Profil Concurenta

CUPRINS/CONTENTS
George Soros, Noua paradigm a pieelor financiare.

Criza creditelor din 2008 i implicaiile ei
George Soros, The new paradigm for financial markets.
The credit crisis of 2008 and what it means
Radu A. PUN
Cea mai mare amend aplicat de Comisia European
n domeniul antitrust reacii i comentarii
Highest fine ever applied by the European Commission
in the field of antitrust reactions and comments
Georgeta GAVRILOIU
Orientarea ctre o abordare mai economic a politicii
n domeniul concurenei n Europa
A more economic approach to competition policy in Europe
Maria ALEXANDRU
Oana STANCIU
Testul monopolistului ipotetic
un instrument de lucru n domeniul concurenei
The hypothetical monopolist test
a working tool in the field of competition
Ionu DRGOI
Diferenieri semnificative ntre reglementrile americane
i cele comunitare n materie de concuren
Significant differences between US and EU competition laws
Ana IVAN - ILIESCU
Preuri de exploatare i preuri excesive de excludere
- abordare din perspectiva Uniunii Europene
Exploitative prices and exclusionary excessive prices
European Unions perspective
Loredana COMNESCU
Modificri recente ale legislaiei comunitare
n domeniul concentrrilor economice. Nouti privind msurile corective
Recent amendments to the European Commission
mergers legislation. Changes regarding remedies
Alina LPDAT
2
3
8
9
16
17
24
25
30
31
40
41
46
47
Analiza conceptual a sustenabilitii fiscale

Investigating the concept of fiscal sustainability
Emilia CMPEANU
52
53
Nouti n domeniul concurenei i ajutorului de stat

News in the competition and state aid field
Carmen BUCUR
58
59
PROFIL: CONCURENA G NR.4/2008
GEORGE SOROS, NOUA PARADIGM A PIEELOR FINANCIARE.

CRIZA CREDITELOR DIN 2008 I IMPLICAIILE EI*
Recenzie de Radu A. PUN1
Aa cum o arat i titlul, cartea de fa propune o
nou paradigm, util, conform autorului, pentru
o mai bun nelegere a ceea ce se ntmpl astzi
pe pieele financiare. Merit subliniat de la nceput
faptul c aceast teorie a fost enunat de George
Soros nc din 1987, ea constituind una dintre
temele principale ale crii Alchimia finanelor2,
i c teoria propus poate avea o arie mai larg de
aplicare, nefiind limitat la pieele financiare.
Paradigma enunat de Soros pune la ndoial
presupunerile pe care se bazeaz teoria competiiei
perfecte, n principal aceea c participanii pe
pia beneficiaz de cunoatere perfect. Soros
afirm c agenii de pe pia i bazeaz deciziile
pe propriile percepii, subiective i limitate, i c
gndirea acestor participani joac un dublu rol:
pe de o parte, actorii ncearc s neleag situaia
n care se gsesc (pentru aceasta autorul folosete
termenul funcie cognitiv), iar pe de alt parte,
aceeai actori ncearc s schimbe situaia n care
se gsesc spre beneficiul propriu (autorul
numete acest lucru funcie manipulatoare).
Ideea central a acestei teorii este c cele dou
funcii descrise mai sus acioneaz n direcii
diferite, dar c, n anumite circumstane, ele pot
interfera, Soros numind aceast interaciune
reflexivitate interferenial.
Aceast teorie a reflexivitii a lansat un curent
de adepi la lansarea din 1987, dar nu a fost luat
n serios n mediul academic. Criza financiar,
aprut la finele lui 2007 i aflat n plin desfurare
n aceste zile (decembrie 2008), i ofer lui Soros

mediul perfect pentru a ncerca validarea i
recunoaterea teoriei sale, magnitudinea deosebit
a crizei financiare, comparabil doar cu cea a
anilor 30, conducnd la o dorin avid de posibile
explicaii i soluii pentru aceasta.
nc de la nceputul crii, George Soros vrea s
se asigure c cititorul nelege felul n care teoria
reflexivitii se aplic la actuala criz financiar.
Autorul afirm c, contrar teoriei economice
clasice, care presupune o cunoatere perfect din
partea actorilor de pe pia, participanii (incluznd
aici i autoritile monetare i fiscale) nu i pot
baza deciziile doar pe cunoatere. Raionamentele
i concepiile greite afecteaz preurile pieei i,
chiar mai important, preurile pieei afecteaz la
rndul lor aspectele fundamentale pe care tocmai
ele ar trebui s le reflecte. Soros susine c
preurile pieei nu se formeaz n mod aleator
dintr-un echilibru teoretic, aa cum susine
paradigma actual. Din contr, ntruct opiniile
participanilor i ale celor ce dirijeaz piaa nu
corespund strii de fapt, autorul susine c
pieele nu pot ajunge la echilibrul postulat de teoria
economic. n plus, ntre percepie i realitate
exist o legtur reflexiv n ambele sensuri, care
poate genera procese dezvoltare-declin de tip
balon, procese care iniial se autosusin,
urmnd apoi s se autodistrug. Fiecare astfel de
balon este format dintr-un curent i un raionament
greit care interacioneaz ntr-o manier reflexiv.
Cartea a fost publicat n 2008 de editura Litera Internaional, Bucureti. Versiunea n limba englez (George Soros, The new paradigm for
financial markets. The credit crisis of 2008 and what it means) a fost publicat n 2008 de editura Public Affairs, New York, i a fost tradus
de Graal Soft cu sprijinul de specialitate acordat de Cristina Bob i Ovidiu Pocan de la Capital Partners.
1
Inspector de concuren, Direcia Cercetare Sinteze.
2
Versiunea n limba englez, George Soros, The alchemy of finance: Reading the mind of the market, a fost publicat n 1987 de editura Simon
& Schuster.
GEORGE SOROS, THE NEW PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS.

THE CREDIT CRISIS OF 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS*
Referral and translated by Radu A. PUN3
As its title indicates, the book at hand proposes a
new paradigm, which may be useful, according
to its author, in offering a better understanding
of what is happening today on financial markets.
It is worth mentioning from the beginning that
the theory has been proposed by George Soros
as early as 1987, being one of the main ideas of
the book The alchemy of finance4, and that the
theory can have a wider range of application, not
limited to financial markets.
The paradigm Soros states questions the
assumptions on which the theory of perfect
competition rests upon, mainly the one that market
participants have perfect knowledge. Soros
maintains that market participants make their
decisions based on their own perceptions,
subjective and limited, and that the participants
thinking plays a dual function: on the one hand,
the actors seek to understand their situation (for
this the author uses the term cognitive function),
while, on the other hand, the same actors try to
change their situation for their own benefit (the
author calls this manipulative function). The
central idea of this theory is that the two
functions described above work in opposite
directions and that, under certain circumstances,
they can interfere with each other, this interaction
been named by Soros interference reflexivity.
This theory of reflexivity acquired a cult following
when it was launched in 1987, but was not taken
seriously in academic circles. The financial
crisis, which unfolded at the end of 2007 and
which is probably in full development these days

(December 2008), provides Soros with the
perfect environment for validation and recognition
of his theory, the impressive magnitude of the
financial crisis, comparable only with that of the
30s, leading to an avid search for possible
explanations and solutions for it.
Even from the beginning of his book, George
Soros wants to make sure that the reader
understands the way in which the theory of
reflexivity can be applied to the current financial
crisis. The author claims that, contrary to the
classical economic theory, which assumes perfect
knowledge of the actors, market participants
(including monetary and fiscal authorities) cannot
make decisions based solely on knowledge.
Their misjudgments and misconceptions affect
market prices, and, even more importantly, market
prices in turn affect the fundamentals that they
themselves are supposed to reflect. Soros states
that market prices are not reached in a random
manner following a theoretical equilibrium, as
the current paradigm holds. On the contrary,
given that the opinions of participants and market
regulators do not represent the actual situation,
the author claims that markets never reach the
equilibrium postulated by economic theory. In
addition, there is a two-way reflexive connection
between perception and reality, which can give
rise to initially self-reinforcing but eventually
self-defeating boom-bust processes, or bubbles.
Every bubble consists of a trend and a misconception
that interact in a reflexive manner.
*
The book was published in 2008 by Litera Internaional, Bucharest. The original English version (George Soros, The new paradigm for
financial markets. The credit crisis of 2008 and what it means) was published in 2008 by Public Affairs, New York, and was translated in
Romanian by Graal Soft, with the help of Cristina Bob and Ovidiu Pocan from Capital Partners.
3
Competition inspector, Synthesis Research Directorate.
4
George Soros, The Alchemy of finance: Reading the mind of the market, published in 1987 by the Simon & Schuster publishing house.
Soros confirm existena unui balon pe piaa

locuinelor din Statele Unite ale Americii, dar
afirm c actuala criz nu a nsemnat doar
spargerea acestui balon, ea fiind mult mai ampl
dect crizele financiare periodice ntlnite de-a
lungul ultimelor decenii. Toate aceste crize fac
parte, potrivit autorului, dintr-un proces reflexiv
pe termen lung ce a generat un super-balon. Astfel,
n ultimii douzeci i cinci de ani, extinderea
creditelor, curent predominant n Statele Unite,
dar nu numai, s-a suprapus unei concepii
greite, fundamentalismul de pia (potrivit
creia pieele ar trebui s aib mn liber).
Soros susine c actuala criz financiar constituie
un punct de cotitur ce demonstreaz inaplicabilitatea
acestor abordri.
n prima sa parte, cartea conine o descriere
succint a contextului n care a aprut criza
financiar, declanat n mod oficial n august
2007, dar care, potrivit lui Soros, putea fi anticipat
de la finele anului 2000, atunci cnd a avut loc
spargerea unui alt balon, cel al tehnologiei i
internetului. Urmeaz apoi o prezentare amnunit
a teoriei reflexivitii, prezentare ce depete
limitele sferei pieelor financiare i pe care cei
interesai doar de criza curent ar putea-o gsi
mai greu de parcurs. Aceti cititori vor aprecia
ns capitolul imediat urmtor, care descrie aplicarea
teoriei reflexivitii n situaia concret a pieelor
financiare.
Aceste piee constituie un bun laborator de testare
a teoriei ntruct majoritatea preurilor, ct i alte
informaii, sunt publice i cuantificabile. Dar
principalul avantaj al pieelor financiare ca
laborator de testare, potrivit autorului, este acela
c teoria reflexivitii se afl n contradicie clar
cu o teorie nc larg acceptat, potrivit creia
pieele financiare tind spre echilibru. Soros susine
c cele dou teorii se exclud reciproc, astfel nct
validitatea uneia dintre ele implic invalidarea
celeilalte.
A doua parte a crii se bazeaz att pe o latur
conceptual, ct i pe experiena lui George
Soros ca manager al unui fond de hedging5,
ambele menite s clarifice ntructva situaia
curent. Autorul afirm c actuala criz financiar
5
6
reprezint sfritul unei epoci, deosebindu-se

fundamental de crizele ultimelor decenii, ce au
fost generate de prbuiri i eecuri izolate.
Pentru a susine aceast afirmaie, Soros propune
ipoteza existenei unor super-baloane, generate
de baloane locale, cum a fost cel imobiliar n
Statele Unite, evolund intrinsec cu acestea, dar
fiind mai complexe i avnd o dezvoltare pe
termen mai lung.
Potrivit lui George Soros, punctul de plecare al
acestui super-balon l-a constituit ncrederea
excesiv n mecanismele pieei (ceea ce el
numete fundamentalism de pia), acesta fiind
principiul de baz al anilor 80, atunci cnd
Ronald Reagan a ajuns preedinte n Statele
Unite, iar Margaret Thatcher prim-ministru n
Regatul Unit6. Super-balonul mbin trei
tendine majore, fiecare fiind afectat ns de cel
puin un defect. Prima tendin este una pe termen
lung, strns legat de existena balonului imobiliar:
extinderea accelerat a creditelor, avantajat i
de inovaiile financiare, mai ales de crearea unor
instrumente sintetice din ce n ce mai sofisticate.
A doua tendin este globalizarea pieelor financiare
care, potrivit lui Soros, favorizeaz Statele Unite
i alte cteva state dezvoltate n detrimentul
economiilor mai puin dezvoltate. A treia tendin,
observat pe parcursul ultimelor decenii, o reprezint
liberalizarea, nlturarea progresiv a reglementrilor
financiare.
n timp ce prima parte a crii include un capitol
autobiografic sugestiv intitulat Autobiografia
unui filozof ratat, a doua parte include un capitol
ntructva paralel dar n egal msur relevant,
intitulat Autobiografia unui speculant de succes.
Cartea continu cu prognoza lui George Soros,
n principal n ceea ce privete anul 2008, dar i
pe termen mai lung. Abordarea este similar cu
cea din Alchimia finanelor, unde Soros realizeaz
un experiment n timp real ce i permite s testeze
calitatea prediciilor sale.
n final, autorul prezint cteva recomandri de
principiu. Soros susine c sectorul financiar nu
trebuie scpat de sub control ntruct aceasta ar
avea efecte dezastruoase asupra economiei.
Fond speculativ cu grad nalt de risc.

Fundamentalismul de pia are rdcini mult mai adnci, nfipte n teoria competiiei perfecte expus de Adam Smith i de economitii clasici.
Soros confirms the existence of the housing market

bubble in the United States, but claims that the
current crisis is not merely the bursting of this
bubble, it is much bigger than the periodic
financial crises experienced in the past decades.
According to the author, all those crises are part
of a long-term reflexive process which has
generated a super-bubble. Thus, in the last
twenty-five years, credit expansion, which was
the trend especially in the United States, but not
only there, overlapped with a prevailing
misconception, market fundamentalism (according
to which markets should be given free rein).
Soros maintains that the current financial crisis
represents a turning point, one which demonstrates
the failure of this approach.
author claims that the present financial crisis

represents the end of an era, being fundamentally
different from the crises experienced in the past
decades, which were generated by isolated
failures and crashes. In order to support this
statement, Soros proposes the hypothesis of
super-bubbles, generated by local bubbles, such
as the housing one in the United States, evolving
intrinsically with these, but being more complex
and developing over a longer term.
In its first part, the book contains a brief

description of the context in which the financial
crisis appeared, the outbreak of which can be
officially fixed as August 2007, but which,
according to Soros, could have been anticipated
at the end of 2000, when the technology and
internet bubble burst. This description is then
followed by a detailed presentation of the theory
of reflexivity, presentation which exceeds the
limits of financial markets, and which may be
found hard going by people interested solely in
the current crisis. However, these readers will
value the following chapter, which describes the
application of the theory of reflexivity for the
concrete case of financial markets.
According to George Soros, the starting point of

this super-bubble was the excessive reliance on
the market mechanism (which he calls market
fundamentalism), which was the dominant creed
in the 80s, when Ronald Reagan became president
in the United States and Margaret Thatcher prime
minister in the United Kingdom8. The super-bubble
combines three major trends, each containing at
least one defect. The first is a long-term trend,
closely connected with the housing bubble: the
accelerated credit expansion, spurred by financial
innovations, especially by the creation of more
and more sophisticated synthetic instruments.
The second trend is the globalization of financial
markets which, according to Soros, favors the
United States and several other developed countries
and penalizes the less-developed economies. The
third trend, observed in the past decades, is
liberalization, the progressive removal of financial
regulations.
These markets offer a good laboratory to test the

theory because most of the price and other information are public and quantifiable. According to
the author, the main advantage of financial markets as a testing laboratory is that the theory of
reflexivity is in direct contradiction of a theory
which is still widely accepted, according to
which financial markets tend to equilibrium.
Soros maintains that the two theories are mutually
excludable, such that ones validity implies the
invalidation of the other.
While the first part of the book contains an

autobiographical chapter suggestively entitled
Autobiography of a failed philosopher, the second
part contains a somewhat parallel but equally
relevant chapter entitled Autobiography of a
successful speculator. The book continues with
George Soros forecast, particularly for 2008, but
for a longer term as well. The approach is similar
to the one in The alchemy of finance, where
Soros conducts a real-time experiment which
allows him to test the quality of his predictions.
The second part of the book is based both on a

conceptual side, and on George Soros experience
as a hedge7 fund manager, both trying to
somewhat clarify the current situation. The
In the end, the author presents several broad

recommendations. Soros claims that the financial
sector should not be left unleashed as this would
have devastating effects on the economy.
High risk speculative investment fund.

The market fundamentalism has much deeper roots, stuck into the theory of perfect competition propounded by Adam Smith and the classical
economists.
8
Stpnirea acestui sector nu ar trebui s se fac

ns printr-o reglementare strict i excesiv
ntruct i aceasta ar duna dezvoltrii economice.
De aceea, potrivit lui George Soros, ntoarcerea
la politicile care au funcionat dup cel de-al Doilea
Rzboi Mondial ar fi o mare eroare. O alt
recomandare se refer la reglementarea pieelor
financiare: cei care se ocup de aceast activitate
trebuie s aib o imagine clar asupra inovaiilor
n domeniu i s nu permit practici pe care nu le
neleg n totalitate. n plus, aa cum experiena a
artat, ideea c managementul riscului poate fi
lsat n totalitate pe seama juctorilor din pia
este o aberaie; anumite riscuri sistemice trebuie
gestionate de autoritile de reglementare.
Potrivit lui Soros, cea mai important lecie ce

trebuie nvat din criza curent este aceea c
autoritatea monetar ar trebui s fie preocupat
nu doar de controlul fluxului de moned, ci i de
acordarea de credite. El susine c autoritile
monetare trebuie s se implice ntr-un joc delicat
de gestionare a ateptrilor, joc n care pot (i
trebuie) s foloseasc toate trucurile tehnicilor de
manipulare, aceasta fiind mai mult o art dect o
tiin propriu-zis.
However, the control of this sector should not be

exercised through strict and excessive regulation
since this would also hurt the economic
development. Therefore, according to George
Soros, a return to the conditions that prevailed
after World War II would be a big mistake.
Another recommendation relates to the regulation
of financial markets: those in charge of this have
to have a clear image on the innovations in the
field and ought not allow practices they do not
fully understand. In addition, experience has
shown that the idea that risk management can be
left completely to the market players is an
aberration; some systemic risks need to be
managed by the regulatory authorities.
According to Soros, the most important lesson to

be learned from the current crisis is that the
monetary authorities have to be concerned not
only with controlling the money supply, but also
with credit creation. He maintains that monetary
authorities have to enter in a delicate game of
managing expectations, game in which they can
(and should) use all the tricks involved in the
manipulative techniques, and this is more of an
art than it is science.
CEA MAI MARE AMEND APLICAT DE COMISIA EUROPEAN

N DOMENIUL ANTITRUST REACII I COMENTARII
Georgeta GAVRILOIU9
Rezumat
Pe data de 12 noiembrie 2008, Comisia European a amendat patru companii productoare de
geamuri auto. Companiile Saint-Gobain (Frana), Asahi (Japonia), Pilkington (Marea Britanie) i
Soliver (Belgia) au fost sancionate pentru nclcarea art.81 din Tratatul CE10 , prin implicarea ntr-un
cartel avnd ca obiect fixarea preurilor, mprirea pieelor, alocarea clienilor i schimb de informaii
strategice.
Sanciunile aplicate n acest caz stabilesc un dublu record, fiind vorba despre cea mai mare amend
total aplicat vreodat pentru nclcarea regulilor de concuren comunitare (1,38
miliarde de euro) i, n acelai timp, cea mai mare amend aplicat unei companii individuale (896
milioane de euro, pentru compania francez Saint-Gobain).
Decizia Comisiei Europene a generat numeroase reacii i comentarii, care au pus n discuie
justeea aplicrii unor asemenea amenzi i chiar eficiena sanciunilor utilizate de Comisie n
domeniul concurenei.
Cuvinte-cheie: cartel, geamuri auto, articolul 81, Saint-Gobain, Asahi, Pilkington, Soliver.
Introducere
Practicile sancionate de Comisie s-au desfurat
ntre anii 1998 i 2003 i au vizat piaa geamurilor
cu destinaie auto11 . Cele patru companii implicate
n acest cartel deineau mpreun cca.90% din
piaa european a geamurilor auto. Gravitatea

deosebit a practicilor sancionate, durata cartelului,
mrimea companiilor implicate, precum i
calitatea de recidiviti a unora dintre participani
au condus la urmtoarele valori ale amenzilor
aplicate: (Tabelul 1).
Tabelul nr. 1. Valoarea amenzilor aplicate de Comisia European

membrilor cartelului de pe piaa geamurilor cu destinaie auto
Reducere n baza
Comunicrii privind
politica de clemen
(%)
Reducere n baza Comunicrii

privind politica de clemen
(EUR)
Amenda
(EUR)
Saint-Gobain (Frana)
896.000.000
Asahi/AGC Flat Glass (Japonia)
50
113.500.000
113.500.000
Pilkington (Marea Britanie)
370.000.000
Soliver (Belgia)
4.396.000
Total
1.383.896.000
Sursa: Comisia European12.

9
Inspector de concuren Direcia Relaii Externe i Integrare European.

Textul Tratatului de instituire a Comunitii Europene (varianta consolidat) este disponibil n limba englez la adresa: http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:pdf (01.12.2008).
11
n aceast categorie intr: parbrizele, lunetele, geamurile laterale, precum i plafoanele vitrate.
12
Comunicatul de pres al Comisiei Europene nr. IP/08/1685, Antitrust: Commission fines car glass producers over 1.3 billion for market
sharing cartel, (Bruxelles, 12 noiembrie 2008).
10
HIGHEST FINE EVER APPLIED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

IN THE FIELD OF ANTITRUST REACTIONS AND COMMENTS
Georgeta GAVRILOIU13
Abstract14
On the 12th of November 2008, the European Commission fined four producers of automotive glass.
The companies Saint-Gobain (France), Asahi (Japan), Pilkington (United Kingdom) and
Soliver (Belgium) were sanctioned for the infringement of Article 81 of the EC Treaty15 by
participating in a cartel for price fixing, market sharing, customer allocation and exchange of
strategic information.
The sanctions applied in this case set a double record: the highest total fine ever applied for a
violation of the EC competition rules (1.38 billion EUR) and, at the same time, the highest fine ever
applied to an individual company (896 million EUR, for the French company Saint-Gobain).
The European Commissions decision has generated many reactions and comments that questioned the
correctness of the application of such fines and even the overall efficiency of the sanctions used by
the Commission in the field of competition.
Keywords: cartel, automotive glass, Article 81, Saint-Gobain, Asahi, Pilkington, Soliver.
Introduction
The practices sanctioned by the Commission
took place between 1998 and 2003 and covered
the market of automotive glass16. The four
companies involved in this cartel held together
about 90% of the European market. The particular

gravity of the practice, the duration of the cartel,
size of the involved companies combined with
the position of some of the participants as
repeated offenders, have resulted into the
following values of fines (Table 1):
Table no.1. Value of fines applied by the European Commission to members

of the cartel on the market of car glass
Reduction under
the Leniency Notice
(%)
Reduction under
the Leniency
Notice ()
Fine ()
Saint-Gobain (France)
896.000.000
Asahi/AGC Flat Glass (Japan)
50
113.500.000
113.500.000
Pilkington (United Kingdom)
370.000.000
Soliver (Belgium)
4.396.000
Total
1.383.896.000
Source: European Commission17.

