Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
2012iulsuport Curs Studii Securitate - 2012
2012iulsuport Curs Studii Securitate - 2012
SUPORT DE CURS
Bucureti, 2012
Obiectivele cursului:
Cursul se adreseaz studenilor i masteranzilor Universitii din Bucureti i
Academiei de Studii Economice, interesai de aprofundarea studiului relaiilor
internaionale i a securitii.
Obiective principale:
CUPRINS
Introducere in tematica cursului 7
1. Delimitarea domeniului.
2. Definitii.
3. Perspective (realista si idealista).
4. Abordarea post-razboi rece.
5. Noul aparat conceptual al securitatii.
6. Redefinirea securitatii. Diagrama studiilor de securitate.
Module
1. SECURITATEA CA PUTERE. DILEMA DE SECURITATE 13
1. Securitatea ca art militar: Clausewitz, Jomini, Machiavelli,
Liddell-Hart, Douhet
2. Securitatea ca putere. Studiile strategice si definirea insecuritatii.
3. Dilema securitii.
4. Securitatea nationala: interese nationale, obiective de
securitate, strategia nationala de securitate.
5. State slabe-state puternice.
Productorii i consumatorii de securitate.
2. SECURITATEA CA PACE.
CONFLICTUL I VIOLENA STRUCTURAL 30
1. Dimitrie Gusti: sociologia pcii i a rzboiului.
2.Conflictul i violena structural.
1. Axiomele conflictului internaional
3. SECURITATEA NAIONAL.
VULNERABILITI, RISCURI, AMENINRI 37
1. Statul i securitatea naional. Interesele naionale.
2. Insecuritatea: vulnerabiliti, riscuri, ameninri.
3. Securitatea militar.
4. Securitatea politic. Subminarea autoritii.
5. Securitatea economic.
6. Securitatea societal, securitatea mediului.
4. SECURITATEA SOCIETAL. NOUA AGEND DE SECURITATE
MIGRAIE, CRIMINALITATE, TERORISM I ORDINE PUBLIC ..........46
1. Societate si securitate.
2. Bazele de constituire a societatii. Aspectele societale.
3. Domeniul securitatii societale.
4. Securitatea in sens largit. Securitatea statului si securitatea societatii.
5. Natiune, nationalism, identitate. Semnificatia lor pentru
securitatea societala.
6. Migraia. Securitatea societal i fenomenul migraiei.
7. Stabilitate societal, delicven, terorism. Ordinea public n Europa.
5. SOCIETATEA RISCULUI. SECURITATE N CONDIII DE RISC 63
1. Industrialism, democratie, modernism: riscul istoriei.
2. Productia bunastarii versus productia riscurilor. Sub-politica.
3. Managementul riscului. Potentialul politic al riscului.
4. Potenialul auto-distructiv al societii.
Secolul XXI - securitate n condiii de risc
Anexe:
THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY: by Bjrn Mller
74
BIBLIOGRAFIE :
Link-uri Internet:
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm
https://da.mod.uk/CSRC/Home/documents/central_and_eastern_europe.h
tm
10
Actorii relevanti in politica sunt grupurile si nu indivizii; cel mai important grup organizat in
politica este statul national (nation-state);
Relatiile inter-nationale sunt in mod esential competitive si conflictuale (anarchy), ceea ce
genereaza insecuritate;
Motivatia prima in politica este puterea si securitatea (power and security).
Scoala liberala (idealista)
starea naturala a lumii este cea de pace (Kant);
individul mai presus de orice organizare (Rousseau), drepturile omului (ale individului)
primeaza;
securitatea este o consecinta a pacii; pacea se instaureaza ca urmare a lipsei razboiului
(Wilson);
sistemul de state este organizat sub forma unei societati internationale a carei
principala misiune este promovarea pacii;
societatea internationala are ca prima menire prezervarea pacii si a securitatii internationale (Hedley
Bull);
organizarea internationala presupune cooperare si integrare prin reglementari stabilite ad-hoc
(Deutsch, Keohane);
interdependenta (Keohane - Democratiile nu lupta una impotriva alteia);
liberalismul economic (integrarea economica si politica) - sursa de securitate (Rosecrance);
globalizarea civilizatiei occidentale - extinderea drepturilor omului, a democratiei si integrarea in
retele = mai multa securitate pentru oameni (human security), mai putina suveranitate pentru state, mai
multa autoritate catre organizatii globale si regionale.
Ipotezele liberalismului
11
12
realist;
interes pentru mentinerea unei ambiguitati simbolice a securitatii
nationale din partea politicienilor.
5. Redefinirea securitatii (B. Buzan, 1998)
Diagrama studiilor de securitate.
Acceptarea ipotezei realiste a sistemului international anarhic;
Amendarea ipotezei politicii de putere cu teoria liberala a interdependentei;
Acceptarea influentelor procesului de globalizare, sub forma creterii anselor
pentru pace, concomitent cu apariia vulnerabilitilor i riscurilor;
Introducerea in domeniu a unor dimensiuni relevante pentru securitate
(natiune, identitate, religie, migratie, terorism, risc etc);
nelegerea securitii ca proces de construcie social (identificare, definire,
securizare a unei vulnerabiliti, risc sau ameninare) securizarea
(securitization) sau desecurizarea presupune un proces de implicare social,
similar procesului politic, cu implicarea publicului;
Securitatea nu este obiectiv definit ci social construit;
Abordarea securitii pe sectoare (politic, militar, economic, societal, de
mediu), pe complexe de securitate regionale, pe regimuri de securitate
internaionale i pe sistemul internaional ca ntreg;
n abordarea tradiional (TSS, vezi diagrama), securitatea este obiectiv
definit, ndeosebi pe latura militar-strategic;
n abordarea critic (CSS), securitatea este definit subiectiv, de ctre actorii
sociali, n funcie de percepiile i interesele lor;
coala constructivist (Buzan) consider c agenda de securitate este
construit prin actele de securizare, acte ce reprezint forme ale practicii
sociale agenda este construit pe ambele ci (obiectiv, de ctre structurile
de stat i subiectiv, de ctre actorii sociali: public, organizaii, pres);
Diagrama de mai jos ilustreaz ipotezele securitii descrise anterior:
abordarea tradiional este obiectivist (nu ine cont de socializarea riscurilor)
sau absolutist, militarist, bazat pe putere; abordarea constructivist este
pragmatic, nelege securitatea ca o construcie social rezultat din jocul
actorilor sociali. ntre aceste dou modele se deruleaz securitatea.
13
1. SECURITATEA CA PUTERE
DILEMA DE SECURITATE
1. Securitatea ca art militar: Clausewitz, Jomini, Machiavelli, LiddellHart, Douhet
2. Securitatea ca putere. Studiile strategice si definirea insecuritatii.
3. Dilema securitii.
4. Securitatea nationala: interese nationale, obiective de securitate,
strategia nationala de securitate.
5. State slabe-state puternice. Productorii i consumatorii de securitate.
14
Securitatea este neleas ca art militar, pentru c rzboiul este, la rndul su,
neles ca o funcie principal i permanent a statului. Pacea este perceput ca o
stare intermediar ntre rzboaie, starea natural fiind cea de rzboi. nct, n
abordarea tradiional a secolului al XIX-lea, securitatea unui stat se putea
obine numai printr-o pregtire permanent pentru rzboi. Faptul c educaia
millitar se adresa ndeosebi elitei iar o bun parte a elitei se ocupa numai de
administrarea chestiunilor legate de rzboi i pregtirea rzboiului, domeniul a
fost
denumit
art
militar.
Practic,
educaia
specific,
inspiraia
marilor
15
Liddel Hart:
Dislocarea fizica si psihica a inamicului;
Separarea fortelor inamicului;
Taierea liniilor de aprovizionare;
3) Securitatea ca putere. Studiile strategice si definirea insecuritatii.
In secolul al XX-lea, securitatea este subsumata domeniului studiilor strategice
(strategic studies), indeosebi dupa 1945. In contextul razboiului rece, a
confruntarii Est-Vest si a cursei inarmarilor, in care inarmarea nucleara a jucat
rolul principal, securitatea a fost inteleasa ca echilibrul fragil al arsenalelor
militare ale celor doua parti. Strategiile politice derivate din aceasta confruntare
politica,
ideologica,
serie
de
teorii
managementul
razboiului
rece,
perioada
in
care
dominanta
este
sa fie
argumenteaza
ca
forta
este
un
element
ineluctabil
in
relatiile
16
avem in vedere una dintre maximele filosofului Spinoza care spune Fiecare are
atata dreptate in lume dupa cata forta are.
Din cele prezentate pe scurt pana aici, deducem, impreuna cu reprezentantii
scolii realiste, ca starea naturala a sistemului international nu este starea de
securitate,
ci
de
insecuritate.
In
viziunea
realista/neorealista,
relatiile
anarhiei,
insecuritatea.
Deosebirea
dintre
politica
interna
si
definita
de
teoria
echilibrului
de
putere
(balance
of
power).
17
18
19
echilibrul ofensiva-defensiva
diferentierea ofensiva-defensiva
20
21
razboiul este mult mai probabil, cursa inarmarilor mult mai accentuata;
22
23
24
25
Uniunea Sovietica din trecut sunt exemple, la indemana, ale acestui caz.
A defini natiunea ca obiect al securitatii presupune, ne avertizeaza Buzan, un
demers subiectiv, prin care valori si identitati sunt protejate. Cursul referitor la
securitatea societala, din cuprinsul acestui manual, descrie pe larg aceasta
chestiune. Securitatea societala este securitatea identitatii colective.
Institutiile statului cuprind intreaga masinarie a guvernarii, din care fac parte
executivul, legislativul, structura administrativa si judiciara, la care se adauga
legislatia, procedurile si normele cu care aceasta masinarie opereaza. Prin
mecanisme politice, juridice si administrative, institutiile sunt desemnate sa
gestioneze securitatea nationala, ca unul dintre actele fundamentale ale
guvernarii. Amenintarile si riscurile la adresa structurii institutionale a statului se
raporteaza diferit, in functie de relevanta lor pentru securitate. Securitatea
politica se refera la riscurile si amenintarile la adresa functionarii optime a
institutiilor publice. Terorismul este o amenintare la adresa securitatii politice.
Terorismul este, nainte de toate, un risc politic.
In ceea ce priveste baza fizica a statului, populatia, teritoriul si resursele naturale
sunt elementele sale constitutive. In cazul bazei fizice a statului, este relativ mai
usor a fi definita ca obiect al securitatii. Teritoriul si resursele naturale sunt, de
aceea, considerate exemplele clasice de obiecte ale securitatii. Controul
teritoriului este un indicator important al suveranitatii si, implicit, al securitatii in
timp ce resursele reprezinta un indicator relevant pentru securitatea economica.
In
ceea
ce
priveste
populatia,
migratia
este
considerata
sursa
de
elementelor
fundamentale
ale
securitatii
(populatie,
teritoriu,
26
obiectivele
de
securitate
naional
ale
unui
stat:
identific
27
economic i militar. Puteri slabe ca Austria, Olanda, Norvegia sunt, toate, state
puternice. Puteri importante, ca Brazilia, Pakistan, Indonezia sunt state slabe.
Superputeri, ca odinioar URSS i astazi China, sunt state slabe. Puterea uria a
Uniunii Sovietice a fost obinut prin slbirea permanent a statului. URSS a
euat ca stat pentru c, aplicnd referenialul nostru, necesara coeziune socialpolitic a statului (nseamnnd realizarea unei identiti colective puternice,
deasupra identitilor naionale i etnice din imperiu, adeziunea din convingere la
ideologia comunist i un sistem instituional optim, neafectat de corupie) nu sa putut realiza. URSS a fost, din acest punct de vedere, un experiment politic
artificial, un stat artificial, chiar dac puterea lui a fost una extrem de real. Baza
puterii sovietice a fost slab, iar puterea sa artificial.
n ceea ce privete statele slabe, literatura din domeniul securitii evideniaz
aceste state ca surs de insecuritate. n primul rnd, exist state slabe ca
urmare a unei relaii de dependen de o mare putere (sau dependencia, termen
n spaniol, desemnat a descrie situaia statelor din America Latin, dependente,
cele mai multe, de Statele Unite). n al doilea rnd, exist state slabe, ndeosebi
n Lumea a III-a i n fosta Uniune Sovietic, n care elementele fundamentale
ale statalitii (populaie, identitate, teritoriu, structur instituional) sunt
insuficient sau precar definite. n al treilea rnd, exist state slabe ntr-un numr
de ri care, chiar dac au realizat o anumit form de coeziune intern (de
obicei prin regimuri politice autoritare), se manisfest pe plan internaional ca
puternice surse de instabilitate i insecuritate (Corea de Nord, Libia, Cuba). Cee
ce este comun statelor slabe, din oricare categorie menionat mai sus, este
nivelul relativ ridicat de riscuri interne, care oricnd se pot transforma n
ameninri la adresa guvernrii, ntruct "statele slabe sau nu au, sau nu au
reuit s realizeze un consens politic i societal de suficient stabilitate pentru a
elimina utilizarea pe scar larg a forei ca element major i de continuitate n
viaa politic a naiunii" (Buzan, op.cit. p.99). Un prim indicator al slbiciunii
statelor este ceea ce Alfred Stepan numete suppression facility (capacitate
represiv, Vezi volumul Armata i societatea, n bibliografia recomandat),
respectiv dimensiunea aparatului de ordine intern raportat la totalul populaiei.
