - avoiding the discrediting “at one’s workplace, in one's family or in the society”, public image deterioration or any aspect “that would deteriorate personal prestige”; ~ gaining ,support in solving a personal problem or in order to obtain privileges of any kind”; - obtaining material advantages, especially money; - for the simple belief that one “has someone” — ,,who could help in case of need”; - ,out of fear that the refusal to collaborate with the Securitate would lead to consequences for acts performed in the past one feels guilty about”; - ,out of the simple desire to rehabilitate a dubious political past”. b) when the informers were recruited through discrediting, black-mail and any other form of constraint - and whose interests were at odds - ,incompatible” with the Securitate’s purpose, the reasons to colaborate regarded the following aspects: - collaborating with the aim of ,,remaining passive, as a result of the misconception that becoming an associate for the Securitate meant becoming a «squealer» on one’s own colleagues and friends (in some situations there are some doubis due to religious beliefs); - accepting the collaboration formally, in order to cover up the lack of one’s faith in the ,,system's strength”. * Signing the agreement Signing the agreement was considered the stage which vali- dated the recruitment (through the associate's written consent) and the “commitment” to secretly collaborate with the Securitatc. The agreement is one of the pieces that form the informers" “personal file”, Sometimes, the informer would sign a written agree- ment to deliver correct information and keep the collaboration a secret, all in the presence of a Securitate officer. Except for the identification data, the agreement would also contain a general reference to patriotism, the person signing it commit- ting to delivering honest information. In the end, the conspirative/code name was mentioned, the name that was to be used for transmitting the 33informative reports. There are no clues or documented arguments for now, which can certify who actually came up with the code name. Sometimes this was done in agreement; sometimes the cognomen was used exclusively by the officer, without it being used by the recruit. There are many situations in which a person has received and used more nicknames during their collaboration with the Securitate. Beyond the wooden language, the Securitate’s officer would emphasize the fact that signing the agreement was matcrial evidence that could be used later on against the signatory. That also happened because in some cases, after signing the agreement, the recruit would no longer accept the collaboration or would pursue the accepted mis- sion only formally. Most of the times, such an attitude would transform the one doing the surveillance into the one under surveillance. Usually, the documents validating the recruitment also point out the reasons it was accepted for: - out of conviction (some people were open to it, accepting “freely”); - based on patriotic feelings; - based on compromising evidence; - based on constraint / forcefully — by using threats, psycho- logical or physical pressure. Examples of agreements (document excerpts): 1. The undersigned /... / from the village /... 4, county / ... /, student at / ... /, aware that our country is going through a new stage of building socialism, I want to make my contribution, as best as I can, to the liquidation of ideas hostile to the policy pursued by our country, In this way I undertake, that when I'll participate in situations which I consider contrary to current requirements, to aid the Securitate with data of interest. So, to that end, I will seek to remember the information which is of interest to the Securitate bodies, to make an effort in finding them out, to deliver them with sincerity, secretly, organized. Also, I will discuss these issues with no one, being fully aware of the laws of our State, and the fact that it would mean disclosing state secrets / ... / (ACNSAS, Network Fund, file no. 706, p. 15). 2. /... / Aware of the fact that defending the homeland is a duty of honor for every citizen of the Romanian Socialist Republic, I want to make my contribution by informing the Securitate organs of any matter 34or act which would harm national security. I undertake that any infor- mation will be delivered timely and will be real. T undertake that, by collaborating with the Securitate organs, I will not tell anyone, regard- less of our relationship at home or at work. ... The informative materi- als which I will provide will not be signed with my real name but the nickname of ,, Stefan” (ACNSAS, Network Fund, file no. 129, p. 15). IV. The Collaboration between Informers and the Securitate. 1. Educating and training the informers. Informers started their “mission” immediately after recruitment, but not before being “trained and educated” to work in the underground system. The liaison officer, who took “care” of all the procedures involved in getting to know and recruiting informers, became, by default, the pedagogue of his own network, responsible for training and development of personal quali- tics and informative abilities, providing secrecy (meeting places, link- ing system, preparing and delivering informative notes, etc.) and “fair, timely and objective reporting” of data in order for it to be exploited later by the Securitate. 2. Most of the times, the information received from informers would come as written notes - informative notes, In order to comply with the requirements of typical secret service activities, the note’s con- tent would have to contain the informer's account on certain situations, people under surveillance, witnesses of events or other aspects that could be of interest to the Securitate, and would have to bear the given nickname. Informative notes contained the following formal elements: a) the date the note was provided on b) the place / conspiracy home where it was delivered or made, c) the nickname of the informant d) the name ‘or nickname of the officer who received the note; it was usually the officer who managed the informer c) the body of data recorded, stored and written down by the informer regarding the person or problem under surveillance. In situations where the informers did not send the data as writ- ten notes, the officer was required to record verbally reported data, compiling report-notes / informative reports or summary-notes. 3. The liaison system and conspiracy homes The role of informers’ conspiratorial meetings, of “training and education of the informative network”, was to strengthen “the belicf 35that by collaborating with the Securitate, one would fulfill a patriotic duty to defend the socialist system, the independence and sovereignty of the motherland”, to “focus on training and development of the per- sonal qualities and informative abilities, on ensuring the secrecy of the collaboration and on the need to timely, accurately and objectively re- all data and information of operative value, “(sce instructions no. D —00180/198 regarding the activity of creating and using the Securitate’s informative network, art, 22, in ACNSAS, Documentary Fund 123, vol, 41). Personal or direct contact of the informer with the Securitate’s officer resulted in pre-established contacts, previously planned and not less than once a month, using code names. Another secret way of inter- acting with the agency was the impersonal relationship. The draft Or- der regarding the organization and the ongoing of informative-opera- tive activity of the Securitate, May 11, 1981 mentions that the imper- sonal connection is to be used only in situations where, “on grounds of secrecy or effectiveness, informers, associates and residents can not be personally contacted. It is achieved by: Leaving the informative mate- rial, at fixed dates and times in a predetermined place, where it is picked up by the officer or warrant officer, sending it by mail, to a mailbox, in the form of personal correspondence, conventional texts or invisible writing, telephone communications using a conventional language or by other means which can ensure secrecy”(see ACNSAS, Documen- tary Fund, file 123, vol. 42, p. 131). Informer files provide examples of impersonal relationships in documents such as Notes regarding the liason system. For example, the informer “Tordache", who used an ingenious system of connecting with his officer: “ a dot of plasticine was applied on the classroom's door frame in case of emergency” or he would contact the officer by tele- phone, using the password “T found a beautiful material for trousers in the Tomis store” (see ACNSAS, Network Fund, file 646, p. 11). 4, Informers’ evaluation The liaison officer had to make a periodic assessment of the coordinated informers which resulted in the preparation of an Analyti- cal note or a Report on the contribution made during the infarmative / operative work, This kind of document specified: the number of meet- ings, liason system, trainings, number of informative notes received, ways to exploit this information, persons under surveillance who were 36in the file's records, informant honesty. 5. “Stimulating” and rewarding the informers In accordance with Securitate directives and instructions, the informers received rewards only under certain conditions for their vigi- lance and readiness to “collect” and transmit “useful” information. The type and method of reward were determined by the liaison officer with the approval of superiors, according to the type of tasks received, the importance of the information provided or the arca where the infor- mant worked, the personal and social skills, the degree of risk for the mission received, etc. The remuneration was not a monthly, fixed amount, but peri- odically offered money or gifts - “attentions”, according to circum- stances. In addition to these “official” methods, there were unofficial ways of stimulating informers - usually in the form of services: visas, scholarships, facilitation of home purchase/sale, career advancement etc, V. Informer abandonment or exclusion from the network Abandoning informers meant the exclusion or removal from the informative network of an agent (informer, associate, resident or host /meeting home). The most common reasons that justified the abandonment a source were the inability to access/deliver information, the disclosure of the relationship with the Sccuritate, the refusal to provide informa- tion, the change of domicile or workplace, taking a “hostile” or “hate- ful” stance against the regime's policy, the end of military service (for the soldiers recruited by military counterintelligence bodies) or by be- coming a party member. Exclusion from the network was based on special report (Abandonment proposals report or Exclusion from the informative network report), prepared by the liaison officer, approved by his superior and included in the informer's personal file. This document contains the assessment and short presentation of the associate's activity, persons or targets kept under surveillance, the reason for exclusion from the network and the place where the contributor's personal file would be stored (service “C”, B.I.D. or CLD). Depending on the grounds of an agent's or associate's aban- 37donment or exclusion from the informative network, a Securitate sta- tistical record reveals the following: 1. 37% of informers had lost their capacity to inform; 2. 13% of informers were found to be lacking the necessary qualities for informative work; 3. 7.6% of all informers refused to collaborate with the Securitate; 4. 6.3% of informers were dishonest, had misinformed or be- trayed their relationship with the Securitate (these data were provided by Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu according to the official address of the S.R.I. to the Senate’s Abuses Committee in 04.01. 1994). In the case of relationship disclosure, the associate's abandon- ment was not immediate, instead, the connection was maintained in order to create the impression that nothing is known, and new tasks were simulated in order to misinform or compromise opponents. After the exclusion from the network, informers were moni- tored or verified, and thus were the associates turned into people under surveillance, VI. Reactivation / Reactivisation - resumption of cooperating with the Securitate in case of a previously abandoned or removed source. After abandonment, according to circumstances, the informer would sometimes be reactivated. This was possible only if the reason for aban- doning was. the lack of capacity to inform, change of jobs or residence or other cases that didn't involve a clear rejection, betrayal or disclo- sure, 38I. 4, Surveillance of the population by audio and video means — Operative Technique. A lady goes on vacation, Five Securitate employees seek to keep her under permanent surveillance. ‘They rent rooms in the same hotel as she does; they even run the risk of getting a remedial treatment in order to maintain their cover. They worry about the disappearance from her room of the object where they wanted to plant the micro- phone, The tapping does not work because the distance is too big be- tween their room and the “target's” room. They satisfyingly report that the “target” has stated she does not believe she is under surveillance, although a friend mentioned to her that she should be on the lookout for them. The scene is not from a Louis de Funés film. It comes from a file in the C.N.S.A.S, archives, which may become, after so many dif- ficult and serious documentaries, the subject for a first comedy script about the Securitate. The burlesque of the situation, but also, the sometimes obses- sive fear of being secretly recorded, belong both to the past and the present and, therefore, there is a public debate and critical analysis about the limits and legality of monitoring the privacy of citizens by the secret services with the aid of technology. A subject that “burns” in Romania's latter years and convulsively stirs sensitivities and the thought that it is on the edge of legality. There is an instant analogy with the improper function of the Securitate to enter, without people's permission and knowledge, into private spaces, It had become one of the fundamental characteristics of Romanian society in the last decades. of Soviet-style communism, track- ing was ubiquitous, covering all geographical areas, social structures and areas of activity, The success of this extension was due to the de- velopment of the most effective, at the time, informative weapons, that 39which the Securitate generically called Operative Technique [T.0.] Much better than the use of informers, the technique knocked down “walls”, brought private and enclosed spaces closer, invaded pri- vacy and controlled the daily existence of all those entering the Securitate’s viewfinder. It was, in the spirit of the age, a “nationaliza- tion” of one’s life - “private” property, which became “state” property and “common wealth”. Thus, the Securitate would verify and combine data from its associates, with information obtained from interceptions and video re- cordings. In the early twentieth century, Securitate was using the tele- phone and mail interception, and in the 1950's - 1960's, microphones ‘were primarily used for the verification and surveillance of people hold- ing important state functions and profiles, Securitate and army officers, as well as those labeled “enemies of the people” which were consid- ered special cases. Beginning with the 1970's, technological mcans of tracking also focus on the microphone, but they are more sophisticated due to tech- nological progress, more diversified and come to be used against ordi- nary people. In this way, the surveillance of the population by the Securitate took an unprecedented scale. Thus, the normal phone is equipped with a very sensitive microphone, able to record all the con- versations made in the room where it was installed. Remote controlled transmitters embedded in the casing of objects emerge. Ashtrays, ce- ramic vases, plates and cups, containing thin battery-powered hand- sets are used. The “shingle” or “tick” was