13
Competition inspector Directorate for External Relations and European Integration.

Translated into English by Georgeta Gavriloiu.
15
The text of the Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated version) is available in English at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu
/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:pdf (01.12.2008).
16
This category includes: windshields, rear windows, side windows and glass roofs.
17
European Commissions press release no. IP/08/1685, Antitrust: Commission fines car glass producers over 1.3 billion for market sharing
cartel, Brussels, 12th of November 2008.
14
Amenda aplicat firmei Saint-Gobain a fost

majorat cu 60% deoarece compania mai fusese
amendat de Comisie n trecut pentru practici
similare. n acelai timp, amenda aplicat
companiei japoneze Asahi a fost diminuat cu
50%, ca recompens pentru cooperarea cu
instituia european n contextul programului de
clemen aplicat de Comisia European n
domeniul cartelurilor.
Reacii i comentarii
Comentnd decizia Comisiei, doamna Neelie
Kroes, comisarul european pentru concuren, a
precizat: Aceste companii au nelat industria
auto i cumprtorii de autovehicule vreme de 5
ani, pe o pia care, n ultimul an al cartelului,
valora 2 miliarde de euro. Amenzile totale sunt
mari datorit cotelor de pia ridicate, a gravitii
cazului i din pricina antecedentelor companiei
Saint Gobain. Comisia a impus asemenea amenzi
ridicate deoarece nu poate i nu va tolera un
asemenea comportament ilegal. Apoi, n stilul care
o caracterizeaz, doamna comisar a adugat:
Conducerea i acionarii companiilor care produc
daune consumatorilor i industriei europene prin
participarea la carteluri trebuie s i nvee forat
lecia dac triezi, vei primi o amend foarte
mare.18
ntr-o prim faz, prile s-au limitat la confirmarea
tirii i la anunarea inteniei de a ataca decizia
Comisiei n faa Tribunalului de Prim Instan
(TPI), dup care s-au grbit s-i liniteasc
investitorii cu privire la impactul amenzii asupra
rezultatelor financiare ale companiilor respective.
Spre exemplu, pe data de 13 noiembrie a.c., un
reprezentant al companiei britanice Pilkington
anuna c, anticipnd decizia de sanciune,
compania i fcuse deja provizioane de cca. 250
de milioane de lire sterline. n realitate, amenda
aplicat de Comisia European a fost cu o treime
mai mare dect valoarea anticipat de Pilkington.
n plus, aceste declaraii linititioare aveau s fie
contrazise, la mai puin de 24 de ore, de
reprezentanii companiei-mam a firmei Pilkington,
grupul japonez Nippon Sheet Glass, care, pe data
de 14 noiembrie, anuna revizuirea n sens negativ
a prognozei financiare a grupului pentru perioada
1 aprilie 2008 31 martie 200919. Aprecierea

monedei japoneze i condiiile dificile de pia, dar i
amenda aplicat de Comisia European companiei
Pilkington sunt cauzele invocate de grupul japonez
pentru aceast revizuire. Comunicatul oficial
menioneaz, printre altele, o scdere considerabil a
venitului estimat, de la 41,15 yeni/aciune la 13,47
yeni/aciune. Cu siguran, aceasta nu este o veste
prea bun pentru investitorii gigantului japonez. De
altfel, acetia au reacionat imediat la anunul
Comisiei, cotaia aciunilor Nippon Sheet Glass la
bursa de la Tokio nregistrnd, pe data de 13
noiembrie, o scdere cu 8,4% fa de valoarea la
nchidere din ziua precedent.
n aceeai situaie s-a aflat i productorul
japonez Asahi care, chiar dac a beneficiat de
clemena Comisiei Europene, nu a scpat totui
de sanciunea investitorilor, aciunile grupului
la bursa de la Tokio scznd pe 13 noiembrie cu
6,1% fa de nivelul din ziua precedent. Trendul
descresctor al valorii aciunilor celor doi
productori s-a meninut i n zilele urmtoare.
Cu privire la impactul amenzii asupra valorii
aciunilor companiei franceze Saint-Gobain, o prim
remarc ar fi c, spre deosebire de piaa asiatic,
bursa de la Paris a reacionat cu o oarecare ntrziere.
Astfel, pe 13 noiembrie, prima zi de dup anunarea
amenzii, aciunile Saint-Gobain au nregistrat o
scdere de doar 0,10%, ns pe 14 noiembrie, aciunile
companiei franceze valorau la nchidere cu 4,23%
mai puin dect n ziua precedent.
Scderea cursului aciunilor Saint-Gobain a
continuat i n zilele imediat urmtoare, chiar
dac productorul francez a anunat acumularea
unor provizioane de 650 milioane euro, destinate
plii amenzii. Ca i n cazul firmei Pilkington,
aceast sum s-a dovedit fi insuficient pentru a
acoperi ntreaga amend aplicat de Comisie
(896 milioane euro).
Trebuie menionat c aceast amend-record
aplicat companiei Saint-Gobain n urm cu
cteva zile urmeaz dup o alt amend, de 133,9
milioane de euro, aplicat de Comisie la sfritul
anului 2007 pentru implicarea ntr-un cartel
european pe piaa sticlei plane20.
18
Comunicatul de pres al Comisiei Europene nr. IP/08/1685.

Comunicatul de pres al Grupului Nippon Sheet Glass Group NSG Group announces Revision of Forecast, 14 noiembrie 2008,
http://www.nsggroup.net/press/2008/1114.html (14.11.2008).
20
Decizia Comisiei Europene din 28.11.2007 n Dosarul nr. COMP 39.165.
19
10
The fine applied to Saint-Gobain was increased

by 60% because the company had been fined in
the past for similar offences. At the same time,
the fine for the Japanese company Asahi was
reduced by 50% as a reward for the companys
cooperation with the Commission in the framework
of the leniency programme applied by the European
institution in cartel cases.
Reactions and comments
Commenting on the Commissions decision,
Mrs. Neelie Kroes, the European commissioner
for competition declared: These companies
cheated the car industry and car buyers for five
years in a market worth two billion euros in the
last year of the cartel. The overall fines are high
because of the large market, the seriousness of
the case, and Saint-Gobain's earlier offences.
The Commission has imposed such high fines
because it cannot and will not tolerate such illegal
behaviour. Then, in her style, she added:
Management and shareholders of companies
that damage consumers and European industry by
running cartels must learn their lessons the hard
way if you cheat, you will get a heavy fine.21
Initially, the parties have only confirmed the
news and announced their intention to appeal the
Commissions decision in front of Court of First
Instance (CFI) and then rushed to give assurances
to their investors about the likely impact of the
fine over the companies financial results.
For example, on the 13th of November, a representative
of the British company Pilkington announced
that, foreseeing the sanctioning decision, the
company had already made provisions of
approximately 250 million pounds. The actual
fine was one third higher than the value anticipated
by Pilkington. Moreover, these reassuring declarations
were to be contradicted, within less than 24
hours, by the representatives of Pilkingtons
mother-company, the Japanese group Nippon
Sheet Glass. On the 14th of November, Nippon
Sheet Glass announced the negative revision of
the groups financial forecast for the period 1
April 2008 31 March 200922. The yens
appreciation and difficult market conditions,
21
together with the fine applied to Pilkington by the

European Commission were the causes invoked
by the Japanese group for this revision. The official
announcement mentions, among others, a significant
reduction of the expected income, from 41.15
yen/share to 13.47 yen/share. Surely, these are
not good news for the groups investors. Anyway
they reacted immediately at the Commission s
announcement and this made the value of Nippon
Sheet Glass at Tokyo Exchange drop on the 13th
of November by 8.4% as compared to the closing
value in the previous day.
The situation of the Japanese producer Asahi was
similar. Even though the group benefited from
the European Commissions leniency, the group
did not escape the sanction applied by its
investors. The value of the groups shares at
Tokyo Exchange fell by 6.1% as compared to the
level in the previous day. For both producers, the
decreasing trend continued also in the next days.
A first remark about the impact of fine over the
shares value in case of the French company
Saint-Gobain would be that unlike the Asian
stock market, the Paris Exchange reacted with a
certain delay. Thus, on the 13th of November, the
first day after the fine was announced,
Saint-Gobains shares decreased only by 0.10%
but on the 14th of November, at closing, the
French companys shares valued 4.23% less than
in the previous day.
In the next days, the decreasing trend continued
also in case of Saint-Gobains shares, despite the
fact that the French producer had announced the
accumulation, in view of the fine, of provisions
of 650 million EUR. Just as in Pilkingtons case,
this sum proved to be insufficient to cover the
entire fine applied by the Commission (896
million EUR).
It is worth mentioning that the record-fine
applied to Saint-Gobain comes after another fine,
of 133.9 million EUR, applied by the Commission
at the end of 2007 for the companys involvement
in another European cartel, on the market of flat
glass 23.
European Commissions press release no. IP/08/1685.

Nippon Sheet Glass Groups press release: NSG Group announces Revision of Forecast, 14th of November 2008,
http://www.nsggroup.net/press/2008/1114.html (14.11.2008).
23
Commission Decision of 28.11.2007, in case COMP 39.165.
22
11
Cursa infernal
Efecte i implicaii
n toate domeniile exist un aa-numit prag

psihologic, o limit care pare de neatins, dar
care odat depit pentru prima dat, devine
rapid un simplu reper din trecut. Spre exemplu,
alergarea distanei de 100 de metri n mai puin
de 10 secunde a fost vreme de mai bine de multe
decenii un astfel de prag. ns dup ce Jim Hines
devenea, n 1968, primul atlet din istorie, care
reuea s doboare aceast barier, parcurgnd cei
100 de metri n 9,95 secunde, muli ali alergtori
aveau s reueasc performane similare. n
prezent, aceast rezultat este considerat mediocru
n competiiile de atletism la cel mai nalt nivel.
Contextul economic actual, dominat de criza

financiar, nu le este tocmai favorabil productorilor
de geamuri auto sancionai, n condiiile n care
principalul lor beneficiar, industria de autovehicule,
este, la rndul su, grav afectat de criza
financiar. Scderea dramatic a vnzrilor
reduce considerabil ansele ca amenzile s fie
recuperate rapid de la cumprtorii de
autovehicule.
Fcnd o paralel (destul de forat, ar zice

unii!), s-ar putea spune c, prin amenda aplicat
productorilor de geamuri auto, Comisia a spart
o barier pshihologic. De altfel, dup ce, anul
trecut Comisia a aplicat productorilor de lifturi
i scri rulante amenzi n valoare total de
992.312.200 de euro, muli s-au ntrebat ct avea
s treac pn la aplicarea de amenzi de peste un
miliard de euro.
Dup cum rezult din declaraiile oficialilor
Comisiei, aplicarea unei amenzi de o asemenea
valoare nu a fost i nu este un obiectiv n sine
pentru instituia european. Totui, mesajul transmis
de Comisie prin aceast amend este unul ct se
poate de clar.
Evoluiile recente au demonstrat c instituia
european poate da dovad de flexibilitate i
poate utiliza regulile existente ale politicii de
concuren pentru a rspunde rapid i n mod
adecvat la criza financiar. Astfel, autorizarea n
regim de urgen a unor operaiuni de concentrare
economic implicnd societi din sectorul bancar
sau chiar autorizarea rapid a unor ajutoare de
stat pentru salvare acordate unor bnci (aproape
o erezie n urm cu doar un an!) sunt doar dou
exemple n acest sens. Totui, n mod evident,
tolerana fa de carteluri nu se numr printre
domeniile n care Comisia dorete s i exerseze
exibilitatea.
n plus, impactul financiar al unei asemenea

amenzi nu este deloc de neglijat. Un calcul
simplu evideniaz faptul c amenda aplicat de
Comisie n cazul n discuie reprezint nu mai
puin de 1% din bugetul total al Uniunii Europene
pe anul 200824 i, n acelai timp, este de 16 ori
mai mare dect bugetul alocat la nivel comunitar
pentru aplicarea politicii n domeniul concurenei.
Mrimea amenzilor la care s-a ajuns n acest
domeniu reflect, indirect, puterea financiar a
firmelor implicate n asemenea practici
anticoncureniale. Trebuie subliniat c, n
asemenea cazuri, amenzile aplicate nu pot depi
10% din cifra de afaceri a contravenienilor. n
acelai timp, valorile din ce n ce mai mari sunt
dovada eforturilor Comisiei Europene de a transforma
cartelurile pan-europene n nite afaceri (ct) mai
puin profitabile pentru participani.
De altfel, n actualul stadiu al integrrii europene,
aplicarea unor amenzi uriae este singurul
mijloc ct de ct eficient de care dispune Comisia
European pentru a descurajara cartelurile. i
totui, cnd reprezentanii companiilor anun cu
nonalan acumularea de provizioane de sute de
milioane de euro n vederea plii amenzilor pe
care se ateapt s le primeasc, nu poi s nu te
ntrebi ct de mari sunt profiturile nete ale unui
cartel de asemenea anvergur!
ntr-un comunicat de pres al firmei Saint-Gobain
se arat, printre altele, c persoanele vinovate de
implicarea n cartel au fost demise. Doar att? Ce
convenabil! Aa cum subliniaz i ali comentatori,
pentru persoanele vinovate, ameninarea unor
sanciuni privative de libertate ar fi un factor de
descurajare mult mai serios. Spre exemplu, n
24
Bugetul general al UE pe anul 2008 este de 129,149 de miliarde de euro. Partea din bugetul Comisiei alocat pentru politica de concuren
este de 78.282.819 euro.
12
Running a race!
Effects and implications
In every field of activity there is a so-called

psychological threshold, a limit that seems
unreachable but once it is overcome for the very
first time becomes quickly just a simple past land
mark. For example, running 100 meters in less
than 10 seconds was, for many decades, such a
threshold. Nevertheless, after, in 1968, Jim Hines
became the first athlete in the history that broke
this barrier and ran the 100 meters in 9.95
seconds, many others obtained similar performances.
Nowadays this is considered only a second-rate
result in the high level athletic competitions.
The current economic context, dominated by

financial crisis is not quite favorable for the
automotive glass producers, taking into account
the fact that their main beneficiary, the automotive
industry, is also heavily affected by financial crisis.
The dramatic decrease of sales in the automotive
sector reduces considerably producers chances
to have their fines recovered from the
customers.
To make a comparison (quite forced, as some

might say!) one could consider that with the fine
applied to the automotive glass producers, the
Commission broke such a psychological
barrier. Anyway, in 2007 when the Commission
applied to producers of elevators and escalators
total fines of 992,312,200 EUR, many commentators
asked how long was before the one billion euro
fine was applied.
It results from the Commission officials
declarations that the application of a fine having
such a high value was not and it is not an objective
in itself for the European institution. However,
the message sent by the Commission with this
fine is very clear.
Recent evolutions have demonstrated that the
European institution can be flexible and use the
existing rules of the competition policy to
respond rapidly and adequately to the financial
crisis. Thus, the rapid authorization of mergers
in the banking sector and even the authorization
of rescue State aid for banks (almost a heresy
only one year ago!) are just two examples in this
respect. However, obviously, tolerance for
cartels is not one of the areas where the
Commission is willing to exert its flexibility.
25
At the same time, the financial impact of such a

fine cannot be neglected. A simple calculation
shows that the fine applied by the Commission
in this case represent not less than 1% of the total
EU budget for 200825 and, at the same time, it is
16 times higher than the budget allocated by the
European Commission for the competition
policy.
The level of fines reached in this field shows
indirectly the financial power of the companies
involved in anti-competitive practices. It should
be underlined that, in cartel cases, fines cannot
exceed 10% of the offenders turnover. At the
same time, the bigger and bigger fines are the
proof of the Commissions efforts to turn
pan-European cartels into less profitable business.
On the other hand, in the current stage of the
European integration, the application of huge
fines is the Commissions only tool somewhat
efficient in fighting against cartels. Even so,
when the companies officials announce nonchalantly
the accumulation of hundreds of millions of euro
as provisions for envisaged fines, one cannot
help wondering how big the net profits of a cartel
of this size are!
Saint-Gobain declares, in a press-release, that the
persons culpable for the involvement in the cartel
were dismissed. Is that all? How convenient! As
other commentators suggest, for the culpable
persons, the threat of imprisonment would be a
more serious deterring factor. For example, in the
The EU general budget for 2008 is of 129.149 billion EUR. The share of the Commissions budget allocated for the competition policy is
of 78,282,819 EUR.
13
Statele Unite, participarea la un cartel este

considerat ofens federal, iar succesul n lupta
mpotriva acestor practici anticoncureniale se
cuantific nu doar n sute de milioane dolari
amend, ci i n muli ani de nchisoare. Peste
ocean, preedinii de companii i managerii
trimii dup gratii sunt trofeele de vntoare
ale oficialilor anti-cartel.
n schimb, n Uniunea European, dei exist
deja cteva state membre ale cror sisteme de
drept cuprind sanciuni penale pentru persoanele
fizice care particip la conceperea sau funcionarea
unui cartel (Romnia fiind unul dintre aceste
state!), n practic, mecanismul aplicrii de
sanciuni penale nu este folosit. n acest domeniu,
aciunea la nivel naional este inexistent, iar la
nivel comunitar este imposibil, deoarece, n
prezent, competenele Uniunii n materie penal
sunt aproape simbolice.
n aceste condiii, aplicarea de amenzi rmne,
totui, o soluie prin care se realizeaz, n ultim
instan o redistribuire, chiar dac discutabil, a
unei pri din profiturile obinute de membrii
cartelurilor ctre cetenii europeni, ca beneficiari
finali ai bugetului UE26.
n loc de concluzii
Productorii de geamuri auto au anunat c vor
ataca decizia Comisiei n faa TPI. Totui, dac
ne gndim la hotrrea pronunat de TPI n
cazul BASF27 la sfritul anului 2007, perspectivele
nu sunt tocmai ncurajatoare pentru viitorii
reclamani. n cazul respectiv, ntr-o aciune
ndreptat mpotriva deciziei prin care Comisia
impusese o amend pentru nclcarea art.81 din
Tratatul CE, tribunalul, avnd n vedere
comportamentul companiei BASF, a dispus,
pentru prima oar, majorarea valorii amenzii ce
fusese aplicat de Comisie!
Fr ndoial, va fi interesant de urmrit felul n
care instana comunitar va aprecia conduita
companiilor implicate n cazul de fa, mai ales
al celor care ar putea deveni oricnd titulare ale
unui card de fidelitate oferit de Comisia
European pentru participarea consecvent n
procedurile de investigaie din domeniul
antitrust.
26
Amenzile aplicate de Comisia European n domeniul concurenei se fac venit la bugetul Uniunii Europene.
Hotrrea TPI pronunat pe 12.12.2007 n Dosarele conexate nr. T-101/05 i nr. T-111/05 BASF AG i UCB SA contra Comisiei
Comunitilor Europene.
27
14
United States, participation to cartels is a federal

offence and authorities success in the fight
against such anti-competitive practices is quantified
not only in hundred of million US dollars but
also in days of imprisonment. On the other side
of the ocean, CEOs and managers sent behind the
bars are the hunting trophies of the anti-cartel
officials.
In contrast, in the European Union, even though
there are a few Member States (including Romania!)
whose legal system provide for criminal
sanctions for the natural persons that participate
in conceiving or running a cartel, in practice, the
mechanism of criminal sanctions is not used. In
this field, action at national level is inexistent and
at EU level it is impossible since, at present, the
Unions competencies in the field of criminal law
are almost symbolic.
In these circumstances, the application of fines
remains a solution that in the end leads to a
reallocation (even though arguable), of a part
from the profits acquired by the cartel members
to the European citizens, as the final beneficiaries
of the EU budget28.
28
Instead of conclusions
The producers of automotive glass have
announced that they will challenge the Commissions
decision in front of CFI. However, if we consider
the judgment pronounced by CFI at the end of
2007, in the BASF29 case , the perspectives are
not quite encouraging for the future appellants.
In the BASF case, in an action against the
Commissions decision imposing fines for the
infringement of Article 81 EC Treaty, the court,
taking into account the conduct of BASF
company, decided for the first time to increase
the fine that had been applied by the Commission.
It will be interesting to see how the Community
court will evaluate the conduct of the participants
in this case, especially of those of them who
might become, at any time, holders of a fidelity
card offered by the European Commission for
the consequent participation in the investigation
procedures in the antitrust field.
The fines applied bz the European Commission in the field of competition become revenue to the EU budget.
CFI judgement of 12.12.2007, in Joined cases T-101/05 and T-111/05 BASF AG and UCB SA v. Commission of the European
Communities.
29
15
ORIENTAREA CTRE O ABORDARE MAI ECONOMIC

A POLITICII N DOMENIUL CONCURENEI N EUROPA
Maria ALEXANDRU30
Oana STANCIU31
Rezumat
Reforma ampl n domeniul aplicrii politicii concurenei din Europa ultimilor ani poate fi
caracterizat drept o orientare ctre o abordare mai economic. Rolul i sfera analizei economice
s-au schimbat, s-a reformulat modul n care aceasta este asimilat aplicarii efective a politicii de
protecie a concurenei, mai ales prin interpretarea corect a teoriilor i a datelor empirice.
Schimbarea politicii de concuren, cu accent sporit pe latura economic s-a concretizat prin
mbuntirea cadrului juridic i procedural.
Cuvinte cheie: concurena, analiz economic, reform, abordare economic.
nc din 2001, Mario Monti afirma cu privire la

viziunea Comisiei Europene n domeniul aplicrii
politicii de protecie a concurenei c, n ultimii
ani, abordarea noastr cu accentul pe latura
economic a politicii concurenei a aezat definirea
pieei n centrul procesului de aplicare a regulilor
concurenei n UE.32 Nellie Kroes, actualul Comisar
pentru concuren, a intensificat, la rndul ei,
procesul abordrii economice a politicii concurenei,
declarnd: Indiferent dac vorbim de aciuni abuzive
ale firmelor dominante pe pia, sancionarea
cartelurilor, controlul fuziunilor sau evaluarea
ajutoarelor de stat potenialul efect negativ asupra
consumatorilor va constitui, ntotdeauna, obiectivul
principal al activitii noastre. Aplicm acest
standard al bunstrii consumatorului printr-o
mai bun utilizare a analizei economice. Aceast
abordare economic ajut Comisia European s-i
concentreze activitile spre cele cu adevrat
importante pentru consumatorii europeni.33
Un punct important pe agenda european a

ultimilor ani, impus de necesitatea adaptrii la
noile condiii create de ultimele valuri de extindere,
ct i de realizarea unei aplicri mai eficiente i
consecvente a politicii de concuren n ntreaga
Uniune, l-a constituit reforma legislativ i procedural.
Caracteristica acestor modificri este orientarea
ctre o abordare mai economic, prin aplicarea
mai accentuat a analizei economice i interpretarea
corect a teoriilor i datelor empirice.
Reformarea politicii de concuren, cu accent sporit
pe latura economic, mbuntirea cadrului juridic
i procedural s-au datorat ntr-o msur semnificativ
i pierderilor suferite n justiie de ctre autoritatea
de concuren a UE, ntr-o serie de cazuri din
domeniul controlului concentrrilor precum
Airtours/First Choice34, Schneider Electric/Legrand35,
Tetra Laval/Sidal36. Astfel, Comisia a modificat
30
Director Direcia Cercetare-Sinteze.

Inspector de concuren - Direcia Cercetare-Sinteze.
32
Mario Monti, fost Comisar european pentru concuren, Speech on Policy Market definition as a cornerstone of EU Competition
Policy - Workshop on Market Definition - Helsinki Fair Centre Helsinki, 5.10.2001.
33
Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Making consumers' right to damages a reality: the case for collective
redress mechanisms in antitrust claims - Conference on collective, redress for European consumers, Lisbon, 9 th November 2007.
34
Airtours v. Commission,[2002] ECR II-2585.
35
Schneider v. Commission,[2002] ECR II-4071.
36
Tetra Laval v. Commission,[2002] ECR II-4381.
31
16
A MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH

TO COMPETITION POLICY IN EUROPE
Maria ALEXANDRU37
Oana STANCIU38
Abstract39
The comprehensive reform in the implementation of the competition policy in Europe in the recent
years may be characterized as one towards a more economic approach. The role and the scope of
the economic analysis has been changing, the way how the economic analysis is used for effective
enforcement of the competition policy enforcement has been reformulated, especially through
correct interpretation of the theories and empirical data.
Competition policy amendment, with emphasis on economics led to an improvement of the procedural
and legal framework.
Keywords: competition, economic analysis, reform, economic approach.
Since 2001, Mario Monti has announced with
reference to European Commission vision in the
area of competition policy enforcement that in
recent years, our increased economic approach
to competition policy has put market definition
at the centre of the process of application of the
competition rules in the EU.40 Commissioner
Nellie Kroes has improved the economic
approach of competition policy, declaring:
Whether we are talking about abusive actions
by dominant companies, breaking up cartels,
vetting mergers, or assessing State aid - the
potential harm to consumers is always at the
heart of what we do. We are applying this
'consumer welfare standard' throughout our
work, through a better use of economic analysis.
This economic approach helps the European
Commission focus on the activities really important
for the European consumers.41
37
The legislative and procedural reform has been

an important point on the European agenda of the
last years, due to the necessity of the adjustment
to the new conditions generated by the last waves
of enlargement and by the achievement of an
effective and consistent implementation of the
competition policy throughout the Union.
The characteristic of these changes is the
orientation towards a more economic approach,
through the focused application of the economic
analysis and the correct interpretation of the
theories and empirical data.
The adjustment of the competition policy, with
emphasis on economics, the legislative and procedural
framework improvement were also a result of the
losses in the legal battles which the competition
authority suffered in court, in a series of merger control
cases, such as Airtours/First Choice42, Schneider
Electric/Legrand43, Tetra Laval/Sidal44.Thus, the
Director Research and Synthesis Directorate.

