Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Studii pontice
nchiderea Mrii Negre sub otomani (I)
SERGIU IOSIPESCU ............................................................................................
REVISTA DE ISTORIE
MILITAR~
30
40
47
57
69
80
i Istorie Militar
Prof. univ. dr. MIHAI Memorialistic militar
RETEGAN,
Universitatea coala de ofieri tehnici de aviaie de la Media
Bucureti
Dr. ing. ITZHAC GUTTMAN BEN-ZVI, Israel .................................................. 89
IULIAN FOTA, consilier
prezidenial
Dr. SERGIU IOSIPESCU, cc. Semnal. Recenzii SERGIU IOSIPESCU, PETRE OTU ............................ 94
t., Institutul pentru Studii
Politice de Aprare i Istorie
Militar
Prof. univ. dr. ALESANDRU Revista a fost inclus n baza de date a Consiliului Naional al Cercetrii
tiinifice n nvmntul Superior, fiind evaluat la categoria B.
DUU, Universitatea Spiru Abonamentele se fac prin unitile militare, pentru cititorii din armat
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VARTIC
ISSN 1220-5710
ISSN 1220-5710
Studii pontice
SERGIU IOSIPESCU
Abstract
The study in the memory of the Romanian historian Paul Cernovodeanu presents the actual
stage of the ancient discussion concerning the question of closing the Black Sea as it was presented
by some recent researches (Halil Inalcik, Mihnea Berindei, tefan Andreescu, Paul Cernovodeanu,
Anca Popescu). Introducing in this discussion the discovery by the author of a hoard (specially
Venetians gold and Spanish silver coins from XVIth-XVIIth centuries) in his archaeological researches
from Qaraharman (actually Vadu, department of Constana, Romania) and a French memoir to the
king Louis XIV concerning the Levant trade (1669), the study argues the reality of the Venetian and
of the others European maritime powers navigation in the Black Sea in some period of peace in the
XVIIth century.
Keywords: Black Sea, Ottoman Empire, Venice,
Moldavia, Wallachia, Qaraharman hoard discovery,
J. C. Roboly
admirabil baz naval n Strmtori, ca i constituirea unei flote aveau s confere otomanilor
supremaia naval militar n bazinul Mediteranei
Orientale, cuprinznd i mrile Neagr i de Azov.
Pasul urmtor ar fi trebuit s fie subordonarea
navigaiei comerciale i impunerea desfurrii
acesteia sub pavilionul sultanului, echivalentul unei
acaparri totale a circulaiei mrfurilor. Aceasta
presupunea ns ca noul imperiu constantinopolitan
s dispun de o flot de comer n stare s asigure
exercitarea unui atare monopol. nchiderea Mrii
Negre era, n fapt, condiionat de o varietate de
factori, ntre care, desigur, pe primul loc figurau
* Studiul dezvolt comunicarea prezentat, n 2008, n cadrul Programului Marea Neagr de la Institutul
de Istorie Nicolae Iorga.
P Revista de istorie militar P
turi din vama petelui cumprat de negustori europeni la Chilia i din taxele puse pe tranzitul vinului
adus de ei i expediat spre Polonia i Moscovia. Acest
comer se va fi continuat ctre 1592. Mai mult chiar,
la 1675 capitulaia acordat de sultan Angliei ngduia comerul acesteia la Caffa i Azaq9.
Fr ca aceast din urm dat s fie reinut, cu
att mai mult cu ct i Fernand Braudel opinase
pentru o stingere a comerului occidental n Marea
Neagr la finele secolului al XVI-lea, explicabil prin
avantajele care le-ar fi prezentat cile terestre n
aceast parte a Europei10, s-a socotit soluionat
chestiunea nchiderii bazinului pontic.
*
* *
O modificare a acestei viziuni avea s se
datoreze unei excepionale descoperiri arheologice
fcute n cursul cercetrilor de la castelul Qaraharman
(azi Vadu, jud. Constana) din campania anului
198711. n seciunea magistral din interiorul
castelului a fost aflat n condiiuni stratigrafice
perfecte, sub nivelul de locuire din a doua jumtate
a secolului al XVII-lea, un ulcior cu 176 de monede
de aur i 71 de argint n greutate total de peste un
kilogram i jumtate. Surpriza a reprezentat-o
dominana absolut a monedei veneiene de aur,
celebri zecchini, cu precdere din secolul al XVII-lea,
a dolarilor spanioli i apoi a ducailor i talerilor
din bazinul Dunrii de Mijloc i Superioare, din
Statele Generale ale rilor de Jos, altinii sultanului
nscriindu-se cu o infim minoritate. Aa cum m
exprimasem chiar cu prilejul comunicrii descoperirii odat cu lansarea volumelor Mrii Negre a
lui Gheorghe Brtianu ea avea i o semnificaie
dezinhibatorie, ceea ce provoca insidioasele interogri ale rposatului academician Virgil Cndea.
Descoperirea a influenat direcia cercetrilor
ntreprinse n arhivele veneiene12, ca i n acelea
otomane, unde nu au lipsit s apar noi date n
chestiunea nchiderii Mrii Negre n secolele ale
XVI-lea i al XVII-lea13. Astfel s-a observat c
absena meniunii Mrii Negre n capitulaia pentru
Veneia de la 1540 nu este dovada unei interziceri
a accesului, ci ar reflecta doar omisiunea unei
direcii a comerului Serenissimei intrat de acum
n obicei. Aceasta i pentru c n 1542 kanunameaua
Caffei (Kefe) prevedea transporturile de gru, mei
i orz pe navele ghiaurilor, iar n 1549 o porunc
adresat cadiului Constantinopolului cerea s nu
mpiedice activitatea comercial veneian n
Marea Neagr.
P Revista de istorie militar P
23 august 1944,
a disputed event
numirea chiar n anul urmtor a unui consul veneian la Caffa/Keffe, al crui urma cunoscut va fi,
dup o meniune de la 1635, cltorul, dominicanul,
Fra Emidio Portelli din Ascoli15. Dup o precizare
cu civa ani anterioar, prezena consulului era
necesar pentru protejarea negutorilor de la
Chios sau chiar Veneia. nc de la 1636 fusese
necesar instalarea i unui consul veneian la
Chilia/Kili, pentru care era acordat un nian al
Porii, unde era expres menionat prezena
negutorilor veneieni i a corbiilor lor n Marea
Neagr. n cazul capturrii unor nave veneiene
de briganzi, corsari dumani sau musulmani,
autoritile otomane locale i populaia erau inui
s recupereze din minile acestor corsari navele,
bunurile, persoanele, tunurile i armamentul veneienilor jefuii astfel i toate trebuiau redate n
ntregime consulilor Veneiei pentru a fi napoiate
la Veneia16 (subl. S.I.). Ceea ce dovedea c, innd
seama de nesigurana navigaiei pe Marea Neagr,
de ameninarea cazacilor i a altor pirai, corbiile
veneiene ce ptrundeau n Pont erau autorizate
s fie narmate chiar i cu tunuri.
3
coboare pe Dunre. Ei iau de aici [de la Constantinopol n.S.I.] mtase fin din Persia, stofe de
ln sau postav i ceva bijuterii, dar se crede c nu
vor continua pentru c nu au fcut pn n prezent
mare lucru din cauza cruelor care i cost mult
pentru transportul mrfurilor dintr-o parte i din
alta /.../ Supuii Marelui Senior fac nego cu Egiptul
i pe tot cuprinsul imperiului i n Marea Neagr,
de unde vin proviziile care se consum la Constantinopol i n locurile vecine i n Egipt.(subl.S.I)32.
Aceeai confluen pontico-dunrean, legtura
dintre bazinul Mrii Negre i Mediterana oriental,
demonstrat de compoziia monetar a tezaurului din
castelul Qaraharman, ntmpin i n memoriul
pregtit pentru regele Louis al XIV-lea, dornic s fac
s prospere comerul Franei cu Levantul.
Evident, chestiunea nchiderii Mrii Negre este
abia la nceputurile cercetrii.
1
Charles Efoulkes, The Dardanelles Gun at the Tower,
n The Antiquaries Journal, X (1930), pp. 217-227.
2
Complexul fortificat Bogaz-Kesen (Bogaz Kesen
Hissari) a fost terminat la 31 august 1452.
3
Vezi analiza registrului vamal al Caffei/Kefe din anii
1486-1490 pentru proveniena stpnilor de corbii din
acei ani pe ruta Caffa-Constantinopol la Halil Inalcik, The
Question of the Closing of the Black Sea under the Ottomans, n Archeion Pontou, 35, (1978), pp. 94-95.
4
O excepie era litoralul pontic caucazian a crui
nesiguran, provocat de ameninarea populaiilor
din inuturile muntoase adiacente, fcea mai puin
favorabil comerul.
5
Paul Cernovodeanu, England and the Question
of the Free Trade in the Black Sea in the 17th Century,
n RRH, 6 (1967), p. 16.
6
Robert Mantran, Istanbul dans la seconde moiti
du XVIIe sicle, Paris, 1962, p. 575.
7
Paul Cernovodeanu, op.cit, p. 21 i 26.
8
Halil Inalcik, op.cit., p. 108.
9
Ibidem, p. 108-109.
10
Fernand Braudel, Mediterana i lumea mediteraneean n vremea lui Filip al II-lea, vol. I, Bucureti,
1985, p. 205.
11
antierul Centrului de Studii i Cercetri de Istorie
i Teorie Militar (actualul Institut pentru Studii Politice
de Aprare i Istorie Militar) de la Karaharman se
desfoar din anul 1981 sub conducerea lui Sergiu
Iosipescu. Pentru descoperirea din 1987 vezi Sergiu
Iosipescu, Dans la Dobroudja ottomane au XVIe-XVIIIe
sicles: le chateau fort de Karaharman et son tresor, n
Guerre et societ en Europe, Bucureti, 2004, p. 63-81.
12
n imposibilitatea de micare i n condiiile de
supraveghere impuse n Romnia socialist autorului
descoperirilor de la Karaharman, este meritul colegului
i prietenului Mihnea Berindei de a-i fi orientat
UNIREA PRINCIPATELOR
I NALTA POART
N VIZIUNEA DIPLOMAIEI EUROPENE
MIRCEA SOREANU
Abstract
In the middle of the 19th century, the western powers France, Great Britain, Prusia and
Piedmond decided that the Union of the Danubian Principalities is possible and necessary. Though
they wanted that Moldova and Wallachia have each a different prince, parlament and army, but
common institutions to be only the Court of Cassation and a Central Commission for issue laws of
social and political development for United Principalities of Moldova and Wallachia, the Romanians
from both Principalities voted for the very same prince in january 1859 Alexandru Ioan Cuza.
After intense negotiations, in which the leading part was played by France and Great Britain,
Ottoman Empire and Austria being firm opponents, in September 6th 1859 the great powers
recognized the double election of prince Cuza, act that represented the first step to the establishment
of Romania as modern state.
This international decision represented the will of the western powers, who protected their
interests. The Romanians benefited by this favourable political situation with wisdom and unity
concerning the national ideal. The results of the determinations in Iai and Bucharest in January
1859 represented and undeniable merit of the Romanians, but, in the same time, constitute their
right response to the western foreign policy, expecially of the maritime powers France and Great
Britain who wanted to stop the triumphant march of the continental colossus Russia who had
as target the possession of the Black Sea and the Staits which permited the access to Mediterranean Sea.
Keywords: Alexandru Ioan Cuza, Union of Principalities,
Costache Negri, Napoleon al III-lea, Lord Clarendon,
Alxandre Walewski, Nicolae I
Secol al renaterii naionale, att pentru romni, ct i pentru alte popoare europene, secolul al
XIX-lea reprezint o adevrat pleiad de evenimente de excepional nsemntate istoric pentru
istoria Romniei: revoluiile de la 1821, 1848, Unirea
Principatelor i domnia lui Alexandru Ioan Cuza,
urcarea pe tronul rii a unui domnitor dintr-o dinastie vest-european, Rzboiul de Independen i
prima ncercare de modernizare a Romniei.
Lupttorii paoptiti au fost cei dinti care au
pus n eviden raportul istoric dintre revoluia lui
Tudor Vladimirescu din 1821 i revoluia de la 1848,
subliniind continuitatea efortului de nnoire a
structurilor i organizrii societii romneti.
8
12
Napoleon al III-lea
contele Walewski, care sublinia c Unirea Principatelor domin azi toate celelalte probleme, mpratul Napoleon al III-lea nota: Sprijinii puternic spre
a obine concursul lui Reid Paa pentru unire. Nu
menajai nimic spre a obine acest rezultat35.
