Materilae Rom

APĂRAREA ŞI SECURITATEA
NAŢIONALĂ A MOLDOVEI
ANUL 2001.
Studiu elaborat de Institutul de Politici Publice

în cadrul proiectului internaţional
“Evaluarea strategică a securităţii şi apărării naţionale a
Republicii Moldova”
în colaborare cu
CENTRUL EURO-ATLANTIC DIN MOLDOVA
CENTRUL DE STUDII ŞI CERCETĂRI ALE CONFLICTELOR,
ACADEMIA REGALĂ MILITARĂ, MAREA BRITANIE
CENTRUL SCOŢIAN DE SECURITATE INTERNAŢIONALĂ,
UNIVERSITATEA DIN ABERDEEN, MAREA BRITANIE
CHIŞINĂU ~ 2001
Institutul de Politici Publice 2
APĂRAREA ŞI SECURITATEA NAŢIONALĂ A MOLDOVEI
ANUL 2001.
INSTITUTUL DE POLITICI PUBLICE
Institutul de Politici Publice este o organizaţie neguvernamentală, independentă,

non-profit. Scopul Institutului constă în a contribui la dezvoltarea în Republica
Moldova a unei societăţi deschise, participatorii, pluraliste, bazate pe valorile
democratice, prin efectuarea, sprijinirea şi sponsorizarea cercetărilor şi analizelor
independente ale politicilor publice, precum şi prin dezbaterea publică şi mediatizarea
largă a rezultatelor acestor cercetări.
Principalele domenii de activitate ale Institutului sunt: politici educaţionale, de

integrare europeană, soluţionare a conflictului transnistrean. Toate acestea presupun şi
efectuarea unor investigaţii sociologice. Într-o perspectivă apropiată Institutul va
începe explorarea şi a domeniilor ce ţin de sistemul public al ocrotirii sănătăţii,
protecţia socială, corupţia, politica bugetară şi cea fiscală.
Institutul susţine relaţii de colaborare cu organizaţii şi instituţii similare de studii

în domeniul politicilor publice din mai multe ţări europene în vederea unui schimb
benefic de informaţii şi experţi, elaborării unor studii comparative şi promovării
politicilor regionale.
Studiile din cadrul proiectului “Evaluarea strategică a securităţii şi

apărării naţionale a Republicii Moldova” au fost finanţate de:
INIŢIATIVA CENTRELOR DE POLITICI PUBLICE A INSTITUTULUI PENTRU

O SOCIETATE DESCHISĂ, BUDAPESTA
FUNDAŢIA SOROS MOLDOVA
COMISIA EUROPEANĂ
Redactor ştiinţific
Dr. Viorel Cibotaru
Opiniile expuse în studii sunt în exclusivitate ale autorilor

şi nu reflectă neapărat poziţiile instituţiilor finanţatoare.
©Institutul de Politici Publice 2001

ANUL 2001.
EVALUAREA STRATEGICĂ
A SECURITĂŢII ŞI APĂRĂRII NAŢIONALE
A REPUBLICII MOLDOVA
Conferinţă Internaţională
20-21 iulie 2001
CHIŞINĂU, REPUBLICA MOLDOVA
Materialele Conferinţei internaţionale
PROGRAMUL CONFERINŢEI
Vineri, 20 iulie 2001

09.00-09.10 Cuvânt de salut:
Ministrul Apărării al Republicii Moldova,
Dr. colonel Victor Gaiciuc
09.10-09.20 Cuvânt de deschidere, expunerea obiectivelor conferinţei:
Dr. Arcadie Barbăroşie, Institutul de Politici Publice, Director
Executiv
Panelul 1 Contextul Strategic
În cadrul acestui panel se va lua în dezbateri rolul Republicii
Moldova în sistemul internaţional de securitate şi se va evalua
procesul de conturare a tendinţelor geostrategice şi geopolitice
la nivel global, continental şi regional care au impact asupra
Moldovei
Moderator: Dr. Graeme P. Herd, Centrul Scoţian de securitate
internaţională, Director adjunct, Universitatea din Aberdeen,
Regatul Unit.
09.30-09.50 Probleme cheie ale securităţii regionale în viziunea
Moldovei.
Dr. Ion Stăvilă, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Direcţia
securitatea internaţională, Director.
09.50-10.10 Uniunea Europeană şi Europa de Sud Est:
perspectivele geostrategice ale Republicii Moldova.
Dr. Oleg Serebrian, Centrul de formare europeană, Director;
Universitatea Internaţională Independentă din Moldova
(ULIM), prorector.
10.10-10.30 Evaluarea procesului de integrare europeană a
Moldovei: aspecte politice, economice, juridice şi
de securitate.
Dr. Valeriu Gheorghiu, Institutul de Politici Publice, Director
de programe.

ANUL 2001.
10.30-10.50 „Schimbarea la faţă” a arhitecturii europene de

securitate: procesul de extindere a NATO şi UE.
Nicu Popescu, Asociaţia Studenţilor de Ştiinţe Politice din
Moldova.
10.50-11.20 Pauză de cafea.
11.20-11.30 Obstacolele şi provocările ale procesului de dubla
(NATO-UE) lărgire, văzute dintr-o perspectivă
Occidentală.
Dr. Graeme P. Herd, Centrul Scoţian de securitate
internaţională, Director adjunct, Universitatea din Aberdeen,
Regatul Unit.
11.30-12.30 Discuţii, schimb de opinii.
12.30-14.30 Prânzul servit în restaurantul hotelului „Dacia”.
Panel II: Examinarea agendei noi a securităţii şi
apărării naţionale a Republicii Moldova
În cadrul acestui panel vor fi identificate riscurile şi pericolele
care pot periclita integritatea securităţii şi apărării naţionale a
Moldovei, va fi evaluată capacitatea forţelor ei armate de a
înfrunta provocările viitorului imediat şi se va analiza mersul
reformei democratice militare a statului într-un context
comparativ. Se va aborda şi problema soluţionării conflictului
transnistrean, reieşind din consecinţele reale şi probabile ale
acestui pericol pentru integritatea şi independenţa Moldovei,
precum şi impactul acestuia asupra securităţii societale şi
economice ale Moldovei.
Moderator: Anne Aldis, Centrul de studii şi cercetări ale
conflictelor, Academia Militară Regală, Director de proiecte,
Regatul Unit.
14.30-14.50 Identificarea pericolelor existente şi probabile

pentru interesele naţionale de bază ale Moldovei.
Locotenent colonel (ret.) Iurie Pîntea, Institutul de Politici
Publice, expert.
14.50-15.10 Soluţionând conflictul transnistrean: securitatea şi
apărarea naţională într-o societate divizată.
Oazu Nantoi, Institutul de Politici Publice, Director de
programe
15.10-15.30 Conflictele interne din Moldova şi Asia Pacifică:
studii comparative.
Sato Keiji, Programul de masterat în domeniul conflictelor,
Universitatea din Tsukuba, Japonia
15.30-15.50 Conflictele interne în clasificarea internaţională.
Nicoleta Munteanu, Masterat în Teoria Conflictelor,
Universitatea din Uppsala, Suedia
15.50-16.10 Reforma forţelor armate în cadrul noilor
democraţii: analiză comparativă.

ANUL 2001.
Dr. Trevor Waters, Centrul de studii şi cercetări ale
conflictelor, Academia Militară Regală, cercetător superior,
Regatul Unit.
16.50-17.10 Dimensiunea economică a securităţii naţionale:
cazul Moldovei, privită ca „stat mic”.
Valeriu Prohniţchi, Institutul de Politici Publice, expert.
Încheierea lucrărilor primei zile de conferinţă.
19.00-21.00 Recepţie oferită de IPP la terasa restaurantului
„Monte Nelly”.
Sâmbătă, 21 iulie 2001:
09.00-09.10 Cuvânt de deschidere:

Iurie Stoicov, Comisia pentru securitatea naţională a
Parlamentului Republicii Moldova, Preşedinte.
Panel III O privire spre viitor: recomandări pentru

securitatea naţională şi politica de
apărare a statului.
În cadrul panelului se vor prezenta, în lumina celor discutate
anterior, propuneri şi recomandări în vederea optimizării şi
dezvoltării sectorului de securitate şi apărare naţională.
Discuţiile se vor focaliza asupra esenţei schimbătoare a
relaţiilor civil-militare în Moldova, procesului de elaborare a
conceptului de securitate naţională, precum şi rolului ştiinţei şi
tehnologiei într-o nouă ambianţă de securitate.
Moderator: Nicolae Chirtoacă, Centrul Euro-Atlantic din
Moldova, Director.
09.15-09.30 Istoriografia curentă a relaţiilor civil-militare în

Moldova
Căpitan, dr. Vitalie Ciobanu, Asociaţia istoricilor militari din
Moldova, Preşedinte; Muzeul Militar al Armatei Naţionale,
Director.
09.30-09.50
Conceptul securităţii naţionale a Moldovei pentru
noul mileniu
Colonel Ion Mastac, Ministerul Apărării, consilier şef al
ministrului apărării
09.50-10.10
Capacitatea clasei politice şi mass media din
Moldova de a promova o politică de integrare

ANUL 2001.
europeană şi ataşare la rigorile securităţii

internaţionale
Dr. habilitat Victor Moraru, Facultatea de Jurnalism şi Ştiinţe
ale Comunicării a USM, Decan.
10.10-10.30
Dimensiunea securităţii naţionale în aspectul
consolidării statului moldovenesc
Dr.habilitat Valentin Beniuc, Academia de Relaţii
Internaţionale şi Studii Diplomatice, Director

12.30-14.30 Prânzul servit în restaurantul hotelului „Dacia”.
Panel IV Agenda generală a securităţii

internaţionale şi Moldova
Moderator: Dr. Trevor W. Waters, Centrul de studii şi cercetări
ale conflictelor, Academia Militară Regală, cercetător superior,
Regatul Unit.
14.30-14.50 Campania anti-corupţie în Moldova.

Dr. Gheorghe Cojocaru, Institutul de Istorie a AŞ din Moldova,
cercetător ştiinţific superior.
14.50-15.10 Factori ai securităţii naţionale a Moldovei şi
Ucrainei: similitudini şi diferenţe.
Natalya Pelitser, Pylyp Orlyk Institut pentru Democraţie, Kiev
15.10-15.30 Rolul investiţiilor străine în economia Moldovei şi a
ţărilor din imediata ei apropiere în consolidarea
securităţii naţionale/regionale.
David Lewis, Control Risks Group London, Consultant politic
superior de riscuri, Regatul Unit.
15.30-15.50 Stabilitatea provizorie: politica identităţilor în
Republica Moldova.
Cornel Ciurea, Institutul de Studii Politice şi Relaţii
Internaţionale, USM, lector
15.50-16.10
Căutările identităţii naţionale în contextul
identităţii europene
Octavian Şofransky, Centrul European din Moldova, Director.
18.00 Cuvânt de încheiere.
Dr. José de Barros, Institutul pentru o Societate Deschisă,
Manager de programe, Budapesta.

ANUL 2001.
List of participants
1. Arcadie Barbăroşie Dr. Executive Institute for
Director Public Policy
2. Nicolae Chirtoacă Director Euro-Atlantic
Center of
Moldova
3. Mihai Chitul Deputy Parliament
Chairman National
Security
Committee
4. Boris Gamurari General, dr Former
Minister of
Defence
5. Ion Culeac Colegiul
Invizibil din
Moldova
6. Iurie Pîntea lt. colonel Expert Institute for
(ret.) Public Policy
7. Victor Gaiciuc colonel Minister Ministry of
Defence
8. Oleg Graur colonel (ret.) Expert Institute for
Public Policy
9. Sergiu Guţu lt. colonel Deputy Head Ministry of
of Center Defence
10. Valeriu Rusu lt.colonel Head of Ministry of
Department Defence
11. Veaceslav Schiopu lt. colonel Senior Ministry of
specialist Defence
12. Mihai Druţă lt.colonel Head of Ministry of
Section Defence
13. Nicolae Chimerciuc colonel Head of Ministry of
Department Defence
14. Oleg Ciornii colonel Head of General Staff
Department
15. V.Cibotaru lt.colonel Program Institute for
(ret.), dr. Director Public Policy
16. Oleg Serebrean Dr. Prorector ULIM
17. Mihai Cernenco Dr. Head of ULIM

Department
18. Victor Moraru Dr. habilitat Dean Moldova State
University
19. Igor Clipii Expert Center of
European
Formation
20. Cornel Ciurea Lecturer Moldova State
University
21. Oazu Nantoi Program Institute for
22. Valeriu Gheorghiu Dr. Program Institute for
23. Octavian Şofransky Director European Center

ANUL 2001.
of Moldova
24. Gheorghe Mârzenco Councellor Ministry of
Economy
25. Eduard Bumbac Counsellor Government
26. Gheorghe Roman Senior National
Consultant Security Council
27. Viorel Albu Consultant Parliament
28. Ion Stăvilă Dr. Head of Ministry of
Department Foreign Affairs
29. Sergiu Buşcăneanu Expert Institute for
Public Policy
30. Anastasia Iliasenco undergraduate Bilkent
student University (
Ankara, Turkey)
31. Svetlana Suveica Lecturer Facaulty of
History, State
University
32. Valentin Dubrovschi European
Integration Web
Project
33. Diana Marza undergraduate Moldova State
student University
34. Anastasija Political Studies
Zalakeviciute Student’s Club,
Lithuenia
35. Valeriu Prohniţchi Expert Institute for
Public Policy
36. Nicoleta Munteanu Master Uppsala
Program University,
Sweden
37. Sato Keiji Master Tsukuba
Program University,
Japan
38. Anton Sârbu Romanian
Association for
Foreign Policy,
Bucharest,
Romania.
39. Alex Oprunenco Bord Director Center of

European
Formation
40. Graeme P. Herd Dr. Deputy Scottish Center
Director for International
Security, UK
41. Anne Aldis Project CSRC,UK
Manager
42. Trevor W. Waters Dr. Researcher CSRC,UK
47. David Lewis Senior Control Risks
Political Risk Group, UK
Consultant
43. Nicu Popescu Political Studies
Students

ANUL 2001.
Association
44. Valentin Beniuc Professor, dr. Director Foreign
Relations and
Diplomatic
Studies
Academy
45. José de Barros Dr. Project LGI-OSI,
Manager Budapest
46. Natalia Potapenco Project LGI office in
Assistant Moscow
47. Natalya Belitser Researcher Pylyp Orlyk
Institut for
Democracy,
Kiev, Ucraine
48. Victoria Antoniu Department Moldova Soros
Director Foundation
49. Igor Nedera Department Moldova Soros
Director Foundation
50. Evgheny Lypustin Embassy of
Russia
51. Julia Novac postgraduate University of
student Toronto
(Canada)
52. Natalia Grozeva undergraduate Moldova State
student University
53. Vitalie Catan CAIRO
54. Olga Berlinshi undergraduate Moldova State
student University
55. Natalia Chirtoaca expert IPP
56. Aurel Guzun member of Moldova’s
Lawers Bar
57. Ghenadii Tudorean journalist Infotag
58. Ludmila Moraru journalist AP FLUX
59. Tatiana Lupascu journalist Info Prim
60. Dumitru Chihai journalist Info Prim
61. Veniamin journalist Argumenti I facti
Tashlevsky
62. Natalia Vasiliuc journalist “Natura” review
63. Ana Pasat undergraduate Moldova State
student University

ANUL 2001.
Cuvântarea Ministrului apărării al Republicii Moldova la

conferinţa internaţională din 20-21.07.2001
Stimaţi participanţi la conferinţă!
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pentru Dezvoltare şi să aduc mulţumiri organizatorilor acestui for, care va contribui la
desfăşurarea discuţiilor şi consultărilor în domeniul securităţii.
Tematica acestei conferinţe “Evaluarea strategică a securităţii şi

apărării naţionale a Republicii Moldova” are, actualmente, o importanţă
considerabilă atît pentru consolidarea securităţii statului nostru, cît şi pentru
menţinerea păcii şi stabilităţii în regiune.
Consider că medierea largă a acestei tematici va contribui la o înţelegere mai

aprofundată a problemelor din acest domeniu, conştientizarea mai adecvată a mediului
de securitate curent, soluţionarea problemelor actuale şi prevenirea pericolelor ce pot
apărea în viitor.
Cea mai complexă şi stringentă provocare cu care se confruntă actualmente

întreaga comunitate europeană este căutarea şi edificarea unui nou model de securitate
pentru secolul XXI. Pe de o parte, procesele de integrare şi cooperare, din zi în zi tot
mai intense, substituie tot mai mult antagonismele trecutului. Pe de altă parte, suntem
martori ai numeroaselor eşecuri. În aceste condiţii important e de a putea ţine piept
noilor provocări, riscuri şi ameninţări, riscuri şi ameninţări la adresa securităţii şi
stabilităţii.
Este dificil să prospectezi viitorul într-un domeniu atît de vast şi de complex

cum este cel al securităţii şi apărării.
Având o importanţă deosebită pentru fiecare din statele europene procesul de

constituire şi implementare a strategiilor de securitate naţională are o semnificaţie
vitală pentru statele afiliate în perioada de tranziţie.
În urma destrămării fostei URSS şi creării noilor state în acest spaţiu s-au
intensificat confruntările de ordin etnic, religios, politic şi teritorial. Acestea au dat
naştere la aşa fenomene ca – separatismul, naţionalismul, extremismul, care au dus la
crearea în acest spaţiu a zonelor de conflict.
Aceste fenomene s-au răsfrânt şi asupra Republicii Moldova şi s-au reflectat

într-o criză majoră evidenţiată prin conflictul transnistrean, nesoluţionat până în
prezent.
Moldova a devenit subiect deplin al dreptului internaţional, are rădăcini

istorice şi relaţii de bunăvecinătate şi prietenie cu statele vecine şi comunitatea
internaţională, nu consideră nici un stat drept duşman al său. Este un stat care apără şi
realizează interesele sale naţional-statale în mod corespunzător.

ANUL 2001.
În acest context, o mare problemă pentru societatea noastră este de a revizui
atît strategia securităţii cît şi întreg sistemul de apărare şi asigurare a securităţii
naţionale.
Nu mai poate fi pus la îndoială şi faptul că stabilitatea economică şi

prosperarea, precum şi obţinerea investiţiilor strategice din exterior sunt direct
dependente de climatul general de securitate, de asigurarea securităţii aceloraşi
investiţii, de integritatea teritorială şi de soluţionarea conflictului transnistrean, de
calitate şi eficienţa sistemului de asigurare a securităţii naţionale.
Vizând obiectivele principale cu privire la tema abordată putem afirma că
scopul principal al politicii militare a Republicii Moldova în asigurarea securităţii
militare a statului, este prevenirea războaielor şi conflictelor armate prin mijloacele de
drept internaţional.
Politica militară a Republicii Moldova se bazează pe următoarele proprietăţi:
- în domeniul politic – soluţionarea paşnică a contradicţiilor apărute între
state şi excluderea confruntării militare prin eforturile colective ale ţărilor, pornind de
la principiile şi normele dreptului internaţional; stabilirea relaţiilor politice,
economice şi militare, care exclud lezarea suveranităţii, şi independenţei statului;
- în domeniul militar – menţinerea capacităţii de apărare a statului la
nivelul care asigură securitatea militară, întărirea măsurilor de credibilitate, extinderea
colaborării militare reciproc avantajoase bazate pe principiile respectării suveranităţii,
independenţei şi neamestecului în afacerile interne ale altor state.
Pentru atingerea acestor priorităţi la nivel global, regional şi naţional
Republica Moldova realizează:
1) la nivel global – participarea la activitatea Comunităţii mondiale în
vederea prevenirii războaielor şi conflictelor armate şi soluţionării paşnice a
problemelor litigioase, crearea condiţiilor care, în cazul unui pericol militar extern vor
asigura realizarea dreptului republicii la asistenţa organizaţiilor internaţionale;
participarea activă la edificarea sistemului internaţional unic de securitate colectivă;
2) la nivel regional – stabilirea relaţiilor prieteneşti bilaterale şi
multilaterale cu statele din regiune, care vor asigura un nivel înalt de încredere
reciprocă şi transparenţă în domeniul militar, precum şi ajutorul reciproc în cazul
periclitării securităţii colective;
3) la nivel naţional – crearea unui potenţial militar suficient pentru
asigurarea securităţii militare a statului.
Astfel, priorităţile, măsurile şi acţiunile statului în plan politico-militar, includ
în sistemul de viziuni şi documente fundamentale ce identifică tendinţa Republicii
Moldova spre construcţia unei societăţi civilizate, democratice şi nonviolente, tendinţa
de a respecta întocmai obligaţiunile conform Dreptului Internaţional, de a promova
politica de pace şi colaborare în plan extern.
În sfârşit, doresc participanţilor la cest for important succese şi eficienţă în
lucru comun cu scopul monitorizării, analizei şi elaborării unei viziuni obiective cu
privire la măsurile de consolidare a securităţii statului nostru, cît şi pentru
menţinerea păcii şi stabilităţii în regiune.
Vă mulţumesc.