Competition inspector - Research and Synthesis Directorate.
39
Translated into English by Oana Stanciu.
40
Mario Monti, former European Commissioner for Competition, Speech on Policy Market definition as a cornerstone of EU Competition
Policy - Workshop on Market Definition - Helsinki Fair Centre Helsinki, 5.10.2001.
41
Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Making consumers' right to damages a reality: the case for collective redress
mechanisms in antitrust claims - Conference on collective, redress for European consumers, Lisbon, 9 th November 2007.
42
Airtours v. Commission,[2002] ECR II-2585.
43
Schneider v. Commission,[2002] ECR II-4071.
44
Tetra Laval v. Commission,[2002] ECR II-4381.
38
17
cadrul legislativ privind acordurile verticale, a

elaborat Cartea Verde privind controlul concentrrilor,
a adoptat noul regulament privind concentrrile
economice i Orientrile privind evaluarea
concentrrilor neorizontale45, ce completeaz
orientrile existente privind concentrrile orizontale
care se refer la fuziunile societilor concurente
pe aceleai piee.
Economistului ef. n acest fel, GE este implicat

ndeaproape att n activitatea zilnic a echipei de
lucru, ct i n investigaii, din stadii incipiente,
oferind consultan pe probleme economice i
asisten metodologic;
O alt latur a mbuntirii cadrului procedural a

constituit-o elaborarea unor linii directoare ce
stabilesc reguli simple, care corespund unui numr
mare de circumstane. Aceste linii directoare nu
pot exemplifica, n ntregime, analiza economic
care se va efectua n contextul unui anumit caz, ci
furnizeaz ndrumri privind tipul de analize
teoretice i empirice ce pot fi realizate.
G instrumentarea unor cazuri de antitrust mai

laborioase.
Reforma politicii n domeniul ajutorului de stat a

vizat i fundamentarea economic a deciziilor
luate n domeniul controlului ajutoarelor de stat,
att n sensul operaionalizrii unei analize mai
amnunite a distorsionrii concurenei, ct i al
utilizrii conceptului de eec al pieei. Eecurile
pieei reprezint un argument n favoarea acordrii
de ajutoare de stat, dar necesit o analiz economic
adecvat i minuioas, i deci utilizarea de
instrumente econometrice.
Pentru a oferi o fundamentare economic deciziilor
Comisiei n materie de concuren, n cadrul
Direciei Generale Concuren s-a instituit o
echip special de economiti. Rolul Economistului
ef i al Grupului condus de acesta (GE) n
cadrul direciei este din ce n ce mai important.
Obiectivele lor principale sunt:
G consultan pe probleme metodologice de
economie i econometrie pentru aplicarea regulilor
concurenei;
G contribuie consistent la dezvoltarea instrumentelor
de politic general cu coninut economic;
Rolul si sfera analizei economice, utilizate n

cadrul aplicrii politicii de protecie a concurenei,
s-au schimbat n Europa ultimilor ani. Concurena,
procesul care oblig firmele s rspund dorinelor
consumatorilor privind preul, calitatea si varietatea
produselor, acioneaz n acelai timp ca un
mecanism selectiv prin care firmele mai eficiente
le nlocuiesc pe cele mai puin eficiente. Concurena
este deci un element cheie n promovarea unei
creteri economice europene rapide, orientat
ctre consumator i mai competitiv.
Din punct de vedere al orizontului de timp,
utilizarea principiilor i a analizelor economice n
aplicarea politicii concurenei se poate clasifica n
analize ex-post i ex-ante. Analizele ex-post se fac
cu scopul de a afla n ce mod deciziile luate n
domeniul antitrust, ajutor de stat i concentrri au
afectat pieele. Principala dificultate a cercetrii o
reprezint stabilirea posibilelor consecine asupra
pieei, n cazul n care s-ar fi adoptat o decizie
alternativ, consecine pe se pot obine folosind
modele i/sau analize econometrice. O alt
dificultate const n identificarea altor factori care
ar fi putut influena piaa, cu scopul stabilirii
impactului deciziei nsi. Cunotintele despre
industrie i piaa sunt cruciale n aflarea exact a
factorilor implicai. Importana analizelor ex-post
nu trebuie subestimat, acestea reprezentand singura
justificare logic a eficacitii unei decizii.
G activitatea de sprijin: un membru GE este

inclus n cadrul echipei de lucru, raportnd ins
45
Concentrrile neorizontale includ concentrrile verticale, care implic societi ce acioneaz la diferite niveluri ale lanului de aprovizionare.
De exemplu, atunci cnd fabricantul unui anumit produs ("societatea din amonte") fuzioneaz cu unul dintre distribuitorii si ("societatea din
aval") i concentrrile conglomerale ce reprezint concentrri ntre firme care se afl n relaii care nu sunt nici orizontale (n calitate de
concureni pe aceeai pia relevant), nici verticale (n calitate de furnizori sau de clieni). n practic, obiectul prezentelor orientri l reprezint
concentrrile economice ntre societi care acioneaz pe piee strns legate (de exemplu concentrri care implic furnizori de produse
complementare sau de produse care aparin aceleiai game).
18
Commission has changed the legislative framework

for the vertical agreements, has developed the
Green Book for merger control and has adopted
the new merger control regulation and the Guidelines
on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers46,
which follow the current guidelines related to the
horizontal mergers that refers to the fusion of the
companies competing on the same markets.
Another area of improvement of the legislative
framework was the development of the guidelines
which establish simple rules, to cover a large
number of circumstances. These guidelines cannot
explain in detail the economic analysis in the
context of one case but offers guidance regarding
the sort of theoretical and empirical analysis that
can be performed.
The political reform in the state aid area aimed
also the economic assessment of the decisions
taken in the area of the state aid control, both in
terms of operationalizing a more explicit analysis
of the distortions of competition, as well as the
use of the concept of market failures. The market
failures represent an argument towards granting
state aids, but a detailed economic analysis by
using econometrical instruments is required.
To offer an economic foundation of the
Commissions decisions, within the DG COMP a
special team of economists was established. The
role of the Chief Economist and the Chief Economist
Team (CET) at DG COMP is more and more
important.
Their basic objectives are:
G
consultancy on economic and econometrical

methodology for the competition policy enforcement;
G support function: one member of the CET

gets assigned to the case team, reporting to the
Chief Economist. In this way, the CET is closely
46
involved with the day-to-day work of case teams,

getting involved early on in the investigation,
giving economic guidance and methodological
assistance;
G
consistent support for the development of the

general policy instruments with economic
content;
G investigation of several more difficult

antitrust cases.
The role and scope of economic analysis in

competition policy in Europe has been changing
in the last years. Competition, the process forcing
companies to respond to the consumers requests
regarding price, quality, and diversity of products,
acts in the same time as a selective mechanism,
by which more efficient companies replace the
less efficient ones. Competition is therefore, a
key element in promoting a rapid European
economic growth, more competitive and
consumer-oriented.
From time horizon point of view, the use of
economic principles and analysis in competition
policy can be differentiate in: ex post and ex ante
analysis. The purpose of the ex post analysis is to
understand how antitrust, state aid and mergers
decisions have affected markets. The main difficulty
of the research is to establish the possible
consequences on the market if some alternate
decision had been taken instead, effects which
can be derived from theoretical models and/or
econometric analysis. Another problem is to
establish other factors that might have had an
influence on the market, in order to identify the
impact of the decision itself. Industry and market
knowledge is crucial in order to understand the
precise factors involved. The importance of ex
post analysis cannot be underestimated. The ex
post analysis is the only logical justification for
the effectiveness of a decision.
Non horizontal mergers include vertical mergers which involve companies operating at different levels of the supply chain. For example,
when a manufacturer of a certain product (the "upstream firm") merges with one of its distributors (the "downstream firm") and conglomerate
mergers that are mergers between firms who are in a relationship which is neither horizontal (as competitors in the same relevant market) nor
vertical (as suppliers or customers). In practice, the focus of the present guidelines is on mergers between companies that are active in closely
related markets (e.g. mergers involving suppliers of complementary products or products that belong to the same product range).
19
Analizele ex-ante, cum ar fi monitorizarea pieei,

reprezint analizele anterioare unei posibile
aciuni antitrust. n cazul monitorizrii pieei sunt greu
de identificat situaiile n care pieele nu funcioneaz,
cum ar fi comportamentul anticoncurenial sau
barierele la intrare. Contribuia tiinei economice
o reprezint i definirea unui set de indicatori care
semnaleaz probabilitatea existenei unei
probleme concureniale specifice pe pia. Analizele
ex-ante pot fi folosite la identificarea situaiilor n
care efectul probabil al unui pretins comportament
anticoncurenial sau al existenei unei pretinse
bariere la intrarea pe pia este redus. Pe baza
analizelor ex-ante se stabilesc prioritile autoritii
de concuren. Astfel, resursele vor trebui alocate
cazurilor i activitilor cu efectele probabile cele
mai duntoare asupra consumatorilor.
Prin abordarea economic a politicii n domeniul
concurenei se realizeaz dou obiective
complementare. Primul obiectiv este identificarea incalcarii prevederilor legale prin comportamente anticoncureniale. Prin concentrarea pe
efectele aciunilor companiei mai curnd dect pe
forma pe care o pot lua aceste aciuni, o abordare economic face mai dificil pentru companii sustragerea de la constrngerile politicii concurenei, n
ncercarea lor de a obine acelai rezultat final folosind diferite practici comerciale. n acelai timp,
aceast abordare ofer o modalitate mai logic de
analiz a diferitelor practici, deoarece fiecare practic specific este evaluat n funcie de rezultat i
dou practici ce conduc spre acelai rezultat final
vor fi analizate n acelai mod.
Al doilea obiectiv este garantarea faptului c prevederile
statutare nu blocheaz stategiile pro-competitive. O
analiz bazat pe efecte ia n considerare posibilitatea
ca practicile de afaceri similare s poat avea rezultate
diferite n circumstane diferite: distorsionarea
concurenei n anumite cazuri i promovarea eficienei
i inovaiei n altele. O abordare a politicii n domeniul
concurenei care compar direct acest dualism va
asigura protecia consumatorilor (prin prevenirea
comportamentului care i prejudiciaz) i va promova,
n acelai timp, productivitatea crescut i dezvoltarea
(deoarece firmele nu vor fi descurajate n ncercrile
lor de sporire a eficienei).
Definirea pieei este un instrument utilizat pentru

a identifica i a descrie graniele concurenei
(perimetrul n interiorul cruia se desfoar
concurena) ntre companii. Acest instrument
permite stabilirea cadrului n care este aplicat
politica de concuren. Conceptul de pia
relevant este diferit de alte concepte de pia,
adesea folosite n alte contexte. De exemplu,
companiile folosesc adesea termenul de pia pentru
a descrie zona n care ii vnd produsele sau pentru
a se referi n sens larg la industria sau sectorul n
care activeaz.
O etap important pentru consolidarea analizelor
n aplicarea politicii de concuren o constituie
Nota Comisiei privind definiia pieei relevante47,
adoptat n decembrie 1997 i publicat n Jurnalul
Oficial C 372, 09/12/1997. Nota ofer un cadru
juridic, bazat pe principii economice, care ar trebui
s asigure consisten i transparen sporite n
aplicarea legislaiei concurenei.
O abordare economic a analizei practicilor
anticoncureniale implic evaluarea fiecrui caz
specific pe baza analizei efectelor anticoncureniale
generate de practica de afaceri i nu pe baza formei
specifice a respectivei practici (de exemplu distribuie
exclusiv, vnzri legate), evaluare ce nu se poate
face dect printr-o analiz economic temeinic.
De exemplu, n evaluarea acordurilor verticale se
ine cont de impactul actual sau potenial al
acordului asupra pieei. Stabilirea structurii pieei
este esenial n determinarea impactului pe care
eventualele acorduri verticale le-ar putea avea asupra
concurenei. Restricionarea concurenei este un
pericol doar n cazul unei insuficiente concurene
intermarc, i dac exist un anume grad de
putere pe piaa respectiv. Restriciile verticale
sunt, n general, mai puin periculoase dect
restriciile orizontale precum fixarea preurilor sau
mprirea pieei, dei pot avea o varietate de
efecte atat asupra firmelor implicate ct i asupra
pieei pe care acestea opereaz. nchiderea pieei
pentru posibilii concureni este cea mai periculoas
i semnificativ urmare asociat cu acest tip de
acorduri.
47
Nota menioneaz: Scopul principal al definirii pieei este identificarea, n mod sistematic, a constrngerilor competitive crora
ntreprinderile implicate trebuie s le fac fa. Obiectivul definirii pieei att sub aspectul produsului ct i n dimensiunea geografic este
de a identifica acei concureni ai firmelor capabili s constrng comportamentele celorlali i s i mpiedice s se comporte independent de
orice presiune concurenial eficient. Din aceast perspectiv, cotele de pia pot oferi informaii utile pentru obiectivul de a estima
dominana.. Exist o serie de teste cantitative concepute special pentru a descrie piaa. Aceste teste constau n diverse abordri econometrice
i statistice: estimri ale elasticitilor i ale elesticitilor ncruciate n funcie de pre pentru cererea produsului, teste bazate pe similaritatea
variaiilor de preuri n timp, analize tip cauz efect dintre seriile de preuri i similitudinea intre nivelurile de pre i/sau convergena lor.http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/relevma_en.html.
20
The ex ante analysis, such as market monitoring,

is the analysis taken prior to a possible antitrust
action. In the case of market monitoring it is
difficult to identify the situations when markets
do not function, such as anticompetitive conduct
or the existence of entry barriers. One contribution
of economics is also to define a set of indicators
that signal a particular competition problem on the
market. The ex ante analysis can be used to identify
situations where the likely impact of alleged
anticompetitive conduct or entry barrier is small.
Based on ex ante analysis, the competition authorities
are setting priorities. Thus, the resources should
be devoted to cases and activities where the
expected harm to consumers is highest.
Two complementary objectives are achieved
through the economic approach to competition
policy. The first objective is identification of the
violations of the legal provisions through
anticompetitive behaviours. Focusing on the
effects of the actions of one company rather than
on the form of these actions, an economic
approach makes more difficult for the companies
to avoid the competition policy constraints in
their attempt to obtain the same final result using
different commercial practices. In the same time,
this approach gives a more logical method of
analysis of different practices, because every
specific practice is evaluated based on the result,
and two practices leading to the same result will
be evaluated in the same way.
The second objective is ensuring that legal
provisions do not prevent pro-competitive
strategies. An effect-based analysis considers the
possibility that similar business practices may
lead to different results under different
circumstances: distortion of competition in certain
cases and promoting efficiency and innovation
in other cases. An approach of the competition
policy which compares directly this dualism, will
ensure consumers protection (by preventing a
harmful behaviour), and in the same time, will
promote increased productivity and development
(because companies will not be discouraged in
their attempts to improve efficiency).
Market definition is a tool to identify and define

the boundaries of competition between firms. It
allows establishing the framework within which
competition policy is applied. The concept of
relevant market is different from other concepts
of market often used in other contexts. For
instance, companies often use the term market to
refer to the area where it sells its products or to refer
broadly to the industry or sector where it belongs.
An important phase for the consolidation of the
analyses in the implementation of the competition
policy is the Commission Notice on the definition
of the relevant market48, adopted in December
1997 and published in the Official Journal C 372,
09/12/1997. The Notice gives a legal framework
based on the economic principles, which should
ensure an increased consistency and transparency
in the implementation of the competition policy.
An economic approach of the analysis of the
anticompetitive behaviors involves the evaluation
of every specific case based on the analysis of the
anticompetitive effects generated by the business
practice and not based on the specific form of the
respective practice (for instance exclusive
dealing, tying). This evaluation can only be performed
through a comprehensive economic analysis.
As an example, when evaluating vertical agreements
we account for the actual or likely impact of the
agreement on the market. To determine the
impact of the potential vertical agreements may
have over the competition, it is essential to
establish the structure of the market. Restraining
the competition is dangerous only when the
inter-brand competition is insufficient and if a
certain degree of power exists on the respective
market. Generally, vertical restrictions are less
dangerous than horizontal restrictions like price
fixing or market allocation although they may have
a variety of effects both on the involved companies
and on the market in which these companies operate.
The most dangerous and significant consequence
associated with this type of agreements is the market
closure for potential competitors.
48
The Notice specifies: The main purpose of market definition is to identify in a systematic way the competitive constraints that the
undertakings involved face. The objective of defining a market in both its product and geographic dimension is to identify those actual
competitors of the undertakings involved that are capable of constraining their behavior and of preventing them from behaving independently
of an effective competitive pressure. It is from this perspective, that the market definition makes it possible, inter alia, to calculate market shares
that would convey meaningful information regarding market power for the purposes of assessing dominance There are a number of quantitative tests that have specifically been designed for the purpose of delineating markets. These tests consist of various econometric and
statistical approaches: estimates of elasticities and cross-price elasticities for the demand of a product, tests based on similarity of price movements
over time, the analysis of causality between price series and similarity of price levels and/or their convergence. http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/relevma_en.html.
21
ns, acordurile verticale sunt adesea necesare

pentru creterea eficienei. n aceste cazuri, efectele
pozitive ale restriciei exced pe cele negative, per
total beneficiind att firmele din industria respectiv,
ct i consumatorii. Exist dou exemple clasice
referitoare la efectele pozitive ale acordurilor
verticale: dubla marj49 i problema pasagerului
clandestin50. Legislaia comunitar prevede o serie
de situaii n care acordurile verticale pot fi
exceptate n bloc deoarece beneficiile rezultate de
pe urma acestora sunt mai mari dect eventualele
costuri, ele fiind favorabile att sporirii eficienei
productorilor, ct i consumatorilor. Atunci cnd
prile implicate n asemenea restricii verticale
dein o putere considerabil de pia, analiza se
face de la caz la caz.
Att la nivel european dar i la nivel naional, rolul
analizei economice n politica de protecie a
concurenei ctig din ce n ce mai mult importan.
O abordare mai economic implic ns necesitatea
asigurrii ca analiza economic asigur sigurana
din punct de vedere legal. n plus, o analiz economic
extensiv necesit timp i aceasta poate prelungi
perioada necesar desfaurrii procedurilor.
Un impediment major al utilizrii mai intense a
analizei economice n procesul decizional din
cadrul politicii concurenei l constituie dificultatea
economistilor de a comunica cu non-economistii,
reprezentai n principal de juriti. Capacitatea
economitilor de a-i prezenta ntr-un mod
comprehensibil i concis prerile, precum i
rezultatele analizelor empirice este crucial la
ambele niveluri cel al autoritii de concurent
ct i n justitie.
n Romania, Consiliul Concurenei urmeaz linia

Comisiei Europene de orientare ctre o abordare
mai economic a politicii concurenei. Astfel,
capacitatea instituional s-a ntrit prin nfiinarea,
n cadrul Direciei Cercetare Sinteze a unui grup
de analiz economic. Grupul ofer consultan
pe probleme de analiz economic i econometrie,
va efectua studii de pia i va utiliza instrumente
moderne de analiz economic n definirea pieei
relevante.
Bibliografie
Roller, L.(2005): Economic Analysis an Competition
Policy
Enforcement
n
Europe
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/
sp2005_011_en.pdf;
* * * (2007): Raport privind politica n domeniul
concurenei pentru anul 2007, Comisia European http://www.ec.europa.eu-competition;
Kroes, N.(2007): Making consumers' right to damages
a reality: the case for collective redress mechanisms in
antitrust claims - http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kroes/speeches_en.html;
Cabral, L. (2000): Introduction to industrial organization,
MIT Press;
* * * http://www.ec.europa.eu-competition/publication;
* * * http://www.biblioteca.ase.ro.
49
Dubla marj situaia n care integrarea pe vertical a dou sau mai multe firme conduce la o mbuntire, nu numai la nivelul ofertei, ci
i la nivelul consumatorilor. Teoretic, pentru a demonstra avantajul integrrii verticale prin intermediul acordului se calculeaz beneficiile
realizate de firme n cazul separrii verticale i apoi n cazul integrrii. n cazul separrii verticale, fiecare agent economic va lua decizia de
maximizare a preului n condiii de monopol. Dac singurul instrument contractual pe care cei doi l pot folosi este preul cu ridicata, atunci
fiecare firm va adauga marja sa de pre peste costul marginal, rezultatul final fiind un nivel de pre mai mare dect n cazul n care doar o
firm ar fi deinut poziia de monopol. Drept urmare, profiturile combinate ale celor dou firme sunt mai mici dect atunci cnd cele dou firme
ar fi fuzionat/integrate. Mai mult, i surplusul consumatorului este mai mic n cazul separaiei verticale, deoarece preul pltit n final de
consummator este mai mare dect preul de monopol. - Cabral, L. (2000), Introduction to industrial organization, MIT Press, Chapter 11.
50
Conceptul pasagerului clandestin cazul concurenei intramarc, n care civa detailiti vnd acelai produs, iar unii dintre ei beneficiaz
de investiiile unui alt distribuitor n publicitate, service sau instruire. Consumatorii caut informaii la magazinul cu serviciul tehnic de calitate
i apoi cumpr produsul n cauz de la un magazin care ofer un pre mai mic. Soluiile posibile de rezolvare a problemei pasagerului
clandestin sunt: fixarea unui pre minim de revnzare pentru a ncuraja concurena prin calitate, restricionarea numrului de distribuitori sau
furnizarea/distribuirea excusiv care asigur recompensarea efortului (n.a. stabilirea unui pre minim sau fix de revnzare este considerat practic
anticoncurenial); cazul concurenei intermarc, acelai detailist vinde produse concurente pe pia. Conceptul pasagerului clandestin reprezint
situaia n care ali productori beneficiaz de investiiile unui alt productor n publicitate, lista clienilor sau instruire. Soluia posibil de
rezolvare a problemei pasagerului clandestin este distribuia exclusiv. - Cabral, L. (2000), Introduction to industrial organization, MIT Press,
Chapter 11.
22
However, vertical agreements are often required

for efficiency increases. In such cases the positive
effects of the restrictions exceed the negative
effects both companies in the respective industry
and the consumers benefiting overall. There are
two classical examples with reference to the
positive effects of the vertical agreements:
double-markup51 and the free-rider problem52.
The EU legislation anticipates several situations,
in which vertical agreements may be block
exempted, because the resulted benefits are
higher than the potential costs, these being
favorable for the increased efficiency of the
manufacturers and for the consumers. When the
involved parties in such restrictions have a
considerable power on the market, the analysis
is performed on a case-by-case basis.
Both at the European and national level the role
of the economic analysis in the competition
policy gains more importance. A more economic
approach however, implies the requirement that
the economic analysis ensures legal certainty. In
addition, an extensive economic analysis requires
time and this may extend the length of the
proceedings.
A major impediment of using economic analysis
more intensely in the decisional process within
the competition policy enforcement is the difficulty
of the economists to communicate with the
non-economists, represented mainly by legal
representatives. The capability of the economists
to present their opinions and the results of the
empirical analysis in an understandable and concise
manner is crucial at both levels - competition
authority and justice.
In Romania, the Competition Council follows the

