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25
ANALIZA ARBORELUI DEFECIUNILOR UTILIZARE
CA METOD DE ANALIZ A RISCULUI LA
INSTALAIILE NAVALE
Gabriel OANCEA, Ovidiu RADU
Centrul de cercetri pentru Forele Navale, Constana
Abstract
One of the most frequently used techniques in risk analyses is fault tree modelling.
A fault tree analysis(FTA) can be used to identify the subsystems that are most critical for
the operation of a given system, or to analyse how undesirable events occur. This paper
describes the design of an fault tree analysis with top event defined as loss of propulsion
for a ship followed by quantitative and qualitative approach using algorithms and
methods shown in the paper (as example, the algorithm called MOCUS Method of
Obtaining Cut Sets or Vessley-Fussell measure of importance that can be applied on
fault trees).
Una din tehnicile cele mai frecvent utilizate n analizele de risc este
analiza arborelui defeciunilor - AAD. O astfel de analiz poate fi folosit
pentru a identifica subsistemele cele mai critice pentru funcionarea unui
sistem dat sau pentru a analiza modul n care iau natere i se produc
evenimente nedorite.
n contextul general al analizelor, metoda AAD este utilizat pentru a
analiza modul producerii evenimentelor nedorite precum i cauzele acestora.
Prin folosirea unei scheme logice sunt vizualizate relaiile dintre cauzele
evenimentelor (de exemplu defectarea unei anumite componente a unui
motor). Metoda presupune moduri operaional binare, ceea ce nseamn c un
eveniment fie se manifest, fie nu se manifest (de exemplu, o alarm de
avarie este dat sau nu).
205
Schema logic utilizat ntr-o AAD const dintr-un set de simboluri de
intrare care descriu relaiile dintre cauze i simbolurile care caracterizeaz
aceste cauze. Evenimentul nedorit luat ca int pentru analiz este menionat
ca eveniment din vrf - evenimentul de top arborelui defeciunilor. Descrierea
evenimentului de top ar trebui s dea rspunsuri la ceea ce tip de eveniment
este, cnd i unde se produce.
Producerea evenimentului de top este ntotdeauna dependent de dou
sau mai multe condiii sau defeciuni la un nivel inferior. Principala sarcin n
abordarea Analizei Arborelui Defeciunilor este de a defini n mod sistematic
structura, condiiile sau cauzele care duc direct la evenimentul de top. Aceste
evenimente ar trebui s fie definite n aa fel nct numai un numr limitat de
cauze s duc la evenimentul de top. Unele opinii din literatura de specialitate
recomand definirea numai a dou cauze la nivelul inferior la un moment dat
dar, pentru unele sistem complex de defectare, acest fapt lucru nu poate fi
considerat realist. Cauzele care conduc direct la evenimentul de top sunt al
doilea nivel al arborelui defeciunilor.
n cazul n care evenimentele sunt definite i structurate, urmtoarea
sarcin este de a evalua relaia logic dintre cauze. n general, fie evenimentul
de top depinde de apariia simultan a acestor cauze pe al doilea nivel sau
numai una din cauze poate duce la evenimentul de top. n primul caz este
folosit o intrare de tip I iar n cel de-al doilea caz este utilizat o intrare de
tip SAU. Aceast procedur se repet pentru a stabili relaiile logice dintre
cauze pe al treilea nivel al AD i aa mai departe. Atunci cnd cauzele sunt
descrise la un nivel de detaliere care asigur validitatea datelor privind
defeciunea, Arborele Defeciunilor se consider finalizat i pregtit pentru
analiza cantitativ.
Un grup de evenimente de baz n Arborele Defeciunilor care
declaneaz evenimentul de top prin producerea lor simultan se numete n
literatura de specialitate cutset al Arborelui.
Pentru a stabili cutset-urile se poate aplica un algoritm numit MOCUS -
Method of Obtaining Cut Sets ( Metod de obinere a cutset-urilor).
Algoritmul MOCUS cuprinde patru etape: a. luarea n considerare a
evenimentului de top; b. nlocuirea evenimentului cu evenimente de pe al
doilea nivel n funcie de urmtoarele criterii: n cazul n care evenimentele de
pe nivelul inferior sunt conectate printr-o intrare SAU, sunt scrise n rnduri
separate; dac acestea sunt conectate printr-o intrare I, sunt scrise n coloane
separate; c. Se realizeaz succesiv pasul 2 pentru toate evenimentele care nu
sunt evenimente de baz; d. Cnd toate evenimentele sunt evenimente de
baz, evenimentele din fiecare rnd constituie un cutset.
Analiza cantitativ a Arborelui Defeciunilor folosete probabilitatea de
defectare q
i
a evenimentelor de baz i intrrile arborelui pentru a calcula
probabilitatea evenimentului de top Q
0
. Pentru evenimente de baz combinate
printr-o intrare de tip SAU este utilizat structura serie. Pentru evenimente
206
combinate printr-o intrare de tip I este utilizat structura paralel (dac se
utilizeaz aceste ecuaii menionm c fiabilitatea p
i
= 1- q
i
, unde q
i
este
probabilitatea defectrii).
Figura 1 ilustreaz structurile serie i paralele folosind diagrame bloc.
Structura serie:
[
=
= =
n
i
i n SF
P P P P P
1
2 1
........ .
Structura paralel: ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 )........( 1 ).( 1 ( 1
1
2 1
[
=
= =
n
i
i n SF
P P P P P
P
SF
= fiabilitatea structurii, Pi= fiabilitatea structurii i. Fiabilitatea P este
definit ca probabilitatea de supravieuire (a unei componente sau sistem) i
este dependent de timpul de operare i condiiile de exploatare.
Probabilitatea de cedare Q este egal cu probabilitatea de non-supravieuire
(1- P).
2. Abordare cantitativ-evaluare
O msur uzual a importanei aplicat la Arborele Defeciunilor este
msura de importan Vessley-Fussell, I
VF
[1]. Aceasta este probabilitatea ca
cel puin un cutset minimal ce conine evenimentul pe baz i este defect la
momentul t, astfel c evenimentul de top este declanat n momentul t. Acest
lucru poate fi calculat prin folosirea urmtoarei ecuaii:
) (
) (
) / (
t
t
Ki
t i
VF
Q
Q
I
0
= ; I
VF
(i/t) = P (Cel puin un cutset ce conine
evenimentul pe baz i este defect la momentul t | Sistemul cedeaz la timpul
t);
Q
Ki
(t) este probabilitatea ca un cutset minimal ce conine cauza de baz i este
defect la momentul t i Q
0
este probabilitatea de apariie a evenimentului de
top.
Cele m cutset-uri minime n care cauza de baz i este prezent nu sunt
independente deoarece aceleai cauze de baz pot fi prezente n mai mult de
un cutset. Cu toate acestea, presupunnd c cele m cutset-uri sunt
independente, limita superioar a Q
Ki
poate fi estimat folosind I
VF
(i/t ) de
mai sus . Aceast ipotez este implementat n urmtoarea ecuaie:
) (
)) (
1
) / (
1 ( 1
t
t
m
j
t i
VF
Q
Q
I
Kij
0
[
~
=
Structur
Structur serie
Figura 1 Structuri generale de sistem
207
unde m = numrul de cutset-uri minimale n care cauza de baz i este
prezent.
3. Exemplu de aplicare a metodei Arborelui defectelor pentru
pierderea propulsiei unei nave
Se va construi un Arbore al Defeciunilor pentru cazul n care
evenimentul de top este pierderea de puterii de propulsie pentru nav urmat de
o analiza cantitativ i calitativ pentru acesta folosind algoritmii i metodele
descrise n continuare. Se presupune c informaiile prezentate n Tabelul 1
sunt n mod obinuit disponibile i cunoscute [2].
Defeciunea Descrierea defeciunii Fiabilitate -
Probabilitatea p
Defectare -
Probabilitatea q
F1 Lips alimentare combustibil 0.730 0.270
F2 Avarierea arborelui cotit 0.973 0.027
F3 Pistoane supranclzite 0.984 0.016
F4 Cuplaj defect 0.948 0.052
F5 Reductor defect 0.764 0.236
F6 Avarierea liniei de axe 0.971 0.029
F7 Defectarea elicei cu pas reglabil - EPR 0.813 0.187
3.1 Abordarea Calitativ: Construirea Arborelui Defectelor
Evenimentul de top este deja definit ca "pierderea propulsiei navei".
Exist trei evenimente independente, care pot rezulta n evenimentul de top.
Acestea sunt "pierderea transmisiei puterii de propulsie" n linia de arbori sau
reductor, "pierderea generrii energiei de propulsie" de la motoare, i
"pierderea consumului puterii de propulsie" din cauza unor defeciuni la elice.
Doar unul dintre aceste evenimente trebuie sa se produc pentru a declana
evenimentul de top. Prin urmare, aceste trei evenimente trebuie s fie
combinate printr-o intrare de tip SAU. Arborele Defeciunilor poate fi
structurat dup cum se arat n Figura 2.
Evenimentul "pierderea transmisiei puterii de propulsie" poate fi
cauzat de o defeciune a reductorului i / sau a liniei de axe i prin urmare
aceste defeciuni trebuie combinate prin utilizarea unei intrri de tip SAU.
Evenimentul "pierderea consumului puterii de propulsie" include doar cazul
defectrii elicei cu pas reglabil (EPR). n ceea ce privete cazul de "pierderea
generrii energiei de propulsie", att motoarele tribord ct i tribord trebuie s
cedeze n a transmite puterea ctre reductor. Prin urmare, trebuie s fie
folosit o intrare de tip I pentru aceste dou evenimente. Exist dou
modaliti pentru ca fiecare motor s nu mai poat transmite putere ctre
reductor: defectarea cuplajului i respectiv cedarea motorului n sine.
O intrare de tip SAU trebuie s fie utilizat pentru aceste evenimente
deoarece unul este suficient pentru ca motorul s nu mai reueasc
Tabelul 1 Date privind defeciunile pentru o perioad de navigaie de un an (336 zile)
208
transmiterea puterii ctre reductor. Evenimentele legate de defectarea
motoarelor principale (att tribord ct i babord) artate n Figura 2 necesit
tratarea n detaliu. cauzele evenimentelor de baz ale defectrii 1, 2, 3 (vezi
Tabelul 1), sunt toate grupate n evenimentul "defectarea motorului
principal" , acestea trebuind s fie combinate prin utilizarea unei intrri de tip
SAU atta timp ct fie i numai una din cauze este suficient pentru ca
motorul principal s cedeze. Principalele moduri de defeciuni la motor pot fi
aranjate / modelate ntr-un Arbore al Defeciunilor aa cum se arat n Figura
2.
Defectarea
motorului
principal
Lips alimentare
combustibil
Avarierea
arborelui cotit
Pistoane
supranclzite
Figura 3 Moduri defectare ale motorului principal
pierderea
transmisiei puterii
d l i
Pierderea funciunii principale de propulsie
pentru o nava specific-tanc petrolier, pentru
o perioad normal de operare de 1 an
pierderea
generrii energiei
de propulsie
(E 2)
pierderea
consumului
puterii de
propulsie
Defeciune la
EPR
Reductor
defect
Linie de
axe
defect
Motorul tribord nu mai
asigur transmiterea
puterii ctre reductor (E
4)
Motorul
principal
tribord defect
(E 6)
Cuplaj
tribord defect
Motorul
principal
babord defect
(E 7)
Cuplaj
babord defect
Motorul babord nu mai
asigur transmiterea
puterii ctre reductor (E
5)
Figura 2 Arborele defeciunilor pentru evenimentul de top Pierdere propulsiei unei
nave de tip Tanc petrolier
209
3.2 Abordarea calitativ: stabilirea cutset-urilor minimale
Se aplica algoritmul MOCUS (s-a notat cu: subscript s = Tribord, subscript
p = babord):
Pasul 1:Pierderea funciunii principale de propulsie pentru o nav specific - tanc
petrolier, ntr-o perioad normal de operare de 1 an
Pasul 2:
E 1
E 2
E 3
Pasul 3.1: - pentru evenimentul
"pierderea transmisiei puterii de
propulsie" (E 1 n structura
arborelui):
F 5
F 6
E 2
E 3
Pasul 3.2: -pentru
evenimentul "pierderea
generrii energiei de
propulsie" (E 2 n structura
arborelui):
F 5
F 6
E 4 E 5
E 3
Pasul 3.3: - pentru
evenimentul "motorul
principal tribord nu mai
transmite putere la reductor"
(E 4 n structura AD):
F 5
F 6
As E 5
F4s E 5
E 3
Pasul 3.4: - pentru
evenimentul "defectarea
motorul principal tribord"
(E 6 n structura arborelui;
vezi Figura 8.12 i 8.13):
F 5
F 6
F 1s E 5
F 2 s E 5
F 3 s E 5
F 4 s E 5
E 3
Pasul 3.5: - pentru
evenimentul
"defectarea motorul
principal babord"
(E 7 n structura
arborelui; vezi
Figura 8.12 i
8.13):
K 1 F 5
K 2 F 6
K 3 F 1 s F 1p
K 4 F 2 s F 1p
K 5 F 3 s F 1p
K 6 F 4 s F 1p
K 7 F 1 s F 2p
K 8 F 2 s F 2p
K 9 F 3 s F 2p
K 10 F 4 s F 2p
K 11 F 1 s F 3p
K 12 F 2 s F 3p
K 13 F 3 s F 3p
K 14 F 4 s F 3p
K 15 F 1 s F 4p
K 16 F 2 s F 4p
K 17 F 3 s F 4p
K 18 F 4 s F 4p
K 19 F 7
Pasul 4:
Exist 19 combinaii de cauze de baz posibile (sau disfuncionaliti
ale evenimentelor de baz) pentru sistemul de propulsie (fiecare rnd). Exist
de cele mai multe ori dou cauze de baz n fiecare cutset. Este preferabil s
avem pe ct posibil ct mai multe cauze de baz n fiecare cutset. Cutset-urile
K1, K2 i K19 includ doar o cauza de baz. Prin urmare, evenimentul de top
se produce atunci cnd apare una din aceste cauze de baz. Aadar, ar fi
preferabil s se implementeze redundana sau alte msuri de mbuntire a
fiabilitii pentru aceste cutset-uri. Spre exemplu, ar putea fi o soluie
utilizarea a dou sisteme de propulsie (elice) independente pentru asigurarea
210
redundanei sistemului i a reduce astfel riscul de apariie eveniment de top
dar acest lucru este ns greu practicabil.
3.3 Abordarea cantitativ: Calcule n Arborele Defeciunilor
Exist mai multe calcule ce pot fi efectuate. Probabilitatea de apariie a
evenimentului de top a Q
0
prezint un interes special. Probabilitile pentru
fiecare cutset sunt de asemenea importante. Ecuaiile pentru structurile serie
sunt folosite pentru a calcula intrrile SAU iar cele pentru structurile paralele
sunt utilizate pentru a calcula intrrile de tip I (reamintim c fiabilitatea pi =
1- qi, unde qi este probabilitatea defectrii). Date privind defeciunile sunt
prezentate n Tabelul 1.
Aa cum se arat n Tabelul 3, probabilitatea pentru evenimentul de top
de "pierdere a funciei principale de propulsie pentru nav specializat pentru
un an de funcionare normal" este 0.465. Acest lucru nseamn c exist
ansa de 46,5% c aceast defeciune s se produc, ceea ce este de nedorit i
potenial foarte periculos, n cazul n care evenimentul va avea loc.
3.4 Abordarea cantitativ: evaluarea importanei cauzei de baz
Pentru a evalua importana diferitelor cauze de baz, probabilitatea de
defectare a cutset-urilor este calculat aa cum este artat n Tabelul 4,
folosind datele privind probabilitatea de defectare prezentate n Tabelul 1.
n conformitate cu msura importanei componentei Vessley-Fussell,
rangul importanei cauzelor de baz (sau defeciunilor) este stabilit dup cum
se arat n Tabelul 5.
Q
E7
= 1- P
E7
= 1 [p
F1
p
F2
p
F3
] = 1 - [(1-q
F1
) (1-q
F2
) (1-q
F3
)] 0,301
Q
E6
= 1 - [(1-q
F1
) (1-q
F2
) (1-q
F3
)] 0,301
Q
E5
= 1 - [(1-Q
E7
) (1-q
F4
)] 0,337
Q
E4
= 1 - [(1-Q
E7
) (1-q
F4
)] 0,337
Q
E2
= 1- P
E2
= 1 [1- (1- P
E4)
) (1- P
E5
)] = Q
E5
Q
E4
0,118
Q
E3
= q
F7
0,187
Q
E1
= 1 - [(1-q
F5
) (1-q
F6
)] 0,258
Q
E0
= 1 - [(1-Q
E1
) (1-Q
E2
) (1-Q
E3
) ] 0,465
K1 F5 Q
K1
= 0,236 1- Q
K1
=0,764
K2 F6 Q
K2
= 0,029 1- Q
K2
=0,971
K3 F1s F1p Q
K3
= 0,073 1- Q
K3
=0,927
K4 F2s F1p Q
K4
= 0,0073 1- Q
K4
=0,9927
K5 F3s F1p Q
K5
= 0,0043 1- Q
K5
=0,9957
K6 F4s F1p Q
K6
= 0,014 1- Q
K6
=0,986
K7 F1s F2p Q
K7
= 0,0073 1- Q
K7
=0,9927
K8 F2s F2p Q
K8
= 0,00073 1- Q
K8
=0,99927
K9 F3s F2p Q
K9
= 0,00043 1- Q
K9
=0,99957
K10 F4s F2p Q
K10
= 0,0014
1- Q
K10
=0,9986
Tabel 3 Calculul probabilitii evenimentului de top Q
0
211
K11 F1s F3p Q
K11
= 0,0043 1- Q
K11
=0,9957
K12 F2s F3p Q
K12
= 0,00043 1- Q
K12
=0,99957
K13 F3s F3p Q
K13
= 0,00026 1- Q
K13
=0,99974
K14 F4s F3p Q
K14
= 0,00083 1- Q
K14
=0,99917
K15 F1s F4p Q
K15
= 0,014 1- Q
K15
=0,986
K16 F2s F4p Q
K16
= 0,0014 1- Q
K16
=0,9986
K17 F3s F4p Q
K17
= 0,00083 1- Q
K17
=0,99917
K18 F4s F4p Q
K18
= 0,056 1- Q
K18
=0,944
K19 F4s F4p Q
K19
= 0,187 1- Q
K19
=0,813
Tabel 4 Calculul probabilitii defectrii cutset-urilor
Cutset-uri relevante
) 1 ( 1 [ QKi
VF
I
rang
F1 K3, K7, K11, K15 0,0966 0,208 3
F2 K4, K8, K12, K16 0,0098 0,021 6
F3 K5, K9, K13, K17 0,0061 0,013 7
F4 K6, K10, K14, K18 0,071 0,150 4
F5 K1 0,236 0,507 1
F6 K2 0,029 0,062 5
F7 K19 0,187 0,402 2
Rangul componentelor este rangul reparaiei. Dac propulsia este
pierdut, cea mai probabil defeciune este legat de reductor, aa cum este
dat n cauza de baz/ eveniment disfuncional F 5, i aa mai departe.
NOTE BIBLIOGRAFICE
[1] Svein Kristiansen, MaritimeTransportation Safety Management and
Risk Analysis, ed. Butterworth-Heinemann, 2005, pag 233.
[2] Svein Kristiansen, MaritimeTransportation Safety Management and
Risk Analysis, ed. Butterworth-Heinemann, 2005, pag 234.
Tabel 5 Importana rangurilor bazat pe msura importanei componentei
Vessley-Fussell
212
RACORDAREA ACTIVITILOR DE CERCETARE
TIINIFIC N DOMENIUL TEHNOLOGIILOR
AVANSATE LA CERINELE SOCIETII CUNOATERII
Silviu Mihai Petrior, Ghi Brsan,
Academia Forelor Terestre Nicolae Blcescu Sibiu,
Ramona Petrior, Colegiul Tehnic Independena Sibiu
Abstract
In the XXI century, human creativity is manifested in the four directions of action
covered by the knowledge society: education, research, development, innovation. These
goals are also reflected in the architecture of the Romanian military environment,
connected to the imperatives of the moment.
An example in this respect is project Research on the optimization of the
capabilities of the military logistic system by the implementation of solution specific to
robotized technologies developed between 2010 and 2013 within the Nicolae Blcescu
Land Forces Academy Sibiu. In this paper, the authors aim to show how the four pillars
specific to the knowledge society are reflected in the activities of the previously mentioned
project and to highlight the complementary relationship between them.
1. Introducere
ntr-o lume n care schimbarea reprezint singura constant existenial,
se cuvine a ndrepta capitalul intelectual spre cele patru direcii de aciune ale
societii cunoaterii: educaie, cercetare, dezvoltare, inovare.
213
Cercetarea tehnologic militar nu trebuie s aib n vedere doar
meninerea competitivitii instituiei militare, optimizarea activitii,
revitalizarea industriei naionale de profil, ci este important s-i aduc
aportul i la asigurarea proteciei cetenilor respectiv a teritoriilor. De la
aceasta se ateapt oferirea valenelor modernizrii n arhitectura sistemului
militar, prin intermediul crerii unor produse adaptabile realitii momentului
i care s corespund anumitor nevoi de: stabilitate, siguran i securitate.
2. Activitate de cercetare n slujba societii bazat pe cunoatere
Capacitatea creativ pus n slujba binelui public, nu trebuie s
neglijeze principiile de utilizare moral, dar nici transpunerea elementelor de
noutate n termeni didactici. n aceast direcie pot fi menionate dou
obiective ale proiectului Cercetri privind optimizarea capabilitilor
sistemului logistic militar prin implementarea unor soluii specifice
tehnologiilor robotizate:
modernizarea unui laborator de Tehnologii Logistice Avansate necesar
att n pregtirea studenilor de la specialitatea Logistic dar i a
masteranzilor de la programele Managementul capabilitilor
organizaionale precum i Management i Tehnologie;
dezvoltarea unei baze informaionale despre cercetri tiinifice cu
privire la optimizarea capabilitilor sistemelor logistice prin
implementarea unor soluii tehnologice avansate robotizate de
actualitate n scopul colaborrii ulterioare cu alte centre de cercetare i
nvmnt de specialitate i alinierii la cerinele mediului Euro-
Atlantic.
Adaptarea armatei la dinamica lumii contemporane aduce n prim-plan
conceptele de sustenabilitate, mentenan, interoperativitate, mobilitate,
capaciti de manevr, suport logistic.
214
Fig.1 Site-ul de prezentare a grantului
Printre cunotiinele i aptitudinile inginerului militar al secolului XXI
se numr utilizarea unor softuri specializate de modelare geometric,
cinematic i dinamic a unor structuri mecatronice ce pot fi implementate n
operaii de manipulare, depozitare i paletizare n cazul unor depozite cu
arsenal militar respectiv conceperea, modelarea i proiectarea anumitor celule
flexibile de fabricaie ( CFF-uri ) echipate cu roboi industriali necesare la
realizarea unor operaii cu nalt grad de risc uman. De cealalt parte,
specialitii militari vor fi responsabili cu proiectarea i realizarea unor
structuri modulare de roboi industriali care s rspund prompt unor cerine
de economicitate, productivitate, flexibilitate, securitate i protecie n munc
precum i realizarea unor programe informatice care s permit locomoia
structurii mecanice de roboi n aa fel nct celula proiectat s fie eficient i
fiabil.
Racordarea lumii militare la realitile i provocrile momentului este
vizibil n ncercarea de vindecare a uzurii fizice a tehnicii, n renviorarea
parcului tehnologic, n eforturile de a produce componente de inteligen
artificial care s aduc eficientizare, productivitate i modernizare n cadrul
logisticii operaionale i care, nu n ultimul rnd, s protejeze viaa.
De real folos pe direcia de reinginerire a sistemului logistic este
posibilitatea de a implementa tehnologii avansate din domenii de vrf ale
societii bazate pe cunoatere: automatica, cibernetica, electronica, robotica
etc. Se poate aprecia astfel c introducerea roboilor industriali n aplicaii
logistice reprezint i o consecin a dezvoltrii tehnologiilor militare n
consens cu dezideratul de a asigura structurilor lupttoare materialele i
echipamentele necesare n cantitatea cerut, n locaiile stabilite i n timpul
oportun.
Maximizarea viitoarelor conflicte armate este i va fi un proces ce va
impune gestionarea atent i riguroas a mijloacelor specifice tehnicii de lupt
la un nivel performant astfel nct efectele distrugtoare ale inamicului s fie
minimizate. Robotul i va face simit prezena n acest context att n
industria militar ( roboii militari ) ct i n teatrele de operaii ale Armatei
Romne ( roboi mobili, roboi pitori, roboi cosmici i probabil alii n
viitorul apropiat).
Posesor al inteligenei artificiale, robotul nu vine s nlocuiasc omul,
ci este conceput pentru a explora medii periculoase sau greu accesibile
respectiv pentru a rezolva situaii dificile fr a pune n pericol vieile
soldailor: detectarea i dezamorsarea bombelor, asigurarea pazei pe timp de
noapte a unor obiective strategice, spionaj i culegere de informaii,
capacitatea de a stoca muniii etc.
215
ns, implementarea sa reprezint un proces amplu i riguros de
proiectare i concepie, toate efectuate prin respectarea unor reguli de etic,
subliniate de printele roboticii Isaac Asimov:
legea 1 - un robot nu are voie s pricinuiasc vreun ru unei fiine
umane, sau prin neintervenie, s permit ca unei fiine umane s i se
fac ru;
legea 2 - un robot trebuie s se supun ordinelor date de ctre o fiin
uman atta timp ct ele nu intr n contradicie cu legea 1;
legea 3 - un robot trebuie s-i protejeze propria existen atta timp ct
acest lucru nu intr n contradicie cu legea 1 sau legea 2.
3. Concluzii
Activitile derulate de membrii sus-numitului contract sunt menite a
(re)aduce n atenie raportul de complementaritate dintre activitatea didactic
i cercetarea tiinific, posibilitatea aplicrii unor soluii tehnico-inginereti
adaptabile la imperativele\necesitile planetare, corelaia dintre inteligena
uman i inteligena artificial n direcia optimizrii industriei de profil,
realizarea demersurilor necesare sistematizrii unor criterii de performan
astfel nct sistemul logistic militar romnesc actual s poat fi adaptat
conceptual i structural la dimensiunile, configuraia respectiv misiunile
structurii de fore integrate prevzute de mediul euro-atlantic.
ACKONWLWDGMENT: Lucrarea este parte integranta in procesul de
diseminare a fazei I din contractul de cercetare CNCSIS - RESURSE
UMANE-TE nr. 59/2010, finantat de Ministerul Educatiei, Cercetarii,
Tineretului si Sportului
NOTE BIBLIOGRAFICE
[1] Brsan, Gh., Giurgiu, Luminia, Bumbuc, tefania, E-learning,
Solution Design -Studies-, Land Forces Academy Publishing House, Sibiu,
2007, ISBN 978-973-153-011-6.
[2] Petrior, S.M., Roboi industriali utilizai n aplicaii speciale, Ed.
Academiei Forelor Terestre Nicolae Blcescu, Sibiu, 2010, ISBN 978-
973-153-082-6.
[3] Buletin AGIR, nr.4\2008.
[4] www.armyacademy.ro\cercetare\robmilcap\robmilcap.html.
[5] www.unap.ro.
216
CONSIDERATIONS UPON PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT
Univ. assist. Brndua Maria POPA
Regional Department for Defense Resources Management Studies,
Braov
Abstract
Managementul performantei ne nva c a fi ocupat nu este acelai lucru cu a produce
rezultate. Specializarea, angajamentul i munca n sine nu sunt rezultate. Un personal bun
i foarte bine instruit, nu este suficient atunci cnd se dorete succesul. Elemente foarte
bune pot forma un sistem bun doar atunci cnd ntre ele se fac conexiunile potrivite pentru
a se obine rezultate. Totui, s obi rezultate nu este ntotdeauna sinonim cu a avea succes
i a fi eficient; ceea ce conteaz cu adevrat este obinerea unor rezultate care sunt utile
pentru organizaie i clienii si i / sau prile interesate. Managementul performanei este
n fapt, drumul de la situaia de a fi foarte ocupat spre eficacitate, este de la orientarea pe
ndeplinirea sarcinii la obinerea rezultatelor care conteaz.
Performance management teaches us that being busy is not the same as
producing results. Training, commitment and hard work alone are not results.
Having good and highly trained personnel is not enough when you want to
become successful. Very good elements can make a good system only when
they make the right connections and achieve results. But, achieving results is
not always synonym with being successful and efficient; what really counts is
achieving results which are useful for the organization and its clients and/or
stakeholders, it is in fact the way from busyness toward effectiveness.
Processes such as planning, budgeting have been performed for many years in
organizations but, many times they are done just to finalize a task and not to
contribute directly to the envisaged results of the organization. Recently, due
to all the changes from the environment the organizations are facing greater
challenges than ever before, meaning the businesses must be much more
careful about their strategies and their activity in order to remain competitive.
217
Typically when we think about performance in organization we think about
the performance of the employees; however performance management should
also be focused the organization as whole, departments, processes (budgeting,
product development, financial management etc.) teams or group.
Performance is built on multiple factors as culture, mission, work-flow, goals,
environment, knowledge and skills all working together to produce something
that is valuable to the consumer. There are three levels of performance: the
organization, the process, the individual. Having a great plan of action is not
enough if you do not have good people to carry it out. Even if the people are
smart and talented this is not enough to accomplish the task if they do not
work well together. In order to be performant we need the best mix of all the
three levels, a breakdown at any level will impede achieving performance.
Armstrong and Baron define performance management as a process which
contributes to the effective management of individuals and teams in order to
achieve high levels of organizational performance. As such, it establishes
shared understanding about what is to be achieved and an approach to leading
and developing people which will ensure that it is achieved.
Performance management is not a separate process through which managers
analyze employees activity, it is a strategy which relates to every activity of
the organization set in the context of its human resource policies, culture,
style an communication systems. The nature of the strategy depends on the
organizational context and can vary from organization to organization.
Performance management has a strategic component, it encompasses broader
issues and looks at longerterm goals and it should be an integrated activity
linking various aspects of the business, people management, and individuals
and teams. Performance management aims at performance improvement -
throughout the organization, for individual, team and organizational
effectiveness, development - unless there is continuous development of
individuals and teams, performance will not improve; it also deals with
behaviour management ensuring that individuals are encouraged to behave in
a way that allows and fosters better working relationships.
Within the framework of performance management there will be established a
culture in which individuals and groups are involved and take responsibility
for the continuous improvement of business processes and of their own skills,
behaviour and contributions. It helps understanding the expectations better,
managers can clarify what they want individuals and teams to do; likewise
individuals and teams can communicate their expectations of how they should
be managed and what they need to do their jobs. It follows that performance
management focuses on interrelationships and on improving the quality of
relationships among all the individuals from an organization - between
218
managers and individuals, between managers and teams, between members of
teams and so on, and that is why we can see it as a collective process. A very
important phase of this process is planning, which is important not only for
setting the strategy of the organization, the ways to reach the goals but also
for defining expectations expressed as objectives and as business plans. Last
but not least, performance management is about measurement; here we can
speak about the old saying If you can't measure it, you can't manage it, as
Peter Drucker said; setting performance indicators (measurable, quantifiable)
should never be omitted. Measurements should apply to all employees,
managers, and teams as much as individuals. It is a continuous process, not a
one-off event. It is not enough to perform an evaluation/appraisal activity
once a year, this is something that should be done periodically (e.g. monthly
or every 3 months) then, wherever it is necessary or if/whenever it is
necessary there should be taken corrective/improvement measures.
Performance standards should be established, goals and relevant indicators of
their achievement. In order to see how much has been accomplished we need
to check against performance measurements which can tell the level of
progress. Reporting of progress (documentation and reporting of progress in
meeting standards and targets and sharing of such information through
feedback) will then take place and improvement will be based on it. As we
can see in figure 1 all these pieces form the big puzzle called performance
management.
Fig. 1 Performance management factors
219
A Performance Management System is the continuous use of all the above
practices so that they are integrated into the organization's core operations.
Last but not least, it is holistic approach and should pervade every aspect of
running an organization from top management to the lowest level of
execution.
Performance management is a system which sets specific objectives and
measurements of achievements while identifying development opportunities.
Corporate strategic goals are the starting point for business and departmental
goals, followed by agreement on performance and development, leading to
the drawing up of plans between individuals and managers, with continuous
monitoring and feedback supported by formal reviews. We should always
start from our main objective which has to be broken down into smaller goals
and targets which are the smaller pieces forming the big image/ mission of the
organization. Objectives or goals describe something to be accomplished by
individuals, departments and organizations over a period of time. They can be
expressed as targets to be reached and tasks to be completed by specified
dates. They can be work-related, referring to the results to be attained in order
to accomplish the higher objective/mission, or personal, taking the form of
developmental objectives for individuals which are also linked to the
organization performance (well trained personnel will always be important
when it comes to doing a better job). Objectives need to be defined and
agreed. They will relate to the overall purpose of the job and define
performance areas - all the aspects of the job that contribute to achieving its
overall purpose. Targets then need to be set for each performance area and
what is very important, the set objectives, goals and targets must be very clear
and attainable, it is important for them to be set high but this also means high
enough to be achievable. The easiest way is to keep in mind that the goals
have to be S.M.A.R.T.: S-specific, M-measurable, A- attainable, R- realistic,
and T- timely. Saying that: we need to improve our work or we need to do
better next year, or something simpler the site needs to be updated will
never help. The site needs to be updated is too general, vague. It should be
said that the site needs to be updated every Monday at 10 because it leaves
no room for misinterpretation. Not knowing clearly what one has to do is the
fastest and surest way of doing a bad job. And what is more important, the
goals must be results-oriented, not task-oriented. The output should be
valuable and useful for the organization otherwise it is just a waste of time
and resources.Many organizations without performance management systems
operate appraisals in which an individual's manager regularly (usually
annually) records performance, potential
220
and development needs in a top-down process.
Performance management systems need to provide those involved, with the
opportunity to reflect on past performance as a basis for making development
and improvement plans, and the performance and development review
meeting provides this chance. There is no standard interpretation of results or
of what performance means. We can say that something id performant only
by comparison with either a set of best practices or another organization; this
means that we need a standard against which we measure performance.
Performance reviews can be seen not only as measurement sessions but also
as learning events, in which individuals can be encouraged to think about how
and in which ways they want to develop.
Alongside objectives are performance standards. They are used when it is not
possible to set time-based targets, or when there is a continuing objective
which does not change significantly from one review period to the next and is
a standing feature of the job. These should put in quantitative terms if
possible, e.g., speed of response to requests or meeting defined standards of
accuracy.
Measures should be transparent and applied fairly across the organization.
Ideally there should be a mix of individual and team measures, and measures
relevant to both the inputs and the outputs of performance.
e.g. Individual output measures:
- Achievement of objectives.
- Achievement against agreed standards of performance
221
- Behaviour, measuring the extent to which individuals exhibit
behaviours associated with performance such as respect for others, trust
etc.
Individual input measures:
- Competence.
- Skills and experience and the extent to which news skills are applied in
the job.
- Potential to develop and/or acquire new skills and progress to next
career level.
- Communication skills, etc.
Team measures:
- Individual contribution to the team through involvement in cross team
projects.
- Support given to other individuals to achieve their objectives.
- Understanding and fulfilling of team role, etc.
So, what can be said as a conclusion is that performance management is more
than the yearly appraisals or evaluation of performance. It is the system which
sets clear and realistic goals and provides meaningful expectations and
meaningful feedback. Performance management is the systematic process by
which an agency involves its employees, as individuals and members of a
group, in improving organizational effectiveness in the accomplishment of
agency mission and goals.
REFERENCES
[1] ARMSTRONG, M. and BARON, A., Managing performance:
performance management in action. London: Chartered Institute of Personnel
and Development, 2004;
[2] CARDY Robert L., Performance management: concepts, skills and
exercises., M.E. Sharpe Inc., New York, 2004
222
GLOBAL INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
Maj. Ala Nadeem QOUL
Jordan Armed Forces
Abstract
The availability of information in a timely and appropriate way for decision makers
is the basis for making process / decision-making, as it is one of the criteria used to
measure the quality of decisions, and how the decisions are not taken in a timely manner
due to lake of availability / access to data in a timely and proper manner. Accordingly, the
information technology is one of the basic tools and important for the exchange and
circulation of information, where they contribute to providing accurate data, and updated,
and timely, and then is the use of technological means of various indispensable basis to
provide information to decision makers in a timely manner and by means of non-
traditional, in addition to envelopment of methods of doing business both within
government and among themselves or with regard to the method to provide services to
citizens and provide information to third parties, there is no doubt that the information
centers in any government is one of the key players entrusted with the provision of
information that are built upon the decision-making using the tools of different technology
available to them, so the information centers need to be updated and continuous
development to meet the growing demand for information and to facilitate the circulation
of between relevant actors, as well as to keep pace with the steady development in the field
of information technology.
In this document we will see the strategy framework for Research and
Development in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector in Jordan,
the main problems delaying Jordan's from developing ICT and the Policy Framework for
223
Management of Information Technology in Canada, and the main role for the CIO in the
Canadian Government.
I. MISSION AND VISION
The Ministry of Information and Communications Technology in
Jordan (MOICT), has the mission of developing ICT initiatives and
stimulating Foreign Direct Investment flows towards Jordan in this sector.
The vision is to develop a dynamic ICT sector through building innovative
local research and development capabilities targeting economic growth,
competitiveness, and providing challenging employment opportunities in the
Jordanian job market. Accordingly, Jordan would be positioned to be a major
regional ICT hub and a leader in ICT-enabled development.
I.1. Improving the IT Environment
The following summarizes the key elements of the strategy, which
takes into consideration the best International practices and lessons learned:
- Establish a national R&D in ICT Committee, including: Governmental
Institutions, private sector, championed by MOICT, with coordination
with R&D.
- Develop incentives and regulation for Venture Capital company
formation.
- Improve Labor law to ensure recognition and benefits for persons
working in R&D related projects and tasks.
- Improve Government processes and procedures, particularly customs
clearance procedures, in order to expedite product development
iterations.
- Increase awareness about intellectual property rights among concerned
parties and citizen.
- Harmonize interrelated policies and strategies with a focus on R&D:
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research Strategy, ICT
sector strategy, small enterprise development, industrial and investment
promotion, key ICT user sector strategies, and the National Agenda.
- Promote competition among broadband telecommunications and
internet providers to reduce their costs to ICT users
I.2. Government role
The industry enjoys strong support from the government the Jordanian
government recognizes the key role it plays in providing an enabling
environment for innovation and research and in building the human capital
that is required for the future knowledge economy. There have been important
224
changes in the system of innovation in the country, specifically in the ICT
sector.
Jordanian institutions and their programs are better aligned with
national needs. Innovation programs, particularly technology incubators were
established in Jordan to encourage innovative solution development in
partnership with private sector.
I.3. Private and Public sectors
There is a good partnership between the private and public sectors but,
yet it needs to be stronger, as both parties share and exchange ideas and
experiences. The partnership is important at this point in order for the ICT
sector to develop further. The role of the Ministry of the ICT sector is to
ensure that all parties involved address the issues and work collectively to
build a strong IT technology.
I.4. Lessons from international experience
International lessons indicate that the enabling policy and business
environment is the most critical element of ICT sector growth strategies and
even more critical for ICT-enabled development strategies. There is
undoubtedly a role for government in supporting R&D and training for ICT
and other high-technology.
There is also a role for governments to induce and facilitate the
formation of clusters, incubators and shared support services for innovative
ICT enterprisespromoting innovation, external economies and joint
action. But the most pervasive impact will come from improving the
policies and business environment to promote ICT adoption, to promote ICT
innovation among local enterprises, and to encourage franchising, joint
ventures, collaborative research and exchanges among local and international
companies.
I.5. Main problems delaying Jordan's from developing ICT
There have been many significant problems delaying Jordan's
transformation such as the lack of infrastructure, Lack of Focus, the scarcity
of funding, absence of a well established e-Society. On an institutional level
within government agencies analysis showed a number of problems which
can be categorised in different domains starting from the expected cultural
problems such as resistance to change, as well as the lack of coordination, and
accountability problems, technical problems related to knowledge
225
management issues, behavioural problems such as the employees' adaptability
to the introduction of new working methods.
II. Canadian Policy on Management of Information Technology
II.1. Objective
The objective of the Canadian policy is to achieve efficient and
effective use of information technology to support government priorities and
program delivery, to increase productivity, and to enhance services to the
public section titles and paragraphs.
II.2. Expected results
The expected results of this policy are:
- Better understanding on the part of all key stakeholders of their roles
and responsibilities with respect to the management of IT in the
government;
- Strengthened management of IT across the government and better
decision-making at all levels, thus ensuring that IT supports program
delivery and provides value for money;
- Increased use of common or shared IT assets and services by
departments and agencies to ensure efficiency gains;
- Responsive services enabled by IT.
II.3. Policy requirements
Deputy heads are responsible for ensuring that: departments participate
in setting government-wide strategic directions for IT; Departmental IT
investment plans are integrated into the overall business plans of the
department; All IT assets and services are used in departments to avoid
duplication; Departmental IT governance structures are established;
Performance related to the departmental management of IT is measured
on an ongoing basis; A senior official is designated to represent the
department in discussions with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat for
the purposes of this policy; Departments provide Treasury Board of Canada
Secretariat with information concerning their activities in relation to this
226
policy that involve the development of national and international technology
standards.
II.4. Monitoring and reporting requirements
II.4.1. Deputy heads Role
Deputy heads are responsible for monitoring adherence to this policy
within their departments, consistent with the provisions of the Treasury
Board's Policy on Evaluation and Policy on Internal Audit, and for ensuring
that appropriate remedial action is taken to address any deficiencies within
their departments. Deputy heads with national or policy responsibilities
related to information technology are responsible for providing to the
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, on an annual basis, the names and
responsibilities of their officers who are involved in national and international
IT standards activities, to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the
Government of Canada's involvement and contribution.
II.4.2. Government Role
The Government will monitor compliance with this policy in a variety
of ways, including: assessments, examinations, evaluations and studies,
reviewing work performed in collaboration with departments. And it will
monitor government-wide progress against established strategic IT directions
and will measure government-wide IT performance on an ongoing basis.
II.4.3. CIO Role
In the Canadian Govermat the CIO is playing a magnificent role in the
progress of the Information Technology in Canada , by providing strategic
direction and leadership for the Government pursuit of excellence in
information management , and is responsible for policy development,
monitoring, management oversight, and leading community development and
capacity building initiatives in information management, information
technology, identity management and security, and access to information and
privacy to ensure the sound management and stewardship of the Government
of Canada's information and technology assets and its communities of
practice.
III. Conclusions
Information technology (IT) plays an important role in government
operations. It is also a key enabler in transforming the business of
227
government. Information technology is an essential component of the
government's strategy to address challenges of increasing productivity and
enhancing services to the public for the benefit of citizens, businesses,
taxpayers and employees. The coordination of all activities of information
technology in any country would ensure uniformity of vision of information
systems with objectives of the country.
Cleared and updated IT Policy with good implementation and
monitoring will also play an effective role in the country progress.
Jordan should seize the opportunity to take its place in the vanguard of
the global knowledge economy and information society. Government should
selectively intervene to complement market forces where the private sector
and academia cannot and where the potential benefits / spillovers are high
enough to justify intervention. Strategic plans are only valuable to the extent
that they are implemented.
To achieve connectivity and integration between the privet sector and
the government sector at the stat level, become the role of the CIO to provide
an integrated vision regarding the circulation of information and information
technology as well as guidance during the development, implementation and
operation of system and new applications, and in strategic planning at the
level of ministry.
The Executive Director of the information has important role to play in
terms of data collection, auditing, analysis and decision support, as well as
participate in the development of policies, strategies and plans that will work
organization in the in the field of handling information, as well as evidence of
the actions required for implementation, and follow-up implementation, and
evaluation of what has been done, as well as taking the necessary action in the
development and improvement of the new plans according to lessons learned
from implementing previous plans.
REFERENCES
1. www.pm.gov.jo
2. www.egovonline.net
3. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat.
4. Research & Development Strategy for Information and Communication
Technology 2007-2010 - Ministry of Information and Communication
Technology Jordan.
228
ABORDRI SISTEMICE PRIVIND FIABILITATEA,
DISPONIBILITATEA, MENTENABILITATEA I
COSTURILE RAIONALE PE CICLUL DE VIA AL
ECHIPAMENTELOR MILITARE
Locotenent colonel drd. Atena VILU
Corpul de control i inspecie
Colonel inginer Vasile ERBNESCU
Departamentul pentru armamente
Abstract
The Ministry of National Defence expects to acquire reliable and maintainable
military equipment that are of high quality, readily available, and able to satisfy user needs
with measurable improvements to mission capability and operational support, in a timely
manner, and at a fair and reasonable price. There are three mandatory sustainment
requirements to ensure that effective sustainment is addressed and accomplished over the
life cycle for all newly developed and fielded systems. The value of the Sustainment KPP
(Key Performance Parameter) is derived from the operational requirements of the weapon
system, assumptions for its operational use, and the planned logistical support to sustain it.