Tratatul de la Paris prevzuse instituirea unei
Comisii europene de informare care s furnizeze
informaii n vederea pregtirii conferinei ce avea
de soluionat chestiunea romneasc. Reprezentantul Marii Britanii n Comisia de informare era
Sir Henry L. Bulwer, care a sprijinit, prin faptul c
era neprtinitor, procesul de Unire a Principatelor.
Astfel, el l-a sftuit pe Reid Paa s nu mpiedice
libera exprimare a idealului naional al romnilor.
Drept urmare, consulul britanic la nalta Poart,
Lord Stratford, care susinea dorina otomanilor
de a obstruciona sau chiar de a mpiedica unirea
romnilor, l-a acuzat c a sftuit Poarta c nu
trebuie s stnjeneasc n nici un fel exprimarea
liber a dorinei naionale n aceast problem
(Unirea) n nici unul din Principate36.
La 11 aprilie 1857, Bulwer scria ctre Lord
Clarendon: A chema aceste ri s-i spun prerea i apoi a le mpiedica s o fac, ar fi o biat
jonglerie, care ar fi imediat descoperit i neutralizat. ntr-adevr, nimic nu mi se pare acum att de
important pentru interesele Porii ca buna ei
credin i ea trebuie s fie remarcabil n acest
13
Lordul Clarendon
15
Guvernul otoman, dup ce s-a neles cu reprezentanii Puterilor, tocmai a protestat mpotriva
alegerii, fcnd apel la Conferin71.
Marele vizir Ali Paa i ministrul de Externe
Fuad Paa intenionau s adopte msuri privind
anularea dublei alegeri a lui Cuza n Principate,
conform raportului ntocmit de Albert, conte de
Lallmand, nsrcinat cu afaceri al Franei la nalta
Poart, din 27 ianuarie/8 februarie 185972.
Ministrul plenipoteniar al Regatului celor Dou
Sicilii, Eduardo Targioni, informa la 4/16 februarie
1859 despre refuzul guvernului otoman de a primi
deputia Moldovei, sosit la nalta Poart pentru
nvestitura oficial a lui Cuza. Astfel, minitrii
otomani n-au vrut pn n momentul de fa s
primeasc oficial deputia i probabil nici n-o vor
primi, ateptnd hotrrile viitoarei Conferine.
(...) n plus, Poarta a ordonat oficiilor telegrafice s
nu transmit mesajele pe care susnumita deputie
ar fi vrut s le expedieze la Iai i Bucureti i, la
rndul lor, autoritile celor dou Provincii [Principate n.n.] au ntrerupt comunicaiile telegrafice
ntre Bucureti i Giurgiu, aa nct tirile din
Principate ajung aici cu mare ntrziere73.
Albert de Lallemand informa pe ministrul de
Externe al Franei, Alxandre Walewski, la 3/15
februarie 1859, c deputaia moldav nsrcinat
s remit Porii cererea oficial de nvestitur
constituit pe lng Ea de noul domnitor al Moldovei se afl aici de cinci sau ase zile. Ea nu a fost
primit de minitrii otomani, care s-au grbit s
explice motivele refuzului lor la toate Cabinetele74.
Dei la 6/18 februarie 1859 Alxandre Walewski
sugera naltei Pori s ia iniiativa unor concesii n
chestiunea romneasc75, nalta Poart, prin
instruciunile secrete nmnate lui Musurus Paa,
plenipoteniarul ei la Conferina de la Paris
parvenite cu peripeii diplomailor francezi aflai
n misiune la nalta Poart i raportate la 21
februarie/5 martie 1859 de Albert de Lallemand lui
Alexandre Walewski , lua o poziie dur fa de
dubla alegere a lui Al. I. Cuza. Principiul Unirii
trebuia respins, ca o violare a Conveniei, implicnd independena rii, iar puterile garante trebuiau convinse s fie de acord cu o intervenie
militar otoman n Principate, dublat de o aciune
diplomatic a tuturor acestor puteri76.
Sir Robert G. Colquhoun, agent i consul general al Marii Britanii la Bucureti, i-a mbuntit
opinia i atitudinea fa de Cuza la contactul direct
cu acesta, telegrafiind la 15/27 februarie 1859 lui
18
revist de trupe sosite din interior, care vor fi expediate la taberele din umla i Sofia87. O lun mai
trziu, Negri trimitea veti bune n ar. La 8/20
iunie relata informaiile ncurajatoare primite de
la ambasadorul britanic i cel francez Sir H.
Bluwer i contele de Lallemand , nalta Poart
devenind favorabil demersurilor delegaiei
romne. Motivnd aceast surpriz de bun augur,
Negri nota: Aceast ntorstur de lucruri neateptat provine, dup prerea noastr, din mai multe
pricini. n primul rnd, din cauza unor anumite
tulburri din Heregovina, de care se tem s nu se
propage pn la Dunre, i apoi de teama repezilor
naintri ale aliailor n Italia, ca i de tot ce se
petrece acolo; apoi, pe deasupra, datorit sfaturilor
date de Puteri Turciei de a o sfri cu problema
Principatelor, spre a avea o mare ncurctur mai
puin n aceste vremuri tulburi; i apoi, de asemenea
credem noi pentru c ne-am anunat plecarea,
ceea ce se poate s se fi socotit de ctre Sublima
Poart ca un nceput de ruptur definitiv88. ntr-adevr, nemulumii de contrapropunerile
Porii89, delegaii romni au hotrt s se ntoarc
n ar. La propunerea lui Costache Negri90, Cuza
a rechemat delegaia, la 31 mai/12 iunie 185991.
Totui, C. Negri, mpreun cu delegatul muntean I.
I. Filipescu, au rmas la Istanbul, la sfatul ambasadorilor puterilor garante.
Aceast anunat plecare a delegaiei romne,
gndit de Cuza ca un factor de presiune asupra
naltei Pori, nu a rmas fr rezultat. Fuad Mehmed
Paa, ministrul de Externe otoman i-a rspuns la
15/27 iunie reprezentantului romn c totul a fost
aranjat aici cu reprezentanii Puterilor garante i
() c nu ar trebui s plecm tocmai acum, cnd
totul se va termina n cinsprezece sau douzeci de
zile, cel mult92.
Dup ce Conferina de la Paris a confirmat
dubla alegere a lui Cuza, domnitorul a liceniat
tabra de la Floreti, la 30 august/11 septembrie
1859, de Sfntul Alexandru, patronul lui Cuza.
Apropierea rzboiului cu Austria, o nverunat
adversar a Unirii Principatelor, l-a determinat pe
Cuza s ncheie o nelegere secret cu Ludovic
Kossuth, liderul revoluionarilor unguri. n mai
1859, generalul G. Klapka, unul dintre conductorii
Revoluiei de la 1848-1849 din Ungaria a ncheiat
un acord secret cu Vasile Alecsandri, reprezentantul lui Al. I. Cuza, pentru a-i ajuta pe ungurii
care doreau s lupte mpotriva austriecilor, romnilor retrocedndu-li-se n schimb Bucovina93. n
19
mentul obinuit, anume c n faa unui refuz categoric ori a unei tergiversri excesive, moldo-valahii
ar fi putut, profitnd de actuala situaie din Europa,
s se declare independeni96.
Poarta a cedat doar dup ase sptmni de
presiuni diplomatice, dup cum constata A. de
Lallemand n raportul su ctre Al. Walewski97. Dar
intenionnd, n acelai timp, dup cum meniona
Henry L. Bulwer, la 30 mai 1859, s introduc
clauza ca, dac vreunul dintre Principate i-ar
exprima, prin organul su reprezentativ, dorina
de a avea un domnitor separat, guvernul sultanului
s-i pstreze libertatea de a consimi la o astfel de
cerere98. S-au opus n special ministrul Prusiei,
dar i Bulwer, dup mrturia sa de mai sus. Caracteristic pentru complexitatea acestor situaii, cnd
vechii aliai mpotriva Rusiei intraser n dezacord
n chestiunea romneasc, A. de Lallemand l
suspecta pe Bulwer de faptul c Fuad Paa a luat
aceast poziie chiar la sugestia ambasadorului
Marii Britanii!99 Intrigi cu adevrat levantine, dar
la ntrebarea cui prodest? rspunsul nu este dect
unul sigur otomanilor, care prin Fuad Paa
ncercau s creeze disensiuni ntre puterile garante.
Ministrul de Externe Al. Walewski avertizase chiar
la 18/30 mai 1859 c orice modificare adus de
guvernul otoman la propunerile care i-au fost
recomandate de cele cinci puteri ar echivala pur i
simplu cu un refuz din partea sa100.
nalta Poart pretindea ca s fie numit
(named) Cuza prin dou firmane separate, cte
unul pentru Moldova, respectiv, ara Romneasc,
un caimacam n fiecare principat n care domnitorul nu era prezent, pe durata absenei sale, dreptul
Porii s intervin armat n Principate101. Ministrul de Externe al Franei, Al. Walewski, considera,
la 22 mai/3 iunie 1859, condiiile puse de Poart
pentru recunoaterea dublei alegeri a domnitorului
Cuza cu totul inacceptabile i impracticabile102.
Rspunsul diplomaiei britanice, respectiv de la
Lord Malmesbury, transmis prin Henry L. Bulwer,
la 25 mai/6 iunie 1859, era ct se poate de clar i de
ferm: Vom sprijini cele dou firmane i ca domnitorul Cuza s mearg la Constantinopol pentru
nvestitur, dar nimic altceva103.
Ca urmare a presiunilor fcute pe cale diplomatic de puterile garante, n primul rnd de francezi,
Poarta i-a schimbat atitudinea fa de Principate,
consimind s fac concesii104, care s fie cuprinse
ntr-un nou contraproiect105.
P Revista de istorie militar P
25
26
66
Ibidem , doc. 380, p. 403-405 i doc. 378, p.
400, 401.
67
Ibidem, doc. 407, p. 427 (des irrgularits
flagrantes renversent lesprit de la Convention).
68
Cf. Romnii la 1859. Unirea Principatelor Romne
n contiina european. Documente externe, 1984,
vol. I, doc. 112, p. 326, 327 (Le colonel Couza peut
bien dire quil a t fait Prince par la grce de Dieu,
car jamais nomination fut plus imprvue pour tous, et
surtout pour celui qui en a t lobjet. Personne ne
songeait lui, et vous devez vous rappeler que, dans
mes rapports, je nai jamais prononc son nom. (...)
Sa nomination est un vritable coup de foudre pour
les Autrichiens et pour les Turcs, et en mme temps
le triomphe le plus clatant de la politique franaise,
non pas parce que les agents franais on travaill pour
lui, mais parce que notre politique tait la bonne, au
point de vue des intrts et des aspiration du pays).
69
Marian Stroia, Romnii n contextul politic
european. De la Unirea Principatelor la cderea lui
Cuza-Vod (1859-1866), Bucureti, 2007, p. 50.
70
R.V. Bossy, LAutriche et les Principauts Unies,
Bucureti, 1938, p. 224.
71
Romnii la 1859, vol. I, doc. 125, p. 356-358 (a
plong la Porte et la diplomatie dans la stupeur. Le
Gouvernement Ottoman aprs stre concert avec
les reprsentants des Puissance vient de protester
contre lelection en faisant appel la confrence).
72
Ibidem, vol. I, doc. 124, p. 351-356.
73
Ibidem, vol. I, doc. 138, 382, 383 (non han
voluto i Ministri, sino a questo giorno officialmente
ricevere la Diputazione, n probabilmente la ricever,
in aspettativa delle determinazioni della futura
Conferenza. (...) Ha inoltre ordinato la Porta alli ufici
telegrafici di non comunicare i dispacci che la
medesima deputazione avrebbe voluto spedire in Jassy
e Bucarest, e dal canto loro, le autorit di quelle Provincie, hanno interrotte le comunicazioni telegrafiche
tra Bucarest e Giurgeve, di guisa che le notizie de
Principati qui pervengono con molto ritardo).
74
Documente privind Unirea Principatelor, vol. VI.
Coresponden diplomatic francez (1856-1859), doc.
249, p. 450, 451 (La dputation moldave charge de
remettre la Porte la demande officielle dinvestiture
forme auprs dElle par le nouvel Hospodar de Moldavie
est ici depuis cinq ou six jours. Elle na pas t reue par
les Ministres ottomans qui se sont hts dexpliquer les
motifs de leur refus tous les Cabinets).
75
Ibidem, doc. 251, p. 453, 454.
76
Ibidem, doc. 256, anexa, p. 464-467.
77
Documente privind Unirea Principatelor, vol. VII,
Coresponden diplomatic englez, doc. 371, p. 951
(in matters of internal policy and administration he
is most rational and prudent and apparently fully understands his position).
