Caiet de istorie contemporan universal

suport de seminar -

Mihai Croitor Manuela Marin

LUJ N APO CA

2 00 7

Caiet de istorie contemporan universal

suport de seminar -

Prezentul suport de seminar i propune s abordeze dintr-o perspectiv sintetic perioada interbelic , desfurarea celui deal doilea rzboi mondial i principalele momente ale rzboiului rece, furniznd totodat i o serie de documente eseniale intervalului cronologic mai sus menionat.

* LECTURA ACESTUI CAIET NU EXCLUDE CONSULTAREA EXTENSIV A BIBLIOGRAFIEI AFERENTE FIECRUI SEMINAR !

Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin Caiet de istorie contemporan universal

Precizri generale

I Modul de evaluare:
examen scris din temele cursului i bibliografia obligatorie: 60% 2 verificri pe parcurs din tematica seminarului: 20% referat din temele propuse la seminar: 10% prezena i activitatea la seminar: 10% referatele se ntocmesc pentru seminariile 4 i 5 ; 13 i 14 i se predau profesorului responsabil cu activitatea de seminar cu o sptmn nainte de seminarul 4 i 13.

II Detalii organizatorice, gestionarea situaiilor excepionale:

prezena la seminarii este obligatorie. Frecvena minim pentru acceptarea la examinarea scris este de 75% din orele de seminar. plagiatul este interzis i se pedepsete n acord cu reglementrile prezente n Carta UBB. orice ncercare de fraud la examen sau la verificrile pe parcurs duce la aplicarea reglementrilor de contractul de studii i Carta UBB.

III Tematica i bibliografia seminarului de istorie contemporan universal

SEMINAR NR. 1 organizarea activitilor de seminar ; prezentarea temelor i bibliografiei ; metodologia i sursele istoriei contemporane ; definirea diacronic, epistemologic i structural a problemelor ce urmeaz a fi studiate. * pentru uz intern 1

Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin Caiet de istorie contemporan universal SEMINAR NR. 2 Conferina de pace de la Paris (1919-1920). Sistemul tratatelor de la Versailles Organizarea Conferinei de pace i relaiile dintre statele participante. Organisme de lucru n cadrul conferinei Tratatele de pace (Versailles, Saint-Germain, Sevres, Trianon, Paris) Pactul Ligii Naiunilor - Societatea Naiunilor i principiile care au guvernat relaiile internaionale dup Primul Rzboi Mondial

Bibliografie: Ch. Zorgbibe, Histoire des relations internationales, Paris, 1994, vol. II (De la paix de Versailles la Grande Alliance contre Hitler 1918-1945), p. 4-94. (BIG 11554) M. Iacobescu, Romnia la Societatea Naiunilor, Bucureti, 1988, p. 16-56, 68-78. (F 3237 a/b) Pierre Gerbert (coord.), Socit des Nations et Organisation des Nations Unies, Paris, Edition Richelieu, 1973, p. 5-30. (BIG 10209) SEMINAR NR. 3 Relaiile internaionale n perioada interbelic. 1919-1939 Conferina de la Washington 1921-1922 Relaiile sovieto-germane: tratatul de la Rapallo, 1922; tratatul de la Berlin, 1926 - semnificaia Problema dezarmrii in deceniul III al sec. XX - Geneva, 1924-1925; Pactul Briand Kellogg, 1928 Acordurile de la Locarno (1925) i restabilirea echilibrului politic n Europa Marea criz economic i impactul su asupra relaiilor internaionale Proiecte ale Ligii Naiunilor: conferina dezarmrii de la Geneva 19321934

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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin Caiet de istorie contemporan universal Proiecte ale statelor revizioniste: agresiunile Japoniei n Extremul Orient, ale Germaniei naziste n Europa (reintroducerea serviciului militar obligatoriu, remilitarizarea Renaniei, Anschluss-ul i dezmembrarea Cehoslovaciei), i ale Italiei fasciste n Africa (Etiopia) Bibliografie: Charles Zorgbibe, op. cit., p. 97-109, 177-184, 193-240. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, London, 1988, p. 296-353. P. Milza, S. Berstein, Istoria secolului XX, Bucureti, 1999, vol. I. (BIG 12215) (paginile referitoare la problematic) Jean- Baptiste Duroselle, Istoria relaiilor internaionale 1919-1947, vol.I, Editura tiinelor Sociale i Poltice, Bucureti, 2006 (paginile referitoare la problematic) SEMINAR NR. 4 I 5 Regimurile politice interbelice: democraie liberal versus totalitarism Ideologie i regim politic State democratice: ideologie, regim politic, caracteristici, studii de caz (SUA, Europa Occidental, Europa Central) State autoritare, dictatoriale i totalitare (Europa Occidental, Europa Central, URSS, Asia)

Studii de caz : Marea Britanie (sistemul constituional; evoluia regimului politic monarhia, partidele politice, guvernele interbelice; imperiul britanic); Frana (sistemul constituional; partidele politice, etapele guvernrii i activitatea guvernelor); Republica de la Weimar (regimul politic preedinia, partidele politice, guvernele i activitatea lor); SUA (evoluii politice n era prosperitii; marea criz economic i consecinele sale; evoluii politice n deceniul patru); Italia fascist, Germania nazist, URSS n perioada interbelic (caracteristicile i evoluia regimului-ideologia, instituiile i funcionarea acestora-perspectiv comparativ).

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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin Caiet de istorie contemporan universal Bibliografie general: Paul Johnson, Histoire du monde moderne, 1980, tome I. (paginile referitoare la problematic) P. Milza, S. Berstein, op. cit., vol. I. (BIG 12215) (paginile referitoare la problematic) Politics in Western Europe, St. 1991. (BIG 10797) (paginile referitoare la problematic) P. Kenedy, op. cit. (paginile referitoare la tematic-ideologia regimurilor politice) E. Hobsbawm, O istorie a secolului XX. Era extremelor. 1914-1991, Chiinu, Editura Cartier, 1999.

Bibliografie suplimentar pt. studiile de caz: A.J.P. Taylor, English History: 1914-1945, New York, 1965, 708 p. (BIG 13041) (paginile referitoare la problematic) Andr Maurois, Istoria Angliei, Bucureti, Editura Orizonturi, 1996, 704 p. (BIG 11063) (paginile referitoare la problematic) David Lindsay Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain: 1485-1937, London, 1947, 568 p. (BIG 9256) (paginile referitoare la problematic) G.M. Trevelyan, Istoria ilustrat a Angliei, Bucureti, Ed. tiinific, 1975, 869 p. (BIG 72211) (paginile referitoare la problematic) G. Brown Tindall, E. David Shi, America: o istorie narativ, Bucureti, Editura Enciclopedic, 1996, vol. III (BIG 11392) Ren Rmond, Istoria Statelor Unite ale Americii, Corint, 1999, p. 108-133. (BIG 12708) Scurt istorie a Statelor Unite ale Americii, Bucureti, Silex, 1995, 192 p. (BIG 10781) (paginile referitoare la problematic) Henry F. Graff, History of the USA, vol. 10, 11, BIG 6019. Jacques Nr, La troisime Republique 1919-1940, Paris, A. Colin, 1965 (BIG 9709) Jacques Madaule, Istoria Franei, Bucureti, Editura politic, 1973, vol. III (De la Republica a III-a la Republica a V-a) (857670, BIG 6955)

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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin Caiet de istorie contemporan universal Jacques Droz, Istoria Germaniei, Corint, 2000, cap. V : Republica de la Weimar ; cap. VI : Germania hitlerist. (BIG 12814) Claude David, Hitler i nazismul, Corint, 2002, partea I-ascensiunea lui Hither i a nazismului, Germania 1919-1933 (p. 7-77); partea a II-a: Hitlerismul la putere (19341945) : stuctura statului : puterea central, statele, partidul, poliii i organizaii militare, Lagre de concentrare, Instituii fundamentale ale statului (justiia, propaganda, formarea tineretului, organizarea muncii. Politica social) (p. 79-91) ; Politica economic (p. 93102) ; Politica intern. Persecuii i crize (p. 103-130). Max Gallo, Italia lui Mussolini, Bucureti, 1969. (BIG 6292, 854487) Giuliano Procacci, Istoria italienilor, Bucureti, Editura politic, 1975, p. 431-438, 452468. (BIG 7194) Martin Clark, Modern Italy: 1871-1982, London, New York: Longman, 1993 (BIG 11319) (paginile referitoare la tematic) Michael Lynch, Stalin i Huciov URSS, 1924-1964, Bucureti, BIC ALL, 1991. (paginile referitoare la problematic) N. Werth, Istoria Uniunii Sovietice de la Lenin la Stalin (1917-1953), Bucureti, Corint, 2000. (paginile referitoare la problematic) Facultativ : Chantal Millon-Delsol, Ideile politice ale secolului XX, Iai, Polirom, 2002, p. 24-51; p. 53-91; p. 118-121. Gh. Rdulescu, Spania, Bucureti, 1997, p. 210-216, 225-254, 266-273. (761900) A. H. de Oliveira Marques, Istoria Portugaliei, Bucureti, 1996, p. 145-172. (725024) J. Gernet, Lumea chinez, vol. II, Bucureti, Editura Meridiane, 1985 (BIG 8176) (paginile referitoare la problematic) Hani Goro, Istoria poporului japonez, Bucureti, Editura politic, 1964 (BIG 5543) (paginile referitoare la problematic) V. Cristian, Istoria Asiei, Corint, 2002. (paginile referitoare la problematic)

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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin Caiet de istorie contemporan universal SEMINAR NR. 6 Evoluia relaiilor interaliate n timpul celui de-al doilea rzboi mondial: 1939-1945 relaiile anglo-americane. Semnarea Cartei Atlanticului, 14 august 1941 relaiile Marii Britanii i ale SUA cu URSS: Declaraia Naiunilor Unite, ianuarie 1942: tratatul anglo-rus, 26 mai 1942 tratatul americano-rus, 11 iunie 1942 conferine interaliate: Casablanca i ideea capitulrii necondiionate a puterilor Axei (13-24 ianuarie 1943) Moscova, Cairo, Teheran (1943) i problema deschiderii celui de-al doilea front Yalta (4-11 februarie 1945) San Francisco i constituirea ONU Potsdam (17 iulie-2 august 1945) i adncirea crizei n interiorul coaliiei anglo- americano-sovietice Bibliografie: Leonida Loghin, Mari conferine internaionale 1939-1945, Bucureti, Editura Politic, 1989 (paginile referitoare la problematic) Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. II, p. 273-295, vol. III (Du system de Ialta aux missiles de Cuba 1945-1962), p. 7-39. Marea conflagraie a secolului XX, p. 188-197. (BIG 6611 a/b) R. G. Feltham, Diplomatic Handbook, London and New York, 1982, p. 61-85. (BIG 9786) Pierre Gerbert (coord.), op. cit., (BIG 10209) (paginile referitoare la problematic)

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SEMINAR NR. 7 Relaiile dintre fotii aliai i debutul rzboiului rece 1945-1947. Definirea rzboiului rece Fundamentele ideologice ale rzboiului rece i expresia lor politic n documentele marilor puteri: Discursul lui Stalin, 9 februarie 1946 Discursul lui Churchill de la Fulton, 5 martie 1946 Telegrama cea lung a lui G. Kennan i doctrina de containment Telegrama Novikov Doctrina Truman, 12 martie 1947 Planul Marshall Crearea Cominformului (septembrie 1947) i teoria lui Jdanov privind mprirea lumii n cele dou blocuri

Bibliografie: Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. III, p. 7-65. H. Kissinger, Diplomaia, Bucureti, 1998, p. 385-429 (BIG12223) Andr Fontaine, Istoria rzboiului rece : de la Revoluia din Octombrie la rzboiul din Coreea : 1917-1950, Bucureti, Editura militar, 1991, vol. III (BIG 10175/723483) (paginile referitoare la problematic) SEMINAR NR. 8 Evoluii n perioada rzboiului rece (1948-1962) Definirea sferelor de influen n Europa central-estic. Satelizarea. Conveniile de armistiiu ; Conferina de pace de la Paris (1946-1947) ; tratatele bilaterale ntre URSS i satelii ; Sovietizarea - mecanisme i instituii Formarea blocului vestic: OECD, NATO

Bibliografie: Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, London, 1991. (BIG 5346) (paginile referitoare la problematic) Peter Calvocoressi, Politica mondial dup 1945 , Editura ALLFA , Bucureti , 2000 (paginile referitoare la problematic) Joseph Rothschild, ntoarcerea la diversitate. Istoria politic a Europei Centrale i de Est dup al Doilea Rzboi Mondial, Oradea, Editura Antet, 1997, cap. 3 (Comunitii preiau puterea), cap. 4 (Dialectica stalinismului i a titoismului) SEMINAR NR. 9 Crizele rzboiului rece (1948-1962). Evoluii n blocul comunist conceptul de criza i expresia ei politic n relaiile dintre marile puteri: Crizele din blocul estic: crizele Berlinului ; Polonia i Ungaria, 1956 Defeciunea iugoslav Crearea CAER Bibliografie: Andr Fontaine, op. cit., vol. IV, De la Rzboiul din Coreea la criza alianelor: 19501967, Bucureti, 1994. (BIG 10175/723483) (paginile referitoare la problematic) Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. III, p. 67-128, 166-187. H. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 429-538, 586-589. Jean-Louis Dufour, Crizele internaionale. De la Beijing 96-98) ; SEMINAR NR. 10 conceptul de criza i expresia ei politic n relaiile dintre marile puteri: (1900) la Kosovo (1999), Corint, 2002. [Blocada Berlinului (1948-1949) (p. 93-96) ; Insurecia ungar (1956) (p.

Rzboiul din Coreea Criza Suezului, 1956

Destinderea relativ i definirea regulilor de funcionare a bipolarismului-mecanisme de comunicarea i reglementare n perioada destinderii relative: Kennedy i riposta gradual i flexibil

Criza cubanez i necesitatea destinderii

Bibliografie: Andr Fontaine, op. cit., vol. IV, De la Rzboiul din Coreea la criza alianelor: 19501967, Bucureti, 1994. (BIG 10175/723483) (paginile referitoare la problematic) Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. III, p. 67-128, 166-187. H. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 429-538, 586-589. Jean-Louis Dufour, op. cit., [Naionalizarea Companiei Universale a canalului Suez (1956) (p. 98-101) ; Rachetele din Cuba (1962) (p. 115-117) SEMINAR NR. 11 Evoluii n perioada rzboiului rece 1962-1989---perioada destinderii 1962-1975: De la criza rachetelor din Cuba la Actul final de la Helsinki. Instituionalizarea destinderii: Tentativele de limitare a folosirii i experimentrii armamentului nuclear: SALT I i II

Crize periferice i de sistem: rolul Chinei n confruntarea celor dou puteri, SUA i URSS, conflictele din Orientul Apropiat i crizele energiei (1973, 1978), rzboiul din Vietnam Criza cehoslovac i suveranitatea limitat n blocul estic De la Ostpolitik la Actul final de la Helsinki Bibliografie: Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p. 538-689. Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. III, p. 307-326, vol. IV (Du schisme Moscou-Pkin laprs guerre froide : 1962 nos jours), p. 7-11, 51-64, 142-144, 178-211.

Andr Fontaine, op. cit., problematic)

vol. IV.

(BIG 10175/723483) (paginile referitoare la

Jean-Louis Dufour, op. cit., [Rzboiul de ase zile i reaciile comunitii internaionale (1967) (p. 120-122) ; Primvara de la Praga i intervenia sovietic (1968) (p. 122-125) ; Urmrile internaionale ale Rzboiului de Yom Kippur (1973) (p. 127-130) SEMINAR NR. 12 Evoluii n perioada rzboiului rece 1962-1989-sfritul rzboiului rece 1975-1989: Tensionarea relaiilor Est-Vest i politica ripostei totale a lui Ronald Reagan Intervenia militar sovietic n Afganistan 1979 i riposta american (Rzboiul stelelor) Evoluii n blocul comunist n deceniile VIII-IX

Bibliografie: Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p. 689-727. Franoise Thom, Sfriturile comunismului, Polirom, Iai, p. 35-91. Joseph Rothschild, op. cit., cap. 7 (Finaluri de partid), cap. 8 (Epilog) Peter Calvocoressi, op. cit. (paginile referitoare la problematic) Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 341-350. Jean-Louis Dufour, op. cit., [Intervenia sovietic n Afganistan (1979) (p. 154-156) ; Stare de rzboi n Polonia (1981) (p. 159-162)] SEMINAR NR. 13 I NR. 14 Caracteristicile generale ale regimurilor politice postbelice State democratice i totalitare Ideologie i regim politic

Studii de caz : URSS dup al doilea rzboi mondial, China, Europa de Est, Europa de Vest, , SUA, Bibliografie general: Paul Johnson, op. cit., vol. II. (paginile referitoare la problematic) Norman Davis, Europe A History, Oxford and New York Univ. Press, p. 1057-1137 (cap. 12) (BIG 12476) Pierre Milza, S. Berstein, op. cit., vol. II, vol. III. (paginile referitoare la problematic) Peter Calvocoressi, op. cit. (paginile referitoare la problematic) Bibliografie pt. studiile de caz: Andr Maurois, op.cit., (BIG 11063) (paginile referitoare la problematic) G.M. Trevelyan, op. cit., (BIG 72211) (paginile referitoare la problematic) C.J. Bartlett, A history of postwar Britain 1945-1974, London, Longman, 1977 (BIG 7660) Ren duc de Castris, Histoire de la France : des origines 1981, p. 575-599. (BIG 9859) J. Madaule, op. cit., vol. III. (paginile referitoare la tematic) P. Courtier, La quatrime republique, Paris, 1989, 126 p. (BIG 9025) H. Mendras, La sconde revolution franaise : 1965-1984, Paris, Gallimard, 1988 (BIG 9498) Allan M. Winkler , Trecutul apropiat, eseuri si documente despre America dupa al doilea razboi mondial, Garson Robert, The Uncertain Power : A Political History of the USA since 1929, (BIG 9777) G. Brown Tindall, E. David Shi, America: o istorie narativ, Bucureti, Editura Enciclopedic, 1996, vol. III (BIG 11392) Andr Kaspi, Histoire des Etats Unis de lAmerique, p. 383-547 Camil Murean, Al. Vianu, Preedinte la Casa Alb, Bucureti, Editura politic, 1974, p. 525-637. (BIG 7091)

Ren Rmond, Istoria Statelor Unite ale Americii, Corint, 1999, p. 135-148. Michael Lynch, Stalin i Huciov URSS, 1924-1964, Bucureti, BIC ALL, 1991. (paginile referitoare la problematic) N. Werth, Istoria Uniunii Sovietice de la Lenin la Stalin (1917-1953), Corint, 2000. (paginile referitoare la problematic) Nicolas Werth, Istoria Uniunii Sovietice de la Hruciov la Gorbaciov (1953-1985), Bucureti, Corint, 2000. Pascal Lorot, Perestroika. URSS sub Gorbaciov (1985-1991), Bucureti, Corint, 2002. Jacques Droz, Istoria Germaniei, Corint, 2000, cap. VII: Germania divizat, cap. VIII: Reunificarea Martin Clark, op. cit. (paginile referitoare la tematic)

Seminar nr. 2
Conferina de pace de la Paris (1919-1920). Sistemul tratatelor de la Versailles

I ncheierea ostilitilor militare:

FRONTUL DE EST: EFECTELE IEIRII RUSIEI DIN RZBOI A. RUSIA, tratative la Brest-Litovsk din 15 decembrie 1917, finalizate prin Tratatul ncheiat la 3 martie 1918; B. Romnia, preliminarii semnate la Buftea n 5 martie 1918, Tratatul semnat la Bucureti, 7 mai 1918. FRONTUL DE VEST I SUD-EST a. BULGARIA, 29-30 SEPTEMBRIE 1918, SALONIC b. TURCIA, 30-31 OCTOMBRIE 1918, MOUDROS c. AUSTRO-UNGARIA, 3-4 NOIEMBRIE 1918, VILA GIUSTI lng PADOVA d. GERMANIA, 11 NOIEMBRIE 1918, PARIS

II. Negocierea pcii la Paris, Versailles

- noua diplomaie, noul tip de negociere, perspectivele naionale asupra pcii. a. pregtirea, deschiderea, definirea organizrii i procedurilor de lucru 18 ianuarie 7 mai 1919. b. 27 de puteri prezente la Paris, 70 de reprezentani ai puterilor nvingtoare, aliate i asociate; neoficial alte 15 state au avut reprezentani; statele nvinse nu au fost invitate la negocieri. c. Prima faz a conferinei: 18 ianuarie-15 februarie: pregtirea proiectului statutului Ligii (Societii) Naiunilor n cadrul Consiliului celor 10 (Clemenceau

i Pichon pentru Frana, Wilson i colonelul House pentru SUA, Lloyd George i Balfour pentru Anglia, Orlando i Sonnino pentru Italia, Saionji i Makino pentru Japonia). d. Fiecare delegaie a fost nsoit de numeroi experi i profesioniti, care aveau misiunea de a prepara tehnic negocierea tratatelor. e. Au funcionat 52 de comisii pentru reglementarea problemelor specifice: Liga Naiunilor, Responsabilitatea pentru Rzboi i Garanii, Reparaii, pentru minoriti, Oraganizaia Internaional a Muncii, etc. Toate erau subordonate i coordinate de Consiliul celor zece f. A doua faz a conferinei: 14 martie- sfritul lunii aprilie 1919 g. Pregtirea i adoptarea formei finale a Statutului (Conventului) Ligii Naiunilor, negocierea termenilor tratatului de la Versailles. h. Coordonarea activitilor a fost transferat Consiliului celor 4, apoi dup criza din Fiume celor 3, care a luat toate deciziile finale pentru cele cinic tratate de pace. i. Crize aprute n negociere ntre puterile aliate: statutul zonei Rhin-ului, a oraului Fiume sau asupra Shantungului. j. Pregtirea tratatelor dificil: multe comisii de specialitate implicate, lips de coordonare ntre acestea: munc laborioas i dificil de evaluat la nivelul ultim decizional: exemplu, Tratatul cu Germania, 200 pagini, 440 articole organizate n 15 capitole, fiecare dependent de munca mai multor comisii. Ca urmare, Consiliul celor 4 nu a vzut textul n ntregime dect n 7 mai 1919 doar cu puine ore nainte de transmiterea acestuia ctre delegaia german. k. Semnarea tratatului de la Versailles a ncheiat misiunea principal a Conferinei; de acum preparativele pentru ncheierea tratatelor cu Austria, Ungaria, Bulgaria a fost lsat n sarcina Consiliului Suprem organizat la Versailles; termenii tratatului cu Turcia au fost precizai la Londra i semnarea a avut loc la Sevres, 20 august 1920.

III. Tratatele de Pace

a. Germania, Versailles, 28 iunie 1919 preambul, convenantul Ligii Naiunilor, care devinea responsabil pentru aplicarea unora dintre clause: organizarea plebiscitelor, numirea administraiei n Saar i Danzig; mandatele i statutul minoritilor; frontierele Germaniei n Europa i lume: Belgia primea teritorii n zona Malmedy i Eupen; Alsacia i Lorena revin Franei; situaia Rhinelandului; independena Austriei; Cehoslovacia a primit o zon restrns lng Tropau; cedarea coridorului Poloniei, a regiunii Poznan i a unei mari pri din vestul Prusiei; Germania obligat s renune la toate drepturile i titlurile avute n lume; Memel i Danzig devineau orae libere; se vor ine plebiscite n Silezia superioar, Estul Prusiei, Schleswig pentru determinarea frontierelor cu Danemarca. Dezarmarea, reducerea armatei la mai puin de 100 000 oameni, pe baze voluntare pe o perioad de 12 ani; producerea muniiei i a armamentului proporional cu mrimea armatei; 10 vase de lupt, ase crucitoare uoare, 12 distrugtoare i 12 torpiloare urmau s compun flota Germaniei (interdicie pentru submarine). Reparaii, penaliti i reparaii pentru agresiuni i distrugeri; 20 miliarde mrci germane ctre Puterile aliate pn n mai 1921; materii prime, crbune, lemn pentru Frana i Belgia; nave pentru Marea Britanie; libertatea de circulaie pe rurile i n porturile germane. Garanii, ocuparea Rhin-landului pentru 15 ani, reducerea prezenei armate aliate la cinci ani sub condiia ndeplinirii clauzelor din tratat, etc. b. Austria, St. Germain, 10 septembrie 1919 - delegaia Austriei ajunge la St. Germain en Laye, 14 mai 1919 - problema definirii Austriei - clauze modelate dup tratatul de la Versailles: de ilustrat frontiere, dezarmare, reparaii, etc.

c. Bulgaria, Neuilly sur Seine, 27 noiembrie 1919 - clauze modelate dup tratatul de la Versailles: de ilustrat frontiere, dezarmare, reparaii, etc. d. Ungaria, Trianon, 4 iunie 1920 - clauze modelate dup tratatul de la Versailles: de ilustrat frontiere, dezarmare, reparaii, etc. - poziia delegaiei Romniei fa de acest tratat e. Turcia, Sevres, 10 august 1920 - clauze modelate dup tratatul de la Versailles: de ilustrat frontiere, dezarmare, reparaii, etc. - poziia Turciei fa de coninutul tratatului - evidenierea cauzelor care au determinat nlocuirea acestui tratat cu cel de la Lausanne (24 iulie 1923); de ilustrat principalele prevederile ale acestui nou tratat semnat de Turcia. f. Problema mandatelor coloniale - evidenierea principalelor puteri care au obinut mandate asupra unor teritorii coloniale.

IV. Liga / Societatea Naiunilor

A) Formarea Societii Naiunilor - aceast organizaie este menionat n ultimul punct din cele 14 evideniate de preedintele american Woodrow Wilson n discursul su din 1918 - planuri pentru crearea Societii Naiunilor: a) planul HoauseWilson: multiplicarea instituiilor internaionale dup modelul statelor naiune, avnd un parlament, guvern etc. b) planul britanic Phillimore: o alian diplomatic ntrit de un sistem de arbitraj

c) planul francez Leon Bourgeois: crearea unei fore militare internaionale , avnd un stat major permanent - Comisia pentru Societatea Naiunilor a acceptat proiectul comun anglo american Hurst Miller, ca baz a discuiilor - 28 aprilie 1919 - acceptarea regulamentului Societii Naiunilor prin adunarea plenar a Conferinei de pace de la Versailles - 28 iunie 1919 semnarea regulamentului alctuit din 26 de articole de ctre statele fondatoare, care sunt i semnatare ale tratatului de pace. Regulamentul devine parte integrant a Tratatului de la Versailles - ianuarie 1920 Societatea Naiunilor i ncepe activitatea. B) Structura: 1) Adunarea general - se ntrunete o dat pe an la Geneva - n cadrul ei, fiecare stat are drept de vot 2) Consiliul: - alctuit iniial din 5 membri permaneni i 4 membrii provizorii alei de Adunarea general - Germania intr n Societatea Naiunilor n 1926 i tot atunci devine membru permanent; dup retragerea sa n 1933, locul su este preluat de Uniunea Sovietic - crete numrul membrilor provizorii de la 6 n 1922, la 9 n 1926 pentru ca n 1936, numrul lor s ajung la 11 - atribuii: decide n caz de conflict care este agresorul i preconizeaz eventualele sanciuni 3) Secretariatul general - condus de un secretar general permanent - pregtete documentele i rapoartele pentru Adunarea general i Consiliu

4) Curtea permanent de justiiei internaional de la Haga - constituit n 1922 - format din 21 de magistraii, alei din toate naiunile, numii pe o durat de 9 ani, reeligibili - judeca diferendele cu caracter internaional supuse ei de prile n litigiu - au existat o serie de organizaii specializate alipite Societii Naiunilor care erau nsrcinate s extind cooperarea internaional n domeniul problemelor sociale (Biroul Internaional al Muncii), financiare (Banca Reglementrilor Internaionale), intelectuale (Centrul Internaional de Cooperare Intelectual), precum i o serie de comisii de studiu (de exemplu, comisia dezarmrii) C ) Scopul: - crearea i garantarea securitii colective prin mijloace specifice specificate n statutul Societii (arbitraj, sanciuni morale, economice, militare) - dezvoltarea cooperrii ntre state - reducerea narmrilor D ) Eecul Societii Naiunilor: - evidenierea cauzelor eecului Societii Naiunilor - poziia Societii Naiunilor fa de: problema securitii colective (Protocolul de la Geneva din 1924) problema dezarmrii (Conferina de la Geneva 1932-1934) agresiunea Japoniei n Manciuria (septembrie 1931) agresiunea Italiei n Abisinia (octombrie 1935) Germania prsete Societatea Naiunilor (19 octombrie 1933) primirea Uniunii Sovietice n Societatea Naiunilor (18 septembrie 1934) Italia prsete Societatea Naiunilor (1937) neintervenia Societii Naiunii mpotriva politicii expansioniste a Germaniei ( reintroducerea serviciului militar obligatoriu, 16 martie 1935;

remilitarizarea Renaniei, 7 martie 1936; anexarea Austriei sau Anschluss, martie 1938; dezmembrarea Cehoslovaciei) dizolvarea Societii Naiunilor prin hotrrea Adunrii generale (18 aprilie 1946)

Dicionar:
armistiiu: suspendarea temporar a aciunilor militare n urma unui acord ncheiat ntre prile beligerante clauz: dispoziie prevzut ntr-o convenie sau tratat demilitarizare: desfiinarea, n urma unei convenii sau a unui tratat, a oricrei armate i excluderea armamentului sau a instalaiilor militare de pe un anumit teritoriu plebiscit / referendum: consultarea prealabil a cetenilor, care urmeaz s se pronune prin da sau nu asupra unui act de stat de importan deosebit preambul: parte introductiv a unui act important, a unui tratat internaional, care lmurete utilitatea sau necesitatea lui sau care prezint sumar dispoziiile lui generale; expunere de motive (a unui proiect de lege) reparaii de rzboi: despgubiri pltite pentru compensarea pagubelor economice datorate unui rzboi securitate colectiv: component a relaiilor internaionale, concretizat prin msuri comune, luate de ctre toate statele i care vizeaz meninerea pcii i respectarea angajamentelor teritoriu sub mandat: teritoriu administrat de o ar strin n baza hotrrii unui for internaional tratat: nelegere scris ncheiat ntre dou sau mai multe state, n vederea determinrii, ntr-un anumit domeniu, a drepturilor i a obligaiilor prilor contractante sau n scopul stabilirii unor norme juridice; acord internaional, convenie internaional

V Suport documentar

Document 1: Cele 14 puncte ale preedintelui Woodrow Wilson , 8 ianuarie 1918

1. Convenii de pace publice, ncheiate deschis, dup care nu vor mai exista acorduri internaionale private de nici un fel, ci o diplomaie care va aciona ntotdeauna cu sinceritate n vzul tuturor. 2. Libertatea absolut de navigaie pe mri n afara apelor teritoriale, att pe timp de pace ct i n timp de rzboi, n afar de mrile care ar putea fi nchise total sau n parte printro aciune internaional n vederea executrii acordurilor internaionale. 3. Suprimarea, att ct va fi posibil, a tuturor barierelor economice; stabilirea de condiii comerciale egale ntre toate naiunile care sunt de acord cu pacea i se asociaz pentru a o menine. 4. Garanii convenabile, date i luate, c armamentele naionale vor fi reduse pn la ultimul punct compatibil cu securitatea rii. 5. nelegerea liber, ntr-un spirit larg i absolut a tuturor revendicrilor coloniale, bazat pe respectarea i pe principiul strict c, n fixarea tuturor chestiunilor de suveranitate, interesele populaiilor n cauz vor trebui s aib o pondere egal cu aceea a cererilor echitabile ale guvernului al crui titlu trebuie s fie hotrt. 6. Evacuarea tuturor teritoriilor ruse i reglementarea tuturor chestiunilor privitoare la Rusia, care vor asigura cea mai buna i mai liber cooperare a celorlalte naiuni, pentru a da Rusiei prilejul s hotrasc, fr s fie mpiedicat sau stnjenit, pentru independena propriei sale dezvoltri i a politicii sale naionale i pentru a i se asigura o sincer bun primire n Societatea naiunilor libere, sub instituiile alese de ea singur i, mai mult dect o primire, ntregul ajutor de care ea ar avea nevoie i pe care l-ar dori. Tratamentul acordat Rusiei de ctre naiunile surori n lunile ce urmeaz va fi piatra de ncercare a bunvoinei lor i a nelegerii nevoilor ei, abstracie fcnd de propriile lor interese i de simpatia lor dezinteresat.

7. Belgia. ntreaga lume va fi de acord c ea trebuie evacuat i restaurat fr nici o tentativ de a limita suveranitatea de care ea se bucur mpreun cu alte naiuni libere. Nici un act nu va servi att ca acela al restabilirii ncrederii printre naiuni n legile pe care le-au stabilit i fixat ele nsele pentru a dirigui relaiile dintre ele. Fr acest act salutar, orice structur, precum i validitatea legilor internaionale vor fi pentru totdeauna slbite. 8. ntregul teritoriu francez va trebui s fie liber i regiunile invadate vor trebui restaurate. Rul fcut Franei de ctre Prusia n 1871, n ce privete Alsacia Lorena, care a tulburat pacea lumii vreme de aproape cincizeci de ani, va trebui s fie reparat, astfel ca pacea s poat, odat mai mult, s fie asigurat n interesul tuturor. 9. O reglementare a frontierei italiene va trebui s fie efectuat de-a lungul liniilor naionalitilor clar recognoscibile. 10. Popoarele Austro Ungariei, crora noi dorim s le vedem locul salvat i asigurat printre naiuni, va trebui s li se dea mai larg ocazia unei dezvoltri autonome. 11. Romnia, Serbia i Muntenegru vor trebui s fie evacuate, i teritoriile lor ocupate vor trebui s fie restituite; Serbiei va trebui s i se acorde acces liber i sigur la mare; i relaiile ntre diverse state balcanice vor trebui s fie fixate la sfaturile prieteneti ale Puterilor i dup liniile stabilite istoricete: credin i naionalitate. Se vor da acestor State balcanice garanii de independen politic i economic i de integrare a teritoriile lor. 12. O suveranitate cert va trebui s fie asigurat prilor turceti ale Imperiului otoman actual, dar celelalte naionaliti care se afl, n acest moment, sub dominaie turc vor trebui s fie asigurate de o securitate nendoielnic a vieii i de posibilitatea nengrdit de a se dezvolta n mod autonom. Dardanele vor trebuie s fie deschise, n permanen, constituind o trecere liber pentru navale i comerul tuturor naiunilor, sub garanii internaionale. 13. Un stat polonez independent va trebui creat. El va trebui s cuprind teritoriile locuite indiscutabil de populaiile poloneze, cruia trebuie s i se asigure accesul liber la mare i a crui independen politic i economic, ca i integritate teritorial, va trebui s fie garantat printr-un acord internaional.

14. O asociaie general de naiuni va trebui s fie format prin convenii speciale, n scopul de a da garanii mutuale de independen politic i integritate teritorial statelor mari, ca i celor mici. SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Bue, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1974, pp.12- 14

Document 2: Tratatul de pace cu Germania de la Versailles , 28 iunie 1919 (excerpt)

Partea I Pactul Societii Naiunilor

naltele pri contractante, considernd c, pentru a dezvolta cooperarea ntre naiuni i pentru a le garanta pacea i sigurana, este necesar s se accepte anumite obligaiuni, de a nu recurge la rzboi, s se ntrein la lumina zilei relaiuni internaionale bazate pe justiie i onoare, s se observe riguros prescripiunile dreptului internaional, recunoscute aici nainte ca regul efectiv a guvernelor, s se fac s domneasc dreptatea i s se respecte cu sfinenie toate obligaiile tratatelor, n raporturile mutuale dintre popoarele organizate. Adopt prezentul pact, care instituie Societatea Naiunilor. Articolul 1 Sunt membri originari ai Societii Naiunilor, acei dintre semnatari al cror nume figureaz n anexa prezentului Pact, precum i statele, de asemenea numite n Anex, care vor fi aderat la prezentul Pact fr nici o rezerv, prin declaraiune, depus la Secretariat, n cursul celor dou luni de la intrarea n vigoare a Pactului i despre care se va face notificare celorlali membri ai societii. Orice stat, dominion sau colonie care se guverneaz liber i care nu este menionat n anex, poate deveni membru al Societii, dac admiterea sa este pronunat de cele dou

treimi ale adunrii, cu condiia s dea garanii efective de intenia sa sincer de a observa angajamentele sale internaionale i de a accepta regulamentul stabilit de Societate, n ceea ce privete forele i armamentele sale militare, navale i aeriene. Orice membru al Societii poate, dup o prealabil ntiinare fcut cu doi ani nainte, s se retrag din Societate, cu condiia de a fi ndeplinit, n acel moment, toate obligaiunile sale internaionale, inclusiv cele prevzute n prezentul Pact. Articolul 2 Aciunea Societii, astfel cum este definit n prezentul Pact, se exercit de o Adunare i de un Consiliu asistai de un secretariat permanent. Articolul 3 Adunarea se compune din reprezentani ai membrilor Societii. Ea se ntrunete la epoci fixate i la orice moment, dac mprejurrile o cer, la sediul Societii sau n vreun alt loc care ar putea fi desemnat. Adunarea are cderea de a se pronuna asupra oricrei chestiuni care intr n sfera de activitate a Societii sau care atinge pacea lumii. Fiecare membru al Societii nu poate avea mai mult de trei reprezentani n Adunare i nu dispune dect de un vot. Articolul 4 Consiliul se compune din reprezentani ai principalelor Puteri aliate i asociate, precum i din reprezentani ai altor patru membri ai Societii. Aceti patru membrii sunt desemnai n mod liber, de Adunare, i la datele ce se va crede de cuviin. (...) Cu aprobarea majoritii Adunrii, Consiliul poate desemna pe ali membrii ai Societii a cror reprezentare va fi de aici nainte permanent. El poate, cu aceeai aprobare, s sporeasc numrul membrilor Societii care vor fi alei de adunare pentru a fi reprezentai n Consiliu. Consiliul se ntrunete cnd o cer mprejurrile i cel puin o dat pe an, la sediul Societii, sau n orice alt loc care ar putea fi desemnat.

Orice chestiune intrnd n sfera de activitate a Societii sau privitoare la pacea lumii e de cderea Consiliului. Orice membru al Societii care nu este reprezentat n Consiliu este invitat s trimit un reprezentant, spre a lua parte n Consiliu, atunci cnd o chestiune care l intereseaz n particular e adus naintea Consiliului. Fiecare membru al Societii reprezentat n Consiliu nu dispune dect de un vot i nu are dect un singur reprezentant. Articolul 5 Afar de vreo dispoziiune hotrt contra acestui Pact, sau clauzelor prezentului tratat, hotrrile Adunrii sau ale Consiliului sunt date de unanimitatea membrilor Societii reprezentani n Adunare. (...) Articolul 6 Secretariatul permanent este stabilit la sediul societii. El se compune dintr-un Secretar general, din secretari i din personalul necesar. (...) Articolul 7 Sediul Societii este stabilit la Geneva. (...) Articolul 8 Membrii Societii recunosc c meninerea pcii cere reducerea armamentului naional la minimul compatibil cu sigurana naional i cu executarea obligaiunilor internaionale impuse printr-o aciune comun. (...) Dup adoptarea lor de diversele guverne, limita armamentelor astfel fixate nu poate fi depit fr consimmntul Consiliului. (...) Articolul 10 Membrii Societii i iau ndatorirea s respecte i s menin n contra oricrei agresiuni externe integritatea teritorial i independena politic existent a tuturor

membrilor Societii. n caz de agresiune, Consiliul avizeaz asupra mijloacelor de a asigura executarea acestei obligaiuni. Articolul 11 Se declar n mod hotrt c orice rzboi sau ameninare de rzboi, fie c ar atinge direct sau indirect pe unul dintre membrii Societii, intereseaz ntreaga Societate i c aceasta trebuie s ia msurile proprii pentru a salva n mod eficace pacea Naiunilor. n asemenea caz, Secretariatul general convoac imediat Consiliul, la cererea oricrui membru al Societii. n afar de aceasta se mai declar c orice membru al Societii are dreptul s atrag, n mod amical, ateniunea Adunri sau a Consiliului asupra oricrei mprejurri de natur s ating relaiunile internaionale i care amenin n urm s tulbure pacea, sau buna nelegere ntre naiuni, de care depinde pacea. Articolul 12 Toi membrii societii convin c, dac se ivete ntre ei un diferend susceptibil s aduc o ruptur, l vor supune fie procedurii arbitrajului, fie examinrii Consiliului. Ei mai convin c, n nici un caz, nu trebuie s recurg la rzboi nainte de expirarea unui termen de trei luni dup darea sentinei arbitrilor sau dup raportul Consiliului. (...) Articolul 13 Membrii Societii convin c dac s-ar ivi ntre ei un diferend susceptibil, dup prerea lor, de o soluie arbitrar i dac acestui diferend nu i se poate pune capt n mod satisfctor, pe cale diplomatic, chestiunea va fi supus n ntregime arbitrajului. Printre diferendele care sunt n general susceptibile de o soluie arbitrar se declar: toate diferendele privitoare la interpretarea unui tratat, la orice chestiune de drept internaional, al orice fapt care dac s-ar realiza ar constitui ruptura unui angajament internaional, precum i diferendele relative la ntinderea sau la natura reparaiilor datorate pentru o asemenea ruptur.