In order for the program manager to develop a complete system to provide warfighting
capability, sustainment objectives must be established and performance of the entire
system measured against those metrics. DoD Regulations I.1000 should require program
managers to formulate a viable Strategy on Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and
229
Cost (RAM-C) and document it in the Systems Engineering Plan (SEP) and Life Cycle
Sustainment Plan (LCSP).
n desfurarea unui program de achiziie pentru aprare, prin ingineria
sistemelor [1], domenii cum ar fi fabricaia, logistica pe ciclul de via,
fiabilitatea, disponibilitatea, mentenabilitatea, problemele de siguran i
mediu, de sntate i interoperabilitate reflect consideraii importante n
proiectare i fac parte din procesul tehnologic al echipamentelor militare.
Marimea consideraiei i impactului asupra proiectrii produsului se
bazeaz pe gradul n care influenteaz costul, termenul i performana
ntregului sistem, la un nivel de risc acceptabil.
I. MODEL DE ABORDRE SISTEMIC AL ACTIVITILOR
FDMC-CVEM
1.1. Generaliti privind abordarea sistemic
Iniial gndirea sistemic n economie [2] s-a orientat spre explorarea
sistemelor stabile, avnd ca principal instrument, modelul sistemului n
echilibru mecanic, stabilitatea cruia este meninut prin opoziia
manifestat fa de orice schimbri percepute ca abateri accidentale de la
programul de funcionare stabilit. Se convenea c procesele care decurg n
interiorul unui sistem nu necesit explicaii, ci interpretri complete, n funcie
de cauz i efect, prezentnd relaiile dintre pri ntr-o manier holistic, ca
pe un ntreg. Ulterior abordarea sistemic a dezvoltat, pe baza studiului
buclelor de reacie sau a conexiunilor inverse (feedback), modele
homeostatice caracterizate prin existena unor circuite informaionale care au
ca punct de plecare anumite intrri (input-uri) pentru un proces care modific
starea iniial a sistemului ntr-o singur direcie sau spre o singur ieire. n
aceste modele managementul apare ca reglare pe baz de feedback a
proceselor, prin alocarea resurselor disponibile n contextul meninerii sub
control a tuturor secvenelor de funcionare, necesare pentru obinerea
rezultatelor proiectate n structura praxiologic
113
a obiectivului sistemului.
Etapa contemporan de evoluie a metodologiei abordrii sistemice este
dominat de modele adaptabile cu autoorganizare. Aceste modele se bazeaz
pe conexiunea invers pozitiv, destabilizatoare, dar care realizeaz cutarea
unor noi forme i combinaii funcionale: nu toate perturbrile trebuie
considerate disfuncii. Modelele din aceast generaie ofer o viziune mai
bogat, mai complex despre schimbarea organizaional a sistemelor
economice, artnd c trecerea spre o nou ordine (stare), eventual una
calitativ superioar, este provocat nu doar de intrri sau de factorii externi, ci
de o combinaie de fore att exogene, ct i endogene, care se alimenteaz i
se ntrein reciproc. n consecin, mediul are un rol determinant n modelarea
113
Praxiologie - Ramur a tiinei care studiaz structura general a aciunilor umane i a
condiiilor eficacitii acestora, conform DEX.
230
configuraiei structurale i a comportamentelor sistemului. Procesele de
autoorganizare formeaz mecanismele prin care dinamica intern este
conectat la schimbrile din mediu, iar crizele i puseurile de dezordine sunt
convertite n bazele unui nou mod de organizare. Funcionarea sistemelor
economice reale, are loc prin cuplarea unor fluxuri de reglare, fie prin
fluctuaii ntre perioadele de relativ stabilitate i perioadele de restructurare,
fie prin autotransformarea sistemului nsui, conservndu-i profilul normativ.
Aceste trei generaii de modele n gndirea sistemic nu numai c se succed n
timp, ci alctuiesc un ansamblu de argumente complementare care spulber
iluzia c putem controla complexitatea organizaional a fenomenului
economic exclusiv prin abordri inginereti: n termeni de precizie,
randamente i parametri de funcionare determinai strict cantitativ.
Evenimentele i procesele din organizaiile economice, ca fapte sociale, fiind
grupate n funcii care iau valori ntr-un interval de autoritate, se preteaz mult
mai bine unor abordri calitative, inclusiv cu ajutorul teoriei sistemelor vagi
(fuzzy) o direcie nc insuficient valorificat.
Obiectivul abordrii sistemice (sistemism, sistemicitate) n management
poate fi formulat astfel: nelegerea i controlul structurilor complexe i
evolutive [3]. Proliferarea structurilor complexe este tendina dominant n
economiile moderne. Deoarece complexitatea, spre deosebire de structurile
simple ale trecutului, nu poate fi descompus i recompus fr pierderi
informaionale, managementul complexitii solicit concepte i tehnici
diferite, de cele specifice managementului tradiional. Managementul
complexitii este una dintre paradigmele eseniale ale viitorului. Sistemismul,
ca demers intelectual, permite integrarea a numeroase constrngeri extra- i
intra-organizaionale n procesele de reflecie managerial.
1.2. Ingineria sistemelor pe ciclul de via al echipamentelor
militare
Ingineria sistemelor [1] este un proces care stabilete un echilibru ntre
performan, risc, cost i grafic, folosind un proces iterativ de sus n jos, de
analiz a cerinelor, analiza funcional, alocare, sintez, verificare, control i
validare a sistemului.
Pentru a traduce nevoile misiunii i cerinele operaionale ntr-o soluie
de sistem care include proiectarea, fabricarea, testarea i evaluarea, precum i
procesele i produsele de suport, directorul de program este obligat s
utilizeze procesul de inginerie a sistemelor.
Prin procesul de inginerie a sistemelor, se asigur:
a) transformarea nevoilor misiunii i cerinelor operaionale ntr-o
soluie integrat de proiectare a sistemului, prin luarea n consideraie
concomitent a tuturor necesitilor pe durata ciclului de via: cercetare,
dezvoltare, fabricare, testare i evaluare, verificare, instalare, funcionare,
suport, instruire i scoatere din nzestrare;
231
b) compatibilitatea, interoperabilitatea i integrarea tuturor interfeelor
funcionale i fizice i faptul c definirea i proiectarea sistemului reflect
cerinele pentru toate elementele sistemului: hard, soft, faciliti, personal i
date;
c) caracterizarea i controlul riscurilor tehnice.
Directorul de program [1] trebuie s verifice ca activitaile referitoare la
fiabilitate, mentenabilitate i disponibilitate s fie stabilite de la nceperea
ciclului de achiziie, n scopul asigurrii ndeplinirii cerinelor operaionale i
reducerea costurilor proprii pe durata ciclului de via.
Cerinele de fiabilitate, mentenabilitate i disponibilitate se bazeaz pe
cerinele operaionale i consideraiile de costuri ale ciclului de via, statuate
n termeni operaionali cuantificabili, msurabili pe durata dezvoltrii, precum
i a evalurii i testrii operaionale i sunt definite pentru toate elementele
sistemului, incluznd i echipamentul de instruire i testare. Ele sunt derivate
din obiectivele privind disponibilitatea sistemului.
Cerinele de fiabilitate se adreseaz att fiabilitii operaionale, ct i
celei logistice. Cerinele de mentenabilitate se adreseaz mentenanei
preventive i de corectare. Cerinele de disponibilitate se adreseaz strii de
pregtire pentru lupt a sistemului.
Directorul de program planific i verific modul cum se realizeaz
fiabilitatea, mentenana i disponibilitatea sistemului pe durata proiectrii,
dezvoltrii produciei i desfoar activiti de testare, cu echipamente care
s demonstreze performanele sistemului, nainte ca producia s reflecte
maturitatea proiectrii.
Demonstraiile utilizeaz sisteme reprezentative de producie sau ct
mai apropiate de acestea i proceduri operaionale reale: piese de schimb,
scule, echipamente de suport, personal calificat.
1.3. Elemente de baz n sfera Fiabilitii, Disponibilitii,
Mentenabilitii i Costurilor raionale pe Ciclul de Via al
Echipamentelor militare (FDMC-CVEM)
Structurile centrale ale M.Ap.N. i categoriile de fore trebuie s emit
politici pe linia sporirii ateniei cu privire la fiabilitate i mentenabilitate n
timpul fazelor derulrii programului de achiziie. Dac fiabilitatea,
mentenabilitatea i logistica pe ciclul de via al echipamentului militar nu
sunt proiectate n mod adecvat, exist riscul ca programele aferente acestora
s ncalce pragurile de referin ale Bazei programului cu creteri mult mai
mari ale costurilor de achiziie care vor rezulta, ca urmare a costurilor
aciunilor corective; costnd mai mult dect se anticipase pentru operare i
suport, fr a reui s ofere disponibilitatea ateptat de ctre lupttor. Ca
urmare a acestor preocupri, reglementrile specifice vor defini trei cerine
obligatorii legate de asigurarea unei sustenabiliti eficiente realizate pe
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parcursul ciclului de via pentru toate sistemele nou dezvoltate i pentru cele
aflate n dotarea forelor lupttoare.
Cerinele de sustenabilitate includ un Parametru Cheie de Performan
(PCP), Disponibilitatea i dou Atribute Cheie pentru Sistem (ACS),
Fiabilitatea i Costul de proprietate.
Sustenabilitatea reprezint o component de baz pentru performan.
Includerea planificrii "n avans" a sustenabilitii permite obinerea unui
echipament militar cu valoare optim a disponibilitii i fiabilitii cerute de
lupttor. Valoarea sustenabilitii este derivat din cerinele operaionale ale
sistemului de armamente, din ipotezele privind utilizarea operaional i din
planificarea suportului logistic pentru acel sistem. Pentru ca directorul de
program s dezvolte un sistem complet care s furnizeze capabilitatea de lupt
cerut, obiectivele de sustenabilitate trebuie s fie stabilite, iar performanele
msurate ale ntregului sistem trebuie s rspund parametrilor de
sustenabilitate.
Cerinele de sustenabilitate. PCP disponibilitatea i cele dou ACS
de sprijin, obligatorii, menionate mai sus sunt prezentate pe scurt aici.
PCP - Disponibilitatea poate fi abordat din punct de vedere al
disponibilitii materiale i al disponibilitii operaionale.
Disponibilitatea material este o msur a procentajului, din stocul
total al unui sistem operaional, capabil (gata pentru misiune) de efectuarea
unei misiuni atribuite la un moment dat, bazat pe condiia material n care se
afl. Disponibilitate material se refer la totalul echipamentelor planificate
pentru utilizarea operaional, inclusiv cele aflate temporar ntr-o stare
neoperaional, dup ce au fost introduse n serviciu (cum ar fi cele aflate n
baze pentru reparaii). ntreaga durat de timp a ciclului de via trebuie s fie
luat n calcul, de la instalarea n serviciul operaional pn la scoaterea din
nzestrare. Dezvoltarea parametrului disponibilitii materiale este o
responsabilitate a directorului programului de achiziie.
Disponibilitatea operaional indic procentajul de timp n care un
sistem sau grup de sisteme din cadrul unei uniti sunt operaional capabile s
execute o misiune atribuit.
Determinarea valorii optime pentru Disponibilitatea operaional
necesit o analiz cuprinztoare a sistemului i a utilizrii planificate a
acestuia, aa cum sunt specificate n Conceptul de operaii (CONOPS),
inclusiv mediul de operare planificat, timpul de operare, alternativele de
fiabilitate, abordrile privind mentenabilitatea, precum i soluiile privind
lanul de aprovizionare. Dezvoltarea parametrului disponibilitii operaionale
este responsabilitatea directorului cu cerinele operaionale.
ACS - Fiabilitatea. Fiabilitatea msoar probabilitatea ca sistemul s
funcioneze fr defeciuni ntr-un interval de timp specificat i n condiii
specificate. Fiabilitatea trebuie s fie suficient pentru a sprijini capabilitatea
de lupt necesar n mediul de operare preconizat. Considerentele de
233
fiabilitate trebuie s sprijine att disponibilitatea material, ct i
disponibilitatea operaional.
ACS - Costul de proprietate. Costul de proprietate ofer un echilibru
pentru soluia de sustenabilitate prin luarea n considerare n punctele de
decizie ale programului a costurilor de operare i suport (O & S) asociate cu
disponibilitatea (de exemplu, cele de mentenan, piese de schimb,
combustibil, de sprijin.).
1.4. Model de abordare sistemic a activitilor FDMC - CVEM
Figura 1 prezint activitile importante derulate n timpul ciclului de
via pentru dezvoltarea Raportului FDMC, precum i care sunt prile
implicate responsabile pentru aceste activiti.
Fig.1 Model de abordare sistemic a activitilor FDMC - CVEM
Abrevierile utilizate n modelul de mai sus sunt prezentate n tabelul 1.
Abrevieri Descrierea termenilor utilizai n activitile FDMC-CVEM
AA Analiza Alternativelor
AAP Acordul Axat pe Performan
ACF Auditul Configuraiei Funcionale
ACFz Auditul Configuraiei Fizice
ATO Activitile de Testare Operaional
AEvP/ Dpa Analiza i Evaluarea Programului / Dpa
BPA Baza Programului de Achiziie
CCV Costurile pe ciclul de via
234
Abrevieri Descrierea termenilor utilizai n activitile FDMC-CVEM
COF Capabilitatea Operaional Final
COI Capabilitatea Operaional Iniial
CONOPS Conceptul de Operaii
CSCI Consiliul de Supraveghere a Cerinelor ntrunite
CVEM Ciclul de Via al Echipamentelor Militare
CVI Costul ca o Variabil Independent
DDC Documentul privind Dezvoltarea Capabilitii
DCI Documentul Capabilitilor Iniiale
D/CPD Definire / Criterii de punctaj al defeciunilor
DDM Decizia privind Dezvoltarea Material
DPC Documentul privind Producia Capabilitii
DT Dezvoltarea Tehnologic
EBC Evaluarea Bazat pe Capabiliti
ELI Evaluarea Logisticii Integrate
EOC Element Operaional Critic
EOCC Elemente i Criterii Critice de operare
EPT Evaluarea Pregtirii Tehnologice
EPTO Evaluarea Pregtirii pentru Testarea Operaional
FDM Fiabilitate, Disponibilitate, Mentenabilitate
FDMC Fiabilitate, Disponibilitate, Mentenabilitate i Cost
F/M Fiabilitate i Mentenabilitate
GIAC Grup de mbuntire a Analizei Costului
LBP Logistica Bazat pe Performan
MPAP Msurile pentru asigurarea performanei
MPE Msuri pentru eficacitate
MPT Msurarea Performanei Tehnice
PCP Parametrii Cheie de Performan
PD A Punctul de Decizie A
PD B Punctul de Decizie B
PD C Punctul de Decizie C
PIS Planul de Ingineria Sistemelor
PMAPA Program major de achiziie pentru aprare
PISM Producia Iniial de Serie Mic
PPTE Planul Principal de Testare i Evaluare
PS Producia de Serie
PSCV Planul de Susinere pe Ciclul de Via
PTC Programul de Testare Comparativ
RAS Revizuirea Alternativelor de Sistem
RBI Revizuirea Bazei de Integrare
RCS Revizuirea Cerinelor de Sistem
RFS Revizuirea Funcionrii Sistemului
RIS Revizuirea n Serviciu
RM Fiabilitatea material
RPC Revizuirea Proiectrii Critice
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Abrevieri Descrierea termenilor utilizai n activitile FDMC-CVEM
RPP Revizuirea Proiectului Preliminar
RPDP Revizuirea Pregtirii de Produciei
RPTO Revizuirea Pregtirii pentru Testarea Operaional
RTI Revizuirea Tehnic Iniial
RVS Revizuirea Verificrii Sistemului
SA Strategia de achiziie
SDT Strategia de Dezvoltare Tehnologic
SMO/PM Sumarul modului operaional / Profilul Misiunii
STE Strategia de Testare i Evaluare
TD/TO Testarea de dezvoltare / Testarea operaional
T&E Testarea i Evaluarea
T&ED Testarea i Evaluarea pentru Dezvoltare
T&EO Testarea i Evaluarea Operaional
T&EOI Testarea i Evaluarea Operaional Iniial
Tabelul 1
1.5. Scopul FDMC
Reglementrile n sfera fiabilitii, disponibilitii, mentenabilitii i
costului (FDMC) sprijin prile implicate n dezvoltarea cerinelor de
sustenabilitate i asigur documentarea pentru Raportul privind FDMC [4],
ajutnd totodat contractantul dezvoltator s proiecteze i s dezvolte un
produs de succes.
Aceste reglementri asigur direcionarea pe linia modului n care s fie
dezvoltate i documentate realistic cerinele PCP / ACS privind
sustenabilitatea, precum i pe linia modului n care aceste cerine trebuie s
fie msurate i testate pe ntreg ciclul de via. Totodat se descrie procesul de
urmat pentru structurile implicate n interfa cu categoriile de fore i echipa
de program pentru dezvoltarea cerinelor de sustenabilitate.
II. COSTUL OPTIM PE CICLUL DE VIA AL
ECHIPAMENTELOR MILITARE
Un scop important al matricei sustenabilitii este de a asigura faptul c
performana sistemului i costul programului sunt corect echilibrate,
conducnd la dezvoltarea unei capabiliti materiale care s fie eficace din
punct de vedere operaional, adecvat i accesibil pentru lupttor.
Figura 2 arat efectul teoretic al fiabilitii i perioadei de timp pentru
sustenabilitate asupra Costurilor pe Ciclul de Via (CCV). De exemplu, un
sistem care prezint fiabilitate sczut poate necesita perioade mari de timp
pentru sustenabilitate, n principal din cauza numeroaselor cicluri de reparare
necesare, ceea ce va conduce la un cost de proprietate mare i la un CCV
mare.
n managementul pe ciclul de via al echipamentelor militare, un
obiectiv important l reprezint realizarea unui echilibru ntre costurile de
236
dezvoltare, producie, operare i suport, avnd ca rezultat costuri minime pe
ciclul de via. Soluia echilibrat va determina punctele optime pentru
fiabilitate i timpii pentru sustenabilitate nc de la nceputul dezvoltrii
programului, asigurnd astfel un CCV acceptabil pentru sistem, n
conformitate cu performana n funcionare necesar ndeplinirii misiunii.
Fig.2 Costul optim pe ciclul de via al echipamentelor militare
Valoarea optim a fiabilitii trebuie s fie suficient pentru a satisface
cerinele cele mai intense ale lupttorului, ceea ce poate conduce la un CCV
mai mare dect CCV minim posibil.
Conceptele considerate de suportabilitate i mentenabilitate ar trebui s
includ optimizarea mediei timpului de mentenan (MDT) a sistemului i
uurina n realizarea mentenanei sistemului. MDT este redus prin limitarea
timpului de ntrziere logistic (LDT) prin pre-poziionarea unei cantiti
suficiente de piese de schimb i printr-un sistem eficient de aprovizionare care
s asigure piese de schimb disponibile la locul potrivit i la momentul potrivit.
Limitarea timpului de ntrziere administrativ (ADT) este un alt mod de a
limita timpul total de nefuncionare a sistemului. ADT este timpul necesar
pentru a iniia o aciune de mentenan dup apariia unei probleme.
Proiectarea sitemului pe linie de mentenabilitate va reduce timpul ntre
reparaii (MTTR), din nou reducnd MDT.
III. MODEL AL PROCESULUI DEZVOLTRII CERINELOR
DE SUSTENABILITATE
Instruciunile pe linia managementului achiziiilor pentru aprare (I
1000) trebuie s impun directorilor de program s formuleze o strategie
viabil privind FDM i s o documenteze n Planul de Ingineria Sistemelor
(PIS) i n Planul privind Sustenabilitatea pe Ciclul de Via (PSCV).
3.1 Punctul de decizie A
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Raportul iniial FDMC ar trebui s fie anexat la Analiza Alternativelor
(AA) aflat n curs de pregtire pentru Punctul de decizie A, Fig. 3.
Fig.3 Model al procesului dezvoltrii cerinelor de sustenabilitate n faza analizei soluiei
materiale
Acest raport poate fi limitat pe linia domeniului de aplicare datorit
necunoscutelor din aceast faz a programului, dar va articula n continuare
meninerea cerinelor FDM i de sustenabilitate n ceea ce privete conceptul
preferat de sistem, conceptul de suport i mentenan, precum i strategia de
dezvoltare tehnologic. Cu toate acestea, este esenial s se documenteze
ipotezele de fiabilitate, mentenabilitate i suportabilitate nc de la nceputul
programului.
3.2 Punctul de decizie B
Dezvoltatorul i directorul de program vor dezvolta sau actualiza
raportul FDMC de la AA pentru a sprijini dezvoltarea Documentului privind
Dezvoltarea Capabilitii (DDC) n curs de pregtire pentru Punctul de decizie
B (PD B), Fig. 4.
238
Fig.4 Model al procesului dezvoltrii cerinelor de sustenabilitate n faza dezvoltrii
tehnologice
Dac programul este iniiat la PD B sau a trecut prin faza de dezvoltare
tehnologic, acest raport FDMC va fi primul raport detaliat care include o
analiz cuprinztoare a sistemului i utilizarea sa planificat. Aceast analiz
include mediul de operare planificat, tempoul de operare, cerinele privind
sustenabilitatea, conceptul de mentenan i abordrile de suport al
produsului, precum i soluiile lanului de aprovizionare cu ipotezele
adecvate. Raportul FDMC va clarifica modul n care cerinele privind
sustenabilitatea sistemului vor fi msurate pe tot parcursul fazelor urmtoare.
La PD B, raportul FDMC va fi prezentat mpreun cu Planul privind
Sustenabilitatea pe Ciclul de Via. Dezvoltatorul va include un rezumat al
Raportului FDMC ca anex la DDC.
Cerinele de sustenabilitate din DDC vor reflecta concluziile desprinse
din dezvoltarea i evaluarea prototipurilor competitive din faza de dezvoltare
tehnologic i vor oferi o soluie echilibrat pentru modul realistic n care pot
fi dezvoltate tehnologiile n cadrul costurilor de program, a graficului de
dezvoltare a programului, precum i a parametrilor de performan i
sustenabilitate.
3.3. Punctul de decizie C
Dezvoltatorul forei combatante va actualiza raportul FDMC, n
colaborare cu directorul de program pentru a sprijini dezvoltarea DPC n curs
de pregtire pentru Punctul de decizie C funcie de performana demonstrat
n timpul testrii i evalurii, mpreun cu negocieri adecvate pentru a
echilibra costurile, graficul i cerinele realizabile, fig. 5.
239
Fig.5 Model al procesului dezvoltrii cerinelor de sustenabilitate n faza de producie i
inginerie
Dac un program este iniiat la Punctul de decizie C (PD C) sau a trecut
printr-o faz de dezvoltare de producie i inginerie (DPI), prezentul raport
FDMC va include o analiz cuprinztoare a sistemului i a utilizrii
planificate a acestuia.
Dac PD-C urmeaz unei faze de DPI, prezentul raport FDMC va
actualiza raportul FDMC, prezentat nainte de Punctul de decizie B i va fi
naintat mpreun cu Planul de Sustenabilitate pe Ciclul de Via. Acesta va
evidenia cazurile n care ipotezele au fost valabile sau n care nu au fost
valabile, precum i modificrile aduse sistemului sau utilizrii operarionale
planificate, ca urmare a rezultatelor testrii, devenind astfel referina de
msurare pentru fazele urmtoare din ciclul de via.
IV. ACTIVITI / OBIECTIVE PE CICLUL DE VIA AL
ECHIPAMENTELOR MILITARE PE LINIA FDMC
Dezvoltatorul de echipamente militare are n vedere elementele FDMC
n toate fazele ciclului de via ale acestora. Un model de abordare pe aceast
linie este prezentat n fig.6, n care sunt evideniate activitile i obiectivele
pe ciclul de via al echipamentelor militare [5].
240
Fig.6 Model al abordrii privind activitile i obiectivele pe ciclul de via al
echipamentelor militare
Pentru dezvoltarea diagnosticabilitii i testabilitii echipamentelor
militare n sfera FDMC, companiile din domeniul industriei de aprare
utilizeaz software-uri dedicate , exemplu eXpress [6] care este o aplicaie
off-the-shelf care asigur cadrul pentru proiectare, capturare a datelor,
integrare, evaluare i optimizare pentru Managementul Diagnosticrii,
Pronosticrii i Strii Sistemului (DPHM), precum i pentru abordarea
general a ingineriei Testabilitii Sistemului. Aceast aplicaie asigur
economii considerabile pentru costurile pe termen scurt i pe termen lung
realizate pe ntreg ciclul de via al sistemului, utiliznd mijloace, cum ar fi:
influena priectrii prin pronosticare, analize de testabilitate i diagnosticare
[7], [8], [9], suportul de inginerie pentru fiabilitate, suportul de inginerie
pentru mentenabilitate, verificarea i validarea.
Din prisma managementului pe ciclul de via al proiectelor [10] pot fi
evideniate caracteristicile cheie ale managementului calitii logisticii pe
ciclul de via al echipamentelor militare, fig. 7.
241
Fig.7 Caracteristicile cheie ale managementului calitii logisticii pe ciclul de via
al echipamentelor militare
V. CONCLUZIE
n funcie de abordarea general n sfera managementului pe ciclul de
via al logisticii echipamentelor militare, fie c planificatorii, dezvoltatorii i
evaluatorii pornesc de la un cadru bazat pe capabiliti, fie c se bazeaz pe
un cadru bazat pe programe sau proiecte, n final scopul, obiectivul, inta i
eforturile lor trebuie s conduc la sisteme de echipamente militare care s
rspund cerinelor lupttorului din punct de vedere al eficacitii,
performanelor, suportabilitii, fiabilitii, disponibilitii, mentenabilitii,
interoperabilitii i siguranei, la costuri raionale pe ntreaga durat de via.
NOTE BIBLIOGRAFICE
[1] *** Instruciunea I 1000.2-01 privind managementul achiziiilor
pentru aprare, editura Academiei Tehnice Militare, Bucureti, 2001;
[2] Dumitracu Vadim, Abordarea sistemic Instrument al
managementului complexitii, Revista Economie teoretic i aplicat, nr.2 /
2006, p. 82;
[3] Prof.Univ.Dr. Marin Fotache, Mai au importan astzi sistemica
i cibernetica n disciplinele tiinifice i aplicative actuale?, Facultatea de
Economie i Administrarea Afacerilor, Universitatea Al.I.Cuza, Iai, 2010;
[4] http://www.theriac.org/pdfs/DoD-RAM-C-Manual%202009-06-
01.pdf;
[5]
http://www.dsiintl.com/resources/presentations/2007/EADS/EADSDEFENSE
SECURITE_eXpress_User_Meeting_2006_Orange.pdf;
[6] http://www.dsiintl.com/WebLogic/Products.aspx;
[7] http://www.testability.com/;
[8] http://www.diagnosticmodels.com/;
[9] http://www.diag-ml.com/;
[10] CEN Workshop 10 - European Handbook for Defence
Procurement, Expert Group 13, Final report on Life Cycle (Projects)
Management, Brussels, 21 April 2008.
242
LOGISTICA PE CICLUL DE VIA
AL ECHIPAMENTELOR MILITARE MAJORE
Colonel inginer Vasile ERBNESCU
Departamentul pentru armamente
Locotenent colonel drd. Atena VILU
Corpul de control i inspecie
Abstract
Generating benefits through life cycle logistics of the major military equipment
(LCLMME) involves the approach in terms of program management, systems engineering,
supportability analysis, integrated logistic support elements, logistics engineering and
reliability, availability, maintainability, testability, predictability and diagnosticability for
the interoperability and optimal cost of major military equipment.
As a challenge of the Romanian DoD strategic vision, DoD decision makers must
integrate acquisition and logistics into a general capabilities framework in order to ensure a
superior support process for the major military equipment by focusing on affordable
system operational effectiveness as a key design and performance factor and emphasizing
total product life cycle logistics considerations in the systems engineering process.
During the process of defence acquisition management, LCLMME should be the
framework of a scientific approach leading to the verified and validated decisions, which
can contribute to a strategic guidance that will lead to faster implemented and more
efficient logistical support, at higher quality and optimal cost.
243
I. LOGISTICA ECHIPAMENTELOR MILITARE N ARMATA
ROMNIEI
Conform actualelor reglementri la nivelul Armatei Romniei, logistica
echipamemtelor militare trebuie ncadrat / abordat astfel (Fig.1):
- logistica de producie a echipamentelor militare;
- logistica de consum a echipamentelor militare.
Logistica de consum a echipamentelor militare trebuie abordat prin
prisma modului de organizare i funcionare reglementat astfel:
o logistica operaional a echipamentelor militare;
o logistica de baz a echipamentelor militare;
o logistica multinaional a echipamentelor militare;
o logistica prin cooperare a echipamentelor militare.
Fig. 1 Logistica echipamentelor militare n Armata Romniei
Avnd n vedere funcionalitatea eficient prin toate aceste tipuri de
logistic [1], viziunea strategic n sfera logisticii trebuie s conduc la un
sistem logistic integrat pe ciclul de via al echipamentelor militare.
244
II. MANAGEMENTUL PE NTREG CICLUL DE VIA AL
ECHIPAMENTELOR MILITARE MAJORE
Beneficiile pe termen mediu i lung pentru o logistic performant se
obin printr-o abordare a managementului echipamentelor militare pe toate
fazele ciclului de via, bazat pe date validate n poligoane de ncercri sau n
teatrele de operaii.
Conform Instruciunii I 1000.2-01 privind managementul achiziiilor
pentru aprare [2], directorul de program desfoar activitile de
management a logisticii achiziiilor pe tot timpul dezvoltrii sistemului pentru
a fi n msur ca proiectarea i achiziia sistemelor s fie susinute la un raport
de cost / eficien optim i s se ngrijeasc ca aceste sisteme, livrate
utilizatorilor, s dispun de suportul de infrastructur necesar ndeplinirii
cerinelor att pe timp de pace ct i la rzboi.
n Fig. 2 se prezint un model de abordare a cadrului managementului
pe ntreg ciclul de via al echipamentelor militare majore [3].
Fig. 2 Model de abordare a managementului pe ntreg ciclul de via al
echipamentelor militare majore
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III. DIAGRAMA LOGISTICII PE CICLUL DE VIA AL
ECHIPAMENTELOR MILITARE MAJORE
Eficiena logisticii pe ciclul de via este generat de abordrile
tiinifice care au la baz datele statistice din exploatarea echipamentelor
similare din dotarea forelor armate proprii sau ale altor armate pe domeniile
cheie cuprinse n diagrama logisticii pe fazele managementului
echipamentelor militare. Un model [4] al diagramei logisticii pe ciclul de
via al echipamentelor militare majore (LCVEMM) este prezentat n Fig.3.
Fig. 3 Model al diagramei logisticii pe ciclul de via al echipamentelor militare
1. LCVEMM - MANAGEMENTUL PROGRAMULUI (MP)
1.1. MP-FAZA DE ANALIZ A SOLUIEI MATERIALE
1.1.1. Sarcini i activiti: Desemnarea Directorului de Sisteme din
cadrul J7/SMG, Stabilirea Echipei Conceptului de Integrare, Analiza
Alternativelor, Cercetarea & Investigarea Pieei, Analiza Accesibilitii;
1.1.2. Documente i produse de ieire: Strategia Dezvoltrii
Tehnologice, Documentul Capabilitilor Iniiale, Strategia Suportabilitii
Iniiale, Analiza Cazului de Afacere Iniial (ACA).
1.2. MP-FAZA DE DEZVOLTARE TEHNOLOGIC
246
1.2.1. Sarcini i activiti: Desemnarea Directorului pentru Suportul
Logistic Integrat (SLI), Evaluarea Reducerii Riscului Tehnologic, Stabilirea
abilitii de Suport a Echipei Integrate de Produs, Memorandumul pentru
Decizia Achiziiei (MDA), Stabilirea Programului de Management pentru
SLI, Actualizarea Cercetrii Pieei, Costul ca o Variabil Independent (CVI),
Actualizarea Analizei Alternativelor, Solicitarea Documentelor, Msurtorile
Programului de SLI, Iniierea Activitilor pentru Logistica Bazat pe
Performan (LBP), Evaluarea Suportabilitii (1), Msurtori de
Performan;
1.2.2. Documente i produse de ieire: Strategia Bazei Programului,
Documentul privind Dezvoltarea Capabilitii, Strategia de Achiziie (SACQ),
Strategia de Suportabilitate, Planul Principal de Testare i Evaluare (PPTE).
1.3. MP-FAZA DE INGINERIE I DEZVOLTARE A PRODUCIEI
1.3.1. Sarcini i activiti: Investigarea i Cercetarea Pieei, Analiza
Alternativelor, Memorandumul pentru Decizia Achiziie, Planul de
Identificare Unic a Articolelor (IDUA), Evaluarea Accesibilitii, Planul de
Inginerie a Productibilitii, Analiza Cazului de Afacere Tip II (ACA), Costul
ca o Variabil Independent (CVI), Desemnarea Integratorului de Suport al
Produsului;
1.3.2. Documente i produse de ieire: Baza Programului de Achiziie
(BPA), Documentul privind Producia Capabilitii (DPC), Strategia de
Achiziie (SACQ), Planul de Transfer al Echipamentelor, Planul de Suport
Post Producie (PSPP), Actualizarea Strategiei de Suportabilitate (SS),
Evaluarea Suportabilitii (2), Actualizarea Planului Principal de Testare i
Evaluare (PPTE), Actualizarea Planului de IDUA, Clasificarea Tip,
Acceptana Echipamentului, Planul de Instalare a Echipamentelor (PIE),
Planul de Scoatere din Uz, Acordurile Bazate pe Performan;
1.4. MP-FAZA DE PRODUCIE I INSTALARE
1.4.1. Sarcini i activiti: Propuneri pentru Modificri de Proiectare,
mbuntirea Continu a Tehnologiei, Instalarea Complet a Sistemului,
mbuntirea Pre-planificat a Produsului, Ordine de Lucru privind
Modificri ale Sistemului;
1.4.2. Documente i produse de ieire: Planul de Suport al Misiuni,
Planul de Suport Post Producie, Aprobarea Acceptanei Echipamentului,
Actualizarea Planului de Instalare a Sistemului, Planul de Scoatere din Uz.
1.5. MP-FAZA DE OPERARE I SUPORT
1.5.1. Sarcini i activiti: Programul de mprosptare a Tehnologiei,
Revizuirea Pregtirii de Sustenabilitate, Revizuirea Post Instalare, Acordurile
Bazate pe Performan, Datele din Procesul de Operare prin Sistemul
Informatic Logistic, Colectarea Datelor prin Prelevarea de Probe, Suportul
Logisticii Bazate pe Performan, Cerine de Securitate, Demilitarizare /
Scoatere din Uz, Raport privind Stadiul Pregtirii Sistemelor, Monitorizarea
Msurtorilor LBP;
247
1.5.2. Documente i produse de ieire: Actualizarea Planului de
Scoatere din Uz;
1.6. MP-FAZA DE SCOATERE DIN UZ I VALORIFICARE
1.6.1. Sarcini i activiti: Implementarea Planului de Scoatere din Uz.
2. LCVEMM - INGINERIA SISTEMELOR (IS)
2.1. IS-FAZA DE ANALIZ A SOLUIEI MATERIALE
2.1.1. Sarcini i activiti: Revizuiri Tehnice, Baza Tehnic, Revizuirea
Tehnic Iniial (RTI), Studiul de Concept pentru Sistem;
2.1.2. Documente i produse de ieire: Revizuirea Conceptului
Sistemului (RCS), Planul Iniial de Ingineria Sistemelor.
2.2. IS-FAZA DE DEZVOLTARE TEHNOLOGIC
2.2.1. Sarcini i activiti: Revizuirea Cerinelor Sistemului (RCS),
Specificaiile Sistemului, Planul Iniial de Management al Configuraiei,
Revizuirea Funcional a Sistemului, Baza Funcional a Sistemului;
2.2.2. Documente i produse de ieire: Revizuirea Proiectrii
Preliminare (RPP), Baza Alocat Sistemului, Actualizarea Planului pentru
Ingineria Sistemelor (PIS) 1.
2.3. IS-FAZA DE INGINERIE I DEZVOLTARE A PRODUCIEI
2.3.1. Sarcini i activiti: Revizuirea Bazei Integrate (RBI), Baza
Produsului, Revizuirea Proiectrii Critice (RPC), Revizuirea Pregtirii pentru
Testare (RPT), Modulul de Suport al Sistemului, Experimentarea Logisticii;
2.3.2. Documente i produse de ieire: Baza Produsului, Actualizarea
Planului pentru Ingineria Sistemelor (PIS) 2, Raportul privind Experimentarea
Logisticii.
2.4. IS-FAZA DE PRODUCIE I INSTALARE
2.4.1. Sarcini i activiti: Revizuirea Verificrii Sistemului (RVS),
Auditul Configuraiei Funcionale (ACF), Revizuirea Pregtirii Produciei
(RPP), Revizuirea Pregtirii pentru Testarea Operaional (RPTO);
2.4.2. Documente i produse de ieire: Auditul Configuraiei Fizice
(ACFz).
3. LCVEMM - ANALIZA SUPORTABILITII (AS)
3.1. AS-FAZA DE ANALIZ A SOLUIEI MATERIALE
3.1.1. Sarcini i activiti: Studiul Utilizrii, Analiza Cerinelor de
Funcionare Iniiale, Analiza Suportabilitii Iniiale, Iniierea Informaiilor de
Management Logistic, Analiza Comparativ 1, Oportunitile Standardizrii
Sistemului de Suport;
3.1.2. Documente i produse de ieire: Specificaiile Preliminare ale
Sistemului.
3.2. AS-FAZA DE DEZVOLTARE TEHNOLOGIC
3.2.1. Sarcini i activiti: Analiza Comparativ 2, Cerinele
Funcionale, Analiza de Comer a Sistemului de Suport, Analiza Costurilor,
Analiza Sensibilitilor, Analiza Sarcinilor, Analiza Nivelului de Reparaii,
Cerinele de Standardizare pentru Sistemul de Suport;
248
3.2.2. Documente i produse de ieire: Pachetul de Proiectarea a
Suportului Produsului, Specificaiile de Performan a Sistemului.
3.3. AS-FAZA DE INGINERIE I DEZVOLTARE A PRODUCIEI
3.3.1. Sarcini i activiti: Cerinele Funcionale, Analiza Efectelor,
Modurilor i Criticalitii Defeciunilor 2, Analiza Arborelui Defeciunilor,
Date Logistice pentru Planul Principal de Testare i Evaluare (PPTE), Date
Logistice pentru Documentul privind Producia Capabilitii (DPC), Analiza
Mentenanei Axate pe Fiabilitate, Refacerea Analizei Sarcinilor, Analiza
Nivelului de Reparaii, Testarea, Evaluarea i Verificarea Suportabilitii.
3.4. FAZA DE PRODUCIE I INSTALARE
3.4.1. Sarcini i activiti: Analiza Iniial a Instalrii, Analiza
Suportului Post Producie.
3.5. AS-FAZA DE OPERARE I SUPORT
3.5.1. Sarcini i activiti: Raportul Echipei de Instalare, Analiza
Suportului Post Producie.
4. LCVEMM - ELEMENTELE SUPORTULUI LOGISTIC
INTEGRAT (SLI)
4.1 PROCESUL I CADRUL SUPORTULUI LOGISTIC INTEGRAT
AL ECHIPAMENTELOR MILITARE (SLI-EM)
4.1.1. Scopul SLI-EM este reprezentat de:
a) Instalarea i susinerea unor sisteme de echipamente militare complet
suportabile n mediile curente i prognozate care ndeplinesc obiectivele
operaionale i de pregtire ale sistemului la un cost minim pe ciclu de via;
b) Dimensionarea corespunztoare a amprentei logistice;
c) Reducerea costurilor i duratei fazelor pe ciclul de via;
d) Reducerea duplicrii eforturilor.
4.1.2. Procesul SLI-EM este o metodologie deliberat, unificat i
iteractiv folosit pentru a dezvolta echipamentul i o strategie de sprijin care:
(1) Optimizeaz elementele funcionale de sprijin pentru un sistem.
(2) Utilizeaz investiiile existente n fora de munc, n sisteme,
echipamente, instruire, faciliti, i n alte resurse.
(3) Direcioneaz procesul de ingineria sistemelor folosind atributele de
suportabilitate pentru atingerea obiectivelor i pentru:
- identificarea suportului (proiectarea suportului i suportul proiectrii).
- influenarea celor mai bune alternative de proiectare;
- definirea strategiei de suportabilitate (SS);
- influenarea testrii i evalurii (T & E), att pentru sistem ct i
pentru SS;
- finanarea i achiziionarea suportului necesar;
- asigurarea suportului pentru lupttor;
- mbuntirea suportului, instalarea i suportul sistemelor de
echipamente.
249
(4) Asigur interoperabilitatea echipamentelor att n cadrul forelor
armate, ct i cu partenerii de coaliie.
Procesul SLI-EM asigur un cadru de management i activitile
tehnice necesare pentru a:
(1) Influena cerinele / capabilitile operaionale i materiale,
specificaiile de performan ale sistemului, integrarea sustenabilitii i a
mentenabilitii, precum i proiectarea final sau selecia sistemului material.
(2) Accentua aspectele suportabilitii nc din primele faze ale ciclului
de via al sistemului.
(3) Defini i perfeciona suportul solicitat pentru produs pe timpul
dezvoltrii i implementrii strategiei de suportabilitate (SS) pe ciclul de via
al sistemului.
(4) Furniza cel mai bun suport de produs pentru optimizarea eficacitii
operaionale al sistemului.
(5) Obine mbuntiri pe linia pregtirii i a costului pe ciclul de via
al sistemului material, precum i al sistemelor de sprijin pe tot parcursul ciclu
de via operaional.
(6) Defini cerinele de sprijin pentru produs ct mai bine relaionate n
proiectarea sistemului.
(7) Implementa logistica bazat pe performan (LBP).
Accentul este pus pe creterea fiabilitii i reducerea amprentei
logistice, pe aplicarea procesului de ingineria sistemelor i pe furnizarea de
sprijin eficient pentru produs folosind strategiile de logistic bazat pe
performan. Figura 4 ilustreaz procesul i cadrul SLI EM [5].
Fig. 4 Procesul suportului logistic integrat al echipamentelor militare
250
Not:
Procesul SLI se bazeaz pe integrarea cadrului SLI (intrrile de proces)
ntr-un model de ingineria sistemelor.
Procesul de SLI este un ciclu continuu care este actualizat pe parcursul
ntregului ciclu de via.
Procesul de SLI este un proces de colaborare, care necesit ca directorul
SLI s lucreze cu ali membri ai echipei de program pentru a integra
elementele suportului logistic n proiectare.
4.1.3. Cadrul SLI (Cele zece elemente ale SLI)
SLI este procesul care faciliteaz dezvoltarea i integrarea tuturor
elementelor de sprijin logistic pentru a dobndi, testa, instala i sprijini
sistemele Armatei. Din primele faze ale dezvoltrii sistemelor, strategia de
achiziie i strategia de suportabilitate vor asigura ca cerinele pentru fiecare
dintre elementele SLI s fie planificate, aigurate cu resurse i implementate
corect.
Aceste aciuni vor permite sistemului s ating nivelurile de pregtire
cerute de lupttor la momentul instalrii i pe parcursul ciclului de via.
Toate elementele SLI trebuie s fie dezvoltate ca parte integrant din
efortul ingineriei de sistem i ca parte a unui sistem de sisteme.
ntre elementele SLI pot fi interdependene n scopul de a dobndi un
sistem care este accesibil (cel mai mic cost pe ciclul de via, CCV), operabil,
suportabil, sustenabil, transportabil i acceptabil din punct de vedere al
cerinelor de mediu, n limita resurselor disponibile.
Elementele SLI-EM sunt prezentate n Fig. 5.
Fig. 5 Elementele suportului logistic integrat al echipamentelor militare
251
4.2 ELEMENTELE SUPORTULUI LOGISTIC INTEGRAT AL
ECHIPAMENTELOR MILITARE PE FAZELE CICLULUI DE VIA
Elementele suportului logistic integrat (ESLI) implic sarcinile /
activitile i documentele / produsele de ieire pe fazele ciclului de via,
pentru fiecare din cele zece elemente: influena asupra proiectrii, planificarea
mentenanei, personalul, suportul aprovizionrii, echipamentele de suport,
datele tehnice, suportul resurselor informatice, instruirea i suportul instruirii,
facilitile, ambalarea, manipularea, depozitarea i transportul.
