STUDII INTERNAIONALE

Coordonatori: Valentina Teosa Bernardo Venturi

STUDII DE PACE I SOLUIONAREA CONFLICTELOR N CURRICULUM-UL UNIVERSITAR GHID TEORETICO-METODOLOGIC

Lucrarea a fost editat n cadrul proiectului internaional Moldovan Peace Scholars and Practitioners Network desfurat de Catedra Relaii Internaionale, FRIPA, USM n colaborare cu Civil Defense Research Center, Roma, Italia, universitile i organizaiile neguvernamentale din Moldova

Chiinu, 2013 CEP USM

CZU 378:327=111=135.1=161.1 S 93

Ediia de fa Studii de pace i soluionarea conflictelor n curriculum-ul universitar. Ghid teoretico-metodologic prezint o culegere a rezultatelor cercetrilor i colaborrii interuniversitare n cadrul proiectului Moldovan peace scholars and practitioners network desfurat de Catedra relaii internaionale n colaborare cu Civil Defense Research Center, Roma, Italia. Un capitol aparte este destinat aspectelor metodico-didactice a studiilor de pace i soluionrii conflictelor n cadrul cursurilor universitare. Materialele sunt adresate att cadrelor didactice, studenilor, masteranzilor, doctoranzilor, sectoarelor guvernamentale, nonguvernamentale, ct i tuturor celor interesai de tematica respectiv. Discutat la Catedra Relaii Internaionale, USM.

Colegiul de redacie: V.Teosa, dr. hab., prof. univ., B. Venturi, dr. (coordonatori al ediiei), Morari C., l. univ., Ilaciuc A., l. univ., Cujba A., l. univ.

Ideile i opiniile expuse n materialele prezentate aparin autorilor i nu reflect neaprat punctul de vedere al colegiului de redacie Articolele apar n redacia autorilor.

Descrierea CIP a Camerei Naionale a Crii

Studii de pace i soluionarea conflictelor n curriculum-ul universitar. Ghid teoretico-metodologic / Catedra Relaii Intern., FRIPA, USM [et al.]; coord.Valentina Teosa, Bernardo Venturi; col. red.: V. Teosa [et al.]. Chiinu: CEP USM, 2013. 310 p. (Studii internaionale). Texte: lb. rom., engl., rus. Referine bibliogr. La sfritul art. 200 ex. ISBN 978-9975-71-375-7. CZU 378:327=111=135.1=161.1 S 93

ISBN 978-9975-71-375-7

USM, 2013

CUPRINS VENTURI Bernardo Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Scholars and Practitioners in the Republic of Moldova .7 ce.....................................................8 TEOSA Valentina Studii de pace i soluionarea conflictelor: cercetarea teoretic pentru implementri practice ..9 COMPARTIMENTUL I. BAZELE TEORETICO-ANALITICE ALE STUDIILOR DE PACE I CONFLICTELOR INTERNAIONALE N CERCETRILE CONTEMPORANE VENTURI Bernardo A Brief History of Peace Studies ...................................................................................................13 MURSA Elena Cultura pcii: semnificaie i promovare n Republica Moldova ................................................23 : ( ) .............................................................30 ...................................................................................................................................40 COJOCARU Igor, JACOTA - DRAGAN Olga Pacea: apogeul dezvoltrii umanitii sau doar o necesitate? ....................................................51 : ..................................................................................................54 TICU Viorica, PANTA Rodica Transformarea panic a conflictelor .........................................................................................64 TICU Viorica, PANTA Rodica Peacefull Conflict Transformation ...............................................................................................73 ROTARU Veronica Eficiena negocierilor diplomatice n soluionarea conflictelor internaionale............................80

COMPARTIMENTUL II. ASPECTE METODICO-DIDACTICE ALE STUDIILOR DE PACE I CONFLICTELOR INTERNAIONALE TEOSA Valentina Cursul universitar Conflicte internaionale .............................................................................92 SLOBODENIUC Ghenadie Utilizarea paginii web n cadrul cursului universitar Conflicte internaionale ................... 110 EANU Constantin Cursul universitar Prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor .......................................111 ILACIUC Dinu, EJOVA Cristina Cursul universitar Securitatea internaional: conceptul i strategii.....................................123 MORARI Cristina Cursul universitar Peace Studies in Theory and Practice of International Relations ...........137 ........161 ............................................................................165 CU Viorica, PANA Rodica Cursul universitar Conflictul transnistrean............................................................................185 PANA Rodica Cursul universitar Securitatea internaional........................................................................189

COMPARTIMENTUL III. READING PENTRU LUCRUL INDIVIDUAL LA STUDIILE DE PACE I CONFLICTELE INTERNAIONALE MORARI Cristina Cursul universitar Peace Studies in Theory and Practice of International Relations...........193 TEOSA Valentina Cursul universitar Conflictele internaionale.........................................................................247 COMPARTIMENTUL IV. RESURSE ELECTRONICE I INFORMAIONALE Instituii i ONG-uri ....................................................................................................................297 Despre autori...............................................................................................................................301

SUMMARY VENTURI Bernardo Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Scholars and Practitioners in the Republic of Moldova .7 LISENCO Vladlena The Role of Civil Society in Peacekeeping Process ......................................................8 TEOSA Valentina Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution: Theoretical Research for Practical Implementations ....9 SECTION I. THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL BASES OF PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH VENTURI Bernardo A Brief History of Peace Studies ...................................................................................................13 MURSA Elena The Culture of Peace: its Importance and Promoting in Republic of Moldova ..........................23 CUJUICLU Elena Integration of Ethnic Minorities: Theoretical and Practical Aspects (the Case of Gagauz Ethnic Minority in the Republic of Moldova) ...........................................................................................30 PAPOVA Alla About the Mechanism of Conflict Containment and Settlement in Traditional Societie ..............40 JACOTA - DRAGAN Olga Peace: the Pinnacle of Human Development or a Mere Need? ...................................................51 LISENCO Vladlena The Role of Civic Society in Peacekeeping: Regional and International Aspect .................54 CU Viorica, PANTA Rodica Peaceful Conflict Transformation ................................................................................................64 ROTARU Veronica Eficience of Diplomatic Negotiations in International Conflict Settlement .................................80

SECTION II. METHODICAL AND DIDACTIC ASPECTS OF PEACE STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS TEOSA Valentina The International Conflicts Course Syllabus ................................................................................92 SLOBODENIUC Ghenadie The WEB Page Utilization within University Course International Conflicts .......................110 EANU Constantin The Conflict Prevention and Crises Management Course Syllabus ...........................................111

ILACIUC Dinu, EJOVA Cristina The International Security: Concept and Strategies Course Syllabus .......................................123 MORARI Cristina The Peace Studies in Theory and Practice of International Relations Course Syllabus ............137 CUJUICLU Elena The Interethnic Relations and Conflict Resolution Course Syllabus ..........................................161 PAPOVA Alla The International Relations Course Syllabus .............................................................................165 CU Viorica, PANA Rodica The Transdniestrian Conflict Course Syllabus ...........................................................................185 PANA Rodica The International Security Course Syllabus ...............................................................................189

SECTION III. PEACE STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS READING FOR INDIVIDUAL WORK MORARI Cristina The Peace Studies in Theory and Practice of International Relations Course Syllabus ............193 TEOSA Valentina The International Connflicts Course Syllabus ............................................................................247 SECTION IV. ELECTRONIC AND INFORMATIONAL RESOURCES Institutions and NGO ..................................................................................................................298 About authors...............................................................................................................................301

PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

VENTURI Bernardo

The main aim of this guide is to provide a tool for peacebuilding and conflict prevention scholars and practitioners in the Republic of Moldova and to support the development of new good practices, trainings and researches. The guide is the result of a collective effort among different academic and professional organizations. These entities represent the founding members of the Moldovan Peace Scholars and Practitioners Network, a network working in two complementary directions. On the one hand, it is supporting synergies and a common work among different organizations. Several remarkable peacebuilding experiences and projects are present in Moldova, but often they are not shared, valorized and considered for future activities. Some of them are presented in this guide, many others materials are available in the common web-portal www.peacebuilding.md. This web-portal will be constantly updated and it will represent a hub for peacebuilding activities in Moldova. On the other hand, peace and conflict studies is a growing field in Moldova Universities and can boost research, teaching, quality assurance, and the internationalization on the same Moldova Universities. Several young researchers and instructors from different institutions are collaborating actively and it is already possible to see the first results. A special attention is paid for Transnistria and Gagauzia. The prevention of any kind of violence is a priority to bear in mind. This shared work can consolidate the existing networks and it can create new ties. Day-by-day activies on concrete issues within a larger view of confidence-building and mutual understanding is the best way to promote a peaceful and prosperous future. As Centro Studi Difesa Civile (Civil Defence Research Centre) we strongly support this work with formal and informal relations, friendship, and international links and exchanges.

 , . , , . , , . - . , . , , 90 - , , . , . - . , . , . , . . 8 ,

STUDII DE PACE I SOLUIONAREA CONFLICTELOR: CERCETAREA TEORETIC PENTRU IMPLEMENTRI PRACTICE

TEOSA Valentina Una din cele mai importante valori ale sec. XXI continu a fi pacea. n pofida optimismului anilor 90 i euforiei asociat cu venirea noului mileniu, omenirea nu a devenit mai neleapt. Din contra, terorismul, conflictele vechi i noi, rzboaiele locale i regionale n diferite pri ale lumii n fiecare zi rpesc viei umane, aduc suferine i distrugeri popoarelor. Problema meninerii pcii n condiiile actuale este strns legat cu jocurile politice, confruntarea cruzimii terorismului, cu cutarea cilor de soluionare a conflictelor la nivel local, regional i global. n contextul noilor realiti ale dezvoltrii globale i informaionale sunt eliminate hotarele statale i de spaiu suferinele popoarelor i distrugerea unor state se reflect cu durere, comptimire i pericol pentru alii. Statele interconexate i interdependente (mari i mici, srace i bogate) i indivizii (apropiai i ndeprtai) lent, ns totui contientizeaz necesitatea unificrii forelor pentru promovarea i consolidarea pcii, soluionarea conflictelor i formarea unei culturi a pcii deosebite, ndreptate spre combaterea apariiei noilor ameninri. n acest context o semnificaie deosebit o capt unificarea eforturilor oamenilor de tiin, reprezentanilor din educaie i a societii civile, ndreptate spre colaborare n domeniul studiului problemelor pcii, soluionrii conflictelor i formrii unei culturi speciale a vieii comunitare cultura pcii. Republica Moldova mai mult de douzeci de ani supraveuiete n condiiile unei instabiliti politice, economice, sociale i umanitare condiionat de existena unui conflict ngheat. Ineficiena formatului oficial de reglementare a conflictului existent dicteaz necesitatea includerii n procesul de pacificare a potenialului diplomaiei sociale i activizrii societii civile. Activitatea de acest gen indiscutabil trebuie s fie organizat pe toate direciile inclusiv tiin i nvmnt universitar. Pentru realizarea unui viitor panic a Moldovei independente i integre, cutarea unor modaliti de apropiere n situaia creat i pentru soluionarea conflictului, au fost unificate eforturile profesorilor din diferite universiti ai Republicii Moldova i al structurilor de cercetare ale societii civile n crearea Reelei Naionale al Cercettorilor i Practicienilor Studiilor de Pace i Conflicte din Republica Moldova. Crearea acestei reele n cadrul Proiectului Internaional ,,Moldovan Peace Scholars and Practitioners Network n colaborarea cu ONG-ul din Italia Civilian Defence Research Center, pe lng Centrul Moldo-Austriac pentru Iniiative de Pace, Schimbri Democratice i Soluionarea Conflictelor n colaborare strns cu Catedra Relaii Internaionale, Facultatea Relaii 9

Internaionale, tiine Politice i Administrative al Universitii de Stat a Moldovei a fost susinut de ctre colegii de la diferite universiti ULIM, Perspectiva-INT, Universitatea de Stat din Comrat, Universitatea de Stat Aleco Russo din Bli, Universitatea de Stat din Tiraspol, precum i din partea organizaiilor neguvernamentale din Chiinu i Tiraspol Centrul de Resurse pentru Drepturile Omului CREDO, Cetrul Hilfswerk-Austria n Moldova, Institutul de Politici Publice, Institutul Independent de Drept i Societate Civil din Tiraspol .a. Misiunea proiectului dat rezid n a reuni profesorii i cercettorii n problema pcii i a soluionrii conflictelor. n acest scop, a fost elaborat i creat pagina web a Reelei Cercettorilor i Practicienilor Studiilor de Pace din Republica Moldova, care ofer un bogat material informativ-teoretic i metodico-didactic pentru cadre profesionale precum i pentru cei cointeresai de problema dat, inclusiv studeni, masteranzi i doctoranzi, care studiaz diferite aspecte a teoriei i practicii pacificrii i soluionrii conflictelor. Un rol important n cadrul proiectului i revine elaborrii i implimentrii n universiti programe vizind problematica dat. Practica realizrii acestora n diferite instituii de nvmnt universitar au fost supus examinrii n cadrul seminarelor: Curricula development in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution (28-29 iunie 2012), organizat de Catedra Relaii Internaionale, la Facultatea Relaii Internaionale, tiine Politice i Administrative al USM; Peace studies development in the Republic of Moldova (25-26 octombrie 2012), gzduit de ULIM; masa rotund n studii de pace i conflict la Universitatea de Stat din Comrat, care a avut loc n cadrul conferinei jubliare pe data de 9 februarie 2013. La toate discuiile desfurate au luat parte reprezentanii Universitii de Stat din Bli Aleco Russo, Universitatea din Tiraspol, precum i reprezentanii ONG-lor CREDO, Hilfswerk Austria, Institutul Independent de Drept i Societate Civil din Tiraspol, Clubul studenesc Hermes, FRIPA, USM, etc. Rezultatele lucrului comun pe parcursul anului au fost generalizate, sistematizate i prezentate cititorului cointeresat de ediia materialului tiinifico-metodic, elaborat n baza abordrilor teoretice i practice, reflectate n structura i coninutul lucrrii, constituit din patru compartimente. n primul compartiment Bazele teoretico-analitice ale studiilor de pace i conflictelor internaionale n cercetrile contemporane snt prezentate rezultatele studiilor teoretico-analitice a participanilor la proiect iniiatorilor crerii Reelei Cercettorilor i Practicienilor Studiilor de Pace din Republica Moldova. Faptul bucurtor este c ei sunt tinerii cercettori, doctoranzi sau nu demult au obinut titlul tiinific n problema domeniului dat. Tematica cercetrilor este multiaspectual: savantul din Italia, doctor n tiine politice Bernardo VENTURI descrie istoriografia studiilor de pace; doctoranzii din Republiva Moldova Elena MURSA reflect asupra culturii pcii i promovarea acesteia n Republica Moldova; Elena CUJUICLU expune aspectele teoretico-practice a integrrii minoritilor etnice, utiliznd drept 10

exemplu grupul etnic gguz din Republica Moldova; Alla PAPOVA se refer la mecanismele de izolare i soluionare a conflictelor n societile tradiionale; Olga JACOTA - DRAGAN analizeaz pacea drept un apogeu al dezvoltrii umanitii; Vlada LSENCO examineaz rolul societii civile n meninerea pcii; Viorica ICU, Rodica PANA cerceteaz transformarea panic a conflictelor; Veronica ROTARU supune analizei eficiena negocierilor diplomatice n soluionarea conflictelor internaionale. Cel de-al doilea compartiment ofer cititorului variante ale curriculum-urilor la disciplinile universitare pentru ciclul I i ciclul II de nvmnt: Cursul universitar Conflicte internaionale elaborat de V. TEOSA, dr. hab., prof. univ., FRIPA, USM; Cursul universitar Prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor elaborat de C. EANU, dr. hab., prof. univ., FRIPA, USM; Cursul universitar Securitatea internaional: conceptul i strategii D. ILACIUC, dr., conf. univ., FRIPA, USM; Cursul universitar Peace Studies in Theory and Practice of International Relations C. MORARI, lector univ., FRIPA, USM; Cursul universitar E. CUJUICLU, lector univ., Universitatea de Stat din Comrat; Cursul universitar n viziunea lectorului superior A. PAPOVA din Universitatea de Stat din Comrat; Cursurilel universitare Conflictul transnistrean i Securitatea internaional ale doctorandelor V. CU, lector superior, R. PANA, lector univ., ULIM. Un interes major prezint programele elaborate de lectorii pentru specialitile de profil din tiine politice, sociologie, relaii internaionale, precum i cele pentru programele nonprofil: istoria, lingvistica, jurnalism. Este necesar de menionat n mod deosebit programa elaborat n limba englez de lectorul universitar MORARI Cristina n colaborare cu doctorul habilitat, profesor universitar TEOSA Valentina, care este predat studenilor n relaii internaionale, dar care poate fi cu succes recomandat altor specialiti ca de exemplu limbi i literaturi strine, jurnalism etc. Folosirea materialelor electronice n cadrul leciilor, i anume utilizarea paginii web n cadrul cursului universitar Conflicte internaionale descris de Ghenadie SLOBODENIUC orienteaz colegii pentru utilizarea acestei resurse electronice importante n cadrul altor disciplini adiacente. n tradiia ediiilor metodice contemporane este prezentat materialul teoretic n form de reading elaborat n baza tematicii date. Considerm, c textele tiinifice prezentate n cel de -al treilea compartiment Reading pentru lucru individual la disciplinile studii de pace i conflicte internaionale vine ca o completare a compartimentelor anterioare ale ghidului i vor fi utile att profesorilor, ct i studenilor. Bineneles, acestea pot fi folosite n scopul pregtirii pentru orele de curs, ct i pot servi drept punct de pornire i vector de cercetare pentru cei ce examineaz

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diferite aspecte ale pcii i soluionrii conflictelor, deoarece nu epuizeaz baza surselor informaionale la problema dat. n fine, ultimul compartiment dedicat surselor informaional-didactice permite s orientm pe cititori la sursele electronice, oferind informaie despre cele mai importante instituii i organizaii de cercetare pentru pace din ar i peste hotare. Informaia despre autorii care au participat la elaborarea ediiei date este prezentat n tradiie last but not least ce conclude prima ediie a ghidului i deschide posibilitatea de a contacta autorii - membri ai actualei reele a cercettorilor i practicienilor studiilor de pace din Republica Moldova . Evident c materialele demonstrate nu cuprinde tot spectrul problemelor studiilor de pace i soluionrii conflictelor. Aceasta este doar prima etap al cercetrii teoretico -metodologice realizat de tinerii cercettori pentru studii asupra uneia dintre cele mai actuale probl eme pentru Republica Moldova soluionarea panic a conflictului existent. Rezultatul va fi prezentat pe pagina web., fapt ce va permite evaluarea materialelor prezentate, naintarea de propuneri pentru tematica cercetrii ulterioare, elaborarea i cooperarea de perspectiv, precum i contriburea cu propriile articole, programe i elaborri metodice pe pagina web:

http://www.peacebuilding.md. n concluzie, aduc sincerele mulumiri partenerilor din Italia, i n particular dlui dr. Bernardo Venturi pentru atitudine deosebit, aportul esenial asupra realizrii unei strnse colaborri, de asemenea tuturor colegilor din universiti, care au demonstrat profesionalism i poziie civic n procesul de colaborare n cadrul proiectului, implicndu-se activ n crearea reelei cercettorilor i practicienilor studiilor de pace i contribuind la elaborarea primei ediii a ghidului dat n numele integritii statale i consolidrii pcii n Republica Moldova.

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COMPARTIMENTUL I.

BAZELE TEORETICO-ANALITICE ALE STUDIILOR DE PACE I CONFLICTELOR INTERNAIONALE

A BRIEF HISTORY OF PEACE STUDIES

VENTURI Bernardo Articolul dat prezint un studiu complex al istoriei dezvoltrii studiilor de pace. Cutarea rspunsului la un ir de ntrebri referitoare la ce studiaz studiile de pace, care este utlitatea cercetrii pcii i cum de aplicat teoriile n practic, au determinat cercettorii s fondeze un nou domeniu de studii - studii de pace. Ca domeniu academic, studiile de pace posed un caracter interdisciplinar, care se bazeaz pe un ir de domenii cum ar fi tiinele politice, sociologia, istoria, antroplogia, teologia, psihologia, filosofia etc. Studiile de pace ncearc s depisteze ct mai curnd posibil cauzele conflictului, cum poate fi prevenit violena i cum controlul politic poate influiena soluionarea unui conflict. Cercetrile n domeniul dat posed o importan esenial i folosite de politicieni, biseric, societate civil i mass-media. Respectiv, n cadrul acestui articol autorul prezint evoluia istoric al studiilor de pace, ncepnd cu originile sale, dezvoltarea n perioada interbelic i pn n prezent, perioada secolului XXI. . , , , , , . , () , , , , , , ... , , . , , . , , , XXI .

Just as war is too important to leave to the generals, so peace is too important to leave to the pacifists. Kenneth Boulding Can peace be studied seriously? Is possible and useful to study peace specifically? Can theories be tied to practices? Haw can violence be contained? These are the guiding questions of the first pioneers and scholars in peace studies. These questions guided them to establish a new field of research, peace studies. Peace studies is an interdisciplinary academic field that draws on political science, sociology, history, anthropology, theology, psychology, 13

philosophy, and other fields to understand the causes of armed conflict, develop ways to prevent and resolve organized violence and build peaceful and just systems and societies. Peace studies aim to put forward proposals for how the causes of conflict can be recognised as early as possible, for how violence can be prevented and how political control can be put in place for solving the conflict. Peace research plays a major role in answering these questions, and the proposals were and still are used by politicians at the national and local level, by unions, the Church, science, political parties and the media. This article is presenting a short history of peace studies, from the evolution of peace studies and peace research from the first pioneers in the interwar period to the tension on the XXI century. The origins Peace studies, as an academic field, born after World War II, as international relations born as a consequence of World War I, and partially from the same reasons. In fact, international relations born as a discipline in Great Britain in 1919, when the first chair in International Politics was established at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. The changed conception of war gives a contribute in this direction. Before 1914, war is a task just for soldiers and diplomats (Carr, 1939). But after WWI, it was clear enough that no war is involving just armies and the problem of large-scale conflicts has to be part of scientific and specialized studies. It is important to note that the science of international politics is born also in response to a popular demand. After WWI, in particular in Anglo-Saxon countries, a protest against the secret treaties raises because it is identified as the main causes of wars. International relations have been designed with one major goal well defined: to avoid the recurrence of tragedies such as First World War. With regard to peace studies, however, already after the WWI, those who can be described as the pioneers of peace research distinguished themselves intellectually, working systematically on the causes and historical patterns of war. In this period, a need for new strains of research and innovative methodologies is evident. From the moral, political and intellectual trauma of war is laid the foundation for what would later become peace studies and peace research. In particular, quantitative studies on conflicts give a different view on the history of war and violence. According to Peter van den Daugen, however, the initiatives related to peace and conflict studies in the interwar period are not numerous enough or coordinated that it is possible to refer to a movement of peace research (Dungen, 1996). Initially the focus is placed on disarmament and control in scientific research for military purposes. Great interest is also shown for the issue of integration between states. Only

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later, especially for the polarization of the winners, it is also paid attention to game theories, conflict theories and conflict analysis (Galtung, 1975). Beyond Sorokin, Richardson e Wright, presented in the next paragraph, some experiences that contribute, to the star-up of a movement on peace studies in the 1950s, are grounded in this period. For instance, the American Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is founded in 1910 with a strong economic support of Andrew Carnegie (Dungen, 1996). In 1930 the European Institute of Peace Research is established by James T. Shotwell in Geneva. Both these two institutes stress the importance of a science for peace (Dungen, 1996). Similar initiatives are present in Lyon (Chaire dtude des Instituions Internationales dOrganisations de la Paix, 1931) and Vienna (Komitee fr Friedenswissenschaft, 1936). The pioneers The most influencing authors that pioneered the field of peace studies are Pitirim Sorokin, Lewis Richardson e Quincy Wright. In the interwar period, with their studies, partly parallel, but always independent, they are the first scholars to develop complex quantitative analysis on the war (Smith, 1988). Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin (1889-1968) is a Russian professor of sociology. Following a dispute with Lenin in 1922, he left for the USA where he founded the Department of Sociology at the University of Harvard in 1930. The third volume of Social and Cultural Dynamics, his most important research published in late 1930s, is focused on analysis of war including statistical survey of warfare since the sixth century BC. The research is republished in the 1960 in a reduced format. Both Wright and Richardson refer to Sorokins research (Geller, 2004). Lewis Fry Richardson (1881-1953), Quaker and physician, served from 1913 to the end of the war with the Friends Ambulance Unit in France. His experience in the war combined with his studies in science and mathematics lead him to research into the causes of war. During the second world war he decides to retire from his position as meteorologist in order to dedicate his time to peace research (Eckhardt, 1983). Richardson compiles a catalogue of all conflicts he could find information on since 1820 and by the middle of the 1940s he has collated his various studies. His two great texts are Arms and Insecurity (Richardson, 1960) and Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Richardson, 1960). Before them, in 1939 an other relevant monographic text is Generalized Foreign Politics (Richardson, 1939). During these researches he is also in contact with Quincy Wright. Philip Quincy Wright (1890-1970), professor at University of Chicago, produces his huge A Study of War (Wright, 1942) after 16 years of research (1926-1942). This study is one of the first attempts to make an empirical synthesis of the variety of factors related to the 15

historical incidence of war, and it has a significant influence on early thinking about the causes and prevention of war. Wright can also be considered as a member of the first community of peace studies. In fact, he published from the first issue on the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1957. All these authors contributed remarkably to create the common ground for the rising of peace studies after the second world war. The founders and the behavioural revolution (1945-68) At the end of the second world war, the first Institute created on peace issues is the Institut Franais de Polmologie based Paris in 1945 ideated by Gaston Bouthoul and Louise Weiss. The same year, this time in the United States, Theodore Ferdinand Lentz (1888-1976) founds one of the first institutes on peace research in the world aimed at mobilizing social scientists for the development of a science of peace. In 1954 he founds the Center for Advanced Studies on the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS, Palo Alto, California), that involved also Kelman, Anatol Rapoport, Kenneth Boulding and Stephen Richardson, son of Lewis Richardson.But 1959 is the year that marks a decisive turning point in peace studies. During this year, in fact, are founded several institutions following different traditions. The Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), is established in Norway by, among others, Johan Galtung as part of the Institute of Social Research and it becomes independent in 1966 (Gleditsch, 2004). Before then, the Institute of Social Research has shown great attention to the theme of peace, inviting many professors from the United States. In 1954, a prize for a thesis on the importance of peace research is created, and, among the winners, there is also Quincy Wright. In addition, in 1957 a seminar for research on conflict is organized with Daniel Katz and Ann Arbor between the participants. The Journal of Peace Research (JPR) starts to be published at PRIO in 1964. From this moment, PRIO serves as a kick-off for the first generation of peace researchers in the Nordic countries, and for young scientists from other countries. The same Galtung is crucial for the creation of many institutions and has heavily influenced PRIO with his thoughts and his writings, first of all with the concept of "positive peace" that is predominant in the Institute by the end of the sixties. In this period the main professional associations are established, and they are still active today. The International Peace Research Association (IPRA) is the first and later is time for the Peace Research Society (International), PRS(I), that become PSS(I), switching to the expression Peace Science.Among the many relevant scholars of this decades, a place of honour is for Kenneth Boulding, John Burton and Johan Galtung.

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Kenneth Boulding (1910-1993) is an economist and he is motivated personally as a Quaker (Boulding, 1944). Boulding and his wife Elise form a partnership which is to make a decisive contribution to the formation of peace and conflict studies. At the University of Michigan, Boulding initiates the Journal of Conflict Resolution (JCR) in 1957 with the mathematician-biologist Anatol Rapoport and the social psychologist Herbert Kelman and with their support he also set up the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution in 1959 (Wiberg, 1988). In general, the publications of Boulding have mainly focused the attention on the prevention of war, in part due to the limited results of the discipline of international relations. John Wear Burton (1915 - 2010), an Australian diplomat, become dissatisfied with traditional diplomacy and begin working drawing multidisciplinary insights on international conflicts from a much broader perspective that the discipline of international relations. Burton break away from the sociological tradition of regarding conflicts as dysfunctional, instead considering conflicts as intrinsic in human relationships. His idea on how to better handle conflicts are influenced by games theory and systems theory as a mean of analyzing the variety of options and orientations available to conflict parties. His main publication in this direction is Conflict in Society in 1966, enriched by contributions by Boulding e Rapoport. Burton works also on a human needs theory and pioneered the field of peace and conflict studies on it. Johan Galtung is indubitably the most famous and influent peace researcher in the 60es and 70es. His research is still the ground and starting point for peace research and peace education. There are some people like Picasso whose output is so large and so varied that it is hard to believe that it comes from only one person. Johan Galtung falls into this category (Boulding, 1977). So Kenneth Boulding opens an article showing Galtung as an author very complex to read and interpret for several reasons. Considered as the main founder of peace research, Galtung has a background primarily as a sociologist and mathematician, but his studies and work on other disciplines lead him to spanning widely and to leave classical and mainstream Western schemes and paradigms. Galtung, then, is not only an intellectual and an academic, but also an activist who writes, speaks, participates on all levels, also able to well-perform on media and public arenas. Overall, if you were to describe Galtungs methodological framework with an adjective, perhaps the most appropriate would be holistic (Galtung, 1988). Johan Galtung is also certainly a nightmare for librarians (Gleditsch, 1980). He wrote a huge number of books and articles, both scientific and popular. A great part of his thoughts are collected in the nine volumes of the Essay in Peace Research. Galtung authors some key17

concepts and ideas that shaped peace studies, but also other field of research and the approaches of some international actors. Among them, for instance, the distinction between negative and positive peace. Negative peace is absence of organized violence. Positive peace also integration, cooperation and social justice (Galtung, 1964). The relation between the two is considered as a continuum. Another crucial concept elaborated by Galtung is violence, presented as structural, cultural and direct violence (Galtung, 1996). Direct violence, physical and/or verbal, is visible as behaviour. Structural violence is the establishment of indirect form of violence, such as economic exploitation or poverty. But this action does not come out of nowhere; its roots are cultural and structural. Cultural violence refers to aspects of culture that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence, and may be exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science. Galtung also contributed to the conceptual elaboration of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding (Galtung, 1976). The analogy between the methodological approach to peace studies and medical science remains the most used and perceived as effective by Galtung. Like medical scientists in respect of disease and physical suffering, peace researchers saw violence and war as an evil to be controlled or eliminated, and made an ethical commitment to that end (Galtung, 1975). This normative or ethical dimension of peace studies is connected to its concern with both theory and action, or even activism. It also suggests to its critics that peace studies by its very nature lacks the objectivity or balance required of academic or scholarly study. Boulding, for example, suggests that, Galtungs thought is very heavily normative, to the point perhaps where the description of reality suffers (1977:77). However, this normative dimension introduced by Galtung is one of the controversial, but distinctive features and strengths of peace studies. The explicit acknowledgement of the role of values and ethics in the study of peace and armed violence is one of the particular contributions of peace studies. The socialist revolution (1968-78) Since the late sixties, however, there are less concerns about the danger of nuclear war, and for the young European researcher North-South issues, including Vietnam, are more relevant than both nuclear threat and totalitarianism. From 1968, with the protracting of the war in Vietnam, begin a major dispute on the priorities within the community of peace research stimulated by some socialist-oriented ideas, that ends only in the mid seventies. However, late in the 1970es, it is possible to see new significant trends. First of all, the division into different schools reduces the radical debates within the community of peace research, beginning to create antidotes and adopting the attitude of laissez faire. Then, some of the most radical scholars concludes their activities 18

related to peace research, removing progressively from this field of research. Finally, there is a path toward more radical thinkers of the remaining from the widening of the research topics, so that will also lead to new growth in the eighties. The 1970s see also the greatest growth in the establishment of institutes on peace studies, outside of Western Europe and the United States, with also a significant differentiation within the field. A new focus not only for post-degree studies, but also on degrees. The institutionalization of the teaching of peace studies at universities become reality. For instance, the first chair was established in Colgate, in the United States, in 1971. In Great Britain, the Department of Peace Studies at Bradford University is established in 1973, with Adam Curle (1916-1996) as director of the first chair in Peace Studies of a British University (OConnell, Whitby, 1995). This department is supported by funds raised by the Quaker Peace Studies Trust and currently it is considered a center of excellence in the world of peace studies at undergraduate and post-graduate (Stephenson, 1990). The wilderness years (1979-1989) In the 1980s, peace studies are progressively back to original agenda, dominated by the concern on the relations between the superpowers, on the arms race and the threat of a nuclear war. The issue of negative peace becomes, once again, more significant than those relating to positive peace and structural violence. However, some authors, including, for example, Johan Galtung, continue to work on both aspects, even if the influence of the nuclear threat influences their research widely. Applied research, which in the previous decade has been dedicated mainly to the poorest and most exploited populations, is now directed towards the emerging forms of governance in civil society, firstly in movement and non-governmental organizations (Gleditsch, 2007). The return of fears of a nuclear war, so widespread in the Western world, is one of the main reasons for a renewed interest in the peace research in the eighties. In particular, the main research of this decade is built around the theories of defense-defense and non-offensive defense. These theories are based on the assumption that the military offensive capabilities are threats and not opportunities to create situations of peace through the balance of power. It is interesting to note that this idea of "defense-defense" is echoed also by the new leadership in the Soviet Union (Robert, 1991). In the 1980s, several governments decide to fund research institute on peace, and, in parallel, the number of academic courses on peace studies increases greatly. An important institution established is the Center for the Study of Conflict at the University of Ulster in Northern Ireland in 1979. In the USA the famous United States Institute of Peace (USIP)e was created in 1984.