Articolul 14 Consiliul este nsrcinat s prepare un proiect de Curtea permanent de justiie internaional i s-l supun membrilor Societii. Aceast Curte va fi competent de a judeca toate diferendele cu caracter internaional ce prile i le vor supune. Ea va da, de asemenea, avize consultative asupra oricrui diferend sau oricrui punct ce va fi adus naintea ei de ctre Consiliu sau de Adunare. Articolul 15 Dac se ivete ntre membrii societii un diferend susceptibil a atrage dup sine o ruptur i dac acest diferend nu este supus arbitrajului prevzut prin articolul 13, membrii Societii convin s-l aduc n faa Consiliului. n acest scop este de ajuns ca unul dintre ei s aduc acest diferend la cunotina Secretariatului general, care ia orice dispoziiuni n vederea unei anchete i a unei examinri complete. (...) Articolul 16 Dac un membru al Societii recurge la rzboi contra angajamentelor luate prin articolele 12, 13 sau 15 este de ipso facto considerat c a comis un act de rzboi n contra tuturor celorlali membri ai Societii. Acetia se ndatoreaz s rup imediat cu el orice relaiuni comerciale sau financiare, s interzic orice raporturi ntre naionali lor i aceia ai statului care a clcat Pactul, i s fac s nceteze orice comunicaiuni financiare, comerciale sau personale ntre naionalii acestui stat i aceia a oricrui alt stat sau nu al societii. n acest caz, Consiliul are datoria de a recomanda diferitelor guverne interesate efectivele militare, navale sau aeriene cu care membrii Societii vor contribui, fiecare n parte, la forele armate destinate respectrii angajamentelor Societii. Membrii Societii mai convin, n afar de aceasta, de a-i da sprijin reciproc pentru aplicarea msurilor economice i financiare ce urmeaz a se lua n virtutea prezentului articol, pentru a reduce la minimum pierderile i neajunsurile ce ar putea rezulta. i dau, de asemenea, sprijin reciproc pentru a rezista mpotriva oricrei msuri speciale ndreptate n contra unuia dintre ei, de ctre statul care a clcat Pactul.

Ei iau dispoziiunile necesare pentru a nlesni trecerea prin teritoriul lor a forelor oricrui membru al Societii, care ia parte la o aciune comun pentru a obine respectarea angajamentelor luate de Societate. Poate fi exclus din Societate orice membru care s-a fcut vinovat de violarea vreunuia din angajamentele ce rezult din Pact. Excluderea este pronunat prin votul tuturor celorlali membrii ai Societii reprezentai n Consiliu. Articolul 17 n caz de diferend ntre dou state, dintre care numai unul singur este membru al Societii sau ntre dou state care nu fac parte din Societate, statul sau statele care nu sunt membrii si Societii sunt invitate s se supun obligaiunilor impuse membrilor ei, pentru soluionarea diferendului n condiiile socotite drepte de Consiliu. Dac aceast invitaie este primit, dispoziiunile articolelor 12-16 se aplic sub rezerva modificrilor considerate ca necesare de Consiliu. Din momentul trimiterii acestei invitaiuni, Consiliul deschide o anchet asupra mprejurrilor diferendului i propune msura care i se pare cea mai nimerit i cea mai eficace n acea mprejurare. Dac statul invitat refuz s primeasc obligaiunile de membru al societii, n scopul soluionrii diferendului i recurge la rzboi n contra vreunui membru al Societii, i sunt aplicabile dispoziiunile articolului 16. Dac cele dou pri invitate refuz s primeasc obligaiunile de membri ai societii, n scopul soluionrii diferendului, Consiliul poate s ai toate msurile i s fac propuneri de natur a preveni ostilitile i a pune capt conflictului. Articolul 18 Orice tratat sau angajament internaional ncheiat n viitor de un membru al Societii va trebui imediat nregistrat de Secretariat i publicat de el ct mai curnd posibil. Nici unul dintre aceste tratate sau angajamente nu va fi obligatoriu nainte de a fi fost nregistrat. (...)

Articolul 20 Membrii Societii recunosc, fiecare n ce-l privete, c prezentul Pact abrog orice obligaiuni sau nelegeri inter se, incompatibile cu dispoziiunile sale i se leag n mod solemn s nu mai contracteze n viitor altele de acest fel. Dac nainte de intrarea sa n Societate un membru a luat asupr-i obligaiuni incompatibile cu dispoziiunile Pactului, dnsul trebuie s ia msuri imediate pentru a se desface de aceste obligaiuni.(...) Articolul 21 Principiile urmtoare se aplic coloniilor i teritoriilor care n urma rzboiului au ncetat a fi sub suveranitatea Statelor care le guvernau mai nainte i care sunt locuite de popoare nc incapabile de a se conduce ele nsele, date fiind condiiunile deosebit de grele ale lumii moderne. Bunstarea i dezvoltarea acestor popoare formnd o misiune sfnt a civilizaiei, este necesar s se ncorporeze n prezentul Pact garanii pentru ndeplinirea acestei misiuni. Cea mai bun metod pentru realizarea n mod practic a acestui principiu este de a ncredina tutela acestor popoare naiunilor mai naintate care, prin resursele, experiena sau poziiunea lor geografic sunt cele mai n msur s-i ia aceast rspundere i care consimt s o primeasc: ele ar exercita aceast tutel n calitate de mandatare i n numele Societii. Caracterul mandatului trebuie s difere, dup gradul de dezvoltare al poporului, dup situaia geografic a teritoriului, dup orice alte circumstane asemntoare (....) Articolul 26 Modificrile Pactului de fa vor intra n vigoare din momentul ratificrii lor de ctre membrii Societii, ai crei reprezentani compun Consiliul, i de ctre majoritatea acelora ai crei reprezentani formeaz Adunarea. Orice membru al societii este liber a nu primi amendamentele aduse Pactului, n care caz el nceteaz a mai face parte din Societate.

Partea a II-a Tratatul de pace cu Germania

Partea a III-a Clauze politice europene Seciunea I Belgia Articolul 32 Germania recunoate deplina suveranitate a Belgiei asupra ansamblului teritoriului contestat Moresnet (zis Moresnet neutru) (...) Articolul 33 Germania renun n favoarea Belgiei la orice drept i titlu asupra teritoriilor ce cuprind ansamblul inuturilor (Kreise) Eupen i Malmedy. (...)

Seciunea a II-a Luxemburg Articolul 40 Germania recunoate c Marele Ducat de Luxemburg a ncetat a mai face parte din Uniunea vamal german, cu ncepere de la 1 ianuarie 1919; renun la orice drepturi asupra cilor ferate; ader la abrogarea regimului de neutralitate a Marelui Ducat i accept dinainte toate aranjamentele internaionale ncheiate de ctre Puterile aliate i asociate cu privire la Marele Ducat (...). Seciunea a III-a Malul stng al Rinului Articolul 42 Se interzice Germaniei de a menine sau de a construi fortificaii, fie pe malul stng al Rinului, fie pe malul drept, la vest de o linie trasat la 50 de km de acest fluviu.

Articolul 43 Sunt de asemenea interzise, n zona definit de articolul 42, ntreinerea sau adunarea de fore armate, fie cu caracter permanent, fie cu caracter temporar, precum i orice manevre militare, de orice natur ar fi, i meninerea oricror mijloace materiale de mobilizare. Seciunea a III-a Bazinul Saar Articolul 45 n compensarea minelor de crbuni distruse n Nordul Franei i n contul sumei de reparaii, pentru pagube de rzboi, datorate de Germania, aceasta cedeaz Franei proprietatea integral i absolut, liber de orice datorii sau sarcini, cu dreptul exclusiv de exploatare a minelor de crbuni situate n bazinul Saar. (...) Articolul 49 Germania renun n favoarea Societii Naiunilor (...)la guvernarea teritoriului specificat mai sus. Dup expirarea unui termen de 15 ani, socotit de la data intrrii n vigoare a prezentului tratat, populaia sus zisului teritoriu va fi chemat s se pronune asupra suveranitii sub care ar dori s fie pus. Seciunea a V-a Alsacia - Lorena Articolul 51 Teritoriile cedate Germaniei [ Alsacia i Lorena ] n virtutea Preliminariilor de pace semnate la Versailles la 26 februarie 1871 i Tratatului de la Frankfurt de la 10 mai 1871, se reintegreaz n suveranitatea francez, cu ncepere de la armistiiul din 11 noiembrie 1918. (...)

Seciunea a VI-a Austria Articolul 80 Germania recunoate i va respecta cu strictee independena Austriei, ntre frontierele care se vor fixa printr-un tratat ce se va ncheia ntre aceast ar i principalele Puteri aliate i asociate.

Seciunea a VII-a Statul cehoslovac Articolul 8 Germania recunoate, dup cum au fcut-o de acum Puterile aliate i asociate, completa independen a statului cehoslovac (...). Ea declar c este de acord cu frontierele acestui stat, aa cum vor fi ele determinate de ctre principalele Puteri aliate i asociate, si celelalte state interesate. Articolul 83 Germania renun n favoarea statului cehoslovac la toate drepturile i titlurile sale asupra prii din teritoriul silezian (...).

Seciunea a VIII-a Polonia Articolul 87 Germania recunoate, dup cum au fcut-o de acum Puterile aliate i asociate, completa independen a Poloniei i renun n favoarea Poloniei la orice drepturi i titluri asupra teritoriilor delimitate de Marea Baltic, frontiera estic a Germaniei (...).

Partea a IV-a Drepturile i interesele germane n afara Germaniei Seciunea I Coloniile germane Articolul 119 Germania renun n favoarea principalelor Puteri aliate i asociate la toate drepturile i titlurile sale asupra posesiunilor sale de peste mare.(...) Partea a V-a Clauze militare, navale i aeriene Articolul 160 Cu ncepere de la 31 martie 1920 cel mai trziu, armata german nu va trebui s cuprind mai mult de apte divizii de infanterie i trei divizii de cavalerie. ncepnd din acest moment, totalul efectivelor armatei statelor care constituie Germania nu va trebui s depeasc o sut de mii de oameni, inclusiv ofieri i necombatani, i va fi destinat exclusiv la meninerea ordinii pe teritoriu i la poliia frontierelor. Efectivul total de ofieri, inclusiv personalul Statelor majore, oricare ar fi alctuirea acestora, nu va trebui s depeasc patru mii (...) Marele Stat major german i alte formaiuni similare vor fi dizolvate i nu vor putea fi reconstituite sub nici o form (...). Articolul 173 Orice fel de serviciu militar obligatoriu va fi desfiinat n Germania. Armata german nu va putea fi construit i recrutat dect prin angajri voluntare.(...) Articolul 180 Toate fortificaiile, fortreele i locurile ntrite, situate pe teritoriul german, la vestul unei linii trasate de 50 km est de Rin, vor fi dezarmate i drmate (...)

Articolul 181 Dup expirarea unui termen de dou luni, socotit de la punerea n vigoare a Tratatului, forele flotei de rzboi germane nu vor trebui s depeasc n nave narmate:6 cuirasate, 6 crucitoare uoare, 12 distrugtoare, 12 torpilatoare sau un numr egal de vase de nlocuire (...). Ele nu vor trebui s includ nici un vas submarin.(...) Articolul 191 Construcia i achiziia oricrui fel de vas submarin, chiar de comer, vor fi interzise n Germania. (...)

Articolul 198 Forele militare ale Germaniei nu vor trebui s cuprind nici o aviaie militar sau marin.(...)

Seciunea a VI-a Comisiuni interaliate de control Articolul 203 Toate clauzele militare, navale i aeronautice coninute n prezentul Tratat i pentru executarea crora s-a fixat o limit de timp vor fi executate de Germania sub controlul unor Comisiuni interaliate, special numite n acest scop de ctre principalele Puteri aliate i asociate (...)

Partea a VIII-a Reparaii Articolul 231 Guvernele aliate i asociate declar, iar Germania recunoate, c Germania i aliaii si sunt rspunztori pentru c le-au cauzat - de toate pierderile i de toate daunele suferite

de guvernele aliate i asociate, precum i de naionalii lor, ca urmare a rzboiului ce le-a fost impus prin agresiunea Germaniei i a aliailor si (...). Articolul 233 Valoarea pagubelor sus menionate, pentru care Germania datoreaz reparaii, va fi fixat de o Comisie interaliat, care va lua denumirea de Comisiunea reparaiilor (...) Comisiunea va stabili un stat de plat, prevznd termenele i modalitile de achitare de ctre Germania a ntregii sale datorii, n decursul unei perioade de 30 de ani, cu ncepere de la 1 mai 1921. (...) Articolul 235 (...) n cursul anilor 1919 i 1920, precum i n primele patru luni ale anului 1921, Germania va plti echivalentul a 20 miliarde mrci aur, n vrsminte i n condiiile pe care le va fixa Comisiunea reparaiilor (n aur, mrfuri, vapoare, hrtii de valoare saul altfel) (...) Articolul 249 Costul total al ntreinerii tuturor armatelor aliate i asociate n teritoriile germane ocupate va fi n sarcina Germaniei cu ncepere de la semnarea armistiiului de la 11 noiembrie 1918 (...). Partea a XII-a Porturi, ci fluviale i ci ferate

Articolul 331 Sunt declarate internaionale: Elba (...), Oder (...), Niemen (...), Dunrea (...).

Partea a XIV-a Garanii de executare Articolul 428 Drept garanie pentru executarea prezentului Tratat de ctre Germania, teritoriile germane aflate la Vest de Rin, mpreun cu capetele de pod, vor fi ocupate de trupele Puterilor aliate i asociate timp de 15 ani, socotii de la intrarea n vigoare a prezentului Tratat (...) Articolul 430 n cazul n care, fie n timpul ocupaiei, fie dup expirarea celor 15 ani sus artai, Comisia reparaiilor ar recunoate ca Germania refuz s respecte n totul sau n parte obligaiunile ce rezult pentru ea din prezentul Tratat cu privire la reparaii, ntreaga sau o parte din zona specificat (...) va fi imediat ocupat din nou de ctre forele aliate i asociate. Articolul 431 Dac Germania i va ndeplini toate angajamentele pe care i le-a luat prin prezentul Tratat, nainte de expirarea perioadei de 15 ani, trupele de ocupaie vor fi retrase imediat (...). Seciunea a II-a Europa Oriental Articolul 433 Drept garanie pentru executarea dispoziiunilor prezentului tratat, prin care Germania recunoate n mod definitiv abrogarea Tratatului de la Brest Litovsk i a tuturor tratatelor, conveniilor i aranjamentelor pe care le-a ncheiat cu guvernul maximalist din Rusia, precum i n vederea asigurrii restabilirii pcii i a unui guvern bun n provinciile baltice i n Lituania, - toate trupele germane, care se afl actualmente n menionatele teritorii, se vor napoia ntre hotarele Germaniei de ndat ce guvernele principalelor Puteri aliate i asociate vor socoti c este momentul potrivit, fa de situaia intern din aceste teritorii.

SURSA: Al. Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, C-tin Bue, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol. I (1917-1939), Bucureti, Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1974, pp. 27- 32.

Document 3: Tratatul de pace cu Austria (excerpt) Saint Germain en Laye, 10 septembrie 1919

(...) Articolul 59 Austria renun, n ce-o privete, n favoarea Romniei la orice drepturi i titluri asupra prii din fostul ducat al Bucovinei aflat dincoace de frontierele Romniei, aa cum vor fi fixate ulterior de ctre principalele Puteri aliate i asociate.(...) Articolul 87 Austria recunoate i se angajeaz s respecte, ca permanent i inalienabil, independena tuturor teritoriilor ce fceau parte din fostul imperiu al Rusiei la 1 august 1914 (...) Articolul 88 Independena Austriei este inalienabil numai cu consimmntul Consiliului Societii Naiunilor. n consecin, Austria se angajeaz s se abin n afar de cazul cnd ar avea consimmntul zisului Consiliu (...) Austria declar de pe acum c recunoate i accept frontierele Bulgariei, Greciei, Ungariei, Poloniei, Romniei, ale Statului Srbo- Croato- Sloven i ale Statului cehoslovac, aa cum aceste vor fi stabilite de ctre principalele Puteri aliate i asociate.(...)

Articolul 120 Numrul total al forelor militare n armata austriac nu va trebui s depeasc 30.000 de oameni, inclusiv ofieri i trupe auxiliare.(...) Armata austriac va trebui s fie folosit n mod exclusiv la meninerea ordinii pe ntinderea teritoriului Austriei i la poliia frontierelor sale (...) Articolul 177 Guvernele aliate i asociate declar, i Austria recunoate, c Austria i aliaii si sunt rspunztori pentru a le fi cauzat de pierderile i pagubele suferite de Guvernele aliate i asociate i naionalii lor, ca urmare a rzboiului ce le-a fost impus prin agresiunea Austro Ungariei i a aliailor si. (...) SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Bue, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1974, pp.35-36.

Document 4: Tratatul de pace cu Bulgaria (excerpt)

Neuilly sur Seine, 27 noiembrie 1919

(...) Articolul 27 Frontierele Bulgariei vor fi stabilite dup cum urmeaz: cu Romnia: de la Marea Neagr pn la Dunre frontiera aa cum era la 1 august 1914; de acolo pn la confluena Timocului cu Dunrea; partea principal de navigaie a Dunrii n amont (...).

Articolul 36 Bulgaria recunoate, aa cum au fcut-o deja Puterile aliate i asociate, Statul SrboCroato- Sloven (...). Articolul 48 (...) Puterile aliate i asociate se angajeaz ca libertatea accesului economic al Bulgariei la Marea Egee s fie garantat. (...)
[Ulterior Tracia a fost cedat Greciei, iar Bulgaria a pierdut ieirea la Marea Egee ]

Articolul 66 (...) Numrul total al forelor militare n armata bulgar nu va trebui s depeasc 20.000 de oameni, inclusiv ofieri i trupele auxiliare (...). Articolul 122 Bulgaria recunoate c, alturndu-se rzboiului de agresiune pe care Germania i Austro-Ungaria le-au pornit mpotriva Puterilor aliate i asociate, le-a cauzat acestora din urm pierderi i sacrificii de tot felul (...). n consecin, Bulgaria se angajeaz s plteasc (...) suma de dou miliarde dou sute cincizeci milioane franci aur, reprezentnd reparaiile(...). Plata acestei sume se va face prin vrsminte semestriale (...) fiecare cuprinznd (...)suma necesar amortizrii n 37 de ani (...) a sumei datorate de Bulgaria (...). SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Bue, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1974, pp.37-38

Document 5: Tratatul de pace cu Ungaria (excerpt) Trianon, 4 iunie 1920

(...) Articolul 45 Ungaria renun, n ce-o privete, n favoarea Romniei, la orice drepturi i titluri asupra teritoriilor din fosta monarhie austro ungar, situate dincolo de frontierele Ungariei (...). Articolul 73 Ungaria declar de pe acum c recunoate i primete fruntariile Austriei, Bulgariei, Greciei, Poloniei, Romniei, Statului Srbo Croato Sloven i ale Statului Cehoslovac, astfel cum aceste fruntarii vor fi fixate de ctre Principalele puteri aliate i asociate. Articolul 104 (...) Numrul total al forelor militare n armata ungar nu va trebui s depeasc 30.000 de oameni, inclusiv ofieri i trupele auxiliare (...). Articolul 161 Ungaria recunoate c ea i aliaii si sunt rspunztori, pentru a le fi cauzat, de pierderile i pagubele suferite de Guvernele aliate i asociate i de ctre conaionalii lor, ca urmare a rzboiului care le-a fost impus, prin agresiunea Austro Ungaria i a aliailor si (...). SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Bue, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1974, pp.39-40

Seminar nr. 3
Relaiile internaionale n perioada interbelic. 1919-1939

I Conferina de la Washington, 12 noiembrie 1921- 6 februarie 1922

- 24 august 1921- Statele Unite au semnat un tratat de pace separat cu Germania - scopul conferinei : - dezarmarea general, i n special dezarmarea naval - soluionarea problemelor din zona Pacificului i Extremului Orient - s-au ncheiat 3 tratate, dup cum urmeaz: I. Tratatul celor Patru Puteri (Anglia, Frana, Japonia, SUA), 13 decembrie 1921, valabil pe o perioad de 6 ani - prile semnatare conveneau s-i respecte reciproc posesiunile din Pacific i s supun consultrilor orice dispute sau ameninri din exterior * De ilustrat principalele prevederi, precum i semnificaia tratatului pentru evoluia ulterioar a evenimentelor II. Tratatul naval al celor cinci puteri sau tratatul asupra limitrii armamentului naval (Anglia, Frana, Japonia, SUA, Italia), 6 februarie 1922, valabil pe o perioad de 15 ani - stabilea un sistem de limitare a tonajelor flotelor - prile semnatare se angajau s menin status-quo-ul n zona Pacificului * De ilustrat principalele prevederi, precum i semnificaia tratatului pentru evoluia ulterioar a evenimentelor

III. Tratatul celor nou (Anglia, Frana, Japonia, SUA, Italia, China, Belgia, Olanda, Portugalia) - garanta independena Chinei - Japonia retroceda Chinei Shandong i Kiaochou - angajamentul formal al prilor de a sprijini politica porilor deschise

II Relaiile sovieto-germane
Acord comercial, 6 mai 1921 - prin acest acord Republica de la Weimar recunotea pe cea a Sovietelor i iniia legturi comerciale cu aceasta Tratatul de la Rapallo, 16 aprilie 1922 - semnarea acestui tratat a marcat sfritul izolrii Uniunii Sovietice i a Germaniei pe plan economic i politico-diplomatic - tratatul prevedea restabilirea relaiilor diplomatice i renunarea reciproc la despgubirile de rzboi de ilustrat contextul n care s-a semnat tratatul, principale prevederi, precum i semnificaia sa Tratatul de la Berlin, 1926 - pact de prietenie germano - rus - urmeaz linia nceput la Rapallo - se ajunge la o nelegere n probleme de politic i economie, partenerii i promit neutralitatea n cazul atacului din partea unei tere puteri Pactul Ribbentrop Molotov, 23 august 1939 - a fost un tratat de neagresiune germano sovietic - cele dou pri se angajau s se abin de la violen i de la orice atac ndreptat mpotriva celeilalte

- coninea un protocol adiional secret prin care erau stabilite sferele de influen * De ilustrat contextul n care s-a semnat tratatul, principalele prevederi, precum i semnificaia sa pentru evoluia ulterioar a evenimentelor Pactul germano sovietic de prietenie i frontier, 28 septembrie 1939 - URSS i Germania i mpreau Polonia i stabileau dispariia ei de pe harta politic a Europei *De ilustrat contextul n care s-a semnat tratatul, principalele prevederi, precum i semnificaia sa pentru evoluia ulterioar a evenimentelor

III Problema dezarmrii

Geneva, 1924-1925 - Protocolul de la Geneva sau Protocolul pentru reglementarea panic a diferendelor dintre state viza: - realizarea securitii colective prin dezarmare - introducea un element nou: arbitrajul obligatoriu - stabilea o legtur ntre cei trei termeni: arbitraj, securitate, dezarmare De ilustrat contextul n care s-a a fost elaborat documentul, principalele prevederi, cauzele eecului acestei iniiative Pactul Briand-Kellogg (sau pactul de renunare la rzboi), Paris, 27 august 1928 - pactul obliga prile semnatare s renune la rzboi ca instrument al politicii naionale i ca mijloc de reglementare a litigiilor internaionale, angajndu-se s rezolve diferendele dintre ele numai prin mijloace panice * De ilustrat prile semnatare, contextul n care a fost elaborat documentul, principalele prevederi, eventualele lipsuri ale noului act Protocolul Litvinov sau acordul de la Moscova, 9 februarie 1929 - o aplicare, pe plan regional a Pactului Briand-Kellogg

- a fost o propunere sovietic: ministrul de externe sovietic, Maxim Litvinov, a propus un document pe aceeai idee a renunrii la rzboi ca mijloc de reglementare a conflictelor, urmtoarelor state: Romnia, Polonia, Estonia i Letonia

IV Problema reparaiilor
- a revenit unei Comisii a reparaiilor, care trebuia s urmreasc modul n care Germania i onoreaz obligaiile asumate - Germania intr n incapacitate de plat a datoriilor sale problema datoriilor germane a fost discutat la Conferina de la Spaa din iulie 1920 Conferina de la Spaa - a stabilit cotele ce trebuiau s revin fiecrui nvingtor - distribuia cotele care cdeau n sarcina Austriei, Ungariei, Bulgariei i Turciei *De ilustrat principalele hotrri ale conferinei - Comisia de reparaii (Londra, aprilie mai 1921) a fixat cuantumul reparaiilor datorate de Germania la suma de 132 miliarde mrci aur sub ameninarea ocuprii Ruhrului de ctre trupele aliate, guvernul german este nevoit s accepte aceast decizie, fr a putea achita traneele respective 11 ianuarie 1923 trupele franceze i belgiene ocup bazinul carbonifer al Ruhrului - rezolvarea crizei Ruhrului s-a realizat prin planul Dawes, 1924 Planul Dawes - se preconiza: 1) o reealonare a datoriilor Germaniei pe 5 ani 2) depunerile germane erau garantate printr-o ipotec asupra cilor ferate i industriei * De ilustrat principalele prevederi ale planului - ntre 1 iulie 17 august 1925 trupele belgine i cele franceze au evacuat zona Ruhrului - planul Dawes este nlocuit cu planul Young, 1930

Planul Young - se prevedea reducerea datoriilor Germaniei la 38 miliarde mrci aur, pltibile n 59 de ani * De ilustrat principalele prevederi ale planului - moratoriu Hoover, 1931 prevedea suspendarea pe o durat de un an a plii tuturor reparaiilor de rzboi - Conferina de la Laussane, 16 iunie 19 iulie 1932, care a marcat sfritul problemei reparaiilor pentru c Germaniei i s-a impus s plteasc doar 3 miliarde mrci aur i numai n msura n care situaia ei economic i permitea acest lucru

V Acordurile de la Locarno (5 -16 octombrie 1925)

- s-au semnat mai multe documente, dup cum urmeaz: Pactul renan de garanie care asigura inviolabilitatea granielor franco germano belgiene, garantat de Marea Britanie i Italia convenii de arbitraj ntre Germania, pe de o parte, i Cehoslovacia, pe de alt parte tratate de alian franco polonez, respectiv franco - cehoslovac * De ilustrat contextul evenimentului, principalele prevederi, precum i semnificaia acestor documente pentru evoluia ulterioar a evenimentelor Frana, Belgia, Polonia,

VI Marea criz economic

- s-a declanat n SUA n octombrie 1929 - debuteaz printr-un crah bursier i se transform ntr-o criz economic

a) cauzele crizei economice - agricultura sufer din cauza scderii preurilor la produsele agricole determinat de o supraproducie, n timp ce preurile pentru mainile agricole continu s creasc pentru c veniturile lor scad, agricultorii contracteaz mprumuturi - contractarea unor credite de ctre personale fizice pentru satisfacerea nevoilor personale - saturarea pieei de produse industriale (automobile, produse electronice) ceea ce d natere unui dezechilibru ntre producie i consum - rile care importau mrfuri din SUA achitau deseori contravaloarea acestora cu bani mprumutai de la bncile americane - creterea speculailor bursiere care n 1929 ating o cifr record - creterea artificial a cursului unor aciuni b) declanarea crizei economice - marea criz economic a debutat pe fondul unei scderi a preurilor la minereurile de fier, la oel, dar i a unei reduceri a beneficilor industriale nete n sectorul construciilor de maini - speculanii bursieri au ncercat s-i vnd titlurile imediat i la un curs ct se poate de mare - pe 24 octombrie 1929 are loc o acumulare a ordinelor de vnzare, care determin prbuirea cursurilor c) efectele crizei economice - primele semne ale crizei se resimt n SUA: prbuirea sistemului de credit supraproducia devine considerabil n condiiile scderii drastice a cererii interne i a restrngerii posibilitilor de mprumuturi supraproducia determin falimentul a numeroase ntreprinderi, o cretere a ratei omajului i o nou scdere a consumului

- mondializarea crizei economice este determinat de: retragerea capitalurilor europene de ctre bncile americane care a determinat falimentul bncilor austriece i germane reducerea exportului european ctre SUA datorit diminurii cererii de produse i ntrirea msurilor protecioniste americane - efectele crizei n domeniul economic: scderea preurilor scderea produciei prbuirea comerului internaional evideniat de scderea valorii schimburilor internaionale, care d natere la importante deficite bugetare renunarea la etalonul aur de ctre toate statele afectate de criz - efectele crizei n domeniul social: creterea omajului pauperizarea agricultorilor crora bncile le confisc terenurile cu care au girat mprumuturile scdere demografic manifestri de violen (greve, maruri ale foamei) - efectele crizei n domeniul politic: liberalismul economic i regimul democratic devin inta unei profunde nencrederi instaurarea unor regimuri autoritare totalitare ca o alternativ credibil la sistemul democratic care euase ascensiunea micrilor de extrem dreapta (a se vedea de exemplu, cazul Germaniei) ascensiunea stngii politice pe plan european d) lupta mpotriva crizei * politica de tip liberal - urmrete o redresare pe termen scurt i mediu

- consider c lucrurile ar trebui s mearg de la sine: scderea preurilor materiilor prime i utilajelor, a salariilor (rezultat al creterii omajului) i a dobnzilor (bncile nu mai au cui s mprumute iar dobnzile scad automat), concentrarea ntreprinderilor - rolul statutului este redus la restabilirea echilibrului bugetar (diminund cheltuielile publice) i la impunerea scderilor salariale necesare reducerii costurilor de producie ale ntreprinderilor - nu se bucur de succes pentru c pieele externe sunt blocate i nu face altceva dect s diminueze i mai mult puterea de cumprare pe plan intern * politica de tip keynesian - J.M. Keynes n lucrarea sa Teoria general a folosirii forei de munc, a dobnzii i a banilor a teoretizat necesitatea interveniei statului n rezolvarea crizei economice - n opinia acestui economist, rezolvarea crizei depinde de relansarea consumului: statul trebuie s adopte o politic de lucrri ample (capabil s ofere locuri de munc), s dea ajutor de omaj, s fixeze un salariu minim pentru a relansa puterea de cumprare; acceptarea deficitului bugetar; devalorizarea monedei pentru a facilita exportul - aplicat n SUA politica New Deal * politica de tip fascist - statul intervine pentru a: lansa o politic prin care se ncurajeaz lucrrile de amploare dezvolta industria de armament determina scderi substaniale ale salariilor muncitorilor care s permit ntreprinderilor s-i sporeasc veniturile necesarul de materii prime, gsirea unor piee de desfacere pentru produsele lor, gsirea unor soluii pentru rezolvarea problemelor bugetare au determinat angajarea statelor n urmrirea unei politici expansioniste

VII Conferina dezarmrii de la Geneva, 1932-1934

- s-a deschis la 2 februarie 1932, cu participarea a 62 de state - n ciuda scopului proclamat al conferinei, marile puteri doreau s-i justifice politica n domeniul militar i al narmrilor - au fost prezentate mai multe planuri pentru realizarea dezarmrii: a) Planul Tardieu care viza crearea unei fore multinaionale aflate sub egida Societii Naiunilor, precum i acordarea unor garanii de securitate b) Planul Hoover propunere de reducere a armamentului: efectivele terestre urmau a fi reduse cu o treime (tancurile i artileria grea urmau a fi eliminate total); pe mare, reducerea cu o treime a tonajului i numrului de cuirasate , crucitoare i contratorpiloare; forele aeriene eliminarea avioanelor de bombardament - 16 septembrie 1932, Germania, pretinznd c egalitatea drepturilor n domeniul dezarmrii nu era acordat, prsete conferina - la 11 decembrie 1932, o conferin a celor cinci (Frana, Anglia, Germania, Italia, SUA) recunoate Germaniei egalitatea n drepturi ntr-un sistem care s asigure securitatea tuturor naiunilor - la noua sesiune a conferinei au fost prezentate din nou dou planuri: 1) planul francez Herriot Bancour care prevedea reducerea tuturor armatelor europene la un tip uniform de poliie 2) planul englez MacDonald care fixa la 200.000 de oameni efectivele armate ale principalelor ri de pe continent - planul britanic este acceptat, n principiu de Hitler, n discursul su din 17 mai 1933 - la reluarea conferinei, Frana i Anglia au susinut ideea c dezarmarea trebuia precedat de un control al armamentelor - teza german era, dimpotriv, c trebuia s se nceap cu dezarmarea, apoi s se treac la controlul armelor - poziia ireconciliabil a celor dou pri a determinat retragerea Germaniei de la conferin, iar la 19 octombrie 1933 din Societatea Naiunilor - eecul conferinei

VIII Proiectul Pactul oriental (aprilie 1934)

- dup retragerea Germaniei din Societatea Naiunilor, Frana a ncercat s organizeze un sistem de securitate colectiv prin Pactul Oriental, iniiativa aparinnd ministrului de externe francez, Louis Barthou - n aprilie 1934, acesta a propus URSS proiectul unui Pact care s grupeze URSS, Finlanda, Estonia, Polonia i Cehoslovacia *De ilustrat contextul propunerii franceze, principalele prevederi ale proiectului i cauzele eecului su

IX Acordurile de la Stresa, aprilie mai 1935

- acordurile de la Stresa au fost o reacie fa de reintroducerea, n serviciul militar obligatoriu n Germania - s-au semnat trei acorduri internaionale: 1) 11aprilie 1935- acord francoangloitalian care viza constituirea unui front antigerman de ctre aceste trei 2) 2 mai 1935 tratatul franco sovietic 3) 16 mai 1935 - tratatul sovieto cehoslovac - prbuirea sistemului creat la Stresa a fost generat de dou evenimente: a) tratatul anglo american prin care se permitea flotei germane s-i ridice tonajul flotei b) agresiunea Italiei n Etiopia *De ilustrat contextul semnrii acestor acorduri i principalele prevederi ale acestora martie 1935, a

X Agresiunea Germaniei asupra Austriei (sau Anschluss-ul)

- agresiunea final a Germaniei asupra Austriei a fost precedat de cteva tentative nereuite: a) 14 martie 1931, ministrul de externe german, Curtius i cel austriac, Schober, au semnat un proiect privind asimilarea condiiilor vamale i politic comerciale ntre Germania i Austria

b) asasinarea cancelarului austriac Dollfuss de ctre un comando de naziti austrieci, iunie 1934 n 1936, ambasadorul german n Austria, von Papen, va ncheia cu cancelarul austriac Schusnigg, a gentlemen`s agreement c) memorandumul Hossbach din 5 noiembrie 1937: stenogram unei edinei lui Hitler cu o serie de consilieri, n timpul creia liderul german ar fi vorbit despre planurile de cucerire a lumii, propunnd mai nti cucerirea Cehoslovacia i doar apoi a Austriei - pregtirile Germaniei pentru Anschluss - tatonarea poziiei aliatului italian: la 6 noiembrie 1937, ntlnire dintre Mussolini i Ribbentrop - noiembrie 1937: ntlnirea dintre lordul Halifax i Hitler la Berchtesgaden - ianuarie 1938, n timpul unei percheziii la sediile naziste au fost descoperite planuri de rebeliune militar ale nazitilor austrieci - 13 februarie 1938 cancelarul austriac, Schuschnigg, se ntlnete cu Hitler la Berchtesgaden; ultimatumul lui Hitler - martie 1938 cancelarul austriac, Schuschnigg anun organizarea unui plebiscit pentru independena Austriei precipitarea evenimentelor i ocuparea Austriei de ctre trupele germane -12 martie 1938 Hitler declara, la Linz, n mod oficial, alipirea Austriei la Germania, confirmat i printr-un plebiscit * De ilustrat pe larg coninutul fiecrei etape a agresiunii Germaniei asupra Austriei, precum i reacia marilor puteri.

XI Agresiunea Germaniei asupra Cehoslovaciei

- memorandumul Hossbach din 5 noiembrie 1937: n timpul unei edine Hitler cu o serie de consilieri, acesta ar fi vorbit despre planurile de cucerire a lumii, propunnd mai nti cucerirea Cehoslovacia i doar apoi a Austriei - lipsa unei coeziuni interne a statului generat de nemulumirile minoritilor naionale - poziia geografic nefavorabil a rii n contextul unui conflict - existena unei micri a germanilor din regiunea sudet

-24 aprilie 1938, Programul de la Karlsbad lipsa de reacie a Franei i, implicit a URSS - Marea Britanie trimite ca mediator pe lordul Runciman - 1 septembrie 1938 Hitler l primete pe Konrad Helein, liderul germanilor sudei i i vorbete acestuia despre armonia perfect ntre opiniile lor - 4 septembrie 1938 are loc o ntlnire ntre Benes i liderii germanilor sudei - 12 septembrie 1938, discursul lui Hitler de la Nrnberg 13 septembrie, liderii germani sudei au ntrerupt convorbirile cu autoritile cehoslovace i au ncercat o revolt, care a fost rapid reprimat de guvernul cehoslovac - 15 septembrie 1938 Chamberlain i Sir Horace Wilson s-au ntlnit cu Hitler la Berchtesgaden - pe 20 septembrie 1938, guvernul cehoslovac a respins memoriu franco britanic privind mprirea rii - pe 21 septembrie 1938, guvernul cehoslovac accept condiiile impuse, ca urmarea a unui ultimatum franco britanic - 22 septembrie 1938, Chamberlain s-a ntlnit din nou cu Hitler, la Godesberg, liderul german declarnd c nu este de acord cu condiiile primite, germanii sudei fiind maltratai, regiunea trebuia anexat Germaniei - 29 septembrie 1938 Conferina de la Mnchen i mprirea statului cehoslovac apogeul conciliatorismului - 30 septembrie 1938 Chamberlain i Hitler au semnat o declaraie de neagresiune considerat de toat lumea ca menit s aduc pacea n Europa - la 2 octombrie 1938 Polonia colonelului Beck a ocupat regiunea Teschen -la 2 noiembrie 1938, n urma primul dictat de la Viena, Ungaria primete sudul Slovaciei - martie 1939, preedintele cehoslovac Hacha (succesorul lui Benes) se ntlnete cu Hitler i sub presiune, accept protectoratul german asupra Boemiei i Moraviei - 15 martie 1939, Slovacia i declar independena, iar la 16 martie 1939 accept protectoratul german * De ilustrat pe larg coninutul fiecrei etape a agresiunii Germaniei asupra Cehoslovaciei, precum i reacia marilor puteri.