Practic, numrul de poliiti, ageni, informatori, jandarmi, gardieni .a. cu funcii
de protecie intern, raportat la 10.000 de locuitori, ne ofer o prim ideea
despre slbiciunea unui stat.
Pot fi listate cel puin ase condiii de definire a statelor slabe. Este deajuns ca
una dintre aceste condiii s fie valabil pentru a se putea aplica definiia de stat
slab:
1. Violen politic manifest (Afganistan, Irak, Coasta de Filde, Somalia);
2. Aciuni represive ale poliiei politice (Belarus, Rusia, China COre"de Nord,
Ucrainanainde!e Iuchnk;
3.
Conflic
politicanifest
28
nt
dhferite
grupuri,
ynsirate
de
29
30
31
2. SECURITATEA CA PACE
CONFLICTUL I VIOLENA STRUCTURAL
razboi civil
revolutie
razboi propriuzis
conflict sangeros
Intre gr de indiv si
stat
Intre state
32
stiinta
economia
cultura
tehnica
MANIFESTARI
izbanda
COSMIC
Spirituale
PSIHOLOGIC Politice
Econ.
BIOLOGIC
Juridice
ISTORIC
Aspecte:
Aspectele razboaielor sunt prezentate de Gusti prin doua perspective opuse
cea pacifista si cea antipacifista:
*aspectul istoric
-pacifista - razboiul este un simplu rest primitiv al trecutului care poate foarte
bine sa fie suprimat fara a fi afectata viata popoarelor, fiind o simpla prejudecata
sangeraoasa si dureroasa.
-antipacifista - daca exista vreun progres al omenirii atunci acesta se face numai
prin razboaie, dupa cum o dovedeste intreaga istorie a umanitatii.
*aspectul etic
33
34
*aspectul economic
-pacifista considera razboiul ca distrugatorul valorilor economice dezorganizand
si paralizand complet orice viata economica.
-antipacifista considera razboiul ca o conditie a organizatiei economice.
Tezele i ideile susinute de creatorul colii sociologice romneti moderne,
sunt izvorte din nelegerea adecvat a evenimentelor, a vieii contemporane
lui, prezint un interes deosebit i se ncadreaz n lupta permanent a
popoarelor pentru cunoatere reciproc, pace i progres, consacrandu-l pe Gusti
nu numai ca un precursor al sociologiei rzboiului i a pcii, ci i unul din
precursorii sociologiei relaiilor internaionale.
Rzboiul, ca fenomen social, acelai n decursul timpului pn astzi, este
supus totui unei metamorfoze a scopurilor. Fenomenul rzboiului rmne adic
acelai, scopurile sale (care sunt de fapt i cauzele sale) se schimb continuu, ca
necorespunztoare culturii timpului. Razboiul este mijloc nu are valoare in sine,
ci numai intrucat este determinat de valoarea unui scop scopurile care se
realizeaza prin razboi reprezinta cauzele razboiului.
Inelesul primitiv al razboiului, - exterminare, lupte sngeroase religioase
ori dinastice s-a ters, a disprut. Rzboiul ns, ca instituie social, s-a
pstrat, dei transformat, creat de scopuri noi, izvorte din atmosfera timpului,
adaptat la ideile culturale i politice predominante ale timpului: la ideea naional
i la ideea imperialist, observa Dimitrie Gusti.
Observatie Gusti nu vorbeste de popoarele primitive (cf. Ratzel) care nu
urmaresc prin razboaie sa invinga, ci numai sa extermine inamicul (daca nu se
intalnesc barbatii se ucid femeile si copii)
S sperm oare c va veni vreodat timpul, se pronuna Dimitrie Gusti,
cnd rzboiul, n puterea metamorfozei scopurilor, se va transforma n
concuren cultural, adaptndu-se culturii viitoare: socializatoare, naionalautonom, productiv i raional?
35
36
explic cele mai multe conflcite dintre pri ... (citat din J, Dedring, On Peace in
Times of War, COPRI).
Galtung leag instituirea pcii de reducerea violenei (tratamentul) i de evitarea
acesteia (prevenirea). Dac avem n vedere c n studiile de pace prevenirea este
esenial pentru evitarea rzboiului, deducem de aici nsemntatea recretrii
conflictului, a cilor de soluionare panic, a proceselor de negociere, pacificare,
etc.
Dup Galtung, orice conflict conine o contradicie intern, derivat fie din faptul
c doi actori urmresc un singur lucru, care este unic, fie din din faptul c acelai
actor urmrete dou lucruri diferite. Prima treapt n formarea unui conflict se
numete disput. A doua treapt este dilema. Degajarea natural de energie
pentru soluionarea conflictului poate conduce la distrugere violent (distrugerea
celuilalt sau auto-distrugere) sau la comportament constructiv i soluie
panic. Contradicia intern este definit ca scopuri incompatibile ntr-un
sistem orientat ctre scopuri, n timp ce conflictul este definit ca o compoziie
dintre atitudini/presupoziii + comportament + contradicie/rezolvare. Galtung
atenioneaz c, pentru rezolvarea conflictului, este nevoie de tratament
pentru toate cele trei componente ale triadei.
Kriesberg (1998) detaliaz conflictul : conflictul social exist atunci cnd dou
sau mai multe persoane sau grupuri manifest credina c au obiective
incompatibile. Rezult c acestea sunt diferite de competiie i sunt percepute
ca fiind conflicte chiar de ctre actori.
3. Instaurarea pcii. Axiomele conflictului internaional.
Pe baza filosofiei elaborate de Galtung i Kriesberg, printre alii, Herbert Kelman
(1997) a formulat axiomele conflictului internaional:
a) Conflictul internaional este un proces ghidat mai degrab de nevoile i
temerile (percepiile) colective dect de calculul obiectiv i raional al
intereselor naionale din partea decidenilor politici.
b) Conflictul internaional este un proces intersocietal, nu doar unul dintre
state sau guverne.
c) Conflictul internaional este un proces cu multiple aspecte ale influenei
reciproce i nu doar un instrument al puterii coercitive.
d) Conflictul internaional este un proces interactiv, cu stadii de escaladare,
dinamic auto-perpetuativ i nu doar o faz a unei aciuni i reaciuni din
partea unor anumii actori.
Aceste necesiti colective pe care le are n vedere teoria conflictului se refer
la identitate, securitate i alte necesiti simbolice sau materiale.
37
38
3. SECURITATEA NAIONAL
VULNERABILITI, RISCURI, AMENINRI
Aceti
actori
sunt
de
natur
suprastatal
(organizaiile
rmn
pentru
perioad
nedefinit
de
timp
principalii
actori
39
ntr-o democraie,
40
de
securitate-insecuritate
se
poate
defini
urma
analizei
aezarea
Poloniei
ntre
Germania
Rusia
rezult
principala
sa
vulnerabilitate. Din punct de vedere strategic, ntre Polonia i cele dou puteri nu
se interpun obstacole naturale majore (vulnerabilitatea), statul polonez nu a
reuit s se consolideze suficient de mult n epoca modern pentru a rspunde
adecvat acestei vulnerabiliti (riscul), Polonia fiind oricnd pasibil la ocupaii
(ameninarea). O politic de securitate ofensiv la Berlin sau Moscova devenea,
n mod tradiional o ameninare la adresa Poloniei, datorit vulnerabilitii
strategice i riscului politic.
Vulnerabilitatea este o caracteristic extern a securitii, riscul este una intern.
Cu alte cuvinte, vulnerabilitatea este pasiv (este un dat ce ine de aezarea
geografic, mrimea teritoriului, populaia), n timp ce riscul este partea activ
(o vulnerabilitate activat i perceput ca atare). Vulnerabilitatea se definete
strategic, riscul se evalueaz din punct de vedere politic. Teoretic, n perioada
modern, construirea unui sistem defensiv la frontierele Poloniei ar fi redus
vulnerabilitatea acesteia, n timp ce o organizare intern optim ar fi redus
riscurile de securitate. n consecin, Polonia a fost ocupat (din 1938 pn n
1989) pentru c era vulnerabil n exterior, n timp ce statul polonez era slab n
interior.
Din acest punct de vedere, politica de securitate, n sensul tradiional, pune n
eviden dimensiunea naional i internaional a securitii. Politica de
securitate
naional
poate
fi
orientat
ctre
interior,
pentru
reduce
41
Coeziune social-politic
Puternic
Slab
Mic
Putere
Mare
Vulnerabil la ameninri
majoritatea ameninrilor
militare
Vulnerabil ndeosebi la
ameninri politice
tipurile de ameninri
42
43
este
relevant
pentru
securitatea
sa.
acest
sens,
se
identific
44
pn
la
rsturnarea
guvernului,
incitarea
la
secesionism
45
ale
statului,
genereze
efecte
perverse,
sub
forma
ecosistemului
schimbare
climateric,
pierderea
46
instabilitate societal;
f) Dezordini civile includ distrugeri ale mediului datorit aciunilor de rzboi
i violene ca urmare a distrugerilor mediului nconjurtor.
47
1. Societate si securitate.
2. Bazele de constituire a societatii. Aspectele societale.
3. Domeniul securitatii societale.
4. Securitatea in sens largit. Securitatea statului si securitatea societatii.
5. Natiune, nationalism, identitate. Semnificatia lor pentru securitatea
societala.
6. Migraia. Securitatea societal i fenomenul migraiei.
7. Stabilitate societal, delicven, terorism. Ordinea public n Europa.
48
49
Securitatea natiunii s-ar referi, in acest caz, la securitatea politica. Includem insa
sensul de identitate, de comunitate si de moralitate pe care il asigura natiunea,
in cadrul securitatii societale.
-
daca
reducem
securitatea
la
securitatea
grupurilor,
operam
fragmentare a securitatii.
Ex: fermierii francezi percep o stare de insecuritate ca urmare a modificarii
politicii agricole a UE, in sensul liberalizarii comertului cu produse agricole in
interiorul GATT si in relatia cu Europa de Est; actiunile lor de protest blocheaza
decizia UE si, in felul acesta, pe cale de consecinta, se genereaza insecuritate in
randul producatorilor agricoli din Europa de Est. Securitatea societala s-ar reduce
la grupul de fermieri, la alte grupuri similare, ceea ce ar fi prea putin.
- daca reducem securitatea la securitatea individuala (sau suma acestora),
revenim la conceptul atomist al securitatii, din care s-a inspirat una dintre
abordarile "securitatii nationale" (inteleasa ca agregatul securitatii de grup si
individuale).
Securitatea societala se refera la acea parte ramasa neacoperita de securitatea
statului (in sensul agregat al securitatii nationale) si de securitatea individuala (in
sensul tomist al securitatii nationale).
Securitatea statului (obtinuta pe cale militara, diplomatica si economica) si
siguranta indivizilor (obtinuta pe cale politieneasca) trebuie completata cu
securitate societatii, adica societala. In acest caz avem
- securitate politica = securitatea nationala
- securitate individuala = securitatea fizica a indivizilor
- securitate societala = securitate morala.
Ecuatia completa a securitatii contine, in intelesul scolii europene: securitatea
politica (a comunitatii nationale, definita in termeni etnici sau civici), securitatea
individuala (definita
indivizilor, bunurilor si
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societala.
In teoria despre securitate, asa cum am discutat in unul dintre cursurile
anterioare, referentul traditional este "statul-natiune": securitatea nationala este
termenul central in literatura de specialitate, in special cea anglo-saxona,
literatura construita pe teoria statului. Practica internationala, de asemenea,
trateaza securitatea la nivel de state suverane si nationale. Este cazul Natiunilor
Unite (ONU), care considera statele actori egali si suverani ai relatiilor internationale (intre natiuni).
Securitatea societala este definita, in intelesul Scolii Europene, in afara statului,
insa nu poate fi definita in afara natiunii. Cele doua intelesuri principale ale
natiunii, i.e. natiunea civica (franceza) si natiunea etnica (germana), trebuiesc
corelate cu teoriile alternative privind natiunea, nationalismul si etnicitatea.
Chestiunea este pe larg expusa intr-un alt curs al Facultatii (Sociologia natiunii si
nationalismului). In acest curs ne intereseaza doar legatura dintre securitatea
societala si natiune-nationalism.
In viziunea modernista (constructivista - Gellner, Andreson, Giddens), natiunile
sunt fenomene construite, sunt, fiecare, un fenomen istoric tranzitoriu: au aparut
in sec. XVIII-XIX, dispar in sec. XX-XXI.
In viziunea primordialista (perenialista - A. Smith), natiunile sunt entitati
inascute, sub forma unor proto-natiuni, sunt realitati perene ale umanitatii si
cadrul principal, alaturi de religie, de definire a identitatii.
Recent, Ilie Badescu adauga o dimensiune noologica, spirituala natiunii, de
esenta religioasa, prin care se completeaza viziunea primordialista a lui A. Smith
(vezi bibliografia recomandata pentru chestiunea natiunii).