ANUL 2001.
DIMENSIUNEA SECURITĂŢII NAŢIONALE
ÎN ASPECTUL CONSOLIDĂRII STATULUI MOLDOVENESC
Valentin BENIUC,
doctor habilitat în ştiinţe
politice, conferenţiar
Abordând subiectul securităţii naţionale reprezentanţii cercurilor academice şi

politice, experţii şi consultanţii în domeniu accentuează frecvent doar aspectul militar
al acesteia având în vedere în special prezenţa trupelor Federaţiei Ruse în raioanele de
Est ale Republicii Moldova. Consideram însă, că la moment problemele de securitate
economică, politică, social-psihologică şi informaţională prevalează asupra celei de
securitate militară, care, în definitiv, va fi rezolvată. Edificarea statului, care
eminamente presupune şi edificarea securităţii acestuia, necesită în mod categoric
soluţionarea unui şir de probleme devenite astăzi factori de stabilizatori activi care
diminuează considerabil eforturile orientate spre consolidarea statului. Este vorba
despre restructurarea uriaşelor datorii externe, renaşterea economiei naţionale,
finalizarea instituţionalizării politice a ţării, inclusiv integrităţii ei teritoriale;
soluţionarea problemelor ce ţin de aspectul social-psihologic, dat fiind faptul că noi
continuam să educăm generaţia tînără în spiritul înstrăinării faţă de stat şi interesele
lui, a intransigenţei faţă de specificitatea culturală, istorică si lingvistică. Pentru ea
(generaţia tînără) noţiunile de Patrie, patriotism sunt vag definite sau nu prezintă
nimic. Este necesar să ne direcţionăm eforturile spre eradicarea sărăciei, corupţiei şi
criminalităţii şi nu în ultimul rînd să constituim un sistem eficient de instruire, de
selectare şi de angajare a cadrelor bazat pe principiul competitivităţii şi dacă doriţi a
gradului disponibilităţii de a servi onest ţara. Toate programele, activităţile practice,
concepţiile politice, economice, educaţionale, realizările din diverse sfere ale
activităţii individuale şi sociale, toate genurile de interese - de grup sau individuale
urmează să fie dirijate conştient spre consolidarea statului. În caz contrar riscăm să
fim privţi şi în continuare drept o entitate efemeră şi virtuală. Este clar faptul că
actualmente Republica Moldova este catalogată în primul rînd ca o regiune ce abundă
în probleme de ordin politic, economic şi civilizaţional a căror eventuală explozie va
afecta cu siguranţă întreg spaţiul european şi doar mai apoi ca partener strategic.
Pentru a fi trataţi ca parteneri serioşi, de perspectivă, urmează în mod categoric să
punem la punct situaţia din ţară. Dacă e să ilustrăm cu elocvenţă această ipoteză, vom
învedera că un om agresiv, bolnav, flămînd şi dezbrăcat este luat în consideraţie de
câtre cei care-l înconjoară doar în măsura în care aceştia se tem să nu fie agresaţi,
contaminaţi sau furaţi. Este indicat în acest context să ne cunoaştem bine, să ne
diagnosticăm în cel mai serios mod, inclusiv cu ajutorul experţilor străini şi să ne
aducem în ordine. In caz contrar, vom fi abordaţi ca o tara-problemă şi nu drept un
stat-partener. Acest pachet de probleme nici pe departe nu epuizează caracteristicile
dure ale situaţiei din Republica Moldova. Pentru a ne apropia cit de puţin de această
complexă caracteristică, vom aborda succint esenţa dimensiunii "identitate-securitate"
in realitatea Moldovei, precum şi politica ei externă - aspectul eficienţei. Indubitabil
statului ii revine rolul primordial în soluţionarea problemelor de securitate. Nu putem
vorbi despre securitatea naţională în lipsa statului, iar acesta din urma nu poate fi luat
în consideraţie daca nu-si asigura securitatea, baza căreia este în primul rînd dorinţa
imperioasa a populaţiei si a centrelor de putere de a avea acest stat. Punerea la
îndoială a suveranităţii statului, a perspectivei existenţei acestuia nu este altceva de cît

ANUL 2001.
subminarea securităţii naţionale. In acest sens trebuie să recunoaştem necesitatea
sistemului de "balanţa a puterii" (balance of power), putere unica, putere raţionalizată,
puterea statului, care se înscrie în anumite graniţe şi este actorul principal în relaţiile
internaţionale. În cadrul unui asemenea sistem de "balanţa a puterii", statul, în limitele
graniţelor sale, dispune de puterea suverană în raport cu membrii societăţii şi
societatea în ansamblu. Acestea sunt condiţiile de baza şi principiile universale pe
care se axează existenta unui stat. Voinţa de edificare a statului comportă necesitatea
acceptării acestor condiţii şi principii, în caz contrar vom fi în permanentă contradicţie
cu realitatea. În plus trebuie să conştientizăm că statul nu este doar garantul securităţii
cetăţenilor, el întruchipează şi identitatea lor în calitate de comunitate politica,
formata conştient şi benevol.
Identitatea reprezintă votul unanim acordat statului, competenţelor şi
împuternicirilor lui. Ea reflectă capacitatea comunităţii de a se autoapara, de a se jertfi
conştient în lupta pentru existenţă. Lipsa acestor caracteristici sau slaba lor
manifestare denota absenţa identităţii sau structurizarea proasta a acesteia. În
Republica Moldova, identitatea de comunitate este subminată atît în virtutea trecutului
istoric, cît şi din cauza influentei metodice şi distructive, mai ales din partea factorilor
politici şi intelectuali ai dreptei extremiste. Nici unul dintre actorii politici, agenţii
economici, comunităţile culturale de pe mapamond nu ne vor percepe ca entitate şi
identitate, daca vom ignora in continuare etnonimul de moldovean, propria istorie,
continuitatea în dezvoltare. Identitatea, indiferent de natura ei constituie nu numai
autoafirmarea unei entităţi in calitate de comunitate politica, dar şi recunoaşterea
acesteia din exterior. După Sincleiter identitatea se refera şi la calitatea statului de
membru al Comunităţii Internaţionale. In aspect politico-ideologic identitatea
reprezintă de asemenea un pretext, iar uneori o motivaţie serioasă de a te integra în
Comunitatea Europeana, preocupată şi de securitatea identităţilor. În acest context
legătura dintre identitate şi securitate nu este expresia unei inventate dialectici, a unui
simplu binom din seria categoriilor politice, ci a unei realităţi irecuzabile. Dintre
complexele probleme legate de consolidarea statului şi securităţii acestuia, face parte
şi politica externa a Moldovei, menită să lanseze ţara în eficiente şi multiple relaţii cu
statele străine. În pofida serioaselor eforturi diplomatice depuse de câtre Ministerul
Afacerilor Externe al Republicii Moldova întru promovarea statului pe arena
internaţionala imaginea Moldovei şi a moldovenilor devine din ce mai alterata,
contribuind în acest sens si caracterul de legitate al legaturilor dintre politica interna şi
cea externă. În acest context eficientizarea relaţiilor internaţionale ale Republicii
Moldova urmează să fie realizata atît prin ameliorarea situaţiei din ţară, cît şi prin
ingeniozitatea diplomatică manifestată de către ministerul şi organele de resort
abilitate să acţioneze în domeniul afacerilor internaţionale. Cadrele implicate în acest
proces trebuie să posede un înalt profesionalism şi să manifeste un veritabil
patriotism. Selectarea cadrelor în baza acestor două fundamentale calităţi,
suplimentată de un adecvat suport financiar va avea drept consecinţa renunţarea
Republicii Moldova la "diplomaţia mâinii întinse" pe care este nevoită s-o promoveze
la etapa actuala. Realitatea însă, ne demonstrează că Moldova continuă să rămînă în
expectativă, nefiind aptă să-şi determine clar opţiunea orientării geostrategice. Pe de o
parte, ea este puternic ancorată în tradiţiile istorice, în legaturile cu Estul, în special cu
Rusia, conflictul din Transnistria şi speranţa soluţionării acestuia cu ajutorul Rusiei
cramponînd - o şi mai mult în acest sector decizional. În afară de aceasta, relaţiile
economice ale Moldovei cu Estul sunt mai clare pentru ea, mai uşor de conceput, dar
şi de realizat atît din perspectiva structurii acestor relaţii, cît şi din aspectul
psihologico-cultural şi lingvistic. Mai mult, noi nu dorim să ne deschidem altor lumi,

ANUL 2001.
temându-ne ca ne vor cunoaşte altfel de cît vrem sa ne cunoască. Ne temem că vor
spune despre noi adevăruri, care nu vrem să fie scoase în vileag. Pe de alta parte, sub
presiunea globalelor realităţi politice, economice, geografice a unor factori decizionali
interni şi externi, încercăm să ne lansam intr-un proces dificil de conceput, dar şi de
realizat – apropierea de Europa, care trece ea însăşi printr-un complicat şi
multidimensional proces de integrare politica si economica. Capacitatea redusă a
conducerii Republicii Moldova de a concepe ordinea lucrurilor, de a dirija eficient
ţara, direcţionează eronat spre implimentarea mecanica a programelor indicate de
către organismele europene, fără a lua în consideraţie specificitatea perioadei de
tranziţie şi de multe ori fără a ţine cont de interesul naţional. Practica integrării
europene, în special la capitolul integrare economica, este, cu părere de rău, deja
compromisa. În al treilea rînd, atît Estul, cît şi Vestul sunt dezorientaţi în ceea ce
priveşte perspectiva reală a devenirii şi consolidării statului moldovenesc. Mesajele
politice parvenite din mediul cercurilor politice din Moldova sau din partea unor lideri
politici autohtoni, precum şi cele pronunţate în cercurile politice din Rusia şi
România, fac această perspectivă difuză si neclară. Tarile lumii care ne-au recunoscut,
organizaţiile internaţionale care ne-au acceptat în calitate de membru, dar, mai ales,
opinia publica mondiala nu înţeleg de ce actorii politici din Republica Moldova, care
tind să ia puterea şi conducerea politică a ţării, nu sunt convinşi de perspectivele
statului moldovenesc, mai mult, ei activează conştient sau inconştient în direcţia
lichidării lui. Securitatea statului şi, implicit, consolidarea lui, ţine şi de problemele
spaţiului comunicaţional al Republicii Moldova. Dezvoltarea slaba a mass-media, în
special, a televiziunii naţionale, comercializarea excesivă a spaţiului comunicaţional
autohton, precum şi calitatea proastă a emisiunilor şi publicaţiilor produse deseori la
comandă, facilitează pătrunderea insistentă şi frecvent agresivă a agenţilor mediatici
străini pe piaţa comunicaţională a Republicii Moldova. Spaţiul informaţional al ţării
este împărţit în zone de interese financiare şi ideologice, care nu au nimic în comun cu
interesul statului şi formarea opiniei publice favorabile securităţii acestuia. În acest
sens nu se pledează pentru re-izolarea informaţională a Moldovei, lucru imposibil, dar
şi absurd. Se punctează doar necesitatea conformării structurii şi funcţionalităţii
relaţiilor mediatice la interesele statului. La baza acestui proces urmează a fi plasat
înaltul profesionalism al jurnaliştilor şi principiul respectării normelor securităţii
naţionale. Astfel, tradiţionalismul politic, economic şi cultural; incapacitatea
conducerii Republicii Moldova de a guverna statul în conformitate cu interesele
naţionale ale ţării; activitatea cercurilor politice şi a liderilor politici indigeni, cît şi a
celor de peste hotare în direcţia subminării procesului de edificare a statului;
structurarea proasta a identităţii; politica externă a statului bazată pe "diplomaţia
mâinii întinse", precum şi vulnerabilitatea informaţionala a Republicii Moldova duc la
apariţia unui complex de probleme care vizează direct securitatea statului.

ANUL 2001.
Doctrina securităţii economice naţionale

a Republicii Moldova (concept-cadru).
Valeriu Prohniţchi
Principii generale:
Doctrina securităţii economice naţionale a Republicii Moldova reprezintă
concepţia oficială asupra principiilor, scopului şi obiectivelor concrete în domeniul
asigurării securităţii economice naţionale, precum şi asupra riscurilor şi ameninţărilor
majore în adresa securităţii economice naţionale.
Îndeplinind funcţii politico-administrative şi politico-economice active, statul este
principalul subiect al securităţii economice naţionale. În această calitate, statul îşi
asumă obligaţia elaborării şi promovării unor politici adecvate pentru realizarea
scopurilor şi obiectivelor în domeniul securităţii economice naţionale. Obiecte ale
securităţii economice sunt statul, consumatorii, prestatorii de factori de producţie şi
producătorii din toate sectoarele economiei naţionale (industrie, agricultură, servicii).
Doctrina securităţii economice a Republicii Moldova este elaborată în
acord cu Constituţia Republicii Moldova şi completează Concepţia securităţii
naţionale a Republicii Moldova. Pentru asigurarea securităţii economice
naţionale, toate actele normative naţionale şi toate acordurile internaţionale la
care va adera Republica Moldova trebuie să respecte următoarele principii:
• aderarea la acorduri, tratate, organizaţii şi structuri internaţionale multilaterale şi
bilaterale nu trebuie să compromită sau să tergiverseze integrarea Republicii
Moldova în structurile economice, politice şi de securitate ale Uniunii Europene;
• drepturile la proprietatea privată şi la libera iniţiativă individuală este un factor
fundamental pentru buna funcţionare a sistemului economic naţional şi pentru
edificarea unei veritabile societăţi democratice;
• prezervarea şi dezvoltarea potenţialului uman este condiţia primară pentru
restabilirea potenţialului economic, pentru asigurarea creşterii economice şi
pentru participarea plenară a Republicii Moldova la relaţiile economice
internaţionale şi la procesele economiei mondiale;
• libera alegere de către consumatori a producătorilor de mărfuri, a prestatorilor de
servicii, a executorilor de lucrări şi a firmelor de intermediere este de importanţă
majoră pentru maximizarea utilităţii consumatorilor;
• deţinătorii de factori de producţie au dreptul la o remunerare adecvată pentru
utilizarea factorilor în activitatea economică şi nici o organizaţie de stat sau
privată nu poate să limiteze prin activitatea sa acest drept;
• instaurarea monopolului de stat şi acordarea monopolului comercial asupra unor
genuri de activitate şi tipuri de produse, servicii şi lucrări se va face doar în baza
principiului de maximizare a efectului economic social;
• reducerea dependenţei unilaterale a producătorilor naţionali de furnizorii externi
de materie primă, energie, tehnologii, know-how şi resurse financiare, precum şi
diversificarea pieţelor de desfacere a produselor economiei naţionale sunt factori
esenţiali pentru asigurarea securităţii economice a statului şi a producătorilor şi
pentru consolidarea independenţei politice reale a Republicii Moldova;
• toate politicile economice guvernamentale urmează a fi ajustate în conformitate cu
principiul de atenuare a decalajelor structurale, cantitative şi calitative existente

ANUL 2001.
între nivelurile de dezvoltare economică şi socială a regiunilor şi a centrului,
precum şi între nivelul de viaţă în mediul rural şi urban;
• în relaţiile economice internaţionale, Republica Moldova va participa nu doar în
calitate de consumator, ci şi de furnizor de securitate economică; prin
contracararea fenomenelor de spălarea a banilor, a crimei organizate
transfrontaliere, a corupţiei, a evaziunilor fiscale şi vamale şi a economiei
subterane, Republica Moldova va demonstra ferma sa hotărâre de a fi un factor de
stabilitate regională.
Securitatea economică a Republicii Moldova este indisolubil legată de situaţia
economică la nivel regional şi mondial, de conjunctura politică internă şi externă, de
cadrul geopolitic şi de relaţiile cu alte state. Pentru a-şi proteja interesele legate de
securitatea economică, Republica Moldova va păstra relaţii bune cu toate statele. În
acelaşi timp, ţinând cont de orientarea europeană a Republicii Moldova, ţările din
Europa Centrală şi Occidentală se includ în zona sa de interes geoeconomic prioritar.
Guvernul şi Banca Naţională vor elabora propuneri de politici economice orientate la
susţinerea exportatorilor naţionali, activitatea cărora vizează sau se desfăşoară în zona
de interes geoeconomic prioritar.
Doctrina securităţii economice va servi drept bază de referinţă pentru:

• formularea şi promovarea tuturor politicilor economice;
• formularea propunerilor pentru perfecţionarea cadrului juridic, metodic, tehnico-
ştiinţific şi organizatoric a securităţii economice;
• elaborarea programelor concrete, ce ţin de sferele de competenţă a diferitor
ministere, departamente şi instituţii de stat, pentru asigurare securităţii
economice.
Scopul şi obiectivele doctrinei:
Scopul doctrinei securităţii economice a Republicii Moldova este asigurarea
permanentă a intereselor economice naţionale. Realizarea şi protejarea acestor
interese este echivalentă cu asigurarea securităţii economice naţionale şi reprezintă o
condiţie necesară pentru dezvoltarea social-economică de durată a ţării.
Pentru îndeplinirea scopului acestei doctrine este necesară realizarea, precum şi
ajustarea permanentă, a următoarelor obiective:
• elaborarea conceptuală, estimarea şi monitorizarea unor indicatori relevanţi care
ar caracteriza starea optimală, admisibilă şi reală a securităţii economice şi a
sistemului economic în diferite domenii şi sectoare, şi care ar ilustra nivelul de
asigurare a intereselor de securitate pentru fiecare dintre cele patru obiecte ale
securităţii economice naţionale – consumatori, proprietarii factorilor, producători,
stat;
• identificarea, monitorizarea, controlarea şi atenuarea permanentă a
vulnerabilităţilor sistemului economic naţional, a asimetriilor structurale şi a
decalajelor existente între nivelul de dezvoltare economică a ţării şi standardele
medii europene;
• identificarea, monitorizarea, controlarea şi atenuarea permanentă a principalelor
ameninţări, riscuri şi surse ale acestora, atât de origine internă, cât şi externă, şi
care pot submina securitatea economică naţională;

ANUL 2001.
• alături de iniţierea unor acţiuni operative sau sectoriale, este necesară elaborarea
şi implementarea unor strategii şi politici economice globale (naţionale) pentru
atenuare vulnerabilităţilor, contracararea riscurilor, ameninţărilor şi surselor
acestora;
• analiza relaţiilor conflictuale care pot exista între obiectele securităţii, a
intereselor contradictorii pe care le pot manifesta, precum şi formularea unor
propuneri şi opţiuni de politici pentru atenuarea şi soluţionarea acestor aspecte
problematice.
Conţinutul securităţii economice:
Securitatea şi stabilitatea sunt două condiţii de bază pentru realizarea unei
dezvoltări economice durabile a Republicii Moldova. Prin securitate înţelegem starea
sistemului în care este asigurată integritatea legăturilor dintre elementele sale şi
posibilitatea de dezvoltare continuă în condiţiile unui mediu intern şi extern
nefavorabil. Stabilitatea semnifică fiabilitatea şi rezistenţa elementelor şi relaţiilor
verticale şi orizontale, precum şi capacitatea de a rezista şi a se adapta eforturilor şi
presiunilor interne şi externe.
În sens larg, prin securitate economică naţională a Republicii Moldova se are în
vedere situaţia în care nu există bariere interne sau externe pentru asigurarea
intereselor naţionale în domeniul economic. Pentru securitatea economică naţională
este important ca cetăţenii, firmele private şi societatea civilă în ansamblu să înţeleagă
şi să susţină interesele economice naţionale, precum şi politicile economice,
financiare, fiscale, bancare, monetare, comerciale, investiţionale etc. În acelaşi timp,
promovarea de către instituţiile abilitate a unor politici sau modele raţionale şi
efective de utilizare a resurselor economice nu trebuie să contravină principiilor de
liberă iniţiativă şi concurenţă, de intangibilitate şi inalienabilitate a proprietăţii private
şi nu presupune implicarea statului în domeniile în care mecanismele de piaţă pot
funcţiona mai eficient în absenţa ingerinţelor guvernamentale.
În sens îngust, securitatea economică naţională este asigurată atunci când nu
există ameninţări de ordin economic, financiar sau comercial care ar putea submina
posibilităţile statului de a-şi asigura resursele necesare pentru îndeplinirea funcţiilor
sale, care ar compromite desfăşurarea unei bune activităţi economice de către
producători, care ar limita posibilităţile proprietarilor de factori de producţie de a
valorifica şi de a fi remuneraţi adecvat pentru utilizarea acestor factori şi care ar pune
în pericol interesele consumatorilor de maximizare a utilităţii.
Prin urmare, securitatea economică naţională se asigură pe patru domenii majore
şi putem vorbi despre securitatea economică a consumatorilor, a producătorilor, a
proprietarilor de factori şi a statului. Existenţa unui echilibru a intereselor, precum şi
relaţiile pozitive între obiectele din cele patru domenii sunt vitale pentru asigurarea
integrităţii şi funcţionalităţii sistemului economic naţional.
Componentele securităţii economice naţionale:

ANUL 2001.
• Securitatea economică a consumatorilor se traduce prin posibilitatea de
exercitare liberă a drepturilor de consumator, în conformitate cu prevederile
legislaţiei Republicii Moldova în domeniul garantării drepturilor consumatorilor
şi a actelor juridice internaţionale din acest domeniu la care Republica Moldova
este parte. Asigurarea posibilităţilor de maximizare a utilităţii consumatorului
este una dintre condiţiile de bază pentru securitatea economică a consumatorilor
ca obiecte ale securităţii economice naţionale.
• Securitatea economică a producătorilor constă în asigurarea condiţiilor necesare
pentru stabilitatea activităţii la fiecare fază a procesului productiv. În acelaşi timp,
insecuritatea economică a producătorilor nu se confundată cu riscurile economice
obiective, inerente activităţii economice. Garantarea accesului la resursele
economice, financiare, informaţionale şi de alt gen, necesare pentru desfăşurarea
liberă a procesului productiv şi a drepturilor inalienabile de maximizare a
beneficiului sunt condiţii de bază pentru securitatea economică a producătorilor
ca obiecte ale securităţii economice naţionale.
• Securitatea economică a proprietarilor de factori de producţie presupune libera
utilizare, valorificare şi dispunere de către aceştia a factorilor ce le aparţin.
Alături de aceasta, proprietarii factorilor de producţie au dreptul la o remunerare
adecvată pentru transmiterea drepturilor de utilizare în activitatea economică a
factorilor. Unele dintre criteriile fundamentale care determină remunerarea
factorilor de producţie este productivitatea acestora, riscurile la care se expun şi
gradul de implicare în activitatea economică.
• Securitatea statului semnifică asigurarea resurselor economice necesare pentru
îndeplinirea funcţiilor sale politice, economice, sociale şi a altora pe care le are în
conformitate cu Constituţia şi cu alte acte normative. Evitarea situaţiilor de
blocadă economică, financiară, energetică, alimentară externă şi internă este
condiţia de bază pentru asigurarea securităţii economice a statului. În asigurarea
securităţii sale economice, statul nu va atenta la securitatea economică a
consumatorilor, a proprietarilor factorilor de producţie şi a producătorilor.
Deficienţele şi vulnerabilităţile sistemului economic şi securitatea economică

naţională:
Funcţionarea sistemului economic naţional pe parcursul perioadei de tranziţie la
economia de piaţă se produce în condiţiile unei crize structurale şi conceptuale acute
şi poate fi caracterizată de următoarele deficienţe şi vulnerabilităţi majore:
• Din cauza lipsei sau subdezvoltării elementelor infrastructurii constitutive a
economiei naţionale (piaţă de capital, bursă de valori, burse agricole şi de
mărfuri, camere regionale de comerţ şi industrie, reţele informaţionale),
privatizarea masivă a proprietăţii de stat nu a fost urmată de creşterea economică
scontată şi de majorarea rentabilităţii şi productivităţii muncii;
• Politica financiar-fiscală a statului, având obiective bugetar-fiscale imediate,
este lipsită de un fundament strategic care ar stimula activitatea economică a
producătorilor naţionali, din care cauză este unul dintre principalii factori ce
contribuie la tergiversarea deficitelor bugetare anuale, la înrădăcinarea unor
practici de evaziune fiscală şi la consolidarea economiei subterane;
• În pofida dependenţei absolute a economiei naţionale de resursele materiale şi
energetice externe, până în prezent nu au fost elaborate politici guvernamentale
viabile pentru reducerea caracterului energofag şi materialofag al economiei

ANUL 2001.
naţionale, precum şi pentru identificarea şi mobilizarea unor surse alternative, ne-
tradiţionale, de energie.
• Criza în care se află producătorii naţionali este aprofundată de promovarea
incoerentă a unor politici ultraliberale vizavi de mărfurile străine de calitate
dubioasă, care la preţuri-dumping inundă piaţa internă, de absenţa unor norme
tehnice faţă de calitatea şi fiabilitatea mărfurilor de import şi de coruperea masivă
a unor organe de stat însărcinate cu controlarea fluxurilor comerciale şi
economice transfrontaliere;
• În absenţa politicilor necesare pentru fortificarea unui mediu investiţional
adecvat şi pentru promovarea imaginii externe a ţării, activitatea investiţională
demonstrează o dinamică net inferioară celei potenţiale, diminuând în continuare
sub influenţa unor factori non-economici (crima organizată, corupţia, interesele
politice, taxele de protecţie, birocraţia, absenţa unor tradiţii contractuale
credibile) care intervin în activitatea firmelor private;
• Absenţa unui model investiţional-productiv (geoeconomic) în relaţiile
economice externe condiţionează lipsa posibilităţilor reale de participare plenară
a producătorilor naţionali la fluxurile de mărfuri, valutare şi financiare mondiale
şi determină dependenţa completă a economiei naţionale de factorii climaterico-
geografici;
• Ca urmarea a utilizării inadecvate a ajutorului economic şi financiar extern,
Republica Moldova a intrat într-o criză serioasă de solvabilitate externă, care, în
lipsa unei creşteri economice susţinute, se poate transforma într-o incapacitate de
plată;
• Anihilarea legăturilor dintre producător şi sfera cercetărilor şi dezvoltărilor
tehnologice a condiţionat uzura morală a tehnologiilor folosite în ramurile
economiei naţionale, competitivitatea redusă a mărfurilor moldoveneşti şi
pierderea sau sub-utilizarea avantajelor comparative ale Republicii Moldova în
relaţiile economice internaţionale.
Aceste deficienţe conceptuale şi structurale, au cel mai nefast impact asupra
obiectelor securităţii economice naţionale, fortificând riscurile şi ameninţările în
adresa acestora.
Riscurile şi ameninţările în adresa securităţii economice
Riscurile principale la care este expus sistemul economic al Republicii Moldova,
după originea şi forma de manifestare, pot fi clasificate în interne şi externe.
Principalele riscuri interne sunt:
• Degradarea definitivă a potenţialului uman şi intelectual naţional - factor
determinant al dezvoltării şi puterii economice;
• Utilizarea inadecvată şi ilegală, de către persoane cu funcţii de
răspundere, a resurselor bugetare în interese personale sau criminale;
• Instituirea monopolului ne-natural, de stat sau privat, în domeniile de
importanţă vitală sau strategică şi divizarea pieţelor prin încheierea acordurilor şi
crearea cartelurilor ilegale;
• Pierderea avantajelor comparative strategice şi transformarea ţării într-un
furnizor de materie primă agricolă şi forţă de muncă ieftine;
• Relansarea spiralei inflaţioniste, devalorizarea monedei naţionale şi
intrarea ţării într-o stare de stagflaţie de durată;