European Commission orientation, towards a
more economic approach of the competition
policy. Thus, the institutional capability was
enhanced by establishing a group of economic
analysis within the Research and Synthesis
Directorate. The group offers consultancy on
economic analysis and econometrics, will perform
market research and will use modern economic
analysis instruments when establishes relevant
market.
Bibliography
Roller, L.(2005): Economic Analysis an Competition
Policy
Enforcement
n
Europe
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp
2005_011_en.pdf;
* * * (2007): Report on Competition Policy 2007,
European Commission - http://www.ec.europa.eu-competition;
Kroes, N.(2007): Making consumers' right to damages
a reality: the case for collective redress mechanisms in
antitrust claims http://ec.europa.eu/commission_
barroso/kroes/speeches_en.html;
Cabral, L. (2000): Introduction to industrial
organization, MIT Press;
* * * http://www.ec.europa.eu-competition/publication;
* * * http://www.biblioteca.ase.ro.
51
Double-markup the situation when the vertical integration of two or more companies leads to an improvement not only at the offer level,
but also at the consumers level. Theoretically, to demonstrate the advantage of the vertical integration through the agreement, we calculate
the benefits of the companies when they are vertically separated and then when they are integrated. When vertically separated, each company
will decide to maximize price under monopoly conditions. If the only contractual instrument that both companies can use is the wholesale price
then every company will add its markup on top of the marginal cost, the end result being a price level higher than if one company only would
have had the monopoly position. As a result, the combined profits of the two companies are lower than if the two companies would be
merged/integrated. Moreover, the consumers surplus is lower in the case of the vertical separation because the final price paid by the consumer is higher than the monopoly price. - Cabral, L. (2000), Introduction to industrial organization, MIT Press, Chapter 11.
52
Free-rider - the case of intrabrand competition, when several retailers are selling the same product and some of them benefit from one distributors investments in terms of advertisement, service or technical training. The customers seek advice from shop with good service and
then buy from a discounter. Possible solutions to resolve the free-riding problem are: setting a minimum resale price to encourage competition in terms of quality, restrict the number of dealers or excusive supply/distribution to ensure reward for effort (a.n. setting a minimum or a
fix resale price is deemed as an anticompetitive practice); the case of interbrand competition, when same retailer is selling competing goods.
The free-rider concept represents the case when other manufacturers benefit from one manufacturers investments in terms of client lists,
technical training or advertising. Possible solution to resolve the free-riding problem is excusive dealing. - Cabral, L. (2000), Introduction to
industrial organization, MIT Press, Chapter 11.
23
TESTUL MONOPOLISTULUI IPOTETIC

UN INSTRUMENT DE LUCRU N DOMENIUL CONCURENEI
Ionu DRGOI53
Rezumat
Elementul central i probabil cel mai important al oricrei aciuni / investigaii a autoritii de
concuren l reprezint definirea pieei relevante. O metod de definire a pieelor i de msurare
direct a puterii de pia este testul monopolistului ipotetic. Testul monopolistului ipotetic sau
testul SSNIP definete piaa relevant prin verificarea profitabilitii creterii preului de vnzare al
produsului (n general cu 5-10%) de ctre un monopolist ipotetic, pe o period de cel puin un an.
Cuvinte cheie: concuren, pia relevant, testul SSNIP, elasticitate critic a cererii, pierdere
critic.
Clasificare JEL: D4, L4.
Adesea activitatea autoritii de concuren

necesit identificarea pieei relevante (n analiza
concentrrilor economice ncheiate sau n curs
de realizare sau n investigaiile cu privire la abuzul
de poziie dominant). Identificarea pieei
relevante nu reprezint un scop n sine ci mai
degrab un punct de plecare ce face posibil
calculul cotelor de pia ce ar permite o mai bun
viziune asupra puterii de pia n cadrul evalurii
unei poziii dominante sau a unei concentrri.
Piaa relevant are dou componente: piaa
relevant a produsului i piaa geografic
relevant.
Piaa relevant a produsului cuprinde toate
produsele pe care consumatorul le consider
interschimbabile sau sustituibile, datorit
caracteristicilor, preurilor i utilizrii creia
acestea i sunt destinate.
Piaa geografic relevant cuprinde zona n care
agenii economici sunt implicai n oferta i
cererea de produse sau servicii n cauz, n care
condiiile concureniale sunt suficient de
omogene i care poate fi distins de zonele cu
53
care se nvecineaz pe baza condiiilor

concureniale diferite.
n 1982, n cadrul Instruciunilor privind
concentrrile economice, departamentul de justiie
al Statelor Unite ale Americii au introdus Testul
monopolistului ipotetic (testul SSNIP) ca o
nou metod de definire a pieelor i de msurare
direct a puterii de pia. n Uniunea European
testul a fost utilizat pentru prima dat n 1992 n
cazul Nestl/Perrier i a fost recunoscut oficial
de ctre Comisia European n 1997 n Not a
Comisiei privind definirea pieei relevante.
Testul SSNIP ncearc s identifice cea mai
restrns pia pe care un monopolist ipotetic ar
putea practica n mod profitabil o cretere mic
dar semnificativ i non-tranzitorie a preului i
o consider ca fiind piaa relevant. Testul
monopolistului ipotetic adreseaz urmtoarea
ntrebare: Ar fi profitabil pentru monopolistul
ipotetic s practice, n acea arie geografic, pentru
produsul (produsele) respectiv (respective), un
pre mai mare cu 5% fa de nivelul competitiv,
pe o perioad de cel puin un an?.
Inspector de concuren, Direcia de Cercetare-Sinteze.
24
THE HYPOTHETICAL MONOPOLIST TEST

A WORKING TOOL IN THE FIELD OF COMPETITION
Ionu DRGOI54
Abstract 55
The central and probably the most important element of any action / investigation of competition
authorities is the relevant market definition. A method for defining markets and for measuring
market power directly is the hypothetical monopolist test. The Hypothetical Monopolist or the SSNIP
test (small but significant non-transitory increase in prices) defines the relevant market by
determining whether a given increase in product prices (usually between 5 and 10 percents) for at
least one year would be profitable for a hypothetical monopolist in the candidate market.
Keywords: competition, relevant market, SSNIP test, critical elasticity of demand, critical loss.
JEL Classification: D4, L4.
Competition authority work often requires a
determination of the relevant market (in litigation
challenging a proposed or consummated
horizontal merger or in the investigations with
regard to abuse of dominant position). Determination
of the relevant market is not a goal in itself.
Rather it is only a starting point which makes
possible to calculate market shares that would
convey meaningful information regarding market
power for the purposes of assessing dominance
or horizontal mergers. The relevant market has
two components: the relevant product market
and the relevant geographic market.
The relevant product market comprises all the
products which are regarded as interchangeable
or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of
the products' characteristics, their prices and their
intended uses.
The relevant geographic market comprises the
area in which the undertakings concerned are
involved in the supply of products, in which the
conditions of competition are sufficiently
homogenous and which can be distinguished
54
55
Competition inspector, Synthesis and Research Directorate.

Translated into English by Ionu Drgoi.
25
from neighboring areas because the conditions of

competition are appreciably different in those areas.
In 1982 the U.S. Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines introduced the Small but Significant
and Non-transitory Increase in Price test (the
SSNIP test) as a new method for defining
markets and for measuring market power
directly. In the EU it was used for the first time
in the Nestl/Perrier case in 1992 and has been
officially recognized by the European Commission
in its "Commission's Notice for the Definition of
the Relevant Market" in 1997.
The SSNIP test tries to identify the narrow
market within which a hypothetical monopolist
could impose a small but significant non-transitory
increase in price and defines this as the relevant
market. As a matter of fact it asks whether a
hypothetical monopolist controlling a product or
a group of products could sustain a price increase
of 5% for at least one year.
Testul se aplic astfel:

G
se pornete de la cea mai restrns pia i se

verific dac o cretere a preului cu 5% ar fi
profitabil;
G dac rspunsul este afirmativ, piaa considerat
reprezint chiar piaa relevant; n caz contrar, se
consider c agentul economic nu are suficient
putere de pia pentru a crete preul;
G se va include cel mai apropiat produs substituient
n piaa relevant i se repet testul pentru noul grup
de produse;
G procedeul se va repeta pn cnd monopolistul
ipotetic poate practica o cretere profitabil a
preului cu 5%;
G setul de produse sau de zone geografice astfel
determinate consituie piaa relevant.
Pentru a verifica dac aceast cretere a preului
este profitabil, n general se utilizeaz dou
metode:
1.
Elasticitatea critic a cererii
Testul SSNIP poate fi aplicat prin estimarea

elasticitii critice a cererii. Elasticitatea critic a
cererii (e) reprezint acea valoare a elasticitii
cererii pentru care creterea preului nu modific
profitul obinut. n cazul cererii liniare, pentru
estimarea elasticitii critice a cererii este suficient
s cunoatem marja cost-pre. Marja brut (cunoscut
i ca Indicatorul Lerner) se definete ca fiind
diferena procentual dintre pre i costul marginal.
Dac preul unei uniti de prdus este P iar costul
marginal este C, atunci marja cost-pre va fi:
2.
1
m+t
Dac valoarea coeficientului de elasticitate a

cererii (n cazul concentrrilor orizontale se consider
elasticitatea cererii anterioar operaiei de concentrare)
este mai mare dect coeficientul de elasticitate
critic a cererii, atunci diminuarea vnzrilor
Pierderea critic
Atunci cnd nu se poate estima elasticitatea cererii,

pentru aplicarea testului SSNIP se poate estima
pierderea critic (y). Pierderea critic reprezint
pierderea maxim din vnzri (procentual) ce
poate fi susinut prin creterea preului, fr a
modifica profitul obinut. Dac pierderea din vnzri
a monopolistului ipotetic este mai mic dect
pierderea critic, atunci creterea de pre practicat
este profitabil iar piae relevant a fost definit.
Pentru a defini piaa relevant n cazul abuzului de
poziie dominant, testul monopolistului ipotetic
trebuie s aib n vedere nivelul competitiv al
preurilor i nu nivelul existent al lor. Calculul
nivelului competitiv al preurilor nu este o
problem uoar, iar uneori chiar nu poate fi
determinat acest nivel. Aceste considerente nu se
aplic atunci cnd este vorba de cazuri de concentrare
economic. n procesul de evaluare a impactului
competitiv al unei concentrri economice,
problema esenial este dac nivelul puterii de
pia ar crete ca urmare a acestei operaiuni.
Dac m este marja cost-pre iar t creterea minim
a preului considerat semnificativ, pierderea
critic este dat de urmtoarea relaie:
P-C
P
n cazul n care creterea minim a preului

considerat seminificativ (de obicei se consider
a fi de 5%) este t, atunci coeficientul de elasticitate
critic a cererii va fi:
datorat creterii preului va fi suficient de mare

pentru a face aceast cretere neprofitabil i testul
se fa reface dup includerea celui mai apropiat
substituient. Altfel, piaa considerat reprezint
chiar piaa relevant. n general, coeficientul de
elasticitate a cererii se estimeaz utiliznd instrumente
econometrice.
t
m+t
Dac pierderea din vnzri este mai mic dect

pierderea critic, atunci creterea de pre practicat
este profitabil iar piae relevant a fost definit.
Nu ntotdeauna testul monopolistului ipotetic
reprezint cea mai adecvat alegere pentru definirea
pieei relevante. Spre exemplu, definirea pieei
relevante utiliznd testul SSNIP atunci cnd un
monopolist i fixeaz preul la nivelul optim
corespunztor monopolului este posibil ca dou
produse s apar ca fiind substituibile dei la un
nivel competitiv al preurilor nu sunt substituibile.
26
The test is applied like this:

G start with narrowest possible market and ask if
5% price increase is profitable;

if the answer is yes, the starting market is the
relevant market; if not, then the undertaking does
not have sufficient market power to raise price;
G the next closest substitute is added to the
relevant market and the test is repeated for the
expanded product group;
G the process continues until the point is reached
where a hypothetical monopolist could profitably
impose a 5% price increase;
G the range of products or the geographic area so
defined constitutes the relevant market.
market and the test repeated for the expanded

product group. Otherwise, the market considered is
the relevant market. The elasticity of demand is
estimated, generally, using econometric instruments
To verify if the price increase is profitable,

generally, are used two methods:
1.
The Critical Elasticity of Demand
The SSNIP test can be applied by estimating the

critical elasticity of demand. Critical elasticity of
demand (e) is the value of elasticity of demand
necessary to leave profits unchanged after price
increase. In the case of linear demand all that is
necessary to calculate the value of the critical
elasticity of demand is information on firms
price cost margins (m). The gross margin (also
known as the Lerner Index) is defined as the
percentage difference between price and
marginal cost. If the price per unit is P and the
marginal cost per is C, then the price cost margin is:
P-C
P
If the minimum price increase considered significant

(usually 5%) is t, then the critical elasticity of
demand (e) is:
2.
The Critical Loss
When the demand elasticity cannot be estimated,

one can use an alternative method for applying
the SSNIP test, namely to estimate the critical
loss (y). The critical loss is defined as the maximum
sales loss (percentually) that could be sustained
as a result of the price increase without making
the price increase unprofitable. If the loss of sales
to the hypothetical monopolist is less than the
critical loss, then the price increase considered
would be profitable and the market is defined.
In the abuse of dominance cases, to define the
market, the SSNIP test would have to be
estimated on the basis of competitive prices
rather than at the prevailing price level. The
calculation of the competitive price level is not
an easy problem and sometimes not even possible.
Such considerations do not arise when defining
the market in merger cases. In assessing the
competitive impact of a merger the essential
issue is if the degree of market power would
increase as a result of the merger.
If m is the price cost margin and t is the minimum
price increase considered significant, then the
critical loss is:
If the loss of sales is less than the critical loss,
then the price increase would be profitable and
the market would be defined.
y
e
1
m+t
t
m+t
Not always the SSNIP test is the suitable for

definition of the relevant market.
If the elasticity of demand (pre-merger elasticity

of demand for horizontal mergers) exceeds the
critical elasticity then the decline in sales arising
from the price increase will be sufficiently large
to render the price increase unprofitable and the
next closest substitute must be added to the relevant
27
Such a case is definition of the relevant

market when monopolist sets its prices at a
monopoly level. In this situation it may happen
that two products appear to be close substitutes
whereas at competitive prices they are not.
Prin urmare, utilizarea testului SSNIP n aceast

situaie duce la definirea unei piee relevante mai
largi. Aceast problem este cunoscut n literatura
de specialitate ca Eroarea celofanului dup
celebrul caz Du Pont.
Bibliografie
Un alt punct slab al testului SSNIP este acela c

msoar competiia dintre ageni daor pe baza
preului i astfel nu poate fi considerat ca un
instrument pe deplin suficient de definire a pieelor.
MASSEY P. (2000), Market Definition and Market

Power in Competition Analysis: Some Practical Issues,
The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2000,
pp. 309-328;
Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market

for the purposes of Community competition law, Official
Journal C 372 , 09/12/1997, pp. 5 13;
SHAPIRO, C. and KATZ, M. (2003), Critical Loss:

Lets Tell the Whole Story, Antitrust Magazine, Vol. 17,
No.2, 2003;
US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
(1992). Horizontal Merger Guidelines, available:
http://www.antitrust.org/law/mg.html.
28
In other words, it may happen that using the

SSNIP test one defines the relevant market too
broadly, including products which are not substitutes.
This problem is known in the literature as the
Cellophane Fallacy after the celebrated Du Pont
case.
Another weakness of the SSNIP test is the fact
that it only measures competition based on price
and thus cannot be considered a fully sufficient
tool for defining markets.
Bibliography
Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market
for the purposes of Community competition law, Official
Journal C 372 , 09/12/1997, pp. 5 13;
MASSEY P. (2000), Market Definition and Market
Power in Competition Analysis: Some Practical
Issues, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 31, No.
4, 2000, pp. 309-328;
SHAPIRO, C. and KATZ, M. (2003), Critical Loss:
Lets Tell the Whole Story, Antitrust Magazine, Vol.
17, No.2, 2003;
US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
(1992), Horizontal Merger Guidelines, available:
http://www.antitrust.org/law/mg.html.
29
DIFERENIERI SEMNIFICATIVE
NTRE REGLEMENTRILE AMERICANE
I CELE COMUNITARE N MATERIE DE CONCUREN
Ana IVAN-ILIESCU56
Rezumat
Fr a avea pretenia unei treceri exhaustive n revist, analiza urmtoare scoate n eviden diferene
semnificative ntre reglementrile americane i cele europene n domeniul concurenei. ntr-un anume
sens, Uniunea European are un complex de inferioritate fa de Statele Unite ale Americii. Acest
complex poate fi explicat prin mai multe argumente, precum evoluia istoric, dar i performana
economic mai slab din ultimele decenii.
Cuvinte-cheie: politic public n domeniul concurenei, modelul investigativ, criteriul eficienei,
nelegeri orizontale /verticale, abuz de poziie dominant, concentrare economic.
Dintr-o perspectiv economic, agenda Uniunii
Europene este dat de ncercarea de a recupera
decalajul de dezvoltare tehnologic i inovativ fa
de SUA, chiar dac se poate argumenta c la nivelul
ceteanului (dimensiunea social), acest decalaj
nu este att de vizibil. Agenda Lisabona, cea prin
care se dorete ca economia european s devin
cea mai competitiv i dinamic economie intensiv
n cunoatere din lume pn n 2010, nu este dect
un alt mod de a spune c Uniunea European i
propune s nregistreze performane mai bune
dect SUA din acest punct de vedere.
Eforturile de integrare a serviciilor i pieelor
financiare la nivel european au cptat i ele un
ritm accelerat, cnd analize precum Raportul
Lamfalussy din 2001 au demonstrat situaia
nefavorabil a industriei financiare din statele
membre fa de cea american. Exist autori care
consider c aplicarea mai eficient a legislaiei
SUA n domeniul concurenei este unul dintre
motivele fundamentale pentru performana mai
bun a acestei economii n ultimul deceniu al
secolului al XX-lea. Astfel de afirmaii nu trebuie
acceptate necondiionat, dar ele pot avea o anumit

relevan. Iat ns un motiv suficient pentru ca
Uniunea European s ncerce s mreasc
eficiena aplicrii legislaiei n domeniul concurenei.
Regulamentul nr. 1 / 2003, care creeaz cadrul
aplicrii legislaiei n domeniul concurenei, i
propune astfel:
G descentralizarea aplicrii politicii n domeniul
concurenei, n conformitate cu principiul fundamental
al subsidiaritii care st la baza politicilor Uniunii
Europene57;
G reducerea rolului notificrilor, prin eliminarea
obligativitii ca firmele s notifice ex ante acele
tipuri de acorduri care se ncadreaz n alineatul 3
al articolului 81, respectiv cel care reglementeaz
condiiile de exceptare;
G posibilitatea Comisiei de a declana anchete
sectoriale: Comisia European a lansat deja dou
astfel de anchete sectoriale, pe de parte n sectorul
serviciilor financiare (cu accent pe piaa serviciilor
bancare retail), iar pe de alt parte n sectorul
energetic (pieele de gaz i electricitate);
G extinderea competenelor de investigare ale
Comisiei.
56
Inspector de concuren, Direcia Industrie i Energie.

Comisia i pstreaz ns un rol central pentru practicile anti-concureniale care aduc atingere comerului intra-comunitar, noua Reea
European de Concuren urmnd a reuni Comisia European i autoritile desemnate din statele membre. Intenia avut n vedere prin
descentralizare este degrevarea Comisiei, care ar urma s se ocupe doar de praticile anticoncureniale cele mai grave, precum cartelurile,
eliminnd munca birocratic precum i costurile suportate de ctre firme n a respecta legislaia. Autoritile naionale capt un rol mrit n
implementarea efectiv a legislaiei n domeniul concurenei, dei acest lucru se petrece n conformitate cu precedentul european i n deplin
comunicare cu Comisia European.
57
30
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US

AND EU COMPETITION LAWS
Ana IVAN-ILIESCU58
Abstract59
Without having the claim to expose all such differences, the following analysis highlights certain
practical differences in the perspectives of European and American competition law. In a certain
sense, the European Union has an inferiority complex vis--vis United States. Such a complex can
be explained by different factors, such as the historical evolution or the weaker economic performance
in the last period.
Keywords: public policy in the competition field, forensic model, the efficiencies criterion, horizontal
/ vertical agreements, abuse of a dominant position, business concentration.
From an economic perspective, the agenda of the
European Union is centered on the attempt to fill
the technological and innovative gap towards
USA even if some argue that this is not the case
from a social point of view, where the gap does
not exist. The Lisbon Agenda formulated the
objective that the European economy should
become the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world by
2010. This is another way of meaning that EU
should attempt to surpass US in this field.
As an example, the European efforts towards the
integration of the markets for financial services
at a community level knew a new tempo when
analysis such as Lamfalussy Report in 2001
demonstrated the precarious position of the
European economy as compared with the American
one. There are certain authors that consider that
the more efficient enforcement of the US
antitrust legislation is one of the core reasons that
explain the better economic performance of this
economy in the 90s. Such a statement needs for
sure certain qualification but it may have a point.
58
This opinion was however sufficient for the

European Union to attempt to increase the
efficiency in the enforcement of the competition law.
Regulation 1/2003, which creates the framework
of the enforcement of the competition law, has
the objectives of:
G decentralization of the enforcement of the
competition policy, according to the fundamental
principle of the subsidiarity on which the European
Unions common policies are based60;
G the reduction of the role of notifications, by
eliminating the obligation of the companies to
notify ex ante any agreement that qualifies for
exemption according to article 81 (3);
G the possibility of the Commission to start sector
inquiries: The European Commission has already
opened two such inquiries, in the financial services
(with a focus on retail banking and payments)
and energy (gas and electricity markets);
G the widening of the investigative competences
of the Commission.
Competition inspector, Industry and Energy Directorate.