a device consisting of a microphone and a magnetic transmitter or recorder, hidden in a picce of wood full of tacks, which was attached beneath the furniture or on rarely used items. The possibility of secretly filming or photographing interiors, while listening to what is happening inside, is available. The main categories of T.O. means used by the Securitate in recent decades are provided in Appendix 1 of the Order by the Minister of Internal Affairs no. 0001450 of 01.07.1978 (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no. 7929/517): a) Means of fixed interception: - LC.T. - Telephone wire tapping; - LC.D.T. - Tapping internal communications as well as tele- phone communications by means of telephone wire tapping; - L.D.M. - Intercepting communications via microphones; 40- LT.L. - Tapping international calls; - LC.H. - Hotel room tapping; - LD.E.R. - Intercepting communications via network emitters; - LT.T. - Interception of telex transmissions. b) Means of mobile interception: - LD.E.B. - Intercepting communications via battery-powered emitters. c) Other special means: - 'T.V. - Monitoring targets via closed circuit television; - §.0. - Monitoring targets by optical probe; - FE - Photographing or filming operative scencs; - D.S. - Opening locks in order to gain secret entrance. The variety of situations, places and people where T.O. means were used is illustrated by the simple enumeration of some of them: houses, offices, institutions, hotel rooms, dormitories, guest houses, restaurants, hospitals, prisons, vehicles, embassies and foreign diplo- mats, representatives of international organizations. The Securitate's General Directorate of Operative Technique [DGTO] dealt, in addition to censorship of correspondence from all over the country and the organization of illegal entries, with the opera- tive technique, via a unit specializing in installing and operating it, Special Unit “T”, Care that these means would not be used “abusively” was sured by the approval given by commanders “according to party deci- sions, country laws, etc.” This special unit would install T.O. means at the request from other Securitate units, but only after obtaining ap- proval. It was given by the Securitate’s hierarchical superiors, accord- ing to the importance, complexity, type, duration of use, human and technical effort required for the job, the person or institution concemed. The installation of T.O. means was done, usually, by the Spe- cial Unit “T” [for the State Security Department or the Bucharest In- spectorate] and the county subunits. ‘There were some exceptions. For installing fixed T.O. means, sometimes the “T” Unit would recruit associates, found among the te- lephony service employees, and have them conduct preparatory tech- nical work. It would also use workers in telecommunications to place type LC.D.T. means. 41‘The mobile means category was handled by officers belonging to the informative apparatus, that is, the officers who managed the cases. They were specially ained by workers from the “T” sub-units and were only used during technically complex assignments. But the rule was for operative officers to install and supervise T.O. installations, and then record and transcribe the information. If they had the ap- proval from the Minister of Internal Affairs or the Head of the State Security Department, they could use residents [heads of informer mi- cro-networks], informers or associates. When it came to listening in on or recording telephone calls, the ICT installations, created by the Special Unit “T", implied mount- ing a switch and a phone line splitter, connected to T.O. interception points. In order to preserve secrecy of T.O. missions, the Securitate would use the following methods: “informative legend", “informative combination”, “secret entry” and ,,secret search”. “Informative legends” were created scenarios or cvents used opportunistically to cover up the secret actions of the Securitate, such as those of T.O. For example, mounting [.C.D.T. means was made, usually, with the use of the “secret entry” or by using the legend of the telephone installation. Telephone maintenance method was only used in excep- tional cases where there was no other possibility of organizing a “se- cret entry”. House key casts were fraudulently obtained at the spouse's workplace, where she was kept ,,busy" by a “source” from the Securitate, while other “sources” would steal the keys, take molds and then put them back in order not to arouse any suspicion, Testing a microphone inserted into the leg of a table from a hotel room and the subsequent installation of a “shingle” were done while ,,the target took a trip, by bus, with her room-mate", The observation of places and persons “through the window” was the pretence used to enter someone's office in order to install the equipment. For home '.O. installations, a real mobilization of resources. was orchestrated, All family members, friends and neighbors, were ,,secured”, cither summoned to the police head- quarters or to the passport service office, “detained” at work or at school (in the children’s case) or simply kept busy inside their home, by talk- ing to a Securitate’s officer. Performing the operative technique of ,,secret entry” involved making a detailed study or outline regarding the features of the build- 42ing and tenants. Conversation records were played and transmitted to other units, but also selected and temporarily stored in points of inter- ception or stations. Their locations could be the “T” unit's headquar- ters, the Securitate headquarters in the area, or small factories and insti- tutions. Generally, recording by T.O, means was used only for active cases, for a fixed period of time, ranging from several days to several months, International telephone calls [L-T.I.] were intercepted without exception, and the names, addresses and telephone numbers of all tele- phone subscribers in the country from where these calls were made were transmitted to the IT and research center [C.1.D.], which “auto- matically processed” the calls and transmitted them to informative units for examination and for taking “necessary” actions. Practically every- one who spoke with someone abroad on the phone would “benefit” from the attention of the Securitate. If these conversations contained references to people in the party and state leadership, they were separately recorded and reported to the management of Unit “I”, which would forward them to the command- ers of local Securitate units and on to the minister of internal affairs or the Head of the Securitate. We find out about the means and duration of storage of inter- cepted international phone calls from Article 24 from the Order by the Minister of Internal Affairs no, 1450 of 01.07.1978 (ACNSAS, Docu- mentary Fund, file no. 7929, vol. 517): “Special Unit «T» and the «T» subunits will store the recorded international channel communications for 10 days, and for 7 days for other types of interception, starting with the date the information got transmitted. After that period, the tapes will be demagnetized, / ... / information that is crucial to national secu- rity can be preserved, for a maximum of one year, in the Special «T> Unit's or subunit's archive. Retention of the tapes for more that 1 year ean only be done with approval from the management of the State Security Department.” Operative technique was used for different purposes. Qn the one hand, actions took a passive form, of information collection and verification, of meetings and close relations to Romanian or foreign citizens control, of attitude and activity of a person or group, as well as beliefs and comments about the regime surveillance, of prevention, 43such as the “leakage of data to foreign radio stations and foreign reac- tionary organizations”. On the other hand, there was direct interven- tion, for example, “the restricting of international telephone calls and the termination of calls to forcign citizens within the country” or that of internal calls, the inability to establish a connection “even if the phone operators would try to dial the respective numbers”. Simply browsing through documents from the Securitate files gives us an overview and an almost complete understanding of what the use of technology meant in the 1970's - 1980's. Some documents are true vintage photographs, with an emotional content, by faithfully reproducing conversations with family or friends, which could be sub- stituted to a journal. Sometimes, the talks, ironical or abusive, were exactly about the police and the Securitate. The typology of T.O. documents found in the communist se- cret service files reflects the entire path of installing and managing T.O. means. Chronologically, the documents created were: - the joint report prepared by the informative units and Special Unit “T”, which requested permission for use of T.O.; - study done by the “T” Unit (subunits), containing a plan of the building and details regarding the residents where the T.O. job would be carried out, if “secret entries” would be required; - action plan, specifying the type of T.O., the details and means of concealing the “secret entry", the “legend” or the “informative com- bination” suggested for the installation and removal of the T.O. means, the duration of job execution, the measures taken to ensure the secrecy of the operation and that of the participants; - report containing the Commandment's suggestion of recruit- ing workers in telecommunications, with subsequent approval from the D.S.S. management; - report containing proposals for the use of verified residents or associates to install the mobile means, which had to be approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs or the Secretary of State; - T.O. recording playback notes, which make up special vol- umes of the files, called T.O, briefs, with the precise transcription of recorded actions or conversations; they are the most important and emo- tionally moving component of all the T.O. documents; - reports or summaries on how the information obtained fromthe use of T.O. means were used. ‘The use of technical means in monitoring individuals lead some- times to serious consequences, such as their immediate arrest and con- viction, 45I, 5, The stakeout: means of informative investigation ‘The stakeout played, in the words of the Securitate, an impor- tant part in the informative-operative activity, it being “the surveillance of people or properties and places which are of interest to the Securitate, done secretly, with the aid of specific methods, processes and means” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 7929, vol. 170, p. 5). The archives of the former Sccuritate abound with examples of different stakeout situations, with a complex typology of the documents related to this issue. One can find the addresses which required the triggering of a stakeout against a person deemed suspicious, stakeout and identifica- tion notes. as well as video or audio recordings, which documented the technique of stakcout surveillance. Aside from their role to systemati- cally monitor the life of ordinary people in communist Romania in order to test their loyalty to the regime, the stakeout evidence can be edifying today by revealing the daily life of the time, thus representing an unusual historical source. ‘The stakeout was meant to discover the people whom a certain person would meet, the places they would visit, and finally, to what extent did this represent a threat to the Romanian social order. Usually, the stakeout was done after the start of someone's informative surveil- lance, in order to confirm suspicions of a person or not. However, the most important feature of the stakeout remained the secrecy. The stake- out was an activity meant to be used in special cases, which could not be approached in any other way, precisely because it involved special financial and technical efforts. Some Securitate documents even specify that other intelligence agencies consider the stakeout a “luxury”, and it is therefore recommended to use it in moderation. It is said about it that, “perhaps more than in other areas of security activities, one can not apply certain rules, patterns, certain chosen and forever set proce- dures” (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 12601, vol.11, p. 82). Mean- 46while, the officer responsible for stakeout needed “more experience, sense of orientation, initiative, boldness, promptness in solving prob- lems” (Ibidem, p. 83). The officers of the Special Service “F”, part of the State Security Directorate, undertook stakeout activities during that time. ‘There were two types of stakeouts: classical and zonal. While the classical one was being used since the 1950's and referred to the actual surveillance of a person / target, the zonal one started being used. especially in the 1970's, as a tracking technique that involved the sur- veillance of a single point, be it a restaurant, a hotel, a market, etc., where operative technique was installed. Compared with the classical stakeout, the zonal stakcout was estimated by Securitate’s officers as safer and more efficient. ‘The people against which the stakeout was especially used were. diplomats - for instance around cach embassy there was a surveillance point, - foreigners which were visiting Romania and were of interest to the Securitate or Romanian citizens considered a potential threat to the Romanian social order. An important place was occupied by support- ers of legionnaires or former political prisoners, which, however, were. often under surveillance for minor reasons. For example, a Securitate report mentioned the following: “Also, the objective «Condruc», a former prisoner for 10 years for subversive activity; released in 1964, has also been under surveillance for 5 days, regarding the same prob- lem. The stakeout has established that the target has a job that allows. him to go to town during working hours and during this time he con- tacts his liasons or takes care of personal errands, while being preoceu- pied with his family during spare time, without conducting any kind of activity“. (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 12601, vol. 60, p. 16). Along with documents describing the stakeoul, the testimonies of those who were targeted by the Securitate with this method were added. From this it appears that although some of the interviewees were. aware that they are under surveillance and could even identify the one. doing the surveillance, others only learned of this when they consulted the file made by the former Securitate in the reading room of the C.N.S.A.S. The consequences on people targeted by stakeout could range from some very dramatic ones, such as suicide, generated by the men- tal pressure of being under surveillance - if it was discovered, to the 47start of a criminal investigation or decision to continue the informative surveillance. In some cases however, comical situations would appear, as happened to one person who discovered the stakeout and went to ask the reason for the surveillance,1. 