ANUL 2001.
• Transformarea economiei în una de subzistenţă ca urmare a dependenţei
totale de factori exogeni incontrolabili (climă secetoasă, degradarea ecologică a
solurilor, expunerea la fenomene meteorologice catastrofale);
• Trecerea definitivă a capitalului în sfera economiei subterane şi ilegale ca
urmare a unor politici fiscale şi sociale inadecvate dezvoltării sectorului productiv
legal;
• Criminalizarea şi politizarea sistemului financiar-bancar.
Principalele riscuri externe sunt:
• Incapacitatea de plată a datoriilor externe, izolarea financiară a Republicii
Moldova şi întreruperea ajutorului financiar, economic şi tehnic extern;
• Substituirea masivă a produselor naţionale prin produse străine de calitate
proastă, importate la preţuri de dumping;
• Atragerea şi implicarea directă a firmelor şi băncilor din Republica
Moldova în circuitele internaţionale de spălarea a banilor, de trafic ilicit şi de
crimă economico-financiară transfrontalieră;
• Afectarea sau distrugerea sistemului financiar-bancar ca urmare a crizelor
economice şi financiare regionale şi mondiale;
• Limitarea posibilităţilor de export şi de desfacere a mărfurilor
moldoveneşti ca urmare a stării economice precare în care se află principalii
parteneri comerciali ai Republici Moldova;
• Controlare unilaterală şi utilizarea subversivă a resurselor şi obiectelor
economice şi de infrastructură naţionale de către un stat străin sau de către
corporaţii străine.
Principalele ameninţări în adresa securităţii economice naţionale a Republicii
Moldova pot fi considerate:
• Acţiunile orientate la anihilarea posibilităţilor de integrare a Republicii Moldova
în Uniunea Europeană;
• Blocada economică şi financiară impusă de state sau de organizaţii internaţionale
şi regionale;
• Separatismul intern care afectează sau poate afecta integritatea economiei
naţionale;
• Acţiuni orientate la subminarea capacităţilor de asigurare adecvată a sistemului
economic cu resurse energetice;
• Activităţi care pot conduce la accentuarea dependenţei economice unilaterale a
Republicii Moldova de ţări şi pieţe de desfacere.
Prevenirea ameninţărilor şi contracararea riscurilor în adresa securităţii

economice
Statul asigură un cadru legal clar şi competent, necesar pentru desfăşurarea
activităţii economice, un sistem bancar stabil şi controlabil, un sistem de creditare
efectiv şi adecvat şi un mediu investiţional favorabil plasării investiţiilor naţionale şi
străine. În acelaşi timp, este asigurată monitorizarea adecvată a balanţelor de plăţi şi
comercială a ţării în scopul contracarării posibilităţilor de controlare unilaterală şi
utilizare subversivă a resurselor naţionale de către un stat străin sau de către corporaţii
străine. Guvernul ia măsurile necesare pentru conservarea energiei, formarea
rezervelor necesare pentru situaţii de criză şi diversificarea surselor de import a

ANUL 2001.
energiei şi a resurselor energetice. Pentru asigurarea creşterii economice statul va
încuraja formarea întreprinderilor cu capital străin şi cu participarea capitalului străin.
Ministerul Economiei, Ministerul Finanţelor şi Banca Naţională a Moldovei va
elabora un program de activităţi în caz de blocadă economică sau sancţiuni economice
impuse de alte state. Guvernul este responsabil pentru luarea măsurilor necesare de
contracarare a contrabandei, corupţiei, spălării banilor şi altor crime financiar-
economice şi va elabora un proiect de lege cu privire la starea excepţională în sistemul
economic.
Interesele economice naţionale:
Interesele economice naţionale sunt scopuri de bază în domeniul economic intern
şi extern, de realizarea cărora depinde independenţa politică şi economică a Republicii
Moldova, dezvoltarea multilaterală şi plenară a personalităţii umane şi asigurarea
viitoarelor generaţii cu resurse necesare pentru dezvoltare în condiţiile unei societăţi
în globalizare. Asigurarea intereselor economice naţionale este finalitatea tuturor
politicilor de securitate economică.
Principalele interese economice naţionale ale Republicii Moldova sunt:
• Valorificarea adecvată a potenţialului uman şi intelectual naţional.
• Obţinerea unei imagini externe favorabile pentru dezvoltarea mediului
investiţional.
• Reducerea ponderii economiei tenebroase.
• Corectarea deformărilor structurale ale economiei naţionale.
• Implementarea modelului geoeconomic (investiţional-productiv) în relaţiile
economice internaţionale.
• Diversificarea pieţelor de desfacere prin ocuparea nişelor strategice pe pieţele din
zona de interes geoeconomic prioritar.
• Depăşirea dependenţei energetice unilaterale.
• Restabilirea integrităţii economice a Republicii Moldova.
Executarea politicii de stat în domeniul securităţii economice:

În baza conceptului de securitate naţională a Republici Moldova şi a doctrinei
securităţii economice naţionale a Republicii Moldova, ministerele, departamentele şi
alte structuri guvernamentale întocmesc anual propuneri concrete în domeniile din
competenţa lor, pentru asigurarea securităţii economice naţionale, şi ţin cont de
prevederile doctrinei securităţii economice naţionale în toate planurile lor de activităţi.
Pentru monitorizarea şi asigurarea securităţii economice naţionale, în componenţa
Consiliului Economic Superior de pe lângă Preşedintele Republicii Moldova este
creat Comitetul de Gestionare a Crizelor şi de Securitate Economică, care este compus
din 9 membri. Parlamentul, Guvernul, Banca Naţională şi Academia de Ştiinţe
numesc câte 2 membri ai Comitetului, iar Preşedintele Republicii Moldova numeşte
preşedintele Comitetului. Membrii Comitetului sunt numiţi pe un termen de 3 ani, cu
dreptul de a fi reconfirmaţi. Comitetul de Gestionare a Crizelor şi de Securitate
Economică este responsabil de realizarea obiectivelor securităţii economice naţionale,
de evaluarea anuală şi de ajustarea doctrinei de securitate economică naţională şi de
întocmirea planul de acţiuni concrete pentru monitorizarea şi asigurarea securităţii
economice naţionale.

ANUL 2001.
DEZVOLTAREA GUUAM – O NECESITATE VITALA PENTRU

REPUBLICA MOLDOVA
Consilier judetean Laviniu Enii,

Institutul de Studii Crestin Democrat Bucuresti
NOI PERSPECTIVE PENTRU VIITORUL SE EUROPEAN
Evolutia geostrategica a Republicii Moldova trebuie azi sa urmeze noile

evolutii aparute in spatiul est-european si ex-sovietic, precum si al bazelor noi pe care
se aseaza relatiile Statele Unite – Rusia.
Extinderea NATO si UE, grabite de politica de “open-doors” a
presedintelui Bush pe de o parte, respectiv a celor 15 dupa “episoadele” Nisa si
Göteborg, precum si efectele intentiilor Rusiei de a-si reafirma statutul de mare putere
nu trebuie sa gaseasca responsabilii de la Chisinau nepregatiti a face fata noilor
coordonate pe care se axeaza viitorul Europei.
Noi perspective se deschid astfel pentru viitorul sud-estului Europei, una
din cele mai sensibile regiuni ale Batranului Continent. De la Marea Adriatica la
Marea Caspica, acest spatiu a fost si este inca strabatut de convulsii, dintre care
tensiunile interetnice, conflictele armate sau instabilitatea economica sunt cele mai
grave probleme in calea dezvoltarii normale a statelor din regiune. In ultimii ani,
implicarea celor mai importante institutii economice si militare europene si euro-
atlantice in solutionarea diverselor probleme ce framanta sud-estul european a dus la
cel putin o atenuare a tensiunilor care, necontrolate, ar putea destabiliza nu numai
regiunea in cauza ci intreg continentul.
In ultima perioada semnalele din partea principalilor actori politici,
econmici si militari ai spatiului euro-atlantic s-au intensificat, contrazicand astfel
temerile in privinta dezinteresului fata de statele mici ale spatiului ex-sovietic: NATO,
UE, OSCE dar si Rusia s-au aratat tot mai interesate in directia Chisinau mai ales in
perspectiva deloc indepartata a extinderii celor doua mari organizatii pan-occidentale
pana la granita de pe Prut.
UNDE SE AFLA REPUBLICA MOLDOVA?

Republica Moldova se gaseste inca in situatia de a proba increderea
potentialilor parteneri strategici, incredere fara de care nu se poate vorbi de un viitor
sigur in ceea ce priveste evolutia economica si geo-strategica a micului stat sud-est
european. Aceasta incredere se poate consolida numai printr-o politica consecventa,
responsabila, caracterizata de o maxima seriozitate, politica neinfluentata de
alternantele la putere ale diferitelor forte politice, interesul strategic al Moldovei
trebuind sa primeze in fata interesului politic de moment.
Politica economica si de aparare a Moldovei trebuie sa se axeze pe
urmatoarele coordonate:
- relatia RM – NATO/UE in perspectiva aderarii Romaniei la cele doua
organisme;
- relatia RM – Rusia cu accent pe rezolvarea diferendului transnistrean si
pe aspectul dependentei energetice;
- politica regionala extra-CSI – Pactul de Stabilitate Sud-Est Europeana,
CEMN;

ANUL 2001.
- politica regionala a RM in cadrul CSI – GUUAM;
CSI – INCERCAREA DE REINVIERE A UNUI ORGANISM DOVEDIT

FALIMENTAR
Colapsul fostei URSS s-a datorat in primul rand falimentului economic al

sistemului comunist. Statele aparute dupa prabusirea sovietelor s-au dovedit a fi cele
mai afectate de urmarile unui sistem economic nefunctional, sistemul economic
hipercentralizat. Regruparea acestor state in jurul leaderului rus, fie si sub denumirea
de CSI nu se justifica in nici un fel. Pretextul unei similitudini cu UE nu sta in
picioare: daca tarile vest-europene au o economie de succes, tarile ex-sovietice sunt
inca la inceputul procesului de trecere la economia de piata. Spre deosebire de tarile
mai sarace ale UE, ca Irlanda, Grecia, Portugalia, care beneficiaza de fonduri
provenite in special de la “bogatii” Europei – Germania, Franta, Italia, Benelux,
Marea Britanie – in scopul reducerii decalajului economic, statele sarace ale CSI nu ar
avea posibuilitatea de a se bucura de sprijinul financiar al Rusiei, ea insasi fiind intr-
un impas economic care o situeaza la marginea colapsului, facand-o dependenta de
sprijinul financiar al fostilor adversari din timpul razboiului rece. Insasi UE cunoaste
un proces deosebit de sinuos si de anevoios in ceea ce priveste consolidarea
mecanismelor sale si aceasta in conditiile in care nivelul de dezvoltare economica si
stadiul de democratizare ale celor 15 sunt incontestabil superioare nivelului atins de
noile state ex-sovietice.
O INITIATIVA LAUDABILA, UN VIITOR PLIN DE OBSTACOLE SI

INCERTITUDINI
Astfel, initiativa infiintarii unor organizatii multistatale in spatiul ex-

sovietic, dar bazata pe principii noi, in spiritul egalitatii si interesului comun este
deosebit de benefica in conditiile imposibilitatii crearii unei CSI functionale.
Cuplarea unui numar restrans de state in aliante create in jurul unor
interese comune deosebit de viabile si nu in functie de interesul de moment al liderilor
politici poate fi singura posibilitate reala de iesire din impas pentru tarile respective.
Iar ratiunea constituirii GUUAM a fost cum nu se poate mai actuala si mai motivata.
Grupul GUUAM tinde insa sa devina, din nefericire, inca unul din
proiectele care risca sa se blocheze inainte de a ajunge la maturitate. Inca de la
infiintare, proiectul crearii in cadrul nefunctionalei CSI a unei uniuni de state
eficienta, vazuta ca o alianta economica si, eventual, defensiv-militara a fost etichetat
drept “contraproductiv” fiind permanent criticat si obstructionat. Paradoxal, tocmai
aceste permanente tentative de subminare a consolidarii acestui grup dezvaluie de fapt
importanta deosebita si eficienta de care ar da dovada acest angrenaj in cazul unei
functionari reusite.
Garantia eficientei unei astfel de asocieri, potentialul extraordinar de
dezvoltare de care ar dispune grupul GUUAM sunt date de bazele deosebit de solide
pe care grupul s-a constituit:
- d.p.d.v. economic, constituirea acestei uniuni de state de-alungul
coridorului de transport euroasiatic care reface vechiul Drum al Matasii
precum si de-alungul proiectatului oleoduct Marea Caspica-Europa de

ANUL 2001.
Vest via Marea Neagra reprezinta o ratiune de a fi deosebit de bine
motivata, poate cheia de bolta a preconizatei dezvoltari spectaculoase a
regiunii;
- d.p.d.v. strategic si militar, nu este intamplator ca pe teritoriul
GUUAM se gasesc nu mai putin de 4-5 puncte “fierbinti”: Transnistria
– in RM; diferendele in privinta Crimeei si a flotei de la Marea Neagra
– in Ucraina; Osetia de Sud si Abhazia – in Georgia; Nagorno-Karabah
– in Azerbaidjan. Nu trebuie uitat ca fiecare din tarile grupului in care
se deruleaza tensiuni separatiste negociaza mai mult sau mai putin
direct cu Rusia problemele legate de tendintele secesioniste ale
diverselor entitati in discutie, precum si retragerea armatelor de
“mentinere a pacii’ rusesti aflate pe teritoriul lor. Elaborarea unei
politici coerente si convergente in ceea ce priveste politica de aparare
si de solutionare a diferendelor va oferi un randament sporit in fata
fragmentarii initiativelor in acest sens.
In ultimul timp insa, au fost tot mai dese semnalele care au alimentat
temerile in privinta unei dezvoltari normale a organizatiei.
Intarzierile, amanarile, ezitarile si oscilatiile in ceea ce priveste soarta
acestei organizatii sunt poate de inteles pana la un punct, tinand cont de dificultatile
intampinate pe toate planurile de toate statele fostului URSS. Insa prelungirea acestor
incertitudini, intarzierea procesului de consolidare a organizatiei prevestesc evolutii
deloc benefice pentru viitorul economico-strategic al regiunii.
GUUAM – O NOUA CEFTA
Dezvoltarea organizatiei de-alungul rutelor de transport comerciale si

energetice Europa-Caucaz-Asia va avea urmari de cea mai mare importanta pentru
tarile din regiune. Insasi existenta GUUAM ca organizatie interstatala, in momentul
consolidarii ca un intreg pe deplin functional - cu institutii comune, politica externa
convergenta, cu o strategie defensiva bine coordonata - va reprezenta o forta
indiscutabil importanta in contextul situarii la intretaierea atator zone de interese.
Astfel, organizatia se desfasoara pe o arie de confluenta intre spatiul euro-atlantic,
Rusia, Lumea Araba si continentul asiatic. Inchegarea unei constructii regionale stil
CEFTA sau Grupul de la Visegrad ar constitui un punct clar de atractie pentru
investitorii vest-europeni si nu numai, mult mai motivati in a participa financiar la
proiecte dezvoltate unitar de statele regiunii si netrebuind sa tina cont de interese
divergente care ar putea sa apara in cazul fragmentarii si disparitiei organizatiei.
Tarile est-europene care au constituit Grupul de la Visegrad au dovedit un
extraordinar spirit de echipa, facandu-se auzite ca o voce comuna mult mai puternica
atat in negocierile de aderare la Uniunea Europeana cat si la NATO. Constituirea
CEFTA in jurul aceluiasi grup de tari est-europene (considerata ca o anticamera a UE)
a avut acelasi scop: crearea unei zone a liberului schimb, menita sa usureze tranzitia
catre integrarea economica cu vestul si sa atenueze din efectele produse de exigentele
UE impuse tarilor aspirante la aderare.
Invitarea Republicii Moldova de a adera la o serie de organizatii europene
si euro-atlantice (Parteneriatul pentru Pace, Pactul de Stabilitate in Sud-Estul Europei,
Cooperarea Economica la Marea Neagra, Organizatia Mondiala a Comertului etc.)
precum si incurajarea GUUAM de a se transforma intr-o zona a liberului schimb (este
cunoscuta chiar disponibilitatea administratiei americane de a sustine financiar

ANUL 2001.
proiectele de consolidare institutionala a GUUAM) sunt tot atatea indicii in favoarea
necesitatii cooperarii regionale, a coordonarii eforturilor statelor cu interese comune
in sensul integrarii si eliminarii dificultatilor economice.
In cazul in care, pe termen scurt, alte oportunitati de iesire din impasul in
care se afla din punct de vedere economic nu exista, pentru tarile GUUAM traseele de
transport preconizate a se dezvolta sunt singura cale spre independenta energetica si
de aici, spre dezvoltarea economica de care au atat nevoie. Este o ocazie care trebuie
fructificata cu orice pret.
RUSIA – TEMERILE “FRATELUI MAI MARE”
Punctul de inflexiune cel mai important pe sinusoida existentei GUUAM il

reprezinta opozitia Rusiei, temerile acesteia in ceea ce priveste intentiile celor 5. O
uniune de state ex-sovietice - construita in primul rand pe criterii economice - in afara
Rusiei nu trebuie vazuta ca o sfidare sau chiar o amenintare a intereselor ei. Este
normala si binevenita dorinta fostelor state mai mici ale fostei URSS de a-si proiecta
un viitor propriu, fara implicarea “fratelui mai mare”, asa cum se intampla in fosta
URSS, situatie intalnita si in functionarea (tocmai de aceea dificila) a actualei CSI. Si
aceasta in conditiile in care Rusia, in calitate de principal actor pe scena comunitatii
nu dispune de forta de a-si ajuta in primul rand material “satelitii”, avand ea insasi de
infruntat probleme deosebit de stringente.
Relatia Rusia-Moldova trebuie reasezata pe raporturi de egalitate, fiind
necesara inlaturarea oricaror urme de relatii de vasalitate care au functionat in fosta
URSS.
Deosebit de periculoasa s-ar dovedi atragerea Rusiei in cadrul GUUAM
(idee vehiculata recent) datorita riscului iminent de blocaj in functionarea
mecanismelor grupului: cele 5 state mai mici vor fi din nou coplesite de disproportia
dintre membri, existand tendinta fireasca spre o evolutie a organizatiei in interesul
celui puternic, fapt ce ar crea frustrari si reactii adverse nedorite.
Pe de alta parte, retragerea Moldovei din acest grup, precum si orientarea
ei catre Uniunea Economica Euro-Asiatica sau catre nucleul acesteia (Uniunea Rusia-
Belarus) ar duce catre acelasi deznodamant: o aliniere a Moldovei catre un curent prea
puternic pentru ea care ar duce la o diminuare a posibilitatilor ei de afirmare.
Totodata, chiar Rusia a incurajat formarea Uniunii Economice Euro-
Asiatice in cadrul aceleiasi cvasi-ineficiente CSI, semnarea acordurilor de la Minsk in
sensul consolidarii Acordului privind Securitatea Colectiva dovedind inca o data ca
nucleul pro-rus din CSI nu ezita sa se consolideze in momentul in care interesele o
cer. Mai mult, revigorarea ApSC dupa modelul defunctului Tratat de la Varsovia, cu
plasarea fortelor armate ale statelor semnatare ale tratatului sub o comanda unica
devine deosebit de semnificativa… (este vorba de cele trei grupuri regionale: cel
vestic - Rusia-Belarus, cel caucazian – Rusia-Armenia si cel central asiatic – Rusia-
Kazahtan-Kirghizstan-Tadjikistan, ale caror forte armate revin sub comanda Rusiei in
caz de agresiune).
Temerile rusesti in privinta viitorului GUUAM se dovedesc astfel a fi in
contradictie cu interesele reale ale celor 5.
SEPARATISMUL – UN INAMIC COMUN
Cele mai fierbinti puncte de tensiune existente in spatiul ex-sovietic se

gasesc pe teritoriul tarilor membre GUUAM. Separatismul transnistrean, cel abhazo-

ANUL 2001.
osetin, problema Crimeei (cu tot cu chestiunea flotei de la Marea Neagra), conflictul
armeano-azer din Karabahul de Munte sunt tot atatea obstacole in calea linistirii
regiunii. Alaturi de problema cecena si conflictul din spatiul ex-iugoslav, ele
reprezinta marea provocare pentru Europa inceputului de secol. Pentru Republica
Moldova, activitatea regimului de la Tiraspol reprezinta principala amenintare la
adresa stabilitatii si dezvoltarii economice, a insasi existentei ei ca stat. Retragerea
sprijinului cel putin “moral” pe care trupele inca stationate in stanga Nistrului il
acorda regimului extremist de la Tiraspol devine de o importanta deosebita. Presiunile
la adresa Tiraspolului (primele efecte s-au concretizat prin ineceperea procesului de
eliberare a detinutilor politici) trebuiesc coroborate cu cele in directia retragerii
contingentelor rusesti din regiune.
Acelasi lucru este valabil si pentru Caucaz. Retragerea trupelor rusesti din
asa-zisele “republici” separatiste ar reprezenta inceputul normalizarii situatiei din
regiune.
Coordonarea eforturilor diplomatiilor tarilor GUUAM confruntate cu
problemele separatiste, adoptarea unei strategii de aparare comune, in spiritul
principiilor Parteneriatului pentru Pace ar mari considerabil efectele asupra factorilor
de decizie implicati. Decizia asa-zisilor “ministri de externe” ai republicilor
secesioniste de a se intalni (chiar la Tiraspol) pentru a pune la punct o strategie
comuna in vederea consolidarii autonomiei ar trebui sa aiba ca efect tocmai aceasta
solidaritate a guvernelor tarilor afectate de separatism in ceea ce priveste politica
externa.
A FI SAU A NU FI “SUB VREMI”
Sfarsitul de secol XX si inceputul noului veac gasesc statul moldovean

intr-un moment de rascruce. Noii lideri de la Chisinau poarta pe umeri decizii de o
importanta capitala pentru viitorul tarii. Momentul infaptuirii unei Europe unite, a
unui continent asezat pe bazele democratiei si economiei prospere sunt din ce in ce
mai aproape. Acest proces va fi incununat de succes doar atunci cand Europa va
deveni un intreg, de la Atlantic pana la Urali, iar estul european va fi vindecat de
ranile lasate de anii totalitarismului.
Integrarea presupune vointa din partea tuturor statelor europene: atat din
partea democratiilor occidentale de a intinde o mana catre estul inca bolnav cat si din
partea fostelor tari socialiste de a continua drumul reformelor institutionale si
economice pe care au pornit.
De aceea Republica Moldova, care si-a afirmat continuu dorinta de
consolidare a institutiilor democratice si economice in spirit european trebuie sa
continue drumul spre Europa. Iar cei care o conduc pe acest drum trebuie sa se supuna
unui singur interes: acela de a-si vedea propriul popor in randul marii familii a
democratiilor europene.