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The 90es and the future of peace studies Overall, in 1990s, the majority of peace research has a cross-disciplinary rather than inter-disciplinary approach and the methodologies are more complex and diverse. Liberal peace is a new challenge for many scholars and it become the core issue of relevant research projects. The idea of peace that prevails is as a reduction of direct violence and this gives new emphasis to the importance of a lasting peace (Gleditsch, 2007). Furthermore, peace research has not been inexorably crushed by the perspective envisaged by Francis Fukuyama on the end of history (Fukuyama, 1992). This is mainly due to the interdisciplinary methodology of peace studies and the wide range of problems addressed, not only reduced to the logic of bipolar confrontation.New issues are part of the peace studies agenda: the revival of nationalism, ethnic conflict, the relationship between environmental problems and conflicts and, finally, the relationship between development and violence. In addition, conflict resolution grows notably with new attention to the conflicts considered unsolvable. Moreover, the number of nonviolent revolutions that have contributed to the latest wave of democratization, from Latin America to Eastern Europe, are studied as a way to resolve conflicts. All these issues are combined with the interest for the work of NGOs, peacebuilding and unofficial diplomacy. New methodologies are keeping together different levels of analysis (between states, groups, etc..), various sectors (psychological, social, economic, etc..) and approaches (prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding, etc..). Finally, the calculated use of violence remains alien to peace research. Instead, the idea is to search peace by peaceful means (Wallensteen, 2012). More comprehensive concepts of security are considered, especially after September 11, 2011, and the concept of human security emerges as an innovative and inclusive definition of security. Today, peace studies are part of the curricula in hundreds of universities around the world. Some international scholar networks are well-established and research institutes such as the above mentioned PRIO or SIPRI are leading high-level research on peace and conflict trends and dynamics. As a 60+-year-old academic field, peace studies has a literature (books and journals), an active base of scholars, an established curriculum, and a pedagogical tradition. Peace is a huge objective; scientific research and professional teaching and training can underpin these efforts.

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Bibliography: 1. Agrell, Wilhelm, Offensive versus Defensive: Military Strategy and Alternative Defence, in Journal of Peace Research, n. 2, vol. 24, 1987. 2. Boulding, Kenneth, Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung, in Journal of Peace Research, n. 1, vol. 14, 1977, p. 75. 3. Boulding, Kenneth, The Economics of Peace, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1944. 4. Burton, J. Conflict: Human Needs Theory, Macmillan Press, London, 1993. 5. Burton, John, Wear, Conflict as Function of Change, in De Reuck, Anthony V. S., Knight, Julie (eds.), Conflict in Society, J. & A. Churchill, 1966. 6. Carr, Edward Hallett The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939, Macmillan, London, 1939. 7. Dietrich, Fischer, Invulnerability without Threat: The Swiss Concept of General Defense, in Journal of Peace Research, n. 1, vol. 19, 1982. 8. Dungen, Peter Initiatives for the Pursuit and Institutionalisation of Peace Research in Europe During the Inter-War Period (1919-1939), in, Lee-Anne Broadhead, Issues in Peace Research 1995-96, University of Bradford, 1996, pp. 5-32. 9. Eckhardt, William, Pioneers of Peace Research, Taylor & Francis, London, 1983. 10. Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, New York, 1992. 11. Galtung, Johan, Peace by Peaceful Means, Sage Publications, London, 1996. 12. Galtung, Johan, Essays in Peace Research, Volumi 1-9, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1975-1988. 13. Galtung, Johan, Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding, Essays in Peace Research Vol. II, pp. 282-304, 1976. 14. Galtung, Johan, Transarmament: from Offensive to Defensive Defence e Boulding, Kenneth, Pathologies of Defence, in Journal of Peace Research, n. 2, vol. 21, 1984. 15. Galtung, Johan, Violence, Peace, and Peace research, in Journal of Peace research, n. 3, vol. 6, 1969. 16. Galtung, Johan An Editorial: What is Peace Research?, in Journal of Peace Research, n. 1, vol. 1, pp. 1-4, 1964. 17. Geller, Daniel S., Towar a Scientific Theory of War, in Diehl, Paul Francis, The Scourge of War: New Extensions on an Old Problem, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2004. 18. Gleditsch, Nills Petter, An Irriverent History of Peace Research, lecture at Master Programme in International Studies, Prio (Oslo), 28 August 2007. 19. Gleditsch, Nills Petter, Peace Research and International Relations in Scandinavia from enduring rivalry to stable peace?, in Guzzini, Stefano, Dietrich Jung (cur.i),

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Contemporary Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, Routledge, London and New York, 2004. 20. Gleditsch, Nils Petter, The Structure of Galtungism, in Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Leidne, Odvar, Holm, Hans-Henrik, Hivik, Tord, Klausen, Arne Martin, Rudeng, Erik, Hkan Wiberg, Johan Galtung, A Bibliography of his Scholarly and Popular Writings 1951-80, Prio, Oslo, 1980. 21. OConnell, James, Whitby, Simon, Constructing and Operating a Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford: A Reflection on Experience Between 1973 and 1995, Unpublished background paper, Bradford University, 1995. 22. Richardson, Lewis Fry, Generalized Foreign Politics. A Study in Group Psychology, in The British Journal of Psychology, supplement, Cambridge University Press, June, 1939. Also in Sutherland, Ian (cur.), Collected Papers of Lewis Fry Richardson (vol. 2), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 251-349. 23. Richardson, Lewis Fry, Arms and Insecurity, Boxwood Press, Pittsburgh, 1960. 24. Richardson, Lewis Fry, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, Atlantic Books, Steven & Sons Limited, 1950. 25. Robert, Adams, New Peace Studies, Old International Relations, in Nobel, Jaap (ed.), The Coming of Age of Peace, Macmillan, London, 1991. 26. Smith, Ron P., Quantitative Methods in Peace Research, in Peace Research, n. 4, vol. 35, 1988, pp. 419-427. 27. Stephenson, Carolyn, Peace Studies: The Evolution of Peace Research and Peace Education, University of Hawaii, 1990. 28. Wallensteen, Peter, Understanding Conflict Resolution, Sage, London, third edition, 2012. 29. Wiberg, Hakan, The Peace Research Movement, in Wallensteen, P. (ed.), Peace Research: Achievements and Challanges, Westview Press, London, 1988, pp. 30-56. 30. Woods, Frederick Adams and Baltzly, Alexander entitled Is War Diminishing? A Study of the Prevalence of War in Europe from 1450 to the Present Day, Houghton Mifflin, 1915. 31. Wright, Quincy The Value for Conflict Resolution of a General Discipline of International Relations e Project for a World Intelligence Center, in Journal of Conflict Resolution, n. 1, vol. 1, 1957. 32. Wright, Quincy, A Study of War, The University of Chicago Press, 1942.

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CULTURA PCII: SEMNIFICAIE I PROMOVARE N REPUBLICA MOLDOVA

MURSA Elena

As defined by the United Nations, the Culture of Peace is a set of values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life that reflect and inspire social interaction and cooperation based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights, tolerance and solidarity, that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to address the challenges through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations. The Charter of the United Nations has an important role in promoting and strengthening a culture of peace. The Charter also states that a key role in spreading the culture of peace belongs to parents, teachers, politicians, journalists, religious bodies and groups, intellectuals, those engaged in scientific, philosophical and creative and artistic activities, health and humanitarian workers , social workers, managers at various levels as well as non-governmental organizations. Fostering cultural diversity can be considered as priorities in the field of culture. To cultural diversity was productive, it must be based on the common interest of people to each other, as an alien culture, the spiritual dialogue and mutual enrichment. These are the cornerstones of building peace in the minds and hearts of people. Thus, it is human relationships - the key to the wealth and diversity of cultures. , , , , , , , , , , . , . , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . C . , , , , . . , . Pe 2 martie 2013 se mplinesc 21 de ani de la aderarea Republicii Moldova la Organizaia Naiunilor Unite. n acest context dorim s menionm rolul ONU n ce privete promovarea Culturii Pcii n ntreaga lume i cum este studiat acest subiect n Moldova. 23

Scopurile pentru care a fost creat ONU i pentru realizarea crora acioneaz statele membre i organizaia ca atare sunt nscrise n primul articol al Cartei [7]. Primul i cel mai important dintre acestea este meninerea pcii i securitii internaionale. Aliniatul nti al aceluiai articol indic i cile utilizrii acestui obiectiv: a.) prin msuri colective pentru prevenirea i nlturarea ameninrilor mpotriva pcii i prin reprimarea actelor de agresiune sau a altor nclcri ale pcii; b.) prin aplanarea i soluionarea diferendelor sau a situaiilor cu caracter internaional care pot duce la o nclcare a pcii, prin mijloace panice i n conformitate cu principiile justiiei i dreptului internaional. n al doilea rnd, dup meninerea pcii i securitii internaionale, Carta subliniaz ca scop al Organizaiei, realizarea cooperrii internaionale n domeniul economic i social. Pentru atingerea acestui obiectiv, ca i n cazul meninerii pcii i securitii globale, Carta conine prevederi precise privind atribuiile organelor sau organizaiilor din sistemul su, n sarcina crora cade realizarea acestui obiectiv [7]. Dac vorbim despre componentele culturii pcii Webster New World Dictionary descrie noiunea cultur ca dezvoltarea, mbuntirea i rafinamentul minilor, emoiilor, intereselor, ideilor, obiceiurilor i capacitilor unor anumii oameni ntr-o anumit perioada [16]. Oxford English Dictionary aduga, c cultura este latura intelectual a civilizaiei. Pacea se definete ca fiind libertatea de rzboi, siguran public, armonie, nelegere. Din cele menionate putem conclude c cultura a pcii poate crea, media i transfera valori, idei, etici, informaie, obiceiuri, tradiii, interese, emoii i rafinament intelectual, ntre oameni, generaii, naiuni i civilizaii. Termenul Cultura Pcii a fost utilizat prima dat n anul 1989 ntr-o decizie luat de Consiliul Executiv al UNESCO. Decizia se referea la Programul Major VII. Contribuia UNESCO la pace, drepturile omului, i la eliminarea tuturor formelor de discriminare, unde se accentua [...] armonizarea ei perfect cu misiunea constituional a UNESCO i rolul etic pe care ea este chemat s-l poarte pentru promovarea unei Culturi a Pcii [...] n baza soluionrii conflictelor pe cale panic, respectului fa de drepturile omului i libertile fundamentale i a dezvoltrii echitabile [8, p.17]. Este rspunderea fiecruia i a tuturor de a pune n practica valori, atitudini i forme de comportament care s inspire cultura pcii. Toi putem contribui n acest sens n cadrul familiei, oraului, regiunii i chiar a rii prin promovarea non-violenei, toleranei, dialogului, reconcilierii, dreptii i solidaritii. Cultura Pcii este o iniiativa dinamic, orientat spre tranziia de la o logic bazata pe putere i team la o etic a non-violenei, a raiunii, cutrii cailor de soluionare a tuturor genurilor de conflicte, ncepnd cu problemele n familie, comunitate i terminnd cu cele mai dificile situaii la nivel de stat i interstatal. 24

Conceptul de Cultur a Pcii, promovat de UNESCO la finele anilor 80, a fost apoi transformat n programul Spre o Cultur a Pcii , implementat prin aciuni globale UNESCO, precum i prin programe naionale. Cultura Pcii reprezint valorile, atitudinile i formele de comportament care reflect respectul pentru via, pentru fiinele umane i demnitatea lor i pentru drepturile omului, respingerea violenei sub toate formele ei i aderarea la principiile libertii, dreptii, solidaritii, toleranei i nelegerii dintre popoare i ntre grupuri i indivizi. Valorile culturii pcii cuprind: Respect, nelegere i tolerana pentru alte Culturi, Opinii i Religii. Dreptul fiecrui individ la tratament uman i la propriile lui valori culturale, norme, motenire culturala i tradiii. Principiul liberti de ameninare cu rzboi, terorii i violenei i respectului pentru via. Drepturi egale pentru toate femeile i toi brbaii. Solidaritate ntre oamenii din ntreaga lume i sprijinirea unei ordini economice mondiale echitabile. Separarea Religiei i a politicului i a sferei publice. Ca actualele i viitoarele generaii s poat culege roadele acestei culturi a pcii, trebuie sa acionm nentrziat: s ncurajam educaia pentru pace, drepturile omului i democraie, tolerana i nelegerea internaional; s protejam i s respectm drepturile omului, fr excepie i s luptm mpotriva oricrei forme de discriminare; s promovm principiile democratice la toate nivelele societii; s trim n toleran i solidaritate; s luptm mpotriva srciei i s asigurm dezvoltarea constant pentru binele tuturor, s fim api de a asigura tuturor o viaa demn; s protejm i sa respectm mediul de securitate. Preambulul Declaraiei de ntemeiere a UNESCO afirm: fiindc rzboaiele izvorsc din spiritul oamenilor, tot n spiritul lor trebuie puse temeliile pcii [8]. n secolul XXI, omenirea a contientizat un fapt remarcabil: cultura pcii este unica ei posibilitate de a supravieui i a se dezvolta. n acest context Adunarea General a ONU a proclamat anul 2000 An Internaional al Culturii Pcii. Aceasta ne ofer o posibilitate excepional de a accelera tranziia de la cultura rzboiului, predominant n mileniile precedente, la o cultur a pcii, deoarece numai pacea poate asigura o dezvoltare durabil pentru toate rile i popoarele lumi.

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Manifestul 2000 pentru o Cultura a Pcii i Non-violentei [9] a fost scris de laureaii premiului Nobel pentru Pace cu scopul de a genera o micare popular mondial n favoarea pcii, a solidaritii i toleranei, crend responsabiliti ncepnd de la nivel individual. Mesajul lor spune oamenilor c este responsabilitatea fiecrui individ de a pune n practic valorile, atitudinile i formele de comportament care inspir cultura pcii. Consolidarea culturii pcii constituie o problem, soluionarea creia poate contribui esenial la prosperarea oricrei ri, fie mare sau mic [11, p.4]. i Republica Moldova s-a alturat la acest Manifest, remarcnd necesitatea dezvoltrii culturii pcii n societatea moldoveneasc. Axarea Raportului Naional al Dezvoltrii Umane - Republica Moldova 2000 pe Cultura Pcii n situaia actual dramatic de dezvoltare a societii moldave este o adevrat provocare, deoarece ara mai trebuie s depeasc starea de criz, efectele politice, economice i culturale ale reformelor din perioada de tranziie care socialmente sunt foarte costisitoare [3, p.7]. Cultura Pcii reprezint un potenial creativ necesar pentru normalizarea vieii sociale n Moldova, pentru activizarea proceselor de consolidare a societii. El poate fi aplicat n promovarea i intensificarea n contiina civic a beneficiilor pe care le ofer tranziia la noile forme de via social, bazat pe principiile democraiei, supremaiei legii, societii civile i vieii fr de violen. Manifestul 2000 a fost fcut public pe data de 4 martie 1999 i este deschis semnrii de ctre oricine cu scopul de a prezenta 100 de milioane de adeziuni la Adunarea Generala a Naiunilor Unite din septembrie 2000. La 5 noiembrie 2001, Adunarea General a considerat c obiectivul Deceniului Internaional pentru o Cultur a Pcii si Non-violenei pentru Copiii Lumii, 2001-2010, a fost ntrirea continu a micrii globale pentru o cultur a pcii (rezoluia 56/5). Adunarea a invitat statele s-i extind activitile de promovare a unei asemenea culturi i a solicitat UNESCO, agenie-lider n domeniu, s-i intensifice eforturile n cadrul acestui Deceniu. Cu prilejul proclamrii n 1998 a Deceniului (rezoluia 53/25 din 10 noiembrie), Adunarea a invitat organizaiile neguvernamentale, grupurile i organizaiile religioase, instituiile educaionale, artitii i mass media s sprijine Deceniul n beneficiul fiecrui om al lumii. Manifestul cuprinde 6 puncte principale ce prevd: S respect viaa respectarea vieii i demnitii fiecrei fiine umane fr discriminare sau prejudeci. S resping violena practicarea non-violenei active, respingnd violena sub toate formele: fizic, sexual, psihologic, economic i social, mai ales fa de cei mai lipsii de drepturi i mai vulnerabili, precum i fa de copii i adolesceni.

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S fiu generos folosirea timpului i resurselor materiale, pentru a cultiva generozitatea cu scopul de a pune capt excluderii, nedreptii i opresiunii politice i economice.

S ascult opinia altuia aprarea libertii de expresie i diversitii culturale, promovnd ascultarea i dialogul, fr cedarea fanatismului, defimrii i respingerea altuia.

S ocrotesc planeta promovarea unui consum responsabil i un mod de dezvoltare care s in cont de importana tuturor i care s pstreze echilibrul resurselor naturale ale planetei.

S constitui solidaritatea contribuirea la dezvoltarea comunitii cu deplin participarea a femeilor i n respectul principiilor democratice n scopul de a realiza, mpreun, noi forme de solidaritate [9]. n cazul Republicii Moldova, cultura pcii constituie o problem de stringent actualitate.

Cultura pcii n situaia actual dramatic de dezvoltare a societii moldave este o adevrat provocare, deoarece ara mai trebuie s depeasc starea de criz, efectele politice, economice i culturale ale reformelor din perioada de tranziie. n perioada formrii culturii pcii n Republica Moldova apar iniiative nonguvernamentale care studiaz pacea, promoveaz idei de pace, genereaz soluii de meninerea a pcii. Societatea civil reprezint toate domeniile autonome de manifestare a vieii sociale, ce se situeaz ntre domeniul public i persoan sau familie ca celul iniial a societii. Ea include totalitatea diverselor asociaii benevole, bisericeti, mijloacelor mass-media etc., bazate pe interese de grup, ori pe criterii profesionale [11, p.94]. Caravana Culturii Pcii i Non-violenei este unul dintre cele mai originale proiecte a copiilor i tinerilor din Republica Moldova care a reunit copii, tineri i mari personaliti din lumea ntreag. Lansat n 1993 - la nivel naional, n 1995 - la nivel internaional, Caravana Culturii Pcii i Non-violenei n toamna lui 2000 a traversat toat Europa, de la Chiinu trecnd din ar n ar, din capital n capital, pn la Consiliul Europei (Strasbourg) i UNESCO (Paris), unde membrii Caravanei au fost primii de nalte oficialiti. n fiecare an Caravana Culturii Pcii are traseu diferit. Cu acest proiect OMCT este unul dintre actorii programului ONU "Decada Culturii Pcii i Non-violenei n folosul copiilor lumii" (2001-2010). Dreptul de autor asupra proiectului aparine autorului, poetei Renata Verejanu, i Organizaiei Mondiale a Copiilor Talentai, n calitatea sa de realizator pe munc de voluntariat [6]. 27

Asociaia Naional a Scouilor din Moldova (A.N.S.M.) a fost fondat la 29 noiembrie 1993, iar la 18 aprilie 1997 a fost primit ca membr cu drepturi depline n Micarea Mondial Scout (O.M.M.S.) Asociaia Naional a Scouilor din Moldova este o micare educativ a tinerilor i copiilor, apolitic i neguvernamental, bazat pe voluntariat, deschis cetenilor Republicii Moldova, indiferent de ras, credin, naionalitate, sex, conform principiilor i metodei elaborate de fondatorul Micrii Scout Robert Baden-Powell. n prezent Asociaia numr 2500 de membri, ce se mpart n 7 filiale: Filiala Chiinu, Filiala Bli, Filiala O rhei, Filiala Nisporeni, Filiala Camenca, Filiala Cahul, Filiala tefan Vod. Astfel, proiectul ANSM mpreun n Scoutism, mpreun pentru Pace are drept obiective: 1. Extinderea reelei Mesagerii Pcii; 2. Implicarea social a copiilor rmai fr un printe sau ambii prini n urma emigrrii; 3. Dezvoltarea capacitailor sociale, intelectuale, morale, fizice prin intermediul metodei scout; 4. Educaia copiilor i tinerilor n spiritual activismului civic [5]. Organizaia Internaional a Francofoniei (OIF) este o instituie nfiinat pe baza limbii franceze i a valorilor comune. OIF reunete 53 de state i de guverne membre, 2 membri asociai, alturi de 13 observatori. Aceasta gestioneaz aciunile n domeniul politicii internaionale i a cooperrii multilaterale. Organizaia Internaional a Francofoniei promoveaz o aciune n favoarea pcii, democraiei i a drepturilor omului, i anim n toate domeniile o unitate ntre membrii si. Republica Moldova a aderat la Organizaia Internaional a Francofoniei n februarie 1996, deinnd statutul de stat membru. Una dintre cele mai importante realizri ale Republicii Moldova n cadrul Organizaiei Internaionale a Francofoniei este includerea problematicii conflictului transnistrean pe agenda de lucru a Comisiei politice OIF i sensibilizarea opiniei publice internaionale prin intermediul celor 68 de state membre ale Francofoniei [10]. Asociaie Obteasc Serviciu pentru Pace are ca scop Promovarea Culturii Pcii prin schimbul intercultural i serviciul de voluntariat n beneficiul comunitii. Activiti la orfelinate i scoli internat, aziluri de btrni, ajutorarea pturilor social vulnerabile, proiecte ecologice, coli de var, seminare i mese rotunde cu tinerii i liderii de ONG din regiunea transnistrean, schimb internaional de voluntari, activiti culturale, competiii sportive Running for Peace, Festivalul Anual al Voluntarilor din Republica Moldova [4]. n acelai scop, n anul 2012 n incinta Universitii de Stat din Moldova apare Reeaua Naional a Cercettorilor Studiilor de Pace din Republica Moldova. Temeiul de creare a Reelei este realizarea sarcinilor n ce privete propagarea cunotinelor n domeniul culturii pcii. Reeaua desfoar activiti legate de organizarea meselor rotunde, seminarelor, 28

conferinelor, leciilor deschise la care sunt invitai experi, savani, profesori i studeni moldoveni precum i din strintate [11] .

Bibliografie: 1. Adams David, From the International Year to a Decade for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence International Journal of Curriculum and Instruction, Vol. II, No. 1, December 2000, 1-10, http://www.culture-of-peace.info/vita/2000/curriculum.pdf 2. Adams David, World Peace through the Town Hall: A Strategy for the Global Movement for a Culture of Peace, http://culture-of-peace.info/books/worldpeace.html 3. Anatol Gudm, expert PNUD Moldova, Raportul naional al dezvoltrii umane, Republica Moldova 2000, PNUD Moldova, 2012 Chiinau, Republica Moldova, p.7 4. Asociaia Naional a Scouilor din Moldova, http://www.scout-moldova.md/ 5. Asociaie Obsteasc Serviciu pentru Pace, http://www.civic.md/lista/ong/serviciu-pentrupace.html#sthash.8NXkveDM.dpuf 6. Caravana Culturii Pcii, http://caravanaculturii.blogspot.com/ 7. Carta ONU, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml 8. Documentul UNESCO 131 EX/Decizia 4.1 i Decizia 4.2, iunie 1989. Raportul naional al dezvoltrii umane, Republica Moldova 2000, PNUD Moldova, 2012 Chiinau, Republica Moldova, p.17 9. Manifestul 2000, http://www3.unesco.org/manifesto2000/ 10. Organizaia Internaional a Francofoniei (OIF), http://www.mfa.gov.md/comunicatepresa-md/475164/ 11. Raportul Naional al Dezvoltrii Umane, Republica Moldova 2000, PNUD Moldova, 2000, 2012, Chiinu, Republica Moldova 12. Reeaua Naioanal a Cercettorilor Studiilor de Pace din Republica Moldova http://www.peacebuilding.md/ 13. Soren Tejno, Reprezentant Rezident al PNUD Moldova, Raportul naional al dezvoltrii umane, Republica Moldova 2000, PNUD Moldova, 2012 Chiinau, Republica Moldova, p.4 14. UNESCO Constitution, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 15. UNSCO oficial website, International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World (2001-2010), http://www3.unesco.org/iycp/uk/uk_sum_decade.htm

29

 : ( )

The concept of integration in a multiethnic society has often been used in political discourse of many countries. Though scholars claim that from theoretical point of view a comprehensive framework of interethnic integration has not been developed yet. The concept of integration has various, often contradictory interpretations among researchers. A specific integration pattern in respect of the Gagauz ethnic minority in the Republic of Moldova was not addressed in this paper. The analysis was based on some of the recommendations provided by the Ljubljana guidelines on integration of diverse societies as well as the results of empirical researches undertaken in different periods of time. The purpose of this article has been to attempt an analysis of different interpretations of the integration concept. Also, the economic, political, cultural and social basic dimensions of integration process have been considered based on the case of Gagauzia in the Republic of Moldova. Conceptul de integrare ntr-o societate multietnic a fost deseori folosit n discursul politic n multe ri. Cu toate acestea, cercettorii subliniaz c din punct de vedere teoretic un cadru comprehensiv al integrriii interetnice nc nu a fost elaborat. Conceptul de integrare interetnic are diferite i deseori contradictorii abordri i interpretri n rndul cercettorilor. Analiza e bazat pe unele recomandri formulate n cadrul Ljubljana guidelines on integration of diverse societies" ct i rezultatele cercetriloer empirice efectuate n diferite perioade de timp. Scopul articolului este de a analiza diferite interpretri al acesui concept. Totodat snt studiate dimensiunile fundamentale economice, politice, culturale i sociale ale procesului de integrare n baza exemplului Gagauziei din Republica Moldova.

. . , , [1, . 25-26]. . . : , / [1, p. 27], , , ; 30

 , [2, p. 337339]. , , .., , , , ,

[2, p. 337-339]. , , . , . , . [2, p. 337] , ( , )

[1, p. 25; 3, p. 4]. . , , , , . , ( - ), . , , , , . [4, p. 533-543] . , [3, p. 3]. . , [5, p. 176]. Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? [6, p.27], . 31

, , , , . , , . . , , : , , , . , - . [7, p. 352]. , , , , . , ,

- -. . XX . [8, p. 107-109]. , . () , [3 , p. 3]. . [9, p. 8], . . , . , , . , , . [3, p. 5] , , , , , . 32

 , . , . (weak multiculturalism) , , , , [10, p. 14-15]. , , . , [3, p. 6-7] . , , : , , . . : , . . :

. . , .. , , . , , , [2, p. 338; 1, p. 28-30]. , . , . . , [11] , , . [12; 13] 33

, , . , , , , , . . , [10, . 3-4]. : ; ; ; , ; ; ; ; , , . , , , [14]. . . ( ). . [14] () , , . , , , . . 1994-2009 . , 34

 [15, .17]. , ( 2005-2009 .- 3 ., 2010.- 4 .), (4,4%). , . [16]. , [12, 7]. , , . , , , [17]. . 1994-2010 . [18, .108]. . 2012 . (50,65% 50,96% - ) , [19]. , . , , 35 10 , 25 - . . 35

 , . . , . 15 [15, .11]. , . , [12]. , . , - [20]. , , . . , , . [21]. - [21; 12, 7]. , - - . . (81,6%), , . , . ,

36

 79,1% , (90,3%) (84,3%) . [12] . . . , , , , , , [17]. , - ( ) [22, . 18]. [17], , , . , , , . . , , , . , [23; 24, . 240]. , . , .

37

 , . , . - . , , , , , . : 1. Genov N. Theoretical Issues and Conceptual Framework // Interethnic Integration in Five European Societies. Nikolai Genov (Ed.). Hamburg: Kramer, 2008, p. 23-25. 2. Henrard K. Tracing visions on integration and/of minorities: an analysis of the supervisory practice of the FCNM, International Community Law Review 2011, pp. 333-360. 3. Medda-Windischer R. Old and New Minorities: Reconciling Diversity and Cohesion. A Human Rights Model for Minority Integration, Montral, Quebec, Canada, October 24-27, 2007. 4. Brubaker R. The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States. Ethnic and Racial Studies 24 [4] (July 2001) . 531-548. 5. Hadden T. Integration and Separation: Legal and Political Choices in Implementing the Minority Rights. In Nazila Ghanea and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds.): Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination. Boston, 2005, . 173192. 6. Choudhry S. Bridging Comparative politics and comparative constitutional law: onstitutional design in divided societies. constitutional design for divided societies: intergration or accommodation?, S. Choudhry, ed., Oxford University Press, 2008. 474 pp. 7. Favell A. Integration policy and integration research in Europe: a review and critique. In T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Doug Klusmeyer (eds.): Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices, Washington, DC: Brookings Institute / Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001, pp. 349-399. 8. Brubaker R. Marcel Mauss on Nationhood: Objectivism and its Limits. In Mria M. Kovcs and Petr Lom (ed.): Studies on Nationalism, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004. pp. 105-114. 9. Parekh B. Rethinking multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Macmillan, Basingstoke. Hampshire, U.K., 2000. 10. Kukathas Ch. Theoretical Foundations of Multiculturalism, 1992. Available at http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/pboettke/workshop/fall04/theoretical_foundations.pdf 11. OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies & Explanatory Note, November 2012. 12. // [ ]. : http://www.ipp.md. 13. ., ., . - ( )// Studii Internationale. Viziuni din Moldova= International Studies. Views from Moldova:

38

Publ. periodic t.-metodic/ Univ. De Stat din Moldova; col. red.: V. Teosa (red.-ef). Chiinu: CEP USM, 2007. . 135-138. 14. Wolff Stefan, The Ljubljana Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in the Post-Soviet Context // [ ].- : http://www.stefanwolff.com/talks/integration-and-conflict-prevention-in-diverse-societies. 15. Protsyk O., Osoian I. Ethnic or multi-ethnic parties? Party competition and legislative recruitment in Moldova. Flensburg, ECMI Working Paper N. 47, 2009. 16. " " // [ ]. : http://www.gagauzlar.md/libview.php?l=ru&idc=295&i4700d=; // [ ]. : http://halktoplushu.com/index.php?option= com_content&view=article&id=467:2011-12-09-09-15-44&catid=1:news. : 09.12.2011. 17. ., . ( ) 22- CG (22)10 // . 18. . . // MOLDOSCOPIE (Probleme de analiz politic). Revist tiinific trimestrial. - Chiinu: CEP USM, nr. 4 (XLVII), 2010 , C.105-112 19. 9 23 2012 // [ ]. : http://www.e-democracy.md/ru/elections/gagauzia/2012/ 20. // [ ]. :http://www.bri.gov.md/index.php?pag=presa&opa=view&id=127&start=&l=ru. : 25.03.2010. 21. . : // Moldova Noastr [ ]. - : http://www.mdn.md/ru/print.php?id=2464&lang=ru : 09.03.2006 22. Legea privind statutul juridic special al Gguziei (Gagauz-Yeri), nr. 344-XIII din 23. 12. 1994.// Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, nr. 3-4 din 14.01.1995. 23. . : , , ./.. .. /. , 2007. 280. 24. . // . . , . .-. . (2011; ). - , 20- ". . ", 11 . 2011 . : . . -, 2011. . 238-240.