6. The secret control and censorship of correspondence Secret control and censorship of correspondence was one of the methods commonly used by the Securitate in the complex process of keeping the population under surveillance. According to the docu- ments identified in the archives of the former Securitate, these involved: the interception of letters, parcels, telegrams, manifests, memoirs and letters of protest, as well as the identification of their authors. ‘The iden- tified information was afterwards sent to various departments of the Securitate, in order to operatively exploit them. This required the knowl- edge of opinions, attitudes, actions and relationships of those under surveillance; preventing the population’s discontent with the regime to spread; the identification and neutralization of citizens who were criti- cal towards the political power. During the communist period, the following specialized units of the former Sccuritate dealt with this activity: Division “F” (1951- 1952) Department for Stakeout and Correspondence (1952-1955), Ser- vice “F” (1956-1967), Division XTI (1967-1968), Division IX (1968- 1972), Division VI (1972-1973) and Special Unit “S” (1973-1989). The interception, control and censorship actions changed dur- ing the existence of the Securitate, according to the operative problems pursued. During the 1950's-1960's, the correspondence under control and censorship belonged to those labeled as ‘enemies’ from an ideo- logical perspective - Legionnaires, “Zionists”, members of political partics during the interwar period, members of cults and religious sects - in order to make “the evidence that would help expose the activity of imperialist intelligence services and their agents throughout the coun- try available to the state’s security body"(Cristina Anisescu, Silviu B, Moldovan, Mirela Matiu, Securitate’s “scores”, Bucharest, Nemira 2007, p. 494) Beginning with the 1970's-1980's, all correspondence of the Romanian citizens with foreigners was controlled - postcards, letters, 49telegrams, packages -, the correspondence of persons prosecuted and ‘that of informers - in order to verify their loyalty - but also “suspicious” correspondence that could contain letters of protest, manifestos and statements for important officials within the state and party apparatus. According to directives and orders of the Securitate, the aim was mainly for: a) Preventing the dissemination of manifestos, memoirs and letiers of protest and identifying their authors. Manifestos and Ictters of protest were usually being disseminated before or during events such as: conferences, elections, visits by foreign personalities, various cam- paigns that were important for party politics. They had a varied appear- ance: they could be written carelessly on randomly torn paper, pieces of paper, and single sheets of paper, postcards, or send in sealed enve- lopes, with precise addresses, which made them hard to distinguish from ordinary letters. The vast majority of manifestos and letters of protest disseminated by mail were addressed to people working for the party and statc apparatus, to the editorial offices of newspapers, to writers and journalists, the radio hosts, etc. In order to identify them, the Securitate’s documents recommended to take account of some com- mon features such as: using the same type of envelope - in size and color, the same stamp placement, a particular way of writing the ad- dress on the envelope - to the left, to the right, in the middle, no send- er’s address or the presence of an abbreviated, fictitious address. (Ibid., pp. 495-501) Special attention was given to correspondence sent abroad. The Securitate found that most manifestos intercepted from correspondence going to the capitalist states had the usual shape, but no return address or with a fictitious sender's address. They were addressed to foreign radio stations that received mail at hidden addresses or were sent to private individuals in order to have them resent to the “Free Europe” radio station for broadcasting. 'b) Intercepting mail that belonged to people under surveillance by the Securitate, At an operative officer's request, the officers from units specialized with the control and censorship of mail had to inter- cept letiers, tclegrams and parcels sent or reccived by people under surveillance. Evidence: obtained like this was important for understand- ing the “target’s” activities, but sometimes, negligent operative work- 50ers could compromise the whole operation. Thus, there were instances when, as the material was returned by the employees, the translation of the letter, work notes or even the schedule signed by the employee was found in envelopes about to go to their destination, errors which, un- timely discovered could lead to disclosure of the entire operation, (/bid., pp. 501-503) c) Technical details regarding the secret control and censorship of correspondence. The actions of the Securitate started from the as- sumption that some of those under surveillance, in an attempt to hide information sent by mail, used different codes of communication. In this. regard, efforts had to be made to discover the means to encode the content: writing with invisible ink, the white copying paper, thc con- ventional text, the code, the cipher, the template paper, the language of texts and others, “Invisible ink” was a substance that did not leave any visible traces, but could be identified by checking with various technical means. ‘To this end, some drugs were used - aminophenazone, salicylate, per- manganate, water, lemon juice, urine, saliva, sweetened water, alcohol and other substances. The invisible ink text was written within the re- maining free space between the rows of the letter, which in order not to attract attention, had a very mundane content. Whenever the content of the letter or its appearance was suspicious of containing invisible writ- ing, the letter would be sent for a physico-chemical test. White copying paper was a white sheet of paper soaked in cer- tain chemicals that would be overlapped with another sheet and by applying pressure, the invisible writing would be printed, Text written in this manner was identified after a technical verification. Conventional text was a much easier way to transmit encrypted information. This text was agreed upon in advance between the sender and the receiver, having a different meaning than the apparent one. For example, the sender could establish a conventional system, which con- sisted of transmitting real communication by writing a word at the be- ginning of cach line of the letter, all the communication being read vertically, from top to bottom. The codes were secret writings that appeared in various forms in the correspondence, They were based on books or dictionaries that were previously set as the “code’s key”. One coding system implied the writing of fraction clusters comprising of two or three terms: 5/7/ 5110, 8/3/5, 10/2/3, 5/4/8. Each of the first digits represented the page of the book that was used by the “key”, the second group of digits repre- sented the row and the last group, the word's number in the row. ‘The code had, in turn, the purpose of hiding information. It consisted of the replacement of letters with numbers, signs or even letters, or a change of place for the letters of a word, thus achieving a mixture of meaningless letters if one did not know the conventional rules established between correspondents. The template paper was a white sheet of paper with specific dimensions, previously established between correspondents, which was cut in some places so that superimposing it on the letter caused only the words that were part of the transmitted message to appear in the empty spaces. The stamps also had the full attention of the Securitate as un- derneath them were often found secret messages or even microfilms. Meanwhile, the stamp image was being researched, as well as its pasi- tion on the letter. (Ibid., pp. 503-512) All the material obtained from work done between 1956-1989. by the units specialized in secret control and censorship of correspon- dence is found today in the CNSAS archive, in the “Mail” Fund, but also in files from the “Informative”, “Network” and “Documentary” supplies, In the “Documents” section of this chapter we provided sev- eral examples regarding the typology of materials that can be identi- fied in the archival supplies mentioned above: fragments of intercepted and confiscated letters, In the “Testimonies” section, a few excerpts from interviews with people who accessed their files were presented. The vast majority of them knew or suspected even since the commu- nist era that the Securitate was intercepting their mail, and now, by reading their file, they were surprised to find among ils pages, copies of sent or received letters, or even original letters, telegrams and post- cards. The documents that resulted from the actions undertaken by units specializing in the secret control and censorship of correspon- dence are, in our opinion, very important for research specialists fo- cusing on recent history. As invaluable historical sources, they contain original information on the biography of personalities of the time, ev- eryday life in the communist period, the opinions, feelings of ordinary 52people, but also how they were perceived internal and external events of the time, They are among the few documents found in the archives of the former Sccuritate that have not been filtered by the employees of repressive institutions and thus reflect real lives and the experiences of people of that period, Furthermore, these documents are conclusive evidence of the regime's intrusion of the privacy of Romanian citizens and of the fla- grant violation of the Constitutions adopted between 1948-1965, which slated that the violation of correspondence secret is a crime. 53I. 7. The searches “In the 1970's, the Securitate started an informative surveil- lance file on a young researcher from the Institute of Philosophy in Bucharest, someone close to the philosopher Constantin Noica, With the collapse of communism, the young man- having in the meantime become one of the most important contemporary Romanian intellectu- als - came to the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Ar- chives to see his file created by Securitate. On this occasion he found out with surprise that in the 1980's, his home was regularly broken into by Securitate officers who would go through his personal belongings in search of ,,criminal evidence’. The things, the written thoughts, pho- tos which he had thought were only his own, were in fact known in his time by many representatives of the political police that watched every moment of his life. The young man in our short story is the philosopher Gabriel Liiceanu, and the method used by the Securitate to discover the details of his personal life is the search “. According to a legal definition, the search was the examination of a suspicious person's house, car or workplace, conducted by state personnel in order to find and aquire material evidence of a crime or in order to discover the one who perpetrated it. In the communist era, the search was another method used by the Securitate to discover compro- mising information about people under surveillance, Searches were done by the Securitate, with or without help from other institutions respon- sible for public order, particularly at the home or workplace of those under surveillance. In addition to these classical cases, searches could be carried out on Iuggage, on people - body scarches - and on cars. ‘There were two types of searches: official - undertaken with the “target’s” knowledge - and secret - done without the knowledge of the person of interest to the Securilate. a) Official searches were carried out when reliable informationwas available or as a result of complaints or allegations concerning a person's activities. During the process of informative surveillance, the official search was used, usually, after a solid case rescarch, when it was certain that it would play a fundamental role in finalizing the case at hand. ‘The official search was done by the Securitate in collaboration with the Police or by officers under police cover and it apparently re- spected all legal proceedings: a search warrant was obtained from the prosecutor, it was carried out in the presence of two witnesses, a scarch report was prepared, signed by authority representatives, the person concemed and the witnesses, also including the materials or objects confiscated. (ACNSAS, Informative Fund, file no. 234691, vol. 13, pp- 164-165.) For example, the official searching of Mary Stefiinescu’s house, who had an informative surveillance file since 14/04/1987, was made after several months of research done with the help of other specific methods such as: informative network, interception of correspondence, special T.O. means, secret scarch, investigation (ACNSAS, Informative Fund, file no. 4957, vol 1, pp. 4-88.). While being investigated by crimi- nal investigation bodies, Maria Stefanescu wrote a declaration, agree- ing to “willingly” allow Police representatives to carry out a scarch of her residence (ACNSAS, Informative Fund, file no. 4957, vol 1, pp. 88). This statement, written clearly under threat, was the basis for the entire operation. Although Maria Steftinescu had been prosecuted based on the information obtained from her intercepted correspondence which showed that she had been sending letters ,,with inappropriate content “ to the Free Europe” radio station, the search was carried out under the pretence discovery of ,,illegally owned” building materials or goods and valuables (ACNSAS, Informative Fund, file no. 4957, vol. 1, pp. 88, 123). ‘The report for the house search described in detail how it was carried out, “the illegal objects” found, and even Maria $teffinescu's and the witnesses’ attitude. “Stefainescu Maria, present witnesses do not object on how the search was conducted nor on the contents of this report” (ACNSAS, Informative Fund, file no. 4957, vol 1 , pp. 85-87). Tf the documents issued by the communist repression bodies are short and to the point and fully justify the search, the oral testimony of Maria Stefinescu gives us an overview of this event from another 55perspective - that of the victim. (Interview with Maria Steffinescu) Thus, she talks about the abusive attitude of the Securitate of- ficers who interrogated her, keeping her away from family, for “hours and days”, about the fear she experienced during those moments, and about the excessive zeal of those who did the search and even went as far as examining the dirty laundry found in washing machine, in front of the witnesses. These are realities and nuances we will never ever find in archived documents - a result specific to totalitarian power - whose contents describe only the official point of view. The confessions of Maria Stefinescu can be extrapolated to all those who were subjected to searches during the communist period. Regardless of the allegations, they would perceive the action as an aggression within their intimate space, which was intimidating for them as well as loved ones - relatives or friends - and made them think about the horror of things to come. The consequences of official searches varied from case to case and from one stage of the communist era to another. While in the 1940's- 1950's they were usually events preceding arrests and convictions, in the 1970's and 1980's, there were no consequences - if nothing com- promising would be found during the search - or there could be inves- tigations and warnings depending on the seriousness of the “crime” committed by the target and how the officers managed the case. b) The secret search was a method of informative surveillance used by Securitate’s officers throughout the entire communist era. It was defined in the official documents of the Securitate as follows: “The secret search - [is] the legendized or hidden investigation of rooms, vehicles, luggage or objects belonging to people of interest to the Securitate, in order to clarify information or research issues of opera- tive interest."