ANUL 2001.
THE CONFLICTS IN MOLDOVA AND OUTSIDE WORLD
Comparative Study
by Nicoletta Munteanu
Introduction
Moldova is one of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union with
around 4,5 million inhabitants of different nationalities and a surface area of 33,700
sq. km. The independence movements in Moldova emerged in 1989, ended in
proclamation and recognition of Moldova as a sovereign state in 1991. The
international community in terms of adopting the democratic reforms perceived
Moldova as one of the most successful ex-Soviet Union republics. Nowadays the
democratization process is undermined and threatened, and according to the last
elections, non-democrats are officially ruling the country. Moldova is perceived by
SIDA as the poorest country in Europe, but also as a failed state. One of the reasons of
the country's failure is also due to its two domestic conflicts in Gagauzia and
Transnistria. Both conflicts at the moment of emergence had some similar features:
they took place in the same time, in the same region and country, with more or less
similar initial causes/reasons but with different outcomes. Why did the conflicts take
different forms? Why one of the regions is still considered to be a high potentiality of
a future conflicts: is it because of the actions of various actors involved, demands of
the conflicting parties or is it because of different methods of conflict prevention used,
or maybe the international community's role or its absence affected the outcomes?
The prevention measures reduced the violence in the Transnistrian conflict, but why
did these actions could not or did not solve the Transnistrian conflict fully, its effects
being seen even today after more than 9 years of the cease-fire?
Both ethnic conflicts are a part of the 21 chain effect armed conflicts from the Soviet
Union. The absence of ethnic conflicts in Moldova prior to 1989, distinguishes the
Transnistrian and Gagauzian from other conflicts such as the ones is Abkhazia,
Nagorno-Karaback, Chechnya. Both cases showed that they started as a response to a
"nationalist agenda" promoted by Moldova, and as every conflict, successive response
of each party involved, amounted to the escalation (Transnistria) or the diminution of
the conflict (Gagauzia). The perception of threat over their identity, the mobilisation
of forces by parties involved to confront the perceived threat, lack of time and
knowledge for a lucid answer not just prepared the ground for the conflicts but
intensified them. What the Moldovans perceived as a “patriotism”, was considered as
"nationalism"1 by the non-Moldovans. Democratisation, the pattern that Moldova
chose after 1989, on another side does not exclude the national unity.
Both conflicts were likely to occur. Moldova taking the path of independence and
democratisation suddenly not gradually, with a lack of historical legacy as a
democratic society, disorganised institutional arrangements, and weak economically
created favourable grounds for generating ethnic tensions. Besides, Moldovan
1
The purpose of the paper was not to define nor to explain whether this was a nationalstic movement
or not. More on nationalism to be found in Smith, Anthony ”The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism”,
Snyder, Jack ”Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State”, Hassner, Pierre ”Beyond
Nationalism and Internationalism: Ethncity and World Order” in edited by Brown, Michael “Ethnic Conflict and
International Security”
. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1993. About nationalism aspect in Moldova
confclits consult O’Loughlin, Kolossov and Tchepalyga “National Construction, Territorial Separatism
and Post-Soviet Geopolitics in the Transdniester Moldavian Republic” published in “The Post–Soviet
Geography and Economics”, V.H.Winston & Son, 1998, 39, No. 6.

ANUL 2001.
legislative and executive bodies were too weak to keep the different ethnicities out of
military clashes, and hardly able to ensure the security of individuals. Concerning the
character of conflicts, the Gagauzi conflict may be considered ethnic in nature, while
the Transnistrian was rather political and ideological with a struggle of different
groups and parties for power. The importance of the erupted violent conflict in
Transnistria is that it produced "dizzying array of new political arrangements",
changing the geopolitical environment, and is associated with the collapse of the
Soviet Union.
Defining Armed Conflicts

To define the conflicts in Moldova I have used several terms such as intra-state,
ethnic, minor armed conflicts. According to Brown an intra-state conflict is an “ethnic
conflict” which is not necessarily "ethnic in character”. This is a conflict arising
between two or more ethnic communities on matters concerning politics, economy,
society, culture or territory2. The ethnic conflicts range from involving little or no
violence to “full-scale military hostilities” and before they are defined as conflicts,
they start as domestic disputes sometimes emerging into interstate conflicts when
outside powers become involved3. In scientific literature they are also known as
domestic conflicts.
Tishkov define ethnic conflict as "any form of civic clash within or across state
boundaries when, at least, one of the warring parties is mobilised and organised along
ethnic lines or on behalf of a certain ethnic group"4. According to him the ethnic
conflicts in the former Soviet Union space can be classified in long-term violent
conflicts (1); short-term violent clashes, with unorganised primary parties and mass
violence (2); and non-violent conflicts with ethnic, political and religions
confrontations or tensions (3).
A violent conflict is "an armed conflict which implies a contested incompatibility”
over government (or political power) and/or territory (power over land) between at
least two parties5. The parties, or actors involved can be state/government that have
the legitimate rights in the country, and non-state parties, in opposition to the
government. Non-state parties can be political parties, movements, any organisations
or alliances of opposition that "announced a name for their group and uses armed
forces"6. The outcomes of conflict can be peaceful reconciliation, peaceful separation,
or war7 with refugees, arms and soldiers and civilian death. Based on this definition
conflicts range from low-intensity to major armed conflicts.
2
Smith, Anthony, defined ethnic communities and its characteristics in ”The Ethnic Sources of
Nationalism” edited by Brown, Michael “Ethnic Conflict and International Security”. Princeton University Press, New Jersey,
1993.
3
Brown, Michael “Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflicts” published in “Ethnic Conflicts and
International Security” Princeton University Press, 1993, p.4.
4
Nozdreakov, Ruslan uses Tishkov's definition in his Master Thesis "The Policy of the Russian Federal
Government Towards the Ethnic Conflicts in the Northern Caucasus". Uppsala University, 2000
5
Wallensteen, Peter and Sollenberg, Margareta. “Armed Conflicts, 1989-99” published in "States in
Armed Conflicts 1999", Report 55, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Uppsala University,
2000. p. 20- 22
6
ibid.
7
Brown, Michael “Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflicts”. Princeton University Press, 1993.
According to the definitions presented by Brown, the ethnic reconciliation would mean a peaceful
resolution of the existing ethnical issues, posing few problems for the outside powers, through
negotiations, that might involve also the constitutionals arrangements, which would ”address specific
concerns and grievances” without any violence. An example of such ethnic reconciliation is the
granting of more autonomy to the Catalans, Galiticans and Basques in Spain, or autonomy to the

ANUL 2001.
The ethnic conflicts depend on the choices adopted by the belligerent parties in
opposition to the State. This influences not only the ethnic policy of the region, but
also the settlement techniques of the conflicts:
1. “cultural revivalism” that is the interest of a minority group without a statehood or
with limited experience as a sovereign state to rebuild their identity through the “re-
adoption” of cultural and historical values,
2. “political autonomism” that is specific to a more organised ethnicity, with a
majority living in a neighbouring country fighting mainly for more political rights,
3. “territorial self-determinism”, specific for a larger ethnic group, living on compact
territories in a large majority fighting for the independence of this territory or for a
more independent status as a part of federation or confederation,
4. “separatism”, characteristic for “ethnically and compact populations, usually with
some history or statehood, who openly oppose the inclusion in the existing federal or
unitary state”,
5. “irredentism”, that is a separatist action towards unification to a neighbouring
country either as a separate administrative unit or an autonomous region8.
Wallensteen and Solenberg define three types of armed conflicts. Transnistria is listed
as a minor armed conflict, while Gagauzia is not listed at all. According to them, a
minor armed conflict is a conflict where “the number of battle-related deaths during
the course of the conflict is below 1,000”. This type of conflict is different from an
intermediate armed conflict, “with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths recorded
during the course of the conflict, but fewer than 1,000 in a particular year” or war or
with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths during a particular year. The last two in
these categories can fit into the category of major armed conflict that implies the use
of armed force between the military agencies of two or more governments, or of one
government and at least one organized armed group, resulting in the battle-related
deaths of at least 1000 people in any single year with the incompatibility concerning
the control over government and/or territory. Major armed conflicts constitute the
larger majority of conflicts, and two-thirds of the armed conflicts recorded in 1998.
The conflict in Transnistria had a bigger impact in the international literature of peace
and conflict studies comparing to the conflict in Gagauzia and is listed in the States of
Armed conflicts published in SIPRI book of 2000. The same publication states that
between 1998-99 there have been 110 armed conflicts in 73 locations around the
world. Out of them, 37 were active in 28 places in 1999. Only in 1992 and 1993 the
incidence of intensive conflict was higher. The number of wars doubled in 1998, after
a marked decrease that had also started in 1992. Most wars took place in Africa.
Quebec region in Canada. The ethnic separation, are the ”velvet divorces”, or agreement of living apart
of the existing parties. A major role is played again by the international community, or outside powers
that shall make the right decisions in the right time for violent conflicts to not erupt. Examples of such
peaceful separation are the break-up of the Soviet Union, or the division of Czechoslovakia into
separate independent republics. Ethnic war, are the violent ethnic disputes between the antagonistic
ethnic groups who ”are not able to agree on new constitutional arrangements or a peaceful separation”.
The demands of the rebellions might vary from case to case from seceding and/or establishing
independent states, creation of independent states within confederation, independent political entity
within a federal state, or just more political, cultural, or administrative autonomy within the existing
state. If the international status quo is unchanged, or if there are no direct effects on the international
community, then it is likely that it will not interfere into the domestic affairs of the country.
8
Bugajski, Janusz “Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: a Guide to Nationality Politics, Organisations
and Parties”. Center for Strategic and International Studies, M.E. Sharpe, 1995, p. xxii-xxiii.

ANUL 2001.
According to the same source, 7 conflicts were interstate conflicts. New armed
conflicts emerged in 1999 in Russia (Daghestan), Ethiopia (Oromiya). 4 conflicts
reescalated in: Russia (Chechenya), Indonesia (Aceh), Philipines and Ethiopia
(Somali). Only 6 conflicts listed in 1998 were not longer active: United Kingdom
(Northern Ireland), Egypt, Cambodia, Tajikistan, Lesothih, Indonesia (East Timor).
Most of the conflicts were intrastate, like the ones in Moldova. Foreign interventions
were recorded in Congo and Yugoslavia. It is also very interesting to note that peace
agreement was the least common type of conflict termination in 1989-999. The default
of this publication is that, it doesn’t analyze the causes of escalation, reescaltion or
termination of conflicts.
Introducing Conflict Prevention Theory

As studies show, the difficulty of reaching a peaceful reconciliation or
separation is proven by the fact that only 20% out of all conflicts terminated in peace
agreements, while 60% still continue to be active10. Peter Wallensteen would argue
that some conflicts don't develop to a higher level of intensity for reasons such as
limited resources of parties, little support or ways the "preventive actions of the
internal and external actors" are used11.
These preventive actions are the preventive interventions that constitute the basis for
preventive diplomacy. Thus, preventive diplomacy is a set of "constructive actions
undertaken to avoid the likely threat, use of diffusion of armed force by parties in a
political dispute"12. Preventive diplomacy helps, if properly applied, to overcome
present and/or potential conflicts, ensuring security through "proactive, co-operative,
long-term" approaches. There are two situations the prevention diplomacy covers:
1. political disputes that might lead to their escalation into conflicts with use of
armed forces;
2. already existing conflicts that might develop into a higher intensity ones.
In the first case the preventive diplomacy measures focus on reducing the tensions do
not escalate in conflicts, while in the second case, the preventive actions focus on
decreasing the violence in the already emerged armed conflicts with the objective of
ending them. Margaretha af Ugglas identifies four situations when the preventive
diplomacy measures shall be used:
1. to prevent disputes from arising between parties,
2. to prevent disputes from developing into conflicts,
3. to eliminate conflicts when they occur
4. to contain and limit the spread of those conflicts not amenable to swift
elimination.13
There is not a unique prevention diplomacy recipe. Preventive measures vary on a
case to case basis, depending on the incompatibility, time frame, parties involved, etc.
9
http://projects.sipri.se/conflictstudy/MajorArmedConflicts.html,
a report of all armed conflicts
is published by the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at Uppsala University,
futher published in SIPRI Yearbook since 1988
10
Wallensteen, Peter and Sollenberg, Margareta. “Armed Conflicts, 1989-99” published in "States in
Armed Conflicts 1999", Report 55, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Uppsala University, p.
12
11
ibid.
12
Wallensteen, Peter. “Preventive security: Direct and Structural Prevention of Violent Conflicts"
published in Wallensteen, Peter "Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past records and Future Challenges"
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1998. p. 11
13
Af Ugglas, Margaretha ”Conditions for Succesful Preventive Diplomacy” in ”The Challenge of
preventive Diplomacy”. Minsitry of Foreigh Affars, Stockholm, 1994, p. 12

ANUL 2001.
Still, there are established guidelines incorporated in the typology of conflict
prevention, which shall be undertaken and used accordingly. The two types of conflict
prevention are: "structural conflict prevention" (SCP) and "direct conflict
prevention" (DCP).
The table* below shows the differences between them:
SCP DCP
Results in the long-run in the short-run
Aims • to establish constructive future • to avoid and manage if already
relationships among the groups in created an immediate conflict
conflict • to stop violence and killing
• to build a "better society"
Issues • democracy, good governance • conflict early warning systems
addressed • international norms, tribunals • a nearing particular crisis
• expansion of networks and
organisations
Approach structural operational
* Peter Wallensteen
A moderation of a conflict is to create very good conditions from preventing serious
tensions to develop into becoming real conflicts. Or, as Eliason state, "war should not
be fought, war should be averted"14. De Nevers suggests that a good solution
undertaken by the local government is the creation of a good political environment, by
structuring the “electoral system of the state so that most political parties and
mainstream politicians cannot perceive a political advantage in adopting extremist
positions on ethnic issues”15. Also, according to him in a case when ethnic tensions
have already started and become violent, then there is not too much that can be done
until the conflicts spent themselves, exception being the windows of opportunities that
politicians might use for promoting a favourable political climate of moderation and
negotiation16. However, this can happen only when the parties in conflict are weak
and/or when they understand that further violence will worsen their existing positions.
Thus, the parties in conflict may use extreme policies, from denying the ethnicity in
conflict (by extermination, expulsion or forced migration) to the set-up of federal
arrangements (federation or confederation) by partitioning the state and changing its
existing boundaries. Democratic countries promote the negotiation tools that would
engage in a dialogue all relevant groups able to solve the conflicts, including the
ethnic leadership.
Brown would probably argue that since the civilian slaughter shall not be tolerated
and since it is “morally diminishing” when the civilians are attacked not just
indiscriminately but deliberately and systematically, this fact being a violation of
international norms and behaviour, the international community has a moral
obligation and a legal right to intervene17. The importance of suppressing a war
became a priority for the UN, while the "UN Charter imposes an obligation on
Member States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means."18 Generally
14
Eliasson, Jan and Rydberg, Robert “Preventive Action and Preventive Diplomacy" published in
Wallensteen, Peter "Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past records and Future Challenges" Department of
Peace and Conflict Research, 1998. p. 39
15
De Nevers, Renee “Democratization and Ethnic Conflicts” published in “Ethnic Conflicts and
International Security” Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 63
16
ibid, pp.61-76
17
Brown, Michael “Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflicts” published in “Ethnic Conflicts and
International Security” Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 17.
18
Eliasson, Jan and Rydberg, Robert “Preventive Action and Preventive Diplomacy" published in
Wallensteen, Peter "Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past records and Future Challenges" Department of
Peace and Conflict Research, 1998. p. 39

ANUL 2001.
"it is always better for the international community to be present in however limited
capacity and in whatever form, than not to be in place at all"19.
The conflict prevention theory relies on rules/techniques to be followed that have
been established as a consequence of successes or failures of up to date conflicts.
These techniques are listed in Appendix 2 as positive and negative lessons. The other
key factors to a successful preventive diplomacy have been defined by Margaretha Af
Ugglas. They are:
• the degree of political support from the parties concerned,
• the prudent selection of political and diplomatic instruments to be applied,
• a careful balance between public and quiet diplomacy,
• the adoption of long-term approach,
• the extent of co-operation with other international organisations20.
Some discourse analysis
What explains the different outcomes of the two conflicts? As we have seen, the
causes of the conflicts were the same and the level of country’s democratisation at
their emergency stage was in both cases the same. However, the size and powers of
various actors/parties in conflict, the ethnic communities of the previous regime and
their role in decision-making process, the presence or absence of the external direct or
indirect actors and the level of their involvement into the conflicts further determined
whether the conflict prevention measures could of been mitigating or exacerbating the
ethnic tensions. The settlement depended a lot not only on the central government
actions, but also on the choices of ethnic leadership and the involvement of
international community and neighbouring countries. The used preventive measures
played an important role but management/monitoring techniques of the conflict
played a much more significant role. The preventive diplomacy applied mostly by
Moldova was rather to stop the conflict from escalating into a major one, but not to
prevent a tension from becoming a conflict. However there are lessons that could be
learnt out of this in terms of both conflict prevention and management measures21.
The two cases showed that the preventive measures in settling conflicts should be
different, regardless of their similarities. While preventive diplomacy aims at the
conflict resolution - that is to end a conflict – it is most likely that not all conflicts end
when planned. For better results, prevention diplomacy shall incorporate conflict
management techniques, which means that these two should not exclude each other.
The approach presented by Wallensteen on the preventive diplomacy as a series of
techniques and effective measures based on negative and positive lessons is very
theoretical. The efficient conflict prevention measures require the potential conflict to
be detected in time. However, as it was proven, it is not easy to detect and predict the
escalation of conflicts. Besides, each tension requires a special attention and shall be
examined carefully and prevented before it becomes a conflict. If the conflict already
started, the preventive diplomacy is weak against the escalated war.
In terms of preventive measures used by the pro-democratic and anti-Communist
Moldova, in 1989-1992, some attempts in preventing and further settling the conflicts
succeeded. Unfortunately, Moldova hardly accepted during early stages of conflicts
any kind of compromises, coalition-building that would contribute to the non-
19
Wallensteen, Peter, “Preventive Security: Direct and Structural Prevention of Violent Conflicts"
20
Af Ugglas, Margaretha ”Conditions for Succesful Preventive Diplomacy” in ”The Challenge of
preventive Diplomacy”. Minsitry of Foreigh Affars, Stockholm, 1994, pp.13-14.
21
See Appendix 1, for the list of positive and negative lessons

ANUL 2001.
alienation of minorities from the democratic mainstream of the country. Its
resentment, antipathy and ignorance towards Russian and Gagauzian minorities were
largely linked to the former domination of the Russian minority and affiliation of both
minorities to the Communist Party. Instead of creating a foundation for a co-operation
and settlement of the disputes, the opposition forces intensified them, which lead to
armed conflicts. One of the major mistakes of the Moldovan government is that at the
early stage it addressed only the political wishes of the majority of population and
only some time later the minority wishes, with minorities consequently taking the
extremist positions. The leadership in opposition to the Communist Party did not
include the leaders of the ethnic groups. After all, the leaders of the ethnic groups
were rather extremists than moderates. Moderation in this contest would mean support
for negotiation settlements within the democratisation, but also avoidance of hostility
vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. As a preventive technique, Moldovan government could
have used the mass-media tools in calling upon civil responsibility.
In preventing its conflicts Moldova used both structural and direct conflict prevention
strategies with long and short-term results. We can not say that they did not work, but
they would have been more effective if used at the right moment. If the settlement of
Gagauzi conflict can be considered more as a result of bilateral discussions and
negotiations than the Transnistrian conflict, which presents a modern conflict, it was
difficult to evaluate and to predict and should be examined through the actions of all
relevant internal and external parties. Both Gagauzia and Transnistria have been
granted autonomy. In both cases the willingness to grant regional autonomy led to a
decrease in violence. Moldova was more concerned with keeping its integrity than
interested in secession.
From the other perspective, the international community required the gradual peaceful
settlement rather than drastic measures. Moldova thus could not confront this,
especially that depended largely on the credits of the World Bank and IMF. It is not a
secret that while negotiating a credit with Moldova, these international financial
organisations often set various so-called “democratic” conditions thus, Moldova was
not able to use any kind of economic or political sanctions against the Transnistrian
rebels.
Also due to criticism is the intervention of the international community in certain
situations only, such as the use of weapons of mass destruction. Even if they were not
used in any of these cases, a higher chance of them being used was in Transnistria.
This territory was open to any illegal operations that meant no control over the
weapons, either chemical or nuclear. From another perspective, the Cossacks from
Ukraine and the illegal traffic of weapons of mass destruction from Ukraine should
also not be excluded. Gagauzia was not of any threat from this perspective due to its
close ties with Turkey. Turkish government would not be interested in undermining
its reputation in front of international community by supplying Gagauzia with any
kind of weapons.
If we analyze the empirical data and dynamics of the two conflicts, the international
community got involved, only much later, and the international "authorities" were not
even present at the time the conflicts escalated. There were already enough political
forecasts before 1989, after the Gorbachov’s “glasnost” and “perestroika”, that these
would lead to some ethnic tensions in the already weakening Soviet Union, however,
the international community tended to ignore this fact and took the “non-intervention”
approach. The argument of the international community that “it was not ready” is not
relevant. How could the international intervention otherwise be explained in the Baltic

ANUL 2001.
States? There can be only two explanations: either that the cases were not considered
of a great importance and of any interest for the international community, or that these
regions are under the Russian sphere of influence and international community and
have no interest in interfering in its so-called “domestic issues”. The international
community could have considered Moldova as a good possibility for the West to
penetrate and weaken the Russian empire, however this was probably not the case,
since until December 1989, Romania, Moldova’s neighboring country was still under
the Ceausescu regime and it was unlikely for the Western society to penetrate the
Russian domains, passing over another communist country. This was possible only in
1990, but Moldova was too small and uninteresting for the international community,
which changed its focus from the former Soviet Union area towards Romania and
other Central and Eastern European states.
The Transnistrian conflict received more support than the Gagauzi one from
international organizations. CSCE/OSCE played a major role in settling the conflict,
and not preventing it, which is its main task, although this should be attributed to the
Russian troops attacks on the civilian population. Since the case of Gagauzia did not
really involve massive military aggressions on the civilian population (if we don't
consider the occasional violent clashes between the Moldovans and Gagauzi living on
that territory), international community did not consider their involvement necessary
in the respective case.
Important is to note the different outcomes because of the involvement or non-
involvement approach of the motherland countries. Russia strongly interfered in
Transnistria, where the Russian ethnic minorities were residing. Its intervention in
Gagauzia was much lower and used only for distracting attention and weakening
purposes of Moldova from the Transnistrian case. If the high involvement of
motherland, Russia, in one case was detrimental, the low involvement of Turkey, in
another case, was beneficial. So it depended largely on the policy the mother country
adopts.
The ethnic leaderships played an important role, not as much in preventing the
conflicts as in managing them. However, one does not have to expect too many
positive reactions from the belligerent anti-democratic parties. Transnistrian leaders,
receiving still a large support from Russia their hostile anti-government actions,
strongly reinforced by it, continue to request secession up to now. Besides, the
Transnistrian territory where the military operations took place is larger than the
territory of Gagauzia, both in terms of inhabitants and size. It is more economically
autonomous and viable as well as better military equipped. The choices of ethnical
leaders whether to cease fire or not, largely depends on these factors also.
As a conclusion, taking into consideration the theoretical framework, I shall mention
that the preventive diplomacy measures should be revised and modified. Important is
not just to prevent but also to monitor and manage the situation, whether there is a
conflict or not. As it was seen, the consequences of the conflicts have been disastrous,
weakening the economic performance, decreasing social and living standards of
population, and contributing to the rise of poverty and corruption in regions in conflict
and in the whole country. The political and economic stagnation led to a weak rule of
law and a weak civil society, low education and income, inaccessibility to the health
care and other services provided, with all these placing the country in the bottom part
of the list of the poorest countries in Europe. The three state formations, lacking the
border at the East Side, made it easy for the criminality to develop, thus increasing the
illegal operations and shadow economy. It is obvious that the local ethnic leadership
as well as the Moldovan administration lack the skills and the mechanisms of

ANUL 2001.
preventing the conflicts as well as managing and maybe resolving them, however
there is no excuse that the role of international community is so low. OSCE role as a
conflict prevention organisation as well as of other organisations should increase in
such armed conflicts, since they can endanger the situation not only in the region but
also in the whole Europe.
Appendix 1
14 negative and positive lessons of preventive diplomacy22
Negative:
1. Avoid making a case a precedent, otherwise action in one case may tie the
international community in another, similar conflict later.
2. Avoid "mission creep": stick to a set goal, do not change it unnecessarily.
3. Make any larger action clearly confined in time, no "for-ever missions" and
elections is a good ending point.
4. Make sure that there is financial basis secured for any larger operation before
acting.
5. In case of a peace operation, make sure there is a "unified command".
6. Focus whenever possible on humanitarian assistance for larger operations,
preferably through NGOs and keep direct conflict prevention to a separate political
process.
7. Whenever possible use other organizations than the UN.
Positive:
1. Act as early as possible, preferably even before a triggering event has taken place.
2. Act swiftly, with knowledge and purposefulness.
3. Use diplomatic means and rewards at the early stage of a conflict, reserve other
means for later stages.
4. Have the support of regionally strong actors, but do not necessarily act through
them.
5. Reward the local leaders that display moderation, avoid rewarding the others.
6. Use the established institutions, although they may be questionable.
7. Select situations and times where success can be expected for preventive diplomacy instruments,
find other means for other situations.
22
Wallensteen, Peter, “Preventive security: Direct and Structural Prevention of Violent Conflicts"

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DEFENSE PLANNING: CIVILIAN AND MILITARY

COOPERATION
Jack Petri
Colonel US Army (Retired)
Consultant to the Croatian Ministry of Defense
MPRI GSOS-G7
HVU “P. ZRINSKI”
ILICA 256b
ZAGREB 10000
CROATIA
(+385 1) 3786064 (office)

(+385 1) 3786366 (fax)
jpetri@demokratia.net
Essay prepared for the “International Workshop on Democratic Control of

Armed Forces and Security Sector Reform in Moldova,” co-sponsored by the
Euro Atlantic Center of Moldova, the Geneva Center for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces, the Institute for Public Policies of Moldova, and
supported by the NATO Office of Information and Press, held in Chisinau,
Moldova, 12-13 July 2001.