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This paper explores the development of nature and means of settling international conflicts in traditional societies. The procedures of preventing and resolving the conflicts have their roots as far back as the antiquity, as for example, the Institute of ambassadors, whose identity was declared sacred and inviolable for the duration of their mission.To strengthen the agreements people in those times relied on the most robust of the existing forms of communication - on the real kinship. Dynastic marriages were the most popular form of it. There was also the institution of hostages - children of the noble, but defeated family, were brought up at the court of a powerful winner. Also there were forms of "localization" of the conflict - for example, reducing it to a fight between the agents of the parties. There were various forms of alliances. The oldest of them were bound up to the sacral centers. In the course of time political institutions went through the complex process of desacralization, but the process was non-straight. Various forms of unions went through the desacralization too. No matter what reasons led to the war, since it began to participate in it becomes a sacred duty of a citizen superseded all other obligations, including family. The significance of this civic duty was so high, that the military "value" of the group determined its political status, which, however, did not concern the status of priests. Compared with the ancient world, was Medieval Europe was more universal because of common cultural foundations of Christianity and Latin, that tied together countries and peoples. However, the political structures created at a time of the Roman Empire, were mainly gone. Family ties still gave a margin of safety to the relations between different countries, but in the meantime generated new problems and conflicts, including civil strifes and the struggle for power. The Roman Catholic Church take charge in piecing out a shortage of universal structures and it determined the political importance of the papacy. Therefore the mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution match the characteristics of the society. In traditional society, it is associated with the use of family ties as a guarantor of the agreements. It should be noted the vital role of the principle of the measure and harmony, pecular to the traditional society.Lucrarea dat este consacrat evoluiei caracterului i mijloacelor de soluionare a conflictelor internaionale n societile tradiionale. nc n antichitate iau natere procedurile de prentmpinare i soluionare a conflictelor, spre exemplu, institutul solilor, al cror personaliti erau declarate sfinte i inviolabile n tot decursul misiunii lor. Pentru a atribui soliditate acordurilor se utilizau legturile de rudenie. Una dintre formele de utilizare a lor snt cstoriile dintre dinastii. A mai existat i institutul ostaticilor. Copiii din familiile vestite ale adversarilor mai slabi erau educai la curtea adversarului mai puternic. O form de localizare a conflictelor era convocarea duelului dintre reprezentanii prilor.Se formau diverse forme de reuniuni. Cele mai vechi dintre ele erau legate de centrele sacrale. Treptat se reducea sacralitatea institutelor politice, dar acest proces nu era sincer. Formele de reuniuni au evoluionat treptat nspre reducerea sacralitii. Oricare ar fi cauzele rzboiului, din momentul nceperii lui participarea la rzboi devinea o datorie sfnt a ceteanului care depete toate celelalte obligaiuni, chiar i cele de rudenie. Importana acestei obligaiuni consta n aceea c valoarea pturii sociale n plan militar determina statutul ei politic ceea ce, de altfel, nu se referea la statutul de sacerdoiu. Europa medieval a devenit mai integr din cteva considerente culturale: cretinismul i limba latin uneau ntr-un tot unic rile i popoarele.Totui, structurile politice create n perioada Imperiului Roman au 40

fost ntr-o mare msur pierdute. Legturile de rudenie, ca odinioar, atribuiau soliditate relaiilor dintre ri, dar, n acelai timp se iscau noi probleme i conflicte inclusiv i luptele interne legate de lupta pentru puterea de stat.Biserica catolic a ncercat s completeze acest cusur ceea ce a determinat importana politic a papalitii. Astfel mecanismele de prentmpinare i soluionare a conflictelor corespunde cu caracteristicile societii. n societatea tradiional acest mecanism corespunde caracteristicilor societii. O importan deosebit l are principiul de respectare a msurii i armoniei, principiu caracteristic societii tradiionale.

. .

, , . , , , . . , . , , , , , , . , V .. . - , , , , [, I, 1-3] [1]. , - . , , , . . - .

41

 II III 1270 .. II , . . , , II . , . . , -. . . . , . . , , , , - . . , . , . , , .. , . , , , , . . , 585 . .. - , .. 42

 , . , ( ) , , ( ). , , . . : , . . . . . . , , V .. , . , . , , . - . . , . II : , . , , IV . .. , . . , . , , . 43

 . , . , , , . -, . , , , , . . , . . . I . .., . , , ( ). . , . : , : , , , [ 4, c.202]. - , . , . , . . , . , , . , . , V .. 44

 . , , , . , , , . , . , . , ( ), . . , II, III . , , , . - . , . (1962 2006 ). , . . . , , . , , , IV .. , , . . II, , III . , 45 ,

, . , . . , , . , . , . , , , , , . : , - , . . . - , , , , , . , . III II . .. , , II , . . , , . 196 .. . . , . , , , .

46

 , , , .. . - . , -,

. , , , . . , , , , . , [3, c. 228]. - . . ( ), , . : . , , . 800 , 962 I . . - . . 843 . , . , I , , . , , . 47

 VII . II , . , . , , , , . . , . , , . , . , . . , 1192 . . , . . , IV . , , , . , , V .. , .

48

 , , , . . , , , . (1618-1648) . . , , , , , . , , , ... , , , . : , . . , . . . , 1648 . [2, . 25]. . , , , , . , , 49 ,

. , . , . . . , , , , , .. : . , . , , . : 1. . . . . : , 1993, 600 . 2. . 1648 : , . . . . : - , 2001. 416 . 3. . . . : - 2003, 559 . 4. . . . . . .1. : ,1989, 575 .

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PACEA: APOGEUL DEZVOLTRII UMANITII SAU DOAR O NECESITATE? (o viziune din perspectiva filosofic)

COJOCARU Igor, JACOTA - DRAGAN Olga

In the history of mankind, war and peace were and continue to be interdependent. One may say that peace is a way to describe the normal state of existence and development of the society. The peace is perceived as an exception rather than the rule, and sometimes considered a period of time between the wars. This paper aims to outline the ideas and views regarding war and peace of great thinkers such as Confucius, Aristotel, Thomas Hobbes, H. Kelsen etc. reflecting the development of peace and war ideas in different periods of time. . , . , . , , . , . .., . Pe parcursul dezvoltrii omenirii, Pacea i Rzboiul au fost i sunt nedesprite, acestea sunt studiate din perspectiva asimetric i a negrii (definirea Pcii are loc ntotdeauna prin intermediul negrii rzboiului i nu invers). Putem invoca ideea conform creia pacea a aprut cu scopul de a descrie starea normal de existen i dezvoltare a societii. Este foarte simplu de a observa c pacea reprezint mai mult un caz excepional dect o regul, uneori chiar numindu se perioada dintre dou rzboaie. Cu o deosebit atenie marii gnditori ai lumii se preocupau de definirea i studierea rzboiului, iar pacea fiind vzut doar ca o finalitate a rzboiului. n filosofia Chinei antice se observ o viziune dubl fa de fenomenul rzboiului i a pcii. Confucius , Lao Tzi, Mo-Tzu, .a. pledeaz pentru meninerea pcii i n acelai timp mpotriva rzboaielor de cucerire, dar Sun Tzu sublinieaz c rul fiind prima cauz a rzboiului este natura omului i astfel rzboiul devine ceva firesc i inevitabil, cu scopul prevenirii acestuia binele trebuie educat n fiecare din membrii societii. [...] Ideea pcii apare i n lucrrile filosofilor Greciei i ai Romei antice, dar ntr-un sens mult mai restrns dect n filosofia Chinei antice, astfel lucrrile acestora se refereau doar la pacea ntre statele Greciei Antice, scopul fiind nlturarea rzboaielor interne. n viziunea platonian a cetii sau statului ideal nu existau rzboaie interne, ns erau elogiai cei, care participau la rzboaie externe1. Acest punct de vedere este susinut i de Aristotel 2, pentru care, obiectul rzboiului este nsi pacea. [...]
1 .. . .: Mo, 1985, p. 87, p. 43 2 Aristotel citat de Dumitru Isac. Aristotel. Bucureti: Ed. Tineretului, 1959.

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n evul mediu, biserica avea o foarte mare influen practic exlusiv fa de rzboaie. Vladimir Monomah, kneazul Kievului, ndemna vasalii s nu ucid n timpul postului mare3. [...] n perioada Renaterii situaia se schimb, biserica tot mai puin influeneaz toate domeniile vieii sociale. Omul Renaterii dorete s absoarb rezultatele tehnicilor i ale tiinelor, el nu-i mai poate irosi timpul ntr-un nvmnt cu programe ce nesocotesc imperativele vremii. Aceasta duce la elaborarea unei noi filosofii a omului creia nu-i lipseau preocuprile politice, a unei reflecii despre formarea i educarea lui, o regndire a pedagogiei. Noua filosofie despre om aprut n Renatere, marcat de tendina de a-l descrie, a-l glorifica i a-l situa n centrul universului capta mai trziu denumirea de umanism. (...) Umanismul renascentist a nsemnat, prin coninut, nainte de toate promovarea unei noi concepii antropologice, etice i social-politice despre om 4. [...] Filosofia bazat pe Pesimismul filosofic al lui Hobbes i Hegel, care prefigureaz orientarea realist, optimismul kantian este baza filosofic a ceea ce s-a numit idealism i, parial, a constructivismului contemporan. Aceast orientare pe care H. Bull o numete realist5 este evideniat n lucrrile lui Thomas Hobbes. Ideea lui Hobbes a rzboiului tuturor mpotriva tuturor6 se extinde la nivelul sistemului internaional. Ideea dat transpare deja n lucrarea Despre cetean (1651): Nu putem nega, c starea fireasc a omului, de pn la formarea societii, era lupta, dar nu numai lupta, ci: Bellum omnium contra omnes 7. Putem presupune c sursa de inspiraie a cestuia fiind dialogul platonian Legile, n care Platon afirm c toi se afl n stare de rzboi, precum n viaa public, aa i n cea intim, chiar cu sine nsui8. Pentru Hobbes Pacea este vzut ca o perioad de pregtire pentru urmtorul rzboi. [...]. Bouthoul studiind pacea i rzboiul, formuleaz o concluzie paradoxal, conform creia pacea este cauza rzboiului i rzboiul este cauza pcii, astfel referina la rzboi va rmne motorul tuturor cercetrilor fundamentale asupra pcii9. Autorul i formuleaz o definiie independent de opinii, de intelectualitate, de ideologii i chiar de mentaliti10, dar cu prere de ru nu reuete s depeasc, n aceast definire a pcii, dependena teoretic de noiunea polar rzboi. Pacea rmne, n concepia lui Bouthoul, ,,ruda srac a istoriei bazat pe evenimente. n lucrare se observ o tentativ de a prezenta un model de pace etern. Dup autor
3 , 2- , , 1989, p. 25. 4 Bobn Gh.: op. citat, 2005, p. 3. 5Bull Hedley: The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London and Basingstoke, 1977, p. 24. 6Hobbes Thomas: Leviathan, cap. 18, n colecia: Les classiques des sciences sociales, la: http://www.uqac.uquebec.ca/zone30/Classiques_des_sciences_sociales/index.html 7Hobbes Thomas n: Bacon Fr., Morus, Hobbes, Locke. Fragmente alese, Ed. de Stat pentru Literatur tiinific i Didactic, Bucureti, 1951. 8 Platon: Dialoguri (626), E.L.U., Bucureti, 1968, p. 403. 9 idem, p.72. 10 idem, p. 30.

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incriminarea juridic a rzboiului, este o aberaie ca i ncercarea de a pedepsi printr -o lege faptul de a fi contactat ciuma sau febra tifoid11. H. Kelsen 12 menioneaz c trecerea de la starea de pace la starea de rzboi este marcat fie de o declaraie de rzboi, fie de ostilitate a unui stat fa de altul 13, ncetarea strii de rzboi are loc fie prin simpla ncetare a ostilitilor, prin intrarea n vigoare a unui tratat de pace, fie prin dispariia unuia din statele aflate n rzboi prin cucerire, ocupare sau capitulare necondiionat. n acest context putem presupune: ct de lung nu ar fi perioada de pace ntr-un stat aceasta posibil va fi iari urmat de rzboi. R. OConnel
14

consider c, dac acceptm c

rzboiul este o realitate care apare la un anumit moment n istoria umanitii, aceasta sugereaz i un sfrit, n momentul n care aceast instituie social i va fi epuizat funciile. [...] . Studiul filosofic al rzboiului reprezint o cale de pstrare a pcii. Cercetarea n domeniul pcii i rzboiului s-a dezvoltat, mai mult ca polemologie dect ca irenologie. Astfel n condiii formate Pacea se afl ntr-o legtur direct fa de rzboi. Gaston Bouthoul15, printele polemologiei, art c perioada de pace deobicei trece neobservat. Bouthoul consider pacea stare normal a societilor16. J. Jaurs are un punc de vedere opus: Pentru a face pace, trebuie ca toi s fie de acord; pentru a declana rzboiul, este de ajuns unul singur. 17 n concluzie putem observa c, pe parcursul dezvoltrii umanitii, o deosebit i mai priveligiat atenie este acordat problemei rzboiului, formndu-se astfel o filosofie a rzboiului. nceputul secolului XXI, o dat cu progresul tehnico- tiinific, schimbrii mentalitii omului, se observ o schimbare a lucrurilor n domeniul menionat. Se conturez studii ce se refer la Pace, pledm i credem c formarea filosofiei a pcii, va fi urmat cu succes, astfel, nct pacea s fie studiat tiinific n corelaie cu fenomenul rzboiului, dar, concomitent, independent de acesta. Analiza i studiile concepiei pcii necesit un efort enorm. Filosofia pcii trebuie s se dezvolte pe baza negrii i asimetriei rzboi pace, att din perspectiv istorico- politic, geopolitic, ct i a relaiilor internaionale.

11 Bouthoul Gaston: Rzboiul, Ed. Militar, Bucureti, 1978 ,p. 141. 12 Kelsen Hans: Principles of International Law, 2-nd edition, reviewed and edited by Tucker Robert W., Hoit, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, 1967. 13Furet Marie-Franoise, Martinez Jean-Claude, Dorandeu Henri: La guerre et le droit, Ed. A. Pedone, Paris, 1979. 14O'Connel Robert: The Ride of the Second Horseman. The Birth and Death of War, Oxford University Press, 1995, p.6. 15 Bouthoul Gaston: La Paix, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1974. 16 Bouthoul Gaston, Carrre Ren, Annequin Jean-Louis: Guerre et civilization, n: Les cahirs de la Fondation pour les tudes de la dfence nationale, Supplment au numro 4 (4-me trimstre 1979) de Stratgique. 17 Jaurs Jeane-Leon: Arta i socialismul. Teatrul social, Ed. P.S.D., Bucureti, 1946.

53

This paper mekes a sound analysis of the role of civil society in peacekeeping. In order to explain this role the author in the first part of the paper considers the role of non-governmental organizations in the civil society development. Then its addresses the civil peace as an important condition for society existence. It is seen mainly as the absence of social and political conflicts in society, and it is also based on the common choice of society. The paper further addresses the role of civil society in peacekeeping that increases in the context of globalization. It is underlined that there should be used advantages of the globalization and avoided possible tensions. n articolul dat este oferit o analiz important al rolului societii civile n meninerea pcii. Pentru a explica acest rol, autorul n prima parte al articolului reflect rolul organizaiilor non-guvernamentale n dezvoltarea societii civile. De asemenea, este studiat pacea civic ca o condiie important al existenei societii. Deseori aceast pace este vzut drept lips a conflictelor sociale i politice din cadrul societii. Autorul continu cu faptul c rolul societii civile n meninerea pcii crete n epoca globalizrii. Este sublinat c pentru a menine pacea e nevoie de folosi avantajele oferite de globalizare i aplante tensiunile posibile.

1. . , ,

, . , , , . , . . , - , [1]. , , [2]. 54

 [3], , , [4]. , , , [5]. , , , -, [6]. , , , , . , , . [7]. [8]. , , - . , , , , , . , , - , , - , . , . . 2. : . . - , , 55

 . , . - , , , . , , , , . , , , . . , -, (, ); -, , , , ; -, , [9]. . : . , , . . , . , . , , . () , , 56

, - . . , , , ; - , . [10]. , , , . . , . . . , , , . , , . . - ; . ; ; , (, , ) . - ; ; , . 57

 . ; - , . : ; ; , , . , , . , , . , . , , . , . 3. , XXI . , . , , , , , , (, ) [11]. , , [12]. : [13], , [14]. , , 58

 . , , , , , . , [15]. . , , , , [16]. , , . XVIII ., , - [17]. . (ius cosmopoliticum), [18]. . , (magna universitas) [19]. , , , . [20], societas civilis. . , ( , , , ) [21]. , . . [22]. , [23]. , ,

59

. [24]. 1945 , 1997 : . , 8 2000 . , XXI . . : , , 2004 . , 170 2005 . , , , . , , [25]. , , , , , . , [26]. , () () [27]. , , [28]. 60

 . - , ( ). , , . , , , . . . , [29]. , . . , , , , , , . , , , [30]. , , , , . , . , . , . : 1. . : - . , 1996. c.16. 2. . (- ). ,1994. c.34. 3. . . , 1993. c.15. 61

4.

. . . . . . , 1996. c.25 . . . . , 1994. c. 57. . . - . , 1998. c. 201. Lester M. Saloman. The riseof Nonprofit Sector // Foreign Affairs, Vol.73, July August, 1994. .108. . // . 1997. 4. . 97; ., . // . 1998. 10-11. . 150-162; . . , 1998. c. 10.; . // . 4. 1996. c. 35. ., . : , , . , 2009. c. 67.

5. 6.

7.

8.

9.

10. . // . 2002. 11. . 135. 11. . ? ( - ) / . . . . . : . 2001. c. 278. 12. Kratochwil F. V., Ruggie J. G. International Organization: a State of the Art and the Art of the State // International Organization. 1986. Vol. 40(4). 13. . : / . . . . . : , 2004. c. 61. 14. Hydmayer F. State Building. Governance and World Order. N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004. p. 226. 15. ., . , , . // 2003, 8, . 87-94. 16. . . // 21 (37), 2010. 17. ., . 1999. . 32. 18. . . 8- . . 7. ., 1994. . 5-56. : . . . , - .

62

19. : , , // . , 2010. 20. Wright M. Theory of Participative Reassurance: a study into the effects of mobile communication within three communities. University of Leicester. Unpublished PhD thesis. 2005; Wright M. Community Safety through Communication: reducing crime and fear with Radio Links. University of Leicester, CSPO. Unpublished MSc dissertation. 1999. 21. Bull The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan, 1977. . 21; . . . . . . . 2005. . 78. 22. , , . . 2- . .. / . . . 1. : / ; - . . , 2008; Mayer P. Regime Theory: State of the Art and Perspectives // V.Rittberger (Ed.) Regime Theory and International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. 23. Peter Mayer et al. Regime Theory: State of the Art and Perspectives // V.Rittberger (Ed.) Regime Theory and International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. 24. . : - // : . . . , 2002. . 63-75. 25. . . 21 2011. 26. Held David et.al. Global Transformation: Politics, Economics, and Culture. Stanford,CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. . 19. 27. ,

. . : : Luard E. The United Nations. How It Works and What It Does. Second Edition. Revised by Derek Heater. New York: St. Martin Press, New York, 2004; . . . .: , . 1995. . 77-101. 28. Weiss T., Gordenke L. Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and

Dimensions // T. G. Weiss and L. Gordenker (Eds.) NGOs, the UN and Global Governance. Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1996. .19. 29. Rosenau J. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 63

TRANSFORMAREA PANIC A CONFLICTULUI CU Viorica, PANA Rodica

n conformitate cu statisticile, n ultimii 6000 de ani, omenirea s-a confruntat cu peste 14 500 de rzboaie, iar n ultimii 3 400 de ani ai istoriei ai existat doar 286 de ani de pace. De la sfritul celui de-al doilea rzboi mondial i pn n prezent au avut loc peste 165 de rzboaie. Aceste date sperie, i n acelai timp reprezint confirmarea faptului c rzboaiele, indiferent de forma de manifestare nsoesc existena uman, de ele nu putem face abstracie, datorit efectelor distrugtoare pe care le presupun. Ceea ce bineneles se contientizeaz, este c rzboaiele i conflictele sunt o parte inerent a vieii sociale i politice. Prin urmare, dei ar trebui s ne preocupe prevenirea izbucnirii lor, accentul ar trebui mai ales pus pe soluionarea lor pe cale panic sau o civilizare a conflictului. Analiza transformrii panice a conflictului pe care urmeaz s o realizm , pornete de la cteva premise de baz. Prima dintre ele, const n definirea conflictului. Aa dar, ce este conflictul? Care sunt cauzele, dinamica i mai ales cum poate fi acesta rezolvat? Dei aparent simplu, este dificil de dat o definiie exact termenului de conflict. Noi adeseori folosim cuvntul conflict fr a contientiza ct de ambiguu i fluid poate fi. El poate indica un conflict din viaa cotidian sau dimpotriv un conflict ntre state. Comun i este o conotaie negativ, fiind interpretat ca opus armoniei, iar conflictele apar atunci cnd prile implicate au interes e incompatibile i acioneaz n termenii acestei incompatibiliti [4, p. 44]. A doua premiz se refer la constatarea faptului c dac, conflictul este o stare endemic a istoriei umanitii, a crui evoluie poate conduce ctre rzboi, prin promovarea aa numitei violene structurale, sau ctre pace, prin nelegere i cooperare, atunci putem considera c, adoptnd strategii adecvate, putem controla evoluia conflictului. Cu alte cuvinte, putem determina transformarea conflictului dintr-o stare n alta, de obicei dintr-o stare de violen structural n una de nelegere i cooperare, adic, o evoluie pozitiv a acestuia [4, p. 16] sau o rezolvare constructiv a lui. Ultima se poate realiza prin nelegerea intereselor incompatibile a prilor aflate n conflict. Astfel, acestea pot fi: resursele i modul de distribuire a acestora teritorii, resurse energetice, alimente, fonduri etc.; distribuia de putere cine participa la luarea deciziilor politice i cum sunt acestea controlate; pstrarea identitii comunitii de apartenen a indivizilor identitate cultural, social, politic etc.; pstrarea statutului social chiar dac oamenii cred c sunt tratai cu diferen i chiar dac tradiiile i poziia lor social este respectat; pstrarea valorilor n particular, cele reprezentate de sistemul de guvernmnt, religie sau ideologie. Este important nc de la nceput s facem o delimitare a trei direcii de 64

cercetare a conflictelor: gestionarea conflictului (Conflict Management), soluionarea conflictului (Conflict Resolution) i transformarea conflictului (Conflict Transformation), recunoscnd n acelai timp c acestea se suprapun n mare msur i implic nu numai diferite tipuri de intervenii, dar, de asemenea, reflect diferite viziuni conceptuale a conflictului. Teoreticienii colii de gestionare a conflictului (Conflict Management) consider c n cadrul conflictului, folosirea violenei este o consecin inevitabil a diferenelor de valori i interese n cadrul i ntre grupuri. Tendina spre violen are la baz instituiilor existente i relaiile istorice, precum i principiile de distribuie a puterii. Se consider c, este imposibil de a rezolva astfel de conflicte: n cel mai bun caz, ele pot fi reglementate sau controlate, i, uneori, este posibil de a ajunge la un compromis istoric, n care violena se deplaseaz n planul secund i se restabilete viaa politic normal. Gestionarea conflictelor - este arta de a alege acele forme de intervenie care permit realizarea unui acord politic, realizat de oamenii politici care dispun de suficiente mputerniciri i resurse pentru a impune prile aflate n conflict s ajunge la un acord. Aceasta este, de asemenea, arta de a crea instituii eficiente pentru a ghida conflictele spre direcia corect. Teoreticienii colii de rezolvare a conflictului (Conflict Resolution) resping ideile primei coli, considernd-o o politica de putere, din perspectiva faptului c, n conflictele dintre grupuri care implic identitatea, oamenii nu pot s cedeze necesitile de baz. Cu toate acestea, ei consider c, dac prile n conflict snt ajutate s analizeze, s pun la ndoial sau s-i reformuleze poziiile i interesele, va aprea ansa de a depi etapa conflictual. De aceea, n soluionarea conflictelor, este necesar intervenia competent a unui ter, pentru a ajuta prile s priveasc conflictul dintr-o perspectiv nou i s nceap construirea unor relaii noi. Reprezentanii acestei coli ncearc s stabileasc cauzele reale a conflictului i s caute soluii creative pe care prile nu le-au observat. Soluionarea conflictelor ajut prile s se deplaseze de la rezultatul zero, adic, de la rezultate distructive spre o soluie constructiv [10, p. 43]. Teoreticienii colii transformrii conflictelor (Conflict Transformation) consider c, la etapa actual nu este suficient doar reformularea poziiilor i gsirea soluiilor reciproc avantajoase. Structura prilor implicate n conflict i relaiile dintre ele reflect conflictualitatea lor care depete limitele unei situaii locale. De aceea, transformarea lor este procesul de transformare a relaiilor, a intereselor, a discursurilor i, dac este necesar a ntregii societi, n cazul n care structura acesteia ncurajeaz continuarea violent a conflictului. Conflictul constructiv este perceput ca un factor vital sau catalizator al schimbrii. n procesul dificil de construire a lumii, toi oamenii pot avea o contribuie, inclusiv reprezentanii prilor aflate n conflict, oamenii care triesc n comunitatea sau regiunea atins de conflict.

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Transformarea conflictului necesit o abordare cuprinztoare i ampl, prioritar n acest proces fiind nu medierea terilor, ci acordarea sprijinului grupurilor din cadrul conflictului. Acesta este un proces progresiv, care presupune pai mici sau mari, precum i msuri concrete n realizarea crora un rol important l pot juca actori foarte diferii. coala transformrii conflictului consider conflictul un eveniment cultural, construit social i l analizeaz prin intermediul unei grile culturale i lingvistice. n perspectiva construciei sociale a realitii, ideea fundamental de la care se pornete este c conflictul apare i se dezvolt n baza semnificaiei i interpretrii persoanelor implicate n aciuni i evenimente [6, p. 8]. n conformitate cu aceast abordare, persoanele nu apar n conflict, precum te mbolnveti de grip, ei particip activ la crearea de situaii i interaciuni care dau natere conflictului. Pent ru diferite limbi i culturi snt realiti diferite de conflict. Astfel, n culturi diferite maniera de a provoca un conflict sau a da natere unui conflict i maniera de a-l soluiona sau procesele de rezolvare sunt construcii diferite [3, p. 29]. Vorbim aici nu de diferite expresii ale aceleai realiti sociale, ci de realiti diferite. Abordarea etnologic a conflictelor nu se limiteaz la investigarea cmpurilor exotice de studiere. Desigur de cele mai dese ori se alege spre analiz omul african sau hawaian. Dar este util de precizat c se pot gsi diferene fundamentale n maniera de gestionare a conflictelor mult mai aproape de realitatea occidental. Ca exemplu, diferena de gestionare a conflictului ntre sistemul judiciar american i cel francez, aici se regsesc diferene n care fiecare dintre lumi percepe justiia. coala transformrii conflictelor, concepe conflictul ca o realitate a vieii sociale care poate fi productiv sau distructiv, n dependen de maniera n care a fost gestionat. Lumea n care se ntlnesc fora sau energiile, perceput mai ales negativ deoarece aceste raporturi nu iau forma dorit de cei care sunt ngrijorai de confruntare. Realitatea distructiv a unui conflict poate fi supus experimentelor, transformat n una constructiv. Astfel, gestiunea conflictului nu este privit n termeni de evitare sau suprimare, ci de transformare a conflictului.

Transformarea conflictelor: aspecte teoretico-metodologice Cadrul conceptual al teoreticienilor transformrii conflictelor se bazeaz pe principii diferite. Unele dintre aceste elementele au aprut recent, altele exist de mult timp, iar altele au fost mprumutate de la alte coli. Ideea de formare a conflictului este prezent n lucrrilor structuralitilor europeni Senghaas D. i Krippendorf E [8, p. 78]. n momentul de fa, una dintre cele mai importante este concepia lui Johanes Galtung care a prezentat-o n lucrarea sa Peace by Peaceful Means [5].