Translated into English by Ana Ivan-Iliescu.
The European Commission retains however the central role in what regards the anticompetitive practices that may infringe the intracommunity
trade (the Community dimension). The new European Competition Network (ECN) reunites the European Commission and the national
competition authorities. The main goals are to allow the Commission to deal with the most anticompetitive practices, such as cartels, and to
delegate the bureaucratic workload at the national level while reducing the costs that companies have in complying with the competition
law. The national authorities have an increased role in the enforcement of the competition law, even if they have to observe the European precedent
as well as closely collaborate with Brussels.municare cu Comisia European.
59
60
31
Regulamentul nr. 1 / 2003 reprezint elementul

central al unui pachet de reform, denumit de
modernizare61. Fcnd din nou apel la experiena
american, Comisia European a nfiinat Biroul
Economistului-ef n cadrul DG Comp pentru a se
asigura c orice decizie este fundamentat economic
din punct de vedere metodologic i tiinific.
nelegerile pe vertical. Legislaia american este
prima care interzice impunerea de ctre productori
a strategiei de pre a distributorilor nc din 1911,
tocmai n scopul protejrii independenei acestora.
Cu toate acestea, interzicerea acordurilor pe vertical
de fixare a preului maxim de revnzare a fost
nlturat, iar cea a preului minim de revnzare a
fost redus ca aplicare. Libertatea productorilor
de a termina oricnd relaiile de distribuie sau a
contractelor de dealership a fost reabilitat. Accentul
politicii n domeniul concurenei pare a cdea n
prezent pe anchetarea i sancionarea acordurilor pe
orizontal ntre concureni, precum i a controlului
concentrrilor ntre firme concurente i mai puin pe
disciplinarea comportamentului productorilor fa
de canalele de distribuie62.
Comisia European a acordat o atenie deosebit
nelegerilor pe vertical, acestea fiind sensibile,
dup cum am vzut, n sensul obiectivului de
integrare a pieelor naionale n cadrul unei Piee
Unice europene. Printre primele cazuri judecate de
ctre Curtea European de Justiie a fost Consten i
Grundig din 1966, prin care s-a interzis strategia
productorilor de a aloca distribuitorilor lor
exclusiviti geografice n cadrul pieei europene.
Reglementrile europene au dorit din acest
moment n permanen s protejeze independena
distribuitorilor fa de productori, precum i s
limiteze libertatea de aciune a acestora din urm
asupra lanului de distribuie n scopul evitrii
compartimentrii pieei63. Autoritile au ncercat
n permanen s favorizeze canalele de distribuie
multi-brand, n sensul de a permite accesul la
canalele de distribuie i a altor productori.
Sectorul distribuiei auto a cunoscut, de exemplu,

prin ultima reglementare specific, lansarea
conceptului de dealer multibrand, prin care Comisia
European ncurajeaz distribuia de automobile
ale unor nume de marc diferite de ctre acelai
dealer64. Protejarea dealer-ilor fa de productori
promoveaz free riding-ul, mpiedic competiia
inter-brand i crete costurile de distribuie65.
nelegerile pe orizontal sunt cele care pot determina
cele mai anti-concureniale practici din punctul de
vedere al politicilor n domeniul concurenei.
Practicile concertate sunt apreciate a avea efecte
mai negative dect cele ale unei singure firme, de
unde i rolul major jucat de anchetarea acestor
nelegeri n cadrul politicilor contemporane n
domeniul concurenei. n 2005, Comisia European
a considerat necesar nfiinarea unui directorat
dedicat exclusiv anchetrii cartelurilor n cadrul
Directoratului General Concuren.
Atitudinea autoritilor americane fa de carteluri
a fost apreciat a fi extrem de sever. Infracionalizarea
comportamentului individual, corelat cu aplicarea
privat a legii concurenei, au fost considerate a
diferenia n mod semnificativ politica SUA fa
de cea a UE n acest domeniu, i mai ales eficiena
lor de operare. Una dintre inovaiile considerate
definitorii ale politicii americane a fost lansarea n
1978 a procedurii de clemen66, prin care firmele
(i indivizii implicai) au fost motivate n a dezvlui
acordurile de tip cartel la care erau parte n scopul
reducerii sanciunilor pe care le primeau. Dei
Uniunea European a adoptat i ea ulterior aceast
procedur, utiliznd-o n mod activ, se consider
c eficiena aplicrii acesteia n Europa este cu mult
mai redus dect n SUA67. Motivaia indivizilor de
a coopera cu autoritile n cazul investigaiei unei
practici anti-concureniale este cu mult mai mare
dac individul respectiv negociaz n nume
propriu evitarea unei amenzi sau a deteniei
personale dect n numele unei companii (acionarii
fiind cei care, indirect, suport amenda)68.
61
Intensele critici la care a fost supus Comisia European (nu numai din partea autoritilor americane dar chiar a unor instituii comunitare)
ca urmare a argumentaiei folosite n blocarea tranzaciei General Electric Honeywell dar i n alte cazuri (precum cazul Airtours / First Choice
din 1999, decizia Comisiei fiind anulat de ctre Curtea de Prim Instan n 2002) par a fi factorii care au determinat iniierea unui amplu
proces de reform.
62
Chiar i n aceast direcie, criteriul eficienei pare a fi de multe ori acceptat n sensul n care practici sau tranzacii care prin form sunt
anti-concureniale pot fi acceptate dac au ca rezultat creterea eficienei.
63
Productorii au obligaia de a face publice criteriile de selecie a canalelor de distribuie iar exclusivitatea a fost mereu un subiect sensibil.
64
Regulamentul Consiliului nr. 1400 / 2002 cu privire la aplicarea articolului 81 alineatul 3 al Tratatului Uniunii Europene la categoriile de
acorduri pe vertical i practici concertate din sectorul distribuiei vehiculelor cu motor.
65
Dei aceast afirmaie poate fi amendat (de exemplu, cresc costurile de distribuie pentru anumite firme n timp ce scad costurile de
distribuie pentru alte firme), protejarea acestei independene apreciat esenial n realizarea Pieei Unice poate duce la ineficiene n distribuie,
care ar putea afecta consumatorul final.
66
Abia din 1993, datorit reformrii sale, numrul cererilor de clemen crete semnificativ.
67
Acest lucru se datoreaz tocmai diferenelor fundamentale n ceea ce privete aplicarea legislaiei n domeniul concurenei.
68
Exist o percepie la nivelul autoritilor americane c atitudinea fa de carteluri n cadrul Uniunii Europene a fost relativ lax, acest lucru
modificndu-se abia la sfritul anilor 90.
32
Regulation 1/2003 represents the central building

block of a reform package known as the
modernization69. Making an appeal to the American
experience, the Commission established the Chief
Economist Office inside the Competition Directorate
in order to have its decision economics-proof,
both scientifically and methodologically.
Vertical Agreements. The American antitrust law
is the first to forbid the fixing by the producers of
the prices offered by their distributors, even in
1911, in order to protect the autonomy of them.
However, the vertical agreements dealing with
the maximum resale price were allowed and the
minimum resale price agreements were reduced
as application. The liberty of the producers to
end anytime the distributorship and dealership
relations was restored. The focus of the American
competition policy is today more on horizontal
agreements as well as the control of horizontal
mergers than the disciplining the behavior of the
producers towards their distribution channels70.
The European Commission paid however a
special attention to the vertical agreements as
they are sensitive, as we already saw, from the
perspective of the objective of Common Market
integration. Among the first cases judged by the
European Court of Justice was Consten and
Grundig in 1966 when the strategy of the
producers to allocate to their distributors
national markets (by geographical exclusivity)
was forbidden. The European legal framework
adopted from that moment the objectives to
protect the independence of the distributors
towards producers and to limit the liberty of
action of the latter on the supply chain in order to
avoid the possibility of market compartmentalization71.
The European authorities have attempted to
favour the multibrand distribution channels in
order to allow other producers to access these
channels. As a good example, the motor vehicle
69
distribution knew, following the last sector

regulation, the launch of the concept of
multibrand dealership by which the Commission
encourages the distribution of the brands of
different auto producers through the same
dealer72. As certain analysts appreciate, protecting
dealers against their suppliers promotes free riding,
impedes interbrand competition and raises the
cost of distribution73.
The horizontal agreements are considered those
that may determine the most anti-competitive
practices from the point of view of competition
policy. Concerted practices are perceived to
generate greater negative effects than the conduct
of a single firm and this is the reason why the
investigation of such practices plays a major role
in the enforcement of contemporary competition
law. In 2005, the European Commission
established a dedicated directorate on cartels
inside the Competition General Directorate.
The attitude of the American authorities towards
cartels has been traditionally considered extremely
severe. As we already saw, the criminalization of
the individual behavior, correlated with the
private enforcement, has significantly differentiated
the American antitrust policy and the European
competition policy, and especially their
effectiveness. One of the core innovations in the
US policy towards cartels has been the launch in
1978 of the leniency procedure by which the cartel
members (and participating individuals) were
motivated to reveal the agreements they were
part of in order to benefit from a reduction in
sanctions74. The incentives of individuals to
cooperate with the authorities in the case of an
investigation are stronger as the individual
applies in his own name in order to avoid a
personal fine or prison than in the name of the
company (shareholders being the ultimate
payers)75.
The intense criticizing of the Commission (not only from the part of American counterparts) for the line of argumentation used in blocking
General Electric Honeywell merger but also in other cases (such as the decision in Airtours / First Choice in 1999, decision reversed by the
Court of First Instance in 2002) are the main triggers of this process.
70
Even in this direction, the efficiency criteria is more and more applied in the sense that agreements and practices that seems prima facie to
be anticompetitive may be accepted if they have the result an increase in the economic efficiency.
71
The producers have the obligation to make public their selection criteria and exclusivity is usually inhibited.
72
Council Regulation 14000 / 2002 on the application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted
practices in the motor vehicle sector.
73
Even if such a statement may be amended, the protection of such independence, which is considered essential to the integration of the Common
Market, may lead to certain inefficiencies in distribution, which may affect the final consumer.
74
Initially, the succes of such procedure was limited. In 1993 however, due to a reform, the number of the leniency applications grew
significantly.
75
Although the European Union actively implemented at its turn this procedure, the efficiency is evaluated is lower because mainly of the
fundamental differences in the competition law enforcement. There is a perception at the level of American officials that the European attitude
towards cartels has been relatively soft and only at the end of the 90s this attitude changed. In this spirit, we cannot pass over the opinion that
there is no accident that the big cartels unveiled in the 90s were organized or managed by European companies. This is an overstatement
as there were also a large number of American companies that took also the initiative.
33
Abuzul de poziie dominant. Printre ariile n care

diferenele dintre cele dou modele de politici n
domeniul concurenei par a fi cele mai manifeste se
numr i cea a abuzului de poziie dominant.
Politica european n domeniul concurenei atribuie
firmelor aflate ntr-o poziie dominant o
responsabilitate special n sensul c libertatea de
aciune a unei astfel de firme este limitat.
Companiile ntr-o astfel de poziie nu pot concura
la fel de agresiv ca i o companie de talie mic. Mai
mult, nsi conceptul de dominan, care este
central politicii Uniunii Europene pe aceast
dimensiune pare a nu fi compatibil cu legislaia
american, care nu are dect conceptul de monopol.
Deoarece este relativ uor pentru o firm mare i de
succes s satisfac criteriile de a fi o firm dominant,
multe i chiar aproape toate dintre aceste firme
mari i de succes se calific pentru a face parte din
categoria de firme dominante. Ca urmare, ele vor
fi supuse obligaiilor legale legate de corectitudine
i nediscriminare.
Politica american n domeniul concurenei
ncurajeaz ns orice form de concuren agresiv
prin preuri, chiar i n cazul companiilor aflate
n poziii dominante76. Dac legislaia european
condamn clauzele nerezonabile i discriminatorii
drept abuz de poziie dominant (dar i ca nelegeri
pe vertical anti-concureniale), politica n domeniul
concurenei din SUA a renunat nc de la mijlocul
anilor 70 la a le mai aplica. De exemplu, prin contrast
cu principiile politicii antitrust americane, legislaia
european condamn reducerile selective de pre
adoptate de ctre firmele ntr-o poziie dominant
ca rspuns la intrarea unui alt concurent pe pia.
Este de remarat c astfel de practici sunt calificate
anti-concureniale, chiar dac preul final rmne
peste costul marginal. Un alt mecanism de excludere
condamnat de ctre legislaia european este cel al
discounturilor bazate pe loialitate / fidelitate. n
prima situaie, cazul Compagnie Maritime este
relevant pentru atitudinea european77. n a doua
situaie, n cazuri precum Michelin sau British Airways,
Comisia European a calificat astfel de comisioane
de fidelitate drept bariere n calea intrrii pe pia
sau n mobilitatea consumatorilor, sancionndu-le.
Asemenea comisioane sunt considerate, n cazul n

care sunt practicare de ctre o firm ntr-o poziie
dominant, drept bariere la intrarea unor concureni
pe canalele de distribuie de pe piaa n cauz.
Numeroi analiti au remarcat c practicile n
cauz nu ar fi fost sancionate pe piaa SUA.
Concentrrile economice. Dac politica european
n privina abuzului de poziie dominant, dar i a
nelegerilor pe vertical are efect doar asupra
firmelor i practicilor lor pe piaa european, politica
sa n ceea ce privete concentrrile economice are
un puternic caracter extrateritorial, deoarece
concentrarea unor firme non-europene prezente
ns pe piaa european poate avea efect asupra
concurenei de pe aceast pia, putnd determina
opoziia Uniunii Europene.
n mod evident i invers, fuziunea unor firme
europene poate avea efecte de concentrare asupra
altor piee. Problema nu se pune numai din punctul
de vedere al perspectivei diferite asupra concurenei
(criteriul eficienei specific modelului american
versus criteriul rivalitii specific modelului
european), dar i datorit cotelor de pia diferite pe
plan internaional ale acelorai firme. Pot exista
dou firme americane care pe piaa american s
aib fiecare cote de pia reduse (5-10%), dar care
pe piaa european s aib individual cote de
30-50%. n acest caz, Uniunea European poate
bloca o fuziune dintre ele, dei o astfel de tranzacie
ar fi perfect logic din punctul de vedere al
prezenei lor pe piaa american.
Uniunea European poate impune condiii ntr-o
astfel de fuziune, care s piard din avantajele
tranzaciei i s determine firmele s renune. Astfel,
realizarea eficienei pe piaa american este prevenit
de ctre decizia autoritilor din Uniunea
European78. Regulamentul nr. 139 /2004 este la
rndul su expresia aceleiai direcii comunitare de
reformare a politicii sale n domeniul concurenei.
Ca i Regulamentul nr. 1 / 2003, aceast
reglementare vizeaz o descentralizare a controlului
concentrrilor economice in spaiul european.
76
nc din 1978, curile americane au afirmat c n cazul unui conflict ntre legea Sherman de promovare a unor piee concureniale i legea
Robinson Patman de protejare a firmelor fa de discriminarea de pre, legea Sherman este cea care prevaleaz.
77
Cazul unei asociaii de armatori care pe lng stabilirea n comun a preurilor (nici mai mult nici mai puin dect un cartel, acceptat ns de
ctre Uniunea European datorit caracterului special al sectorului de transporturi) a decis s concureze agresiv orice alt tranportator prin pre.
Asociaia avea nave dedicate (fighting ships) care aveau rolul de a concura individual navele concurenilor prin practicarea unor preuri sub
cele practicate de ctre asociaie. Era vorba de o reducere selectiv de pre n scopul nlturrii concurenilor pentru anumii clieni specifici,
i nu la nivelul ntregii piee.
78
Cazul unei asociaii de armatori care pe lng stabilirea n comun a preurilor (nici mai mult nici mai puin dect un cartel, acceptat ns de
ctre Uniunea European datorit caracterului special al sectorului de transporturi) a decis s concureze agresiv orice alt tranportator prin pre.
Asociaia avea nave dedicate (fighting ships) care aveau rolul de a concura individual navele concurenilor prin practicarea unor preuri sub
cele practicate de ctre asociaie. Era vorba de o reducere selectiv de pre n scopul nlturrii concurenilor pentru anumii clieni specifici,
i nu la nivelul ntregii piee.
34
Abuse of a dominant position. One the main

areas where the differences between the two
competition models are manifest is the abuse of
the dominant position. The European policy confers
to the firms qualified in a dominant position a
special responsibility in the sense that their
liberty of action is seriously limited. Companies
which are in such a position cannot compete as
aggressively as any other company. Moreover,
the concept itself of dominance, which is central
to the European Union policy in this respect,
seems to be incompatible with the American
legislation, which take into consideration only
the concept of monopoly. According to certain
analysis, because it is relatively easy for a large
and successful firm to meet the preconditions for
a dominant status, many or even most, large and
successful firms will fall into the category of
dominant firms. They will then be subject to
legal obligations tied to notions of fairness and
nondiscrimination.
The American antitrust policy encourages any
form of aggressive competition through prices,
even in the case of firms with dominant positions79.
Whether the European legislation condemn the
unfair and discriminatory clauses imposed by a
firm in a dominant position as abuse of
dominance (but also as vertical anticompetitive
agreements), the US antitrust policy has
abandoned their enforcement starting with mid
70s. As an example, by contrast with the principles
of the American policy, the European legislation
condemn the selective price reductions by the
firms in a dominant position adopted as a
response to the entry on the market of another
competitor. It is to be noted that such practices
are qualified as illegal even if the prices remain
above the marginal costs. Another related abuse
of exclusion that is condemned by the European
competition law is the fidelity /loyalty discounts
and rebates. In the first situation, the Compagnie
Maritime is a significant case80. In the second

situation, in cases like Michelin or British
Airways, the European Commission qualified
such discounts as entry barriers for competitors
and impeding the consumers mobility. A number
of analysts remarked that such practices would
not have been penalized in United States.
Economic concentrations. Whether the European
policy in the field of abuse of dominance as well
as vertical agreements has an effect only on the
business practices of firms on the Common Market,
the EU policy in the field of economic concentrations
has a pronounced extraterritorial character. The
reason for such a qualification is that the
concentration that involves two non-European
companies may have a strong effect on the
European market, which may raise the objections
of the Commission and even its opposition. This
issue is not caused only by the difference of
perspectives on the concept of competition (the
efficiency specific to the American model versus
the rivalry specific to the European model) but
also to the different market shares of the same
companies on different international markets. We
can imagine 2 American firms with low market
shares at home (5-10%) but with high market
shares on the European market (30-50%).
In such a situation, the European Union may
oppose a merger even if such a concentration
would make sense on the American market. Or
the European Commission may also impose
certain conditions that could make the
transaction less attractive and force the
companies to give up. As a consequence, the
attempt to increase the efficiency on the American
market may be prevented by the competition
authorities of the European Union81 . In the
spirit of the Regulation 1/2003, this merger
regulation implements a decentralization of the
merger control in the European framework.
79
Starting with 1978, the American courts stated that The Supreme Court has ruled that in a conflict between the Sherman Acts competitive
market policy and the Robinson-Patman Acts policy of protecting business firms against being disadvantaged by price discrimination, it is
the competitive-market policy of the Sherman Act that will prevail.
80
It was the case of a maritime conference, a cartel among shipowners regarding the common establishment of freights which is however accepted by the European Union (because of the exceptional situation of the transport sector). The conference decided however to aggresively
compete other companies through prices. It operated so called fighting ships by which they attempted to individually eliminate competitors through lower prices. It was a selective reduction in prices for certain clients and not on the entire market.
81
The blocking in 2001 by the European Union of the General Electric Honeywell merger determined a negative reaction from the part of
American authorities. In order to avoid such situations in the future, the two entities established a US EU Merger Task Force in which the
transaction of this kind be debated ex ante, before an unexpected decision. Regulation 139 / 2004 is also an expression of the same modernization direction of the European competition policy.
35
Astfel, Comisia i rezerv dreptul de a se pronuna

doar n ceea ce privete concentrrile care au o
dimensiune comunitar, ceea ce se traduce prin
faptul c celelalte concentrri vor fi analizate la
nivelul autoritilor naionale n domeniul concurenei
din statele membre.
Criteriile prin care o concentrare este calificat a
avea o dimensiune comunitar sunt:
1. cifra de afaceri agregat a firmelor depete 5
miliarde euro, iar fiecare din cel puin dou firme
implicate au o cifr de afaceri mai mare de 250 de
milioane de euro;
2. cifra de afaceri agregat a firmelor depete 2,5
miliarde euro iar fiecare din cel puin dou firme
implicate au o cifr de afaceri mai mare de 100 de
milioane de euro, la care se adaug condiia ca cifra
de afaceri agregat a firmelor s depeasc 100
de milioane de euro n fiecare din cel puin trei
state membre, iar cifra de afaceri a fiecreia din cel
puin dou firme depete 25 de milioane n fiecare
din cel puin trei state membre. Problematica
concentrrii se ridic nu numai n cazul tranzaciilor
de fuziuni i achiziii ntre firme, dar i n cazul
stabilirii de societi n comun concentrative.
Societile n comun concentrative, spre deosebire
de societile n comun de cooperare, sunt acele
entiti care sunt independente din punct de vedere
operaional de societile-mam (aa numitele full
function joint ventures).
Criteriul eficienei. Unul dintre elementele care
sunt considerate a face diferena n mod
fundamental, cel puin pn n ultimii ani, ntre
modelul american i cel european n domeniul
concurenei este aa-numita problem a eficienelor
(efficiencies). Dac ncepnd cu mijlocul anilor
70, instanele americane au aplicat acest criteriu
n evaluarea practicilor anti-concureniale i mai
ales n evaluarea compatibilitii concentrrilor cu
concurena liber, autoritile europene au luat cu
mult mai puin n considerare acest aspect, promovnd
n continuare perspectiva rivalitii ntre firme82.
Criteriul eficienelor pare a fi extrem de atrgtor
pentru un economist, cel puin la prima vedere.
Blocarea proceselor de restructurare industrial nu
poate avea drept consecin dect meninerea unor
structuri concureniale artificiale precum i, n mod
evident, a ineficienelor n calea alocrii resurselor.
Cu toate acestea, poziia european pare a avea i

motivaii destul de puternice n sprijinul ei. n primul
rnd, din punct de vedere teoretic, eficienele luate
n considerare de ctre autoritile n domeniul
concurenei nu pot fi dect nite anticipri ex ante
ale evoluiei companiei luate n considerare
(respectiv a companiei ce se nate prin fuziune).
Pe lng economiile de scal directe care se nasc
prin concentrare, structura de producie existent
n momentul fuziunii, att la nivelul industriei, ct
i al companiei n cauz permit calcularea economiilor
de costuri care iau natere. Lund n considerare
ns dinamica pieei i a economiei n general, aceste
eficiene ex ante pot deveni ineficiene ex post dac
realitatea economic evolueaz ntr-o direcie opus
anticiprilor implicite n ipotezele de lucru avute n
vedere de ctre companie i autoriti. Astfel,
argumentul eficienelor n favoareaconcentrrii economice
ntre dou entiti nu reprezint dect o anticipare
speculativ asupra dinamicii ulterioare a pieei.
Pn la urm, dintr-o perspectiv ex ante (ignornd
dinamica ulterioar a resurselor, ideilor tehnologice
i preferinelor de consum) i eliminnd raionalitatea
limitat, se poate chiar argumenta c o economie
planificat este mai eficient dect una de pia. n
al doilea rnd, exist o diferen fundamental ntre
condiiile economice din SUA n momentul n care
acest criteriu a nceput s fie luat n considerare de
ctre autoriti i condiiile din economiile statelor
membre ale Uniunii Europene (i chiar din economia
american contemporan). Aceast diferen este
dat de piaa controlului corporaional, precum i
de mecanisimele de guvernan corporativ.
Spre deosebire de America anilor 70, n Uniunea
European nu exist o pia a controlului corporaional
matur. Prelurile ostile de firme sunt, de exemplu,
o raritate. Ori, tocmai aceast pia a controlului
corporaional este cea care ndeplinete rolul de
eliminare ex post a ineficienelor din cadrul unei
companii concentrate. Valul prelurilor ostile i a
deconglomerrii de la sfritul anilor 80 (ndeosebi
prin tranzaciile de tipul Leverage Buy Out)83 a
reprezentat pentru economia SUA factorul care a
asigurat eficiena operrii companiilor din anii 90
n aceeai msur dac nu chiar ntr-o msur
mai mare dect reglementrile specifice n
domeniul concentrrilor.
82
Cazul General Electric / Honeywell precum i condiiile impuse de ctre Comisia european fuziunii Boeing / McDonnel-Douglas.
Achiziionarea unei companii de ctre alta, folosind fonduri mprumutate. De obicei, compania sau indivizii care fac achiziia folosesc
propriile bunuri ca garanie pentru fonduri. Intenia este ca mprumuturile s fie rambursate din fluxurile de numerar ale companiei achiziionate.
83
36
The Commission retains the right to decide in

what regards the mergers with a community
dimension and the national authorities in what
regards the mergers that do not surpass a certain
threshold.
from a theoretical point of view, the efficiencies

taken into consideration by the competition
authorities cannot be based but on certain ex ante
anticipations on the evolution of the market size,
competitor rivalry and other factors.
The criteria that confer a merger a community

dimension are:
Besides direct scale economies generated by a

concentration, the current production structure of
the company as well as of competitors allow a
certain projection of the efficiencies that are
determined. If we take however into consideration
the dynamics of that particular market or the
economy in general, these ex ante efficiencies
may however become ex post inefficiencies
whether the economic and technological reality
evolves in a manner opposed to the explicit or
implied working hypothesis of the competition
authorities. The efficiencies argument in favour
of economic concentrations has a good deal of
speculative anticipation of the market dynamics.
1. the combined aggregate turnover of all the

undertakings concerned is more than 5 billion
euros and the aggregate communitywide turnover
of each of at least two of the undertakings
concerned is more than 250 million euros;
2. the combined aggregate worldwide turnover
of all the undertakings concerned is more than 2,5
billion euros and the combined aggregate
turnover of all the undertakings concerned is
more than 100 million euros turnover in each of
at least three member state. Meanwhile, the
aggregate turnover of each o at least two of the
undertakings concerned is more than 25 million euros.
The problem of concentrations is not raised only
in the mergers and acquisitions cases but also in
the case of concentrative joint ventures. The
concentrative joint ventures, as opposed to
cooperative joint ventures, are those entities that
operate independently from an economic and
organizational point of view from their parents
(also named full function joint ventures).
The efficiencies criterion. As we already saw, one
of the core elements that differentiate, at least
traditionally, the American and the European
models of competition policies is the so called
issue of efficiencies. Whether the American
authorities started in mid 70s to apply this criterion
in the appraisal of the anticompetitive practices and
especially of the economic concentrations, the
European counterparts have a time lag in this
respect as the rivalry norm seems to still be the
norm84. The criterion of efficiency seems to be
extremely attractive for an economist, at least at
first sight. Blocking certain industrial restructuring
processes cannot have but the consequence of
artificially maintaining certain market structures and,
obviously, the inefficient allocation of resources.
However, the European position may also have
some strong arguments in its support. First of all,
84
Using the same logic, someone may argue, from