ANUL 2001.
DEFENSE PLANNING: CIVILIAN AND

MILITARY COOPERATION
INTRODUCTION
While it is generally agreed that in most NATO countries, there are effective practices of
democratic control of defense policy in place, they are not necessarily formally established
practices, based on constitutions or laws. They are more likely to be of an informal nature. It
must be admitted that for all of our countries, democratic control of armed forces (DCAF) is,
ultimately, an ongoing process; it is not something that is ever really completed. I believe it is
also generally agreed that for Partner countries, it is better, in this area, not to follow our
example of a general lack of formal practices, but rather, to lay out in their legislation, and
policy-making apparatus, more formal roles and responsibilities of the players in the national
security and defense business. It is quite clear that there is no Western model for civil-military
relations (CMR). But at the same time the search goes on for Western standards for effective
CMR. Other than in some thoughtful academic works, I have yet to see an official MOD
produced set of standards for CMR from any of the NATO countries, with the possible
exception of the 3 newest members. Further, I see no inclination or necessity on the part of
the 16 NATO countries to formally codify sets of standards. When we look closely into the
MODs of countries where CMR works relatively well, understanding that tension is a
permanent characteristic of CMR, even in the best of circumstances, we find that success is
due to practices, norms, and procedures that have evolved over time, and are now more or
less institutionalized. As we get down to the level at which civilian and military staff officers
conduct the business of defense and the armed forces, and which I, for my own convenience,
refer to as the ‘operational level of CMR,’ we can see what some of those practices are.
I’ll talk about the difficulty of establishing control over defense planning in the absence of
essential management tools; or, in other words, in the absence of a defense planning system.
When we speak of control, not only are we talking about aspects such as civilian personnel in
key positions in the MODs, and parliamentary oversight, and an effective public debate on
issues of national security and defense, but also we want to be talking about the
accountability of both civilian and military personnel in the MODs and GSs. Without formal
management systems, there is no effective accountability – which by the way is one of the
reasons why it takes so long for these systems to really come alive – there is not always a
great rush to be accountable.
I’ll also be talking about these systems as a medium in which attitudes can be changed in the
context of CMR.
First, some discussion of types of systems necessary to support missions assigned to armed
forces, and what happens when they are absent, or not enforced, then relating the systems to
civil-military cooperation (in many instances there is not even mil to mil cooperation).
And how oversight of defense planning really doesn’t work until these systems are in place,
and I am speaking of oversight from all levels. If, for example, the GS doesn’t’ effectively
employ formal systems for determining requirements, or projecting expenditures, or for how
money may be spent, and tracking expenditures, they will not have adequate data for their
leaders to use to address the many questions associated with budgeting. And this works its
way through the MOD, and up to the parliament, where the tough questions about where the
money is going and why, and what the priorities are, and why, need to be asked (and
adequately answered), and the need for parliamentarians to be able to draw upon more than
just the MODs and GSs for their information. And we need to address the fallacious and
counterproductive assumption that good CMR means that civilians tell the military what to do
and how to do it, and the military does it.

ANUL 2001.
For the purpose of this essay I’ll be referring to the General Staff (GS) as inclusive of the
military service headquarters’.
Defense Planning Systems
When we speak of democratic control of defense policy, we are generally referring to control
and oversight of the development of policy. More specifically, and importantly, we are
referring, usually by implication rather than directly, to not only the development of policy, but
also development of the management systems and programs that flow from policy; in effect,
the policy tools. And even further, we assume, often incorrectly, that the policies almost
automatically result in effective management systems, and that they will actually be
implemented in the intended spirit of the policies. Just as strategic documents (National
Security Strategies, White Papers, etc.), stating that defense planning and budgeting will be
transparent often do not result in such transparency, policies directing effective budgeting,
realistic force structures, rational acquisition systems, or force readiness, often do not reach
their goals. One of the primary reasons for this is the lack of the management systems and/or
a failure to properly implement or enforce the systems where they exist.
I would like to present a few examples of the systems I am talking about. I think that it is
important for our colleagues that are in the transition process to be exposed to these systems,
because this is another necessary kind of interoperability. Until similar systems are in place,
there will be limited effective interoperability between Partner states and NATO, which is
important if that is a nation’s goal. It is also of importance for those of us that are working to
assist the transition effort. We should know how vital it is for the defense and armed forces
establishments to have these kinds of management systems in place, what doesn’t happen
in their absence, and how they serve as a medium for CMR at the operational level. We also
have to know that as parliamentarians become better equipped in their oversight
responsibilities, defense and the military will find it difficult to respond to increasingly more
detailed inquiries, without the solid data these systems provide.
For example, a formal system of requirements determination is one of the fundamental

planning systems in any Western armed forces. Force restructuring and modernization really
cannot be effective in the absence of a formal means of determining and prioritizing needs. In
the next few minutes, it is not my intention to give a lesson on force planning, a key subsidiary
of defense planning, but rather to give something of an overview of critical systems that we do
not often find effectively operating in nations in transition.
Requirements determination determines existing deficiencies in doctrine, organization,

materiel, personnel and training in the current force’s ability to successfully execute its
missions, and the analysis and identification of alternative means to improve force capability.
This is accomplished through analyses of groups of similar battlefield systems, such as tank
killing systems, or air defense systems, command & control, or intelligence systems. The
objective is to determine deficiencies, shortcomings, opportunities (such as new technologies
that may be used to enhance current systems), and to determine current and future needs
that must be satisfied in order to perform missions derived from National Security Strategies.
(A critical, and rather common conflict is often evident in this area, whereby the missions are
assigned, and the budgets are inadequate to achieve mission capability or readiness,
however, this interesting discussion is beyond the scope of my essay, though it certainly
bears further attention.)
The analysis of these battlefield systems or mission areas considers such elements as the
threat (this requires a realistic threat analysis), review of concepts and doctrine for validity,
lessons learned (both our own and others), vulnerabilities, missions, input from major
commanders, and technology. Simulations are widely used in the West as a very useful tool
in such a process. The analysis tells us what the needs are. The environment, threat,
technology, as well as senior leaders and commanders, are in a constant state of change,
which forces military planners to analyze current and future force capabilities, on a virtually
continuous basis, and in a methodical way.

ANUL 2001.
When requirements are determined to be in the areas of doctrine, training, leader
development, or other areas that are mostly the domain of the military, the action is passed to
the appropriate GS agency for development. When the requirement is for materiel, either
new or to improve current systems, the requirement enters into an acquisition decision-
making process. The requirement decision enters an analysis and evaluation phase,
involving both MOD and GS planners and leaders, which may result in a decision to create a
funding element within the budget. Funding allows programs to be initiated, impacting force
modernization.
The acquisition decision system provides the framework to identify and prioritize resources
and the management processes necessary to execute senior leadership decisions within
resource constraints. The system also provides the structure and information necessary to
ensure that decisions faithfully execute national policies and guidance.
Developing experience in such analyses is important; for it provides the insights necessary to
improve force capability based a rational process, a process that can be clearly articulated to
support the conclusions.
Without systems like this in place the validity of proposed changes or acquisitions are difficult
to prioritize and justify, the input to the budget process is flawed, and accountability comes
into question.
Budget systems of a cyclical nature, that provide for near to long term planning, and contain
programs for major groups on which the budget will be expended, make up a key element of
the foundation of any defense planning system. Even for small countries, defense budgeting
is a complicated business. It is less complicated for those nations in which the process
remains very centralized. In such circumstances, the process is also less effective, less
accountable, and certainly less transparent. Without the active involvement of MODs in the
budget process, effective oversight is hobbled, or exists in name only. Without the informed
input from the GSs, such as formally determined and prioritized requirements, with their
justification, a budget system overly centralized at the MOD level will not be effective.
Although hierarchical, defense budgeting has to be a shared effort between MOD and GS.
GS planners perform analyses on an ongoing basis, so that new data is constantly entering
the system for consideration and analysis, producing recommendations for decision-makers.
But this cannot be accomplished in isolation. The system works properly only when there is
an interactive relationship between MOD and GS. Interactive cannot be defined as the
presentation of uncoordinated decisions from one party to the other, regardless of the
direction. Interactive must be defined as the collaborative effort of defense and GS staff
officers, civilian and military. Interactive staff work allows for the MOD planners to be aware
of the development of military requirements, as data is analyzed and recommendations are
made. MOD planners are then better able to ensure that these developments are in
accordance with national security strategies, defense guidance, and budgetary goals and
objectives. And it also gives them the opportunity to raise questions and provide MOD level
input during the process. Pretty basic one would say, correctly, but also very much lacking in
most transition countries.
Even these few paragraphs may be more than you ever wanted to know about Requirements
Determination and budgeting, but I think it is important to have an understanding of why these
systems are so essential.
They provide more than the rationale for force restructuring or force modernization; they also
provide a medium in which we can build more effective CMR. When they are not in place or
not enforced, there is a strong likelihood that the wrong requirements may be identified for
funding. We have seen over the past 10 years continuous examples of Partner nations
funding NATO related activities or purchases, only to find later that due in large part to the
absence of formal systems like those I have just described, the funding was misplaced, or
that sufficient funding was not available to support the activities they have signed up for, or
materiel they have committed to purchase. There are certainly instances where the military

ANUL 2001.
have agreed at the outset that the goals can be reached, without having conducted the
necessary analysis to support this, but it is also the case where the civilian leadership makes
commitments, at times for strictly political purposes, that are beyond the ability of the military
to meet. Inevitably, such outcomes lead to a search for the guilty, and increased conflict in
CMR, not to mention the unanswered questions about the costs involved in membership in
PfP and NATO.
Oversight
My colleague from the DCAF center has raised several issues requiring attention in the
parliamentary area. Under the rubric of parliamentary oversight of defense planning and
CMR, I would like to take a few minutes to connect some of the parts of this complicated
equation.
With increased attention on democratic control of armed forces, and the relationships
between civilians and military over the past few years, discussions surrounding the role of
parliaments are becoming more practical; but the challenge for parliamentarians of identifying
what needs to be known, and how to find out, remains.
The challenge regarding parliamentary oversight of defense and armed forces rests on both,
or more specifically on all 3 of the parties: parliaments, MODs, and the GSs. First, those in
parliaments responsible for matters concerning defense and the armed forces face a steep
learning curve vis-à-vis their oversight responsibilities. Parliamentarians and their staffers
must be educated. But in the crush of politics in most countries in transition, the focus on
learning about defense and the armed forces is not always a high priority.
What is it in MOD and GS planning that needs approval of parliaments? Quite simply,
anything that requires money, the nature, or effectiveness of how planning is done, force
capabilities and readiness, and more subtly, the vast area of personnel, from recruiting,
through how they are cared for and managed, to retirement. Money is needed for weapons
systems, training facilities, operations and maintenance, personnel, and other major
categories. Who answers the questions about requirements – only the military? Are more, or
new tanks needed? Would it be possible to refit the tanks in the current inventory for less
money and still meet the mission needs? What are the life cycle costs of refit versus new
tanks? That question may reveal that in the long term, the refitted tank may cost much more
in upkeep (maintenance). So it’s important to know what the right questions are, and to be
able to obtain responses from sources other than the military. In the main, parliaments are
looking at budget execution in the context of readiness, for virtually everything the military
does orients on readiness, readiness to perform missions deriving from national security
strategies.
Experts in MODs and GSs can be of great assistance in the education process of
parliamentarians, not only through the formal process of parliamentary committees calling
them for formal sessions, but also in the informal process where the defense and military
experts are able to interact with parliamentarians and their staffers away from committee
rooms, where some of the most important learning occurs, on the part of both groups. But in
many countries this kind of a process is not sanctioned by the MODs or GSs, or not
demanded by the parliaments, for a number of reasons, the great majority of which are
flawed. If the process of democratization continues, parliaments will ultimately learn how to
ask the hard questions. The result of a lack of effort on the part of the defense or military
establishment to really assist parliaments will cause parliamentarians to take much longer to
learn their jobs, and relations between them and the MODs and/or military suffer in the
process. So they both lose, at least initially. In the longer term, the MODs or GSs lose the
most, in credibility as well as support for their programs.
One of the major benefits for the defense and military leadership in developing a healthy
interaction with their parliaments is that it allows them to become informed of developing

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areas of concerns of parliamentarians and take pro-active steps to respond to these
concerns.
Formal and informal means of interaction between the defense, or military, and parliaments
are accomplished in a variety of successful ways in most NATO nations. There are a number
of ways that military experts can contribute to the education of parliamentarians, but in order
for this to happen, the parliaments normally have to request it, and the MODs/GSs comply. In
many countries there is too little of both.
Even in the best of circumstances, getting answers from the MODs and GSs, alone, is not
sufficient. Experts outside of the strict defense and military community must be involved in
order to provide outside analyses to parliaments. That is why it is so important for
academicians, research organizations and other NGOs, as well as the media, to be involved
in a civilian community of defense and military experts. They not only provide alternative
views, and with maturity the ability to generate expert data, but also contribute to the
education of society on these issues. Initially, the military is very reluctant to have outsiders
enter what has been their very exclusive domain, but in time, this outside community
becomes diversified, with elements that support, as well as criticize aspects of defense
planning.
Finally, as I discussed above, in the absence of formal defense management systems, neither
the military nor their civilian counterparts in the MODs will have sufficient tools to build the
data necessary to justify their planning, budget and other priorities to parliaments.
COOPERATION
Problems in cooperation between the defense and military establishment and parliaments are
usually only part of a more pervasive problem, a lack of cooperation within and between
MODs and GSs. Without effective management systems in place that require a continuous
flow of analyzed, and coordinated information, and feedback, information is not properly used,
and decisions are often flawed. (Any manager or leader knows well how easy it is to make a
bad decision, if the available information is flawed.) And it is not that there is an intention on
the part of the military to avoid doing their job better; it’s just that when there was so little
accountability – in the sense we use it in a democracy – the very centralized methods of
decision making, a lack of the principle of delegating authority, a tradition of concealing rather
than sharing information, or classifying information beyond all reason, were not challenged,
because the decisions were not challenged. Finding ways of getting people to work with one
other is not, perhaps, the stuff of esoteric discussion, but it is most certainly a major, and
fundamental problem to be solved.
Many MODs in transition are not only dealing with this legacy, but the related phenomenon
that even when presented with information by one group, a receiving group may elect to do
nothing with it. To illustrate, some time ago I was asked by a friend of some years, who was
working in a Partner nation MOD, to assist in a high visibility force-downsizing project. I was
provided with a draft concept of some 30 pages and asked if it would be possible to review it
and comment, by the next day – the document had just been translated. I provided him with
several pages of detailed comments and recommendations. In his response he mentioned an
incident that he described as common practice. In a meeting with GS representatives a week
earlier, after going over the details of the concept – which the GS personnel had been given
almost 2 weeks prior to the meeting – there were almost no comments, and no
recommendations at all. Most interesting is that the lion’s share of work on this project would
have to be accomplished by the GS.
I spoke with a colleague in the GS, who had been at the meeting, and asked about this lack of
involvement. He told me that the position of the GS was that when they were directed by the
MOD to implement, they would determine the best way to do so, and therefore there was no
need to “waste time” on the development of the MOD concept.

ANUL 2001.
In defense of the GS, I was also aware of several instances where they had submitted
recommendations to the MOD, only to have them ignored. I would like to be able to tell you
that these are isolated examples, but they are not.
The results of dysfunctional practices such as this are a failure to develop both policy and
plans based on the integrated best thinking of staff officers (regardless of civil or military),
and, often, an actual subversion of implementation, resulting in the original and valid goals not
being achieved efficiently, and sometimes not at all.
There is a great need to find ways to bring the staffs of MODs and GSs to work between and
within their organizations.
I believe that this divisive practice has been below the effective focus of nearly all of the
assistance efforts I have seen, not to mention MOD and GS leadership in most transition
countries, and has been allowed to continue, and even deteriorate in many countries, for too
long. While I understand a reasonable degree of reluctance on the part of NATO to get too
deeply into the inner workings of a Partner state, we have to realize that without some
leveraged assistance somewhere from the West, many of the countries in transition will not,
of their own accord, take this problem on in a serious way.
SUMMARY
In this brief essay, I have focused on defense planning and how the lack of good
management systems hobbles the process. I hope I have provided some useful insights into
why such systems are so important in the relationships involving MODs/GSs and parliaments,
and why it is necessary for parliamentarians to learn about the tools the military requires to be
effective managers, and to develop multiple sources of information. Finally, it was my intent
to raise the awareness of the real challenge we face in getting civilians and military alike to
effectively cooperate with one another in the transition nations, and the role effective
management systems can play in fostering improved CMR in defense planning.

ANUL 2001.
Some Factors of National Security

of Moldova and Ukraine: Similarities and Distinctions
By Natalya Belitser,
Pylyp Orlyk institute for Democracy, Kyiv, Ukraine
The two countries referred to, representing newly established states having arisen as a
result of the collapse of multinational Soviet Empire, share with other former
republics of the USSR a number of burdens inherent in their past, and threatening
their very existence as independent states. To list briefly these negative factors, they
relate to the economic and social crisis consequent to the totally “planned”, prescribed
and state-regulated industrial and agricultural production, incompetence and easily
corrupted ranks of rulers, vast majority of whom has been cultivated by the
totalitarian communist regime or belonged to former “nomenclature”, and
disappointed, frustrated, and embittered ordinary people often experiencing a kind of
nostalgia for the paternalistic role of the state fully responsible for their destiny.
Despite these similarities, each of these countries, as each unhappy family, has its
own grievance, sufferings and fears, usually rooted in their historical and recent past.
As to the Republic of Moldova, a special place among the latter seems to be occupied
by the still acute trauma of bloody conflicts, resulting not only in human and material
losses and still displaced population, but also in a particular “post-conflict” public
mood unfavourable for decisive steps towards democracy and European integration.
For Ukraine, often predicted civic war between its western and eastern parts, as well
as forceful military attempts to curb separatist movements in Crimea, were fortunately
escaped, thus making further developments towards national consolidation less
painful, - at least theoretically.
Negative factors influencing the fate of post-Soviet states seem to be inevitable for a
transition period, especially taking into account unprecedented cruelty and scale of
mass repressions leaving whole nations and conquered territories drained of blood or
severely devastated. Therefore, one of the main problems faced by the NIS in terms of
their national security, apart from more conventional considerations about military,
economic, social, and ecological threats, may consist in those undermined human and
spiritual resources which are the necessary prerequisite for national rebirth and
ensuring of the further advancement towards modern European statehood.
This problem is closely related to widely discussed, both in Moldova and Ukraine,
lack of general “national idea” capable to unite people of these countries in their strive
for joining the family of well-established European nations. In other words, deep
internal splits divide the societies along the lines of self-identity. In Ukraine, the long-
lasted dominance of first Tsarist Russian and then Soviet Empire resulted in heavy
assimilation and Russification of population, especially in eastern and southern parts
of Ukraine. Combined with strong positions of Communist party in these regions,
skillfully using the hardships of the transition period for compromising the very idea
of national independence, this public mood tends to oppose “Western” values as
something alien and unacceptable, suspects European and Euro-Atlantic structures
and organizations of vicious plans to transform post-Soviet countries into their new
exploited colonies, and regards NATO – for Central Europen states, the most reliable

ANUL 2001.
and desirable prospect against military aggressions - as being aggressor itself.
Inherent in such a paradigm is a trend to join Russia or establish some “Union of
Slavic nations” which would actually mean the end of Ukrainian independence.
The problem of self-identity in Moldova seems to be an issue too delicate for an

outsider to touch it, hence, it could only be mentioned that painful split between
separate “Moldovan” and common Romanian identity may contribute to internal
instability, and thus should be handled with extreme care and caution in order to avoid
aggravation of public discontent. Perhaps, the general notion of prevalence of free
self-identity and mutual tolerance might be accepted before more crucial solution will
be found in the future. The lack of such badly needed tolerance might be illustrated by
the case of the Bessarabian Orthodox Church subordinated to the Bucharest
Patriarchate. Successive Moldovan governments refused to register it, claiming that to
do so would be to interfere in the internal affairs of the Moldovan Orthodox Church
which is subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate. Its complaint submitted to the
European Court of Justice in Strasbourg was followed by the decision about the
admissibility of this case and fixed date of hearing it on 2 October. Positive verdict of
this higher European legal authority, or even better, compliance with the
recommendation of internal “amiable settlement”, would mean a serious step forward
towards religious tolerance and at the same time, may diminish potent religious factor
of influence of former imperial power over Moldovan Christian believers. Here again,
the similarity can be easily observed with the religious situation in Ukraine, where
Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Moscow Patriarchate often plays a role of a
politicized force threatening national security of Ukraine. Recent events related to the
visit to Ukraine of the Pope Iohann Pavel II are a striking illustration of this.
The lack of united identity often described in terms of “political nation”, namely,
coherent entity of people considering themselves as citizens of the same country dear
to all of them – majority and minorities alike - irrespectively of their ethnic origin,
social status, or religious beliefs is often perceived as a main threat to national
security. Does it means that any kind of national or territorial autonomy versus
unified, consolidated unitary state, could – or should - be perceived as a threat to
national security? By no means the answer is positive. Whereas national/territorial
autonomy is a well-known, fully justified, and in many cases, successful solution for
solving modern problems of national minorities, in some particular cases, especially
during the transition period following the dismantling of multinational empires,
certain artificially created autonomies have nothing to do with actual minority rights
and mechanisms of their effective protection. They represent instead the result of
successful political manipulation of former imperial rulers, aimed at preserving their
influence or even attempting to restore their dominance over the former subject of
metropolis. Viewing from Ukraine, the self-proclaimed Transdniestrian Republic is a
striking illustration of such a situation, presenting by its overt separatist trends a direct
threat to national security of Moldova. Relief of such a threat might be directly linked
to the concrete terms and completeness of the withdrawal of Russian military troops
from the territory of Transdnistria. In this context, support provided by the
international community to sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova is of
outmost importance. In particular, a resolution approved by the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly’s Commission on Political and Security Affairs on 8 July 2000 should be
recalled that said, inter alia, that Russian troops must be withdrawn from the
Transdniester breakaway region “gradually but to tally” by 2002. So, now it is a

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matter of political will of the Moldovan government to observe the timetable of this
process.
Here, we see the situation very similar to that concerning the Russian Black Sea Fleet
based in Sevastopol but whose presence extends economic, ecological, ideological
and political influence over the whole Crimea, threatening to make this autonomous
republic an actual outpost of the RF in Ukraine. Potential ethno-political conflict in
Crimea instigated by military and political elite of the neighbouring country, though,
fortunately, not yet reaching the “point of no return”, remains one of the most serious
threats to national security of Ukraine. Moreover, taking into account the Crimean
Tatar factor, continuing attempts and pressure to make Crimea as “Russian” as only
seems possible, may represent a real danger not only for Ukraine and its immediate
neighbours, and not only for the Black Sea and Caspian region, but for the whole
Europe.
In contrast to the so-called Transdnistrian Republic of Moldova and Autonomous

Republic of Crimea – the latter formally legalized but nevertheless remaining rather
odd part of otherwise unitary Ukraine, such units as autonomy for Gagauz seem not
contradicting international law and already used practice, and as a legal solution of
Gagauz problem should not be considered as a threat to national security of Moldova.
Current troubles and difficulties, relating, inter alia, to implicit or explicit support and
sympathy provided by the Gagauz leaders to the rebel separatist Transdnistria, might
be, let us hope, of a temporary nature, and gradually disappear in a course of natural
changes of soviet and post-soviet generations and their replacement by differently
minded and oriented people. The latter, having been conscious of their own distinct
ethno-cultural identity, might well be fully loyal to their state recognizing and
respecting such an identity. Similarly, if such an awkward structure as an ARC would
be shaped as national/territorial autonomy of its main indigenous population –
Crimean Tatar people – that would mean not a growing threat to sovereignty and
integrity of Ukraine but, quite the opposite, its growing maturity as a democratic state
able to provide effective protection of the indigenous people living at the territory
belonging to Ukraine and having no other kin-state elsewhere.
Moreover, there is a certain similarity in both cases to use a chance for strengthening
national security of Moldova and Ukraine exactly due to existence on their respective
territories of these particular minorities that are potentially of essential help to
establish closer links of partnership with Turkey. Such a partnership would be an
indispensable contribution to the diversification of sources of energy (oil and gas
supplies), for diminishing the energy dependence from Russian sources whose current
monopoly establish one of the serious threats to national security, also an obstacle to
comply with standards established for countries of the European Union.
Therefore, a change of mentality in several spheres, concerning, in particular, internal

policy towards minorities and indigenous peoples, is badly needed both in Moldova
and Ukraine. Regrettably, the current situation is characterized by the essential
strength of left wing politicians, who managed to gain such a conclusive victory
during the recent parliamentary elections in Moldova, and also continue to hold strong
position in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. Being far apart from the
European-like genuine social democrats, they embody the strive for restoration of the
old regime, together with more immediate threat of bringing both our countries closer

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to the RF, and in the worst scenario – dragging them into the notorious Russian-
Belarussian Union. That would mean not only a failure of modern statehood and the
end for all hopes for European integration, but also the inevitable internal crisis up to
civil war. Respectively, all steps and measures counterbalancing this dangerous
tendency must be welcomed and intensified.
One of the possible directions on this path would be strengthening regional

cooperation, in particular, within the GUUAM format. Recent summit of the heads of
the GUUAM countries, taking place – after several politically motivated delays – in
Yalta, brought about the long-awaited institutionalization of this previously informal
association, its transformation into the international organization, and laid foundation
for its further successful cooperative efforts to overcome together numerous
difficulties faced by all member states. Further developments and success in
implementation of the adopted agreements would depend not only from the leaders of
the states and official bodies. Too much would depend on the emerging civil societies
of the newly independent states, and on their awareness and willingness to support
“from below” the initiatives developed and proposed from above. And unfortunately,
actual knowledge about the GUUAM and its prospects both in Moldova and Ukraine
seem rather poor, far from what is needed for the success of the whole enterprise.
Working together, NGOs, mass media, independent experts and other actors would be
able to make a remarkable contribution thus strengthening common civic movement
aimed eventually in making our countries full-fledged members of European nation
states.