78
Ibidem, p. 951, 952 (in the Turkey attempt to
set up on Wallachian territory he would be placed
himself at the head of the nation and blood should
flow; he said that he had 20 000 men in Wallachia and
10 000 men in Moldavia and feared not what Turkey
could do). Vezi i Beatrice Marinescu, Poziia Marii
27
28
99
114
120
Ibidem, doc. 79, p. 199, 201. (Jai tout lieu de
croire que mes vigoureuses dclarations au sujet de
lUnion, rptes tant de fois, ont produit un salutaire
effet la Sublime Porte.
Jai accoutum tout le monde ici lide que, si
bientt la Sublime Porte ne prenait pas une dcision
catgorique legard de la dite Union, Votre Altesse,
force par la necessit, la proclamerait delle mme,
pas plus tard qu louverture de la nouvelle Chambre
de Bucarest).
121
Dan Berindei, Lupta diplomatic a Principatelor
Unite pentru desvrirea Unirii (24 ianuarie 1859-24
ianuarie 1862), n vol. Studii privind Unirea Principatelor, Bucureti, 1960, p. 436.
122
Idem, n Istoria romnilor, vol. VII, ed.cit .,
p. 500, 501.
123
Dan Berindei, I. Vlasiu, Documente privind politica
extern a Principatelor n anii Unirii (1859-1861), n
Studii. Revist de istorie, XII, nr. 1, 1959, p. 296.
124
Dan Berindei, Lupta diplomatic a Principatelor
Unite pentru desvrirea Unirii, p. 440.
125
Documente ale Unirii (1600-1918), Bucureti,
1984, doc. 161, p. 270, 271.
126
Romnii la 1859, vol. I, doc. 214, p. 591, 593
(dune hostilit sistmatique).
127
Ibidem, p. 592, 595 (ne saurait lui reconnatre
aucun droit de changer ou de modifier les lois
fondamentales du pays, lois tablies en vertu des
traits dont elle fait partie intgrante).
128
Ibidem, p. 592, 595 (tout acte de la nature
de ceux mentionns plus haut dpasse le cercle des
attributions reconnues et lgitimes du Gouvernement de Votre Altesse et quil le considre comme
non avenu). Vezi i Marian Stroia, op.cit., doc. VI,
p. 233, 234.
129
Beatrice Marinescu, Romanian-British Political
Relations 1848-1877, Bucureti, 1983, p. 154.
130
Beatrice Marinescu, Valeriu Stan, Un document
inedit referitor la cea de-a doua vizit a domnitorului
Alexandru Ioan Cuza la Constantinopol (iunie 1864),
n Revista Istoric, t. 3, nr. 9-10, 1992, p. 998-1003.
131
Marian Stroia, op.cit., p. 171. Autorul a utilizat
un document aflat la Biblioteca Academiei Romne,
Manuscrise, Fond Vasile i Iancu Alecsandri, Varia I,
f. 94 (N. Bordeanu ctre Cuza, 1/13 iulie 1864).
132
Mesagii, proclamaii, rspunsuri i scrisori
oficiale ale lui Cuza Vod, Vlenii de Munte, 1910,
p. 180.
133
Cf. Dan Berindei, Diplomaia romneasc
modern de la nceputuri la proclamarea independenei
de stat (1821-1877), Bucureti, 1995, p. 139.
29
RELAII ROMNO-GERMANE
N ANUL 1914
CARMEN-PATRICIA RENETI
Abstract
The study is based on data gathered from Romanian and German journals. In the first part is
described the increasing dependence of Romania to German the finance and industry between 1878
and 1914 (it could be assessed that Romania evolved toward a Hinterland status). The political relations were defined by the alliance with the Central Powers closed in 1883. After the Balkan War of
1913, the position of Romania in this alliance became uncertain. The hope of the liberation of the
Romanians from Austro-Hungary led to this change, and the beginning of World War I was seen as an
opportunity for this. Because the Crown Council of 3 August 1914 decided the neutrality, the Germans
tried to change this position by diplomatic actions and mass-media propaganda, supported by the
German intelligence services. This action failed. In December 1914 Romania was still neutral, and
the newspapers paid by Germany had a very small impact.
Relaiile romno-germane n anul 1914 reprezint un capitol important din politica extern a
Romniei n timpul Primului Rzboi Mondial.
Articolul preia informaii din presa timpului pentru
a schia ct mai obiectiv evoluia raporturilor dintre
Romnia i Germania. Rezultatul poate fi neateptat: dei exist numeroase articole n ziarele
vremii, acestea nu sunt articole de prim pagin,
nu agit spiritele i nu ridic patimile la fel de mult
ca relaiile romno-austriece i mai ales cele romno-maghiare.
Politica romneasc nu intereseaz Germania?
Sau acest factor este unul mult prea discret i
puternic, dar nu unul de ur nverunat, la fel ca
factorul austro-ungar?
n Romnia anului 1914 exista o pres foarte
bogat. Dup statisticile Academiei, apreau n
toat ara 300 de publicaii politice, n Bucureti
fiind 25 de cotidiene, 12 sptmnale i 21 bilunare.
30
alimentar, forestier i minier au nceput s fie dezvoltate de mari companii strine, n principal britanice i germane.
Din 1870 pn n 1914, Romnia a rmas n
mare parte controlat de capitalul i produsele germane. Grupul bancar german Disconto-Gesselschaft Bleichrder, bazndu-se pe legturile sale
strnse cu dinastia regal din Romnia, a fost cel
care a condus, n principal, negocierile cu guvernul
romn de fiecare dat. Bncile franceze Paribas,
Socit Gnrale i Comptoir National dEscompte
de Paris, acionnd fie separat, fie n grup, au rmas
n urma i sub conducerea concurenilor germani6.
Frana a pierdut n Romnia lupta pentru controlul
economic, n favoarea Germaniei.
Evoluia politic european oblig Romnia s
fie dependent economic tot mai mult de Germania. n 1913, pe fondul participrii la Rzboaiele
balcanice, Romnia a trebuit s contracteze un
mprumut de 300 de milioane de franci de pe pieele
monetare europene. De data aceasta, bncile
franceze aveau ordine restrictive: trebuiau s evite
facilitarea plasamentelor de obligaii de stat sau de
polie pe pieele rilor balcanice care aveau
legturi cu forele ostile Antantei7.
Relaiile economice strnse dintre Romnia i
Germania se menin i n anul de nceput al
Primului Rzboi Mondial. Astfel, un manual de
geografie german redactat n anul 1914 relata:
Romnia export n special cereale i fin, dar i
lemn i iei, precum i prune i nuci. Ea import
ndeosebi produse fabricate. Germania cumpr
mari cantiti de gru, porumb i alte cereale,
precum i nuci din Romnia. Aceste mrfuri sunt
transportate n mare parte cu vaporul, pe mare
deoarece costul transportului pe ap este mai mic
dect cel pe calea ferat. Navigaia pe Dunre nu
este dect n mic msur utilizat. Doar benzina
i petrolul urc pe Dunre n tancuri petroliere
speciale n Romnia acioneaz mult capitalul
german. Germanii au participaii la rafinriile de
petrol, la bnci i la cile ferate; n Romnia triesc
muli germani8.
Strnsele legturi cu Germania determin
presa de orientare antigerman s vad Romnia
ca un Hinterland al Germaniei. Iar argumentaia
este dintre cele mai plauzibile: Populaia Germaniei sporind mereu, i mai ales cea oreneasc,
este natural ca germanii s caute s-i plaseze mereu
31
16
Idem , Nr. 8072, Donnerstag, 9. Juli 1914.
Deutschlands Balkanpolitik und Rumnien.
17
I. Gh. Duca, Memorii, vol. I, Editura Express,
Bucureti, 1992, p. 9-10.
18
Rumnischer Lloyd, No. 7962, Samstag, 21.
Februar 1914. Kaiser Wilhelm in Bukarest.
19
Epoca, anul XX, No. 88, mari, 1 aprilie 1914,
p. 8. Ultima or. Vizita mpratului Wilhelm la
Bucureti.
20
Idem, anul XX, smbt, 12 aprilie 1914, p. 2.
Cltoriile mpratului Wilhelm.
21
Idem, anul XX, No. 136, mari, 20 maiu 1914,
p. 3. mpratul Germaniei i arul Rusiei n Romnia.
22
Ibidem.
23
Rumnischer Lloyd, Nr. 8045, Samstag, 6 Juni
1914. Trbe Aussichten.
24
Idem, No. 7962, Samstag, 21. Februar 1914.
Kaiser Wilhelm in Bukarest.
25
Idem, Nr. 8057, Montag, 22. Juni 1914. Traurige
Bilanz.
26
Raymund Netzhammer, op.cit., p. 511, duminic,
5 iulie 1914.
27
Dimineaa, anul XI, No. 3724, joi, 17 iulie 1914,
p. 3. Atitudinea Germaniei.
28
I. Gh. Duca, Memorii, vol. I, Editura Express,
Bucureti, 1992, p. 36.
29
Neamul Romnesc, anul IX, 27 iulie 1914, p. 6-7.
Germania i Romnia.
30
Epoca, anul XX, No. 202, vineri, 25 iulie 1914,
p. 1. A vrut Germania rzboiul?
31
Ibidem.
32
Idem, anul XX, No. 192, mari, 15 iulie 1914,
p. 2. Atitudinea Romniei.
33
Ion Bulei, op.cit., p. 122.
34
Raymund Netzhammer, op.cit., p. 528, luni, 14
septembrie 1914.
35
Ibidem.
36
Constantin Kiriescu, op.cit., p. 126.
37
Raymund Netzhammer, op.cit., p. 488, duminic,
22 februarie 1914.
38
Ibidem, p. 492, mari, 24 martie 1914.
39
Ibidem, p. 712, mari, 20 februarie 1917.
40
Constantin Kiriescu, op.cit., p. 126.
41
Istoria politicii externe romneti n date, coord.
Ion Calafeteanu, Editura Enciclopedic, 2003, p. 211.
42
erban Rdulescu-Zoner, Beatrice Marinescu,
Bucuretii n anii Primului Rzboi Mondial. 1914-1918,
Editura Albatros, Bucureti, 1993, p. 35-36.
43
Dr. Marcel Bibiri-Sturia, Germania n Romnia,
eri, azi, mine; comer, industrie, finana, colonia
german, regele, propaganda corupia, spionajul,
Stabiliment de Arte Grafice Energiea, Bucureti,
1916, p. 166.
44
Aciunea, anul XIII, No. 3382, miercuri, 24
septembrie 1914, p. 1. La mezat.
45
Ion Bulei, op.cit., p. 131-133.
46
Aciunea , anul XIII, No. 3381, mari, 23
septembrie 1914, p. 3. Cum opereaz spionii strini?
Cine e Joseph Hennenvogel?
47
Idem, anul XIII, No. 3400, joi, 16 octombrie
1914, p. 3. ntrunirea studenilor i manifestaia de la
Ziua; Idem, anul XIII, No. 3404, mari, 21 octombrie
1914, p. 3. Ultimele informaiuni.
48
Constantin Kiriescu, Istoria rzboiului pentru
ntregirea Romniei, 1916-1919, Editura tiinific i
Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 1989 p. 126.
49
Ion Bulei, op.cit., p. 123.
50
N. Moghior, I. Dnil, V. Popa, Ferdinand I vzut
de contemporanii si, Editura Militar, Bucureti,
2006, p. 78.
51
Cartea roie austro-ungar. Documente
diplomatice privitoare la relaiile dintre Austro-Ungaria
i Romnia n perioada de la 22 iulie 1914 pn la 27
august 1916 (n continuare Cartea roie austroungar) Editura Regele Carol, Bucureti, 1917;
Contele Czernin ctre contele Berchtold, Bucureti,
2 decembrie 1914, p.18.
52
Cartea roie austro-ungar, 14 noiembrie 1914,
p. 17.
53
Epoca, anul XXI, No. 226, luni, 18 august 1914,
p. 1-2. Neutralitatea leal.
54
Minerva, anul VI, No. 2033, smbt, 16 august
1914, p. 1. Scrisoarea regelui ctre mpratul
Germaniei.
55
Aciunea , anul XIII, No. 3384, vineri, 26
septembrie 1914, p. 3. Ultimele informaiuni.
56
Cartea roie austro-ungar, 22 septembrie
1914, p. 11.
57
Dimineaa, anul XI, No. 3880, smbt, 20
decembrie 1914, p. 3. ncercarea de corupie a lui
Nicolae Fleva de ctre Ministrul Germaniei.
58
Ion Bulei, op.cit., p. 133.
59
Aciunea, anul XIII, No. 3453, duminic, 21
decembrie 1914, p. 3. Ultimele informaiuni.
60
Cartea roie austro-ungar, 2 decembrie 1914,
p. 18.