Avnd n vedere complexitatea sarcinilor / activitilor i documentelor
/ produselor de ieire specifice elementelor suportului logistic integrat pentru
echipamentele militare, aceste trebuie s fie analizate detaliat pentru fiecare
faz a ciclului de via.
ELEMENTELE SUPORTULUI LOGISTIC INTEGRAT (ESLI)
4.2.1. ESLI-FAZA DE ANALIZ A SOLUIEI MATERIALE
4.2.1.1. Sarcini i activiti:
- Influena asupra proiectrii - Consideraii privind Suportul Logistic;
- Planificarea mentenanei - Stabilirea Conceptului de Mentenan, Stabilirea
Scopurilor pe linia Obiectivelor pentru Pregtirea Sistemului & Fiabilitate,
Disponibilitate, Mentenabilitate (OPS&FDM);
- Personalul- Planul de Management al Sistemului de Integrare a
Personalului;
- Suportul aprovizionrii - Conceptul Prilor Reparabile, Consideraii privind
Echipamentele Asigurate Guvernamental (EAG);
- Echipamentele de suport- Conceptul privind Echipamentele de Testare,
Consideraii privind Diagnosticarea & Pronosticarea;
- Datele tehnice - Conceptul privind Instruciunile Echipamentului,
Descrierea Audienei int;
- Suportul resurselor informatice - Conceptul Resurselor Informatice;
- Instruirea i suportul instruirii - Conceptul de Instruire;
- Facilitile - Conceptul Facilitilor de Suport;
- Ambalarea, manipularea, depozitarea i transportul - Conceptul privind
Ambalarea, Manipularea, Depozitarea i Transportul (AMDT), Conceptul
Echipamentelor pentru Manipulare, Ingineria pentru Transportabilitate.
4.2.2. ESLI-FAZA DE DEZVOLTARE TEHNOLOGIC
4.2.2.1. Sarcini i activiti:
- Influena asupra proiectrii - Analiza Efectelor, Modurilor i Criticalitii
Defeciunilor 1, Analiza Mentenanei Axate pe Fiabilitate (MAF);
- Planificarea mentenanei - Planul Iniial de Mentenan, Proiectul Graficului
de Alocare pentru Mentenan (GAM);
- Personalul - Planul pentru Personal;
- Suportul aprovizionrii - Planul Prilor Reparabile;
- Echipamentele de suport - Echipamente i Utilaje pentru Testare;
252
- Datele tehnice - Planul Datelor Tehnice, - Prevederile Instruciunilor
Echipamentului pentru Documente Solicitate, - Planul Instruciunilor
Echipamentului;
- Instruirea i suportul instruirii - Stabilirea MTEI pentru Instruire, Planul
Instruirii pe Sisteme;
- Suportul resurselor informatice - Suportul pentru Software;
- Facilitile - Facilitile de Suport 1, Programarea Fondurilor pentru
Faciliti;
- Ambalarea, manipularea, depozitarea i transportul - Viaa produsului n
Depozitare.
4.2.2.2. Documente i produse de ieire:
- Analiza Logisticii de Baz;
- Planul de Instruire pentru Sistem (PIPS) ;
- Raportul privind Transportabilitatea.
4.2.3. ESLI-FAZA DE INGINERIE I DEZVOLTARE A
PRODUCIEI
4.2.3.1. Sarcini i activiti:
- Influena asupra proiectrii - Analiza Negocierilor de Proiectare /
Negocierilor pentru SLI, - Validarea MAF;
- Planificarea mentenanei - Validarea GAM, Planul de Suport pentru
Mentenan n Baze (PSMB);
- Personalul - Criteriile de Selecie a Personalului (CSP), Datele Necesare
pentru Planul privind Bazele Sistemului (DNPBS), Validarea Cerinelor
pentru Integrarea Personalului (CIP);
- Suportul aprovizionrii - Planul Aprovizionrii de Sistem (PAS), Selecia i
Alocarea Prilor Reparabile, Validarea Prilor Reparabile;
- Echipamentele de suport - Aprobarea i Dezvoltarea Echipamentelor i
Utilajelor de Testare, Suportul pentru Echipamentele i Utilajele de Testare,
Validarea Echipamentelor i Utilajelor de Testare;
- Datele tehnice - Programarea Instruciunilor Echipamentelor, Documentaia
Tehnic de Livrare, Elaborarea Manualelor Tehnice Preliminare, Validarea
Manualelor Tehnice Preliminare, Planul de Verificare a Manualului Tehnic,
Verificarea Instruciunilor Echipamentelor, Copiile Reproductibile Finale;
- Instruirea i suportul instruirii - Planul de Instruire pentru un Echipament
Nou (PIEN), Cerinele de Instruire pentru Rezideni / Instruirea la Locul de
Munc (ILM), Instruirea pentru Testare, Validarea Sistemelor de Instruire;
- Suportul resurselor informatice - Planul de Management pe Ciclul de Via
al Resurselor Informatice, Setul Programelor de Testare, Validarea Suportului
Informatic;
- Facilitile Facilitile de Suport 2, Validarea Cerinelor pentru Faciliti;
- Ambalarea, manipularea, depozitarea i transportul - Cerinele pentru
AMDT, Validarea Ambalrii, Manipulrii, Depozitrii & Transportului.
4.2.3.2. Documente i produse de ieire:
253
- Planificarea mentenanei - GAM Final, Evaluarea Bazelor Principale;
- Personalul - Planul privind Bazele Sistemului (PBS);
- Suportul aprovizionrii - Datele pentru Aprovizionare;
- Datele tehnice - Instruciunile Echipamentelor Autentificate de Categoria de
Fore (CF);
- Instruirea i suportul instruirii - Actualizarea Planului de Instruire pentru
Sistem (PIPS);
- Suportul resurselor informatice - Actualizarea Planului de Management al
Resurselor Informatice;
- Facilitile - Anexa cu Facilitile de Suport;
- Ambalarea, manipularea, depozitarea i transportul - Actualizarea
Raportului privind Transportabilitatea.
4.2.4. ESLI-FAZA DE PRODUCIE I INSTALARE
4.2.4.1. Sarcini i activiti:
- Influena asupra proiectrii - Evaluarea MAF;
- Planificarea mentenanei - Planul de Suport al Mentenanei n Baze,
Programul de Garanii;
- Personalul - Actualizarea Situaiei Organizrii i a Echipamentelor (SOE),
Actualizarea SOE Modificat (SMOE) ;
- Suportul aprovizionrii - Planul de Distribuire a Echipamentelor,
Desfurarea Livrrilor, Actualizarea Datelor de Livrare;
- Echipamentele de suport - Echipamentele de Testare n Baze;
- Datele tehnice - Proiectul Cerinele de lucru pentru Mentenana n Baze /
Cerine de lucru pentru Mentenana Naional (CLMB / CLMN), Verificarea
CLMB / CLMN, Stabilirea CLMB / CLMN, Instruciunile pentru Mentenana
Echipamentelor / Actualizarea Listei Utilajelor Speciale pentru Prile
Reparabile (LUSPR);
- Instruirea i suportul instruirii - Instruirea pe Noile Echipamente;
- Ambalarea, manipularea, depozitarea i transportul - Capabilitatea de
Manipulare / Depozitare.
4.2.4.2. Documente i produse de ieire:
- Personalul - Personalul Instruit;
- Suportul aprovizionrii - Planul PPSPF;
- Datele tehnice - Instruciuni Noi / Revizuite ale Echipamentelor;
- Instruirea i suportul instruirii - Programa de nvmnt pentru Instruire;
- Suportul resurselor informatice - Suportul pentru Software Post Instalare;
- Facilitile - Capabilitatea de Mentenan n Baze.
4.2.5. ESLI-FAZA DE OPERARE I SUPORT
4.2.5.1. Sarcini i activiti:
- Influena asupra proiectrii - Sporirea Fiabilitii;
- Planificarea mentenanei - Ordine privind Modificri de Lucru, Operaiunile
de Mentenan;
- Personalul - Actualizarea SMOE;
254
- Suportul aprovizionrii - Actualizarea Codurilor Numerice Naionale
(CNN), Modernizarea prin Piese de Schimb;
- Datele tehnice - Stabilirea Ordinelor de lucru privind Modificri ale
sistemului (OLMS);
- Instruirea i suportul instruirii - Revizuirea Programului de Instruire;
- Ambalarea, manipularea, depozitarea i transportul - Revizuirea Directivei
privind AMDT, Cerinele de Manipulare a Materialelor Periculoase.
4.2.5.2. Documente i produse de ieire:
- Planificarea mentenanei - Modulul de Suport pentru Mentenana n Baze a
Sistemelor de Armament.
4.2.6. ESLI- FAZA DE SCOATERE DIN UZ I VALORIFICARE
4.2.6.1. Sarcini i activiti:
- Suportul aprovizionrii - tergerea CNN nvechite;
- Datele tehnice - Abrogarea Instruciunilor Echipamentului.
IV. CONCLUZII
Generarea avantajelor prin logistica pe ciclul de via al echipamentelor
militare (LCVEM) implic abordarea din punct de vedere al managementului
programului, al ingineriei sistemelor, al analizei suportabilitii, al
elementelor suportului logistic integrat, al ingineriei logistice i al fiabilitii,
disponibilitii, mentenabilitii, costurilor raionale i a interoperabilitii
echipamentelor militare majore.
Ca o provocare pentru viziunea strategic a M.Ap.N., autoritile de
decizie trebuie s integreze achiziiile pentru aprare i logistica ntr-un cadru
general bazat pe capabiliti pentru a asigura un proces superior de sprijin
pentru echipamentele militare majore, prin concentrarea pe eficacitatea
operaional a sistemelor accesibile ca un factor cheie de proiectare i
performan i prin accentuarea consideraiilor privind logistica pe ntreg
ciclul de via al produsului n derularea procesului de ingineria sistemelor.
SLI-EM este procesul care faciliteaz dezvoltarea i integrarea tuturor
elementelor de sprijin logistic pentru a dobndi, testa, instala i sprijini
sistemele Armatei. Din primele faze ale dezvoltrii sistemelor, strategia de
achiziie i strategia de suportabilitate vor asigura ca cerinele pentru fiecare
dintre elementele SLI s fie planificate, aigurate cu resurse i implementate
corect.
ntre elementele SLI-EM pot fi interdependene n scopul de a dobndi
un sistem care este accesibil (cel mai mic cost pe ciclul de via), operabil,
suportabil, sustenabil, transportabil i acceptabil din punct de vedere al
cerinelor de mediu, n limita resurselor disponibile.
Pe parcursul procesului de management al achiziiilor pentru aprare
LCVEMM reprezint cadrul pentru instituionalizarea unei abordri tiinifice
care conduce la decizii verificabile i validate, care pot contribui la generarea
unei viziuni strategice prin care suportul i sprijinul logistic vor fi
255
implementate mai rapid, de o calitate superioar, cu costuri mai mici i mai
eficient.
NOTE BIBLIOGRAFICE
[1] Regulamentul logisticii operaiilor ntrunite, L-1, Bucureti, 2008;
[2] Instruciunea I 1000.2-01 privind managementul achiziiilor pentru
aprare, editura Academiei Tehnice Militare, Bucuresti, 2001;
[3]
http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/MCO%204000.57A.p
df;
[4] https://acc.dau.mil/logsa/default.aspx;
[5] http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/r700_127.pdf.
256
ACTUALITATEA I TENDINELE ANULUI 2010
N DOMENIUL TERMINALELOR MOBILE
Lt. col. ing. drd. Daniel SORA
Departamentul Regional de Studii pentru Managementul
Resurselor de Aprare
Abstract
Worldwide smartphone sales to end users reached 54.3 million units in the first
quarter of 2010, an increase of 48.7 per cent from the first quarter of 2009, according to
Gartner, Inc. Among the most successful vendors were those that controlled an integrated
set of operating system (OS), hardware and services. Mobile e-mail, rich messaging and
social networking will continue to drive demand for smartphones and enhanced phones
that feature full hardware keyboards.
In the smartphone OS market, Android and Apple were the winners in the first
quarter of 2010. Android moved to the No. 4 position displacing Microsoft Windows
Mobile for the first time. Both Android and Apple were the only two OSs vendors among
the top five to increase market share year-on-year. Symbian remained in the No. 1 position
but continued to lose as Nokia remains weak in the high-end portfolio.
1. Introducere
O caracteristic a tendinelor actuale de evoluie a echipamentelor de
tehnologia informaiei este convergena tehnologiilor. Nevoile de mobilitate i
de conectivitate au determinat pe de o parte reducerea dimensiunilor
calculatoarelor portabile simultan cu creterea duratei de utilizare prin
alimentarea de la acumulatorul intern, pe de alt parte creterea vitezei de
conectare la internet prin infrastructura reelelor de telefonie mobil. Astfel au
aprut noile tipuri de calculatoare portabile numite netbook, cu ecrane de
257
dimensiuni mai mici, fr unitate de cd/dvd, dar cu conectivitate att clasic
cu sau fr fir, dar i cu modem 3G inclus, la care se poate ataa o cartel SIM
de la un furnizor de telefonie i internet mobil. Mai mult, o alt categorie de
calculatoare portabile o constituie calculatoarele ultra mobile (Ultra-Mobile
PC sau tablet PC), cu dimensiuni i mai reduse dect ale celor de tip netbook,
dotate cu ecran tactil i care ruleaz aceleai sisteme de operare ca i
calculatoarele obinuite.
Fig. 1 Calculatorul ultra-mobil OQO Model 02
n domeniul PDA-urilor i al telefoanelor inteligente putem observa
aceeai tendin de convergen, mergnd chiar pn la contopire. Deja nu
mai sunt diferene semnificative ntre aceste categorii de echipamente mobile
de vreme ce telefoanele au nglobat aproape toate funciile specifice PDA-
urilor (doar conexiunea fr fir tip Wi-Fi lipsete de la majoritatea modelelor
existente n prezent), iar tot mai multe PDA-uri au fost dotate cu conectivitate
prin infrastructura reelelor de comunicaii mobile, cptnd astfel i funcia
de telefonie mobil. n plus, majoritatea sistemelor de operare actuale sunt
instalate att pe telefoanele inteligente ct i pe PDA-uri, fiind foarte greu de
stabilit din care categorie fac parte noile dispozitive.
Puterea de calcul a terminalelor mobile de tip PDA sau telefon
inteligent a crescut foarte mult, frecvena procesoarelor depind pragul de
1GHz, iar din punct de vedere al memoriei, 512 MB pentru RAM i 32 GB ca
i capacitate de stocare sunt deja obinuite pe pia, din acest punct de vedere
fiind comparabile cu calculatoarele din urm cu doar civa ani. De asemenea,
rezoluiile ecranelor de 800x480 puncte compenseaz dezavantajul
dimensiunilor reduse ale acestora. Ca urmare, aceste tipuri de terminale au
devenit tot mai utile fiind tot mai folosite pentru navigare pe internet, pentru
serviciile de pot electronic i chiar pentru editare de documente.
Un pas important n direcia apropierii dintre calculatoarele portabile
care devin tot mai mici i terminalele mobile care devin tot mai puternice,
258
dei din punct de vedere al dimensiunii se strduiesc s se limiteze la a
ncpea ntr-un buzunar (poate unul mai ncptor), a fost constituit de
lansarea de ctre firma Apple la nceputul anului 2010 a unui calculator ultra-
portabil care ruleaz un sistem de operare de PDA, denumit iPad.
Terminalele mobile pot fi utilizate pentru o gam larg de aplicaii,
dintre care enumerm urmtoarele:
dispozitive de calcul mobile:
o dispozitive mobile pentru internet;
o asistent digital personal (PDA)/asistent digital profesional
(enterprise digital assistant - EDA)
o calculatoare portabile
o console portabile pentru jocuri
o dispozitive portabile de redare a coninutului multimedia
camere foto digitale
camere video digitale
telefoane mobile
pagere
dispozitive de navigare (GPS)
Compania suedez People of Lava a scos la vnzare n luna noiembrie
2010 primul televizor care ruleaz sistemul de operare Google Android i
permite utilizatorilor s vizioneze pagini internet pe un ecran de 55 inch.
2. Sisteme de operare pentru terminale mobile
Sistemele de operare disponibile n prezent pentru telefoanele
inteligente sunt Symbian OS (Nokia), iOS (Apple), BlackBerry OS (RIM),
Windows Phone OS (Microsoft), WebOS (Palm, achiziionat recent de HP),
Android (Google), Bada (Samsung) i Maemo (Nokia).
Fig.2 Reprezentarea cotelor de pia a principalelor sisteme de operare pentru telefoane
inteligente n trimestrul al doilea al anului 2010
259
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Symbian OS deine cea mai mare parte a pieei mondiale (cu excepia
celei Nord-Americane), ca efect al succesului celui mai important client i
deintor de aciuni Nokia. Acest sistem de operare a fost utilizat de multe
dintre companiile importante productoare de telefoane mobile cum sunt:
BenQ, Fujitsu, LG, Mitsubishi, Motorola, Nokia, Samsung, Sharp, sau Sony
Ericsson. n prezent, dispozitive mobile bazate pe Symbian sunt produse de
Fujitsu, Nokia, Samsung, Sharp i Sony Ericsson. Pn n 2009 Symbian a
suportat multiple interfee utilizator, cum sunt UIQ (UIQ Technologies), S60
(Nokia), sau MOAP (NTT DOCOMO). Ca urmare a unificrii platformelor
Symbian n anul 2009, aceste trei interfee utilizator au fost contopite ntr-una
singur, care nu mai este n totalitate open source.
BlackBerry OS este un sistem de operare creat iniial pentru oamenii
de afaceri, a crui principal caracteristic era uurina utilizrii.
mbuntirile recente au constat n acceptarea unui numr crescut de aplicaii
suplimentare, ca i oferirea suportului complet pentru fiiere multimedia. n
prezent, pe site-ul dedicat, App World, se pot descrca peste 6000 de aplicaii.
Android
114
a fost creat iniial de o mic companie achiziionat ulterior
de Google Inc., care continu dezvoltarea acestui sistem de operare. Android
este o platform derivat din sistemul de operare Linux, la realizarea creia,
alturi de Google au contribuit un grup de companii importante din domeniul
hardware i software (dintre care Intel, HTC, ARM, Samsung, Motorola i
eBay), care formeaz Open Handset Alliance
115
. Acest sistem de operare
relativ nou, a avut deja lansate ase versiuni: Android 1.0, 1.5, 1.6, 2.0, 2.1 i
2.2.
114
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/146450/developers_praise_android_at_google_io.html?tk=
rl_noinform
115
http://www.openhandsetalliance.com/oha_members.html
261
iOS este sistemul de operare derivat din Mac OS X creat de firma
Apple pentru dispozitivele iPhone, iPod Touch i iPad
116
. Aplicaiile altor
productori nu au fost official acceptate pn la lansarea versiunii iOS 2.0 pe
11 iulie 2008.
Windows Mobile, aprut iniial sub numele de Windows CE, este
foarte rspndit n special n Asia. Varianta mbuntit Windows Mobile 6
Professional (pentru PDA i dispozitive cu ecran tactil) a fost anunat n
Februarie 2007, dezvoltat ulterior pn la versiunea 6.5. A fost criticat n
special pentru interfaa utilizator neoptimizat pentru controlul ecranului tactil
cu ajutorul degetelor
117
. Cota de pia a dispozitivelor Windows Mobile a
sczut vertiginos n ultimii ani, ajungnd la doar 5% n trimestrul al doilea al
anului 2010, compania Microsoft fiind concentrat pe lansarea noii sale
platforme, Windows Phone.
Windows Phone a fost anunat de Microsoft pe 15 februarie 2010 ca
fiind noua generaie de sisteme de operare pentru terminale mobile, sub
numele de Windows Phone 7. Noul sistem de operare se caracterizeaz printr-
o orientare complet diferit a interfeei utilizator inspirat de limbajul "Metro
Design Language", ce ofer o integrare complet a serviciilor Microsoft cum
sunt Windows Live, Zune, Xbox Live i Bing, dar i a unor servicii non-
Microsoft cum sunt Facebook sau conturile Google. Deoarece Windows
Phone 7 este o platform complet nou, nu ofer compatibilitate cu aplicaiile
116
"Canalys: iPhone outsold all Windows Mobile phones in Q2 2009". AppleInsider. 21 August 2009.
http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/09/08/21/canalys_iphone_outsold_all_windows_mobile_phones_in_q2
_2009.html Retrieved 21 September 2009.
117
"CEO Ballmer Reportedly Says Microsoft 'Screwed Up' with Windows Mobile". eWeek. 28 September
2009. http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Windows/Microsoft-CEO-Steve-Ballmer-Says-Company-Screwed-Up-
Windows-Mobile-241614/
Fig.4 Apple iPad utilizeaz o versiune de iOS.
262
create pentru Windows Mobile, iar unele caracteristici importante ale
sistemului de operare Windows Mobile nu se regsesc pn la urmtoarele
actualizri.
Linux deine cea mai mare cot de pia n China unde este utilizat de
Motorola i n Japonia, utilizat de DoCoMo. Linux nu este foarte utilizat ca
platform distinct, ci mai curnd reprezint baza pentru un numr mare de
platforme diferite cum sunt Android, LiMo, Maemo, Openmoko sau Qt
Extended, care sunt destul de incompatibile ntre ele. PalmSource (n prezent
Access) se dezvolt ctre o interfa bazat pe Linux. Alte platforme bazate
pe Linux sunt n curs de dezvoltare de ctre Motorola, NEC, NTT DoCoMo,
Panasonic, Samsung, sau Vodafone.
webOS reprezint urmtoarea generaie de sisteme de operare Palm.
PalmSource utilizeaz propria platform dezvoltat iniial de Palm Inc.
Access Linux Platform (ALP), ca o mbuntire care a fost planificat a fi
lansat n prima parte a anului 2007, folosind specificaiile tehnice ale Linux
Phone Standards Forum. Aceast platform include un emulator care suport
aplicaiile create pentru dispozitivele Palm. HP a cumprat compania Palm n
2010.
bada este un system de operare pentru telefoane inteligente creat de
Samsung Electronics. Samsung pretinde c bada va nlocui rapid platformele
telefoanelor mobile proprii, transformnd telefoanele mobile n telefoane
inteligente. Numele bada este derivat din cuvntul Corean care nseamn
ocean sau mare. Primul dispozitiv care a ruleaz sistemul de operare bada se
Fig.5 Telefonul Palm Pre cu sistemul de operare webOS (HP)
263
numete Wave i a fost anunat public la Mobile World Congress 2010.
Wave este un telefon bazat n totalitate pe ecranul tactil, mpreun cu care
Samsung a lansat propriul magazin virtual pentru aplicaii, Samsung Apps,
care ofer n prezent peste 300 de aplicaii mobile. Dei Samsung
intenioneaz s instaleze bada pe multe dintre telefoanele construite,
compania dezvolt i o gam larg de telefoane bazate pe Android.
MeeGo este un sistem de operare lansat n anul 2010 la Mobile World
Congress n Barcelona de companiile Nokia i Intel care combin cele mai
bune caracteristici ale sistemelor de operare Moblin i Maemo pentru a crea o
adevrat experien open-source pentru utilizatorii oricror dispozitive
mobile.
Maemo este o platform software dezvoltat de Nokia pentru telefoane
inteligente i Tablete Internet, bazat pe sistemul de operare Debian, n
colaborare cu alte proiecte open source ca Linux kernel, sau GNOME.
3. Android (Google)
Android este un sistem de operare mobil conceput de Android Inc., o
companie achiziionat de Google n 2005. Android se bazeaz pe o versiune
modificat a nucleului sistemului de operare Linux. Google a colaborat cu ali
membri ai Open Handset Alliance la crearea Android Open Source Project
(AOSP) n scopul ntreinerii i dezvoltrilor ulterioare a sistemului de operare
Android. Din punct de vedere al vnzrilor, telefoanele inteligente cu sistem
de operare Android s-au clasat pe primul loc pe piaa S.U.A. n trimestrele al
doilea i al treilea din anul 2010, cu o cot de pia n trimestrul al treilea de
43.6%.
264
Android are o larg comunitate de programatori de aplicaii ("apps")
care extind funcionalitatea dispozitivelor, existnd n prezent peste 100000
aplicaii disponibile online prin magazinul virtual oferit de Google, dei
aceste aplicaii pot fi descrcate i de pe alte site-uri. Programatorii scriu
aceste aplicaii n limbajul Java, cu ajutorul bibliotecilor Java furnizate de
Google.
Anunarea distribuiei sistemului de operare Android la 5 noiembrie
2007 a fost finanat de Open Handset Alliance, un consoriu de 78 de
companii de hardware, software, i de telecomunicaii. Google a lansat cea
mai mare parte a codului Android sun licen Apache, o licen pentru
software gratuit i open source.
Structura software a sistemului de operare Android const n aplicaii
Java care ruleaz ntr-un mediu orientat pe obiecte Java mpreun cu
bibliotecile de baz Java (scrise n C) pe o main virtual Dalvik. Sistemul
de operare Android conine 12 milioane linii de cod dintre care 3 milioane
linii n XML, 2.8 milioane linii de C, 2.1 milioane linii de Java, i 1.75
milioane linii de C++.
Sistemul de operare Android poate fi instalat pe telefoane mobile,
netbook sau tablet-PC, cum sunt Dell Streak, Samsung Galaxy Tab i alte
dispozitive. Primul televizor cu sistem de operare Android, numit
Scandinavia, a fost lansat de compania People of Lava. Primul telefon cu
sistem de operare Android aprut pe pia a fost HTC Dream, lansat pe 22
octombrie 2008.
Fig.6 Android 2.2
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Mediul de dezvoltare Android SDK conine un set complet de
instrumente, incluznd un depanator, biblioteci, un emulator de terminale
(bazat pe QEMU), documentaie, exemple de cod i tutoriale. Platformele de
dezvoltare suportate n prezent sunt calculatoare cu arhitectur x86 cu sisteme
de operare Linux (oricare versiune modern de Linux), Mac OS X 10.4.9,
Windows XP sau Vista. Pe aceste calculatoare trebuie instalate Java
Development Kit, Apache Ant, i Python 2.2 sau mai nou. Mediul integrat de
dezvoltare recunoscut oficial este Eclipse (versiunea 3.2 sau mai nou) cu
Android Development Tools (ADT) Plugin, dei programatorii pot utiliza
orice editor de text pentru fiierele Java sau XML i linii de comand pentru a
crea, compila sau depana aplicaii Android i pentru controlul dispozitivelor
Android conectate.
Android Market, magazinul virtual pentru aplicaii Android de la
Google a fost lansat pe 22 octombrie 2008, ca locaie oficial de descrcare a
aplicaiilor i jocurilor pentru dispozitivele cu sistem de operare Android,
existnd o aplicaie special inclus n sistemul de operare al telefoanelor
mobile pentru accesul la acesta. Exist o imens cantitate de jocuri i alte
aplicaii disponibile la Android Market, numrul acestora depind 160000 n
noiembrie 2010.
La 12 iulie 2010 Google a anunat existena App Inventor, un mediu
vizual de dezvoltare Web pentru programatori nceptori, bazat pe biblioteca
Java Open Blocks de la MIT care ofer acces la datele GPS, accelerometrului
i ale busolei digitale, la funciile de telefon, de mesaje text, conversia
vorbire-text, la datele de contact, la spaiul de stocare i la serviciile Web,
incluznd iniial Amazon i Twitter.
Google a participat la Android Market oferind cteva aplicaii pentru
serviciiole proprii, cum sunt Google Voice, Sky Map, Finance, Maps Editor,
Places Directory, Google Goggles, Gesture Search, Google Translate,
Google Shopper, Listen sau My Tracks.
n August 2010, Google a lansat "Voice Actions for Android", care
permite utilizatorilor s caute, s scrie mesaje text i s iniieze apeluri prin
comenzi vocale.
Sistemul de operare Android a crescut semnificativ, o serie de site-uri
populare de internet ca MySpace, Facebook, sau Twitter lansnd aplicaii
proprii pentru telefoanele Android.
4. iOS (Apple)
iOS este sistemul de operare mobil creat de compania Apple iniial
pentru iPhone, fiind instalat apoi i pe iPod Touch, iPad i Apple TV. Apple
nu accept ca acest sistem de operare s ruleze pe alte dispozitive hardware.
La 20 octombrie 2010, magazinul virtual App Store al firmei Apple coninea
peste 300000 de aplicaii pentru iOS, cu peste 7.5 miliarde de descrcri. n
mai 2010, iOS avea 15.4% din piaa sistemelor de operare pentru telefoanele
266
inteligente ca numr de terminale vndute, pe locul trei dup Symbian i
Blackberry, dar cotat cu 59% dintre utilizatorii mobili de web (fr a include
iPad) n America de nord.
Interfaa utilizator a sistemului de operare iOS se bazeaz pe conceptul
de manipulare direct, cu utilizarea gesturilor multiple (multi-touch gestures).
Elementele de control ale interfeei constau n cursoare, comutatoare i
butoane. Accelerometrele interne sunt utilizate de unele aplicaii pentru a
rspunde la micrile de scuturare a dispozitivului (un rezultat obinuit fiind
reversarea ultimei comenzi) sau de rotire (de exemplu pentru comutarea ntre
modurile portrait i landscape).
iOS este derivat din Mac OS X, fiind deci un sistem de operare tip
Unix, cu patru niveluri: nivelul nucleului sistemului de operare, nivelul
nucleului serviciilor, nivelul mediilor de stocare i nivelul de interaciune cu
utilizatorul. Sistemul de operare ocup aproximativ 500 MB din spaiul de
stocare, n funcie de model.
n ziua n care Apple a anunat iOS, Cisco Systems a dat n judecat
Apple. Numele IOS era utilizat de Cisco de peste 10 ani pentru sistemele de
operare instalate pe ruterele Cisco. Pentru a evita procesul, Apple a ncheiat o
nelegere cu Cisco pentru a utiliza numele "IOS".
Sistemul de operare iOS a fost anunat mpreun cu iPhone la
Macworld Conference & Expo pe 9 ianuarie 2007 i lansat n luna iunie a
aceluiai an. La nceput, Apple nu a precizat numele noului sistem de operare,
declarnd c iPhone utilizeaz OS X. Iniial, aplicaiile altor dezvoltatori nu
au fost acceptate. La 17 octombrie 2007, Apple a anunat c un pachet de
dezvoltare nativ era n lucru i c urma s fie lansat n februarie 2008. La 6
martie 2008, a fost lansat prima versiune de testare, mpreun cu numele
sistemului de operare: iPhone OS.
Fig.6 iOS 4.1 pe un iPhone 4
267
La 27 ianuarie 2010, Apple a anunat iPad, caracterizat de un ecran mai
mare dect al dispozitivelor iPhone i iPod Touch, precum i de utilizarea
pentru navigarea pe internet, pentru utilizarea fiierelor media i pentru citirea
crilor electronice iBooks.
La 7 iunie 2010, Apple a anunat c iPhone OS a fost redenumit iOS.
Apple a obinut licena de utilizare a mrcii "iOS" de la Cisco Systems (care
deine IOS), aceeai companie cu care Apple a disputat anterior marca
"iPhone".
iOS 4 a fost lansat la 21 iunie 2010, cu trei zile naintea iPhone 4, cu
intenia de a reduce efortul asupra serverelor Apple cauzat de aceste
evenimente. iOS 4 a fost prima versiune de sistem de operare oferit ca
actualizare gratuit pentru iPod touch, utilizatorii iPad 3.x fiind anunai
anterior c urmau s primeasc o actualizare gratuit la urmtoarea versiune
major (4.x) lansat.
Versiunea iOS 4.2 a fost anunat pe 1 noiembrie 2010, pentru toate
dispozitivele Apple A4, mai puin Apple TV. Aceasta este prima versiune 4.x
suportat de iPad, oferind AirPlay i AirPrint, cteva schimbri minore la
aplicaia YouTube i mbuntiri ale animaiilor multitasking.
Ecranul principal al dispozitivelor iPhone conine o mulime de
aplicaii implicite,unele fiind iniial ascunse i pot fi accesate de utilizatori
prin aplicaia Settings sau prin alte metode. Toate utilitarele, cum sunt
mesageria vocal, ceasul, calculatorul sau busola se gsesc ntr-un folder
numit "Utilities" la versiunea 4.0. Multe dintre acestea sunt concepute pentru
transferul de date (de exemplu, un numr de telefon poate fi selectat dintr-un
email i salvat ca un nou contact sau utilizat pentru un nou apel telefonic).
Apsarea dubl a butonului home activeaz comutatorul de aplicaii,
declannd defilarea coninutului pe ecran. Prin alegerea unei pictograme, se
comut aplicaia corespunztoare.
iOS nu suport Adobe Flash i Java, paginile care utilizeaz aceste
tehnologii nefiind afiate corect pe dispozitivele iOS. n schimb, browserul
iOS 4 suport un numr de tehnologii HTML5 pe care Apple le recomand ca
alternative la utilizarea tehnologiilor Flash.
Mediul de dezvoltare, lansat pe 6 martie 2008, permitea realizarea de
aplicaii pentru iPhone i iPod Touch, ca i testarea lor cu ajutorul unui
iPhone simulator. n schimb, transferarea unei aplicaii pe dispozitiv era
posibil numai dup plata unei taxe de dezvoltator de programe pentru
iPhone. De la lansarea Xcode 3.1, acesta a devenit mediul de dezvoltare
pentru iOS. Aplicaiile iPhone, ca i iOS i Mac OS X, sunt scrise n
Objective-C.
Dezvoltatorii pot stabili orice pre mai mare dect un minimum stabilit
de Apple pentru a distribui aplicaiile lor prin App Store, din care primesc
70%. Altfel, ei pot opta pentru lansarea gratuit a aplicaiilor, caz n care nu
trebuie s plteasc dect taxa de membru.
268
iOS a fost subiectul a numeroase modificri neautorizate n ncercarea
de a aduga funcii neoferite de Apple. nainte de lansarea App Store n 2008,
motivul principal al acestora era instalarea altor aplicaii native. Apple a
declarat c nu va emite actualizri de software n scopul de a elimina aceste
aplicaii adugate ilegal (cu excepia celor care deblocau cartela SIM), dar
fiecare actualizare iOS prea s fac aceste programe s nu mai funcioneze.
Dup apariia App Store i acceptarea aplicaiilor altor furnizori, scopul
comunitii atacatorilor s-a schimbat, orientndu-se spre instalarea temelor
pentru modificarea aspectului sistemului de operare, sau spre descrcarea i
instalarea ilegal a aplicaiilor de pe App Store.
Natura nchis i proprietar a sistemului de operare iOS a generat
critici, n special din partea susintorilor drepturilor digitale, pentru
restriciile impuse prin proiectarea sistemului de operare care determin
blocarea coninutului media achiziionat pe platforma Apple, pentru modelul
impus dezvoltatorilor care impune plata unei taxe anuale pentru distribuia
aplicaiilor proprii, pentru procesul prea centralizat de aprobare a noilor
aplicaii, ca i pentru controlul general al companiei Apple asupra platformei
(inclusiv posibilitatea acesteia de a dezactiva sau terge de la distan anumite
aplicaii).
Exist ns i voci din afara companiei Apple care au sprijinit modelul
nchis al iOS. Dezvoltatorul Facebook Joe Hewitt, care iniial protestase
mpotriva controlului Apple asupra dispozitivelor proprii descriindu-l ca un
precedent oribil, a argumentat ulterior c blocarea aplicaiilor n iPad este
similar n cazul aplicaiilor web i ofer securitate suplimentar.
5. Windows Phone 7
Windows Phone 7 este sistemul de operare mobil creat de Microsoft ca
succesor al platformei Windows Mobile. A fost lansat n Europa, Singapore i
Australia la 21 octombrie 2010, iar n S.U.A. i Canada la 8 noiembrie 2010,
urmnd ca n Asia s fie lansat n 2011. Odat cu Windows Phone 7,
Microsoft introduce o nou interfa utilizator, integreaz sistemul de operare
mobil cu celelalte servicii Microsoft i intenioneaz s menin un control
strict asupra platformelor hardware pe care ruleaz.
Lucrul la o mbuntire major a platformei Windows Mobile a
nceput nc din 2004 sub numele de cod "Photon", dar rezultatele au aprut
lent i proiectul a fost n cele din urm abandonat. n 2008, Microsoft a
reorganizat grupul de lucru Windows Mobile i a nceput lucrul la un nou
sistem de operare mobil, care trebuia lansat n 2009 sub numele Windows
Phone, dar mai multe ntrzieri au fcut Microsoft s lanseze Windows
Mobile 6.5 ca o variant intermediar.
WP7 a fost creat n grab. Un prim rezultat este acela c aplicaiile
Windows Mobile nu pot rula pe acest sistem de operare. HP a decis s nu
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construiasc dispozitive compatibile cu Windows Phone 7, prefernd s se
orienteze ctre achiziia lor cea mai recent, sistemul de operare webOS.
Windows Phone introduce o nou interfa utilizator, cu numele de cod
Metro. Ecranul de start este compus din plci (tiles), care sunt legturi
ctre aplicaii, funcii sau elemente individuale (contacte, pagini web, aplicaii
sau fiiere media). Utilizatorii pot aduga, rearanja sau ndeprta aceste plci,
care sunt dinamice i se actualizeaz n timp real de exemplu placa
corespunztoare unui cont de email poate afia numrul de mesaje necitite n
timp ce o alta poate afia informaii actualizate despre condiiile meteo.
Windows Phone 7 utilizeaz tehnologia multi-touch. Interfaa implicit
a sistemului Windows Phone 7 are o tem pe fundal negru care prelungete
viaa bateriilor, deoarece punctele complet negre de pe ecranele OLED nu
emit lumin.
Versiunea de Internet Explorer de pe Windows Phone 7, situat ntre
IE7 i IE8, permite meninerea unei liste cu paginile web favorite, suport
pn la 6 tab-uri care pot ncrca paginile n paralel, utilizeaz gesturile multi-
touch i va fi actualizat regulat, independent de sistemul Windows Phone
Update.
Redarea fiierelor video din fereastra Internet Explorer nu este posibil,
dei filmele de pe YouTube pot fi redate prin aplicaia special YouTube
pentru WP7 care folosete Zune media player. Windows Phone 7 nu se poate
conecta la reelele (Wi-Fi) ascunse, nu suport apelurile video, apelurile
VoIP, dispozitivele de stocare USB, csua de email universal, cutarea
universal, transferul de fiiere prin Bluetooth, sau tonuri de apel
personalizate.
Fig.7 Ecranul de start la Windows Phone 7
270
n versiunea enterprise, Windows Phone 7 nu accept setrile de
securitate ale documentelor Office, mecanismele de securitate
IPsec, iar dintre
facilitile Microsoft Exchange Server suport numai o mic parte.
Microsoft a declarat c funciile cut, copy & paste vor fi adugate la
Windows Phone 7 la nceputul anului 2011, iar facilitile multitasking
cndva n viitor. Adobe a anunat c aplicaiile Flash vor fi adugate la
Windows Phone 7, fr a preciza o limit de timp.
Windows Phone 7 suport cardurile SD, dar cnd utilizatorul schimb
cardul toate datele de pe telefon se pierd iar aparatul revine la setrile din
fabric, din cauza unui sistem unificat de fiiere aplicat tuturor mediilor de
stocare.
Mediul de dezvoltare pentru Windows Phone 7 se va baza numai pe
Silverlight, XNA i .NET Compact Framework 4. Instrumentele principale vor
fi Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 i Expression Blend, pe care Microsoft le
ofer gratuit.
La lansarea Windows Phone 7, i lipseau unele interfee de programare
a aplicaiilor (API) necesare pentru accesarea unora dintre funciile
telefonului. Astfel, aplicaiile nu puteau accesa multe dintre funciile camerei
video ncorporate, putnd prelua numai imagini statice. Dei busola
electronic este prevzut ca i caracteristic obligatorie a tuturor telefoanelor
create pentru Windows Phone 7, lipsa interfeei API a fcut ca numeroase
programe s nu o poat accesa. De asemenea nu exist interfa API pentru
managerul de informaii personale (PIM), ceea ce face ca aplicaiile s nu
poat accesa agenda telefonului, lista de activiti sau calendarul.
Cerinele minime ale dispozitivelor Windows Phone 7:
ecran capacitiv, cu 4 puncte multi-touch, cu rezoluie WVGA
(800x480);
procesor 1 GHz ARM v7 "Cortex/Scorpion" sau mai bun;
procesor grafic compatibil DirectX9
256MB memorie RAM i cel puin 8GB memorie flash;
accelerometru cu busol, senzor de lumin ambiental, senzor de
proximitate i GPS asistat;
camer foto de 5 megapixeli cu iluminare LED;
receptor radio FM;
6 butoane hardware dedicate.
6. webOS
n anul 2010 HP a achiziionat webOS, care este sistemul de operare
pentru dispozitivele mobile Palm bazat pe un nucleu Linux.
Telefonul inteligent Palm Pre a fost primul dispozitiv dotat cu sistemul
de operare webOS, anunate mpreun la Consumer Electronics Show n Las
Vegas pe 8 ianuarie 2009 i lansate pe 6 iunie 2009. Al doilea dispozitiv care
a utilizat acest sistem de operare, Palm Pixi, a fost lansat pe 15 noiembrie
271
2009. webOS integreaz cele mai semnificative reele sociale ca i standardul
Web 2.0.
Interfaa grafic a sistemului de operare webOS, creat pentru
dispozitive cu ecran tactil, include o suit de aplicaii pentru managementul
informaiilor personale, utiliznd tehnologii web printre care HTML5,
JavaScript i CSS.
Aplicaiile pot fi lansate fie prin "Launcher", care afieaz implicit trei
pagini de pictograme de aplicaii ntr-o gril care defileaz pe ecran, sau prin
bara de comenzi rapide care afieaz cinci pictograme ntr-o linie orizontal.
Utilizatorul poate comuta ntre aplicaiile active prin apsarea butonului de pe
panoul frontal care rsfoiete aplicaiile reprezentate ca paginile unei cri.
ntoarcerea unei pagini peste marginea de sus a ecranului nchide aplicaia.
webOS include o funcie numit Synergy care integreaz informaii din
mai multe surse, permind utilizatorului s se conecteze la conturi de Gmail,
Yahoo!, Facebook, LinkedIn i Microsoft Outlook (prin Exchange
ActiveSync). Contactele din toate aceste surse sunt integrate ntr-o singur
list. Calendarele din surse multiple pot fi vizualizate mpreun sau separat.
Pentru mesagerie, Synergy combin toate conversaiile cu fiecare contact ntr-
o singur fereastr.
Aplicaia de navigare web al webOS, numit simplu "Web", este
similar cu Apple Safari, Google Chrome sau Android. Pagina poate fi
vizualizat fie n orientarea peisaj fie n cea portret, comutarea fcndu-se
prin rotirea dispozitivului. Pe 17 februarie 2010, Adobe a prezentat o versiune
a Adobe Flash Player pentru webOS.
Fig.8 Ecranul telefonului Palm Pre cu HP webOS
272
n spatele interfeei utilizator rezid un pachet software care are multe
n comun cu majoritatea distribuiilor Linux pentr calculatoarele obinuite.
webOS utilizeaz nucleul Linux 2.6.24, Upstart, GStreamer, libpurple, Simple
DirectMedia Layer (SDL), PulseAudio i WebKit. Aplicaiile pentru webOS
sunt scrise n JavaScript, HTML, AJAX, i alte cteva tehnologii web.
Palm a publicat un pachet de dezvoltare software pentru webOS numit
Mojo, pe 20 iulie 2009. Modul de dezvoltare de aplicaii poate fi accesat din
ecranul de start al dispozitivelor Pre sau Pixi prin tastarea frazei
"upupdowndownleftrightleftrightbastart" (cunoscut sub numele de codul
Konami) sau "webos20090606" (data lansrii n S.U.A. a dispozitivului Palm
Pre). webOS are un catalog de aplicaii integrate, ca i interfee API pentru
JavaScript prin care se pot accesa caracteristicile hardware ale dispozitivelor.
Dei multe dintre aplicaiile disponibile pentru webOS se bazeaz pe
aplicaiile PIM originale disponibile n sistemele de operare Palm OS, webOS
este o platform complet nou care utilizeaz Linux. Palm a contractat firma
MotionApps pentru dezvoltarea unui emulator Palm OS, numit Classic,
pentru webOS.
ntre 1992 i 2002, compania Palm Computing (redenumit ulterior
Palm, Inc.) a fost dezvoltatoarea platformei software Palm OS. n 2002, Palm
a creat o nou companie pentru partea software, numit PalmSource. Palm a
liceniat Palm OS pentru a fi implementat n PDA-urile i telefoanele
inteligente proprii. Ulterior, Palm a nceput dezvoltarea unei platforme
complet noi, finalizat cu lansarea webOS n 2009, dup care Palm a anunat
c nu va mai produce nici un nou dispozitiv bazat pe vechiul sistem de
operare Palm OS.