ANUL 2001.
Scenarios of NATO enlargement and

the Membership Action Plan members.
Nicu Popescu
The Collapse of communism in the Central and eastern Europe created a world of new
aspirations, opportunities and threats. The last decade of the XXth century witnessed
radical changes in the European architecture, that manifested in some former Warsaw
pact members as a desire to accede to Euro-Atlantic security institutions.
For the last decade NATO has transformed itself into an institution with more
collective security functions. It defines security in more-inclusive terms, where the
security of NATO members is closely linked with the security of non-members in
Europe. NATO is giving implicit security guarantees to the “close partners”. The
degree of this implicit NATO guarantee varies with the level of interdependance
established with NATO countries through membership in the EU, as well as with
geography and the likelihood of future NATO membership. The level of this implicit
security guarantees is related to particular countries membership in other European
political and security entities, some of which act somehow within the NATO
framework. One of them, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), is a
consultative body set up as a forum for deliberations on security issues in Europe and
former Soviet space; another, Partnership for Peace (PfP), is a military cooperation
program between NATO and non-NATO countries. The membership in EAPC and
PfP are similar to the membership of the OSCE, which is the most inclusive
organization devoted to European security. The third and the most closed to NATO is
the Membership Action Plan (MAP) entity.
NATO has identified nine countries as being on track to membership through its
Membership Action Plan (MAP).
The MAP countries are: Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, FYROM, Slovakia, Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia. Croatia has recently applied officially for membership and joined the
group of applicants, known today as the “Vilnius 10”. The Czech republic, Hungary
and Poland, former Warsaw Pact members, joined the Alliance in 1999, following the
invitation to enter the NATO issued at the 1997 Madrid summit. For all the
applicants, NATO has established pre-conditions for consideration of new-members,
almost all of which involve internal democratic reforms rather than military
considerations. The MAP countries have been singled out by NATO as important to
NATO and capable of full integration at some future point.
The situation in the 9 MAP states in the context of their efforts to join the Alliance is
as follows:
Slovenia – the most qualified and attractive candidate for membership from NATO’s
strategic perspective. The costs of Slovene integration will be virtually nil, and the
benefits
will be potentially significant in view of NATO’s focus on the Balkans. There are no
reasons why this country could not join NATO after 2002, would it be from the

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political, economical or military point of view. Consequently, it is the most likely
future NATO member.
Slovakia – although it had some internal problems at the beginning of ’90, now, it is
moving successfully to NATO and the EU. Situated between NATO members,
Poland, Czech republic and Hungary, Slovakia seems to be indispensable to the next
round of NATO enlargement, thanks to its geographical position, and to its successful
reforms as well. Its army is relatively larger and more modern than the Slovenia’s
one. The cost of its integration will be low.
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia are the three controversial candidates for NATO. Their
advanced stage in meeting NATO’s criteria is offset by the strategic implications of
their accession, caused by Russia’s opposition to the acceptance of the three Baltic
states to NATO.
Romania and Bulgaria’s and strategic attractiveness is offset by their inability to meet
NATO criteria. Their role during the Kosovo crisis has convinced the West of their
reliability, and of their importance to stability in South-Eastern Europe. Romania and
Bulgaria are likely to bring considerable military heft and size to NATO. But the
problem lies in the poor result of economic and military reforms.
Macedonia and Albania – are the least advanced in meeting NATO criteria.
Moreover, because of serious hard and soft security problems the two countries
cannot be treated as real NATO candidates even in the mid-term. These two countries
are the only MAP members not being on the track of EU membership.
Scenarios of NATO enlargement.

ANUL 2001.
At the Washington summit in 1999, the Western leaders promissed to the NATO
applicants that in 2002, at the Prague NATO summit, a new enlargement round will
be announced.
NATO have not yet taken a decision upon which of the potential new members it
would welcome and when. The Alliance faces an intense internal debate between now
and November 2002, when the Prague summit will take place. At Prague, formal
invitations to join NATO are likely to be issued. However, the second round of
NATO enlargement is lacking the historic symbolism of NATO’s acceptance of its
first former Warsaw Pact members.
During this debate over the enlargement, some of the possible scenarios have already
emerged. The first, and the less probable one is the so-called <Big-bang>
enlargement. The idea of issuing simultaneous NATO invitations to all the aspirant
countries does not seem to be taken into consideration by NATO policy-makers,
although it has a certain support in the establishment of certain Western countries.
With situation in Macedonia aggravating, and general instability in the Balkans
arising again, FYROM and Albania are not seen in the West as potential NATO
members for the nearest future.
A second scenario of enlargement would be the most modest one, and it is called the
“Slo-Slo” plan. Its name comes from “Slovenia-Slovakia”. The “Slo-Slo” scenario is
advocated by some Europeans who fear that Russia’s alienation would be an excesive
price for NATO enlargement. If realized, this “minimalist” plan will lead to growing
frustration among the East-Europeans. While reticence towards enlargement in the EU
is growing, the realisation of the “Slo-Slo” scenario may be too high in terms of
security, for a united Europe. A double refusal or delay, from NATO and the EU, for
countries like Romania and/or Bulgaria, may have negative consequences for the
security archirecture of the continent and may lead to the preservation of the
“nationalized” defense in the “unintegrated” area of Europe.
The third scenario is put forward by the some Euro-integrationists, and it may be a
good example of the efforts to transform the Common Security and Defense Policy
(CSDP) into one of the pillars of the European security environment, which would be,
more or less, an alternative to NATO. The central idea of the suggestion is the
necessity of coming to a possible trade-off: admit Romania and Bulgaria, which will
not be ready for the EU for many years, to NATO to stabilize the Balkans; and offer
the Baltics quick EU membership with an implicit security guarantee. This plan
suggests that the EU feels confident about offering itself as a worthy alternative to
NATO. It comes from the EU plan to create by 2003 a rapid-reaction force that can
act appart from the Alliance, and is the result of the development of the CSDP.
There are serious arguments in favor of this plan. Firstly, the Big Three (UK, France,
Germany) bilieve that the price of Baltic states membership would be too high in
terms of the likely setback in relations with Russia. Secondly, most Europeans bilieve
that the greatest risks to their security lie in the Balkans, not in Russia, and the South-
Eastern Europe is the region which needs the stabilizing effect of NATO enlargement.
This position favors Romania and Bulgaria, as the biggest NATO aspirants and
countries with an important stabilizing effect in the region. So long as the Balkans

ANUL 2001.
remain politically precarious and militarily volatile, Romania and Bulgaria are seen as
important security-providers in the region. Ironically, the Baltics are readier to join
NATO, but the Southern Europe needs NATO more.
A possible, fourth, scenario is the “realistic Big Bang enlargement”, which means
inviting all the applicants, except for Albania and Macedonia, to join NATO in 2002.
If the decision of enlargement “from the Baltic to the Black sea” is not taken by the
West, the Baltic states on one hand, and Romania and Bulgaria on the other hand, are
likely to enter a fierce competition in their efforts to join NATO.
Romania and Bulgaria will emphasize their geographical advantages, size and
necessity to accede to at least one Western structure (NATO), while their EU
membership is not likely to happen in this decade. They will remind of their
unequivocally pro-Western position during the Kosovo crisis, even if they had to
suffer serious economic damage. Furthermore, the two countries will suggest that
their full NATO membership will contribute to the stabilization of the whole South-
eastern Europe. However, to join NATO, Romania and Bulgaria’s role of security-
providers should be reinforced with successful military reforms and good economic
background.
The situation is different for the Baltic states. From the economic and military point of
view, they are closer to NATO standards, but the political price of accepting them to
NATO is very high, which makes especially the Europeans to doubt whether they can
pay such a price for the acceptance of the three Baltic states.
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are considered as security consumers, rather than
security-providers. However the Baltic states have booosters in some Nordic NATO
members and, most important, in the USA. Still there is a long way to the unanimity
upon this issue. The basic arguments of the so-called “Baltoskeptics” are:
• The entry of the Baltic trio would hurt NATO’s relations with Russia, because the
latter would feel threatened and offended by such a move.
• The Baltic states’ location and size might make them “indefensible” in a crunch.
• Why not entrust the Baltic states’ security to the EU, or instruct the Baltics to
follow the Finland’s and Sweden’s neutrality models?
As a response, the Baltic states invoke the post-Cold War principle that “every
country has an inherent right to choose its security arrangements and allies”.
Moreover, some claim that the Balts are good security-providers, as they will boost
the allied air-defense and monitoring capabilities for the avoidance of a conflict.
Another argument is that the Balts have considerably progressed in meeting
qualifications goals. Furthermore, the “back-door” security guarantees from the EU
are not very credible, because the EU’s own defense organization will take a long
time to develop fully. And finally, they claim that EU membership is not a substitute
for NATO.
But some of the Balts’ arguments will not value too much
as the three Baltic states often treat each other as rivals rather than partners on their
way to NATO. Lithuania and Estonia bilieve that they have greater chances to enter
NATO in 2002 if treated individually. Estonia meets the political, economic and

ANUL 2001.
military criteria. But its small military size limits its contribution to NATO, and it is
still below the NATO “floor” level in indicators of the quality of armed forces.
Lithuania, and Latvia are not far beyond, with some shortfalls in meeting the
economic criteria. However their main shortcomings are in the military realm, with
constraints in the quality of their military forces.
The basic idea of the intra-Baltic rivality layes in Lithuania’s bilief that its
geographical positions is the main strategic argument in favor of accepting it. The
Lithuania’s policy- makers think that accepting only Lithuania to NATO would be a
good way to avoid a too negative reaction from the part of Russia, and at the same
time increasing NATO’s presence in the Baltic sea region.
Following the military criteria, the most significant problems facing the MAP states is
modernization of their army. One of the problems is the domination of ground forces,
and the low-quality of air force. Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia and
Albania are in the process of building their armed forces, and they currently cannot
ensure their own security and sovereignity. Consequently they are likely to become
security-consumers. In the case of the three Baltic states this security-consumption
will be even higher because of the specificity of the Baltic sea region-I mean the
presence of the Kaliningrad region of Russia, and the neutrality of Sweden and
Finland, which makes the three Baltic states potentially “indefensible”. Romania and
Bulgaria’s strategic attractiveness is offset by their inability to meet NATO criteria.
The countries are important to stability in South-Eastern Europe, but the economic
cost of their acceptance may be too high. Slovenia and Slovakia are indisputable
favorits of this second round of NATO enlargement, while Macedonia and Albania
are indisputable out-siders of the 2002 enlargement.

ANUL 2001.
Comparative study of national security:

Case of Transnistria and North Korea.
What kind of obstacles lies down the way of negotiation?
IPP Intrnational Conference

Chisinau, Republic of Moldova
Master Program: Tsukuba University
SATO, Keiji
2001.07.21
Introduction:
Settlement of Transnistrian conflict is main problem for Moldovan national security.

After an Snegr-Yeltsin agreement of cease-fire in 1992 July, OSCE, Russian
Federation, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Transnistria(PMR) sit at the
negotiating table, but we cannot easily find concrete way to settlement. President
Voronin negotiated with Smirnov about this settlement a time for two month and is
going to define Transnistrian status inside Moldova. However this trial also dose not
progress well. Voronin insists that Moldova has to keep integration as a single
sovereign state and the status of Transnistria must not violate current Moldovan
constitution. On the contrary, Smirnov opposes this status and maintains that Moldova
has to be organized by two (or three) equivalent subject, Moldova, Transnistria and
(Gagauzia). This disagreement in status is obstacle on promoting negotiation. We
expect that Smirnov, for time being, will not have a will to change his unyielding
attitude to negotiation. In addition, a withdrawal problem is also main subject on
thinking of Moldovan national security. In Transnistria there are much unknown arms
and armament not only of Transnistrian army but also of past Russian 14th army.
Unfortunately, it practices too slow that withdrawal process of past Russian 14th army
till limit in last day in 2002, which was decided by OSCE Istanbul Summit. Smirnov
insists the right of ownership in past Russian 14th army and does not approve of
OSCE document as illegal. At last Smirnov prepares for next presidential election,
and we expect that it have a possibility to make stronger authoritarianism
(dictatorship). If so, it will more difficult to be approved peaceful compromise
between them. Because, generally speaking, authoritarianism structure or dictatorship
keep unyielding attitude to negotiation. It will be difficult to dialog by democratic
way.
On the other hand, we can find some authoritarian and dictatorship governments
supported by unknown military strength within the sphere of Far East including Japan.
From the point of view of Japanese national security, we cannot ignore existence of
North Korea; develop a missile system to attack on whole Japan, “doubt” of develops
a nuclear weapon, “doubt” of taking Japanese habitants away, and so on. However we
have never been concluded peace treaty between us and have a few chances to
negotiate these problems. After 1992, negotiation between North Korea and Japan
started on Kim Il Sung government but we cannot find any progress till now. In last
10th negotiation in 2001, Japanese former foreign minister Kouno and North Korean
foreign minister Paku signed statement. This results simply “ we try to continue
negotiation”. They did not discuss any incident about missile issue and national
security problems.

ANUL 2001.
Then, because of participant from Japan, I would like to compare the case of
Japanese national security to North Korea with the case of Moldova to Transnistria
and make it clear obstacles in negotiation. The main goal in this presentation is that,
from this comparison, I describe reasons why it is difficult to negotiate with North
Korea about peace treaty and to propose possibility to resolve these problems. In my
method, at first I explain basic data and background as geopolitical location in North
Korea and Transnistria. And then I will shift theme to point of resemblance between
Transnistria and North Korea from military aspect. From this resemblance, At last I
would like to make clear reasons of unprogressed negotiation.
Background – Geopolitical location:
Main actors in negotiation
*Korean Peninsula
During Cold War (USSR, U.S.A, China, Japan) Present (U.S.A, China, Japan)
Korea is surrounded by huge country, U.S.A, Russia, China, and Japan from
geopolitical aspect.
*Moldova
1989-1991(USSR) 1992-(Russia, Ukraine, OSCE)
Moldova is located in Russian sphere of influence
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPKR, North Korea) is located in

Fareast, proximally 40 of degrees latitude and 125 degrees of east longitude. This
territory is about four times larger than Moldova. After ruling by Japanese Empire,
Korea split North Korea, which base on Communism and South Korea, which base on
liberal democratic state. In 1948 North Korea declared independence as sovereign
state. In 1950 it happened war between North Korea supported by China and USSR,
and South Korea by U.S.A by ideological difference. Although after a few years they
approved a cease-fire agreement, most of them do think, ”War is not ended”.
Sometimes we can find provocative action from North Korea. In Transnistria it
happened conflict between Front Popular Government and Transnistrian regional
government in 1992. Transnistrian movement was strongly supported by Soviet
Union, mainly Russian nationalist in wartime because of deterrence of Moldovan
nationalism. Moldova was not directly supported by foreign country. Compared with
this Moldovan situation, Korean War become big internationals war because China
and U.S. armies officially interfered to this war. On the contrary, in Transnistrian
conflict Russia or Ukraine might interfere to this conflict, but I cannot exact tell it
international war. Firstly Moldova is located in Russian sphere of strong influence. By
this Russian sphere, it is difficult that other foreign country interfere to his policy.
Especially at once after split Soviet Union, Western Countries were afraid to interfere
to Russian policy in past USSR space, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Chechen. Secondly
this root of conflict was made in Soviet period. Of course main Transnistrian conflict
happened after independence, but small conflict had yet happened between Chisinau
and Tiraspol.
North Korea is, what we call, communist and socialist state, which base on
dictatorship. But then, they name “Democratic” People’s Republic of Korea but this
“Democratic” structure is far from Japanese or U.S.A style. Kim Jhong Il, leader of
DPKR, has an authority in every field. In addition, his family and relations occupy

ANUL 2001.
main post of administration and government. Usual habitants are influenced by strong
propaganda, which teaches legality of this structure. It inclines to populism. This
structure is similar to Ciaushescu Romanian dictatorship system. On the contrary, we
cannot name exact Transnistria (PMR) communist state because many capitalists exist
there. Private Company is based on Transnistrian economy. In 1989-1991, Smirnov
said that it maintained communist and socialist structure against Moldovan capitalist
class, and was scheduled to join with USSR. However, after split Soviet Union he
changed this insists. He stated that they would find the way ”It is not communist state
nor capitalist state. From political aspect, this structure is similar to a kind of
dictatorship, which base on communism structure. Because to some extent it has yet
remains communism structure, Supreme Soviet Diet, KGB and so on.
99% of habitants in North Korea are Korean. We can say nearly homogeneous.
Compared with Moldova, which various ethnics mix and live, we cannot find ethnical
collision. Ethnic Russian accounts for 13 % of all population in Moldova, and 24% in
Transnistria. Russian name “minority” from statistical thought, but they have a strong
influence in Moldovan policy and economy, and we cannot say “weak minority”.
Comparison of Case of Transnistria and Case of North Korea:
Viewpoint for comparison (from military aspect)

1. Huge military strength
2. Dictatorship
3. Military manufacturing capacity
For comparison, I must define frame from what aspect I will look at Case of
Transnistria to Moldova and Case of North Korea to Japan. In this chapter I pick up
three stands point from viewpoint of national security. At first, let us look at military
strength. Transnistria and North Korea base on huge military strength. It organized
Transnistrian army in 1989. This number accounts about 4500 troops, which consists
of Unit of defense Ministry, Internal Affairs and State Security. It expects that on
urgent time this army is possible to expand to 25 thousand troops. If we compare this
number with number of all population in Transnistria, about 700 thousand, we can
know that many habitants engaged in army. It is said that 40% of population in Tigina
(Bender) and Tiraspol directly and indirectly attend to army including retired
serviceperson. They might think it important policy to Military maintain. In addition,
in Transnistria there are about 1000 Cossack and 2500 past Russian 14th army. In the
meantime Moldovan national army was organized by 8.2 thousand troops (population
3.7 million). According to estimation, power balance between Moldova and
Transnistria might be 2.2:10 if Cossack and Russian troops were to participate in
War23. In North Korea about 6 million availability troops is stationed at military
bases. If we account 350 thousand troops of military service, total troops counts about
1 million. As we compare it with 21 million populations, this amount is too huge. 1
million troops are ranked at 5th position in world. DPKR spend 25-33% of GDP to
maintain armed forces. Japan has a self-defense army, which is organized by army,
navy and air force. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution prohibit to possess armed
forced. This self-defense army cannot act outside from Japan. Japanese government
spends less than 3 % of GDP to maintain it.
Secondly, Transnistrian government and North Korea mainly were controlled by
authoritarianism (dictatorship). Igor Smirnov, who had come to Moldova in 1987, was
23
Молдавские Ведомости, 2, 16 мая 2001

ANUL 2001.
elected as a PMR president in 1991. After 5 years when it held president election, he
was elected again. However nobody know this election was practiced “usual”
democratic way. By Transnistrian presidential system, author has a strong power. This
system is easy to shift to dictatorship. In reality, Smirnov changed constitution, from
which it was possible to elect same president two times, to non-limit. Now he prepare
for 3rd presidential election. If he elects again, it expects that he would get more power
in every field. Dictatorship system is easy to control armed force and to protect him.
North Korea is base on dictatorship. Kim Jhong Il took office as leader of DPKR after
death of his father in 1995. At the same time he becomes a general of North Korean
army. His family and relations occupy important post. It expects that his direct
descendant will succeed to his post. This structure behind army makes them
uncompromising attitude to international tables. From example of Hitler in German or
Franco in Spain, we cannot find peaceful dictatorship.
Thirdly, they have more potential to make weapons. Transnistria exceed
possibility of Moldova and North Korea exceeds Japan. In soviet period two thirds of
industry in MSSR concentrated in Transnistria regardless of 15% of whole
population. This industry consists of steal industry, agricultural industry, light
industry, automobile industry and so on. After around conflict, it expects that some
factory produced light weapons arms Karashinikov, pistol, Grened launcher, and
rocket weapon. It doubts some of them have been exported to Abkhazia, Chechen,
and former Yugoslavian countries. North Korea has a much potential to develop
missile system and nuclear weapon. In 1998 it practiced the missile-launching test
under ostensible reason why launched satellite. This missile dropped the Pacific
Ocean at 60km from Japanese coastline over Japanese territory. This incident proved
that missile system in North Korea progressed quickly. This type of missile, what is
called NoDong, is yet placed in active service. North Korea developed missile that has
wide range to capable to reach to whole Japan and part of U.S.A. In addition we doubt
that North Korea exploits nuclear weapon. Some investigator expects that he has yet
completed to develop it and possess 2 or 3 prototypes. After negotiation between U.S.
government and DPKR, he officially stopped to practice experiments. On behalf of it,
Japanese government and South Korea invested to construct light water reactor.
From these points, we must be hurry to construct mutual system under
international law between them on national security standpoint but do not have a good
relation. In Transnistria after a Snegr-Yeltsin agreement, we cannot nearly find
progress to mutual structure. In relation between North Korea and Japan we do not
have diplomatic relation since independence in 1948. Why is it difficult to negotiate
with them?
Obstacle in negotiation:
Why is it difficult to negotiate with them?