XII Agresiunea Japoniei n Extremul Orient

- n contextul unei crize economice resimite de Japonia, militarii niponi propun ca soluie la aceast situaie o politic de cuceriri profitnd de un incident minor la cile ferate japoneze (18 septembrie 1931), trupele japoneze au ocupat principalele orae din Manciuria, o bogat regiune minier i agricol din nordul Chinei - guvernul chinez refuz s negocieze, face apel la Societatea Naiunilor, ordon boicot mpotriva mrfurilor japoneze, dar nu declar rzboi Japoniei, din cauza pregtirilor militare insuficiente - septembrie decembrie 1931, Consiliul Societii Naiunilor a examinat plngerea chinez decembrie 1931 s-a creat comisia Laytton, - ntre timp continu agresiunea japonez n China, ocupnd noi provincii i afectnd, n acest mod, interesele americane i engleze doctrina Stimson, prin care fcea cunoscut decizia SUA de a nu recunoate nici un fel de anexri teritoriale sau tratate acorduri care ar consimi aceste contropiri; de asemenea, n not se protesta mpotriva oricror msuri care ar leza interesele americane n China sau ar veni n contradicie cu principiul porilor deschise - la 18 februarie 1832, japonezii au proclamat independena Manciuriei, sub numele de Manciuko - la 9 martie 1932, n fruntea statutului marionet creat de japonezi era impus ca regent, apoi ncoronat ca mprat la 1 mai 1932, Pu I (cel care fusese forat s abdice de pe tronul Chinei n 1912) - septembrie 1932, Comisia Laytton ia prezentat raportul, discutat n Adunarea General a Societii Naiunilor dup dezbateri prelungite, la 24 februarie 1933 s-a adoptat o rezoluie n spiritul recomandrilor Comisiei Laytton: - nu se aplicau nici un fel de sanciuni Japoniei agresive - se recunoteau aa zisele drepturi i interese speciale ale acesteia n nord estul Chinei - se constata nclcarea de ctre Japonia a Tratatului celor nou puteri - nu se recunotea existena statului Manciuko

- la 27 martie 1933, Japonia prsete Societatea Naiunilor, nemulumit de coninutul rezoluiei Adunrii Generale - Japonia invadeaz Jehol, o regiune din China cuprins ntre Manciuria i Marele Zid Chinezesc - la 7 iulie 1936, trupele japoneze lanseaz o nou ofensiv n China: dup cucerirea Pekinului (26-27 iulie), ele invadeaz China de nord est - la sfritul anului 1937, trupele japonez controleaz porturile importante, prin care Shanghai - singura regiune care le scap japonezilor este cea din centrul rii, controlat de armate a lui Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai shek), are a fcut din oraul Chongqing (Tchoung King) capitala sa provizorie - japonezii decid s pun capt rezistenei chineze, tind drumurile prin care aceasta primea arme din URSS (pn n 1938), apoi din SUA *De ilustrat pe larg coninutul fiecrei etape a agresiunii Japoniei asupra Chinei

XIII Agresiunea Italiei n Albania

- Ahmed Zogu, protejat iugoslav, s-a alturat italienilor, dup ce l-a izgonit pe predecesorul su - ales preedinte pe 7 ani, acesta l-a informat pe Mussolini, n ianuarie 1925, c inteniona s realizeze un guvern solid n Albania pentru a contribui la pacea din Balcani, iar liderul fascist italian l-a recunoscut imediat - 27 noiembrie 1926 s-a semnat primul tratat italo-albanez, n fapt un pact de prietenie i securitate - Mussolini a perceput Acordul de la Paris dintre Iugoslavia i Frana (11 noiembrie 1927) ca fiind unul ndreptat mpotriva Italiei 22 noiembrie 1927, Mussolini a ripostat, semnnd cu Albania un al doilea tratat la Tirana - n septembrie 1928, Ahmed Zogu a fost ncoronat regele al albanezilor, cu aprobarea Italiei - la 7 aprilie 1939, urmnd exemplul lui Hitler, Mussolini a ordonat trupelor sale s invadeze Albania

- regele Zogu a prsit ara - la 8 aprilie 1939, Albania a devenit protectorat italian i, la cererea albanezilor italofili, cele dou Coroane au fost unite * De ilustrat pe larg coninutul fiecrei etape a agresiunii Italiei asupra Albaniei

XIV Agresiunea Italiei n Etiopia

- Etiopia era un stat independent african, membru al Societii Naiunilor din 1923, admiterea sa fiind susinut de Frana i Italia un acord privind zonele de influen n Etiopia, plecnd mai degrab de la o serie de considerente de ordin economic - Frana a protestat mpotriva acestui acord n numele unui tratat din 1906, care prevedea meninerea drepturilor suverane ale mpratului Etiopiei - n iunie 1926, Etiopia a protestat, la rndul ei, pe lng Societatea Naiunilor, declarnd c acordul este o ameninare pentru suveranitatea etiopian - Italia reuete s liniteasc guvernul etiopian i s semneze mpreun pe 2 august 1928 un tratat de prietenie, de conciliere i arbitraj - ideea lui Mussolini de a cuceri Etiopia dateaz cel puin din toamna anului 1933 - incidentul de care s-a servit Mussolini s-a desfurat la Ual-Ual, la 5 decembrie 1934, la frontiera dintre Eritreea i Etiopia - guvernul etiopian a propus ca incidentul s fie supus arbitrajului, conform tratatului din 1928, ns Italia a refuzat (15 decembrie 1934) - imediat guvernul etiopian a fcut la Societatea Naiunilor; n aceste condiii, guvernul italian a revenit asupra deciziei sale i a acceptat arbitrajul, da acesta a euat - pentru c pregtirile militare ale Italiei n Eritreea au cptat dimensiuni considerabile, la 17 martie 1935, Etiopia a fcut din nou apel la Societatea Naiunilor - poziia dificil a guvernelor englez i francez generat de renarmarea Germaniei i de interesele lor specifice legate de aceast zon - negocierile stagnau - ncercrile de compromis ale lui Eden, ale conferinei tripartite franco anglo- italian, ale Consiliul Societii Naiunilor respinse de Mussolini

- cu toate manevrele de intimidare ale Marii Britanii n Mediterana i contient de voina pacifist a guvernului englez, la 3 octombrie 1935, Mussolini a nceput operaiunile militare n Etiopia - Frana i Anglia au ncercat o soluie proprie pentru a pune capt crizei etiopiene: planul Laval Hoare (decembrie 1935) - Mussolini accept n principiu planul, dar acesta eueaz din cauza protestelor opiniei publice engleze informat asupra prevederilor panului - la iniiativa statelor democratice, Societatea Naiunilor hotrte s impun sanciuni economice Italiei (ridicate n 1936), n vreme ce Germania i furnizeaz Italiei crbunele de care are nevoie, iar SUA petrolul necesar marinei i aviaiei - la 28 decembrie 1935 Mussolini a denunat acordurile de la Stresa i Roma - la 5 mai 1936, Negusul Etiopiei a cerut pacea dup victoria italian de la lacul Achianga - la 7 martie 1936, Mussolini s-a artat dispus s negocieze, dar denunarea tratatului de la Locarno de ctre Germania n aceeai zi, a distras atenia internaional de la afacerea etiopian i i-a permis Ducelui s obin victoria - la 9 mai 1936, un decret al lui Mussolini proclama anexarea Etiopiei de ctre Italia, iar regele Italiei devenea mpratul Etiopiei - la 4 iulie 1936, Adunarea Naiunilor Unite a votat o rezoluie prin care erau ridicate sanciunile economice i financiare luate mpotriva Italiei *De ilustrat pe larg coninutul fiecrei etape a agresiunii Italiei asupra Etiopiei

XV Rzboiul civil din Spania

- n 1931 Spania devine republic - alegerile din februarie 1936 sunt ctigate de Frontul Popular constituit din forele de stnga spaniole imediat se declaneaz un val de greve revoluionare, ranii ocup pmnturile, violenele se generalizeaz - la 13 iulie 1936 liderul monarhist Calvo Sotelo este asasinat, ceea ce a dat semnalul loviturii militare de stat, Franco devenind eful micrii naionaliste - va ncepe un rzboi civil ce va dura 3 ani, n care s-au confruntat dou tabere:

a) naionalitii sprijinii de armata permanent, de Falang, de majoritatea clerului catolic i de clasa conductoare b) republicanii susinui de muncitori, de mica burghezie radical, de o parte a rnimii - n aprilie 1938, Franco reuete s izoleze Madridul de Barcelona, pe 28 martie 1939 va ocupa Madridul, unde n octombrie i va instala propriul guvern - rzboiul din Spania s-a transformat ntr-un conflict internaional, o adevrat repetiie general a rzboiului mondial * De ilustrat aceast ultim idee, n fapt, poziia marilor puteri fa de conflictul din Spania, precum i posibilele consecine pe plan internaional ale acestui conflict

XVI Aliane
- formarea Micii nelegeri (Cehoslovacia, Iugoslavia, Romnia), 1921 de ilustrat scopurile constituirii acestei aliane - 9 februarie 1934, la Atena, a fost semnat Pactul nelegerii Balcanice (Turcia, Iugoslavia, Romnia, Grecia) - de ilustrat scopurile constituirii acestei aliane - Axa Berlin Roma Tokio: octombrie 1936 protocol semnat ntre Germania i Italia 25 noiembrie 1936 Germania i Japonia semnau Pactul Anticomintern 6 noiembrie 1937 Italia ader la Pactul Anticomintern 24 februarie 1939 Ungaria i statul Manciuko se altur Pactului Anticomintern 27 februarie 1939 Spania se altur Pactului Anticomintern * De ilustrat principalele prevederi, precum i semnificaia acestor documente pentru evoluia ulterioar a evenimentelor

Dicionar: conciliatorism: atitudine care duce spre mpcare, spre realizarea unui acord sau a unui compromis crah: fenomen economic manifestat prin lipsa acut a creditului pe pia, prin scderea brusc a cursului aciunilor la burs i prin devalorizarea monedei credit: capital provenit prin mprumut, pe baza ncrederii i solvabilitii deficit bugetar: sum cu care cheltuielile depesc veniturile moratoriu: amnarea plii datoriilor unui debitor; amnarea legal a executrii obligaiilor financiare internaionale, determinate de o situaie excepional (criz economic, rzboi etc.) pact de neagresiune: tratat prin care dou sau mai multe state se oblig s nu ntreprind aciuni dumnoase unul fa de cellalt securitate colectiv: component a relaiilor internaionale, concretizat prin msuri comune, luate de ctre toate statele i care vizeaz meninerea pcii i respectarea angajamentelor reparaii de rzboi: despgubiri pltite pentru compensarea pagubelor economice datorate unui rzboi revizionism: curent politic care i propune modificarea (revizuirea) unor tratate internaionale

XVII Suport documentar

Document 1: Moratoriu Hoover Declaraia preedintelui Herbert Hoover , 20 iunie 1931 (excerpt)

Guvernul american propune amnarea pe o durat de un an a tuturor plilor datoriilor interguvernamentale, a datoriilor reparaiilor i a celor contractate n virtutea mprumuturilor pentru ajutor de dup rzboi (...)

Eu nu aprob deloc, chiar n sensul cel mai larg, anularea datoriilor care ni se cuvin. ncrederea internaional nu ar spori prin aceasta. Nici una din naiunile care ne sunt debitoare nu a sugerat-o vreodat, dar acum baza reglementrii acestor datorii const n capacitatea de plat a debitorilor n condiii normale, noi acionm n deplin concordan cu politica i principiile noastre, lund n consideraie situaia anormal existent actualmente n lume. Esena prezentei propuneri este de a da rgaz guvernelor debitoare, s-i refac prosperitatea naional. (...) SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Bue, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1974, Vol.I, p.74

Document 2: Tratatul de la Rapallo ntre Republica Sovietic Federativ Rus i Germania , 16 aprilie 1922 (excerpt)

Articolul 1 Cele dou guverne sunt de acord ca divergenele dintre Germania i Republica Sovietic Rus, n probleme ce au aprut n timpul cnd aceste state au fost n stare de rzboi, s se reglementeze pe urmtoarele baze: a) Statul german i RSFSR renun, n mod reciproc, la despgubirea pentru cheltuielile de rzboi, precum i la dezdunarea pagubelor de rzboi, adic a acelor pagube care le-a fost cauzate, lor i cetenilor respectivi, n regiunile operaiunilor de rzboi i ca urmare a msurilor de rzboi, inclusiv rechiziiile fcute pe teritoriul Prii potrivnice. Ambele pri renun, de asemenea, la dezdunarea pagubelor cauzate cetenilor unei din Pri, nu de rzboi, ci prin aa-numitele legi excepionale de rzboi i prin msurile forate luate de organele de stat ale celeilalte Pri. b) Germania i Rusia renun, n mod reciproc, la despgubiri pentru cheltuielile ce le-au avut cu prizonierii de rzboi. Guvernul german renun, de asemenea, la despgubiri,

pentru cheltuielile fcute cu internarea n Germania a unei pri din Armata Roie. Guvernul rus renun, la rndul su, la restituirea sumelor ctigate de Germania din vnzarea bunurilor militare introduse de Germania de ctre unitile internate. Articolul 2 Germania renun la preteniile izvornd din faptul aplicrii, pn n prezent, a legilor i msurilor RSFSR unor ceteni germani i drepturilor lor private, precum i drepturile Germaniei i ale statelor germane fa de Rusia; de asemenea renun la preteniunile ce izvorsc, n general, din msurile luate de RSFSR sau de organele ei fa de cetenii germani sau fa de drepturile lor private, - sub condiia c guvernul RSFSR nu va satisface preteniuni analoge ale altor state. Articolul 3 Relaiile diplomatice i consulare ntre Germania i R.S.F.S.R. se reiau fr ntrziere. Articolul 4 Ambele guverne sunt de acord mai departe s aplice clauza naiunii celei mai favorizate, cu privire la situaia juridic general a cetenilor uneia din Pri pe teritoriul celeilalte i n reglementarea general a relaiilor economice i comerciale reciproce.

Articolul 5 Cele dou guverne vor lua n considerare cu bunvoin, n mod reciproc, nevoile economice ale ambelor pri. Guvernul german se declar gata s sprijine, pe ct posibil, conveniile proiectate de unele firme particulare, - care i-au fost aduse la cunotin n ultima vreme, i s nlesneasc executarea lor (...).

SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Bue, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1974, Vol.I, pp. 98-99.

Document 3: Pactul Ribbentrop Molotov ( Pactul de neagresiune germano sovietic) , 23 august 1939 Articolul 1 Ambele pri contractante se oblig a se abine de la orice violen, de la orice aciune agresiv i orice atac una mpotriva celeilalte, att izolat, ct i n comun cu alte puteri. Articolul 2 n cazul cnd una din Prile contractante devine obiect al aciunilor militare din partea unei tere puteri, cealalt parte contractant nu va susine sub nici o form aceast putere. Articolul 3 Guvernele ambelor Pri contractante rmn s in contact ntre ele pe viitor pentru consultaii, ca s se informeze reciproc asupra chestiunilor ce privesc interesele lor comune. Articolul 4 Nici una din Prile contractante nu va participa la orice grupare de puteri ndreptat, direct sau indirect, mpotriva altei pri. Articolul 5 n caz de izbucnire a litigiilor sau conflictelor ntre prile contractante ntr-un fel sau altul de chestiuni, ambele pri vor rezolva aceste litigii i conflicte exclusiv pe cale panic, fcnd schimb prietenesc de opinii sau, n cazuri necesare, pe calea crerii unei comisii pentru aplanarea conflictului.

Articolul 6 Tratatul de fa este ncheiat pe un termen de zece ani. Dac una din prile contractante nu-l va denuna cu un an nainte de expirarea termenului, durata pactului s fie considerat n mod automat pe urmtorii cinci ani. Articolul 7 Tratatul de fa urmeaz s fie ratificat ntr-un termen ct mai scurt posibil. Schimbul de instrumente de ratificare trebuie s aib loc la Berlin. Tratatul ntr n vigoare imediat dup semnarea lui. Protocolul adiional secret Cu ocazia semnrii Tratatului de neagresiune dintre Reichul german i Uniunea Republicilor Sovietice Socialiste, plenipoteniarii semnatari din partea celor dou pri au discutat, n cadrul unor convorbiri strict confideniale, problema delimitrii sferelor lor respective de interes n Europa Rsritean. Aceste convorbiri au dus la urmtorul rezultat: 1. n cazul unor transformri teritoriale i politice ale teritoriilor aparinnd statelor baltice (Finlanda, Estonia, Letonia, Lituania), frontiera nordic a Lituaniei va reprezenta frontiera sferelor de interes att ale Germaniei, ct i ale URSS. n legtur cu aceasta, interesul Lituaniei fa de teritoriul Vilno este recunoscut de ambele pri. 2. n cazul unor transformri teritoriale i politice ale teritoriilor aparinnd statului polonez, sferele de interes, att ale Germaniei, ct i ale URSS, vor fi delimitate aproximativ pe linia rurilor Narev, Vistula i San. Problema dac n interesele ambelor pri ar fi de dorit meninerea unui stat polonez i independent i a modului n care vor fi trasate frontierele acestui stat poate fi soluionat definitiv numai n cursul evenimentelor politice ulterioare. n orice caz, ambele guverne vor rezolva aceast problem pe calea unor nelegeri prieteneti.

3. n privina Europei de Sud Est, partea sovietic subliniaz interesul pe care-l manifest pentru Basarabia. Partea german i declar totalul dezinteres fa de aceste teritorii. 4. Acest protocol va fi considerat de ambele pri ca strict secret. SURSA: Gheorghe Onioru, Istoria contemporan universal 1917 1945, Editura Fundaiei Romnia de Mine, Bucureti 2005, pp.43-45. Document 4: Pactul germano sovietic de prietenie i frontier , Moscova, 28 septembrie 1939 (excerpt)

Articolul 1 Guvernul URSS i guvernul german stabilesc ca frontierele ntre cele dou state interesate, pe teritoriul fostului stat polonez, linia trasat pe harta alturat, ce va fi descris mai amnunit n protocolul suplimentar (...). Articolul 3 Reconstruirea de stat necesar pe teritoriul de vest de la linia artat la articolul 1 o va face guvernul german, pe teritoriul de la rsrit de aceast linie - guvernul URSS. SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1976, p.19. Document 5: Pactul Briand Kellogg sau Pactul de la Paris , 27 august 1928 (excerpt) Articolul 1 naltele pri contractante declar solemn n numele popoarelor lor respective c condamn recursul la rzboi pentru regularea diferendelor internaionale i renun la el ca instrument de politic naional n relaiunile lor mutuale

Articolul 2 naltele pri contractante recunosc c regularea sau rezolvarea tuturor diferendelor sau conflictelor de orice natur sau de orice origine ar fi ele care se vor putea ivi ntre ele, nu va trebui niciodat urmrit dect prin mijloace pacifiste. (...) SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Bue, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1974, p.134. Document 6: Tratatele de la Locarno cu privire la garantarea frontierelor germano franceze i germano belgiene, 16 octombrie 1925 (excerpt)

Pactul de garanie renan

Articolul 1 naltele pri contractante garanteaz fiecare pentru sine i toate mpreun (...) meninerea statu qou-ului teritorial care rezult din frontierele dintre Germania i Frana, inviolabilitatea acestor frontiere, aa cum au fost stabilite prin Tratatul de pace semnat la Versailles la 28 iunie 1919, sau aa cum au fost stabilite n executarea acestuia, precum i respectarea prevederilor articolelor 42 i 43 din menionatul tratat, referitoare la zona demilitarizat. Articolul 2 Germania i Belgia, precum i Germania i Frana se oblig n mod reciproc ca, n raporturile lor, s nu recurg n nici un caz la agresiune i cotropire i s nu recurg la rzboi una mpotriva celeilalte (...). Articolul 3 Fa de obligaiile reciproce pe care i le-au asumat prin articolul 2, Germania i Belgia, precum i Germania i Frana, se oblig s rezolve pe cale panic toate problemele, de

orice natur ar fi, care le despart i care ar putea fi soluionate prin obinuitele ci diplomatice (...). Articolul 4 n cazul unei nclcri a articolului 2 din prezentul tratat sau a nerespectrii vdite a articolelor 42 sau 43 din Tratatul de la Versailles, de ctre una din naltele pri contractante, fiecare din celelalte Puteri contractante se oblig de pe acum ca, de ndat ce va afla c acea nclcare sau nerespectare constituie un act de agresiune neprovocat i c sunt necesare aciuni imediate din cauza trecerii frontierei, sau a nceperii aciunilor de rzboi, sau a concentrrii de fore armate n zona demilitarizat, s acorde fr ntrziere sprijinul su acelei Pri fa de care s-a svrit o astfel de nclcare sau o astfel de nclcare (...). Articolul 5 Dispoziia din articolul 3 al prezentului tratat se pune sub garania naltelor pri contractante, dup cum urmeaz: n cazul n care una din Puterile indicate n articolul 3 refuz s se conformeze regulilor panice sau s execute o hotrre arbitral sau judectoreasc, i ar viola articolul 3 al prezentului tratat, sau nu ar respecta articolele 42 sau 43 din Tratatul de la Versailles, ea va fi supus aplicrii prevederilor din articolul 4 al prezentului tratat (...). Articolul 6 Dispoziiunile prezentului Tratat nu aduc nici o atingere drepturilor i obligaiunilor ce decurg pentru naltele pri contractante din Tratatul de pace de la Versailles, precum i din conveniile complementare, inclusiv aceea din 30 august 1924 semnat la Londra (...).

Tratatul ntre Frana i Polonia (sau tratat de garanie franco - polon)

Articolul 1 n cazul n care Polonia sau Frana ar avea de suferit de pe urma nerespectrii angajamentelor, intervenite astzi ntre ele i Germania n vederea meninerii pcii

generale, Frana, i n mod reciproc Polonia, acionnd n aplicarea articolul 16 din Pactul Societii Naiunilor, se angajeaz s-i dea imediat ajutor i asisten, dac o asemenea nerespectare va fi nsoit de o folosire a armelor ce n-ar fi fost provocat (...). SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1976, pp. p.113-115

Seminarul nr. 6
Evoluia relaiilor interaliate n timpul celui de-al doilea rzboi mondial: 1939-1945

I Formarea coaliiei Naiunilor Unite

1) 22 iunie 1941, discursul lui Winston Churchill la radio prin care fcea cunoscut poporului englez, agresiunea Germaniei mpotriva Uniunii Sovietice i justifica, din perspectiva necesitii eliminrii agresiunii militare fasciste, aliana cu URSS, depind astfel orice diferene ideologice 2) 12 iulie 1941, la Moscova era semnat acordul sovieto englez, intitulat Cu privire la aciunile comune de rzboi mpotriva Germaniei 3) stabilirea modalitilor concrete de ajutorare a Uniunii Sovietice misiunea H. Hopkins, schimbul de scrisori ntre Stalin i Franklin Roosevelt din 30 octombrie, respectiv 6 noiembrie 1941 4) 14 august 1941, Carta Atlanticului 5) 24 septembrie 1941 URSS ader la Carta Atlanticului 6) conferina de la Moscova (29 septembrie 1 octombrie 1941) care a stabilit modalitile de realizare i proporiile colaborrii ntre URSS i aliaii si anglo-saxoni 7) la nceputul lunii noiembrie 1941, Congresul american a hotrt s extind prevederile legii lend and lease i asupra schimburilor fcute cu SUA de ctre URSS, i n acest

scop, a acordat un credit iniial de 1 miliard de dolari, iar n februarie 1942, un alt fond de aceeai valoare 8) colaborarea anglo sovietic din Iran - refuzul ahul Reza, cunoscut pentru poziia sa progerman, de a expulza pe resortisanii germani, poziia strategic a Iranului pentru frontul sovietic, precum i interesele economice britanice n aceast ar, au constituit principale motive ale atacrii Iranului de ctre trupele sovietice i engleze (vara toamna 1941) - ocuparea Iranului nu a fost nsoit de ncercri de subminare a integritii teritoriale, suveranitii i independenei sale politice 9) a doua zi dup atacul de la Pearl Harbour, la 8 decembrie 1941 SUA i Anglia au declarat rzboi Japoniei 10) 11 decembrie 1941, Germania i Italia au declarat rzboi SUA 11) 1 ianuarie 1942 a fost semnat la Casa Alb, Declaraia Naiunilor Unite de ctre reprezentanii celor 26 de state care au participat la Conferina de la Washington (22 decembrie 1941 14 ianuarie 1942) 12) 26 mai 1942 s-a semnat la Londra, tratatul de alian anglo sovietic, intitulat Cu privire la principiile ajutorului reciproc n rzboiul mpotriva agresorului 13) 11 iunie 1942 s-a semnat la Washington acordul sovieto american care reglementa relaiile economice i financiare pe baza legii lend and lease De ilustrat, pe larg, coninutul fiecrei etape, din formarea coaliiei Naiunilor Unite.

II Formarea alianei anglo americane

- n perioada rzboiului ciudat, SUA au susinut pasivitatea manifestat de guvernele francez, englez mpotriva Germaniei i au fost de acord cu planuri de operaii pentru ajutorarea Finlandei mpotriva URSS - n februarie 1940, preedintele american F. Roosevelt l-a trimis pe Summer Welles, adjunct al Secretarului de Stat, n Europa, pentru a sonda posibilitatea ca Anglia i Frana s ncheie pace cu Germania misiunea eueaz - victoriile obinute de aliana fascist i capitularea Franei au determinat Congresul SUA s acorde de urgen credite sporite pentru armament - ntre iunie 1940 iulie 1941 au fost livrate Angliei de ctre SUA cantiti importante de arme, muniie, avioane - 2 septembrie 1940 s-a semnat un tratat anglo american prin care Marea Britanie, n schimbul a 50 de crucitoare americane i a obligaiei SUA de a apra posesiunile engleze n emisfera occidental, arenda Statelor Unite, pe termen de 99 de ani, baze n insulele Newfoundland, Bermude, Bahamas, Jamaica, Santa Lucia, Trinitii, Antigua, pe litoralul Guineiei britanice - 15 iunie 1940, F. Roosevelt a semnat ordinul de creare a Comitetului pentru cercetrile n domeniul folosirii energiei atomice n scopuri militare - 16 septembrie 1940 SUA au adoptat legea privind obligativitatea serviciului militar obligatoriu - 6 ianuarie 1941, n mesajul pe care preedintele american F. Roosevelt l-a adresat Congresului, a propus adoptarea legii lend and lease - 11 martie 1941 a intrat n vigoare legea lend and lease De ilustrat, pe larg, coninutul fiecrei etape, din formarea coaliiei anglo-americane.

III Conferinele interaliate

1) Conferina de la Casablanca (13-24 ianuarie 1943) - au participat premierul britanic, Winston Churchill i preedintele american, Franklin Roosevelt - se amn deschiderea celui de al doilea front pentru primvara anului 1944 - s-a hotrt ca dup ncheierea operaiunilor din Africa de Nord s se pun n aplicare planul de debarcare a trupelor anglo americane n Sicilia - pentru a amna impresia defavorabil lsat de aceast nou amnare s-a adoptat principiul capitulrii necondiionate pentru puterile Axei

2) Conferina de Quebec (august 1943) - redactat un proiect comun de declaraie a celor patru puteri (SUA, URSS, Marea Britanie, China) - s-a confirmat decizia de fixare a deschiderii celui de al doilea front n Frana la 1 mai 1944 - s-a fixat o operaiune de debarcare n sudul Franei, aa- numita operaiune Anvil - problema rzboiului din Pacific s-a aprobat planul de operaiuni americane pentru perioada 1943-1944, care prevedea ocuparea arhipelagurilor Marshall, Caroline, Mariane - august 1943 s-a semnat un acord anglo-american n domeniul cercetrii atomice 3) Conferina de la Moscova (19-30 octombrie 1943) - o conferin a minitrilor de externe ai Marii Britanii, Uniunii Sovietice i Statelor Unite ale Americii - au fost date din nou asigurri ca n mai 1944 se va deschide cel de al doilea front

- delegaii britanici i americani au propus unele proiecte de federalizare a rilor mici din Europa central, de sud est respinse de guvernul sovietic - au fost adoptate: Declaraia cu privire la Austria Declaraia cu privire la Italia Declaraia cu privire la rspunderea nazitilor pentru atrocitilor comise Declaraia celor patru 4) Conferina de la Cairo (26-27 noiembrie 1943) - premierul britanic, Winston Churchill i preedintele american, Franklin Roosevelt s-au ntlnit la Cairo - la 1 decembrie 1943, acetia, mpreun cu Chiang Kai -shek, au dat publicitii Declaraia tripartit anglo americano chinez n legturile cu reglementrile din Extremul Orient 5) Conferina de la Teheran (28 noiembrie 1 decembrie 1943) - reprezentanii sovietici au insistat asupra oportunitii unor operaiuni de anvergur n Occident, peste Canalul Mnecii, ca soluie pentru grbirea nfrngerii Germaniei i scurtarea duratei rzboiului - Chruchill a susinut varianta balcanic: un avans rapid al aliailor n Italia, care ar fi adus rzboiul n regiunea Bosforului sau n Balcani respins de Roosevelt i Stalin - Stalin a insistat s se acorde prioritate debarcrii n Frana, adic operaiunilor Overlord i Anvil - s-a discutat statutul postbelic al Germaniei: a) Roosevelt a prezentat un plan de mprire a Germaniei n cinci state autonome sub control internaional b) Churchill a propus: separarea Prusiei militariste de restul rii

 desprinderea unor regiuni din sudul Germaniei pentru includerea lor, alturi de alte state din Europa Central n o Federaie dunrean guvernul sovietic s-a opus, iar preedintele american a propus ca problema s fie discutat n Comisia consultativ european - n ceea ce privete chestiunea polonez, Churchill a acceptat soluia de a mpinge Polonia spre vest, teritoriul polonez trebuind a fi delimitat de linia Curzon i Oder, inclusiv Prusia Oriental i Oppeln URSS ncorpora teritoriile atribuite prin acordul germano sovietic din 1939, iar Polonia primea n schimb, n compensaie, Prusia Oriental, Pomerania, Silezia - Finlanda Stalin a artat c Finlanda trebuia s revin la frontierele din 1940 s cedeze Uniunii Sovietice, Petsamo s alunge trupele germane de pe teritoriul su s plteasc Uniunii Sovietice, reparaii de rzboi - Oceanul Pacific URSS a considerat c este posibil s nceap operaiunile militare mpotriva Japoniei, la 6 luni dup terminarea conflictului din Europa - organizarea securitii colective: a) Churchill a propus un sistem regionalist construit n jurul a trei organisme continentale din Europa, Asia i America b) Stalin a imaginat o instituie mondial cu trei nivele de operaionalizare: o adunare, la care s participe toate statele suverane un comitet executiv care s administreze serviciile publice internaionale un directoriat al celor patru mari puteri (SUA, URSS, Anglia, China) care s menin ordinea internaional - a fost adoptat: Declaraia cu privire la Iran (1 decembrie 1943) 7) Conferina de la Moscova (9-18 octombrie 1944) - n cursul acestei ntlniri, Churchill i-a propus lui Stalin s stabileasc sferele de influen n Balcani aa numitul acord al procentajelor:

Romnia 90% sovieticii 10% alii Ungaria i Iugoslavia 50% influen occidental 50% influen sovietic Bulgaria 75% influen occidental 25% influen sovietic 8) Conferina de la Yalta (4-11 februarie 1945)

Grecia 90% Marea Britanie 10% Uniunea Sovietic

- au participat Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt, Churchill, minitrii de externe american i englez, consilieri militari - s-au luat decizii referitoare la: A) problema german - principiul capitulrii necondiionate - punerea Germaniei n imposibilitatea de a mai provoca rzboi a) mprirea Germaniei i conducerea acesteia n perioada postbelic b) stabilirea plii unor reparaii de rzboi delegaia sovietic a prezentat cteva principii privind perceperea reparaiilor n natur, nu n bani, prin confiscarea de maini de maini i utilaje, prin livrri anuale de mrfuri, termenul de lichidare fiind fixat la 10 ani nu s-a ajuns la un acord n privina reparaiilor rezolvarea problemei a fost ncredinat unei comisii de reparaii cu sediul la Moscova, incluznd trei reprezentani (englez, sovietic i american) propunerea sovietic: comisia de reparaii cu sediul la Moscova trebuia s aib ca baz de discuie suma total de 22 de miliarde de dolari, din care jumtate trebuia s revin Uniunii Sovietice, urmnd a fi acoperit din producia curent, utilaj industrial demontat din zona sovietic i occidental, proprietile germane din afara teritoriului german, folosirea mnii de lucru germane

B) problema polonez - problema constituirii unui guvern polonez - stabilirea frontierelor statului polonez C) problema iugoslav - problema constituirii unui guvern iugoslav D) problema strmtorilor E) problema Japoniei F) Declaraia Europei eliberate G) Organizaia mondial - s-a stabilit convocarea unei conferine a Naiunilor Unite pentru constituirea unei organizaii mondiale la data de 25 aprilie 1945 n Statele Unite ale Americii 9) Conferina de la Postdam ( 17 iulie 2 august 1945) - au participat Stalin, Truman, Churchill, nlocuit cu Atlee - scopul conferinei era acela de a stabili organizarea postbelic a lumii: a) s-a creat un Consiliu al minitrilor de Externe englez, francez, chinez, american i sovietic b) problema german - organizarea postbelic a Germaniei prin mprirea ei n zone de ocupaie - transformarea Germaniei ntr-un stat democratic i panic prin: denazificare democratizare demilitarizare

- stabilirea modului de percepere a reparaiilor germane de ctre URSS, Marea Britanie, SUA

c) problema Italiei - preedintele american Truman a propus ncheierea ct mai repede posibil a pcii cu Italia pentru a se putea ncepe ct mai repede procesul de refacere i edificare a vieii statele democratice - Churchill s-a opus acestei propuneri, amintind c Italia a fost mult vreme n tabra fascist d) problema polonez - problema tezaurului aflat al Londra: Churchill a afirmat c valoarea sa nu acoperea cheltuielile fcute de Marea Britanie pentru organizarea i ntreinerea trupelor poloneze, pentru ntreinerea guvernului polonez aflat n exil i a emigraiei - problema frontierelor: anglo saxonii au promis s sprijine transferul ctre URSS a oraului Koenigsberg i a unei pri din Prusia oriental cealalt parte a Prusiei Orientale i oraul Danzig trebuiau s revin Poloniei teritoriul de la est de linia Oder-Neisse s fie administrat provizoriu de Polonia e) strmutarea populaiilor germane n Germania din Prusia Oriental, Polonia, Cehoslovacia, Ungaria f) s-a adoptat o declaraie comun anglo americano chinez prin care se cerea Japoniei s capituleze necondiionat, creia i se va altura, ulterior, i partea sovietic

De ilustrat, pe baza documentelor incluse n acest caiet de seminar, deciziile luate n cursul conferinelor interaliate asupra problemelor identificate mai sus.

IV Crearea Organizaiei Naiunilor Unite

Geneza: - n ianuarie 1941, n mesajul su adresat Congresul SUA, preedintele american Roosevelt proclama cele patru drepturi: dreptul la expresie i de opinie dreptul de liber exercitare a credinei dreptul de a fi ferit de srcie dreptul de a fi ferit de teroare - 14 august 1941, Carta Atlanticului realizarea unui sistem mai larg i permanent de securitate general - 1 ianuarie 1942 a fost semnat la Casa Alb, Declaraia Naiunilor Unite de ctre reprezentanii celor 26 de state care au participat la Conferina de la Washington (22 decembrie 1941 14 ianuarie 1942); Aliaii i spun pentru prima oar Naiunile Unite - 1943 Conferina minitrilor de Externe de la Washington a hotrt crearea unui organism internaional pentru asigurarea pcii i securitii - ntre 21 august -7 octombrie 1944 s-a desfurat Conferina de la Dumbarton Oaks, n cadrul creia s-au elaborat propunerile privind statutul O.N.U. i s-au stabilit principiile generale de organizare - la Conferina de la Yalta din 4-11 februarie 1945 s-a stabilit, printre altele: c membrii permaneni ai Consiliului de Securitate primesc drept de veto convocarea unei conferine a Naiunilor Unite privind constituirea organizaiei mondiale la data de 25 aprilie 1945 n Statele Unite ale Americii - la 26 aprilie 1945 s-a deschis Conferina de la San Francisco, cu participarea a 50 de state - dup negocierile din cadrul acestei conferine (aprilie iunie 1945), la 26 iunie 1945, ntemeierea O.N.U.: Naiunilor Unite - la 15 octombrie 1945, Polonia (al 51-lea stat fondator) ratific Carta reprezentanii celor 50 de state au semnat Carta

- 24 octombrie 1945, Carta intr n vigoare (Ziua Naiunilor Unite) Organizaia Naiunilor Unite - funcionarea i activitatea ei este reglementat pe baza Cartei O.N.U. - obiectivele organizaiei - membrii calitatea de membru obligaiile membrilor numrul statelor membre: n 1945 erau 51 de state membre, crora li s-au adugat rile din Africa i din Asia, care i-au dobndit independena, fotii aliai ai Germaniei (1955 - 1956), apoi China comunist (1971), cele dou state germane (1973), statele rezultate n urma desfiinrii URSS - organizarea: 1) Adunarea General 2) Consiliul de Securitate 3) Secretarul General 4) Curtea Internaional de Justiie de la Haga 5) Consiliul de Tutel 6) Consiliul Economic i Social (ECOSOC) - se ocup de creterea general a nivelului de trai, servindu-se n acest, scop de alte agenii i comisii speciale ale O.N.U.: - O.M.S. (Organizaia Mondial a Sntii), cu sediul la Geneva - O.I.M. (Organizaia Internaional a Muncii), cu sediul la Geneva - F.M.I. (Fondul Monetar Internaional), cu sediul la Washington

- F.A.O. (Organizaia pentru Alimentaie i Agricultur), cu sediul la Roma - U.N.I.C.E.F. (Fondul Internaional pentru Urgene ale Copiilor al Naiunilor Unite), cu sediul la New -York - U.N.E.S.C.O. (Organizaia Naiunilor Unite pentru Educaie, tiin i Cultur), cu sediul la Paris - B.I.R.D. (Banca Internaional pentru Reconstrucie i Dezvoltare) -U.N.C.T.A.D. (Comisia Naiunilor Unite pentru Comer i Dezvoltare) * De ilustrat principalele atribuii ale organismelor O.N.U., menionate mai sus.

V Suport documentar

Document 1: Winston Churchill despre agresiunea Germaniei mpotriva Uniunii Sovietice (excerpt) Londra, 22 iunie 1944 Nimeni mai mult dect mine nu a fost un adversar mai statornic al comunismului, n cursul ultimilor 25 de ani. Nu voi retrage nici un cuvnt din cele ce am spus despre acest subiect (...). Nu avem dect un singur el, un singur scop irevocabil. Suntem hotri s distrugem pe Hitler i orice urm de a regimului nazist. Nimic nu ne va ndeprta de la aceast hotrre nimic! (...) orice om i orice stat care lupt mpotriva nazismului va avea sprijinul nostru. Orice om i orice stat care merge cu Hitler este dumanul nostru (...). SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1976, pp.91-92.

Document 2: Acord ntre guvernele URSS i Marii Britanii cu privire la aciunile comune mpotriva Germaniei (excerpt) Moscova, 12 iulie 1941 (...) Guvernul URSS i guvernul Majestii Sale a Regatului Unit au ncheiat prezentul acord i declar urmtoarele: 1. Ambele guverne se oblig reciproc s-i acorde unul altuia ajutor i sprijin de orice natur n actualul rzboi mpotriva Germaniei hitleriste. 2. Ele se oblig de asemenea ca n continuarea acestui rzboi s nu duc tratative, s nu ncheie armistiiu sau tratat de pace fr acordul celuilalt (...). SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1976, p.96.

Document 3:Carta Atlanticului 14 august 1941 Preedintele Statelor Unite ale Americii i Dl. Churchill, prim ministru, reprezentnd guvernul Majestii Sale n Regatul Unit, ntlnindu-se pe mare, consider c trebuie fcute cunoscute unele dintre principiile pe care i bazeaz speranele ntr-u viitor mai bun pentru omenire i care sunt comune politicii naionale a rilor respective. 1. rile lor nu urmresc nici o mrire teritorial sau de alt natur. 2. Ei nu doresc s vad nici o modificare teritorial care s nu fie n acord cu voinele liber exprimate ale popoarelor interesate.

3. Ei respect dreptul ce are fiecare popor de a alege forma de guvernmnt sub care vrea s triasc; ei doresc s fie redate drepturile suverane i liberul exerciiu de guvernare celor care au fost privai de ele prin for. 4. Ei se strduiesc, innd seama de obligaiile pe care i le-au asumat deja, s deschid tuturor statelor, mari sau mici, nvingtori sau nvini, accesul la materii prime ale lumii i tranzaciilor comerciale care sunt necesare prosperitii lor. 5. Ei doresc s realizeze ntre toate naiunile colaborarea cea mai complet n domeniul economic, cu scopul de a garanta tuturor ameliorarea condiiei muncii, progresul economic i securitatea social. 6. Dup distrugerea final a tiraniei naziste, ei sper s vad stabilindu-se o pace care va permite tuturor naiunilor s se afle n securitate n interiorul propriilor lor frontiere i va garanta tuturor oamenilor din toate rile o existen eliberat de orice team i de lipsuri. 7. O asemenea pace va permite tuturor oamenilor s navigheze fr fric pe mare. 8. Ei sunt convini c toate naiunile lumii, att din motive de ordin practic ct i de ordin spiritual, vor trebui s renune n cele din urm la folosirea forei. i din moment ce este imposibil de a salva pacea viitoare atta vreme ct unele naiuni care o amenin sau ar putea s o amenine posed arme pe mare, pe uscat i n aer, ei consider c, ateptnd s poate stabili un sistem larg i permanent de securitate general, dezarmarea acestor naiuni se impune. Totodat, ei vor ajuta i ncuraja toate celelalte msuri susceptibile s uureze povara zdrobitoare a armamentelor care copleete popoarele panice.

SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1976, p.111.

Document 4 :Declaraia Naiunilor Unite Washington 1 ianuarie 1942 Guvernele semnatare, Subscriind la principiile i obiectivele definite n programul comun, cuprins n Declaraia comun a Preedintelui Statelor Unite ale Americii i a primului Ministru al Regatului Unit al Marii Britanii i Irlandei de Nord, cu data de 14 august 1941, Declaraia cunoscut sub numele de Carta Atlanticului. Convini c victoria complet asupra inamicilor este indispensabil aprrii existenei lor, a libertii, a independenei i a libertii religioase, precum i a aprrii drepturilor i dreptii omeneti, att n rile lor, ct i n celelalte ri, convini de asemenea c ei sunt angajai ntr-o lupt comun contra forelor slbatice i brutale care ncearc s aserveasc lumea. 1) Fiecare guvern se angajeaz s ntrebuineaz toate resursele sale, militare sau economice, contra acelor membri ai Pactului Tripartit i contra acelor adereni ai acestui din urm Pact, cu care unul din aceste guvernele semnatare se gsete n stare de rzboi. 2) Fiecare guvern se angajeaz s colaboreze cu guvernele semnatare i se oblig s nu semneze cu inamicul un armistiiu separat sau o pace separat. Toate naiunile care dau sau vor da asisten, care dau sau vor da contribuia lor la lupta pentru victoria asupra hitlerismului, vor putea adera la prezenta declaraie. SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1976, pp.121-122.

Document 5: Twenty-Year Mutual Assistance Agreement Between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics : May 26, 1942 (excerpt) London, May 26, 1942 HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN, IRELAND AND BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA, AND THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: Desiring to confirm the stipulations of the agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for joint action in the war against Germany signed at Moscow, July 12, 1941, and to replace them by formal treaty () PART ONE ARTICLE I In virtue of the alliance established between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the high contracting parties mutually undertake to afford one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in war against Germany and all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe. ARTICLE II The high contracting parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with the Hitlerite Government or any other government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggression intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude, except by mutual consent, any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

PART TWO ARTICLE III 1. The high contracting parties declare their desire to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period. 2. Pending adoption of such proposals, they will after termination of hostilities take all measures in their power to render impossible the repetition of aggression and violation of peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe. ARTICLE IV Should either of the high contracting parties during the postwar period become involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in Article III, Section 2, in consequence of the attack by that State against that party, the other high contracting party will at once give to the contracting party so involved in hostilities all military and other support and assistance in his power. () ARTICLE V The high contracting parties, having regard to the interests of security of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after re-establishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe. They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. ARTICLE VI The high contracting parties agree to render one another all possible economic assistance after the war.

ARTICLE VII Each contracting party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other high contracting party. SURSA: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/brsov42.htm , 15.01.2007

Document 6: Acord ntre guvernele URSS i SUA asupra principiilor aplicabile ajutorului reciproc n vederea rzboiului mpotriva agresiunii Washington, 11 iunie 1942

Articolul 1 Guvernul SUA va continua s aprovizioneze guvernul URSS cu acele materiale de aprare, de asisten medical i informaii pe care preedintele SUA a dispus s i le transmit sau s i le pun la dispoziie. Articolul 2 Guvernul URSS va continua s contribuie la aprarea SUA i la ntrirea lor i s le furnizeze materiale, asisten, avantaje i informaii n msura posibilitilor sale (...). SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1976, p.134.