Securitatea societala ia in considerare urmatoarele
componente definitorii:
1. Natiunea definita ca "o anumita populatie, impartasind un teritoriu
istoric, mituri si memorii istorice colective, o cultura publica de masa, o economie
comuna si un sistem legal de drepturi si obligatii comune pentru toti membrii (A.
Smith, 1991, citat in O. Weaver, 1993).
2. Nationalismul ca "o actiune politica", program, initiativa politica care are
ca principal obiectiv crearea unei natiuni, protectia unei natiuni impotriva unei
amenintari sau risc, sau pur si simplu o mobilizare politica pentru un obiectiv
considerat ca "national". In acest inteles, nationalismul este o stare si o actiune
legitime, normale, desirabile. Nationalismul este, in acest inteles, un fenomen
politic pozitiv. (Extremismul nationalist cu totul altceva si se refera la obiective
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avea, n 1990, un produs intern brut pe cap de locuitor de circa 6.000 USD.
Austria, care avea s devin membr UE mai tarziu, nregistra circa 17.000 USD
pe cap de locuitor. Prin comparaie, Cehoslovacia avea circa 3.500 USD, iar
Romnia numai 1.600 USD pe cap de locuitor.
Evident c acest optim social, obinut prin eforturi individuale i comune de rile
europene, este afectat prin migraie. Recesiunea economic a UE din anii "90,
creterea somajului, competiia economic cu SUA i Japonia, susinerea
procesului de extindere a Uniunii ctre Europa central i de Est, mbtrnirea
populaiei .a. au pus n discuie statul bunstrii. O serie de evenimente
"vizibile" (criminalitate, ndeosebi delicte mpotriva persoanei i bunurilor
personale, violen de strad, ghettouri de imigrani n periferiile marilor orae,
toate surprinse de media), la care se adaug somajul pe termen lung, criza
locuinelor, violena n coli, "mizeria" din locurile publice au transferat
responsabilitatea situaiei comunitilor de imigrani. omajul, mizeria, lipsa
locuinelor, violena n coli se datoreaz imigranilor!
Imigranii s-au transformat, astfel, din muncitori-invitai (Gestarbeiters) n
ceteni indezirabili. n opinia public se percepe c o parte nsemnat a
problemelor sociale existente n rile Europei Occidentale se datoreaz
imigranilor. Imigranii sunt percepui ca strini (outsiders), chiar i cei care
provin din a doua sau chiar a treia generaie. Este tiut din una dintre teoremele
lui Thomas c definirea public a unei situaii devine parte a situaiei.
Pe de alt parte, o bun parte a imigranilor, ndeosebi cei care prin culoarea
pielii i alte trsturi rasiale se deosebesc evident de populaia majoritar, se
consider ei nii imigrani. Un francez imigrant este cetean al Republicii i se
bucur de toate drepturile definite juridic de constituie, ns nu este considerat
un francez adevrat. Aceasta nseamn c acordarea ceteniei, obinerea unui
loc de munc permanent i a unei rezidene stabile nu sunt suficiente pentru a
defini identitatea.
n continuare, n Europa, spre deosebire de America sau Australia, identitatea
este apreciat n funcie de trsturile fizice i, mai ales, de religie, naionalitate
i cultur. A fi american este, de cele mai multe ori, suficient a fi cetean. A fi
francez, german sau englez nu se poate dobndi prin cetenie. Cele mai multe
state europene se consider state-naionale omogene, a cror membri au
sentimentul apartenenei la comunitatea naional datorit unor factori unificatori
precum istorie comun, identitate etnic, limb, cultur i experien politic. Un
autor din anii '60 (Enoch Powel, citat de autorii studiului, vezi op.cit. p. 162)
considera c un pakistanez sau indian nu poate, nscundu-se n Anglia, s
devin un englez. Juridic el devine un cetean britanic prin natere, ns de fapt
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el este pakistanez sau indian. Astfel de idei, rezultatul unei stri de spirit, au dat
natere unor micri politice anti-imigraioniste n Europa de Vest, cum sunt cele
conduse de Jean Marie Le Pen n Frana, Jorg Haider in Austria, sau . in Olanda.
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sau pot s nu fie, ntr-o anumit msur, sponsorizai, dar care nu sunt n mod
normal controlai, de un stat suveran. Terosimul sponsorizat de stat este
terorism de stat i nu face obiectul riscurilor de natur societal, ci se
ncadreaza n categoria ameninrilor de natur militar.
Singurele ameninri de natur terorist n Europa, cu cauze exclusiv locale, sunt
cele din Irlanda de Nord i din ara Bascilor. Ambele cazuri au o istorie mult mai
lung dect procesul de integrare european i, deci, nu putem plasa i identifica
cauzele lor n interiorul acestui proces, ca efecte secundare ale integrrii. Cel
mult putem remarca creterea vizibilitii lor ca urmare a expunerii prin
procesul de integrare. Irlanda de Nord dateaz din 1921 (urmare a aciunilor
Provisional Irish Republican Army PIRA), n timp ce ara Bascilor este rvit
de violen de la nceputul anilor '60 (prin aciunile Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
ETA). Alturi de aceste dou cazuri, n Europa de Vest se manifest intermitent
terorismul corsican. Potenial terorist exist i n Catalania, Bretonia, Tirolul de
Sud, ara Galilor i Scoia. Procesele politice interne din rile vizate i avansul
integrrii europene au absorbit cea mai mare parte a acestui potenial disruptiv,
dei nu n totalitate.
Dac n Europa de Vest terorismul de extracie local este pe cale de a fi absorbit
i diluat prin integrarea european, n Europa de Est potenialul terorist este n
curs de definire. Este vorba n primul rnd de terorismul albanez n Balcani, dar
cu ramificaii n ntreaga Europ. Este, de asemenea, vorba de rzboiul etnic din
fosta Uniune Sovietic, n care exemplul Ceceniei primeaz. Tutui, n cazul
Rusiei, rzboiul din Cecenia este mai degrab un rzboi de eliberare naional i
mai puin unul terorist.
Totui, cu excepia Balcanilor i al fostei URSS, potenialul de instabilitate n
Europa este unul redus. Schimbrile de frontier i apariia sau dispariia unor
state sunt puin probabile. Cu o singur excepie: Romnia-Moldova, care mai
devreme sau mai trziu se vor reunifica.
n afara motivelor mari care ar putea afecta ordinea public n Europa, pot fi
enumerate cauze mai mici, dar nu lipsite de importan. Astfel, putem vorbi de:
a) grupuri minoritare alienate recrutate de obicei din rndul imigranilor,
marginalizai n interiorul rilor UE (fr locuri de munc, locuine, fr
acces la educaie, sntate), care pot dezvolta comportamente violente;
b) grupuri minoritare care reacionez prin violen fa de ideile politice ale
partidelor politice extremiste (de exemplu gruprile neonaziste);
c) numr mare de imigrani care sosesc n rile UE ca urmare a deteriorrii
brute a situaiei din rile de origine (exemplu invazia albanez a
coastelor italiene n anul 1997);
d) grupuri etnice care se pot angaja n aciuni violente la iniiativa statului de
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5. SOCIETATEA RISCULUI
SECURITATE N CONDIII DE RISC
Cursul de fata ne previne asupra uneia dintre cele mai recente si, in acelasi timp,
provocatoare teorii privind securitatea. Ideea principala are in vedere complicata
societate contemporana care, prin gradul foarte ridicat de complexitate a
sistemelor de productie si distributie, a modului de locuire, al sistemelor de
transport, de comunicatii s.a., devine ea insasi generatoare de riscuri de
securitate. Am putea numi acest fenomen sindromul insecuritatii dobandite.
Societatea industriala moderna, prin propria sa existenta si functionare,
genereaza insecuritate. Aceasta este teza principala a teoriei societatii riscului.
Dezbaterea pe aceasta tema a fost deschisa inca din anii '80 de catre sociologul
german Ulrich Beck. In anii '90, teoria lui Beck a fost asimilata studiilor de
securitate. Modernizarea induce, asadar, insecuritate. Cu cat o societate este mai
sofisticata, cu atat (poate deveni) devine mai nesigura. Aceasta teza trebuie,
evident, demonstrata si argumentata in cursul nostru.
Pana de curand, beneficiile modernizarii nu au fost puse la indoiala. Mai mult,
teoriile
modernizarii
sunt,
aproape
fara
exceptie,
construite
pe
premisa
perspectiva radicala
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66
67
politica.
Societatea
industriala
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dezvoltat
un
sistem
politic
sub
forma
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indeosebi in societatile in care nevoile materiale ale oamenilor sunt asigurate prin
dezvoltarea productivitatii pe baza tehnologiei si prin mecanismele statului
bunastarii. In al doilea rand, cresterea exponentiala a fortelor tehnologice ale
productivitatii (prin care sa se asigure nevoile materiale ale oamenilor),
evenimentele neprevazute si amenintarile potentiale sunt direct proportionale cu
aceasta crestere.
In acesta chestiune, ne previne Beck, important este modul in care riscurile si
evenimentele neprevazute (hazards), ca parte a procesului de modernizare, sunt
prevenite, minimizate si inlaturate. Managementul riscurilor presupune ca
procesul de modernizare nu este afectat si, in acelasi timp, nu se depasesc
limitele a ceea ce este definit ca "tolerabil" din punct de vedere ecologic, medical,
psihologic si social.
Prin urmare, societatea adauga o noua sarcina activitatii umane, alaturi de
exploatarea resurselor naturale si eliberarea de constrangerile traditionalismului,
anume gestionarea problemelor rezultate din insasi procesul de modernizare.
Ulrich Beck crede ca modernizare devine, in acest fel, reflexiva, adica devine
propria sa tema. Modernizarea nu mai este un scop in sine; dintr-un mit cu
valoare universala, modernizarea devine o povara la care omenirea trebuie sa
reflecteze.
Definitia riscului la Ulrich Beck este urmatoarea : "Riscul poate fi definit ca o cale
sistematica de gestionare a evenimentelor cu pericol potential si a insecuritatii
induse si introduse de procesul de modernizare". (op.cit. p. 21) In intelesul
acestei lucrari si in lumina a deschiderilor pe care le propune, definitia lui Beck,
elaborata in urma cu aproape 20 de ani, are nevoie de actualizare.
Riscuri sociale obisnuite in sec. XIX - saracie, sanatate, accidente industriale
locale. Riscurile ecologice in secolul al XIX-lea (poluare fizica si chimica,
indeosebi) puteau fi izolate si gestionate la nivel local, fara urmari deosebite. In
secolul XX, riscurile saraciei si ale sanatatii au fost eliminate prin intermediul
statului bunastarii. In schimb, accidentele industriale, in ciuda cresterii masurilor
de siguranta in exploatare, si-au marit exponential potentialul distructiv. O uzina
atomica, de exemplu, nu prezinta un risc doar la nivel local si pe o perioada
limitata de timp. Accidentele atomice nu mai pot intra la categoria accidente. Nu
pot fi incheiate asigurari pentru astfel de accidente, iar efectele se prelungesc pe
durata generatiilor: afecteaza pe cei in viata si pe cei care urmeaza sa se nasca.
Cine poate acorda o asigurare, in sensul industrial clasic al termenului, pentru
cineva care urmeaza sa se nasca peste 10 sau 20 de ani? Acest lucru arata ca
institutiile si modalitatile de calcul ale riscului, stabilite pana in prezent pe cale
stiintifica si legala se prabusesc.
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avertizeaza
Beck,
"in
societatea
riscului
consecintele
necunoscute
si
Pe esafodajul teoretic pus in evidenta mai sus, Ulrich Beck descrie cinci teze ale
ale potentialului auto-distructiv generat de societatea riscului:
1. Definirea riscului este importanta. Prin risc trebuie inteles in primul rand riscul
radioactivitatii, care nu poate fi perceput pe cale umana, la care se adauga
toxinele si poluantii din aer, apa, hrana si intreaga serie de consecinte si efecte
pe termen mediu si lung asupra plantelor, animalelor si oamenilor. Aceste riscuri
induc efecte sistematice si adesea ireversibile, raman in general putin vizibile, se
bazeaza pe o interpretare cauzala (sunt constatate pe cale stiintifica dupa ce siau produs efectele si sunt limitati de posibilitatile de cunoastere). Fiind deschisi
definirii si constructiei pe cale sociala, pot fi schimbati, magnificati sau
minimizati. Se poate deduce de aici rolul important al media si al profesiilor din
stiintele exacte si din domeniul juridic chemate sa defineasca riscurile. Cei ce
definesc riscurile capata pozitiile sociale si politice importante in societate. Apare,
cu societatea riscului, o noua profesie: managerul de risc. Calificarea sa stiintifica
si juridica este printre cele mai inalte. Prin ascendenta managerului de risc, rolul
militarului si, in general, importanta sociala a profesiilor chemate sa gestioneze
violenta legala in societate, scade. Important nu (mai) este s gestionezi
violena, ci s previi violena, prin controlul riscurilor.