an ex ante perspective (ignoring the later market
contingencies, technological innovations and
change in the consumers preferences) and
eliminating the bounded rationality, that a
socialist economy is more efficient than a market
economy. Secondly, there exists a fundamental
difference between the economic reality in
United States in the moment of the adoption of
this criterion and the current economic reality of
the member states of the European Union (and,
someone may argue, even from the present day
US). This difference resides in the operability of
the market for corporate control as well as
corporate governance mechanisms.
Unlike USA in the mid 70s, the European Union
does not have such a mature market. Hostile
takeovers are, for example, a rare event. Or it is
specifically this market for corporate control that
has the function to eliminate ex post efficiencies
in a merged entity. The wave of hostile takeovers
and deconglomeration from the end of the 80s
(especially through Leveraged Buy Outs85) has
arguably represented the real factor that allowed
the efficiencies in the operation of the companies
in the 90s, more than the merger control
legislation.
The case General Electric / Honeywell and also the conditions imposed by the Commission in the Boeing / McDonnel-Douglas merger.
LBO = the acquisition of a firm by another, using loan capital. Usually, the company or the individuals which acquire the other company
guarantee the loan with their own goods and intend to pay it from the cash flows of the acquired company.
85
37
Pericolul real pe care economia european l poate

cunoate i de care politica n domeniul
concurenei va fi responsabil n totalitate prin
adoptarea criteriului eficienelor este ca aceste
concentrri care vor deveni posibile odat cu
schimbarea de atitudine s nu poat face fa dinamicii
pieei prin restructurarea intern necesar n
momentul schimbrii condiiilor sectorului i
economiei n ansamblu. Iar aceast realitate este
perfect posibil n condiiile n care, n prezent,
libertatea fuziunilor i achiziiilor mai ales a celor
ostile este departe de a fi asigurat pe pieele
financiare europene. Astfel, adoptarea de ctre
Uniunea European a criteriului eficienelor poate
fi un pas greit n condiiile n care nu se asigur,
concomitent, o pia liber i fr obstacole a
controlului corporaional. America nsi poate
cunoate astfel de pierderi de eficien n condiiile
n care propria pia a controlului corporaional i-a
pierdut din dinamica i libertatea cunoscut pn la
sfritul anilor 80. Noul Regulament nr. 139 /
2004 al Consiliului cu privire la controlul
concentrrilor dintre firme a fost apreciat ca
expresia acestei convergene, marcnd o cretere a
rolului considerentelor de eficien n ceea ce
privete evaluarea compatibilitii fuziunilor i
achiziiilor cu legislaia european n domeniul
concurenei. n acelai sens, n 2005, Comisia a
fcut public un material cu privire la aplicarea
articolului 82 (abuzul prin excludere practicat de
firmele aflate ntr-o poziie dominant) prin care
se ridic aceeai problem. Dac n ceea ce privete
dimensiunea concurenei ntre firme, politica SUA
n domeniul concurenei pare a beneficia de un
avantaj n ceea ce privete substana i coerena,
trebuie subliniat c i politica european are un rol
consistent i inovator sub diferite aspecte. Atunci
cnd aceast problematic se va ridica n mod
serios din pespectiva concurenei n cadrul diferitelor
foruri internaionale, precum i a relaiilor bilaterale,
se poate aprecia c experiena european va oferi o
valoare adugat mai mare dect cea american.
Dorina autoritilor europene de a face politica

european n domeniul concurenei, la fel de
eficient precum cea american, s-a concretizat la
rndul su n Regulamentul nr. 1 / 2003, denumit
nu ntmpltor (alturi de pachetul legislativ care l-a
nsoit) de modernizare. Intenia Uniunii Europene
de a se apropia i n aceast sfer de modelul SUA
ridic ns probleme destul de sensibile, care in de
relaia dintre aplicarea legislaiei n domeniul
concurenei i sistemele naionale de drept ale
statelor membre.
Bibliografie
Limits and Control of Competition with a View to
International Harmonization, Kluwer Law International,
2002;
Yang-Ching Chao, Gee San, International and Comparative
Competition Law and Policies, Kluwer Law
International, 2001;
Maher Dabbah, Paul Lasok, Merger Control Worldwide,
Cambridge University Press, 2005;
Mark R. Joelson, An International Antitrust Primer: A
Guide to the Operations of United States, European
Union and other Key Competition Laws in the Global
Economy, Kluwer Law International, 2006;
Richard Wish, Competition Law, Oxford University
Press, 2005.
38
The real danger for the European economy and

the competition policy will assume the main
liability as it adopts the efficiency criterion is
that the new entities that will appear wont meet
the challenges of the dynamics of the market
process through internal restructuring. And thats
very possible in the context of a lack of operation
of an European market for corporate control. In
this way, the adoption by the European Union of
the efficiencies criterion may be partial wrong
step (or just a partial good one) in case it is not
completed by a liberalization of the market for
corporate control and the operation of the corporate
governance mechanisms. America itself has
known a process of inhibiting the operation of
this market and limiting the liberty of investors to
break down conglomerates through legitimate
means as in the 80s. The new regulation 139 /
2004 of the European Council as regards the
control of concentrations (the Merger Regulation)
seems to be the expression of such a convergence,
witnessing the increased role of efficiency
considerations in the evaluation of the compatibility
of mergers and acquisitions with the European
competition legislation. In the same direction, in
December 2005, the European Commission
made public a Discussion Paper regarding the
application of the article 82 (the abuse of exclusion
by the dominant firms). While on the antitrust
dimension, US policy seems to benefit from an
advantage in what regards the substance and the
coherence, it must be highlighted that the
European policy has a consistent and innovative
approach in other dimensions, such as the state
aid. When this issue will be seriously raised in
different international or bilateral for a, the
European experience will be more substantial
than the American one.
39
The desire of the European authorities to make

the competition policy as efficient as the
American one was materialized in the Regulation
1 / 2003 (and the legislative package that
accompanied it), called the modernization package.
The intention of the European Union to close the
gap towards USA in the enforcement field rises
however sensitive issues related to the connection
between European legislation and national law
systems.
Bibliography
Limits and Control of Competition with a View to
International Harmonization, Kluwer Law International,
2002;
Yang-Ching Chao, Gee San, International and
Comparative Competition Law and Policies, Kluwer
Law International, 2001;
Maher Dabbah, Paul Lasok, Merger Control Worldwide,
Cambridge University Press, 2005;
Mark R. Joelson, An International Antitrust Primer: A
Guide to the Operations of United States, European
Union and other Key Competition Laws in the Global
Economy, Kluwer Law International, 2006;
Richard Wish, Competition Law, Oxford University
Press, 2005.
PREURI DE EXPLOATARE
I PREURI EXCESIVE DE EXCLUDERE
- ABORDARE DIN PERSPECTIVA UNIUNII EUROPENE
Loredana COMNESCU86
Rezumat
Prin aplicarea prevederilor Tratatului de instituire a Comunitii Europene, autoritile de
concuren pot interveni pentru sancionarea cazurilor de preurile excesive (preuri de exploatare
sau preuri de excluziune). Autoritile de concuren nu au drept obiectiv reglementarea preurilor
, ns pot impune anumite msuri acolo unde concurena nu se manifest n mod liber pe baza
cererii i a ofertei. Practicarea unor preuri excesive reprezint acea situaie n care cel care
abuzeaza de poziia sa dominant solicit clienilor si preuri de vanzare ce depesc cu mult
costurile efective, plus un profit rezonabil. Aprecierea c un pre este excesiv se face prin comparaie
ntre preul ridicat i un pre format din costul de producie plus un profit rezonabil.
Cuvinte-cheie: preuri excesive, dominan, cost de producie, profit.
Legile europene de concuren condamn ca
abuzuri de exploatare politicile de pre ale
firmelor dominante care pot conduce la reducerea
bunstrii consumatorilor. Articolul 82(a) din
Tratatul de instituire a Comunitii Europene prevede
faptul c impunerea unor preuri nejustificate
consumatorilor prin existena unor productori
dominani constituie un abuz.
Exist cteva cazuri investigate de Comisia
European si de autoritile de concuren din statele
membre prin care au fost descoperite firme ce
abuzeaz de poziia lor dominant prin practicarea
unor preuri excesive. Acele cazuri arat c impunerea
de preuri excesive ridic o serie de dificulti i
orice ncercare de a detecta i de a nltura preurile
excesive conduce la predicii incorecte. n unele
cazuri autoritile pot ajunge la concluzia eronat
c preurile practicate sunt competitive. n acest
caz veniturile sunt sub nivelul optim. De asemenea
poate exista i situaia contrar cnd preurile sunt
considerate excesive, dar n realitate acestea sunt
competitive. n aceast situaie profiturile sunt
meninute la un nivel sczut, reducnd astfel
iniiativa de a investi i a inova ceea ce este n
detrimentul consumatorilor. Teoria economic
arat c pieele sunt eficiente atunci cnd preurile
86
sunt competitive, la preuri ridicate ncrederea

consumatorilor se reduce.
n teorie nu exist o definiie general acceptat
referitoare la preurile nejustificate (unfair
prices). Pentru adepii lui Marx n preul produsului
este inclus valoarea muncii implicat in producie.
Pentru economitii neoclasici, valoarea bunurilor i
serviciilor este dat de existena preului competitiv,
care este un pre de echilibru ce rezult din interaciunea
cererii i a ofertei ntr-o pia concurenial.O cretere
a preurilor peste nivelul competitiv implic doua
efecte negative asupra bunstrii consumatorului: n
primul rnd, consumatorul va plti pentru orice bun
sau serviciu un pre mai mare dect ar plti pe o pia
concurenial. n al doilea rnd, anumii consumatori cu
venituri modeste vor fi exclui de pe pia.
Concurena este rareori static i industriile i
manifest economiile de scop i de scal. n
industriile dinamice, unde costurile fixe sunt ridicate
i creterea costurilor este redus, preurile
competitive nu sunt date de costurile marginale,
fiind astfel imposibil de defint preurile competitive
utiliznd doar informaii referitoare la cost.
Inspector de concuren, Direcia Servicii.
40
EXPLOITATIVE PRICES
AND EXCLUSIONARY EXCESSIVE PRICES
EUROPEAN UNIONS PERSPECTIVE
Loredana COMNESCU87
Abstract88
The EC Treaty gives competition authorities the power to intervene against excessive prices (being
exploitative or exclusionary). Antitrust authorities should not aim to directly regulate firms prices,
access and output, but instead should focus on preserving structures and conditions whereby
market forces constrain price and increase output. The situation of imposing excessive prices represents
that fact regarding the abuse of a dominant firm which asks to its clients higher prices. These
selling prices include the profit and exceed the effective costs.
Keywords: excessive prices, dominance, production cost, profit.
European competition laws condemn as exploitative

abuses the pricing policies of dominant firms that
may result in a direct loss of consumer welfare.
Article 82(a) of the EC Treaty, for example,
expressly states that imposing unfair prices on
consumers by dominant suppliers constitutes an abuse.
Several firms have been found to abuse their
dominant positions by charging excessive prices in
cases brought by the European Commission and
the competition authorities of several Member
States. Those cases show that the assessment of
excessive pricing is subject to substantial conceptual
and practical difficulties, and that any policy that
seeks to detect and prohibit excessive prices is
likely to yield incorrect predictions in numerous
instances. In several cases, the national authorities
could conclude that the prices are competitive; thus
the incomes are below the optimum level. In other
cases, the prices could be considered excessive, but
in fact the prices are competitive. In this case the
income is at a lower level, reducing the innovation
enterprise, which would affect the consumer.
Economic theory shows that markets are most
efficient when prices are competitive. At higher
87
88
Competition inspector, Directorate of Services.

Translated into English by Loredana Comnescu.
41
prices, consumers are made worse off and overall

welfare is reduced.
There is no generally accepted definition of what
an unfair price is. For Marxist economists the
fair price of a product is equal to the value of
labor involved in its production. For neo-classical
economists, the fair value of a good or service is
given by its competitive market price, which is
the equilibrium price that would result from the
free interaction of demand and supply in a
competitive market. An increase in prices above
the competitive level has therefore two negative
effects on consumer welfare: First, it transfers rents
from consumers to firms, as every consumer who
purchases the goods and services in offer pays
more for them than in a competitive market.
Second, it destroys rents by forcing out of the market
some consumers with relatively modest valuations.
But competition is rarely static and industries often
exhibit significant economies of scale and/or
scope. In dynamic industries, where typically fixed
costs are high and incremental costs are low, the
competitive price is not given by marginal costs.
Un caz de preuri excesive incriminat de Comisia

European este reprezentat de United Brands
(UBC). n acest caz, Curtea European de Justiie
(ECJ) a reprimat decizia Comisiei, deoarece
aceasta considera analizele Comisiei subiective,
incomplete si defectuoase. ECJ susine c un pre
este excesiv atunci cnd nu are nici o legatur cu
valoarea economic a produsului tranzactionat.
Comisia European a considerat n decizia sa c
UBC deine o poziie dominant pe piata geografic
a bananelor, realiznd urmatoarele abuzuri:
G mpiedicau distribuitorii s revnd bananele dac
acestea erau nc verzi;

preuri discriminatorii ntre Scipio Group (cu
care UBC avea relaii comerciale) i ali
distribuitori;
G impuneau preuri excesive pentru vnzarea
bananelor Chiquita pentru consumatorii (alii dect
Scipio Group) din Belgia, Luxembourg, Danemarca,
Germania;
G refuzau s trateze cu clienii danezi. n acest
context, Comisia a analizat discrepanele de pre,
depistnd faptul c bananele Chiquita erau vndute
la un pre mult mai ridicat fa de cele vndute de
concureni.
Piaa medicamentelor pe baz de morfin cuprinde

2 segmente: aa-numita comunitate i segmentul
spitalelor. Aproximativ 86-90% din pia se
indreapt spre farmacii pentru uzul pacienilor, n
timp ce 10-14% se achiziioneaz de ctre spitale.
Napp deinea o cot de pia n exces de 90% n
ambele segmente. Lund n considerare barierele la
intrare pe piaa relevant, OFT a decis c Napp
deine o poziie dominant, iar politica de pre
folosit de Napp pe piaa morfinei era una att de
ruinare, ct i excesiv. Preurile practicate de
Napp la medicamente la un nivel foarte sczut n
spitale erau unele de ruinare, iar cele practicate la
un nivel foarte ridicat n farmacii erau preuri
excesive.
ns cheia acestui caz o constituie comparaia dintre

preurile practicate de UBC n Statele Membre.
Comisia European a decis faptul c preurile
practicate de UBC n afara Irlandei erau mai ridicate
cu circa 15%. Comisia nu a ncercat s stabileasc
costul de producie al UBC pentru a determina care
era preul corect pe care ar fi trebuit s-l practice.
Ins, singura determinare a fost cea legat de costul
direct dependent de presupusa profitabilitate din
vnzarea bananelor din Irlanda.
Un al doilea caz, mult mai recent este Napp
Pharmaceutical Holdings. Acesta este primul caz
de preuri excesive din UK. OFT (Office of Fair
Trading) a argumentat decizia din 2001 prin faptul
c Napp era dominanta pe piata morfinei i preurile
practicate de Napp ctre anumii consumatori erau
excesive. Acest caz a fost atacat prin apel la CCAT
(Competition Commission Appeals Tribunal) din UK.
Napp a fost amendat cu 3.21 milioane de lire sterline

pentru abuz de poziie dominant. Compania a fost
obligat s creasc preurile practicate pentru
spitale la un nivel care s acopere costurile totale i
de asemenea s reduc preurile cu 15% pentru
Serviciul Naional de Sntate.
Napp Pharmaceutical a facut apel la Comisia de
Concuren din UK n anul 2001, amenda
reducndu-se la 2,2 milioane de lire sterline, susinnd
faptul c OFT nu a luat n considerare evoluia
dinamic a concurentei pe pia, apreciind c pentru
a se demonstra dac preurile sunt excesive trebuie
s se ia n considerare ntreaga industrie
farmaceutic, s se fac un studiu bazat nu doar pe
costurile promoionale, dar i pe dezvoltarea unui
numar mare de alte produse care nu i acoper
propriile costuri, i de asemenea un studiu pentru
produse noi, multe dintre acestea fr succes.
Cazul Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg
Hamm AB (HHAB), prin care Scandlines a naintat
Comisiei o plngere pe data de 2 iulie 1997,
acuznd HHAB de ncalcarea Art. 82 din Tratatul
CE, prin perceperea unor taxe excesive i
discriminatorii pentru serviciile furnizate de
operatorii ce transbordeaz cu bacul:
G taxele de port sunt considerate a fi excesive,
deoarece acestea nu reflect costurile actuale utilizate
de ctre HHAB pentru furnizarea de servicii
operatorilor ce transbordeaz cu bacul;
G preurile practicate n port sunt considerate
discriminatorii, deoarece operatorii de feriboturi
practic preuri mult mai ridicate comparativ cu
ceilali utilizatoiri. Ei argumenteaz acest fapt prin
taxele percepute de HHAB altor operatori cargo,
taxe ce nu acoper costurile serviciilor furnizate.
42
The first case, United Brands, is one of the few

cases on excessive pricing under EC competition
law. In this case, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) quashed the Commissions decision because
it considered the economic analysis performed
subjective, incomplete and flawed. The ECJ stated
that a price is excessive when it has no reasonable
relation to the economic value of the product supplied.
The European Commission considered in its decision
37 that UBC had a dominant position in bananas
on the relevant geographic market, and that it had
committed four abuses:
G preventing its distributors/ripeners from reselling
bananas while still green;
G price discriminating between the Scipio group
(with which UBC had a particularly close business
relationship) and other distributors/ripeners;
G imposing unfair (i.e. excessive) prices for the
sale of Chiquita bananas for customers (other than
the Scipio group) in Belgium, Luxembourg,
Denmark and Germany; and
G refusing to supply to a particular Danish
customer. The Commission looked at price
discrepancies between branded and unbranded
bananas, finding that Chiquita bananas were slightly
more expensive than bananas sold by competitors.
But the key exercise was the comparison of UBCs

prices across Member States.
The Commission decided that UBCs price outside
Ireland was excessive by 15 percent. Furthermore,
the Commission did not attempt to establish UBCs
production costs in determining a fair price. Its
sole determination of cost was dependent on the
supposed profitability of banana sales in Ireland.
The second case, Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings,
is much more recent. This was the first excessive
pricing case tried under the UK 1998 Competition
Act. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) argued in its
2001 decision that Napp was dominant in the market
for sustained release morphine and that the prices
charged by Napp to some consumers were excessive.
The case was upheld on appeal by the UK Competition
Commission Appeals Tribunal (CCAT).
43
In the market for sustained release morphine

tablets, there are two customer segments: the
so-called community (or general practitioner) and
hospital segments. Approximately 86-90 percent
of the market is supplied by wholesalers to
community pharmacies to be used by patients as
prescribed by their primary care physicians, while
10-14 percent is purchased directly by hospitals.
Napp had market share in excess of 90 percent in
both consumer segments. When put together with
the considerable barriers to entry into the relevant
markets, the OFT decided that Napp had market
dominance and its practice of pricing the drug at a very
low level in the hospital segment was ruled predatory,
and its pricing at a high level in the community/general
practitioner segment was ruled excessive.
Napp was fined 3.21 million for an abuse of
dominant position. The company was required to
increase its hospital prices to a level which covered
average total costs, and was also ordered to reduce its
prices by 15 percent to the National Health Service.
Napp took issue with the OFTs conclusions. The
case was upheld on appeal before the UK Competition
Commission Appeals Tribunal (CCAT) in 2001,
but the fine was reduced to 2.2 million. Napp
Pharmaceutical claimed that the OFT had not taken
proper account of the dynamic nature of competition
in the market, because there should be taken into
account the whole pharmaceutical industry, and
there should be also a study based on new products.
Another case is Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of
Helsingborg Hamm AB (HHAB). Scandlines
lodged a complaint to the Commission on 2 July
1997 alleging that HHAB has infringed Article 82
of the EC Treaty, by levying excessive and
discriminatory charges for services provided to
ferry operators:
G port charges are deemed to be excessive because
they do not reflect the actual costs borne by HHAB
for the provision of services to the ferry operators;
G port charges are deemed to be discriminatory
because ferry operators are charged substantially
higher prices than the other users of the port. They
further argue that the port fees charged by HHAB to
other cargo operators do not cover the costs for the
services provided to them.
Acesta este rezultatul, potrivit Scandlines, punctului

de vedere al HHAB conform cruia portul este privit ca
o singur unitate economic i operaional ce nu
percepe taxe diferiilor utilizatori ai portului, potrivit
unei alocri a costurilor n concordan cu gradul de
folosin al portului. Astfel, ar trebui ca pentru
operatorii de feriboturi s se perceap taxe mai
scazute comparativ cu ceilali utilizatori din port.
Dup cteva decenii de dezbateri, s-a ajuns la

concluzia c este foarte greu de mbinat n practic
obiectivitatea i eficiena. Se poate defini o regul
obiectiv, specificnd, de exemplu c o firma
impune preuri excesive atunci cnd acestea sunt
cu x procente mai mari dect media costurilor
variabile. ns acest lucru se va reflecta n reguli
arbitrare, care vor duce n mod sigur la venituri
ineficiente.
*
*
Dac numrul cazurilor de preuri excesive era

relativ modest pn n prezent, acestea ar putea s
creasc pe viitor datorit efectelor desprinse din
liberalizarea anumitor industrii. Autoritile de
concuren ar trebui s intervin tocmai n sectoarele
liberalizate, datorit inexistenei unei reglementri
efective, rolul acestor autoriti crescnd prin
aplicarea Articolului 81(3) din Tratatul de instituire
a Comuinitii Europene, dar mai ales a Articolului
82. Problemele cu care se confrunt autoritile de
concuren i Curile de justiie se refer la faptul
c nu exist o delimitare clar pentru relaia pre cost
sau profitabilitate prevazute de Articolul 82(a) n
masur s satisfac 2 conditii: 1. de obiectivitate; 2.
de eficien.
n ceea ce privete obiectivitatea, regula este
urmatoarea: (1) trebuie s se specifice standardul
preului i al profitului care se compar. (2)
identificarea unui termen de comparaie i (3)
definirea unui prag limit pentru pre sau profitul
variabil corespunztor.
Articolul 82(a) interzice firmelor dominante

impunerea direct sau indirect a preurilor de vnzare
sau de cumprare ori a altor condiii comerciale89.
O firm deine o poziie dominant dac are o cot
de pia suficient de mare pentru a se manifesta n
mod independent fa de concureni, clieni sau
consumatori. Potrivit articolului invocat mai sus,
orice firm dominant, indiferent de mrimea cotei
de pia, are obligaia90 de a nu impune preuri
excesive. Astfel, un pre se consider a fi excesiv
atunci cnd o firm dominant profit de poziia sa
pe pia prin stabilirea unor niveluri de pre
semnificativ mai mari dect cele ce rezult efectiv
din manifetarea liber a concurenei.
Comisia examineaz n continuare comportamentul
companiilor care i manifest dominana n mod
direct asupra concurenilor sau noilor intrai, fapt
ce reprezint o ameninare pentru concuren, prin
practicarea unor preuri excesive de excludere.
n ceea ce privete eficiena, preurile sunt excesive

atunci cnd sunt stabilite la niveluri ce reduc
eficiena static i dinamic de pe pia n
detrimentul consumatorilor.
89
90
Tratatul de la Amsterdam, art. 82.

Michelin 322/81 [1983] ECR 3461.
44
This is a result, according to Scandlines, of HHAB

viewing the port as a whole, single operational and
economic unit and not charging the different users
of the port according to an allocation of the costs
corresponding to their respective use of the port.
The complainant states that charges should be
considerably lower for ferry operators and higher
for the other users of the port.
*
*
If the number of excessive pricing cases in the EU

has been relatively modest until now, it may
increase in the future due the combined effects of
the liberalisation of network industries. National
competition authorities should intervene through
liberalized sectors. In the absence of effective
regulation, the role of NCA should increase in
applying of Article 81(3) of EC Treaty, but more
generally in the application of all antitrust provisions,
including Article 82 EC. There is no price-cost or
profitability benchmarking rule that implements
Article 82(a) (or its counterparts in the Member
States) in a manner that satisfies the following two
conditions: (1) objectivity and (2) efficiency.
To be objective the rule would have to (1) specify
what measure of price and profit would be
employed in the comparison, (2) identify an
unambiguous and workable comparator, and (3)
define a critical threshold for the price or profit
variable.
After several decades of debating how to regulate

utilities and other natural monopoly/oligopoly
industries, it should be clear that there is no way to
satisfy those two requirementsobjectivity and
efficiencyin practice.There could be define an
objective rule which will state that a firm impose
excessive prices, in this situation the prices are
higher with x per cent than the average of variable
costs.
According to Article 82(a) of the EC Treaty, a firm
with market power abuses its dominant position if
it directly or indirectly imposes unfair purchase
or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions91.
A firm holds a dominant position if it possesses
enough market power to behave to an appreciable
extent independently of the competitors, customers
and consumers. Due to the general formulation of
Article 82, every dominant firm, however its market
power has been acquired or maintained, has the
special responsibility92 not to set excessive prices.
Thus, a price is unfair when dominant firms have
actually taken advantage of their dominant position
to set prices significantly higher than those which
would result from effective competition.
Commission examines the behaviour of dominant
companies which manifest their dominance over
the competitors or over the new entrants. This fact
represents a threat for competition, by imposing
exclusionary prices.
To be efficient, the general benchmark rule

described above would have to find that prices are
excessive only when set at levels that reduce the
static and dynamic efficiency of the market to the
detriment of consumers.
91
92
Treaty on European Union (Amsterdam Treaty) art 82.