Document 7: Legea de mprumut i nchiriere (excerpt) Washington, 11 martie 1941

Se stabilete prin prezenta, c aceast lege se va numi Legea despre ntrirea aprrii Statelor Unite (...). Seciunea 3 a) Independent de prevederile cuprinse n orice alt lege, preedintele poate, atunci cnd socoate ca necesar, n interesele aprrii naionale, s mputerniceasc pe Secretarul de rzboi, Secretarul flotei maritime de rzboi sau pe conductorul oricrui alt minister sau instituie guvernamental: 1) n limitele mijloacelor alocate pentru acest scop, sau contractelor aprobate din timp de ctre Congres, s produc n arsenalele, fabricile i antierele aflate n subordinea lor sau s procure pe orice alt cale orice materiale de aprare pentru guvernul fiecrei ri a crui aprare preedintele o consider vital necesar pentru securitatea Statelor Unite. 2) S vnd, s transfere dreptul, s schimbe, s dea n arend, s dea n folosin sau s predea n orice alt mod unui astfel de guvern orice materiale de aprare care nu sunt produse i procurate n conformitate cu paragraful 1(...). b) Termenele i condiiile n care oricare astfel de guvern strin va primi oricare din ajutoarele autorizate conform cu subseciunea a) vor fi stabilite de ctre preedinte; pentru livrrile efectuate, Statele Unite vor primi plata sau compensarea fie direct sub forma de sume de bani, fie sub forma de orice fel de proprietate pe care le va stabili preedintele (...).

SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1976, pp. 81-83 .

Document 8: Casablanca Conference 1943 (excerpt) Feb 12, 1943 () We have lately concluded a long, hard battle in the Southwest Pacific and we have made notable gains. That battle started in the Solomons and New Guinea last summer. It has demonstrated our superior power in planes and, most importantly, in the fighting qualities of our individual soldiers and sailors. American armed forces in the Southwest Pacific are receiving powerful aid from Australia and New Zealand and also directly from the British themselves. We do not expect to spend the time it would take to bring Japan to final defeat merely by inching our way forward from island to island across the vast expanse of the Pacific. Great and decisive actions against the Japanese will be taken to drive the invader from the soil of China. Important actions will be taken in the skies over China-and over Japan itself. The discussions at Casablanca have been continued in Chungking with the Generalissimo by General Arnold and have resulted in definite plans for offensive operations. There are many roads which lead right to Tokyo. We shall neglect none of them. In an attempt to ward off the inevitable disaster, the Axis propagandists are trying all of their old tricks in order to divide the United Nations. They seek to create the idea that if we win this war, Russia, England, China, and the United States are going to get into a cat-and-dog fight.

This is their final effort to turn one nation against another, in the vain hope that they may settle with one or two at a time-that any of us may be so gullible and so forgetful as to be duped into making "deals" at the expense of our Allies. To these panicky attempts to escape the consequences of their crimes we say-all the United Nations say-that the only terms on which we shall deal with an Axis government or any Axis factions are the terms proclaimed at Casablanca: "Unconditional Surrender." In our uncompromising policy we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis nations. But we do mean to impose punishment and retribution in full upon their guilty, barbaric leaders... In the years of the American and French revolutions the fundamental principle guiding our democracies was established. The cornerstone of our whole democratic edifice was the principle that from the people and the people alone flows the authority of government. It is one of our war aims, as expressed in the Atlantic Charter, that the conquered populations of today be again the masters of their destiny. There must be no doubt anywhere that it is the unalterable purpose of the United Nations to restore to conquered peoples their sacred rights. SURSA: Casablanca Conference 1943 , http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/casablan.htm , 15.01.2007

Document 9 :The Quebec Conference, August 17-24, 1943 Joint Statement by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt, August At, 1943 The Anglo-American war conference, which opened at Quebec on August 11, under the hospitable auspices of the Canadian Government, has now concluded its work. The whole field of world operations has been surveyed in the light of the many gratifying events which have taken place since the meeting of the President and the Prime

Minister in Washington at the end of May, and the necessary decisions have been taken to provide for the forward action of the fleets, armies, and air forces of the two nations. Considering that these forces are intermingled in continuous action against the enemy in several quarters of the globe, it is indispensable that entire unity of aim and method should be maintained at the summit of the war direction. Further conferences will be needed, probably at shorter intervals than before, as the war effort of the United States and British Commonwealth and Empire against the enemy spreads and deepens. It would not be helpful to the fighting troops to make any announcement of the decisions which have been reached. These can only emerge in action. It may, however, be stated that the military discussions of the chiefs of staff turned very largely upon the war against Japan and the bringing of effective aid to China. Dr. T. V. Soong, representing the Generalissimo Kai-shek, was a party to the discussions. In this field, as in the European, the President and the Prime Minister were able to receive and approve the unanimous recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Agreements were also reached upon the political issues underlying or arising out of the military operations. It was resolved to hold another conference before the end of the year between the British and American authorities, in addition to any tri-partite meeting which it may be possible to arrange with Soviet Russia. Full reports of the decisions so far as they affect the war against Germany and Italy will be furnished to the Soviet Government. Consideration has been given during the Conference to the question of relations with the French Committee of Liberation, and it is understood that an announcement by a number of governments will be made in the latter part of the week. SURSA: The Quebec Conference, August 17-24, 1943 , http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade06.htm , 15.01.2007

Document 10:The Moscow Conference; October 1943 (excerpt)

JOINT FOUR-NATION DECLARATION The governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China; United in their determination, in accordance with the declaration by the United Nations of January, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender; Conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression; Recognizing the necessity of insuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments; Jointly declare: 1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security. 2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy. 3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy. 4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security. 5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations, with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation. 7. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period. DECLARATION REGARDING ITALY The Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have established that their three governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy toward Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil influence and configuration shall be completely destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based on democratic principles. () In furtherance of this policy in the future the Foreign Secretaries of the three governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect: 1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by inclusion of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism. 2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public meeting, shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups. 3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed. 4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from institutions and organizations of a public character. 5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded full amnesty. 6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.

7. Fascist chiefs and army generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice. ()

DECLARATION ON AUSTRIA The governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination. They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any charges effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-established a free and independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighboring States which will be face with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace. Austria is reminded, however that she has a responsibility, which she cannot evade, for participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation. STATEMENT ON ATROCITIES Signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin. The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. () Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied powers, speaking in the interest of the thirtytwo United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows: At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been

responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of free governments which will be erected therein. () SURSA: The Moscow Conference; October 1943 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/moscow.htm , 15.01.2007

Document 11: Cairo Conference 1943 , November, 1943 , Released December 1, 1943

The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already mounting. The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen form the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent. With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan. SURSA: : Cairo Conference 1943 , November, 1943 , Released December 1, 1943 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/cairo.htm , 15.01.2007

Document 12:The Tehran Conference THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 28-DECEMBER 1, 1943 (a) Declaration of the Three Powers, December 1, 1943 We the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past, in this, the Capital of our Ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy. We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.. As to war-our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south. () No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U Boats by sea, and their war plants from the air. Our attack will be relentless and increasing. Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences. We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose. ROOSEVELT, CHHRCHILL and STALIN Signed at Tehran, December 1, 1943 (b) Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran, December 1, 1943 The President of the United States, the Premier of the U. S. S. R. and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union. The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations, and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption. With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters. The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed. WINSTON S.CHURCHILL J. STALIN FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT (c) Military Conclusions of the Tehran Conference The Conference:(1) Agreed that the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando operations ()

(4) Took note that Operation OVERLORD would be launched during May 1944, in conjunction with an operation against Southern France. () FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT JOSEPH V. STALIN WINSTON S. CHURCHILL TEHRAN, December 1, 1943. SURSA: The Tehran Conference , http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/tehran.htm , 15.01.2007

Documentul 13:The Yalta Conference February, 1945

Washington, March 24 - The text of the agreements reached at the Crimea (Yalta) Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin, as released by the State Department today, follows: PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS OF CRIMEA CONFERENCE The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions: I. WORLD ORGANIZATION It was decided: 1. That a United Nations conference on the proposed world organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America. 2. The nations to be invited to this conference should be: (a) the United Nations as they existed on 8 Feb., 1945; and

(b) Such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1 March, 1945. (For this purpose, by the term "Associated Nations" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the conference on world organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United State of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White Russia. 3. That the United States Government, on behalf of the three powers, should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization. 4. That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations conference should be as follows: "The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic invite the Government of -------- to send representatives to a conference to be held on 25 April, 1945, or soon thereafter , at San Francisco, in the United States of America, to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security. "The above-named Governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI: C. Voting "1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote. "2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members. "3. Decisions of the Security Council on all matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence

of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.' "Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently. "In the event that the Government of -------- desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments." Territorial trusteeship: It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations conference on the question of territorial trusteeship. The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be place under trusteeship. II. Declaraia asupra Europei eliberate Urmtoarea declaraie a fost aprobat: Preedintele Consiliului de Minitri ai URSS, primul Ministru al Regatului Unit i Preedintele SUA s-au consultat n interesul comun al popoarelor rilor lor i al tuturor popoarelor Europei eliberate. Ei afirm acordul comun de a duce o politic comun din partea celor trei guverne ale lor n timpul perioadei temporare de instabilitate n Europa eliberat i acela de a ajuta popoarele Europei eliberate de sub dominaia Germaniei

naziste i popoarele fostelor state satelite ale Axei, s rezolve prin mijloace democratice probleme lor politice i economice cel mai urgente. Stabilirea ordinii n Europa i reconstrucia economiei naionale trebuie s fie realizat prin mijloace care s permit popoarelor eliberate de a lichida ultimele vestigii ale nazismului i fascismului, de a stabili instituii democratice alese de ele. Acestea corespund principiilor Cartei Atlanticului dreptul tuturor popoarelor de a-i alege forma de guvernmnt n care doresc s triasc restaurarea drepturilor suverane i de autoguvernare n profitul popoarelor care au fost private de aceste drepturi prin acte de agresiune. n scopul de a crea condiiile n care popoarele eliberate s poat s-i exercite aceste drepturi, cele trei guverne vor asiste mpreun popoarele oricrui stat european, fost satelit al Axei, de fiecare dat cnd ele vor crede c situaia o impune: a) crearea condiiilor de pace intern; b) s ia masurile de urgen pentru a ajuta popoarele aflate n pericol; c) s constituie autoriti guvernamentale provizorii n mod larg reprezentative ale tuturor forelor democratice ale acestor populaii i care se vor angaja s stabileasc, ct mai curnd posibil, prin alegeri libere, guverne care s fie expresia voinei popoarelor i, d) s faciliteze, oriunde va fi necesar, astfel de alegeri. Cele trei guverne vor constata c situaia dintr-un stat eliberat din europa sau ntr-un fost satelit al axei, impune o asemenea aciune necesar, ele se vor consulta asupra msurilor de luat pentru a-i asuma rspunderea comun definit prin prezenta declaraie. SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1976, pp.185-186.

III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

() "The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the

exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security." The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. John Winant, and Mr. Fedor T. Gusev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative. IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY. It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be allocated France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government. It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany. V. REPARATION The following protocol has been approved: Protocol On the Talks between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on the Question of the German Reparations in Kind 1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy. 2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms: (a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of

industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany. (b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed. (c) Use of German labor. 3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied reparation commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives - one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America. 4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression, the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows: "The Moscow reparation commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2 should be 22 billion dollars and that 50 per cent should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow reparation commission, no figures of reparation should be mentioned. The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow reparation commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the commission. VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS The conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the conference.

VII. POLAND (.)The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. ()This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. () "The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions in territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course of the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference."

VIII. YUGOSLAVIA It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Ivan Subasitch: () (b) That as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare: (I) That the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and (II) That legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; and that this statement should be published in the communiqu of the conference. ()

XI. SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects: (a) The Control Commission in Bulgaria. (b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations. (c) Oil equipment in Rumania. (..)

XIV. THE MONTREAUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreaux Convention, and report to their Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment. The forgoing protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference Feb. 11, 1945. E. R. Stettinius Jr. M. Molotov Anthony Eden AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN The leaders of the three great powers the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that: 1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian Peoples Republic) shall be preserved.

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.: (a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union; (b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored; The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria; 3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union. (.) Joseph Stalin Franklin D. Roosevelt Winston S. Churchill February 11, 1945. SURSA: The Yalta Conference, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/yalta.htm , 15.01.2007 Document 14: Potsdam Conference (excerpt) July 17-August 2, 1945 () I. ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. A. The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements:

" (1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States. "(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Ministers, and by a small staff of technical advisers. " (ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time. " (3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established. () II. THE PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY IN THE INITIAL CONTROL PERIOD A. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES. 1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council. 2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are: (i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the SS., SA., SD., and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military and semi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism; (b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms. ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented. (ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable. (iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda. (iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany. 4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discriminations on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated. 5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi

organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned. 6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany. 7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas. 8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion. 9. The administration in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:(i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation; (ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany; (iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government; (iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council. 10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject

likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted. B. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES. 11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed. 12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements. 13. In organizing the German Economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. () III. REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY. 1. Reparation claims of the U. S. S. R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U. S. S. R., and from appropriate German external assets. 2. The U. S. S. R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations. 3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets. 4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U. S. S. R. from its own zone of occupation, the U. S. S. R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones:

(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon. (b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return. Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously. () 8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below. 9. The Governments of the U. K. and U. S. A. renounce all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria. 10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany. IV. DISPOSAL OF THE GERMAN NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE A. The following principles for the distribution of the German Navy were agreed: (1) The total strength of the German surface navy, excluding ships sunk and those taken over from Allied Nations, but including ships under construction or repair, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. A. (2) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair may be (3) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. A. for experimental and technical purposes.

(4) All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy appertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) hereof shall be handed over to the respective powers receiving such ships. () B. The following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine were agreed:(1) The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., the U. K., and the U. S. A. () V. CITY 0F KOENIGSBERG AND THE ADJACENT AREA. ()The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent () The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement. VI. WAR CRIMINALS. () The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring these criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of these major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before 1st September. VII. AUSTRIA. The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria. () It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria. VIII. POLAND. A. DECLARATION. We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with

the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. () The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections. B. WESTERN FRONTIER OF POLAND. () The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement. The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories cast of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinamunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

IX. CONCLUSION on PEACE TREATIES AND ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION. ()The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic governments in these States will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries. The three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. As regards the admission of other States into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that: 1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations; 2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above. () XII. ORDERLY TRANSFER OF GERMAN POPULATIONS. The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in

Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner. () XIV. IRAN. It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945. XVI. THE BLACK SEA STRAITS. The Three Governments recognized that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions. It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government. ()

SURSA: Potsdam Conference, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade17.htm , 15.01.2007 Document 15: Charter of the United Nations; June 26, 1945 (excerpt) CHAPTER I PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES Article 1 The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends. Article 2 The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles. 1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members. 2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter. 3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and. justice, are not endangered. 4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. 6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. 7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or

shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under CHAPTER II MEMBERSHIP () Article 4 1. Membership in the United Nations is open to a other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. () CHAPTER III ORGANS Article 7 1. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat. 2. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter. () CHAPTER IV THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY Composition Article 9 1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations. 2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

Functions and Powers () Article 11 1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both. 2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of inter- national peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United () may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. () Voting Article 18 1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote. 2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a twothirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, () the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions. Procedure Article 20 The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-

General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations. Article 21 The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President for each session. Article 22 The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. CHAPTER V THE SECURITY COUNCIL Composition Article 23 1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist , the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council (). 2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non- permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election. 3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers Article 24 1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. () Voting Article 27 1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. () Procedure Article 28 1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at times at the seat of the Organization. () CAPTER VI PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES Article 33 1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of a, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means. Article 34 The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 35 l. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. 2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter. ()

CHAPTER VII ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION () Article 44 When Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45 In order to enable the Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. () Article 46 Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. (.) Article 48 1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine. 2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49 The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council. () CHAPTER X THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL Composition Article 61 1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of fifty-four Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly.

2. () eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate reelection. () 4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative. Functions and Powers Article 62 1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned. () Voting Article 67 1. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote. 2. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting. () CHAPTER XIV THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE Article 92 The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.() Article 96 1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities. CHAPTER XV THE SECRETARIAT Article 97 The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary- General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization. Article 98 The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization. Article 99 The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. () SURSA: Charter of the United Nations; June 26, 1945, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/unchart.htm , 15.01.2007

Seminar nr. 7
Relaiile dintre fotii aliai i debutul rzboiului rece 1945-1947
I Definirea rzboiului rece
termen general acceptat , desemnnd conflictul ideologic , politic , psihologic i militar de dup 1945 dintre aliaii occidentali ( condui de SUA ) pe de o parte i blocul comunist ( n frunte cu URSS ) pe de alt parte. paternitatea expresiei n cauz este atribuit regentului Castiliei i Leonului , prinul Juan Manuel , care n secolul al XIV - lea a utilizat sintagma de rzboi rece pentru a descrie conflictul din Spania , dintre cretini i musulmani. Spre deosebire de rzboaiele clasice , un atare rzboi ncepe fr o declaraie de rzboi i se ncheie fr un tratat de pace. reactualizarea termenului de Rzboi Rece , o datorm jurnalistului american Walter Lippmann , care n 1947 public o carte cu acelai nume. De ilustrat, pe larg , principalele teorii privitoare la originile rzboiului rece.

II Fundamentele ideologice ale rzboiului rece i expresia lor politic n documentele marilor puteri
A. Discursul lui Stalin, 9 februarie 1946 un discurs electoral Stalin aducea elogii sistemului sovietic care a ieit nvingtor din rzboi, fapt care demonstra, din perspectiva sa, c sistemul social sovietic era o form de organizare mai bun dect orice alt sistem social ne-sovietic descriind cauzele celui de al doilea rzboi mondial, liderul sovietic invoca o norm comunist clasic, i anume c rzboiul nu ar fi fost provocat de Hitler

sau de ali efi de stat, ci de funcionarea defectuoas, generatoare de inegaliti economice a sistemului de tip capitalist liderul sovietic sublinia inevitabilitatea unui nou rzboi cu rile din sistemul capitalist i n acest context, el afirma necesitatea ntririi interne a Uniunii Sovietice pentru a putea face fa acestui nou conflict B. Discursul lui Churchill de la Fulton , Missouri , 5 martie 1946 nc din 12 mai 1945 , ntr-o telegram adresat preedintelui Truman ( care i succedase lui Roosevelt la 12 aprilie 1945 ) , Winston Churchill i exprima ngrijorarea cu privire la lipsa de transparen din zonele ocupate de sovietici , afirmnd : a fost tras o cortin de fier n faa aliailor vestici. n timpul Conferinei de la Potsdam , Churchill , utiliznd o expresie metaforic , protesteaz fa de mprejmuirea de ctre sovietici , cu un gard de fier , a misiunii britanice din Romnia. n iulie 1945 , n urma alegerilor generale din Marea Britanie , la mijlocul Conferinei de la Potsdam , Winston Churchill este nlocuit de noul prim-ministru Clement Attlee. 5 martie 1946 - invitat la Westminister College , Winston Churchill utilizeaz pentru prima dat , n public , sintagma cortin de fier, afirmnd : De la Stettin , de pe coasta Balticii pn la Triest , de pe coasta Adriaticii , o cortin de fier a cobort tind n dou continentul. ( ) reaciile la discursul rostit de Churchill nu au ntrziat s apar. Guvernul britanic, condus de Attlee a dezavuat discursul fostului prim ministru britanic. La 15 martie 1946 , a urmat replica sovietic , prin discursul rostit de Stalin . Vizibil deranjat de discursul de la Fulton , liderul de la Kremlin a inut s precizeze c ascensiunea comunitilor n sud-estul Europei nu este una accidental, ci o consecin fireasc a sacrificiului pe care acetia l-au dovedit n lupta cu regimurile fasciste. De ilustrat , pe larg , semnificaiile discursului de la Fulton.

C. Telegrama cea lung a lui G. Kennan i doctrina de containment diplomat de carier , n 1944 George Kennan se rentoarce la Moscova ( unde activase anterior ntre 1933-1937 ) , n calitate de ministru-consilier , devenind unul dintre consultaii ambasadorului Averell Harriman. 22 februarie 1946 - Kennan expediaz telegrama cea lung - un studiu de 8 000 de cuvinte, pe parcursul cruia realizeaz o radiografie total a comportamentului i politicii externe promovate de Stalin. iulie 1947 - trimestrialul Foreign Affairs public Articolul X, Factorii care determin comportamentul sovietic , sub semntura X. Noul document elaborat de Kennan prezenta necesitatea aplicrii doctrinei de containment (stvilire) i a devenit imediat un punct de reper pentru susintorii acesteia. n esen, doctrina de containment viza o politic ferm din partea SUA, care s nu permit sovieticilor obinerea unor noi poziii. De ilustrat relevana prezentei telegrame , n conturarea politicii externe americane.

D. Telegrama Novikov septembrie 1946 - ambasadorul sovietic la Washington , Nikolai Novikov elaboreaz o telegram n care atrgea atenia factorilor politici de la Moscova asupra pericolului politicii americane de dominare economic i militar a lumii. E. Doctrina Truman , 12 martie 1947 21 februarie 1947 - cabinetul britanic , condus de Clement Attlee , l informeaz pe preedintele Truman de faptul c partea britanic se afl n imposibilitatea de a-i mai onora angajamentele luate fa de Grecia i Turcia. 24 februarie 1947 - preedintele Truman ia hotrrea ca aceste angajamente s fie preluate de SUA. 26 februarie 1947 are loc o ntlnire tensionat n Biroul Oval , ntre preedintele Truman i principalii congresmeni ( la ntlnire au luat parte i gen. George C. Marshall i secretarul de stat Dean Acheson ). n cursul

ntlnirii , preedintele american i-a prezentat intenia de a prelua angajamentele britanicilor din Mediterana Rsritean , justificndu-i poziia prin necesitatea stoprii expansionismului sovietic. 12 martie 1947 n faa Congresului , preedintele Truman solicit un ajutor economic de 400 mil. $ pentru ajutorarea celor dou ri , precum i trimiterea de experi civili i militari americani. De ilustrat importana acestei doctrine , din perspectiva izolaionismului american. F. Planul Marshall , 5 iunie 1947 la nceputul anului 1947 , datorit aciunilor energice promovate de George C. Marshall i Dean Acheson , factorii politici americani contientizeaz faptul c situaia economic disperat din Europa cerea un ajutor american de avergur. n cadrul Departatmentului de Stat se constituie un grup de specialiti , sub conducerea efului nou-creatului Oficiu de Planificare Politic , George Kennan , cu scopul de gsii soluii viabile pentru mbuntirea situaiei economice a Europei. Raportul naintat de Kennan susinea necesitatea unui ajutor din partea SUA pentru nsntoirea economic a Europei. 5 iunie 1947 prin discursul su de la Universitatea Harvard , George Marshall anun noul proiect. dei adresat tuturor rilor europene , rile din sfera de influen sovietic au declinat propunerea american ( dei Polonia i Cehoslovacia i manifestaser iniial intenia de a participa la discuii , reacia URSS a determinat abandonarea acestei intenii ). programul a nceput n iulie 1948 , a continuat pn n 1952 i a costat guvernul american 10,2 miliarde $ . De ilustrat rezultatele implementrii Planului Marshall

G. Crearea Cominformului (septembrie 1947) i teoria lui Jdanov privind mprirea lumii n cele dou blocuri 1943 din ordinul lui Stalin Comintern-ul este desfiinat , aceast msur , aparent radical , avnd menirea de a-i convinge pe aliaii occidentali de faptul c URSS a renunat la ideea revoluiei mondiale. 22 septembrie 1947 este creat Cominformul . n discursul inaugural , Andrei Jdanov , dup ce prezint Cominform-ul drept o reacie direct la propunerea de acceptare a Planului Marshall , proclam mprirea oficial a lumii n dou tabere: tabra imperialist i antidemocratic al crei scop rezid n sprijinirea regimurilor reacionare i pro-faciste. tabra antiimperialist i democratic , avnd drept scop consolidarea democraiei , eliminarea ultimelor vestigii ale fascismului , rezistnd totodat expansiunii imperialiste. ulterior a avut menirea de a pregti terenul extirprii abcesului titoist.

III Suport documentar

Document 1: Discursul lui Stalin , 9 februarie 1946 (excerpt) Comrades! () It would be wrong to believe that the Second War broke out accidentally or as a result of the mistakes of some or other statesmen, through mistakes certainly were made. In reality, the war broke out as an inevitable result of the development of the world economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism.

Marxists have stated more than once that the capitalist system of world economy conceals in itself the elements of general crisis and military clashes, that in view of this in our time the development of world capitalism takes place not as a smooth and even advance but through crises and war catastrophes. The reason is that the unevenness of the development of capitalist countries usually results, as time passes, in an abrupt disruption of the equilibrium within the world system of capitalism, and that a group of capitalist countries which believes itself to be less supplied with raw materials and markets usually attempts to alter the situation and re-divide the spheres of influence in its own favour by means of armed forces. This results in the splitting of the capitalist world in two hostile camps and in war between them. () Thus the first crisis of the capitalist system of the world economy resulted in the First World War, and the second crisis resulted in the Second World War. This does not mean, of course, that the Second World War was an exact replica of the first. On the contrary, the Second World War substantially differs in its nature from the first. () The Second World War from the very outset assumed the nature of an anti Fascist war, a war of liberation, one of the tasks of which was also to reestablish democratic liberties. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the Axis States could only strengthen and actually did strengthen the anti fascist and liberating character of the Second World War. It was on this basis that the anti-fascist coalition of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain and other freedom loving States took shape, a collation which later played a decisive part in routing the armed forces of the Axis States. This is how matters stand with regard to the question of the origin and nature of the Second World War. () But the war was not only a curse. It was at the same time a great school in which all the forces of the people were tried and tested. The war laid bare all the facts and events in the rear and at the front, it mercilessly tore off the veils and covers which had concealed the true faces of the States, governments, and parties, and placed them on the stage without masks, without embellishments, with all their shortcomings and virtues.

The war set something in the nature of an examination for our Soviet system, our State, our Government, our Communist Party, and summed up the results of their work as if telling us: here they are, your people and organizations, their deeds and days look at them closely and reward them according to their deserts. This is one of the positive aspects of the war. () There is one main result which served as a basis for all other results. This result is that at the end of the war the enemies suffered defeat and we, together with our Allies, emerged as victors. We ended the war in complete victory over the enemy this is the principal result of the war. But this is too general as a result, and we cannot stop at that. () Our victory means, in the first place, that our Soviet social system has won, that the Soviet social system successfully withstood the trial in the flames of war and proved its perfect viability. () The war has shown that the Soviet social system is a truly popular system, which has grown from the people and enjoys its powerful support, that the Soviet social system is a perfectly viable and stable from of organization of society. More that that, the point is now not whether the Soviet social system is viable or not, since after the objective lessons of the war no single skeptic now ventures to come out with doubts concerning the viability of the Soviet social system. The point is that the Soviet social system has proved more viable and stable that a non-Soviet social system, that the Soviet social system is a better form of organization of society than any nonSoviet social system. () Secondly, our victory means that our Soviet State System has won, that our multinational Soviet State withstood all the trials of war and proved its viability. () Thirdly, or victory means that the Soviet armed forces have won, that our Red Army has won, that the Red Army heroically withstood all the adversities of war, utterly routed the armies of our enemies and emerged from the war as victor. () These are the main results of the war. SURSA: Stalins Speech , 9 Febrary , 1946 http://humanities.uwe.ac.uk/corehistorians/powers/twxt/s28stali.htm, accesat 12 august 2001.

Document 2 , Discursul lui Churchill de la Fulton , Missouri , 5 martie 1946 (excerpt)

( ) A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately light by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies. I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshall Stalin. There is deep sympathy and goodwill in Britain -- and I doubt not here also -- towards the peoples of all the Russias and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships. We understand the Russian need to be secure on her western frontiers by the removal of all possibility of German aggression. We welcome Russia to her rightful place among the leading nations of the world. We welcome her flag upon the seas. Above all, we welcome, or should welcome, constant, frequent and growing contacts between the Russian people and our own people on both sides of the Atlantic. It is my duty however, for I am sure you would wish me to state the facts as I see them to you. It is my duty to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe. From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in some cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens alone -- Greece with its immortal glories -- is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French observation. The Russian-dominated Polish Government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon Germany, and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and undreamed-of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police

governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy. Turkey and Persia are both profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims which are being made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow Government. An attempt is being made by the Russians in Berlin to build up a quasi-Communist party in their zone of occupied Germany by showing special favors to groups of left-wing German leaders. At the end of the fighting last June, the American and British Armies withdrew westward, in accordance with an earlier agreement, to a depth at some points of 150 miles upon a front of nearly four hundred miles, in order to allow our Russian allies to occupy this vast expanse of territory which the Western Democracies had conquered. If no the Soviet Government tries, by separate action , to build up a proCommunist Germany in their areas, this will cause new serious difficulties in the American and British zones, and will give the defeated Germans the power of putting themselves up to auction between the Soviets and the Western Democracies. Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts -- and facts they are -- this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace. ( ) SURSA: Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech, http://www.historyguide.org/europe/churchill.html , 12.01.2007

Document 3 , Percepia lui Stalin asupra discursului de la Fulton ( excerpt ) ( ) In substance , Mr. Churchill now stands in the position of a firebrand of war. And Mr. Churchill is not alone. He has friends not only in England but also in the United States of America. In this respect , one is reminded remarkably of Hitler and his friends. Hitler began to set war loose by announcing his racial theory , declaring that only people speaking the German language represent a fully valuable nation. Mr. Churchill begins to set war loose,

also by racial theory , maintaining that only nations speaking the English language are fully valuable nations , called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world. ( ) As a result of the German invasion , the Soviet Union has irrevocably lost in battles with the Germans , and also during the German ocupation and through the expulsion of Soviet citizens to German slave labor camps , about 7 000 000 people. In other words , the Soviet Union has lost in men several times more then Britain and the United States together. It may be that some quarters are trying to push into oblivion these sacrifices of the Soviet people which insured the liberation of Europe frome the Hitlerite yoke. But the Soviet Union cannot forget them. One can ask therefore , what can be surprising in the fact that the Soviet Union , in a desire to ensure its security for the future, tries to achieve that these countries should have governments whose relations to the Soviet Union are loyal? How can one , without having lost ones reason , qualify this peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union as expansionist tendencies of our Government? ( ) Mr. Churchill wanders around the truth when he speaks of the growth of the influence of the Communist parties in Easter Europe ( ) The growth of the influence of the Communism cannot be considered accidental. It is a normal function. The influence of the Comunists grew because during the hard years of the mastery of fascism in Europe , Communists showed themselves to be reliable , daring and self-sacrificing fighters against fascist regimes for the liberty of peoples. SURSA: Jussi Hanhimaki , Odd Arne Westad , The Cold War , A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts , Oxford University Press , 2004 , p.48-49

Document 4 , Telegrama cea lung a lui G. Kennan , 22 februarie 1946 ( excerpt ) ( ) In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life

be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict.. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make: (1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventunstic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns. (2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.

(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for the moment--highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured. (4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program. For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments: (1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual. (2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on RussianAmerican relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we

should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis. (3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqus. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit--Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies. (4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will. (5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping. SURSA: The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State , http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm , 12.01.2007

Document 5 , George Kennan , Sursele comportamentului sovietic , iulie 1947 , (excerpt )

( ) In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige. In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the world community. But if the ideology convinces the rulers of Russia that truth is on their side and they they can therefore afford to wait, those of us on whom that ideology has no claim are free to examine objectively the validity of that premise. The Soviet thesis not only

implies complete lack of control by the west over its own economic destiny, it likewise assumes Russian unity, discipline and patience over an infinite period. Let us bring this apocalyptic vision down to earth, and suppose that the western world finds the strength and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years. What does that spell for Russia itself? The Soviet leaders, taking advantage of the contributions of modern techniques to the arts of despotism, have solved the question of obedience within the confines of their power. Few challenge their authority; and even those who do are unable to make that challenge valid as against the organs of suppression of the state. The Kremlin has also proved able to accomplish its purpose of building up Russia, regardless of the interests of the inhabitants, and industrial foundation of heavy metallurgy, which is, to be sure, not yet complete but which is nevertheless continuing to grow and is approaching those of the other major industrial countries. All of this, however, both the maintenance of internal political security and the building of heavy industry, has been carried out at a terrible cost in human life and in human hopes and energies. It has necessitated the use of forced labor on a scale unprecedented in modern times under conditions of peace. It has involved the neglect or abuse of other phases of Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, consumers' goods production, housing and transportation. To all that, the war has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in Russia today a population which is physically and spiritually tired. The mass of the people are disillusioned, skeptical and no longer as accessible as they once were to the magical attraction which Soviet power still radiates to its followers abroad. The avidity with which people seized upon the slight respite accorded to the Church for tactical reasons during the war was eloquent testimony to the fact that their capacity for faith and devotion found little expression in the purposes of the regime. In these circumstances, there are limits to the physical and nervous strength of people themselves. These limits are absolute ones, and are binding even for the cruelest dictatorship, because beyond them people cannot be driven. The forced labor camps and the other agencies of constraint provide temporary means of compelling people to work

longer hours than their own volition or mere economic pressure would dictate; but if people survive them at all they become old before their time and must be considered as human casualties to the demands of dictatorship. In either case their best powers are no longer available to society and can no longer be enlisted in the service of the state. It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and, weakening of all rival influence and rival power. Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon he interests of a peaceful and stable world. ()

SURSA: George Kennan , The Sources of Soviet Conduct , http://www.historyguide.org/europe/kennan.html, 12.01.2007

Document 6 , Telegrama lui Novikov , septembrie 1946 (excerpt )

The foreign policy of the United States, which reflects the imperialist tendencies of American monopolistic capital, is characterized in the postwar period by a striving for

world supremacy. This is the real meaning of the many statements by President Truman and other representatives of American ruling circles; that the United States has the right to lead the world. All the forces of American diplomacy -- the army, the air force, the navy, industry, and science -- are enlisted in the service of this foreign policy. For this purpose broad plans for expansion have been developed and are being implemented through diplomacy and the establishment of a system of naval and air bases stretching far beyond the boundaries of the United States, through the arms race, and through the creation of ever newer types of weapons. 1. a) The foreign policy of the United States is conducted now in a situation that differs greatly from the one that existed in the prewar period. This situation does not fully conform to the calculations of those reactionary circles which hoped that during the Second World War they would succeed in avoiding, at least for a long time, the main battles in Europe and Asia. They calculated that the United States of America, if it was unsuccessful in completely avoiding direct participation in the war, would enter it only at the last minute, when it could easily affect the outcome of the war, completely ensuring its interests. In this regard, it was thought that the main competitors of the United States would be crushed or greatly weakened in the war, and the United States by virtue of this circumstance would assume the role of the most powerful factor in resolving the fundamental questions of the postwar world. These calculations were also based on the assumption, which was very widespread in the United States in the initial stages of the war, that the Soviet Union, which had been subjected to the attack of German Fascism in June 1941, would also be exhausted or even completely destroyed as a result of the war. Reality did not bear out the calculations of the American imperialists. b) The two main aggressive powers, fascist Germany and militarist Japan, which were at the same time the main competitors of the United States in both the economic and foreign policy fields, were thoroughly defeated. The third great power, Great Britain, which had taken heavy blows during the war, now faces enormous economic and political difficulties. The political foundations of the British Empire were appreciably shaken, and crises arose, for example, in India, Palestine, and Egypt.

Europe has come out of the war with a completely dislocated economy, and the economic devastation that occurred in the course of the war cannot be overcome in a short time. All of the countries of Europe and Asia are experiencing a colossal need for consumer goods, industrial and transportation equipment, etc. Such a situation provides American monopolistic capital with prospects for enormous shipments of goods and the importation of capital into these countries -- a circumstance that would permit it to infiltrate their national economies. Such a development would mean a serious strengthening of the economic position of the United States in the whole world and would be a stage on the road to world domination by the United States. 3. Obvious indications of the U.S. effort to establish world dominance are also to be found in the increase in military potential in peacetime and in the establishment of a large number of naval and air bases both in the United States and beyond its borders. In the summer of 1946, for the first time in the history of the country, Congress passed a law on the establishment of a peacetime army, not on a volunteer basis but on the basis of universal military service. The size of the army, which is supposed to amount to about one million persons as of July 1, 1947, was also increased significantly. The size of the navy at the conclusion of the war decreased quite insignificantly in comparison with wartime. At the present time, the American navy occupies first place in the world, leaving England's navy far behind, to say nothing of those of other countries. Expenditures on the army and navy have risen colossally, amounting to $13 billion according to the budget for 1946-47 (about 40 percent of the total budget of $36 billion). This is more than 10 times greater than corresponding expenditures in the budget for 1938, which did not amount to even $1 billion. ... In recent years American capital has penetrated very intensively into the economy of the Near Eastern countries, in particular into the oil industry. At present there are American oil concessions in all of the Near Eastern countries that have oil deposits (Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia). American capital, which made its first appearance in the oil industry of the Near East, only in 1927, now controls 42 percent of

all proven reserves in the Near East, excluding Iran. Of the total proven reserves of 26.8 billion barrels, over 11 billion barrels are owned by U.S. concessions. Striving to ensure further development of their concessions in different countries (which are often very large--Saudi Arabia, for example), the American oil companies plan to build a transArabian pipeline to transport oil from the American concession in Saudi Arabia and in other countries on the southeastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea to ports in Palestine and Egypt. In expanding in the Near East, American capital has English capital as its greatest and most stubborn competitor. The fierce competition between them is the chief factor preventing England and the United States from reaching an understanding on the division of spheres of influence in the Near East, a division of that can occur only at the expense of direct British interests in this region. ( ) SURSA: The Novikov Telegram, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/02/documents/novikov/, 12.01.2007 Document 7 , Discursul preedintelui Harry S. Truman , 12 martie 1947

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved. One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey. The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation. I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek Government.

Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious and peace loving country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife. When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five per cent of the children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings. As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible. Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances the people of Greece cannot make progress in solving their problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate need of financial and economic assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel and seeds. These are indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods necessary to restore internal order and security, so essential for economic and political recovery. The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American administrators, economists and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public administration. The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A Commission appointed by the United Nations security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece and alleged border violations along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other. ................................................................................................................................................ Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention.

The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support. Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East. The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey. As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help. I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time. I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the $350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war. In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.

Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized. ( ) SURSA: President Harry S. Truman's address before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947 , http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm , 12.01.2007.