39
UN DOCUMENT INEDIT
DESPRE APRAREA
PORTULUI CONSTANA N ANUL 1916
CORNEL POPESCU*
Abstract
In October 1916, the German, Bulgarian and Ottoman armies entered in Dobrudja with a total
of 10 divisions. The defense line was broken, and by this reason Constana was evacuated on 21
October. The author is publishing the entire report on this action, written after a week by the
commander of the harbor, Commodore Constantin Mihu. From this document results that the
harbor would have resisted more time if the Russian navy would have been attacked the Tuzla
area with bombs. The equipment was not destroyed because the same Russians hoped that the
harbor will be recovered. Only few ships were saved and sent to Sulina.
Keywords: World War I, Romanian navy, Russian
navy, Central Powers offensive in Dobrudja, Constana
* Doctorand n cadrul Universitii Valahia din Trgovite, coala doctoral de istorie. Articolul face parte
din Proiectul Oportuniti oferite n cadrul stagiului de pregtire doctoral n vederea creterii capacitii i
motivaiei pentru cercetare tiinific de performan, POSDRU/6/1.5/S/23.
40
CONCLUZIUNI
1) Escadra Rus ca i armata de uscat Rus au
avut tot concursul nostru n port i constnd n:
reparaiuni de vase i maini din care cele mai
importante au fost reparaia definitiv a dou vedete
cari au avut toat pupa demontat a contratorpilatorului Qespoconie, grav avariat de explozia
a dou mine spre a putea lua Marea la Sevastopol;
demontarea tunurilor i tuburilor de lans-torpile
ale acestui torpilor aprovizionarea cu produse
petroliere a ntregii escadre din Constana, benzin
pentru Medgidia i dou trenuri cu pcur de 900
tone pentru vasele ruse din Brila; Serviciul de
Pilotaj i toate corvezile din port au fost fcute
numai de vasele noastre; contra-torpilorul sus artat
dac a putut fi salvat numai graie msurilor i
mijloacelor repezi date de noi; toate transporturile
pe uscat cum a fost parcul de aeroplane, convoiurile
de trupe i aprovizionrile lor s-au fcut prin
rechiziiile noastre; s-a rechiziionat i un vapor
romn Elena care n-a mai fost ntors n port.
2) Transporturi ruse prin port mai importante
au fost cele dou brigzi de infanterie rus cu
aprovizionrile lor.
P Revista de istorie militar P
46
person who can advocate surrender.5 This verdict is to be found throughout retrospective literature, from the top brass, i.e. generals down to the
simple private.
This may apply to the eastern front, where a
consensus prevails concerning the ideologised
warfare conducted by the Wehrmacht, with the
fear of retaliation by the Red Army being added as
a further significant motive. There has so far,
though, been a lack of relevant studies regarding
the battles against the western allies. It is hence
the objective of this paper to clarify what motivated soldiers throughout the ranks to carry on a
pointless war and at the same time want to survive
it. The findings of my more extensive study on this
subject are described and summarised in the following, so as to be able to present an intersection,
as it were, that provides initial indicators.6 The
motives of the soldiers fighting against the western powers are brought out in a first step and then
compared with the motives of those who were already captives of the western Allies at the time (in
other words, unlike their fellow soldiers on the
battlefield did not face an immediate threat to their
health or even their lives), as well as with the motives of women7 who were completely outside the
military construct. Although the latter had already
spent long years being subjected to wartime bombing, it was only when the fighting took place on
homeland soil that they experienced actual contact with enemy soldiers.
2. Soldiers motives
a) Generals
Capitulation was never an option for the military leadership elite of the German Reich, neither
at the time nor in retrospect. As the recently appointed Supreme Commander in the northern region, Grand Admiral Karl Dnitz, made absolutely
clear to his Gauleiter officials even on 25 April
1945, surrender was exclusively a matter for the
state leadership, embodied by the Fuhrer.8 He did
not depart from this position even after the end of
the war, when interviewed by Allied interrogation
officers: To me, intervention was out of the question, based on what I knew. It would have been
wrong, in my opinion, to interfere with another
department without detailed knowledge. Where
would things end if this was generally the practice.9 And he was by no means alone in thinking
48
this way: The political leadership made the decision to venture into war, and it also had to decide
whether and when there was a possibility to end it.
Also the reproachful question, asked after the last
war, as to Why did you not stop waging war after
you must have known that the war was already
lost? is, for this reason, mis-directed. As one of
the generals responsible, Hans Friener, said in
1956 (...) Any military commander who would
capitulate without the instruction of his government would violate not only every basic military
law but also the principle that determines the relationship between politics and the Wehrmacht.10
Which is why many saw death or perseverance
as the only alternative11, and even those close to
the resistance thought that the only thing left for
them was the soldierly attitude, which was possibly conducive to sparing the German people and
the soldiers entrusted to our leadership from the
worst.12 This they had in common with those loyal
to the regime, such as General Dietrich von
Choltitz, who saw it as an expression of the highest
soldierly virtue to prove oneself before the enemy
regardless of sacrifices13, or General Alfred Jodl,
for whom the greatest achievement in a soldiers
life was (to fight) to the death, even when already
facing it14. The insipidness of such pathos-filled
statements was soon exposed nevertheless, as in
the example of Field Marshall Walter Model. He
wrote to his wife on 24 March 1945 that it was
essential not to give up hope on any account, but
to remain active according to the dictum Continue to fight courageously and prefer to die bravely
rather than lose freedom and taint the soul!15 It is
permissible to ask the question in how far the suicide he committed not even a month later can be
considered a sign of his bravery. Neither Choltitz
nor Jodl, moreover, fought with weapon in hand.
They, unlike hundreds of thousands in those days,
survived the war, as did General Hermann Balck
who similarly believed in having to continue the
fight until the enemy realised the impossibility of
bringing us (sic!) to our knees.16
He nevertheless described the predicament of
the military leaders at the time during the last
phase of the Second World War when he stated:
General Jodl was quite right when he said that
Hitler was our destiny, we will either be victorious
with him or go under with him. Hitler was in no
manner or form replaceable. His person was the
cement that insolubly held the people and the
P Revista de istorie militar P
Wehrmacht together. All the authority of the commanders at every level, each devotedness of the
ordinary man, was rooted in him. If Hitler were
removed, the Wehrmacht and state would then
collapse.17 The fact is in any case that Hitler had,
from the beginning of the war, proclaimed that
there would be no repetition of 1918, that for him
surrender was out of the question.18 It is equally a
fact that those who, in their own words, continued
to fight in order to defend their homeland had a
very major part in its destruction and were responsible in the last year for almost just as many
casualties as in the preceding war years taken together.19 Even so, it was not only the German public that for decades followed the lead given by retrospective literature, probably because it seemed
logical to do so at first glance. The war was, it was
said, continued for a lack of alternatives, and the
already inevitable defeat was eventually sealed due
to the immense superiority in materiel. The
Wehrmacht, on the other hand, stood up to the
enemys superiority as long as it was in any way
within its possibilities to do so.20 Closely associated
with this is the astonishingly persistent legend concerning an untarnished Wehrmacht that had
been created to a considerable degree by memoir
literature.21 Some commanders, even while they
were in captivity, demanded leadership positions
in the new state as well, instead of accepting responsibility.22
The military therefore thought beyond the end
of the war. In defining themselves as a functional
elite they saw the opportunity of being needed again
also after the war. It must have been in their
thoughts, therefore, to demonstrate their professional skills even under the adverse conditions of
the last months of the war. In this context, priority
was given not only to preserving power and status
or to surviving but also, by combining the two arguments, to continuing to exist as a functional elite
beyond the end of the war. Carrying on in a kind of
business as usual was also an obvious possible course
of action.23 The military were thus able to remain
loyal to their previous principles. They needed
neither to surrender nor to desert nor to defect
and therefore not expose themselves to the
regimes persecution mechanisms like many ordinary soldiers. Soldiering-on, however, posed namely
a much greater risk to life and limb for those who
actually fought in battles than for the senior und
highest-ranking officers at the headquarters and
P Revista de istorie militar P
command posts. The regime and military leadership, moreover, not only threatened to mete out
punishments for any such considerations, but also
provided motivation through a burgeoning system of dotation, promotions and awards. Many in
the military were thus able to accumulate honours
and awards also beyond the end of war which, under normal conditions, would have been much
more difficult to obtain.
c) Women
The study of basic behaviour patterns of German females generally reflects those established
for the male perspective. Although, gradually, the
Hitler myth also lost its sheen with the women,
attachment to the regime eroded and war-weariness increased. The search for alternatives remained limited nevertheless, and resistance the
exception. As long as the enemy was impersonal,
so to say, and the broader living conditions remained
basically untouched, the vast majority of women
were not ready to give up the war or even to act
against it. The increased terror, particularly in the
last few months, must be taken into account in this
regard as in the case of the men, but the fear of
what was to come later was in both cases an incomparably greater motivating factor for soldiering on. The actual everyday struggle for survival,
or what was at least increasingly perceived as such,
became ultimately a struggle to survive the NS
system, to which the majority did not withdraw
their allegiance until the end.31
In this context, as in the world of male
socialisation, the performance of duty provided
the main source of momentum, both in contemporary argumentation and in hindsight. The only difference between male and female perception in
the last phase of the Second World War seemed to
be that women understood more easily and earlier
than men that this war had been lost. They reacted to this in the same way as the military, by
withdrawing to the tasks assigned to them,
namely the private sphere. The survival of the
family beyond the end of the war was seen as the
key factor. This is additionally demonstrated by
the fact that it was often women, nonetheless, who
assumed responsibility for the task if their locality
and, therefore, their homes were faced with destruction in what was seen as a futile situation during the last year of the war.32 By generally showing
readiness to do so only when the male actors re50
in citizens as early as the 19th century39 as crowning all duties towards the state, compulsory military service escalated into an apparently unquestionable service sui generis.
Ultimately, and this has yet to be taken sufficiently into account by military history research,
it was not a special but an everyday behaviour pattern that was responsible for people soldiering
on in German society at the end of the Second
World War. The discussion about the ominous zero
hour manifestly long obscured the view that the
behaviour of the Germans, in terms of their logic,
was plausible. For the majority of the population in
the German Reich, the war was lost sometime between September 1944 and May 1945, yet trust in
the regime was not simultaneously withdrawn. It
was not without reason that a large proportion of
Germans did not want to abandon former ideals of
good National Socialism until far into the postwar period and pinned the responsibility for the
negative ones on those right at the top. As a
logical consequence, those who had been involved
in the events were the ones to stage the culture of
retrospection regarding the Third Reich. Within it
the legend concerning zero hour provided the
dividing line between past and future and hence
for the responsibilities for the crimes.40 The concept of duty forming the focus of all education since
the days of the Empire, if not before, which demanded personal sacrifice to the point of self-denial, was not only politically instrumentalised in
that period, but also experienced its strongest form
of expression through individual duty being bound
to the will of the Fuhrer. Military service especially, by it being declared a duty of honour following the Prussian reforms of the early 19th century, became the purest form of doing ones duty.41
Only a much more broadly based study, of course,
can determine to what extent the individuals involved actually felt this way.42 But it is undisputed
that the topos intrinsically was the guiding principle.
4. Closing remarks
The catastrophic situation of the Third Reich
in the last year of the Second World War did not
come about unexpectedly. Strictly speaking, not
all too much had changed from a purely military
perspective compared with the wartime events
after early 1943. Thereafter, the armies of the antiHitler coalition continuously pushed the German
51
1
Cited in Kluge, Friedrich/Elmar Seebold:
Etymologisches Wrterbuch der deutschen Sprache.
24th edition, Berlin 2002.
2
The point in time at which each individual claims
to have realised this varies, however. Only a few diehards, though, continued to believe in a victorious
outcome until the last months of the war: FretterPico and Friener in early 1945, and Model, Reinhardt
and Schrner until the very end. There are, by comparison, written statements from the majority, between the failure to take Moscow in 1941 and the
successful allied landings in Normandy in 1944, that
defeat was coming. Most of these, in turn, claim to
have been convinced of defeat by late 1942/early 1943
at the latest; see Paulus, Friedrich, Ich stehe hier auf
Befehl. Lebensweg des Generalfeldmarschalls
Friedrich Paulus. Mit den Aufzeichnungen aus dem
Nachla, Briefen und Dokumenten, edited by Walter
Grlitz, Frankfurt a.M. 1960, p. 263, Rommel, Erwin,
Krieg ohne Hass, 3rd edition, Heidenheim 1950, p.
244, Choltitz, Dietrich von, Soldat unter Soldaten,
Zurich 1951, pp. 147 and 166, as well as Westphal,
Siegfried, Heer in Fesseln. Aus den Papieren des
Stabschefs von Rommel, Kesselring und Rundstedt,
53
5
Vernehmungsprotokoll: Fragen an Grossadmiral
Dnitz im Lager Mondorf (Lux.) 1945; BA-MA N 539/
v.31, fol. 12.