1. Dictatorship
2. Unyielding mission’s attitude in international meetings
3. Lack of liberal information
What kind obstacle lies down the way of negotiation? I will explain three main
obstacles. Firstly, as mentioned above, dictatorship is main obstacle on progressing
negotiation. This structure becomes obstacle in settlement by democratic way.
In the second place, mission keeps unyielding stand in international meetings.
This point has relation with first point. In OSCE meeting in 2000, Alexander Karaman

ANUL 2001.
and Valerie Litskai, mission from PMR, left their seat because, they explained, they
got anger to attitude of Moldovan mission. Not only in this accident but also in other
cases, mission and leader sometimes boycott international meeting. Some researchers
concerned negotiation might not progress unless mission will participate in these
tables. Negotiation between North Korea and Japan started from 1992. After
suspension from 1993-1997, this negotiation restarted. During meetings North Korean
mission continues to insist apology and compensation of WW2.They do not say how
degree Japanese government needs to make up. Most of time in meetings they
finished to talk about this topic and could not progress more. This unyielding attitude
is main obstacle. Transnistria does not have international legal standard enough.
OSCE try to construct it in space of past USSR. This international legal base will
make this negotiation smooth.
At last, I will mention about lack of liberal information among nations. In PMR it
publishes Transnistrian newspaper, Pridoniestorbie, Dniestrovskaya Pravda and so on.
And they have a little television companies and radio stations. It does not publish and
broadcast Chisinau newspaper and mass media. Now president Voronin negotiates
about publication of Chisinau mass media in PMR. Compared with situation between
Japan and North Korea, habitants in Transnistria can physically listen to Chisinau
Radio program and watch TV program. Information from Chisinau is not closed in
reality. North Korea does not exist free broadcast system. Usually habitants do not
have much information from outside. From lack of much information, they might lose
parallel standpoint. Although nation starved because of drought, flood and crop
failure, we cannot find any riot or protest demonstration inside. This situation will not
make reformed movement from bottom.
This three point mainly obstruct to negotiate smoothly.
Conclusion:
In this text, I explain difference and resemblance from aspect of national security
and obstacle in negotiation. Of course this comparison is difficult because the case of
Moldova to Transnistria is drastically different from the case of Japan to North Korea
in every field. I can say this comparison is a kind of trial to think these problems not
as regional problem, but as international problem. Voronin mentioned that he wanted
to deal with Transnistrian conflict as inner problem. He does not hope that this
problem will become international problem. However it is too late because foreign
mediator, OSCE, Russia, Ukraine and etc., has yet attended to Transnistrian
negotiation. Time cannot go back past. We have to think over this problem with
foreign mediators
North Korea is official country, which approved by China, Russia although he is
not member of UN. It is difficult to be compelled to participate in international
negotiation. Official position might be big obstacle to progress negotiation.
Transnistria is not official state except approve from Abkhazia. If Transnistria will get
official position, this settlement will go off into the distance.
Basic Data about North Korea (DPKR):
1. Geography and People

ANUL 2001.
Area:120,540sqkm
Area—comparative: about 4 times larger than Moldova
Natural resources: coal, lead, tungsten, zinc, graphite, magnetite, iron ore, copper, gold,
pyrites, salt, fluorspar, hydropower
Population: 21,234,387 (July 1998 est.)
Life expectancy at birth: total population: 51.32 years
Ethnic groups: Korean, racially homogeneous
2. Government and Economy

Country name: conventional long form: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
Government type: Communist state; one-man dictatorship
Independence: 9 September 1948 Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
Economy: North Korea bases on Socialist economy. More than 90% of this economy
is socialized. Economic growth during the period 1984-88 averaged 2%-3% under the
former leader, Kim Il Sung, but output declined by an average of 4%-5% during
1989-97. Nowadays we can find economic decline in North Korea because they had
economical and technological strong links with the former USSR but they lost stabile
supply after split Soviet Union. Heavy industry is based on military produce.
According to 1998 estimation, North Korea spends 25%-33% of budget to military.
Despite expansion of irrigation, and the use of fertilizers, North Korea is not yet self-
sufficient in food production. In addition, a shortage of lands, several years of poor
harvests, systemic inefficiencies, a cumbersome distribution system, and extensive
floods in 1995-96 followed by a severe drought in 1997 have resulted in increasingly
serious food shortages. After this disaster UN, Japan, South Korea, and U.S.A aided
food products to large extent, but this shortage has not yet resolved. After incident of
launching missile, this supply was stopped temporary. Although these shortages
continue until now, DPEK concentrates to invest and expand own army. North Korea
is far from South Korea from economic and political aspect.
GDP: purchasing power parity—$21.8 billion (1997 est.)
GDP—real growth rate: -3.7% (1997 est.)
3. Military
Military branches: Korean People's Army (Army, Navy, Air Force), Civil Security Forces
Military manpower—military age: 18 years of age
Military manpower—availability: males age 15-49: 585,363 (1999 est.)
Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 352,776 (1999 est.)
Military manpower—reaching military age annually: males: 178,931 (1999 est.)
Military expenditures—dollar figure: $22.66 billion (1999 est.)
Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 25%- 33%(1998 est.)
4.NoDong-1
NoDong-1
Date of development 1993?
Date of disposition of Missile 1995
Length 15.5 (m)
Diameter 1.3 (m)
Weight 21.000 (kg)
Warhead Unknown, nuclear?

ANUL 2001.
Guidance system inertia
Propulsive force single
Shooting range 1.000 (km)
5. TaepoDong-1 / -2 (IRBM – Intermediate range ballistic missile)
TeapoDong-1 TeapoDong-2
Date of development 1993? 1994?
Date of disposition of Missile 2000 2004-2006
Length 25.0 (m) 32.0 (m)
Diameter 1.3 (m) 2.4 (m)
Weight 27.000 (kg) 60.000 (kg)
Warhead Unknown, nuclear? Unknown, nuclear?
Guidance system inertia inertia
Propulsive force two steps two steps
Shooting range 2.000 (km) 3.500-6.000 (km)
Note:
These missiles, Nodong-1, Teapodong-1, and TeapoDong-2 have its roots in
Scud missile that produced in Former USSR. It is possible to contain nuclear weapon.
U.S. government named them the name of place, which found them from
reconnaissance satellite. Nodong is located in north of DPRK and along with Japan
Sea. Teapodong is about 25km from Nodong. In mid-1980s North Korea developed
Scud B and C missiles with a range of 300-500km. This shooting range is enough for
reaching whole South Korea, but not enough for Japan. And then she progressed her
technique to reach there. After near 1993, it started to construct missile launch base in
the place of Nodong and Teapodong. Nodong-1 missiles with a range of 1,000km
were developed in 1993. This type is capable of reaching of South Korea and a part of
Japan. It expects the TaepoDong-1 missile was developed in 1994 with a range of
2,000-4,500km. It is possible to attack to whole South Korea Japan and Guam. In
1995 they launched TeapoDong-1 (?) under the ostensible reason why launched
satellite and dropped the Pacific Ocean at 60km from Japanese coastline. Nobody was
damaged by this accident. Teapodong-1, we expect, was developed under range of
whole Japan. TeapoDong-2 is possible to reach to part of Alaska. Of course, their
ultimate goal is the developing missile with a range of whole U.S.A. U.S. government
negotiated with DPRK about ban of launching experimentation. Officially DPRK
does not practice them now. By their official statement, they do not have any will to
test long-range missile during negotiation. However DPRK, some investigators
expect, export TeapoDong-1 by unofficial route to Iran and other countries and offer
making technique. On behalf of it, they get experimental data of possibility of test
missile after launching in Iran.

ANUL 2001.
MOLDOVENIZATION:
SEARCH OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
OR AN EXPLOSIVE POLITICAL COMPROMIZE
Octavian Sofransky
Chairman,
European Centre in Moldova
The intention of Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin to rewrite the country’s

history books provoked a wave of public discontent and disapproval. The governing
Communist party saw the currently thought “History of Romanians” inappropriate for
Moldovan pupils and announced that “it is time to learn the history of our state and
the land where we live," as Misin, the ethnic Russian vice-chairman of Parliament
was quoted as saying. The rewriting of history was entrusted to Vladimir Taranov, a
fervent promoter of theory of Moldovan ethnic nation, vehemently contested by
opponents as a Stalinist project of identity engineering.
As long as the Communists hold a constitutional majority in the Parliament won in

February elections, they can, in principle, enact any legislation they want without
consent of opposition. However, this identity politics mater is likely to meet harsh
opposition and even unrest if it is implemented in an authoritarian matter, which
Communists master best.
There are two visions on history in Moldova. According to Russian and Soviet
historians, to whose school Taranov belongs, “Moldovan ethnicity” evolved as a mix
of Latin and Slav “blood” and “culture” while “Moldovan statehood” flourished only
under Soviet authority. The other view, that prevailed after 1991 proclamation of
independence, is that Moldovans belong to the ethno-cultural group of Romanians,
while the establishment of Soviet Moldova in 1940 by Stalin was nothing else but the
expansion of Russian empire; and the imposition of Cyrillic alphabet and Moldovan
”ethnic identity” was violent and inappropriate. According to first view, Basarabia (as
the region was known before the war) was “occupied” by Romania after the Russian
revolution and “liberated” by red army in 1940, while the other school of thought sees
the Soviet Union as the “occupant” of Eastern Romania and the Republic of Moldova
as “the second Romanian state”.
Today, Moldovenization is promoted by Communists in their bid to strengthen

Moldovan statehood and sense of common identity. However nowadays Moldovan
communists have no clear cultural or ethnic orientation. Although the “farther of
Moldovan nation” was Stalin who created the Autonomous Moldovan republic in
1924, it is Lenin statue that they promise to re-erect in Chisinau main square.
Although Stefan cel Mare, a medieval king of Moldova, looks up from every
Moldovan banknote, none of the Communist leaders of the country took part in his
anniversary celebration last week. On one hand, Moldovan Communists shout the
intention to make Russian second official language in the country, proving that for
them Moldovenization goes hand in hand with Russification. On the other hand,
Moldovan communists are exhibiting a strange corporate nationalism while none but
one member of the new cabinet they elected represents an ethnic minority.

ANUL 2001.
A group of Soviet historians, which build their career on inventing and then
promoting the Moldovan identity, are ready to serve the regime also counting on good
fees from the would-be publications. The priests of Moldovan nation-hood, have not
passed away with the “end of that history”, but gathered their effort and published in
1997 the “History of the Republic of Moldova from the ancient times until
nowadays”, under the redaction of Sornicov, an ethnic Russian member of parliament.
Rejected as inappropriate by the political and cultural establishment of the time, now
with the monopolization of power in Moldova by Orthodox Communists, the danger
of imposing a Stalinist history on school pupils becomes imminent.
Amazingly, one of leading pressure groups for renouncing the “history of Romanians”
is the Council of Russian communities in Moldova. Indeed the Russians, which
account for 13% of country’s population as well as Ukrainians and other ethnic
groups do not find representation within the “History of Romanians” and claim that it
is hostile to Russia, to which they have strong emotional ties. There are numerous
attempts to forge a common front against the “danger of Romanzation” of the would-
be “ethnic Slavs” that should bend together the Ukrainian , Bulgarain and Rusian
minorities, through common identity projects such as the creation of a “Slavic
University” and organization of days of “Slavic culture”.
A common characteristic of the Moldovenist pressure groups is a hidden or an open

Romanophobia, largely inherited from Soviet authoritarian regime. In search for “the
other”, Soviet propaganda painted Romanian bourgeoisie into the enemy of Soviet
Moldovans, an ideology that provoked inhibition among Moldovan Romanians and
hate among Russians and other ethnic groups. Currently hate speech and discrediting
continues to be a commonplace in media such as “Glasul Moldovei”, “Saptamana” or
Russian language “Kisinevskie novosti” or “Nezavissimaya Moldova” newspapers. At
large the Moldovanists have succeded in securing in 1994 constitution the name
“Moldovan” for the official language, although the school curriculum calls it
Romanian.
The danger of abusive Moldovenization is pointed out by opposition political parties.

Dumitru Diacov, the Charman of the centrist Democratic Party said: "It is not so
much changing the title of the book that is at stake, for here a judicious compromise
might be reached right on the surface, as that we are running the risk of having one-
sided, dogmatic interpretation of the dramatic history of our people,", while Iurie
Rosca, the leader of most prominent pro-Romanian party said: "the Communists had
no right to alter the language, history and culture of a nation, because they were
elected only for cheap bread and salami." He promised to ask the parliamentary
majority to officially deny plans of re-writing the history book and "to drop any
attempts against the language and history of Romanians."
Over five hundred history teachers gathered in early July at a national conference and
condemned the attempts of the Communist party to usurp the truth also menacing a
countrywide strike against teaching an ideologycized history to pupils. “The
replacement of the national history book with one of the Moldova's history, contrarily
to all scientific principles, will seriously harm to the education process and will
challenge population's distrust in the competence of specialists in the field”, said
Anatol Petrenco, chairman of the Associations of Historians of Moldova.

ANUL 2001.
As an immediate response to Voronin’s initiative, over a hundred students and
teachers manifested in downtown Chisinau, carrying national flags and banners
reading "Our History is Romanian History!", while two weeks later, Moldovan
students in Bucharest shouted the same slogans in front of Moldovan embassy there.
Asked to comment on the possibility of changing the school subjects, a 15 years
school-boy Ion Plamadeala told me he does not see the difference, while his mother
Tamara, 36 said:” how much longer can the history be shifted up and down? I do not
believe the communists will succeed in imposing a new history ” She thinks the
reform will disorient the pupils completely, as it did with the older generation,
suddenly treating all historical events upside-down. Concerning the opportunity to
teach a “History of Moldova” she said: “it could exist as a complementary part, since
Moldova exist as independent state”. Today approximately one third of Moldovans
considers themselves ethnic Romanians and this proportion grows, while the majority,
according to the polls, consider the spoken language Romanian.
The communist minister of education, Ilie Vancea said to media that there are no
plans so far to reverse the curricula however the experts at the ministry are dealing
with the drafting of an annex for the history book of Romanians, which would include
data on the history of the national minorities on Moldova's territory .
The general feeling in Moldova is that the likelihood of an imminent imposition of a
totalitarian history is low, but real. The civic groups and political parties are raising
pre-emptive awareness and concern, and the eventuality that communists will be able
to engage the various actors into a nation-wide dialog on history reconciliation seem
equal to none, due to their totalitarian past and populist present. However, should
Voronin enact authoritatively a new history of Moldova, this would necessarily
polarize Moldovan electorate, strengthen the fragmented opposition, and undoubtfully
provoke social unrest that might lead to anticipated parliamentary elections.
CONCLUSION
Moldovenization is a new government policy of "state building" focussed on
removing the history of Romanians and the term "Romanian language" from schools'
curricula and replacing them with Moldovan. This policy is extremely similar to the
Soviet policy of creating the Soviet Moldovan nation and building walls towards
Romania and is supported by the same people - local Communists. The new policy
faces two counter reactions. First is the opposition of pro-Romanian parties that see
this policy abusive and anti-liberal. The second is the contradiction between the need
to develop a modern civic (non-ethnic) Moldovan
identity to integrate Moldovan citizenry into one community and the desire of
Communists to strengthen a Moldovan ethnic identity group to "legitimise", in their
eyes, the Moldovan statehood. My concluding question is, why the contemporary
history of the Republic of Moldova should be necessary incompatible with the
cultural and political history of Romanians and why are the Communists to decide so?

ANUL 2001.
VOLUNTEER RESERVE FORCES:

A CONTRIBUTION TO DEFENCE IN A DEMOCRACY
Dr Trevor Waters
( The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the UK
Ministry of Defence.)
Introduction
Moldovan society and the Moldovan army remain in a confused and confusing state: a
state, as the vogue term puts it, of transition. Moldova has certainly abandoned the
totalitarian, one-party political system of the Soviet period, but has it achieved a
genuine, viable, stable and lasting democracy? The so-called command
administrative economic system, in which everything was centrally planned and
controlled, has clearly now been replaced by a form of market economy which for
some, perhaps many, however, (especially the elderly and vulnerable) still provides
only a standard of living that is worse than last year, better than next! Above all,
however, Moldova has striven to shift from a monolithic, totalitarian, one-party model
of the armed forces, and the associated views on civil-military relations, to genuine
democratic, civilian control of the military, and the broadly-based democratic security
community associated with it, that is, to what we might think of as defence in a
democracy.
This is where the notion of the volunteer reserve serviceman or woman becomes
relevant in the framework of Partnership for Peace within a new Europe and in the
context of the new Euro-Atlantic community from Vancouver to Vladivostok that is
now being built. The volunteer reservist clearly plays an important role in the military
establishments of western democratic countries and functions as a key link between
the military and civil society at large. He/she is, so to speak, one of the elements in
the military which enables us to say that we organise defence in line with democratic
principles. It introduces the idea of voluntary reserve service - an unknown notion in
the communist era - into the new military establishments of Central and Eastern
Europe.
Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The Army & Society

The primary function of the army is to preserve the external security of the state.
Armies are organised, equipped and trained either to deter conflict, or to fight
effectively against an enemy, if they are needed. Given the very nature of armies and
their fighting tasks, there are, potentially at least, three characteristic implications for
the military and society.
1. The risk of military coup d'état, of government take-over by the military, of

military intervention in government, or of effective threats to do so: because of the
army's monopoly, or near monopoly, of armed force, because it possesses the
weapons and the skills to use them, there is always a possibility for the army to abuse
its privileged position and seek to take over society altogether.

ANUL 2001.
2. The risk that the army becomes alienated from, or within, society, that the
military becomes a separate structure within society in a negative sense: the highly
regimented character of military life may lead to a pathologically narrow-minded
view of the world and man's place in it. Armies, it has been said, are 'total'
institutions, like prisons, lunatic asylums and monasteries, and there is a barrier
between the army and the external world. Typically, the army will train in areas far
away from the civilian population. The dictates of military secrecy, very properly,
erect barriers too. The army may come to see itself, and to be seen by civilians, as an
alien institution whose traditions, interests and goals are disturbingly and dangerously
different from those of society as a whole. The army may become, as happened
famously in Germany for a while ein Staat im Staate (a state within a state).
3. The special responsibility that society, and ultimately the government, has for
members of the armed forces who work to an "unlimited" contract in the sense that it
is an occupational hazard for them to be required, under orders, to endanger and even
lose their lives. The fact that soldiers operate under this unlimited liability means that
the political leadership, and society as a whole, incur an exceptional duty of care
towards servicemen and women.
A sensitive understanding of the two risks and the special responsibility outlined
above is essential for healthy relations between the military and society. Indeed, as
Michael Quinlan put it in an address to the NATO Defence College a year or so ago:
"The central challenge for democratic systems, and the one which fundamentally
distinguishes managing defence from managing, say, social welfare or the road
construction programme, is … how to reconcile all these special pressures - how to
maximise the security value of our armed forces at the same time as we minimise the
risk of coercive misuse, of social alienation and perhaps of lives needlessly lost."
The democratic 'control', or, better, 'management' or 'direction' of defence is

essentially a two-way process, between civil society and the military on the one hand,
and the military and civil society on the other. It is, of course, inherent within the
concept of democratic government that national armed forces are subordinated to the
duly elected political leadership of the state, that there exists a clearly defined, legal
constitutional framework within which the military hierarchy is responsible to the
government through a civilian minister of defence, and that there be effective control
and accountability by parliament. This is a part, at least, of what is meant by the
'primacy' of the civil power. But the civilian authorities must not regard the military,
as it were, as dangerous wild beasts who must be tamed and 'controlled', but must
rather see to it that soldiers have a genuine understanding of the principle of the
primacy of the civil power and the importance of civilian management of defence. A
very considerable educational effort is made in this direction in NATO armies, and
the Germans, in particular, made special efforts in this field of "Innere Führung" when
the Bundeswehr was created after World War II.
Equally, it is highly unlikely that a good army, (ie an effective fighting force) will be
created, or an army that feels comfortable and at ease within society, unless the
citizenry at large, and this, in a democracy, means the voters, have a sympathetic
understanding of military aims and values, and are aware of what makes an army tick.
The military must mount an 'educational' effort of sorts, engage in public relations and

ANUL 2001.
public information exercises, to 'keep the army in the public eye' as one such British
activity of this kind was known.
Democratic Control Breaks Down: An Example from Moldova

On 15 March 1996, President Snegur, in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces, issued a decree removing Defence Minister Creanga from his post after
accusing him of incompetence in combating the theft of army property and wasting
money. There followed a period of acute political crisis when parliament described
the defence minister's dismissal as unconstitutional and the Constitutional Court ruled
against the presidential decree. Despite the appeal by an overwhelming majority of
army officers from the Ministry of Defence Staff and Chişinău garrison urging that
Creanga "cannot further head the Defence Ministry", the former defence minister was
reintstated in his post, though he said he intended soon to resign. Civil-military
relations continued to fester throughout 1996 with President Snegur threatening to
take "direct control of the army" and accusing Creanga of "mutiny", while the recently
reinstated defence minister protested in an open letter in a government newspaper that
he was the victim of a smear campaign because of his refusal to allow the army to be
dragged in to politics.
As a foreign observer of Moldovan affairs sitting in London, some of the details in my

brief account of this matter are almost certainly wrong. Nonetheless, I venture to
suggest that the Creanga affair pointed alarmingly to the fragility of the machinery for
effective political control of the armed forces and threw into relief the power struggle
between the head of state and the prime minister in the run-up to the presidential
elections of November 1996.
Volunteer Reserve Forces

Adam Michnik, the Polish dissident during the communist era, and later a deputy in
the Sejm, was once asked whether the collapse of the Soviet Union represented the
victory of democracy over totalitarianism. No, said Michnik, the collapse of the
Soviet Union was a victory of freedom over dictatorship. He want on to add,
democracy means the institutionalisation of freedom and 'that is still a long way off.'
Volunteer Reserve Forces are one example of the way in which freedom can be
institutionalised. It is in this sense that Volunteer Forces contribute to and so embody
the idea of defence in a democracy.
What is a Volunteer Reservist?

He or she is a civilian who volunteers as a part-time soldier, a citizen, not a
professional soldier, ie he/she is a citizen soldier. The late NATO Secretary-General,
Manfred Wörner, once said: "The simple truth is that security is a concept which does
not recognise artificial divisions between civilian and military responsibilities -
security is the business of all of us, citizens, soldiers and citizen soldiers."
In the United Kingdom the Regular Army is dependent on the so-called Territorial
Army - TA - (the army element of the national Volunteer Reserve Forces) to complete
the Order of Battle. The likelihood of using the TA in circumstances less than full
mobilisation is now much greater than during the Cold War. To carry out Britain's
defence responsibilities, the Army needs the TA. In Britain, the TA and the Regular
Army share:

ANUL 2001.
• their military ethos
• the same command structure
• doctrine and tactics
• the Regimental system
• similar equipment and training.
Why volunteer? First because there is the challenge of doing another kind of job. As
a civilian, one meets a variety of people - civilians and soldiers - in many
circumstances. The enormous sense of comradeship is built on a sense of service. In
recognition of this commitment the volunteer receives rates of pay in line with the
regular forces for each day he or she trains. An additional cash incentive is paid for
the completion of an annual minimum training period.
The volunteer is a member of the Volunteer as opposed to the Regular Reserve made
up of ex-regulars. Each has a statutory period of reserve service and that after having
completed their full- time service. The volunteer makes a significant contribution to
the national defence capability. Most important, in time of war or crisis, the reserves
provide vital manpower alongside the regular forces. In short, the reserves complete
the Order of Battle. More than 800 volunteer reservists served in the Gulf, for
example, and the TA makes up some 20% of British troops in Bosnia.
In the best sense of the word, volunteers are cheap. During the Cold War it was
reckoned that the Territorial Army cost about 3% of the British Army vote yet
provided about 25% of the mobilisation Order of Battle. On average the TA soldier
costs only one-seventh that of a regular soldier to maintain.
Defence In A Democracy
Defence in a democracy clearly includes Government direction of military activity,
Parliament's oversight of both government and the military, and a free press/media
which tells voters about competing political, social, economic and defence
alternatives: an emancipated media is a necessary condition for the democratic
management of defence.
In Moldova (as in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe) there is an especial
need for civilians to be knowledgeable about the military. This must include
journalists, Ministry of Defence civil servants, academics in universities, members of
think tanks, and non-government organisations (NGOs). Less well known, but of
similar importance, are the civilians who, in NATO nations, are members of the NGO
known as the CIOR (Confédération Interalliée des Officiers de Réserve - Interallied
Confederation of Reserve Officers).
Some years ago, Field Marshal Sir Richard Vincent, former Chairman of the NATO
Military Committee, asked CIOR to find ways in which they could play a major role
in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) process. He saw the influence of members of
Volunteer Reserve Forces as critical in bridging the civilian/military divide in the
nations of Central and Eastern Europe.
In April 1996, the Polish Ministry of Defence and CIOR held a PfP-Seminar in
Warsaw entitled 'Armed Forces and Society - The Importance of Reserve
Associations and their Role within the PfP Context'. The aim of the seminar was to

ANUL 2001.
inform Polish authorities and associations about the position of CIOR and reserve
associations in NATO countries and to encourage the foundation of a Polish tri-
service, democratic reserve association that could cope with the CIOR constitution. A
CIOR task force to assist was established. Partnership for Peace was the theme of the
British Presidency of CIOR in 1996/98.
Javier Solana, NATO Secretary-General at the time commented: "If anything, the
Alliance is becoming increasingly dependent on reservists, both in terms of
capabilities as regular forces are being reduced and in terms of public backing for our
security objectives as the issues facing NATO are becoming broader and in some
ways more complex".
One of the most striking features of communist military culture was that military
matters were held to be the exclusive preserve of the military. To some extent, post-
communist military society still remains a society that is closed to civilians and which
resents and resists civilian interference. The lack in Moldova (as in other Central and
Eastern European countries) of civilian knowledge, competence and experience in
defence issues still influences civil servants, legislators, the media and the public.
But it does not matter how good in theory the democratic structures for control of the
military are if there continue to be few competent civilians to man the Ministry of
Defence and few civilians who can talk to the military on equal terms. The new
members of the legislatures must have a real understanding of the army's justifiable
needs. That has to be followed by effective means of educating the voter in military
matters. On the whole, these remain serious problems in most Central and Eastern
European countries, including Moldova.
In western democracies is makes sense to speak of a defence and security community.
This is supposed to be - and usually is - a vibrant community composed not only of
military officers, but also of civilians of various professions and interests. Volunteer
reservists are key members of that community.
The volunteer plays an important part in representing the military in civil society and
in acting as an invaluable link between the government, the armed forces and the
wider community. He could, and perhaps should, take up that key function in
Moldova?