Document 8 , Discursul de la Harvard al generalului Marshall (5 iunie 1947)

Nu trebuie s v spun, Domnilor, c situaia mondial este foarte grav. Acest lucru este absolut evident pentru orice om inteligent. Cred c una dintre cele mai serioase dificulti este c problema e de o att de mare complexitate nct chiar masa faptelor prezentate publicului prin pres i radio fac extrem de dificil pentru omul de pe strad o evaluare clar a situaiei. n plus, populaia acestei ri se afl foarte departe de regiunile ntunecate ale globului i este foarte greu s-i imagineze mizeria, reaciile ce o nsoesc la popoarele care au suferit ndelung i efectul pe care aceste reacii l au asupra guvernelor n cursul ncercrilor noastre de a restabili pacea n lume. Atunci cnd am cercetat necesarul pentru reconstrucia Europei, pierderile n viei omeneti, distrugerea satelor, uzinelor, minelor i a cilor ferate au fost estimate destul de exact, ns a devenit evident, n cursul lunilor care tocmai s-au scurs, c aceste distrugeri vizibile sunt probabil mai puin grave dect dislocarea ntregii structuri a economiei europene. De zece ani, situaia este absolut anormal. Pregtirile febrile pentru rzboi i activitatea i mai febril pentru susinerea efortului de rzboi au distrus toate ramurile economiilor naionale. Utilajul industrial n-a fost ntreinut, a fost deteriorat sau este complet depit. Sub dominaia arbitrar i distrugtoare a nazitilor, aproape toate ntreprinderile au fost nhmate la maina de rzboi german. Vechile relaii comerciale, instituiile private, bncile, companiile de asigurri i companiile de navigaie au disprut, din lips de capital, ca urmare a absorbirii lor atunci cnd au fost naionalizate sau pentru

c au fost pur i simplu distruse. n multe ri, ncrederea n moneda national a fost grav zdruncinat. Prbuirea structurii comerciale a Europei s-a produs n timpul rzboiului. Renvierea economic a fost serios ntrziat datorit faptului c doi ani dup ncetarea ostilitilor acordul cu privire la tratatele de pace cu Germania i Austria n-a fost nc stabilit. Unul dintre aspectele acestei probleme este n acelai timp interesant i grav: fermierul a produs ntotdeauna bunuri alimentare pe care le poate schimba cu orenii contra altor lucruri necesare vietii. Aceast diviziune a muncii reprezint baza civilizatiei moderne. La ora actual, ea e ameninat de ruin. lndustriile oraelor nu produc suficiente mrfuri necesare schimbului cu fermierii productori de produse alimentare. Lipsesc materiile prime i combustibilul. Utilajul industrial lipsete sau este prea uzat. Fermierul i ranul nu pot s gseasc pe pia mrfurile pe care vor s le cumpere, astfel nct vnzarea produselor lor n schimbul banilor pe care nu pot s-i utilizeze le pare o tranzactie lipsit de interes. Deci, ei au ncetat s mai cultive intensiv cmpul pentru a obine nutre n ciuda faptului c le lipsete mbrcmintea i alte produse ale civilizaiei. n acelai timp, locuitorilor oraelor le lipsesc hrana i combustibilul. Guvernele sunt deci forate s se serveasc de resursele n devize strine i de credite pentru a cumpra din strintate aceste produse indispensabile, epuiznd astfel fondurile de care au o nevoie urgent pentru reconstrucie. Deci, se creeaz rapid o situaie foarte grav care este de ru augur pentru ntreaga lume. Sistemul modern care se bazeaz pe diviziunea muncii i pe schimbul de produse este n pericol de a se prbui. Adevrul este c nevoile Europei de hran i de alte produse eseniale importate din strintate - i mai ales din America - pentru urmtorii trei sau patru ani sunt mult mai mari dect capacitatea sa actual de plat, nct ea va trebui s primeasc un ajutor suplimentar foarte important sau s se expun unei dislocri economice, sociale i politice foarte grave. Remediul acestei situaii const n sfrmarea cercului vicios i n restaurarea ncrederii locuitorilor ntregii Europe. Fabricantul i fermierul din multe regiuni trebuie s poat i s vrea s-i schimbe produsele contra monede a cror valoare constant s fie fr dubiu. n afar de efectul demoralizant pe care disperarea popoarelor n chestiune o are asupra ntregii lumi i a tulburrilor pe care aceasta le poate provoca, ar trebui s fie

evidente pentru toi i consecinele acestei situaii pentru economia Statelor Unite. Este logic c Statele Unite ar trebui s fac tot ceea ce pot pentru a sprijini restabilirea sntii economice a lumii, n lipsa creia stabilitatea politic i pacea sunt imposibile. Politica noastr nu este dirijat mpotriva nici unei ri, mpotriva nici unei doctrine ci contra foametei, srciei, disperrii i haosului. Scopul su trebuie s fie renaterea unei economii active n lume pentru a crea condiiile politice i sociale n care s poat s existe instituii libere. Acest ajutor, sunt convins, nu trebuie acordat cu zgrcenie, de fiecare dat cnd survin crize. Orice ajutor pe care acest guvern ar putea s-l dea n viitor ar trebui s fie mai mult un remediu dect un simplu paleativ. Orice guvern care vrea s sprijine relansarea economic se va bucura, sunt sigur de acest lucru, de ntreaga cooperare din partea guvernului Statelor Unite. Orice guvern care va ncerca mpiedicarea relansrii economice a altor ri nu poate spera s primeasc ajutorul nostru. n plus, guvernele, partidele i gruprile politice care caut s perpetueze mizeria uman pentru a avea un profit pe plan politic sau pe alte planuri se vor ciocni de opoziia Statelor Unite. Este deja evident c nainte ca guvernul Statelor Unite s poat s continue eforturile pentru remedierea situaiei i sprijinirea Europei pe calea nsntoirii, ar trebui s se realizeze un acord de ctre rile Europei, asupra nevoilor lor actuale i asupra ceea ce aceste ri ale Europei vor face ele nsele pentru a eficientiza toate msurile pe care acest guvern ar putea s le ia. Nu ar fi nici bine, nici util ca guvernul Statelor Unite s stabileasc el nsui un program destinat punerii pe picioare a economiei europene. Aceasta este problema europenilor. Dup prerea mea, iniiativa trebuie s vin din partea Europei. Rolul Americii trebuie s constea n oferirea unui ajutor prietenesc la stabilirea unui program european i s ajute apoi la aplicarea acestuia n msura n care va fi posibil s o fac. Acest program va trebui s fie unul general, stabilit n comun mcar de ctre un mare numr de naiuni europene, dac nu de toate. SURSA: Charles Zorgbibe, Construcia european. Trecut, prezent, viitor, Ed. Trei, Bucureti, 1998 , p. 26-28.

Document 9 , Discursul lui Andrei Jdanov la edina inaugural a Cominform-ului Andrei Zhdanov September 22, 1947 The fundamental changes caused by the war on the international scene and in the position of individual countries has entirely changed the political landscape of the world. A new alignment of political forces has arisen. The more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct becomes two major trends in postwar international policy, corresponding to the division of the political forces operating on the international arena into two major camps: the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other. The principal driving force of the imperialist camp is the U.S.A. Allied with it are Great Britain and France. ... The imperialist camp is also supported by colony-owning countries, such as Belgium and Holland, by countries with reactionary anti-democratic regimes, such as Turkey and Greece, and by countries politically and economically dependent upon the United States, such as the Near Eastern and South American countries and China. The cardinal purpose of the imperialist camp is to strengthen imperialism, to hatch a new imperialist war, to combat socialism and democracy, and to support reactionary and anti-democratic pro-fascist regimes and movements everywhere. In the pursuit of these ends the imperialist camp is prepared to rely on reactionary and anti-democratic forces in all countries, and to support its former adversaries in the war against its wartime allies. The anti-fascist forces comprise the second camp. This camp is based on the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies. It also includes countries that have broken with imperialism and have firmly set foot on the path of democratic development, such as Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Indonesia and Vietnam are associated with it; it has the sympathy of India, Egypt and Syria. The anti-imperialist camp is backed by the labor and democratic movement and by the fraternal Communist parties in all countries, by the fighters for national liberation in the colonies and dependencies, by all progressive and democratic forces in every country. The purpose of this camp is to resist the threat of new wars and imperialist expansion, to strengthen democracy and to extirpate the vestiges of fascism.

The end of the Second World War confronted all the freedom-loving nations with the cardinal task of securing a lasting democratic peace sealing victory over fascism. In the accomplishment of this fundamental task of the postwar period the Soviet Union and its foreign policy are playing a leading role. This follows from the very nature of the Soviet socialist state, to which motives of aggression and exploitation are utterly alien, and which is interested in creating the most favorable conditions for the building of a communist society. One of these conditions is external peace. As embodiment of a new and superior social system, the Soviet Union reflects in its foreign policy the aspirations of progressive mankind, which desires lasting peace and has nothing to gain from a new war hatched by capitalism. The Soviet Union is a staunch champion of liberty and independence of all nations, and a foe of national and racial oppression and colonial exploitation in any shape or form. The change in the general alignment of forces between the capitalist world and the socialist world brought about by the war has still further enhanced the significance of the foreign policy of the Soviet state and enlarged the scope of its activity on the international arena. The successes and the growing international prestige of the democratic camp were not to the liking of the imperialists. Even while World War II was still on, reactionary forces in Great Britain and the United States became increasingly active, striving to prevent concerted action by the Allied powers, to protract the war, to bleed the U.S.S.R., and to save the fascist aggressors from utter defeat. The sabotage of the Second Front by the Anglo-Saxon imperialists, headed by Churchill, was a clear reflection of this tendency, which was in point of fact a continuation of the Munich policy in the new and changed conditions. But while the war was still in progress British and American reactionary circles did not venture to come out openly against the Soviet Union and the democratic countries, realizing that they had the undivided sympathy of the masses all over the world. But in the concluding months of the war the situation began to change. The British and American imperialists already manifested their willingness to respect the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and the democratic countries at the Potsdam tripartite conference in July 1945. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the democratic countries in these two past years has been a policy of consistently working for the observance of the democratic

principles in the postwar settlement. The countries of the anti-imperialist camp have loyally and consistently striven for the implementation of these principles, without deviating from them one iota. Consequently, the major objective of the postwar foreign policy of the democratic states has been a democratic peace, the eradication of the vestiges of fascism and the prevention of a resurgence of fascist imperialist aggression, the recognition of the principle of the equality of nations and respect for their sovereignty, and general reduction of all armaments and the outlawing of the most destructive weapons, those designed for the mass slaughter of the civilian population. ... Of immense importance are the joint efforts of the diplomacy of the U.S.S.R. and that of the other democratic countries to secure a reduction of armaments and the outlawing of the most destructive of them -- the atomic bomb. Soviet foreign policy proceeds from the fact of the coexistence for a long period of the two systems -- capitalism and socialism. From this it follows that cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and countries with other systems is possible, provided that the principle of reciprocity is observed and that obligations once assumed are honored. Everyone knows that the U.S.S.R. has always honored the obligations it has assumed. The Soviet Union has demonstrated its will and desire for cooperation.

SURSA: Report on the international situation to the Cominform , http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/04/documents/cominform.html, 12.01.2007

Seminar nr. 8

Evoluii n perioada rzboiului rece (1948-1962)

I Procesul de sovietizare i satelizare

- din punctul de vedere al evoluiei comunismului, perioada 1944-1948 a marcat trecerea de la stadiul de socialism ntr-o singur ar la cel de socialism ntr-o singur regiune - au existat dou procese prin care sovieticii i-au subordonat ntregul spaiu al Europei Centrale i de Est, procese care s-au desfurat simultan: A) satelizare: - procesul prin care rile din aceast regiune s-au subordonat intereselor politicii externe sovietice - a nceput odat cu intrarea Armatei Roii n regiune n 1944 i a continuat cu a) semnarea tratatelor de pace i colaborare dintre aceste ri, devenite democraii populare, i Uniunea Sovietic b) prin nchegarea tot mai coerent a blocului, prin constituirea n septembrie 1947, a Cominformului B) sovietizare: - a nceput n 1944 /1945 - a cunoscut o definire treptat n funcie de evoluiile internaionale - a constat n impunerea i acceptarea transformrii statelor dup modelul sovietic viznd regimul politic, valorile societii, economia, structurile sociale, instituiile, omul - impunerea modelului sovietic a fost legat de prezena Armatei Roii, cu excepia Iugoslaviei i Albaniei

- Virgiliu ru a introdus termenul de fidelizare pentru a desemna instituirea unei hegemonii sovietice n planul politicii externe (satelizare), ci i adoptarea unor instituii, mecanisme i procese politice similare cu cele din Uniunea Sovietic - Hugh Seaton-Watson menioneaz 3 etape ale procesului de comunizare innd seama de particularitile statelor: I. coaliia veritabil - presupune existena unor multor partide politice - o colaborare veritabil a comunitilor cu partidele necomuniste - controlul comunist asupra puterii este foarte sczut - meninerea libertii cuvntului i ntrunirilor - cenzura politic este redus II. coaliia mltinoas - hruirea i marginalizarea partidelor politice necomuniste - folosirea de ctre comuniti n relaiile lor cu celelalte partide politice a dou tactici: tactica salamului i tactica calului troian - guvernul este format din comuniti i necomuniti selectai de ctre comuniti - extinderea controlului asupra puterii - restrngerea libertii presei, a cuvntului i ntrunirilor III. apariia blocului monolitic - suprimarea opoziiei prin exilarea i arestarea liderilor ei - afirmarea frontului condus de comuniti - lichidarea democraiei burgheze - aceast etap se ncheie prin instaurarea unor regimuri staliniste, prin acapararea puterii depline de ctre partidele comuniste, prin impunerea regimului democraiei populare, organizarea unor epurri n partidele comuniste

- Romnia, Bulgaria I III - Iugoslavia, Albania III - Polonia II-III - Ungaria, Cehoslovacia I-II - Sten Berglund i Frank Aarebot au identificat 4 submodele angajate de sovietici n procesul de comunizare, caracterizate de elemente structurale legate de: efectele rzboiului asupra societii, asupra economiei, poziiei elitelor politice tradiionale i poziia Partidului Comunist i de considerentele externe ale procesului: Modelul de preluare a puterii
Rzboi, criz

Structura modelului

Poziia Partidului Comunist

ara

Modelul lui Lenin

economic, conflicte inter-elitare Rzboi, criz economic, forele politice de centru i de dreapta sunt lipsite de legitimitate

Puternic

Cehoslovacia

Modelul regimului marionet

Slab, suport puternic al Armatei Roii

Estonia, Letonia, Lituania, RDG

Modelul imperialist sovietic: democraie ghidat Modelul partizanilor

Rzboi, criz economic, conflicte ntre elitele politice Rzboi, criz economic, vechile elite decimate i delegitimate de rzboi sau de epurrile de dup Puternic, control prin armata de partizani asupra societii Slab, suport puternic al Armatei Roii

Polonia, Ungaria, Romnia, Bulgaria

Iugoslavia i Albania

(Sten Berglund i Frank Aarebot, The Political History of the Eastern Europe in the 20th Century. The Struggle between Democracy and Dictatorship, Edward Elgar, Celtenham UK, 1997, p.65 apud. Virgiliu ru, Alegeri fr opiune. Primele scrutinuri parlamentare din Centrul i Estul Europei dup cel de-al Doilea Rzboi Mondial, Editura Eikon, Cluj Napoca, 2005, p.55 )

* De ilustrat, plecnd de la modele teoretice menionate mai sus i pe baza bibliografiei indicate, modul de preluare a puterii de ctre comuniti n Europa de Central i de Est. A) satelizare: - etape: a) semnarea conveniilor de armistiiu Armistiiu cu Italia, septembrie 1943 Armistiiu cu Romnia, 12 septembrie 1944 Armistiiu cu Bulgaria, 28 octombrie 1944 * De ilustrat structura acestor convenii de armistiiu i rolul lor n mecanismul de sovietizare b) Conferina de pace de la Paris (1946-1947) - s-a deschis la 26 iulie 1946, n Palatul Luxemburg - au participat reprezentanii celor cinci mari puteri, 16 state care i trimiser trupe n Europa, precum Cehoslovacia, i un numr de state invitate; au participat i delegaii ale Italiei, Finlandei, Bulgariei, Romniei i Ungariei - au fost semnate tratatele de pace pe baza proiectelor ntocmite de Consiliul Minitrilor de Externe - structura tratatelor: clauze politice: vizau excluderea organizaiilor fasciste i crearea unui cadrul democratic clauze economice: se refer la reparaii i restituiri clauze militare cu privire la prizonieri, dezarmare, reducerea armatei, aviaiei etc.; URSS i rezerva dreptul de a-i menine forele militare n vederea asigurrii liniilor de comunicaii cu zonele sovietice de ocupaie din Austria clauze teritoriale - nu s-a semnat un tratat de pace cu Germania - Japonia: 1951, Statele Unite ale Americii a organizat o Conferin de pace, la care nu au participat Uniunii Sovietice i statele satelit; SUA i Marea Britanie au semnat un tratat, Japoniei fiindu-i recunoscut independen i suveranitatea; Statele Unite aveau dreptul

de a pstra armata n Okinawa, iar Japonia i lua obligaia de a renuna la for i la ameninarea cu fora - 14 mai 1955, Viena s-a semnat tratatul de pace cu Austria * De ilustrat structura cu date concrete coninutul clauzelor tratatelor i rolul lor n mecanismul de sovietizare c) tratatele bilaterale ntre URSS i satelii - semnate ntre URSS cu Cehoslovacia (12 decembrie 1943), cu Iugoslavia (12 aprilie 1945), cu Polonia (21 aprilie 1945), Romnia (4 februarie 1948), cu Ungaria (18 februarie 1948), cu Bulgaria (18 martie 1948) - aceste tratate prevedeau organizarea unei aprri comune mpotriva Germaniei, erau orientate mpotriva puterilor occidentale i urmreau ntrirea militar i diplomatic a blocului sovietic european B) sovietizare: - transformarea intern a societilor din Europa de Central i de Est s-a bazat pe tiparele staliniste aplicate de n URSS, n anii 1930 -Zbigniev Brzezinski: Stalin cuta securitatea, n faa unui posibil conflict cu Occidentul, n aplicarea rigid a experienei sale trecute la fiecare nou situaie, creznd c loialitatea va fi obinut ntr-o msur mai mare prin duplicarea structurii sovietice n Europa Central i de Est a) viaa politic: - partidele socialiste au fost absorbite de ctre partidele comuniste - opoziia deschis a fost dispersat, nchis sau lichidat - partidele non comuniste au fost dizolvate sau incluse n fronturile patriotice i naionale - creterea numeric iniial a partidelor comuniste a fost urmat de epurri n mas a membrilor de partid, dar i a unor lideri de partid, care fceau parte din diferite fraciuni ale aceluiai partid comunist - impunerea regimului politic de democraie popular

b) viaa cultural: - controlul comunist asupra sistemului de nvmnt epurarea corpului profesoral, eliminarea unor discipline i introducerea unora noi (de exemplu, cursurile de marxism -leninism) - realismul socialist a fost proclamat ca norm n art, arhitectur etc. c) viaa economic: - naionalizarea principalelor mijloace de producie - colectivizarea forat a agriculturii - adoptarea unui model de industrializare rapid, de inspiraie sovietic bazat pe: impunerea unui model centralizat de planificare predominarea sectorului de stat accentul pus pe industria grea dezvoltarea sistemului comercial ntre statele blocului sovietic d) viaa social: - apariia unui clase muncitoare antrenate n domeniul industriei, extrase n marea sa majoritate din mediul rural - modelul urbanizrii comuniste: construirea de orae n jurul marilor centre industriale, cu un aspect arhitectural specific generat de nevoia stringent de locuine - conflictul red (membrii de partid) versus expert (intelectualitatea tehnic) - crearea unor organizaii de mas specializate pentru fiecare categorie social n parte (femei, copii, tinere etc.) - eforturi pentru crearea unui tip de om nou, socialist

II. OCDE
- acordarea ajutorului prevzut n planul Marshall era condiionat de ntocmirea unui plan general de reconstrucie a continentului

- la 16 aprilie 1948 s-a creat, printr-o convenie, Organizaia European de Cooperare Economic (OECE) - OECE va fi nlocuit n 1961 de OCDE (Organizaia de Cooperare i Dezvoltare Economic), compus din SUA, Canada, Japonia i Europa Occidental

III. NATO
- etapele constituirii Organizaiei Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord 1) tratatul de la Dunkerque, martie 1947: semnat ntre Marea Britanie i Frana 2) lrgirea pactului de alian din martie 1947 la 17 martie 1948, la Bruxelles s-a semnat un nou tratat ntre Marea Britanie, Frana, Belgia, Olanda, Luxemburg 3) 11 iunie 1948 rezoluia Vandenberg care permitea Statelor Unite s intre ntr-un sistem de alian n afara continentului 4) 4 aprilie 1949 s-a semnat, la Washington, Tratatul Atlanticului de Nord, de reprezentanii a 12 ri (SUA, Canada, Marea Britanie, Frana, Italia, Islanda, Belgia, Olanda, Luxemburg, Norvegia, Danemarca, Portugalia) - structura Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord: a) preambul b) 14 articole * De ilustrat principalele prevederi ale Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord

IV. Alte aliane defensive:

a) Pactul Pacificului (ANZUS) - septembrie 1951, San Francisco, s-a semnat Pactul Pacificului (ANZUS), de ctre Australia, Noua Zeeland i SUA - alian defensiv ndreptat mpotriva atacurilor, respectiv agresiunilor japoneze

b) Organizaia Asiei de SE (SEATO) - septembrie 1954, la Manila, format din fostele ri din ANZUS i Pakistan, Filipine, Thailanda, Anglia i Frana - viza: - aprarea, inclusiv, a statelor care nu fac parte din SEATO - consultare n cazul infiltrrii comuniste - manevre militare comune - organizare: a) Consiliu permanent al minitrilor, avnd un Secretariat executiv (Bangkok) b) un organism de planificare militar c) serviciu de cercetare pentru monitorizarea subversiunii comuniste - n 1958 stabilete contacte cu NATO i CENTO c) Organizaia Tratatului Central (CENTO) - 1955, format din Anglia, Turcia, Iran, Irak, Pakistan - prevedea pentru statele membre, cooperarea i asisten reciproc, ca i angajamentul de a nu interveni n politica intern a celorlalte state; - viza ndiguirea Uniunii Sovietice prin crearea unei linii de state puternice de a lungul frontierei sud vestice a acesteia - nu a dispus de o structur de comand militar unificat

V Suport documentar

Document 1: Tratatul de pace cu Italia ( excerpt ) Paris, 10 februarie 1947 (...) Articolul 21 I. Teritoriul liber al Triestului se recunoate de ctre Puterile Aliate i Unite i Italia, care sunt de acord c integritatea i independena lui trebuie asigurate de ctre Consiliu de Securitate al Naiunilor Unite (...). Articolul 23 I. Italia renun la toate drepturile i legitimitile sale asupra posesiunilor teritoriale italiene din Africa i anume: Libia, Eritreea i Somalia Italian. (...) Articolul 27 Italia recunoate i se oblig s respecte suveranitatea i independena statului albanez. (...) Articolul 33 Italia recunoate i se oblig s respecte suveranitatea i independena statului etiopian. (...) SURSA: Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1983, p.21.

Document 2 : Tratatul de pace cu Bulgaria ( excerpt ) Paris, 10 februarie 1947 Partea I Graniele Bulgariei Articolul 1 Graniele Bulgariei (...) vor fi aceleai care existau la 1 ianuarie 1941.(...) Partea a IV-a Retragerea trupelor aliate (...) Articolul 2 Toate forele Puterilor aliate i Unite vor fi retrase din Bulgaria n cel mai scurt timp posibil i n orice caz la nu mai mult de 90 de zile din ziua intrrii n vigoare a prezentului Tratat (...). SURSA: Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1983, p.23.

Document 3: Tratatul de pace cu Japonia (excerpt) San Francisco, 8 septembrie 1951 (...) Articolul 2 a) Japonia, recunoscnd independena Coreei, renun la toate drepturile, temeiurile pentru drepturile i preteniile asupra Coreei, incluznd insulele: Quelpart, portul Hamilton i Dagelet. b) Japonia renun la toate drepturile, temeiurile pentru drepturi i pretenii asupra Formozei i insulelor Pescadores.

c) Japonia renun la toate drepturile, temeiurile pentru drepturi i preteniile asupra insulelor Kurile i asupra acelei pri a Sahalinului i a insulelor nvecinate cu el a cror suveranitate Japonia a dobndit-o prin tratatul de la Portsmouth din 5 septembrie 1905. (...) Articolul 6 a) Toate trupele de ocupaie ale Puterilor Aliate vor fi retrase din Japonia n cel mai scurt timp posibil dup intrarea n vigoare a prezentului Tratat i n orice caz la nu mai mult de 90 de zile din ziua intrrii n vigoare a prezentului Tratat (...). SURSA: Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1983, p.39.

Documentul 4: Tratatul de pace cu Austria ( excerpt ) Viena, 15 mai 1955 (...) Articolul 1 Restaurarea Austriei ca stat liber i independent Puterile Aliate i Unite recunosc c Austria se reconstituie ca stat suveran, independent i democratic. (...) Articolul 4 Puterile Aliate i Unite declar c uniunea politic sau economic ntre Austria i Germania este interzis. (...)

Articolul 8 Instituii democratice Austria va avea un guvern democratic, ales n baza dreptului de vot general, liber, egal i secret al cetenilor (...). Articolul 9 1. Austria trebuie s desvreasc msurile ncepute prin introducerea legilor corespunztoare, aprobate de Comisia Aliat pentru Austria, privind lichidarea partidului naional socialist i a organizaiilor afiliate lui, ori aflate sub controlul acestui partid (...). SURSA: Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1983, pp.24-25. Document 5: North Atlantic Treaty ( excerpt ) Washington DC, 4th April 1949

(...) ARTICLE 1 The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. ARTICLE 2 The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by

promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them. ARTICLE 3 In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. ARTICLE 4 The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened. ARTICLE 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective selfdefence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. ARTICLE 6 For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: - on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. ARTICLE 7 The Treaty does not effect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. ARTICLE 8 Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty. ARTICLE 9 The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5. ARTICLE 10 The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United

States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession. ARTICLE 11 This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratification of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications. ARTICLE 12 After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. ARTICLE 13 After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation. ARTICLE 14 This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly

certified copies will be transmitted by that government to the governments of the other signatories. SURSA: North Atlantic Treaty , 15.01.2007 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/nato.htm ,

Document 6 Tratatul ncheiat ntre SUA, Australia i Noua Zeeland (excerpt) San Francisco, 1 septembrie 1951 (...) Articolul 1 Prile i iau obligaia, n conformitate cu Carta ONU, s soluioneze prin mijloace panice orice litigiu internaional n care ar fi implicate i s se abin n relaiile lor internaionale de la folosirea forei n orice mod care nu este compatibil cu elurile ONU. Articolul 2 Pentru a ndeplini mai efectiv elul acestui tratat, Prile separat sau mpreun pe calea unui nentrerupt i efectiv ajutor propriu i a ajutorului reciproc, vor continua s ntreasc capacitatea lor proprie i colectiv de a se opune unei invazii armate. (...) SURSA: Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1983, p.62.

Seminar nr. 9
Crizele rzboiului rece (1948-1962). Evoluii n blocul comunist Conceptul de criza i expresia ei politic n relaiile dintre marile puteri ( I )

I Crizele din blocul estic

A. Crizele Berlinului 1) Blocada Berlinului (1948-1949) 1945 Berlinul este administrat n comun de cele patru puteri aliate (SUA, Marea Britanie , Frana i URSS ). Se nfiineaz Kommandatura , alctuit din patru comandani ( cte unul pentru fiecare putere aliat) 2 decembrie 1946 acord americano-britanic privind crearea unei uniuni economice n zona de ocupaie ( Bizonia ) intr n vigoare la 1 ianuarie 1947 iunie 1948 Conferina de la Londra americanii, britanicii i francezii hotrsc unirea celor trei zone de ocupaie , organizarea de alegeri pentru o adunare constituant. Totodat pentru stoparea inflaiei galopante , se ia hotrrea instituirii unei monede comune marca german. O atare orientare contravine intereselor sovietice 24 iunie 1948 sovieticii blocheaz toate cile terestre de acces spre Berlinul de Vest

rspunsul occidentalilor const n organizarea unui pod aerian de anvergur ( 4 000 10 000 t de mrfuri erau aduse zilnic , pe calea aerului, n Berlinul de Vest )

26 septembrie 1948 occidentalii supun chestiunea crizei Berlinului n Consiliul de Securitate 25 octombrie 1948 URSS uzeaz de dreptul su de veto 12 mai 1949 n faa succesului incontestabil al podului aerian , sovieticii renun la blocad 7 septembrie 1949 Republica Federal Germania ( RFG ) 7 octombrie 1949 Republica Democrat Germania ( RDG )

2) A doua criz a Berlinului (1953) 16 iunie 1953 n Berlinul de Vest au loc manifestaii mpotriva msurilor guvernamentale de intensificare a produciei n industrie 17 iunie 1953 datorit lipsurilor alimentare , protestele degenereaz n revolt sovieticii intervin militar i restabilesc ordinea ( bilanul 25 de demonstrani ucii i 378 rnii ) 3) A treia criz a Berlinului (1958-1961) 27 noiembrie 1958 - Nikita Hruciov declar c URSS dorete s transfere guvernului est-german toate responsabilitile guvernului sovietic n termen de 6 luni 31 decembrie 1958 aliaii occidentali resping propunerea sovietic 1961 creterea masiv a exodului est-german spre Berlinul de Vest (numai n luna iulie au trecut aprox. 30 000 de est-germani) august 1961 autoritile est-germane ncep construcia Zidului Berlinului, din blocuri de zgur i srm ghimpat ( au fost pstrate 13 puncte de trecere oficial)

26 iunie 1963 , aflat n vizit n Berlinul de Vest , JF Kennedy rostete celebra sintagm: Ich bin ein Berliner!

B. Revolta polonez ( 1956 ) 12 martie 1956 Boleslav Bierut moare , fiind nlocuit n fruntea partidului de Edward Ochab 28-29 iunie 1956 are loc revolta muncitorilor de la Poznan , desfurat sub lozincile: Jos comunismul ! , Vrem pine ! cauze ale revoltei: lipsa de alimente i bunuri de consum condiii insalubre de locuit reducerea salariului real practicile birocratice armata polonez condus de generalul Konstantin Rokossovsky (sovietic) a intervenit n for. Intervenia s-a soldat cu mori i rnii n rndurile protestatarilor. n faa presiunii sociale natolitii ( nucleul moscovit al comunitilor polonezi) au propus cooptarea lui Wladyslaw Gomulka n Biroul Politic. Gomulka refuz! octombrie 1956 vizita lui Nikita Hruciov n Polonia. Gomulka este readus la putere, devenind premier al Poloniei. Din aceast postur , Gomulka a oprit colectivizarea agriculturii. Generalul Rokossovsky a fost chemat la Moscova. n schimbul indulgenei Moscovei , Gomulka se angaja s pstreze monopolul comunist al puterii. C. Revoluia din Ungaria (1956) 17 iulie 1956 Anastas Mikoian , asistat telefonic de Nikita Hruciov , l convinge pe Rakosi s demisioneze din funcia de prim-secretar (motivul

oficial invocat a fost de natur medical hipertensiune ). n locul lui Rakosi este numit Erno Gero 6 octombrie 1956 au loc funeraliile naionale ale lui Laszlo Rajk (fost ministru de interne , spnzurat n 1949 , din ordinul lui Stalin , sub acuzaia de titoism ) la care particip 300 000 de oameni 22 octombrie 1956 vestea succesului obinut de polonezi i revenirea la putere a lui Wladyslaw Gomulka au creat la Budapesta impresia posibilitii crerii unei ci maghiare spre socialism 23 octombrie 1956 - studenii din Budapesta organizeaz o manifestaie de solidaritate cu Polonia 23-31 octombrie 1956 prima faz a revoluiei maghiare. Revendicrile studenilor: revenirea la putere a lui Imre Nagy libertatea cuvntului alegeri libere suprimarea simbolurilor comuniste 24 octombrie 1956 trupele sovietice deschid focul asupra demonstranilor , creznd c muncitorii nu se vor solidariza cu studenii.nelndu-se au oprit intervenia. 24 octombrie 1956 Imre Nagy este numit premier i se solidarizeaz cu manifestanii 25 octombrie 1956 - Erno Gero este nlocuit cu Janos Kadar 30 octombrie 1956 trupele sovietice se retrag din Budapesta 2 noiembrie 1956 Imre Nagy anun: alegeri libere i sfritul partidului unic retragerea Ungariei din Tratatul de la Varovia proclam neutralitatea rii i solicit protecia Naiunilor Unite 4 noiembrie 1956 sovieticii declaneaz intervenia militar ( bilanul 2 000 de mori n Budapesta i aprox. 700 n restul rii )

Imre Nagy i colaboratorii si s-au refugiat la Ambasada Iugoslav din Budapesta. Dndu-i-se asigurri c poate iei n siguran , Nagy a plecat n Romnia. A fost arestat i trimis n Ungaria. n 1958 , guvernul maghiar a anunat execuia lui Imre Nagy. La 31 iulie 1989 , guvernul de la Budapesta i-a organizat acestuia funeralii naionale.

De relevat impactul acestor crize asupra sistemului internaional D. Defeciunea iugoslav

cauze: refuzul lui Iosip Broz Tito de a fi considerat vasal al Moscovei sprijinul pe care iugoslavii l-au acordat comunitilor greci n timpul rzboiului civil patronarea iugoslav a proiectului unei mari federaii balcanice , ce urma s includ Ungaria , Romnia , Iugoslavia , Bulgaria , Albania , posibil i Grecia

10 februarie 1948 Kremlin ntlnirea delegaiilor de partid sovietic , iugoslav i bulgar. Stalin ordon crearea unei federaii iugoslavobulgare ( raiunea unui atare ordin rezid n docilitatea fa de Moscova a liderilor comuniti bulgari )

1 martie 1948 Comitetul Central al Partidului Comunist Iugoslav respinge propunerea sovietic 18 martie 1948 Moscova i retrage consilierii militari i civili din Iugoslavia 27 martie 1948 ntr-o scrisoare , Moscova i motiva retragerea consilierilor: acetia fuseser tratai de iugoslavi cu ostilitate i agresivitate

 Partidul Comunist Iugoslav czuse prad ideologice

ereziei

comunitii iugoslavi erau intimidai de serviciile de securitate conducerea iugoslav se autoinstituise , fr a fi aleas n mod democratic 13 aprilie 1948 rspunsul iugoslav, structurat pe 4 puncte: Stalin era victima unor dezinformri comunitii iugoslavi nu erau intimidai de serviciile de securitate , relaiile dintre acetia fiind solid fundamentate Partidul Comunist Iugoslav le inoculase maselor iubirea fa de URSS , proces deloc uor de realizat construiau socialismul dup un model diferit de URSS , ns nu mai puin legitim 4 mai 1948 - reacia sovietic atitudinea iugoslav a fost catalogat drept pueril i arogant 28 iunie 1948 excluderea Iugoslaviei din Cominform

II Crearea CAER

CAER Consiliu de Ajutor Economic Reciproc rspunsul sovietic la Planul Marshall s-a concretizat n urmtoarele organizaii: Planul Molotov , Cominform i CAER creat n ianuarie 1949 , CAER-ul avea misiunea de a stimula comerul dintre rile din blocul estic. n realitate , URSS nu a putut oferi rilor comuniste un ajutor comparabil cu cel acordat de SUA rilor occidentale

III Suport documentar

Document 1: Raport sovietic cu privire la revolta berlinezilor din 16-19 iunie 1958 (excerpt)

I. The course of events in the GDR on 17-19 June. 2. Events in Berlin on 16-19 June ( ) During the day of 16 June, there was a marked increase in the activity of small groups of provocateurs in various parts of East Berlin, carrying out anti-democratic agitation amongst the populace. In a number of enterprises in East Berlin and in GDR a slogan was sent forth from West Berlin calling for an immediate strike in solidarity with the construction workers of Berlin, as well as a slogan calling for a general strike on 17 June. In the evening of 16 June an extra edition of the evening paper Dernbend was published in West Berlin, with calls for a general strike in the Eastern zone of Germany. Solidarity strikes started to spread throughout a number of enterprises towards the days end on 16 June. In the evening of 16 June the situation in Berlin became more difficult. At 20.00 an extraordinary session of the most active members of the Berlin SED organizations was held, where, in the presence of the entire CC SED Politburo, Ulbricht and Grotewohl gave speeches on the new political course of the party and government. The mood of the active party members, according to members of the Politburo, was good. However, the GDR leadership said not a word of the strikes that were taking place in the city, and gave no indication as to what course the active party members ought to take in the near future. During this time crowds of West Berliners, consisting mostly of youth, began to arrive on city railcars and other means of transportation as well as on foot. A crowd of some 4-5 thousand people moved in the direction of the Friedrichstadtpalast where a session of the active members of the party was taking place, thus creating a possible danger that the

members of the CC SED Politburo could become hostages. At the same time, in the centre of the city at Stalinallee, a crowd of West Berliners numbering some 2 thousand began throwing rocks at the monument of comr. Stalin, and calling for the overthrow of the GDR government. The were also shouts by isolated provocateurs, calling for the killing of Russians. The GDR police, acting on their instructions, did not actively intervene in these events. The measures that we undertook (the dispatch of police reserves to the Friedrichstadtpalast), were enough to disperse the crowd that was moving in the direction of Friedrichstadtpalast, as well as the mob at Stalinallee. Following this, various groups of provocateurs and bandits, principally from West Berlin, took to rioting in various places in the Soviet sector of Berlin, overturning automobiles, looting shops and apartments of SED activists on Stalinallee, stopping street traffic, trying to break into the [natural] gas plant and other important city enterprises. These acts of outrage were carried out by groups that together numbered approximately 1.5-2 thousand people. Late in the evening of 16 June, we met with the leadership of CC SED (Grotewohl, Ulbricht, [secret police chief Wilhelm] Zaisser, [SED Politburo member Rudolf] Herrnstadt). We turned their attention to the seemingly serious nature of the disorders that had taken place in the city, pointing out that the slogans thrown out by the provocateurs at the end of the day calling for a general strike were finding a positive response within the enterprises of East Berlin and in some other places in GDR, and also pointing out that it is necessary to take the most decisive measures to maintain order in the city on 17 June, since one could expect a massive influx into East Berlin of provocateur bands from West Berlin. We informed our friends of our decision to send Soviet forces into Berlin. Our friends announced that they did not believe the situation so serious as to warrant such extraordinary measures, and that, in their opinion, one should not expect serious unrest in the city on 17 June, though they did not rule out the possibility of a slight increase in unrest as compared to 16 June. They evaluated the situation in GDR rather optimistically. We pointed out to the GDR leadership that it is necessary to be highly prepared and we proposed that detachments of German barracksbased police from Potsdam and Oranienburg be called out, which they did by the

morning of 17 June. During the day of 16 June we sent a warning telegram to our regional representatives informing them of the unrest in Berlin and recommending that they take urgent preventive and preparatory steps to tackle unrest in the regions of GDR.We advised the friends /Ulbricht/ to also warn the regions about this through CC SED channels, but they could not think of anything better than to call first secretaries of regional committees to Berlin on 17 June for instruction, and as a result, during the unrest of 17 June the regions were left with practically no top party leaders. At about 7 oclock in the morning of 17 June, in East Berlin and in many cities in the western and southern parts of GDR, there took place simultaneous mass strikes that turned into demonstrations, which, in a number of cities /Berlin, Magdeburg, Herlitz, and others/, in turn became riots. The provocateurs were not able to call out a general strike in Berlin. However, according to preliminary figures, on 17 June 80 thousand workers, out of a total number of 200 thousand, did strike. In addition, the largest enterprises participated in the strike: the Stalin electrical machinery factory, the Bergman-Borzig factory, the Soviet enterprises of Siemens-Planya, cable factories, and others. After stopping work, many workers proceeded in columns towards the city centre to Straussbergerplatz, where, the day before, the provocateurs called a general city meeting. At 7:30 about 10 thousand people gathered at this plaza, who proceeded in separate columns towards the GDR Statehouse, carrying banners Down with the government, We demand a decrease of norms, We demand a decrease of prices at KhO by 40%, We demand free elections. At 9 in the morning a crowd of 30 thousand people gathered outside the GDR Statehouse, a significant part of which was made up of West Berlin residents, who were the main organizers of the provocations. The insurgents were able to break through the line of steadfast policemen, who did not use weapons during this time, and after throwing rocks at them, they broke into the Statehouse where a pogrom was committed. The police security force of the Statehouse was reinforced, and at the time of the attack numbered 500 men. The Statehouse was recaptured only upon the arrival of the Soviet forces, in concert with which,

by the way, the German police, having been partially beaten by the crowd, actively participated in the reestablishment of order. At the same time, in the region of Aleksandrplatz (the centre of Berlin) large columns of demonstrators came together from the regions of Pankov, Vaisenzee, and Kpenich (the Soviet sector of Berlin).The crowds of demonstrators, with the active participation of provocateurs, besieged the CC SED building, the Berlin Polizeipresidium, the main telegraph, the city trade-union administration and other buildings. At the Aleksandrplatz and in the Pankow region, the demonstrators built barricades and obstructions. Windows were smashed in a number of GDR government buildings. Overall, approximately 66 thousand people, including some 10 thousand West Berliners, took part in the street demonstrations in East Berlin on 17 June. In addition to the workers, the demonstration included artisans, merchants, and other members of the petit bourgeoisie. During the course of the day on 17 June, there appeared over various parts of the Soviet sector of Berlin American planes, from which were dropped leaflets containing calls to the population to participate in the strikes and the unrest, and to work to overthrow the Government of GDR. On the sector border mobile loudspeakers appeared on several occasions over which the insurgents were given orders. After the deployment of guards on the sector border, several large groups of provocateurs and hooligans from West Berlin broke through to the Soviet sector. In the streets Braunekstrasse and Bernauerstrasse, these bands started an exchange of fire with the German police, as a result of which there were casualties. In the evening of 17 June, the American radio station RIAS in its transmissions recommended that the insurgents submit to the orders of Soviet officials, and not clash with Soviet forces. On 18 June in Berlin, under the presence of the military situation, many factories continued to strike. In a number of places there were attempts to resume the

demonstrations and to form picket lines of strikers, which were suppressed by the decisive actions of the German police and, in part, by the Soviet forces, which secured all points of importance in the eastern part of the city. In the relations between the populace and the Soviet military there was [a] significant feeling of alienation; in fact, not until 22 June did the party organize any campaign to reestablish friendly ties between the populace and our military. By 19-20 June the strikes in Berlin began to decline sharply and normalcy was established. () SURSA: The course of events in the GDR on 17-19 June n Cold War International History Project Bulletin , Nr. 5 , Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars , Washington DC, Spring 1995 , p.17-19

Document 2 : Telegram , N. Firiubin ctre ministrul de externe sovietic , 4 Noiembrie 1956 Strictly secret Copying is forbidden Coded Telegram From BELGRADE PRIORITY Kardelj informed me that on the night of November 4, they got in touch with Imre Nagy, as had been agreed upon with comrade Khrushchev. Imre Nagy, Santo Zoltan and 11 more Hungarian communists are located in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. It is not yet known, Kardelj said, whether Nagy Imre made his last statement in the name of the government in Budapest. If he made this statement, they, the Yugoslavs, will try to get him to announce that he did so under reactionary pressure [nazhim reaktsiia]. They also intend to come to an agreement with Imre Nagy so that he will make a statement supporting the government headed by Kadar in Solnok. In Kardeljs words, such an announcement would facilitate the discussion of the Hungarian issue in the Security Council and the recognition of Kadars government as

the legal government. Kardelj, on Titos instructions, requested the advice of the CPSU and the Soviet government as to whether to continue further talks with Imre Nagy. Tito also asked the Soviet government to convey to Kadars government the request that they not repress those communists who did not immediately take the correct line during the recent events in Hungary. Tito, in Kardeljs words, also asked the Soviet government to take measures to protect the Yugoslav embassy from possible attacks on it, especially if reactionaries find out that Nagy, who is located in the embassy, is supporting Kadars government. 4/XI-56 N. FIRIUBIN SURSA: Cable, N. Firiubin to Soviet Foreign Ministry , 4 November 1956 n Cold War International History Project Bulletin , Nr. 10 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars , Washington DC , March 1998 , p.143-144 Document 3 : Statutul Consiliului de Ajutor Economic Reciproc ( excerpt ) () Articolul I Obiective i principii 1. Consiliu de Ajutor Economic Recirpoc are ca scop s contribuie , prin unirea i coordonarea eforturilor rilor-membre ale Consiliului de dezvoltare planic a economiei naionale , la ridicarea nivelului industrializrii rilor cu o industrie mai puin dezvoltat, la creterea continu a productivitii muncii i la ridicarea nencetat a bunstrii popoarelor rilor-membre ale Consiliului. 2. Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc este format pe baza egalitii suverane a tuturor rilor-membre ale consiliului. Colaborarea economic i tehnico-tiinific a rilor-membre ale consiliului se desfoar potrivit principiilor egalitii depline n drepturi, respectrii suveranitii i intereselor naionale , ale avantajului reciproc tovresc.