Dup achiziionarea companiei Palm de ctre HP, noul proprietar a
anunat c intenioneaz s continue dezvoltarea webOS i s o instaleze pe
produse hardware multiple, cum sunt telefoanele inteligente, computerele-
tablet sau imprimantele.
La 19 octombrie 2010, HP a anunat cea mai semnificativ mbuntire
a sistemului de operare webOS: webOS 2.0, mpreun cu lansarea unui nou
telefon numit Pre 2.
Pentru a crea aplicaii pentru webOS, dezvoltatorii ncep prin crearea
unui cont pe pagina dezvoltatorilor Palm, care poate fi unul dintre cele trei
tipuri disponibile: complet, open source, sau de comunitate. Conturile
complete se adreseaz persoanelor care doresc s-i publice aplicaiile contra
cost. Acest tip de cont este gratuit, dar dezvoltatorii primesc 70% din
veniturile obinute de aplicaiile produse. Conturile open source sunt similare
n toate aspectele conturilor complete, cu excepia faptului c aplicaiile
software trebuie s fie open source ceea ce nseamn c programatorii trebuie
s pun codul surs al aplicaiilor la dispoziia oricui dorete s-l acceseze.
Conturile de comunitate sunt de asemenea gratuite, der aplicaiile produse n
273
aceast categorie nu pot fi publicate contra cost. Toate veniturile
dezvoltatorilor sunt transmise prin intermediul conturilor PayPal.
7. BlackBerry OS
BlackBerry OS este sistemul de operare mobil creat de compania
Research In Motion (RIM) pentru seria proprie de telefoane inteligente
BlackBerry. Sistemul de operare ofer funcii multitasking i suport
dispozitivele de intrare specializate adoptate de RIM pentru a fi utilizate la
terminalele proprii, dintre care rotia de defilare (trackwheel), bila de defilare
(trackball), i mai recent ecranul tactil.
Platforma BlackBerry este cea mai renumit probabil prin suportul
nativ pentru email, prin MIDP 1.0 i mai recent printr-un subset al MIDP 2.0,
care permite sincronizarea n totalitate fr fir cu Microsoft Exchange, Lotus
Domino, sau cu Novell GroupWise pentru email, calendar, liste de sarcini,
note i contacte, atunci cnd sunt utilizate mpreun cu BlackBerry Enterprise
Server. Sistemul de operare suport WAP 1.2.
Actualizrile sistemului de operare pot fi disponibile n mod automat
prin orice furnizor de comunicaii fr fir care suport serviciile BlackBerry
OTASL (Over The Air Software Loading).
Dezvoltatorii pot scrie aplicaii cu ajutorul claselor de interfee
BlackBerry API, dei aplicaiile care utilizeaz unele funcii trebuie semnate
digital.
Dei RIM produce i lanseaz versiuni actualizate ale sistemului de
operare pentru fiecare dispozitiv, furnizorii de servicii de comunicaii decid
dac i cnd aceste noi versiuni vor fi disponibile abonailor proprii.
n aprilie 2010 RIM a anunat noua versiune BlackBerry OS 6.0, care a
fost lansat n luna august 2010.
La 27 septembrie 2010, RIM a anunat o nou platform bazat pe
QNX, BlackBerry Tablet OS, care va rula pe viitoarela computere tablet
BlackBerry PlayBook. QNX urmeaz s nlocuiasc n totalitate BlackBerry
OS sub numele de BlackBerry 7.
Fig.9 Ecranul unui BlackBerry Bold 9000 cu BlackBerry OS
274
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dex.html#macosx Retrieved 2010-06-15.
[13] Gonsalves, Antone (2007-10-11). "Apple Launches iPhone Web Apps Directory".
InformationWeek.
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iPhone". http://www.engadget.com/2007/06/11/apple-announces-third-party-software-
details-for-iphone/ Retrieved 2010-06-09.
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ndows-phone-7-released-to-manufacturing.aspx Retrieved 2010-09-29.
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emid=42 Retrieved 25 August 2010.
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Pre". http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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276
RISK MANAGEMENT
Lt.col.ing. drd. Daniel SORA
Departamentul Regional de Studii pentru Managementul
Resurselor de Aprare
Abstract: Unul dintre cele mai importante standarde ce compun Codul
controlului intern, aprobat prin Ordinul ministrului finanelor publice nr. 946/2005, este
standardul referitor la managementul riscurilor.
Conform standardului menionat mai sus, fiecare entitate public are obligaia de a
analiza sistematic, cel puin o dat pe an, riscurile legate de desfurarea activitilor sale,
s elaboreze planuri corespunztoare n direcia limitrii posibilelor consecine ale acestor
riscuri i s numeasc responsabili pentru aplicarea planurilor respective. Aceast practic
a migrat din sectorul privat n cel public, astfel nct din ce n ce mai multe guverne din
rile membre ale Uniunii Europene au integrat managementul riscurilor n reformele
gestiunii publice, ntreprinse n ultimii ani.
When I was young, people called me a gambler. As the scale of my
operations increased I became known as a speculator. Now I am called a
banker. But I have been doing the same thing all the time.
Sir Ernest Cassell Banker to Edward VII
The entire history of human society is a chronology of exposure to risks
of all kinds and human efforts to deal with those risks. From the first
emergence of the species Homo sapiens, our ancestors practiced risk
management in order to survive, not only as individuals but as a species. The
survival instinct drove humans to avoid the risks that threatened extinction
and strive for security. Our actual physical existence is proof of our ancestors
success in applying risk management strategies.
277
Although the term risk management originated in the 1950s, Henry
Fayol recognized its significance earlier
118
. Fayol, a leading management
authority, was influenced by growing mass production in the United States,
and the existence of giant corporations and their management challenges. In
1916, he structured industrial activities into six functions, including one
called security, which sounds surprisingly like the concept of risk
management:
The purpose of this function is to safeguard property and persons
against theft, fire and flood, to ward off strikes and felonies and broadly all
social disturbances or natural disturbances liable to endanger the progress
and even the life of the business. It is the masters eye, the watchdog of the
one-man business, the police or the army in the case of the state. It is
generally speaking all measures conferring security upon the undertaking and
requisite peace of mind upon the personnel.
Organizations face a very wide range of risks that can impact the
outcome of their operations. The desired overall aim may be stated as a
mission or a set of corporate objectives. The events that can impact an
organization may inhibit what it is seeking to achieve (hazard risks), enhance
that aim (opportunity risks), or create uncertainty about the outcomes (control
risks).
1. Risk definition
The Oxford English Dictionary definition of risk is as follows: a
chance or possibility of danger, loss, injury or other adverse consequences
and the definition of at risk is exposed to danger. In this context, risk is used
to signify negative consequences. However, taking a risk can also result in a
positive outcome. A third possibility is that risk is related to uncertainty of
outcome.
For the purposes of this discussion, risk is defined as a condition in
which there exists an exposure to adversity. In addition, there is an
expectation of what the outcome should look like. Therefore, risk is defined
here as follows: a condition in which there exists a possibility of deviation
from a desired outcome that is expected or hoped for.
Potential risks that might occur in the future are not excluded. In
addition, we do not limit the range of risk to circumstances in the external
environment. Many crises in the economy and the financial services industry
happen because of problems within organizations. These often have to do
with problems in the human resource area, which belong in the realm of the
behavioral sciences.
118
Henri Fayol, General and Industrial Management, New York: Pitman, 1949.
278
The term risk is linked to the possibility of deviation. This means that
the possibility of risk can be expressed as a probability, ranging from 0 to 100
percent. Therefore, the probability is neither impossible nor definite.
This definition does not require that the probability be quantified, only
that it must exist. The degree of risk may not be measurable, for whatever
reason, but the probability of the adverse outcome must be between 0 and 100
percent.
Another key element of the definition is the deviation from a desired
outcome that is expected or hoped for. The definition does not say how such
an undesirable deviation is defined. There are many ways of building
expectations. By projecting historical data into the future, we build
expectations. This pattern of behavior can be observed in our everyday lives.
Another way of building expectations is to forecast by using information
directed toward the future, not by looking back. The definition of expectations
is absolutely key in the concept of risk, as it is used to define the benchmark.
Any misconception of the expectations will distort the measurement of risk
substantially.
Many definitions of risk include the term adverse deviation to express
the negative dimension of the expected or hoped-for outcome. We do not
agree with this limitation, which implies that risk exists only with adverse
deviations, which must be negative and thus are linked to losses. Such a
restriction would implicitly exclude any positive connotations from the
concept of risk. We believe that risk has two sides, which both have to be
included in the definition, and that risk itself has no dimension, negative or
positive.
2. Degree of risk
Risk itself does not say anything about the dimension of measurement.
How can we express that a certain event or condition carries more or less risk
than another? Most definitions link the degree of risk with the likelihood of
occurrence. We intuitively consider events with a higher likelihood of
occurrence to be riskier than those with a lower likelihood. This intuitive
perception fits well with our definition of the term risk. Most definitions
regard a higher likelihood of loss to be riskier than a lower likelihood.
If risk is defined as the possibility of a deviation from a desired
outcome that is expected or hoped for, the degree of risk is expressed by the
likelihood of deviation from the desired outcome.
The expected value of a loss or profit in a given situation is the
likelihood of the deviation multiplied by the amount of the potential loss or
profit. If the money at risk is $100 and the likelihood of a loss is 10 percent,
the expected value of the loss is $10. If the money at risk is $50 and the
likelihood of a loss is 20 percent, the expected value of the loss is still $10.
The same calculation applies to a profit situation. This separation of
279
likelihood and value impact is very important, but we do not always consider
this when we talk about more or less risk.
Frequently, persons who sit on supervisory committees (e.g., board
members and trustees of endowment institutions and other organizations)
have to make decisions with long-ranging financial impact but have
inadequate backgrounds and training to do so. Organizational structures and
processes are rarely set up to support risk management, as these structures are
usually adopted from the operational areas.
Banks and other regulated financial institutions have been forced by
government regulations and industry self-regulating bodies to develop the
culture, infrastructure, and organizational processes and structures for
adequate risk management. Risk management has become a non-delegable
part of top managements function and thus a non-delegable responsibility
and liability. Driven by law, the financial sector has developed over the past
years strategies, culture, and considerable technical and management know-
how relating to risk management, which represents a competitive advantage
against the manufacturing and insurance sectors.
3. Risk management
Risk management is basically a scientific approach to the problem of
managing the pure risks faced by individuals and institutions. The concept of
risk management evolved from corporate insurance management and has as
its focal point the possibility of accidental losses to the assets and income of
the organization.
Risk is everywhere and derives directly from unpredictability. The
process of identifying, assessing and managing risks brings any business full
circle back to its strategic objectives: for it will be clear that not everything
can be controlled. The local consequences of events on a global scale, such as
terrorism, pandemics and credit crunches, are likely to be unpredictable.
However, they can also include the creation of new and valuable
opportunities.
Those who carry the responsibility for risk management (among whom
the insurance case is only one example) are called risk managers. The term
risk management is a recent creation, but the actual practice of risk
management is as old as civilization itself.
Definition of risk management: In a broad sense, the process of
protecting ones person or organization intact in terms of assets and income.
In the narrow sense, it is the managerial function of business, using a
scientific approach to dealing with risk. As such, it is based on a distinct
philosophy and follows a well-defined sequence of steps.
4. Types of risks
Risks can be classified according to the nature of the attributes of the
risk, such as timescale for impact, and the nature of the impact and/or likely
280
magnitude of the risk. They can also be classified according to the timescale
of impact after the event occurs. The source of the risk can also be used as the
basis of classification. In this case, a risk may be classified according to its
origin, such as counterparty or credit risk.
A further way of classifying risks is to consider the nature of the
impact. Some risks can cause detriment to the finances of the organization,
whereas others will have an impact on the activities or the infrastructure.
Further, risks may have an impact on the reputation of the organization or on
its status and the way it is perceived in the marketplace.
Individual organizations will decide on the risk classification system
that suits them best, depending on the nature of the organization and its
activities. Also, many risk management standards and frameworks suggest a
specific risk classification system. If the organization adopts one of these
standards, then it will tend to follow the classification system recommended.
The risk classification system that is selected should be fully relevant to
the organization concerned. There is no universal classification system that
fulfils the requirements of all organizations. It is likely that each risk will need
to be classified in several ways in order to clearly understand its potential
impact.
Risk may have positive or negative outcomes or may simply result in
uncertainty. Therefore, risks may be considered to be related to an
opportunity or a loss or the presence of uncertainty for an organization. Every
risk has its own characteristics that require particular management or analysis.
Risks can be divided into three categories:
hazard (or pure) risks;
control (or uncertainty) risks;
opportunity (or speculative) risks.
There are certain risk events that can only result in negative outcomes.
These risks are hazard risks or pure risks, and these may be thought of as
operational or insurable risks. In general, organizations will have a tolerance
of hazard risks and these need to be managed within the levels of tolerance of
the organization. A good example of a hazard risk faced by many
organizations is that of theft.
The application of risk management tools and techniques to the
management of hazard risks is the best and longest-established branch of risk
management. Hazard risks are associated with a source of potential harm or a
situation with the potential to undermine objectives in a negative way. Hazard
risks are the most common risks associated with organizational risk
management, including occupational health and safety programmes.
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Fig.1 Risk Reference Matrix
There are certain risks that give rise to uncertainty about the outcome
of a situation. These can be described as control risks and are frequently
associated with project management. In these circumstances, it is known that
the events will occur, but the precise consequences of those events are
difficult to predict and control. Therefore, the approach is based on
minimizing the potential consequences of these events. In general,
organizations will have an aversion to control risks. Uncertainties can be
associated with the benefits that the project produces, as well as uncertainty
about the delivery of the project on time, within budget and to specification.
The management of control risks will often be undertaken in order to ensure
that the outcome from the business activities falls within the desired range.
At the same time, organizations deliberately take risks, especially
marketplace or commercial risks, in order to achieve a positive return. These
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can be considered as opportunity or speculative risks, and an organization
will have a specific appetite for investment in such risks.
There are two main aspects associated with opportunity risks. There are
risks/dangers associated with taking an opportunity, but there are also risks
associated with not taking the opportunity. Opportunity risks may not be
visible or physically apparent, and they are often financial in nature. Although
opportunity risks are taken with the intention of having a positive outcome,
this is not guaranteed. Opportunity risks for small businesses include moving
a business to a new location, acquiring new property, expanding a business
and diversifying into new products.
Risk management provides a framework for organizations to deal with
and to react to uncertainty. Whilst it acknowledges that nothing in life is
certain, the modern practice of risk management is a systematic and
comprehensive approach, drawing on transferable tools and techniques. These
basic principles are sector-independent and should improve business
resilience, increase predictability and contribute to improved returns.
5. Risk description
In order to fully understand a risk, a detailed description is necessary so
that a common understanding of the risk can be identified and
ownership/responsibilities may be clearly understood.
The next example provides information on the range of information
that must be recorded to fully understand a risk. The list of information
presented is most applicable to hazard risks and the list will need to be
modified to provide a full description of control or opportunity risks.
So that the correct range of information can be collected about each
risk, the distinction between hazard, control and opportunity risks needs to be
clearly understood.
Example of risk description:
Name or title of risk
Statement of risk, including scope of risk and details of possible events
and dependencies
Nature of risk, including details of the risk classification and timescale of
potential impact
Stakeholders in the risk, both internal and external
Risk attitude, appetite, tolerance or limits for the risk
Likelihood and magnitude of event and consequences should the risk
materialize at current/residual level
Control standard required or target level of risk
Incident and loss experience
Existing control mechanisms and activities
Responsibility for developing risk strategy and policy
Potential for risk improvement and level of confidence in existing controls
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Risk improvement recommendations and deadlines for implementation
Responsibility for implementing improvements
Responsibility for auditing risk compliance
6. Attitudes towards risk
Different organizations will have different attitudes to risk. Some
organizations may be considered to be risk averse, whilst other organizations
will be risk aggressive. To some extent, the attitude of the organization to risk
will depend on the sector and the nature and maturity of the marketplace
within which it operates, as well as the attitude of the individual board
members.
Risks cannot be considered outside the context that gave rise to the
risks. It may appear that an organization is being risk aggressive, when in fact,
the board has decided that there is an opportunity that should not be missed.
However, the fact that the opportunity is high risk may not have been fully
considered.
One of the major contributions from successful risk management is to
ensure that strategic decisions that appear to be high risk are actually taken
with all of the information available. Improvement in the robustness of
decision-making processes is one of the key benefits of risk management.
7. Risk management activities
Risk management is a process that can be divided into several stages,
described as identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and
reviewing risk. This provides a clear distinction between the risk management
process and the framework that supports this process. Descriptions of the risk
management process together with the risk management framework are
required in order to produce a comprehensive risk management standard.
There are a number of options when responding to hazard risks. These
are often represented as the 4Ts of hazard risk management, and these risk
response options are:
tolerate;
treat;
transfer;
terminate.
8. Risk likelihood and magnitude
Risk likelihood and magnitude are best demonstrated using a risk map,
sometimes referred to as a risk matrix. Risk maps can be produced in many
formats. Whatever format is used for a risk map, it is a very valuable tool for
the risk management practitioner. The basic style of risk map plots the
likelihood of an event against the magnitude or impact should the event
materialize.
284
Figure 2 is an illustration of a simple risk matrix, sometimes referred to
as a heat map. This is a commonly used method of illustrating risk likelihood
and the magnitude (or severity) of the event should the risk materialize. The
use of the risk matrix to illustrate risk likelihood and magnitude is a
fundamentally important risk management tool. The risk matrix can be used
to plot the nature of individual risks, so that the organization can decide
whether the risk is acceptable and within the risk appetite and/or risk capacity
of the organization.
Fig.2 Risk likelihood and magnitude
The horizontal axis is used to represent likelihood. The term likelihood
is used rather than frequency, because the word frequency implies that events
will definitely occur and the map is registering how often these events take
place. Likelihood is a broader word that includes frequency, but also refers to
the chances of an unlikely event happening. However, in risk management
literature, the word probability will often be used to describe the likelihood of
a risk materializing.
The vertical axis is used to indicate magnitude. The word magnitude is
used rather than severity, so that the same style of risk map can be used to
illustrate hazard, control and opportunity risks. Severity implies that the event
is undesirable and is, therefore, related to hazard risks.
However, the more important consideration for risk managers is not the
magnitude of the event, but the impact or consequences.
For example, a large fire could occur that completely destroys a
warehouse of a distribution and logistics company. Although the magnitude
of the event may be large, if the company has produced plans to cope with
such an event, the impact on the overall business may be much less than
would otherwise be anticipated.
285
9. Risk likelihood and impact
Large organizations frequently make use of a risk matrix as a means of
summarizing their risk profile. The risk matrix is very useful and can be used
for a range of applications. It can also be used to identify the type of risk
response that is most likely to be employed. Figure 3 illustrates the occasions
when each of the responses tolerate, treat, transfer and terminate are most
likely to be employed for the current level of risk.
Impact is not the same as magnitude, because a risk may have a high
magnitude in terms of the size of the event, but the impact may be smaller.
For example, a road transport company may suffer the complete loss of one of
its vehicles but, depending on the exact circumstances, this may have a very
small overall impact on the business. This will be especially true if the
company did not have sufficient work to fully utilize the type of vehicle
involved in the loss.
Fig. 3 Risk matrix and the 4Ts of hazard management
When assessing a risk for the first time you should assume there are no
controls already in place. The subsequent two assessments are completed
with:
1) those controls already in place and
2) with any additional controls needed to reduce the risk further.
The assessor should assign values for the identified likelihood of
occurrence (A) and the severity of the Impact (B). By multiplying A and
B together you get the rating score, which gives an indication of how
important the risk is. The thick black line is the line of tolerance. Those
risks that are plotted above the line (score 10 25) are out of tolerance and
should be referred for further consideration.
286
L
I
K
E
L
I
H
O
O
D
(
A
)
Very Likely
5
5 10 15 20 25
Likely
4
4
8 12 16 20
Feasible
3
3 6 9 12 15
Slight
2
2 4 6 8 10
Very
unlikely
1
1 2 3 4 5
Insignificant
1
Minor
2
Significant
3
Major
4
Critical
5
IMPACT (B)
Fig. 3 Sample Risk Assessment Matrix:
Green = Low risk, Yellow = Moderate Risk, Amber = High Risk, Red = Extremely High
risk
Likelihood of Occurrence (A) Severity of Impact (B)
1- Very unlikely (hasnt occurred
before)
1 - Insignificant (have no effect)
2 - Slight (rarely occurs) 2 - Minor (little effect)
3 - Feasible (possible, but not 3 - Significant (may pose a
problem)
4 - Likely (has before, will again) 4 - Major (Will pose a
problem)
5 - Very Likely (occurs frequently) 5 - Critical (Immediate
action required)
E - Extremely High Risk - Activities in this category contain
unacceptable levels of risk, including catastrophic and critical injuries that are
highly likely to occur. Organizations should consider whether they should
287
eliminate or modify activities that still have an E rating after applying all
reasonable risk management strategies.
H - High Risk - Activities in this category contain potentially serious
risks that are likely to occur. Application of proactive risk management
strategies to reduce the risk is advised. Organizations should consider ways to
modify or eliminate unacceptable risks.
M - Moderate Risk - Activities in this category contain some level of
risk that is unlikely to occur. Organizations should consider what can be done
to manage the risk to prevent any negative outcomes.
L - Low Risk - Activities in this category contain minimal risks and are
unlikely to occur. Organizations can proceed with these activities as planned.
10. Risk and uncertainty
Risk is sometimes defined as uncertainty of outcomes. This is a
somewhat technical, but nevertheless useful definition and it is particularly
applicable to the management of control risks. Control risks are the most
difficult to identify and define, but are often associated with projects. The
overall intention of a project is to deliver the desired outcomes on time, within
budget and to specification.
It would be unrealistic for the project manager to assume that only
adverse aspects of the ground conditions will be discovered. Likewise, it
would be unwise for the project manager to assume that conditions will be
better than he has been advised, just because he wants that to be the case.
Because control risks cause uncertainty, it may be considered that an
organization will have an aversion to these risks. Perhaps, the real aversion is
to the potential variability in outcomes. A certain level of deviation from the
project plan can be tolerated, but it must not be too great. Tolerance in
relation to control risks can be considered to have the same meaning as in the
manufacture of engineering components, where the components must be of a
certain size, within acceptable tolerance limits.
11. Business continuity planning
There has been considerable interest in the subjects of business
continuity planning (BCP) and disaster recovery planning (DRP) in recent
times. This illustrates the importance of BCP as an integral part of risk
management. This increased concern has been reinforced by the potential for
major disruption posed by extreme weather events, terrorist attacks, civil
emergencies and the fear of a fl u pandemic.
In simple terms, BCP is how an organization prepares for future
incidents that could jeopardize its existence. The range of incidents that
should be covered will include everything from local events like fires through
to regional disruption such as earthquakes or national security incidents and
extend to international events like terrorism and pandemics.
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British Standard BS 31100 defines business continuity planning as a
holistic management process that identifies potential threats to an
organization and the impacts to business operations that those threats, if
realized, might cause, and which provides a framework for building
organizational resilience with the capability for an effective response to
safeguard the interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value-
creating activities.
In case of a serious incident such as loss of access to premises or failure
of a major part of an organization, it is important to have in place a well
defined, documented and tested disaster recovery plan. Such plans inevitably
focus on recovery of access to IT systems and data, but also commonly cover
the provision of alternative premises (if needed) and other facilities, as well as
setting out plans for communications with employees and with other
stakeholders such as suppliers, customers and the media at a time of crisis.
Business continuity plans build upon this by setting out longer-term
plans for restoration of business as usual in the immediate aftermath of a
disaster. A business continuity plan is an important part of reducing the
impact of a hazard incident. The plan should include arrangements for
reducing the damage caused during the incident and containing the cost of
recovery from it.
Disaster recovery plans are a particular component of business
continuity planning. If a computer system fails to operate correctly or data has
become corrupted, the organization will need emergency procedures to ensure
that the data can be recovered and/or ensure that the organization continues in
existence.
For a printing firm IT systems are fundamental to the operation of the
company, because the computer systems process orders, schedule printing and
manage invoicing. For such a company, it may be appropriate to arrange for a
mobile emergency computer facility to be available in case of major IT
failure. If this decision is taken, a contract should be set up with an outside
company for a duplicate computer to be delivered in a trailer to the premises
of the company. The duplicate computer would then be connected and the
operations would be controlled from the duplicate computer in the trailer. The
success of this arrangement will depend on the availability of information
from backup disks that should be produced at least once per day and possibly
several times per day.
The overriding principles appropriate to successful business continuity
planning are that the business continuity plan (BCP) should be:
comprehensive;
cost-effective;
practical;
effective;
maintained;
289
practiced.
It is important that the BCP should cover all the operations and
premises of the organization to ensure that the plan can facilitate a complete
resumption of normal business operations. It is also important that the plan is
cost-effective and proportionate to the risk exposures.
The BCP must be practical and easily understood by staff and others
who are involved in the execution of the plan. Overall, the BCP must be
effective in that it will recognize the urgency of certain business components
or functions and identify responsibilities for ensuring timely resumption of
normal work.
In order to guarantee that the BCP will be effective, it needs to be
tested, maintained and practiced. All members of staff need to be familiar
with the intended operation of the plan and training will need to be provided.
The lessons learnt during testing and practice of the business recovery plan
should be incorporated into the plan so that it becomes more effective.
Testing of business continuity plans is an essential component of
ensuring that they will be appropriate and effective. However, testing of plans
can be time-consuming and, in some circumstances, disruptive and costly.
Even the simple example of a fi re evacuation drill from a building illustrates
that the testing of procedures is inevitably going to disrupt normal routine
operations.
There is an obvious link between BCP and enterprise risk management
(ERM). ERM is concerned with the risks facing the whole organization and
BCP takes an approach that business continuity arrangements should be in
place. The BCP approach is to look at the continuity of operations across the
whole organization. Ensuring continuity is obviously part of an ERM
approach. It should therefore be considered that BCP is part of ERM, but it is
not the whole of ERM activity. Nevertheless, there is a strong similarity in
approach and the business continuity and disaster recovery activities should
take place within the context of a broader ERM initiative, as appropriate.
Continuation of core business processes is also the basis of business
continuity planning. The difference in emphasis is that ERM seeks to identify
the risks that could impact the core processes. BCP seeks to identify the
critical business functions that need to be maintained in order to achieve
continuation of the business. The approaches are complementary and there is
a good deal of similarity between BCP and this style of ERM.
290
REFERENCES
1. R. Gallati, Risk management and capital adequacy, McGraw-Hill
Companies, 2003
2. P. Hopkin, Fundamentals of risk management, The Institute of Risk
Management, 2010
3. Ministerul Finanelor Publice, Metodologie de implementare a
standardului de control intern Managementul riscurilor, 2007
291
SUPPLIES, FUNDING AND OUTSOURCING SERVICES
Lect. univ. dr. Cristina Gelan
Lect. univ. dr. tefan Georgescu
Andrei aguna University
Abstract
Externalizarea a devenit o problem strategic dei muli manageri sunt nc
nepregtii n acest sens. O nou er, a externalizrii diferitelor capabiliti, va provoca
reproiectarea organizaional i apariia unui nou set de aptitudini manageriale.
Datorit schimbrii rapide de orientare n economia global, orice companie trebuie s
fie capabil s anticipeze schimbrile n economie, precum i dinamica externalizrii.
Nu de mult cele mai mari companii deineau propriile depozite i aveau propriul sistem
de distribuie, iar logisticienii nu aveau nici expertiza nici aptitudinile necesare
gestionrii acestora. Astzi, n schimb, distribuitorii se ntrec n a oferi servicii
complete din punctul de vedere al reelelor logistice i chiar marile companii
externalizeaz depozitarea, distribuia i alte activiti.
For years, sourcing has been just another word for procurement - a
financially material, but strategically peripheral, corporate function. Now,
globalization, aided by rapid technology innovation, is changing the basis of
competition. Its no longer a companys ownership of capabilities that matters
but rather its ability to control and make the most of critical capabilities,
whether or not they reside on the companys balance sheet. Outsourcing is
becoming so sophisticated that even core functions like engineering, R&D,
manufacturing, and marketing can - and often should - be moved outside. And
292
that, in turn, is changing the way firms think about their organizations, their
value chains, and their competitive positions.
Forward-thinking companies are making their value chains more elastic and
their organizations more flexible. And with the decline of the vertically
integrated business model, sourcing is evolving into a strategic process for
organizing and fine-tuning the value chain. The question is no longer whether to
outsource a capability or activity but rather how to source every single
activity in the value chain. This is the new discipline of capability sourcing.
Perhaps the best window on the new sourcing landscape is a handful of vanguard
companies that are transforming what used to be purely internal corporate
functions into entirely new industries. Firms like United Parcel Service in
logistics management, Solectron in contract manufacturing and Hewitt
Associates in human resource management have created new business models by
concentrating scale and skill within a single function. As these and other function-
based companies grow, so does the potential value of outsourcing to all
companies. Its not always obvious which functions have the most potential for
developing scale and skill.
Migrating from a vertically integrated company to a specialized provider of a
single function is not a winning strategy for everyone. But all companies need to
rigorously assess each of their functions to determine in which they have
sufficient scale and differentiated skills and in which they dont. Greater focus
on capability sourcing can improve a companys strategic position by reducing
costs, streamlining the organization, and improving quality. Finding more-
qualified partners to provide critical functions usually allows companies to
enhance the core capabilities that drive competitive advantage in their industries.
[1]
Yet despite the enormous opportunities available through capability sourcing,
specialized re-search indicates that many executives remain unprepared for this
transformation. A recent Bain survey of large and medium-sized companies
reports that 82% of large firms in Europe, Asia, and North America have
outsourcing arrangements of some kind, and 51% use offshore outsourcers. But
almost half say their outsourcing programs fall short of expectations, only 10%
are highly satisfied with the costs theyre saving, and a mere 6% are highly
satisfied with their offshore outsourcing overall. [2]
The reason these efforts often fail to measure up to expectations, even purely
in terms of cost savings, is that most companies continue to make sourcing
decisions on a piece-meal basis. They have not put hard numbers against the
potential value of capability sourcing, and theyve been slow to develop a
comprehensive sourcing strategy that will keep them competitive in a global
economy. [3] To realize the full potential of sourcing, companies must forget
the old peripheral and tactical view and make it a core strategic function.
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The Changing Basis of Competitive Advantage
For over a century, companies competed on the basis of the assets they owned.
AT&T, with its direct control of the American telephone network; Bethlehem
Steel, with its large-scale manufacturing plants; and Exxon, with its vast oil
reserves, each dominated its respective industry. But in the 1980s, the basis of
competition began to shift from hard assets to intangible capabilities.
Microsoft, for example, became the de facto standard in the computing
industry through its skill in writing and software. Wal-Mart transformed
retailing through its proprietary approach to supply chain management
and its information-rich relationships with customers and suppliers. [4]
A similar shift occurred in the worldwide auto industry. When U.S.
automakers began losing market share to Japanese companies, they were
forced to confront a growing gap in both cost and quality. Recognizing that
upstream component quality was critical to their end product and seeing the
success of the Japanese keiretsu model of networked suppliers, the Big Three
began to move design, engineering, and manufacturing work to specialized
partners. They hammered out strategic sourcing relationships for complex
subassemblies
such as seats, steering columns, and braking systems. [5] To win a significant
share of their business, chosen suppliers had to meet tough cost and quality
specifications. More important, to ensure the long-term success of a
partnership, both parties had to open their books, sharing detailed information
that became the basis for continual quality and cost improvements over many
years. Both parties shared in the savings generated from improved efficiency,
which provided ongoing incentives to identify and remove unnecessary costs.
This new approach to sourcing had profound effects on the automakers
operations and management. For example, Chrysler established what it called
value-managed relationships, in which it consolidated component purchases
with the few suppliers it believed could sustain competitive costs, high
quality, and efficient delivery. The carmaker and its key suppliers set a common
goal of achieving the lowest total systems cost. Before it could reach this goal,
however, Chrysler had to refocus its entire procurement function so that it
could manage the new, highly collaborative sourcing relationships. That
required the company to train and promote a different kind of manager who
was capable of understanding system economics, not just one who knew how to
nickel-and-dime the supplier base [6].
The same dynamics were also at work in the credit card industry, which
restructured in response to a dramatic change in the basis of competition
fueled by technological innovation. In the 1970s, most banks that issued credit
cards also processed their own transactions in a very labor-intensive manner. But
as computers automated transaction processing, the economies of scale grew
significantly, and individual issuers started to pool their transactions to drive
down costs. The industry began to separate into those companies that issued
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cards and managed customers, on the one hand, and those that processed
transactions, on the other, as transaction-processing underwent rapid
commoditization.
If globalization and technology transform more industries, all companies will
eventually have to let go of that comfortable but simplistic guideline. A series
of geopolitical, macroeconomic, and technological trends has opened the
worlds markets, made business capabilities much more portable, and produced
a level of discontinuity that has no precedent in modern economic history. These
events include the fall of the Berlin wall, Chinas embrace of capitalism, the
advent of worldwide tariff reduction agreements, and the spread of cheap,
accessible telecommunications infrastructure. In the new era of capability
sourcing, companies value chain decisions will increasingly shape their
organizations and determine the kinds of managerial skills they need to acquire
and develop in order to survive amid increasingly fluid industry boundaries. [7]
Outsourcing Opportunities
Using a sourcing opportunities map, we can determine which functions have
the highest outsourcing potential and which should remain under a companys
control. The vertical axis measures how proprietary a capability is for a
company.
The horizontal axis plots how common the capability is within or outside an
industry. The less proprietary and the more common a function is, the stronger
a candidate it is for outsourcing [8].
The vertical axis of the map measures how proprietary a process or function is;
the horizontal dimension assesses the degree of commonality, both within and
outside an industry. Capabilities that fall in the upper right portion of the
map are strong candidates for outsourcing. Those that appear in the lower left
section are
potential prospects for captive sourcing. Such capabilities may even be
candidates for in-sourcing - that is, if can determine that a company is really
the best at a given function, and may have an opportunity to perform this
function for other companies.
Opportunities that fall in the middle of the sourcing opportunities map
generally require more detailed analysis of both a company and an industry.
We will need also to consider such factors as regulation, standards, and
alternative products to figure out what will happen to those capabilities in the
future. To provide a quick sense of the relative financial stakes involved, and
highlight the biggest opportunities, the sourcing opportunities map should be
populated with bubbles scaled to represent the cost dollars at stake for each
capability. Once weve discovered which capabilities promise high potential
for alternative sourcing, the next question is: How should we source them?
We need to figure out how ours capabilities stack up to whats required. Do we
meet, exceed, or fall short of cost and quality requirements? A capability
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assessment map like the one in the exhibit How Strong Are Ours
Capabilities? plots each capability according to its cost and quality relative to
top-performing competitors or suppliers. This map will help we determine
which key capability gaps our company needs to fill. Perhaps equally
important, it will identify any current activities that we could perform with less
rigor without incurring any strategic penalty.
Where capabilities fall on this grid establishes appropriate goals for an
outsourcing relationship. Functions that fall, for instance, in the upper left
(relatively high-cost functions).
Unique Common
to self across
industries
Uniqueness of business process or function
Table 1. Proprietary nature of process or function [9]
Companys ability to perform function
Once we have determined which capabilities offer the highest potential value
from outsourcing, we need to see how well, and how efficiently, a company
currently performs each one of them. This exercise may surprise: If the cost per
transaction is low enough and quality high enough, should be thinking of
Not proprietary
High
Strong candidates
Priority
outsourcing
Data are
proprietary
Medium Priority:
Business process is
Proprietary
Outsourcing
on industry and
dynamics
opportunities
company
Dependent
Profit model is
Proprietary
Low Priority:
Captive
Candidates
sourcing
296
selling that function as a new business in itself.
Better than
it needs
to be
Source to
sacrifice
necessary
reduce cost;
capability if
Consider creating
Source to
reduce cost
a new business (if
adjacent to core
business)
Not good
enough
Source to
increase
capability at
lower cost
Above industry
median
Source to
capability even
if necessary
Alt industry
median
Increase
at higher cost
Below industry median
Cost per transaction
Table 2. Companys ability to perform function [10]
Given the rapidly shifting contours of the global economy, companies need to
be able to anticipate changes in the economics and geography of outsourcing.
It wasnt long ago, for example, that most big companies had to own their own
warehouses and operate their own distribution systems. Logistics specialists
had neither the skill nor the scale to handle those functions. But today,
suppliers are competing fiercely to offer full-service logistics networks, and
even the largest companies can now outsource warehousing, distribution, and
related activities. Such trends will only accelerate in the future, and those
companies that have recognized and prepared for them will be the first to
capitalize on them.
So, to ensure that it doesnt quickly be-come obsolete, a sourcing strategy needs
to consider not only present circumstances but also future alternative scenarios.
What trends will influence the sourcing options available for each key
capability? Is the supplier base growing rapidly, and are innovative new
outsourcers emerging? Are different regions of the world investing heavily in
particular capabilities - like contract manufacturing or customer service - and
will they offer greater cost or quality advantages in the future. The answers to
such questions may encourage a company to pursue certain sourcing
opportunities that might not be highly attractive based on current numbers
but could offer dramatic benefits in the coming months and years [11]. Or they
297
may lead a company to negotiate short-term sourcing contracts to keep options
open, rather than enter into long-term relationships. Ultimately, a companys
skill in quickly remolding its sourcing arrangements in response to market
conditions and rivals moves may be its strongest competitive advantage.
Instead of conclusions
Functions that are situated in the upper (costly functions whose quality levels
exceed requirements) should be outsourced to low-cost providers - even if it
means a reduction in quality. Capabilities that fall in the lower left (high-cost
functions performed relatively poorly) require outsourcing partners that can
both reduce costs and improve quality. The capability assessment map also gives
another way to identify in-sourcing opportunities. Capabilities that fall in the
upper right (low-cost, high-quality functions) could become the basis for
attractive new businesses.
Following the first two steps of our framework can help you determine what
type of control we need over each of your capabilities. The third step is a
kind of reality check in which we determine whether a capability that is a
strong candidate for strategic sourcing can be carried out at a distance without
any loss of quality.
The issue of physical proximity may not seem very strategic, but globalization and
advances in technology ensure that its a constantly moving target. For many
functions, including transaction processing, design, engineering, and customer
service, the Internet and an increasingly sophisticated telephone infrastructure
have made physical proximity much less relevant, at least from a cost
perspective. The necessary information and outputs can be transferred
electronically at high speed and low cost. For tangible products that must be
shipped, however, proximity plays a large role in both cost and timeliness
considerations; it may not be feasible to manage the movement of such products
from afar. There may also be customer service constraints. Certain product
development, sales, and service tasks, for example, may require local interactions.
Capabilities that do not require physical proximity are good candidates for off
shoring, whether through a traditional outsourcing arrangement or, for
proprietary capabilities, through a captive operation.
If to go through this three-step analysis, a company should have the outline
of a comprehensive capability sourcing strategy. To know which capabilities
need to own and protect, which can be best performed by what kind of partners,
and how to structure a productive relationship. Formulating the strategy is, of
course, only the first stage of a sourcing effort: Partners then have to be chosen,
contracts negotiated, and management structures established and monitored. The
success of the strategy often hinges on the creativity with which partner-ships
are organized and managed. But only by first taking a broad, strategic view of
capability sourcing can a company make the most of its sourcing choices.
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NOTE BIBLIOGRAFICE:
[1] COLLINS, James C., PORRAS, Jerry I., Building your companys vision, in
Harvard Business Review, Harvard Business School Publishing, September
October 1996, p. 4;
[2] GOTTFREDSON, Mark, PURYEAR, Rudy, PHILLIPS, Stephen,
Strategic Sourcing, in Harvard Business Review, Harvard Business School
Publishing, February 2005, p. 2;
[3] COLLIS, David J., RUKSTAD, Michael G., Can you say what your strategy
is?, in Harvard Business Review, Harvard Business School Publishing, April
2008, p. 6;
[4] GOTTFREDSON, Mark, PURYEAR, Rudy, PHILLIPS, Stephen, Strategic
Sourcing, in Harvard Business Review, Harvard Business School Publishing,
February 2005, p. 2;
[5] NISHIGUCHI, Toshihiro, Strategic Industrial Sourcing, New York: Oxford
University, 1994, pp. 102 - 107;
[6] GOTTFREDSON, Mark, PURYEAR, Rudy, PHILLIPS, Stephen, Strategic
Sourcing, in Harvard Business Review, Harvard Business School Publishing,
February 2005, p. 2;
[7] BEIMBORN, Daniel, Cooperative sourcing: Simulation studies and
empirical data on outsourcing coalitions in the banking industry, Gabler
Publisher, Wiesbaden, 2008, pp. 85 - 90;
[8] GOTTFREDSON, Mark, PURYEAR, Rudy, PHILLIPS, Stephen, Strategic
Sourcing, in Harvard Business Review, Harvard Business School Publishing,
February 2005, p. 6;
[9] GOTTFREDSON, Mark, PURYEAR, Rudy, PHILLIPS, Stephen, Strategic
Sourcing, in Harvard Business Review, Harvard Business School Publishing,
February 2005, p. 6;
[10] GOTTFREDSON, Mark, PURYEAR, Rudy, PHILLIPS, Stephen,
Strategic Sourcing, in Harvard Business Review, Harvard Business School
Publishing, February 2005, p. 7;
[11] NISHIGUCHI, Toshihiro, Strategic Industrial Sourcing, New York:
Oxford University, 1994, pp. 93
299
DE LA MANAGEMENTUL INTERCULTURAL
LA SOCIETATEA CUNOATERII
- Studiu asupra implicaiilor interculturalului n
transformarea sistemului militar pentru a rspunde
provocrilor mileniului III
Lect. univ. dr. Livia Ecaterina TTAR
Departamentul Regional de Studii pentru
Managementul Resurselor de Aprare, Braov
Abstract
The challenges posed by Romanias accession to the Euro-Atlantic bodies cannot be faced
in the absence of the military decision-makers education and training, for the process of
transformation implies the existence of a set of special skills, knowledge, and aptitudes
meant to facilitate the process per se, as well as to motivate those who must put it in
practice.
The Romanian military systems transformation process is accompanied by the NATO
transformation process, which is the reason why the Allied Transformation Command was
established. On the one hand, this may be regarded as a constraint; on the other hand, it is
also a chance and a catalyst for our country, since we thus have something against which to
benchmark our achievements, as well as a source of inspiration in terms of our own
military systems transformation.
300
Partea I Management, leadership, cultur
I.1. Premise teoretice
Literatura de specialitate din domeniul managementului i economiei n
general (Cook, 1995; Anjard, 1998; Cicmil, 1999; Pelzer Hudson, 1999;
Teare i Monk, 2002) subliniaz c mediul social, economic, politic i cultural
contemporan este pus sub semnul schimbrii, iar ritmul acesteia este tot mai
alert. Fie c vorbim de schimbarea generat de evoluia tehnologic i
informaional, fie c privim lucrurile prin prisma mult mai complex a
globalizrii, aceast schimbare afecteaz societatea contemporan n
ansamblul su, iar implicaiile asupra mediului organizaional sunt profunde.
Nu este, aadar, suprinztor, c aceste fenomene au fost studiate att din
perspectiv naional-intercultural, ct i din perspectiva modificrilor impuse
n context organizaional, cu accent pe evoluia tehnicilor manageriale i de
leadership (Recklies, 2001).
O analiz a caracteristicilor culturale i a relaiei dintre acestea i actul
managerial nu poate trece cu vederea relevana teoriei lui Hofstede (1983),
care a identificat coordonatele majore ce guverneaz valorile culturale:
individualism-colectivism, masculinitate-feminitate, distana fa de putere i
evitarea incertitudinii. n ncercarea de a testa validitatea acestei teorii n
organizaii aparinnd unor culturi diferite, Wheeler (2002) a ntreprins un
studiu ce viza impactul diversitii culturale asupra managementului, iar
concluzia sa a fost una fr echivoc: sensibilitatea cultural este o cerin de
baz a managerului modern n scopul creterii performanei organizaionale i
al meninerii avantajului concurenial.
n ceea ce privete specificul cultural naional, Kelemen (1995) s-a concentrat
asupra provocrilor crora trebuie s le fac fa managerii romni, respectiv,
britanici, iar rezultatele studiului su au evideniat un grad ridicat de
similitudine n acest sens, semn c nelegerea i aplicarea practic a
leadership-ului se realizeaz n mod asemntor, n ciuda diferenelor inerente
de ordin cultural (cum ar fi: educaia, experiena, afectivitatea etc.) dintre cele
dou categorii studiate. Explicaia pe care o propune autoarea este, n
principal, globalizarea nsoit de tendinele manageriale asociate acesteia:
aplatizarea organizaional (engl. delayering), delegarea autoritii,
mputernicirea angajailor (engl. empowerment), autonomia i dezvoltarea
profesional a subalternilor, abordarea constructiv a diferenelor culturale,
colaborarea i ncurajarea spiritului de echip etc.