(Instructions no. D — 00190/1987 regarding the organi- zation and development of informative-operative activity by Securitate bodies, ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no. 7929, vol. 443) In order to do a secret search, the officer on the case had to prepare a report regarding: the reason for the action, how it would take place, the objective’s map - home, office, etc., the schedule of those occupying it or living in the neighborhood, the withdrawal option in case of failure, and the used legend, Approval of the secret search came from the officer in command. Most secret searches remained a mystery to the people under 56surveillance, because, not willing to risk the disclosure of their meth- ods, the Securitate officers would never use the data obtained strictly from scarches. For example, in autumn 1958, the Securitate officers conducted such a search on the house of Catholic priest loan Duma and his church, when they discovered several secret documents hid- den within the altar- some in various foreign languages - that have been photocopied. (ACNSAS, Informative Fund, file no, 234691, vol 13, pp. 163-164) After translating and studying them, the case officers decided to conduct an official search in that church, in order to “find” the docu- ments without compromising the secret action. This was also the case of Maria Stefanescu, shown above, who was subjected to an official search only after her actions had been rescarched by several specific methods, including a secret search. Because it involved substantial effort, the secret search was used less than the official one during operative-informative work. This mea- sure was only used when it was certain that there were no other means of obtaining the valuable data necessary for solving the case. Documents regarding official or secret searches done by the Securitate during the communist era can be found in the CNSAS archive, usually in the files from the “Informative Fund” and “Criminal Fund” but can sometimes be found in the files from the “Documentary Fund” or “Network Fund”, In the “Documents” section of this chapter, several examples are provided on the typology of materials that can be found in the above mentioned sections of the archive: statement for accepting the carrying out of a house search, proposal report for con- ducting a secret search, reports, notes, addresses, and summaries de- scribing how the official or secret searches were conducted by the Securitate’s officers,I. 8. Investigations done by the Securitate in the last decades of communism Investigations occurred as a result of breaching the norms cs- tablished by the state party. Citizens were held accountable by Securitate officers for reasons considered serious, but which seem trivial and unacceptable today, such as political or social criticism and civic atti- tudes, They were questioned and had to give statements to the Securitate. They were investigated, although not by the rightful law enforcement bodies, which was allowed as a social practice, even legal and chal- lenged by no one. The Securitate, as an independent entity, acted as one of the state powers. It created and activated parallel and concurrent structures of investigation, more precisely, the Criminal Investigation Department of the Securitate. ‘There was even a set of coercive measures - sanctions with an educational character -, which the officers would apply at the end of ‘the investigation. The most serious one was the start of criminal pro- ceedings that resulted in conviction, Unlike judicial investigations, these did not end with one's conviction, but could continue even after re- lease. The repression of dissenting people during the 1970's and 1980's was also achieved with the help of mega-interrogations done by the Securitate. Individual dissent, like that of Gheorghe Ursu, Doina Comea or Radu Filipescu, but also that of groups, such as the members of the Free Union of Workers [SLOMR], founded in 1979, or the insur- gents of the spontaneous uprising in Brasov on November 15th, 1987, sparked large-scale investigations on the Securitate’s side. Routine investigations during the 1970's and 1980's have the “technical” name, in the files and official regulations of the time, of informative investigation or examinations, Here's how the communist authoritics suggestively defined this activity [according to “Instructions No, D - 00190/1987 reganding the informative-operative activity of or- 58ganization and development by security bodies, State Security Depart- ment, June 24, 1987, Art. 7]: one of the specific methods of informa- tive-operative activity used by the Securitate, it represents the action for the clarification of information for which there is solid evidence of truth, and is done by investigating, directly or under cover, any indi- viduals of interest (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no. 123, vol. 41, pp. 24-28). If the direct purpose of the security investigation was to repress dissent, be it major or minor, the default one was to send others a mes- sage of unconditional acceptance of the miserable and restrictive liv- ing conditions. Two Securitate officers, col. Gheorghe Constantinescu and col. Florea Gheorghiu have written down their empirical observa- tions in the article “The collaboration between the criminal investiga- tion bodics and the informative - operative ones for preventing any other anti-social acts”, in the “Securitatea” magazine no. 4 (52) - 1980: ‘The practice has always shown that the arrest of one or more persons, or just calling them over for an investigation resulted in a series of reactions among business connections, family members, friends, col- leagues and has produced a change in the behavior of the accused. Discovering these reactions and behavioral changes can only be ac- complished by the informative officer, who has adequate means at his disposal, but he must notify his criminal investigations colleague with- out delay. (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no, 8712, vol 2, part. 17, p. 23-24) In order to trigger a security investigation, two initial condi- ‘tions were to be met. First, the Securitate’s criminal investigation bod- ies were noticed by the Informative-operative Securitate bodies, mcan- ing the operative officers who were directing the surveillance cases. Then, once this requirement was satisfied, it was mandatory to obtain approval from the Head of the Securitate or other hicrachical superiors. From this point onward, there was collaboration between the operative officer and the criminal investigation officer, regarding a se- ries of steps preceding the actual investigation which would take place at the Securitate headquarters: 1, studying and analyzing already existing information from surveillance or informative investigation files; 2. establishing check-ups and measures, even taking direct « preventive » and research action [house or workplace 59searches, bringing targets to the police, to the passports ser- vice office, having them excluded from the party, etc.}; 3. agrecing on the completion of cases and hidden means of action, for example, determining the person concerned to recognize the committed “acts”, in providing the « legal » framework for confiscating objects or documents; 4. taking into account the political and criminal significance of acts, the criminal investigation officer would draw up a research plan, a detailed schedule and a questionnaire which would form the basis of the investigation. Prom issue no. 4 (52) - 1980 of the “Securitatea” magazine we find out details regarding work practices: Finding the witnesses, setting the order in which they would be summoned to the criminal investigation division and especially check- ing their sincerity of their accounts were, also, tasks that can and must be addressed by the criminal investigation officer together with the in- formative officer. When it is discovered that someone has not told the truth, the information officer from the informative body will notify the criminal investigation officer and will continue to work towards determining the causes which have led the target to conceal the truth. Depending on the specifics of these causes, a mutually agreed method for their removal will be decided, in order to eventually dis- cover the complete truth. (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no. 8712, vol. 2, part. 17, p. 23) Then, the person - called “target” - was summoned to the Securitate headquarters, at a previously announced date and hour or they were simply “picked up”. Showing up was mandatory, according to the laws of the time, The documents from the Securitate archives describing the investigations during the 1970's-1980"s contain state- ments from convicts and, eventually, from their relatives and acquain- tances, They are usually part of an informative investigation file and only in case of prosecution and conviction are they part of a criminal investigation file. The header represents the evidence for the investiga- tion, which indicates that the statement is given to the “criminal inves- tigation division”. Investigation documents from the 1940's - 1950's, describe exactly the way it happened, that is, the interrogation, listing ques- 60tions [investigator] - answers [accused]. Compared to this, statements from the 1970's - 1980's do not reflect the interrogation directly, be- causc the questions are missing. They are not recorded, The interven- tion of officers is apparently nil. Only their presence is stated, as as tants, beyond that, nothing more is known. This is the film negative, where. we see inverted white and black. That which transpires from the composition and order of statements is the fact that each paragraph looks like the answer - admitting in writing during an interrogation - direct questioning. The use of locutions such as “I uttered abusive words regarding the leadership” or “the radio station calling itself Free Eu- rope” shows that the person under interrogation was not only “sug- gested” what to write, but also how to write, by replacing personal language with officially accepted jargon, formulas and mentality. ‘That which cannot be found in the files is the atmosphere dur- ing the interrogation, the way the statements were obtained. Only the testimonies of those who have been through such investigations are able to develop the film's action, The arrangement, scriptwriting, the interrogation scheme and even the allegations resemble the ones from the 1940's - 1950's. What is missing is the “torture”, the “industrial” amount of beatings, which is then replaced by beatings, as prophy- laxis, as means. of intimidation, ‘Therefore, the repertoire was the same. The atmosphere at the Securitate headquarters, with bars, gratings, uniforms, metal cabinets, inmates who worked in the yard. The interrogations were harsh and were done by two or three investigators, playing as the good person - bad person and lasted for many hours, day and night, sometimes for several days, intermittently, as in daytime at the Securitate, nighttime at home. The methods of pressure and harassment designed to gain a confession for having done “something”, were diverse. From repeat- ing a question-accusation several times, destroying statements and start- ing over and over again, to using insults, vulgar words, threats (against family, of electric shock, car accidents), being exhausted by being mocked (spending the night behind a metal cabinet, standing on one foot in front of the dog, holding Ceausescu's picture with the nose - when the picture would fall, the person would be accused of _,,throw- ing” Ceausescu down, nerve wrecking (waiting long hours) and for the most “stubborn” ones, the ones who refused to write, beating with fists, palms, rubber batons. The investigation took place separately and si- 61multaneously for members of the same group. Why would someone be investigated during the 1970's — 1980's ? Here are some of the “guilts” that some Romanian citizens had to account for, which were deemed by the Securitate as potential crimi- nal faults, “admitted” and explained if needed, in statements: “we some- times discussed the shows aired by the BBC and Free Europe radio stations”, “we have criticized the higher learning system, stating that it is outdated”, “we also criticized the cultural system of our country, stating that the intellectuals don’t have enough rights and opportunities to creatively express themselves (magazines, publishing houses, insti- ‘tutes etc.)", “I began questioning both the economical and social policy of our state”, “regarding the creation of a certain history class - [ can say that I know from /,../ that this class should not have been created”, “I did not speak to anyone except the personnel at the American |i- brary", “my poetry presents sometimes certain elements of social cri- tique”, “regarding the issue of samizdat: it is true that we discussed this idea for a while”, “regarding weapons all I can say is that it is a totally unknown subject for me, my intentions and my aspirations”, “regard- ing the intent to leave the country: [ have personally stated several times that I wish to emigrate to the U.S.A.”, “he borrowed a few articles from legionnaire newspapers”, “he allowed himself to be mislead into using inappropriate words regarding official persons”, “among my ac- tions designed to attain this aim, I have written and delivered a Ieticr to the Party County Committee”, “I admit to having unofficial ties with some foreign Western Germany, French and Hungarian citizens”, “I wrote and delivered two letters which I sent to /.../ who was meant to hand them over to the «Free Europe» radio station”, “the main reasons for my membership with S.L..0.M.R. are connected with the most basic human rights”. ‘The use of investigations by the Securitate apparently had some secondary objectives, such as ,,the clarification of new data”, obtain- ing written evidence, ,,cstablishing the degree of honesty”, preventing the “perpetration” of some “acts”, warning or even recruitment. Statements given during the investigation were documents - which could become evidence in a trial - used to force people into recognizing as crime, natural acts. from everyday life, to recognize them as a “social danger”, to express regret for them and serenely accept the 62punitive measures meant “to prevent” them from happening again. ‘The statement would end with the promise [,,commitment"] to never make the “mistake” again. ‘The Sccuritate investigations sometimes resulted in criminal cases. and the sentencing of the person under surveillance, In other cases, measures taken were considered “preventive”, such as a warning, a fine or actions regarding party membership, such as exclusion from the party. Either way, in the memory of those who have been confronted with such a situation, the investigation remains a trawna, 63I. 9. Preventive measures used by the Securitate All investigations, regardless of their shape, be it via informa- tive networks or special means like T.O., searches, interception of cor- respondence, help to identify an image of the targeted person and their actions. It is once again, the time for the Securitate to act with specific methods, secking to intimidate the person under surveillance by taking preventive security measures. According to Instructions No. 1-00190/ 1987 regarding the management and pmgress of the informative-op- erative security activity, the category of preventive measures include: a) The positive influence - is accomplished with the help of the informative network or family, to protect some persons from negative ideas that could instigate them to perform antisocial acts that could harm state interests. b) The notice - applies to persons that are lnbeled as potentially capable of committing antisocial acts or who joined an inappropriate entourage and are not recorded in the operative Securitate files. ) The warning - is the measure by which the target is told to correct one’s conduit according to social law and norms, because its actions and behaviour can degenerate into acts which are likely to harm state security. People who have been warned have to declare that they understood the preventive measure and are committed to abide the law and abstain from affecting the defense of state security interests in any way. The warning may be carried out in the presence of other people, workplace superiors or family members. d) The public debate - applies when it is believed that the re- sulting publicity is likely to cause the person to abstain from engaging. in hostile activities. ¢) The breakdown - implies taking a number of preventive mea- sures in order to stop inappropriate activities which take place within groups and entourages and could degenerate into crime or other anti- social acts. (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no. 123, vol. 41, a4pp. 24-26) The positive influence and the notice are measures which were applied in simple cases, such as spreading rumors or news from West- em radio stations, ‘They are not explicitly recorded in documents pre- pared by Securitate personnel, but are mentioned in the closure reports for the informative investigation files. The other measures, the warning, the