6
On this and the following see Zimmermann, John,
Pflicht zum Untergang. Die deutsche Kriegfhrung
im Westen des Reiches 1944/45. Paderborn 2009
(forthcoming).
7
In view of a lack of relevant studies, it will not be
possible in the following, either, to make any general
statement about women as such, this being due to
the, in some cases, widely differing individual backgrounds and personal situations.
8
Besprechung Dnitz mit allen Gauleitern des
Nordraumes mit Ausnahme des Hamburgers Kaufmann am 25. April 1945; BA-MA RW 44 I/1 (KTB).
9
Vernehmungsprotokoll: Fragen an Grossadmiral
Dnitz im Lager Mondorf (Lux.) 1945; BA-MA N 539/
v.31, fol. 14.
10
Friener, Hans, Verratene Schlachten. Die
Tragdie der deutschen Wehrmacht in Rumnien und
Ungarn. Hamburg 1956, S. 221f. Concerning similar
argumentation see also Wagner, Elisabeth (ed.), Der
Generalquartiermeister. Briefe und Tagebuchaufzeichnungen des Generalquartiermeisters des
Heeres, General der Artillerie Eduard Wagner. Munich,
Vienna 1963, p. 13, and Westphal, Siegfried, Der
Deutsche Generalstab auf der Anklagebank. Nrnberg
1945-1948. Mainz 1978, pp. 82 and 87.
11
Diary entry by Reinhardt, dated 25.1.1945; BAMA N 245/3.
12
Gersdorff, Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von, Soldat
im Untergang. Frankfurt a.M. et al. 1977, p. 149.
13
Choltitz, Soldat, S. 128f.
14
Letter by Jodl to his wife; cited in Jodl, Luise,
Jenseits des Endes. Der Weg des Generaloberst Alfred
Jodl. Extended and revised new edition, Munich 1987,
p. 77.
15
Letter from Model to his wife dated 24.3.1945;
BA-MA N 6/1.
16
Balck, Hermann, Ordnung im Chaos. Erinnerungen 1893-1948. Osnabrck 1980, p. 643.
17
Ibid, p. 640.
18
For Wette, Wolfram, Zwischen Untergangspathos
und berlebenswillen. Die Deutschen im letzten
halben Kriegsjahr 1944/45, in: Das letzte halbe Jahr.
Stimmungsberichte der Wehrmachtpropaganda 1944/
45 . Edited by Ricarda Bremer, Detlef Vogel and
Wolfgang Wette, Essen 2001 (Kritische Studien zur
Geschichtswissenschaft, 100), pp. 9-37, p. 16, on the
basis of Kutz, Martin, Realittsflucht und Aggression
im deutschen Militr. Baden-Baden 1990, in particular pp. 7f., this was nothing more than a militarily
related escape from reality as an attempt to compensate for the occurring problems through a radicalisation
of warfare.
19
Overmans, Rdiger, Deutsche militrische
Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Munich 1998 (Beitrge
zur Militrgeschichte, 46), pp. 228, 241-249 and 271.
54
20
See in this regard Henke, Klaus-Dietmar, Die
amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands. Munich 1995
(Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 17)
as well as Weinberg, Gerhard L., Eine Welt in Waffen.
Die globale Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges.
Stuttgart 1995 and Gruchmann, Lothar, Totaler Krieg.
Vom Blitzkrieg zur bedingungslosen Kapitulation.
Munich 1991. It has only been recently that doubts
regarding this argument have been expressed. Richard Overy, Die Wurzeln des Sieges. Warum die
Alliierten den Zweiten Weltkrieg gewannen. Translation from English by Jrgen Charnitzky. Although
Reinbek, in Hamburg in 2002, did not prove that the
German Reich would have been able to win the war,
he drew attention however to the enormous efforts
required within the anti-Hitler coalition to defeat the
German aggressor. Almost incidentally, he also managed once again to consign the still powerful verdict
concerning the Wehrmachts professionalism to the
realms of fantasy, the closer the end of the war came.
21
Gerstenberger, Strategische Erinnerungen,
Zimmermann, Das Bild, as well as recently, Lingen,
Kerstin von, Kesselrings letzte Schlacht. Kriegsverbrecherprozesse, Vergangenheitspolitik und Wiederbewaffnung: Der Fall Kesselring. Paderborn et al. 2004
(Krieg in der Geschichte, 20) and above all Manig,
Bert-Oliver, Die Politik der Ehre: Die Rehabilitierung
der Berufssoldaten in der frhen Bundesrepublik.
Gttingen 2004.
22
See for instance Kdr Division z.b.V. 172, Brief
an den Kommandierenden General des Ems-AK, Betr.:
Stimmung der Truppe, dated 11 July 1945; BA-MA RH
26-172/7: He demanded that the leading positions in
any future German state be assumed by members of
the former officer corps, because this (would be)
particularly suited to lead the people in the future, as
it had always been educated in an apolitical way and
had been best able to observe und understand the
value and shame of the National Socialist regime from
outside of the party ().
23
General Siegfried Westphal admitted afterwards
that there had increasingly been a tendency to pretend to act against the Western Allies; Westphal,
Siegfried, Erinnerungen. Mainz 1975, p. 333. Concerning this see also: Kunz, Wehrmacht, pp. 248-260.
24
According to Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung, pp. 798f, the majority actually resigned themselves to defeat only after the Allied armies crossed
the Rhine on a broad front. This also remains the only
difference to the attitude of the military leadership,
who still cherished hopes even at that stage. Only
Weinberg, Eine Welt, pp. 860f, claims to have found
also a split in the military leadership after the division
of the Reich, comprising the majority around Goebbels,
Bormann, Steiner, Keitel and Jodl, who wanted to
continue at any price, and a minority who had finally
admitted defeat, among whom he includes Heinrici.
Quite apart from the fact that there is no source evidence of this, any such realisation would have been
very late.
25
Richard Baader, Kriegsende in Reischach; BAMA MSg 2/5665, p. 5 tells of three suicides committed by soldiers while their comrades surrendered in
droves. Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung ,
pp. 964f. assumes that, in total, several thousand
suicides connected with the end of the war were committed by people in prominent positions. Although
a larger number cannot be excluded here, it ought
hardly make any difference in the overall context. As
a rule they were allegedly people known to have been
directly involved in crimes, and probably only in exceptional cases were they people who no longer
wished to live on because of the downfall of the National Socialist regime.
26
That this balancing act between performance of
duty and prolongation of the war was recognised at
least in individual cases is confirmed by various statements in retrospective literature, cf. for instance
Schmidt, Helmut, Politischer Rckblick auf eine
unpolitische Jugend, in: Schmidt, Helmut et al.,
Kindheit und Jugend unter Hitler. Mit einer
Einfhrung von Wolf Jobst Siedler, 2nd edition, Berlin
1992, pp. 188-254, in this regard pp. 231f.
27
L. to Ms M. R. on 5 January 1945; cited in
Feldpostprfstelle bei AOK 19: Auszge der im Januar
1945 geprften Briefe; dated 3 February 1945; BAMA RH 20-19/285, fol. 195-202, here fol. 200.
28
In connection with this typical statement, see
the relevant forces mail reports in the last year of the
war, e.g. also Feldpostprfstelle bei AOK 19:
Monatsbericht fr November 1944; dated 3 December 1944; BA-MA RH 20-19/285, fol. 22-23.
29
Neitzel, Snke, Deutsche Generle in
britischer Gefangenschaft 1942-1945. Eine Auswahledition der Abhrprotokolle des Combined Services
Detailed Interrogation Centre UK, in: VfZg 2/2004,
pp. 289-348, pp. 300-302.
30
Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma on 12 September
1943; cited in ibid, p. 300.
31
Here just a short insight into the range of writings: Schwarz, Gudrun, Die Frau an seiner Seite.
Ehefrauen in der SS-Sippengemeinschaft. Berlin
2000, Harter-Meyer, Renate, Der Kochlffel ist unsere
Waffe. Hausfrauen und hauswirtschaftliche Bildung im
Nationalsozialismus. Baltmannsweiler 1999, Heinsohn, Kirsten/Vogel, Barbara/Weckel, Ulrike (eds.),
Zwischen Karriere und Verfolgung. Handlungsspielrume von Frauen im nationalsozialistischen
Deutschland. Frankfurt a. M., New York 1997 (Geschichte und Geschlechter series, vol. 20) and, for an
overview regarding the dimension of the battle of
sexes in the post-war period, see recently Echternkamp, Jrg, Nach dem Krieg. Alltagsnot, Neuorientierung und die Last der Vergangenheit 1945-1949.
Zurich 2003, pp. 176-192.
P Revista de istorie militar P
32
Drr, Durchkommen, p. 383, Drr, Wer die Zeit
nicht miterlebt hat..., vol. 3, p. 441. Representative
of many examples is the removal of antitank obstacles
by women in Chemnitz in April 1945; OKH/GenStdH/
Op.Abt.(IIIc)/Nr. 4514/45 gKdos., Tagesmeldungen
West vom 18.4.1945, dated 19 April 1945; BA-MA RH
2/495, fol. 94-98, here fol. 96. Regarding the realisation
of the futility at the end of the war, see also Meves,
Christa, Flakhelferin , in: Frauen im Wehrdienst.
Erinnerungen von Ingeborg Hecht, Ruth Henry,
Christa Meves. Freiburg 1982, pp. 22-45 here p. 31,
and Kundrus, Nur die halbe Geschichte, pp. 722f.
33
Barnouw, Dagmar, Germany 1945. Views of War
and Violence. Bloomington 1996, Nieden, Susanne
zur, Mtter des Herzens. berlegungen zu einem
Frauenbild in der Alltagsliteratur der ersten Jahre
nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: Insa Schningh/
Agnes Jooster (eds.), So nah beieinander und doch so
fern. Frauenleben in Ost und West. Pfaffenweiler 1992,
pp. 75-90, Bandhauer-Schffmann, Irene/Ela Hornung
(eds.), Trmmerfrauen ein kurzes Heldinnenleben?
Nachkriegsgesellschaft als Frauengesellschaft, in:
Andrea Graf (ed.), Zur Politik des Weiblichen. Frauen,
Macht und Ohnmacht. Vienna 1990, pp. 93-120, or
Drr, Margarete, Wer die Zeit nicht miterlebt hat...,
Frauenerfahrungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg und in den
Jahren danach. 3 vols., Vol. 3. Frankfurt a.M., New
York 1998.
34
In her interviews, Drr, Durchkommen, pp. 142f.,
identified the instilled as well as passed-down sense
of duty as being responsible. See also Leck, Ralph
M., Conservative Empowerment and the Gender of
Nazism. Paradigms of Power and Complicity in German Womens History, in: Journal of Womens History 12/2000, S. 147-169.
35
See e.g. Winkler, Heinrich-August, Der lange
Weg nach Westen. First volume: Deutsche Geschichte
vom Ende des Alten Reiches bis zum Untergang der
Weimarer Republik. Munich 2000, esp. pp. 378-555.
36
For research on women and the role of women
in war cf. Drr, Margarete, Durchkommen und
berleben. Frauenerfahrungen in der Kriegs- und
Nachkriegszeit. Frankfurt a.M. 1998, p. 80 note 1,
and regarding relevant studies of regional and local
history ibid, p. 383 note 18, Kundrus, Nur die halbe
Geschichte, Kundrus, Widerstreitende Geschichte, as
well as Kundrus, Frauen und Nationalsozialismus.
berlegungen zum Stand der Forschung, in: AfS 36/
1996, pp. 481-499.
37
Frevert, Ute, Pflicht, in: Deutsche Erinnerungsorte . Edited by Etienne Franois and Hagen
Schulze, 3 vols., Vol. 2, Special edition Munich 2003,
pp. 269-285, here pp. 279f., as well as, in general,
mainly Wildt, Michael, Generation des Unbedingten.
Das Fhrungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes. Hamburg 2002, and on the popularity of the
55
NS regimes from below e.g. Gellately, Robert, Backing Hitler. Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany.
Oxford 2001, or Paul, Gerhard/Klaus-Michael
Mallmann (eds.), Die Gestapo im Zweiten Weltkrieg.
Heimatfront und besetztes Europa. Darmstadt 2000.
38
Arendt, Hannah, Eichmann in Jerusalem. Ein
Bericht von der Banalitt des Bsen (1964). Leipzig
1990, p. 246.
39
See e.g. Brockhaus Conversations-Lexikon, 13th
ed., vol. 16, Leipzig 1887, p. 504.