Un alt studiu, focalizat de data aceasta pe felul n care conflictul este perceput
n diferite culturi, aparine lui Lee (1998), care identific discrepane
301
semnificative ntre culturile occidental i est-european. Astfel, n timp ce
conflictul, n viziunea occidental, este un joc alternativ de victorii i eecuri
ce ofer oricnd posibilitatea unei revane, n cultura est-european acesta
este vzut ca o ameninare fundamental. O justificare simplist a acestei
situaii, n opinia autoarei, ar fi cei cincizeci de ani de comunism est-
european, dar ea nsi recunoate c o asemenea explicaie ar fi doar o
stereotipizare grosolan, dat fiind faptul c percepii similare se constat i n
cazul unor ri ce nu au cunoscut experiena comunist. Pe de alt parte, un
punct de vedere plauzibil n acest sens ar putea fi cel avansat de Obeyesekere
(1990), care pune aceste diferene pe seama psihologiei i miturilor de grup ce
ne contureaz harta mental i conduc, n mod inevitabil, la o anumit
modalitate de percepere a fenomenelor nconjurtoare.
Din pcate, dup cum remarc Analoui (2000), schimbarea i implicaiile
profunde ale acesteia asupra realitilor organizaionale au fost insuficient
studiate n perioada anterioar anului 1989 n ri ca Romnia, n vreme ce
literatura occidental s-a aplecat de mult vreme asupra acestor fenomene.
Acest lucru este cu att mai semnificativ, cu ct evenimentele din decembrie
1989 ilustreaz conceptul de schimbare discontinu, definit de Kitchen i
Daly (2002) drept o transformare brusc i radical, ce afecteaz o societate n
mod dramatic i sub toate aspectele sale.
Pe lng elementele naional-interculturale exemplificate succint n
paragrafele anterioare, o alt faet a actului managerial este impus de
realitatea organizaional, ce presupune provocri variate: diferene culturale
ntre categoriile socio-profesionale, schimbri interne, sau modificri ale
tehnicilor de conducere.
I.2. Sistemul militar romnesc scurt prezentare
Se poate afirma c sistemul militar romnesc, n ansamblul su, a trecut
printr-un proces de profunde transformri impuse de abandonarea conceptelor
de Rzboi Rece, Pact de la Varovia sau Cortin de Fier cu tot ce presupuneau
acestea i trecerea la interoperabilitate, flexibilitate sau control civil al
Armatei. Impactul la nivelul culturii organizaionale este unul semnificativ i
drastic. Aa cum explic Monahan (2001), mediul militar a devenit de
nerecunoscut de la sfritul Rzboiului Rece i, n consecin, cultura
militar trebuie s se modifice din cel puin dou motive: n primul rnd,
personalul de conducere trebuie s recunoasc faptul c stilul de lucru
tradiional, autocratic i bazat pe executarea ordinelor nu mai poate fi acceptat
dect dac este nsoit de mputernicirea i participarea subordonailor; n al
doilea rnd, comandanii trebuie s dobndeasc noi aptitudini ca
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flexibilitatea, adaptabilitatea, comunicarea, asumarea riscurilor, adoptarea
deciziilor i creativitatea pentru a putea face fa actualelor provocri din
domeniul securitii. Avnd n vedere complexitatea acestor schimbri, nu
este surprinztor c mii de ofieri superiori ai armatei romne au optat pentru
trecerea n rezerv, ei nefiind capabili sau dispui s se angajeze n acest
proces de schimbare (Costea, 2002; Zulean, 2002). Oricum, succesul acestui
proces nu poate fi nc estimat, cu att mai mult cu ct exist autori ce resping
din start posibilitatea implementrii schimbrii n organizaiile piramidale i
tradiional-ierarhice de tipul celor militare (Reis i Pea, 2001; Clayton i
Gregoy, 2000). Dei o astfel de opinie poate fi etichetat drept radical sau, n
cel mai bun caz, rigid, nu se poate ignora faptul c managementul schimbrii
este un proces extrem de dificil ca urmare a reaciilor negative pe care le
presupune, i anume: respingere (Appelbaum et al., 1998, Rothberg, 2000;
DiPaola i Hoy, 2001), team (Bechtel i Squires, 2001) i/sau nemulumire
(Waddell i Sohal, 1998; Pelzer Hudson, 1999).
n afara tensiunilor generate la scara ntregului sistem militar, o alt surs de
provocri este reprezentat de diversitatea cultural a angajailor acestuia. Din
acest punct de vedere, pot fi identificate cel puin trei categorii distincte i
dihotomice de personal: civili-militari, ofieri-subofieri, brbai-femei.
Firete c un studiu intercultural trebuie extins i asupra altor surse de
diversitate cultural, cum ar fi: originea, etnia, religia, educaia pentru a
enumera doar cteva dintre dimensiunile relevante n acest sens (Cristian,
2002).
Dup cum observ Hatch (1997) sau Darling i Walker (2001), fiecare grup
este purttorul propriilor valori, concepii i preocupri. Starea organizaiei
depinde de felul n care factorii de conducere utilizeaz sau valorizeaz aceste
diferene culturale pentru a le pune n slujba creterii performanei
organizaionale. n caz contrar, eterogenitatea cultural devine o surs de
conflict distructiv ce poate submina colaborarea, comunicarea i motivarea
angajailor, toate acestea afectnd grav funcionarea organizaiei. Mai mult,
ignorarea diversitii culturale sau ncercarea de a impune omogenitatea n
rndul angajailor pot avea efecte la fel de dezastruoase, prin diminuarea ori
suprimarea creativitii i inventivitii personalului (DeDreu, 1997).
n acest context, merit menionat legtura dintre managementul diverselor
grupuri culturale i concepte manageriale colaterale, cum ar fi: exercitarea
puterii i, implicit, modul n care puterea este resimit la nivelul diferitelor
culturi individuale sau de grup. Pentru a ilustra aceast idee, Cheng (1994) a
pornit de la categoriile clasice de putere identificate de Buchanan i
Huczynski (1997), respectiv, Edelmann (1993) i anume, puterea
recompensatoare (engl. reward power), puterea coercitiv (engl. coercive
303
power), puterea expertului (engl. expert power), puterea legitim (engl.
legitimate power) i puterea referenial (engl. referent power) i a studiat
felul n care diferitele tipuri de putere sunt percepute de categorii socio-
profesionale diverse. Concluzia autorului este categoric: diferitele tipuri de
putere au efecte variate asupra atitudinii, comportamentului i performanei
profesionale ale angajailor, explicaia principal fiind una de natur cultural.
De pild, un militar va fi mult mai dispus s execute un ordin primit pe cale
ierarhic dect un civil, ca urmare a educaiei individuale i a culturii
organizaionale n care funcioneaz. Pe de alt parte, ns, un profesor va
respinge acest mod de lucru datorit gradului ridicat de independen pe care
formaia i prestaia sa profesional o presupun, dei funcioneaz n aceeai
organizaie. Acest lucru este cu att mai pregnant n instituiile totale
(Goffman, 1961) de tipul academiilor militare, n cadrul crora cadrele
didactice au adesea sentimentul c regulile sistemului contravin ethosului lor
profesional i, n consecin, acumuleaz frustrri i resentimente (Fincham i
Rhodes, 1992; Bamberger i Hasgall, 1995; Siegall, 2000).
Aspectele semnalate anterior sunt cu att mai importante cu ct ele joac un
rol esenial n managementul schimbrii, proces n care sistemul militar este
angajat n ansamblul su. n ciuda rezistenei pe care toate categoriile de
personal o opun n acest context, un act managerial bazat pe o strategie
coerent i care face uz de tehnici eficiente de comunicare cu fiecare categorie
de subalterni poate transforma acest efort ntr-o reuit (Gunnigle i Moore,
1994; Meskill et al., 1999).
Aceeai idee este susinut i de Elangovan i Xie (2000), care subliniaz
importana unui act managerial flexibil i nuanat n cazul organizaiilor
multiculturale, menit s rspund nevoilor i ateptrilor diverselor categorii
de personal. Mai mult, dup cum remarc Dolan i Garcia (2002), valorile i
cultura fiecrui grup i sub-grup dintr-o organizaie sunt cele care guverneaz
i determin tipul de management practicat ntr-o instituie. n consecin,
autorii avanseaz un nou stil de management: managementul bazat pe
valori, care este vzut drept un instrument strategic pentru asigurarea
succesului oricrei organizaii n secolul al XXI-lea, cnd factorii de
conducere au rolul de a inspira i canaliza eforturile angajailor, respectndu-
le valorile i tratndu-i ca pe nite indivizi maturi, creativi i autonomi. Astfel,
n opinia lui Homes (2001), relaia dintre manager i subordonai/subalterni
trebuie s se manifeste sub forma unui parteneriat avantajos pentru ambele
pri. Efectul benefic al acestui parteneriat asupra succesului organizaional
este i mai semnificativ dac lum n considerare statisticile care arat c mai
mult de 80% dintre problemele de calitate a muncii sunt cauzate de factorii de
conducere, n timp ce doar 20% dintre acestea sunt rezultatul erorilor
subalternilor (Ho i Fung, 1994).
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Dintr-o lumin optimist, se poate argumenta c orice proces de schimbare
implic dificulti inerente i, odat ce sistemul va intra pe un fga stabil,
aceste aspecte vor fi mai uor de administrat. Astfel, fiecare categorie de
personal va acumula experiena i cunotinele necesare pentru a accepta i a
se adapta la noua stare de fapt, conform principiului curbei nvrii
(Daniels i Radebaugh, 1996). Pe de alt parte, integrarea cultural a civililor
n sistemul militar este etichetat de aceeai autori drept creolizare, iar acest
efort este sortit eecului n absena voinei ambelor pri de a adopta o
atitudine proactiv n acest sens, cu accent pe asumarea responsabilitii
pentru rezultatele ce vor fi nregistrate (Bagshaw, 1998; Harrington i
Harrington, 1995).
Dup cum se poate observa, diversitatea cultural are ramificaii multiple n
realitatea organizaional i presupune trimiteri la numeroase concepte
teoretice: putere, conflict, cultur, schimbare sau motivare. Dei un asemenea
demers ar putea prea ndrzne i riscant deopotriv, datorit caracterului su
exhaustiv, totui lucrarea se dorete realist n sensul concentrrii asupra unor
realiti organizaionale ce se preteaz observaiei i analizei pertinente.
I.3. Motivaia temei de studiu
Motivele care stau la baza alegerii acestei teme de studiu sunt, n primul rnd,
de ordin subiectiv i personal. Mai exact, experiena profesional este cea care
a declanat dorina de a nelege realitatea organizaional a sistemului militar
romnesc, cu tot ce presupune acesta: relaii inter-umane, conflicte, succese i
eecuri.
Tensiunile crora armata romn este supus n prezent sunt multiple i
provin din surse politice, economice i ideologice. n consecin, factorii de
conducere trebuie s fac fa unor provocri pentru care nu sunt ntotdeauna
pregtii nici teoretic, nici practic. Aceste neajunsuri se rsfrng asupra
ntregului personal, iar efectele sunt, de multe ori negative, n special n
privina strii de spirit a angajailor. Comunicarea defectuoas, incoerena n
aplicarea schimbrii, rigiditatea sau ignorarea diferenelor culturale din
interiorul sistemului conduc adesea la conflicte ntre indivizi sau grupuri
socio-profesionale (Armstrong, 1999).
Din pcate, la nivelul structurilor de conducere ale Ministerului Aprrii
Naionale nu a existat, cel puin pn n prezent, o preocupare clar n direcia
identificrii surselor conflictuale i de rezisten la schimbare, n ciuda
importanei strategice pe care un asemenea demers ar avea-o. Se constat o
305
concentrare a eforturilor pe direcia soluionrii aspectelor cuantificabile sau
tangibile ale procesului (de pild, resurse financiare sau umane, achiziii etc.),
comparativ cu lipsa unei analize comprehensive a factorilor culturali sau etici,
mult mai dificil de identificat i examinat, dar cu influene profunde asupra
eficienei proceselor organizaionale.
Studiul de fa i propune s fac un pas n acest sens, n sperana c un
asemenea demers va ncuraja preocupri similare viitoare.
I. 4. Concluzii preliminare
Fr pretenia de a elucida toate dilemele pe care pe care le presupune
conducerea unei organizaii multiculturale i, cu att mai puin, de a propune
reetele unui management de succes, lucrarea de fa i propune s identifice
manifestrile individuale i de grup care mpiedic buna funcionare a
sistemului militar n ansamblul su, dar i s evidenieze aspectele pozitive ale
acestuia. n plus, se va ncerca explicarea resorturilor ce stau la baza
fenomenelor semnalate, cu accent pe utilitatea teoriilor managementului
intercultural n soluionarea elementelor negative i potenarea celor pozitive.
n fine, acest studiu ncearc s se constituie ntr-un credibil punct de plecare
al preocuprilor interculturale din domeniul militar, chiar dac el va prezenta
starea de fapt constatat de un minoritar al sistemului, mai precis o femeie ce
funcioneaz ntr-un mediu preponderent masculin i, n acelai timp, un civil
ce activeaz n mediul militar. n ciuda dificultilor pe care le poate
presupune, acest demers este o provocare ce se dorete a fi dus pn la capt,
constituindu-se n acelai timp ntr-o pledoarie pentru un nou tip de lider care,
dac nu este el nsui un filosof, este n schimb dispus s se bazeze pe
judecata filosofic a cetenilor de rnd din arena politic (Goulet, 2002, p.
13).
Parte a II-a - Transformarea Armatei Romniei i cultura
organizaional centrat pe nvare necesitate i aplicabilitate
II. 1. Fixarea cadrului de studiu
Conform opiniei exprimate de McAdam et al. (1998), organizaia centrat pe
nvare are ca principal atribut expansiunea cunoaterii, dar nu a cunoaterii
n sens academic, ci a cunoaterii ca element central al productivitii, n aa
fel nct nvarea nsi devine o form de munc sau un mod de lucru. n
306
plus, acest tip de organizaie se modific n continuu i creeaz toate
condiiile pentru ca membrii ei s nvee permanent.
Dei poate fi privit ca un curent sau doar o mod trectoare printre altele de
acest gen din teoria i practica managerial, nvarea joac un rol
fundamental n asigurarea succesului i progresului unei organizaii, pornind
de la premisa c profesionalismul celor ce o compun constituie chezia
acestor deziderate. n fapt, este vorba despre crearea unei filosofii personale i
profesionale, care pune n prim-planul preocuprilor continua acumulare de
cunotine i aptitudini, ce nu pot conduce, pe termen lung, dect la o
performan profesional superioar, reflectat n realizarea de servicii i/sau
produse de o calitate mereu crescnd (Hicks, 1996). Pornind de la principiul
sinergic potrivit cruia performana profesional a fiecruia dintre angajai
reprezint performana ntregii organizaii, putem presupune c o permanent
mbuntire a acesteia conduce, fr echivoc, la optimizarea proceselor
organizaionale n ansamblul lor.
II.2. Delimitri conceptuale
Analiznd tendinele i contradiciile din procesul de dezvoltare managerial,
Talbot (1997) distinge trei componente ale nvrii:
1. educaia care urmrete formarea de cunotine, aptitudini,
valori morale i a nelegerii unor aspecte generale ale vieii i
mai puin ale unui anumit domeniu de activitate;
2. dezvoltarea ce const n contientizarea abilitilor personale
prin nvare contient sau incontient, de pild prin
intermediul studiilor sau acumulrii de experien i folosind
metode precum consilierea sau mentoratul;
3. instruirea care este un proces planificat de schimbare a
atitudinilor, cunotinelor sau aptitudinilor pe baza experienei
menite s ating performane efective ntr-un anumit gen de
activiti.
n ceea ce privete paleta metodelor de nvare n cadrul organizaiei, aceasta
cuprinde cel puin trei tehnici: studiul de caz, simularea i proiectul de
consultan (Jennings, 2002). n funcie de scopul nvrii, fiecare metod
prezint avantaje i dezavantaje. Astfel, studiul de caz plaseaz individul ntr-
o situaie neutr, n care este liber s exploreze anumite probleme pe care s le
relaioneze cu teoria i s foloseasc propriile aptitudini de analiz,
comunicare i sintez. Pe de alt parte, ns, studiile de caz sunt limitative n
sensul n care ele nu prezint imaginea de ansamblu a unei organizaii i, prin
urmare, implic riscul unei judeci simpliste asupra contextului respectiv.
307
Simularea, la rndul ei, permite nvarea din situaii noi i lipsite de asumarea
unor riscuri reale i inutile, precum i dobndirea unor abiliti decizionale. n
plus, aceast tehnic stimuleaz capacitile de cercetare, comunicare i lucru
n echip, dar ca principal neajuns este lipsit de latura realist a
demersului.
n fine, proiectul de consultan presupune nvarea prin aciune i are loc n
afara slii de clas. Mai exact, subiecii sunt plasai ntr-un context
organizaional real, pentru ca apoi s li se cear formularea unor propuneri de
optimizare a produselor sau serviciilor prestate de companie, precum i cile
de implementare a acestor soluii. Proiectele trebuie s fie realiste i viabile,
astfel c nvarea are loc prin asumarea unor riscuri i consecine ale
aciunilor ntreprinse, pornind de la ideea c soluionarea problemelor i
nfruntarea anxietii provocate de acestea constituie elemente fireti ale
nvrii prin aciune. Alte avantaje ale acestei metode sunt reprezentate de
contientizarea punctelor forte i a celor slabe att n privina propriei
persoane, ct i a celor cu care interacioneaz pe durata proiectului de
consultan. Firete, ns, c nici acest procedeu nu este lipsit de dezavantaje.
n primul rnd, este esenial ca cel ce organizeaz i coordoneaz procesul s
cunoasc bine participanii, n aa fel nct s fie sigur de capacitatea acestora
de a se relaiona. De aici deriv i faptul c aceast metod este cronofag i
nici nu garanteaz efecte spectaculoase, ntruct participanii se pot simi
frustrai sau copleii de obstacolele ntmpinate, ceea ce i poate mpinge
ctre soluii facile i de moment.
Dup cum se observ, fiecare dintre cele trei metode prezint avantaje i
dezavantaje, ns am putea lua n considerare folosirea lor alternativ, cci
putem presupune c acest lucru ar putea asigura (n msura n care nvarea,
ca proces profund individual i individualizat, poate oferi garanii) atingerea
unor obiective educaionale realiste i concentrate pe performan i calitate.
Dei, n opinia noastr, cutarea unor reete prestabilite de succes n
management este cel puin riscant, dac nu imposibil, totui exist
teoreticieni care au ncercat dezvoltarea unor modele de implementare a
acestui tip de management. Credem c intenia lor nu a fost cea de a gsi un
panaceu general valabil, ci, mai degrab, de a oferi propria viziune asupra
unor realiti organizaionale trite prin prisma experienei personale. ntr-un
fel, putem considera teoriile i modelele manageriale ca fiind similare leciilor
nvate: ele sunt rodul unei experiene reale i reprezint ceea ce autorul a
neles din acea situaie, ale crei implicaii sunt sintetizate i puse la
dispoziia altor persoane ce s-ar putea gsi ntr-un context asemntor i ar
avea, astfel, la dispoziie o posibil cale de nelegere i soluionare a acesteia.
308
Pentru a exemplifica situaia descris anterior, aducem n discuie modelul
integrativ de nvare organizaional i teorie bazat pe resurse dezvoltat de
Smith et al. (1996). n viziunea acestor teoreticieni, nvarea este un concept
dinamic, iar folosirea lui n teorie ilustreaz caracterul permanent schimbtor
al organizaiilor, dar i al mediului extern, n care globalizarea i concurena
sunt coordonatele fundamentale. Teoria bazat pe resurse, la rndul ei, este
considerat drept una dintre cele mai promitoare modele din domeniul
managementului strategic, dei nu toate abordrile ei au reuit s surprind
latura strategic a nvrii ca resurs organizaional. n opinia autorilor de
mai sus, nvarea organizaional este o capabilitate strategic, iar rolul
teoriei resurselor este cel de a face din aceasta un instrument eficient de
atingere a avantajului concurenial.
Unul dintre neajunsurile de pn acum ale acestor demersuri este acela c
superioritatea concurenial a fost bazat, n mare msur, pe folosirea
resurselor msurabile ale organizaiei, de tipul celor materiale, financiare etc.,
fr a se acorda o atenie deosebit resurselor intangibile, cum sunt capitalul
intelectual sau potenialul educaional al organizaiei. De asemenea, nu a fost
ndeajuns argumentat i ilustrat necesitatea susinerii acestui avantaj pe
termen lung prin intermediul implementrii unei culturi organizaionale care
s fac din nvare o valoare central, care s diferenieze propria entitate de
alte structuri similare din contextul socio-economic extern.
n plus, este important de menionat c nu exist o singur resurs care s
asigure succesul organizaiei, ci, mai degrab, trebuie adoptat o manier
dinamic i sinergic de gestionare a capabilitilor instituiei, prin utilizarea a
ceea ce s-ar putea numi mnunchi de resurse (Barney, 1991). Conform
teoriei resurselor, fiecare membru ar organizaiei trebuie s selecteze i s
foloseasc n mod constructiv orice resurs ce ar putea contribui la atingerea
performanei organizaionale.
Un alt aspect care necesit anumite clarificri este legat de semnificaia
sintagmelor avantaj concurenial sau performan organizaional. Dac
n cazul unei organizaii civile privat sau bugetar acestea se msoar n
profitul nregistrat sau n calitatea serviciilor prestate, n cazul organizaiei
militare ele sunt mai greu de definit n termeni concrei. Putem, ns,
considera c felul n care militarii romni acioneaz n cadrul misiunilor
internaionale n care sunt angajai reflect, cu destul acuratee, gradul de
eficien i eficacitate al sistemului militar romnesc oglindit n ndeplinirea
obiectivelor acestor intervenii sau, n cazuri extreme, n numrul de pierderi
de viei omeneti.
Revenind la modelul integrativ de nvare organizaional i teorie a
resurselor, se impune evideniat existena unor condiionri ntre cele dou
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componente. Astfel, literatura de specialitate (Cossette, 2002) a identificat
harta cognitiv ca fiind un instrument util n dezvoltarea capacitii de
nvare a membrilor unei organizaii. n cadrul acesteia, se disting dou
elemente: dezvoltarea cognitiv i dezvoltarea comportamental, care concur
la transformarea capacitii de nvare ntr-o resurs strategic ce const n
dou etape: nvarea cu o singur bucl (sau nvarea inferioar) i nvarea
cu dou bucle (sau nvarea superioar). Prima dimensiune produce
schimbri n operaiile de rutin, n vreme ce a dou conduce la transformri
strategice, de ansamblu, la scara unui ntreg sistem.
n contextul analizei noastre, suntem de prere c acest tip de abordare a
nvrii, att la nivel conceptual, ct i practic, ar putea avea rezultate
benefice, cci ea presupune o cunoaterea stadiului actual al organizaiei,
identificarea punctelor forte i a celor slabe, diagnosticarea acestora din urm
i adoptarea unui plan coerent i realist de implementare a transformrii prin
folosirea nvrii continue la toate nivelurile ierarhice.
Unul dintre avantajele eseniale ale acestui tip de cultur organizaional este
dezvoltarea unor capaciti i abiliti necesare n actualele condiii politico-
militare i strategice, care impun un management flexibil, uor adaptabil la
schimbri brute i semnificative, bazat pe anticipare, inovare, relaionare i
asumarea riscurilor i responsabilitilor. Dup cum observ Kandampully i
Duddy (1999), cheia, dar i dovada succesului unei organizaii rezult din
loialitatea membrilor i beneficiarilor acesteia, cci n mediul actual, extrem
de competitiv, organizaiile nu mai pot concura la standardele din trecut i s
se atepte s obin poziii de lider n prezent (p. 52). Poziia de lider i
decident rezid tocmai din capacitatea de a gndi dincolo de prezent
(anticipare), n folosul beneficiarului (inovare) i dincolo de limitele
organizaiei (relaionare). Inovarea este procesul prin care organizaia
introduce schimbri n filosofia, cultura, procedurile, deciziile i modul su de
lucru pentru a-i mbunti permanent prestaia (asigurarea securitii i
integritii naionale) n serviciul beneficiarului (n cazul nostru, societatea n
ansamblul ei).
II. 3. Implicaii practice ale abordrilor teoretice
Odat trecute n revist cteva coordonate ale nvrii organizaionale, ale
cilor de realizare i ale beneficiilor pe care acestea le aduc organizaiei,
dorim s subliniem natura profund uman, individualizant a acestui proces.
n fapt, acest aspect este cel care face din nvare o provocare pentru factorii
de decizie din orice entitate socio-profesional, cci percepia individului
asupra obiectelor i evenimentelor este influenat de trsturile cognitive ale
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acestuia (de exemplu, personalitate sau atitudine), predispoziia emoional,
ori caracteristicile demografice (Huber et al., 2001, p. 43). Deoarece suntem
de prere c organizaia militar modern implic agilitate, inovaie,
dinamism i adaptabilitate, propunem un stil managerial care s rspund
acestor cerine i pe care literatura de specialitate l numete managementul
inovaiilor (Hauschildt
i Schewe, 2000). n acest tip de management,
succesul demersului managerial depinde de calitile personale i profesionale
ale unor persoane-cheie din conducerea organizaiei: paznicul i
promotorul. Primul actor descrie persoana care joac un rol activ n cadrul
unui proiect sau proces organizaional indiferent de specificul acestora, pe
cnd cel de al doilea se refer la o persoan care are atribuii determinate
exclusiv de implementarea unei anumite schimbri. Dup cum remarc autorii
antecitai, rolurile acestora se modific n timp, n funcie de situaie,
rmnnd, totui, n sfera de conducere i luare a deciziilor n ierarhia
organizaional. Condiia ca prestaia acestora s contribuie la succesul
aciunii manageriale este ca ntre ei s existe o bun coordonare dublat de
colaborare bazat pe ncredere reciproc.
Scopul principal al nvrii, aadar, este dobndirea de competene i
aptitudini care s asigure i s pstreze avantajul concurenial al unei
organizaii prin crearea capitalului intelectual al acesteia. ntr-un studiu
dedicat dezvoltrii unui model de formare a capitalului intelectual, Vlpel
(2002) vede n acesta o resurs strategic, prin care se creioneaz traiectoria
ascendent a organizaiei n trei etape: imaginaia strategic i construcia
capitalului intelectual pe baza analizei i experienei; diseminarea sensurilor
capitalului intelectual; transformarea identitii sau culturii organizaionale
prin asimilarea noului capital intelectual. Principalul obstacol n acest efort
este demolarea rutinei i strategiilor care s-au dovedit a fi funcionale n
trecut, ceea ce impune instaurarea unei stri de haos creativ, n care
necesitatea schimbrii la nivelul mentalitilor i a modului de adoptare a
deciziilor devine mult mai evident i stringent. Dup ce rezistena la
schimbare este, n acest fel, minimizat, ideile inovatoare se vor rspndi prin
interaciune social, n care cele dou roluri descrise mai sus au o importan
fundamental.
Desigur c aceste consideraii pot fi privite drept cuvinte frumoase fr
utilitate practic imediat, idee cu care suntem de acord ntr-o prim instan.
Pe termen lung, ns, beneficiile dezvoltrii unei culturi organizaionale
centrate pe nvare sunt semnificative. Mai mult dect att, exist teoreticieni
care vin cu soluii concrete n acest sens. De pild, Whiteley i Hessan (1996)
avanseaz unele metode de aplicare a acestor principii, cum ar fi: reducerea
birocraiei prin eliminarea unor politici i proceduri depite, inutile sau
redundante, nlocuirea echipelor de lucru formale i ierarhice cu structuri
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flexibile, mai puin ierarhizate, n care colaborarea s fie real i dispus pe
orizontala organizaiei n locul verticalei acesteia, ncurajarea autonomiei i
responsabilizarea angajailor i, ca pilon central al demersului, adoptarea unui
stil de conducere bazat pe implicarea decidenilor n soluionarea problemelor
simultan cu angajarea i mputernicirea subordonailor n adoptarea deciziilor
care i afecteaz direct, precum i perceperea mediului organizaional extern
la scar larg i pe termen lung.
II. 4. Concluzii preliminare
Pn n aceast etap a studiului, am ncercat explicarea utilitii nvrii n
asigurarea succesului organizaional, fcnd i trimiteri la importana
considerrii unicitii factorului uman n acest proces. Pentru o mai bun
nelegere a modului n care eecul poate fi evitat, ar putea fi de folos o scurt
enumerare a factorilor ce l pot cauza, aa cum sunt ei prezentai de
Thompson i Richardson (1996): management autocratic i lipsit de
profesionalism, asumarea unor riscuri inutile din pur orgoliu, un control
financiar-bugetar ineficient, incompatibilitatea dintre obiectivele organizaiei
i infrastructura acesteia, rezistena la schimbare i neacordarea ateniei
dezvoltrii profesionale a angajailor. Dup cum relev aceast opinie,
asigurarea profesionalismului angajailor prin nvare mpreun cu un stil de
management democratic, participativ i responsabil constituie dimensiuni
eseniale ale unei organizaii competente i performante, aa cum dorim s fie
organizaia militar romneasc n contextual actual al apartenenei sale la
structurile euro-atlantice cu toate avantajele, dar i provocrile pe cale acest
statut le implic.
Partea III-a Rzboi i pace: dou realiti supuse informatizrii i
tehnologizrii
III.1. Conturarea cadrului de studiu
n mediul economic hipercompetitiv actual, succesul pe termen lung depinde
de calitatea bunurilor sau serviciilor oferite clienilor i, n egal msur, de
managementul resurselor informaionale de care dispune fiecare organizaie.
Dei dezvoltarea unei culturi organizaionale orientate pe eficientizarea
resurselor informaionale nu este uor de realizat, nici un manager nu-i poate
permite s ignore acest imperativ.
n cele ce urmeaz, ne propunem, aadar, s evideniem felul n care aceste
resurse pot contribui la sporirea performanei organizaionale n dou domenii
aparent opuse: afaceri i conflicte militare. Am folosit termenul aparent,
deoarece rzboiul este perceput, cu tot mai mult acuitate, drept un nou tip de
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afacere. n sprijinul acestei afirmaii vine nsui limbajul conflictelor armate,
n care noiunea de rzboi centrat pe reea (engl. net centric warfare)
capteaz tot mai mult atenia factorilor de decizie din domeniul afacerilor
politico-militare.
n consecin, eseul nostru va continua cu o trecere n revist a tendinelor
actuale din domeniul managementului resurselor informaionale n general,
dup care se va concentra asupra caracteristicilor rzboiului centrat pe reea i
a modului n care informaia poate contribui decisiv la nfrngerea inamicului.
III.2. Chief Information Officer un nou tip de manager?
Prioritatea care se contureaz n cazul n care o organizaie, indiferent de
natura acesteia, decide s foloseasc avantajul informaional n scopul
optimizrii performanei organizaionale este formarea unei echipe
manageriale de tip IT, ai crei membri s cunoasc n detaliu obiectul de
activitate al firmei, nevoia acesteia de informaie i nalt tehnologie i care s
conlucreze n condiii perfecte. n plus, n acest context se impune existena
unei noi poziii de conducere n ierarhia companiei, i anume Chief
Information Officer (CIO).
Acest manager nu este nici pe departe responsabil cu culegerea de informaii
n sensul negativ cu care experiena comunist ne-a obinuit, din pcate
spionajul i, cu att mai puin, spionajul economic, ce nu intr, nici pe
departe, n lista sa de ndatoriri. Dimpotriv, el este factorul de conducere
responsabil de folosirea eficient a informaiilor care joac un rol esenial n
obinerea avantajului concurenial al organizaiei. Firete c aceasta este o
descriere extrem de general a rolului su, deoarece atribuiile sale sunt mult
mai complexe i, n consecin, impun aptitudini i deprinderi aparte.
Dup cum subliniaz Morin et al. (1999), prima condiie pe care trebuie s o
ndeplineasc un CIO este credibilitatea prin observarea atent a practicilor i
sistemelor din interiorul companiei, n aa fel nct s cunoasc n profunzime
cultura organizaional, precum i felul n care aceasta poate fi modificat
prin introducerea de noi tehnologii i metode de lucru. Mai mult, el trebuie s
nregistreze succese rapide i s prentmpine pierderile, s-i construiasc o
reea de relaii interne i externe, s fie n stare s asculte, s fie un bun
manager al schimbrii i obin rezultate. Dup cum se poate remarca,
atribuiile unui CIO acoper o palet larg de roluri, dintre care unele sunt
necesare oricrui manager modern i eficient, iar altele sunt specifice
managerului de tip IT.
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Gndirea strategic i planificarea strategic a resurselor informaionale
nseamn mult munc i ani de experien, dar aceste aptitudini sunt
eseniale pentru a obine performana. La prima vedere ele pot avea conotaii
pur teoretice, dar absena lor duce la eecuri practice. Cultura organizaional,
managementul schimbrii, luarea deciziilor, lucrul n echip, gradul de
autonomie al angajailor toate acestea influeneaz i sunt influenate de
tehnologie i informaie.
Fr ndoial c fiecare organizaie are propria sa personalitate reflectat n
cultura, structura, ori misiunea sa, prin urmare i resursele de care dispune un
CIO variaz de la firm la firm. Exist, ns, i aspecte ce demoleaz cu
uurin barierele structurale sau formale i pot fi generalizate la nivelul unui
ntreg sistem. De pild, majoritatea companiilor moderne nglobeaz
tehnologia i informaiile n strategia lor. Nimeni nu i mai permite luxul de a
nu investi n aceste dou elemente dat fiind rolul lor critic n ndeplinirea
obiectivelor pe care firma i le propune. Evaluarea i explorarea
alternativelor, discutarea acestora cu colegii, clienii i stakeholder-ii,
efectuarea analizei cost-beneficii i armonizarea acestor aspecte cu misiunea
i obiectivele organizaiei toate acestea sunt atribuiile unui CIO. La acestea,
se adaug sarcina de a explica factorilor decideni, dac este cazul, necesitatea
de a investi n tehnologie sau de a schimba modul de lucru din cadrul
organizaiei. Practic, un CIO conduce, faciliteaz i supervizeaz estimarea
prioritilor informaionale, elaboreaz viziunea, planul strategic i bugetul
pentru necesitile informaionale, conduce i ntreine sistemele organizaiei,
stabilete politica pentru standardele de infrastructur, achiziioneaz
resursele specifice i administreaz riscurile asociate. Iar cnd este vorba
despre IT, riscurile sunt greu de estimat dat fiind ritmul extrem de alert n care
acest domeniu se dezvolt. Integrarea calculatoarelor i telefoniei, precum i
creterea accelerat a reelelor de telecomunicaii sunt dou dintre schimbrile
majore ce sporesc provocrile crora un CIO trebuie s le fac fa. Alte
aspecte de interes se refer la creterea exponenial a procesrii datelor i
vitezei de transfer, accesul imediat la date, noile metode de manipulare a
informaiilor, procesarea acestora n timp real i transferul simultan de
multiple tipuri de date voce, imagini etc. consecina este creterea
ateptrilor publicului n privina posibilitilor oferite de informaii i
tehnologie.
n aceste condiii, este extrem de greu de inut pasul cu progresele
tehnologice, dar i cu cele nregistrate de metodele i procedeele ce nsoesc
elementele de hardware i software, de pild: designul i implementarea
sistemelor modulare, programe de asigurare a calitii, re-designul proceselor
de producie sau alocarea costurilor n funcie de activiti. i aici rolul
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deinut de CIO este esenial pentru a evita instalarea decalajului dintre
realitatea organizaional i progresele nregistrate n mediul de afaceri.
Provocrile unui CIO nu se opresc, ns, aici. Pe lng dificultile provenite
din exterior i care sunt, n fond, inerente n condiiile n care progresul este
dezirabil i alert, profilul personal i profesional al unui CIO eficient este cel
puin la fel de provocator n sensul mbinrii unor trsturi i aptitudini care
pn mai ieri aparineau unor profesii ori funcii diferite: talent n afaceri i
aptitudini tehnice, viziune de ansamblu i spirit de observaie, capacitatea de a
lucra n echip, gndire clar i de perspectiv, abiliti de comunicare,
adaptabilitate i flexibilitate. Iar lista nu se oprete aici, deoarece un CIO de
succes trebuie s fie n stare s msoare performana organizaional ntr-o
manier ct se poate de obiectiv, pentru ca ulterior s poate comunica
rezultatele obinute i s ofere soluii pentru optimizarea acestora n sensul
ateptrilor formulate de clieni.
Poate c cel mai dificil rol al unui CIO este cel legat de politica firmei n
sensul relaiilor informale sau partea ascuns a aisbergului, dar care
influeneaz decisiv cursul afacerilor: conflictele deschise sau ascunse,
simpatiile sau antipatiile personale, interesele fie sau nerecunoscute toate
contribuie la creterea sarcinilor puse n seama unui CIO. Aa cum explic i
Koenig (2000), nimeni nici n afaceri, nici n via nu este imun la
tiranie, manipulare sau exploatare ntr-un mediu dominat de politic. Orice
organizaie va avea de ctigat dac oamenii ei sunt suficient de puternici
pentru a face lucrul potrivit la momentul potrivit, nu doar s execute ordine i
s capituleze.
III.3. Probleme i soluii n IT management
n opinia lui Lutchen (2004), companiile nu au reuit s foloseasc eficient
informaia n ciuda sumelor importante de bani pe care le-au cheltuit n acest
scop, iar explicaiile pe care autorul le ofer sunt legate, n principal, de lipsa
unei strategii sau viziuni globale, neincluderea informaiei n planul de afaceri
al companiei, caracterul fragmentat i necristalizat al managerilor IT,
nedelimitarea clar a atribuiilor acestora i neacordarea importanei cuvenite
funciei de CIO. Este interesant de menionat c motive similare stau i la
baza eecului nregistrat de numeroase companii britanice (Cobbold i
Lawrie, 2001), ceea ce conduce la concluzia c rolul pe care managementul
resurselor informaionale i profilul celor care au sarcina de a le administra
sunt de maxim importan n contextul economico-social actual.
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n ciuda complexitilor din realitatea mediului de afaceri i a aparentului
blocaj nregistrat n soluionarea acestor probleme, Lutchen surprinde cu o
soluie pe care el nsui o definete drept simpl i radical (pag. 6) i care
ar consta din ase pai:
1. Poziionarea resurselor IT n centrul preocuprilor organizaiei.
2. Perceperea organizaiei IT ca o unitate de afaceri de sine stttoare.
3. ncorporarea strategiei IT n strategia companiei, cu accent pe aspectele
practice n locul celor teoretico-idealizate.
4. Definirea nevoilor de IT ale organizaiei i solicitarea ca departamentul
IT s furnizeze servicii pe baza unei metodologii riguroase de
management al relaiilor.
5. Instituionalizarea unei culturi centrate pe servicii de nalt calitate
furnizate la timp i cu o orientare clar spre obinerea de rezultate.
6. Recompensarea managerilor IT n funcie de rezultatele care sporesc
valoarea afacerii la toate nivelurile organizaiei.
O analiz atent a soluiei propuse de autor conduce la concluzia c resursele
informaionale sunt puse n lumina mult mai strlucitoare de care se bucurau,
pn nu demult, doar resursele financiare, iar ulterior cele umane. Desigur c
schimbarea de accent ce a survenit n timp se datoreaz progreselor evidente
din tiina i practica managementului, care au condus la abordarea
difereniat a diverselor tipuri de resurse, respectiv, material-financiare,
umane i, mai nou, informaionale.
n continuare, vor fi prezentate tendinele contemporane din domeniul
conflictelor militare, cu precdere felul n care superioritatea informaional
determin avantajul asupra inamicului n cadrul rzboiului centrat pe reea.
III.4. Rzboiul centrat pe reea definiie i caracteristici
Dup cum arat Alberts et al. (2003), rzboiul este produsul epocii sale:
armele i tacticile de lupt evolueaz odat cu tehnologia, prin urmare i
conflictul armat din era informaional va reflecta realitatea acestei perioade
prin capabilitile implicate n lupt i prin mediul n care se desfoar
conflictul.
Spre deosebire de trecut, cnd organizaiile militare erau adesea promotoare
ale progresului tehnic, dezvoltarea tehnologic din prezent este dictat de
sectorul comercial i afecteaz ulterior sistemul militar. Un exemplu gritor n
acest sens este cel al modului n care impactul informaional a schimbat
cultura organizaional din sistemul militar al SUA dup ncheierea
Rzboiului Rece: dac n trecut fiecare categorie de fore infanterie, marin,
aviaie opera individual, acum ele trebuie s conlucreze ca urmare a
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necesitii de diseminare a informaiei la scara ntregului sistem. Aceast
nevoie este dictat de modificarea mediului i a inamicului: n Rzboiul Rece
inamicul era cunoscut, iar ameninrile relativ previzibile. Acum, totul s-a
schimbat: mediul este haotic, iar terorismul lovete aleatoriu. Aa cum
remarc Monahan (2001), mediul militar a devenit de nerecunoscut dup
ncheierea Rzboiului Rece (p. 1), prin urmare se impun noi tactici,
instrumente i strategii pentru a face fa acestui nou tip de conflict.
Soluia a fost cea a prelurii tehnicilor i procedeelor folosite de firmele din
sectorul comercial pentru a ctiga i pstra avantajul concurenial. Dei cu o
tent de cruzime, concurena acerb din mediul de afaceri poate fi asimilat,
prin extrapolare i pstrnd proporiile cuvenite, cu lupta pentru superioritate
militar. Dac firmele reuesc acest lucru prin exploatarea informaiei i a
tehnologiei aferente, atunci aceste concepte i resurse pot fi preluate i n
operaiunile militare.
Rzboiul centrat pe reea poate fi definit ca un concept de operaiuni bazate
pe superioritate informaional i care genereaz putere de lupt prin senzori
de reea, factori de decizie i combatani pentru a obine contienizare
generalizat, vitez de comand sporit, ritm accelerat al operaiunilor, grad
ridicat de letalitate, supravieuire mai mare i autosincronizare. Pe scurt,
rzboiul centrat pe reea transform superioritatea informaional n putere de
lupt prin conectarea eficient a entitilor de cunoatere pe cmpul de lupt
(Alberts et al., 2003, p. 2).
n esen, acest nou tip de conflict implic o profund schimbare cultural
lucru dificil de realizat mai ales n organizaia militar, care este strict-
ierarhic i rigid. Dei unii autori susin cu trie caracterul aproape imposibil
al schimbrii n asemenea tipuri de organizaii (Reis i Pea, 2001), presiunea
mediului prin terorism, atacuri asimetrice etc. impune acest proces, n
ciuda ineriei inerente.
III. 5. Sectorul comercial i conflictul militar: dou extreme sau dou
faete ale aceluiai fenomen?
Dac n cazul firmelor succesul se msoar n bani, calitatea personalului, sau
imaginea n cadrul comunitii, n cazul unei operaiuni armate reuita adic
dominaia deplin ntr-un anumit spaiu sau domeniu se bazeaz pe
superioritatea informaional, care este abilitatea de a colecta, procesa i
disemina un flux nentrerupt de informaii simultan cu exploatarea sau
mpiedicarea adversarului de a face acelai lucru (Alberts et al., 2003, p. 54).
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Ca i n sectorul comercial, informaia este util dac ndeplinete trei criterii:
relevan, acuratee i promptitudine. Ca i n sectorul comercial,
instrumentele folosite pentru atingerea obiectivelor sunt diverse: de pild,
ameninrile asimetrice fac investiia n arme letale inutil n multe cazuri,
dac inamicul investete, n acest timp, n pregtirea specialitilor IT sau
recrutarea hacker-ilor. Ca i n sectorul comercial, accesarea sau distrugerea
bazelor de date ale oponentului poate aduce supremaia. Ca i n sectorul
comercial, intuiia i rapiditatea deciziei fac diferena dintre succes i eec. i
ntr-un caz i n cellalt situaia poate fi comparat cu o tabl de ah: ambele
pri au aceleai piese / resurse, dar va ctiga juctorul care va ti s le
utilizeze cel mai bine.
Trebuie subliniat c rzboiul centrat pe reea este mult mai mult dect un
fenomen concentrat pe reele de comunicaii. Acestea nu sunt dect suportul
acestui tip de conflict, n vreme ce esena operaiunii este reprezentat de
fluxurile informaionale, natura i caracteristicile entitilor angajate n
conflict (cunoaterea spaiului de lupt, funciile de comand, control i luare
a deciziilor i execuia) i felul n care acestea interacioneaz. Rzboiul
centrat pe reea reflect i nglobeaz ingredientele succesului n era
informaional agilitate, abilitatea de a capitaliza ansele prin dezvoltarea
unei nelegeri a spaiului de lupt ntr-un fel care este superior nelegerii sau
percepiei adversarului.