Articolul II Calitatea de membru 1. Membrii iniiali ai Consiliului de Ajutor Economic Reciproc sunt rile care au semnatz prezentul statut. 2. Primirea n calitate de membru al Consiliului este deschis pentru alte ri europene care mprtesc scopurile i principiile Consiliului i i-au exprimat acordul de a-i asuma obligaiile cuprinse n prezentul Statut Primirea de noi membrii se face prin hotrrea Sesiunii Consiliului , pe baza cererilor oficiale ale rilor de a fi primite ca membrii ai Consiliului. 3. Fiecare ar-membr a Consiliului poate s ias din Consiliu , ntiinnd despre aceasta pe depozitarul prezentului Statut. Aceast ntiinare intr n vigoare dup ase luni de la data primirii ei de ctre depozitar. Dup primirea unei asemenea ntiinri , depozitarul va ncunotina despre aceasta rile-membre 4. rile-membre ale Consiliului convin: a) s asigure ndeplinirea recomandrilor organelor Consiliului, adoptate de ele; b) s acorde Consiliului i funcionarilor acestuia sprijinul necesar n ndeplinirea de ctre acetia a atribuilor prevzute n prezentul Statut; c) s prezinte Consiliului materialele i informaiile necesare pentru realizarea sarcinilor ce-i sunt ncredinate; d) s informeze Consiliul asupra mersului ndeplinirii recomandrilor adoptate n Consiliu. () Articolul V Organe 1. Pentru ndeplinirea atribuiilor i mputernicirilor menionate in articolul III al prezentului Statut , Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc are urmtoarele organe de baz: Sesiunea Consiliului, Consftuirea Reprezentanilor rilor n Consiliu, Comisiile permanente,

Secretariatul 2. Alte organe , care se pot dovedi necesare , se instituie potrivit prezentului Statut () SURSA: Aurel Preda-Mtsaru , Tratat de Relaii internaionale moderne i contemporane, vol. III , Ed. Lumina Lex , Bucureti , 2005, p.137-139

Seminar nr. 10
Conceptul de criza i expresia ei politic n relaiile dintre marile puteri ( II )

I Rzboiul din Coreea

Declaraia de la Cairo, semnat de Roosevelt, Churchill i Chiang Kai-shek promitea Coreei, dup ncheierea rzboiului, independena dup capitularea trupelor japoneze, trupele sovietice s-au deplasat de urgen la nord de paralela 38, pe 14 august 1945, fiind urmate abia n septembrie 1945 de instalarea trupelor americane la sud de paralela 38 n 1948, Naiunile Unite au adoptat propunerea american care susinea alegeri libere n ntreaga Coree, alegeri care urmau a decide soarta viitorului stat nordul Coreei, aflat sub tutel sovietic a declinat propunerea american, n timp ce n Sud s-au organizat alegeri libere, Syngman Rhee fiind ales n funcia de preedinte Rspunsul sovietic nu a ntrziat s apar, n nord fiind proclamat Republica Democrat Popular Coreea (RDPC) aceiai hotrre a Naiunilor Unite solicita i retragerea trupelor aflate n Coreea. Att SUA ct i URSS i-au retras propriile trupe, dar nu integral, ambele lsnd n Coreea grupuri de consilieri la nceputul anului 1950, administraia Truman considera Coreea de Sud ca fiind insuficient de important din punct de vedere strategic pentru a mandata o actiune militar american care s previn o eventual invazie din partea Coreei de Nord. Generalul Mac Arthur i Secretarul de Stat Dean Achenson au ilustrat noua situaie prin definirea perimetrului de aprare al Statelor Unite ale Americii, perimetru din care att Coreea ct i Taiwan-ul erau excluse.

14 aprilie 1950 NSC-68 - definea clar determinarea american de a ngrdi rspndirea comunismului, afirmnd explicit c SUA nu va tolera nici o agresiune din partea Uniunii Sovietice, indiferent unde aceast agresiune s-ar produce

25 iunie 1950 - la ora 4:40 a.m. atacul Armatei Populare Nord Coreene (APNC) asupra Coreei de Sud a nceput. n ciuda realului devotament profesat de ARC (Armata Republicii Coreea ), APNC profitnd de deficienele militare ale sudcoreenilor au ocupat capitala Seul pe 29 iunie 1950

27 iunie , Washington decizie referitoare la intervenia militar a SUA n Coreea (preedintele Truman a ordonat forelor militare aeriene i navale ale SUA s sprijine eforturile de rezisten ale ARC i Flotei a 7-a s ocupe poziii n preajma strmtorilor Taiwan-ului)

printr-o surpriz total, Consiliul de Securitate al Naiunilor Unite a votat susinerea eforturilor SUA de a sprijini Coreea de Sud. Aceasta fusese posibil datorit absenei reprezentantului URSS, care astfel nu a putut uza de dreptul su de veto. La 7 iulie 1950, Generalul MacArthur a primit comanda Forelor Naiunilor Unite (FNU) din Coreea. Dup ce Syngman Rhee a transferat comanda trupelor sud-coreene lui MacArthur, acesta a devenit comandantul militar suprem din Coreea de Sud

4 iulie 1950 - forele militare americane s-au angajat n lupta cu APNC , ns rezultatele au fost sub ateptri. Lipsa de experien a armatei americane, echipamentul militar depit i strategia eronat de lupt au avut drept rezultat o victorie categoric a nord-coreenilor. n urmtoarele dou luni, armata american s-a retras aprox. 150 de mile.

15 septembrie 1950 - asaltul FNU de la Inchon , reuind s ncercuiasc i s anihileze Armata 1 i Armata 2 a APNC, nu mai puin de 14 divizii nord-coreene fiind distruse, FNU cucerind Seulul.

14 octombrie 1950 dup mai multe ezitri , Republica Popular China ia decizia trimiterii n Peninsula Coreana a voluntarilor chinezi ( 200 000 de voluntari chinezi intr n lupt , la 1 noiembrie )

26 noiembrie 1950 trupele chineze ating paralela 38 - 4 ianuarie 1951 cuceresc Seul-ul

14 martie 1951 Mac Arthur organizeaz contraofensiva american reuind s cucereasc Seulul i s-i mping pe comuniti spre paralela 38 10 aprilie 1951 Generalul Mac Arthur , datorit unor declaraii hazardate referitoare la politica extern a SUA ( posibilitatea folosirii armei atomice ) este nlocuit cu Generalul Matthew B Ridgeway

8 iulie 23 august 1951 tratative la Kaesong ntre prile beligerante eueaz 28 aprilie 1952 Generalul Matthew B. Ridgeway este nlocuit de Generalul Mark Clark 8 octombrie 1952 un nou set de tratative eueaz 26 aprilie 27 iulie discuii finalizate cu semnarea armistiiului de la Panmunjon semnarea armistiiului, mult dorit de ambele pri , la 27 iulie 1953, n Panmunjom, va face ca grania dintre cele dou state coreene s fie marcat n acest sat printr-o fie de beton vopsit, lat de un picior

II Criza Suezului

iulie 1956 secretarul de stat John Foster Dulles anun faptul c SUA i retrag sprijinul financiar pe care-l promiseser autoritilor egiptene pentru construirea barajului de la Assuan.

26 iulie 1956 Abdel Gamal Nasser ( venit la putere n 1954 ) hotrte naionalizarea Companiei Universale a Canalului Suez ( companie cu capital majoritar francez i englez )

naionalizarea canalului provoac la Paris i Londra indignare. Britanicii i francezii , mpreun cu israelienii , elaboreaz planul unei riposte: armata israelian urma s invadeze Egiptul, extinzndu-i controlul asupra Peninsulei Sinai. Odat declanat conflictul , Frana i Marea Britanie urmau s trimit n zon trupe de meninere a pcii.

29 octombrie 1956 armata israelian atac Egiptul

30 octombrie 1956 Londra i Parisul lanseaz un ultimatum potrivit cruia prile beligerante trebuiau s-i retrag trupele la 16 Km de canal. Israelul se conformeaz imediat.

31 octombrie 1956 aviaia britanic i francez bombardeaz bazele aeriene egiptene. 5 noiembrie 1956 intr n aciune trupele franco-britanice , atacnd oraul Port Said URSS reacioneaz mpotriva interveniei franco-britanice , punnd n discuie i posibilitatea unor represalii nucleare SUA , nemulumite c nu au fost consultate anterior de francezi i englezi, solicit ncetarea imediat a ostilitilor 6 noiembrie 1956 britanicii renun , fiind urmai aproape imediat i de francezi Criza Suezului consacr noul statut al Marii Britanii i Franei puteri de rangul II

III Destinderea relativ i definirea regulilor de funcionare a bipolarismului-mecanisme de comunicarea i reglementare n perioada destinderii relative: Kennedy i riposta gradual i flexibil
A. Massive Retaliation represalii masive 12 ianuarie 1954 secretarul de stat John Foster Dulles declar n faa Consiliului pentru Relaii Externe faptul c SUA posedau mijlocul de descurajare , care este capacitatea de a trece la represalii masive. B. Flexible Response riposta gradual i flexibil - 1959 Maxwell Taylor public The Uncertain Trumpet , carte n care dezvolt doctrina ripostei graduale i flexibile

1962 este numit preedinte al Comitetului Unificat al efilor de StatMajor ideile formulate de M. Taylor aduceau n discuie posibilitatea unui rspuns difereniat i a unui rzboi limitat.

* De ilustrat detaliat regulile de funcionare a bipolarismului

IV Criza rachetelor din Cuba ( 1962 )

Cuba insul situat la 180 Km de coastele Floridei 15 aprilie 1961 bombardiere americane B-26 , camuflate n avioane cubaneze , bombardeaz insula 17 aprilie 1961 cteva sute de cubanezi debarc n Bahia de Cochinos (Golful Porcilor) operaiunea militar eueaz 14 octombrie 1962 un avion american U-2F , survolnd insula la mare nlime , a fotografiat amplasamentele de lansare a rachetelor SS4 i SS5

16 octombrie 1962 preedintele Kennedy e informat i au loc dezbateri cu privire la rspunsul ce trebuia dat aciunilor sovietice din Cuba. Dou opinii au fost preliminate: o intervenie chirurgical , respectiv lovirea amplasamentelor de lansare a rachetelor opinie susinut de generalul Maxwell Taylor blocada Cubei idee susinut de George Ball

s-a optat pentru a doua variant , instituindu-se o carantin n jurul Cubei (carantin termen lipsit de nuan belicoas) 22 octombrie 1962 ntr-un discurs televizat , preedintele Kennedy face public diferendul americano-sovietic , i afirm c orice atac din Cuba asupra oricrei ri din Emisfera Vestic va fi considerat drept un atac URSS mpotriva SUA

26 octombrie 1962 ntr-un mesaj adresat preedintelui SUA , Hruciov propune o soluie de compromis: sovieticii i vor retrage rachetele din Cuba sub condiia ca SUA s se angajeze c nu va ntreprinde nici un atac mpotriva Cubei

27 octombrie 1962 un alt mesaj trimis de Hruciov , complica lucrurile: sovieticii solicitau i retragerea rachetelor americane Jupiter din Turcia. n aceiai zi , un avion american U-2F , ce zbura la joas nlime , a fost dobort de o rachet sovietic incident major

27 octombrie 1962 Kennedy i rspunde lui Hruciov , dndu-i acordul pentru suspendarea carantinei i dnd asigurri c SUA nu vor invada Cuba

28 octombrie 1962 Hruciov anun c sovieticii vor renuna la amplasarea rachetelor n Cuba SUA i-au informat pe sovietici c rachetele americane din Turcia vor fi retrase , dar c aceast chestiune nu poate fi menionat n nici un acord (de altfel autoritile americane stabiliser retragerea acestor rachete nainte de izbucnirea crizei rachetelor din Cuba , din simplul motiv c

dezvoltarea tehnologiei produciei de rachete permitea acum lansarea acestora i de pe submarine) 7 noiembrie 1962 SUA i URSS au ajuns la un acord , potrivit cruia navelor americane le era permis inspecia vaselor sovietice aflate n drum spre cas. ca urmare a prezentei crize este instituit un telefon rou ntre Moscova i Washington De relevat impactul acestor crize asupra sistemului internaional

V Suport documentar

Document 1: Telegram , Mao Zedong ctre Stalin , 2/3 octombrie - neexpediat (1) We have decided to send a portion of our troops, under the name of [the Chinese] Volunteers, to Korea, assisting the Korean comrades to fight the troops of the United States and its running dog Syngman Rhee. We regarded the mission as necessary. If Korea were completely occupied by the Americans and the Korean revolutionary force were fundamentally destroyed, the American invaders would be more rampant, and such a situation would be very unfavorable to the whole East. (2) We realize that since we have decided to send Chinese troops to Korea to fight the Americans, we must first be able to solve the problem, that is, we are prepared to wipe out the invaders from the United States and from other countries, and [thus] drive them out [of Korea]; second, since Chinese troops will fight American troops in Korea (although we will use the name of the Chinese Volunteers), we must be prepared for an American declaration of war on China. We must be prepared for the possible bombardments by American air forces of many Chinese cities and industrial bases, and for attacks by American naval forces on China's coastal areas.

(3) Of the two questions, the first one is whether the Chinese troops would be able to wipe out American troops in Korea, thus effectively resolving the Korean problem. If our troops could annihilate American troops in Korea, especially the Eighth Army (a competent veteran U.S. army), the whole situation would become favorable to the revolutionary front and China, even though the second question (that the United States declares war on China) would still remain as a serious question. In other words, the Korean problem will end in fact with the defeat of American troops (although the war might not end in name, because the United States would not recognize the victory of Korea for a long period). If so, even though the Untied States declared war on China, the confrontation would not be a large-scale one, nor would it last very long. We consider that the most unfavorable situation would be that the Chinese forces fail to destroy American troops in large numbers in Korea, thus resulting in a stalemate, and that, at the same time, the United States openly declares war on China, which would be detrimental to China's economic reconstruction already under way and would cause dissatisfaction among the national bourgeoisie and some other sectors of the people (who are absolutely afraid of war). (4) Under the current situation, we have decided, starting on October 15, to move the twelve divisions, which have been earlier transferred to southern Manchuria, into suitable areas in North Korea (not necessarily close to the 38th parallel); these troops will only fight the enemy that venture to attack areas north of the 38th parallel; our troops will maintain a defensive warfare, while fighting with small groups of enemies and learning about the situation in every respect. Meanwhile, our troops will be awaiting the arrival of Soviet weapons and to be equipped with those weapons. Only then will our troops, in cooperation with the Korean comrades, launch a counter-offensive to destroy the invading American forces. (5) According to our information, every U.S. army (two infantry divisions and one mechanized division) is armed with 1500 pieces of artillery of various calibers ranging from 70mm to 240mm, including tank guns and anti-aircraft guns, while each of our armies (three divisions) is equipped with only 36 pieces of such artillery. The enemy would control the air while our air force, which has just started its training, will not be able to enter the war with some 300 planes until February 1951. Therefore, at present, we

are not assured that our troops are able to wipe out an entire U. S. army once and for all. But since we have decided to go into the war against the Americans, we should be prepared so that, when the U.S. high command musters up one complete army to fight us in one campaign, we should be able to concentrate our forces four times larger than the enemy (that is, to use four of our armies to fight against one enemy army) and to use a firing power one and a half to two times stronger than that of the enemy (that is, to use 2200 to 3000 pieces of artillery of 70mm caliber and upward to deal with the enemy's 1500 pieces of artillery of the same calibers), so that we can guarantee a complete and thorough destruction of one enemy army. (6) In addition to the above-mentioned twelve divisions, we are transferring another twenty-four divisions, as the second and third echelons to assist Korea, from the south of the Yangzi River and the Shannxi-Ganshu areas to the Long-hai, Tianjin-Pukou, and Beijing-Southern Manchuria railways; we expect to gradually apply these divisions next spring and summer in accordance with the situation of the time. SURSA: Chen Jian , Chinas Road to the Korean War , Columbia University Press, New York , 1994 , http://www.ciaonet.org/book/chen/auth.html , 15.02.2005

Document 2 : Telegrama cifrat , Roshchin ctre Stalin , 3 octombrie 1950

Pentru FILIPPOV ( Stalin ) V transmit rspunsul lui Mao Zedong la telegrama dumneavoastr nr. 4581: Am primit telegrama dumneavoastr din 1.10.50 (1 octombrie 1950 n.a.). Noi iniial am plnuit s trimitem cteva divizii de voluntari n Coreea de Nord pentru a oferi asisten tovarilor coreeni atunci cnd inamicul va avansa la nord de paralela 38. Cu toate acestea , dup o analiz profund, acum considerm c asemenea aciuni ar putea avea consecine serioase. n primul rnd e foarte dificil s rezolvm problema corean cu cteva divizii (trupele noastre sunt extrem de prost echipate, i nu exist ncredere n succesul

operaiunilor militare mpotriva trupelor americane), iar inamicul ne poate obliga s ne retragem. n al doilea rnd e foarte posibil ca aceasta s provoace un conflict deschis ntre SUA i China, i ca o consecin i Uniunea Sovietic poate fi trt i ea n rzboi, iar problema va deveni astfel extrem de garv. Muli tovari din CC al PCC (Comitetul Central al Partidului Comunist Chinez n.a.) consider c este necesar s dm dovad de precauie aici. Desigur, netrimiterea trupelor pentru a oferi asisten tovarilor coreeni are un efect negativ, acetia aflndu-se ntr-o mare dificultate, pe care o simim i noi profund ; dar dac noi trimitem cteva divizii i inamicul ne foreaz s ne retragem ; i aceasta n plus va provoca un conflict deschis ntre SUA i China, atunci ntregul nostru plan de reconstrucie panic va fi distrus i o buna parte a populaiei din ar va fi nemulumit (rnile inoculate de rzboi populaiei nc nu s-au vindecat, noi avem nevoie de pace). Prin urmare e mai bine s dm dovad de rbdare acum , s ne abinem de la trimiterea trupelor i s ne pregtim activ forele noastre , ceea ce va aduce un avantaj n rzboiul cu inamicul. Coreea , ct timp va suferi o nfrngere temporar, i va schimba tactica de lupt spre rzboiul de partizani. Vom stabili o ntlnire a CC , la care vor fi prezeni principalii tovari din diferitele structuri politice. O decizie final , referitoare la aceast problem , nu a fost nc luat. Aceasta este o telegram preliminar, noi dorind s ne consultm cu dumneavoastr. Dac suntei de acord , noi suntem pregtii s trimitem imediat , pe calea aerului , pe tovarii Zhou Enlai i Lin Biao s discute cu dumneavoastr aceast problem i s raporteze evoluiile discuiilor n China i Corea. Ateptm rspunsul dumneavoastr MAO ZEDONG 2.10.50 1. Din punctul nostru de vedere, rspunsul lui Mao Zedong indic o schimbare n poziia iniial , referitoare la chestiunea corean , a conducerii chineze. Aceasta contrazice poziia anterioar, exprimat n discuiile lui Mao Zedong cu Yudin, Kotov i Konnov i n discuiile lui Liu Shaoqi cu mine. n aceste discuii acetia au afirmat c AEP este pregtit s ajute poporul corean, c moralul AEP este ridicat i c aceasta este

capabil, dac e necesar s nving trupele americane, privite ca fiind mai slabe dect cele japoneze. 2. Guvernul chinez, poate trimite , fr ndoial , nu doar cinci-ase divizii ci chiar mai multe. i aceasta fr a spune c trupele chineze au nevoie de echipament tehnic n domeniile antitanc i artilerie. Motivele acestor schimbri de poziie a chinezilor nu ne sunt clare. Putem presupune c au fost influenai de situaia internaional , de nrutirea poziiei Coreei i de intrigile blocului anglo-american prin intermediul ( prim-ministrului indian Jawaharlal n.a.) Nehru , care i-a ndrumat pe chinezi la rbdare ( n privina interveniei) , pentru a evita o catastrof. ROSHCHIN Nr. 2270 3.10

SURSA: Document 12 : Ciphered Telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov (Stalin), 3 October 1950 conveying 2 October 1950 message from Mao to Stalin n Cold War International History Project Bulletin , ... nr. 6-7, 1995-1996, p. 114116

Document 3 : Telegram , Roschin ctre Stalin , 7 octombrie 1950

Rspunsul la nr. 4676 Pe 6 octombrie la 22:30, ora Beijingului , l-am vizitat pe Mao Zedong i i-am nmnat rspunsul dumneavoastr. Dup ce m-a ascultat Mao Zedong a declarat c: 1 El este complet de acord cu evaluarea dumneavoastr a situaiei internaionale prezente i cu perspectivele posibile ale evoluiei ei.

El e foarte bucuros c rspunsul dumneavoastr vorbete despre o lupt comun a

Chinei i URSS mpotriva americanilor. El a subliniat faptul c dac cineva merge la rzboi, atunci fr nici un dubiu acel cineva ar trebui s mearg la rzboi acum. El a mai adugat c tocmai a prezentat o idee analog la sesiunea Biroului Politic CC al PCC. 3 Ct privete trimiterea trupelor chineze n Coreea, Mao Zedong consider c trebuiesc trimise nu doar cinci-ase divizii ci cel puin nou divizii. Cu toate acestea el a subliniat nivelul extrem de sczut al echipamentului militar al acestor divizii, ele deinnd doar 108 piese de artilerie i nici un tanc. Mao Zedong de asemenea a remarcat, referindu-se la informaiile primite de la prietenii coreeni , c n cazul corpurilor de armat SUA ( trei divizii ) aceste dein n jur de 1 500 de piese de artilerie, de diferite calibre, inclusiv tancuri. Mao Zedong consider c pentru a nfrnge corpurile de armat americane, chinezii ar trebui s aib o superioritate de patru la unu n privina forei umane i de trei la unu n privina echipamentului militar . Mao Zedong a subliniat faptul c el poate rezolva uor problema infanteriei , datorit rezervelor disponibile, dar n ceea ce privete echipamentul tehnologic al trupelor chineze el se bazeaz categoric pe asistena Uniunii Sovietice. El a mai precizat c n prezent ei nu au cadre antrenate pentru unitile de artilerie, tancuri i alte mijloace tehnice. n ceea ce privete chestiunea momentului intrrii trupelor chineze Mao Zedong a afirmat c ei sunt gata s-i deplaseze diviziile n zilele urmtoare, dar el crede c nu trebuie s se fac n grab aceasta; ar fi mai bine s se dea ansa americanilor de a nainta mai adnc n nord, deoarece acesta ar duce la dispersarea lor i ar facilita nfrngerea lor pe pri de ctre chinezi. 4 Mao Zedong a acordat o atenie deosebit problemei aviaiei. El a subliniat faptul c potrivit datelor primite de la prietenii coreeni, americanii au n jur de 1 000 de avioane pe cmpul de lupt corean , n timp ce chinezii nc nu au aviaie. n opinia lui Mao Zedong aviaia e necesar pentru: a) acoperirea trupelor chineze de uscat ce vor fi trimise n Coreea ; b) pentru operaiunile de lupt de pe front ;

c) pentru acoperirea centrelor industriale mari: Shanghai , Tianjin , Beijing, Mukden ( Anshan , Fushun ). Mao Zedong crede c americanii pot , la nceput , s distrug din aer baza industrial chinez , s dezorganizeze viaa economic i s ncurce comunicaiile. O asemenea situaie , a spus Mao Zedong , ar putea crea o nemulumire serioas n ar , mai ales din partea burgheziei naionale , i s pun guvernmntul popular ntr-o poziie extrem de dificil. Mao Zedong a declarat faptul c guvernul chinez nu poate asigura singur acoperirea aerian a trupelor i a centrelor industriale i c echipamentul din Uniunea Sovietic e esenial. 1 Mao Zedong a atras atenia asupra faptului c n Coreea drumurile i comunicaiile sunt distruse i aceasta complic misiunea de aprovizionare a armatei. n acest caz , a spus el , chinezii se pot baza numai pe asistena sovietic n furnizarea mijloacelor de transport 2 Mao Zedong a declarat faptul c guvernul chinez nu posed suficiente fonduri pentru achiziionarea armamentului cerut , pentru aviaie i muniie. ntregul buget pe 1951 este de dou miliarde dou sute de milioane de dolari americani , din care numai dou sute de milioane ar putea fi direcionate pentru armament. 3 Dup ce a afirmat cele de mai sus , Mao Zedong a spus c este necesar trimiterea imediat a lui Zhou Enlai i a lui Lin Biao pentru a v raporta toate evoluiile i consideraiile prietenilor chinezi. Zhou Enlai i Lin Biao vor putea pleca pe calea aerului pe 8 octombrie. Ei vor zbura la Beijing la Irkutsk. Avionul nostru special e cerut n Irkutsk. Mao Zedong i-a exprimat dorina ca Zhou Enlai i Lin Biao s fie nsoii de Shi Zhe i Fedorenko. Au fost prezeni la conversaie: Zhou Enali, U Su Xian i Fedorenko. Conversaia a durat 1 or i 45 de minute. Atept instruciunile dumneavoastr. Roshchin No. 2318 7.10.50

SURSA: James G. Hershberg , Vladislav Zubok Russian Documents on the Korean War, 1950-53 , Document No. 7 : Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to China N.V. Roshchin , to Stalin , 7 October 1950 n Cold War International History Project Bulletin , ... nr. 14-15, 2003-2004 , p. 377-378 Document 4: Telegrama cifrat , Roshchin ctre Stalin , 14 octombrie 1950

n completarea telegramei nr. 2406 , Mao Zedong a afirmat: Tovarii notri consider c dac trupele americane nainteaz spre grania Chinei, atunci Coreea va deveni o pat neagr pentru noi i nord-estul (Chinei n. a.) se va afla sub o constant ameninare. Ezitrile anterioare ale tovarilor notri s-au produs datorit faptului c problemele legate de situaia internaional, problemele legate de asistena sovietic pentru noi i problemele legate de acoperirea aerian, nu erau clare pentru ei. n prezent toate aceste probleme au fost clarificate. Mao Zedong a subliniat faptul c acum este avantajos pentru ei s trimit trupe chineze n Coreea. Chinezii au obligaia absolut de a trimite trupe n Coreea. n acest moment ei trimit primul ealon compus din nou divizii. Dei sunt slab narmate, ele vor fi capabile s lupte mpotriva trupelor lui Syngman Rhee. ntre timp tovarii chinezi vor trebui s pregteasc al doilea ealon. Principalul lucru de care noi avem nevoie, spune Mao Zedong, este fora aerian, care ne va asigura acoperirea aerian. Noi sperm s soseasc ct mai curnd posibil , dar nu mai trziu de dou luni. n plus, Tovarul Mao Zedong a subliniat faptul c n prezent guvernul Republicii Populare China nu poate plti cu bani ghea armament livrat. Ei sper s primeasc arme pe credit. Astfel bugetul pe 1951 nu va fi afectat i va fi mai uor pentru ei s eplice aceasta democrailor. n concluzie, Mao Zedong a afirmat faptul c tovarii din Comitetul Central al Partidului Comunist Chinez cred n necesitatea asistenei chineze a tovarilor coreeni, n

dificila lor lupt. Pentru a discuta aceast problem, Zhou Enlai va trebui s se ntlneasc cu tovarul Filippov din nou. ROSHCHIN Nr. 2408 13.10.50

SURSA: Document 19:

Ciphered Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov ( Stalin ), 14

October 1950 , re Meeting with Mao Zedong n Cold War International History Project Bulletin , ... nr. 6-7, 1995-1996, p. 118-119

Document 5: Scrisoare , Kennedy ctre Hruciov , 22 octombrie 1962 Dear Mr. Chairman: A copy of the statement I am making tonight concerning developments in Cuba and the reaction of my Government thereto has been handed to your Ambassador in Washington.(1) In view of the gravity of the developments to which I refer, I want you to know immediately and accurately the position of my Government in this matter. In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the one thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility that your Government would not correctly understand the will and determination of the United States in any given situation, since I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor. At our meeting in Vienna and subsequently, I expressed our readiness and desire to find, through peaceful negotiation, a solution to any and all problems that divide us. At the same time, I made clear that in view of the objectives of the ideology to which you adhere, the United States could not tolerate any action on your part which in a major way disturbed the existing over-all balance of power in the world. I stated that an attempt to

force abandonment of our responsibilities and commitments in Berlin would constitute such an action and that the United States would resist with all the power at its command. It was in order to avoid any incorrect assessment on the part of your Government with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took place, the United States would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies. Moreover, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing its support of this declared policy.(2) Despite this, the rapid development of long-range missile bases and other offensive weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. I must tell you that the United States is determined that this threat to the security of this hemisphere be removed. At the same time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any misjudgment on your part. I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiation. Sincerely, JFK(3) SURSA: Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, Washington, October 22, 1962, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba044.htm , 12.01.2007 Document 6: Scrisoare , Hruciov ctre Kennedy , 24 octombrie 1962

Dear Mr. President: I have received your letter of October 23,(1) have studied it, and am answering you. Just imagine, Mr. President, that we had presented you with the conditions of an ultimatum which you have presented us by your action. How would you have reacted to

this? I think that you would have been indignant at such a step on our part. And this would have been understandable to us. In presenting us with these conditions, you, Mr. President, have flung a challenge at us. Who asked you to do this? By what right did you do this? Our ties with the Republic of Cuba, like our relations with other states, regardless of what kind of states they may be, concern only the two countries between which these relations exist. And if we now speak of the quarantine to which your letter refers, a quarantine may be established, according to accepted international practice, only by agreement of states between themselves, and not by some third party. Quarantines exist, for example, on agricultural goods and products. But in this case the question is in no way one of quarantine, but rather of far more serious things, and you yourself understand this. You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather are setting forth an ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force. Consider what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What would it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean guiding oneself in one's relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness. You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us. No, Mr. President, I cannot agree to this, and I think that in your own heart you recognize that I am correct. I am convinced that in my place you would act the same way. Reference to the decision of the Organization of American States cannot in any way substantiate the demands now advanced by the United States. This Organization has absolutely no authority or basis for adopting decisions such as the one you speak of in your letter. Therefore, we do not recognize these decisions. International law exists and universally recognized norms of conduct exist. We firmly adhere to the principles of international law and observe strictly the norms which regulate navigation on the high seas, in international waters. We observe these norms and enjoy the rights recognized by all states. You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that every sovereign state enjoys, you are trying to legislate in questions of international law, and you are violating the universally accepted norms of that law. And you are doing all this not only out of hatred for the Cuban people and its government, but also because of considerations of the

election campaign in the United States. What morality, what law can justify such an approach by the American Government to international affairs? No such morality or law can be found, because the actions of the United States with regard to Cuba constitute outright banditry or, if you like, the folly of degenerate imperialism. Unfortunately, such folly can bring grave suffering to the peoples of all countries, and to no lesser degree to the American people themselves, since the United States has completely lost its former isolation with the advent of modern types of armament. Therefore, Mr. President, if you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the United States. When you confront us with such conditions, try to put yourself in our place and consider how the United States would react to these conditions. I do not doubt that if someone attempted to dictate similar conditions to you-the United States--you would reject such an attempt. And we also say--no. The Soviet Government considers that the violation of the freedom to use international waters and international air space is an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war. Therefore, the Soviet Government cannot instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the orders of American naval forces blockading that Island. Our instructions to Soviet mariners are to observe strictly the universally accepted norms of navigation in international waters and not to retreat one step from them. And if the American side violates these rules, it must realize what responsibility will rest upon it in that case. Naturally we will not simply be bystanders with regard to piratical acts by American ships on the high seas. We will then be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary and adequate in order to protect our rights. We have everything necessary to do so. Respectfully, N. Khrushchev(2) SURSA: Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy , Moscow, October 24, 1962, 12.01.2007 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba061.htm ,

Document 7: Mesaj , Hruciov ctre Kennedy , 27 octombrie , 1962 DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I have studied with great satisfaction your reply to Mr. Thant(1) concerning measures that should be taken to avoid contact between our vessels and thereby avoid irreparable and fatal consequences. This reasonable step on your part strengthens my belief that you are showing concern for the preservation of peace, which I note with satisfaction. Council of Ministers, are concerned solely with having our country develop and occupy a worthy place among all peoples of the world in economic competition, in the development of culture and the arts, and in raising the living standard of the people. This is the most noble and necessary field for competition, and both the victor and the vanquished will derive only benefit from it, because it means peace and an increase in the means by which man lives and finds enjoyment. In your statement you expressed the opinion that the main aim was not simply to come to an agreement and take measures to prevent contact between our vessels and consequently a deepening of the crisis which could, as a result of such contacts, spark a military conflict, after which all negotiations would be superfluous because other forces and other laws would then come into play--the laws of war. I agree with you that this is only the first step. The main thing that must be done is to normalize and stabilize the state of peace among states and among peoples. I understand your concern for the security of the United States, Mr. President, because this is the primary duty of a President. But we too are disturbed about these same questions; I bear these same obligations as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. You have been alarmed by the fact that we have aided Cuba with weapons, in order to strengthen its defense capability--precisely defense capability--because whatever weapons it may possess, Cuba cannot be equated with you since the difference in magnitude is so great, particularly in view of modern means of destruction. Our aim has been and is to help Cuba, and no one can dispute the humanity of our motives, which are oriented toward enabling Cuba to live peacefully and develop in the way its people desire.

You wish to ensure the security of your country, and this is understandable. But Cuba, too, wants the same thing; all countries want to maintain their security. But how are we, the Soviet Union, our Government, to assess your actions which are expressed in the fact that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases; surrounded our allies with military bases; placed military bases literally around our country; and stationed your missile armaments there? This is no secret. Responsible American personages openly declare that it is so. Your missiles are located in Britain, are located in Italy, and are aimed against us. Your missiles are located in Turkey. You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us; our sentries patrol back and forth and see each other. Do you consider, then, that you have the right to demand security for your own country and the removal of the weapons you call offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? You have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. How then can recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such unequal relations between our great states? This is irreconcilable. It is good, Mr. President, that you have agreed to have our represent-atives meet and begin talks, apparently through the mediation of U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations. Consequently, he to some degree has assumed the role of a mediator and we consider that he will be able to cope with this responsible mission, provided, of course, that each party drawn into this controversy displays good will. I think it would be possible to end the controversy quickly and normalize the situation, and then the people could breathe more easily, considering that statesmen charged with responsibility are of sober mind and have an awareness of their responsibility combined with the ability to solve complex questions and not bring things to a military catastrophe. I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach agreement as to the period of time needed by you and by us to bring this about. And, after that, persons entrusted by the

United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made. Of course, the permission of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey is necessary for the entry into those countries of these representatives and for the inspection of the fulfillment of the pledge made by each side. Of course it would be best if these representatives enjoyed the confidence of the Security Council, as well as yours and mine--both the United States and the Soviet Union--and also that of Turkey and Cuba. I do not think it would be difficult to select people who would enjoy the trust and respect of all parties concerned. We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidence in their security, will make a statement within the framework of the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it would also restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey's other neighboring states. The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework of the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the inviolability of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Cuba itself or make its territory available as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and will also restrain those who might contemplate committing aggression against Cuba, either from the territory of the United States or from the territory of Cuba's other neighboring states. Of course, for this we would have to come to an agreement with you and specify a certain time limit. Let us agree to some period of time, but without unnecessary delay-say within two or three weeks, not longer than a month. The means situated in Cuba, of which you speak and which disturb you, as you have stated, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore, any accidental use of them to the detriment of the United States is excluded. These means are situated in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government and are only for defense purposes. Therefore, if there is no invasion of Cuba, or attack on the Soviet Union or any of our other allies, then of

course these means are not and will not be a threat to anyone. For they are not for purposes of attack. If you are agreeable to my proposal, Mr. President, then we would send our representatives to New York, to the United Nations, and would give them comprehensive instructions in order that an agreement may be reached more quickly. If you also select your people and give them the corresponding instructions, then this question can be quickly resolved. Why would I like to do this? Because the whole world is now apprehensive and expects sensible actions of us. The greatest joy for all peoples would be the announcement of our agreement and of the eradication of the controversy that has arisen. I attach great importance to this agreement in so far as it could serve as a good beginning and could in particular make it easier to reach agreement on banning nuclear weapons tests. The question of the tests could be solved in parallel fashion, without connecting one with the other, because these are different issues. However, it is important that agreement be reached on both these issues so as to present humanity with a fine gift, and also to gladden it with the news that agreement has been reached on the cessation of nuclear tests and that consequently the atmosphere will no longer be poisoned. Our position and yours on this issue are very close together. All of this could possibly serve as a good impetus toward the finding of mutually acceptable agreements on other controversial issues on which you and I have been exchanging views. These views have so far not been resolved, but they are awaiting urgent solution, which would clear up the international atmosphere. We are prepared for this. These are my proposals, Mr. President. Respectfully yours, N. Khrushchev(2) SURSA: Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy , Moscow, October 27, 1962, 12.01.2007 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba091.htm ,

Document 8: Mesaj , Departamentul de Stat al SUA ctre Ambasada din URSS , 27 octombrie 1962 1015. Following message from President to Khrushchev should be delivered as soon as possible to highest available Soviet official. Text has been handed Soviet Embassy in Washington and has been released to press: "Dear Mr. Chairman: I have read your letter of October 26(1) with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements. Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this week and--in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative--an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals--which seem generally acceptable as I understand them--are as follows: 1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba. 2. We, on our part, would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise. If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments", as proposed in your second letter which you made public.(2) I would like to say again that

the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals. But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26. /s/ John F. Kennedy" Rusk SURSA: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union , Washington, October 27, 1962, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba095.htm , 12.01.2007 Document 9: Mesaj , Hruciov ctre Kennedy , 28 octombrie 1962

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of October 27.(1) I express my satisfaction and thank you for the sense of proportion you have displayed and for realization of the responsibility which now devolves on you for the preservation of the peace of the world. I regard with great understanding your concern and the concern of the United States people in connection with the fact that the weapons you describe as offensive are formidable weapons indeed. Both you and we understand what kind of weapons these are. In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give an assurance to all people who crave peace, and to reassure the American people, who, I am certain, also want peace, as do the people of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further

work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union. Mr. President, I should like to repeat what I had already written to you in my earlier messages--that the Soviet Government has given economic assistance to the Republic of Cuba, as well as arms, because Cuba and the Cuban people were constantly under the continuous threat of an invasion of Cuba. A piratic vessel had shelled Havana. They say that this shelling was done by irresponsible Cuban emigres. Perhaps so, however, the question is from where did they shoot. It is a fact that these Cubans have no territory, they are fugitives from their country, and they have no means to conduct military operations. This means that someone put into their hands these weapons for shelling Havana and for piracy in the Caribbean in Cuban territorial waters. It is impossible in our time not to notice a piratic ship, considering the concentration in the Caribbean of American ships from which everything can be seen and observed. In these conditions, pirate ships freely roam around and shell Cuba and make piratic attacks on peaceful cargo ships. It is known that they even shelled a British cargo ship. In a word, Cuba was under the continuous threat of aggressive forces, which did not conceal their intention to invade its territory. The Cuban people want to build their life in their own interests without external interference. This is their right, and they cannot be blamed for wanting to be masters of their own country and disposing of the fruits of their own labor. The threat of invasion of Cuba and all other schemes for creating tension over Cuba are designed to strike the Cuban people with a sense of insecurity, intimidate them, and prevent them from peacefully building their new life. Mr. President, I should like to say clearly once more that we could not remain indifferent to this. The Soviet Government decided to render assistance to Cuba with the means of defense against aggression--only with means for defense purposes. We have supplied the defense means which you describe as offensive means. We have supplied them to prevent an attack on Cuba--to prevent rash acts. I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the

United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear. It is for this reason that we instructed our officers--these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers--to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27,(2) we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means. Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict. I note with satisfaction that you have responded to the desire I expressed with regard to elimination of the aforementioned dangerous situation, as well as with regard to providing conditions for a more thoughtful appraisal of the international situation, fraught as it is with great dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocketry, spaceships, global rockets, and other deadly weapons. All people are interested in insuring peace. Therefore, vested with trust and great responsibility, we must not allow the situation to become aggravated and must stamp out the centers where a dangerous situation fraught with grave consequences to the cause of peace has arisen. If we, together with you, and with the assist-ance of other people of good will, succeed in eliminating this tense atmosphere, we should also make certain that no other dangerous conflicts which could lead to a world nuclear catastrophe would arise. In conclusion, I should like to say something about a detente between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries that you have mentioned. We have spoken about this long since and are prepared to continue to exchange views on this question with you and to find a reasonable solution. We should like to continue the exchange of views on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament, and other problems relating to the relaxation of international tension. Although I trust your statement, Mr. President, there are irresponsible people who would like to invade Cuba now and thus touch off a war. If we do take practical steps and

proclaim the dismantling and evacuation of the means in question from Cuba, in so doing we, at the same time, want the Cuban people to be certain that we are with them and are not absolving ourselves of responsibility for rendering assistance to the Cuban people. We are confident that the people of all countries, like you, Mr. President, will understand me correctly. We are not threatening. We want nothing but peace. Our country is now on the upsurge. Our people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful labor. They have achieved tremendous successes since the October Revolution, and created the greatest material, spiritual, and cultural values. Our people are enjoying these values; they want to continue developing their achievements and insure their further development on the way of peace and social progress by their persistent labor. I should like to remind you, Mr. President, that military reconnaissance planes have violated the borders of the Soviet Union. In connection with this there have been conflicts between us and notes exchanged. In 1960 we shot down your U-2 plane, whose reconnaissance flight over the USSR wrecked the summit meeting in Paris. At that time, you took a correct position and denounced that criminal act of the former U.S. Administration. But during your term of office as President another violation of our border has occurred, by an American U-2 plane in the Sakhalin area. We wrote you about that violation on 30 August. At that time you replied that that violation had occurred as a result of poor weather, and gave assurances that this would not be repeated. We trusted your assurances, because the weather was indeed poor in that area at that time. But had not your planes been ordered to fly about our territory, even poor weather could not have brought an American plane into our airspace. Hence, the conclusion that this is being done with the knowledge of the Pentagon, which tramples on international norms and violates the borders of other states. A still more dangerous case occurred on 28 October, when one of your reconnasissance planes intruded over Soviet borders in the Chukotka Peninsula area in the north and flew over our territory. The question is, Mr. President: How should we regard this? What is this: A provocation? One of your planes violates our frontier during this anxious time we are both experiencing, when everything has been put into combat

readiness. Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step? And all the more so since the U.S. Government and Pentagon long ago declared that you are maintaining a continuous nuclear bomber patrol. Therefore, you can imagine the responsibility you are assuming, especially now, when we are living through such anxious times. I should like to express the following wish; it concerns the Cuban people. You do not have diplomatic relations. But through my officers in Cuba, I have reports that American planes are making flights over Cuba. We are interested that there should be no war in the world, and that the Cuban people should live in peace. And besides, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have our people in Cuba. Under such a treaty with the Cuban Government we have sent there officers, instructors, mostly plain people: specialists, agronomists, zoo technicians, irrigators, land reclamation specialists, plain workers, tractor drivers, and others. We are concerned about them. I should like you to consider, Mr. President, that violation of Cuban airspace by American planes could also lead to dangerous consequences. And if you do not want this to happen, it would be better if no cause is given for a dangerous situation to arise. We must be careful now and refrain from any steps which would not be useful to the defense of the states involved in the conflict, which could only cause irritation and even serve as a provocation for a fateful step. Therefore, we must display sanity, reason, and refrain from such steps. We value peace perhaps even more than other peoples because we went through a terrible war with Hitler. But our people will not falter in the face of any test. Our people trust their Government, and we assure our people and world public opinion that the Soviet Government will not allow itself to be provoked. But if the provocateurs unleash a war, they will not evade responsibility and the grave consequences a war would bring upon them. But we are confident that reason will triumph, that war will not be unleashed and peace and the security of the peoples will be insured. In connection with the current negotiations between Acting Secretary General U Thant and representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Republic of Cuba, the

Soviet Government has sent First Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation. Respectfully yours, N. Khrushchev(3) SURSA: Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy , Moscow, October 28, 1962 , 12.01.2007 Document 10: NSC-68 (excerpt) http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba102.htm ,

I. Background of the Present Crisis () Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced two global wars of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions--the Russian and the Chinese-of extreme scope and intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five empires--the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian, and Japanese--and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the span of one generation, the international distribution of power has been fundamentally altered. For several centuries it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater strength. The international scene was marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states was maintained, over which no state was able to achieve hegemony. Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historic distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, anti-thetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet

Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war. On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand, any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. It is in this context that this Republic and its citizens in the ascendancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril. The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. They are issues which will not await our deliberations. With conscience and resolution this Government and the people it represents must now take new and fateful decisions. II. Fundamental Purpose of the United States The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution: ". . . to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual. Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as in the Declaration of Independence, "with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."