66

Galtung consider c n cadrul conflictului sunt prezente att elemente vitale, dar i distructive. Conflictele apar n rezultatul disensiunilor din cadrul structurii sociale i sunt exprimate prin atitudinile i comportamentul oamenilor. Odat aprut, conflictul este supus la o varietate de transformri: apariie i separare, complexitate sau simplificare, polarizare sau, escaladare sau declin [9]. De asemenea, Johan Galtung subliniaz c este o naivitate s credem c am putea soluiona toate conflictele ntr-un mod satisfctor. Multe conflicte trebuie, nainte de a fi rezolvate, transformate n structuri care s nu dea natere la noi violene. i aici accentul este pus pe gndirea occidental care consider c n etapa final conflictele sunt fie soluionate, fie abandonate, fiind considerate a fi lipsite de orice speran i interminabile. Astfel, soluionarea conflictelor poate fi definit printr-o formul acceptabil pentru toi actorii i prin participarea tuturor actorilor. Naiv ar fi s considerm c un conflict este soluionat atunci cnd elitele din prile implicate au czut la un acord, ntrind acest acord printr-un document ce poart semnturile lor. A. Curle n lucrarea sa Making Peace se bazeaz pe abordarea lui J. Galtung. El analizeaz posibilitatea restabilirii echilibrului n relaiile asimetrice, prin intermediul procesului de contientizare, negociere i dezvoltare. Aceste idei au fost preluate de ctre J. P. Lederach. Cartea lui E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict [1] a avut, de asemenea, o influen semnificativ asupra teoriei de transformare a conflictelor explicnd caracterul de durat a conflictelor. Printre factorii cauzali, Azar consider nemulumirea fa de necesitile de baz, o conducere defectuoas, securitatea i dezvoltarea economic, i propune o abordare care descrie cel mai bine conflictele actuale din statele slabe R. Vayrynen [7] consider c, teoria conflictului trebuie s se bazeze pe ideea de transformare i analiz a forelor care particip la acest proces: transformarea actorilor - modificri ale prilor n conflict sau apariia noilor actori; transformarea problemelor - modificarea problemelor care au dat natere conflictului; transformarea regulilor modificarea normelor sau regulilor stabilite n conflict; transformarea structurii modificarea structurii relaiilor dintre pri i distribuia puterii n conflict. Obiectivul major urmrit ntr-un proces de rezolvarea a conflictelor prin abordarea transformativa este un acord care ar satisface reciproc prile n conflict i mbuntete situaia ambelor pri. Altfel spus, transformarea conflictului se realizeaz cu succes atunci cnd prile experimenteaz succesul att n capacitatea de a se ntri pe sine, ct i n capacitatea de relaionare cu ceilali. Inspirndu-se din teoria lui R. Vayrynen, Hugh Miall consider c exist 5 factori de transformare a conflictului: transformarea contextului, transformri structurale, transformarea 67

actorilor, transformarea problemelor, transformri la nivel de personalitate i elite. Aceste cinci forme de transformare se refer la diferite etape a cauzelor conflictelor i etapei de prevenire [8, p. 78]. Transformarea contextului are loc la nivel global sau regional. Transformarea structurii este la nivelul statului i a societii. Transformarea actorilor i problemelor este caracteristic pentru prile din conflict i nivelul elitelor, precum i transformarea personal necesit cunotine la un nivel personal. Ideea de transformare nu sugereaz faptul c eliminm pur i simplu sau controlm conflictul, ci mai degrab arat natura lui dialectica: conflictul social trece prin anumite faze previzibile, care transforma relaiile i organizarea social. Conflictul schimb schemele de comunicare, afectnd astfel relaiile i organizarea social, transform percepiile despre sine, despre ceilali, precum i problemele aflate n disput. Printre metodele de rezolvare a conflictelor prin abordarea transformativ menionm: intervenia pacifist care poate avea loc n orice stadiu de evoluie a conflictului; avertizarea timpurie i aciunile preventive - sunt destinate s atenioneze asupra faptului c o anumit situaie conflictual poate evolua ctre un curs violent i sunt necesare aciuni preventive pentru stoparea acestei evoluii; managementul crizelor reprezint un set de msuri i aciuni destinate a opri n ultimul moment evoluia conflictului ctre un curs violent sau a stopa extinderea violenelor ctre rzboi; consultrile, medierea i arbitrajul - reprezint modalitile de intervenie pentru schimbarea cursului conflictului, atunci cnd acesta a atins cotele violenei extreme; negocierile, concilierea, rezolvarea problemelor reprezint modaliti de intervenie pentru soluionarea conflictului o dat ce acesta a intrat in faza destinderii. Aceste metode se pot aplica la toate nivelurile (personal, local, naional, regional i internaional sau global) i n toate stadiile de evoluie a conflictelor. Politica diplomatica este cea care caracterizeaz relaiile dintre pri n cazul pcii durabile, iar diplomaia preventiv sau prevenirea conflictului sunt cele mai potrivite pentru a prentmpina escaladarea tensiunilor i pentru evitarea confruntrilor. Transformarea conflictelor implic, de obicei, o multitudine de actori. Actorii pot fi mprii n patru categorii principale: statele i organizaiile interguvernamentale; ageniile de dezvoltare i organizaii umanitare; ONG-urile internaionale specializate n prevenirea i transformarea conflictelor, prile implicate n conflict i cu alte grupuri afectate de conflictul din societate. Transformarea conflictului i propune s dezvolte potenialul i s realizeze schimbri structurale, nu se bazeaz pe cutarea de soluii i ncheierea acordurilor, implic intervenia n conflict sau n etapa anti-violent, sau dup izbucnirea ei violent, precum i analiza cauzelor i consecinelor de conflict violent, care de obicei, depesc zona de rzboi. 68

Modelul Lederach de transformare a conflictelor J. P. Lederach a oferit una dintre cele mai complete abordri a transformrii conflictelor, destinat pentru practicieni. Pentru el, meninerea a pcii reprezint o transformare de durat a rzboiului, care se bazeaz pe valori ca pacea, adevrul, dreptatea i mila. Aceasta presupune o schimbare a diverselor aspecte ale conflictului (personale, structurale, interpersonale i culturale), care au loc n intervale diferite de timp (pe termen scurt, mediu i lung) i ating diferite niveluri ale sistemului (de la probleme specifice, la subsistemele i sisteme, n contextul n care exist un conflict). n lucrarea sa Preparing for Peace. Conflict Transformation Across Cultures, Lederach este n cutarea unei metode care ar permite transformarea conflictelor. El face referin la dou idei principale. n primul rnd, evoluia diferitor grupuri care alctuiesc o societate, trec prin conflicte permanente n urm crora aceste grupuri se definesc cu o identitate proprie. Aceste conflicte pot fi violente sau nu. Aceste conflicte nu pot fi eliminate, ele pot fi transformate, acordndu-le o expresie nonviolent i propice pentru apariia unei justiii sociale. Lederach respinge literatura cu privire la soluionarea conflictelor (Coflict resolution), deoarece, afirm el, este imposibil a soluiona cea mai mare parte din conflictele actuale chiar dac se i dorete. De asemenea, el respinge literatura privind reglementarea conflictelor (Conflict management), deoarece susine autorul, de multe ori mecanismele de gestionare a conflictului snt ineficiente dat fiind c ele au tendina de a controla manifestrile cele mai violente a conflictelor sociale, fr a merge la originea acestora. Lederach opteaz pentru transformarea conflictelor deoarece aceast abordare pune n valoare dou realiti neglijate: conflictele sunt parte integrant a vieii i a societii i mecanismele care permit declanarea lor violent nu pot fi detaate de dinamicele profunde care le dau natere. Astfel, transformarea conflictelor umple lacunele, propunnd o metod de restructurare a relaiilor sociale non propice pcii [6, p. 14] care are ca scop de a reorienta dinamicele conflictuale care agit societatea, n maniera n care aceste grupuri implicate n aceste dinamici s aib sentimentul unei justiii sociale. John Paul Lederach distinge folosirea descriptiv i prescriptiv a conceptului de transformare. Aceast distincie permite de a analiza trecerea de la teorie la practic. n folosirea sa descriptiv, conceptul de transformare permite de a ine cont de dinamica ciocnirilor dintre fore sau practicile discursive. Naturale i inevitabile n viaa social, conflictele sunt locuri i ocazii de schimbare. Conflictul este un moment de criz n viaa social, dar nu este neaprat distructiv. coala transformrii conflictului se intereseaz de diverse practici de comunicare i confruntare. Relaia poate fi caracterizat printr-o trecere de la dinamic distructiv la una constructiv n beneficiul fiecreia dintre pri (transformarea poate fi i invers). Energia schimbrii este perceput ca fiind endogen: ea poate sta la baza energiei conflictului n 69

desfurare. Aceast gril de lectur nu implic fascinaia pentru schimbarea social, ci pune n eviden importana gsirii modalitii de soluionare. Aici se face trecerea de la teorie la practic care implic decizii i angajamente. John Paul Lederach descrie trecerea ca fiind una pacifist non-violent revoluionar, unii vad aici o trdare a ideilor sau compromisuri vinovate. Dar pentru Lederach, nu este suficient de a te concentra pe rezultatele ateptate, ci trebui e de concentrat cu un realism practic pe procesele care permit accederea la aceste rezultate. Nu exist rezultate care s fie independente de proces, procesul fiind drumul care trebuie parcurs pentru a ajunge la destinaie. Preocuparea este foarte concret, practic i realist, la ce bun de imaginat soluii ideale dac nu se propun modaliti pentru a ajunge la ele sau mijloacele pentru care s -a optat contravin idealurilor (de exemplu recurgerea la violen). Mijloacele trebuie s fie compatibile cu scopurile cutate. Folosirea prescriptiv a conceptului de transformare nu implic dect faptul c practica ilustrat se bazeaz pe o filozofie prescriptiv. Modelul care urmeaz s fie aplicat nu este cel de intervenie extern, de exemplu, un expert sau client care ne va nva. Pentru Lederach, experii sunt persoanele implicate n conflict. Comunitile sunt interpreii limbii i culturii n care triesc. Rolul formatorului este de a arta cum un lucru de facilitare ntre regimuri de comunicare are ca scop explicarea practicile implicite deja practicate. Lederach se inspir din lucrrile lui Paulo Freire [3, p. 30] din domeniul educaiei populare i preia o concepie elcitiv de nvare. Drumul, sau procesul, aparine comunitilor implicate n conflict i persoanelor care trebui s-l parcurg. Dac ele nu particip, procesul nu se produce adecvat, astfel c, transformarea durabil a conflictului devine imposibil. Persoanele dispun de resurse culturale i lingvistice care reprezint materia prim cu care trebuie de lucrat. i dac aceste resurse nu sunt adaptate la noile circumstane, comunitile vizate sunt principalii actori de intervenie i de creare de noi procedee. Acest lucru poate fi descris ca un rezultat a unui bricolaj a resurselor puse la dispozi ia lor i noi instrumente descoperite pe parcursul ntlnirilor i schimbului; toate aceste instrumente trebuie s fie absorbite n matricea cultural i regulile forjabile a comunitii. Abordarea transformrii conflictelor, consider limba i persoane ca resurse ntr-un proces de transformare. Limba nu mai este considerat un vehicul transparent n cele mai bune cazuri, i un obstacol opac i funestru n altele, i persoanele nu mai sunt recipiente-rezervoare, pacieni care ateapt vindecarea bolii, printr-o analiz generic, adic autonom de subiectivitatea lor, ei nii sunt actori i stpni a unei pri din resurse fr de care nimic nu se va schimba. Modelul lui Lederach se bazeaz pe un proces participativ, care urmrete crearea schemelor de transformare a conflictului, incluznd etape cum ar fi:

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1. descoperirea: participanii se angajeaz i interacioneaz cu propria lor nelegere asupra modului n care funcioneaz conflictul; 2. recunoaterea i structurarea n categorii: pune participanii n situaia de a crea propria lor teorie, pe baza experienei trecute i pe nelegere, fiind important contribuia procesului de nvare; 3. evaluarea: o dat ce participanii au descoperit ce este conflictul i cum se rezolv, ei pot ncepe s evalueze ce i-a ajutat i ce nu din modul cum au gestionat conflictul; 4. adaptare/re-creare: aceasta este ocazia de a adapta modalitile curente de gestionare a conflictului sau de a explora noi strategii, prin analizarea practicilor din culturi i contexte diferite; 5. aplicarea practic: stadiul final al nvrii rezolvrii conflictelor implic exerciii, prin care se experimenteaz noile idei i opinii; membrii organizaiei sunt capabili s foloseasc noile cunotine i aptitudini n situaii de confruntare. Punctul forte ale acestui model este nu doar analiza conflictului i a membrilor si, dar acesta propune implicarea resurselor de meninere a pcii a ntregii societi. Dezavantajul este c nu atrage atenia asupra schimbrilor autonome ale sistemului politic, care apar n societile afectate de conflicte. J. Lederach, a ridicat o problem important pe care muli teoriticieni ncearc s o soluioneze n sfera rezolvrii conflictelor: problema stabilirii succesivitii n momentul implicrii n conflict. Teoria transformrii conflictelor conine probleme care necesit rspunsuri. Pn n prezent, nu exist nici o teorie detaliat, care s rspund noilor caracteristici ale conflictului, inclusiv a noilor actori i a noilor probleme. Cele mai multe dintre ele se limiteaz la determinarea cauzelor i a dinamicii de conflict, sau sprijin consolidarea potenialului pcii.

Bibliografie: 1. Azar E. The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990. 2. Belu M. Dimensiunea intercultural n rezolvarea conflictului //The Romanian economic journal, an XI, nr. 4, 2008, p. 89-102. 3. Bitter J. N. Lea dieux embusques, un aproche pragmatique de la dimension religieuse des conflicts, Droz 2003. 4. Craciun I. Prevenirea conflictelor i managementul crizelor, Bucureti: Carol I, 2006. 5. Galtung J. Peace by Peaceful Means, London: Sage, 1996. 6. Lederach J.- P. Preparing for Peace. Conflict Transformation across Cultures, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995. 7. Vayrynen R. To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts // New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, London: Sage, 1991, p. 1-25. 8. . : // : : , 71

, . .. - , 2007, c. 76-96. 9. . A. , 2009, http://uchebnikbesplatno.com/uchebnik-mejdunarodnie-otnosheniya/teoriya-integratsii.html 10. .. // . 2011. 11. No 2, c. 42- 46.

PEACEFULL CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION CU Viorica, PANA Rodica According to the statistics, in the last 6000 years, mankind has faced over 14,500 wars, and in the last 3400 years of history there have been only 286 years of peace. Since the end of World War II and until today, over 165 wars have occurred. These data frighten, and at the same time it represents the confirmation that the war in any form of expression shadow humans existence, we cannot ignore them, because of the destructive effects they involve. Which of course is being aware of, is that both during peacetime and in time of wars existed and will continue existing conflicts, they have become an inherent part of social life, so although we should worry about preventing their outbreak, focusing especially on their peacefully resolution or on civilizing the conflict. The analysis that follows to accomplish on the process of peaceful conflict conversion is based on several core premises. The first one consists in defining the conflict. Therefore, which is the conflict? Which are the causes, dynamics and especially how it can be solved? Although seemingly simple, it is quite difficult to a precisely define for the term of conflict. We often use the word conflict without realizing how ambiguously and fluid it can be. It may denote a daily life conflict or rather a conflict between states. A negative connotation is common for both senses and it is understood as the opposite of harmony, also the conflicts arise when the parties involved have incompatible interests and act in terms of this incompatibility [4, p 44]. The second premise refers to ascertainment if the conflict is an endemic state of humans history, whose evolution can lead to the beginning of a war, by promoting the so-called structural violence, or to peace through understanding and cooperation, then we may consider that adopting appropriate strategies, we can control the evolution of the conflict. Namely, we can determine its transformation from one state to another, usually from a structural violence state in one of understanding and cooperation, in other words to a positive development [4, p 16] or to a constructive solving. The last one can be achieved by understanding the incompatible interests of the conflicting parties. Thus they may be: resources and their distribution - territories, energy 72

resources, food, money etc.; power distribution - who takes part in political decision making and how they are controlled, identity preservation of individuals community belonging - cultural, social, political identity, etc.; social status maintaining - even if people think they are treated differently and even if they believe their traditions and social position is respected; values preservation - in particular, those represented by the system of government, religion or ideology. From the very beginning it is important to make a distinction of three conflict research directions: Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, Conflict Transformation, while recognizing that they largely overlap and involve not only various types of interventions, but they also reflect different conceptual views of the conflict. Theoreticians of the Conflict Management School consider that within the conflict, the use of violence is an inevitable consequence of the existing differences of values and interests within and between the groups. Violence tendency is based on the existing institutions and historical relations, as well as the power distribution principles. It is considered that is impossible to resolve such conflicts: in the best case, they may be regulated or controlled, and sometimes - it is possible to reach a historic compromise, in which the violence moves to the background and normal political life is restored. Conflict management - is the art of choosing those forms of assistance that allow a political agreement made by politicians who have sufficient powers and resources to enforce the parties of the conflict to reach an agreement. It is also the art of creating effective institutions which may guide the conflict in the right direction. Theoreticians of the Conflict Resolution School reject the ideas of first one, considering it as being a power politics, in view of the fact that conflicts between groups involving identity, people cannot yield their basic needs. However, they believe that if the parties of the conflict are helped to analyze, to doubt or to reformulate their positions and interests, there will be a chance to overcome the conflict phase. Therefore, for conflict resolution, is needed the intervention of a third party responsible for helping the parties to see the conflict from a new perspective and begin building of new relationships. Representatives of this school are trying to establish the real causes of the conflict and look for creative solutions which have not been noticed by the parties. Conflict resolution helps the parties to move from "zero" result, in other words the destructive results to a constructive solution [10, p 43]. Theoreticians of Conflict Transformation School consider that nowadays is not sufficient just to reformulate the positions and to find mutually beneficial solutions. The structure of the conflict parties and relations between them reflects their conflictual state which is exceeding the limits of local situations. Therefore, their transformation represents the transformation of relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary of the entire community in case when its structure encourages further violent conflict. Constructive conflict is seen as a vital factor or as 73

the catalyze of change. The difficult process of world building, everyone can contribute, including the representatives of the conflicting parties, people living in the community or region dominated by the conflict. Conflict transformation requires a comprehensive and fully approach, primarily in this process is not third-party mediation, but providing support for the conflict group. It is a progressive process that involves small or large steps, as well as concrete measures in which implementation different actors can play an important role. Conflict Transformation School considers the conflict as being a cultural event, socially built and analyzes it through a cultural and linguistic scale. In view of the social construction of reality, the fundamental idea of this approach is that the conflict arises and develops according to the meaning and interpretation of the people involved in actions and events [6, p 8]. Under this approach, individuals do not appear in conflict, as you catch flu, they actively participate in creating situations and interactions that give rise to the conflict. There are different conflict realities for different languages and cultures. Thus, in different cultures the way to cause a conflict or to give rise to a conflict and the resolution manner or solving processes represents different constructions [3, p 29]. We mean not different expressions of the same social realities, but different realities. Ethnological approach of the conflicts is not limited to investigating exotic fields of study. Of course the most often chosen for analysis are African or Hawaiian man. But it is useful to note that one can find fundamental differences in the manner of managing conflict much closer to Western reality. For example, there is a deference of conflict management between American and French judicial system, there are differences found in the manner each of the world perceives justice. Conflict Transformation School, conceives the conflict as a fact of social life which can be productive or destructive, depending on the manner in which it has been managed. The world that meets force or energy, especially negatively perceived because these relationships do not take the desired shape of those who are worried about the confrontation. Destructive reality of a conflict may be subjected to different experiments, being this way transformed into a constructive one. This way, conflict management is not seen in terms of avoidance or suppression, but in transformation of conflict.

Conflict Transformation: theoretical and methodological issues Theoreticians conceptual framework of conflict transformation is based on different principles. Some of these elements have appeared recently, some of them exist for a long time and some were borrowed from other schools. The idea of Conflict forming is present in some European structuralists works, such as Senghaas D. and Krippendorf's [8, p 78]. Currently, one 74

of the most important concepts is the one which belongs to Johannes Galtung who presented it in his Peace by Peaceful Means work [5]. Galtung considers that in a conflict there are vital elements, as far as destructive ones. Conflicts arise as a result of disagreements within the social structure and are expressed in humans attitudes and behavior. Once emerged, the conflict is subjected to a variety of changes: occurrence and separation, complexity or simplicity, polarization, escalation or decline [9]. Also, Johan Galtung highlights that it is naive to believe that we could resolve all the conflicts in a satisfactory manner. Many conflicts must be converted, before being resolved, into structures that do not give rise to further violence. Here the emphasis is put on western thought which considers that in the final phase the conflicts are either resolved or are abandoned and considered to be hopeless and endless. This way conflict resolution can be defined by a formula acceptable for all stakeholders with the participation of all of them. It would be ignorant to believe that the conflict is resolved when the elites of the parties involved have fallen to an agreement, reinforcing this agreement by a document bearing their signatures. A. Curl in his work Making Peace is based on the approach of J. Galtung. He is considering whether to restore equilibrium in asymmetric relations through raising awareness, negotiation and development. These ideas were taken over by J. P. Lederach. E. Azars book, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict [1] had also a significant influence on conflict transformation theory explaining the lasting character of the conlicts. Through the causative factors, Azar considers dissatisfaction towards basic needs, poor leadership, security and economic development, and proposes an approach which best describes the current conflicts existing in weak states. R. Vyrynen [7] considers that conflict theory must be based on the idea of transformation and analysis of the forces involved in this process: Actors transformation - changes of the conflict parties or the emergence of new actors; Problems transformation - changing of the problems that gave rise to conflict; Rules transformation - changing of the rules and legislation in conflict; Structural transformation - changing of the structure and distribution of power between the parties in conflict. The major objective pursued in the process of resolving conflicts through transformative approach is an agreement that would mutually satisfy the parties in conflict and would improve the situation for both of them. In other words, the conflict transformation is successful when both parties experience success in their ability to strengthen itself and the ability to relate to others. Drawing on the theory of R. Vyrynen, Hugh Miall considers that there are 5 factors of conflict transformation: context transformation, structural change, actors transformation, 75

transformation of problems, changes of personality and elite level. These five forms of transformation refer to the different stages of conflict causes and prevention phases [8, p 78]. Context transformation occurs at globally or regionally level. Structural transformation takes place at state and society level. Transformation of actors and issues of the conflict is characteristic for parties and elites, as far as personal transformation requires knowledge on a personal level. The idea of transformation does not suggest that the conflict is simply eliminated or controlled, but rather indicates the dialectical nature: social conflict passes through some predictable stages that transform relationships and social organization. The conflict changes the communication schemes, this way affecting social relationships and organization, transforms perceptions about themselves, about others, and about the issues in dispute. Among the methods of resolving conflicts through transformative approach can be mentioned: - Peaceful intervention - this can occur at any stage of development of the conflict; - Early warning and preventive actions are intended to alert the fact that a conflict situation can lead to violent course and preventive actions are needed to stop this development; - Crisis management - is a set of measures and actions for stopping at the last moment an ongoing violent conflict development or halt the spread of violence into a war; - Consultations, mediation and arbitration represent the means of intervention to change the course of the conflict, when it has reached extreme violence; - Negotiations, conciliation, problem solving - are ways to intervene in solving the conflict once it has entered the relaxation phase. These methods can be applied at all levels (personal, local, national, regional and international or global) and at all stages of development of the conflicts. Diplomatic policy is one that characterizes relations between parts for lasting peace and preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention are best to prevent escalation of tensions and avoid confrontations. Conflict transformation usually involves a multitude of actors. The actors can be divided into four main categories: states and intergovernmental organizations, development agencies and humanitarian organizations, international NGOs specialized in conflict prevention and transformation, conflict parties and other groups affected by conflict in society. Conflict transformation aims to develop the potential and to achieve structural changes, although it is not based on looking for solutions and agreements, it involves the intervention in conflict or the pre violent stage, or after its violent outburst, as well as analyzes the causes and consequences of the violent conflict, which usually are beyond the war zone.

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Lederach Pattern of Conflict Transformation J. P. Lederach has provided one of the most comprehensive approach to conflict transformation, designed for practitioners. For him, keeping the peace is a lasting transformation of the war, being based on the values such as peace, truth, justice and mercy. This requires a various aspects change of the conflict (personal, structural, interpersonal and cultural) that occurs in different timeframes (short, medium and long) and reaches different levels of the system (from specific problems to subsystems and systems in a context where there is a conflict). In his work, Preparing for Peace. Conflict Transformation Across Cultures, Lederach is looking for a method that would allow conflict transformation. He refers to two main ideas. First he refers to the evolution of various groups that make up a society, pass through permanent conflicts following which these groups are defined with its own identity, conflicts can be violent or not. These conflicts cannot be eliminated, they can be only transformed, giving them a nonviolent expression and propitious for the emergence of social justice. Lederach rejects literature with respect to Conflict Resolution, because, as far as he says, it is impossible to solve most of the current conflicts even if they want to. He also rejects the literature regarding Conflict Management, because as the author argues, often the conflict management mechanisms tend to be inefficient to control the most violent manifestations of social conflicts without going to their origins. Lederch opts for conflict transformation because this approach highlights the two neglected realities: conflicts are a part of life and society and the mechanisms that allow their violent trigger cannot be detached from the deep dynamics that give them rise. This way conflict transformation fills some gaps by proposing a restructuring method of social relations non favorable for peacekeeping [6, p 14] which aims to refocus the conflicting dynamics that shake society, in the way that the involved groups in these dynamics should have the sense of social justice. John Paul Lederach distinguishes between descriptive and prescriptive use of the transformation concept. This distinction allows analyzing the transition from theory to practice. In its use descriptive concept of transformation allows to take into account the clashes dynamic between forces or discursive practices. Natural and inevitable in social life, conflicts represent places and opportunities of changing. Conflict is a crisis in social life, but not necessarily a destructive one. Conflict Transformation School is interested in various communication and confrontation practices. Relationship can be characterized by a shift from a destructive to a constructive dynamic in benefit of each party (the transformation can also be reversed). The change energy is perceived as being endogenous: it can be the basis of the ongoing conflict energy. This reading grid does not involve fascination for social change, but emphasizes the importance of finding a resolution. Here should take place the transition from theory to practice 77

involving decisions and commitments. John Paul Lederach describes the passage as being a peaceful non-violent revolutionary one; some others see here a betrayal of ideas or guilty compromise. But for Lederach it is not enough to focus on expected results, but it should concentrate with practical realism on the accession processes that would allow these results. There are no independent of process results, the process is the way which leads to the destination. The concern is very real, practical and realistic, what is the use of to imagining the ideal solutions unless there are no proposed ways to reach them, or the means chosen are contrary to the ideals (e g the use of violence). The means must be compatible with the sought purposes. Prescriptive use of the transformation concept does not involve anything else then that the practice is based on a prescriptive philosophy. The model which is going to be applied is not foreign intervention one, such as an expert or customer who will teach us. For Lederach, the experts are people involved in the conflict. Communities are the interpreters of the language and culture in which they live. The role of the trainer is to show how something with a facilitating effect between communication regimes is intended to explain the implicit practices which have been already applied. Lederach is inspired by the works of Paulo Freire [3, p 30] form folk education field and retrieves an elicitive learning conception. The way or the process belongs to the conflicting communities and to the people that have to go through it. If they do not participate, the process does not run in a proper way, so that a sustainable conflict transformation is impossible. People do not have cultural and linguistic resources represent the raw work materials. And if these resources are not adapted to the new circumstances, targeted communities become the main intervention actors and creators of new methods. This can be described as a result of resources tinkering which have been available to them and new tools discovered during meetings and exchanges, all of them must be absorbed into the cultural matrix and malleable rules of the community. Conflict transformation approach considers language and people as resources in a process of transformation. In the best cases language is no longer considered a transparent vehicle, but an opaque obstacle in the others, and people are no longer container-tanks, patients waiting for cure disease through a generic analyze, namely independent of their subjectivity, they are actors themselves and masters of a part of the resources without which nothing will change. Lederach's model is based on a participatory process that aims to create conflict transformation schemes, including steps such as: discovery: participants engage and interact on their own understanding of the functioning of the conflict; recognition and structuring by categories: places the participants in a situation to create their own theory, based on past 78

experience and comprehension, the learning process contribution being important; evaluation: once the participants have discovered what is and how to resolve a conflict, they can begin to assess what helped and what did not in the way they managed the conflict; adaptation / recreation: this is the opportunity to adapt the current methods of conflict management and to explore new strategies, by analyzing the practices of different cultures and contexts; practical application: the final stage of conflict resolution involves learning exercises, through are being which experienced new ideas and opinions, the new members of the organization are able to use new knowledge and skills in confrontation situations. The strength of this model is not only the conflict analysis and its members, but it suggests involvement of peacekeeping resources of the whole society. The downside is that it doesnt highlight the autonomous changes of political system, which occur in societies affected by conflicts. J. Lederach, raised an important issue that many theoreticians are trying to solve in the field of conflict resolution: the problem of establishing succession when engaging in conflict. Conflict transformation theory includes problems that need answers. So far, there is no detailed theory until today, to meet the new features of the conflict, including the new actors and new issues. Most of them are limited on determining the causes and dynamics of the conflict, or just support the peace consolidation potential. References: 1. Azar E. The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990. 2. Belu M. Dimensiunea intercultural n rezolvarea conflictului //The Romanian economic journal, an XI, nr. 4, 2008, p. 89-102. 3. Bitter J. N. Lea dieux embusques, un aproche pragmatique de la dimension religieuse des conflicts, Droz 2003. 4. Craciun I. Prevenirea conflictelor i managementul crizelor, Bucureti: Carol I, 2006. 5. Galtung J. Peace by Peaceful Means, London: Sage, 1996. 6. Lederach J.- P. Preparing for Peace. Conflict Transformation across Cultures, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995. 7. Vayrynen R. To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts // New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, London: Sage, 1991, p. 1-25. 8. . : // : : , , . .. - , 2007, c. 76-96 9. . A. , 2009, http://uchebnikbesplatno.com/uchebnik-mejdunarodnie-otnosheniya/teoriya-integratsii.html 10. .. // . 2011. 11. No 2, c. 42- 46

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EFICIENA NEGOCIERILOR DIPLOMATICE N SOLUIONAREA CONFLICTELOR INTERNAIONALE

ROTARU Veronica

Today the role of diplomatic negotiations has increased significantly, as these negotiations are the main instruments of conflict settlement. Due to diversity of possibilities offered by diplomatic negotiations, the last are essential for conflict prevention and conflict situation accommodation. This article analyzes the effectiveness of diplomatic negotiations in international conflict. Author presents the historiography of diplomatic negotiations and reflects their influence during conflict settlement. The paper also provides definitions of diplomatic negotiations and international conflicts. It is underlined that diplomatic negotiations are used in accordance with international law for the purpose of maintaining peace and security in the world. The effectiveness of diplomatic negotiations is hard to evaluate, because different factors are involved. Author mentions that for a conflict settlement it is necessary that the conflict parties should have the will to solve it, by permanent communication, mutual concessions and respect for each others interests , . , , . . . . , , , . , . , . Interdependena crescnd a statelor, reflectat n totalitatea raporturilor dintre ele, impune practic ca fiecare conflict internaional care s-a iscat sau e pe cale s escaladeze, s fie soluionat n mod panic, ct mai rapid posibil i n mod definitiv. n relaiile internationale, cel mai efectiv i cel mai utilizat mijloc, n acest scop, sunt negocierile diplomatice. n condiiile actuale, deseori este extrem de dificil s reconciliezi poziiile contradictorii ale prilor participante la conflict. n acest context, negocierile diplomatice i-au demonstrat, de nenumrate ori, eficiena n soluionarea conflictelor internaionale. Problema eficienei negocierilor diplomatice ca mijloc de soluionare a conflictelor internaionale i gsete rezonan n lucrrile mai multor specialiti strini i autohtoni. Printre cercettorii care s-au preocupat de elaborarea unei baze teoretice i analiza diverselor aspecte ale negocierilor i putem numi pe: J. Hiltrop i S. Udall [1], M. Malia [2], V. Kremeniuk [3], I. Lukaiuk [4], C. Crciun [5], L.Terentii [6], etc. 80 n lucrrile sale, autorii cerceteaz

particularitile i caracteristicile negocierilor, stabilesc diferite tipuri de negocieri, analizeaz personalitatea negociatorului, proiecteaz necesitatea eficientizrii procesului de negocieri. n cea ce privete noiunea i specificul conflictului international, putem evidenia lucrrile cercettorilor: A. Dmitriev [7], M. Lebedeva [8], M. Malia [9], C. Eanu [10], etc., care ne-au permis s delimitm arealurile de conflicte actuale, specificul i mijloacele de reglementare a acestora, evideniindu-se, mai ales, negocierile diplomatice. Printre autorii care au analizat procesul de negociere, ca mijloc de soluiona re a conflictelor, i putem evidenia pe R.Fisher, E. Kopelman i S. Kupfer [11]. n lucrarea sa, cercettorii analizeaz cteva idei. n primul rnd, capacitatea de a privi prin ochii celuilalt, sau mai bine zis de a ne concentra asupra opiunilor celuilalt, ceea ce nseamn de fapt, un mare beneficiu pentru noi, deoarece ne consolidm relaia cu partenerul pentru o afacere de viitor mai stabil. n al doilea rnd, capacitatea de a inventa soluii cu ctig reciproc, ceea ce reprezint o modalitate eficient de a-i crea partenerului o stare de confort, facilitnd procesul de negociere. n al treilea rnd, se nainteaz ideea de onestitate profesional a celei de a treia pri, a mediatorului, care poate contribui la propunerea soluiilor pentru conflictul existent. Totodat, autorii analizeaz conceptul de conflict, prezentndu-l ca o industrie a dezvoltrii, deoarece oamenii interacionnd unii cu alii, genereaz noi idei, opinii, dar i divergene. ntr-un context internaional, aflat n schimbare rapid, o soluie care prea adecvat lun trecut poate fi depit sptmna viitoare. Aparea, astfel, necesitatea unei abordri total diferite, mai eficiente, care sunt anume negocierile. n acelai context, se nscrie i lucrarea cercettorului Ch. Thuderoz [12], care vizeaz un spectru larg de probleme vis--vis de calitile politice i morale ale negocierilor, iar conflictul este tratat ca modalitate obinuit a relaiilor sociale, dar i ca un liant social. n opinia autorului, negocierile constituie dispozitivul cel mai eficient de realizare a multiplelor interdependene dintre personae i de reglare a divergenelor. O analiz ampl a negocierilor ca metod de soluionare a diferendelor pe cale panic o gasim n lucrarea lui L. Strauss [13]. Autorul cerceteaz comportamentului statelor n cadrul relatiilor internationale, n concordan cu mprejurrile care sunt la moment. De asemenea, el elaboreaz un set de construcii analitice n care se include contientizarea contextului i cauzelor negocierilor. L. Strauss este de prerea c un actor, fie el un individ, grup, comunitate sau stat, dac vrea sa obin ce i-a propus, are la dispoziie un set ntreg de opiuni. Din aceste opiuni fac parte: convingerea, argumentarea, manipularea, impunerea regulilor, legilor, apelarea la autoriti i, desigur, negocierile. n concepia autorilor rui contemporani, fenomenul de negociere include n sine o analiz profund a situaiei, determinndu-i pe participani s identifice riscurile i avantajele n 81

conformitate cu poziia adoptat, tehnicile i strategiile utilizate. I. Vasilenco [14] analizeaz modelele negocierilor n cadrul unui conflict, care implic utilizarea medierii, ca mijloc de contrabalansare a situaiei problematice. Totodat, ne prezint diverse stiluri de negociere, n dependen de cultur i civilizaie, spre exemplu, stilul de negociere american, ca unul dintre cele mai favorizate i rspndite pe piaa negocierilor internationale. De asemenea, cercettorul a introdus noiunea de negociere politic, considernd-o o art de elaborare a stratagemelor. Cea mai simpl definiie care apare n lucrrile cercettorilor din acest domeniu este aceea c negocierile diplomatice sunt o form panic de soluionare a disputelor i nenelegerilor, aprute ntre dou sau mai multe pri/state indipendente. Astfel, indiferent de modalitatea de analiz, toi cercettorii ajung la concluzia c negocierile diplomatice sunt cea mai binevenit modalitate de soluionare a conflictelor internationale. Actualmente, exist o mulime de definiii a negocierilor care ncearc s redea ntregul lor coninut. R. Fisher i W. Ury consider negocierile drept o comunicare destinat obinerii unui acord, cnd prile mprtesc att interesele comune ct i cele opuse [15, p.11]. G. Evans G. i J. Newnham, n dicionarul de relaii internationale, analizeaz negocierile ca procesul prin care actorii macropolitici interacioneaz pentru a atinge un numr de scopuri, care pot fi realizate n modul cel mai eficient, printr-un acord comun [16, p.366]. Cercettorul romn . Pruteanu consider c prin negocieri trebuie sa nelegem orice form de confruntare nearmat, prin care dou sau mai multe pri cu interese i poziii contradictorii, dar complementare, urmresc s ajung la un aranjament reciproc avantajos ai crui termeni nu sunt cunoscui la nceput [17, p.164]. La rndul su, I. Diaconu definete negocierile ca modul prin care statele realizeaz cooperarea internaional, fie multilateral, fie bilateral [18, p.280]. Ele reprezint concomitent, un mijloc important de reglementare panic a diferendelor. Negocierile diplomatice, n conceptia lui L. Terentii, reprezint un proces de gsire a unui compromis ntre persoane cu interese distincte; un instrument alctuit de omenire pentru soluionarea conflictelor i reglementarea problemelor [6, p.17]. Negocierile diplomatice constituie mijlocul cel mai mai eficient de a ajunge la o soluie satisfctoare ntre prile implicate n conflict. Conform opiniei lui V. Beniuc i Gh. Rusnac, negocierile diplomatice, esen a activitii diplomatice, constau n aprarea intereselor statului propriu prin ncercarea de a ajunge la un acord cu statul negociator, de a gsi cu el puncte de tangen [19, p.95]. n fond, negocierile diplomatice intervin n dou situaii: a) la ncheierea unui acord indiferent de natura i obiectul acestuia; b) pentru soluionarea unui diferend sau conflict. n ambele cazuri, negocierile diplomatice sunt destinate pentru realizarea unui interes comun.