III. 6. Concluzii preliminare
n ceea ce privete sistemul militar, era informaional este diferit de cele
anterioare din cel puin patru motive identificate de Alberts et al. Mai nti,
ritmul progresului tehnologic i apariia continu de noi produse au crescut
exponenial. n al doilea rnd, progresele tehnologice relevante pentru
sectorul militar sunt generate de sectorul privat i de nevoia acestuia de a
procesa informaia cu o vitez imposibil de imaginat cu doar civa ani n
urm. n al treilea rnd, sistemul militar este dominat acum de un ciclu
tehnologic tot mai accelerat i are tot mai puin timp s profite de noile
capabiliti nainte ca acestea s fie depite. n ultimul rnd, noile capabiliti
sunt disponibile, n aceeai msur, i pentru adversari.
Cu toate c autorii menionai au enumerat aceti factori doar cu privire la
felul n care informaia influeneaz natura conflictelor i afacerilor militare, o
examinare atent a celor patru aspecte conduce cu uurin la concluzia c i
domeniul afacerilor este afectat, n egal msur, de acestea. Dup cum s-a
vzut n seciunile anterioare ale studiului, organizaiile contemporane,
indiferent de specificul activitii lor, sunt supuse aceleiai presiuni exercitate
318
de tehnologie i informaie. Dinamica modificrilor din mediul extern
afecteaz ireversibil i mediul intern al organizaiilor, fie c vorbim de o
firm, fie c vorbim de natura conflictului armat n epoca actual.
Departe de a ignora caracteristicile fiecreia dintre cele dou tipuri de
fenomene discutate, este totui greu s nu remarcm numeroasele similitudini
ale situaiilor discutate: rapiditatea schimbrilor, impactul informaiei i
tehnologizrii, modificarea culturii organizaionale i caracterul instabil i
imprevizibil al mediului n care funcioneaz cele dou categorii de
organizaii.
IV. Concluzii ale studiului
Din intenia de a creiona cadrul larg al mediului organizaional i de securitate
n care funcioneaz sistemul militar romnesc, studiul de fa a prezentat o
palet larg de concepte i abordri teoretice i practice care descriu aceste
realiti.
Pornind de la faete aparent incompatibile ale managementului organizaiei
militare i anume, cultur, leadership i resurse informaionale considerm
c analiza pe care am ntreprins-o a reuit s surprind complexitatea actului
managerial n condiiile actuale, dominate de incertitudine, ambiguitate i
volatilitate.
Avnd n vedere aceste considerente, putem afirma c una dintre
responsabilitile fundamentale ale liderilor militari actul decizional
depinde de calitatea informaiilor. Cu toate acestea, experiena a demonstrat
c, n majoritatea situaiilor, decidenii se gsesc n imposibilitatea de a deine
totalitatea informaiilor de care au nevoie, fapt ce a condus la soluia denumit
generic 70%. Cu alte cuvinte, decidenii trebuie s fie pregtii s adopte
soluii n condiiile deinerii a 70% din informaiile referitoare la situaia n
care se afl, chiar dac aceasta este una de natur combatant.
Un alt aspect asupra cruia consider c trebuie s struim este c managerii
din toate organizaiile, fie c vorbim de cele private sau de cele de stat, caut
s creasc productivitatea prin procese organizaionale i lucrative care
optimizeaz utilizarea resurselor umane. Dei abordrile pot varia, rolurile
jucate de indivizi i echipe sunt de o importan primordial n cadrul acestor
procese. Toate aceste aspecte sunt eseniale n condiiile n care managerii
trebuie s fac fa provocrilor generate de diversitatea forei de munc,
economia global, cerinele impuse de calitatea total etc. Fiecare angajator
trebuie s dezvolte resursele umane i s utilizeze talentul acestora la potenial
319
maxim. Desctuarea potenialului maxim al fiecrui angajat din fiecare loc
de munc este prioritatea oricrui manager modern.
Actul muncii implic un schimb pozitiv de valori ntre angajat i organizaie.
Acest schimb reciproc avantajos este exprimat prin intermediul contractului
psihologic, definit ca fiind o nelegere informal legat de ceea ce d i ceea
ce primete fiecare angajat i angajator ntr-o relaie de munc. Situaia ideal
este aceea n care acest schimb de valori este unul corect. Cnd contractul
psihologic este nclcat, apar problemele de natur motivaional. Aceast
problem s-a manifestat n Japonia, unde, n mod tradiional, angajaii se
bucurau de stabilitatea locului de munc i, n schimb, munceau mult n
beneficiul organizaiei. Cnd, ns, economia Japoniei s-a confruntat cu
dificulti, iar companiile au nceput s disponibilizeze fora de munc,
moralul angajailor a sczut. Contractul psihologic dintre angajat i angajator
fusese nclcat.
Un contract psihologic real ofer un echilibru ntre contribuia angajatului i
ceea ce primete acesta n schimb de la organizaie. Individul ofer munc,
efort, timp, creativitate i loialitate. Toate acestea fac din angajat o resurs
valoroas. La rndul ei, organizaie ofer salariu, beneficii, pregtire i anse
de dezvoltare profesional i personal.
n acest context apare i conceptul de calitate a vieii profesionale. Majoritatea
oamenilor petrec multe ore, multe sptmni i muli ani la serviciu. Ceea ce
li se ntmpl aici, felul n care sunt tratai i natura muncii pe care o presteaz
le influeneaz viaa n mod semnificativ. n consecin, orice manager trebuie
s accepte acest tip de responsabilitate. Felul n care acesta i trateaz
subordonaii se rsfrnge mult n afara sferei profesionale. Experienele de la
locul de munc ne afecteaz i restul activitilor i invers. Un stil de
management defectuos poate diminua calitatea vieii individuale, nu doar a
celei profesionale.
Se ateapt ca managerii moderni s se concentreze pe crearea unor locuri de
munc n care oamenii s aib experiene pozitive, concomitent cu
ndeplinirea atribuiilor ce le revin. Un termen tot mai des folosit n acest sens
este echilibrul munc-via, prin care se nelege armonizarea
responsabilitilor profesionale i a nevoilor familiale. Orice dezechilibru
conduce la disfuncii de diferite feluri.
Una dintre modalitile de a msura calitatea vieii profesionale este
satisfacia profesional. Aceasta reflect gradul n care un individ percepe
pozitiv sau negativ diverse aspecte ale locului su de munc. n prezent,
satisfacia profesional este o atitudine ce influeneaz decisiv
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comportamentul la locul de munc. Pentru a decide felul n care putem nclina
balana n direcie sporirii satisfaciei profesionale, trebuie s lum n calcul
factori precum salariul, sarcinile atribuite, nivelul i stilul de supervizare,
colegii, locul de munc i ansele de promovare.
Cercetrile de pn n prezent arat c exist o strns legtur ntre
satisfacia profesional i absenteism. Angajaii mulumii de locul de munc
au o frecven mult superioar celor care sunt nemulumii. Aceeai
interdependen se semnaleaz i n cazul rotirii personalului. Ambele
manifestri sunt costisitoare pentru instituie, cci presupun cheltuieli legate
de recrutarea i pregtirea personalului nou, precum i costuri rezultate din
scderea productivitii pe perioada de pregtire a noilor angajai.
Tot pe linia factorilor asimilai satisfaciei profesionale i aportului angajailor
la bunul mers al organizaiei n ansamblul ei se ncadreaz i conceptul de
performan profesional, ce const n cantitatea i calitatea ndeplinirii
sarcinilor ce revin unui angajat sau unei echipe. n acelai timp, performana
profesional este piatra de temelie a productivitii i contribuie la atingerea
obiectivelor organizaionale. Criteriul valorii adugate este folosit n tot mai
multe organizaii pentru a evalua utilitatea unei munci i/sau a celor ce o
presteaz.
Att teoria, ct i practica managerial demonstreaz c trsturile individuale
joac un rol esenial n privina modului n care unii angajai sunt motivai
mai mult, iar alii mai puin de munca depus. Proba aptitudinii unui manager
de a construi locuri de munc realmente valoroase este cea de a descoperi
nsemntatea muncii pentru alte persoane i, ulterior, de a crea un mediu de
lucru care s ajute angajaii s ating un nivel ridicat de performan i
satisfacie. Din acest punct de vedere, literatura de specialitate ofer mai
multe abordri. Dintre acestea, merit menionat cea conform creia
performana este un multiplu al abilitii, sprijinului i efortului pe care un
angajat le depune n procesul muncii.
Calitatea i cantitatea acestor factori depinde, n primul rnd, de designul
locului de munc respectiv i, cu precdere, de nivelul de automatizare i
tehnologizare a acestuia. Aceste coordonate descriu locul de munc din punct
de vedere obiectiv, al dotrii materiale a respectivei funcii. Exist, ns, i
coordonate subiective ale fiecrei poziii din structura unei organizaii, care
in de capacitatea managerului de a spori gradul de complexitate i importan
a muncii depuse ntr-un anumit sector de activitate. n acest scop, managerul
poate aplica tehnici motivaionale de tipul: limitarea gradului de control i
supervizare a angajailor; oferirea posibilitii ca acetia s adopte decizii
privitoare la propria sfer de rspundere; ncurajarea angajailor s-i asume
321
responsabilitatea pentru aciunile personale; acordarea permisiunii ca acetia
s ndeplineasc sarcini integrale, cu grad sporit de importan i vizibilitate;
conferirea de feedback transparent i prompt celor vizai.
Prin adoptarea unor astfel de strategii, prestaia individual i satisfacia
profesional sporesc n mod semnificativ. Cu toate acestea, putem remarca
faptul c aceast tehnic poate s nu funcioneze n toate cazurile, dat fiind
diversitatea organizaiilor i a resurselor umane ce o compun. Dac la aceste
variabile adugm i caracterul profund i accelerat al modificrilor survenite
n mediul extern al organizaiei, atunci marja de aplicabilitate a acestor
tehnici, strategii i proceduri se ngusteaz i mai mult.
Un studiu legat de factorii cu impactul cel mai notabil asupra naturii
procesului lucrativ i asupra factorului uman n contextul organizaiei
secolului XXI nu putea s omit locul central ocupat de tehnologie n
modificarea traiectului profesional i n designul locului de munc n
instituiile contemporane. Provocarea activitii manageriale este una fr
echivoc: designul profesiei trebuie s porneasc de la obiectivul creterii
productivitii prin utilizarea unor sisteme socio-tehnice integrate. Rolul lor
este de a profita de tehnologie la maximum, simultan cu abordarea angajailor
cu respect, permindu-le s-i utilizeze talentele i aptitudinile personale la
potenial optim. Exemplul cel mai gritor este cel al calculatorului, care
modific n permanen structura, fluxul de activiti i setul de aptitudini i
deprinderi necesare n numeroase contexte organizaionale.
Un alt exemplu ilustrativ este cel al roboilor, care n multe cazuri au nlocuit
complet omul, ceea ce reprezint forma extrem de simplificare a muncii.
Privit de la polul opus, aceast tehnic prezint att avantaje, ct i
dezavantaje. Pe de o parte, tehnologia ofer posibilitatea de a prelua multe
sarcini de rutin care, anterior, erau realizate de oameni, deschiznd astfel
calea utilizrii talentelor n ndeplinirea altor sarcini. Din acest punct de
vedere, tehnologia i diversificarea sarcinilor i activitilor pot aciona n
complementaritate.
De asemenea, dorim s precizm c examinarea impactului managementului
intercultural asupra organizaiei moderne ce funcioneaz n cadrul societii
cunoaterii nu reprezint dect un prim pas n nelegerea profundelor
transformri survenite n managementul organizaiei, cu precdere n
gestionarea resurselor umane, indiferent de natura activitilor n care acestea
sunt implicate.
n soluionarea acestor probleme, managerii se confrunt adesea cu
numeroase dileme de natur etic, lucru ce nu face dect s sporeasc
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dificultatea alegerilor pe care trebuie s le realizeze. n afara educaiei
interculturale i etice pe care prezentul studiu le recomand ca instrumente
imperios necesare formrii managerului modern, n al crui profil trebuie s
se regseasc numeroase componente de leadership. Roluri precum
comunicarea, motivarea, cunoaterea i armonizarea diversitii culturale a
angajailor trebuie s fie un sine-qua-non al managerului modern.
De asemenea, educaia, pregtirea i nvarea continu sunt pilonii ce susin
eficiena i eficacitatea activitii manageriale contemporane. Experienele de
zi cu zi, ansele de informare i valorizare a acestora contribuie la formarea
unui portofoliu de aptitudini i deprinderi mereu actualizate i puse n slujba
organizaiei. nvarea permanent este ea nsi o deprindere ce contribuie la
succesul personal i profesional al unei persoane.
n cadrul societii cunoaterii, cci n acest cadrul larg se plaseaz studiul de
fa, se impune de la sine conceptul de management al cunoaterii, pentru a
descrie procesele prin care organizaiile i dezvolt, organizeaz i
disemineaz cunotinele pentru a dobndi avantaj concurenial. Semnificaia
managementului cunoaterii ca for strategic i integratoare n cadrul
organizaiei este demonstrat de apariia unei noi funcii executive Chief
Knowledge Officer (CKO), cu trimitere direct la alt funcie de valorizarea a
resurselor informaionale ale organizaiei Chief Information Officer (CIO)
pe care am analizat-o n prezentul studiu. Funcia de CKO este responsabil
de susinerea proceselor de nvare i asigur faptul c portofoliul intelectual
i de cunoatere al organizaiei este bine gestionat i permanent actualizat i
extins. Mai mult dect att, capitalul intelectual include patente, drepturi de
proprietate intelectual, secrete de producie, procese i metode speciale,
precum i cunotinele i nelegerea acumulate cu privire la totalitatea
resurselor umane.
Managementul cunoaterii implic presupune crearea unei culturi n care
diseminarea informaiilor, nvarea i mbogirea cunotinelor fac parte din
norm. Acest tip de management implic un stil de leadership cu totul i cu
totul special, ce recunoate capitalul intelectual ca fiind o valoare inestimabil
n aceast er supus transformrii i tehnologizrii. Mai presus de toate, ns,
managementul cunoaterii cere ca managerii i liderii organizaiei s respecte
omul i potenialul lor creator n organizaia creia i aparin.
Nu putem concluziona acest studiu fr a insista, nc o dat, asupra
importanei eticii n abordarea oricrei situaii organizaionale. Este
responsabilitatea factorilor de conducere manageri sau lideri, indiferent de
nivelul ierarhic la care se plaseaz s stabileasc un set de standarde etice
care s ghideze conduita profesional a subordonailor n fiecare clip. De
323
asemenea, managerii i liderii nii trebuie s fie primii care s aplice aceste
standarde, pentru a asigura credibilitatea efortului etic. Viziunea unui
leadership moral pornete de la premisa conform creia oamenii care i
asum activitile pe care le desfoar vor munci mai bine dect cei care se
simt exclui. n consecin, liderii eficieni vor inculca acest sentiment tocmai
permindu-le subordonailor s acioneze la cotele cele mai nalte. Din acest
tip de relaie etic i reciproc avantajoas, vor beneficia att angajaii, ct i
organizaia n ansamblul ei, care astfel se va ncadra pe drumul avantajului
concurenial.
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES:
BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN
STAFF DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
A comprehensive study on the theory and practice
of organisational conflict
Lect. univ. dr. Livia Ecaterina TTAR
Departamentul Regional de Studii pentru
Managementul Resurselor de Aprare, Braov
Abstract
Studiul de fa i propune s treaca n revist o serie de abordri teoretice i soluii
practice oferite de literatura de specialitate n privina conceptului de conflict
organizaional. Lucrarea face referire i la contextul economic, politic, social, cultural i
de securitate n care funcioneaz organizaia contemporan, cu precdere organizaia
militar. Una dintre caracteristicile fundamentale ale organizaiei militare este diversitatea
resurselor umane care o compun, ceea ce conduce att la avantaje, ct i la dezavantaje din
punctul de vedere al actului managerial. n partea final a studiului, prezentm cteva
posibiliti de soluionare a problemelor diversitii culturale din interiorul sistemului
militar, cu accent pe idea de flexibilizare i nuanare a tehnicilor manageriale n exercitarea
actului de conducere.
330
1.1. Introductory issues: the aims of the study and the organisational
context
This study attempts to analyse the concept of organisational conflict both
from the theoretical perspective, that is, the way in which management
literature defines it and identifies its sources, manifestations and implications,
as well as from the practical point of view, in the sense that the conflict will
be examined in a particular organisational context, namely, the military
system.
The interest behind this is the necessity of examining particularities of
military organisations functioning in a post-communist country such as
Romania, a field which unfortunately has not benefited from significant
attention despite its strategic importance in the current context of the NATO
enlargement and the profound changes which it entails in terms of national
and international security and stability.
Consequently, the first chapter of the study will present the military
organisations profile with an emphasis on the elements pertaining to conflict
occurrence. Next, various conflict theories will be critically discussed with
regard to the organisational characteristics, as well as other related
management concepts such as change, power, and politics since management
literature acknowledges the interdependence existing in terms of these
concepts, as it will be illustrated. Then, the final part will attempt to offer
suggestions and recommendations concerning the possible management
approaches meant to improve the military systems organisational
performance.
A dual aspect of the military organisations managerial activity is determined
by the fact that some of the staff are civilians, an aspect requiring a flexible
management behaviour in order to harmonise the working environment, for
the various educational backgrounds, that is, civilian and military, lead to
different work behaviours. More explicitly, the notion of flexibility used in
this context and associated with the idea of diverse working styles describes
the necessity of approaching the two categories of staff differently: whereas
the military are educated in the spirit of following orders and superior-
subordinate hierarchy, the civilians may perceive this working style as an
obstacle to their professional autonomy and even as a sign of disrespect,
which means that the management need to shape their behaviour in order to
accommodate the staffs individual expectations.
The third category of impairing elements is represented by Romanias social,
economic, and political conditions dominated by numerous constraints and
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contrasts due to the difficult transitional process that started in December
1989, after the collapse of communism. This raises significant complexity
since the military organisations environment should consider not only
national issues and implications, but also regional and global security aspects.
Thus, in order to achieve a more accurate picture of the challenges which the
Romanian military system faces, one should take into consideration the
background factors affecting this organisation. They refer to the deep
restructuring process of the Romanian Armed Forces due to social
democratisation and NATO orientation, which started in the early 90s. This
involves a complex change process stemming both from internal causes, that
is, Romanias transition from communist totalitarianism to modern
democracy, and from external causes, that is, the necessity of meeting the
NATO and EU integration criteria.
In this respect, the extent of change is wide and profound, and entails a shift
in the military mentality: whereas the Cold War era was threat-oriented, the
current conditions require that the Armed Forces should be more security
building-oriented, which results in the gradual dissolution of the differences
between terms such as commander and manager (Maior and Matei 2002).
Also, a significant facet of this problem is the necessity of bridging the
classical civil-military gap and enforcing the civilian control over the military
forces in the light of the present NATO orientation. However, the success of
this enterprise depends on the management / leadership characteristics of the
decision-making factors at every level within the Romanian military system
for there is inevitably greater adaptability within the civilian culture to new
processes as military establishments inertia relies very much on a specific
culture of loyalty, tradition and corporateness (Maior and Matei 2002, p. 24).
Each element of the military organisational profile must be examined in terms
of civilian-military compatibilities and discrepancies, both internally and
externally. It thus becomes evident that a reciprocal transformation and
adaptation process is in progress, in which the key roles are represented by the
military system and civilian institution. As Donnely (1997) emphasises, the
army has to get used to the idea that its entire basis for operation and even
existence has changed fundamentally. In the meantime, society has to
understand that it has to build up and nourish a new kind of army (p. 28).
A more in-depth examination of the military restructuring will reveal even
more complexity. For the purpose of a better understanding of these
contextual circumstances, one should adopt a more general view of the
Romanian Armed Forces, notwithstanding that this study does not focus on
this particular topic.
332
Thus, according to Zulean (2002), the first step towards the democratisation
of the civil-military relations and the democratisation of the society as a
whole consists of creating professional military bodies, a process involving
three main steps: changing the role, missions and defence planning;
restructuring the military organisation; and changing the system of the
military education and training, which can be translated into structural and
mentality changes that have resulted in tremendous reform efforts. Among
these, the most painful has been the drastic personnel reduction , followed by
the creation of a re-conceptualised education system meant to train the
military personnel according to new concepts such as combat interoperability,
flexibility, or C4I (command, communication, control, computing, and
information) system operations. Therefore, one should not assume that
Romanian Armed Forces transformation has been smooth despite the broad
public support it has enjoyed since this political trend was first formulated at
the beginning of the last decade 86% of the population, according to the
data included in the Central and Eastern Euro-barometer survey cited in
Kostadinovas (2002) study on East European public support for NATO
membership. In this respect, Marin (2000) considers that the transitional
process has been perceived negatively due to factors such as the lag between
actions and expected results, corruption phenomena, flawed management, or
drastic staff reduction.
So far, some organisational elements have been considered in order to
illustrate that the military organisation offers propitious conditions for conflict
regarded as negative or dysfunctional. However, these aspects represent only
one facet of the problem for the civilian personnel also play a pivotal
organisational role despite its relatively low representation. From this point of
view, one can identify sources for several types of conflict among which one
can mention the inherent difference in values (Hatch 1997) brought by the
military and civilian personnel, respectively, or gender (Cheng 1995). The
latter aspect is illustrated by the fact that the Romanian military system still
has a poor female representation (approximately 20% of the employees) in a
traditionally male-dominated environment.
Thus, the organisation displays two particular categories of groups: civilian
versus military; and female versus male. However, this paper argues that
gender is not a significant source of conflict, for the same idea is sustained by
other studies concerning Romanias military system and society as a whole
(Cristian 2002; Miroiu 2002).
Besides the two personnel categories mentioned above, one might identify
another distinct group based on age criteria. One should not consider this
333
remark as a sign of ageism for it does not intend to label the more senior staff
as obsolete or inadequate to the current organisational realities. On the
contrary, their knowledge and experience are regarded as a useful foundation
for the organisations future success. However, within the military
organisation this group might raise some particularities. The rationale behind
this statement refers to the transformational process in which Romania and
especially the Romanian military system have been involved for more than
two decades. Although this phenomenon has been unfolding at a national
scale, the pressure upon the military is even greater due to the current security
implications. As a result, Romanias Armed Forces have been subjected to
both types of change processes: first, the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989,
which was the sort of thing that alters completely the business landscape, the
nature of whole industries and economies (Kitchen and Daly 2002, p. 19),
and, subsequently, the inevitable shifts occurring in any contemporary
society.
In the wake of the previous ideas, the question naturally arising is the
following: is it possible to change the people born and educated in the
ideology of the Warsaw Pact so that they can function efficiently in the
NATO spirit? To illustrate some of the entailed difficulties, let us consider
two of the priorities formulated by the Romanian Ministry of National
Defence when envisaging Romanias NATO accession approximately ten
years ago: redefining the status of the non-commissioned officers as junior
leaders of the military hierarchy; and the personnels English language
training according to the NATO STANAG 6001, which is the NATO standard
for evaluating foreign language knowledge (Costea 2002). Translated into
actions, the former means reducing the number of senior officers, and the
latter refers to the necessity of reaching the level of the English knowledge
necessary to participate in NATO missions. Arguably, the less significant
barrier would be the linguistic one although some of the senior military are
reluctant to begin learning English shortly before retiring. The fundamental
change, however, must take place at the behavioural and attitudinal level for
at least two reasons: first, the senior military personnel must accept that the
traditional, autocratic, order-based working style is no longer acceptable
unless it is accompanied by the subordinates empowerment and participation;
and second, the military commanders must develop new leadership skills
such as flexibility, adaptability, communication, risk-taking, decision-making,
and creativity in order to face the current security challenges. According to
Monahan (2001), the military environment has altered out of all recognition
since the end of the Cold War, and consequently military leaders must be
able to look at chaos with the intellectual confidence it takes to explore it
from unexplored angles and discover patterns (p. 1). Given the depth of this
change, it is not surprising that thousands of Romanian senior officers have
334
opted for voluntary retirement due to either inability or reluctance to engage
in the change process (Zulean 2002).
It is in the above context that the question regarding the ability to change and
adapt senior staffs mentality and behaviour to the new requirements has
emerged. In order to answer it, this paper argues that a flexible approach must
be used acknowledging that individual characteristics play an essential role in
a persons ability and/or willingness to embrace change. Thus, it would be
equally dangerous both to conclude that the entire senior staff obstruct the
change process on the one hand, and to minimise the conflict potential which
may arise from such mentality-based clashes on the other hand. An additional
issue to examine is the type of conflict that may occur depending on the
standpoint adopted. Although it might seem a hazardous stereotyping, one
may assume that senior officers, and implicitly senior management, are likely
to manifest difficulty in accepting and adapting to the challenges posed by the
new working environment, which may result in negative conflict situations
generated by the more junior staffs rejection of the traditional management
style. Such circumstances may lead to low cooperation, poor communication,
or lack of commitment, which impacts negatively upon organisational
performance (Dolan and Garcia 2002). From a structural standpoint, this may
be labelled as vertical conflict as it affects the superior-subordinate
relationship.
1.2. Summary of the social, political and economic context in which the
military organisation functions
The conclusion of the presentation above is that the this organisation is
subjected to various tensions dictated by external factors, that is, deep social
and political changes on the one hand, as well as internal factors, that is, its
unique and innovative role in terms of providing a new type of service in a
new type of environment facing a new type of challenges on the other hand.
As a consequence, it faces a complex change process, which has been
regarded as a significant source of disruptive conflict due to its associated
phenomena such as resistance (Appelbaum et al. 1998; Rothberg 2000;
DiPaola and Hoy 2001), fear (Bechtel and Squires 2001), and dissatisfaction
(Waddell and Sohal 1998; Pelzer Hudson 1999).
Taking into consideration the previously stated circumstances in which the
military system functions, it may be useful to mention the importance of some
cross-cultural studies carried out in the field of management. For instance,
Kelemen (1995) states that Romanian and British managers are facing similar
behavioural challenges generated by the current globalisation tendencies
335
despite the differences in the cultural settings, education and experience,
whereas Lee (1998) identifies significant discrepancies between the ways in
which conflict is perceived in Western countries compared to Eastern
European countries: the former view conflict as a win-lose game in which
there can always be a return match, whereas the latter regard conflict as a
fundamental threat. According to Lee (1998), a superficial explanation would
be that the perception of conflict as negative is the product of the fifty years
behind the Iron Curtain, but she continues to say that this may be a gross
stereotyping since similar attitudes towards conflict can also be encountered
in cultures that have not experienced communism. A more plausible
explanation, on the other hand, is proposed by Obeyesekere (1990) in the
form of our cultural psyche and family myths that shape our mindsets and
inherently lead to a certain way of perceiving environmental phenomena.
The previous paragraph aims to raise an aspect relevant to the Romanian
military organisations activity: how can it function in an Eastern European
country, applying Western working procedures, and facing global security
challenges? Therefore, the following sections will attempt to use Western
theories of conflict in order to examine this Eastern European organisation.
1.3. Theoretical approaches to conflict and their relevance to the military
organisations realities literature review
The conflict theories analysed in this study concentrate on the following areas
of interest: conflict perceived as negative and disruptive (Fayol 1949;
Mintzberg 1973; Oyebade 1995; Johns 1996), conflict as positive and
functional (Pascale 1990; Darling and Walker 2001), conflict as overt, covert,
and latent (Hatch 1997), and conflict as vertical and/or horizontal (Hatch
1997).
This selection of approaches is underpinned by the environment in which the
envisaged organisation operates, in the sense that the tensions to which it is
subjected require a holistic examination involving a threefold analysis. Thus,
conflict as positive/negative refers to the perception level of the phenomenon
or the cognitive perspective, which tries to explain why people do what
they do (Appelbaum et al. 1998). The overt/covert/latent ramification relates
to conflict manifestations or the interactional perspective, which attempts to
clarify how people do what they do (Appelbaum et al. 1998), whereas the
vertical/horizontal dichotomy offers the structure-based mechanisms to
explain conflict occurrence in the organisation, which is a pyramidal structure
par excellence. A reverse approach could argue that the most straightforward
336
examination of conflict relies on the organisational structure (for it involves
the use of hard or descriptive data concerning the organisational formal
hierarchy such as the organisational departments, number of employees and
their position, etc.), gradually moves to a combination of both concrete and
abstract aspects (depending on how visible, manifested, or perceived the
conflict is), and culminates with the mental level, where the soft aspects
such as organisational and individual culture occupy the central position in
the process of conflict phenomena.
Formulated six decades ago, Cosers (1956) classification of conflict is
pragmatic yet very general as it encompasses the two main views on conflict,
that is, disruptive versus functional. Thus, Coser advances the idea of realistic
conflicts, which reflect disagreements over the means to an end or over the
ends themselves, and non-realistic conflicts, whose sole purpose is defeating
or hurting the opponent. Notwithstanding the difference in terminology, one
can equate realistic conflict with positive conflict, and non-realistic conflict
with negative conflict, respectively. This identification relies on the resolution
techniques used in each type of conflict: whereas the former involves a wide
variety of behaviours ranging from coercion and threat to negotiation, voting,
joking, and relaxation in order to reach an acceptable solution, the latter is
less flexible and makes extensive use of aggression and force. On the other
hand, since Cosers view mentions the liaison between means and ends, one
may connect it to the ethical side of business and management conduct, an
aspect which ensures its modernity, considering the increasingly great
emphasis placed on ethics in the present business environment (Key and
Popkin 1998; Driscoll and Hofmann 2000; Zairi 2000).
Returning to the founders of management, let us consider a classical
definition of conflict as an element that compromises organisational co-
ordination and success (Fayol 1949). How valid is this definition in the
context of the military-civil ambivalence specific to the military
organisations activity?
This approach can be viewed from various perspectives. Thus, the historical
circumstances when Fayol developed his management theories play an
important role in the sense that one may argue that a managerial model
developed at the beginning of the last century may not be applicable to an
organisation functioning in the 21
st
century. The most plausible argument in
favour of this opinion would be that the worlds social-economic conditions
have changed dramatically over the last century, which has impacted upon
organisational behaviours. In this respect, Cook (1995) points out the
necessity of permanently adapting work attitudes to the requirements imposed
by todays continuously changing environment, whereas Recklies (2001)
describes the contemporary business world as chaotic and dominated by
337
turbulent change and diversity in opinions, impressions, experiences (p.
3). Given the particularities of Romanias communist and post-communist
experiences, the discrepancy between the stated framework and the military
systems organisational realities seems even more obvious. However, one
may identify ways to bridge the gap between the theoretical background of
Fayols approach and the actual managerial behaviour displayed within the
system. Paradoxically, the very military nature of the organisation may plead
for the applicability of some of his concepts in spite of the fact that Fayol
developed his theories in relation to civilian organisations. Thus, his
managerial roles of commanding and controlling, which have been regarded
as authoritarian and obstructive to the current tendencies towards delayering
and staff empowerment (Newman DiPadova 1996), appear to be relevant in
the hereby context, which is a military organisation structured according to
strict rank-based hierarchies and chain of command. To enforce this idea, it is
worth mentioning that the commanding or directing role must be done,
however euphemistically or surreptitiously (Fells 2000, p. 347), therefore it
would be erroneous to label Fayols view as obsolete, especially in the
context of our organisation.
As a result, the discussion on conflict should focus on the exercise of power
seen from the military perspective and manifested in a mixed environment,
where the potential clash between two types of culture, namely, military and
civilian can materialise: as Hatch (1997) and Darling and Walker (2001) point
out, a significant source of negative conflict is the difference in values, issues,
or concerns of various groups. To illustrate the potentiality of this conflict,
one should emphasise the features of a civilian educational institution, which
must foster creativity, autonomy, and independence because a classroom
including a group of students and their class teacher is in itself a small social
organisation, in which the class teacher is often assumed to be the leader and
students the followers (Cheng 1994, p. 54). When/if these tendencies are
obstructed by the systems rules and procedures, it is obvious that a disruptive
conflict occurs and undermines organisational cooperation (Hatch 1997).
Mention should be made that such a conflict may be viewed both as vertical
conflict because the pressure can be exerted top-down, from the military
superior to the civilian subordinate, and as horizontal conflict if the pressure
comes from the peers, whose perceptions and task-approaches vary according
to their education, experience, and personal characteristics, for instance:
military versus civilian, junior versus senior, male versus female.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that horizontal conflict should not be
restricted to antagonisms between the members of the same departments, but
it may be manifest between various departments of the same organisation due
338
to factors such as operative-level goal incompatibilities, task-interdependence,
rewards and performance criteria, common resources, status incongruity,
unclear delineation of responsibilities, communication obstacles, and
individual differences (Hatch 1997).
Pooled task interdependence, which demands little interaction and,
consequently, little conflict.
- Reciprocal task interdependence, on the other hand, facilitates conflict
due to almost continuous interaction.
- Sequential task interdependence, characterised by unilateral
dependency between two departments, fosters chronic conflict due to
the asymmetrical distribution of power.
Another source of conflict noticed by Hatch (1997) refers to status
incongruity, which is not uncommon in total institutions (Goffman 1961)
such as military academies and training facilities, in which instructors may
often feel that many of the demands placed on them run counter to their
professional ethos, and as a result, experience role conflict (Bamberger and
Hasgall 1995, p. 69).
The type of conflict described above might also be viewed from another
angle, namely, as a conflict originating from individual differences. The
assumption underpinning it is that not all people get along with each other
(Hatch 1997, p. 313), but this can be labelled as simplistic because it is
unlikely that organisations employ people on subjective criteria such as
personal affinity. It would arguably be wrong to include the aforementioned
criterion in the recruitment procedures that focus on the employees personal
features, for instance psychometric tests, whose purpose is to facilitate the
psychological contract (Roehling 1997) between the employee and the
organisation. Although such a perspective may be an oversimplification, one
could notice the thread of specificity, whether it is linked to groups or
individuals.
Centred on the same concept of group as an organisational entity, another
approach to conflict has been developed by Johns (1996), who regards as
conflict any process during which a person, a group, or a department prevents
their counterparts from achieving their goals. The most significant conflict
triggers that the author identifies are group belongingness and bias, task
interdependence, differences in power, status, and culture, role ambiguity, and
insufficient resources. One may notice the high degree of similitude between
Johns and Hatchs approaches in terms of the identified conflict triggers;
however, Johns appears to place greater emphasis on the natural tendency of
the individuals to include themselves in a group, and, more significantly, to
339
become suspicious when dealing with other groups. The criteria on which
these groups are constituted range from gender to profession and position.
Whether this group emphasis is beneficial or detrimental to the organisation is
debatable: if one considers the current management techniques oriented
towards team-building as a means to improving organisational performance
(Esquivel and Kleiner 1996; Appelbaum et al. 1998), this trend is positive and
desirable. Conversely, such an attitude can close communication channels
between departments or individuals, which impacts negatively upon
organisational effectiveness (Gent et al. 1998; Steiner 2001; Kitchen and Daly
2002).
An approach that may be regarded as a corollary of Hatchs conflict stemming
from individual differences and Johns group emphasis has been advanced by
Appelbaum et al. (1998), when examining the interrelationship between group
formation and normative conflict starting from Robbins (1989) view on
conflict. While the importance of each aspect is being acknowledged, the
combined effects of the two components are analysed using a twofold
perspective: process and structural.
Thus, according to Robbins, the former model views conflict dynamically as a
sequence of events, as follows:
1. frustration, which involves a unilateral accumulation of dissatisfaction
and is caused by factors such as poor communication, flawed structure,
or individual incompatibilities;
2. conceptualisation, which consists of conflict realisation and
behavioural alterations;
3. interaction, which may lead to either conflict manifestation or
resolution;
4. outcome, which may range from agreement to long-term hostility.
The structural framework, on the other hand, deals with the conflict
parameters:
1. behavioural predisposition, which refers to personal abilities and
characteristics;
2. social pressure, which is exerted by the public or peers;
3. incentive structure, which is linked to relationships manifested in
competitive matters;
4. rules and procedures, which determine and shape conflict behaviours.
In order to explain how the above theory bridges Hatchs and Johns
approaches, one should notice that both the process and the structural models
are built around the individual as the main component, which is placed in the
organisational environment and given a dynamic role in the sense that
individual traits and behaviours manifest according to the internal (for
340
instance, organisational structure or communication) and external (for
instance, social requirements) pressures. The human dimension is thus viewed
individually, as an element that determines conflict intrinsically, according to
its characteristics (hence, the commonality with Hatchs approach), as well as
collectively, as an element that influences and is influenced by a group or
team (which bears resemblance with Johns framework).
Notwithstanding the difference in emphasis displayed by the process and
structural models, respectively, several commonalities can be pointed out.
Thus, the former seems to be more concerned with the dynamics of conflict
manifestation, whereas the latter appears to place greater emphasis on the
individual perception of conflict. Nevertheless, the dimensions and
implications of the two models are not as different as they may seem:
personal variables, for instance, can be assimilated with behavioural
predisposition; conceptualisation might be equated with incentive structure;
structure and interaction may materialise in the form of rules and procedures.
However, regardless of the differences in terminology or emphasis, these
models highlight the idea of a work force characterised by people with
different human qualities who belong to different cultural groups
(Appelbaum et al. 1998, p. 217). Last but not least, this approach does not
explicitly label conflict as negative or positive, but rather pleads for
acknowledging cultural diversity and using it in order to produce new ideas
and optimum solutions.
As already mentioned, numerous theorists such as Mintzberg (1973),
Oyebade (1995), or Johns (1996) have regarded conflict as negative and
disruptive. Furthermore, one cannot ignore that these approaches have been
developed more recently compared to Fayols definition, which emphasises
that to regard conflict as dysfunctional is still valid. Within the military
organisation, this idea is even more plausible considering that this institution
could be included in the category of rule-bound systems (Clayton and
Gregory 2000), in which who has the final say is externally determined by
the rules governing the systems area of function (Clayton and Gregory
2000, p. 141). Consequently, the likelihood of conflict resulting from the
exercise of power and related concepts such as decision-making and
organisational politics increases due to the organisations pyramidal structure,
which Reis and Pea (2001) consider to be a major obstacle to organisational
effectiveness in contemporary conditions, dominated by constant changes at
every social and economic level. Again, this also opens the way to vertical
conflict (Hatch 1997), which characterises hierarchy-based organisations, in
which power runs the risk of being abused rather than used judiciously and
responsibly (Butcher and Clarke 1999, p. 10).
341
In the previous paragraphs, some internal organisational aspects connected to
the exercise of command, control and power have been mentioned as potential
sources of disruptive conflict. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore that power
manifestation should not be restricted to legitimate power, which results from
ones position within an organisational hierarchy (Johns 1996), for an
organisations power exercise can be viewed from numerous perspectives in
terms of its sources (Buchanan and Huczynski 1997; Edelmann 1993), that is,
reward, coercion, expertise, legitimacy, and reference.
Another issue worth noting is the similar classification of the two
management concepts, namely, power and conflict, which illustrates the tight
connection between them. Thus, Lukes (1974) identifies three categories of
power: overt (defined as power openly and explicitly exerted due to its being
vested in an individual or group and supported by rules and/or resources),
covert (implying a more subtle form of exercise derived from less visible
attributes such as personal qualities, expertise, or social networks), and latent
(expressed by means of ones gaining control over valuable information,
knowledge and resources, and waiting for the favourable circumstances to
display the exercise of power).
Despite examining a different management concept, that is, conflict, Hatch
(1997) reaches an identical classification, namely: overt (a visible struggle
between two or more groups or organisations); covert (a hidden state of
opposition between two or more groups or organisations); and latent (a
gradual accumulation of tension between two or more groups or
organisations). Considering this classification similitude, one can hardly
regard it as coincidental. Conversely, this paper argues that there is a strong
connection between power exercise and conflict manifestation, as theorists
such as Fincham and Rhodes (1992) have pointed out.
In order to analyse this interdependence, a problem worth considering is the
employee perception of power, which has been studied by Elangovan and Xie
(2000). In the light of their approach, there is a tight connection between the
managements power bases and the employees behaviours. An aspect to
examine is whether there is a direct correspondence between each type of
power and each type of conflict, respectively, or not. In other words, does
overt power vested in the senior management lead to overt conflict? Does
covert power result in covert conflict? Does latent power open the way to
latent conflict? Furthermore, one should consider the possibility that this
correspondence may be contradicted in the sense that certain types of power
may not lead necessarily to their corresponding conflict manifestations, thus
breaking the apparent symmetry of the two triangular classifications, namely,
power and conflict, respectively.
342
As far as overt power is concerned, one may use Hatchs approach in order to
examine the relationship between it and the conflict manifestations which it
generates. Thus, if both conflict actors have overt power, the likelihood of
overt conflict increases because both parties may feel entitled to express their
opinions openly and fearless of coercive consequences. However, when
examining this type of conflict, one should also consider the interdependence
existing between the two parties, that is, pooled, reciprocal, or sequential. As
previously stated, each relationship may lead to various degrees of conflict
probability. On the other hand, a different conflict analysis is required if the
two conflict parties do not enjoy similar distributions of power. In this case,
one may infer that the occurrence of overt conflict is low for it is likely that
the conflict exponents will react differently: the subordinates may feel
intimidated and unwilling to air their grievances, whereas the superiors may
feel entitled to exert their coercive power.
In terms of latent power and conflict, one may argue that their manifestation
is more perceptible horizontally in the sense that they display a dynamic,
though gradual, unfolding within one or more organisational groups. This
type of conflict may be fuelled by limited resources, which foster competition
and organisational politics, and, in turn, require effective use of power as well
as leadership skills on the top managements behalf, whose responsibility is to
balance between individual/group interests and organisational interests
(Armstrong 1999; Butcher and Clarke 1999).
To deepen the connection between power exercise and conflict manifestation
already pointed out when mentioning the similar classification of the two
concepts, Ropers (2003) taxonomy of conflict highlights the role played by
the amount or type of power which the conflict parties exert within the
organisation. Thus, Ropers distinguishes two categories of conflict:
symmetrical, in which the parties involved in the conflict have equal degrees
of power; and asymmetrical, in which the conflict parties have different
degrees of power. Once this distinction has been acknowledged, the further
steps should take into consideration the remaining two aspects: measuring the
quantity of power allotted to each side, that is, performing a hard analysis
of the power distribution; and then, examining the quality of power gained
by each exponent, that is, determining the soft features of the power
displayed in the conflict process.
Apparently, Ropers classification of conflict may be considered as pragmatic
as other dichotomies such as positive versus negative, or vertical versus
horizontal. However, a thorough analysis of his approach reveals more subtle
implications in the sense that it combines elements of other theories on power
343
and conflict viewed from various perspectives. Thus, the quantitative aspect
of power may be linked to overt power, but one should also consider the
situation when an individual or a group has covert power or accumulates
latent power. This means that simply examining an organisations hierarchical
structure does not offer a clear idea of the power distribution within that
organisation. On the other hand, people occupying lower hierarchical
positions might enjoy significant amounts of covert or latent power, which
imposes a careful analysis of the power phenomena inside the organisation.
Consequently, the conflict events that take place at and/or between various
organisational levels require significant knowledge and understanding of the
organisations structural and cultural realities. Therefore, accepting Ropers
conflict classification without considering its implications in terms of power
would hardly lead to an accurate picture of events, and ultimately to an
effective management of conflict.
To conclude in respect of the above internal and external organisational
facets, one may infer that an organisation can undergo conflict both internally,
due to its various categories of staff, and externally, due to the complex
changes experienced by the environment in which it operates (Olorunsola
1997).
Under these circumstances, it is clear that organisational characteristics may
foster the appearance and growth of negative conflict unless these seemingly
antagonistic elements are properly addressed by the management team either
by preventing their manifestation or by transforming them into creative
conflict. We thus reach the opposite end of the scale, represented by the
theorists that adopt a positive view of organisational conflict, namely, conflict
as functional and creative tension (Pascale 1990) or an excellent
opportunity for growth for both the organisation and the individual (Darling
and Walker 2001, p. 230).
Notwithstanding that such a phrase as to win without fighting (Ma 2003)
may seem an oxymoron, one can find good reasons to embrace this vision for
it represents another (and brighter) side of the same coin, that is, organisation
viewed from a positive perspective, in which potential sources of conflict may
be transformed into rewarding and invigorating experiences. Moreover, Ma is
not the only theorist who opts for this arguably ideal, conflict-free
organisational environment. Thus, Banner (1995) acknowledges three levels
of conflict manifestations: the traditional or physical level, which sees conflict
as bad and its elimination as desirable; the interactionist or modern view,
which regards conflict as functional and in need of being managed
effectively; and the transcendent or transformational approach, which
emphasises an expanded sense of personal identity and an awareness of the
344
interconnectedness of people in their organisational culture, and of
organisational cultures to each other in the larger environment (p. 32). What
this approach brings new is the existence of grey areas in managerial
perceptions, that is, the idea that conflict is not necessarily bad or good,
negative or positive, but the result of the larger context in which businesses
function. This is a valuable contribution for this study argues that effective
conflict management requires flexible and nuanced management behaviours
rather than pre-established recipes. Thus, Banner sustains his theory by
applying the immutable laws of life to organisational existence, and
suggests that conflict can be eliminated if we adopt a synergetic view of
organisations materialised in the form of several principles:
1. Stop judging other people and situations, which should prevent people
from applying negative labels to surrounding phenomena.