To take the general formulation of Michelin 322/81 [1983] ECR 3461.
45
MODIFICRI RECENTE ALE LEGISLAIEI COMUNITARE

N DOMENIUL CONCENTRRILOR ECONOMICE.
NOUTI PRIVIND MSURILE CORECTIVE
Alina LPDAT93
Rezumat
n luna octombrie 2008, Comisia European i-a revizuit orientrile privind msurile corective
referitoare la controlul concentrrilor economice, astfel nct s asigure o abordare mai eficient a
problemelor concureniale. O analiza retrospectiv a evideniat faptul c doar 57% din msurile
corective impuse pn acum de Comisia European au reuit cu adevrat s elimine problemele
concureniale aprute ca urmare a implementrii concentrrilor economice. Articolul i propune s
prezinte succint aspectele cu caracter de noutate cuprinse n Comunicarea revizuit a Comisiei
Europene privind msurile corective.
Cuvinte cheie: concentrri economice, msuri corective, cesionri, cumprtor adecvat, clauza de
reexaminare.
Msurile corective reprezint modificrile aduse
operaiunilor de concentrare economic cu scopul
reducerii puterii de pia a prilor implicate i
restabilirii condiiilor de concuren efectiv care
ar fi denaturat ca urmare a crerii sau consolidrii
prin concentrarea economic a unei poziii dominante.
Plecnd de la necesitatea de a reflecta practica aplicat
de Comisie, dar i de a ngloba jurisprudena
recent a instanelor europene, n special n ceea
ce privete cadrul juridic de acceptare sau respingere
a acestor msuri, n luna octombrie a acestui an,
Comisia European a revizuit Comunicarea
privind msurile corective. n acelai timp a fost
modificat i Regulamentul (CE) nr.802/2004 de
punere n aplicare a Regulamentului (CE)
nr.139/2004, n aa fel nct s fie conform cu
modificrile aduse Comunicrii privind msurile
corective.
a unei activiti de sine-stttoare ctre un cumprator

adecvat;
G introducerea unor criterii de evaluare a
caracterului de cumprator adecvat, inclusiv prin
stabilirea unor cerine minimale standard privind
cumprtorul;
G introducerea n angajamente a unei clauze de
reexaminare;
G clarificri privind rolul i obligaiile mandatarului
nsrcinat cu monitorizarea;
G stabilirea unei perioade de timp n care Comisia
are dreptul s monitorizeze viabilitatea i eficacitatea
punerii n aplicare a msurii corective.
n cele ce urmeaz, fiecare aspect cu caracter de
noutate va fi detaliat separat.
Introducerea unui nou formular privind msurile
corective
Principalele nouti constau n:

G introducerea unui formular privind msurile
corective, denumit formular RM;

G accentuarea ideii c msurile corective sunt
acceptabile numai dac sunt viabile i elimin efectiv

problemele din domeniul concurenei, evideniind
preferina Comisiei pentru operaiunea de cesionare
93
n mod uzual prile transmit angajamente coninnd

propuneri de msuri corective menite a asigura
compatibilitatea concentrrii cu piaa comun.
Comisia trebuie s evalueze dac msurile corective
propuse, odat puse n aplicare, elimin problemele
de concuren identificate. n acest scop,
Regulamentul (CE) nr.802/2004 de punere n aplicare
Inspector de concuren, Direcia Servicii.
46
RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

MERGERS LEGISLATION.
CHANGES REGARDING REMEDIES
Alina LPDAT94
Abstract 95
In October 2008, the European Commission has revised its guidelines on remedies in merger control
in order to ensure that competition concerns are dealt with more effectively. A retrospective look at
merger remedies has shown that only 57 per cent of remedies imposed by the European Commission
actually succeeded in solving competition concerns following the merger. This article is trying to
present briefly the news set out in the Commission revised Remedies Notice.
Keywords: mergers, remedies, divestitures, suitable purchaser, review clause.
Remedies are modifications to a proposed transaction,

suggested by the parties involved, in order to
reduce the merging parties' market power and to
restore conditions for effective competition which
would be distorted as a result of the merger creating
or strengthening a dominant position.
Starting with the necessity to reflect the Commission's
experience in a large number of cases and, also, the
recent jurisprudence of the European Courts,
notably on the legal framework for accepting or
rejecting remedies, in October 2008, the European
Commission has revised the Remedies Notice. In
the same time, the Commission has adopted
amendments to the Merger Implementing Regulation
(EC) No. 802/2004, in line with the changes to the
Remedies Notice.
The most important changes include:
G the introduction of a form for submitting
information on remedies, hereinafter form RM;
G emphasising the idea that remedies are only
acceptable if they are viable and effectively eliminate
the competition concerns, underliningthe Commissions
preference for the divestiture of a viable business
to a suitable purchaser;
94
95
Competition inspector, Directorate of Services.

Translated into English by Alina Lpdat.
47
G the introduction of some criteria to define the

suitability of a purchaser, including the settlement of
the standard purchaser requirements;
G the introduction of a review clause that commitments
will include, irrespective of the type of remedy;
G clarifications on the role and obligations of the
monitoring trustee;
G the settlement of a period of time within the
Commission has the right to monitor the effective
implementation of the remedy.
Further on, every new aspect will be detailed one

by one.
The introduction of a new form for submitting
information on remedies
Usually, the parties submit commitments containing
remedies, with a view to rendering the concentration
compatible with the common market. The
Commission has to assess whether the proposed
remedies, once implemented, would eliminate the
competition concerns identified. To this end, the
Commission has amended the Regulation (EC)
No. 802/2004 for implementing the Merger
a Regulamentului (CE) nr.139/2004 a fost modificat

prin introducerea unei noi anexe, denumite formular
RM privind msurile corective, care oblig prile
ce efectueaz notificarea s furnizeze, mpreun cu
angajamentele, informaii detaliate privind
coninutul angajamentelor oferite, condiiile de
punere n aplicare a acestora i s demonstreze
adecvarea lor pentru eliminarea oricror obstacole
semnificative n calea concurenei. n cazul
angajamentelor care constau n cesionarea unei
activiti, prile trebuie s furnizeze o descriere
detaliat, n special a modului n care funcioneaz
n prezent activitatea propus pentru cesionare.
Aceste informaii permit Comisiei s evalueze
viabilitatea, competitivitatea i potenialul comercial
al activitii, comparnd funcionarea actual a
acesteia cu obiectivele propuse n cadrul
angajamentelor.
Msurile corective sunt acceptate numai dac sunt
viabile i elimin efectiv problemele concureniale
identificate. Ideea n sine nu este o noutate, ns,
n aceast form revizuit a Comunicrii privind
msurile corective, se accentueaz necesitatea ca
angajamentele propuse s elimine complet problemele
de concuren i s fie complete i eficace din toate
punctele de vedere. In caz contrar concentrarea
economic supus autorizrii va fi interzis.
Un alt aspect scos n eviden este acela c
angajamentele structurale, n special cesionrile,
propuse de pri vor ndeplini aceste condiii numai
n msura n care Comisia poate concluziona, cu
un grad de certitudine suficient, c va fi posibil
punerea n aplicare a acestora i c noile structuri
comerciale rezultnd din acestea sunt susceptibile
de a fi suficient de viabile i de durabile pentru a
asigura c distorsionarea semnificativ a concurenei
nu se va materializa.
Gradul suficient de certitudine privind punerea n
aplicare a angajamentelor propuse poate fi afectat,
n special, de riscuri legate de transferul unei
activiti destinate cesionrii, cum ar fi condiii pe
care trebuie s le ndeplineasc prile care particip
la cesionare, drepturi ale terilor n legtur cu
activitatea sau riscuri privind gsirea unui cumprtor
adecvat, precum i riscuri legate de degradarea
activelor pn la data realizrii cesionrii. Obligaia
de a nltura aceste elemente de incertitudine
revine n totalitate prilor atunci cnd propun
Comisiei msurile corective.
Cesionarea unei activiti de sine-stttoare ctre

un cumprtor adecvat
Cesiunea, n accepiunea dat n domeniul
concurenei, reprezint operaiunea de transmitere
printr-un contract cu titlu oneros a dreptului de
proprietate asupra unei activiti sau pri dintr-o
activitate deinute de o societate.
n prezent, cesiunea reprezint cea mai eficient i,
din acest motiv, preferat modalitate de a menine
concurena efectiv, deoarece creaz condiiile de
nfiinare a unei noi entiti concureniale. Ideea de
baz care trebuie avut n vedere la analizarea acestui
tip de msur corectiv este ca activitatea ce
urmeaz a fi cesionat s fie viabil, s poat funciona
autonom i s poat concura efectiv i durabil cu
entitatea creat prin concentrarea economic.
n acest sens, pentru a crea un concurent efectiv pe
pieele afectate, s-ar putea dovedi necesar cesionarea
unor activiti legate de piee pe care nu s-au
identificat probleme de concuren, dar care nu pot fi
separate de activitile desfurate pe pieele afectate.
Totodat, pentru a fi viabil, activitatea ce urmeaz
a fi cesionat trebuie s includ toate activele care
contribuie la funcionarea sa curent, precum i
ntregul personal angajat sau care efectueaz funcii
eseniale pentru activitate.
Caracterul adecvat al cumprtorului
Plecnd de la ideea c efectul pe care l vizeaz
cesionarea va fi atins numai dac i atunci cnd
activitatea este transferat unui cumprtor adecvat
n posesia cruia va deveni o for competitiv
activ pe pia, s-au identificat o serie de cerine
minimale standard privind cumprtorul:
G s fie independent de pri i s nu aib legturi
cu acestea;
G s dispun de resursele financiare, de competen
relevant dovedit i s aib interesul i capacitatea

de a dezvolta activitatea cesionat sub forma unei
fore competitive viabile i active aflat n concuren
cu prile;
G achiziionarea activitii de ctre un cumprtor
propus nu trebuie s fie susceptibil a crea noi
probleme de concuren i nici nu trebuie s
comporte riscul de a ntrzia punerea n aplicare a
angajamentelor.
48
Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 by introducing a

new form RM which obliges the notifying parties
to provide, with the commitments, detailed
information on the content of the commitments
offered, the conditions for their implementation
and showing their suitability to remove any significant
impediment of effective competition. For commitments
consisting in the divestiture of a business, parties
have to describe in detail in particular how the
business to be divested is currently operated. This
information will enable the Commission to assess
the viability, competitiveness and marketability of
the business by comparing its current operation to
its proposed scope under the commitments.
Remedies are only acceptable if they are viable and
effectively eliminate the competition concerns.
This statement isnt a new idea, but this revised
Remedies Notice stress out that the commitments
have to eliminate the competition concerns entirely
and have to be comprehensive and effective from
all points of view. Otherwise, the proposed merger
must be prohibitive.
Another underlined aspect is that structural
commitments, in particular divestitures, proposed
by the parties will meet these conditions only in so
far as the Commission is able to conclude with the
requisite degree of certainty that it will be possible
to implement them and that it will be likely that the
new commercial structures resulting from them
will be sufficiently workable and lasting to ensure
that the significant impediment to effective
competition will not materialize.
The requisite degree of certainty concerning the
implementation of the proposed commitments may
in particular be affected by risks in relation to the
transfer of a business to be divested, such as
conditions attached by the parties to the divestiture,
third party rights in relation to the business or the
risks of finding a suitable purchaser, as well as
risks in relation to the degradation of the assets
until the divestiture has taken place. It is incumbent
on the parties to remove such uncertainties as to
the implementation of the remedy when submitting
it to the Commission.
49
The divestiture of a viable business to a suitable

purchaser
Divestiture, in competition field, means the
disposition or sale of an activity or parts of an
activity by a company.
Nowadays, divestiture represents the most effective
and preferred way to maintain effective competition,
because creates the conditions for the emergence of
a new competitive entity. The basic idea we have
to consider when analyze this kind of remedies is
that the divested activities must consist of a viable
business that can operate on a stand-alone-basis and
must be able to compete effectively with the
merged entity on a lasting basis.
To this purpose, to create an effective competitor in
the affected markets, it may also be necessary to
include activities which are related to markets
where the Commission did not identify competition
concerns, but which can not be separated from the
activities on affected markets.
In the same time, in order to be a viable one, the
business to be divested has to include all the assets
which contribute to its current operation and all
personnel which is currently employed or providing
essential functions for the business.
Suitability of a purchaser
Working from the idea that the intended effect of
the divestiture will only be achieved if and once
the business is transferred to a suitable purchaser in
whose hands it will become an active competitive
force in the market, the Commission identified the
standard purchaser requirements as follows:
G the purchaser is required to be independent of
and unconnected to the parties;

G the purchaser must possess the financial
resources, proven relevant expertise and have the

incentive and ability to maintain and develop the
divested business as a viable and active competitive
force in competition with the parties;
G the acquisition of the business by a proposed
purchaser must neither be likely to create new
competition problems nor give rise to a risk that
the implementation of the commitments will be
delayed.
Clauza de reexaminare
O alt noutate o reprezint introducerea n
angajamente, indiferent de tipul msurii corective,
a unei clauze de reexaminare, care va permite
Comisiei, la cererea motivat a prilor, s acorde
o prelungire a termenului sau, n cazuri specifice,
s renune, s modifice sau s nlocuiasc
angajamentele.
Existena posibilitii de a modifica angajamentele
este important n special pentru angajamentele
care nu implic cesionarea, ca de exemplu msurile
corective privind accesul, care pot continua mai
muli ani i pentru care nu pot fi anticipate, la data
adoptrii deciziei Comisiei, toate evoluiile legate
de punerea n aplicare a angajamentelor.
Rolul i obligaiile mandatarului nsrcinat cu
monitorizarea
Spre deosebire de vechea Comunicare privind
msurile corective, forma revizuit a acesteia
distinge clar 5 sarcini principale i neexclusive pe
care mandatarul nsrcinat cu monitorizarea trebuie
s le ndeplineasc sub supravegherea Comisiei, i
anume:
G supravegherea msurilor de salvgardare pentru
activitatea de cesionat n cursul perioadei de tranziie;

G n cazurile de disociere, monitorizeaz separarea
activelor i alocarea personalului ntre activitatea
de cesionat i activitile reinute de pri;
G supravegheaz eforturile prilor de a gsi un
cumprtor potenial, asigurndu-se c eventualii
cumprtori primesc informaii corecte i
suficiente cu privire la activitatea de cesionat;
G acioneaz ca punct de contact pentru orice
solicitri provenite de la poteniali cumprtori n
legtur cu angajamentele;
G ntocmete rapoarte periodice prin care
informeaz Comisia cu privire la stadiul respectrii
angajamentelor.
Stabilirea unei perioade de timp n care Comisia

are dreptul s monitorizeze viabilitatea i eficacitatea
punerii n aplicare a msurii corective
Un alt element de noutate l reprezint paragraful
conform cruia angajamentele trebuie s prevad
c, n decursul unei perioade de 10 ani dup adoptarea
deciziei de acceptare a angajamentelor, Comisia
poate solicita informaii de la pri. Acest lucru va
permite Comisiei s monitorizeze punerea n
aplicare eficace a msurii corective.
n contextul actualei crize financiare globale, n
care numrul companiilor aflate n dificultate este
n continu cretere, i prin urmare i numrul
operaiunilor de concentrare economic, Comunicarea
revizuita a Comisiei privind msurile corective,
reprezint un ghid de ndrumare binevenit i foarte
util att autoritilor naionale de concuren ct i
ntreprinderilor implicate n cazurile de concentrri
economice.
Bibliografie
Regulamentul (CE) nr. 139/2004 privind controlul
concentrrilor economice ntre ntreprinderi;
Regulamentul (CE) nr.802/2004 de punere n aplicare a
Regulamentului (CE) nr. 139/2004;
Comunicarea Comisiei privind msurile corective
admisibile n temeiul Regulamentului (CE) nr.4064/1989
al Consiliului i al Regulamentului (CE) nr.447/1998 al
Comisiei din 2001;
Comunicarea Comisiei privind msurile corective
admisibile n temeiul Regulamentului (CE) nr. 139/2004
al Consiliului i al Regulamentului (CE) nr. 802/2004 al
Comisiei din 2008.
50
Review clause
Including a review clause in all commitments,
irrespective of the type of remedies, represents
another new aspect of revised Remedies Notice.
This may allow the Commission, upon request by
the parties showing good cause, to grant an extension
of deadlines or, in exceptional circumstances, to
waive, modify or substitute the commitments.
The possibility to modify the commitments in any
way (waive, modify or substitute) is more relevant
for non-divestiture commitments, such as access
commitments, which may be on-going for a number
of years and for which not all contingencies can be
predicted at the time of the adoption of the
Commission decision.
The settlement of a period of time within the

Commission has the right to monitor the effective
implementation of the remedy
According to this new introduced article, the
commitments have to foresee that for a period of
10 years after the adoption of the decision accepting
the commitments, the Commission may request
information from the parties. This will allow the
Commission to monitor the effective implementation
of the remedy.
In the context of global financial crisis, when the
number of companies having difficulties is
increasing and also the number of mergers is rising,
the revised Commission Remedies Notice represents
a welcome and very useful guideline for both
National Competition Authorities and companies
involved in mergers.
The role and obligations of the monitoring trustee

Bibliography
In distinction from the old Remedies Notice, the

revised form of it, clearly point out five main,
non-exhaustive tasks which the monitoring trustee
should carry out under the supervision of the
Commission:
Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 on the control of

concentrations between undertakings;
Merger Implementing Regulation (EC) No. 802/2004;
G supervising the safeguards for the business to be

divested in the interim period;
G in carve-out cases, the monitoring trustee has to
monitor the splitting of assets and the allocation of
the personnel between the divested business and
retained businesses by the parties;
G overseeing the parties' efforts to find a potential
purchaser and verifying that potential purchasers
receive correct and sufficient information relating
to the business;
G act as a contact point for any requests by third
parties, in particular potential purchasers, in relation
to the commitments;
G submitting period compliance reports to the
Commission.
51
Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council

Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 and under Commission
Regulation (EC) No 447/98;
Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission
Regulation (EC) No 802/2004.
ANALIZA CONCEPTUAL A SUSTENABILITII FISCALE

Emilia CMPEANU96
Rezumat
Creterea gradelor de ndatorare public a statelor, precum i acumularea de datorii externe a condus
la necesitatea studierii sustenabilitii datoriei publice, considerndu-se c meninerea deficitului
bugetar la un nivel prudent ar asigura i sustenabilitatea politicii fiscale. Scopul lucrrii este de a
prezenta numeroasele sensuri pe care sustenabilitatea fiscal le-a dobndit de-a lungul timpului.
Cuvinte cheie: deficit bugetar, deficit primar, datorie public, sustenabilitate, constrngere bugetar.
Clasificare JEL: H 63.
Creterea gradului de ndatorare a rilor i
acumularea de datorii externe a condus la necesitatea
studierii sustenabilitii datoriei publice,
considerndu-se c meninerea deficitului bugetar
la un nivel prudent ar asigura i sustenabilitatea
politicii fiscale. Aceste preocupri au fost accelerate
i de organismele internaionale (Fondul Monetar
Internaional, Organizaia Economic de Cooperare
i Dezvoltare, Banca Mondial, etc.), care au
stabilit metodologii de determinare a nivelului
sustenabil al datoriei publice, inclusiv al datoriei
externe nc de la nceputul anilor 80 cnd marea
majoritate a rilor industrializate au nregistrat
grade ridicate de ndatorare.
ns, definirea sustenabilitii datoriei publice, i,
implicit, a politicii fiscale nu este uor de realizat
avnd n vedere, pe de o parte, implicaiile acestora
la nivel macroeconomic, i, pe de alt parte,
numeroasele sensuri pe care le-au dobndit de-a
lungul timpului.
Sintetiznd preocuprile privind sustenabilitatea
datoriei publice sau a politicii fiscale putem vorbi
de urmtoarele modaliti de definire: stabilitate;
constrngere bugetar intertemporal; solvabilitate;
96
97
sustenabilitate pe termen scurt; sustenabilitate pe

termen lung; sustenabilitate potrivit criteriilor
stabilite n Pactul de Stabilitate i Cretere. n plus,
sustenabilitatea datoriei publice poate fi identificat
i pe baza unor indicatori de sustenabilitate.
Stabilitate. In viziunea lui Zee (1987), sustenabilitatea
reprezint stabilitate aa cum reiese din studiul
privind sustenabilitatea i optimul datoriei publice:
nivelul sustenabil al datoriei publice este cel ce
permite economiei, n absena ocurilor exogene
neanticipate, s tind spre echilibru97. Totodat
trebuie inut cont c sustenabilitatea datoriei
publice implic necesitatea revenirii datoriei
publice la gradul iniial de ndatorare (Blanchard,
Chouraqui, Hagemann i Sartor, 1990). Existena
unui grad de ndatorare apreciat ca fiind sustenabil
ridic o serie de probleme privind modul n care
este stabilit, viabilitatea acestuia i cine l fixeaz.
De asemenea, Blanchard (1990) susinea c
ustenabilitatea poate fi asigurat i prin politici
fiscale i bugetare care s nu genereze creterea
accelerat a gradului de ndatorare, majorarea
presiunii fiscale, reducerea semnificativ a cheltuielilor
bugetare, monetizarea deficitului bugetar sau
repudierea datoriei publice.
Lect. univ. dr. la Catedra de Finane din cadrul Academiei de Studii Economice din Bucureti.
Zee, H. (1987), On the Sustainability and Optimality of Government Debt, IMF Working Paper WP/87/83, p. 8.
52
INVESTIGATING THE CONCEPT OF FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY

Emilia CMPEANU98
Abstract99
The growth of public debt ratio and external debt ratio conducted to the necessity to study public debt
sustainability is the result of the consideration that public deficit must be maintained at a prudent
level in order to ensure fiscal sustainability. The aim of this paper is to define the concept of fiscal
sustainability.
Keywords: budget deficit, primary deficit, public debt, sustainability; intertemporal budget
constraint.
JEL classification: H 63.
The growth of public debt ratio and external debt
ratio conducted to the necessity to study public
debt sustainability is the result of the consideration
that public deficit must be maintained at a prudent
level in order to ensure fiscal sustainability. Also,
international organizations (International Monetary
Fund, Organization for Economic and Co-operation
and Development, The World Bank) had
established methodologies to identify the sustainable
level of public debt and external debt since 80
when majority of industrialized countries had
confronted major fiscal unbalances.
But, defining public debt or even fiscal sustainability
is a difficult process taking into the consideration
the macroeconomic impact and the various values.
long run, and according to the Stability and Growth

Pact. We also may use different indicators to
determine the sustainable level for public debt.
Stability. Fiscal sustainability means stability: A
sustainable level of public debt is therefore one
which allows the economy, in the absence of
unanticipated exogenous shocks, to settle eventually
in to a steady-state100. This stability also implies
the necessity that public debt must convergence to
its initial level (Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hagemann
and Sartor, 1990) which is difficult to be identified.
Stability is used to define a prudent fiscal policy
that, according to Blanchard (1990), must not
explode public debt ratio and tax rate, reduce the
budget expenditures, or even repudiation of debt.
Resuming the debates of fiscal sustainability we

may define it as stability, intertemporal budget
constraint, solvability, sustainability on short and
98
Ph.D. Lecturer at the Department of Finance in the Bucharest University of Economics.