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Specialistul autohton C. Crciun [5], analiznd mai multe definiii ale negocierilor, concluzioneaz urmtoarele: a) b) c) sunt precedate de anumite aciuni i situaii care declaneaza derularea lor; constituie un proces de interaciune comunicativ ntre dou sau mai multe pari; reprezint o interaciune ntre participanii motivai de prezena unor divergene i

necesitatea de a ajunge la un acord. Soluionarea unui conflict depinde de comprehensiunea cauzelor sale de ctre pri, mizele i riscurile ce i le asum. Deoarece conflictele sunt, deseori, percepute ca o lupt care trebuie castigat cu orice pre, ele dezvolt, adesea, o dinamic intern care ngreuneaz, dac nu chiar exclude, o reglementare panic, constructiv i nonviolent. Pentru a negocia soluionarea un conflict trebuie mai nti s-l nelegem, s obinem ca prile implicate s contientizeze c recurgerea la for are un cost superior reglementrii sale panice, iar rezultatele pot fi departe de cele ateptate. M. Malia susine c ponderea tot mai mare pe care o dobndete n viaa internaional, n relaiile interstatale, metoda negocierilor panice, dovedete faptul c cercuri tot mai largi ale opiniei publice neleg c singura alternativ a unui nou rzboi mondial i a altor conflicte distrugtoare e discutarea problemelor litigioase n scopul gsirii unei ci de nelegere [2, p.8]. Atunci cnd obiectivele sunt fundamental incompatibile i ambele pri i menin cu trie poziiile, probabilitatea influenrii comportamentului, aciunilor, scopurilor prin negocieri diplomatice scade, n special, dac una dintre pri consider c poate s -i satisfac interesele prin alte aciuni dect negocierile. Soluionarea panic trebuie s devin unica alternativ de anihilare a unui conflict, prin ferma convingere a prilor c doar prin negocieri directe sau cu ajutorul medierii unui ter, interesele lor vor fi mai bine aprate, costul realizrii lor va fi mai redus, pstrndu-i concomitent suveranitatea i prestigiul pe arena internaional. n ceea ce privete aspectele conceptuale ale noiunii de conflict, costatm c n literatura tiinific exist multiple abordri n cercetarea conflictelor internaionale ce se explic prin diversitatea tractrilor coninutului termenului de conflict internaional. Conflictul e o situaie competitiv n care prile contientizeaz neconcordana poziiilor lor i fiecare parte ncearc s obin unele beneficii, n detrimentul celeilalte. Conflictul internaional constituie, de fapt, o ciocnire ntre actorii internaionali din cauza puterii, valorilor promovate sau resurselor, n care scopul fiecrei pri este neutralizarea, slbirea sau nlturarea inamicilor si [20, p.9]. n opinia conflictologului A. Dmitriev, conflictul este expresia contrazicerilor obiective i subiective ce se manifest prin lupta dintre pri [7, p.54]. P. Tsygankov definete conflictele internaionale ca contradicii aprute ntre state, actori ai sistemului de relaii internaionale [21, p.409]. Cercettorul explic faptul c nceputul secolului XXI aduce cu sine modificri eseniale 83

ale conceptului de conflict. n primul rnd, s-au modificat cauzele i sursele conflictelor: actualmente cele mai frecvente sunt cele etnice, regionale i cele bazate pe resurse, dar care provoac cele mai mari disfuncii n societatea internaional. n al doilea rnd, s -au schimbat participanii la conflict: conflictele dintre state inclusiv cele militare nu dispar, dar posibilitatea de a avea loc ciocniri de tipul celor dou conflagraii mondiale este puin pobabil, n sensul c statele vor lupta nu numai cu state, ci i cu ali actori nonstatali grupri extremiste i teroriste internaionale. Reieind din cele menionate, constatm c conflictele reprezint interaciunea actorilor cu interese contradictorii, de aici rezult i importana negocierilor diplomatice n acest caz, cnd subiecii cu interesele sale distincte sunt angajai ntr-un dialog pentru a se ajunge la un compromis. n prezent, n cadrul conflictelor pot fi evideniate urmtoarele tendine: - Mutarea accentului de la conflictele interstatale la cele ce se petrec n interiorul statelor. Din circa treizeci de conflicte anuale identificate ca atare pe plan global, doar unul sau dou sunt interstatale; - Transferarea accentului de la motivaiile clasice (economie, resurse, teritorii) la caracterul identitar bazat pe sisteme de valori i credine (culturi care cuprind ideologiile i religiile); - Trecerea de la armatele mari la formaiunile mici (gheril i terorism individual); - Posibilitatea accesului acestora din urm la armele cele mai letale i sofisticate (arme chimice, biologice i nucleare sau rzboi electronic i propagandistic). Astfel, la sfritul secolului XX nceputul secolului XXI, au avut loc transformri majore n caracterul conflictelor armate i a reaciei comunitii internaionale la ele. n prezent, mai mult de 90% dintre conflicte nu sunt ntre state, ci n interiorul lor, ceea ce complic, deseori, soluionarea acestora. n baza principiului respectrii suveranitii naionale, intervenia devine tot mai neacceptat, ns, necesitatea monitorizrii aplanrii conflictului prin mijloace panice este legitimat prin principiul respectrii drepturilor omului i interzicerea categoric a folosirii forei armate. n acest, context importana negocierilor diplomatice n reglementarea conflictelor poate fi argumentat n felul urmtor: a) Argumentul juridic negocierile constituie prima procedur diplomatic de soluionare panic. Ele reprezint un demers absolut necesar oricrei tentative de a reglementa un diferend. Obiectivul negocierilor poate fi soluionarea ca atare a diferendului sau doar clarificarea elementelor acestuia, n vederea determinrii proceduri pe care prile, de comun acord, o vor adopta n continuare, n scopul soluionri definitive.

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b)

Argumentul politic negocierile reprezint mijlocul prin care se realizeaz

cooperarea internaional, fie bilateral sau multilateral. Prile nu doar eglementeaz conflictul n sine, dar i se angajeaz ntr-un dialog deschis, unde nu mai e loc pentru confruntare, ci doar pentru cooperare. Ele ncearc s ajung la un maximum de avantaje prin pierderi minime, n acelai timp, innd cont de interesele adversarului [22, p.200]. Negocierile diplomatice trebuie s asigure cadrul i atmosfera de ncredere indispensabil reglementrii unui conflict internaional. Obiectivul unor negocieri poate fi soluionarea ca atare a diferendului sau doar clarificarea elementelor acestuia, n vederea determinrii procedurii pe care prile de comun acord o vor adopta n continuare n scopul soluionrii definitive. Determinarea corect a cauzelor conflictului i a poziiei fa de el a prilor implicate este o condiie obligatorie pentru reuita soluionrii sale. Totodat, constatm faptul c negocierile diplomatice, cu toate c sunt cel mai eficient i utilizat instrument de prentmpinare, soluionare sau aplanare a conflictelor internaionale, nu ntotdeauna au rezultatul ateptat. Exist un ir de impedimente majore care complic procesul de negocieri i contribuie la rspndirea opiniei despre ineficiena real a negocierilor, puterea militar devenind, n acest mod, factorul decisiv n reglementarea unui conflict internaional. Experiena ne arat c dou dintre calitile cele mai necesare n abordarea divergenelor sunt puterea de convingere i capacitatea de a adapta propriul mod de gndire la noua situaie. De multe ori, soluionarea unui conflict internaional prin negocieri pare imposibil, deoarece prile implicate au idei preconcepute, estimnd diferit cauzele conflictului, mizele i chiar inteniile adversarului. Cum au remarcat cercettorii R. Fisher i W. Ury nelegerea modului de gndire a prii adverse nu e doar o activitate care ajut la soluionarea problemei, problema rezult din nsi modul lor de gndire [15, p.62]. Acest obstacol poate fi depit doar prin comunicarea ntre pri. Comunicarea nu se realizeaz uor nici chiar ntre oamenii care posed acelai sistem de valori i experiene comune, dar, mai ales, n cazul conflictelor cnd divergenele de opinii sunt i una din cauzele apariiei lor. Abaterile de la reguli fundamentale de purtare a negocierilor ne conduc la forme viciate, prin ntrebuinarea unor mijloace imorale cum ar fi: utilizarea forei, presiunilor, ameninrilor, etc. Practicarea acestora are efecte negative pentru toate prile implicate n conflict, chiar i pentru partea care le iniiaz. n sistemul international actual, gradul de interdependen dintre state schimb caracterul tradiional al negocierilor diplomatice. Cu toate c iniiativa de a negocia, acceptarea medierii, hotrrea final rmne n competena statelor, cursul negocierilor e profund influenat de implicaiile relaionale i de organizaiile internaionale din care statele fac parte. Astfel, existena unui sistem de organizaii internaionale i multiplele conferine internaionale ce au loc cu diverse ocazii face ca statele s nu mai fie singure n negocieri, ntruct acest sistem atrage i 85

implic un anume cadru ce se ofer organic drept suport a celor mai particulare negocieri [12, p.82]. Totodat, evoluia relaiilor internaionale demonstreaz c cooperarea dintre state i ali subieci ai dreptului internaional, constituie o surs de stoparea a presiunilor i un element de sporire a anselor de rezolvare panic a diferendelor internaionale. Implicarea organizaiilor internaionale n soluionarea unui conflict prin susinerea negocierilor bilaterale i organizarea negocierilor multilaterale este, evident, necesar, ns exist diferite obstacole ce le impiedic s obin un rezultat cu adevrat stabil i eficient. Suveranitatea statelor i prevederile tratatelor le limiteaz aciunile, deoarece rolul instituii internaionale ntrun conflict devine, de regul, formal i inflexibil, fiindu-le interzise multe activiti utile [2, p.127]. De asemenea, prin nsi natura lor, organizaiile organizaiilor internaionale produc, uneori, escaladri ale unor conflicte prin simplul fapt c se implic. Totui, obiectivul major al organizaiilor internaionale rmne a fi meninerea pcii i securitii n regiune i respectiv n lume, prin prentmpinarea conflictelor internaionale sau chiar interne, care amenin stabilitatea general. Att prentmpinarea, ct i n caz de escaladare, soluionarea lor se efectueaz prioritar prin mijloace panice, dintre care negocierile ocup un loc prioritar. Multe conflicte internaionale au fost prentmpinate sau rezolvate n acest mod. E adevrat c nu ntotdeauna s-a obinut un acord de pace stabil, ns n orice situaie, negocierile diplomatice rmn a fi cea mai bun alternativ. Datorit multiplelor posibiliti pe care le ofer, negocierile au devenit un mijloc real de prevenire i aplanare a diferendelor i strilor conflictuale, reprezentnd cea mai important cale de reglementare. Avantajele acestei proceduri se evideniaz prin faptul c toate diferendele internaionale sunt supuse acestei proceduri. n Carta Naiunilor Unite este stipulat c n orice diferend a crui prelungire ar putea pune n primejdie meninerea pacii i securitii internaionale, prile vor trebui s caute s-l rezolve, nainte de toate prin tratative, anchet, mediere, conciliere, arbitraj, pe cale judiciar, recurgerea la organizaii sau acorduri regionale sau prin orice mijloace panice, la alegerea lor [23]. Astfel, negocierile diplomatice au devenit instrumentul stabil i permanent al relaiilor internaionale, constituind cea mai nsemnat cale de rezolvare i prevenire a conflictelor. Realitatea demonstreaz c simpla semnare a unui acord de pace nu anihileaz cauzele conflictului, dar traseaz calea necesar de a fi urmat pentru eliminarea lor treptat [24, p.73]. Eficiena negocierilor diplomatice depinde de prile aflate n conflict, care constientizeaz pericolul acestuia i ncearc de a lua decizii care presupun compromis politic sau indispensabilitatea implicrii internaionale. Negocierile diplomatice sunt mult mai eficiente la etapa timpurie a conflictului internaional, cnd divergenele nu sunt att de acerbe nct s blocheze capacitatea nelegerii panice. Negocierile bilaterale, directe, ntre prile beligerante, 86

dac sunt corect organizate i persist dorina real de a ajunge la un acord, sunt ntr-adevr cel mai recomandabil mijloc de soluionare a conflictelor internaionale. Exist un ir de principii i reguli simple, respectarea crora poate garanta ajungerea prilor la un numitor comun, apropierea poziiilor lor vis--vis de necesitatea rezolvrii conflictului. Metodologia de pregtire poate fi foarte diferit, tipul negocierii i experiena practic a negociatorului avnd rolul determinant pentru alegerea activitilor n cadrul unui process de negocieri. Un model pe care l recomandm ar cuprinde urmatoarele activiti minime: 1. Diagnosticarea situatiei de negociere. Cunoaterea situaiei de negociere este echivalent cu a ti de unde pornim, astfel nct s putem gndi n termeni mai realiti unde vrem s ajungem. Pentru a cunoate situaia prezent, diagnosticarea se poate baza pe analiza unor aa factori fundamentali ca: Identificarea i definirea problemei care constituie obiectul global al negocierilor. Definirea subiectelor i obiectelor specifice ale negocierilor. Stabilirea prioritilor, innd cont ca nu toate obiectele sunt la fel de importante pentru negociator. Stabilirea unor poziii de negociere pentru obiectele identificate (n special, punctul de ruptur). nelegerea contextului, adic a influenelor din mediu relevante pentru problema sau proiectul negociat (ex.: factori de mediu, evoluii, tere pri, evenimente etc.). Clarificarea nevoilor, dorinelor proprii i formarea unei idei despre interesele partenerului. Clarificarea alternativelor de aciune n eventualitatea neajungerii la un acord. Definirea zonelor de acord i dezacord, formate din interesele comune i cele divergente. Identificarea surselor de putere ale prilor i evaluarea raportului de putere prin inventarierea punctelor tari i slabe n cazul propriu i n cel al oponentului. ntreprinderea unor aciuni pentru creterea puterii de negociere. ntelegerea partenerilor pe baza informaiilor relevante (politici i strategii, poziia pe arena international, stil de negociere). 2. Stabilirea obiectivelor. Obiectivele sunt intele de atins sau rezultatele asteptate pe care i le fixeaza negociatorul, n scopul realizrii intereselor sale. Obiectivul global al unei negocieri este, de regul, ncheierea unui acord profitabil i echitabil, soluionarea creativ a conflictului. n afar de aceasta, negociatorul i fixeaz obiective specifice pentru diferite obiecte de negociere. Obiectivele 87

trebuie s corespund unor anumite cerine: s fie precise i msurabile, s fie realiste i flexibile. Pregtirea flexibil poate fi asigurat prin fixarea obiectivelor printr-o gam de trei niveluri: Obiectivul maxim cel mai bun rezultat pe care l poate atepta. Obiectivul minim cel mai slab rezultat acceptabil, dincolo de care negocierea nu mai prezint interes. Obiectivul int cel mai realist rezultat. Obiectivele stabilite de negociator, pentru diferite elemente de negociere, nu sunt egale ca importan, deoarece elementele de negociere nu au aceeai valoare. Negociatorul are anumite prioriti. Prioritile diferite favorizeaz desfurarea negocierii. Dac prile au aceleai prioriti probabil c negocierea va fi mai dificil, rezultnd o abordare distributiv. n aprecierea prioritilor partenerului, negociatorul utilizeaz desigur propria judecat, de aceea va trebui s fie contient c perspectiva sa ar putea s difere fa de realitate i ipotezele vor trebui verificate n discuia cu cellalt. 3. Pregtirea strategic.

Elaborarea unei strategii concrete presupune adoptarea unor decizii fundamentale privitor la orientarea predominant, preluarea iniiativei, manevrrii strategice a timpului, etc. Pe lng orientrile generale, pregtirea strategic include i pregatirea unor instrumente concrete de lucru cum ar fi: schiarea unor scenarii i a unor soluii de rezerv; pregtirea concesiilor de acordat la unele dintre punctele de negociere n schimbul concesiilor solicitate la alte puncte; pregtirea argumentelor proprii, schiarea unor contra-argumente posibile ale oponentului i modul de contracarare a acestora; pregtirea unor tactici n concordan cu strategia aleas. 4. Organizarea negocierii. Principalele aspecte organizatorice se refer la formarea echipei, mandat, locul negocierii sau organizarea primirii echipei vizitatoare (primire la aeroport, asigurarea cazrii, organizarea unui eventual program de relaxare). Aadar, pregatirea negocierii presupune desfasurarea unor activiti de colectare de informaii, de analiz i de reflecie care s ofere negociatorului un ghid pentru abordarea, n mod profesionist, a discuiilor i a interaciunii cu partenerii si. E necesar de pregtit minuios agenda negocierilor, informaiile ce vor fi prezentate i pregtirea psihologic orientat constructiv i flexibil pentru ascultarea i nelegerea celeilalte pri. 88

n cadrul negocierilor, cu toate c prile unui conflict sunt orientate reciproc destul de ostil, fiind reprezentate de negociatori profesioniti, trebuie s-i pstreze calmul, s evite atitudinea iritant i ntreruperea partenerului. De asemenea, e foarte important nelegerea modului de gndire i poziiei prii adverse, evitarea efectuarii cedrilor inutile, dar i evitarea stilului ireconciliant [25, p.26]. Pentru eficiena negocierilor diplomatice, ntreprinse n scopul soluionrii unui conflict international, o mare nsemntate o are atmosfera n care se poart negocierile, capacitatea negociatorilor de a tolera preteniile prii adverse fr a le refuza categoric, ci a le exclude treptat pe cele exagerate sau inutile. Negocierile bilaterale, n special cele nemediate eueaz adesea din cauza incapacitii prilor de a se asculta reciproc, de a evidenia prioritar interesele comune i nu dezacordurile, de a prezenta soluii alternative celor iniiate ce ar fi mai rezonabile i mai uor de acceptat. Convingerea categoric c fiecare din ele e purttoarea adevrului unic ce nu poate fi modificat, e principalul obstacol n stabilirea unui compromis. E adevrat c discuiile asupra eficienei negocierilor diplomatice n rezolvarea unui conflict internaional va exista permanent, aprnd noi i noi factori care vor sprijini sau vor pune la ndoial posibilitile lor. Astfel, doar cumularea tuturor premiselor necesare: dorina comun, real de a gsi prin negocieri soluia acceptabil a conflictului; capacitatea prilor de a face cedri necesare; percepia adecvat a situaiei stabilite i a modului de gndire a celeilalte pri; imperativul categoric c doar negocierile panice reprezint unica variant posibil i evident, conjunctura internaional favorabil garanteaz eficiena procesului de negocieri i respectarea condiiilor acordurilor semnate. Un argument n plus n favoarea alegerii negocierilor i nu a forei armate ca mijloc de soluionare a conflictelor internaionale este i costul lor mult mai redus, evitarea datorit lor a pierderilor materiale i a victimelor umane. Prevalena dialogului prin contacte i tratative n epoca noastr, a faptului c statele au nteles mai bine necesitatea conlucrrii multilaterale n vederea atingerii obiectivelor de pace i securitate, este o consecin a acelor caracteristici ale vieii internaionale contemporane n care respectul integral i necondiionat al tuturor popoarelor devine un imperativ fundamental, iar participarea tuturor statelor la rezolvarea problemelor majore ale contemporanietaii constituie o condiie necesar a evoluiei panice a fiecrui stat. Cu toate c n lume mai persist acele cmpuri de lupt, care perturb securitatea international, totui comunitatea mondial, aplicnd metodele diplomatice de soluionare a conflictelor, ncearca s transforme prile din dumani n actori cu interese proprii care n cutarea realizrii lor, vor efectua diferite concesii ca n cele din urm s ajung la un compromis. Astfel, conchidem cu faptul c anihilarea conflictelor n relaiile internaionale prin intermediul soluionrii pe cale panic este o cerin fundamental a meninerii pcii i 89

securitii internaionale, a statornicirii unor raporturi normale, de convieuire i conlucrare ntre state. Conflictele ntre state sunt inerente desfurrii relaiilor internaionale contemporane. Pe de o parte, n multe regiuni exist litigii i diferende ntre state, care creaz instabilitate i dezordine, iar, de multe ori, numeroase pierderi umane i materiale. Pe de alt parte, n drumul su spre progres i civilizaie, omenirea se confrunt necontenit cu numeroase probleme tot mai complexe, a cror soluionare reclam participarea tuturor statelor. Adesea abordrile i punctele de vedere sunt diferite, uneori chiar diametral opuse, genernd nenelegeri, diferende sau friciuni. Este tiut faptul, c dezvoltarea colaborrii i, n general, multiplicarea legturilor dintre state conduc, n mod inevitabil, la sporirea conflictelor internaionale, cel puin din punct de vedere numeric. Acolo unde relaiile sunt mai complexe, unde contactele i schimburile sunt numeroase, posibilitatea ivirii conflictelor este n mod obiectiv mai mare. Apariia acestora nu este, n mod necesar, un fenomen negativ n sine. Negativ i profund duntoare, n condiiile internaionale de astzi, este nesoluionarea lor i ncercrile de a le soluiona pe alte ci dect cele panice. De aceea, odat cu evoluia multilateral a raporturilor dintre state este necesar dezvoltarea i perfecionarea procedurilor de reglementare pentru a permite soluionarea oricrui diferend i conflict prin mijloace panice, precum negocierile diplomatice. Considerm c, negocierile sunt elementele de baza care stau la formarea i existena relaiilor dintre state, reprezentnd o nou form de existen, trecnd de la metode violente la cele umane.

Bibliografie: 1. Hiltrop J., Udall S. Arta Negocierii: Procesul de negociere. Negocierea interpersonal. Cultura negociatorului. Greeli comune. Bucureti: Teora. 2000. 176 p. 2. Malia M. Teoria i practica negocierilor. Bucuresti: Politica, 1972. 679 p. 3. . . : , 2001, .12, .100-106. 4. . . : Nota Bene, 2004. 144 c. 5. Crciun C. Teoria i practica negocierilor. Chiinu: Prut Internaional, 2001. 216 p. 6. . . Chiinu: ASEM, 2001. 250 c. 7. . . : , 2003. 318 . 8. .. : , , . : -, 1997. 234 c. 9. Malia M. Jocuri pe cena lumii: conflicte, negocieri, diplomaie. Bucureti: C.H. Beck, 2007. 362 p. 10. Eanu C. Activitatea diplomatic n prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor internaionale. n: Serviciul diplomatic: teorie i practic. Chiinu: CEP USM, 2011, p. 222-228. 11. Fisher R. i alii. Dincolo de Machiavelli. Intrumente utile pentru o bun gestionare a conflictelor. Bucureti: Codecs, 2003. 177 p. 12. Thuderoz Ch. Negocierile. Eseu de sociologie despre liantul social. Chiinu: tiina, 2002. 198p. 13. Strauss L. A review Symposium. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 1978. 320 p. 90

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

. . : . 2011. 351 c. Fisher R., Ury W. Sucesul n negocieri. Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1995. 295 p. Evans G., Newnham J. Dicionar de relaii internaionale. Londra: Universal Dalsi, 2001. 366 p. Pruteanu . Comunicare i negociere n afaceri. Iai: Polirom, 1998. 164 p. Diaconu I. Tratat de drept internaional public. Bucureti: Lumina Lex, 2005. 280 p. Beniuc V., Rusnac Gh. Conceptele i noiunile de baz ale diplomaiei. Chiinu: USM, 1998. 190 p. Montbrial Th. La guerre et la diversite du monde Paris: Le Monde et edition de l'Aube, 2004. 198 p. .. . : , 2003. 590c. Cohen H. Orice se poate negocia. Bucureti: Colosseum. 1995. 290 p. Carta Naiunilor Unite. http://www.onuinfo.ro/documente_fundamentale/carta_natiunilor_unite/ (vizitat 12.04.2013) Cohen S. Les diplomates. Ngocier dans une monde chaotique. Paris: Autrement, 2002. 182 p. Georgecu T. Negocierea afacerilor: Ghid practic. Galai: Porto-Franco, 1992. 244 Strauss L. A review Symposium. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 1978. 320 p. . . : . 2011. 351 c. Fisher R., Ury W. Sucesul n negocieri. Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1995. 295 p. Evans G., Newnham J. Dicionar de relaii internaionale. Londra: Universal Dalsi, 2001. 366 p. Pruteanu . Comunicare i negociere n afaceri. Iai: Polirom, 1998. 164 p. Diaconu I. Tratat de drept internaional public. Bucureti: Lumina Lex, 2005. 280 p. Beniuc V., Rusnac Gh. Conceptele i noiunile de baz ale diplomaiei. Chiinu: USM, 1998. 190 p. Montbrial Th. La guerre et la diversite du monde Paris: Le Monde et edition de l'Aube, 2004. 198 p. .. . : , 2003. 590c. Cohen H. Orice se poate negocia. Bucureti: Colosseum. 1995. 290 p. Carta Naiunilor Unite. http://www.onuinfo.ro/documente_fundamentale/carta_natiunilor_unite/ (vizitat 12.04.2013). Cohen S. Les diplomates. Ngocier dans une monde chaotique. Paris: Autrement, 2002. 182 p. Georgecu T. Negocierea afacerilor: Ghid practic. Galai: Porto-Franco, 1992. 244 p.

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COMPARTIMENTUL II.

ASPECTE METODICO-DIDACTICE ALE STUDIILOR DE PACE I CONFLICTELOR INTERNAIONALE

CURSUL UNIVERSITAR CONFLICTE INTERNAIONALE

TEOSA Valentina

I. PRELIMINARII Cursul universitar Conflicte internaionale este elaborat n corespundere cu programul aprobat de Senatul USM (cuprinde 21 ore de curs, 21 ore de seminar i 18 ore de lucru individual). Prezentul curs este structurat cu scopul ca studenii s nsueasc aparatul categorical, fundamentele teoretice i aspectele aplicative al acestei discipline. Actualitatea cursului este determinat de necesitatea crescnd a conlucrrii pe plan global, regional i naional ntre diferii subieci ai relaiilor internaionale, pentru gsirea obiectivelor comune i metodelor de aplanare a conflictelor. Optarea pentru colaborare i aplicarea mijloacelor nonviolente de soluionare a conflictelor, presupune studierea teoriei conflictelor i a metodelor de reglementare a lor. n cadrul disciplinii, studenii au posibilitatea de a studia subiecte precum: aspecte teoretico-metodologice a conflictelor internaionale; tiplogizarea conflictelor; strategiile internaionale de soluionare a conflictelor; metodele de soluionare a conflictelor, etc.. Cunoaterea metodelor i tehnicilor de soluionare a conflictelor este o necesitate pentru viitorii specialiti n domeniul relaiilor internaionale. Lucrul individual este orientat spre dezvoltarea abilitilor analitice i aplicative a viitorilor funcionari diplomatici i experi n relaii internaionale. Cursul va completa cunotinele acumulate la orele de teorie a relaiilor internaionale, tiine politice, geopolitic i globalistic. The International Conflicts Course has been developed fully in line with a program approved by the Moldovan State University Senate (including: 21 theoretical classes, 21 practical classes, 18 individual classes). The program of the course is structured in order to introduce students to theoretical, practical and applied background of the international conflicts. The course relevance is determined by the increasing need for multi-level cooperation (global, regional and national) between different international relations actors with the aim to find common goals and methods of conflict resolution. The option for nonviolent means and cooperation in conflict resolution implies an in-depth study of the conflict theory, international strategies and conflict regulation methods. The core issued addressed by the course are as follows: theoretical and methodological background of the international conflicts; the conflicts typology; the international strategies of conflict resolution; traditional methods and new instruments of the international conflict resolution arsenal. The understanding of international approaches and techniques of the conflict resolution is absolutely necessary for training future experts in international relations. Individual work is directed toward developing analytical and practical skills of future diplomatic officials and specialists in international relations. The course will complement the knowledge gained from the previous courses, such as theory of international relations, political science, geopolitics, global politics etc.

92

 , ( 21 , 21 , 18 ). , . , , . , , . , , ; ; ; . , . -. , , , . .

II. OBIECTIVELE GENERALE / STANDARD ALE MODULULUI / DISCIPLINEI La nivel de cunoatere i nelegere: S determine actualitatea i locul disciplinei Conflicte internaionale n Teoria relaiilor internaionale S disting noiunile de baz, scopul i obiectivele a disciplinei S cunoasc izvoarele teoretice ale tiinei despre conflict internaional S determine cauze i etape ale conflictelor internaionale S fie iniiai n bazele internaionale a reglementrii conflictelor La nivel de aplicare: S nsueasc metode de reglementare a conflictelor de diferite niveluri S utilizeze diferite forme de soluionare a conflictelor internaionale S clasifice tipurile de conflicte internaionale S argumenteze utilizarea mijloacelor panice de reglementare a conflictelor la diferite etape Sa implementeze studiul de caz al conflictului contemporan La nivel de integrare: S aprecieze importana teoriei conflictelor n relaiile internaionale S propun iniiative de efecientizare a metodelor de reglementare S propun soluii optime de rezolvare a situaiilor conflictuale S evalueze eficiena mijloacelor de soluionare a conflictelor S realizeaz studiul comparat privind rolul organizaiilor internaionale n prevenire i soluionare conflictelor contemporane

93

III.ADMINISTRAREA MODULULUI / DISCIPLINEI Codul modulului/ disciplinei n planul de nvmnt S.06.O134 III VI 21 21 18 Anul Semestrul Numrul de de studii C ore S L Nr. De credite 2 Forma de evaluare examen Teosa V. Evaluarea Responsabil de modul / disciplin

IV. Finaliti ale studiului: Competene generale 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Capacitatea de a aplica cunotinele teoretice la analiza conflictelor actuale. Consideraii privind starea conflictual mondial la nceput de mileniu. Contietizarea problemelor i strategiilor reglamentrii conflictelor internaionale. Aptitudini privind metodologia i metodele de analiza a conflictelor. Evaluarea rolului negocierii i medierii n rezolvarea conflictului. Pronosticarea extinderii conflictului contemporan.