public debate and the breakdown were more widely used, with a particular emphasis on the warning. Its implementation implied setting an entire bureaucratic pro- cedure in motion, The officer in charge of the case had to make a warn- ing proposal report, which described the opening of the informative investigation file, its reasons and conclusions, and in the end, the officer's suggestion. Once it was approved by the Head of Service and the Head of Security Inspectorate, a new report was added to it, containing the date and place where the warning was to be made. ‘The location was set at either one of the Securitate offices, or the management offices at the target's workplace. At that time, the target was faced with his actions, and their seriousness, risking greater consequences if he would con- tinue to commit them the future, In order to persuade the Securitate personnel that the target understood the warning, he had to sign an agreement where he promised to give up his wrongful acts and keep the meeting a secret. After that, the case officer, would draw up a report about the warning, which, just like the previous ones had to be approved by his superiors. Use of the warning did not necessarily mean terminating the surveillance. The officer who handled the case kept the target under surveillance by the same special means, in order to be certain that the hostile attitude, which required the use of the waming, would be dropped completely. If the target would not comply, a new warning was in order, which involved the same bureaucratic approach as the one above. In many cases, the second warning was replaced by a measure considered much more effective by the Securitate: making the target a subject of workplace debate (public debate). This theatrical measure carefully prepared by the Securitate personnel with the aid of the target's workplace superiors, involved statements from colleagues who incrimi- 65nated the target's acts, and required self-criticism and a commitment to calm down on his side. A very special situation for the Securitate was the surveillance of groups, particularly adolescents, who were “guilty” of antisocial acts which avoided regime guidelines and the policy of the Romanian com- munist regime (listening to officially banned Western music, or pro- moting ideas inspired by the legionnaire or Nazi ideology, etc). In such a case, the breakdown of was done by the informative network respon- sible with “supervising” the delinquent group. Many times, the break- down of groups (especially adolescent groups) was accomplished by means of public debate, by labelling them as enemies which was enough to get them to behave, If the preventive measures delivered the expected results, the informative investigation file (D.U.T.) was closed and ranked in the Securitate archives and records. If after a while, the same person would become a target again, for the same reason, or a different one, the previous reason, as well as the preventive measures taken were recorded in the new file.I. 10. The ban on leaving the country ‘The ban on leaving the country was the means of the commu- nist regime to control the flow of people and information that could create a negative image abroad, and also punish those who were against the communist state. Thus, Decision No. 800 by the Council of Minis- ters regarding the issue of documents and visas necessary for crossing the state border of the Romanian Socialist Republic stated that: “the Ministry of Internal Affairs is authorized to establish which categories of people may apply for the documents and visa necessary for crossing the state border” (Decision no. 800 by the Council of Ministers regard- ing the granting of documents and visa for crossing the state border of the Romanian Socialist Republic as well as the organization and func- tioning of checkpoints for crossing the state border in the ,,Official Gazette” No. 32, April 13th, 1967, p. 130). This statement offered police officials the right to verify all those who applied for documents necessary for crossing the border. Accord- ing to the same decision, the officials who could approve the issue of travel documents (passport as well as exit- entry visa) were the gov- ernment commission for passports and visas, the foreigner control and passports division, the capital's police and regional police directorates, the police city and district divisions (Thidem, p. 131). Any of the previ- ous could block the process of obtaining travel documents, so the ap- plicant would get notified that it was forbidden to leave the country. If the passport was obtained, after the return from the trip, it was given to the militia for keeping, where it stayed until the owner made a new request to temporarily leave the country (Ibidem, p. 140). The categories of people who could experience difficulties. in getting travel documents were former political prisoners, former mem- bers of historical parties, people with relatives living abroad, suspected of the intention to leave the country for good or simply people sus- pected of evasion. 67‘The role of the Securitate in using this type of ban may be less obvious at first glance, since the Militia [Police] was responsible for issuing, maintaining or suspending the passport. In reality though, all persons who applied for a passport and a visa were checked by the State Security Directorate. This is evidenced by the files containing lists of those who requested to temporarily or permanently leave the country, together with the suggestion of having their request refused or accepted, (see ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no. 179, vol. 4). Along with these documents, testimonies regarding the ban on leaving the country for various reasons are available, serving as proof for the limited freedom of movement in Romania during 1970 — 1980, which was a breach of a fundamental human right recognized by the 1965 Constitution of the R.P.R. and by Romania's international agree- ments. ‘The documents and testimonies below illustrate the kind of bans regarding the freedom of movement that could be enforced upon Ro- manian citizens during the 1970's, but especially the 1980's, as well as their consequences on the private lives of individuals. ‘The relevance of this topic as well as that of the documents and testimonies presented in this collage is significant for Romania's recent history, with topics such as human rights violations, daily life during communism or the history of the frontier concept possibly benefiting from this type of sources.Part IIT Documents from the CNSAS archive regarding methods of citizens surveillance during 1970 — 1980 Motives for keeping ordinary citizens under surveillance during 1970 - 1980 i. 29" of December 1966. Synopsis note regarding the visit of state leaders and party members in the country (excerpt). 4../0n the 29th of December 1966, agent G.M. informed us that during his discussion with B.O. about the visit af state leaders and party members in different regions of the country, the latter affirmed: “too much commotion is caused by these state visits in the country. The money that is spent on these visits could very well be given to the peaple, to improve their lives.” He also affirmed about the General Secretary of the Commu- nist Party “he counts too much on the nationalism of people”, that is the personality cult. From his order, in 1970s there will have to be pro- duced 4 purely nationalist movies. /./ Now, men are not allowed to satisfy their needs and are used only for reproductive purposes. Abortion is banned in other countries as well, but at least they have medicine to prevent pregnancy, while we do not. Through this method, men are forced to either give up their pleasure, or otherwise take a chance. All these facts will have a nega- tive influence and will give way to suicides and the practice of homo- sexuality. /.../ (ACNSAS, Information Fund, file no. 4362, p. 168) 2. 1™ of May 1975. Motives for opening an Informative Surveil- lance File (excerpt). Ministry of Internal Affairs, Valcea County Inspectorate, Service H, Top Secret, 69No, 201/00631 from the 16" of June 1976 Synopsis note for file no. 00631, regarding the named “Ladescu”. D.U.I. was opened on the I" of May 1975, on the basis of infor- mative documents obtained, making M. M.N. suspect of committing acts of sabotage, consorting with foreign citizens and, in certain occasions, having a hateful attitude towards the socialist orders... (ACNSAS, Information Fund, file no, 202, p. 295) Methods, means and techniques for surveillance used by the Securitate. 3. 5" of November 1983. Plan of methods in an Informative Sur- veillance File, created by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Dambovita County Inspectorate, Service I (excerpt). Plan of methods in the informative action apened for PC. from Targoviste 4. from the analysis of the situation of the above-mentioned person, the following tasks must be completed: 1. determining if the suspect intends to leave the country and the actions he undertakes in this direction, the causes that deter- mine him to have such a position and the political statements he makes; 2, finding out about all the suspects relationships and also seleci- ing those who will prove useful in certain operative actions, 3, preparing the conditions that will lead to documenting the case and also solving it through specific prevention methods which will lead to the neutralization of the suspect's actions; /.../ (ACNSAS, Information Pund, file no. 5488, vol.1, p. 2) Informers of the Securitate - from recruitment to abandon- ment 4. 9 of June 1987. Note regarding the measures that will be un- dertaken for “verifying the candidate and raising the extent in which he is dependent on the authorities of Securitate”, created by Hajeg City Securitate (excerpt). 4.4 a) Measures for verifying the candidate after the recruitment 70process is over: - He will be given certain aspect for clarification, aspects that are already known to us. - The informer “Pddurean Ion" will give our candidate certain information about JJ, sectarian, with relationships among fu- gitives, a person who is well known to be able and willing to orchestrate an escape across the border. Through this we in- tend to find out if our candidate will give us the information he received from "Pddurean lon”, - Using the “S” control method [intercepting and censorship of correspondence] which helps us determine aspects from our candidate's life relationships, interests, ete. Obtaining information through our network, investigations, etc. by Measures for raising the extent to which the candidate is depen- dent on the authorities of Securitate: - he will be given support to facilitate his registration in the Driver's School in Hunedoara or Deva, thus helping him obtain his driver's license; - rewards consisting of money will be given gradually, accord- ing to his contribution in solving certain security matters; ~ he will be helped to obtain his license for amateur fishing /../ (ACNSAS, Network Fund, file no. 1741, vol. 1, p. 11) Surveillance of the population via audio and video means: Operative Technique. §. 24" of April 1987. Installing a microphone in a table leg, and later on, a shingle, in a hotel room in Covasna (excerpt). 4..fWhen we entered the room, we all checked and studied the spot where the T.O. specialists were going to plant the device. The con- clusion that was reached was that the best place would be the table leg, which was fastened with screws to the table/.../ Leutenent Major Dujé Jon pointed out the fact that the table leg should not be removed fram the room until the replacement was brought in, so as not to attract attention when the maid came to clean the room. Lt. Ignat left for the Administration desk, to find a replacement table leg/.../ After verifying the fact that our suspect had left on a trip with her roommate, we began to test the equipment that had just been installed by the T.O. specialists. 7AWe noticed that the signal did not reach our surveillance room. Thus, we brought in the shingle, tested it, found out that it was working prop- erly and proceeded to installing it in the suspect's rooms... we report that we were not discovered during the planting of the equipment, we were not seen during the process and there were no ulterior suspicions, 1...fbetween, 4 of April and the 8 of April 1985, we listened to the TO. equipment on a daily basis and the conclusion is that the suspect and all other participants in discussions did not have an inadequate political attitude. /../ (ACNSAS, Information Fund, file no. 4957, vol. 1, pp. 227 - 228) Stakeout: means of informative surveillance 6. I" of July 1978. Order from the Intemal Affairs Minister, No. 001401 regarding surveillance work and investigations (excerpt). i... Surveiliance is about watching certain people or the su- pervision of certain buildings and sites, fieldwork done secretly, using specific methods and means The main tasks of surveillance are: Art, 3 - studying and determining behavioral and occupational pat- terns that the elements of interest have in various places, as well as the activities they undertake in the buildings or sites which are kept under surveillance;/.../ - making a selection of the people the element came into direct contact with, and monitoring them to find out their identity;/.../ -making a list o addresses the elements visit; /.../ - identifying the place, date of dispatch of postal effects as well as other clues which will permit the investigator to locate and intercept them; ~ observing and remembering, as much as possible, the phone numbers dialed by the objective when in public, as well as the discus- sions that took place; -noticing and communicating immediately the opportunity for technical-operative teams to intervene by placing their equipment; (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 7929, vol. 170, pp. 5-11) 7. 16" of December 1987. Note regarding surveillance on objec- 72tive “Bob”, 16.12.1987, between the hours 06:00 and 17:00, recorded by Special Service “F", Cluj County Inspectorate, Intemal Affairs Min- istry (excerpt). +S Objectives of Activity: At 7:00 target “Bob” left his home, walked down A. Endre Street, Calea Turzii Street and stopped in the bus station in Baba Novac Square. After 3-4 minutes the no. 10 bus arrived in which the objective got on and traveled to Garii Square where he got pages. He continued to move from Gdrii Square on several streets until reaching Razboieni Street, entering Mucart headquarters at 7:30 — his workplace. /.../ (ACNSAS, Information Fund, file no. 2126, p. 40) Control and censorship of correspondence 8. 15" of October 1971. Fragment from a Ictter addressed by a group from the “Free Kings’ Club” to Cornel Chiriac, radioman at uropa Libera” (excerpt). The Free Kings’ Club Brdila — October 15" 1971 Transmits: Dear Cornel, The number of friends af “Metronomul” is growing constantly. We are three friends: Ghary O'Hara, Kenedy O'Hara si O'Brien Mc. Harrison who together with same other friends make up “The Free Kings’ Club”, and all of us consider ourselves friends of “Metronomul”. The fact thar this is our first letter should not lead you to think that we have been listening to “Metronomul” for | or 2 weeks, Please consider us old friends, who listen to your show or those of Radu Teador, as well as other radio shows from “Bucuresti no. 4" radio station. Regarding age, you should know that we are not very old: Kennedy is 14, and Ghary and O'Brien are 16. In fact, 16 is the medium age of all club members /.../ Gone are beards and long hair of young people, gone is pop, beat or progressive music. “AIL” is gone. Only a few things re- main, waiting-lines at the butcher's shop and at the grocery store, which make life sad. Why do so many Romanians who have the opportunity to go to a capitalist country leave and never look back ? Is it because they are happy ? Definitely not, But who has the courage to stand up and shout this truth ? No one! Because as seon as you make a fuss about it, they 73come and pick you up. And then all you get are fists and canes from police officers, This is their way of making you think like a communist. However, as always, we say what they say as we please. Moreover, the only way we can relieve our pressure, pour our soul, is to write to you, dear Cornel. You are for us as a second parent, In your shows, we see a better life, freedom, a life worth living. So let us thank you from the depths of our hearts for everything that you did, are doing and will do for us, Us = the youth of Romania. /../ (ACNSAS, Information Fund, file no. 3032, vol. 1, p. 21) 9. 