ANUL 2001.
Un maraton cu obstacole: Mass media şi itinerarul

integrării europene
Victor Moraru
La început a fost aspiraţia. O aspiraţie, mai mult vagă şi generală decît

concretizată, spre occidentalizare. Stimulată de lansarea schimbărilor fundamentale
produse în societate la sfîrşitul anilor optzeci-începutul anilor nouăzeci, această
aspiraţie a generat atît descoperirea adevărului că principiile democratice şi
respectarea drepturilor omului sînt la fel de fireşti pentru ţările postcomuniste ca şi
pentru Occident, cît şi substituirea vechilor valori prin valorile proprii unei "societăţi de
consum". Astfel, direcţiile noi ale dezvoltării societăţii postcomuniste s-au impus cu o
viteză spectaculară, modelul occidental al democraţiei şi al economiei de piaţă
obţinînd statutul de pisc rîvnit. Acest lucru a însemnat că orientarea spre
paradigmele universale ale Occidentului va constitui de acum înainte vectorul
mişcării spre ieşirea din criză şi abolirea regimului sovietic. Motivarea care a stat la
baza acestui reviriment de mentalitate poate fi formulată pe cît de simplu, pe atît de
elocvent: “un imens supermarket este întotdeauna mai bun decît o imensă
cazarmă”1. În această deschidere spre Occident, din care a derivat în mod expres o
apologie a Occidentului, societatea, dominată ani la rînd de o realitate economică
austeră, privată, în partea ei covîrşitoare, de acces la un larg spectru de bunuri de
consum, a văzut o adevărată întîlnire cu Panaceea, un remediu contra tuturor relelor
moştenite de la trecutul totalitarist. Reprezentările despre modul de viaţă occidental,
defăimat ani la rînd de propaganda comunistă într-un mod absolut şi la maximum
agresiv, au suferit, o dată cu demararea perioadei de tranziţie, o metamorfoză
relevantă, obţinînd o alură fetişizatoare. Atmosfera generală, dacă ar fi evocate
mitingurile cu zeci de mii de participanţi, avea nuanţe pronunţate de euforie, de
încredere spontană că este de ajuns să se producă adoptarea unei legislaţii
echitabile şi trecerea la liberalizarea economiei, pentru a dispune, integral şi
categoric, de un mod de viaţă raliat la standardele societăţii de consum. Implantarea
acestei atmosfere, expresie a aspiraţiei nestăvilite spre schimbări – un antrenant
slogan al clasei politice emergente care venea să estompeze fosta nomenklatură, - a
fost favorizată şi de mass media ori, mai precis, de o bună parte a acestora.
În realitate, itinerarul parcurs de Republica Moldova în ultimul deceniu s-a

dovedit a fi mult mai sinuos decît părea să se prefigureze la începutul marilor
transformări. Ineficienţa guvernărilor ce s-au perindat pe parcursul deceniului la
conducerea ţării a condiţionat, spre începutul anului 2001, o interpretare specifică a
dihotomiei vechi/nou: în alegerile parlamentare din 25 februarie 2001 majoritatea
covîrşitoare a electoratului, refuzînd vechiul şi în dorinţa de afirmare a noului, a ales
ceea ce întruchipa implicit, mai degrabă, nostalgia unor timpuri trecute -noul "vechi"
PCRM. De remarcat, în context, că cea mai reuşită campanie mediatică de
promovare a ideii integrării europene a desfăşurat-o în ultimii ani ziarul "Mesagerul",
organul PFD, dar această formaţiune politică n-a obţinut la ultimele alegeri sprijinul
electoral necesar pentru a intra în Parlament.
Luînd în considerare faptul că noua configuraţie a forţelor politice în

Republica Moldova s-a produs pe calea unor alegeri democratice (se ştie că unul
dintre principiile cardinale ale democraţiei, aşa cum arată politologul italian Domenico
Fisichella, constă în faptul că adversarului politic "îi este garantată posibilitatea de a-
şi manifesta dezacordul şi de a se opune, dar, în afară de aceasta, adversarului i se
permite chiar să ajungă în mod paşnic la putere, înlocuindu-l pe însuşi deţinătorul
acesteia"i), ponderea cea mai mare o obţine în situaţia politică actuală răspunsul la
"întrebarea care se pune democraţiei, după cum a remarcat judicios autorul francez

ANUL 2001.
Jean-Francois Revel, - dacă arta de a fi ales are vreo legătură cu capacitatea de a
guverna"ii. Tocmai necesitatea de a-şi demonstra capacitatea de a depăşi criza în
care s-a pomenit Republica Moldova, de a răspunde la aşteptările electoratului a
dictat pentru noua guvernare, în pofida tentaţiei, manifestate, deschis ori tacit, în
sloganurile electorale, de a contrapune orientării prooccidentale orientarea proestică,
prioritatea promovării unei linii "pragmatice", consistînd în colaborarea cu
organismele internaţionale, în continuarea eforturilor de ordin diplomatic pentru a nu
admite izolarea şi marginalizarea ţării. Actuala politică externă a Republicii Moldova,
purtînd toate însemnele unei politici "duplicitare", oricum, înscrie printre succesele
sale, de exemplu, faptul admiterii Republicii Moldova în Pactul de Stabilitate pentru
Europa de Sud-Est.
"Cursa spre Europa" pentru Moldova, de fapt, a început nu de acum cîţiva

aniiii. În fond, vocaţia europeană a Moldovei este perenă şi constantăiv, în condiţiile
actuale obiectivul primordial conturîndu-se drept accedere în calitate de membru al
Uniunii Europenev. În consecinţă, aşa cum reiese din conţinutul unei mari părţi a
mesajelor recente ale mass media din republică, n-ar fi nici o exagerare în a
constata, că “integrare” a devenit sloganul zilei. Pînă şi presa comunistă include
printre titlurile publicaţiilor sale unele de genul "Europa pe care o alegem"vi. Ce-i
drept, presa opoziţiei nu conteneşte să persifleze pe seama "opţiunii europene" a
comuniştilor care se reduce de multe ori doar la nenumărate călătorii ale delegaţiilor
parlamentare moldoveneşti în Occident: "ei (comuniştii – V. M.) se ocupă activ de
turismul interstatal, chiar şi în Adunarea Parlamentară a nesuferitului NATO s-au
înscris, dar rezultatul acestor călătorii este nul. Numai pierderi pentru buget… Ei
merg în străinătate, se documentează, iar întorcîndu-se acasă continuă să cînte din
fluierul comunist…"vii.
Tabloul realităţii, în special, cel oferit de mass media în ansamblul lor apare
astfel destul de neunivoc. Toate acestea înaintează în prim plan imperativul
interogării atente a cadrului fenomenic al dezvoltării, necesitatea examinării modului
în care elementele de ruptură cu trecutul tind să se manifeste pe fundalul afirmării
unor elemente noi. Este evident că acestea din urmă nu pot apărea în mod
spectaculos şi într-un ritm rapid, ci se inserează în structura preexistenta, modificînd-
o, iar determinarea modelului contemporan adecvat de dezvoltare are de trecut, aşa
cum demonstrează experienţa ultimilor ani, un drum sinuos, pendulînd între
stereotipuri ale gîndirii şi revelaţii, între anumite prejudecăţi şi argumente probante.
Există, pentru moment, o serie de factori care, în totalitatea lor, consituie un obstacol
serios în calea Republicii Moldova spre integrare europeană. Este vorba, mai întîi de
toate, de nişte date statistice care plasează discuţia aspctelor abordate în cadrul
problemei în cauză într-un context marcat de o serie de adevăruri foarte dure. Pe
plan global acest context ar putea fi definit prin cuvintele unui consilier al
administraţiei americane care a remarcat: "Nu cred că ar fi o exagerare să afirm că
lupta globală contra sărăciei şi pentru protecţia unui mediu acceptabil pentru
generaţiile viitoare – şi tocmai aceasta este problema propusă pentru discuţie - este
pe cale de a fi pierdută în acest moment… Din cele şase miliarde ale populaţiei
planetei, cinci miliarde locuiesc în ţările în curs de dezvoltare sau în ţările ce au avut
un regim comunist (Ignacio Ramonet, directorul publicaţiei "Le Monde Diplomatique",
notează şi mai direct: "Din cele şase miliarde de locuitori ai planetei, cinci miliarde
sînt săraci"viii – V. M.). Trei miliarde din aceste persoane trăiesc cu mai puţin de doi
dolari pe zi. La mai mult de un miliard din ele le revine mai puţin de un dolar pe zi.
Sărăcia continuă să fie un factor destabilizator şi mai multe ţări din Africa, Asia şi
America Latină (dar şi Europa, sîntem nevoiţi a adăuga noi – V. M.) sînt mai puţin
capabile s-o înfrunte, ceea ce generează mase tot mai numeroase de oameni
disperaţi care vor căuta să intre în Europa Occidentală şi în Statele Unite"ix. Ei bine,
ceea ce preocupă la moment clasa politică şi elita mediatică moldovenească este

ANUL 2001.
aceeaşi intrare în Europa, în sensul de integrare în Europa, dar pe o cale cît mai
decentă. Iată de ce este justificat să ne întrebăm despre capacitatea clasei politice şi
a mass media de a promova o politică rezonabilă şi eficientă de integrare, iar implicit
de securitate naţională şi internaţională.
Raportarea cifrelor evocate la contextul local, ne oferă posibilitatea constatării

că îngrijorarea exprimată de experţii occidentali este absolut valabilă şi pentru cazul
Republicii Moldova în care, conform ultimelor estimări, valoarea salariului mediu
constituie treizeci şi şapte de dolari pe lună, iar problema sărăciei a fost anunţată de
Preşedintele ţării de la tribuna Adunării Parlamentare a Consiliului Europei (de rînd
cu problema teritoriilor estice ale Moldovei şi problema corupţiei) drept una dintre
problemele, "fără soluţionarea cărora este imposibilă edificarea statului moldovenesc
ce ar corespunde standardelor şi valorilor europene"x.
Dacă am recurge la “o privire dintr-o parte”, exprimată ceva mai înainte, dar
păstrîndu-şi şi azi valabilitatea, a unuia dintre reprezentanţii organismelor
internaţionale la Chişinău, Republica Moldova trece dintr-o criză în alta, de ordin
economic, politic sau social, în particular, din cauza "lipsei de claritate în promovarea
politicii de integrare" şi a absenţei "unui consens naţional"xi. Este absolut evident că
sarcina unor clarificări şi a activităţii îndreptate spre atingerea unui consens naţional
revine mass media. Tocmai ele trebuie să contribuie la identificarea problemelor, şi
tocmai lor le revine căutarea, prin ampla dezbastere publică, a unor soluţii
accep0tabile. Bineînţeles, este o variantă idealizată. În realitate însă, mass media,
abordînd evenimentele cotidiene, fiecare din propria perspectivă, legată de cele mai
multe ori de interesele politice, proprii ori reprezentate, contribuie, mai degrabă, la
perpetuarea stării de confuzie generală, tratarea problemelor în paginile acestora
cunoaşte, în fond, două moduri - fie din perspectiva mitralierei kalaşnikov, fie din
perspectiva culorii absolut roze, îngereşti. Dar, dacă acceptăm metafora mass media
drept oglindă a realităţii, nu avem dreptul a ne supăra pe oglindă, dacă vedem în ea
ceea ce nu ne produce plăcere. Bineînţeles, dacă oglinda nu este deformată.
Rolul mass media în societate este important, dar, oricum, nu poate fi decisiv
în soluţionarea problemelor de ordin politic. Inclusiv, al problemei integrării europene.
În cercurile jurnalistice este recunoscută complexitatea enormă a acestei probleme.
Pătrunderea complexităţii însă, aşa cum atestă urmărirae publicaţiilor mass media,
întîrzie să se producă. Respectiv, paginile presei, emisiunile radio şi tv profilează, de
multe ori, o percepţie confuză a multiplelor aspecte ale acesteia, o tratare
superficială, derivată dintr-o cunoaştere insuficientă a situaţiilor reale. Se operează
de foarte multe ori cu scheme, cu clişee cu care sînt familiarizaţi cititorii,
radioascultătorii şi telespectatorii, dar jurnaliştii nu că ar veni să răstoarne aceste
scheme, ci, dimpotrivă, le ajustează, le menţin şi le perpetuează. De cele mai multe
ori dilema dintre "a dezvălui esenţa fenomenului" şi "a-i arăta elementul spectacular"
se rezolvă în favoarea celei de-a doua opţiuni. A vorbi despre integrarea europeană
în mass media înseamnă atunci a vorbi la nivelul de "fapt divers". Pe cînd, alături de
astfel de subiecte, în mod preponderent, reportericeşti, este nevoie şi de materiale
analitice, de jurnalism de investigare. Primează însă opinia preconcepută, de
exemplu: integrarea este bine, neintegrarea este rău. Dar nu se întreprinde, ori se
întreprinde foarte rar, încercarea de a veni cu argumente, de a asculta şi
argumentele – dacă ele există – ale părţii contrapuse. Principiul "audiatur et altera
pars", se pare că este străin presei noastre. Şi atunci viziunea realităţii apare
sărăcită, lamentaţiile abundente copleşesc şi întronează chiar o "filosofie a mîinii
întinse".
Astfel, principala problemă a mass media rezidă nu în faptul că ele n-ar

aborda tema integrării, ci în faptul că această temă este abordată, practic, în

ANUL 2001.
exclusivitate drept o temă strict politică, pe cînd modalităţile mediatice presupun, mai
ales, o abordare foarte concretă. O serie de reportaje publicate recent în paginile
"Jurnalului de Chişinău" pot constitui o pledoarie pentru integrare mult mai reuşită
decît divagaţiile prolixe ale multor publicaţii. Din punctul de vedere al eficienţei, o
ştire despre importul nucilor din Moldova în Europa Occidentală publicată la 20 iulie
în suplimentul chişinăuean al ziarului "Комсомольская правда" poate fi mai
rezultativă decît numeroasele ştiri, incluzînd cifrele degradării societăţii. Acele
materiale în care este urmărit destinul omului, de exemplu, vor avea întotdeauna
priză la cititor, vor dispune de un potenţial persuasiv mai mare. Din păcate, astfel de
materiale apar prea puţine în paginile mass media, iar cele ce apar se disting prin
lejeritatea şi superficialitatea abordării. Este nevoie deci de a identifica problemele,
de a clarifica dimensiunea şi ponderea lor reală, de a le dezvălui aspectele
primordiale, sugerînd chiar răspunsuri practice. Nu putem pretinde nici forţelor
politice, şi nici celor mediatice, promovarea unui mesaj univoc şi uniformizator. Dar
ceea ce le uneşte este aceeaşi incertitudine vis-a-vis de problemele majore, difuzată
în societate.
Astfel mass media abordează oarecum confuz problema serioasă a exodului

masiv al unei părţi însemnate a populaţiei republicii. Prevalează, spre regret,
lamentaţiile ("Moldova rămîne fără oameni, ca pe timp de război"xii), iar disecarea
fenomenului, dezvăluirea lui în multitudinea aspectelor ce-l alcătuiesc ţine, probabil,
de domeniul viitorului. Nici forţele politice nu manifestă o atitudine clară faţă de
problema în cauză, în timp ce diferenţierea socială şi fragmentarea politică ameninţă
prin dezrădăcinarea a tot mai mulţi compatrioţi (şi, în definitiv, alegători). În fond, o
atitudine duplicitară faţă de o astfel de stare de lucruri poate fi întrevăzută şi în
acţiunile puterii (ori în evitarea acestora). În orice caz, extinderea fenomenului
migraţiei implică pentru forţele politice, ca şi pentru mass media, necesitatea
observării atente a mobilităţii populaţiei, dar şi a participării active la canalizarea
acestei mobilităţi într-o albie adecvată exigenţelor timpului. Tocmai acest lucru nu se
produce ori se produce destul de rar.
Este unanim recunoscut rolul mass media în constituirea unui consens social.
Dar un astfel de consens, în fond, este imposibil, în condiţiile dezintegrării teritoriale
a republicii. Or, tocmai tergiversarea soluţionării diferendului transnistrean
condiţionează implicit întîrzierea accederii depline a Republicii Moldova în
comunitatea statelor europene. În acelaşi timp, nu poate fi neglijat faptul că tocmai
mass media au contribuit într-o anumită măsură la producerea unor efecte sociale
destabilizatoare, fortificînd impulsurile distructive. Într-adevăr, n-am putea nega că
mass media au constituit un factor destabilizator, atunci cînd, de exemplu, redactorul
publicaţiei Uniunii Scriitorilor aborda cu toată seriozitatea problema originii ruse a
soţiilor unor lideri politici prezentînd-o drept o chestiune de principiu, iar Radioul
Naţional, în momentele de vîrf ale conflictului, transmitea cîntecele ostăşeşti
înregistrate în tranşeele de pe malul Nistrului, în care erau astfel de cuvinte ca
"pentru unul ucis de-al nostru vom ucide zece ruşi". Este evident că în astfel de
cazuri nu putem vorbi despre eficienţa conciliantă a mass media. De fapt, tocmai prin
intervenţia mass media, dramaturgia atroce a conflictelor interetnice este
transformată, după cum arată cercetătorul român Grigore Georgiu, în "spectacol
mediatic, cu posibilitatea de a vectoriza mesajele în favoarea unei părţi, culpabilizînd
partea adversă. Portretul negativ al unei comunităţi etnice, făcut din detalii expresive
şi din informaţii orientate politic, într-un mod insesizabil de către masa receptorilor…
duce la o interpretare deformată a conflictului, la formarea unei atitudini care este în
defavoarea respectivei comunităţi, oricît de îndreptăţite ar fi aspiraţiile pentru care
luptă"xiii.

ANUL 2001.
Problema conflictelor interetnice apare aşadar, drept un punct de reper,
capabil să explice situaţia actuală şi vectorul mişcării ulterioare a diverselor entităţi
statale din spaţiul postcomunist. În orice caz, anume pentru această zonă s-a
adeverit avertizarea lui Juan Linz, formulată acum cîţiva ani: “În viitorul apropiat vom
putea avea democraţii dificile ori de înaltă conflictualitate”xiv.
Războiul informaţional, inerent unei situaţii de conflict (dar despre faptul că a

fost şi este un adevărat război mărturiseşte faptul unor atacuri mediatice înverşunate,
demararea în paginile mai multor publicaţii de la Tiraspol şi de la Moscova a unei
campanii de denigrare a politicii promovate de Republica Moldova) poate fi cîştigat
doar în condiţiile asigurării unui flux informaţional operativ şi convingător. Este nevoie
de o activitate informaţională intensă, pentru a contrapune informaţiei falsificate
propriul punct de vedere, a-l face cunoscut. Ar putea facilita acest lucru editarea unor
publicaţii speciale cu menirea – promovarea imaginii Republicii Moldova în lume, a
unui digest al presei republicane (tradus şi în alte limbi), aceste acţiuni înscriindu-se
firesc în albia eforturilor necesare pentru integrarea republicvii în comunitatea
internaţională. Oricum, nu putem fi indiferenţi în ceea ce priveşte imaginea ţării în
lume, repercusiunile unei neglijenţe în această direcţie ar putea fi fatale. Lipsa unei
strategii de activitate a mass media, a unei coordonări, în limitele acceptabile, a
activităţii informaţionale reprezintă şi ea un obstacol în calea integrării rîvnitexv.
Dezvoltarea complicatelor situaţii în ţările postcomuniste suscită interesul, dar

trezeşte şi anumite nelinişti, generînd păreri neunivoce ale politicienilor şi experţilor.
În condiţiile unei economii în criză eforturile pentru stabilizarea societăţii încă nu pot
contrabalansa tendinţele distructive ale perioadei de tranziţie. În orice caz, însă, este
absolut clar: e nevoie de un efort comun, căci “succesul unei societăţi nu este
rezultatul acţiunilor statului şi nici ale celui mai bun dintre guverne, dar al efortului
unit al întregii societăţi"xvi.
Maratonul integrăprii europene pentru Republica Moldova continuă. Cît de

reuşit vor fi depăşite obstacolele cursei, depinde, în acest context, indiscutabil, şi de
mass media.
1
Campana Domenico. Il voto corre sul filo: democrazia diretta, democrazia in diretta. – Roma:
Seat, 1994, p. XXXI.
i
Fisichella Domenico. Ştiinţa politică. Probleme, concepte, teorii. – Chişinău: Universitatea de
Stat din Moldova, 2000, p. 292.
ii
Revel Jean-Francois. Revirimentul democraţiei. – Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1995, p. 367.
Moldova, România, Ucraina: integrarea în structurile europene. – Chişinău: Perspectiva.
iii
Cf.: Moraru Victor. Cursa spre Europa sau "ascunsa nostalgie a originilor" // Flux, 1996, 3
mai.
iv
Cf.: Moraru Victor. Repere italiene. Chişinău: Universitatea de Stat din Moldova, 1998.
v
Cf.: Moldova, România, Ucraina: integrarea în structurile europene. – Chişinău: Perspectiva,
2000.
vi
Cf.: Comunistul, 2001, 15 iunie, p. 7.
vii
Чубашенко Дмитрий. Недоразумение. Неизменные коммунисты в изменившемся мире
// Молдавские Ведомости, 2001, 16 июня.
viii
Ramonet Ignacio. Enfances fracassees // Le Monde Diplomatique, 1998, janvier, p. 1.
ix
Gardner R. N. L'economia mondiale alla soglia del terzo millennio // Antologia nuova, 1999,
ottobre-dicembre, p.53.
x
Независимая Молдова, 2001, 28 июня.
xi
Cf.: Flux, 1999, 8 octombrie.
xii
Flux, 2000, 20 septembrie.
xiii
Georgiu Grigore. Filosofia culturii. – Bucureşti: SNSPA, 2001, p. 179.
xiv
Linz Juan. La transizione alla democrazia // Modernizzazione e Sviluppo, 1990, Nr. 2-3, p.
16.

ANUL 2001.
xv
Mai amănunţit, cf.: Moraru Victor. Logica intrinsecă a paradoxului // Moldova Suverană,
1992, 29 aprilie; Moraru Victor. Avem restanţe la capitolul informaţie // Sfatul Ţării, 1992, 15
mai.
xvi
Linz Juan. Op. cit.

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