Competene specifice 1. Interpretarea elaborrilor conceptuale ale conflictelor internaionale. 2. Argumentarea genezei noilor tipuri de conflicte internaionale. 3. Identificarea dimensiunilor i dinamismului dezvoltrii conflictelor internaionale. 4. Generalizarea activitii practice a actorilor i cauzele conflictelor internaionale 5. Evaluarea formatului i metodelor de management al conflictului internaional. V. TEMATICA I REPARTIZAREA ORIENTATIV A ORELOR Tematica i repartizarea orientativ a orelor la curs / prelegeri Nr 1 Tema
Ore curs 2 2 2 2 Ore seminar 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Ore Lucru ind.

Introducere. Conflictele internaionale n lumea contemporan 2 Conflictele internaionale - abordri istoriografice, teoretice i metodologice 3 Trasturi caracteristice ale conflictele contemporane 4 Tipologizarea conflictelor internaionale contemporane 5 Rolul pacificator al organizaiilor internaionale n soluionarea conflictelor contemporane 6 Strategii internaionale de soluionre a conflictelor: definiii i coninuturi 7 Caracterul complex al strategiilor internaionale 8 Corelaie dintre politic extern (mare strategie) i politic intern 9 Sistemul internaional de reglementare a conflictelor: aspecte politico-juridice 10 Metodele diplomatice de soluionare a conflictelor Total 94

2 2 2 2 3 21

2 2 2 2 3 21

2 2 2 2 2 18

VI. OBIECTIVE DE REFERIN I CONINUTURI

Obiectivele de referin

Coninutul prelegerilor/seminarelor

Tema 1. Introducere. Conflictele * S defineasc obiectul de studiu al disciplinei internaionale n lumea contemporan * S determine obiectivele cursului Necesitatea i importana studierii * S selecteze tendinele i factorii care influeneaz conflictelor internaionale asupra apariiei conflictelor internaionale Tendinele dezvoltrii lumii contemporane, * S estimeze locul i importana difiritor forme care influeneaz asupra apariiei de lucru in cadrul structurii cursului conflictelor. Factorii care influeneaz asupra apariiei conflictelor: aspecte politologice * Structura cursului: - 21 curs + 21 seminar + 18 l/ind. = 60 ore - volumul/tematica lucrului individual - cerine privind lucrul individual Tema 2. Conflictele internaionale * S disting elaborrile conceptuale ale conflictelor abordri istoriografice, teoretice internaionale. i metodologice. * S stabileasc geneza conflictelor internaionale Elaborri conceptuale ale conflictelor * S evalueze istoriografia cercetrii internaionale: problemele originii i conflictelor n tiina autohton evidenierii conflictelor internaionale. Conceptele teoretice privind reglementarea conflictelor internaionale. Cercetrile conflictelor n tiina autohton Tema 3. Trasturi caracteristice ale conflictelor contemporane * S relateze despre specificul conflictelor * Dimensiunile i funciile conflictelor contemporane, s disting stadiile desfurrii lor contemporane. * S generalizeze configuraiile noi ale conflictelor * Configuraii noi ale conflictelor internaionale internaionale * Dinamizmul dezvoltrii conflictului * S argumenteze rolul tehnologiilor noi n stadiile i fazele dezvoltrii conflictelor, desfurarea conflictelor contemporane. * S determine stadiul conflictului armat i stadiul rolul conflictului armat * Rolul tehnologiilor noi i factorul tehnologiilor noi n dinamica conflictului. militar n conflictele contemporane Tema 4. Tipologizarea conflictelor internaionale contemporane Paradigme tiinifice n identificarea * S relateze despre criterii i abordari n identificarea i clasificarea conflictelor internaionale. conflictelor internaionale Cauzele extinderii conflictelor contemporane * S determine tipologizarea conflictelor n baza n baza unei clasificri cauzelor de extindere a lor. Locul i specificul conflictelor identice n * S argumenteze conflictele identice n coraport tipologizri contemporane. cu alte tipuri de conflicte contemporane. Tema 5. Rolul pacificator al * S disting rolul organizaiilor internaionale organizaiilor internaionale n n situaie de conflict * S determine scopul, obiectivele i funcii ale ONU, soluionarea conflictelor contemporane ONU - centru internaional de prevenire, OSCE, NATO n meninerea pcii i reglementare i soluionare a conflictelor soluionarea conflictelor de interstatale; meninere a pcii globale i * S estimeze potenialul, avantaje i dizavantaje ale 95

organizaiilor internaionale n reglementarea conflictelor contemporane

* S interpreteze noiunea de strategie i rolul ei n lumea contemporan. * S generalizeze caracterul complex al strategiilor * S evalueze funciile i resursele strategiilor naionale i internaionale.

* S disting structur strategiilor internaionale * S demonstreze factorii de influene asupra strategiilor internaionale * S argumenteze criterii de clasificare a strategiilor internaionale * S estimeze rolul strategiilor internaionale n coraport cu aciunile altor actorilor n soluionarea conflictelor internaionale * Distingei particularitile strategiei mari (politicii Tema 8. Corelaie dintre politic extern (mare strategie) i politic intern externe) i politicii interne Corelaia strategiei mari (politicii externe) * Stabilii factori interni i externi care influeneaz i politica intern asupra procesul de soluionare a conflictelor Resursele interne a relaiilor internaionale * Estimai potenialul de reglementare a conflictelor n baza factorilor interni i externi (n baza studiului i a politicii externe, determinare de multitudinea i diversificarea factorilor de caz) interni Influena factorilor interni i externi asupra procesul de reglementare a conflictelor Tema 9. Sistemul internaional * Descriei actorii importani n procesul de formare de reglementare a conflictelor: a sistemului internaional de drept * Stabilii etape n evoluia cadrului juridic aspecte politico-juridice Organizaiile care formeaz baza internaional de reglementare a conflictelor internaional politico juridic de * Estimai situaiile cu privire factorii de influen asupra aplicrii strategiilor internaionale n reglementare a conflictelor procesul de soluionare a unor conflicte n baza Evoluia cadrului juridic internaional de reglementare a conflictelor etape i studiului de caz realizat. documente de reper Factorii de influen asupra elaborrii strategiilor internaionale 96

promovarea dezvoltrii durabile ONU scopul, obiectivele i funciile pacifictoare la etapa contemporan ONU - direciile de activitate n contextul de conflict: evoluia instrumentariu de influena OSCE, NATO rolul i funciile n meninerea pcii Tema 6. Strategii internaionale de soluionre a conflictelor: definiii i coninuturi Strategii internaionale o form de activitate internaional ce reflect i stabilete o coresponden (legtur) dintre scopuri i mijloace. Rolul strategiei n lumea contemporan. Caracterul complex al strategiilor internaionale. Corelaia dintre politic extern (marea strategie naional), politic intern i strategiile internaionale Tema 7. Caracterul complex al strategiilor internaionale Aspecte practice i valorice ale caracterului complex al strategiilor internaionale Dependen strategiilor internaionale de scopuri, situaie, formatului internaional de participare i de contextul internaional. Clasificarea strategiilor internaionale

*S descrie formele tradiionale de reglementare a conflictelor internaionale i se demonstreze aplicarea lor n aciunile contemporane * S generalizeze impactul msurilor moderne cu implicare multilateral asupra procesului reglementare a conflictelor internaionale n baza studiului comparat * S argumenteze efeciena aplicrii metodelor diplomatice n soluionarea conflictului din Republica Moldova

Tema 10. Metodele diplomatice de soluionare a conflictelor Procedurile tradiionale: formele de reglementare a conflictelor internaionale i aplicarea lor n conflictele contemporane Msurile moderne cu implicare multilateral Aplicarea metodelor diplomatice n soluionarea conflictului din Republica Moldova Tema 11. TEST final

VII. LUCRUL INDIVIDUAL A) Tematica lucrului individual Izvoarele teoretice ale conflictologiei Baza conceptual i paradigmele tiinifice a teoriei conflictului Conflictul ca fenomen social Cauzele apariiei conflictelor Conflicte regionale i globale Tipologia conflictelor internaionale Dinamica i etapele conflictelor internaionale Metodele i strategiile internaionale de soluionare a conflictelor contemporane

B) Forme de organizare a lucrului individual Referat teoretico-analitic (1) - pn la 10 pag. inclusiv anexe sau prezentarea PP Expertiza probleme de conflict i comunicatul pe tem (1) - pn la 5 pag. inclusiv anexe sau prezentarea PP Studiul de caz a unui conflict actual (1) - 5-7 pag. inclusiv anexe sau PPP Studiul comparat al conflictelor regionale (1) pentru lucrul n grup de 3-4 persoane, prezentare vizual n formatul PPP este opional, se evaluiaz suplementar la rezultatele atinse - pn la 10 min.

Note: Alegerea tematicii pentru cercetri individuale se efectuiaz din lista bibliografiei i readingului propus pentru lucrul individual. VIII. TEMATICA ORIENTATIV A TEZELOR DE LICEN: 1. Modaliti de reglementare a conflictelor internaionale: studiul comparat 2. Impactul conflictelor asupra relaiilor internaionale: studiul comparat 3. Procedurile politico-diplomatice i importana lor n reglementarea conflictelor: studiul comparat 4. Rolul organizaiilor internaionale i regionale n soluionarea conflictelor: studiul de caz 5. Conflicte internaionale n contextul studiilor de securitatea n lumea contemporan: studiul de caz. 6. Intervenia i securitatea statal: studiul comparat: studiul de caz. 7. Eficiena negocierilor n procesul reglementrii conflictelor: studiul de caz. 97

8. Semnificaia strategiilor internaionale n reglementarea conflictului din Moldova. 9. Factorul forei n mecanismul de soluionare a conflictelor internaionale: studiul comparat. 10. Strategii internaionale n reglementare conflictelor ngheate: studiul comparat sau de caz. 11. Influiena globalizrii/europenizrii asupra procesului de soluionare a conflictelor: studiul comparat sau de caz. Note: Tem ales trebuie s fie concretizat dup efectuarea studiului bibliografic i consultaii cu conductorul tiinific IX. EVALUAREA DISCIPLINEI n contextul evalurii curriculare vor fi aplicate toate tipurile de evaluare: iniial, formativ, curent i sumativ/final. Evaluarea nivelului de cunotine acumulate de studeni n cadrul cursului i a gradului de accesibilitate i actualitate a coninutului cursului se va face n dou etape: evaluarea curent (la sfritul fiecrei lecii/ seminar) i evaluarea final (la sfritul semestrului). Evaluarea curent: Evaluarea curent se va efectua la sfritul fiecrui seminar, n mod obligatoriu, n baza participrii active la lecie a studenilor n timpul seminarului n lucrul efectuat n grupuri. Evaluarea final: Evaluarea final se face n baza punctajului obinut de studeni pe parcurs n baza urmtoarelor criterii: 1. Evaluarea semestrial - 60% inclusiv Activitatea la seminare 20% Lucrri de control (note) 20% Lucrul individual - 20% 2. Examen n forma scris - 40%

Subiectele pentru examen: 1. Teoria conflictelor internaionale- obiect de studiu 2. Noiunea de conflict internaional i caracteristicile lui. 3. Izvoarele teoretice ale conflictelor 4. Tipologia conflictelor internaionale 5. Clasificarea tipurilor de conflicte internaionale 6. Structura conflictului.Graniile conflictului internaional. 7. Funciile conflictelor. 8. Nivelurile analizei conflictului. 9. Actorii conflictelor internaionale. 10. Cauzele apariiei conflictelor internaionale. 11. Dinamica conflictelor internaionale. 12. Etapele conflictelor internaionale. 13. Etapele latente i de formare a conflictului 14. Etapele de manifestare ale conflictului internaional 15. Reglementarea conflictelor internaionale. 16. Elaborri conceptuale ale conflictelor internaionale. 17. Geneza i evidenierea conflictelor internaionale. 18. Formele de reglementare a conflictelor. 19. Paradigmele tiinifice ale conflictelor internaionale. 98

20. Configuraiile noi ale conflictelor internaionale. 21. Specificul conflictelor contemporane 22. Conflictele identice n relaiile internaionale 23. Stadiile i fazele dezvoltrii conflictelor internaionale. 24. Conflictul i dimensiunile lui. 25. Caracteristica calitativ a actorilor conflictelor internaionale. 26. Conflictele ca problem de securitate. 27. Corelaia metodelor violente i panice a soluionrii conflictelor 28. Contextul internaional contemporan X. REFERINE BIBLIOGRAFICE 1. Conflict Barometer 2011. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. 2012 2. Salem E.-A. Strategii contemporane internaionale de soluionare a conflictelor regionale (Cazul conflictului palestino-israelian)/Creterea impactului cercetrii i dezvoltarea capacitii de inovare.Conf.tiinfic, dedicat aniv.65 de la fondarea USM, 21-22 sept.2011.Rezumatele comunicrilor. tiine sociale. Vol.I, Chiinu: CEP USM, 2011. p.394-397. 3. . .-. . - . . : 2007. 155. 4. . .-. : ( - ). . 2011, 135c.
5. POLITICI I STRATEGII N GESTIONAREA CONFLICTUALITII. SESIUNEA ANUAL DE COMUNICRI TIINIFICE CU PARTICIPARE INTERNAIONAL A CENTRULUI DE STUDII STRATEGICE DE APRARE I SECURITATE - 20-21 NOIEMBRIE 2008, BUCURETI - UNIVERSITATEA NAIONAL DE APRARE CAROL I. VOL. 1 -3. EDITURA UNIVERSITII NAIONALE DE APRARE CAROL I BUCURETI, 2008.

6. Joshua S. Goldtein, Jon C. Pevehouse. Relaii internaionale. Iai Polirom,2008 7. Eugen Struiu. Teme introductive n relaiile internaionale. Sibiu, 2007. 8. Stoica-Constantin, A.Niculau. Psihologia rezolvrii conflictului. Iai 1998. 9. Dufour Jean-Louis, Crizele internaionale. De la Beijing (1990) la Kosovo (1999). 10. . .. . . 2003. 11. Crciun C., Tehnici de comunicare i negocieri. Chiinu.1998 12. Stoica C.,Psihologia rezolvrii conflictului. Bucureti.1998 13. Iovanovici M. ,Conflictele asimetrice i conceptul de putere // Personal. Bucureti. 2001 14. . 2004. 15. Gobacenco P.,Rolul organizaiilor regionale n meninerea pcii i securitii // Moldoscopie. Partea 9. Chiinu. 1999 16. Merton R.,Social theory and social structure. New York. 1998 17. , M ,M ,Taaa Ko, , a To, Ma a : . : , . M.: 2005, 312c18. .. . .1996. 19. .. . . 1997. 20. .. . --.1998. 21. .. .. .. . . : , 1993. 22. A. Miroiu, Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu. Manual de relaii internaionale, Iai, Polirom,2006. 23. L.A Ghica, M.Zulean. Politica de securitate naional. Concepte,instituii,procese., Iai, Polirom,2007 24. Grigoroiu M.-V..Crizele i conflictele contemporane. Bucureti,2006. 99

XI. Anexa. Prezentare a unor teme n format Power Point

Conflictele internaionale n lumea contemporan Structura cursului: - 21 curs + 21 seminar + 18 l/ind. = 60 ore - volumul/tematica lucrului individual - cerine privind lucrul individual Tendinele dezvoltrii lumii contemporane, care influeneaz asupra apariiei conflictelor. Factorii care influeneaz asupra apariiei conflictelor: aspecte politologice.
2

Tendinele dezvoltrii lumii contemporane, care influeneaz asupra apariiei conflictelor Creterea conflictualitii (potenialul de conflict) dup finisarea rzboiului rece teoria despre ciocnirea civilizaiilor lui Huntington - 1989 36 conflicte armate n 32 de ri - 1995 30 c/a n 25 puncte ale lumii - 1999 27 c/a n 25 puncte ale lumii

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Influena proceselor globale

Globalizarea procesul care reflect cre terea interdependenei statelor, economiilor, culturilor i aduce la prezentarea mai ingust a spaiului internaional n contiina uman - apariia ameninrilor noi: - Migraii globale a populaiei de la periferii ale lumii n statele occidentale dezvoltate cu scopurile economice apariia fenomenului de globalizarea opus [G. Benhabib] cnd migranii lupt pentru drepturile specifice culturii/tradiiilor lor; - Tendina de cretere a terorismului internaional;
4

Europenizarea ca factor de influena asupra conflictelor

Europenizarea proces, strategie i scop ndreptat spre aderarea statelor la UE prin intermediul: - apropierea de valorile spirituale i culturale ale UE - implicarea n activitatea economic -reglementarea panic a conflictelor existente
5

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Impactul interesului naional asupra apariiei conflictelor internaionale

Restructurarea sistemului mondial politic de la modelul Westphalic spre lumea unipolar a adus la multiple cauze de apariie a conflictelor: Erodarea suveranitii statului-naiune; Interesele naionale securitatea naional, controlul asupra folosirii resurselor naturale; identit atea cultural i naional etc.; Contradicii dintre interesele naionale i limitele resurselor, precum i interesele altor state; Metamorfoza interesului naional a statelor mari pn la interesele globale; Necesitatea ordinii mondiale de tip nou bazat pe prioritatea intereselor internaionale, general-umane, comune pentru ntreaga omenire Eseu; Tendina spre autonomie, descentralizare i separatism;
7

102

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104

105

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UTILIZAREA PAGINII WEB N CADRUL CURSULUI UNIVERSITAR CONFLICTE INTERNAIONALE

SLOBODENIUC Ghenadie n procesul formrii profesionale studenii la specialitatea Relaii Internaionale trebuie s nsueasc aparatul categorial din limbajul profesional i competene metodologice de analiz a conflictelor internaionale. Cursul universitar Conflictele internaionale este adresat studenilor anului 3 de studii, ciclu I (Bologna). Realizarea scopului i obiectivelor cursului universitar necesit aplicarea instrumentelor tehnologice de instruire - printer care este pagina web www.peacebuilding.md, creat n cadrul Reelei Naionale pentru Cercettori i Practicieni de Studii de Pace din Republica Moldova. Tinerii pot folosi materialele electronice pentru pregtire la diverse teme specifice (compartimentul Publicatii )i pentru informare despre oportunitile de studii i instruire peste hotare in domeniu studiilor de pace si solutionare a conflictelor (compartimentele, Proiecte si Programe, Links). Totodat, s fie familiarizai despre activitile naionale i internaionale organizate n cadrul Reelei Naionale (compartimentul Evenimente). Beneficii pentru studeni: Pagina web www.peacebuilding.md este o platform deschis pentru a prezenta i promova cele mai performante proiecte de cercetare, eseuri sau prezentari elaborate de ctre tineri n cadrul cursului universitar sau voluntarilor care activeaz n acest domeniu practic. Structura paginii WEB. La baza elaborrii structurii paginii web www.peacebuilding.md st ideea accesibilitii logice i utilitii informaiei din content. Elementele principale ale paginii web snt: Consiliul Coordonator i Misiunea Reelei Naionale; Proiectele i programele accesibile n domeniul Studiilor de Pace, Medierii, Transformrii i Rezolvrii Conflictelor; Publicaiile (Curricule universitare, Suport de curs, Rapoarte elaborate de ctre ONG, materiale elaborate de ctre tineri studeni, masteranzi, doctoranzi n acest domeniu); Membrii Reelei Naionale (Organizaii i individual) Forum de comunicare Linkuri utile despre activitaile din ntreaga lume.

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CURSUL UNIVERSITAR PREVENIREA CONFLICTELOR I GESTIONAREA CRIZELOR EANU Constantin

I.

PRELIMINARII

Cursul prevede studierea schimbrilor de mare amploare i diversitate din lumea contemporan, profundele modificri de natur politic, diplomatic, social, financiar, economic, religioas, informaional, ecologic, etc. Aceste modificri structurale au determinat intensiti i situaii deosebite de crize, conflicte de nivel organizaional, zonal, regional, internaional sau strategic. Cursul include variate forme i procedee de manifestare a crizelor, originile crizelor i conflictelor, negocierea i medierea n rezolvarea conflictelor. Cursul este ntocmit n baza programului aprobat de Senatul USM i cuprinde prelegeri, seminare, mese rotunde . a.

The course addresses the complexity of changes in the contemporary world occurred in political, diplomatic, social, financial, economic, religious, informational, environmental and other fields. These structural changes have been led to distinct crises issues and to conflicts at organisational, zonal, regional, international or strategic levels. The course enhances a variety of forms and procedures of crises conduct, the origins of crises and conflict as well as the mediation and negotiation processes of conflict resolution. The course has been developed in compliance with the program aproved by the SUM Senate and includs lectures, seminars and round tables. The course addresses such issues as international crises in modern society, the UN role in crises management, the role of international and regional organizations in crises management, economic conflicts, ethnic conflicts, religious and ideologic crises etc. , , , , , , . , , . , , . , , . , , , , , , ...

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II ADMINISTRAREA DISCIPLINEI Codul Denumirea Responsabil disciplinei disciplinei de din disciplin planul de studii S. 02 O Prevenirea Eanu C. 09 conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor Evaluarea Semestrul Total ore inclusiv C 15 S 30 L LI 105

II

150

Total

examen

Uniti de coninut i repartizarea orientativ a orelor N r. Uniti de coninut d/ o 1. Introducere n obiectul de studiu. Prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor 2. Crizele internaionale n societatea contemporan 3. Rolul ONU n gestionarea crizelor internaionale 4. Rolul organismelor interne i internaionale n gestionarea crizelor internaionale 5. Caracteristicile i nivelurile procesului de gestionare a crizelor n unele ri-membre ale NATO 6. Rolul UE n prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor ineternaionale 7. Conflictele economice cu diverse implicaii i prevenirea lor 8. Prevenirea conflictelor entice i gestionarea crizelor etnice 9. Prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor internaionale metode distinctive 10. Rolul organismelor interne i internaionale i modalitile de aciune pentru gestionarea crizelor contemporane 11. Prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor religioase i ideologice 12. Prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor economice i internaionale 13. Tipologia i etapele gestionrii crizelor internaionale 14. Forme i procedee de manifestare a crizelor 15. Eforturi de prevenire a conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor n regiunea Mrii Negre 16. Rolul instituiilor internaionale n gestionarea crizelor i prevenirea conflictelor conflictelor n zona Mrii Negre 112 Ore Curs 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 6 Lucrul Seminar individua l 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

2 2 2 2 2 4

10

Nr. de credite 5 5 5 5 5 5

17. Rolul negocierii i medierii n rezolvarea conflictelor 18. Tipuri de conflicte. Prevenirea conflictelor legate de graniele teritoriale 19. Principii generale care se aplic n gestionarea situaiilor de criz contemporan 20. Forme de aciuni pentru combaterea crizelor internaionale Total

2 2 2 2 15 30

5 5 5 5 105

III COMPETENE Competene generale 1. Conturarea aplicativ a cunotinelor teoretice acumulate i vocaiei formate la obiectul Prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor internaionale; 2. Capacitatea de comparare, sintetizare i de analiz a activitii diferitor actori pe arena mondial; 3. Cultivarea aptitudinilor de munc n echip; 4. Capacitatea de folosire a instrumentelor diferitor disciplini pentru soluionarea sarcinilor; 5. Argumentarea propriei poziii n adoptarea unei decizii profesionale ce ine de domeniul conflictelor internaionale; 6. Cultivarea sentimentului demnitii n stabilirea relaiilor interpersonale ce ine de domeniul relaiilor internaionale; 7. Cunoaterea principalelor tendine globale i evidena influenei lor asupra dezvoltrii i funcionrii institutelor internaionale, statale i regionale; 8. Manifestarea toleranei n comunicare cu persoanele din alte domenii de activitate; 9. Capacitatea de a prognoza, n special la analiza scenariului. Competene Specifice 1. Cunoaterea bazelor fundamentale ale studiului referitor la conflictele i crizele internaionale; 2. Elaborarea proiectelor de activitate profesional n domeniul gestionrii conflictelor i crizelor interetnice; 3. Modelarea diferitor scenarii de prevenire a conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor internaionale; 4. Cercetarea principiilor generale care se aplic n gestionarea situaiilor de criz contemporan; 5. Dezvoltarea spiritului critic n acumularea i analiza formelor de aciuni pentru combaterea crizelor internaionale; 6. Interpretarea teoriilor cooperrii regionale n gestionarea crizelor; 7. Abordarea rolului Uniunii Europene n gestionarea crizelor i conflictelor etnice; 8. Caracteristicile i nivelurile procesului de gestionare a crizelor n unele ri membre ale NATO; 9. Analiza tacticilor i procedeelor de intervenie n situaii de criz.

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IV OBIECTIVELE GENERALE (STANDARDE ALE DISCIPLINEI). Scopul const n evidenierea rolului comunitii umane, a instituiilor internaionale, organismelor i organizaiilor, statelor i guvernelor n coordonarea i unirea eforturilor cu scopul gsirii, n funcie de situaia concret, a modalitilor mprejurrilor, cilor, prevederilor i metodelor, precum i a mijloacelor i resurselor, cele mai eficiente pentru gestionarea crizelor contemporane. La nivel de cunoatere S determine obiectul de studiu al disciplinei S cunoasc aparatul categorial al disciplinei S defineasc metodele tradiionale i procedeele instituionale ale conflictelor S explice structura i motivaiile conflictelor concrete S caracterizeze izvoarele principale ale crizelor contemporane S se disting formele de prevenire a conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor internaionale La nivel de aplicare S se delimiteze tipurile conflictelor inetrnaionale S compare concepiile savanilor despre conflicte i crize S explice activitatea aciunilor umanitare asupra situaiei de criz S explice problemele prevenirii conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor internaionale La nivel de integrare S formuleze noiunile generale de criz-conflict S estimeze formele i procedeele de manifestare a crizelor S agumenteze rolul organismelor interne i internaionale n prevenirea conflictelor S selecteze unele riscuri externe i interne care pot genera crize contemporane S evalueze managementul conflictelor S aprecieze situaiile de criz n cadrul organizaiilor internaionale. V. OBIECTIVELE DE REFERIN I CONINUTURI. 1. Prelegeri: Obiective de referin Continuturi S defineasc termenul criz. Tema 1. Introducere. Obiectul de studiu Prevenirea S compare criza din interiorul conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor internaionale. statelor Preliminarii. Termenii de referin al cursului. Teoria i s formuleze principalele fenomenologia crizei. Definiiile date crizelor. Crize n caracteristici ale situaiilor interiorul statelor. Crize pe plan zonal, regional, zonale, regionale i internaionale. internaionale generatoare de crize S defineasc termenul criz Tema 2. Crize internaionale n societatea S se clasifice tipurile de criz contemporan S estimeze gestionarea crizelor Originile crizei. Stadiul crizelor. R. Aron despre crize. internaionale Crizele de la sfr. Rzboiul Rece. Tipologia crizelor. Etapele crizelor. Gestionarea crizelor internaionale. Organizarea aciunilor pentru soluiionarea crizei.

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S disting abordrile teoretice referitoare la prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor internaionale S generalizeze strategiile de prevenire a conflictelor i gestionare a crizelor internaionale S aprecieze metodele ONU, misiunile ei n gestionarea crizelor s descrie rolul organisemelor interne i internaionale n prevenrea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor s descrie rolul NATO n prevenirae conflictelor S formuleze managemenul crizelor

Tema 3. Prevenirea conflitelor i gestionarea crizelor internaionale-abordri distinctive Managementul conflictelor i crizelor internaionale. Instrumentele de analiz a conflictelor i crizelor. Strategia de transformare a conflictelor, strategiile dezvoltate din perspective studiilor privind pacea. Practica gestionrii crizelor. Sistemul tradiional de gestionare a crizelor i conflictelor. Rolul ONU n prevenirea conflictelor i gerstionarea crizelor internaionale. Misiunile ONU de meninere a pcii.

Tema 4. Rolul organismelor interne i internaionale n gestionarea crizelor internaionale Activitile organismelor interne i internaionale n prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor internaionale. Experiena NATO n prevenirea conflictelor i gestioarea crizelor. Formele de prevenire; misiunile, consultaiile, alarmarea, inspecile i monitorizarea. OSCE i organisemele ei principale de lucru, summituirle efilor de state. Aplicarea normelor de drept umanitar n perioada crizelor S disting aliaii NATO i rolul Tema 5. Caracteristicile i nivelurile procesului de lor privind securitatea i gestionare a a crizelor n unele ri membre ale NATO aprarea rilor Rolul UEO n gestionarea crizelor. Participarea noilor S generalizeze activitatea mecanisme i structuri ale UEO n prevenifrrea organizaiilor internaionale conflictelor. Vocaia NATO privind managementul ONU, OSCE, NATO n crizelor. Prioritile i obiectivele procesului NATO n prevenirea conflictelor gestionarea crizelor. Managementul crizelor n Frana, S dezvolte managementul Germania, Olanda, Grecia, Belgia, R. Ceh, Ungaria crizelor n unele ri membre ale NATO- Frana, Germania, Olanda, Belgia, Grecia, Ungaria S relateze despre noua Tema 6. Rolul UE n prevenirea conflictelor i arhitectur de securitate gestionarea crizelor internaionale european Securitatea european n condiiile noii arhitecturi S demonstreze rolul europene. Rolul UE n prevenirea conflcitelor i Comunitii Europene n gestionarea crizelor n condiiile colapsului URSS i gestionarea crizei din Balcani destrmrii Iugoslaviei. Prevenirea conflictelor entice. S formuleze poziiile statelor Conflictul din Bosnia. Negocierile de pace. Criza din membre ale UE fa de Kosovo. Consultrile NATO i UE cu privire la Federaia iugoslav gestionarea crizelor internaionale. Aciunile UE n cadrul Politicii Europene de Securitate i Aprare S disting formele conflictului Tema 7. Prevenirea conflictelor economice i economic gestionarea crizelor internaionale S stabileasc influena Competiia economic-form rspndit de conflict n conflictelor economice asupra relaiile internaionale. Specificul conflictului economic la securitii etapa actual. Implicaiile conflictelor economice asupra S aprecieze conflictele legate securitii internaionale. Conflictele comerciale. Tipurile de traficul de droguri de conflicte economice. Conflictele legate de droguri. Originile conflictelor legate de droguri

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b) Tematica i repartizarea orientativ a orelor de seminar (laborator) Obiectivele de referin Coninutul seminarelor S descrie rolul NATO n Tema 1 Rolul organismelor interne i internaionale i prevenirea conflictelor modalitile de aciune pentru gestionarea crizelor S formuleze managementul contemporane crizelor Activitile organismelor interne i internaionale n S generalizeze activitatea prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor NATO, ONU, OSCE n internaionale. Experiena NATO n prevenirea conflictelor prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor. Managementul crizelor n Frana, S demonstreze rolul Germania, Olanda, Grecia, Belgia, R. Ceh, Ungaria. Rolul Comunitii Europene n UE n prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor gestioinarea crizei n Balcani internaionale. Prevenirea conflictelor etnice n Balcani. Aciunile UE n cadrul Politicii Europene de Securitate i Aprare S disting conflictele Tema 2Prevenirea conflictelor i gestionatrea crizelor religioase i rolul organismelor religioase i ideologice locale i internaionale n Micrile fundamentaliste. Viziunile fundamentalitilor prevenirea lor evrei, fundamentalitii cretini. Divergenele n activitatea S generalizeze crizele ntre lor. Islamul, religia practicat ca un stereotip n discursul religii i gestionarerea lor politic european i nord-american. Conflictele dintre S aprecieze deosebirile dintre musulmani i nemusulmani. Guvernul islamic din conflictele religioase i cele Afganistan (1992). Rzboiul din Algeria din anii 1990. ideologice Diferenele ideologice dintre state. Sprijinul rebelilor UNITA dectre Angola, SUA care lupta contra guvernului aliat sovieticilor. Comunismul, fascismul ca ideologii-rolul lor n tensidicarea conflictelor S relateze despre formele Tema 3. Conflictele economice cu diferite implicaii, conflictului economic i prevenirea i soluionarea lor soluionarea lui Competiia ca form de conflict n relaiile internaionale. S stabileasc metodele de Schimbrile economice care implic ca form de conflict prevenire i gestionare a lor de interese. Tranzaciile economice. Tipurile de conflicte S selecteze tipurile de conflite economice i soluionarea lor. Influena conflictelor economice i cile de economice asupra securitii. Comerul ilegal. Eforturile gestionare a lor. guvernelelor pentru prevenirea lor. Conflictele cu droguri, soluionarea lor cu ajutor financiar S disting tipologia Tema 4. Tipologia , etapele i gestionarea crizelor conflictelor i crizelor internaionale S stabileasc etapele Conflicte fr crize, Conflictele de interese. Conflictele conflictelor i crizelor spontane. Confruntarea dintre politici. Crizele n funcie de S estimeze etapele domeniu; politice, sociale, economice, culturale, preconfrontal i precriz informaionale, financiare, etnice, religioase, ideologice. Crize n funcie de zon, crizele i conflictele pot fi naionale, frontaliere, regionale, globale. n funcie de intensitate; de joas intensitate, medie i mare intensitate. n funcie de calitatea i caracteristicile entitii angajate; inter-etnice, reliogioase, intra-civilizaionale, interinstituionale, inter-categorii sociale profesionale Etapele; anormalitate, pre-criz, criz, conflict (rzboi). Conflictele trec prin urmtoarele etape; preconflict, conflict, post- conflict.