13" of December 1974. Notification from the Direction of Postal Services and Communication Iasi County to Iasi County Inspectorate of Internal Affairs Ministry in which they announced the damage of a letter during “processing” (excerpt). 4.4 Please find attached a very simple letter, which was dete- riorated during processing thus making it impossible to figure out who the sender or the recipient were. According to our internal regulations, if a letter cannot be returned to the sender or delivered to the recipient, it is classified as undelivered and is opened to find if there is an address inside the envelope. When opening this letter, we noticed that it contained a rather special message, which we consider you should verify, 4.4 (ACNSAS, Information Fund, file no. 2698, vol. 1, p. 3) The searches 10. 15" of November 1979. On their trip to the West, G. R. and his wife were thoroughly searched as they left the country (excerpt). Lud From 15.X1.1979 until 11,XH,1979 F have travelled to the West. On the 15" of November: to the Bihor Diocese. My travel docu- ments were checked on the train, on the way to Oradea, At the Bihor Diocese station, my papers were checked again. All my belongings packed in two suitcases were spread in the first class compartment my wife and I were travelling in, I have been invited in the next compart- ment where I was searched. Nothing was found. My wife was stripsearched by a female border guard. She was forced to pull dawn her underware while being checked between her legs (very shameful). On the isle: a superior officer was watching in order to make sure that 74the female border guard did her job properly. I protested against this kind of treatment, The answer came: «These are our orders», The bor- der guard apologized. (Would it not have been a better idea to ask what she was looking for?) A small book containing poetry by Saint Cotrus was taken from me before leaving the country, but given back upon my return, which I will show to anyone asking for proof. /.../ (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no, 69, vol. 86, p. 2) 11. 19” of February 1980. Report created by the Cluj County Inspectorate regarding measures taken in the C.R. case, protester un- der D.U.I. surveillance (excerpt). /..f Based on unverified information, which states that hostile ma- terials and documents are to be found at his home and copies of data sent abroad and transmitted by the «Free Europe» radio station, we obtained permission to carry out a search of his home on the 13* of February, 1980 from the Military Prosecutor in Cluj. Based on the search authorization issued on the 14® of Febru- ary, 1980, under police cover, we proceeded to search his home, where a number of writings and documents, copies of hostile calls and state- ments, submitted or sent by C.R. to foreign representatives of the « Free Europe » radio station and reactionary political and religious organi- zations, were found and confiscated. /.../ Comrade Dumitragcu Neculai, Colonel, Head of County's Securitate Office, took part during the discussions held at the Munici- pal Police Station in Cluj-Napoca with C.R. /... (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 2760, vol 1, p. 142) Investigations by the Securitate during the latter decades of communism 12. 27 of July 1988. Statements from the investigation of a group of young people (excerpt). 4..f During occasional meetings with my friends / ... / we talked about the BBC shows and, sometimes the ones on «Free Europes. /../ In my case, the critical tendencies started when my debut volume about to be published by the «Cartea romdneascd» Publishing House, part of a collective anthology, was abusively removed from the editorial plan, due to backstage machinations. Personally, I criticized the edu- 75cation system, arguing that it is outdated because too many teachers are elderly and incompetent, I also criticized the cultural system of the country, arguing that intellectuals da not have sufficient rights and opportunities for expressing themselves creatively (magazines, publish- ing houses, institutes, etc.). | have criticized the system both with my faculty colleagues as well as with my friends, I was the ane who initi- ated many of our critical discussion during our comments. Seduced by the pleasure to criticize, I also brought into ques- tion the social and economic policy of our state. /../ 1 declare that these statements were made mainly in ovder to act snobly and amaze our colleagues and that I never had any possibility, or real intention of emigrating. I declare, support and sign, 27-VH-I988. (ACNSAS, Informative Fund, file no. 10, p. 29-34) 13. 2™ of September 1988. Statement - after the investigation (ex- cerpt), /,./ 1 maintain the previous statements regarding informal rela- tions with Hungarian citizens / ... / and sending letters containing in- adequate content to the radio station calling itself Radio Free Europe, facts which I regret as I realize their social seriousness and danger. Under the warning by the security forces for committing the aforemen- tioned facts, I declare that I understood the correctness of the preven- five measure taken in my case and I am committed to stopping for good and never doing it again. /.../ (ACNSAS, Informative file, file no. 4957, vol 1, pp. 29-29v) Preventive measures used by the Securitate 14. 24" of September 1985. Report regarding the use of the wam- ing, made by the Botosani County Inspectorate - Securitate, for the State Security Department, Directorate I - Service V (excerpt). 4.4 On the 24th of September 1985, mister A.l. received a warn- ing from the security forces / ... / He was spreading news heard over the Western reactionary Free Europe and Voice of America radio stations, being influenced into making hostile comments against the top party and state leadership of our country. / ... / The warning was made at the headquarters of the County Health 76Department, in the presence of the Head of Health Department, the deputy director in charge of organizational problems, the party cam- mittee secretary and the president of the union. They all took a firm siand against acts committed by AL, and made suggestions for his behavior and conduct in the future. Informative-operative measures were taken in order to monitor his re- action after the warning. Head of County's Securitate Office, Head of Directorate I, Colonel Hulubas Constantin 1, col, Créiciun Mihai (ACNSAS, Informative Fund, file no. 5042, vol.1, p. 12) 15. September 1987. Report which describes the target's activity after the warning - Dolj County Inspectorate, Service I (excerpt). J... On the 24th of July,1987, C. §. was warned by the security forces. /... / It has been established that in July, he took the admission exam for the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Department TCM, evening course, which he passed. Source “S” and “T" announce that after the examination, during the months of July and August, he went to Deva and Sebes to visit relatives. / ... / September 7th, 1987 /... / Continue the use of positive influence, and the informative sur- veillance should also be done, after each contact, with the network's help. The letter Sec. jud. Mehedinji nr, 0011912 of 8.08. 1987 raises major problems, and may even be an attempt to instigate. /.../ (ACNSAS, Informative Fund, file no. 5711, vol.1, pp. 134-134) Bans from leaving the country 16. 2™ of September 1983. Issues and lessons learned from the prevention, detection and neutralization of attempts to illegally facili- tate, host and guide people across the Romanian state borders (excerpt). 4.4 Information obtained regarding the “People with intentions of illegally crossing the state border” issue proves that emigration takes place and has worsened amid the resurgence of increasingly virulent attempts to subvert the state's ideology by reactionary circles and in- telligenee agencies abroad, in order to generate dissident ideas in the minds of people with or without political or criminal history. Since spring 1977, beginning with Goma Paul's hostile activity in Bucharest, the 7tendency to emigrate has experienced accelerated growth, and as a result, the number of people applying for approval to leave the country has grown, usually people with relatives or connections abroad (par- ticularly Romanian citizens of German nationality), but also those who attempted to cross the Romanian state border. / ... / From a Securitate’s point of view, the people who attempt to ille- gally cross the state borders can be: /... - known for having a history of reactionary political and crimi- nal acts or targeted by security measures. In 1981, “Ion C”, retired feacher, former head of the legionnaire sector managed to disappear and leave the country illegally, and settle into the German Federal Re- public. The same year, two people involved in a security case crossed the border illegally, and arrived in Canada and Spain, respectively; - illegally transporting objects, data, and information used abroad in hostile propaganda, especially the so called breaches of “hu- man rights”, particularly the ones regarding immigration, /.../ (ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file 7929, vol. 364, pp. 2, 5) 78Part III. Fragments from interviewees’ confessions. Reasons for the surveillance of ordinary citizens during the 1970’s - 1980's. 1. 4... My father wrote a lot and lots of philosophy, Christian phi- losophy, And then they found some of my manuscripts, That was back in 1960, And in those manuscripts, I used to write down my opinion about all that happened in politics, about some people's aititude, about ail that was happening socially, financially. You know, I did some dis- sertations that were far from friendly. This was why, soon afterwards, within a few months, I was removed from the dispensary. Brasov came and took me, then Bucharest took me, the captain, he was a captain at that time, Gheorghe Enoiu ... After several months, my brother was arrested, who should not have been arrested, because they had no veason. He was framed, but only to he able to punish my father, to be able to defeat him. They haven't succeeded, but did everything pos- sible, including torture. /.../ (Interview with Galina Raduleanu) 2. 4../1 have worked for 20 years as an assistant for the English Department of the Faculty of foreign languages (University of Bucharest), and could not get promoted because I had relatives abroad, and came from a family with problems (in 1944, my mother’s brother, Mircea Mihai Filipescu, remained in Germany and later exiled to Australia, In 1946, my father's sister, Pia, married Fdrcdsanu, had fled with her husband in exile. My maternal grandfather, George Ene Filipescu, leading mem- ber of the Sacial Democratic Party died in prison in the 1950's. My paternal grandmother, painter Maria Pillat-Brates, was arrested in 1949 and then forcefully sent during 1950-1955 to the Hungarian Autono- mous Region, and then was forbidden to exhibit her paintings in the art 79salons in the capital and throughout the country. My father had been arrested and convicted in the Noica-Pillat trial, trial against intellectu- als during the 1960's. /.../ (Interview with Monica Pillat Sdulescu) Methods, means and techniques of surveillance used by the Securitate. 3. 4... My action plan contains, as an action against me, the in- struction to contact the staff, probably employed by them (the French Library), and ask what books I loan, and for how long, who do T talk to when I get there, what contacts do I have, what relationships I had formed and so on. The roughest action plan against me appears in 1986, two years after having an informative investigation file opened in 1984, Already three years after my return to Romania from Algeria. So, in 1986 they said this. Their goals: “To determine the nature of the correspondence between the target Dragu”, that was my name (conspiratory, as target), “and its contacts abroad, to prevent the leak of data, secret information from his contacts; to investigate his illegal activity, don't know what they are talking about, and to take operative measures against Dragu”. Probably because I received food parcels, there was a great famine here and I had three aunts, elderly, which I had to feed. /.../ The actions, with deadlines, set against me: “a con- nection, his or his wife's, will be selected, verified and studied in onler to become an associate. ... The requirements necessary for conducting a secret search of his home and for installing the special means of operative technique will be analyzed”. ... They did not! “We will en- sure the informative surveillance of Dragu at the French Library, by relying on sources “Sorina” and “Delia“ to determine who gets in contact with him, the frequency of his visits and more, » That I think they did, but I have no proof. And the last, the hardest, I've already told you about. “Initiating an informative combination by interposing an informer pretending to be sent by one of his contacts in France, in order to observe his responses and intentions in such situations.” This action plan has been found in various forms in other similar docu- ments appearing in the file until 1989. /.../ (Interview with Nicolae Drigulinescu)Informers of the Securitate - attempts to recruit ! 4. /...4 | want to say that as a young man and /.../ inside the Securitate headquarters ... only hearing about the Securitate... only looking at the Securitate building was enaugh to get you scared. I do not know how many there were, they act so brave naw, how many there were in some small room of the Securitate, only with an officer... I was afraid, but I thought: “Lord, what can I do ? Please help me {Then he reproduces the dialogue with the Securitate officer] / ../ “Come on, write! I declare ... so and so, 1 declare that I will reveal information about ../" And made me write my name, I wanted to find out the names that interested them, “And now, sign!" I can't I said, I can't...“What do you mean you can't sign ?” He began to get angry like a lion in a cage, started watking around table. “I feel ... with the others, I don't know ... I think I would have punched them ! He said. This time IT don't know what I'll do!” Sir, I'm sorry, don't get mad, I cannot do it, I cannot give you information about ... [long pause) write here and sign that I will become an informer. And I want you to know that when I left the church, I told the church elders that I'll be coming here! “What ? He jumped. You told them ?” I tald them I've come here and now, you know, when I get out of here, a friend of mine expects me to call. /.../ (Interview with David Ciucur) 5. 4.4 They would fight for this name, the modified name. The name is essential. That is the reason why the file is analyzed. The file has only one weak spat. The modified name, The name is used to cover up the infernal pot of sin. There is not only one sin there. The file is a Sfruit of several sins. £./ (Interview with loan Buga) ‘The surveillance of the population via audio and video means - Operative Technique. 6. 