2. Distributia sociala a riscului este inegala. Unii oameni sunt expusi mai mult
decat altii riscurilor. In principiu, riscurile se distribuie in functie de stratul si
pozitia sociala a indivizilor. Evident ca un individ care lucreaza si locuieste intr-o
zona urbana intens poluata este expus mai mult; similar, un individ care
locuieste in apropierea unei uzine atomice sau a unui mare aeroport, in
comparatie cu un individ (familie) care locuieste intr-o zona rezidentiala, in afara
marilor aglomerari urbane. In mod obisnuit, epidemiile de gripa, bolile generate
de poluare, consumul de droguri, violenta de strada s.a. sunt asociate cu zonele
urbane aglomerate. Totusi, ne avertizeaza Beck, exista riscuri la care sunt expusi
toti indiviziii, fara deosebire de clasa sau statut social. In cazul riscurilor cu grad
ridicat de periculozitate - care sunt riscuri generate de cele mai avansate forme
de modernitate - si aici intra riscurile accidentelor nucleare, exista un asa-numit
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de
gestionare
riscurilor
de
catre
forurile
internationale.
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ANEXA
When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, it means just what I
choose it to meanneither more nor less. The question is, said Alice, whether
you can make words mean so many things. The question is, said Humpty Dumpty,
which is to be masterthat's all. (Lewis Carroll: Through the Looking Glass)i
I. SECURITY IN THE INTER-DISCIPLINARY BATTLE
Until fairly recently, the term security was almost monopolized by the academic discipline of International
Relations (IR). IR theorists employed it in a rather narrow sense which happened to correspond to the way politicians
tended to use the word, i.e. as almost synonymous with military power. The more military power, or rather the more
favourable the military balance, the more security.
Surprisingly little was, however, written about security by the IR theoreticians, in the works of whom
national interest and/or power were preferred, sometimes as alleged synonyms of security. In his seminal work on
Realism, Hans Morgenthau thus hardly bothered to define securityii. Arnold Wolfers was one of the few who
ventured a definition of the term:
security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective
sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.iii
In contrast to IR, peace research in general, and Johan Galtung in particular, have for decades endeavoured to
develop meaningful conceptions of peace, security and violence. Both Galtung's term positive peace and the late
Kenneth Boulding's stable peace could thus be seen as precursors of the emerging, expanded security conceptiv. For
security to be meaningful and durable, it would have to amount to a positive or stable peace structure. This would
imply considerably more than negative peace equated with an absence of war, as merely one particular form of
*
The author holds an MA in History and a Ph.D. in International Relations, both from the University of Copenhagen. Since
1985, he has been (senior) research fellow, subsequently programme director and board member at the Copenhagen Peace
Research Institute (COPRI, formerly Centre for Peace and Conflict Research), where he is also editor of the international
research newsletter NOD and Conversion. He has served as Secretary General of the International Peace Research Association
(IPRA) since 1998, and as External Lecturer at the Institute of Political Studies, University of Copenhagen since 1992. In
addition to being the author of numerous articles and editor of six anthologies, he is the author of three books: Resolving the
Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (1991); Common Security and Nonoffensive
Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (1992); and Dictionary of Alternative Defense (1995).
75
direct violence. Genuine peace and security would presuppose an elimination of, or at least a reduction of,
structural violence, i.e. the relative deprivation of large parts of the world population.
Belatedly, members of the IR community have come to accept the challenge of developing broader
conceptions of securityv, with Barry Buzan and his collaborators at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, COPRI
(but not the present author) belonging to theoretical vanguard by virtue of their analyses of national and societal
securityvi. However, while acknowledging the need for shifting the focus from the (now defunct) East-West conflict
and military mattersvii, most members of the strategic studies (now often re-labelled security studies) community
continue to fight a rearguard battle against what they regard as an inappropriate expansion of the concept of
security. Even though a consensus thus seems to be emerging on the need for a certain widening, disagreement
persists about where to draw the line.
As will be argued in the following (and in line with Humpty Dumpty's linguistic philosophy) there is no
correct answer to questions such as this. It is a matter of definitions, which may be more or less useful or relevant,
but neither right nor wrong. To expand the notion of security too farsay, to include the absence of all types of
problemswould not be practical, since it would merely create the need for an additional term for traditional
security, now relegated to being merely one species of the genus security. Not to widen the concept at all might, on
the other hand, relegate security studies to a very marginalized position, if (as seems likely) traditional security
problems will be perceived as having a sharply diminishing salience.
Moreover, constructivists are probably right in rejecting as futile the quest for concepts that are correct in
the sense of corresponding to reality, if only because this reality is itself socially constructed, inter alia by means of
concepts such as peace and security. What the analyst, who is part of the game himself, can do is to analyze how
concepts are used, and how the security discourse is evolving. As argued by Ole Wver and others to thus analyze
the entire security discourse as a complex speech act challenges the analyst to explore the securitization of issues,
which may have political implications. Among other advantages, this approach induces caution with regard to
elevating too many problems to the status of security problems. In the political discourse, to call something a
security problem may be (ab)used for a tabooization of issues and marginalization of ideological opponents. To
label something as important to national security is often almost tantamount to declaring it off limits, i.e. not a
legitimate subject for political or academic debate. Hence, a relevant political goal might be a de-securitization of
pertinent issues, which may allow for a more open and fruitful debate.viii
II. THE NARROW CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND ITS EXTENSIONS
What characterized the traditional IR approach to security, especially during the era of almost unchallenged
dominance of Realismix, was the focus on the state as the referent object of security. Even though the preferred term
was national security, this was thus a misnomer when applied globally and only appropriate in those exceptional
cases where nation and state happened to be (almost) coterminous.x
What the Realists were really referring to was the security of the territorial (rather than nation-) state, which
was indeed the principal actor in their Westplahlian universe. It was presumed (if only for the sake of the
argument) to be both universal and perennial, when in fact it was neither.xi This international system was supposed
by anarchic and to consist of sovereign states, each pursuing its national interest, defined in terms of power or,
somewhat more modestly, in terms of security in the sense of survival. Furthermore, this universe was characterized
by strife, since the aformentioned national interests inevitably collided, hence the pervasiveness of competition,
conflict and war.xii Since states were thus inherently insecure, they were well advised to make sure their power would
suffice to parry threats from other states to their sovereignty. As far as the system as such was concerned, the best
safeguard of peace would presumably be a balance of powerxiii. As such balance is difficult to define and well nigh
impossible to achieve or preserve, the system had an inherent propensity of for a competitive arms build-up without
any natural saturation pointxiv. To the extent that balance was believed to be unattainable, nuclear deterrence was
believed to serve as an equalizer, capable of providing a balance of sorts.xv
As became increasingly obvious, this was not merely a very bleak (and probably incorrect) view of the
world, but also one that pointed to a strategy that might all too easily become counterproductive. At the end of the
day, nobody (except the military-industrial complex) benefitted from the armaments dynamics, but everybody
suffered: in their role as tax-payers ordinary people suffered under the burden of military expenditures, and in their
role as citizens they had to live under an ever-present (yet non-quantifiable) risk of nuclear holocaust.
As a predictable reaction, a partial innovation occurred in the early 1980s, connected with the term
Common Security. The term was coined by Egon Bahr, and promulgated in the Palme Commission's 1982 report
Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival. Its main message (besides a number of concrete recommendations for
arms control measures and the like) was that security under conditions of anarchy and high levels of armaments
required mutual restraint and proper appreciation of the realities of the nuclear age, in the absence of which the
pursuit of security can cause intensified competition and more tense political relations and, at the end of the day, a
reduction in security for all concernedxvi. Furthermore, the securityeven the existenceof the world [was
acknowledged as] interdependent, hence the admonition that security can be attained only by common actionxvii.
Common Security was thus envisaged as a way of solving (or perhaps better: circumventing or transcending) the
well-known security dilemma, about which so much has been written by IR scholars, not least by Realistsxviii.
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The growing number of references to Common Security (occasionally called security partnership, mutual
security, reciprocal security or cooperative security) in political statements as well as in the academic literature
was, unfortunately, not matched by any rigorous theoretical analysis of the implications of the conceptxix. Some
(including the present author) advocated a rather austere concept of Common Security, tantamount to little more
than what might be called a mutual restraint imperative, presupposing neither an abandonment of competition or
conflict in favour of cooperation (desirable though this might be), nor any institutionalization or codification. Thus
conceived, Common Security would be little more than an special instance of cooperation between adversaries, i.e.
a form of regime, entirely compatible with the teachings of both soft Realistm, liberal institutionalism,xx and the
so-called English School's notions of international society.xxi
Thus conceived, Common Security does not automatically entail any broader notion of security, but may
signify little more than the same type of security, only to be achieved by other, less confrontational means. The state
remains the referent object of security and the focus remains on threats from other states, including (or perhaps even
primarily) military threats, against which military counters continue to be deemed warranted. The associated concept
of non-offensive defence (NOD) may thus best be understood as a military strategy intended as a functional
substitute for prevailing military strategies, only without their negative repercussions. It is intended as an instrument
for states acting within an international system resembling that of the Realists: dominated by territorial states which
are presumed to be pursuing their national interests within an anarchic setting and in (at least latent) conflict with
each other. By abstaining from offensive capabilities, however, the security dilemma may presumably be evaded and,
as a longer-term perspective, transcended. War might thus eventually become inconceivable, thus also rendering
NOD obsolete, along with all other military strategies.xxii
Other Common Security proponents, howeveramong whom most of the staff of Egon Bahr's peace
research institute in Hamburghave sought to subsume a very broad panoply of proposals under Common Security
as an umbrella concept encompassing collective security, disarmament, and the like, and being almost tantamount
to a virtual denial of international conflict. Such advocacies have typically also emphasized the need for broader
concepts of security, which should include e.g. Third World development, ecological security, etc. Laudable though
such endeavours may be in principle, only little has been accomplished so far in terms of rigorous theoretical
analysisxxiii.
Another extention of the traditional concept of security, which has been around for decades, yet seems to be
attracting growing attention in the post-Cold War era, is that of Collective Security which is both more and less
radical than (some versions of) CS. Less radical in the sense of being conceived of as a counter to the traditional
state-versus-state military threats, yet more radical by envisaging a transfer of powers from the state to international
authorities, i.e. a partial relinquishment of sovereignty. Whereas collective security was until recently dismissed as
irrelevant by most of the IR community (because of its poor achievement in the inter-war years)xxiv, it has been taken
increasingly seriously in the post-Cold War eraxxv.
Moreover, to the extent that United Nations forces (or those of other international organizations, say the
OSCE) are not merely employed for restoring peace between states, but also within states, or for safeguarding
human rights there, they might point towards a new international system: a new world order that is no longer based
on sovereign states with impermeable borders, but a truly global one in which international politics is superceded
by domestic politics of a global scale (Weltinnenpolitik).xxvi However, it remains to be seen whether the isolated
instances of humanitarian interventions the world has seen so far are in fact harbingers of such a new order, or
merely aberrations from business as usual attributable to the confusion of the present transitional period. In either
case, however, the theoretical implications are being analyzed extensively within the IR, peace research and strategic
studies communitiesxxvii. To the extent that such interventions can be legitimized as promoting security, it is surely no
longer the security of the state, but of some other entity, which leads us directly to the next question:
III. WHOSE SECURITY?
A central premise for the question whether or not to expand the notion of security is whose security one is talking
about, i.e. the referent object of security.
Some confusion arises from the fact that security is both a terminus technicus of the academic discipline of
IR as well as other academic disciplines, and a word in common usage. Whereas in the latter field it is regarded as
natural that people, i.e. individuals, are either secure or insecure, the dominant brand of IR theory, i.e. Realism, has
neglected this dimension and treated the state as the only appropriate referent object of security. The State, however,
is an entity sui generis, which is often either portrayed as endowed with certain almost metaphysical characteristics
or personified, i.e. treated as if it were an individual writ largexxviii. Neither the interests nor the will of the State are
thus reducible to those of its citizens, but likewise sui generis. The State's security is, in the final analysis, only
definable in terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity.xxix
This state-centred approach has been charged with neglecting the people, i.e. individual security, which is
basically about well-being and, in the last analysis, survival. Thus conceived individual security may indeed be
placed in jeopardy by an unrestrained quest for state security, say if the latter should involve war. Hence, for instance,
the unconfortable Red or dead dilemma that haunted NATO (and especially Germany) for decades: should one
sacrifice the survival of the population for such intangible values as sovereigty? Furthermore, is it ethically justifiable
to kill other individuals for the sake of state interests, as would have been the implication of a breakdown of
77
deterrence? According to a cosmopolitan ethicsxxx, what really matters is the survival and well-being of the
individuals, e.g. as the utilitarians formulated it: the greatest happiness principlexxxi. This may of course be
compatible with, but only rarely presupposes, a defence of sovereignty. Moreover, for principled proponents of this
view, state security can merely be a relevant goal to the extent that the state derives its powers from la volont
generale. If and when it ceases to represent the interests of its citizens, say when state security places individual
security in jeopardy, the latter takes precedencexxxii.