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S descrie formele de manifestare a crizelor S demonstereze cauzele crizelor bancare i prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor S aprecieze prevenirea crizelor financiare i gestionarea ei S interpreteze actuala stare de instabilitate din regiunea extins a Mrii Negre S stabilieasc profilul conflictului, caracteristica contextului n care e plasat intervenia S selecteze cauzele i factorii principali care contribuie la conflict i pace S relateze despre natura conflictului din Transnistria S se generalizeze rolul major al instituiilor internaionale de securitate n gestionarea crizelor i prevenirea conflictelor n zona Mrii Negre S aprecieze eforturile de soluinare a conflictelor

S disting aspectele privind negocierea n gestionarea crizelor S argumenteze evaluarea negocierii S demonstreze prioritile negocierii S estimeze medierea ca metod de rezolvare a situaiilor conflictuale S disting tipurile de conflicte S generalizeze mijloacele de a controla teritoriile S estimeze rolul controlului asupra guvernelor

Tema 5 Forme iprocedee de amnifestare a crizelor Procedee specifice de amnifestare i desfurare a crizelor. Crize economice sau sociale cu diverse implicaii. Criz bancar-element de baz al crizei economice. Cauzele falimentelor bancare pe plan mondial. Msurile luate n prevenirea crizei bancare. Criminalitatea financiar, crima organizat i crizele financiare. Etapele i metodele de planificare pe timpul posibilitilor crizelor contemporane. Tema 6 Eforturi de prevenire a conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor crizelor n regiunea mrii Negre Profilul conflictului. Geografia fizic. Analiza structurii politice i economice, proceselor de reform, construirea de infrastructuri noi, zone care se afl sub influiena unor actori specifici, evenimente critice eforturi de mediere, intervenii externe. Cuzele i factorii principali care contribuie la conflict i la pace; cauze structurale ale conflictului; guvernarea neligitim lipsa participrii la viaa politic, absena oportunitilor economice i sociale egale. Cauze proxime ale conflictului; lipsa de control a sectorului de securitate, nclcarea drepturilor omului, etc. Tema 7. Rolul instituiilor internaionale n gestionarea crizelor i prevenirea conflictelor n zona Mri Negre Declaraia comun a minitrilor de externe referitoare la modalitile de soluionare a conflictelor ngheate n Gerogia, R. Moldova i Azerbaidjan. Criteriile aplicate n evaluarea acestor conflicte. Rolul ONU, procedurile de prevenire i de asiten a statelor implicate n conflicte (prevenirea crizelor, operaii de meninere a pcii i operaii de meninere a NATO. Includerea Georgiei, Armeniei, Azerbaidjanului i Republicii Moldova n Politica European de Vecintate). Abordarea UE. Misiunea OSCE n Republica Moldova. GUAM. Diversele agenii internaionale non-guvernamentale Tema 8 Roul negocierii i al medierii n rezolvarea conflictlor Negocierea mijloc eficient de comunicare. Negocierea ca form nonviolent. Actorii negocierilor. Prioritile negocierilor. Negocierea conflictelor n organizaii. Medierea ca metod de rezolvare a situaiilor conflictuale

Tema 9.Tipurile de conflicte. Prevenirea conflictelor legatede granie teritoriale Disputele teritoriale. Diferendele referitoare la stabilirea granielor dintre 2 state. Mijloacele de a controla terotorii. Secesiunea. Micrile de secesiune. Destrmarea statelor multinaionale. Graniele interstatale. Prevenirea conflictelor legate de graniele interstatale. Prevenirea conflictelor legate de disputele persistente. Controlul asupra guvernelor 117

S descrie principile de prevenire i gestionare a crizelor S aplice pricipiile managementului situaiilor de urgen S argumenteze rolul structurilor destinate la desfurarea aciunilor pentru prevenirea i gestionarea crizelor contemporane S relateze despre formele de aciuni pentru combaterea crizelor contemporane S compare modalitile de prevenire i soluionare a crizelor n timp de pace i rzboi S formuleze categoriile de factori care genereaz fenomene de criz

Tema 10. Principii generale care se aplic n gestionarea situaiilor de criz contemporan Principiile de prevenirea i gestionare a crizelor. Principiile generale de drept, dreptului uman, necesitii, umanitar, proporionalitii. Principiile comune a dreptului umanitar; inviolabilitii, nediscriminrii, securitii. Principiile proprii dreptuui umanitar de la Geneva. Activitile structurale destinate desfurrii aciunii pentru prevenirea i gestionarea crizelor contemporane Tema 11Forme de aciuni pentru combaterea crizelor contemporane Principalele aciuni cu caracter general pentru prevenirea i gestionarea crizelor interne. Forme de aciuni care presupun sau nu folosirea forei. Modaliti de prevenire i soluionare a crizelor pe timp de pace i rzboi. Prevederea i prevenire crizelor. Supravegherea crizelor. Alerta timpurie. Tactici i procedee de intervenie n situaii de criz

VI. LUCRUL INDIVIDUAL AL STUDENILOR. A. Produsul preconizat i strategiile de realizare a acestuia Nr. Produsul preconizat Strategii de realizare Criterii de evaluare Profunzimea studiului Diversitatea surselor Metode/tehnici utilizate Caracter analitic Relevana concluziilor Volumul Analiza critic a rezultatelor prezentate Profunzimea studiului Diversitatea surselor Analiza critic a rezultatelor prezentate Volumul Identificarea posibilitilor de aplicare a rezultatelor Metode/tehnici adecvate Formularea corect a aparatului categorial Analiza/prelucrarea datelor Originalitatea formei de prezentare Corectitudinea

Termen de realizare

1.

Prezentarea studiilor individuale/ prezentrilor PPT

Studiu bibliografic; Studiu teoretico-analitic; Realizarea cercetrii; Prezentarea comunicrii;

Conform graficului stabilit

2.

Referate

Lecturarea; Analiza, reflecii critice; Elaborarea i prezentarea informaiei analitice; Elaborarea concluziilor.

Conform graficului stabilit

3.

Prezentarea rapoartelor efectuate n grup

Studiu bibliografic ; Realizarea investigaiei; Analiza, reflecii critice; Distribuirea responsabilitilor i generalizarea rezultatelor; Acordarea consultaiilor n procesul de realizare al 118

Conform graficului stabilit

rapoartelor; Prezentarea rezultatelor cercetrii analitice sub form de informaia analitic, tabele i scheme. Studiu bibliografic; Proiectarea etapelor; Realizarea cercetrii aprofundat a unor problematici concrete din cadrul cooperrii regionale; Dezbaterea acestor problematici; Analiza, reflecii critice

utilizrii termenilor Relevana concluziilor

Dezbateri n cadrul meselor rotunde

Profunzimea studiului Diversitatea surselor Analiza critic a rezultatelor prezentate Participarea la dezbateri Originalitatea formei de prezentare Corectitudinea utilizrii termenilor Relevana concluziilor

Conform graficului stabilit

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

B. TEMATICA LUCRULUI INDIVIDUAL Conflictele internaionale i tipurile lor Prevenirea conflictelor metode tradiionale i procedee instituionale Cauzele conflictelor concepte teoretice Divergenile baza conflictelor internaionale Modaliti decizionale n condiiile crizei Prevenirea crizelor i conflictelor i gestionarea lor n cadrul noii architecturi de securitate european Aciunile umanitare asupra situaiei de conflict Stadiile i fazele dezvoltrii conflictelor; extinderea i escaladarea lui Dimensiunile conflictelor internaionale Sistemul tradiional de gestionare a crizelor i a conflictelor Rolul organismelor interne i internaionale n prevenirea conflictelor Abordri teoretico-metodologice ale crizelor i conflictelor Riscuri interne i externe care pot genera crize Gestionarea situaiilor de criz n cadrul NATO Personalul ntrebuinat n rezolvarea crizei contemporane Gestionarea crizelor i a conflictelor internaionale Identificarea, prognoza i analiza situaiilor conflictuale Concepte contemporane de securitate i natura ameninrilor posibile Rolul ONU n gestionarea conflictelor Reglementarea diferengenelor internaionale Gestionarea reactiv a conflictelor. UE n Balcanii de Vest Opeaiunile ONU n prevenirea conflictelor i meninerea pcii Direcii recente n gestionarea crizelor i conflictelor Practica gestionrii conflictelor UE i gestionarea conflictelor etnice de la prabuirea comunismului la conflictul din Kosovo. Testarea noilor capabiliti de gestionare civil a crizei UE i funciile ei ca actor internaional n aplanarea viitoarelor conflicte etnopolitice Dezvoltarea sistemului de gestionare a crizelor Fazele crizei internaionale Medierea ca medtod de rezolvare a situaiilor conflictuale Tipologia crizelor internaionale Gestionarea unei crize i democraia (cazul francez i altele) 119

33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

Stiluri i metode de management ale conflictelor Aciunile umanitare n prevenirea conflictelor Conflictele interetnice la intersecia secolelor Conflictele n politica mondial Modelul pcii de la Westphalia i particularitile conflictelor la intersecia sec. XX-XXI

C. TEMATICA TEZELOR DE MASTER 1. NATO principala organizaie politico-militar cu vocaie universal n managementul crizelor i conflictelor. 2. Relaiile de cooperare a organizaiilor universale pentru securitatea internaional. 3. Atribuiile specifice a organizaiilor internaionale n managementul crizelor i conflictelor. 4. Activitatea organizaiilor regionale cu rol n gestionarea crizelor i protecia minoritilor. 5. Abordarea regional a soluionrii crizelor i conflictelor internaionale. 6. Politici i strategii n gestionarea conflictualitii. 7. Organizaiile internaionale de securitate i rolul lor n organizarea operaiilor multinaionale. 8. Consideraii privind starea conflictual mondial la nceput de mileniu. 9. Minoritile etnice i dezvoltarea conflictelor. 10. Rolul i locul aciunilor militare n conflictele contemporane. 11. Conflictul i rzboiul n mediul internaional contemporan. 12. Riscuri i ameninri la adresa securitii n regiunea extins a Mrii Negre n perioada post Rzboi Rece. 13. Managementul crizelor i conflictelor regionale. 14. Probleme demografice internaionale: estimri i pronosticri ale ONU. 15. Managementul crizelor i conflictelor internaionale. 16. Conflictul i rzboiul n mediul contemporan. VII. EVALUAREA DISCIPLINEI Evaluarea curricular se aplic prin dou forme: intermediar i final. 1. Evaluarea sumativ intermediar se efectueaz sub form de lucrri de control pe un grup de cinci-ase teme cu subiecte care cuprind cele trei nivele: de cunoatere, de aplicare i de integrare. 2. Evaluarea sumativ final se efectueaz n conformitate cu planul de nvmnt sub form de examen. Testele de examinare conin subiecte la disciplin, care corespund celor trei nivele: de cunoatere, de aplicare i de integrare. Aprecierea cunotinelor se efectueaz conform baremelor unice stabilite la facultate. Ponderea n notare, La stabilirea notei finale se iau n considerare exprimat n % (Total=100%) 20% - testarea continu pe parcursul semestrului, rezultatele cel puin 60% activitii la seminare / lucrri practice de laborator - testarea periodic prin lucrri de control - activitile individuale teme / referate / eseuri / traduceri / proiecte, studiu de caz, etc. - activiti practice - alte activiti (precizai) 30% 10% 0% 0%

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Rezultatele de la examenul final

cel mult 40%

40%

MODELE DE TESTE Subiectul I: Prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor la nceput de mileniu 1. Explicai particularitile conflictelor i crizelor internaionale (3p.). 2. Evideniai noiunea i tipurile conflictelor (5p.). 3. Elucidai metodele i procedeele de prevenire a conflictelor (7p.). Subiectul II: Identificarea i prognozarea situaiilor conflictuale internaionale 1. Descriei criza ca form deosebit a conflictului (3p.). 2. Demonstrai formele divergenelor baz a conflictelor (5p.). 3. Reevaluai clasificarea conflictelor internaionale (7p.). SUBIECTELE PENTRU EXAMEN: 1. Obiectul de studiu. Actualitatea i necesitatea studierii problemelor de prevenire a conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor internaionale 2. Teoria i fenomenologia crizei 3. Tipologia i structura crizei 4. Gestionarea i prevenirea crizelor internaionale 5. Abordri tiinifice cu privire la prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor internaionale 6. Conceptul prevenirii conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor internaionale 7. Rolul organismelor interne i internaionale n prevenirea conflictelor 8. Asplicarrea normelor de drept umanitar i a drepturilor omului pe timpul crizelor 9. Gestionarea situaiilor de criz n cadrul NATO 10. Rolul UEO n gestionarea crizelor 11. Managementul crizelor n unele ri membre ale NATO 12. Prevenirea conflictelor i getionarea crizeor n cadrul noii arhitecturi de securitate european 13. Dezvoltarea sistemului de gestionare a crizelor 14. Rolul UE n prevenirea viitoarelor conflicte etnopolitice 15. Particularitile conflictelor la intersecia sec. XX-XXI. Noiunea i tipurile conflictelor 16. Prevenirea conflictelor; metode tradiionale i proceduri instituionale 17. Prevenirea conflictelor legate de graniele teritoriale 18. Disputele persistente n relaiile interstatale 19. Controlul asupra guvernelor ca form a conflictelor internainale 20. Forme ale conflictului economic n relaiile internaionale 21. Conflictele internaionale reieite din comerul illegal de droguri 22. Prevenirea conflictelor entice 23. Cauzele ostilitii entice. Etnocentrismul 24. Prevenirea conflictelor religioase i gestionarea crizelor religioase 25. Prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor ideologice 26. Principii generale care se aplic n gestionarea situailor de criz contemporan 27. Forme de aciuni pentru compbaterea crizelor contemporane 28. Rol instituiilor internaionale n gestionarea crizelor i prevenirea conflictelor n zona Mrii Negre 29. Eforturi de prevenire a conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor n regiunea Mrii Negre 30. Rolul negocierii i al medierii n rezolvarea conflictelor 121

VIII. Referine bibligrafice: Bibliografia obigatorie 1. Bhnreanu C. Rolul organismelor internaionale n managementul crizelor n regiunea Mrii Negre. Bucureti, 2008 2. Grigoroiu M.V. Crizele i conflictele contemporane. Bucureti, 2008 3. Joshua S., Goldstein E., Jon C. Pevehouse. Relaii Internaionale, Polirom, Iai, 2008 4. Vduv Gh., tefan M. D. Crizele poltico-militare la nceput de mileniu. Bucureti, 2005 5. Dufour. J.-L. Crizele ineternaionale. (De la Beijing (1990) la Kosovo (1999). Bucureti, 2002. Bibliografia opional 2. Ghica L. A., Zulian M. Politica de securitate naional; concepii, instituii, procese. Polirom, Iai, 2007 3. Kolodziej E. A. Securitatea i relaiile internaionale. Iai, 2007 4. Miroiu A., Ungureanu R. S.. Manual de relaii internaionale. Polirom, Iai, 2006 5. Durossele J.-B., Rapsi A. Istoria relaiilor internaionale (1948-pn n zilele noastre). Vol. II., Bucureti, 2006 6. Buzan B. Poparele, statele i teama. O agend pentru studii de securitate internaional n epoca de dup rzboiul rece. Cartier, Chiinu, 2000 7. Gilpin R. Rzboi i schimbare n politica mondial. Craiova. 2000 8. Goodin E., Klingemann Hans-Dieter Manual de tiin politic. Polirom, Iai, 2005 9. Hirst P. Rzboi i putere n sec. XXI, antete Bucureti, 2003 10. Nye Joseph S. Jr. Dscifrarea conflictelor internaionale; teorie i istorie. Antet. Bucureti, 2005 11. , . ., . . : , 2007, 320 c. 12. . . : , 2003, 169 . 13. .. . . . : , 2008, 590 . 14. .. . , 2004. 15. , -: , 2004. 16. .., . . . , , , , : -, -, 2008, 320 . 17. , , 2005. 18. . : , () , 2008, 336 , 19. , , 2008. 20. . . / . . . ., 2001. . 532.

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CURSUL UNIVERSITAR SECURITATEA INTERNAIONAL: CONCEPTUL I STRATEGII ILACIUC Dinu, EJOVA Cristina

I. PRELIMINARII Problema securitii - una dintre problemele centrale n teoria i practica relaiilor internaionale, de aceea, ea continu s reprezinte una din preocuprile de baz a reprezentanilor mediului academic i a funcionarilor de stat. Problema dat, ntr-un fel sau altul, are afinitate cu oriice subiect de pe agenda politicii internaionale. n condiiile derulrii procesului de globalizare care a cuprins toate domeniile de existen ale omenirii, problema asigurrii securitii internaionale a statului, ocup un loc central pe agenda de lucru a instituiilor specializate statale, dar i a organismelor internaionale. n prezentul curs, sunt reflectate problemele ce in de securitatea internaional a statului, pe fonul realitilor ce s-au profilat, n ultimele decenii, pe arena internaional. Cursul, este proiectat ntr-o manier de a aborda conceptul de ,,securitate din mai multe puncte de vedere, innd cont de manifestrile, formele i metodele de realizare ale acesteia la etapa contemporan. O atenie deosebit se atrage asupra noilor forme de ameninri i riscuri la adresa securitii internaionale. Totodat, cursul tinde i spre latura aplicativ, ncercnd s scoat n eviden problematica securitii naionale ale Republicii Moldova. Studierea cursului ,,Securitatea internaional: conceptul i strategii, are ca scop, familiarizarea studenilor cu: conceptele de securitate internaional, factorii care influeneaz securitatea internaional, criteriile de analiz a problemei. Cursul universitar ,,Securitatea internaional n contextul relaiile internaionale, este elaborat n conformitate cu programul aprobat de ctre Senatul USM i cuprinde ore de prelegeri i seminare. The security challenge is a crucial problem in both theory and practice of International Relations, will always remain an area of interest of the international scholars and politicians. More or less any issue regarding global politics is linked to it. In the conditions of ongoing globalization process which touched all the existence activities of humanity, problem of assuring state international security, take a central place on the agenda of the state specialized institutions, and the international organizations as well. This course addresses the issues of international security of a country, on the background of the realities that have taken place during the last decades on the international arena. The course is structured in manner to make an analysis of the security concept from multiple points of view, taking into account the manifestations, forms and methods of its realization nowadays. A special attention is paid to the new forms of threats and risks of the international security. At the same time, the course tends to focus on the applicative side as well, trying to emphasize the problematics of security of the Republic of Moldova. The International Security: Concepts and Strategies Course aims at teaching students the terms: international security concepts, factors that affect international security, its analysis criteria. The International Security: Concepts and Strategies Course has been developed according with the academic program approved by the Moldovan State University Senate, and it includes lectures and seminars. The course syllabus includes the following themes: the problem of international security in international relation; types of threats to the national security; models of assuring national security; national security and national interests; new concepts related to the safeguarding international security; the role of the state in ensuring international security; priority directions in safeguarding the international security; national security in a context of globalization; 123

problems of international security; religion and international security; internal military conflicts and international military involvement; weapons of mass destruction and control on their proliferation; European security system; national security concepts of Russia and the US; security challenges in the Middle East; security issues in Asia and the Pacific; national security strategy of the Republic of Moldova. , . , , . , , , . , , . , , , . . . : , , . : . . : ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; , ; ; - ; .

II. ADMINISTRAREA DISCIPLINEI Codul disciplinei Denumirea disciplinei Responsabil de disciplin D. Ilaciuc C. Ejova Semestrul V Evaluare a Nr. de credite ex 3 Ore total: inclusiv Total 90 C 15 S 30 L LI 45

S 05.O1.40 Securitatea internaional: conceptul i strategii

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Uniti de coninut i repartizarea orientativ a orelor N r. d/ o Ore Uniti de coninut Curs zi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Problema securitii internaionale n relaiile internaionale. Tipurile de ameninare la adresa securitii internaionale. Modele de asigurare a securitii internaionale. Securitatea naional i interesele naionale. Noile concepte cu privire la asigurarea securitii internaionale. Rolul statului n asigurarea securitii internaionale. Direciile prioritare n asigurarea securitii internaionale. Securitatea naional n condiiile globalizrii. Introducere n securitatea internaional. Parametrii securitii internaionale. Probleme ale securitii internaionale la etapa actual. Securitatea naional n contextul securitii globale. Religia i securitatea internaional. Conflictele militare interne i amestecul militar internaional. Armele de nimicire n mas i controlul asupra rspndirii lor. Testare intermediar. Concepiile securitii naionale ale SUA i Rusiei. Asigurarea securitii europene. Problemele securitii n Orientul Apropiat i Mijlociu. Problemele securitii n Asia i Oceanul Pacific. Strategia securitii naionale ale Republicii Moldova. Testare final Total 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 f/ r* 15 Seminar zi f/r* Lucrul individual zi f/r* 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 45

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 30

III. COMPETENE generale capacitatea de a nva capacitatea de analiz i sintez posedarea abilitilor de comunicare scris i oral n limba matern cunoaterea i aplicarea a cel puin o limb strin n studiu i cercetare domeniu aplicarea tehnologiilor informaionale n activitatea profesional; argumentarea propriei poziii n luarea unei decizii profesionale ce ine de domeniul relaiilor internaionale manifestarea toleranei n comunicare cu persoanele din alte domenii de activitate demonstrarea competenelor de selectare i prelucrare a informaiei domeniului relaiilor internaionale 125

specifice cunoaterea fundamentelor teoretice n domeniul securitii internaionale evaluarea riscurilor, ameninrilor i incertitudinilor n domeniul securitii internaionale evaluarea situaiei Republicii Moldova n contextul problemelor securitii internaionale capacitatea de a nsui noi domenii prin studiu individual identificarea problemelor specifice/actuale ale domeniului securitii internaionale pronosticarea posibilelor evoluii ale riscurilor, ameninrilor i incertitudinilor n domeniul securitii internaionale capacitatea de a cerceta n complexitate aspectele securitii naionale a statului la etapa actual; capacitatea de analiz a instrumentelor i metodelor de operare a statelor n vederea asigurrii securitii naionale; dezvoltarea abilitilor de aplicare a metodelor de cercetare tiinific n domeniul securitii naionale;

IV. OBIECTIVE GENERALE La nivel de cunoatere S descrie obiectul de studiu al disciplinei; S defineasc conceptul de ,,securitate internaional; S reproduc noiunile i categoriile disciplinei; S contientizeze importana problemei securitii internaionale i impactul acesteia asupra securitii regionale i internaionale; S determine obiectivele i coninutul problemei securitii internaionale;

La nivel de aplicare S stbileasc particularitile aplicrii conceptului de ,,securitate naional n practica relaiilor internaionale; S clasifice principiile securitii internaionale; S demonstreze esena conceptului de ,,securitate internaional; S compare modelele de securitate internaional; S explice geneza conceptului de ,,securitate internaional;

La nivel de integrare S argumenteze locul i rolul securitii internaionale n politicile interne i externe ale statului; S propun sugestii i soluii pentru realizarea obiectivelor privind realizarea securitii europene; S estimeze aspectele pozitive i negative ale practicii securitii internaionale; S aprecieze rolul securitii internaional n relaiile internaionale la etapa contemporan; S propun modele ale securitii internaionale innd cont de realitile existente la etapa contemporan.

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V. OBIECTIVE DE REFERIN I UNITI DE CONINUT a) Tematica i repartizarea orientativ a orelor la curs / prelegeri Tema 1: Problema securitii internaional n relaiile internaionale. S determine obiectul de studiu i structura - Obiectul de studiu, structura cursului, cursului; sursele bibliografice pe problemele securitii internaionale. Locul S stabileasc locul cursului printre alte cursului printre alte disciplini din discipline din domeniul relaiilor domeniul relaiilor internaionale, internaionale, importana teoretic i importana teoretic i practic a practic a studiului; studiului. s defineasc conceptul de ,,securitate internaional; - Conceptul de ,,securitate internaional i evoluia acestuia n s stabileasc evoluia conceptului n sec. sec. XX; XX; - Obiectivele principale de referin ale s clasifice abordrile teoreticosecuritii internaionale; metodologice a conceptului de ,,securitate internaional; - Abordarea teoretico-metodologic a s evalueze obiectivele principale de conceptului de ,,securitate referin ale securitii internaionale. internaional. Tema 2: Tipurile de ameninri la adresa securitii internaionale. - Ameninrile de ordin politic; s defineasc noiunea de ameninare la - Ameninrile de ordin economic; adresa securitii internaionale; - Ameninrile de ordin militar; s stabileasc tipologia ameninrilor la adresa securitii internaionale; - Ameninrile de ordin social; - Ameninrile de ordin ecologic; s contientizeze gradul de risc al fiecrui - Ameninri specifice. tip de ameninare. Tema 3: Modele de asigurare a securitii internaionale Sistemele de asigurare a securitii naionale pe arena internaional; a) bipolar; b) multipolar; c) unipolar; d) ,,concertul statelor mari i puternice; e) Modelul global; - Securitatea colectiv; - Securitatea general; - Securitatea cooperativ. Tema 4: Securitatea internaional i interesul naional. - Conceptul de ,,interes naional; s defineasc conceptul de ,,interes naional; - Interesele fundamentale ale statului prin prisma conceptului de ,,securitate s stabileasc interesele fundamentale ale internaional: statului prin prisma conceptului de a) suveranitatea statului; ,,securitate internaional; b) integritatea teritorial; s contientizeze particularitile c) stabilitatea social-politic a transformrii necesitilor interne n statului; interese naionale. d) regimul constituional; s defineasc noiunea de sistem al securitii; s identifice sistemele de asigurare a securitii naionale pe arena internaional; s proiecteze modelul optimal de asigurare a securitii naionale a Republicii Moldova pe arena internaional. 127

e) stabilitatea strategic n relaiile internaionale; f) accesul liber la zone de importan strategic; - Particularitile transformrii necesitilor interne n interese naionale. Tema 5: Noile concepte cu privire la asigurarea securitii internaionale - Concepia securitii colective; s defineasc conceptele de securitate - Concepia securitii umane; colectiv i securitatea uman; - Teoria ,,pcii democratice; s contientizeze teoria ,,pcii - Crearea sistemelor autonome de democratice; securitate regionale i sub-regionale. s evalueze crearea sistemelor autonome de securitate regionale i sub-regionale. Tema 6: Rolul statului n asigurarea securitii internaionale. s descrie rolul statului n gestionarea - Statul ca obiect al securitii internaionale; - Complexitatea relaiilor naiune stat problemelor de securitate internaional; i stat naiune; s stabileasc relaiile dintre naiune stat; - Tangibilitatea instituiilor statale; s clasifice factorii de influen asupra - Factorii de influen asupra securitii securitii statale; statale; s generalizeze factorii de influen asupra - Statul ca factor de ameninare a securitii statale; securitii internaionale. s s formuleze rolul statul ca factor de ameninare a securitii internaionale. Tema 7: Direciile prioritare de asigurare a securitii internaionale - Securitatea nuclear i energetic; s stabileasc direciile prioritare n asigurarea securitii internaionale; - Securitatea ecologic; - Dezvoltarea resurselor umane i s cunoasc direciile prioritare n tiinifice; asigurarea securitii nucleare, energetice i - Ocrotirea sntii; securitii ecologice; - Lichidarea barierelor n calea s contientizeze importana definirii comerului i investiiilor; principalelor domenii de securitate Lupta contra crimei organizate. internaional; s relateze asupra principalelor direcii de activitate n asigurarea securitii internaionale. Tema 8: Securitatea internaional n condiiile globalizrii. - Schimbarea mediului de securitate n s defineasc noiunea de ,,mediu de condiiile provocrilor globale; securitate; - Factorii globali ce influeneaz s stabileasc factorii globali ce securitatea internaional; influeneaz securitatea internaional; - Strategii globale de asigurare a s identifice strategiile globale de asigurare securitii internaionale. a securitii internaionale; s proiecteze modele de asigurarea securitii internaional n condiiile globalizrii. 128

b) Tematica i repartizarea orientativ a orelor la seminar Obiectivele de referin Coninuturi Tema 1: Introducerea n securitatea internaional. - Noiunea de securitate s defineasc noiunea de securitate internaional; internaional; Rzboiul, morala i dreptul s stabileasc relaia dintre rzboi, moral internaional; i dreptul internaional; Izvoarele i literatura pentru studierea s cunoasc principalele izvoare i problemelor securitii internaionale. literatura pentru studierea problemelor securitii internaionale; s apricieze cele mai importante coli din domeniul securitii internaionale. Tema 2: Parametrii securitii internaionale - Schimbarea mediului securitii s defineasc noiunea de mediu de internaionale ; securitate internaional; - Noile provocri la adresa securitii s stabileasc noile provocri la adresa internaionale; securitii internaionale; - Rolul statelor mari i puternice n s evalueze rolul statelor mari i puternice asigurarea securitii internaionale; n asigurarea securitii internaionale. Tema 3: Probleme ale securitii internaionale la etapa actual - Conceptul ,,Securitatea internaional s defineasc conceptul de ,,securitate i evoluia acestuia n sec. XX; internaional; - Obiectivele principale de referin ale s stabileasc evoluia conceptului n sec. securitii internaionale; XX; - Abordarea teoretico-metodologic a s clasifice abordrile teoreticoconceptului de ,,securitate metodologice a conceptului de ,,securitate internaional. internaional; s evalueze obiectivele principale de referin ale securitii internaionale. Tema 4: Securitatea naional n contextul securitii globale - Factorii ce asigur securitatea s stabileasc factorii ce asigur naional pe arena internaional; securitatea naional pe arena - Sursele de ameninare a securitii internaional; naionale: S identifice sursele de ameninare a a) de ordin intern; securitii naionale; b) de ordin extern. s proiecteze modelul optimal de asigurare a securitii naionale a Republicii Moldova pe arena internaional. Tema 5: Religia i securitatea internaional - Concepia cretin asupra politicii i s defineasc concepia cretin asupra rzboiului; politicii i rzboiului; Concepia ,,rzboiului sfnt asupra s determine esena concepiei ,,rzboiului ,,necredincioilor; sfnt asupra ,,necredincioilor; - Religia ca mijloc i metod de s relateze asupra religiei ca mijloc i asigurare a securitii internaionale. metod de asigurare a securitii internaionale. 129

Tema 6: Conflictele militare interne i amestecul militar internaional - Conflictele militare interne; s defineasc noiunea de conflicte - Statele ONU i amestecul militar militare interne; internaional; s stabileasc relaia dintre statele- Intervenia umanitar; membre ONU i amestecul militar - Operaiunile antiteroriste. internaional; s evalueze practica interveniilor umanitare i operaiunilor antiteroriste. Tema 7: Armele de distrugere n mas i controlul asupra rspndirii lor - Controlul asupra armamentului s stabileasc pericolul armelor nucleare strategic din SUA i Federaia Rus; i a mijloacele de transportare a lor; - Armele nucleare i mijloacele de s contientizeze importana controlului transportare a lor; asupra armamentului strategic din SUA i - Perspectivele stabilitii nucleare pe Federaia Rus; scar mondial. s estimeze perspectivele stabilitii nucleare pe scar mondial. Tema 8: Concepiile securitii naionale ale SUA i Rusiei - Sistemul de asigurare a securitii s descrie esena sistemului de asigurare a internaionale din SUA la etapa securitii internaionale din SUA la etapa contemporan; contemporan; Sistemul de asigurare a securitii s determine sistemul de asigurare a internaionale din Federaia Rus la securitii internaionale din Federaia etapa contemporan; Rus la etapa contemporan; - Tendinele majore n reformarea s formuleze tendinele majore n sistemelor de securitate internaional reformarea sistemelor de securitate ale SUA i Federaiei Ruse. internaional ale SUA i Federaiei Ruse. Tema 9: Asigurarea securitii europene - Uniunea European i sistemul s stabileasc principiile de funcionare a securitii europene; sistemului european de securitate; Procesul de reformare i lrgire a s identifice elementele principale ale Tratatului Nord-Atlantic; sistemului european de securitate. - Locul Republicii Moldova n procesele s defineasc obiectivele de baz ale securitii europene. Politicii Externe i de Securitate Comun ale UE; s descrie procesul de reformare i lrgire a Tratatului Nord-Atlantic; s estimeze locul Republicii Moldova n procesele securitii europene. Tema 10: Problemele securitii n Orientul Apropiat i Mijlociu - Etapele dezvoltrii proceselor s stabileasc etapele dezvoltrii securitii regionale n Orientul proceselor securitii regionale n Orientul Apropiat i Mijlociu ; Apropiat i Mijlociu; - Influena asupra securitii din S argumenteze problema Palestinei; regiunea dat a Irakului, Israelului, S identifice influenele asupra securitii Iranului i Siriei; din regiunea dat a Irakului, Israelului, - Problema Palestinei. Iranului i Siriei. 130

Tema 11: Problemele securitii n Asia i Oceanul Pacific - Problemele securitii din Asia de s stabileasc elementele centrale ale Nord si de Est; sistemului de securitate n Asia i Oceanul Probl emele securitii Situaia din Asia Pacific; de Sud i de Est; s contientizeze rolul i importana Problemele securitii Situaia din Asia regiunii n sistemul de securitate global; de Sud i Oceanul Pacific. s formuleze principalele probleme la adresa securitii n Asia i Oceanul Pacific. Tema 12: Strategia securitii naionale ale Republicii Moldova - Definirea intereselor naionale ale s identifice interesele naionale ale Republicii Moldova prin prisma Republicii Moldova prin prisma conceptului de ,,securitate conceptului de ,,securitate internaional; internaional; Obiectivele securitii naionale ale s stabileasc obiectivele securitii Republicii Moldova; naionale ale Republicii Moldova; - Evaluarea mediului de securitate al s generalizeze factorii de risc intern i Republicii Moldova; extern care afecteaz securitatea - Factorii de risc intern i extern care internaional a Republicii Moldova; afecteaz securitatea internaional a s evalueze mediului de securitate al Republicii Moldova; Republicii Moldova; - Direciile i mijloacele principale de asigurare a securitii internaionale ale s formuleze direciile i mijloacele republicii Moldova. principale de asigurare a securitii internaionale ale Republicii Moldova.