2. Take 100 per cent responsibility for your reality, which encourages
personal accountability.
3. Live in the present moment, which fosters personal involvement in the
current unfolding of events.
4. When something appears to be conflictual, there is a message for me in
that situation, which enhances the idea of conflict perceived as an
opportunity for learning and personal growth.
However, a closer analysis of the above principles reveals that their
application can be interpreted as steps towards a positive perception of
conflict for they contain the elements encountered in functional conflict, such
as personal responsibility and conflict perceived as an opportunity for
personal or professional development. Consequently, one may consider
Banners view as unrealistic since his theory only apparently delineates the
coordinates of a conflict-free environment, when in fact it is based on tools
used to sustain the positive perception of conflict.
Moreover, although a conflict-free environment may seem the ultimate goal
of any business, it can also be a dangerous situation, both from the
organisational point of view, and from the employees perspective. Thus, the
former idea is illustrated by DiPaola and Hoy (2001), when pointing out that
in schools in which there is little conflict there is no sense or urgency, no
necessity to look for alternatives, and no incentives for conciliatory overtures
(p. 241). In other words, the lack of conflict is assimilated with the lack of
organisational growth, which may signal negative symptoms such as
complacency or disinterest. The latter aspect points to the staffs
dissatisfaction and demotivation manifested in the form of reduced creativity
and innovation. Consequently, the key to effective conflict management,
according to DiPaola and Hoy, is suppressing the occurrence of social-
emotional (or affective) conflict, that is, negative or dysfunctional conflict,
345
which reduces performance and satisfaction, while enhancing task-related (or
cognitive) conflict, that is, positive or creative conflict, which influences
positively decision quality and overall group performance.
To return to the positive perception of conflict, the diversified staff structure
can be regarded as a fruitful source of different opinions and experiences,
which can enrich the organisations life provided that these differences are
constructively used to find innovative solutions to improve organisational
effectiveness rather than foster the contradiction between professional ethos
and administrative requirements (Bamberger and Hasgall 1995, p. 68). In
other words, the employees diversity can impact positively upon the
organisational environment provided that every category of personnel
participates in decision-making and problem-solving, thus applying concepts
such as empowerment and delayering, which have been considered crucial
success factors in modern organisations (Waddell and Sohal 1998; Bechtel
and Squires 2001; Cook 1995; Burdett 1994; Kitchen and Daly 2002). In this
respect, methods such as formal and informal meetings, daily reports, Intranet
postings, or suggestion boxes are possible methods to foster staffs
contribution to problem-solving and conflict prevention or resolution.
Tightly connected to concepts such as empowerment and participation in
decision-making and problem-solving is the creation of a team-based
organisational culture. Despite being widely regarded as a key element of any
modern organisations success (Esquivel and Kleiner 1996; Appelbaum et al.
1998), a team-based culture can also pose a series of obstacles towards
effective conflict management. Thus, DiPaola and Hoy (2001) refer to the
formal aspect of a team and state that the larger and more diverse the group,
the greater the potential for conflict because diversity among members of
groups results in differences in goals, perceptions, preferences, and beliefs
(p. 238), which reflects significant resemblance with Hatchs view of
individual differences as a source of disruptive conflict. A much more
pessimistic approach, however, has been formulated by Bagshaw (1998), who
links concepts usually regarded as positive trends, that is, delayered or less
hierarchical organisations, to negative outcomes resulted from unclear
definitions of collaborative effort, shared learning, or self development: This
can lead to a self-protective attitude where knowledge is jealously guarded,
with the assumption that to share it would be to lose it (p. 207). One is thus
warned against the danger of accepting concepts usually bearing positive
connotations without adopting a critical standpoint that should consider each
organisations particularities rather than generalise and apply labels without
questioning their relevance to a certain management situation.
346
However, the benefits of applying the previously mentioned methods for
enhancing organisational communication and cooperation cannot be
overstated since they can determine the type of conflict manifested (Esquivel
and Kleiner 1996): if the employees disagreement results from issue-related
differences of opinions that tend to improve team effectiveness, the positive
or C-type conflict occurs and fosters creativity and the utilisation of
individuals skills and abilities; conversely, if the disagreement if fuelled by
personal feelings or agenda, the negative or A-type conflict emerges and
deters the members from the group objectives. Assuming that the organisation
can provide its staff with the material and technical means to facilitate
communication, one may conclude that it is the managerial exercise that
ultimately decides upon the best course of action meant to nurture positive
conflict and inhibit disruptive conflict.
In terms of conflict resolution methods, communication should be the most
effective tool if it is used adequately (Appelbaum et al. 1998). However,
managers must adopt a critical standpoint when assessing the conflict
situation in order to identify its source, exponents, manifestation, and
eventually resolution method. In other words, discriminating between various
types of conflict is essential when developing a strategy for a particular
conflict situation. According to Johns, the following conflict management
styles have been identified:
1. conflict avoidance style, whose effectiveness is low due to the parties
reluctance to face and change the issues causing the conflict;
2. courtship style, manifested by cooperation with the opponent without
sustaining personal interests, which can be effective when one of the
parties wants to compensate for a mistake that he/she has committed;
3. competitive style, based on maximising one partys interest and
minimising cooperation level, may be useful when the party is certain
of his/her power, influence, or rightness, in win-lose situations, or when
it is unlikely that the parties will meet again in the future;
4. concessive style, which combines cooperation and own-interest
protection, can be effective in conflicts caused by insufficient
resources, but it is less likely to function when the conflict parties have
asymmetrical power;
5. collaborative style, which emphasises both own interest and
cooperation, aims at obtaining a win-win outcome, and appears to be
effective when the conflict is not intense as well as when each party
possesses information that the opponent may need.
Regardless of the approach used in order to solve a particular conflict
situation, the mechanism on which all the five conflict management styles are
based is communication. However, one cannot ignore the thread of
347
commonality that these resolution techniques share, namely, the degree of
power possessed by the conflict exponents: the more power one party has, the
less democratic or participative the resolution process is. As a result, one may
infer that conflict management should rely on at least two components in
order to be successful: communication and symmetrical power distribution.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that power distribution can be determined
extrinsically due to the intrinsic organisational structure and mechanisms,
which leads to the conclusion that it is the communication component that
may play a decisive role in effective conflict management.
Unlike Johns view on conflict management, which emphasises individual
reactions to conflict, Darling and Walker (2001) approach this issue from a
behaviour-based group perspective, and identify four basic behavioural styles:
the people person (relater), the thought person (analyser), the action person
(director), and the front person (socialiser). The responsibility for effective
conflict management in an organisation, the authors argue, lies with all
members of the team, thus shifting the focus from the manager to the team.
This view is sustained by the idea that the manager as an individual is
unlikely to display all these behavioural traits, whereas the team (or the
group) will almost always consist of a combination of these styles although
they may not be evenly distributed.
Darling and Walkers perspective may be regarded as more realistic in terms
of achieving conflict resolution due to more individuals sharing the
responsibility for the conflict outcome, whereas Johns attributes an arguably
too complex role to a single individual, that is, the manager. However, if one
considers that it is the managers duty to build the team and coax its efforts
towards achieving a common goal, in this case conflict resolution, Johns
perception appears to gain credibility. As Knights and McCabe (2002) point
out, management can enrol and mobilise, or coerce and control their
employees (p. 241).
Also, a significant obstacle posed by Darling and Walkers approach is that
not all the team members may have the necessary skills to distinguish
between the various behavioural styles, which means that they should rely
only on personal experience or empirical observation in order to delineate the
adequate course of action. On the other hand, the same difficulty might occur
when the manager must deal with a conflict, which raises additional doubts
regarding the practical applicability of the behavioural styles approach to
conflict management. Hence, one may conclude that the framework advanced
by Darling and Walker may have solid theoretical foundations, but it requires
equally solid behavioural knowledge in order to be successfully used, which
significantly reduces its practical utility.
348
1.4. Summary of the literature review
Organisational characteristics can be viewed from various perspectives and
pertain to numerous interpretations in terms of identifying the conflict
definition which best suits each particular context. Depending on the
standpoint adopted, one may find arguments to underpin different approaches
to organisational conflict, which cover a wide range of frameworks and
perceptions.
1.5. Conflict and ethics or winning wars without fighting battles
The previous study of this analysis presented an overview of the theoretical
approaches and practical manifestations of the concept of organisational
conflict in the military organisation. In the hereby study, I would like to focus
more on the solutions one may envisage in order to constructively solve
conflict situations in a win-win manner. Therefore, I will assume that the
conclusions of the previous parts of the study are already known, so that we
shall concentrate on the practical side of this investigation.
1.6. Building upon the previous literature findings practical solutions
Therefore, in the wake of the critical examination of the literature review
outlined in the prior parts of the study, the following conclusions may be
drawn:
1. The individual differences leading to negative conflict stem from
cultural discrepancies between civilian and military staff as well as
from junior versus senior antagonisms, which confirms the applicability
of the theories advocating the negative or destructive nature of conflict
phenomena.
2. The pyramidal structure of the military organisation opens the way to
vertical conflict, which impacts negatively upon the communication
process at the team level regardless of the size of the organisation,
which illustrates that the conflict triggers identified by Hatch and Johns
are correct.
3. If the organisational pay policy is unsatisfactory, it must be
accompanied by alternative reward schemes in order to represent a
significant motivating factor to the employees, which proves that
349
Johns conflict management styles should be used extensively and
flexibly. More explicitly, the management team must treat each
organisational group, whether professionally or socially established,
according to its background, needs and expectations.
4. If the relationships between peers are good within the organisation
notwithstanding the staff diversity, the probability of functional conflict
increases, thus resulting in creativity, innovation, and learning
opportunities; this proves that the positive and constructive perception
of conflict is realistic.
As a result, the hereby study argues that the military organisations
management team should proceed to improving the managerial practices
related to organisational communication at lower levels, especially bottom-up
collection of information and feedback as well as enhancing the subordinates
participation in decision-making. In this respect, Johns conflict management
styles may be effective provided that each conflict situation is treated
separately on the one hand, and the appropriate resolution techniques are
involved in each situation. Ideally, the collaborative style should prove most
effective for it aims at obtaining a win-win outcome, but it may not be
applicable in the case of the military-civilian antagonisms if the conflict
existing between the two groups is too intense. This situation pertains to at
least two interpretations: either the conflict actors focused on using the
competitive style if each party perceived it as a symmetrical power, as Ropers
suggests; or the top management failed to perform the roles which Darling
and Walker regarded as crucial in solving a conflict, that is, relater, analyser,
director, and socialiser. Whereas the former interpretation suggests a mistaken
management technique, the latter suggests the individuals incapacity to
approach the situation. The conclusion of this assumption may be that
optimum results in conflict management require a combination of resolution
tools, that is, both objectivity in choosing the procedures and subjectivity in
selecting the appropriate mitigating agent.
Then, another conflict trigger, namely, the organisational hierarchical
structure, may be overcome by counterbalancing aspects such as applying
simpler reward and reporting procedures as well as increased people-
orientation and flexibility, all of which being connected to organisational size
and regarded as facilitators in terms of organisational effectiveness and
smooth running, as Ghobadian and Gallear point out. In order to enhance
reporting procedures, the top management may put in practice the open-doors
policy, which provides the employees with the opportunity to communicate
vertically, that is with their superiors, which supposedly should minimise
vertical conflict, as Hatchs defines it, or asymmetrical conflict, as Ropers
labels it. This management technique could be considered detrimental in some
350
respects as it is time-consuming on the one hand, and may result in
undermining the middle managers authority and credibility on the other
hand. Nevertheless, the benefits of this policy can compensate for such
shortcoming because they also facilitate the manifestation of leadership skills
that include employee involvement in decision-making, innovation, and team-
work, which ultimately are expected to increase organisational effectiveness
(DiPaola and Hoy 2001). This approach is particularly important in military
educational institutions, where leaders have to reach a compromise between
the administrative and formal aspects of their activity on the one hand, and the
necessity of ensuring a working atmosphere that fosters collaboration and
professional autonomy on the other hand. As DeDreu (1997) emphasises,
administrators who seek to create a homogeneous faculty and suppress
minority dissent are reducing creativity and innovation (p. 240). As a
consequence, such an attitude may be regarded as an illustration of the
theories according to which conflict is a positive phenomenon based on a
diversity of group and individual cultures which thus take the opportunity to
express their creativity and imagination.
However, the challenge that the top management faces is that the middle
management represent the main hindrance to organisational cooperation and
subordinates participation. In order to attenuate these possible mentality
incompatibilities, one should view the senior/junior dichotomy constructively
in the sense that the senior staffs experience combined with the junior staffs
enthusiasm can ensure organisational success. This idea is supported by Ford
(2002), who regards it as a prerequisite for effective management: a joint
forward-looking and backward-looking approach was superior in terms of
enhancing organisational fitness than was either approach used
independently (p. 638).
Nevertheless, this positive view may not be enough in order to persuade the
middle management to change their behaviour, and consequently the top
management must embark on a process of sharing information and enforcing
communication by means of setting a personal example in order to win the
middle managers trust and ensure the process credibility across the
organisation. In other words, the military top management must act both as a
gatekeeper and as a process promoter in order to avoid being hampered by
those passively affected by and those actively engaged in the process
(Hauschildt and Schewe 2000, p. 99).
Time-consuming as this endeavour may appear, it hopefully benefits from the
subordinates trust in the top management, and as a result it has to concentrate
on enhancing the middle managements willingness to communicate.
However, if the top management uses motivating tools such as participation
351
and empowerment in order to secure the middle management collaboration,
the enterprise can be successful. Also, it is important that the entire process is
conceived and applied holistically, according to a cohesive strategy that
emphasises the necessity of creating and retaining an educated workforce as a
prerequisite for organisational success. As Gunnigle and Moore (1994) note,
even in cases where the adoption of a certain strategy is not appealing to
those required to implement it, the articulation, communication, and
championing of a well-constructed strategy is more likely to lead to
successful implementation (p. 69). Given the literature review conclusions,
the effectiveness of this method cannot be overlooked.
On the other hand, this study argues that the transformational endeavour that
the military systems top management must accelerate is facilitated by the
high level of staff commitment, which represents a valuable advantage
because it allows the management to concentrate its efforts on one main
direction, namely, enforcing vertical communication and particularly bottom-
up feedback and participation. The subordinates contribution to the
organisational improvement cannot be overstated, especially considering that
more than 80% of quality problems are caused by management and fewer
than 20% are caused by workers (Ho and Fung 1994, p. 27).
Nevertheless, the top managements degree of involvement in enforcing the
transformational process should be carefully applied as it may convey
contradictory messages: on the one hand, it can be perceived as a hands-on
approach which proves commitment from the top and impacts positively on
the staffs motivation (Elangovan and Xie 2000). On the other hand, it may
trigger the employees frustration resulted from constant control and
supervision (Elangovan and Xie 2000). Therefore, a balance must be reached
in the sense that top-down message reinforcement should not compromise the
subordinates freedom and initiative, which represent the very goals of these
efforts.
An argument connected to the current military organisation being a relatively
new entity whose staff, culture, and internal mechanisms are still in formation
is the possibility that the negative conflict occurrences signalled previously
may be attenuated gradually according to the principle of the learning curve
(Daniels and Radebaugh 1996). In other words, in time both the workers and
the management will gain experience, which in turn may result in various
staff categories mutual acceptance of their differences in values and task
approaches. One may argue that the dysfunctional conflicts are already deeply
rooted, and as a result the top management should adopt a proactive attitude
towards resolving them rather than rely on such time-based expectations.
Nonetheless, the reconciliation process may not necessarily necessitate a
352
cultural change in its classical form, for the Romanian military culture is not
mature yet after the NATO and EU accession, and therefore the efforts focus
should concentrate on persuading the conflict parties, that is, the identified
distinct groups, to accept and respect their counterparties values and
expectancies. This process could be described as creolisation, which Daniels
and Radebaugh (1996) define as the process of introducing elements of an
outside culture (p. 52). In this case, the outside culture can be considered
the civilian component, which must accept and be accepted by the military
system. On the other hand, mention should be made that this process is
doomed to fail unless all the conflict components agree to act as a synergetic
team focused on reaching a reasonable outcome by using techniques such as:
willingness to express opinions and feelings, active participation, careful
listening, creative thinking, avoiding communication discontinuity, taking
time to reflect, protecting the other parties rights, and assuming responsibility
for the outcomes (Harrington and Harrington 1995).
Connected with the previous idea related to the necessity of creating a
synergetic team within the military organisation, it is essential that the middle
management should understand that unless they inform and are informed by
their subordinates, the overall organisational performance will be
unsatisfactory, and the nature of negative conflict between individuals will
persist (Gent et al. 1998). Instead, they must develop into facilitators of the
success of their colleagues (Dolan and Garcia 2002, p. 103), by encouraging
their teams to express their opinions, contribute to setting team goals, and
experiment new ideas. Also, in the light of the subordinates potential
complaints related to the insufficient feedback provided by their superiors, a
job evaluation programme would prove useful in order to ensure the clarity of
each employees responsibilities, performance, assessment, reward, or
training needs. According to Armstrong (1999), such a programme should
cover the following aspects: roles, briefing, procedures, training, pay issues,
job evaluation, job analysis, communication and negotiation.
Last but not least, this paper sustains the importance of enforcing ethical
behaviour as an effective tool of decreasing negative conflict and fostering
functional conflict. As Moon and Bonny (2001) state, ethically based
management can shape an entire business (p. 25). In a military organisation,
which can be regarded as rigid and authoritarian, the ethical component
becomes even more important, especially due to the role it can play in crucial
business activities such as communication, decision-making, reward and
training procedures, and ultimately power exercise: Programme components
such as training, reporting systems and feedback-gathering mechanisms must
be accompanied by the development of a broader value-based culture that
employees see as consistent and believable (Moon and Bonny 2001, p. 37).
353
To conclude, this paper argues that, especially in the new political, social and
economic environment, there is a call for a new and complex breed of
decision-makers who, if they are not themselves philosophers, are willing to
trust the philosophical judgment of common citizens in the political arena
(Goulet 2002, p. 13). On a more pragmatic note, unless military managers at
every hierarchical level are willing to assume genuine leadership roles and
value cultural diversity, conflict aspects such as the ones identified and
discussed in this study cannot be constructively approached and solved, which
will only result in dissatisfied employees and poor organisational
performance.
1.7. Conclusions and proposals
In the light of the previous comprehensive examination of the concept of
conflict in the military organisation, one may conclude upon the
omnipresence of conflict potential and situations, given the staff diversity
dominating the current organisational environment to a larger and larger
scale. Therefore, resisting this trend will only result in poor organisational
performance and dissatisfied employees, which is obviously an undesirable
outcome. This is the reason why the present study argues that a constructive
and productive approach to organisational conflict resides with ethics-based
procedures combined with communication, empowerment, and motivation
techniques meant to boost the subordinates involvement in the organisational
processes across the system.
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362
PLANIFICAREA APRRII N ROMNIA
DE LA COMITETUL DE STAT AL PLANIFICRII LA
PLANIFICAREA
PE BAZ DE CAPABILITI
ARIUC Alexandru Mirel
Ministerul Aprrii Naionale Departamentul pentru Politic de
Aprare i Planificare
Abstract
Planning represents a fundamental prerogative of the leadership and it is
impossible to understand how a system functions in the absence of the corresponding
planning. On the other hand, planning is useless in cases when the foreseen objectives are
misbalanced as compared with the level and availability of resources for the process.
Planning of the defence is not different, and the developments during the past two
decades seem to bring an increased realism in designing the objectives and the
establishment of a priorities system that could approach more flexibly the objectives,
depending on the variation of the resources level. In the current context of Romanias
membership to NATO, the capabilities based planning would ensure the adequate
effectiveness and an increased efficiency of the national defence system.
Planificarea socialist
n cel de-al aptelea deceniu al secolului trecut, un profesor de
management la Institutul de Tehnologie din Massachusetts (MIT) producea
senzaie la Clubul de la Roma, prezentnd primele modele ale lumii, bazate pe
teoriile sale asupra dinamicii sistemelor. Profesorul se numea Jay W.
Forrester i susinea, fr rezerve, posibilitatea modelrii matematice a
oricror sisteme, astfel nct funcionarea lor s fie optim. Fost inginer de
frunte n domeniul proiectrii i aplicrii calculatoarelor electronice, Forrester
363
era un optimist incorigibil care credea cu trie c modelarea societii va
permite cunoaterea i, mai mult, construcia voluntar a unei lumi lipsite de
evenimente nedorite sau a crei funcionare poate fi reglat rapid n urma unor
astfel de surprize. Evident, aa cum se tie, deceniile urmtoare au deturnat
interesul dinspre optim spre convenabil (pornindu-se de la legea Pareto 80%
din efect se produce cu 20% din efort), observndu-se c unele sisteme nu pot
fi cunoscute n amnunt i, ca urmare, modelele pot avea un grad nalt de
arbitrariu. Totui, teoriile lui Forrester sunt foarte utile analizei sistemice,
pn la momentul n care costurile presupuse de construcia i utilizarea lor nu
impieteaz asupra eficacitii analizei.
Vorbim aadar de un sistem al planificrii aprrii, ataat unui sistem al aprrii naionale,
iar pentru a studia evoluia acestuia sunt necesare cteva precizri. Pornind de la Forrester,
un sistem nseamn o grupare de elemente componente care acioneaz mpreun n
vederea atingerii unui obiectiv comun [1]. Att sistemul naional de aprare, ct i
sistemul de planificare a aprrii ar trebui s fie, dup teoria profesorului de la MIT,
sisteme cu conexiune invers negativ, adic un sistem contient de comportarea sa trecut,
a crui evoluie este influenat de neatingerea obiectivului. Prelum un exemplu simplu:
Un sistem cu conexiune invers comand aciunea bazndu-se pe rezultatele aciunii
anterioare. Sistemul de nclzire dintr-o camer este comandat de un termostat, care
acioneaz n funcie de cldura produs anterior de instalaia de nclzire pentru
temperatura din aceast camer. Din cauz c aceast cldur produs anterior de sistem
sistem comand viitoarea generare de cldur, sistemul de nclzire reprezint un sistem
cu conexiune invers negativ care are ca obiectiv temperatura optim [1].
n acele vremuri, n plin revoluie tehnico-tiinific, Romnia se trata
pe sine ca pe un calorifer cu termostat, ncercnd s se auto-controleze
complet din punct de vedere economic, pornind ns de la ipoteze false,
ignornd mediul general i punnd ntre paranteze legea cererii i a ofertei,
existena concurenei .a.m.d.. Sistemul respectiv de planificare fixa un numr
de ieiri (obinuit mobilizatoare - nerealiste) i, prin operaii matematice
simple (inversarea matricei de transfer), determina intrrile (arareori
corespunztoare din punct de vedere calitativ i cantitativ). Se urmrea
obinerea rezultatelor i depirea lor, n condiiile limitrii rersurselor, lucru
care duce la suspiciuni ndreptite referitoare la acurateea modelului, n
condiiile folosirii unui algoritm extrem de exact.
O parte a acestui sistem o constituia, evident i aprarea. i, la fel de
evident, produsele respective erau de calitate inferioar celei raportate, n
condiiile n care resursele erau ajustate frecvent. Revenind la exemplul lui
Forrester, este imposibil, indiferent de structura sistemului, s obii cldura
necesar atunci gazul este tiat. Inutil s mai spunem c sunt muli specialiti
care consider c o astfel de abordare a coninut n sine germenii prbuirii
sistemului socialist. Revenind la subiectul nostru, planificarea aprrii era
parte a planificrii generale, lucru care, ntr-o oarecare msur, ni se pare
interesant i pozitiv.
364
Sistemul de Planificare, Programare, Bugetare
Interesant ni se pare faptul c din acea perioad ncepe n Statele Unite
o adevrat revoluie n domeniul planificrii, odat cu proiectarea i
implementarea Sistemului de Planificare, Programare i Bugetare. Acest
sistem este datorat n mare parte lui Charles Hitch, numrul doi n
Departamentul Aprrii al SUA, care a introdus metodele cercetrii
operaionale (n mare ascensiune atunci) n domeniul politicii de vrf.
Preocuparea lui Hitch a fost de dezvolta un sistem care s permit trecerea
dincolo de simpla execuie (aa cum era la acel moment) i s coreleze
cheltuielile cu performana. Charles J. Hitch fusese autorul unei lucrri
capitale, Price Theory and Business Behavior, aprut la Oxford n 1939 i
care sfida teoria convenional, bazndu-se pe date empirice colectate de la
oameni de afaceri (evident, nici unul dintre acetia nu avea habar de venit
marginal sau cost marginal). n 1948 a nfiinat divizia economic a
corporaiei RAND, unde a utilizat in extenso analiza sistemic.
Secretarul aprrii din epoc (1961-1968), Robert McNamara, avea un
background potrivit pentru implementarea unui asemenea sistem: studii de
statistic, implicat n utilizarea calcului operaional n timpul celui de-al
doilea rzboi mondial, director general la Ford unde introdusese metode noi
de management. Preocuparea de principiu a lui McNamara (dus pn la
obsesie n unele situaii) a fost cea de translatare a prioritilor politice n
politici publice (n cazul SPPB, politica de aprare, iar ulterior, pe durata
lungului su mandatul de preedinte al Bncii Mondiale ntre 1968 i 1981, de
dezvoltare economic a Lumii a Treia). Aceast preocupare s-a tradus prin
constituirea unei arhitecturi complexe de planificare a politicilor, servit de un
sistem de planificare bugetar (inclusiv n cadrul Bncii Mondiale, unde a
folosit tot planuri multianuale pe cinci ani, ca i la Pentagon).
Revoluia declanat de implementarea sistemului este dovedit, printre
altele, i de faptul c n anul 1965 preedintele Johnson a dispus generalizarea
sa la nivelul ntregii administraii. Din pcate, aceast msur a fost pripit,
ignorndu-se faptul c att SPPB, ct i analiza sistemic fuseser proiectate
strict pentru uzul Departamentului Aprrii, se bazau pe cercetri efectuate pe
durata unei decade de ctre o corporaie privat, i beneficiau de existena
unui solid corp profesional specializat. Aplicarea sa la alte departamente care
nu ntruneau niciuna dintre condiiile enunate mai sus a generat o mare
confuzie i compromiterea metodelor de management pe care SPPB le
promova.
Ceea ce ni se pare esenial n aceast abordare a domeniului este
aezarea pe paliere distincte ale celor trei componente inseparabile
(Planificare, Programare, Bugetare), pornindu-se de la dou principii clare:
palierele se refer la activiti cu orizonturi diferite, iar determinarea reciproc
are loc n ambele sensuri. Astfel, planificarea strategic de nivel nalt (termen
365
lung) determin aezarea activitilor n ordinea lor logic (programare
planificarea n sens de plan de aciune termen mediu), care determin
estimarea costurilor necesare atingerii intelor (bugetare planificare n sens
de alocare a resurselor financiare termen scurt). Invers, constrngerile
imediate de natur financiar (bugetarea) determin ajustarea planului de
aciuni (programarea), care poate determina reevaluarea politicii
(planificarea).
Planificarea aprrii, astzi
Dup cderea ornduirii socialiste, Romnia i-a ndreptat prioritar
atenia ctre Occident, astfel nct, de la mijlocul anilor nouzeci a nceput
folosirea PPBS. Planificarea aprrii a fost reglemetat prin lege, astfel nct
s se asigure respectarea angajamentelor fa de Aliana Nord-Atlantic.
Legea planificrii aprrii este legea de baz att pentru desfurarea
procesului de planificare a aprrii ct i pentru organizarea i funcionarea
sistemului corespunztor. Ea a fost iniiat de ctre Ministerul Aprrii i
descrie algoritmul prin care se desfoar procesul n Romnia.
Legea 473/2004 definete planificarea aprrii n articolul 1:
Planificarea aprrii, atribut i component esenial a politicii de aprare,
reprezint un complex de activiti i msuri care vizeaz promovarea
intereselor naionale, definirea i ndeplinirea obiectivelor securitii naionale
a Romniei n domeniul aprrii.. Dup cum se poate observa, aceast
definiie fixeaz planificarea aprrii n interiorul politicii de aprare, fr a
defini acest din urm concept. Or, n accepiunea larg a cuvintelor, aceast
definire a planificrii ca parte a politicii de aprare fie nu ine cont de acea
parte exclusiv tehnic a procesului de planificare, fie consider c opiunea
pentru metodele i tehnicile de planificare ofer posibilitatea acceptrii ca
politic de aprare a ntregului proces.
Legea planificrii aprrii stabilete, n concordan cu documentele de
planificare ale NATO i domeniile ce fac parte din planificarea aprrii: (1)
Domeniile planificrii aprrii sunt: a) planificarea forei; b) planificarea
armamentelor; c) planificarea resurselor; d) planificarea logistic; e)
planificarea pentru comand, control, comunicaii; f) planificarea pentru
urgene civile. [2] Se poate observa c, fa de domeniile prezentate anterior,
lipsete planificarea nuclear, evident din motivul c Romnia nu este putere
nuclear.
Fa de actul normative ce i-a precedat [3], legea planificrii aprrii
prezint marele avantaj c este foarte concret i direcionat, ea fiind
aplicabil Ministerului Aprrii Naionale i nu ntregului sistem de
securitate. n compensaie, apariia ei ngreuneaz prin nereglementare
legislativ corelarea planificrii securitii i, n unele cazuri, chiar a aprrii,
dac adugm armatei i alte elemente care particip la securitatea militar a
366
statului: uniti ale MAI, SRI etc. Pragmatic vorbind, efectele adoptrii legii
au fost benefice, Directiva anual de planificare aprnd la vremea cuvenit,
chiar n condiiile ntrzieii prelungite a documentelor ce o fundamenteaz.
Planificarea pe baz de capabiliti
Centrul de greutate al noului sistem de planificare a aprrii, fixat de
altfel, de proiectul noii legi, l constituie capabilitile militare. Vom evita s
facem o analiz a acestui concept, mai ales c nelesul su nu este prezentat
n DEX. Cu toate acestea, este un concept att de folosit n domeniul de care
ne ocupm nct este inevitabil s l descriem ct mai precis. Capabilitatea
este abilitatea de a atinge un obiectiv specific... sau de a face ceva, ntr-o
situaie data [4]. Aceast prim definiie, care descrie esena conceptului este
foarte larg, aa c vom continua demersul nostru. Definiia agreat de
ministerul britanic al aprrii este Capabilitatea este abilitatea trainic de a
genera rezultate operaionale sau efecte dorite, n legtur cu ameninri,
mediu i contribuia partenerilor de coaliie [5]. Conceptul a evoluat i a
devenit din ce n ce mai uzitat n diversele medii, ndeosebi n domeniul
aprrii, aflndu-se la baza unor adevrate noi tiine. Astfel, capabilitatea
este inima ingineriei sistemelor, dei, din pcate ea este rareori precizat ca
atare n abordrile bazate pe aceast tiin [6]. Pe baza acestui concept a
fost creat sistemul de planificare bazat pe capabiliti, care nseamn s
planifici, n condiiile incertitudinii, realizarea unor capabiliti care s
rspund unor arii largi de provocri i circumstane specifice zilelor
noastre, n interiorul unui cadru economic ce te oblig adesea la alegere [7].
Capabilitatea are o serie de componente. Dac n general, n activitatea
industrial aceste componente sunt Oamenii (resursele umane), Produsele,
Procesele, Tehnologia i Facilitile, n domeniul militar componentele sunt
specifice i mai numeroase. Componentele capabilitii industriale sunt
interdependente fiecare cu fiecare, variaiile uneia dintre ele provocnd
modificri fiecrei alte componente, situaie care duce la necesitatea unui
model complex al dinamicii capabilitii.
Touchin consider c o capabilitate militar este format din
urmtoarele componente: Instrucie, Echipament, Personal, Informaii,
Doctrin i Concepte, Organizare, Infrastructur Logistic. Evident, situaia
general este foarte asemntoare cu situaia existent n cazul capabilitii
industriale. Modificarea unei componente determin modificarea
corespunztoare a celorlalte, ceea ce nseamn c efectele unor decizii aparent
locale se regsesc n toate componentele capabilitii.
Privind aceast definiie, putem prea dezarmai de complexitatea
funcionrii unei capabiliti militare. De aceea, s descriem simplificat un
exemplu comun: trebuie s avem abilitatea de a proteja o poriune de
367
conduct de produse petroliere ce ar putea constitui int pentru inamic. Prima
caracteristic a conceptului este c avem libertatea de a alege modalitatea de a
o proteja, indiferent de natura forelor implicate, de gradul lor de ntrunire.
Putem proteja respectiva conduct cu fore terestre care fac paz permanent,
cu ajutorul supravegherii aeriene, combinat... exist desigur o multitudine de
modaliti dintre care alegem. S presupunem c am ales c protecia va fi
asigurat de blindate, observaia fiind realizat cu avioane fr pilot. Deja
trebuie s ne ngrijim s avem militari instruii, echipamente corespunztoare,
logistica necesar, procedurile de intervenie, infrastructura ce va fi folosit.
Cnd toate acestea sunt bine puse la punct, avem o capabilitate. Dac o
decizie cu privire la una dintre componente este luat la un moment dat,
efectele sale se vor regsi n toate celelalte componente i, evident, n cadrul
sistemului, putnd pune n pericol nsi existena capabilitii.
NOTE BIBLIOGRAFICE
[1] Forrester, J.W.: Principiile sistemelor Teorie i instruire
autoprogramat, Ed. Tehnic, Bucureti, 1979
[2] ***, Legea 473/2004 privind planificarea aprrii
[3] ***, Ordonana Guvernului nr. 52/1998 privind planificarea
aprrii naionale a Romniei
[4] Touchin, Malcolm: System of Systems Engineering for Capability,
2007
[5] Ministry of Defence: Acquisition Operating Framework, London,
2009
[6] Neaga, E.I., Henshaw, M., Yue, Y.: The Influence of the Concept of
Capability-based Management on the Development of the Systems
Engineering Discipline, 7th Annual Conference on Systems Engineering
Research 2009
[7] Davis, A., Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning,
RAND, 2002
368
MOLDOVA - DIN SPAIUL POST-SOVIETIC N LUMEA
VALORILOR DEMOCRATICE
maior drd. Adriana UNGUREANU
Serviciul de Telecomunicaii Speciale
Abstract
Withdrawing its troops from Moldovas territory and its support from Tiraspols
authorities must be a small price to pay for an institutionalized Russian role in Europes
security affairs from Russias standpoint. Although Russia controls Transnistria militarily
and politically, Medvedev declared that any solution depends on the positions of European
Union, Romania, Moldova, and Transnistria. Mihai Ghimpu, dissolved on September 28,
the parliament by decree effective on September 29, and scheduled parliamentary elections
for November 28. A new parliament will again attempt to elect a head of state in
December.
The country may need to consider instituting a presidential republic, if a
representative leader with a competent team can be identified because Moldova has
descended from the political crisis of spring 2009 to the constitutional crisis of August
2009 and than again to a legitimacy crisis of the authorities in June 2010 and these kind of
events do not lead to stability and prosperity.
Pe 24 iunie, preedintele interimar al Republicii Moldova, Mihai
Ghimpu, a emis un decret prin care ziua de 28 iunie era declarat Ziua
Comemorrii Ocupaiei Sovietice, n amintirea zilei de 28 iunie 1940 cnd
Basarabia a fost ocupat de trupele sovietice.
n acest context, trebuie s menionm faptul c aciunile externe
ntreprinse de Moscova fa de Chiinu de la nceputul acestui an, nu relev
faptul c ar dori s se retrag din Transnistria prea curnd. Moscova a nceput
s creeze o baz de relativ legitimitate pentru prelungirea pe termen nedefinit
369
a retragerii trupelor din Transnistria n luna mai 2010, atunci cnd
preedintele Medvedev a semnat o declaraie comun cu omologul su
ucrainean, Viktor Ianukovich, n care se accepta ca retragerea s se produc
conform documentului Smirnov-Voronin-Medvedev semnat n 18 martie
2009 la Moscova, adic dup o perioad suficient de lung de la soluionarea
politic a conflictului, timp n care trupele erau considerate garani ai
aplicrii documentului.
Moscova nu a dorit implicarea Chiinului n scrierea propriei sale
istorii, acest lucru rezultnd din semnarea declaraiei Medvedev-Merkel, de la
nceputul lunii iunie. Chiar dac dialogul dintre Angela Merkel i Vlad Filat,
care a precedat ntlnirea Medvedev-Merkel, a adus problema Transnistriei pe
ordinea de zi ca o prioritate, n declaraia final dintre Germania i Rusia,
Republicii Moldova nu i se atribuie statutul de interlocutor al unui viitor
dialog pe probleme de securitate dintre UE-Rusia, inclusiv pe problema
Transnistriei. Astfel, n ciuda faptului c este vorba despre propriul su
teritoriu, Chiinului nu i este permis accesul la negocieri.
Este evident c n lista prioritilor de pe agenda Berlinului nu se afl
integritatea teritorial a Republicii Moldova sau rezolvarea chestiunii
nistrene, acestea fiind doar elemente ce sunt folosite ca baz pentru lansarea
unui dialog consistent ntre Rusia i Germania. Atta timp ct Moscova se va
angaja n proiecte solide de parteneriat cu Germania, Berlinul nu va fi
interesat de influena ruilor n Republica Moldova. Acest lucru este dovedit
i de atitudinea plin de siguran demonstrat de Moscova. Ministrul rus de
externe a declarat la OSCE, a doua zi dup emiterea decretului, c Rusia nu
are de gnd s-i retrag trupele din Republica Moldova sau s schimbe
formatul forelor de meninere a pcii, afirmnd c este convins c motivele
reale ale autorilor acestei iniiative sunt cele de a distruge actualele
mecanisme de asigurare a stabilitii la Nistru.
Reacia Moscovei n urma decretului a fost una tranant, la fel cum a
fost cea din 2009, survenit n urm revoluiei de la Chiinu. n urma
decretului, eful Serviciului Federal al Proteciei Consumatorului, Gennady
Onishchenko, a declarat c Federaia Rus va nspri controlul asupra
exporturilor de vin dinspre Republica Moldova, dup ce cteva loturi nu ar fi
ntrunit standardele de siguran alimentar. Aceast sanciune ar putea fi o
tactic de presiune n urma decretului prezidenial, existnd mai multe
exemple n care Rusia a atacat direct anumite industrii ale unor ri ce aveau o
viziune diferit dect a lor. Aceast aciune este relevant pentru cazul de fa
deoarece exporturile de vin ctre Rusia reprezint 3,1% din exporturile totale
ale Republicii Moldova i 2,4% din PIB, iar o ntrerupere a acestora ar afecta
serios economia Chiinului.
Dintre cei patru lideri ai Alianei pentru Integrare European (AIE),
Ghimpu este singurul care promoveaz identitatea naional romneasc, iar
n Republica Moldova se poate sesiza nc teama de Rusia. Principalul
370
obiectiv al AIE acum este ctigarea alegerilor i micorarea numrului de
procente pe care comunitii nc le au. Mesajul trimis de Ghimpu prin
decretul semnat este acela c actualul Partid Comunist al Republicii Moldova
este succesorul comunismului Sovietic. Astfel, se dorete de-legitimarea
comunitilor n faa electoratului. Celelalte partide din AIE se tem ns de un
efect invers i anume o solidarizare cu PCRM, datorit naturii presupus
persecutive a decretului.
Precizm c Republica Moldova se bucur n acest moment de o
pseudo-susinere german n baza unei nelegeri mult mai cuprinztoare.
Cum Rusia nu i poate permite n acest moment o deteriorare a relaiilor sale
cu Germania, nu se poate pune problema ncetrii discuiei despre situaia
Transnistriei, dar se poate vorbi despre o rearanjare a premiselor. Mai mult,
versiunea expus de Vladimir Putin legat de reeditarea scenariului
Krgzstan este foarte posibil, cu att mai mult cu ct vizibilitatea
comunismului n Republica Moldova este accentat, PCRM bucurndu-se
nc de o susinere popular important, iar n eventualitatea unei asemenea
micri, suspiciunile de implicare ale Moscovei ar fi minime.
n urma edinei din 20 septembrie, Curtea Constituional a Republicii
Moldova a constatat existena condiiilor care justific necesitatea dizolvrii
Parlamentului i a solicitat preedintelui interimar Mihai Ghimpu s emit
decretul privind dizolvarea legislativului. Hotrrea de dizolvare a
Parlamentului Republicii Moldova trebuie neleas ca o etap care face parte
dintr-o serie de evenimente ce s-au declanat n lan n aprilie 2009, cnd au
avut loc alegeri legislative. Au urmat apoi declaraii contradictorii referitoare
la desfurarea scrutinului, acuzaii referitoare la falsificarea voturilor n
favoarea Partidului Comunitilor (PCRM) care ulterior i-a nsuit victoria
n alegeri i a fcut propunerea pentru noul preedinte al statului
manifestaii de strad marcate de violene i nclcri ale drepturilor omului,
nchiderea granielor statului pentru cetenii romni i un conflict diplomatic
cu Romnia.
De asemenea, msura de dizolvare a Legislativului i organizarea
alegerilor parlamentare anticipate trebuie plasate ntr-un context politic mult
mai amplu. Alegerile legislative din aprilie 2009 au reprezentat nceputul unei
schimbri de orientare a politicii de la Chiinu dinspre Moscova spre
Bruxelles, dar aceast iniiativ s-a transformat ntr-un blocaj politic.
Republica Moldova a rmas practic blocat politic la momentul de dup
alegerile anticipate din iulie 2009, dei au fost fcute cteva demersuri
precum redeschiderea granielor, nlturarea gardului de srm ghimpat de
pe Prut, depunerea scrisorii de acreditare a ambasadorului romn la Chiinu
sau obinerea unui mprumut de 574 de milioane de dolari de la FMI i a unui
ajutor financiar n valoare de 90 de milioane de euro din partea Uniunii
Europene.
371
n urma discuiilor de la Bucureti dintre Romnia, Germania i Marea
Britanie, la nivel de secretari de stat ai MAE, rezult c cele trei state percep
Republica Moldova ca pe un element esenial n construcia unei vecinti
sigure i stabile pentru Uniunea European. David Lidington i Werner Hoyer
au declarat c vizita lor la Chiinu reprezint ncercarea de a transmite un
mesaj de solidaritate, tradus prin importana i sprijinul pe care Marea
Britanie i Germania le acord procesului de democratizare i reform
economic din Republica Moldova, pe fondul unor progrese importante
realizate de conducerea democratic a statului. n ansamblul su, aceast
nlnuire de evenimente dizolvarea Parlamentului, organizarea de alegeri
legislative anticipate, numirea unui ef de stat plasat n contextul crizei
politice, care deja dureaz de aproximativ 16 luni, reprezint un examen
dificil pentru partidele pro-europene aflate acum la guvernare i un moment
de cotitur pentru direcia pe care o va adopta democraia din Republica
Moldova la ncheierea acestui ciclu.
n ceea ce privete rezultatul alegerilor legislative de la sfritul lui
noiembrie, acesta depinde de o serie de aspecte care influeneaz, n mod
pozitiv sau negativ demersul democratic realizat pn acum de Aliana aflat
la conducere. Pe de-o parte, bugetul pentru 2011, legislaia care ngreuneaz
i ncetinete procesul de alegere a preedintelui statului, faptul c populaia
este chemat des la vot ntr-un interval de timp att de scurt din cauza
imposibilitii parlamentarilor de a gsi o soluie care s permit numirea n
funcie a preedintelui statului i utilizarea unor nume care permit memoriei
colective asocieri cu conotaii negative, sunt doar civa dintre factorii
negativi ai acestei ecuaii. Pe de alt parte, balana se echilibreaz cu factori
pozitivi precum realizrile legislative ale actualului Parlament, susinerea
economic i politic pe care partenerii occidentali o ofer guvernrii de la
Chiinu, precum i msurile luate pentru a restabili bunele relaii cu
Romnia.
Orientarea spre o politic pro-rus a lui Marian Lupu i a partidului su
nu este tocmai de bun augur. Vizita la Moscova i semnarea acordului de
parteneriat cu Partidul premierului Putin, Edinaia Russia, coroborat cu vizite
la Moscova ale numeroilor altor reprezentani ai AIE, a fcut ca n percepia
public s se instaleze o idee de competiie pentru bunvoina Moscovei, iar
perspectiva lsat deschis de Marian Lupu spre o cooperare cu comunitii
dup alegeri chiar dac e element de poziionare electoral aduce costuri
alianei i crete incertitudinea succesiunii politicilor pro-europene la
Chiinu.Una dintre cele mai nocive evoluii pe care alegerile le poate genera
ar fi aceea de prelungire a crizei politice n cazul n care noul Parlament nu va
ajunge la nicio nelegere privind alegerea preedintelui sau, cel puin, la
modificarea prevederilor constituionale, astfel ca acesta s fie ales printr-o
modalitate care s faciliteze demersul democratic al actualei puteri.