Whereas Realists and neorealists would tend to deny the importance of individual security, some of them
would go as far as to acknowledge the relevance of an intermediary level, namely that of collectivities, such as ethnic
groups or nations, even when they are not coterminous with the state. Hence the notion of societal security, more on
which in due course. Suffice it at this point to mention that it is about identity.
Whether to limit security to the state level, or extend the term to the individual and/or societal level is a
matter of arbitrary definition. Neither is more correct than the other, even though one definition may be more useful
than others. In the following, I shall regard the three levels as equally important, but above all separate in the sense
that neither can be reduced to the othersxxxiii.
Referent object
The State
Content
Sovereignty, power
Collectivities
Individuals
Identity
Survival, well-being
78
This observation has led what one might call the triumphalists or endists (most prominently Francis
Fukuyama) to foretell an end of history as a result of the universalization of the western values of democracy,
pluralism and market economyxxxix. Others have been less sanguine and have pointed out the various flaws in
democracy as practiced by the triumphant Western states, and have demanded additional democratizationxl. Be that
as it may, few would contest the notion that democracy is a powerful antidote to bellicosity, and that a thoroughly
democratic Europe (such as the one that we may well be approaching, even though we are not quite there yet) will
most likely be peaceful. A fortiori, a democratization of the rest of the world would undoubtedly go a long way
towards a more peaceful world. However, a caveat may be needed, lest the triumphalists have their way and attempt
to export democracy and accompanying western values to the rest of the world, perhaps only in a well-intended quest
for democratization. Logical though it might seem at first glance, to go to war for the sake of imposing democracy
would be most unwise, indeed merely a new variety of the well-known phenomenon of the alleged war to end all
wars.xli
B. THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION
Economic securityxlii may mean (at least) two rather different things. Either, it may be understood narrowly as the
economic foundations of military power; or, it may be seen as an aspect or dimension of security in its own right.
The former interpretation is based on the common sense observation that economic power is eminently
fungible in the sense that it may be transformed into almost anything, depending of course on the time perspective
and preconditioned on a functioning world market. Money may buy a state weapons from abroad, and it may
increase productivity, thus allowing for a transfer of labour from the civilian sphere into that of arms production or
armed service. In the final analysis, wealth is thus tantamount to mobilization potential, if not in the short term then at
least in the medium to long run. According to this line of reasoning, the economic power of a nation inevitably
constitutes a latent threat to its adversariesxliii, hence the advisability of not contributing to the economic development
of one's enemies or opponents, if need be even of embargoing trade with them. This was a very widespread view in
the USA throughout the Cold War period, including the dtente of the early seventiesxliv. Paradoxically, this view
stands in sharp contradition with the liberal view of international trade (Smith, Ricardo, etc.) which presumed trade to
have beneficial effects on the war-proneness of the international systemxlv.
On the other hand, actual militarization (including the maintenance of standing armed forces, and of a
follow-on system of military productionxlvi) inevitably comes at the expence of the civilian economy. Paradoxically,
excessive militarization now may thus damage mobilization potential at a later stage, since the latter ultimately
reflects the state of the economy as a whole. According to several analysis, the high level of military expenditures in
both the former superpowers, albeit most radically in the former Soviet Union, was counterproductive and, in the
long run untenable. More generally, this would seem to affect great powers in the phase of decline that is inevitable
sooner or later, but which becomes more painful and costly because of overextension, both politically and
militarilyxlvii.
The latter interpretation, in its turn, comes in at least two different versions. First of all, economic warfare
may be a functional substitute for the use of military power, just as military power may serve to cripple an
adversary's economy, as in the case of blockades. However, even without the use of military might, starvation is a
very powerful means of compellance that might be (indeed has been) used with success to enforce a (bloodless, yet
far from painless) surrender. As a reflection thereof, many states have striven for economic self-sufficiency as a
means of security: by stockpiling strategic materials as well as ordinary goods they may make themselves less
vulnerable to economic warfare, hence more securexlviii.
Secondly, economic security may mean invulnerability to economic hazards which need not be created
deliberately by an adversarial state, but could well be structural, i.e. caused by the workings of the system, rather
than by a specific (in this case malevolent) actor. There are at least three different approaches to enhancing economic
security in this sense: autharky (a special species of the genus mercantilism), diversification and interdependence
(including integration).
Autharky might conceivably enhance economic security, as preached by classical mercantilism. This was
e.g. the strategy chosen by the USSR who regarded the world market as unsafe, not merely because it was controlled
by hostile capitalist powers, but also because of its capitalist nature. Certain peace researchers (Galtung and others)
have also advocated economic self-sufficiency as a (strictly defensive, hence preferable) for of defence, providing for
invulnerabilityxlix
Diversification, in the sense of a deliberate spreading of a state's dependencies between as many other states,
and across as many fields, as possible, has been another traditional means of economic security. States that are
dependent on one single (group of) supplier(s) for essential commodities, such as raw materials for its industry, are
vulnerable to a cut-off of these supplies. States in the global periphery, which often have only one significant
commodity to export, are, for instance, especially vulnerable to fluctuations of world market prices, as well as to
political manipulations thereof, to say nothing of boycotts by their main customersl.
The furthering of interdependence, even to the point of integration, is the third, and in several senses most
modern way of enhancing economic security. This is, e.g., the approach taken by the EU countries ever since the
foundation of the European Coal and Steel Communitiesli. The underlying understanding has been that a web of
mutual interdependencies would serve as a powerful inhibition against war, in perfect conformity with the afore-
79
mentioned tenets of classical liberalism, as well as with the writings of Norman Angell, and modern analysts of
complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye, among others)lii. One might, indeed, call this the common security
approach to economic security, since it is tantamount to a transcendence of the national boundaries with regard to
the subject of security: The whole system is to be made more secure, hence also its members, who could not achieve
the same level of security through their individual effortsliii.
C. THE SOCIETAL DIMENSION
Whereas Realists have focused their attention on the level of the state as the only proper referent object of security,
Idealists (including a large part of the peace research movement) have maintained that people, i.e. individuals, are
what really matters in the final analysis. State security may be worth striving for, but only to the extent that it
contributes to the security, i.e. survival and well-being, of people. The state is, at most, a means but never an end in
itself. To thus focus on the lowest level, somewhat paradoxically, inevitably also draws attention to the highest level,
namely that of Mankind as a whole, i.e. the great community of individuals, irrespective of citizenship. Individual
and global security are thus two sides of the same coin, as argued by proponents of human security.liv
As mentioned above, some have taken an intermediate position, wishing to deny the field of security studies
to the proponents of individual/global security (also because it would tend to blur the contours of security studies as
an academic discipline), while agreeing with them that the state level is too narrow. Hence the need for a collective,
yet non-state referent object of security, conceived of as collectivities, the security of which is termed societal
security. In the seminal, work on the topic societal security is defined as
...the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible
or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for
evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national
identity and custom.lv
Thus defined, it becomes obvious that much of the recent discourse about risks (as opposed to threats is really
about societal security. Of course, the various societal developments referred to also impinge on the state level in
various ways, yet to make this their admission ticket into the field of security problems often becomes far-fetched.
Run-away population growth has been singled out by some authors as perhaps the most serious security
problem for the decades aheadlvi, if only because of the Malthusian implications of a growing discrepancy between
the available resources for consumption and the much faster growing number of would-be consumers. This might be
a security problem in its own right, particularly of course for the losers in the competition for scarce resources, but
also with security implications for the winners.
It might, for instance, become a societal security problem for the North if resource depletion in the South
should leads to a tidal wave of migration to the Northlvii. Whereas it strains the imagination to envision, say, countries
such as Denmark being more than marginally affected by this, countries in the borderland between North and South
(such as the entire Mediterranean region) might well be more seriously affected. Migration may also flow in the EastWest direction, not so much as a reflection of a population surplus, as because of a deficit of resources, say if the
economic transformation embarked upon since 1989 should fail completely. One might, e.g. envisage migration from
the former USSR to Poland, and/or from the latter or the Czech republik to Germanylviii.
Another societal security problem is represented by the forces of nationalism that were unleashed by the
democratic revolutions of 1989 and 1991 in the former East and South-East of Europelix. To the extent that this leads
to violent strife between ethnic and/or religious or cultural groups (a phenomenon of which there have already been
dozens of examples) it certainly constitutes a serious societal security problem. It also threatens to become a political
security problem affecting the already weak states in the countries in question, if and when if nationalism is
manifested in a struggle for secession. This is often exacerbated by the so-called matrozka effect, which promises
fragmentation down to very small, and often not survivable, political unitslx.
Finally, problems such as the above may also have repercussions for the relations between states, i.e.
develop into traditional security problems. Communal strife thus has a certain in-built propensity for
internationalization, especially in those (numerous) cases where a suppressed, exploited or otherwise disadvantaged
ethnic group has a paternal state.lxi Also, nationalism implies the risk that the numerous unresolved territorial
disputes may be reinvigorated. Were this to happen, especially during a period of political weakness, old-fashioned
war for territorial conquest may, once again, become conceivable.
D. THE ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION
That the environment is degrading was discovered several years ago. However, the awareness of ecological
challenges was especially boosted by the publication in 1987 of the report of the Brundtland Commission on Our
Common Future, which inspired a flood of books on environmental or ecologic securitylxii. However, to recognize
environmental decay as a problem was, of course, one thing, to elevate it to the status of a security problem
something else which remains disputed. There are, at least, three different senses in which the environment might
become subsumed under an expanded notions of security:
80
First of all, environmental problems could be caused by war, or preparations for war, of such severity as to
count among the most serious indirect war effects. A precursor of the current environmental awareness in
peace circles was, for instance, the debate in the early 1980s on the nuclear winter hypothesis, according
to which even a small-scale nuclear war could have caused a climatic and ecological disaster, the casualties
of which would not only be the warring states, but the entire globelxiii. The more recent discoveries are,
however, in a sense more profound since they imply environmental catastrophy as a result of business as
usual, constituting what will automatically happen unless people stop to think (to quote L.F. Richardson).
Secondly, wars might accrue from environmental problems, e.g. in the form of resource wars. An obvious
example might be wars over scarce water supplies, say between states sharing the same river, as has been
very close to happening in the Middle Eastlxiv.
Thirdly, environmental problems might, according to some analysts, constitute a security threat directly,
i.e. whether or not weapons and physical force ever enter into the picturelxv. In extreme cases, the physical
basis of a state could be placed in jeopardy by nature. For instance, countries such as Bangladesh or the
Netherlands would almost disappear in the case of severe global flooding. In most cases, however, the
concept of environmental security presupposes taking individuals (or Mankind) or collectivities rather than
states as the referent objects of security. In this case it certainly makes sense to acknowledge that the survival
and well-being of people is threatened by environmental problems, which may be conceived of as a form of
structural violence, resulting e.g. in shorter life expectancies, higher infant mortality rates and a
deteriorating general health situation.
V. SECURITY IN THE NORTH AND SOUTHlxvi
The entire security discourse has, like the IR discipline as a whole, all along been ethnocentric to the extreme.lxvii
This is particularly obvious when it comes to the connection between security and development: a topic which has
usually been approached from the angle of the North (and especially the West) in the following manner:
Either economic and social underdevelopment in the South will breed political instability, hence may cause
wars which mat spill over to the Northlxviii. Or they may lead to a militarization implying that countries of the South
may come to constitute military threats to the North (vide the debate on ballistic missile and nuclear proliferationlxix).
In the present `uthor's assesseot, these$alleged threats should be taken cum grano salis: ballistic missiles are
lo$mora (probably0less) treatenilg than aircrafv and only constitute threats whe~"paired with nuclear weapons; the
North constitudes a far more sarious threat to the Soutj than vice ver{a; ant only few regiOns in the North are witxin
reach of ballistic missines (or aircraft for that matter) from the s/uththe Mediterranean regioO(cg.stiuuting one
such potentially vulnerable spot.
More!imporTantly, however, it tends to!be0foruotten that countries of the So5th are referent objects of
security )n thdir own right, i.e. exp%rience security problems. Jusd as is0the case in The N/rt`, some of These are
e~dogenous to(eaah`gountry whereas othdrs are a function of$reioNal conflicts between(southez. countries.
OcCasionally, however, the North is erceved as a thrgat to the sec5rity of the South, e.g. manifeSted in the threa4
on intervention is well as thd (not yet quite abandoned) practice of gunboat diplomecy and various forms of covert
operations. Furthermore, most countries of the South are very vulnerable to economic means of compellance, such
as economic sanctions, an economic security problem that has been further aggrevated by the debt crisis.lxx
The security problems of the South differ considerably from those of the North in several respects:
Intra-state strife tends to loom larger than inter-state threats.
Political security is generally low because of weak states: with fragile support in the population,
questionable legitimacy, little or no democratic traditions. Such weak states may even collapse completely,
i.e. be reduced to virtual or failed states.
Regime security is often sought by means of large military expenditures, mostly for internal purposes.
The level of militarization tends to place great strains on the civilian sector of the economy, hence to
jeopardize development.
Economic underdevelopment causes or exacerbates communal conflicts.
VI. COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY: SYNERGIES AND VICIOUS CIRCLES
The above account of Third World security problems illustrates the way in which the various security problems tend
to exacerbate each other, locking the country in question into vicious circlesa phenomenon which it also prevalent
in the North, especially in the former East:
An emphasis on military security places great strains on the economy, hence tends to undermine economic
security.