4...f Beyond the fact that they were informers we had a very clear signal - and clear for us as well - that someone was listening, because at some point Sorin and Marius were moved without any ex- planations from one room to another. Yes ? Someone from the police came with an imaginary charge from one of their investigations, possi- bly some old books trafficking, a very bad lie anyway, and after that, 81after being summoned at the police station in Grozdvesti, their rooms were suddenly switched. Yes, they were moved elsewhere. How should I put this, no matter how naive we were, we could not help realize that - and we were not that naive - they did it in order to place us under surveillance. And obviously we even abstained for a while, we stopped talking. However, up to a point, because from one point onwards it be- came an excuse for youthful irresponsibility, | cannot call it otherwise. Something to joke about, and that's why he associated our listeners to our jokes, we sent them messages. And it all started when Sorin was once alone in the room, shivering from the cold and told us how he rose suddenly and said: “I would like to thank the Party, personally thank Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu for the wonderful conditions which he created for us." We had so much fun after listening to that story that we stopped holding back. Maybe this upset them, the fact that we made fun of them and included them in our family. They were regulars sort of, you know, you get used to it, in a sort of LL. Caragiale's writings” sort of way... It seems that they did not like the joke though! /.../ (Inter- view with Caius Dobrescu) The stakeout: means of informative investigation. 7. 4../The stakeout started at 8 a.m. and it went on until he was sure that you had gone to sleep and he would write down what you did every minute. I have also seen files from the Berevoiesti pit, where docu- ments of the Securitate were burned in the early 90s, some were recov- ered and the thing that amazed me was to see conversations with, say, Andrei Plegu, which, again, were terribly inconsistent. You can imag- ine those conversations... the trivial things two people speak of on the Phone can be written down on dozens of pages. What an absurd work it was ? I have a file where they wrote down everything that was said during the burial of Noica, what happened ... Noica’s funeral was held in Paltinis, near Sibiu. Then how, what I said on the phone while talk- ing to Emil Cioran, from Sibiu, when I called to talk about Noica’: funeral. Emil Cioran had called... to pay homage ta Noica. Yes ... ev- erything that I discussed with Emil Cioran was recorded every minute, 4. (interview with Gabriel Liiceanu) 828. 4...4 The surveillance was unbearable ... because you knew you were being watched all the time, from every angle, and you had no Possibility of doing anything. [ was once on holiday with my family, visiting my son in Slobozia. And the boy went to work, we would stay at home and in the morning we would get up and go to Amara, Amara is about 7 km away from Slobozia. Well, the officer - we entered the beach, changed inta bathing suits, lay the blanket, there were some trees, green grass and two-three feed away was the water, where we would swim. And the officer got undressed as well and stood in his speedo like so (stands up), glued to a fence, looking at us. Always looking at us until 3-4 o'clock in the afternoon, when we would get bored, get dressed and leave. He also got dressed and followed us. He watched us as we entered the apartment building, and he sat there ... | do not know where he sat, but in the morning when we left again he was once more waiting by the entrance to the apartment building and followed us to Amara, stripped and sunbathed again and so on. And during our vacation, we had no vacation... We could net calm down for one single minute out of 24 hours. /.../ (interview with Vasile Paraschiv) The secret control and censorship of correspondence. 9. 4... There are intercepted letters [in the file] ... Especially Pia's letters to us ... On the envelope there was a blue cross made with pencil showing that those letters had been read. Moreover, I wondered why these letters had to be marked like that, Because they could have been read anyway. That's what happens later ... no longer do they bear the blue cross, but the copies are to be found in the file. And I think it was a kind of strategy by the Securitate to show those who received the letter that it was read. It was a sign that said: “We know what's going on and what it being sent!" It was another way of keeping people under surveillance and making them aware of it. /.../ (Interview with Monica Pillat Sdiuleseu) 10. 4../ Some of my letters reached their destination, others not... T had a list with the envelope’s contents: 20 stamps, 3 postcards, this many newspaper cutouts... And the receiver would confirm: they ar- rived or not... After that, I started sending express mail... Those did not make it, | checked with the International Postal Union ... They had a 83rule: “For every express letter that does not reach its destination, there is a $30 fine for the sender State's postal service, "So I wrote on the envelope:” If this letter does not reach its destination, the Romanian Postal Service will receive a 30 dollar a fine. “And it made them mad. I found in the file, someone had written there: “Comrade’... rank’, Please advise on how to proceed because the target tends to file com- Plaints with the International Postal Union.” I made them furious. /../ (Interview with Nicolae Drigulinescu) The searches ll. 4./ These people, after having broken into my home, having made keys for themselves, having bugs placed inside for close moni- toring, they would enter my place at any time, they would go through the files at my desk where | work to this day, they would take out my photos, make pictures of them, put them back and leave. This would happen periodically. The act of going through your files, through your photos, of entering the deepest parts of your life was basically a dis- placement of your ultimate being. I got upset retroactively ... You knaw ? Because I needed a little bit of humour to deal with this. We all needed some humour to help us deal with this terrible thing. Retroactively how- ever, I feel like crying because it is a terrifying thing to be able to enter someone's life down to its very last detail. Because photographs taken during your life and placed at the bottom of a drawer represent your life's ultimate intimacy. If they could get there, they could get abso- lutely anywhere, /.../ (Interview of Gabriel Liiceanu) 12. 4... They even came to my home when I was at work, And that happened once when T was coming home ... | had a lock up, a lack down ... | had locked the door with the key to the top lock and had no key for the other lock. When I came home, I could not open the door. I went over to my parents for they also had keys, I have lost... I had a... 4.4 1 had a Dacia car which I bought in installments ... /../ And I had a dashboard notebook. Where I wrote down my trips ! Well, the dash- board notebooks were gone !/.../ (Interview with Aluna Brana)‘The investigations by the Securitate during the last decades of communism 13. /../ Et, col. Pddurariu, and major, back in 1984, Adamescu, loan Adameseu, the two who handled me for five - six days in July 1984. 4. First they expressed their disagreement and hatred for me for having betrayed them when they tried to recruit me, secondly they made hostile statements against my poetry, the theater, my private life and myself - my strategy, which I imposed on myself, was to say nothing about others, of course. /... / I acted naively and this infuriated them, because if they said that my poems are hostile, I gave them an interpre- tation ... [ said “This is a mean interpretation, I can interpret betiers, and I gave them a positive interpretation". /./ the classical “good cop - bad cop” method began, one of them, I do not know which one, they changed roles. Pddurariu and Adamescu interrogated me. Come on, you are a good person, tell us what Totok said, come on tell us what Wagner said. I do not know, [ know nothing of it. Then came the threats, we have this many files with complaints about you, from the university, from colleagues and staff, we will thrash you, you won't achieve anything, you won't be able to publish. Up to things like you should be careful not to have a car accident, you'll leave this place in some car, we'll keep you here all night in the cellar, you're not going home, /../ Until ten - eleven o'clock in the evening and then they suddenly released me. And I think it was the third or fourth day. I always brought a bag of socks, underwear, underpants, with a few sandwiches /./ to be arrested, to become a prisoner there, And this was much more depressing. /.../ and they said, “Tonight you won't be going home anymore, you know, you'll stay in our cellar.” And this game is so humiliating, so perverse, that one fine day I wished they would not tell me to go home, { wished to remain there, because this firing upon your nervous system destroys you, it crushes you. /... / Afterwards, I refused to write what they wanted me to write and I said: «I won't write its. And then, suddenly mr. lon Adamescu got up and started beating me with fists everywhere you can hit without leaving a mark, In the back, in the kidneys, 1 went [huddles up, hands guarding his face], first I got into this posture, I don't know why, to guard from being hit in the face, it would have been better to get hit in face for others to see it, and then I got up and ran around the table and he 85chased me. And a situation like that happened again, two days or one day later, when he tried to beat me. Now if I tell it, I feel like laughing, it was pure slapstick, but back then it was no laughing matier for me because this Adamescu was strong too. And when I saw that he got up to come at me again [raises his right arm with his fist up high] / gor up as well and the chair fell and he didn't grab me because he had to lift the chair and I stood in a corner and he stood in the other and I said T would stand until someone else comes, And then he left and Pddurariu came, as if nothing happened. / ... / With violence and repression and with... For example, during that time, this is also not in the file, Adamescu came to me and said “Look, we want to, uh, finish with these hostile intellectuals. You are of German language, go to Germany ! Here, have a blane passport. Say yes, | write down your name in the passport, you leave Romania, do nothing hostile to Romania, and you'll have your peace, we have our peace and it's over". / ... / They released me on the Jifih day because I said, “You know what I did, 1 told ail my friends that 1 am being interrogated”. /.../ Then Adamescu started beating me again, it was simply a matter of anger, it was not calculated and yet another grotesque scene and then they discussed with each other, gave me a pen, to write something, an interpretation of a poem and I sat there for hours, until they decided to let me go /.../ and give me another date to come back on, the 20th of august I think /.../. (Interview with Mr. Helmuth Frauendorfer) 14. 4.4 In Brasov, yes, in Brasov. I was forced, threatened with the dog, to stand on one leg and hold Ceaugescu’s picture with my nose, and to look for, the investigator came and said: “Here, find your pic- tures.». So I began to find some of my pictures. In the meantime, he got out of the room, and a second one entered: «What are you doing, search- ing through those papers ?". He would beat me up, and I would stop, of course, since he had beaten me! He got out of the room, and the another one came: «What are you doing, are you defying me ? I asked you to find yourself in these pictures.» And you can imagine the terms they used, like scoundrel, murderer, rapist, the state struggled to get me through school and I was a bastard, I blew it, I spat the hand that raised me, this was the kind of slogans they stuffed down my throat, so to speak, they were hitting the hands, the legs, if you withdrew your hand the number of hits would double, saying that they would give you 86ten hits, but if you withdrew your hand, twenty. You see, | was not ac- customed to this kind of investigation, 1 had no idea what was going to happen, and then /... / So, the dog, at one time they brought in a wolf dog, ordered him to sit, and made me stand on one leg with the dog in front of me. He left the room, Now you realize that I, after five to ten minutes, can’t remember exactly, but I obviously got numb and then I gat the idea - we have some laughs about this with the colleagues - to spit in the dog’s face. As he tried to wipe it off with his paw, | would switch the foot. At first it was sort of, scary, but of course, no matter how smart the dog was, he did not realize that, in fact, I’m standing on my left or my right foot. After about half an hour of jumping from one foot to the other, the investigator came expecting to see, obviously, that the dog had attacked me or something like that, hey, how long can this guy hold on, And then I got beat up again, after releasing the dog, who was taken out of the room by a soldier, and then he beat me up and said - do you see in all the offices, everywhere there was a picture of Ceausescu. After removing one of the many Ceausescu paintings from the wall, he told me I have to hold it against the wall with my nose. He then got out of the room to see how long I can do this. When he heard that I dropped the painting, he returned to the room and asked,,. “What are you doing ?" Well, I said, I dropped it. “Aaa, you dropped (wond- play meaning “to overthrow") Ceausescu?” And they would ruff me up. Now I consider this a bad joke, but back then, it had a terrible effect on me. I was afraid of everything that might happen, besides, bur this happened afterwards, uh, and it convinced me even more, in Bucharest, over there, from the start, we were tald that we are consid- ered expendable, the state has no use of us, we have ceised to exist as person, we have no identification, so my name is not Dénut lacob, but number 416, I should always address them as “investigative citizen” and not use “sir” but “comrade”, so, clearly, because I no longer represented anything. He showed me the pen and said: “This pen shail decide for you. From now on, the pen decides your fate.” You realize, feeling scared by ail this, with all my experiences, all with thoughts. /../ At night, in fact, there was no sleeping, it was a nonstop interrogation, for they would switch. He started asking me again what I did, I gave one hundred statements I think, only with Little Red Riding Hood, Snow White. I would write the story, he would ask me when and where: “So, 87what happened in Brasov, which books do you read, which actors do you like ?” So he was sort of, uh, creating my profile. In the end he said «Since you are short, you were always in front, try not to lie about this stuff, so you have always seen the way it was organized.” So he was explaining, and doing all sorts of connections like that and it was im- possible for me not to tell them what they wanted to get from me, Which is something I've never hidden except for the first day of inquiry in Brasov, /.../ (Interview with Dinut Tacob) Bans from leaving the country 15. 4./ That year [1974], I had to leave, acting as a representative af the Romanian geomagnetism geophysics IAGA, | was the national representative, as I still am today, the national correspondent for the international association of geomagnetism and aeronautics. And I had to ga to a conference in France. I had all the documents required, but my passport got withdrawn at the last moment. I got over it easily. T thought that some failure occurred. Afterwards, the failure emerged. 4... / At the last moment, a few days ... It came... the officer in charge of the institute had been replaced, It was a man who didn't know me and he called me into his office and told me: « do you knaw why you don't have a visa?” “No.” “Well because you have connections with run- aways". Never thought about it... “Isn't it true that you live in the home of Dan Constantinescu who has fled to Germany and you have rented from him". “No”. And T told him exactly what the situation was. 4.4 (Interview with Andrei Soare) 16. 