Translated into English by Emilia Cmpeanu.
100
Zee, 1987: pp. 8.
99
53
Constrngere bugetar intertemporal. Sustenabilitatea

datoriei publice deriv din constrngerea bugetar
intertemporal, potrivit creia datoriile guvernamentale
totale trebuie s fie acoperite de valoarea
actualizat a viitoarelor venituri guvernamentale
(Blanchard, 1990; Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hageman,
and Sartor, 1990; Gramlich, 1990; Horne, 1991;
Corsetti i Roubini,1991; Buiter, 1995; Commission
of the European Communities, 2006). Deci,
guvernul trebuie s nregistreze, n viitor, surplusuri
primare suficient de mari pentru a finana dobnzile
la datoria public, precum i alte cheltuieli (de
exemplu, cheltuielile sistemului public de pensii).
Solvabilitate. Datoria public sustenabil
reprezint acel nivel de ndatorare ce poate fi
rambursat de autoritile publice fr a se realiza,
n viitor, ajustri ale veniturilor i cheltuielilor
bugetare. n acest sens, sustenabilitatea datoriei
publice include solvabilitatea i lichiditatea statului
(Geithner, 2002). Aceste concepte trebuie tratate
separat, fiecare avnd identiti proprii ce conduc
la sustenabilitatea politicii fiscale. Astfel, o entitate
este solvabil dac valoarea actualizat a cheltuielilor
primare curente i viitoare este mai mic dect
diferena dintre valoarea actualizat a veniturilor
curente i viitoare i serviciul iniial al datoriei
publice; ... obligaiile unei entiti sunt sustenabile
dac satisfac constrngerea bugetar fr corecii
majore ale veniturilor i cheltuielilor avnd n
vedere costul finanrii101. Vulnerabilitatea, ce
exprim riscul unei entiti de a intra n criz102,
este un alt concept legat de cel de sustenabilitate.
Ca urmare, simpla analiz a gradului de ndatorare
a unei ri nu este suficient pentru a stabili dac
politica datoriei publice este sustenabil. Creterea
gradului de ndatorare nu implic neaprat i
inexistena sustenabilitii dac creterea economic
este mai mare dect rata real a dobnzii la
mprumuturile de stat. Deci, solvabilitatea statului
este o condiie necesar dar nu i suficient pentru
ca politica datoriei publice sau, n sens larg, politica
fiscal s fie sustenabil (Horne, 1991).
101
102
Astfel, sustenabilitatea este strns legat de condiia

ca traiectoria variabilelor macroeconomice s nu
fie influenat de alegerea ntre creterea presiunii
fiscale i contractarea de noi mprumuturi de stat.
n acest caz, nu mai conteaz cum este finanat
deficitul bugetar ceea ce ne conduce la problematica
echivalenei ricardiene. De asemenea, corelarea ratei
reale a dobnzii la datoria public cu creterea economic
implic aplicarea schemei Ponzi.
Sustenabilitatea pe termen scurt se refer la faptul
c politicile fiscale i bugetare trebuie s reacioneze
instantaneu n scopul evitrii creterii excesive a
gradului de ndatorare. Aceast sustenabilitate pe
termen scurt este influenat de structura datoriei
publice n funcie de maturitate, moned, condiiile
medii ale obligaiilor asumate.
Sustenabilitatea pe termen lung evideniaz faptul
c orizontul de timp trebuie s fie suficient de
ndeprtat pentru a se putea identifica impactul
asupra bugetului, a angajamentelor asumate de stat
pe baz de mprumuturi.
Criterii de convergen. Potrivit tratatelor Uniunii
Europene privind criteriul fiscal de convergen i
Pactului de Stabilitate i Cretere, putem spune c
o datoria public este sustenabil dac deficitul
bugetar nu este mai mare de 3% din PIB, iar gradul
de ndatorare nu depete 60% din PIB. Pentru
respectarea acestor limite, rile Uniunii Europene
trebuie s elaboreze i, ulterior, s aplice politici
fiscale i bugetare pe termen mediu (3-5 ani)
menite s asigure evitarea deficitului excesiv.
Indicatorii de sustenabilitate permit stabilirea riscului
de nesustenabilitate n relaie cu probabilitatea de realizare
a datoriei publice planificate pe termen mediu. Astfel
de analize sunt utile mai ales la nivelul rilor ce au
nregistrat o cretere accelerat a ndatorrii.Indicatorii
de sustenabilitate exprim sintetic dezechilibrele
bugetare curente i viitoare, ce pot fi determinate
prin nsumarea urmtoarelor componente: poziia
relativ a surplusului primar din anul curent n
comparaie cu surplusul primar ce stabilizeaz gradul
de ndatorare pe termen lung (debt-stabilizing
primary balance); dac surplusul primar nu este
suficient de mare atunci exist riscul ca datoria
public s explodeze; nivelul iniial al datoriei
publice (de exemplu 60% din PIB); creterea
cheltuielilor generate de mbtrnirea populaiei.
Geithner, T. (2002), Assessing Sustainability, IMF Working Paper, p. 5.

Geithner, T. (2002), Assessing Sustainability, IMF Working Paper, p. 5.
54
Intertemporal budget constraint. Debt and fiscal

sustainability is determined using intertemporal
budget constraint based on the parity of the current
debt and the discounted value of future budget revenue
(Blanchard, 1990; Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hageman,
and Sartor, 1990; Gramlich, 1990; Horne, 1991;
Buiter, 1995; Commission of the European
Communities, 2006). Therefore the government
must reach in the future sufficient primary
surpluses to finance the debt interests and other
expenditures.
Therefore, only the investigation of the public debt

level is not sufficient to establish that fiscal policy
is sustainable. The growth of public debt ratio does
not involve the absence of sustainability if the real
interest rate of public debt is bellow the growth
rate. So, according to Horne (1991), state solvability
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for fiscal
sustainability. As a result, fiscal sustainability
involves the condition that macroeconomic
variables must not be influenced by the option
between increasing tax rate and issuing more public
debt.
Solvability. Debt sustainability used with the sense

of debt solvability represents the level that
governments can reimburse without fiscal adjustments
in the future. In this context, Geithner (2002)
demonstrated that debt or fiscal sustainability
involves state solvability and liquidity: An entity
is solvent if the present discounted value (PDV) of
its current and future primary expenditure is no
greater than the PDV of its current and future path
of income, net of any initial indebtedness. ... An
entitys liability position is sustainable if it satisfies
the present value budget constraint without a major
correction in the balance of income and expenditure
given the costs of financing it faces in the market.103
.As a result, when liquidity or solvency conditions
are violated and the borrower enters a crisis104 then
the country is confronted with the risk of vulnerability.
Fiscal policy is sustainable on short run if reacts

instantaneous to economic shocks and not conduct
to explosion of public debt. In long run, we may
study fiscal sustainability identifying the public
debt incidence on public budgets.
103
104
Geithner, 2002: pp. 5.

Geithner, 2002: pp. 5.
55
According European Union Treaty and the Stability

and Growth Pact, fiscal policy is sustainable if
budget deficits not exceed 3% of GDP and public
debt does not growth above 60% of GDP.
The sustainability indicators are useful in the study
of the unsustainable risk related with the probability
that the public debt reaches the level estimated on
the long run. Therefore, these indicators express the
current and future budget disequilibrium who can
be determined by debt-stabilizing primary balance,
initial debt level, and the age-growth expenditures.
Bibliografie
Blanchard, O. (1990): Suggestions for a New Set of
Fiscal Indicators, OECD Economics Department
Working Papers no.79;
European Commission (2006): The Long-Term

Sustainability of Public Finance in the European Union,
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications_en.htm;
Geithner, T. (2002): Assessing Sustainability, IMF
Working Paper, pag.1-60;
Blanchard, O., Chouraqui, J.C., Hagemann, P.R., Sartor,

N. (1990): The Sustainability of Fiscal Policy: New
Ansewars to Old Questions, OECD Economic Studies
No.15, Autumn 1990;
Gramlich, E.M. (1990): Fiscal Indicators, OECD

Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper
No.80;
Buiter, W.H. (1995): Measuring Fiscal Sustainability,

www.nber.org/~wbuiter-sustain.pdf.;
Horne, J. (1991): Indicators of Fiscal Sustinability,

IMF Working Paper, WP/91/5;
Corsetti, G., Roubini, N. (1991): Fiscal Deficits, Public

Debt, and Government Solvency: Evidence from OECD
Countries, NBER Working Paper No.3658;
Zee, H. (1987): On the Sustainability and Optimality of

Government Debt, IMF Working Paper WP/87/83, pag.
1-25.
56
Bibliography
Blanchard, O. (1990): Suggestions for a New Set of
Fiscal Indicators, OECD Economics Department Working
Papers no.79;
European Commission (2006): The Long-Term

Sustainability of Public Finance in the European Union,
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications_en.htm;
Geithner, T. (2002): Assessing Sustainability, IMF
Working Paper, pag.1-60;
Blanchard, O., Chouraqui, J.C., Hagemann, P.R., Sartor,

N. (1990): The Sustainability of Fiscal Policy: New
Ansewars to Old Questions, OECD Economic Studies
No.15, Autumn 1990;
Gramlich, E.M. (1990): Fiscal Indicators, OECD

Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper
No.80;
Buiter, W.H. (1995): Measuring Fiscal Sustainability,

www.nber.org/~wbuiter-sustain.pdf.;
Horne, J. (1991): Indicators of Fiscal Sustinability,

IMF Working Paper, WP/91/5;
Corsetti, G., Roubini, N. (1991): Fiscal Deficits, Public

Debt, and Government Solvency: Evidence from OECD
Countries, NBER Working Paper No.3658;
Zee, H. (1987): On the Sustainability and Optimality of

Government Debt, IMF Working Paper WP/87/83, pag.
1-25.
57
NOUTI N DOMENIUL CONCURENEI

I AJUTORULUI DE STAT105
Antitrust
Raport preliminar privind rezultatele anchetei
efectuate n sectorul farmaceutic
Comisia European a publicat raportul preliminar
privind ancheta pe teme concureniale efectuat n
sectorul farmaceutic, potrivit cruia n acest
domeniu regulile concureniale nu sunt pe deplin
respectate. Rezultatele preliminare ale anchetei
arat c exist dovezi conform crora o serie de
companii inovatoare au folosit anumite mijloace
pentru a ntrzia sau a bloca intrarea pe pia a unor
medicamente produse de companii concurente.
Printre metodele folosite mpotriva firmelor
productoare de medicamente generice se numr
depunerea mai multor cereri de brevet pentru acelai
medicament (aa-numitele grupuri de brevete),
generarea de conflicte i litigii, ncheierea unor
acorduri n materie de brevete care blocheaz
intrarea pe pia a companiilor productoare de
medicamente generice i intervenii pe lng
autoritile naionale, n cazul n care aceste
companii solicit cereri de autorizare.
Acolo unde au avut succes, astfel de metode au
generat costuri suplimentare semnificative pentru
bugetele sntii publice i, n ultim instan,
pentru contribuabili i pacieni i reducerea
msurilor de stimulare a inovrii.
ar fi intrat pe pia fr ntrziere. Totodat, raportul

menioneaz c au fost aplicate strategii de brevetare
defensive, avnd ca scop principal blocarea procesului
de fabricare a unor noi medicamente de ctre
firmele concurente.
Raportul preliminar i informaii suplimentare
despre ancheta efectuat n sectorul farmaceutic
vor fi disponibile la adresa:
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html.
Revizuirea Regulamentului privind concentrrile
Comisia European a lansat o consultare public
referitoare la funcionarea Regulamentului
privind concentrrile (Regulamentul Consiliului
nr.139/2004), care stabilete regulile privind
controlul concentrrilor n Spaiul Economic
European. Scopul acestei revizuiri este de a urmri
cum funcioneaz regulile privind pragurile
jurisdicionale i mecanismele n practic n cei 4
ani de cnd Regulamentul se aplic. Pe baza
rspunsurilor, Comisia European va elabora un
raport ctre Consiliul de Minitri al UE pn n
iulie 2009.
Chestionarul este disponibil la adresa:
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/
consultations/2008_12_merger_regulation.html.
Raportul prezint exemplul unui eantion de

medicamente care s-au confruntat cu o pierdere a
exclusivitii n perioada 2000-2007 n 17 state
membre, estimnd c s-ar fi putut economisi
aproximativ 3 miliarde de euro pentru acest eantion
dac, n aceeai perioad, medicamentele generice
105
Material realizat de Carmen Bucur, inspector de concuren, Direcia Cercetare-Sinteze.
58
NEWS IN THE COMPETITION

AND STATE AID FIELD106
The report also finds that companies applied
defensive patenting strategies, primarily aimed at
blocking competitors in the development of new
medicines.
Antitrust
Preliminary report on pharmaceutical sector

inquiry
The preliminary report and more information on

the pharmaceutical sector inquiry will be available at:
The European Commission has published its

preliminary report on the competition inquiry into
the pharmaceutical sector, which finds that
competition in this industry does not work as well
as it should. According to the preliminary findings
there is evidence that originator companies have
engaged in practices with the objective of delaying
or blocking market entry of competing medicines.
Practices vis--vis generic companies include
multiple patent applications for the same medicine
(so-called patent clusters), initiation of disputes and
litigation, conclusion of patent settlements which
constrain market entry of generic companies and
interventions before national authorities when
generic companies ask for regulatory approvals.
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html.
Where successful, these practices result in significant

additional costs for public health budgets and
ultimately taxpayers and patients and reduce
incentives to innovate.
The report takes a sample of medicines that faced
loss of exclusivity in the period 2000 to 2007 in 17
Member States and estimates that additional
savings of around 3 billion would have been
possible on that sample over this period if generic
medicines had entered the market without delay.
106
Review of Merger Regulation

The European Commission has launched a public
consultation on the functioning of the EC Merger
Regulation (Council Regulation 139/2004), which
sets out the rules for merger control in the
European Economic Area. The purpose of the
review is to evaluate how the rules on jurisdictional
thresholds and referral mechanisms have worked
in practice during the fours years the Regulation
has been applied. Based on the response to the
consultation, the Commission will prepare a report
to the EU Council of Ministers by July 2009.
The questionnaire is available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/
consultations/2008_12_merger_regulation.html.
Drafted and translated by Carmen Bucur, competition inspector, Synthesis and Research Directorate.
59
Ajutor de stat
Norme privind ajutoarele de stat serviciilor publice

de radiodifuziune
n ultimele trei decenii, sectorul radiodifuziunii a
fost supus unor schimbri importante. Eliminarea
monopolurilor, apariia unor noi operatori i dezvoltarea
rapid a tehnologiei au modificat n mod fundamental
mediul concurenial. Planul de aciune al Comisiei
din 2005 privind ajutoarele de stat a anunat
reevaluarea, de ctre Comisie, a Comunicrii sale
privind aplicarea normelor privind ajutoarele de stat
n domeniul serviciului public de radiodifuziune.
ntre 10 ianuarie i 10 martie 2008, Comisia a
organizat o consultare public privind importana
revizuirii comunicrii din 2001. Consultarea s-a
bazat pe un set de ntrebri detaliate, invitnd prile
interesate s trimit observaii privind anumite
propuneri de mbuntire i actualizare a comunicrii
existente. Comisia a primit 121 de comentarii, care
au fost ulterior publicate. Rspunsurile au confirmat
opinia preliminar a Comisiei n sensul c aspectele
clarificate n comunicarea din 2001 nu au reflectat
suficient politicile sale stabilite prin decizii individuale.
Comunicarea consolideaz practica decizional a
Comisiei n materie de ajutoare de stat ntr-un mod
orientat spre viitor, bazat pe comentariile primite
n urma consultrii publice. Aceasta clarific principiile
urmate de Comisie n aplicarea articolelor 87 i 86
alineatul (2) din Tratatul CE n sectorul radiodifuziunii,
avnd n vedere recentele evoluii ale pieei i ale
mediului juridic. Prezenta comunicare nu aduce atingere
aplicrii normelor legate de piaa intern i principiilor
fundamentale n domeniul radiodifuziunii.
Proiectul Comunicrii este disponibil la adresa:
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid
/reform/reform.cfm.
Un nou tablou de bord privind ajutoarele de stat
Cel mai recent tablou de bord privind ajutoarele de
stat al Comisiei Europene arat c statele membre
folosesc din ce n ce mai mult posibilitile oferite
de normele UE privind ajutorul de stat, revizuite
recent, pentru o mai bun direcionare a ajutorului.

n 2007, statele membre au alocat, n medie, 80%
din ajutoarele acordate ctre obiective orizontale,
comparativ cu aproximativ 50% la mijlocul anilor
1990, majornd totodat fondurile destinate C&D i
ajutorului de mediu. Confruntndu-se cu actuala
criz financiar, aciunea coordonat a statelor membre
i a Comisiei a asigurat mobilizarea rapid a
mecanismelor de sprijinire a sectorului financiar, n
conformitate cu normele UE privind ajutorul de stat.
Aciunea coordonat a statelor membre i a Comisiei
a permis punerea n aplicare rapid a unor
mecanisme de sprijin adecvate pentru a rspunde
provocrii crizei financiare n conformitate cu normele
UE privind ajutorul de stat. Situaia excepional a
pieelor i numrul mare de notificri primite
constituie o provocare semnificativ pentru Comisie,
care trebuie s rezolve aceste cazuri rapid,
asigurndu-se totodat c msurile sunt proporionate
i nu fac discriminri ntre companii. Ca urmare a
bunei cooperri cu statele membre i a instituirii
rapide a unei proceduri rapide, Comisia a reuit s
rspund la notificri i s adopte decizii n timp record.
Tabloul de bord indic, de asemenea, progresele
realizate cu privire la recuperarea ajutoarelor ilegale
i incompatibile. La sfritul lunii iunie 2008, existau
47 de decizii de recuperare n curs de executare,
comparativ cu 93 la sfritul anului 2004. Mai mult
dect att, 7,1 miliarde euro au fost recuperate efectiv,
precum i 2,4 miliarde euro sub form de dobnzi.
Acest lucru nseamn c aproape 90% din valoarea
total a ajutoarelor ilegale i incompatibile a fost
rambursat n mod efectiv de ctre beneficiarii acestora
pn la sfritul lunii iunie 2008, comparativ cu
numai 25% la sfritul anului 2004.
Comisia consider c asigurarea aplicrii legislaiei
n materie de ajutor de stat de ctre instanele naionale
este important pentru sistemul general de control al
ajutoarelor de stat i, astfel, a lansat recent o consultare
public cu privire la un set de orientri destinate
sprijinirii instanelor statelor membre n vederea aplicrii
normelor UE privind ajutorul de stat.
Tabloul de bord, mpreun cu un set detaliat de
tabele i indicatori statistici pentru toate statele
membre, este disponibil pe site-ul:
/studies_reports/studies_reports.html.
60
State aid
Rules on the application of state aid rules to public

service broadcasting
Over the last three decades, broadcasting has
undergone important changes. The abolition of
monopolies, the emergence of new players and
rapid technological developments have fundamentally
altered the competitive environment. The
Commission's 2005 State Aid Action Plan8
announced that the Commission would revisit its
Communication on the application of State aid
rules to public service broadcasting.
Between 10 January and 10 March 2008 the
Commission held a public consultation on the
value of reviewing the 2001 Communication. The
consultation was based on a set of detailed questions
which invited stakeholders to comment on certain
proposals for improving and updating the existing
Communication. The Commission received 121
comments which were subsequently published.
The replies have confirmed the Commission's
preliminary impression that the clarifications set
out in the 2001 Communication did not sufficiently
reflect its policy as set out in individual decisions.
The Communication consolidates the Commission's
case practice in the field of State aid in a
future-orientated manner based on the comments
received in the public consultation. It clarifies the
principles followed by the Commission in the
application of Articles 87 and 86(2) of the EC
Treaty to the broadcasting sector, taking into
account recent market and legal developments.
The Communication is without prejudice to the
application of the internal market rules and fundamental
principles in the field of broadcasting.
The draft of Communication is available at the
following address:
/reform/reform.cfm.
state aid rules to better target their aid. Member

States awarded on average 80% of their aid to
horizontal objectives in 2007, compared with
around 50% in the mid-1990s with increased
spending on R&D and environmental aid. Faced
with the current financial crisis, coordinated action
by Member States and the Commission has
ensured that support schemes for the financial sector
could be implemented quickly in compliance with
EU state aid rules.
Coordinated action by Member States and the
Commission has allowed the rapid implementation
of adequate support schemes to meet the financial
crisis challenge in compliance with EU state aid
rules. Exceptional circumstances on the markets
and the large number of notifications provide a
significant challenge for the Commission to deal
with these cases quickly, while ensuring that measures
are proportionate and do not discriminate between
companies. With good cooperation from Member
States and the quick set-up of a fast-track procedure,
the Commission has managed to respond to
notifications and to adopt decisions in record time
The Scoreboard also notes progress in the recovery
of illegal and incompatible aid. At the end of
June 2008, there were 47 pending recovery
decisions compared with 93 at the end of 2004.
Moreover, 7.1 billion has been effectively
recovered as well as 2.4 billion of interest. This
means that almost 90% of the total amount of
illegal and incompatible aid had effectively been
repaid by its beneficiaries by the end of June
2008 compared with only 25% at the end of
2004.
The Commission considers that state aid enforcement
by national courts is important for the overall system
of state aid control and thus recently launched a
public consultation on a set of guidelines to assist
Member States' courts in applying the EU state aid.
The Scoreboard, together with a set of detailed
statistical tables and indicators for all Member
States, is available on the following website:
/studies_reports/studies_reports.html.
A new State Aid Scoreboard The European

Commission's latest State Aid Scoreboard shows
that Member States are increasingly using the
possibilities offered by the recently revised EU
61
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CUPRINS/CONTENTS

George Soros, Noua paradigm a pieelor financiare.

Analiza conceptual a sustenabilitii fiscale

Nouti n domeniul concurenei i ajutorului de stat

PROFIL: CONCURENA G NR.4/2008

GEORGE SOROS, NOUA PARADIGM A PIEELOR FINANCIARE.

n aceste zile (decembrie 2008), i ofer lui Soros

PROFIL: CONCURENA G NR.4/2008

GEORGE SOROS, THE NEW PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS.

which is probably in full development these days

PROFIL: CONCURENA G NR.4/2008

Soros confirm existena unui balon pe piaa

reprezint sfritul unei epoci, deosebindu-se

Fond speculativ cu grad nalt de risc.

PROFIL: CONCURENA G NR.4/2008

Soros confirms the existence of the housing market

author claims that the present financial crisis

In its first part, the book contains a brief

According to George Soros, the starting point of

These markets offer a good laboratory to test the

While the first part of the book contains an

The second part of the book is based both on a

In the end, the author presents several broad

High risk speculative investment fund.

PROFIL: CONCURENA G NR.4/2008

Stpnirea acestui sector nu ar trebui s se fac

Potrivit lui Soros, cea mai important lecie ce

PROFIL: CONCURENA G NR.4/2008

However, the control of this sector should not be

According to Soros, the most important lesson to

PROFIL: CONCURENA G NR.4/2008

CEA MAI MARE AMEND APLICAT DE COMISIA EUROPEAN

piaa european a geamurilor auto. Gravitatea

Tabelul nr. 1. Valoarea amenzilor aplicate de Comisia European

Reducere n baza Comunicrii

Asahi/AGC Flat Glass (Japonia)

Pilkington (Marea Britanie)

Sursa: Comisia European12.

Inspector de concuren Direcia Relaii Externe i Integrare European.

PROFIL: CONCURENA G NR.4/2008

HIGHEST FINE EVER APPLIED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

about 90% of the European market. The particular

Table no.1. Value of fines applied by the European Commission to members

Asahi/AGC Flat Glass (Japan)

Pilkington (United Kingdom)

Source: European Commission17.

Competition inspector Directorate for External Relations and European Integration.

PROFIL: CONCURENA G NR.4/2008

Amenda aplicat firmei Saint-Gobain a fost

1 aprilie 2008 31 martie 200919. Aprecierea

Comunicatul de pres al Comisiei Europene nr. IP/08/1685.

PROFIL: CONCURENA G NR.4/2008

The fine applied to Saint-Gobain was increased

together with the fine applied to Pilkington by the

European Commissions press release no. IP/08/1685.

PROFIL: CONCURENA G NR.4/2008

n toate domeniile exist un aa-numit prag

Contextul economic actual, dominat de criza

Fcnd o paralel (destul de forat, ar zice

n plus, impactul financiar al unei asemenea

PROFIL: CONCURENA G NR.4/2008