III. Fundamental Design of the Kremlin The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control. In the minds of the Soviet leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority. The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the nonSoviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design. IV. The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of ideas and Values between the U.S. Purpose and the Kremlin Design A. NATURE OF CONFLICT The Kremlin regards the United States as the only major threat to the conflict between idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin, which has come to a crisis with the polarization of power described in Section I, and the exclusive possession of atomic weapons by the two protagonists. The idea of freedom, moreover, is peculiarly and intolerably subversive of the idea of slavery. But the converse is not true. The implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which gives the present polarization of power the quality of crisis. The free society values the individual as an end in himself, requiring of him only that measure of self-discipline and self-restraint which make the rights of each individual compatible with the rights of every other individual. The freedom of the individual has as

its counterpart, therefore, the negative responsibility of the individual not to exercise his freedom in ways inconsistent with the freedom of other individuals and the positive responsibility to make constructive use of his freedom in the building of a just society. From this idea of freedom with responsibility derives the marvelous diversity, the deep tolerance, the lawfulness of the free society. This is the explanation of the strength of free men. It constitutes the integrity and the vitality of a free and democratic system. The free society attempts to create and maintain an environment in which every individual has the opportunity to realize his creative powers. It also explains why the free society tolerates those within it who would use their freedom to destroy it. By the same token, in relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society is on the strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all societies into conformity with it. For the free society does not fear, it welcomes, diversity. It derives its strength from its hospitality even to antipathetic ideas. It is a market for free trade in ideas, secure in its faith that free men will take the best wares, and grow to a fuller and better realization of their powers in exercising their choice. The idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than the idea of submission to authority. For the breadth of freedom cannot be tolerated in a society which has come under the domination of an individual or group of individuals with a will to absolute power. Where the despot holds absolute power--the absolute power of the absolutely powerful will--all other wills must be subjugated in an act of willing submission, a degradation willed by the individual upon himself under the compulsion of a perverted faith. It is the first article of this faith that he finds and can only find the meaning of his existence in serving the ends of the system. The system becomes God, and submission to the will of God becomes submission to the will of the system. It is not enough to yield outwardly to the system--even Gandhian non-violence is not acceptable-for the spirit of resistance and the devotion to a higher authority might then remain, and the individual would not be wholly submissive. The same compulsion which demands total power over all men within the Soviet state without a single exception, demands total power over all Communist Parties and all states under Soviet domination. Thus Stalin has said that the theory and tactics of

Leninism as expounded by the Bolshevik party are mandatory for the proletarian parties of all countries. A true internationalist is defined as one who unhesitatingly upholds the position of the Soviet Union and in the satellite states true patriotism is love of the Soviet Union. By the same token the "peace policy" of the Soviet Union, described at a Party Congress as "a more advantageous form of fighting capitalism," is a device to divide and immobilize the non-Communist world, and the peace the Soviet Union seeks is the peace of total conformity to Soviet policy. The antipathy of slavery to freedom explains the iron curtain, the isolation, the autarchy of the society whose end is absolute power. The existence and persistence of the idea of freedom is a permanent and continuous threat to the foundation of the slave society; and it therefore regards as intolerable the long continued existence of freedom in the world. What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which now inescapably confronts the slave society with the free. The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere. The shock we sustained in the destruction of Czechoslovakia was not in the measure of Czechoslovakia's material importance to us. In a material sense, her capabilities were already at Soviet disposal. But when the integrity of Czechoslovak institutions was destroyed, it was in the intangible scale of values that we registered a loss more damaging than the material loss we had already suffered. Thus unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully and powerfully evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power. B. OBJECTIVES The objectives of a free society are determined by its fundamental values and by the necessity for maintaining the material environment in which they flourish. Logically and in fact, therefore, the Kremlin's challenge to the United States is directed not only to our

values but to our physical capacity to protect their environment. It is a challenge which encompasses both peace and war and our objectives in peace and war must take account of it. 1. Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way in which we affirm our values in the conduct of our national life, and in the development of our military and economic strength. 2. We must lead in building a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world. It is only by practical affirmation, abroad as well as at home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our own integrity, in which lies the real frustration of the Kremlin design. 3. But beyond thus affirming our values our policy and actions must be such as to foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, a change toward which the frustration of the design is the first and perhaps the most important step. Clearly it will not only be less costly but more effective if this change occurs to a maximum extent as a result of internal forces in Soviet society. In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership. It demands that we make the attempt, and accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy. We should limit our requirement of the Soviet Union to its participation with other nations on the basis of equality and respect for the rights of others. Subject to this requirement, we must with our allies and the former subject peoples seek to create a world society based on the principle of consent. Its framework cannot be inflexible. It will consist of many national communities of great and varying abilities and resources, and hence of war potential. The seeds of conflicts will inevitably exist or will come into being. To acknowledge this is only to acknowledge the impossibility of a final solution. Not to acknowledge it can be fatally dangerous in a world in which there are no final solutions. All these objectives of a free society are equally valid and necessary in peace and war. But every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national

security demands that we seek to achieve them by the strategy of the cold war. It is only by developing the moral and material strength of the free world that the Soviet regime will become convinced of the falsity of its assumptions and that the pre-conditions for workable agreements can be created. By practically demonstrating the integrity and vitality of our system the free world widens the area of possible agreement and thus can hope gradually to bring about a Soviet acknowledgement of realities which in sum will eventually constitute a frustration of the Soviet design. Short of this, however, it might be possible to create a situation which will induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself, with or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence on tolerable terms with the non-Soviet world. Such a development would be a triumph for the idea of freedom and democracy. It must be an immediate objective of United States policy. There is no reason, in the event of war, for us to alter our overall objectives. They do not include unconditional surrender, the subjugation of the Russian peoples or a Russia shorn of its economic potential. Such a course would irrevocably unite the Russian people behind the regime which enslaves them. Rather these objectives contemplate Soviet acceptance of the specific and limited conditions requisite to an international environment in which free institutions can flourish, and in which the Russian peoples will have a new chance to work out their own destiny. If we can make the Russian people our allies in the enterprise we will obviously have made our task easier and victory more certain. The objectives outlined in NSC 20/4 (November 23, 1948) ... are fully consistent with the objectives stated in this paper, and they remain valid. The growing intensity of the conflict which has been imposed upon us, however, requires the changes of emphasis and the additions that are apparent. Coupled with the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union, the intensifying struggle requires us to face the fact that we can expect no lasting abatement of the crisis unless and until a change occurs in the nature of the Soviet system. () SURSA: NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950,http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-1.htm , 18.02.2007

Seminar nr. 11
1962-1975: De la criza rachetelor din Cuba la Actul final de la Helsinki. Instituionalizarea destinderii

I Tentativele de limitare a folosirii i experimentrii armamentului nuclear: SALT I i II

5 august 1963 semnarea Tratatului de Interzicere a Experienelor Nucleare de ctre SUA , URSS i Mare Britanie. Tratatul stipula acordul prilor semnatare de a renuna la experimentarea armelor nucleare n atmosfer , n spaiul cosmic i sub ap. Tratatul n cauz este cunoscut i sub denumirea de Tratatul Limitat de Interzicere a Experimentelor Nucleare , deoarece nu coninea nici o prevedere privind experimentele subterane 1 iulie 1968 semnarea Tratatului de Neproliferare Nuclear de ctre SUA , URSS i Mare Britanie. Tratatul cerea prilor semnatare s se abin de la facilitarea dobndirii acestor arme de ctre alte ri. mai 1972 la Moscova , Richard Nixon i Alexei Kosghin semneaz SALT I. Tratatul cuprinde dou pri : un acord , pe 5 ani , care limiteaz numrul rampelor de lansare a rachetelor balistice la numrul celor care existau sau erau n construcie la data ncheierii acordului (nr. rachetelor balistice intercontinentale : URSS 2 358 ICBMs , SUA 1 710 ICBMs ; rachete ce pot fi lansate de pe submarin : URSS 62 SLBMs , SUA 44 SLBMs). Neajuns se fixeaz o limit

pentru numrul proiectilelor , nu ns , i pentru ogivele nucleare pe care fiecare proiectil poate s le duc. a doua parte a tratatului se refer la proiectilele antibalistice (ABMs - acestea au menirea de a distruge proiectilele inamice , nainte ca acestea s-i ating inta). Acordul , ncheiat pe o perioad nelimitat , reduce numrul acestora la o poziie unic de 100 de proiectile. Invazia sovietic din Afganistan a determinat Congresul SUA s nu ratifice acest tratat. iunie 1979 la Viena , Jimmy Carter i Leonid Brejnev semneaz SALT II. Prezentul tratat , prevede limita de 2 250 de proiectile pentru fiecare putere i aduce limitri serioase n privina numrului de ogive nucleare transportate.

II Crize periferice i de sistem: rolul Chinei n confruntarea celor dou puteri, SUA i URSS, conflictele din Orientul Apropiat i crizele energiei (1973, 1978), rzboiul din Vietnam

A. Rolul Chinei n confruntarea celor dou puteri, SUA i URSS 1) Ruptura chino-sovietic : februarie 1956 Congresul al XX-lea al PCUS i discursul secret al lui Nikita Hruciov noiembrie 1957 Consftuirea partidelor comuniste de la Moscova 31 iulie 3 august 1958 ntlnirile oficiale dintre Mao Zedong i Nikita Hruciov (Beijing)

 impactul atacului chinez asupra insulelor Quemoy i Matsu asupra relaiilor chino-sovietice 2 octombrie 1959 ntlnirea dintre Nikita Hruciov i Mao Zedong (Beijing) 18 iulie 1960 retragerea experilor sovietici din China 2 martie , 15 martie 1969 incidentele militare sinosovietice de pe insula Damansky ( Zhenbao ) 2) Apropierea chino-american : martie 1971 SUA ridic restricia la paapoarte cetenilor americani care doresc s cltoreasc n China 6 aprilie 1971 - Diplomaia ping-pong-ului 10 iunie 1971 SUA ridic , dup 22 de ani , embargoul privind comerul cu Republica Popular China 9-10 iulie 1971 cltoria secret n China efectuat de Kissinger 25 noiembrie 1971 discursul lui Huang Hua , discurs petrecut dup primirea Republicii Populare China n ONU 21-28 februarie 1972 vizita preedintelui Nixon n Republica Popular China De ilustrat ntr-o manier detaliat , evenimentele mai sus enunate

B. Conflictele din Orientul Apropiat i crizele energiei (1973, 1978) 1) Rzboiul de 6 zile (1967) 1967 Abdel Gamal Nasser reuete s obin din partea ONU retragerea ctilor albastre 22 mai 1967 Egiptul refuz accesul navelor sub pavilion israelian n Golful Aquaba

30 mai 1967 Egiptul i Iordania ncheie un tratat de aprare mutual 5 iunie Israelul lanseaz un atac preventiv asupra vecinilor si arabi. Victoria Israelului este total (340 de avioane egiptene sunt distruse, majoritatea la sol). Israelul ocup teritoriul Gaza

7 iunie 1967 israelienii cuceresc nlimile Golan , Cisiordania i Ierusalimul. Tot acum guvernul israelian se declar dispus a nceta focul ncetarea focului , fr nici un fel de condiie, este acceptat de Iordania la 7 iunie , de Egipt la 8 iunie , i de Siria la 10 iunie 22 noiembrie 1967 Consiliul de Securitate adopt rezoluia 242 , a crei formulare ambigu ( retragerea israelian din toate teritoriile sau numai din unele ) ascunde smburii rzboiului de Yom Kippur

De relevat poziiile SUA i URSS vis-a-vis de aceast criz 2) Rzboiul de Yom Kippur (1973) 6 octombrie 1973 Ziua Marii Iertri Evreieti ( Yom Kippur ) egiptenii atac Peninsula Sinai i nlimile Golan egiptenii reuesc s foreze trecerea Canalului Suez , sirienii recuceresc o partea Podiului Golan 12 octombrie 1973 armata israelian organizeaz cu succes o contraofensiv 22 octombrie 1973 Consiliul de Securitate adopt rezoluia 338 ( ncetarea focului n 12 ore ) i cere aplicarea rezoluiei 242 23 octombrie 1973 armata israelian reia operaiunile militare 26 octombrie 1973 Consiliul de Securitate adopt rezoluia 339 i hotrte organizarea unei fore de urgen. De relevat poziiile SUA i URSS vis-a-vis de aceast criz precum i principalele prevederi ale acordului de la Camp David (17 septembrie 1978), dintre Anwar as Sadat i Menahem Begin

3) Prima criza energetic (1973) 6 octombrie 1973 declanarea Rzboiului de Yom Kippur 14 octombrie 1973 SUA organizeaz un pod aerian pentru a aproviziona armata israelian cu material de rzboi , ceea ce provoac o reacie dur din partea rilor arabe 16 octombrie 1973 OPEC decide creterea preului petrolului. 19 octombrie 1973 OPEC decide instituirea unui embargo asupra exportului de petrol n SUA ( preul benzinei crete de la 3$ barilul la 11.65$ n numai trei luni ) 23-28 octombrie 1973 embargo-ul este extins i asupra Olandei, urmat la 23 noiembrie de Portugalia i Africa de Sud 27 noiembrie 1973 Richard Nixon semneaz Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act ( viza preul i producia de iei ) 17 martie 1974 OPEC renun la embargo ( excepie face Libia)

4) A doua criz energetic (1978-1979) decembrie 1978 violenele radicale din Iran determin oprirea exportului de petrol 16 ianuarie 1979 ahul Iranului este constrns s ia calea exilului 1 februarie 1979 ayatolahul Khomeiny instaleaz o Republic islamic sub noul regim , exporturile de petrol sunt reluate , ns ntr-o cantitate mult mai mic dect anterior determin creterea preului ieiului 1980 Saddam Hussein invadeaz Iranul exporturile de petrol ale Iranului sunt oprite , iar cele ale Irakului sunt reduse cu 70% - provoac creterea preului ieiului

5) Rzboiul din Vietnam Administraia Truman - n timpul celui de al doilea rzboi mondial, rezistena mpotriva ocupaiei japoneze a fost condus de Vietminh (Liga vietnamez pentru independen ) care a czut sub influena comunitilor condui de Ho i Min - la sfritul rzboiului Vietminhul controla nordul Vietnamului, iar n septembrie 1945 Ho i Min a proclamat nfiinarea Republicii Democratice Vietnam, cu capitala la Hanoi, recunoscut de Frana n 1946 - la sfritul anului 1946, Ho i Min s-a opus eforturilor franceze de a pune bazele unui alt regim n sud Administraia Einsenhower - n 1954 fore masive franceze sunt trimise la Dien Bien Phu n nord-vestul Vietnamului, lng grania cu Laos, pentru a atrage gherila Vietminh n cmp deschis i a o distruge, ns lipsii de ajutorul american, francezii sunt ncercuii i asediai, iar Dien Bien Phu cade - n iulie 1954 se ncheie acordurile de la Geneva, prin care se urmreau normalizarea situaiei din Vietnam - n 1956, guvernul Vietnamului de Sud refuz s respecte prevederile Acordurile de la Geneva i n acest context, forele de gheril ale Vietcongului declaneaz o serie de atacuri mpotriva regimului Administraia Kennedy - Vietcongul este aprovizionat de Nord, prin Laos, prin calea Ho i Min - preedintele Kennedy trimite doar consilieri militari - n 1963, Diem, primul ministru sud vietnamez este nlturat printr-o lovitur de stat, ceea ce a inaugurat o perioad de instabilitate politic se declaneaz rzboiul din Indochina

Administraia Jonhson - la 7 august 1954 rezoluia asupra Golfului Tonkin este votat de Congres - n februarie 1965 Vietcong a ucis i rnit ceteni americani preedintele american Jonhson ordon operaiunea Rolling Thunder (bombardarea asupra Vietnamului de Nord pentru a opri aprovizionarea Vietcong) - n martie 1965 primele uniti sunt trimise sub pretextul aprrii aerodromurilor americane - 31 ianuarie 1968, nerespectnd armistiiul ncheiat pentru srbtori, forele Vietcong i Nordul declaneaz un atac surpriz mpotriva Sudului, aa numita ofensiva Tet contraatac american i al forelor Vietnamului de Sud, ncheiat fr un rezultat clar, de fapt o victorie psihologic pentru Hanoi ncetarea bombardamentelor Administraia Nixon - o nou strategia care viza trei direcii de aciune: a) convorbiri la Paris - ajung ntr-un impas datorit poziiilor ireconciliabile ale celor dou pri: americanii doreau retragerea forelor Vietnamului de Nord i a Vietcongului din Sud, meninerea regimului sprijinit de ei, n timp ce nord vietnamezii i Vietcongul doreau meninerea unei prezene militare i reunificarea Vietnamului sub conducerea unui guvern comunist b) vietnamizarea conflictului: reducerea implicrii directe americane prin scderea numrului de soldai americani i transferarea operaiunilor militare ctre unitile vietnameze, nsoit de un sprijin american pentru instruirea i echiparea acestora c) extinderea rzboiului asupra Cambodgiei, aa numita operaiune Menu (bombardarea ncepnd cu martie 1969 a bazelor comuniste din Cambodgia) - dificulti interne generate de o serie de scandalurile legate de operaiunile militare americane n Vietnam (masacrul de la My Lai , incursiunea din Cambodgia din 1970, adevrul despre evenimentele din Portul Tokin )

- n decembrie 1972, convorbirile de la Paris s-au ntrerupt americanii declaneaz aa numitele bombardamente de Crciun - 27 ianuarie 1973 semnarea unui acord prin care nord vietnamezii obineau ceea ce ceruser anterior, n timpul negocierilor, iar sud- vietnamezii acceptau doar datorit promisiunii Statelor Unite c vor interveni dac acordul este nclcat - la sfritul lui martie 1973, unitile americane au prsit Vietnamul - martie 1975, Vietnamul de Nord declaneaz ofensiva mpotriva Sudului; cererea de ajutor a Vietnamului de Sud este ignorat de Congresul american

III Criza cehoslovac i suveranitatea limitat n blocul estic

A. cauze: - eforturile reformitilor de la Praga de a oferi un model de socialism radical diferit de cel sovietic - lipsa de legitimitate a elitelor conductoare, asociate cu modelul anacronic stalinist conflict ntre ramura slovac i cea ceh a partidului comunist ascuirea luptei politice de la vrful conducerii partidului ianuarie 1968, Novotny este nlocuit de ctre Alexander Dubcek, n fruntea partidului comunist, iar n martie 1968, demisioneaz din funcia de preedinte al Republicii, lsndu-i locul generalului Ludvik Svoboda B. desfurarea evenimentelor: - Dubcek a ncercat o modernizare a sistemului socialist aprilie 1968 este adoptat de ctre Comitetul Central al partidului comunist documentul intitulat Programul de aciune - au avut loc masive reabilitri politice i ale victimelor represiunii staliniste

- 23 martie 1968 ntlnirea de la Dresda a statelor participante la Tratatul de la Varovia condamnarea micrii reformiste cehoslovace - 27 iunie 1968 este publicat Manifestul celor 2000 de cuvinte - iulie 1968 o nou ntlnire a statelor participante la Tratatul de la Varovia, fr Romnia i Cehoslovacia s-a ncheiat cu remiterea unei scrisorii deschise amenintoare adresat liderilor cehoslovaci - o nou ntlnire a statelor participante la Tratatul de la Varovia la Bratislava ncercarea sovietic de a-l nltura pe Dubcek, care eueaz - 21 august 1968 a avut loc invazia Cehoslovaciei de ctre trupele Tratatului de la Varovia consecine: impunerea unui guvern pro sovietic Dubcek, ali lideri cehoslovaci au fost luai ostateci i transportai la o unitate militar din URSS desfurarea tratativelor de la Moscova - aprilie 1968 Husak l nlocuiete pe Dubcek - 13 noiembrie 1968 discursul lui Brejnev doctrina suveranitii limitate

IV De la Ostpolitik la Actul final de la Helsinki

- n 1969, social democratul Willy Brandt pune capt doctrinei Hallstein (ruperea relaiilor diplomatice cu toate rile care au recunoscut R.D.G.) - Willy Brandt iniiaz o politic de deschidere spre Est (Ostpolitik), care se va materializa prin ncheierea urmtoarelor acorduri: a) august 1970 tratatul germano rus b) decembrie 1970 tratatul germano rus c) septembrie 1971 tratatul cvatripartit cu privire la Berlin d) decembrie 1972 tratatul fundamental dintre cele dou state germane, R.D.G. i R.F.G. e) tratat de prietenie cu Cehoslovacia

Actul final de la Helsinki - s-a semnat la sfritul Conferinei pentru Securitate i Cooperare n Europa, la 1 august 1975 - ideea ntririi pcii i securitii n Europa i a convocrii unei conferine n acest sens a fost pentru prima dat inclus n Declaraia cu privire la ntrirea pcii i securitii n Europa, adoptat la 6 iulie 1966, n cadrul edinei Comitetului Politic Consultativ al Tratatului de prietenie, colaborare i asisten mutual de la Varovia - prima Conferina pentru Securitate i Cooperare n Europa a inclus trei faze: 1) nivelul minitrilor afacerilor externe, avnd sarcina s nregistreze punctele de vedere ale guvernelor participante n problemele referitoare la securitatea i cooperarea n Europa, precum i eventualele propuneri ale diferitelor probleme ale ordinii de zi a conferinei, s-a desfurat la Dipoli (o localitate mic de lng Helsinki) ntre 22 noiembrie 1972- 8 iunie 1973 2) a doua faz, la nivel de experi, consacrat elaborrii documentelor finale sub form de declaraii, recomandri, rezoluii sau orice alt tip de document final, precum i pregtirea, fixarea celei de a treia faze s-a desfurat la Geneva, ntre 18 septembrie 1973-21 iulie 1975 3) a treia faz prevzut pentru adoptarea documentelor finale, ntr-un cadru oficial, la nivelul efilor de stat sau de guvern, s-a desfurat ntre 30 iulie 1 august 1975 la Helsinki - la CSCE Helsinki au participat 33 de state, membre ale Alianei Nord Atlantice, Pactului de la Varovia, state nealiniate - structura Actului final de la Helsinki: trei pri / couri mari a) probleme politice b) probleme economice c) problema drepturilor omului i libera circulaie a ideilor

* De ilustrat principalele prevederi ale Actului final de la Helsinki plecnd de al direciile indicate mai sus, precum i semnificaia acestui document din punctul de vedere al evoluiei relaiilor internaionale.

V Dicionar
ABMs acronim desemnnd Antiballistic Missiles diplomaia ping-pong-ului la 6 aprilie 1971 echipa de tenis de mas a Chinei a invitat echipa de tenis de mas a SUA s fac o vizit n China; ( un prim pas n normalizarea relaiilor dintre cele dou state ) ICBMs acronim desemnnd Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles SALT acronim desemnnd Strategic Arms Limitation Talks i ulterior Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty Shuttle Diplomacy diplomaie de navet n perioada de dup rzboiul de Yom Kippur , Henry Kissenger fcea cltorii dus-ntors ntre Cairo i Ierusalim pentru negocieri

VI Suport Documentar
Document 1: Prima conversaie dintre Hruciov i Mao Zedong , 31 iulie 1958 (excerpt ) Mao Zedong: Fr a face prognoze pe termen ndelugat , putem afirma faptul c i cooperarea noastr este asigurat pentru 10 000 de ani. Hruciov: n acest caz ne putem ntlni din nou n 9 999 de ani pentru a pune la punct cooperarea pentru urmtorii 10 000 de ani. ................................................................................................................................................ Mao Zedong: Am neles dup cum urmeaz: dac vrem s obinem asisten sovietic atunci trebuie s construim o flot comun orientat n principal mpotriva SUA. Am neles c Hruciov a vrut s rezolve chestiunea flotei comune mpreun cu tovarii chinezi , avnd n gnd i atragerea Vietnamului.

Hruciov: Am spus c atunci cnd rzboiul ncepe, noi va trebui s folosim zonele de coast pe scar larg , inclusiv Vietnamul. Mao Zedong: Am spus anterior c n caz de rzboi Uniunea Sovietic va putea folosi orice parte a (teritoriului n.a.) Chinei , i marinarii rui vor fi liberi s acioneze n orice port al Chinei. Hruciov: Nu a vorbi despre marinari rui. Cnd rzboiul ncepe este nevoie de eforturi comune. Poate marinarii chinezi vor aciona, poate eforturi comune vor fi necesare. Dar nu am ridicat problema niciunui teritoriu (chinez n.a.) i a unei baze (militare sovietice n.a.) acolo. Mao Zedong: Spre exemplu dac ar fi 100 de soldai n flot ce parte ai deine dumneavoastr i ce parte noi? Hruciov: Flota nu se poate afla n proprietatea a dou state. Flota trebuie comandat. Cnd doi sunt la comand e imposibil de dus un rzboi. Mao Zedong: Este adevrat. Hruciov: Putei s nu fii de acord cu noi. Analiznd aceasta ( chestiunea flotei comune n.a.) putem spune c suntem mpotriv. Dac ne-ai fi sugerat dumneavoastr aceasta ( ideea flotei comune n.a.) am fi fost deasemena mpotriv. Mao Zedong: Dac este aa atunci toi norii negrii sunt risipii. ................................................................................................................................................ Hruciov: Acum a vrea s vorbesc despre staia radar. Nu a fost nici o decizie a CC n acest chestiune. Tovarii miliari spun c este necesar o staie radar , pentru ca atunci cnd e nevoie s putem comanda submarinele sovietice din Pacific. Cred c aceste consideraii sunt corecte. M-am gndit c pentru realizarea unei atare probleme, am putea intra n contact cu tovarii chinezi pentru a construi o astfel de staie. Ar fi mai bine dac tovarii chinezi ar accepta participarea noastr la construcia staiei fie prin intermediul unui credit, fie n alt mod. Staia este necesar. Noi avem nevoie de ea i dumneavoastr vei avea nevoie de ea , atunci cnd vei dobndi o flot de submarine. Problema e exploatarea ( staiei radar n.a.). Cred c nu pot exista doi proprietari asupra acestei staii. prin urmare , suntem de acord ca pe baze de egalitate ca dumneavoastr s putei menine prin intermediul acestei staii legtura cu flota dumneavoastr de submarine. Nu exist nici o problem n legtur cu proprietatea ( staiei radar n.a.). Aceasta trebuie s

fie chinez. A vrea s ajungem la un aranjament de operare ( a staiei radar n.a.) pe baze de egalitate. Dumneavoastr vei putea opera n staiile noastre din Valdivostok , Kurile i zonele nordice de coast. dac nu exist nici o obiecie din partea dumneavoastr , cred c militarii notrii ar trebui s ia n calcul aceast problem. Dac RPC refuz , nu vom mai insista ( asupra acestei chestiuni n.a.). Mao Zedong: Aceast staie poate fi construit. Va fi proprietatea Chinei , construit cu investiii guvernamentale chineze i o vom putea opera n comun. Hruciov: Nu n comun , ci numai parial. Nou ne va fi folositoare doar n timp de rzboi, sau n timpul antrenamentelor. ...

SURSA: Document No. 1 First Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong Hall of Huaizhentan [Beijing], 31 July 1958 , n Cold War International History Project Bulletin ... nr.12-13 , 2001, p. 250-260

Document 2: A patra conversaie dintre Hruciov i Mao Zedong , 3 august 1958 (excerpt)

Mao Zedong: A vrea s clarificm dou mici, dar importante probleme. Prima-legat de interzicerea experienelor de arme atomice. Dumneavoastr ai oprit testarea unilateral , dar n Vest continu testarea (armelor nucleare n.a.). Credei c este necesar reluarea testelor? Hruciov: Ei ne-au eliberat de orice angajament luat prin faptul c nu au oprit testele lor. Noi ne-am desfurat testele noastre. Acum continum s lucrm la bombele atomice i cu hidrogen. Cnd va fi necesar , desigur vom relua testele, sub condiia ca la acea vreme s nu fie un angajament general cu privire la ncetarea testelor. Mao Zedong: Acum am neles. Ai spus c rachetele intercontinentale se deplaseaz prin spaiu. Nu ard cnd reintr n atmosfer? Hruciov: Nu , aceast probleme e rezolvat. ................................................................................................................................................

Mao Zedong: Cred n continuare faptul c deplasarea dumneavoastr peste grani , cu ocazia summit-ului efilor de state , e periculoas. V-a sftui s declarai numirea unui reprezentant n absena dumneavoastr ( de la summit n.a.). Toi suntem ngrijorai cnd prsii ara ( URSS n.a.). Hruciov: Da, exist un anumit risc , mai ales dac summit-ul are loc la New-York: acolo sunt muli maghiari furioi , precum i ali inamici. Condiiile sunt mult mai bune la Geneva. ... Mao Zedong: Stalin a refuzat s mearg la Geneva , dar eu am n vedere alt tip de pericol. Hruciov: Stalin era senil ... ................................................................................................................................................ Mao Zedong: Credei c ( John Foster n.a.) Dulles va rmne n aceiai poziie? Hruciov: Nu , probabil va pleca , dei e mai bine pentru noi dac va rmne. E mai uor s te nelegi cu un prost dect cu o persoan inteligent. Mao Zedong: n opinia dumenavoastr ( candidatul democrat la preedinie n.a.) Stevenson va deveni preedinte? Hruciov: E o personalitate mult mai pozitiv. Mao Zedong: Cel mai probabil , dac Partidul Republican rmne la putere ( vicepreedintele Richard n.a.) Nixon va deveni preedinte. Hruciov: Da, probabil aa va fi. El va fi mult mai dificil dect Eisenhower. Eisenhower a intrat pe arena (politic n.a.) ca un erou naional, ca rezultat al rzboiului (celui de-al doilea rzboi mondial n.a.). Ca politician , nu e printre cei mai buni: i lipsete experiena politic. i chiar ca i militar nu e prea strlucit. La sfritul rzboiului , germanii aproape c l-au nvins n Ardeni. Apoi (Winston) Churchill i-a cerut lui Stalin s vin n ajutorul aliailor vestici. ...

SURSA: Document No. 2 Fourth Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong,Hall of Qinjendiang, 3 August 1958 n Cold War International History Project Bulletin ... nr.12-13 , 2001, p.260-262

Document 3 : Conversaia dintre Hruciov i Mao Zedong , 2 octombrie 1959 (excerpt )

Mao Zedong:

Ne-am pus la curent n legtur cu mesajul lui Eisenhower ctre

Dumneavoastr , Tovare Hruciov , care ne-a fost pus la dispoziie n aceast diminea Hruciov: Bine. n afar de aceasta am dori s v punem la curent cu unele fragmente referitoare la China, din discuia mea cu Preedintele D. Eisenhower din 27 septembrie 1959 , i apoi permitei-ne s schimbm opinii n legtur cu vizita mea n SUA i n legtur cu relaiile cu America. Recomandat ar fi ca fragmentele de conversaie cu Eisenhower , mai sus menionate , s fi traduse aici oral de interpret. Interpreii Yang Ming Fu i Li Yue Zhen traduc oral fragmentele de conversaie cu Eisenhower , mai sus menionate. Chinezii au acordat o mare importan chestiunii deteniei a cinci americani n China , ca i remarcii lui Eisenhower n legtur cu motivul pentru care URSS nu a adoptat aceiai poziie n problema Taiwan-ului ca n cea a Germaniei. ................................................................................................................................................ Hruciov: Nu tiam c RPC deine cinci americani n captivitate. E adevrat? n conversaia cu Eisenhower am spus c doar sub forma unui sfat prietenesc a putea atige aceast problem la Beijing. Zhou Enlai:La 1 august 1956 , americanii i noi , am ajuns la un acord potrivit cruia americanii care locuiesc de mult timp n RPC (imigranii) se pot ntoarce n SUA. Cu toate acestea am stipulat faptul c dac aceti oameni comit orice infraciune, ei pot fi arestai. Dreptul chinez prevede faptul c dac un deinut se poart bine n detenie, sentina lui poate fi redus. A doua categorie , care potrivit acordului , le era permis s prseasc RPC erau prizonierii de rzboi.Un avion aparinnd SUA a fost dobort pe teritoriul Chinei i nu al Coreei.18 militari americani , care se aflau n acest avion au fost luai prizonieri. ... Noi am luat iniiativa i am eliberat 13 prizonieri de rzboi americani. Prin urmare la Conferina de la Geneva , americanii nu au avut de ce s ne acuze. Dup aceasta au mai fost capturai doi americani , Fekto i Downey, care sunt acum n detenie. Ei sunt ageni ai Ageniei Centrale de Iformaii i au fost prini n flagrant. ... O instan judectoreasc chinez i-a condamnat la pedepse lungi: unul pe via i altul la 20 de ani

de nchisoare. ... Am avut sub detenie n jur de 90 de americani. Majoritatea au fost eliberai i numai 5 americani se afl n detenie pe teritoriul RPC. Toi sunt spioni i potrivit dreptului chinez sunt supui ncarcerrii. ... ................................................................................................................................................ Mao Zedong: Desigur i putem elibera sau nu (pe prizonierii americani-n.a.), dar nu i vom elibera pe americani acum , ci la momentul oportun. ................................................................................................................................................ Zhou Enlai: n privina chestiunii Taiwan-ului , ar trebui s tragem o linie ntre cele dou aspecte ale sale: relaiile dintre Republica Popular China i Taiwan sunt o chestiune intern i relaiile dintre China i America n privina problemei Taiwan-ului , reprezint aspectul internaional al acestei probleme. Hruciov: Aa este i n aceast modalitate am vorbit cu Eisenhower, dup cum ai putut vedea din fragmentele conversaiei mele cu Preedintele. ... Cu ceva vreme n urm , Lenin a creat Republica Orientului ndeprtat n Estul ndeprtat al Uniunii Sovietice, i Lenin i-a recunoscut (suveranitate n.a.).inei minte c aceast republic a fost stabilit pe teritoriul Uniunii Sovietice. A fost incredibil , dar Lenin pentru o perioad a fcut asta. Mai trziu , aa cum se cuvenea , Republica Orientului ndeprtat s-a unit cu Uniunea Sovietic. ................................................................................................................................................ Mao Zedong: Dei am deschis focul asupra insulelor ( Quemoy i Matsu n.a.) noi nu vom ncerca s le eliberm. Noi de asemenea credem c Statele Unite nu se vor porni un rzboi doar din cauza acestor insule i a Taiwan-ului. Hruciov: Da, americanii nu vor porni un rzboi din cauza acestor insule i a Taiwanului. Noi cunoatem coninutulinstruciunilor care i s-au dat lui (John Foster n.a.) Dulles atunci cnd s-a ntlnit cu Chiang Kai-shek.Dac v intereseaz acest document , vi-l putem pune la dispoziie. Ct privete atacarea insulelor , dac atacai atunci trebuie s capturai aceste insule i dac nu considerai necesar capturarea acestora , atunci nu mai are rost s atacai. Sincer vorbind, am crezut c vei cuceri aceste insule i am fost suprat cnd am aflat c nu le-ai cucerit.Desigur c este problema dumneavoastr , dar eu vorbesc despre aceasta n calitate de aliat. ................................................................................................................................................

Hruciov: De ce a trebuit s omori oameni la grania cu India? Mao Zedong:Ei ne-au atacat mai nti, au trecut grania i au continuat s trag (focuri de arm) timp de 12 ore. Zhou Enlai: Cedate informative credei- cele indiene sau ale noastre? Hruciov: Dei hinduii au atacat primii, nimeni dintre chinezi nu a fost ucis, ci numai dintre hindui. Zhou Enlai:Dar ce trebuia s facem dac ei ne-au atacat primii? Nu puteam trage n aer.Hinduii chiar au trecut linia McMahon. n afar de aceasta , n viitorul apropiat Vicepreedintele (indian n.a.) Radhakrishnan va sosi n China. Am afirmat aceasta pentru c am luat msurile de a rezolva aceast chestiune panic, prin negocieri. n scrisoarea mea ctre Nehru din 9 septembrie , i-am furnizat explicaii detaliate cu privire la cele ntmplate ntre India i noi. ................................................................................................................................................ Chen Yi: Sunt insultat de declaraia dumneavoastr potrivit creia deteriorarea relaiei cu India a fost din vina noastr. Hruciov: i eu sunt insultat de declaraia dumneavoastr potrivit creia noi (sovieticii n.a.) suntem servili.Ar trebui s-l susinem pe Nehru , s-l ajutm s rmn la putere. Mao Zedong: Evenimentele din Tibet i conflictul de grani sunt aciuni temporare. Mai bine terminm discuia acestor probleme acum. Putem evalua relaia noastr dup cum urmeaz , respectiv c n general suntem unii, iar cele cteva diferene nu stau n calea prieteniei noastre... SURSA: Document No. 3 Memorandum of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Beijing, 2 October 1959 , n Cold War International History Project Bulletin ... nr.12-13, 2001, p.262-269

Document 4: Not privind retragerea experilor sovietici , Ambasada Sovietic din Beijing ctre Ministerul de Externe al RPC , 18 iulie 1960 Potrivit Tratatului de Prietenie , Alian i Asisten Reciproc , ncheiat ntre URSS i RPC , guvernul sovietic a trimis , la cererea guvernului chinez , un numr considerabil de experi pentru a-i desfura activitatea n China. Pentru acest obiectiv organismele sovietice au selectat pe cei mai buni i mai experimentai experi , chiar cu riscul producerii unor dezechilibre ale economiei URSS. (...) n timpul vizitei liderilor sovietici n RP China , la nceputul lunii august 1958 , partea chinez i-a exprimat nemulumirea cu privire la unii experi i consilieri sovietici. ... Recent partea chinez , n contactele cu experii sovietici din RP China, a nceput s adopte o linie , aparent , neprieteneasc fa de Uniunea Sovietic , ceeaa ce contravine obligaiilor asumate prin tratat , ca i normelor uzitate ntre statele socialiste. ... Guvernul sovietic se vede nevoit s declare c aciunile prii chineze , mai sus menionate , sunt neprietenoase fa de Uniunea Sovietic. Acestea sunt n contradicie cu Tratatul de Prietenie , Alian i Asisten Reciproc , dintre URSS i RP China , potrivit cruia ambele pri i-au luat angajamentul reciproc , n spiritul prieteniei i al cooperrii i n acord cu principiile de egalitate i interese mutuale s dezvolte i s consolideze relaiile economice i culturale dintre ele. (...) Ambasada (sovietic de la Beijing n.a.) este instruit s informeze guvernul RP China, de faptul c experii i consilierii sovietici , inclusiv cei militari , n acord cu propria lor voin , sunt rechemai n patria-mam. n luarea acestei decizii partea sovietic a luat n consideraie i faptul c guvernul nui al RP China , n trecut , a ridicat chestiunea ca un numr de experi sovietici care lucreaz n RP China s se ntoarc n Uniunea Sovietic. Guvernul Uniunii Sovietice , i exprim sperana c guvernul RP China va nlege corect cauzele care au dus la o atare decizie. SURSA: Note: The Soviet Embassy in Beijing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, 18 July 1960 n Cold War International History Project Bulletin ... nr.8-9 , 1996-1997, p.249-250

Document 5: Raport sovietic cu privire la evenimentele din 2 martie 1969 , ctre liderii comuniti est-germani , 3 august 1969 La 2 martie 1969 , ora local 11 , chinezii au organizat o provocare pe Insula Damansky , care este situat pe rul Ussuri , la sud de Khabarovsk , ntre punctele Bikin i Iman ( Regiunea Primorsky). (...) Nu exist aezri pe Insula Damansky , care nu are nici o importan economic; nu se afl sate n vecintate dect la zeci de mile deprtare. Putem trage concluzia c ( Insula Damansky n.a.) a fost aleas ca loc de provocare , deoarece un asemenea plan putea fi pregtit acolo n secret i prezentat apoi lumii ntr-o versiune favorabil organizatorilor (planului n.a.). n timpul provocrii , militarii chinezi au comis acte de o cruditate i brutalitate incredibil mpotriva grnicerilor sovietici rnii. Bazndu-ne pe inspeciile la faa locului i pe raporturile de expertiz ale comisiei medicale , care a examinat cadavrele grnicerilor sovietici , putem afirma faptul c rniii au fost mpucai de chinezi de la distan mic , njunghiai cu baionete i cuite. Faa unor victime a fost distrus dincolo de posibilitatea de recunoatere , iar alte victime aveau uniformele i cizmele furate de ctre soldaii chinezi. (...) SURSA: Document No.1: Soviet Report to GDR Leadership on 2 March 1969 SinoSoviet Border Clashes n Cold War International History Project Bulletin ... nr. 6-7, 1995-1996, p.189

Document 6 : Doctrina Brejnev , discursul lui Leonid Brejnev , 13 noiembrie 1968

In connection with the events in Czechoslovakia the question of the correlation and interdependence of the national interests of the socialist countries and their international duties acquire particular topical and acute importance. The measures taken by the Soviet Union, jointly with other socialist countries, in defending the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people are of great significance for strengthening the socialist community, which is the main achievement of the international working class.