40
Regarding representation in the media, see for
instance Michael Schornstheimer, Die leuchtenden
Augen der Frontsoldaten. Nationalsozialismus und
Krieg in den Illustriertenromanen der fnfziger Jahre,
Berlin 1995, p. 10, and Michael Schornstheimer,
Harmlose Idealisten und draufgngerische Soldaten. Militr und Krieg in den Illustrierten-romanen
der fnfziger Jahre. In: Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944. Edited by Hannes
Heer and Klaus Naumann, 2nd edition, Hamburg 1995,
pp. 634-650, and Schuld und Shne? Kriegserlebnis
und Kriegsdeutung in deutschen Medien der
Nachkriegszeit (1945-1961) . Edited by Ursula
Heukenkamp. Amsterdam, Atlanta 2001 (= Amsterdamer Beitrge zur neueren Germanistik, 50, 1 u. 2).
41
Frevert, Pflicht, pp. 275-283, as well as Wette,
Wolfram, Militarismus in Deutschland 1871-1914.
Zeitgenssische Analyse und Kritik. Mnster et al.
1999 and a critical assessment by Ziemann, Benjamin,
Sozialmilitarismus und militrische Sozialisation im
deutschen Kaiserreich 1870-1914. Desiderate und
Perspektiven in der Revision eines Geschichtsbildes,
in: GWU 3/2002, pp. 148-164. Concerning the argument that the Wehrmacht was a melting pot of national socialist conviction see also Bartov, Omer,
Hitlers Army. Nazis and War in the Third Reich. Oxford 1991, pp. 271f. In his opinion, many might probably have remained immune to National Socialist indoctrination, had they not been called up. Concerning ideologised warfare in the east, see also Bartov,
Omer, The Eastern Front 1941-1945. German Troops
and the Barbarization of Warfare. London, Basingstoke
1985, Pohl, Karl Heinrich (ed.), Wehrmacht und
Vernichtungspolitik. Militr im nationalsozialistischen
System. Gttingen 1999, Schulte, Theo J., The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia. Oxford et al. 1989 or Streit, Christian, Keine Kameraden.
Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945, 4th edition, Bonn 1997.
42
Regarding initial attempts, see for instance H,
Rudolf, Kommandant in Auschwitz. Autobiographische
Aufzeichnungen. 11th edition, Munich 1987, in particular pp. 24f., 69 and 124, who declared the performance of duty to be the guiding principle to which
56
Diploma]ie [i ap`rare
Abstract
The study entitled Lights and Shadows of the RomanianPolish relations in the interwar
period would like to present, from a historical perspective, the communion between the forenamed
countries. One of the most important politician who encouraged the approach between Romania
and Poland was Nicolae Titulescu, also named the friend of the Polish people.
The historiography of the problem is enriched by various studies, most of them being dated
from the seventies, when the interest regarding the relationship between Romania and Poland
increased. Among those authors who treated different aspects of the relationship between these
countries, we emphasize the contribution by Henryk Jaboski, Wadysaw Stpniak, Henryk Walczak,
Andrzej Kory.
When we talk about the activity of Nicolae Titulescu concerning the above mentioned problem,
we have to bring into discussion the contribution by Take Ionescu, the mentor of the first one.
Thus, in this study, the actions undertaken by Take Ionescu and then, by his successors are
presented, in order to maintain and develop this relationship.
Nicolae Titulescu, one of the most important Romanian diplomats continued the work of Take
Ionescu, understanding the needs of that time when Romania can be defended only by the
medium of actions and not by the lack of actions.
The study also emphasizes the difficult moments of the Romanian Polish relationship, from
the beginning of the thirties.
Keywords: Polish relations, diplomacy, Jzef Beck,
Nicolae Titulescu, Little Entente
Numai romnii sunt ndrituii s spun
poporului lor ce este patriotic i ce nu
Indignat de amestecul flagrant al diplomailor
polonezi n treburile interne romneti, Nicolae
Titulescu constata n a doua parte a anului 1934:
D-nii Beck i Arciszewski au tot dreptul s dea
lecii de patriotism polonezilor, dar numai romnii
P Revista de istorie militar P
sunt ndrituii s spun poporului lor ce este patriotic i ce nu. Ar tolera oare Polonia un ministru
romn la Varovia care s declare c cine nu
urmeaz linia de aciune a d-lui Titulescu nu este
un bun cetean polonez?1
Titulescu a dorit s taxeze, n cuvinte elegante,
grobianismul i lipsa de deontologie profesional a
trimisului polonez pe meleaguri dmboviene,
57
3. Caut cu orice prilej i pe orice cale s ntreasc i s ridice statele adversare ale acestor
grupri i ncurajeaz revendicrile lor fa de
acestea. Citez: politica Poloniei favorabil Ungariei
i Bulgariei17.
n octombrie 1938, Beck va da o lovitur
mortal Micii nelegeri prin atacarea, imediat dup
Mnchen, a Cehoslovaciei. Predicia lui Vioianu
a fost din timp i corect transmis la Bucureti. De
aceea, Titulescu i-a i mulumit.
Tabloul respectiv este completat de ministrul
plenipoteniar romn, inclusiv cu dovezi privind
ostilitatea pe care liderii polonezi o dovedeau, chiar
i prin acte publice, fa de ncercarea Bucuretiului de apropiere ruso-romn. Aceasta, trebuie
spus, dup ce Varovia i pusese dsagii n cru,
semnnd Tratatul cu Moscova, dup cum se tia, la
25 iulie 1932.
Toate argumentele care mi se dau aici mpotriva unei asemenea apropieri precizeaz
Constantin Vioianu sunt sau de ordin sentimental polonez sau de ordin politic strin condiiunilor
de aprare romneasc. Nici unul nu este fondat
pe un interes romnesc, nici unul nu este izvort
din natura alianei romno-poloneze18.
Politica extern a Poloniei este alta dect
cea pe care o mrturisete i pe care
s-a sprijinit aliana romno-polon
Diplomatul romn constat cum dumnia
Poloniei fa de Mica nelegere i de nelegerea
Balcanic se completeaz cu poziiunea tutelar
63
65
67
torial a Romniei, acest tratat implic recunoaterea de ctre Polonia fa de Romnia a titlurilor
juridice internaionale n virtutea crora Romnia
a obinut integritatea actual a teritoriului ei i cari
titluri se gsesc n Tratatele de pace semnate dar
neratificate de ctre Polonia35.
ns Beck a refuzat s-i dea omologului su o
asemenea asigurare, respectiv s semneze nota
propus Romnia rmnnd fr nicio garanie
scris n aceast direcie.
Lui Titulescu, n exil, nu i-a rmas dect s
constate: dac formula rennoirea prieteniei
dintre Polonia i Romnia nseamn c un om a
mpiedicat mbuntirea relaiilor polono-romne,
atunci ea trebuie tradus n felul urmtor:
De ndat ce Romnia constat c unul dintre
minitrii si de externe nu este pe placul unui
anume stat, deoarece apr interesele romneti,
ceea ce nu coincide totdeauna cu interesele tuturor,
Romnia, n dorina de a face plcere altor ri, l
concediaz pe ministrul su, n loc s l sprijine i
s-l impun unor ri strine, cum ar fi, de pild,
Polonia sau Iugoslavia. Este imposibil s-i dai seama
imediat ct de dezastruoase pot fi consecinele
acestui sistem pentru aprarea intereselor
romneti n viitor36.
O profeie amar, care se va adeveri n tot
dramatismul ei, peste trei ani, dup ce va trece
prin unele momente de extaz, nainte de a cunoate,
aadar, delirul din septembrie 1939.
*
*
68
B`t`lii celebre
BTLIA DE LA ADRIANOPOL
(14 sau 15 aprilie 1205)
Prima lupt din secolul al XIII-lea
pentru hegemonie n sud-estul Europei
dintre Orient i Occident
Dr. VASILE MRCULE
Abstract
On 13th of April 1204, the participants at the fourth crusade conquered Constantinople dissolving
the Byzantine Empire, on its ruins a Latin Empire was built, led by the emperor Balduin I and also a
series of small states of Byzantine or Crusader kind. In the Balkan Peninsula the expanding politics
of Latin Empire of Constantinople knocked against that of the Vlacho-Bulgarian Czardom, which
under the leading of Ioannitsa Assen became the main power in the region. On the terms of the new
international context, in two powers will become main protagonists of the fight for hegemony in the
Balkan Peninula. The final confrontation between them will be consumed on Adrianoples walls on
14th or 15th April 1205. Being on ally with the Cumans from the North of the Danube, Ioannitsa Assen
tsar will give the crusade forces a destructive blow, causing them a dangerous defeat, during which
the emperor Balduin I will be taken prisoner, dying a little later in Vlacho-Bulgarian captivity. The
victory from Adrianople confirmed and consolidated the Vlacho-Bulgarian Czardoms position of
main power upon South-Eastern Europe. In exchange, after the received blow, the Latin Empire of
Constantinople was never been totally reconstructed.
Keywords: The Romanian Bulgarian Empire, The Latin
Empire of Constantinople, Baudoin of Flandres, battle of
Adrianople
71
formaiuni politice cruciate create n aceeai perioad15, cci pericolului reprezentat de aversiunea
grecilor supui, dar puin dispui s accepte ocupaia
latin, i se aduga acum unul incomparabil mai
grav, cel reprezentat de aratul Vlaho-Bulgar. Ca
urmare a acestei politici promovate de latini, remarca istoricul francez Ch. Diehl, n locul ajutorului
pe care l-ar fi putut gsi la bulgari pentru lupta
mpotriva bizantinilor, ei au fcut din aceia inamici
ireconciliabili, care s-au neles cu suveranii
bizantini de la Niceea mpotriva imperiului latin,
pentru a-i provoca ruina16.
Confruntat cu ostilitatea declarat a cruciailor
i, probabil, cu atac iminent din partea acestora,
aa cum rezult din relatarea lui Villehardouin,
arul vlaho-bulgar a reacionat imediat. ntr-o prim
faz, el s-a ntors spre grecii, care se revoltau
mpotriva dominaiei latine, le-a acceptat colaborarea i n anul 1205 a ncheiat o alian antilatin
cu ei17. ntr-adevr, rspunznd ostilitii latinilor,
Ioni Asan a susinut rscoala aristocraiei
bizantine din Thracia i Macedonia, care nu se
P Revista de istorie militar P
Statele succesoare
ale Imperiului Bizantin
Ea a creat panic, muli locuitori, inclusiv participani la cruciad, temndu-se de un atac al forelor
vlaho-bulgaro-cumane asupra capitalei, prefernd
s prseasc oraul pe calea mrii58.
Retragerea trupelor latine (14/15 sau 15/
16-21 sau 22 aprilie 1205). Pentru Geoffroy de
Villehardouin, devenit prin fora mprejurrilor
comandantul armatei cruciate, se punea ca problem imediat, urgent i grav, salvarea resturilor acesteia. n urma unei consftuiri cu dogele
Enrico Dandolo, care nici el nu intrase cu forele
sale n lupta de la Adrianopol, s-a decis adpostirea
acestor trupe n puternica cetate Rhaidestos
(Rodosto), situat la trei zile distan de Adrianopol
i la dou zile de Constantinopol.
Retragerea forelor latine de la Adrianopol la
Rhaidestos este sumar prezentat n majoritatea
surselor de care dispunem. Spre exemplu, Niketas
Choniates consemneaz doar c armata latin
plecnd de acolo se duce la Rhaidestos, pe rmul
mrii59. Informaii la fel de vagi ne transmite i
Robert de Clari, care susine c cine a putut s
scape a venit n goan la Constantinopol; i aa a
venit duca Veneiei la fug i muli oameni cu el i
i-au lsat corturile i tot buclucul de izbelite, n
cetate, i niciodat n-au mai cutezat s se abat
prin partea aceea, acolo unde aa mare nfrngere
a fost60. Singura surs care ne ofer informaii
mai complete asupra retragerii forelor latine dup
dezastrul de la Adrianopol este lucrarea lui Geoffroy
de Villehardouin.
Contient de faptul c forele cruciate erau
incapabile s mai susin o nou confruntare cu
cele vlaho-bulgaro-cumane, Geoffroy de
Villehardouin a fixat ca principal obiectiv al
retragerii evitarea unei asemenea confruntri. Ca
urmare, el a decis ca retragerea spre Rhaidestos
s fie executat n etape pe timp de noapte. Marul
spre Rhaidestos, gndit de Geoffroy de Villehardouin
i executat de o armat nvins i demoralizat sub
comanda acestuia, poate fi considerat o realizare
militar de excepie. n cursul su, comandantul
cruciat a fcut permanent dovada naltei sale
capaciti de militar i strateg.
n noaptea de 14/15 sau de 15/16 aprilie 1205,
care a urmat nfrngerii, dup ce au luat msuri de
inducere n eroare a adversarului, grosul forelor
latine, comandate de dogele Enrico Dandolo, a
77
1
S. Brezeanu, O istorie a Imperiului Bizantin,
Bucureti, 1981, p. 160; Idem, O istorie a Bizanului,
Bucureti, 2005, p. 240 (n continuare: Bizanul).