Economic problems tend to cause political instability as well as to contribute to a neglect of urgent
environmental protection measures.
81
Political instability tends to spur a search for scape-goats, more often than not in the form of external
foes, hence may lead to further militarization.
There is therefore a need for a comprehensive concept of security as a guideline in the urgent quest for a multipronged security strategy, lest endeavours along one dimension tend to bloc the quest for security along others.
On the other hand, one should also guard against excessive securitization, as this may entail risks:
A danger of militarization, as the armed forces tend to assume that security is their business. In
times of impending cut-backs in military expenditures, the military tend to be quite eager to embrace
expanded notions of security in the hope that this will protect them against further reductions.
A danger that a desecuritization of issues may lead to a neglect of them. If security concerns, for
instance, are accepted as the primary rationale for development assistance, development aid may
decline once it is realized that countries of the South constitute no danger to the North.
The above account of new thinking on security has, hopefully, demonstrated that new ideas do exist. However, the
history of mankind shows that it may take years, decades, centuries, or even millennia, for such new ideas to become
generally accepted and adopted as guidelines for actionlxxi. In this section, I shall therefore briefly survey the political
field in various countries for signs that the above ideas have actually achieved this status, or are approaching it.
VII. ENDNOTES
i.
In Carroll, Lewis: Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass (Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books, 1962), p. 274.
ii.
The closest he came to a definition was: National security must be defined as integrity of the national territory
and its institutions, in Morgenthau, Hans J.: Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd edition (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 562. In another connection, he added culture to the list, emphasizing that the survival of a
political unit in its identity (i.e. security) constitutes the irreducible minimum, the necessary element of its interests vis-vis other units. See The Problem of the National Interest (1952), in idem: Politics in the Twentieth Century (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 204-237 (quote from p. 219).
iii.
Wolfers, Arnold: National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol, in idem: Discord and Collaboration. Essays on
International Politics (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 147-165 (quote from p. 150).
iv.
Galtung, Johan: Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, in idem: Peace: Research, Education, Action. Essays in
Peace Research. Volume I (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1975), pp. 109-134; idem: Peace Research, ibid., pp.
150-166; idem: What is Meant by Peace and Security? Some Options for the 1990s, in idem: Transarmament and the Cold
War. Essays in Peace Research, Volume VI (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1988), pp. 61-71; cf. Wiberg, Hkan:
Konfliktteori och fredsforskning, (Stockholm 1976: Esselte Studium), pp. 4-8. On stable peace, see Boulding, Kenneth:
Stable Peace (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978); or idem Moving from Unstable to Stable Peace, in Anatoly
Gromyko & Martin Hellman (eds.): Breakthrough. Emerging New Thinking (New York: Walker & Co., 1988), pp. 157-167.
See also Krell, Gert: The Development of the Concept of Security, in Egbert Jahn & Yoshikazu Sakamoto (eds.): Elements
of World Instability: Armaments, Communication, Food, International Division of Labour, Proceedings of the International
Peace Research Association Eighth General Conference (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1981), pp. 238-254; Frei, Daniel: Was
ist unter Frieden und Sicherheit zu verstehen?, in Wolfgang Heisenberg & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): Sicherheitspolitik
kontrovers. Frieden und Sicherheit. Status quo in Westeuropa und Wandel in Osteuropa (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fr politische
Bildung, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 41-49; Stephenson, Carolyn: New Conceptions of Security and Their Implicatons for Means and
Methods, in Katharine and Majid Tehranian (eds.): Restructuring for World Peace. On the Threshold of the Twenty-First
Century (Creskil, NJ: Hampton Press, 1992), pp. 47-61.
v.
A precursor of the present debate was Ullman, Richard: Redefining Security, International Security, vol. 8, no.
1 (Summer 1983), pp. 162-177. Good overviews are Nye, Joseph E. & Sean M. Lynn-Jones: International Security Studies:
A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field, International Security, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 5-27; LynnJones, Sean: The Future of International Security Studies, in Desmond Ball & David Horner (eds.): Strategic Studies in a
Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives, Series Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, vol. 89,
(Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, the Australian National University,
1992), pp. 71-107. See also Mangold, Peter: National Security and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1990);
Booth, Ken: Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice, International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 3 (1991), pp.
527-545; idem (ed.): New Thinking About Strategy and International Security (London: Harper Collins, 1991); Klare,
Michael & Daniel C. Thomas (eds.): World Security. Trends and Challenges at Century's End (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1991); Clarke, Michael (ed.): New Perspectives on Security (London: Brassey's, UK and Centre for Defence Studies, 1993);
Rees, G. Wyn (ed.): International Politics in Europe. The New Agenda (London: Routledge, 1993); Fischer, Dietrich:
Nonmilitary Aspects of Security. A Systems Approach (Aldershot: Dartmouth and UNIDIR, 1993).
vi.
Buzan, Barry: People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era,
Second Edition (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf and Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991); idem, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre,
Ole Wver & al.: The European Security Order Recast. Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (London: Pinter, 1990);
Wver, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre: Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe
(London: Pinter, 1993).
vii.
Good examples of expanded strategic studies are Brown, Neville: The Strategic Revolution. Thoughts for the
Twenty-First Century (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1992); Souchon, Lennart: Neue deutsche Sicherheitspolitik
(Herford: Mittler Verlag, 1990).
viii.
82
Wver, Ole: Securitization and Desecuritization, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.): On Security (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46-86; Buzan, Barry, Ole Wver & Jaap de Wilde: Security. A New Framework for
Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998). Recent works of a related constructivist or post-structuralist orientation include
Campbell, David: Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Revised Edition
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Dalby, Simon: Rethinking Security: Ambiguities in Policy and Theory,
International Studies (Burnaby, BC: Dep. of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, 1991); Fierke, K.M.: Changing
Games, Changing Strategies. Critical Investigations in Security (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998);
Huysmans, Jef: Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier, European Journal of International
Relations, vol. 4, no. 2 (June 1998), pp. 226-255; Hansen, Lene: A Case for Seduction? Evaluating the Poststructuralist
Conceptualization of Security, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 32, no. 4 (December 1997), pp. 369-397. A basic work on
social constructivism is Berger, Peter L. & Thomas Luckman (1967): The Social Construction of Reality (London: Allan
Lane). For an application of this approach to the security debate, leading to a critique of the Copenhagen School (Buzan,
Wver and others) for not being constructivist enough is McSweeney, Bill: Security and Identity: Buzan and the
Copenhagen School, Review of International Studies, vol. 22, no. 1 (1996), pp. 81-93; idem: Security, Identity and Interests.
A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). On the various postmodern
approaches to IR theory see George, Jim: Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International
Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Vasquez, John A.: The Post-positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific
Enquiry and International Relations Theory After Enlightenment's Fall, in Ken Booth & Steve Smith (eds.): International
Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 217-240. For a critique see sterrud, yvind: Antinomies of
Postmodernism in International Studies, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 33, no. 4 (November 1996), pp. 385-390.
ix.
For a historical account of Realism, see e.g. Smith, Michael Joseph: Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger,
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986). The best example of classical Realism is Morgenthau: op. cit. (note
2). Good examples of neorealism are Waltz, Kenneth N.: Theory of International Politics, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
1979); Gilpin, Robert G.: War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Keohane,
Robert O. (ed.): Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); and Buzan: op. cit. (note 6). See
also Frankel, Benjamin (ed.): Roots of Realism (London: Frank Cass, 1996); idem (ed.): Realism: Restatements and Renewal
(London: Frank Cass, 1996); Guzzini, Stefano: Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy. The
Continuing Story of a Death Foretold (London: Routledge, 1998). For a critique see Vasquez, John: The Power of Power
Politics. From Classsical Realism to Neotraditionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
x.
On the concept of nation see, for instance, two excellent readers: Huthinson, John & Anthony D. Smith (eds.):
Ethnicity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); and idem & idem (eds.): Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996). See also Gellner, Ernst: Nations and Nationalism (London: Basil Blackwill, 1983); Griffiths, Stephen Iwan:
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Threats to European Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Periwal, Sukumar
(ed.): Notions of Nationalism (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995); Anderson, Benedict: Imagined
Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991); Brass, Paul: Nations and
Nationalism. Theory and Comparison (London: Sage, 1991); Kellas, James G.: The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity
(Houndsmills: Macmillan, 1991); Kupchan, Charles (ed.): Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe. A Council of
Foreign Relations Book (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Brass, Paul R.: Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and
Comparison (London: Sage, 1991); Kellas, James G.: The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (Houndsmills, Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1991).
xi.
Spruyt, Hendrik: The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1994). See also Fowler, Michael Ross & Julie Marie Bunck: Law, Power, and the Sovereign State. The Evolution and
Application of the Concept of Sovereignty (University Part, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995); Krasner, Stephen
D.: Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
xii.
For a critique see Wendt, Alexander: Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics, International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.
xiii.
Sheehan, Michael: The Balance of Power. History and Theory (London: Routledge, 1996). For a crique see
Vasquez: op. cit. (note 9).
xiv.
Neild, Robert: An Essay on Strategy as it Affects the Achievement of Peace in a Nuclear Setting (London:
Macmillan, 1990), pp. 106-110; Mller, Bjrn: Non-Offensive Defence, the Armaments Dynamics, Arms Control and
Disarmament, in Burkhard Auffermann (ed.): NOD or Disarmament in the Changing Europe?, Research Reports, no. 40
(Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1990), pp. 43-102; idem: From Arms to Disarmament Races: Disarmament
Dynamics after the Cold War, in Ho-Won Jeong (ed.): The New Agenda for Peace Research (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp.
83-104.
xv.
On the pros and cons of nuclear weapons and their proliferation see Sagan, Scott D. & Kenneth N. Waltz:
The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); Jervis, Robert: The Meaning of the Nuclear
Revolution. Statecraft and the Prospects of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Glaser, Charles L.: The
Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament, Survival, vol. 40, no. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 112-128; Cimbala, Stephen J.: The Past
and Future of Nuclear Deterrence (Westport: Praeger Press, 1998); Gray, Colin: The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1999). On US nuclear policy for the future see Nolan, Janne E.: An Elusive Consensus. Nuclear Weapons
and American Security after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999). On the assumptions behing
NATO's nuclear weapons see Daalder, Ivo H.: The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response. NATO Strategy and Theater
Nuclear Forces Since 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Haftendorn, Helga: NATO and the Nuclear
Revolution. A Crisis of Credibility, 1966-1967 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Heuser, Beatrice: NATO, Britain, France
and the FRG. Nuclear Strategies and Forces
for Europe, 1949-2000 (London: Macmillan, 1999); Haglund, David G.: Pondering NATO's Nuclear Options: Gambits for a
Post-Westphalian World (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Quens University, 1999). On the nuclear strategies of
other nuclear weapons states see Karp, Regina Cowen (ed.): Security With Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on
National Security (London: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1991); Hopkins, John C. & Weixing Hu (eds.): Strategic Views
83
from the Second Tier. The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain and China (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,
1996); Singh, Jasjit (ed.): Nuclear India (New Delhi: Knowledge World and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,
1998). On the rationales for not aquiring nuclear weapons see Karp, Regina Cowen (ed.): Security Without Nuclear
Weapons? Different Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Security. (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1992); Reiss, Mitchell:
Bridled Ambitions. Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press,
1995).
xvi.
Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues): Common Security. A
Blueprint for Survival. With a Prologue by Cyrus Vance (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), p. 138.
xvii.
ibid., pp. 5, 7 and 9.
xviii.
Herz, John M.: Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and Realities (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1951), passim; idem: Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma, World Politics, no. 2, 1950, pp.
157-180; Jervis, Robert: Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1976), pp. 58-93; cf. idem: Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214;
Buzan: op. cit. 1991 (note 6), pp. 294-327; Glaser, Charles L.: The Security Dilemma Revisited, World Politics, vol. 50, no.
1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201; Schweller, Randall L.: Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?, in Frankel
(ed.): Realism (op. cit., note 9), pp. 90-121. The most elaborate study of the security dilemma is Collins, Alan: The Security
Dilemma and the End of the Cold War (Edinburg: Keele University Press and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).
xix.
Among the theoretical analyses, the following deserve mentioning: Vyrynen, Raimo (ed.): Policies for
Common Security (London: Taylor & Francis/SIPRI, 1985); Bahr, Egon & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): Gemeinsame Sicherheit.
Idee und Konzept. Bd. 1: Zu den Ausgangsberlegungen, Grundlagen und Strukturmerkmalen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1986); Smoke, Richard: A Theory of Mutual Security, in idem & Andrei Kortunov (eds.):
Mutual Security. A New Approach to Soviet-American Relations (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 59-111; Gottfried, Kurt et
al.: Towards a Cooperative Security Regime in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Peace Studies Program, 1989); Gottfried,
Kurt & Paul Bracken (eds.): Reforging European Security. From Confrontation to Cooperation (Boulder: Westview Press,
1990); Nolan, Janne (ed.): Global Engagement. Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1994).
xx.