We cannot ignore the assertions, held in some places, that the actions of the five socialist countries run counter to the Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty and the rights of nations to self determination. The groundlessness of such reasoning consists primarily in that it is based on an abstract, nonclass approach to the question of sovereignty and the rights of nations to self determination. The peoples of the socialist countries and Communist parties certainly do have and should have freedom for determining the ways of advance of their respective countries. However, none of their decisions should damage either socialism in their country or the fundamental interests of other socialist countries, and the whole working class movement, which is working for socialism. This means that each Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people, but also to all the socialist countries, to the entire Communist movement. Whoever forget this, in stressing only the independence of the Communist Party, becomes one-sided. He deviates from his international duty. Marxist dialectics are opposed to one-sidedness. They demand that each phenomenon be examined concretely, in general connection with other phenomena, with other processes. Just as, in Lenin's words, a man living in a society cannot be free from the society, one or another socialist state, staying in a system of other states composing the socialist community, cannot be free from the common interests of that community. The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interests of the world of socialism, of the world revolutionary movement. Lenin demanded that all Communists fight against small nation narrow-mindedness, seclusion and isolation, consider the whole and the general, subordinate the particular to the general interest. The socialist states respect the democratic norms of international law. They have proved this more than once in practice, by coming out resolutely against the attempts of imperialism to violate the sovereignty and independence of nations. It is from these same positions that they reject the leftist, adventurist conception of "exporting revolution," of "bringing happiness" to other peoples.

However, from a Marxist point of view, the norms of law, including the norms of mutual relations of the socialist countries, cannot be interpreted narrowly, formally, and in isolation from the general context of class struggle in the modern world. The socialist countries resolutely come out against the exporting and importing of counterrevolution. Each Communist Party is free to apply the basic principles of Marxism, Leninism and of socialism in its country, but it cannot depart from these principles (assuming, naturally, that it remains a Communist Party). Concretely this means, first of all, that in its activity, each Communist Party cannot but take into account such a decisive fact of our time as the struggle between two opposing social systems -- capitalism and socialism. This is an objective struggle, a fact not depending on the will of the people, and stipulated by the world's being split into two opposite social systems. Lenin said: "Each man must choose between joining our side or the other side. Any attempt to avoid taking sides in this issue must end in fiasco." It has got to be emphasized that when a socialist country seems to adopt a "nonaffiliated" stand, it retains its national independence, in effect, precisely because of the might of the socialist community, and above all the Soviet Union as a central force, which also includes the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any of the links in the world system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries, which cannot look indifferently upon this. The antisocialist elements in Czechoslovakia actually covered up the demand for so-called neutrality and Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the socialist community with talking about the right of nations to self-determination. However, the implementation of such "self-determination," in other words, Czechoslovakia's detachment from the socialist community, would have come into conflict with its own vital interests and would have been detrimental to the other socialist states. Such "self-determination," as a result of which NATO troops would have been able to come up to the Soviet border, while the community of European socialist countries would have been split, in effect encroaches upon the vital interests of the

peoples of these countries and conflicts, as the very root of it, with the right of these people to socialist self-determination. Discharging their internationalist duty toward the fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia and defending their own socialist gains, the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist states had to act decisively and they did act against the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia. SURSA: Brezhnev Doctrine, Polish United Workers Congress, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/14/documents/doctrine/ , 15.02.2007

Document 7 : The CPCz (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia ) Action program, April 1968 (excerpt) () The Leading Role of the Party: A Guarantee of Socialist Progress At present it is more important that the party adopt a policy fully justifying its leading role in society. We believe this is a condition for the socialist development of the country. () In the past, the leading role of the party was usually conceived of a monopolistic concentration of power in the hands of party organs. This concept corresponded with the false thesis that the party is the instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat. That harmful conception weakened the initiative and the responsibility of state, economic, and social institutions, damaged the party authority, and prevented it from carrying out its real functions. The partys goal is not to become a universal caretaker of society, bind all organizations, and watch every step taken in fulfillment of its directives. Its mission instead is primarily to inspire socialist initiative, to demonstrate communist perspectives, their modes, and to win over all workers by systematic persuasion and the personal examples of communists. This determines the conceptual side of party activity. Party organs should not deal with all problems: they should encourage others and suggest solutions to the most important difficulties. But at the same time the party cannot turn

into an organization that influences society by its ideas and program alone. It must develop through its members and bodies the practical organizational methods of political force in society. () As a representative of the most progressive section of the society and therefore the representative of the prospective aims of society the party cannot represent the full range of social interests. () The party does not want to and will not take the place of social organizations; on the contrary, it must ensure that their initiative and political responsibility for the unity of society are revived and can flourish. The role of the party is to find a way of satisfying the various interests without jeopardizing the interests of society as a whole, and promoting those interests and creating new progressive ones. The partys policy must not lead non-communists to feel that their rights and freedom are limited by the role of the party. () For the Development of Socialist Democracy and a New System of the Political Management of Society () We must reform the whole political system so that it will permit the dynamic development of social relations appropriate for socialism, combine broad democracy with scientific, highly qualified management, strengthen the social order, stabilize the social order, and maintain social discipline. The basic structure of the political system must, at the same time, provide firm guarantees against a return to the old methods of subjectivism and highhandedness. () The implementation of the constitutional reforms of assembly and association must be ensured this year so that the possibility of setting up voluntary organizations, special - interest associations, societies, and other bodies is guaranteed by law, and so that the present interests and needs of various sections of our society are tended to without bureaucratic interference and free from a monopoly by any individual organization. () Legal standards must also set forth a more explicit guarantee of the freedom of speech for minority interests and opinions. () The constitutional freedom of movement

particularly that of travel abroad for our citizens must be explicitly guaranteed by law. () Our entire legal code must gradually come to grips with the problem of how to protect, in a better and more consistent way, the personal rights and property of citizens, and we must certainly remove statutes that effectively put individual citizens at a disadvantage with the state and other institutions. In the future we must prevent various institutions from disregarding personal rights and the interests of individual citizens as far as personal ownership of family houses, gardens, and other items is concerned. () It is troubling that up to now the rehabilitation of people, both communists and non- communists, who were the victims of legal transgressions in previous years, has not always been carried out in full, regarding the political and civic consequences. () Socialism Cannot Do without Enterprises The democratization program of the economy places special emphasis on ensuring the independence of enterprises and enterprise groupings and their relative independence from the state bodies; the full implementation of the right of consumers to determine their consumption patterns and lifestyles; the right to choose jobs freely; and the right and opportunity of various groups of working people and different social groups to formulate and to defend their economic interests in shaping economic policy. () Decision making about the plan and the economic policy of the state must be both a process of mutual confrontation and harmonization of different interests, that is, the interests of enterprises, consumers, employers, different social groups of population, nation, and so forth. It also must manifest a suitable combination of the log-term development of the economy and its immediate prosperity. () The International Status and Foreign Policy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic () We stand resolutely on the side of progress, democracy, and socialism in the struggle by socialist and democratic forces against the aggressive attempts of world

imperialism. It is from this viewpoint that we determine our attitude toward the most acute international problems of the present and our role in the worldwide struggle against the forces of imperialist reaction. Taking, as a point of departure, the existing relationship of international forces and our awareness that Czechoslovakia is an active component of the revolutionary process in the world, the SSR (Czechoslovak Socialist Republic ) will formulate its own position toward the fundamental problems of world politics. The basic orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy took root at the time of the struggle for national liberation and in the process of the social reconstruction of the country. It revolves around the alliance and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. () We will actively pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence vis-avis the advanced capitalist countries. () SURSA: Akn program Komunistick strany eskoslovenska, Rud prvo (Prague), April 10, 1968, pp.1-6 apud. Jaromr Navrtil and others (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968. A National Security Archive Documents Reader, CEU Press, 1998, pp.92-95.

Document 8 : The Two Thousand Words Manifesto, June 27, 1968 (excerpt) Two Thousand Words that Belong to Workers, Farmers, Officials, Scientists, Artists, and Everybody The first threat to our national life was from the war. The came the evil days and events that endangered the nations spiritual well-being and character. Most of the nation welcomed the socialist program with high hopes. But it fell into the hands of the wrong people. () After enjoying great popular confidence after the war, the communist part by degrees bartered this confidence away for office, until it had al the offices and nothing else. () The leaders mistaken policies transformed a political party and an alliance

based on ideas into an organization for exerting power, one that proved highly attractive to power-hungry individuals eager to wield authority, to cowards who took the safe and easy route, and to people with bad conscience. The influx of members such as these affected the character and behavior of the party (). We bear responsibility for the present state of affairs. But those among us who are communists bear more than others, and those who acted as components or instruments of unchecked power bear the greatest responsibility of all. The power they wield was that of a self-willed group spreading out through the party apparatus into every district and community. It was this apparatus that decided what might and might not be done: It ran the cooperative farms for the cooperative farmers, the factories for the workers, and the National Committees for the public. No organizations, not even communist ones, were really controlled by their own members. The chief sin and deception of these rulers was to have explained their own whims as the will of workers. () While many workers imagined that they were the rulers, it was a specially trained stratum of party and state who actually rules in their name. In effect it was these people who stepped into the shoes of the deposed class and themselves came to constitute the new authority. Let us say in fairness that some of them long ago realized the evil trick history had played. () They share our opposition to the retrograde views held by certain party members. But large proportions of officials have been resistant to change and are still influential. They still wield the instruments of power, especially at district and community level, where they can employ them in secret and without fear of prosecution. () For after twenty years the communists were the only ones able to conduct some sort of political activity. It was only the opposition inside the communist party that had the privilege to voice antagonistic views. The effort and the initiative now displayed by democratically minded communists are only a partial repayment of the debt owed by the entire party to the non-communists whom it kept down in an unequal position. () But in the days to come we must gird ourselves with our own initiative and make our own decisions. To begin with we will oppose the view, sometimes voiced, that a democratic revival can be achieved without the communists, or even in opposition to them. This

would be unjust and foolish too. The communist already have their organizations in place, and in these we must support the progressive wing. They have their experienced officials, and they still have in their hands, after all, the crucial levers and buttons. On the other hand they have presented an Action Program to the public. ()We must demand that they produce local Actions Programs in public in every district and community. () Although at present one cannot expect more of the central political bodies, it is vital to achieve more at district and community level. Let us demand the departure of people who abused their power, damaged public property, and acted dishonorably or brutally. Ways must be found to compel them to resign. To mention a few: public criticism, resolutions, demonstrations, demonstrative work brigades, collections to buy presents for their retirement, strikes, and picketing at their front doors. () Let us demand public sessions of the national committees. For questions that no one else will look into, let us set up our own civic committees and commissions (). There has been great alarm recently over the possibility that foreign forces will intervene in our development. Whatever superior forces may face us, all we can do is stick to our own positions, behave decently, and initiate nothing ourselves. We can show our government that we stand by it, with weapons if need be, if it will do what we give it a mandate to do. And we can assure our allies that we will observe out treaties of alliance, friendship and trade. () () a great opportunity was given to us once again, as it was after the end of the war. Again we have the chance to take into our hands our common cause, which for working purposes we call socialism, and give it a form more appropriate to our oncegood reputation and to the fairly good opinion we used to have of ourselves. The spring is over and will never return. By winter we will know all. () SURSA: Dva tisce slov, Litern listy (Prague), 27 June 1968, p.1 apud. apud. Jaromr Navrtil and others (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968. A National Security Archive Documents Reader, CEU Press, 1998, pp.177-181

Document 9 : Alocuiunea preedintelui Consiliului de Stat al Romniei, Nicolae Ceauescu, rostit la mitingul din Piaa Palatului Republicii, 21 august 1968 (excerpt) Dragi tovari, Ceteni ai rii romneti, n aceste momente grele pentru poporul frate cehoslovac, pentru situaia din Europa, doresc ca, n numele Comitetului Central, al Consiliului de Stat i al guvernului s m adresez dvs., exprimnd ncrederea noastr deplin n hotrrea poporului romn de a asigura construcia panic a socialismului n patria noastr. Ptrunderea trupelor celor cinci ri socialiste n Cehoslovacia constituie o mare greeal i o primejdie grav pentru pacea n Europa, pentru soarta socialismului n lume. Este de neconceput n lumea de astzi, cnd popoarele se ridic la lupt pentru a-i apra independena naional, pentru egalitatea n drepturi, ca un stat socialist, ca state socialiste s ncalce libertatea i independena altui stat. Nu exist nici o justificare, nu poate fi acceptat nici un motiv de a admite, pentru o clip numai, ideea interveniei militare n treburile unui stat socialist fresc. (...) Problema alegerii cilor de construcie socialist este o problem a fiecrui partid, a fiecrui stat, a fiecrui popor. Nimeni nu se poate erija n sftuitor, n ndrumtor cu privire la felul n care trebuie construit socialismul n alt ar. Noi considerm c pentru a aeza relaiile dintre rile socialiste, dintre partidele comuniste pe baze cu adevrat marxist leniniste trebuie, o dat pentru totdeauna, s se pun capt amestecului n treburile altor partide. (...) Noi pornim n activitatea noastr de la rspunderea pe care o avem fa de popor, fa de toi oamenii muncii fr deosebire de naionalitate. Noi cu toii, romni, maghiari, germani, oameni de alte naionaliti, avem acelai destin, aceleai nzuine furirea comunismului n patria noastr i suntem hotri, ntr-o unitate deplin, s asigurm nfptuirea acestui ideal. (...)

SURSA: Ion Ptroiu (coordonator), nghe n plin var. Praga august 1968, Editura Paideia, Bucureti, 1998, pp.94-96.

Document 10: Document: Tratatul R.F. Germania cu URSS , Moscova, 12 august 1970 (excerpt) (...) Articolul 1 Republica Federal Germania i URSS consider cel mai important el al politicii lor s sprijine pacea internaional i s obin destinderea ncordrii. Ele i exprim nzuina de a stimula normalizarea situaiei n Europa i dezvoltarea relaiilor panice ntre toate statele europene, pornind n aceast nzuin de la situaia real existent n aceast regiune. Articolul 2 Republica Federal Germania i URSS se vor cluzi n relaiile lor reciproce, precum i n problemele asigurrii securitii europene i internaionale, dup elurile i principiile expuse n Carta Naiunilor Unite. Ca urmare, ele i vor soluiona problemele litigioase exclusiv prin mijloace panice i i asum obligaia s se abin (...) de la ameninarea cu fora sau de la folosirea forei n probleme care afecteaz securitatea din europa i securitatea internaional, precum i relaiile lor reciproce. Articolul 3 n concordan cu elurile i principiile expuse mai sus, Republica Federal Germania i URSS sunt unanime n a recunoate c pacea n Europa poate fi meninut numai dac nimeni nu va atenta la graniele actuale. Ele se oblig s respecte neabtut integritatea teritorial a tuturor statelor din Europa n graniele lor actuale. Ele declar c nu au nici un fel de pretenii teritoriale fa de cineva i nu vor ridica asemenea pretenii nici pe viitor.

Ele consider, n prezent ca i n viitor, graniele tuturor statelor din Europa ca fiind inviolabile, aa cum exist ele n ziua semnrii acestui tratat, inclusiv linia Oder Neisse, care constituie grania vestic a Republicii Populare Polone i inclusiv grania ntre Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German. (....) SURSA: Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1983, p.30.

Document 11: Tratatul R.F. Germania cu R.P. Polon , Varovia, 7 decembrie 1970 (excerpt) (...) Articolul 1 1. Republica Federal Germania i Republica Populare Polon constat n deplin acord c grania actual, care este trasat n capitolul IX al hotrrilor Conferinei de la Postdam din 2 august 1945, ncepnd de la Marea Baltic, n imediata apropiere i la vest de Swinemunde, mergnd de acolo de-a lungul Odrei pn la confluena cu Neisse, iar apoi de-a lungul rului Neisse pn la grania cu Cehoslovacia, constituie grania de stat vestic a Republicii Populare Polone. 2. Ele confirm inviolabilitatea granielor lor actuale acum i n viitor i se angajeaz reciproc s respecte cu strictee integritatea lor teritorial. 3. Ele declar c nu au nici un fel de pretenii teritoriale una fa de cealalt i nu vor enuna pretenii nici pe viitor. Articolul 2 1. Republica Federal Germania i Republica Populare Polon se vor conduce n relaiile lor reciproce, precum i n problemele garantrii suveranitii n Europa i n lume dup elurile i principiile nscrise n Carta Naiunilor Unite.

2. Ca urmare, corespunztor articolelor I i II din Carta Naiunilor Unite, ele vor rezolva toate probleme litigioase exclusiv cu mijloace panice i se vor abine n problemele care afecteaz securitatea european i internaional, precum i n relaiile lor reciproce de la ameninarea cu fora sau de la utilizarea forei. Articolul 3 1. Republica Federal Germania i Republica Populare Polon vor ntreprinde noi pai n direcia deplinei normalizrii i dezvoltri a relaiilor lor reciproce, a cror baz stabil o constituie acest tratat. (...) SURSA: Constantin Bue, Zorin zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1983, p.31.

Document 12 : Tratatul privind bazele relaiilor dintre Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German , Berlin, 21 decembrie 1972 (excerpt) Articolul 1 Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German dezvolt ntre ele relaii normale de bun vecintate pe baza egalitii. Articolul 2 Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German se vor conduce dup scopurile i principiile nscrise n Carta Naiunilor Unite, mai ales a egalitii suverane a tuturor statelor, a respectrii independenei, suveranitii i integritii teritoriale, a dreptului la autodeterminare, a aprrii drepturilor omului i a nediscriminrii.

Articolul 3 n conformitate cu Carta O.N.U., Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German vor rezolva probleme lor litigioase n exclusivitate prin mijloace panice i se vor abine de la ameninarea cu fora sau de la aplicarea forei.

Articolul 4 Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German declar ca nici unul din cele dou state nu-l reprezint pe cellalt pe plan internaional i nu vorbete n numele lui. Articolul 5 Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German vor promova relaii de prietenie cu statele europene i vor contribui la securitatea i colaborarea european. (...) Articolul 6 Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German pornesc de la principiul limitrii forelor n ambele state. Ele respect independena i suveranitatea celor dou state n treburile lor interne i externe. (...) Articolul 8 Republica Federal Germania i Republica Democrat German vor efectua un schimb de reprezentane permanente. (...) SURSA: Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1983, pp.34-35.

Document 13 : Acordul celor patru puteri cu privire la Berlin , Berlin, 3 septembrie 1972 (excerpt) (...) Partea II Dispoziiuni referitoare la sectoarele occidentale ale Berlinului a. Guvernul URSS declar c circulaia n tranzit a persoanelor civile i a bunurilor ntre sectoarele occidentale ale Berlinului i R.F.G. pe osele, ci ferate i ci navigabile peste teritoriul R.D.G. nu va fi n nici un fel mpiedicat, c aceast circulaie va fi nlesnit n aa fel nct s se desfoare n modul cel mai simplu i rapid i s se bucure de prioriti. (...) b. Guvernele Republicii Franceze, Regatului Unit, SUA declar c legturile ntre sectoarele occidentale ale Berlinului i R.F.G. vor fi meninute i dezvoltate considernd c aceste sectoare, ca i pn acum, nu constituie parte constitutiv a R.F.G. i nu vor fi n viitor administrate de ea. (...) c. Guvernul URSS declar c liniile de comunicaie ntre sectoarele occidentale ale Berlinului i inuturile cu care acestea se mrginesc, ct i cu alte inuturi ale R.D.G. cu care acestea se mrginesc, vor fi mbuntite. Persoanele cu domiciliul stabil n sectoarele occidentale ale Berlinului vor putea cltori, din motive umanitare, familiale sau religioase, culturale i comerciale, n aceste inuturi, n aceleai condiii care sunt valabile pentru celelalte persoane care cltoresc n aceste zone. (...) SURSA: Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1983, p.36.

Document 14 : Actul final al Conferinei pentru Securitate i Cooperare n Europa, Helsinki, 1 august 1975 (excerpt) (...) Declaraia privind principiile care guverneaz relaiile reciproce dintre statele participante Statele participante, (...) Declar hotrrea lor de a respecta i pune n practic, fiecare dintre ele n relaiile sale cu toate celelalte state participante, indiferent de sistemul lor politic, economic sau social, precum i de mrimea lor, situaia lor geografic sau nivelul lor de dezvoltare, principiile urmtoare (...): 1. Egalitatea suveran, respectarea drepturilor inerente suveranitii (...). 2. Nerecurgerea la for sau la ameninarea cu fora (...). 3. Inviolabilitatea frontierelor Statele participante consider, fiecare, toate frontierele celuilalt, precum i frontierele tuturor statelor din Europa, i n consecin ele se vor abine acum i n viitor de la orice atentat mpotriva acestor frontiere. n consecin, ele se vor abine, de asemenea, de la orice cerere sau de la orice act de acaparare i uzurpare a ntregului sau a unei pri a teritoriului oricrui stat participant. 4. Integritatea teritorial a statelor (...). 5. Reglementarea panic a diferendelor (...). 6. Neamestecul n treburile interne

7. Respectarea drepturilor omului i libertilor fundamentale, inclusiv a libertii de gndire, contiin, religie sau de convingere Statele participante vor respecta ras, sex, limb sau religie. Ele vor promova i ncuraja exercitarea efectiv a drepturilor i libertilor civile, politice, economice, sociale, culturale i altele care decurg toate din demnitatea inerent persoanei umane i sunt eseniale pentru libera i deplina sa dezvoltare. n acest cadru, statele participante vor recunoate i respecta libertatea individului de a profesa i practica, singur sau n comun, religia sau convingerea acionnd dup imperativele propriei sale contiine. Statele participante pe teritoriul crora exist minoriti naionale vor respecta dreptul persoanelor care aparin acestor minoriti la egalitate n faa legii, le vor acorda posibilitatea deplin de a se bucura n mod efectiv de drepturile i libertile fundamentale i, n acest mod, vor proteja interesele lor legitime n acest domeniu. Statele participante recunosc importana universal a drepturilor omului i libertilor fundamentale, a cror respectare este un factor esenial al pcii, justiiei i bunstrii necesare pentru a asigura dezvoltarea relaiilor amicale i a cooperrii ntre ele, ca i ntre toate statele. Ele vor respecta n mod constant aceste drepturi i liberti n relaiile lor reciproce i se vor strdui, individual i n comun, inclusiv n cooperare cu Naiunile Unite, s promoveze respectarea universal i efectiv a lor. Ele confirm dreptul individului de a cunoate drepturile i ndatoririle sale n acest domeniu i de a aciona n consecin (...). 8. Egalitatea n drepturi a popoarelor i dreptul popoarelor de a dispune de ele nsele (...). 9. Cooperarea ntre state (...). drepturilor i libertilor fundamentale, inclusiv a libertii de gndire, contiin, religie sau de convingere pentru toi, fr deosebire de

SURSA: Constantin Bue, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bdescu, Relaii internaionale n acte i documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1983, p.205-211. Document 15: Rezoluia Consiliului de Securitate nr. 242 , 22 noiembrie 1967 The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; Affirms further the necessity For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible. SURSA: United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/un242.htm , 12.01.2007 Document 16: Rezoluia Consiliului de Securitate nr. 338 , 22 octombrie 1973 The Security Council, Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy; Calls upon all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242(1967) in all of its parts; Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. SURSA: United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/un338.htm , 12.01.2007

Seminar nr. 12
Evoluii n perioada rzboiului rece 1962-1989 - sfritul rzboiului rece
I Tensionarea relaiilor Est-Vest i politica ripostei totale a lui Ronald Reagan
A. URSS 10 noiembrie 1982 Leonid Brejnev moare 12 noiembrie 1982 CC al PCUS l alege ca secretar general pe Iuri Andropov , fost ef al KGB 9 februarie 1984 Iuri Andropov moare 13 februarie 1984 CC al PCUS l alege ca secretar general pe Konstantin Cernenko 11 aprilie 1984 Sovietul Suprem l alege pe Cernenko ca ef al statului (preedinte al Prezidiului) 10 martie 1985 Konstantin Cernenko moare 11 martie CC al PCUS l alege n funcia de secretar general pe Mihail Gorbaciov perestroika (restructurare) i glasnost (transparen) B. SUA 2 noiembrie 1976 Jimmy Carter ( fostul guvernator al Georgiei ) devine al 39-lea preedinte al SUA - 17 septembrie 1978 Acordurile de la Camp David dintre Anwar as Sadat i Menahem Begin ( ntlnire mediat de Carter) - 4 noiembrie 1979 debutul crizei ostatecilor din Iran - 4 noiembrie 1980 Ronald Reagan este ales al 40-lea preedinte al SUA

- 8 martie 1983 Reagan catalogheaz URSS drept Imperiul Rului - 23 martie 1983 Reagan propune dezvoltarea i amplasarea unui sistem antirachet Iniiativa de Aprare Strategic - 6 noiembrie 1984 - Ronald Reagan este reales n funcia de preedinte C. Relaii Est-Vest

1. Criza euro-rachetelor - n 1977 URSS a hotrt s modernizeze i s ntreasc rachetelor sale cu raz medie de aciune, ncepnd s desfoare rachetele de tip SS20, mobile dotate fiecare cu cte trei capete nucleare, fiecare putnd s parcurg mai mult de 5.000 km i deci, cu raz mare de aciune, plecnd de pe teritoriul sovietic, pn n Europa, bazinul mediteranean, Extremul Orient (China, Japonia) i chiar Alaska. - la 14 decembrie 1979, aliana nord atlantic a adoptat dubla decizie care consta n modernizarea ncepnd sfritul anului 1983, a rachetelor americane instalate n Europa occidental (euromissiles) prin dotarea cu rachete de tip Pershing II i rachete de croazier i negocieri cu scaden n 1983, ntre Washington i Moscova n vederea eliminrii rachetelor SS 20, fcnd astfel inutil amplasarea noilor rachete americane. - conform acestei duble decizii, la Geneva se vor desfura, ncepnd cu data de 30 noiembrie 1981, negocierile americano-sovietice n privina acestor rachete cu raz medie de aciune - ele stagneaz, URSS propunnd o ngheare a desfurrii rachetelor SS-20 (n schimbul stoprii instalrii noilor rachete americane), dar excluznd orice lichidare a stocurilor - la sfritul anului 1983, pentru c negocierile americano-sovietice nu au dat nici un rezultat, se ncepe instalarea rachetelor Pershing II i a rachetelor americane de croazier

- la 8 decembrie 1987, preedintele american Ronald Reagan i liderul sovietic Mihail Gorbaciov au semnat la Washington un tratat prin care se stabilea distrugerea tuturor rachetelor americane i sovietice cu o raz de aciune ntre 500 i 5000 de km

2. Doctrina Reagan formulat la nceputul preediniei lui Reagan, stipula decizia SUA de a recurge la fora militar pentru a se opune influenei sovietice n Lumea a Treia. 3. ntlniri la vrf 11-12 octombrie 1986 Reykjavik Ronald Reagan i Mihail Gorbaciov convin asupra eliminrii rachetelor balistice cu raz medie de aciune din Europa 2-3 decembrie 1989 Malta ntlnire ntre George Bush i Mihail Gorbaciov , prilej cu care liderul sovietic a declarat c nu va folosi fora pentru meninerea regimurilor comuniste din Estul Europei. De ilustrat ntr-o manier detaliat , evenimentele mai sus enunate

II Intervenia militar sovietic n Afganistan 1979

27 aprilie 1978 lovitur de stat Mohammed Taraki , conductorul aripii dure din Partidul Comunist Afgan , ajunge la putere 5 decembrie 1978 semnarea tratatului sovieto-afgan septembrie 1979 asasinarea lui Taraki (n spatele asasinrii se afl primministrul Hafizullah Amin ) 24 decembrie 1979 sovieticii invadeaz Afganistanul

De ilustrat reacia comunitii internaionale fa de invazia sovietic a Afganistanului

III Evoluii n blocul comunist n deceniile VIII-IX

Cauzele revoluilor din 1989 a) cauze economice - eecul sistemului economic de tip socialist (centralizare, planificare, accent pus pe industrializarea de tip stalinist, napoierea tehnologic, apariia economiei subterane i a comerului la negru) - reconsiderarea de ctre Uniunea Sovietic a relaiilor economice din interiorul blocului estic: schimbrile din economia mondial, combinate cu crizele petrolului din anii aptezeci, au transformat statele est- europene dintr-un avantaj ntr-o greutate economic pentru statul sovietic - presiunea social crescnd ca urmare a dificultilor economice - scderea creterii economice, concomitent cu o scdere a resurselor - crizele petrolului au determinat acute crize financiare, rezultatul fiind reprezentat de apariia unor noi dezechilibre economice b) cauze politice - schimbri n politica extern a blocului occidental: decizia NATO de narmare i decizia statelor Comunitii Europene de a forma o uniune politic - factorul CSCE drepturile fundamentale ale cetenilor incluse n cel de al treilea co al CSCE Helsinki, care deveniser i drepturi pe care cetenii statelor comuniste le puteau cere, au contribuit la de-legitimarea conducerilor acestor state i la formarea unor grupuri sociale autohtone - folosirea prevederilor Actului final de la Helsinki ca o modalitate de presiune diplomatic asupra rilor est europene - factorul Gorbaciov reformele impuse de acesta sistemului sovietic; impunerea doctrinei Sinatra n relaiile Uniunii Sovietice cu rile blocului comunist - efectul Ioan Paul al II-lea folosirea mesajul cretin avnd la baz adevrul, solidaritatea i respectarea drepturilor omului ca o form de slbire din interior a regimurilor comuniste

- o nelegere ntre cele dou mari puteri (Uniunea Sovietic i Statele Unite ale Americii) ca o modalitate de a se pune capt rzboiului rece, divizrii Europei i a Germaniei - existena unei fraciuni reformatoare n cadrul partidelor comuniste care va forma nucleul unei conduceri alternative - apariia primelor micri de contestare a regimurilor comuniste din partea societii civile - pierderea legitimitii partidelor comuniste datorit prelungirii crizei existente c) cauze morale - erodarea ideologiei marxist leniniste: scderea ncrederii marii mase a populaiei n capacitatea elitelor comuniste de a rezolva criza prin metode tipice sistemului; demoralizarea elitelor comuniste, pierderea ncrederii acestora n viabilitatea unui sistem de tip socialist * De ilustrat, pe baza bibliografiei aferente seminarului, evoluiile politice din Estul Europei n deceniile VIII-IX precum i cazurile concrete ale prbuirii regimurilor comuniste din urmtoarele ri: R.D.G., Polonia, Cehoslovacia, Ungaria, Romnia, Bulgaria.

IV Suport documentar
Document 1: Scrisoarea Forumului Civic (Cehoslovacia) ctre George Bush i Mihail Gorbaciov, 21 noiembrie 1989 Dear Sirs! On 19 November 1989, the Civic Forum, which feels itself responsible to act as the mouthpiece of the Czechoslovak public, was established in Prague. In a demonstration by the Prague populace, attended by hundreds of thousands of people on Wenceslas Square, the Civic Forum gained a consensus of opinion and therefore is turning to you also in the name of these people.

The Soviet government has announced a policy of non-involvement in connection with the democratic movements in Eastern Europe. We must warn you that in the case of Czechoslovakia, this policy in reality means support for the political leadership which was installed in the year 1968 by forceful intervention, and which, during the course of twenty years of rule, has absolutely discredited itself. One of the demands of the mass demonstration on 21 November was precisely the removal of these politicians from the political scene. Dear Sirs, we are of the opinion that the past intervention into Czechoslovak internal events in the year 1968 should be condemned and decried as an unlawful encroachment. The silence surrounding the intervention in August de facto means entanglement into Czechoslovak internal conditions. We besiege you to pay attention to this question during your negotiations; it is not only important for Czechoslovakia these days, but also for all of Europe. The Civic Forum In Prague on 21 November 1989 SURSA: Document No. 3, Letter from the Civic Forum to US President George Bush and USSR General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, 21 November 1989 n Cold War International History Project Bulletin , Nr. 12/13 , , Fall/Winter, 2001, p. 210-211

Document 2: Declaraia

Forumului Civic , rostit de Vaclav Havel , Piaa

Wenceslas , 23 noiembrie 1989 The Declaration of The Civic Forum After twenty years Czechoslovakia once again finds itself at a historical intersection thanks to the peoples movement, to which all generations and segments of the population and the majority of the still existing social organizations are quickly adding themselves. This movement is a movement of both of our nations. Its mouthpiece has spontaneously become the Civic Forum, which today is the real representative of the will of the people. Its natural component has become the wellorganized student

movement, which, through its protest demonstration, gave us the impulse for dramatic social movement. Within it work all the current independent initiatives, artistic unions headed by the theaterthe first to be in solidarity with the studentsand the renewed currents in the National Front, including many former and current members of the CPCz. The Catholic Church supported the Civic Forum through the words of the cardinal, and other churches in Czechoslovakia. Anyone who agrees with its demands is joining, and may join, the Civic Forum. The Civic Forum is prepared to secure a dialogue between the public and the present leadership immediately and has at its disposal qualified forces [from] all areas of society, capable of carrying out a free and objective dialogue about real paths toward a change in the political and economic conditions in our country. The situation is open now, there are many opportunities before us, and we have only two certainties. The first is the certainty that there is no return to the previous totalitarian system of government, which led our country to the brink of an absolute spiritual, moral, political, economic and ecological crisis. Our second certainty is that we want to live in a free, democratic and prosperous Czechoslovakia, which must return to Europe, and that we will never abandon this ideal, no matter what transpires in these next few days. The Civic Forum calls on all citizens of Czechoslovakia to support its fundamental demands by the demonstration of a general strike declared for Monday, 27 November 1989, at noon. Whether our country sets out in a peaceful way on the road to a democratic social order, or whether an isolated group of Stalinists, who want at any price to preserve their power and their privileges disguised as empty phrases about reconstruction will conquer, may depend upon the success of this strike. We challenge the leadership of this country to grasp the gravity of this situation, rid themselves of compromised individuals and prevent all eventual efforts for a violent revolution. We call on all the members of the ruling party to join the citizenry and respect its will.

We challenge all the members of the Peoples Militias to not come out violently against their comrade workers and thus spit upon all the traditions of worker solidarity. We challenge all the members of the Police to realize that they are first and foremost human beings and citizens of this country and only second subordinate to their superiors. We challenge the Czechoslovak Peoples Army to stand on the side of the people and, if necessary, to come out in its defense for the first time. We call on the public and the governments of all countries to realize that our homeland is from time immemorial the place where European and world confrontations have begun and ended, and that in our country it is not only its fate which is at stake, but the future of all of Europe. We therefore demand that they support in every way the peoples movement and the Civic Forum. We are opponents of violence; we do not want revenge; we want to live as dignified and free people, who have the right to speak for the fate of their homeland and who also think of future generations. The Civic Forum 23 November 1989 SURSA: Document No. 4, The Declaration of Civic Forum Representative Vclav Havel on Wenceslas Square, Prague, 23 November 1989, 4 p.m. n Cold War International History Project Bulletin , Nr. 12/13 , , Fall/Winter, 2001, p.211 Document 3: Discuiile Bush-Gorbaciov , Malta , 3 decembrie 1989 (excerpt)

() G. Bush: I want to clarify one point. You expressed concern about Western values. It would be understandable if our devotion to certain ideals provoked difficulties in the USSR or Eastern Europe and interfered with the progressive processes developing there. But we have never

pursued such goals. Any discussion of Western values in NATO or other Western organizations are completely natural and do not have destructive intent. But what are Western values? They are, if you will, glasnost., openness, and heated debates. At the economic level.incentives to progress and a free market. These values are not something new or expedient but long-shared by us and the West Europeans, and they unite the West. We greet the changes in the Soviet Union or in Poland but do not at all set Western values against them. Therefore I want to understand your point of view as much as possible in order to avoid any misunderstandings. M. S. Gorbachev: The main principle which we have adopted and which we follow in our new thinking is the right of each country to free choice, including the right to reexamine and change their original choice. This is very painful, but it is a fundamental right. The right to choose without outside interference. The US is devoted to a certain social and economic system which the American people have chosen. Let other people decide themselves, figuratively speaking, what God to pray to. It is important to me that the tendency toward renewal noted in Eastern and Western Europe is proceeding in the direction of drawing closer. The result will not be a copy of the Swedish, British, or Soviet model. No. Something will result which meets the needs of the present stage of development of human and European civilization. It has been observed now that people have no fear of choosing one system or the other. They are looking for their unique version which provides them with the best living conditions. When this choice proceeds freely thenone can say only one thing: go right ahead. G. Bush: I do not think that we differ here. We approve of self-determination and the attendant debates. I want you to understand our approach on a positive level: Western values do not at all mean imposing our system on Romania, Czechoslovakia, or even the GDR. M. S. Gorbachev: This is very important for us. Fundamental changes are occurring and peoples are drawing closer together. And this is the main thing. I see that several means of solving problems used by another system are taking root in Eastern Europe.in the fields of economics, technology, etc. This is natural. If we and you have such a common understanding, then all practical actions in changing conditions will be adequate and will begin to have a positive nature. ()

J. Baker: I would like to clarify our approach to selfdetermination. We agree that each country should have the right of choice. But all of this makes sense only when the people in the country are actually in a position to choose freely. This is contained in the concept of .Western values,. and is not at all the right to force their systems on others. M. S. Gorbachev: If someone lays claim to the truth. expect disaster. G. Bush: Absolutely right. J. Baker: Ive been talking about something else. Let us say, the question of the reunification of Germany, which is causing nervousness in both our countries, and even among Europeans. What do we say here about this? So that reunification takes place according the principles of openness, pluralism, and a free market. We do not at all want the reunification of Germany done on the model of 1937-1945 which, obviously, concerns you. The Germany of that time had nothing in common with Western values. M. S. Gorbachev: This is what [longtime Gorbachev aide] A. N. Yakovlev asks: why are democracy, openness, and a [free] market .Western. values? G. Bush: It was not always so. You personally have laid the foundation for these changes, the movement toward democracy and openness. It is actually considerably clearer today that you and we share these values than, say, 20 years ago. M. S. Gorbachev: We ought not be drawn into propaganda battles. A. N. Yakovlev: When they insist on Western values, then Eastern and Southern values unavoidably appear. () M. S. Gorbachev: Thats it. And you see that ideological confrontations flare up again. G. Bush: I understand you and agree. Let us avoid careless words and talk more about the substance of the values themselves. We welcome the changes which are occurring with all our hearts. M. S. Gorbachev: This is very important since, as I have said, the main thing is that the changes lead to greater openness in our relations with one another. We are beginning to be organically integrated and liberated from everything which divided us. What will this be called in the final account? I think.a new level of relations. Therefore, for my part, I support your suggestion.let us

not have a discussion on a theological level. Historically this has always led to religious wars. () SURSA: At Historic Crossroads: Documents on the December 1989 Malta Summit ,2-3 December 1989 n Cold War International History Project Bulletin , Nr. 12/13 , , Fall/Winter, 2001, p.240-241