2
Pentru tratativele dintre Ioni Asan i
Innocentius III, vezi: Documente privitoare la istoria
romnilor culese de E. de Hurmuzaki, vol. I, partea 1,
Bucureti, 1887, p. 1-8, 9-13, 17-39, 40-50, doc., doc. I-VII,
IX-XI, XV-XXIX, XXXI-XXXV (n continuare: Hurmuzaki, I/1). Pentru discuiile asupra acestei probleme,
vezi: S. Brezeanu, Imperator Bulgariae et Vlachiae.
n jurul genezei i semnificaiei termenului Vlachia
din titulatura lui Ioni Asan, n Revista de Istorie, 33,
1980, 4, p. 651-674.
3
Fr. Dvornik, Slavii n istoria i civilizaia european, Bucureti, 2001, p. 86.
4
Robert de Clari, Cei care au cucerit Constantinopolul , editat de Tatiana-Ana Fluieraru i O.
Pecican, Cluj-Napoca, 2005, p. 119, 64 (n continuare
Clari).
5
Ibidem, p. 121, 65.
6
Ibidem.
7
Nicetae Choniatae, Historia, recensuit Immanuelus Bekkerus, Bonnae, MDCCCXXXV, p. 809 (n
continuare: Choniatae).
8
O. Pecican, Vlahia i vlahii la Robert de Clari, n
Idem, ntre cruciai i ttari. Cretintate occidental
i nomazi n Europa central-sud-estic (1204-1241),
Cluj-Napoca, 2006, p. 44.
9
Fr. Dvornik, op. cit, p. 85-86.
10
Ibidem, p. 86.
11
Geoffroy de Villehardouin, Cucerirea Constantinopolului, ediie de O. Pecican, Cluj, 2002, p. 130,
276 (n continuare: Villehardouin).
12
T. Teoteoi, Civilizaia statului Asnetilor ntre
Roma i Bizan, n Rscoala i statul Asnetilor,
Bucureti, 1989, p. 83.
13
Villehardouin, p. 140, 311.
14
Hurmuzaki, I/1, p. 48, doc. XXXIV.
15
Villehardouin, p. 130-137, paragrafele 276-299;
Clari, p. 157-162, 98-105.
16
Ch. Diehl, Istoria Imperiului Bizantin, Craiova,
1999, p. 161; Cf. G. Ostrogorsky, Geschichte des
byzantinischen Staates, Mnchen, 1963, p. 352.
17
Fr. Dvornik, op. cit., p. 86.
18
Choniatae, p. 809.
19
Villehardouin, p. 146-147, 333.
20
Choniatae, p. 809-811; Villehardouin, p. 146,
333-350.
21
Ibidem, p. 810.
22
Clari, p. 169, 112.
23
Hurmuzaki, I/1, p. 51, doc. XXXVII.
24
Villehardouin, p. 149, 343-344.
25
79
B`t`lii celebre
Abstract
The Hunnic art of war was based on high-speed light cavalry attacks. The main weapon was the
powerful long composite bow, but swords were also used.
The Huns arrived from Central Asia in Eastern Europe around 370, and after few years conquered
the area inhabited by Alans and Ostrogoths between Dniepr and Dniestr. In 376, the Visigoths took
refuge in the Roman Empire, followed by an Ostrogothic group in 377; other North-Danubian barbarians (Carpi, Ostrogoths, Skiri), stirred by the Hunnic advance, launched invasions in the empire
between 381 and 394. The Huns established a real domination north of the Lower Danube only around
400. The first invasions led by king Uldin occurred in 404 and 408, when were destroyed the bridgeheads of Hinova, Ostrovul Banului, Drobeta and Sucidava, as well as several forts south of the Danube.
The next invasion (422) started from the Hunnic center of power located north of the Black Sea,
led by king Rua. Several fortifications in northern Scythia Minor were affected, and the empire
accepted to pay a tribute. This payment was doubled in 440, when a new peace was closed at
Margum, with the new ruler Attila (the Huns were then already moved in Pannonia). The peace was
violated by Attila in 441. The attacks that lasted until 442 covered a large part of the frontier and
reached important inland cities. The strategic plan was to reach Constantinople, but the Roman
army defeated the Huns in the Thracian Chersonesus. The most powerful invasion took place in 447.
It covered the entire eastern part of the Balkan Peninsula, and a strip between Singidunum i Novae
was annexed to the Hunnic empire.
After 448, the Huns changed direction to West, and in 454 their domination collapsed after the
sudden death of Attila. Various warrior groups splitted from the Hunnic confederation continued to
attack the Lower Danubian provinces between 466 and 474.
Keywords: Huns, Late Roman Empire, Limes, Attila,
nomad art of war
Arc hunic
eurasiatice ajuni la frontierele sale. Crescui ntrun mediu natural ostil i obinuii de la cea mai
fraged vrst cu clria i tragerea cu arcul, toi
aceti nomazi, de la huni pn la mongoli, au
dezvoltat o art militar bazat pe atacuri rapide
ale cavaleriei uoare. Pn la apariia armelor de
foc, aceste fore ale clreilor nomazi, cu mare
mobilitate i manevrabilitate, bine instruite, folosind
arcul, spada i sabia, au fost superioare armatelor
sedentarilor n operaiunile ofensive. Capacitatea
acestor clrei de a lansa sgei att n fa, ct i
din retragere, a fost un mare avantaj tactic n
luptele n cmp deschis contra infanteriei, dar i a
cavaleriei, prin procedeul de lupt al fugii simulate,
urmate de contraatac. Arma principal pe care o
foloseau era arcul reflex asimetric, care era compus din dou segmente de lemn flexibile curbate n
S, ntrite cu plcue de os sau corn n partea
central i la extremiti. Aceste arcuri aveau
lungimea ntre 130 i 160 cm i lansau sgei dotate
cu vrfuri cu trei aripioare, care erau mai penetrante dect cele triunghiulare. Fora de izbire mare
era o consecin i a lungimii arcului. De aceea,
arcurile hunice erau superioare celor folosite de
romani sau de barbarii europeni. Pentru lupta de
aproape, hunii erau narmai cu spade i sbii scurte,
dar arcul rmnea arma cea mai important1.
Confruntarea cu marile puteri ale antichitii
i evului mediu (China, Persia, Imperiul Roman,
apoi Bizantin) a determinat apariia unor forme de
organizare politico-militar superioar la nomazii
care au populat stepa eurasiatic, acel spaiu ntins
pe circa 7 000 km ntre frontierele vestice ale
Chinei i Dunre: imperiile stepei. Aceast expresie
a fost introdus n cartea publicat n 1938 de ctre
unul dintre cei mai buni cunosctori ai istoriei
antice i medievale a Eurasiei, Ren Grousset. Un
asemenea imperiu poate fi definit ca o societate
P Revista de istorie militar P
Spada de la Pannonhalma
83
1
M. Kazanski, propos des armes et des lments
dharnachament orientaux en Occident lpoque
des Grandes Migrations (IVe-Ve s.), Journal of Roman Archaeology, 4, 1991, p. 132-137; I. Lebedynsky,
Armes et guerriers barbares au temps des Grandes
Invasions (IVe au VIe si cle apr. J.-C.) , Paris, 2001,
p. 176-180, 197-199.
2
R. P. Lindner, Nomadism, Horses and Huns,
Past and Present, 1981, 92 (August), p. 3-19.
3
Vezi pe larg n A. Madgearu, Istoria militar
a Daciei post-romane, 275-376 , Trgovite, 2008,
p. 79-82.
4
N. Lenski, Failure of Empire: Valens and the
Roman State in the Fourth Century A.D., Berkeley,
2002, p. 325340; P. Heather, The Fall of the Roman
Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians,
Oxford, 2006, p. 158-189.
5
Zosimos, Historia, IV, 34.6; 35, 38-39 (FHDR, II,
p. 312/313); Marcellinus Comes, Cronica, an 386
(FHDR, II, p. 360/361); Claudianus, Panegyricus de
tertio consulatu Honorii Augusti , VII, 147-150;
Panegyricus de quarto consulatu Honorii Augusti, 623636; In Rufinum, II, 26-28, 36-38; De Consulato
Stilichonis, I, 94-115; E. Stein, Histoire du Bas-Empire, tome I. De ltat romain ltat byzantin (284476), Paris, 1959, p. 194; R. Vulpe, I. Barnea, Din
istoria Dobrogei. II, Romanii la Dunrea de Jos,
Bucureti, 1968, p. 405; O. Maenchen-Helfen, The
World of the Huns. Studies in their History and Culture, Berkeley, 1973, p. 40, 47-48; M. Zahariade, Scythia
Minor. A History of a Later Roman Province (284681), Amsterdam, 2006, p. 27-28.
6
M. O. Coi, Discuie asupra localizrii Mnstirii
Halmyrisos din Vita Sancti Hypatii . Comunicare
prezentat la sesiunea Pontica, Muzeul de Istorie
Naional i Arheologie Constana, 4 octombrie 2007.
7
Philostorgios, Church History, Translated by
Philip R. Amidon, Atlanta, 2007, p. 137.
8
M. Zahariade, op. cit., p. 27.
9
A. Suceveanu, M. Zahariade, Du nom antique de
la cit romaine tardive dIndependena (dep. Tulcea),
Dacia, NS, 31, 1987, p. 95.
10
R. Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus and the
Nicene Revolution, Oxford, 2000, p. 356.
11
Zosimos, V. 22. 1-3 (FHDR II, p. 316/317); O.
Maenchen-Helfen, op. cit., p. 59; S. Williams, G. Friell,
The Rome that did not fall: the survival of the East in
the fifth century, London, 1999, p. 12.
12
Sozomenos, VIII. 25. 1 (FHDR, II, 228/229); O.
Maenchen-Helfen, op. cit., p. 62-63; S. Williams, G.
Friell, op. cit., p. 28.
13
Nikephor Callistos Xanthopoulos, Ekklesiastike
Historia, XIII, 35 (Patrologia Graeca, vol. 146, col.
1040); O. Maenchen-Helfen, op. cit., p. 63.
14
Sozomenos, IX. 5 (FHDR, II, 228/229); O.
Maenchen-Helfen, op. cit., p. 63-66; S. Williams, G.
Friell, op. cit., p. 108-109; M. Rouche, Attila. La violence nomade, Paris, 2009, p. 113-114.
15
D. Bondoc, The Roman Rule to the North of the
Lower Danube during the Late Roman and Early Byzantine Period, Cluj-Napoca, 2009, p. 61, 64, 69-70.
16
O. Toropu, Romanitatea trzie i strromnii n
Dacia traian sud-carpatic (sec. III-XI), Craiova,1976,
p. 32-34.
17
Gh. Poenaru-Bordea, V. Barbu, Contributions
lhistoire du Bas Empire Romain la lumire des deux
trsors monetaires des IV -V sicles, dcouvertes a
Celeiu, Dacia, NS, 14, 1970, p. 294.
18
L. Zotovi, Boljetin (Smorna), camp romain et
palobyzantin, Starinar, NS, 33-34, 1982-1983 (1984),
p. 222, 225.
19
V. Popovi, Donji Milanovac Veliki Gradac
(Taliata). Forteresse romano-byzantine, Starinar, NS,
33-34, 1982-1983 (1984), p. 282.
20
A. Jovanovi, Hajduka Vodenica, fortification
antique tardive et palobyzantine, Starinar, NS, 3334, 1982-1983 (1984), p. 331.
21
L. Vagalinski, Die sptrmische nrdliche
Festungsmauer von Transmarisca, n G. von Blow, A.
Milcheva (ed.), Der Limes an der unteren Donau von
Diokletian bis Heraklios. Vortrge der internationalen
Konferenz Svishtov, Bulgarien (1.-5. September 1998),
Sofia, 1999, p. 235.
22
M. Coma, O cas roman trzie situat extra
muros de la Dinogetia, Pontica, 21-22, 1988-1989,
p. 329, 331.
23
A. Opai, A. Sion, I. Vasiliu, Aegyssus79 ,
Materiale i cercetri arheologice, 14, 1980, p. 270.
24
Olympiodoros, frg. 27 (Fragmenta Historicorum
Graecorum), ed. Karl Mller, vol. IV, Paris, 1851,
p. 63); Marcellinus Comes (an 422) (FHDR, II,
p. 360/361); Theodoretos, V. 37. 4-10 (FHDR, II, p.
236-237); O. Maenchen-Helfen, op. cit., p. 76; B. Croke,
Evidence for the Hun Invasion of Thrace in A. D. 422,
Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 18, 1977, 4,
p. 346-367.
25
L. Oa, Hunii n Dobrogea, Istros, 10, 2000,
p. 369.