For an overview, see e.g. Milner, Helen: Review Article: International Theories of Cooperation Among
Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses, World Politics, vol. 44, no. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496. Good examples of this
tradition include Jervis, Robert: loc.cit. 1978 (note 18); idem: Security Regimes, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2
(Spring 1982), pp. 357-378; George, Alexander L., Philip J. Farley & Alexander Dallin (eds.): U.S.Soviet Security
Cooperation. Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Axelrod, Robert: The Evolution
of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Kanet, Roger E. & Edward A. Kolodziej (eds.): The Cold War as
Competition. Superpower Cooperation in Regional Conflict Management (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991);
Stein, Arthur A.: Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1990); Keohane, Robert O. & Joseph S. Nye: Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little
Brown, 1977); Glaser, Charles L.: Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help, in Frankel (ed.): Realism (op. cit., note
9), pp. 122-163; Krasner, Stephen D. (ed.): International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1982); Mller, Harald:
Die Chance der Kooperation. Regime in den internationalen Beziehungen (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,
1993); Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer & Volker Rittberger: Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge Studies in
International Relations, vol. 55 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
xxi.
Wight, Martin: Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977); Bull, Hedley: The Anarchical
Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977); Watson, Adam: The Evolution of International
Society (London: Routledge, 1992). See also Griffiths, Martin: Realism, Idealism and International Politics. A
Reinterpretation (London: Routledge, 1992); Dunne, Tim: Inventing International Society: A History of the English School
(Houndmills: Macmillans, 1998).
xxii.
Mller, Bjrn: Common Security and Non-Offensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner and London: UCL Press, 1992). See also idem: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on
Non-Offensive Defence (London: Brassey's, 1991); and idem: The Dictionary of Alternative Defence (forthcoming, 1994); or
Bahr, Egon & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Konventionelle Stabilitt. Bd. 3: Zu den militrischen Aspekten
Struktureller Nichtangriffsfhigkeit im Rahmen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1988).
xxiii.
Bahr, Egon & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Dimensionen und Disziplinen. Bd.2: Zu rechtlichen, konomischen, psychologischen und militrischen Aspekten Gemeinsamer Sicherheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag
1987); Lutz, Dieter S. & Elmar Schmhling (eds.): Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Internationale Diskussion. Bd. 5: Beitrge und
Dokumente aus Ost und West (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1990). See also the precursor of CS: Kommite fr Grundrechte
und Demokratie: Frieden mit anderen Waffen. Fnf Vorschlge zu einer alternativen Sicherheitspolitik (Reinbek: Rowohlt
Verlag, 1981)
xxiv.
Cf. Carr, Edward Hallett: The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of International
Relations, second edition 1946 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964). For a modern critique, see Joffe, Josef: Collective
Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends, Survival, vol. 34, no. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 36-50.
xxv.
Lutz, Dieter S.: Auf dem Weg zu einem System Kollektiver Sicherheit in und fr Europa, in idem (ed.):
Kollektive Sicherheit in und fr Europa: Eine Alternative? Beitrge zur Utopie und Umsetzung einer neuen Friedens- und
Sicherheitsprogrammatik. Pro und Contra (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1985), pp. 22-44; idem: Sicherheit 2000.
Gemeinsame Sicherheit im bergang vom Abschreckungsregime zu einem System Kollektiver Sicherheit in und fr Europa
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991); Senghaas, Dieter: Europa 2000. Ein Friedensplan (Frankfurt a.M.:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990); Chalmers, Malcolm: Beyond the Alliance System, World Policy Journal, vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring
1990), pp. 215-250; Brauch, Hans Gnter: From Collective Self-Defence to a Collective Security System in Europe, Disarmament, vol. 14, no. 1 (1991), pp. 1-20; Johansen, Robert C.: Lessons for Collective Security, World Policy Journal, vol. 8,
no. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 561-574; Kupchan, Charles A. & Clifford A. Kupchan: Concerts, Collective Security, and the
Future of Europe, International Security, vol. 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; idem & idem: The Promise of
84
Collective Security, ibid., vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Weiss, Thomas G. (ed.): Collective Security in a
Changing World (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Butfoy, Andrew: Themes Within the Collective Security Idea,
The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 16, no. 4 (December 1993), pp. 490-510; Cusack, Thomas R. & Richard J. Stoll:
Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 1 (March
1994), pp. 33-59; Downs, George W. (ed.): Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of
Michigan Press, 1994); Mller, Bjrn: Multinationality, Defensivity and Collective Security, in Jrg Callie (ed.): RstungWieviel? Wozu? Wohin?, Loccumer Protokolle, no. 63/93 (Rehburg-Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 1994), pp.
251-290; idem: UN Military Demands and Non-Offensive Defence. Collective Security, Humanitarian Intervention and
Peace Operations, Peace and Conflict Studies, vol. 3, no. 2 (December 1996), pp. 1-20. For a more sceptical view, see Betts,
Richard K.: Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe, International
Security, vol. 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43; Clark, Mark T.: The Trouble with Collective Security, Orbis, vol. 39, no.
2 (Spring 1995), pp. 237-258.
xxvi.
Recent works about the possible modification, or even abadonment ofthe Westphalian order of sovereign states include
Camilleri, J.A. & Jim Falk: The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (London: Edward
Elgar, 1992); Deng, Francis M., Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild & I. William Zartman: Sovereignty as
Responsibility. Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996); Fowler & Bunck: op.
cit. (note 11); Lugo, Luis E. (ed.): Sovereignty at the Crossroads. Morality and International Politics in the Post-Cold War
Era (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996); Lyons, Gene M. & Michael Mastanduno (eds.): Beyond Westphalia?
National Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995); Sellers, Mortimer
(ed.): The New World Order. Sovereignty, Human Rights and the Self-Determination of Peoples (Oxford: Berg, 1996).
xxvii.
The central document is the report of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (17 June 1992): An
Agenda for Peace, e.g. in SIPRI Yearbook 1993. World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1993), pp. 66-80. See also idem: An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later, Orbis, vol. 37, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 323-332.
Examples of the academic debate on humanitarian intervention include the following works: Rodley, Nigel (ed.): To Loose
the Bands of Wickedness. International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights (London: Brassey's, 1992); Connaughton,
Richard: Military Intervention in the 1990s. A New Logic of War (London: Routledge, 1992); Levite, Ariel E., Bruce W.
Jentleson & Larry Berman (eds.): Foreign Military Intervention. The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1992); Schraeder, Peter J. (ed.): Intervention into the 1990s. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World. 2nd
Edition (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publ., 1992); Stedman, Stephen John: The New Interventionists, Foreign
Affairs, vol. 72, no. 1 (1993), pp. 1-16; Tetzlaff, Rainer: Erste und Dritte Welt - zur Legitimitt Politischer
Interventionen, S+F. Vierteljahresschrift fr Sicherheit und Frieden, vol. 10, no. 1 (1992), pp. 21-25; Mazarr, Michael J.:
The Military Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention, Security Dialogue, vol. 24, no. 2 (June 1993), pp. 151-162; Roberts,
Adam: Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights, International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 3 (July 1993), pp.
429-450; idem: The United Nations and International Security, Survival, vol. 35, no. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 3-30; Urquhart,
Brian: The UN: From Peace-keeping to a Collective System?, Adelphi Papers, no. 265, Winter 1991/92 (New Dimensions
in International Security, Part I), pp. 18-29; Moore, Jonathan (ed.): Hard Choices. Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian
Intervention (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Williams, John: The Ethical Basis of Humanitarian Intervention, the
Security Council and Yugoslavia, International Peacekeeping, vol. 6, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 1-23.
xxviii.
On the notion of raison d'tat, see e.g. Meinecke, Friedrich: Machiavellism. The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and
Its Place in Modern History (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1984). Besides Machiavelli, other ancestors of modern Realism
come close to a personification of the State, e.g. Hobbes, Thomas: Leviathan, Edited With an Introduction By C.B.
Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), who e.g. describes the Common-Wealth (i.e. the Leviathan) as the
multitide so united in one person (p. 227).
xxix.
Walker, R.B.J.: Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993); Hall, Rodney Bruce: Territorial and National Sovereigns: Sovereign Identity and Consequences for Security
Policy, Security Studies, vol. 8, no. 2/3 (Winter 1998/Spring 1999), pp. 145-197.
xxx.
For an analysis of the communitarian-v-cosmopolitan dichotomy, see Brown, Chris: International Relations
Theory. New Normative Approaches (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).
xxxi.
Mill, John Stuart: Utilitarianism, in Max Lerner (ed.): Essential Works of John Stuart Mill (New York:
Bantam Books, 1963), pp. 189-248. See also Ellis, Anthony: Utilitarianism and International Ethics, in Terry Nardin &
David R. Mapel (eds.): Traditions in International Ethics (Series: Cambridge Studies in International Relations) (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 158-179.
xxxii.
Cf. Rosseau, Jean-Jacques: Du contrat social (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1966).
xxxiii.
For a critique of reductionism, see e.g. Kenneth Waltz's classic: Man, the State and War. A Theoretical
Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
xxxiv.
Quotation from Hobbes: op. cit. (note 28), p. 186.
xxxv.
E.g. Buzan: op. cit. 1991 (note 6), pp. 35-56.
xxxvi.
Ayoob, Mohammed: The Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict, and the
International System (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995); idem: The Security Predicament of the Third
World State: Reflections on State Making in a Comparative Perspective, in Brian J. Job (ed.): The Insecurity Dilemma.
National Security of Third World States (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 63-80 (quotation from p. 66); Job,
Brian L.: The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World, ibid., pp. 11-35; Weiss,
Thomas G. & Maryl A. Kessler (eds.): Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era. A World Peace Foundation Study
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Holsti, Kalevi J.: The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996).
xxxvii.
See e.g. Holsti, Kalevi J.: International Theory and War in the Third World, in Job (ed.): op.cit. (note 36),
pp. 37-60; cf. for a historical perspective: idem: Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International order 1648-1989
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); or Van Creveld, Martin: The Transformation of War (New York: The Free
85
Press, 1991); Snow, Donald M.: UnCivil Wars: International Security and the New Pattern of Internal War (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 1996); Zartmann, William I. (ed.): Collapsed States. The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate
Authority (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Cilliers, Jakkie & Peggy Mason (eds.): Peace, Profit or Plunder? The
Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies (Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies, 1999); Reno,
William: Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
xxxviii.
The classical formulation of the thesis (not referring explicitly to democracies, but to representative
government in general) is Kant, Immanuel (1795): Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf (Stuttgart: Reclam,
1963). A general survey of the idea is provided by Gleditsch, Nils Petter: Democracy and Peace, Journal of Peace
Research, vol. 29, no. 4 (November 1992), pp. 369-376. The recent revival of interest in the thesis may be traced back to
Doyle, Michael: Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12, no. 3-4 (1983), pp.
205-35, 323-353. Recent works include Russett, Bruce: Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War
World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Elman, Miriam Fendius: Paths to Peace. Is Democracy the
Answer? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); MacMillan, John: On Liberal Peace. Democracy, War and the International
Order (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998); Brown, Michael E., Sean Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (eds.): Debating the Democratic
Peace (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996); Gowa, Joanne: Ballots and Bullets. The Elusive Democratic Peace
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor: Elections and War. The Electoral Incentive in the
Democratic Politics of War and Peace (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Ray, James Lee: Democracy and
International Conflict. An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press,
1995); Weart, Spencer R.: Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Other (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1998).
xxxix.
Fukyama, Francis: The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992); idem:
Democratization and International Security, Adelphi Papers, no. 266, Winter 1991/92 (New Dimensions in International
Security. Part II), pp. 14-24.
xl.
See e.g. Bchler, Gnther: Gewaltverzicht durch Demokratisierung. Dimensionen der Demokratisierung der
friedens- und sicherheitspolitischen Diskussion, in Wolfgang R. Vogt (ed.): Mut zum Frieden. ber die Mglichkeiten einer
Friedensentwicklung fr das Jahr 2000 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1990), pp. 176-187; Johansen,
Robert C.: Real Security is Democratic Security, Alternatives, vol. 16, no. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 209-242; Rourke, John T.,
Richard P. Hiskes & Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh: Direct Democracy and International Politics. Deciding International Issues
Through Referendums (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
xli.
On the promotion of democracy and human rights see Peceny, Mark: Democracy at the Point of Bayonets
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).
xlii.
Bienen, Henry (ed.): Power, Economics, and Security. The United States and Japan in Focus (Boulder:
Westview, 1992); cf. Buzan: op.cit. 1991 (note 6), pp. 230-269.
xliii.
See e.g. Knorr, Klaus: The Determinants of Military Power, in Bienen (ed.): op.cit. (note 42), pp. 69-133;
which is an update on idem: The War Potential of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).
xliv.
Becker, Abraham S.: U.S.-Soviet Trade and East-West Trade Policy, in Arnold L. Horelick (ed.): U.S.-Soviet
Relations. The Next Phase (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 175-197; Stent, Angela: Economic Containment, in
Terry L. Deibel & John Lewis Gaddis (eds.): Containing the Soviet Union. A Critique of US Policy (London: PergamonBrassey's, 1987), pp. 59-77. On the debate on most-favoured-nation status for the USSR in return for good behaviour in the
realm of arms control, see e.g. Garthoff, Raymond: Detente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to
Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 87-93.
xlv.