372
n contrapondere, este recomandabil ca Republica Moldova s i
defineasc i s pstreze direcia de politic extern pe care dorete s o
urmreasc. De asemenea, cei trei diplomai care s-au reunit la Bucureti
recomand Alianei aflate la putere la Chiinu s se mobilizeze exemplar i
s nu se lase descurajat de rezultatul referendumului din 5 septembrie.
Din categoria factorilor pozitivi pentru AIE n viitoarele alegeri, ar
putea fi menionat susinerea pe care Germania i Marea Britanie o acord
partidelor pro-europene de la Chiinu. Cele dou state occidentale acord o
mare importan Memorandumului semnat de cancelarul german Angela
Merkel i preedintele rus Dmitri Medvedev, cu scopul de a face din
problematica transnistrean o prioritate pe agenda UE.
ntlnirea de la Bucureti a reprezentanilor din Romnia, Germania i
Marea Britanie este un alt factor pozitiv, iar vizitele celor doi demnitari
strini, nti la Chiinu i apoi la Bucureti, pot fi interpretate ca ncercri ale
partenerilor europeni de a reaminti Republicii Moldova c atingerea
obiectivelor sale majore se bucur de susinerea Occidentului, dar depinde de
evoluia sa intern la mai multe niveluri: economic, politic, social i cultural.
n plus, semnalul privind nevoia de coordonare a poziiilor cu Bucuretiul
este, de asemenea, transparent.
n contextul viitoarelor alegeri parlamentare, acest sprijin european,
mpreun cu valorificarea relaiilor bilaterale dintre Republica Moldova i alte
state occidentale, precum i creterea exponenial a mizei scrutinului pentru
viaa viitoare a cetenilor Republicii Moldova, ar putea genera o cretere a
prezenei la vot, n comparaie cu cea de la referendumul din 5 septembrie i
ar putea influena opiunea fcut n favoarea partidelor care formeaz acum
AIE.
NOTE BIBLIOGRAFICE
[1] Grka-Winter Beata, Kumoch Jakub, What is Behind Sarkozys
Proposal for Reshaping EU-Russia Relations? Polish Institute of
International Affairs (PISM), 2010
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?fecvnodeid=12
7094&groupot593=0c54e3b
[2] Socor Vladimir, Medvedev Deflects Merkel-Sarkozy Proposal on
Transnistria at Deauville Summit, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue:
191, October 22, 2010
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D
=37064&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=484&no_cache=1
373
[3] Socor Vladimir, Moldova Faces Yet Another Election As Governing
Alliance Falls Apart, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 176
September 30, 2010
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D
=36963&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=484&no_cache=1
[4] Socor Vladimir , Moldovan Referendum: Suffers Governing Alliance
Crushing Defeat
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 159
September 7, 2010
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D
=36793&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=484&no_cache=1
374
IRANUL - PUTERE REGIONAL I FACTOR DE
INSECURITATE
maior drd. Adriana UNGUREANU
Serviciul de Telecomunicaii Speciale
Abstract
The Security Council imposed additional sanctions on the country, expanding an
arms embargo and tightening restrictions on financial and shipping enterprises related to
proliferation-sensitive activities because of its deep concern about Irans lack of
compliance with its previous resolutions on ensuring the peaceful nature of its nuclear
programme.In spite of international sanctions, Russian Energy Minister, Sergei Shmatko,
and Irans Oil Minister, Masoud Mirkazemi, announced interesting plans for bilateral
cooperation.. Shmatko and Mirkazemi signed a road-map agreement on joint oil and gas
projects with a 30-year time-frame, at their Moscow meeting.
It is necessary to examine the thinking of the current political leaders in the country
if we want to understand Irans current threat perception. Irans missile program cannot be
viewed separately from its military nuclear ambitions. Both are expressions of Iranian
ambition to be a regional power. The current Iranian leadership is using strategies like
expansion of the nuclear and missile programs, empowerment of the Shiite population both
in the region and globally and opportunistic use of oil as a weapon in order to achieve the
status of a regional power.
n iunie, Consiliul de Securitate al ONU vota adoptarea unor noi
sanciuni mpotriva Iranului ca rspuns la programul nuclear pe care acesta l
desfoar. Dei conine msuri mai stricte n ceea ce privete sectorul
financiar i cel al importului de arme, Rezoluia 1929/2010 pare a nu
375
mpiedica Iranul s i conduc afacerile n maniera obinuit. De asemenea,
n pofida faptului c Federaia Rus i China au votat n favoarea adoptrii
Rezoluiei mpotriva aliatului lor, relaiile cu Iranul nu au avut de suferit
deoarece noile sanciuni sunt moderate, fr efecte importante. Rezoluia nu
include nici sanciuni economice zdrobitoare, nici un embargo asupra
petrolului sau a gazului natural, nici mcar asupra importului de benzin, de
care Iranul este dependent ntr-o msur considerabil.
Nu dup mult timp de la adoptarea rezoluiei, ministrul iranian al
Petrolului Seyyed Masoud Mirkazemi i ministrul rus al Energiei, Serghei
Shmatko semnau la Moscova un acord n domeniul energiei. Perioada fixat
pentru investiiile care trebuie fcute n urma semnrii acestui acord este de
30 de ani. Decizia Federaiei Ruse de a semna un document care s includ
cooperarea n domeniul petrolului, gazului natural i industriei petrochimice a
fost posibil datorit inexistenei unor interdicii n cadrul Rezoluiei
1929/2010, lipsa acestora permind semnarea unor acorduri n domeniul
energetic ntre Iran i un stat ter.
Astfel, regimul de la Moscova s-a declarat pregtit pentru livrarea
produselor petroliere ctre Iran i compania Gazprom a acceptat s ajute statul
iranian s-i dezvolte sectorul energetic. Acordul n domeniul energiei poate
fi considerat un mod al Kremlinului de a calma Teheranul ca urmare a poziiei
statului rus din ultima perioad. Relaiile Moscova Teheran au avut de
suferit din cauza votului Federaiei Ruse n cadrul Consiliului de Securitate al
ONU, dar i ca urmare a nerespectrii de ctre Kremlin a contractului prin
care acesta din urm se obliga s livreze statului iranian sisteme de rachet S-
300. Cu toate acestea, Federaia Rus nu pare dispus s renune la anumite
avantaje economice doar pentru a face pe plac comunitii internaionale care
datorit componenei Consiliului de Securitate al ONU, are nevoie de acordul
su cnd se pune problema lurii unor decizii importante n plan internaional.
Rusia nu dorete s abandoneze un vechi aliat mai ales dup ce acesta a
cheltuit miliarde de dolari pentru a achiziiona arme i tehnologie nuclear,
meninnd astfel producia de armament ruseasc pe linia de plutire. n
prezent, cele dou state sunt parteneri de ncredere i n domeniul energetic,
Gazprom aflndu-se ntr-o competiie acerb cu companiile chineze de stat
pentru controlul asupra cmpurilor bogate n gaze naturale din regiunile
iraniene Pars i Azar. Aa cum observm, Federaia Rus i-a protejat
ntotdeauna interesele, iar faptul c a semnat un acord energetic cu Iranul nu
reprezint o surpriz pentru nimeni. Deintor al unor importante rezerve de
petrol i gaze naturale, Iranul consider cooperarea cu ruii un mod foarte
practic de a obine tehnologie i produse petroliere fr a depune mari
eforturi i fr a trebui s apeleze la comunitatea internaional.
n acest moment, cooperarea cu Rusia reprezint pentru Teheran o mare
realizare. Mare productor de petrol, Iranul se afl n imposibilitatea de a
asigura cantitatea intern necesar de benzin, importul pentru consumul
376
domestic fiind de aproximativ 40%. n iulie, Iranul anuna c plnuiete s
devin n viitorul apropiat unul dintre cei mai mari exportatori de benzin. n
aceste condiii, cu o reducere aproape total a dependenei fa de produse de
import i cu un spaiu de manevr destul de generos oferit de apropierea de
state precum Federaia Rus, China i nu numai, Iranul va deveni un stat cu
care se va putea negocia foarte greu. Astfel, comunitatea internaional se va
afla n situaia de a avea ca partener de discuii un stat aproape imposibil de
convins s urmeze o conduit indicat din exterior.
La sfritul lui august, Iranul anuna fabricarea bombardierului fr
pilot, Karrar, capabil s execute misiuni la o distan de 1.000 km fa de
locul de decolare. Anunul venea la numai cteva zile de la declaraiile
Teheranului legate de testarea cu succes a rachetei Fateh-110, dar i a altor
realizri n domeniul tehnologiilor militare. Prezentarea noii drone iraniene a
avut loc n cadrul Zilei Industriei de Aprare, zi important pentru Iran avnd
n vedere interesul major pe care acesta l manifest n ceea ce privete
domeniul militar.Numit de liderul de la Teheran ambasador al morii,
Karrar a strnit reacii negative la Washington i n Orientul Mijlociu
deoarece deinerea unui astfel de aparat de zbor crete performana Iranului n
culegerea de informaii i trimiterea la int a unor rachete. Dezvoltarea
industriei de aprare a statului Iranian pare s fi atins cote impresionante.
Iranul este capabil s produc echipamente militare peste nivelul propriilor
necesiti, aceast performan plasndu-l pe lista statelor exportatoare de
arme i echipamente n domeniu. Rachetele testate, exerciiile militare,
construirea unei noi drone i nu numai au fost posibile datorit unei activiti
intense n acest sector, menit s fac posibil obinerea de noi tehnologii n
domeniul militar.
La evenimentul organizat pentru prezentarea noii drone, Ahmad
Vahidi, n calitate de ministru al Aprrii, declara c aceasta reprezint un
simbol al progresului industriei de aprare iraniene.
Realizrile iranienilor n domeniul tehnologiilor militare transmit un
mesaj de descurajare pentru orice atac mpotriva Iranului i aliailor si
deoarece conform declaraiilor lui Ahmadinejad, iranienii ar trebui s fie o
umbrel de aprare pentru toate statele iubitoare de libertate, mpotriva
unor agresiuni globale. Afirmaiile pacifiste referitoare la absena inteniei de
a iniia un atac mpotriva vreunui stat par s i piard din consisten n
condiiile n care Teheranul a anunat pe 26 august intenia de a furniza arme
Libanului. Vestea unei astfel de decizii a trezit temeri Israelului n legtur cu
securitatea statului evreu, n condiiile n care iniiativa unei astfel de aciuni
vine din partea Hezbollah, mai exact a liderului gruprii extremiste iite,
Hassan Nasrallah, care a cerut guvernului libanez s solicite asisten militar
din partea Iranului.
Sugestia lui Nasrallah a venit ca rspuns la decizia Congresului
american de a suspenda un ajutor militar pentru Liban n valoare total de 100
377
de milioane dolari, pe fondul temerilor c armele ar putea fi folosite pentru
declanarea unor atacuri mpotriva aliatului tradiional al SUA, Israelul.
Rmnnd fr ajutor din partea Washingtonului, Libanul poate obine cu
uurin compensarea acestuia din partea Iranului, care este un susintor al
Hezbollah, pe care de altfel se i bnuiete c l finaneaz, n ciuda negrii
vehemente a Teheranului. Statele Unite se afl n prezent n situaia de a privi
cum Iranul i declar n mod public intenia de a umple golul lsat de
Washington n btlia pentru ctigarea Libanului. Mai mult, prin blocarea de
ctre SUA a ajutorului destinat armatei libaneze, Casa Alb nu face altceva
dect s piard un instrument important de control i influen n Liban i s
mping Beirutul i mai mult n braele Siriei i Iranului. n ciuda imaginii de
stat pacifist pe care Iranul o afieaz, dezvoltarea industriei militare iraniene l
transform n mod inevitabil ntr-o putere regional n Orient, iar narmarea sa
nu face altceva dect s schimbe raportul de fore dintre acesta i vecinii si.
n acest context, aliaii Statelor Unite Israel, Arabia Saudit, Bahrain, Qatar
i Kuweit - pot reprezenta tot attea inte ale ameninrilor statului iranian, ca
i interesele americane din regiune.
Exceptnd Arabia Saudit i Israel, celelalte state ar avea reale
probleme n cazul unui conflict cu Iranul. Un rzboi convenional ntre Iran i
cele trei state arabe care protejeaz interesele americanilor n Orientul
Mijlociu, ar fi dezastruos pentru Bahrain, Qatar sau Kuweit, ri cu teritorii
foarte mici i fr posibilitatea de a duce un rzboi mpotriva unui agresor
superior din punct de vedere al teritoriului i populaiei.
Cu toate c tehnologia este unul dintre factorii cei mai importani
pentru ctigarea unui rzboi, puterea fizic a unui stat este extrem de
important. Aceasta este dat de suprafaa i resursele pe care statul n cauz
le deine, dar i de populaie. n ceea ce privete Israelul, vulnerabilitatea
acestuia crete pe msur ce Iranul obine noi realizri n domeniul
tehnologiilor militare. Mai mult, apropierea de state precum Liban i Siria nu
face altceva dect s ntreasc poziia statului iranian n regiune. n
consecin, fiecare ar care se simte ameninat de un Iran narmat peste
pragul periculos al declanrii unor conflicte, va recurge la narmarea propriei
armate, scopul fiind acela de a face fa unui posibil rzboi cu statul iranian.
ntr-adevr, Iranul poate respecta actuala poziie de a nu iniia un atac
armat mpotriva unui stat, ns nu exist garania faptului c nu poate
declana, indirect, un conflict cu un alt actor. n cazul n care Teheranul va
dori o confruntare armat n regiune, cel mai probabil va gsi modalitatea de a
o face posibil fr a fi cel care iniiaz formal atacul. Pn atunci ns un
lucru este cert: Iranul a ctigat putere i ctig n continuare, fapt ce slbete
poziia celor doi aliai, SUA i Israel, dar i a partenerilor arabi din regiune.
Menionm c pe 23 septembrie, liderul iranian Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad a inut un discurs n faa Adunrii Generale a Organizaiei
Naiunilor Unite. Fr a lua n considerare faptul c se afl pe teritoriul
378
statului american, liderul iranian a acuzat Statele Unite de implicarea n
organizarea atacurilor teroriste de la 11 septembrie 2001 n ncercarea de a
fabrica un motiv pentru invadarea Afganistanului i Irakului. Astfel, n opinia
lui Ahmadinejad, statul american se face vinovat de moartea celor cteva mii
de oameni care i-au pierdut viaa n urma atacurilor teroriste de pe teritoriul
SUA, ct i pentru cele cteva sute de mii de victime ale rzboaielor
declanate de George W. Bush. La auzul acestor declaraii, delegaia
american la Naiunile Unite a decis s prseasc sala n semn de protest fa
de poziia liderului iranian, fiind urmat de reprezentanii celor 27 de state
membre ale Uniunii Europene, care au dorit s i demonstreze solidaritatea
fa de statul american. Preedintele iranian Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a
provocat noi controverse cnd a declarat c majoritatea oamenilor care
locuiesc n Statele Unite i n ntreaga lume consider c guvernul american a
organizat atacurile teroriste de la 11 septembrie 2001 n ncercarea de a
asigura supravieuirea statului Israel. Un vehement contestatar al veridicitii
episodului 11 septembrie 2001, despre care i-a exprimat ndoielile nc de
la momentul n care atacul terorist a avut loc, Ahmadinejad a cerut crearea
unei comisii independente ONU care s analizeze acest eveniment i s
probeze dac a fost sau nu organizat la comanda Washingtonului.
Experiena Adunrilor Generale anterioare, organizate de Naiunile
Unite, dezvluie faptul c acestea sunt privite de liderii extremiti ca pe o
oportunitate de a-i exprima opiniile legate de chestiuni sensibile ntr-o
manier n care s trezeasc controverse pentru cei prezeni la dezbateri.
Vorbind despre prezena Statelor Unite n Orientul Mijlociu, liderul iranian a
susinut c atacurile teroriste de la 11 septembrie 2001 au reprezentat i un
pretext pentru statul american de a invada Afganistanul i Irakul, decizii care
au dus la moartea a sute de mii de oameni. Potrivit lui Ahmadinejad, n cazul
n care Washingtonul nu ar avea nici o legtur cu episodul 9/11, ar fi trebuit
s i pedepseasc pe cei vinovai i nu s ocupe dou state independente,
vrsnd astfel i mai mult snge.
n discursul su, Ahmadinejad nu s-a rezumat numai la a acuza Statele
Unite de fabricarea unui motiv pentru atacarea celor dou state din Orient.
Liderul de la Teheran a vorbit totodat despre eecul actualei ordini mondiale
ca urmare a incapacitii capitalismului de a face fa noilor provocri cu care
lumea ntreag se confrunt. n ciuda atitudinii ostile a liderului de la Teheran,
poziia Washingtonului n ceea ce privete Iranul a rmas aceeai. Cu cteva
ore nainte de discursul lui Ahmadinejad, Barack Obama a declarat n faa
Adunrii Generale a ONU c Statele Unite sunt dispuse s pstreze aceeai
politic deschis fa de statul iranian n cazul n care acesta dorete s
coopereze cu comunitatea internaional.
edina Adunrii Generale a ONU de la New York, a reprezentat o
nou oportunitate pentru Ahmadinejad s i exprime opoziia fa de Statele
Unite, fa de politica dus de acestea n Orientul Mijlociu, precum i fa de
379
tot ceea ce nseamn sistemul capitalist. Acuzaiile dure ale Iranului
referitoare la nscenarea atacurilor de la 11 septembrie 2001, nu pot fi
percepute de ctre Washington dect ca grave jigniri la adresa administraiei
americane.
Pe de o parte, nu putem s nu observm faptul c Washingtonul este
pus mult prea des n situaia incomod de a privi cum un lider important
aduce acuzaii grave statului american, iar singurul rspuns la o astfel de
atitudine este prsirea de ctre diplomaii americani a slii n care acesta i
ine discursul. Pe de alt parte, acuzaiile Iranului legate de implicarea
Statelor Unite n atentatele teroriste de la 11 septembrie 2001 nu sunt n
msur s deterioreze nite relaii diplomatice practic inexistente i n pofida
faptului c imaginea SUA este afectat datorit lipsei de reacie n faa sfidrii
liderului iranian, aceast atitudine poate fi interpretat ca fiind una aparinnd
unui stat democratic, suficient de puternic i matur pentru a nu lua n seam
un comportament inadecvat al unui alt stat, chiar dac acesta este Iranul.
Oricum, ntr-o perioad n care ntreaga comunitate internaional este
concentrat pe situaia din Iran, Teheranul nu pare dispus s se abat de la
traiectoria pe care a ales-o, astfel c ntre cooperarea cu Occidentul i
dezvoltarea unor capabiliti care s i asigure statutul de putere regional i
nu numai, n acest moment, Iranul a ales fr nici o ezitare a doua variant.
NOTE BIBLIOGRAFICE
[1] Baev Pavel K. , Russian Foreign Policy Takes a Sensible Course on Iran
and in the Arctic, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 173, September 27,
2010,
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D
=36918
[2] Crisis Watch, Nr. 87, November 2010
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?fecvnodeid=11
8574&g
[3] Christoff Joseph A , Iran Sanctions, 20 Jul 2010,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Find-Information/Regions/Keyword-
Object/?fecvnodeid=128845&dom=1&groupot593=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-
2c24-a6a8c70
[4] Haas Marcel, Russian Security Policy and Cooperation with the West, 16
Jun 2010
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Find-Information/Regions/Keyword-
Object/?fecvnodeid
380
[5] Roell Peter, Iran: Foreign and Security Policy Aspects, 20 Oct 2010
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/FindInformation/Regions/Keyword
Object/?dom
[6]RussianAnalyticalDigestNo.80:RussiaandAfghanistan
http://www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/rad/details.cfm?lng=en&id=117218
[7]RussianAnalyticalDigestNo.78:RussianMilitaryThinkingToday
http://www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/rad/details.cfm?lng=en&id=116019
[8] Russian Analytical Digest No. 71: Russia's Economic and Security
RelationswithCentralAsia
http://www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/rad/details.cfm?lng=en&id=111838
[9] Socor Vladimir , Moscow-Tehran Oil and Gas Roadmap to Circumvent
Sanctions on Iran, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 139, July 20, 2010
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D
=36644&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=484&no_cache=1
381
UNELE OPINII PRIVIND MANAGEMENTUL STRATEGIC
AL CONSECINELOR IMEDIATE I PE TERMEN LUNG
ALE PROFESIONALIZRII RESURSEI UMANE DIN
ARMATA ROMNIEI
Gl. Bg.(r) CS I dr. GHEORGHE VDUVA, INSTITUTUL DE STUDII
DE SECURITATE DIN CADRUL UNIVERSITII CRETINE
DIMITRIE CANTEMIR, BUCURETI
Abstract
Professionalization of the armed forces seems to be specific to the end of the 20
th
century
and the beginning of the 21
st
century. It is without doubt a necessary process, with accurate
and authoritative determination, and hasty measures and practices, and effects which in
certain situations, could become significantly negative, if not serious. Militaries of the
world - who are and will be a long time state institutions - become organizations like any
other, which are subject to modern management theories, such as, for example those
included in the so-called Z category theory or theories, where it is very important the
strength of the organization and the organizational culture. This, in what concerns the
endogenous pattern of becoming a military; the exogenous part of the development and
reconfiguration of the institution is subject to many factors, among which we find budgets,
resources, motivations, and realities that are becoming more fluid, more misleading. Some
states, under the pressure from others or under the illusion that the military component of
war has become obsolete, place their military among organizations of the second or third
category. If there were not some concerns arising from changing nature of conflict they
would gladly give them up. But, reality is often misleading. It says one thing and does
something else. to understand this, there should be effective evaluation systems and a
rational management based on deep knowledge of this reality, and especially of the trends.
This is certainly the case with the Romanian Armed Forces.
382
Reducerea efectivelor i esena reformei
Aa cum bine se tie, n primul deceniu care s-a scurs de la Revoluia din
1989, Armata Romniei i-a redus drastic efectivele de la peste 300 000 de
militari la 75 000. Motivele pentru care s-a produs aceast imens mutaie
strategic se cunosc i ele sunt, n mare parte, raionale. i, desigur, chiar
necesare. De altfel, Armata Romniei este singura instituie a statului romn
care a urmat, ca s spunem aa, o cale raional de reform, cu un program i
un plan bine alctuite i puse n oper aa cum s-a putut. Ce a ieit se vede.
Pentru c realitile reformei sunt foarte departe de proiectele ei i de
algoritmii raionali care ar fi trebuit aplicai. Mai mult, o astfel de maieutic,
esenial pentru orice structur care se reformeaz radical, este foarte
costisitoare, iar statul romn nu a fost dispus (poate, nici nu a fost n msur,
adic n-a putut) s-i asume n ntregime costurile. Ceea ce s-a fcut, din
punctul de vedere al alocrii bugetelor necesare costurilor, reprezint doar
nite crpeli. Merge i aa a funcionat i de data aceasta.
Printre puinele costuri pe care i le-a asumat efectiv statul romn sunt cele
ale disponibilizrilor. Te pltim ca s pleci principiu cameleonic, coercitiv
i distrugtor a luat foarte rapid locul acelui principiu stimulativ i
constructiv Te pltim ca s rmi i s nfloreti. Cei disponibilizai s-au
gndit c, folosind salariile compensatorii, pot ncepe o nou via, pot opta
pentru o nou carier. Unii au reuit, alii nu. Instituia a scpat ns foarte
rapid de ei i aproape nimic nu s-a schimbat, de atunci, sub soare, desigur, n
ceea ce privete efectele acestei reduceri masive de efective, poate singura din
istoria modern a rii, n timp de pace, de o asemenea proporie. Naiunea nu
a simit n nici un fel efectele acestei reduceri masive a efectivelor armatei, iar
unii chiar s-au bucurat ntruct statul nu a mai fost nevoit s aloce resurse
bugetare n activiti neproductive. Armata nu mai era, ca n comunism, o
for de munc, iar statul romn de dup 1989 nu mai avea efectiv nevoie de
for de munc, nici de divizii care s fie dispuse pe zone de operaii, nici de
tancuri, nici de avioane, nici de nave de rzboi, nici de submarine i nici de
industrie de aprare, motiv pentru care a fcut cu ea exact ce a fcut cu
ntreaga economie romneasc, de la industrie la agricultur, comer, servicii
etc. i-a luat mna de pe ea. A spus c statul este un prost manager, a vndut
economia rii unor manageri care s-au dovedit a fi mult mai slabi ca el, iar
industria de aprare pur i simplu a disprut, chiar dac au mai rmas, pe ici
pe acolo, cteva nuclee, ca s nu se uite c a existat cndva, iar o parte din ea
a fost chiar performant. Dar dac nu a mai avut pentru cine s fabrice arme,
iar piaa i s-a desfiinat, normal c i ea a sucombat. Aceste nuclee pot fi nc
nite viitori embrioni, care, s sperm, vor putea crea structuri de producie
pentru un posibil viitor
n mod normal, reducerea masiv a efectivelor, fireasc i necesar n
procesul profesionalizrii, trebuia s fie precedat i nsoit (i nu urmat!)
de nzestrarea armatei cu sisteme de arme moderne. Pentru a nu scdea
383
capacitatea de lupt a armatei, procesul reducerii efectivelor trebuie s fie deci
precedat sau mcar nsoit de introducerea unor sisteme de arme moderne care
s fi permis i chiar s fi impus reducerea efectivelor, pe motiv c aceste
mijloace erau mnuite de mai puini militari i aveau randament de zece i
chiar de o sut de ori mai mare dect clasicele arme consumatoare de resurse
umane, de carburant i de energie. Dar, n acest fel, costurile reformei
instituiei militare ar fi fost de cteva ori mai mari i este foarte limpede c
statul romn, debarasat de propria-i economie i de propria-i agricultur, cel
care-i trimisese muncitorii n omaj sau le dduse liber s-i caute locuri de
munc pe unde vor i pe unde pot (i dintr-odat ara s-a golit de cteva
milioane de oameni n putere), nu avea de unde s ia aceste resurse financiare
i, deci, nu putea s i le asume.
La drept vorbind, soluii nu prea erau. Armata Romniei avea, ca s lum un
singur exemplu, pe la finele anului 1989, aproape trei sute de avioane MiG
21, o escadril de MiG 29, un regiment de IAR 93, iar nlocuirea acestora sau
mcar a o parte dintre ele cu avioane moderne, achiziionate din zona Alianei
Nord-Atlantice, ar fi fost imposibil, ntruct costurile erau imense, dac
avem n vedere faptul c un singur avion costa, la vremea aceea, n jur de 20
de milioane de dolari Nici mcar americanii nu-i permit s nlocuiasc
dintr-odat parcul lor de avioane F-15, F-16, F-18, din Forele Aeriene i din
Forele Navale, cu performanele F 35 (90 de milioane de dolari bucata),
avion cu decolare vertical, sau cu superstarul F 22 (120 de milioane de dolari
fiecare)! Modernizarea avionului MiG 21, devenind MiG 21 Lancer, a fost o
soluie pentru vremea aceea. Dar i resursa acestuia se apropie de sfrit
Cum bine tim, cam aa stau lucrurile i cu cealalt tehnic, iar achiziionarea
unor radare F 117 i a ctorva exemplare din diverse categorii de tehnic,
printre care cele dou fregate, transportoarele Pirania, mainile Humvee etc.,
sunt, pur i simplu, cam tot ce i-a putut permite statul romn, hruit de crize
i sucombat de propriile-i greeli, extrem de grave, care au fcut din industria
romneasc un morman de fiare vechi i din economia rii o povar greu de
dus
n aceste condiii, profesionalizarea a nsemnat doar renunarea la serviciul
militar obligatoriu, reducerea drastic a efectivelor i ncadrarea unui numr
destul de limitat de soldai i gradai voluntari, concomitent cu modernizarea
sistemului nvmntului militar. Ieirea sistemului nvmntului militar
din specializarea ngust, pe arme i pe mijloace de lupt, i deschiderea lui
spre orizonturi contingente (care, ntr-un fel, ncepuse chiar nainte de 1989,
prin nfiinarea colilor militare superioare de ofieri activi) sunt ct se poate
de necesare i de benefice pentru actuala i viitoarea condiie a militarului
profesionist. Prin alte pri, aceast deschidere fusese operat de foarte mult
vreme. De exemplu, misiunea Academiei Forelor Terestre de la West Point,
formulat nc de Jefferson, era i a rmas aceea de a pregti ofier
comandani (lideri) pentru conducerea armatei i, n acelai timp, oameni
384
capabili s slujeasc naiunea. De aceea, o mare parte din timpul petrecut n
aceast coal vestit este acordat pregtirii academice i n calitate de lideri.
Pregtirea practic se face n tabere de instrucie situate undeva la vreo 30 de
kilometri de locul n care se afl aceast instituie.
O astfel de deschidere nseamn extindere a culturii organizaionale militare
spre domenii care sunt conexe instituiei militare ntruct aceast instituie
se afl n slujba naiunii i, n acelai timp, constituie resurse reale i
motivaionale puternice pentru vocaie, carier i comportament.
Efectele modernizrii sistemului de nvmnt militar romnesc se simt n
teatrele de operaii, militarii romni fiind cotai, din punct de vedere
profesional, moral i al capacitii lor de a rezolva situaii complexe, printre
cei mai buni din cadrul contingentelor participante la astfel de misiuni.
Meritul este, desigur, al militarilor, dar mai ales al celor care-i conduc, al
ofierilor i subofierilor formai la aceste coli care au devenit cu adevrat
instituii de nvmnt superior prin integrarea benefic a spiritului academic,
a componentei academice, a componentei de lider i a componentei
profesionale militare.
Acestea sunt, ca s spunem aa, prile bune, performante ale acestei reforme,
la urma urmei, miezul ei, substana care se va regsi, sperm, n viitoarea
devenire a Armatei Romniei, n calitatea nou a acestei instituii. Drumul e
lung, dar primii germeni sunt deja vizibili prin comportamentul militarilor
romni profesioniti n teatrele de operaii, prin calitatea Statului Major
General, a statelormajore ale categoriilor de fore, a comandamentelor de
uniti i de mari uniti, a componentelor militare romneti din
comandamentele NATO i din structurile UE. Dac liderii sunt performani,
atunci i grupurile pe care le conduc au toate ansele s devin performante.
Complexitatea efectelor
Efectele sau consecinele profesionalizrii resursei umane din Armata
Romniei sunt numeroase. Am putea vorbi chiar de lanuri de efecte, unele
previzibile, altele nu. Aceste efecte sunt, n opinia noastr, de mai multe
feluri: planificate i neplanificate; prevzute i neprevzute; dorite i nedorite;
principale i secundare; centrate pe obiective precise, punctuale, clare, dar i
efecte colaterale; unice (singulare) i multiple; finale i pariale; nchise i
deschise; stinse i generatoare de lanuri de efecte etc.
Aceast clasificare este foarte important pentru analiza relaiei cauz-efect i
a feed-back-ului acesteia, efect-cauz, mai ales din perspectiv strategic.
Profesionalizarea unei armate nu este o chestiune simpl, aa cum s-a crezut
i nc se mai crede. Este, n primul rnd, o schimbare de paradigm, este o
nou filozofie a unui modus vivendi, iar acest lucru poate avea consecine
foarte importante, pe toate planurile, ncepnd cu cele care in de securitatea
naional, de aprarea naional i continund cu cele care relev puterea i
385
credibilitatea statului de drept. Chiar dac se va obiecta c puterea militar nu
este elementul central al puterii unui stat, noi tim cu toii c, fr o putere
militar consistent i credibil, un stat conteaz prea puin sub semnul
importanei i duratei. Elveia, care nu a mai participat la un rzboi de cinci
secole, i care este respectat i protejat de toat lumea, ntreine una dintre
cele mai interesante i, considerm noi, cele mai performante armate din
Europa. De ce oare, cnd, de fapt, aceast ar nu este ameninat de nimeni?
Rspunsul ine de complicata filozofie a puterii. Iar aceast putere nu ine
doar de mrimea statului, de potenialul economic i tehnologic, de ansele de
a ctiga un rzboi n confruntarea cu un adversar de talia unei mari puteri, ci
mai ales de echilibrul componentelor puterii, de modul cum se constituie i
cum se ntreine aceast putere, adic de managementul politic i strategic al
puterii.
Exist i persist nc mentalitatea c, dac un stat nu este mare putere
economic i militar, i ntreine degeaba o armat, ntruct, ntr-o
confruntare militar modern, de amploare i de mare intensitate, nu-i
folosete la nimic. Cei care cred i susin acest lucru nu neleg filosofia
puterii unui stat i rolul ei n relaiile internaionale, n securitatea i aprarea
acelui stat, n dezvoltarea sa echilibrat i durabil.
Practic, profesionalizarea unei armate ar trebui s aib efecte consistente n
construcia i modernizarea puterii acelui stat, ntruct instituia militar
reprezint unul dintre pilonii importani de siguran strategic, cu efecte
pozitive att n filosofia i fizionomia puterii, ct i n efectul acesteia pe
planul relaiilor internaionale. Puterea militar modern a unui stat nu este
neaprat o ameninare pentru alt stat, dei nu se poate eluda nicio astfel de
perspectiv, ci un garant al securitii statului respectiv, un factor de putere a
statului i, n acelai timp, un element de conexiune internaional a puterii,
ndeosebi a puterii militare, n vederea gestionrii conflictualitii lumii i
soluionrii cooperative, sinergice, a situaiilor politice i strategice complexe
generate de recrudescena fenomenelor de crize i conflicte armate.
n ceea ce privete fora militar, n calitatea ei de component a puterii
statului, considerm c avem de-a face cu o epoc dual. Rolurile i
funciunile armatelor s-au complicat i s-au diversificat. Practic, armatele au
ieit din cazrmi i triesc n vzul lumii, dei ele devin din ce n ce mai
complicate i mai sofisticate. Arma nuclear i sistemele de arme moderne au
impus cu pregnan acest lucru. Milenii de-a rndul, armatele au fost
instrumente de ducere a btliilor n cadrul unor rzboaie extrem de violente.
Cu alte cuvinte, armatele erau (i sunt i acum!) fore a cror menire era
ducerea rzboiului. Armatele au fost create pentru a aciona n caz de rzboi.
Cu alte cuvinte, meseria lor este rzboiul.
ntre timp, lucrurile s-au mai schimbat. Fr s-i fi diminuat cu nimic rolul
lor i locul n ceea ce privete ducerea rzboiului care se prezint, din toate
timpurile, ca un efect, un instrument i un mijloc al politicii , armatelor li s-a
386
mai adugat un rol extrem de important: paza i supravegherea rzboiului,
gestionarea rzboiului, controlul rzboiului, cu scopul de a nu-i permite s
depeasc un anumit prag de angajare a forelor i mijloacelor, o anumit
amploare i o anumit intensitate.
Pentru acest ultim rol, armatele, pe baza unor decizii politice naionale sau
internaionale, dar validate de parlamentele naionale, coopereaz pentru a
asigura toate condiiile ca rzboiul s nu se produc. i i ndeplinesc cu
mult contiinciozitate acest rol, ntruct ele sunt primele care tiu foarte bine
ce nseamn un rzboi de amploare n condiiile actuale.
Dac, prin absurd, conflictualitatea lumii ar fi scpat de sub control i s-ar
declana un rzboi care nu ar mai putea fi gestionat, ar fi posibil ca
respectivul rzboi s fie i ultimul pentru omenire. Acesta este motivul
principal pentru care armatele sunt i nu mai sunt ce au fost pn la ncheierea
Rzboiului Rece. Omenirea trebuie s fie foarte atent cu propriile sale fore
i mijloace de distrugere. n mod normal, ar trebui s renune la ele, s le
dezafecteze, dar acest lucru nu este posibil ntruct matricea lumii n care
trim este una de tip conflictual, iar trecerea la o alt filozofie existenial, la
o alt paradigm este, practic, n condiiile actuale i pe termen previzibil,
imposibil.
Armatele profesioniste ies din entuziasmul naional, fr a-i prsi ns
cultura i patrimoniul, i i extind orizontul existenial i cognitiv spre un nou
management al conflictualitii, de tip cognitiv, participativ i, cum afirmam
mai sus, cooperativ. Soldaii naionali sunt, deopotriv, i internaionali. Ei
nu-i mai apr ara numai la frontiere, nu mai construiesc cazemate i linii
fortificate n zonele de grani, ci i apr ara contribuind la controlul
rzboiului i la stingerea oricrui conflict care ar putea, potrivit teoriei
haosului, s genereze un uragan planetar de foc, n urma cruia n-ar mai
rmne nici urm de om pe pmnt. Un astfel de uragan poate izbucni,
metaforic vorbind, de la o flacr de chibrit.
Am fcut aceste precizri, ntruct considerm c ele sunt necesare pentru
cunoaterea i nelegerea efectelor procesului de profesionalizare a armatei i
n configurarea managementului strategic al consecinelor pe termen scurt i
pe termen lung. Armata nu se divide ns ntre cele dou roluri majore ale
sale, cel de aprare a rii mpotriva oricrui agresor, n contextul aprrii
colective generate de NATO n folosul aprrii naionale i al politicii de
securitate i aprare generat de UE, i cel de participare efectiv la
gestionarea crizelor i conflictelor armate de pretutindeni, acestea
reprezentnd, prin lanul complex de efecte pe care le genereaz, o ameninare
la nsi securitatea naional a rii noastre. Cele dou roluri sunt pri ale
aceluiai ntreg i reprezint noua filosofie a instituiei militare naionale, noul
ei modus vivendi.
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Faptul c decidentul politic din Romnia nu nelege pe deplin acest lucru sau,
chiar dac l nelege, acioneaz sectar, voluntarist, fr s apeleze la o
expertiz strategic corespunztoare, are sau poate avea consecine de tipul
celor pe care le-au suportat militarii, armata i ara nainte, n timpul i dup
cele dou rzboaie mondiale, soldate cu pierderi de viei omeneti, cu rapturi
teritoriale i cu numeroase alte urmri pe care le simim i azi.
Profesionalizarea armatei nu rezolv toate problemele care in de instituia
militar a statului de drept, ci doar creeaz una dintre premisele majore pentru
ca armata s funcioneze la parametri de normalitate, ntr-o epoc n care
schimbrile sunt intempestive i imprevizibile, iar reconfigurrile geopolitice
au efecte greu de anticipat, care nu par a fi, totui, foarte pozitive pentru
Romnia. Faptul c ara face parte din NATO i din Uniunea European, iar
aceste dou entiti uriae au un rol decisiv n procesele de reconfigurri
geopolitice i geostrategice, nu constituie un adpost integral i definitiv, ci
doar unul dinamic, ce trebuie construit mereu. Mai mult, prezena noastr n
cele dou mari organizaii cere participare efectiv, angajare responsabil,
efort financiar, angajament direct. Dar, mai ales, respectarea angajamentelor
luate cu prilejul admiterii rii noastre n cele dou organizaii. E drept, ara
particip la misiuni n cadrul NATO i n cel al UE, unitile armatei
acioneaz foarte bine n teatrele de operaii, dar ara este foarte departe n a-i
ndeplini obligaiile pe care le are fa de propria ei armat.
Trecerea la profesionalizarea armatei a scos cumva aceast instituie din vzul
oamenilor, transformnd-o ntr-o instituie a Administraiei rii, nu a
poporului, adic rii, aa cum scrie n Constituie. Tinerii nu mai au obligaia
s se instruiasc pentru a-i apra ara, economia privatizat sau nstrinat
nu-i mai nelege rolul de potenial de aprare, dect ca o obligaie sau ca o
corvoad, legtura ntre poporul romn, neles ca totalitate a locuitorilor
acestei ri, i Armata Romniei, ca for militar de aprare a rii n caz de
rzboi i n alte situaii-limit, s-a fracturat sau este n curs de fracturare, iar
aceast consecin, cu totul nou pentru Romnia, nu este gestionat n mod
corespunztor.
Oamenii nu tiu, nu neleg i nu particip la cunoaterea i nelegerea
determinrilor i, mai ales, a consecinelor profesionalizrii armatei. Mai
mult, pe msura ndeprtrii de dezbaterea problemelor de aprare i
securitate ale epocii moderne, ei se ndeprteaz din ce n ce mai mult de
instituia militar, iar numrul celor care consider c armata este inutil este
n continu cretere.
Din pcate, chiar i unii oficiali ntrein aceast stare de indiferen fa de
instituia militar, pe motiv c nu mai sunt rzboaie i, chiar dac ar fi, ele ne
depesc, iar armata pe care ne-o putem noi permite ar fi, pentru un eventual
rzboi nalt tehnologizat i de amploare, ca un fel de frecie la un picior de
lemn. Aceast atitudine face mari deservicii rii, ntruct armata, aa cum
afirmam la nceputul acestor rnduri, este un factor de putere a statului, este o
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component a puterii. Cu o armat slab, prost echipat i prost instruit,
puterea statului este incomplet, este o putere neechilibrat i necalibrat,
chioap, care nu conteaz n sistemul relaiilor internaionale.
Chiar dac statul romn nu se afl nc ntr-o astfel de situaie, dac guvernele
vor continua s nu acorde atenia cuvenit instituiei militare, tind bugete i
tratnd cu indiferen problemele strategice ale armatei, inclusiv pe cele de
management strategic al resurselor umane, ca s nu mai vorbim de cele care
in de strategia de nzestrare cu sisteme de arme i mijloace moderne de lupt,
atunci consecinele vor fi ct de poate de grave pentru statul romn. Aici nu
este vorba numai de alocrile bugetare, de nerespectarea angajamentului fa
de NATO de a menine cheltuielile militare la nivelul de 2,3% din PIB, ci mai
ales de lipsa unui orizont strategic corespunztor.
Resursa uman se mpuineaz. Factorul demografic nu este un punct forte al
Romniei. Scderea demografic este ct se poate de accentuat. Se apreciaz
c, numeric, populaia Romniei va scdea, pn n 2050, cu patru-cinci
milioane, ajungnd la o cifr situat undeva n jurul a 15 milioane de
locuitori. Bulversarea nvmntului i creterea enorm a costului educaiei,
n pofida proliferrii reelelor virtuale i a facilitrii accesului la informaie, va
duce la scderea nivelul de educaie i, n consecin, a calitii intelectuale a
oamenilor, ceea ce nseamn reducerea semnificativ a bazei de selecie a
tinerilor pentru a deveni militari profesioniti. De asemenea, datorit
politicilor cel puin neatente fa de instituia militar, atractivitatea acestei
profesiei nu se va situa, dup toate probabilitile, la cote agreabile, ci,
dimpotriv, se va diminua. Evident, dac nu se iau msurile necesare pentru
revigorarea respectului factorilor decideni fa de aceast instituie.
Instituia militar a fcut, practic, tot ce depinde de ea pentru construirea i
implementarea noii paradigme de armat profesionist multirol, a elaborat
noi strategii i noi doctrine ale forelor i mijloacelor, a realizat parametrii de
standardizare cerui, a acionat i acioneaz ireproabil n teatrele de operaii,
a pus n oper toate deciziile politice la timp i n integralitatea lor, a
modernizat nvmntul, a elaborat strategii i programe de nzestrare
corespunztoare, a creat structuri destul de flexibile care prezint garania c,
n caz de nevoie, se vor realiza parametri de structuri, de putere i de
mobilitate necesari i multe altele. Practic, Armata Romniei este n grafic la
toate capitolele care depind de ea Mai mult nu poate face. Dar ceea ce a
fcut pn n prezent, dup opinia noastr, este foarte mult i onoreaz
instituia i pe cei care activeaz n cadrul ei.
Concluzie
Asigurarea unui statut corespunztor n cadrul structurilor statului de drept,
meninerea armatei la cote ridicate de ncredere a populaiei i partenerilor n
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aceast instituie, nelegerea profund a rolului i locului instituiei militare n
sistemele i procesele de gestionare a crizelor i conflictelor armate, de
control al conflictualitii, de meninere a pcii, de prevenire i descurajare a
rzboiului i rzboaielor, pregtirea ei strategic, operativ i tactic
temeinic, n funcie de noile roluri care i se atribuie i pe care i le asum,
trebuie s fac parte din managementul strategic al consecinelor
profesionalizrii Armatei Romniei, management care angajeaz, deopotriv,
decidentul i executantul. Executantul, dup cum rezult i din cele afirmate
de noi n acest text, i face ireproabil datoria n teatrele de operaii, acolo
unde se d adevrata msur a profesionalismului, devotamentului i
calitilor unei armate, cu mijloacele precare pe care le are n dotare, dar, din
punctul de vedere al comportamentului i calitii ndeplinirii misiunilor, la
nivelul celor mai moderne armate din lume.