26
Vezi carierele celor doi n J. Martindale, The
Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire, vol. II
(395-527), Cambridge, 1980, 396, 892-893.
87
27
Priscus, frg. 1 (Ambasadele), ed. Gh. PopaLisseanu, Izvoarele Istoriei Romnilor, vol. VIII,
Bucureti, 1936 p. 39-40, 81-82); E. Stein, op. cit. ,
p. 289-290; O. Maenchen-Helfen, op. cit., p. 90-94; S.
Williams, G. Friell, op. cit., p. 55; M. Rouche, op. cit.,
p. 128-130.
28
C. Zuckerman, Lempire dOrient et les Huns.
Notes sur Priscus, Travaux et Mmoires, Centre de
Recherche dHistoire et Civilisation Byzantines,
Paris, 12, 1994, p. 160-163.
29
Priscus, frg. 1 (ed. Popa-Lisseanu, p. 40, 82).
30
De exemplu: R. Vulpe, I. Barnea, op. cit., p. 407;
L. Oa, op. cit., p. 372.
31
C. Nicolae, Descoperiri de epoc roman i bizantin la Carsium, Pontica, 28-29, 1995-1996, p. 154.
Dou monede emise n intervalul 408-423 au fost
publicate ulterior: C. Chiriac, S. Grmticu, G.
Talmachi, C. Nicolae, Noi descoperiri monetare la
Carsium (Hrova-jud. Constana), Pontica, 32, 1999,
p. 326 (nr. 33, 34), 338.
32
O. Maenchen-Helfen, op. cit., p. 110.
33
Priscus, frg. 2 (ed. Popa-Lisseanu, p. 67-68, 117118); frg. II (Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum, vol.
V/1, Paris, 1873, p. 25-26); Marcellinus Comes (anii
441, 442) (FHDR, II, 360/361); E. Stein, op. cit. ,
p. 291-292; O. Maenchen-Helfen, op. cit., p. 109-116;
S. Williams, G. Friell, op. cit., p. 63-72; M. Rouche, op.
cit., p. 153-156.
34
C. Zuckerman, op. cit., p. 165.
35
M. Tomovi, Ravna - the Roman and Early Byzantine Fortification, n Roman Limes on the Middle and
Lower Danube, ed. by P. Petrovi, Belgrade, 1996, p. 79.
36
M. Vasi, ezava = Castrum Novae. La
stratigraphie, la chronologie et les phases architectoniques, n Akten des 14. Internationalen Limeskongresses 1986 in Carnuntum , Wien, 1990, vol. 2,
p. 905-906.
37
M. Vasi, Larchitecture lintrieur des camps
romains des Portes de Fer au IVme et Vme sicle, n
Roman Frontier Studies 1989. Proceedings of the XVth
International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies, ed.
by V. A. Maxfield, M. J. Dobson, Exeter, 1991, p. 310.
38
G. von Blow, Die Entwicklung des Siedlungsbildes von Iatrus in der Periode B / C, n Iatrus-Krivina.
Sptantike Befestigung und frhmittelalterliche
Siedlung an der unteren Donau, V. Studien zur
Geschichte des Kastells Iatrus (Forschungsstand
1989), Berlin, 1995, p. 44-49.
39
A. Suceveanu, M. Zahariade, F. Topoleanu, G.
Poenaru-Bordea, Halmyris I. Monografie arheologic,
Cluj-Napoca, 2003, p. 36, 113, 162.
40
Priscus, frg. 4 (ed. Popa-Lisseanu, p. 40, 83).
Acest Theodoulus era magister militum per Thraciae,
dup cum reiese din frg. 5 (ed. Popa-Lisseanu, p. 69,
120). Pentru cariera sa vezi J. Martindale, op. cit. ,
p. 1105-1106.
41
O. Maenchen-Helfen, op. cit., p. 119.
88
42
I. Bna, Das Hunnenreich. Vom Hunnensturm
im Jahr 376 bis zum Tod Attilas: Geschichte, Kultur
und Archologie der Hunnen, Budapest, Stuttgart,
1991, p. 54 (dateaz n 441); M. Rouche, op. cit. ,
p. 130-131 (dateaz n 445).
43
W. Bayless, The Treaty with the Huns of 443,
The American Journal of Philology, 97, 1976, 2,
p. 176-179; I. Bna, op. cit., p. 58-59; M. Rouche,
op. cit., p. 158-159.
44
C. Zuckerman, op. cit., p. 186-187.
45
Marcellinus Comes (an 447) (FHDR, II, 360/
361); Iordanes, Romana, 331 (FHDR, II, 410/411); E.
Stein, op. cit ., p. 292-293; O. Maenchen-Helfen,
op. cit. , p. 117-125; S. Williams, G. Friell, op. cit. ,
p. 77-79, 109; M. Rouche, op. cit., p. 165.
46
Priscus, frg. 5 (ed. Popa-Lisseanu, p. 69-70,
120-121).
47
M. Garaanin, M. Vasi, Castrum Pontes, n
Cahiers de Portes de Fer, Belgrad, 4, 1986, p. 91;
M. Vasi, Transdrobeta (Pontes) in the Late Antiquity, n G. von Blow, A. Milcheva (ed.), Der Limes an
der unteren Donau ..., p. 34-35.
48
O. Toropu, op. cit., p. 33-34 nu admite dect
aceast distrugere, nu i cea din 408.
49
D. Vladimirova-Aladova, Numismatic Evidence
about the Intensity of Barbarian Invasions into the Province of Lower Moesia during the 5th Century, n
Stephanos nomismatikos. Edith Schnert-Geiss zum
65. Geburstag, hrsg. von U. Peter, Berlin, 1998, p. 645.
50
C. Scorpan, Limes Scythiae. Topographical and
Stratigraphical Research on the Late Roman Fortifications on the Lower Danube, Oxford, 1980, p. 123-125.
n schimb, L. Oa, op. cit., p. 369-370 susine c atacul
din 447 nu ar fi afectat Dobrogea, dar nu ine seama
de existena acestor niveluri de distrugere.
51
Priscus, frg. 5, 6 (ed. Popa-Lisseanu, 68-69, 70,
118-119, 122); O. Maenchen-Helfen, op. cit., p. 124;
B. Croke, The Context and Date of Priscus Fragment
6, Classical Philology, 78, 1983, 4, 298-307; C.
Zuckerman, op. cit. , p. 168; M. Rouche, op. cit. ,
p. 158-159 (pacea datat eronat n 443), 166-168.
52
Sidonius Apollinaris, Poems and Letters, with
an English Translation, Introduction, and Notes by W.
B. Anderson, vol. I, Cambridge (Mass.), London, 1963,
p. 30-33 (Panegiricul pentru Anthemius, 269-287); V.
Velkov, Cities in Thrace and Dacia in Late Antiquity
(Studies and Materials), Amsterdam 1977, p. 42-43; J.
Martindale, op. cit., p. 97, 212-213, 1201.
53
Priscus, frg. 38, 39 (ed. Popa-Lisseanu, p. 77,
78, 133, 134); Marcellinus Comes (an 469) (FHDR,
II, 362/363); R. Vulpe, I. Barnea, op. cit., p. 408; O.
Maenchen-Helfen, op. cit., p. 163-168; S. Williams, G.
Friell, op. cit., p. 110; L. Oa, op. cit., p. 371.
54
Evagrios, Historia, III. 2 (FHDR, II, 524/525);
Theophanes, an 5966 (FHDR, II, 596/597); E. Stein,
op. cit., p. 362.
Memorialistic militar
Abstract
Founded on October 18, 1920, by King Ferdinand I, the Romanian Army Aviation School was
soon relocated from Bucharest to Media (during the summer of 1921), where it functioned without
interruption until September 1st, 2004. The article signed by Itzhac Guttman Ben-Zvi is a vivid
recollection of the authors days as a student at the school in Media during the 1950s, successfully
capturing both the hardships and the successes of the Romanian school of aviation in shaping new
generations of engineers.
Keywords: King Ferdiand I, Romanian
Army Aviation School, Media
Prima coal tehnic aeronautic din Romnia, devenit ulterior o prestigioas instituie de nvmnt a otirii romne, s-a nfiinat oficial la 18 octombrie 1920 cnd, prin naltul Decret Regal nr.4167,
regele Ferdinand punea bazele colii de meseriai militari ai aeronauticii pentru a da cu timpul
maetri, submaetri i lucrtori specializai n mecanic, ajustaj, tmplrie, tapierie, tinichigerie, necesari
aviaiunii i aerostaiunii militare.
A fost o msur imperios necesar, determinat de dezvoltarea aeronauticii romneti n perioada
Primului Rzboi Mondial i n anii postbelici, materializat n creterea numrului i diversitii aparatelor
de zbor intrate n dotarea aviaiei militare.
n primul an al existenei sale, coala a funcionat pe aerodromul Pipera-Bucureti, dup care,
ncepnd cu vara anului 1921, instituia a fost dislocat la Media, iniial ntr-o veche cazarm de husari,
iar din 1927 ntr-un local nou construit pe malul Trnavei Mari, ocupnd o suprafa de cca 80 hectare
pe care s-a amenajat i un aerodrom cu infrastructura corespunztoare. S-a realizat astfel un adevrat
campus tehnic de aviaie, care a oferit toate condiiile de pregtire i instruire viitorilor subofieri i
ofieri tehnici de aviaie.
coala, aureolat pe rnd de numele pionierilor aviaiei romneti Aurel Vlaicu i Traian Vuia , a
funcionat nentrerupt la Media, timp de 83 de ani, pn la 1 septembrie 2004, cnd, urmare a msurilor
radicale de restructurare a organismului militar, a fost mutat n garnizoana Boboc-Buzu, funcionnd
ntr-o nou concepie mpreun cu coala de Aplicaie a Forelor Aeriene. Vechiul local din urbea
mediean nu mai pstreaz aproape nimic din mreia tradiiilor de odinioar. Un nsemn memorial
ridicat n faa fostei intrri n coal, prin osrdia oficialitilor locale i a cadrelor militare n rezerv din
garnizoana Media, omagiaz contribuia personalului i a absolvenilor celor peste 75 de promoii la
zborul spre nlimi al aeronavelor romneti.
P Revista de istorie militar P
89
Perioada interbelic a fost cea mai fecund din istoria colii, prestigiul instituiei crescnd de la an la
an. ncepnd cu 26 iulie 1931, timp de ase ani, Principele motenitor Mihai I a fost nscris n registrele
colii tehnice aeronautice. Herman Oberth i-a experimentat teoriile de construcie a rachetelor n
atelierele colii de aviaie din Media. eful primei promoii, viitorul cpitan-comandor Cucu Ilie, avea s
devin doctor n aeronautic.
Dup rzboi, au absolvit cursurile colii viitorii generali Gheorghe Zrnescu i tefan Ispas, comandantul
Aviaiei Militare i, respectiv, rectorul Academiei Militare Tehnice.
Tot la Media se desfurau convocrile periodice de pregtire militar n urma crora primeau
gradul de ofier n rezerv tinerii absolveni ai Seciei aviaie din Institutul Politehnic Bucureti. Din
rndul acestora remarcm pe viitorul vicepreedinte al Industriei Aeronautice Israeliene, prof. ing.
Itzhac Guttman Ben-Zvi, un discipol al academicianului Elie Carafoli, un prieten devotat al Romniei i
un colaborator fidel al Revistei de Istorie Militar. Iat cteva amintiri ale domniei sale despre coala
tehnic aeronautic din Media. (G.V.)
90
Pavilionul \nv`]`mnt
Pavilionul comand`
al [colii cu bustul lui
Traian Vuia
92
93
Militrgeschichte Zeitschrift
fr Historische Bildung,
4/2009
95
96
CONTENTS
Pontic Studies (Black Sea Studies)
- The Closing of the Black Sea under the Ottomans (I)
SERGIU IOSIPESCU ............................................................................................................................................
30
40
47
57
Famous Battles
- The Battle of Adrianople (14th or 15th of april 1205) first Fight for Hegemony in South-Eastern Europe,
between the East and the West from the 13th Century VASILE MRCULE, PhD ........................................
Hunnic Attacks against the Late Roman Lower Danubian Frontier ALEXANDRU MADGEARU, PhD ........
69
80
Military Memoirs
The Romanian Air Forces School for Technical Officers, Media ITZHAC GUTTMAN BEN-ZVI, PhD, Israel ....
89
94
Adresa redaciei: strada Constantin Mille nr. 6, cod 010142, Bucureti, sector 1,
telefon: 0213157827, telefax: 004021-3137955
www.mapn.ro/diepa/ispaim
Tiparul executat la Centrul Tehnic Editorial al Armatei sub comanda nr. 5216/2010
B 136/29.03.2010