4./ Of course that having that kind of history, meant being de- nied a passport for the first travel abroad with the institution, the choir J was singing in, in Budapest. So I could nat even ga to Budapest, thus J went to see the Head of Passports Service Office over at the Securitate, to complain, And there in his report it says that he ix posing as a man who ...repented ... that is, who no longer wants to be under surveil- lance. That was about it. Poses as an honest man. Basically, a year or two-three years ago, my intention was to leave abroad bur I could not. A few years ago I would have applied for a passport and I would have received it, now T could no longer apply and no longer receive it. /../ (Interview with Marin Balas) 88Part IV The impact of reading the Securitate file on the person previously under surveillance ‘One of the main reasons for starting the National Council for the Study of Securitate Archives (by the 187/1999 Law) was the access to one’s own file made by the Securitate, in the communist era, From the moment it came into existence and to this day, thousands of people have had the opportunity of reading their files of informative and crimi- nal surveillance and also the network files written by the political po- lice of the communist state. For many years, we have witnessed strong emotions experi- enced in the C.N.S.A.8’s reading room, by people whose lives were monitored by the secret services in Romania, between 1984-1989. Impressed and shocked by the information they discovered, people felt the need to openly express emotion, astonishment, disapproval or resentment, Because of this experience, we considered it important to widely examine the impact of being able to view one’s file by studying the interviews taken during the ,,Learning History through Past Experi- ences: Ordinary People Under the Securitate’s Surveillence” project. ‘To start with, we wanted to find out the circumstances that led to asking C.N.S.A.S. to facilitate access to their files. Many of the an- swers we were given are now found in the subchapter “Why did they want to see their Securitate file 7". Reading them carefully, you might notice that many were more or less sure of the existence of such a file, partly because they felt the «shadow» of the Sccuritate, or cven some got the opportunity to brutally experience the reality of it — we are talking about the persons who were subjects of interrogations, warn- ings, investigations or even of those whom the Securitate pressured into becoming informers. They wanted now, in particular, to get a full picture of the trauma experienced and to find out who in their entou- 89rage helped the Securitate. However, some said they came to see their files out of simple curiosity or in hope of identifying documents which would grant them certain rights. It is interesting to notice the level of expectation of those who requested access to their file. Many thought they will find recordings of all the important events in their life, others hoped to identify friends and foes, or some even sought comprehensive answers regarding the problems they had with the regime and its main tool — the Securitate, Sometimes, reading the file was viewed as a last step to make towards the final rupture with the past. ‘One of the greatest issues of those who read thcir file is related to the identification of the Sccuritate informers. When browsing through the informatory notes provided, one is invaded by an ocean of mixed feelings: fear of finding out that someone close to him was an informer, disgust at discovering the nature and content of the information pro- vided by the informers to the political police, amazement in seeing how well their actions were known by the Securitate or even astounded and outraged because many of the data was inaccurate, misleading or even deliberately falsified. Albeit that the informers appear in files with their conspiracy names, often their true identity is of no mistery to the ones being under surveillance, since documents carry sufficient clues that lead to their disclosure. When, for various reasons, this is not possible, or when some want to have an official document, they ask the C.N.S.A.S. to expose the identity of the informer. Surprisingly, even though they wish to know who helped the Securitate in its actions against them, the ma- jority of the persons do not intend to use this information in a vindic- tive way. Some demonstrate generosity when being able to forget the ones guilty of denouncement, others limit themselves to letting them know they are aware of their actins from the past, and others take on a careless attitude, and abandon, more or less suddenly, any relations they had with the past informers. Few are those who try in one way or another to punish the former informer, which shows that they had rec- onciled with the past and prefer to look further into the future. More- over, in his case, the simple advertising of their actions or recordings with the Securitate is a punishment. In addition to discovering «another version of one's life» and to finding out who one’s «friends and enemies were», the persons who 90read their file get the opportunity to closely observe the functioning mechanism of the terrible soul mixer which the Securitate was. It is interesting the fact that for many, reading the files written by the Securitate officers led to the downfall of the omnipotent communist secret services myth, People have discovered with surprise that dozens of officers had as sole objective the surveillance of rather harmless individuals, that many of them were poorly trained professionally wise and that their activity was not just reprehensible — fitting perfectly in the so far called «political polices - but also completely useless. Maybe that is why, the idea most expressed in the statement of those who read their informative file is that it cannot be complete or even real, but a coun- terfcit that was hastily handed to C.N.S.A.S. by the competent authori- ties: S.R.L, S.LE. and M.A.P.N. Disappointed by the file content, there are persons ready to embrace any theory that explains why they have not found what they sought or hoped for. What many fail to understand is that it was not and entire life they trailed but only that part of it that elicited the interest of the Securitate. Despite the small letdowns, people consider that it is very im- portant that those who have been prosecuted by the Securitate, or their followers, to use the right of access to their file, right established by Law 187/1999 with its modification from 2006-2008, Overall, know- ing is more beneficial than not knowing, the trauma and deception brought by the information written in the files being definitely sur- passed by the benefits of reading it. * 1. Why did they want to see their Securitate file? Fragments from testimonies 4../ I have come to see my file because | wanted to find out what those who ratted me out wrote. /.../ (Interview with Paul Mancas) 4../ Twas curious! I am an authentic journalist...for me, curi- osity is a sin as well as a virtue. /.../ (Interview with Igor Butnaru) 4.4 T have come to see my file because I thought it ta be good to acknowledge the whole truth or just to get closer to it. To know what happened and how it happened...And I'm not sorry I did. /.../ (Inter- view with Andrei Soare) 91are pardonable. No one can accuse someone who has been through what happened back then, No one! I have forgiven them, There is no need to accuse them, They had no other choice,,. /../ (Interview with Galina Raduleann) IV. The omnipotence of the Securitate: a myth confirmed by the read- ing of the personal file ? 4.4 The Securitate was the most terrible creation of the totali- tarian regime. Not even Hitler's Gestapo managed to reach the level of perfection, and the refinement of this instrument, As in any totalitarian regime, a very strong repressive division is created, meant to ensure dominance. /.../ It was a very well-tuned mechanism. Both in terms of violence, brutality, improvement but alsa in terms of using more refined things. Like psychology, the development of a psychosis, the creation of distrust among people until they stop being able to communicate with family members. Thus the dissolution of the most intimate relation- ships thraugh this mechanism, I mean, in this respect, they were very good. Some of them have behaved quite unlike the usual patterns of torturers whe would squeeze your energy, exhaust you physically and morally, and then send you to death eventually. /../ (Interview with Igor Butnaru) 4.41 knew nothing about the Securitate, except for the fact that it was a massive scarecrow. Everyone believed that it was more dan- Rerous, more professional, and more powerful than it actually was. In fact, the Securitate was much weaker than it appeared. Nevertheless, the myth ... the myth is huge. There were poor people working there, of poor intelligence, who, in fact, were at work during communism. They were bad at their jobs, did nothing despite huge personal and material expenses which where made for keeping someone as simple as myself under surveillance. In reality, they used to count on these stakeouts, investigations and maintaining an atmosphere of terror. The profes- sionalism, however, was very low I/,../ (Interview with Catilin Popescu) 4... 1 was impressed by the crowd of people who followed me. So I was a lonely student, who kept a lot of people fed. That, T thought, was colossal, I mean captains, lieutenants, generals who ex- changed correspondence in order to install means of recording in the folklare camp of Targu-Jiu. That was unbelievable, And frightening, 94‘on the other hand. /../ (Interview with Andrei Bodiu) #4 Many of the Securitate officers used to mimic the beginning of the age... Moreover, during the interrogation I felt that major Matei mimics the beginning of the age... On the other hand, he was a very well trained professional! After 1990 he wasn't retired. He worked for the U.M. 0215, However, I never knew nor thought ... [ thought it was an action started on his own initiative and not one that is coordinated by the Head of County's Securitate Office. And that reports were made to Gheorghe Rariu, Head of Service I. But back then I had no idea. /.../ (Interview with Liviu Bejenaru) J... The thing that amazed me was to see conversations with, say, Andrei Plesu, which, again, were terribly inconsistent, You can imagine those conversations... the trivial things two people speak of on the phone can be written dawn on dozens of pages. What an absurd work it was! They used to chew the emptiness of our lives. You know, the vast majority of a human's life is not spent doing great things. It is spent doing ordinary things, Therefore, if you chaase to watch a hu- man being every second, you will be grinding his life's void, not his life's fullness. Because the fullness happens rarely/.../ (Interview with Gabriel Liiceanu) V. What does the Securitate file bring new to the personal history ? 4.41 just found out (about the time when the Securitate broke into her house). | had no idea! We had children, all three of them had keys but I understand they got a key from my hushand and got in. But I was baffled when I read in the file about the way they organized and kept all of our neighbors busy” (Interview with Maria Steftinescu) 4.1 The one amazing information that brings me much joy is that I got to meet my father’s brothers. All 16 of them. They all have something written there. Tam very glad because after I make a copy of the file I will look for them. Many are gone, my dad is gone too, but at my father’s funeral only 5 of the 16 attended. But they are... I want to see... they all are in Galati, somewhere../...4 (Interview with Gheorghe Teodorascu) 95VI. Complaints about the file read: 4.4 The file only follaws a short period of my life, just before the real problems started with the Securitate. Therefore, the file I just read does not express difficulties or problems, just the opposite, there are 2 or 3 pages that actually praise me for being a good boy, for knowing French and ... some things I don't remember anymore. /.../ (Interview with Dan Constantin) 4.../ Twas well received here, treated exactly like a human should be, So I'm not complimenting the C.N.S.A.S. just because I’m in their headquarters. I am a very onest person, and that is why I have suffered all my life. | took a look at my files. One of them, that is abaut 400 pages long, recorded all of my calls. Anyway...another one, was num- bered by them, at that time, in ink, And, before bringing all the files here, they probably erased that and removed pages because naw they are numbered in red. And nothing...everything that might have been important...and maybe would have helped me...All those years they constrained me for hours... They took my peace away, ruined my health, nothing can be recovered and I cannoi get anything in compensation. There is nothing in the file about the important things that happened to me then! /./ 1 cannot get a certificate that would attest my being con- strained and tricked by the Securitate. /../ (Interview with Maria Stefiinescu) 4... In my opinion, the C.N.S.A.S files are incomplete and judg- ing by the numbering, they are part of many other files. I am interested in the complete file, In everything that it contains. Not in one filled with Christmas cards./.../ (Interview with Xifta Doina Alexandrescu) 4...¢ The file seems incomplete to me because the Major Constantin Matei had to submit a report describing how the warning was given. That is nowhere to he found. Therefore, probably certain reports, well..maybe informative notes are in the target file. Sadly, those are at the national security, I think.,,./.../ (Interview with Liviu Bejenaru) 4.4 In my opinion, there is still light to be shed over this. For example, this file...you will surely give me the copies without names... That is not fair! It is my life, a part of my life, and I have the right to bring it to light just as it is, with names, dates and facts. No law and nobody can refuse me this right. At least give me that! We are not requesting the arrest, deportation or any of the other things they tried to do to us. 96At least give us the truth! To keep them awake at least for one night! /./ (Interview with Civilin Popescu) VII. Why is it important to see your Securitate file 4.4 Tam not able to exactly describe the feeling | had [after reading my file. n.n.]. Paradoxically, it gave me a certain level of tranquility. On the one hand I saw a lot of atrocities and on the other hand 1 felt like... was relieved. I mean, I understood some things, and, in a way, I was glad that I had the opportunity to read my file. On another level, it cannot impress you. I am not saying it is shocking. T was not going to say: ,,Sir, 1 am so sick..." I was nat sick because it was my life. I was not surprised by what I read; I just had some things clarified. And so I got the confirmation that I should continue having an active civic attitude and that I need to talk about these things and educate my students towards defending the civie values and under- standing that freedam is the most valuable thing in life. 4.../ (Interview with Andrei Bodiu) /..f Knowing what happened, knowing your own history, is a very important aspect. There are some though - maybe alsa because of their age -, who view things differently. Because, let us face it...it is just history! It does not matter anymore ! It has to be left behind, how you say. /../ (Interview with Nicolae Drigulanescu) 4... The most important thing is that our followers try to dis- cover out life by studying the published work and not have a narrow point of view...To live their lives but to take care of their freedom for it is not without a price and they have to do their best not to lose it. 4../ (interview with Paul Mancas) 4.4 From time to time, the young ones should be reminded of this because it is nat something you can ignore or let pass. That might awake the ones which say: ,,God, it was so good back then!" I am telling you, it was not good, Because if it had been, | would not have sold postcard and other things to make money. Moreover, it would not have come to this. On the other hand, for those here (officers of the Securitate) it was good, Then you should take care when saying it was good... because people will label you/.../ (Interview with N. J.) 7Bibliography I. Sources 1. Original sources a. 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