See e.g. Goodwin, Crauford D.: National Security in Classical Political Economy, in idem (ed.): Economics
and National Security. A History of Their Interaction. Annual Supplement to Volume 23, History of Political Economy
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 23-35.
xlvi.
On the follow-on system, see Kaldor, Mary: The Baroque Arsenal (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981).
xlvii.
See e.g. Cohen, Richard & Peter A. Wilson: Superpowers in Economic Decline. U.S. Strategy for the
Transcentury Era (New York: Crane Russak, 1990); cf. Deger, Saadet & Somnath Sen: Military Expenditure. The Political
Economy or International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI: Strategic Issue Papers, 1990); Mintz, Alex (ed.):
The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States (London: Routledge, 1992); Vyrynen, Raimo: Military
Industrialization and Economic Development. Theory and Historical Case Studies (Aldershot: Dartmouth and UNIDIR,
1992). The only IP theorerician who has dealt at length with this matter is Gilpin, Robert G.: War and Change in World
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); idem: The Economic Dimension of International Security, in
Bienen (ed.): op. cit. (note 42), pp. 51-68. His hypotheses received historical support from Paul Kennedy's monumental The
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Unwin Hymann, 1988).
xlviii.
On the effectiveness of economic blockade, see e.g. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann
Elliott: Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. History and Current Policy, 2nd edition (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
International Economics, 1990). For an analysis of Sweden's quest for this form of economic security, see Agrell, Wilhelm:
Sveriges civila skerhet (Stockholm: Liber Frlag, 1984). For a similar analysis of Switzerland, see e.g. Fischer, Dietrich:
Invulnerability Without Threat: The Swiss Concept of General Defense, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 19, no. 3, 1982,
pp. 205-225.
xlix.
Galtung, Johan: There Are Alternatives. Four Roads to Peace and Security (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984), p.
13; Fischer, Dietrich: Preventing War in the Nuclear Age (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), pp. 142-153; idem,
Wilhelm Nolte & Jan berg: Frieden gewinnen. Mit autonomen Initiativen den Teufelskreis durchbrechen (Freiburg:
Dreisam Verlag, 1987), pp. 195-199; berg, Jan: Myter om vor sikkerhed. En kritik af dansk forsvarspolitik i et
udviklingsperspektiv (Copenhagen: Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke, 1980); idem: At udvikle sikkerhed og sikre udvikling
(Copenhagen: Vindrose, 1983), pp. 131-142.
l.
Emmanuel, Arghiri: L'change Inegal (Paris: Maspero, 1969); Frank, Andre Gunter: Capitalism and
Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); Galtung, Johan: A Structural Theory of
Imperialism, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 8, no. 2 (1971), pp. 81-118; Amin, Samir: Le developpement ingal (Paris:
86
Editions du Minuit, 1973); idem: L'accumulation a l'chelle mondiale, vols. 1-2 (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1976).
li.
Haas, Ernst: International Political Communities, (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 93-110; cf. idem: The
Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing (1970), in Richard A. Falk & Saul
Mendlowitz (eds.): Regional Politics and World Order (San Francisco: Freeman, 1973), pp. 103-130; Hansen, Roger:
Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts, in Michael Hodges (ed.): European Integration,
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 184-199. See also the prize-winning essay by Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe:
Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC, Millennium:
Journal of International Studies, vol. 20, no. 1, 1991, pp. 1-22.
lii.
On complex interdependence, see Keohane & Nye: op.cit. (note 20); cf. for a historical survey: Wilde, Jaap de:
Saved From Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century. A Study on the Causality Between War
and Complex Interdependence (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991); Tromp, Hylke: Interdependence and Security: the Dilemma
of the Peace Research Agenda, Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 19, no. 2 (1988), pp. 151-158; Haas, Ernst B.: War,
Interdependence and Functionalism, in Raimo Vyrynen (ed.): The Quest for Peace. Transcending Collective Violence and
War Among Societies, Cultures and States (London: Sage, 1987), pp. 108-127.
liii.
Bolz, Klaus: Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Ost-West Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, in Bahr & Lutz (eds.): op. cit.
1987 (note 23), pp. 129-142; Wilke, Peter: konomische Aspekte Gemeinsamer Sicherheit. Anmerkungen zum Stand der
Debatte, ibid., pp. 151-168.
liv.
A proponents of this view is
Booth, Ken (1991): Security and Emancipation, Review of International
Studies, vol. 17, no. 4 (1991), pp. 313-327; idem: Human Wrongs and International Relations, International Affairs, vol. 71,
no. 1 (January 1995), pp. 103-126. See also Suhrke, Astri: Human Security and the Interests of States, Security Dialogue,
vol. 30, no. 3 (September 1999), pp. 265-276; Zacarias, Agostinho: Security and the State in Southern Africa (London: I.B.
Tauris, 1999). For a related view see Falk, Richard: Predatory Globalization. A Critique (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999).
lv.
Wver, Ole: Societal Security: the Concept, in idem et al.: op. cit. (note 6), pp. 17-40 (quote from p. 23). See
also Buzan, Barry: Societal Security, State Security and Internationalization, ibid., pp. 41-58.
lvi.
E.g. Lellouche, Pierre: Le nouveau monde. De l'ordre de Yalta au dsordre des nations (Paris: Grasset, 1992),
pp. 257-305.
lvii.
See e.g. Weiner, Myron: Security, Stability and International Migration, International Security, vol. 17, no. 3
(Winter 1992/93), pp. 91-126.
lviii.
Heisler, Martin O. & Zig Layton-Henry: Migration and the Links Between Social and Societal Security, in
Wver et al.: op. cit. (note 6), pp. 148-166.
lix.
See e.g. Snyder, Jack: Averting Anarchy in the New Europe, International Security, vol. 14, no. 4 (Spring
1990), pp. 5-41; Griffiths, Stephen Iwan: Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Threats to European Security (SIPRI Research
Report No. 5) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
lx.
The image refers to the famous Russian wooden dolls: When you open the biggest one, a smaller appears, inside
which is an even smaller, etc. On secession see Mortimer: op. cit. (note 26); Cassese, Antonio: Self-Determination of
Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Freeman, Michael: The Right to SelfDetermination in International Politics: Six Theories in Search of a Policy, Review of International Studies, vol. 25, no. 3
(1999), pp. 355-370; Meadwell, Hudson: Secession, States and International Society, ibid., pp. 371-387. On Russia see
Baev, Pavel: Russia's Stance against Secessions: From Chechnya to Kosovo, International Peacekeeping, vol. 6, no. 3
(Autumn 1999), pp. 73-94.
lxi.
Midlarsky, Manus I. (ed.): The Internationalization of Communal Strife (London: Routledge, 1992); and Muni,
S.D. (ed.): Pangs of Proximity. India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis (New Delhi and London: Sage, and Oslo: PRIO, 1993);
Brown, Michael E. (ed.): The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Lake, David
A. & Donald Rothchild (eds.): The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear, Diffusion and Escalation (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1998).
lxii.
Brundtland Commission (World Commission on Environment and Development): Our Common Future
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Brundtland, Gro Harlem: The Environment, Security and Development, SIPRI
Yearbook 1993, pp. 15-26; Moss, Richard H.: Resource Scarcity and Environmental Security, ibid., pp. 27-36. See also
Prins, Gwyn: Politics and the Environment, International Affairs, vol. 66, no. 4 (1990), pp. 711-730; Renner, Michael G.:
National Security: The Economic and Environmental Dimensions, Worldwatch Paper, no. 89 (Washington D.C.:
Worldwatch Institute, 1989); Thomas, Caroline: The Environment in International Relations (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1992), pp. 115-151 et passim; Weizscker, Ernst U. von: Erdpolitik. kologische Realpolitik an der
Schwelle zum Jahrhundert der Umwelt, third, updated edition (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992);
Boulding, Elise: States, Boundaries and Environmental Security, in Dennis J.D. Sandole & Hugo van der Merwe (eds.):
Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and Application (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp.
194-208; Dalby, Simon: Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse, Alternatives,
vol. 17, no. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 95-134; Suliman, Mohamed (ed.): Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict (London: Zed
Books, 1998). See also the discussion on environmental security in Elise Boulding (ed.): New Agendas for Peace Research.
Conflict and Security Reexamined (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992): Brock, Lothar: Security Through Defending the
Environment: An Illusion?, pp. 79-102; Mische, Patricia: Security Through Defending the Environment: Citizens Say
Yes!, pp. 103-120; and Oswald, Ursula: Ecodevelopment: What Security for the Third World, pp. 121-126. A good
overview os Grger, Nina: Review Essay: Environmental Security, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 33, no. 1 (February
1996), pp. 109-116.
lxiii.
See e.g. Sagan, Carl: Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe (Foreign Affairs, Winter 1983-84), in William P.
Bundy (ed.): The Nuclear Controversy. A Foreign Affairs Reader (New York: New American Library, 1985), pp. 117-152;
Ehrlich, Paul, Carl Sagan, Donald Kennedy & Walter Orr Roberts: The Cold and the Dark. The World After Nuclear War
(London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984); Gleditsch, Nils Petter: Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the
Literature, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 35, no. 3 (May 1998), pp. 381-400.
lxiv.
Gleick, Peter H.: Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security, International
87
Security, vol. 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 79-112; Lowi, Miriam R.: Bridging the Divide: Transboundary Resource
Disputes and the Case of Westbank Water, ibid., pp. 113-138; Beschomer, Natasha: Water and Instability in the Middle
East, Adelphi Papers, no. 273 (London: IISS, 1992); Morris, Mary E.: Water Scarcity and Security Concerns in the Middle
East, The Emirates Occasional Papers, no. 14 (1998); Homer-Dixon, Thomas F.: Environment, Scarcity, and Violence
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Hauge, Wenche & Tanja Ellingsen: Beyond Environmental Scarcity:
Causal Pathways to Conflict, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 35, no. 3 (May 1998), pp. 299-317; Elhance, Arun P.:
Hydropolitics in the 3rd World. Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins (Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 1999).
lxv.
See e.g. the discussion in Ball, Desmond & David Horner (eds.): Strategic Studies in a Changing World:
Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives, Series Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, vol. 89 (Canberra:
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, the Australian National University, 1992),
especially Sean Lynn-Jones: loc.cit. (note 5) who argues for a broader, yet still national security-oriented, agenda with a
focus on military matters; and Gwyn Prins: A New Focus for Security Studies (pp. 178-222) who is in favour of a complete
shift of focus to the environment. An even more extreme, eco-centric, view is that of Eckersley, Robyn: Environmentalism
and Political Theory (London: UCL Press, 1992).
lxvi.
Ball, Nichole: Security and Economy in the Third World (London: Adamantine Press, 1988); Brandt
Commission: North-South: A Programme for Survival. Report of the Independent Commission on International Development
Issues (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980); Brandt, Willy: Der organisierte Wahnsinn. Wettrsten und Welthunger (Kln:
Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1985); Job (ed.): op. cit. (note 36); Weiss, Thomas G. & Maryl A. Kessler (eds.): Third World
Security in the Post-Cold War Era. A World Peace Foundation Study (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1991).
lxvii.
Neuman, Stephanie (ed.): International Relations Theory and the Third World (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1998).
lxviii.
See e.g. Nincic, Miroslav: How War Might Spread to Europe (London: SIPRI/Taylor & Francis, 1985).
lxix.
Bailey, Kathleen: Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press,
1992). On ballistic missile proliferation, see e.g. Carus, W. Seth: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World. Threat and
Response, The Washington Papers, no. 146 (New York: Praeger & The Center for Strategic and International Studies,
1990); Karp, Aaron: Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World, in SIPRI Yearbook 1989. World Armaments and
Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1989), pp. 287-318; idem: Controlling Ballistic Missile
Proliferation, Survival, vol. 33, no. 6 (1991), pp. 517-530; Nolan, Janne E.: Trappings of Power. Ballistic Missiles in the
Third World, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1991); Fetter, Steve: Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction:
What is the Threat? What Should be Done?, International Security, vol. 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 5-42; Navias, Martin:
Going Ballistic. The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East (London: Brassey's, UK, 1993); Neuneck, Gtz & Otfried
Ischebeck (eds.): Missile Proliferation, Missile Defence, and Arms Control (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1992). On nuclear
proliferation, see e.g. Spector, Leonard S.: Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York: Vintage Books, 1984); Meyer, Stephen
M.: The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984); Fischer, David: Stopping the
Spread of Nuclear Weapons. The Past and the Prospects (London: Routledge, 1992); Barnaby, Frank: How Nuclear
Weapons Spread. Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s (London: Routledge, 1993). On chemical weapons and
missiles, see Findlay, Trevor (ed.): Chemical Weapons and Missile Proliferation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991). On
the proliferation problems stemming from the dissolution of the USSR, see Zagorski, Alexander: Post-Soviet Nuclear
Proliferation Risks, Security Dialogue, vol. 23, no. 3 (September 1992), pp. 27-39.
lxx.
lxxi.
On this phenomenon, examplified by the idea of peace, see Rapoport, Anatol: Peace. An Idea Whose Time
Has Come (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).
88