VI. LUCRUL INDIVIDUAL Nr. Produsul preconizat Strategii de realizare Criterii de evaluare Termen de realizare

1.

Pregtirea diferitor tabele i prezentarea schematic Prezentarea studiilor individuale/ al specificului securitii naionale a statului la prezentrilor PPT etapa actual Elaborarea analiticoinformaional al comunicrilor privind diferite probleme de cooperare n domeniul securitii naionale a statului la etapa actual Efectuarea rapoartelor i studiilor de caz pe tematicile propuse n baza lucrului n grup; 131

2.

Referate

3.

Prezentarea rapoartelor efectuate n grup

Aprecierea nivelului de cunoatere al aspectelor teoretice privind esena septembrie securitii naionale a statului la etapa actual Aprecierea referatului n baza criteriilor: - cunotine teoretice - abiliti analitice octombrie - organizarea logic a comunicrii - aspectul tehnic de realizare al sarcinii Evaluarea rapoartelor se va efectua n baza: noiembrie -organizrii coerente i logice al prezentrii;

Distribuirea responsabilitilor i generalizarea rezultatelor; Acordarea consultaiilor n procesul de realizare al rapoartelor.

-capacitilor analiticoaplicative; -nivelul de cunoatere al subiectului. modalitatea de prezentare al lucrului n grup(folosirea tablei. PPT etc.); Aprecierea studenilor din punct de vedere al capacitilor de analiz, critic, evaluare, comparare i a aplicrii decembrie practice al cunotinelor; Capacitatea de a-i formula i exprima opinia vizavi de problematica discutat.

Dezbateri n cadrul meselor rotunde

Cercetarea aprofundat a unor problematici concrete din cadrul securitii naionale a statului la etapa actual; dezbaterea acestor problematici n cadrul meselor rotunde n baza prezentrii generale a subiectelor i discuiilor argumentative prin intermediul comentarii.

TEMATICA ORIENTATIV A LUCRULUI INDIVIDUAL Referate 1. Procesul de reformare i lrgire a Tratatului Nord-Atlantic 2. Uniunea European i sistemul securitii europene 3. Peninsula Balcanic i sistemul securitii europene 4. Locul Republicii Moldova n procesele securitii europene 5. Controlul asupra armamentului strategic din SUA i Federaia Rus 6. Armele nucleare i mijloacele de transportare a lor. 7. Perspectivele stabilitii nucleare pe scar mondial 8. Concepiile cu privire la securitatea internaional ale SUA i ale Federaiei Ruse: abordare comparativ. 9. Securitatea internaional a Republicii Moldova: factori de risc, ameninri i soluii. 10. Implicaiile procesului de globalizare asupra securitii internaionale a statului. 11. Interesul naional prin prisma conceptului de ,,securitate internaional. 12. Implicaiile factorului militar asupra asigurrii securitii internaionale. 13. Dimensiunea economic a securitii internaionale. Cercetare i comunicare individual 1. Cercetarea aprofundat a unor problematici concrete din cadrul securitii naionale a statului la etapa actual; 132

2. Dezbaterea acestor problematici n cadrul meselor rotunde n baza prezentrii generale a subiectelor i discuiilor 3. Securitatea informaional a statului n epoca globalizrii. 4. Conceptul de ,,securitate internaional prin prisma colii ,,realismului politic. 5. Securitatea internaional prin prisma asigurrii statului cu resurse naturale. 6. Factorul energetic n asigurarea securitii internaionale a statului. 7. ,,Revoluiile democratice (oranj, a rozelor, etc) i securitatea internaional a statelor post-comuniste.

Lucrul n grup 1. Pregtirea diferitor tabele i prezentarea schematic al specificului securitii naionale a statului la etapa actual Prezentare vizual /PPT 2. Elaborarea unei tabele comparative privind clasificarea i tipurile de ameninare la adresa securitii naionale. 3. Prezentarea analitico informaional a etapelor i mecanismelor de instituire a sistemului de securitate internaional. 4. Elaborarea i argumentarea modalitilor der soluionare a problemelor de conflict n RI. 5. Elaborarea schemelor privind strategii, tactici i tehnici utilizate n cadrul asigurrii securitii naionale.

VII. EVALUAREA DISCIPLINEI Evaluarea curricular se aplic prin dou forme: intermediar i final. 1. Evaluarea sumativ intermediar se efectueaz sub form de lucrri de control pe un grup de cinci-ase teme cu subiecte care cuprind cele trei nivele: de cunoatere, de aplicare i de integrare. 2. Evaluarea sumativ final se efectueaz n conformitate cu planul de nvmnt sub form de examen. Testele de examinare conin subiecte la disciplin, care corespund celor trei nivele: de cunoatere, de aplicare i de integrare. Aprecierea cunotinelor se efectueaz conform baremelor unice stabilite la facultate.

133

La stabilirea notei finale se iau n considerare - testarea continu pe parcursul semestrului, rezultatele activitii la seminare / lucrri practice de laborator - testarea periodic prin lucrri de control - activitile individuale teme / referate / eseuri / traduceri / proiecte, studiu de caz, etc. - activiti practice - alte activiti (precizai) cel mult 40% 20% cel puin 60% 30% 10% 0% 0%

Ponderea n notare, exprimat n % (Total=100%)

Rezultatele de la examenul final

40%

Model de test: Subiectul I. Ideeia de securitate n RI 1. Identificai teoriile liberalismului politic asupra conceptului de securitate (3 puncte) 2. Determinai obiectivele principale ale neorealismului i feminismului asupra conceptului de securitate (5 puncte) 3. Apreciai rolul acestor teorii i impactul lor asupra securitii europene (7 puncte) Subiectul II. Securitatea naional n contextul securitii internaionale 1. Definii conceptul de interes naional prin prisma securitii naionale (3 puncte) 2. Identificai interesele fundamentale ale statului privind asigurarea securitii naionale (5 puncte) 3. Explicai relaia ntre securitatea naional i securitatea internaional (7 puncte)

SUBIECTE PENTRU EXAMEN 1. Problema securitii internaionale n relaiile internaionale 2. Tipurile de ameninare la adresa securitii internaionale. 3. Rolul statului n asigurarea securitii internaionale 4. Securitatea naional i interesele naionale 5. Noile concepte cu privire la asigurarea securitii internaionale. 6. Modele de asigurare a securitii internaionale. 7. Direciile prioritare n asigurarea securitii internaionale 8. Securitatea naional n condiiile globalizrii 9. Introducerea n securitatea internaional 10. Parametrii securitii internaionale 11. Probleme ale securitii internaionale la etapa actual 12. Securitatea naional n contextul securitii globale 134

13. Religia i securitatea internaional 14. Conflictele militare interne i amestecul militar internaional 15. Armele de nimicire n mas i controlul asupra rspndirii lor 16. Testare intermidiar 17. Concepiile securitii naionale ale SUA i Rusiei 18. Asigurarea securitii europene 19. Problemele securitii n Orientul Apropiat i Mijlociu 20. Problemele securitii n Asia i Oceanul Pacific 21. Strategia securitii naionale a Republicii Moldova

BIBILIOGRAFIE SELECTIV Obligatorie 1. Bull H. Societatea anarhic: un studiu asupra ordinii n politica mondial. Chiinu: Editura tiina, 1998. 261 p. 2. Buzan B. Popoarele, statele i teama, ed ,,Cartier, Chiinu 2000. 386 p. 3. Claval P. Geopolitic i geostrategie. Bucureti: Corint, 2001. 248 p. 4. Huntington S. Ciocnirea civilizaiilor i refacerea ordinii mondiale. Bucureti: Editura Antet, 1998. 320 p. 5. Security studies: a reader / ed. by C.W. Hughes, Lai Yew Meng. London: Routledge, 2011. 451 p. 6. Waltz K. Omul, statul i rzboiul. Iai: Institutul European. 2001. 296 p. 7. ., . . . . : . 2003. 207 c. 8. . . . : , 2006. 318 c. 9. : / . . . . : , 2005. 344 . 10. : . / . . . . : , 2011. 146 . Opionale: 11. European Security and Defence Policy. The first 10 years (1999-2009). Edited by Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane. Paris, 2009. 448 p. 12. Bdescu I. Sociologia i geopolitica frontierii. Bucureti, 2000. 455 p. 13. Brucan S. Dialectica politicii mondiale. Bucureti: Editura Nemira, 1997. 199 p. 14. Buchet C. Religie i putere n Relaiile Internaionale. Bucureti: Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, 1998. 100 p. 15. Ciachir N. Istoria Relaiilor Internaionale. Bucureti: Oscar Print, 1998. 345 p. 16. Frigioiu N. Globalizarea versus probleme globale ale omenirii. Bucureti: Editura SNSPA, 2001. 17. Stan A., Rus R. Istoria religiilor. Bucureti: Editura Institutului Biblic i de Misiune al Bisericii Romne Ortodoxe, 1991. 350 p. 18. Burian A. Geopolitica lumii contemporane. Chiinu, 2003. 455 p. 19. . : . : Observer. 2011. 8. . 2633.

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20. . . : . 2011. 6. . 3044. 21. . . : . 2009. 4. . 100117. 22. . . : : , , . 2011. 1. . 3750. 23. . . : . 2011. 3. . 3649. 24. . . : . 2009. 4. . 312. 25. . XXI . : . 2009. 1. . 104129. 26. : / . . .. . , 2011. 271 . 27. . : . : . 2011. 7. . 2426. 28. . XXI . : , 2002. 209 . 29. . : ? . : . 2011. 1. . 8188. 30. ., ., ., ., . . : . 2011. 6. . 5358. 31. . : . : : , , . 2011. 1. . 23 36. 32. . . : . 2009. 1. . 728. 33. . : . : -. 2011. 5. . 122131. 34. . ?: : . : . 2011. 3. . 8192. 35. . . : Observer. 2009. 7. . 7782. 36. . : . : . 2011. 3. . 2435. 37. . : . : : , , . 2011. 10. . 4359. 38. . - - . : , 2010. 491 . 39. . . : . 2011. 3. . 4649. 40. . . : . 2011. 6. . 1730. 41. . : . : : , , . 2011. 2. . 5776. 42. . . : . 2011. 3. . 4649.

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CURSUL UNIVERSITAR PEACE STUDIES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MORARI Cristina,

INTRODUCTION The Peace Studies in Theory and Practice of International Relations Course is an optional course for the second year students (Bologna Process), with specialization in International Relations. Lessons are held in the second semester in Romanian, Russian and English languages. Basic methodological principle of the Peace Studies in Theory and Practice of International Relations Course is its interdisciplinary nature. Course topics are structured in such a way as to ensure the connection with other basic courses of the International Relations academic program such as: International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy and DecisionMaking, Diplomacy, International Organizations, Global Policy, etc. The course also addresses in its scientific analysis the fundamental problems of International Relations War and Peace. The course aims to give the knowledge of peace studies, peace research problems and peaceful conflict settlement. The main goal of the course is: formation of new authentic attitude at the younger generation regarding the theme of peace, which claims to manifest itself in national politics in the future. Cursul universitar Studii de pace n teoria i practica relaiilor internaionale este opional orientat pentru studenii anului II (Procesul de la Bologna), la specialitatea Relaii Internaionale. Leciile se vor dsfura n semestrul II n limbile romn, rus i englez. Principiul metodologic de baz al cursului Studii de pace n teoria i practica realiilor internaionale este interdisciplinaritatea. Temele cursului snt structurate astfel, nct s asigure conexiunea cu celelalte disciplini fundamentale i de specialitate, precum: Teoria Relaiilor Internaionale; Politica Extern i Procesul Decizional; Analiza Politic n Relaiile Internaionale; Bazele diplomaiei; Organizaii Internaionale; Politica Mondial etc. n cadrul acestui curs snt supuse analizei tiinifice problemele fundamentale ale relaiilor internaionale Rzboi i Pacea. Esena cursului este cunoaterea evoluiei procesului de cercetare al problemelor pcii i soluionrii panice a conflictelor. Scopul cursului: Formarea noii atitudini autentice la generaia tnr fa de tema pcii, care pretinde n viitor de a se manifesta n viaa politic naional. n cadrul cursului snt cerecetate subiecte importante cum ar fi:instituionalizarea studiilor de pace; Rzboi i Pace ca obiect de studiu; conflictul, violena i puterea nonviolenei; mijloacele de pstrare a pcii n relaiile internaionale; tolerana; dialogul intercultural vs diversitate cultural; drepturile omului; educaia pentru pace; cultura Pcii; terorismul i peace building;; promovarea pcii n Republica Moldova. . , . . , : ; ; ; ; . 137

 , . , . : , . : ; ; , ; ; ; ; ; ; ; peace building; .

Semest er IV

Number of hours: inclusive Total C S L LI 30 15 15 30

S04.A126 Patient education

Peace Studies in Theory and Practice of International Relations

Morari C.

E x a m

III. THEMES AND INDICATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF HOURS N r. Theme d/ Course o d f/r* 21. Institutionalization of peace studies 2 22. War and Peace as object of peace studies 2 23. Conflict, violence and the power of non-violence 2 24. Measures of peacekeeping in the International Relations 2 25. Tolerance as peaceful instrument 2 26. Peace Culture: the meaning and significance 2 27. Education of peace: tasks and objectives 2 28. From the philosophy of war to the new philosophy of peace 29. Peaceful conflict transformation 30. Test 1 31. Terrorism and peace building 32. Peace and disarmament 33. Intercultural dialogue vs. cultural diversity: the meaning and practices 34. Test 2 35. Promotion of peace in the Republic of Moldova Total 14

Hours Seminar d 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 16 f/r* Individua l work d f/r*

30

138

evaluation Nr. of credits 2

II. MANAGEMENT OF THE COURSE Responsibl The Form of e for the courses Discipline studies course code

III. SKILLS generic capacity to study capacity to analyze development of decision making capabilities argumentation of position in professional decision making; application of information technology in professional activity; cultivation of dignity in interpersonal relationships in the professional staff, national or international community; cultivation of tolerance in communication with people from other fields; respect for professional ethics in the controversy with colleagues; teamwork skills; practice of a foreign language through professional readings specific knowledge of the theoretical bases of peace studies; identification of specific / current problems of peace studies ; application of theoretical knowledge into practice within the analysis of peace studies in Moldova; ability to acquire new areas through individual work and studies; argumentation of using of certain methodology in the study of peace studies; elaboration of scientific research projects in order to develop analitical/applicative capacities.

IV. GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE At the level of knowledge and understanding: To determine the object of study of discipline; To define the basic concepts of the discipline as: war, peace, philosophy of peace, philosophy of war, etc; To interpret the course objectives and content; To determine the relationship of the course with other related disciplines of the professional training of International Relations specialty; To relate about the fundamental problems of International Relations. At the level of application: To analyze the trends and prospects of peace studies in theory and practice of International Relations; To establish the interdependence between the theories about peace and practice of modern international policy; To transfer the ideas and skills obtained at lessons in social life At the level of integration: To reevaluate individual and public attitude in RM regarding peace; To formulate proposals and recommendations of social peace building; To elaborate a program of peace promotion

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V. INDIVIDUAL WORK OF STUDENTS.

Nr. Result Strategies of realization Evaluation criteria Deadline

1.

Presentation of individual studies/ PPT presentations

Study of bibliography; Theoretical and analytical Methods/techniques study; Analytical character

Research activity;

Complexity of the study Diversity of bibliography

Importance of conclusions Volume

Presentation of research.

In accordance with schedule

2.

Essays

Reading; Analyze, critical reflections; Elaboration and presentation of analytical information;

Elaboration of conclusions.

Critical analyze of results Complexity of the study Diversity of bibliography Critical analyze of results Volume Identification of ways to use gained results in practice
Methods/techniques

In accordance with schedule

Study of bibliography;
Research activity;

Analyze, critical reflections;

3.

Presentation of team reports

Distribution of responsibilities and generalization of activities; Consultation during research activity;

Presentation of reports using tables and schemes.

Correct formulation of notions Analyses and processing of dates Originality of presentation Relevance of conclusions Complexity of the study Diversity of bibliography Critical analyze of results
Involvement in debates

In accordance with schedule

Study of bibliography; Debates within round tables

Design of steps; Making a thorough investigation of specific issues of human rights; Debates on certain issues;

Analyze, critical reflections

Originality of presentation
Fairness of used terms Relevance of

In accordance with schedule

conclusions PROPOSED SUBJECTS FOR INDIVIDUAL WORK: Presentation of individual studies/PPT presentations : 1. Peace Studies development: a historical overview 2. Phylosophical views regarding War and Peace 140

3. PATRIR activity: the effectiveness of the results 4. UNESCO programs for culture of peace promotion 5. NGO activity in peace domain from the Republic of Moldova 6. Education of peace: objectives and significance Essays 1. Importance of peace studies in the Republic of Moldova 2. Mahatma Gandhi, Apostle of Nonviolence 3. Tolerance - a moral virtue? Reports 1. Conflicts dynamic in international relations 2. Preventive Diplomacy: objectives and trends 3. The Global Alliance for Ministries and Departments of Peace: activity and results. 4. Violence types in modern society 5. Tolerance and diversity Debates 1. Dilemma of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping 2. The role of cultural diversity in peacekeeping in the context of globalization 3. Global culture and peace operations 4. Culture of Peace in the Republic of Moldova

VI. COURSE EVALUATION Will be used all types of evaluation: initial, formative and final (summative) one. Evaluation is done on the base of proposed objectives. The final evaluation consists of current tests and final exam. The final evaluation is based on scores obtained by students during the following criteria: Attendance and participation at lessons Participation in discussions, presentation of essays and team-work. Control tests (scores) Written exam. Example of test: Subject I: War as object of peace studies. 1. Define the concept of war (3 p.); 2. Characterize the specific of civil way, informational war, cold war, psychological war (7 p.); 3. Analyze the particularities of new wars (7 p.).

VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY: Basic: 1. Barash, David P. and Charles P. Webel. Peace and conflict studies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002. 2. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines.- New York, 2010 3. Caltung J. Peace by peaceful means.-Oslo, IPRI,1996 4. Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies /Edited by Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, New York,Routledge, 2007 141

5. Rivera J. Assessing the Basis for a Culture of Peace in Contemporary Societies// Journal of Peace Research,vol. 41, no. 5, 2004 6. Adolf, Antony. Peace: a world history. Cambridge: Polity, 2009. 7. Barash, David P., ed. Approaches to peace, a reader in peace studies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000 [collection]. 8. Barash, David P. and Charles P. Webel. Peace and conflict studies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002. 9. Cortright, David. Peace: a history of movements and ideas. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 10. Fahey, Joseph and Richard Armstrong, eds. A peace reader: essential readings on war, justice, non-violence, and world order. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1992 [collection]. 11. Galtung, Johan,. Peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict, development and civilization. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996. 12. Galtung, Johan, C.G. Jacobsen, Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen et al. The road to TRANSCEND. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press in association with TRANSCEND, 2000. 13. Harris, Ian M. and Mary Lee Morrison. Peace education. 2nd ed. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003. 14. Kirschner, Alan and Kirschner, Linda. eds. Blessed are the peacemakers. New York: Popular Library, 1971 [popular collection]. 15. McCarthy, Colman. I'd rather reach peace. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002. 16. Rogers, Mark M., Tom Bamat, and Julie Ideh. eds. Pursuing just peace: an overview and case studies for faith-based peacebuilders. Baltimore: Catholic Relief Service, 2008 [case studies]. 17. Ramos-Horta, Jos and Jeffrey Hopkins. The Art of peace: Nobel peace laureates discuss human rights, conflict and reconciliation. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2000 [collection]. 18. Stassen, Glen Harold. ed. Just peacemaking: the new paradigm for the ethics of peace and war. Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2008 (rev. ed. of Just peacemaking: ten practices for abolishing war. Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2004) [collection]. 19. Weinberg, Arthur and Lila Weinberg, eds. The power of nonviolence: writings by advocates of peace. Boston: Beacon Press, 2002 [collection]. 20. Yoder, John Howard, ed. What would you do? a serious answer to a standard question. Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1992 [collection]. Reading: 1. Barash, David P. Intruduction to Peace Studies. Belmont, CA:Wadsworth, 1991 2. Theories of peace. A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking/By Johan Galtung, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1967 3. A design for Peace: Advances in Systems Research of Peace: How to replace a culture of war by the Culture of Peace. Ontario 1997 4. Ronald J.Glossop Confronting War. An Examination of Humanity s Most Pressing Preblem Third Edition 5. Chace James The Consequences of the Peace: The New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy NY. 1992. 6. Smith Dan War, Peace and Third World Development. NY.1993 7. International Peace research institute, Oslo, Journal of Peace Research http://www.prio.no/ 8. United Nation Peace building Commission - www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/ 9. International Peace Bureau - www.ipb.org 10. The Fund for Peace- http://www.fundforpeace.org

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Below are presented the main thesis of lessons according to university curricula:

THEME 1 INTRODUCTION IN PEACE STUDIES

1. Definition of Peace Studies 2. Features and branches of Peace Studies 3. Evolution and institutionalization of Peace Studies

1. Definition of Peace Studies Peace Studies as an established academic field is characterized by different approaches. The field of Peace Studies has been influenced by a broad range of disciplines (philosophy, psychology, sociology, political science, etc) and focuses on a large number of issues ranging from conflict resolution, security, deep understanding of the causes of war and conditions for peace, among others. Peace studies are defined by specialized dictionaries as an interdisciplinary field of study that focuses on conflict analysis, conflict management, and conflict transformation; nonviolent sanctions; peace building, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement; social and economic justice; wars causes and conduct; and international and domestic security. Traditional focus of Peace Studies has been on a holistic understanding of the causes of war and of the conditions for peace. As a field of study, Peace Studies tends to refuse the positivist claim of a universal truth opting for a more relativistic approach. Peace Studies embraces primarily peace research and peace education. 2. Features and branches of Peace Studies Rogers and Ramsbotham identified seven common features of Peace Studies that together set it apart from other fields of study that focus on international conflict: 1) a concern to address the root causes of violence; 2) the use of interdisciplinary approaches; 3) the search for nonviolent transformations; 4) a multi-level analysis to overcome the distinction between internal and external dimensions of a crisis; 5) the adoption of a multicultural approach; 6) the coexistence of normative and analytical dimensions; and 7) strong relations between theory and practice. At its turn, Johan Caltung made a distinction between three essential branches of Peace Studies. Broadly speaking these are Peace Studies in past, present and future tenses. These are: 1) Empirical PS are based on empiricism: the systematic comparison of theories with empirical reality(data), revising the theories if they do not agree with the data- data being stronger than theory; 143

2) Critical PS are based on criticism: the systematic comparison of empirical reality (data) with values trying in words and/or in action, to change reality if it does not agree with the values values being stronger than data. 3) Constructive PS based on constructivism: the systematic comparison of theories with with values trying to adjust theories to values, producing visions of a new reality- values being stronger than theory. 3. Evolution and institutionalization of Peace Studies The origins of Peace Studies (including conflict resolution, conflict studies) as an academic discipline can be traced to the late 1940s, and the field has been developing steadily since then. The peace studies approach to international relations and conflict was founded by a group of scholars with backgrounds in economics and the social sciences, including Kenneth Boulding, Howard Raiffa, Anatol Rapaport and Johan Caltung. The backdrop of the Cold War and the political reaction against the threat of nuclear war provided a major impetus for the growth of peace studies, which many people saw as an antidote to programs in war studies, strategic studies, etc. that also developed on many campuses during this period. Many research centers have been established worldwide, such as International Peace Research Association (IPRA) and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) that was founded in 1959 and became a fully independent institute in 1966. PRIO was one of the first centers of peace research in the world and its Journal of Peace Research and Bulletin of Peace Proposals have helped develop the field of peace research etc. Also a great work is made by United Nations through its University for peace and Peacebuilding Commission. By 2000, the number of academic peace studies and conflict resolutions programs numbered in the hundreds, located all over the world, and organized in professional frameworks such as the Peace Studies section of the International Studies Association and the Political Studies Association. Today Peace Studies have become a developed and diversified field of research and practice. Questions for disscusions. 1. What is the object of Peace Studies? 2. How Peace Studies differ from other fields? 3. Do we need Peace Studies? Why? Individual work. 1. Communication: Peace Studies development: a historical overview. 2. Report: The Global Alliance for Ministries and Departments of Peace: activity and results. 3. Analytical study: UN system role in Peace Studies promotion 144

Bibliography. 1. A glossary of terms and concepts in peace and conflict studies, University of Peace, 2005 2. Caltung J. Peace by peaceful means.Oslo,PRIO,1996 3. Steinberg G.Postcolonial Theory and the Ideology of Peace Studies. Israel Affairs, Vol.13, No.4, October 2007, pp.786796

THEME 2 WAR AND PEACE AS OBJECT OF PEACE STUDIES

1. The concept of war. 2. Causes of war and its classification. 3. The definition and types of Peace.

1. The concept of war. Talking about the war, it can be defined in various ways. The term itself is perhaps derived from an ancient Greek verb meaning to go to ruin. Generally, war is seen as a mutually recognized, hostile exchange of actions among two or more parties (such as between or within nation-states) conducted by conventional military forces, paramilitary forces, or guerrillas to achieve respective policy objectives. Warfare assumes a degree of continuity until such objectives are accomplished or a party concedes or is defeated. Some sources say that an armed conflict must cause 1,000 or more reported battle deaths in a calendar year to be considered a war. As portrayed in Clausewitzs On War, modern warfare is a conflict between organized armies on the battlefield and is a continuation of politics by other means, the logic of which tends toward extremes in warfare. The consolidation of political power, the creation of large standing armies, and the harnessing of the power of the economy via the creation of the militaryindustrial complex are conducted to serve this end. 2. Causes of war and its classification Wars do not have a single or simple cause. The reasons of war are analyzed by different theories. On the individual level it is all about rationality. One theory consistent with realism holds that the use of war and other violent means of leverage in international conflicts is normal and reflects rational decisions of national leaders: that wars begin with conscious and reasoned decisions based on the calculation, made by both parties that they can achieve more by going to war than by remaining at peace. An opposite theory holds that conflicts often escalate to war because of deviations from rationality in the individual decision-making processes of national 145

leadersinformation screens, cognitive biases, groupthink, and so forth. A related theory holds that the education and mentality of whole populations of individuals determine whether conflicts become violent. Neither theory holds up very well, because a man of war can become a man of peace. The domestic level draws attention to the characteristics of states or societies that may make them more or less prone to use violence in resolving conflicts. Some argue that domestic political factors shape a states outlook on war and peace. For example, the democratic peace suggests that democracies almost never fight other democracies, although both democracies and authoritarian states fight wars. Others claim that domestic political parties, interest groups, and legislatures play an important role in whether international conflicts become international wars. The theories at the interstate level explain wars in terms of power relations among major actors in the international system. Power transition theory holds that conflicts generate large wars at times when power is relatively equally distributed and a rising power is threatening to overtake a declining hegemon. At the global level of analysis, a number of theories of war have been proposed. Of the several variations on the idea that major warfare in the international system is cyclical, one approach links large wars with long economic waves (also called Kondratieff cycles) in the world economy, of about 50 years duration. Another approach links the largest wars with a 100 year cycle based on the creation and decay of world orders These cycle theories can explain only general tendencies toward war in the international system over time. Explanations and justifications for war have led to numerous categorizations and terms, for example total war, civil war, ethnic war, proxy way, wars of self -determination, world war, informational war etc. 3. The definition and types of Peace. Taking into consideration that war is one of humanitys most pressing problems, peace is an ideal people are focusing and peace is almost always preferable to war. The concept of peace is notoriously difficult to define. The simplest way of approaching it is in terms of harmony achieved by the absence of war or conflict. It is defined also as a political condition that ensures justice and social stability through formal and informal institutions, practices, and norms. In his works, Johan Caltung denotes two types of peace: positive and negative one. Negative peace is simply the absence of direct violence or war. It is a condition in which no active and organized military violence is taking place. It is the most common understanding of peace, not only in the context of international politics, but more broadly speaking in the context of the peace and war debate. The pax romana (a condition of absence of violence guaranteed by legal arrangements, military power and social repression) is an example of negative peace. The 146

concept of negative peace is immediately intuitive and empirically measurable and can be used as a starting point to elaborate its counter part concept positive peace. The last (is the presence of justice) is more than the absence of war or even violence. Positive peace is not only a condition of society in which exploitation is eliminated or minimized, but its meaning is so broad to include also the idea of peace of mind, harmony with other living things and with the entire world. It implies equity and justice in human relations, and absence of all kind of violence. Further, positive peace is a pattern of cooperation and integration between major human groups...[It] is about people interacting in cooperative ways; it is about social organizations of diverse peoples who willingly choose to cooperate for the benefit of all humankind; it calls for a system in which there are no winners and losers - all are winners; it is a state so highly valued that institutions are built around it to protect and promote it.

Questions for disscusions. 1. Are there justifications of war? 2. Is it possible that some wars are just? 3. Is peace absolute or it can manifest in different ways? 4. What type of peace is characteristic for modern society? Individual work. 1. Communication: Phylosophical views regarding War and Peace 2. A comparative study of war categorizations. 3. An analytical presentation of Positive and Negative Peace by Johan Caltung. Bibliography. 1. A glossary of terms and concepts in peace and conflict studies, University of Peace, 2005 2. John A. Vasquez The war puzzle. Cambridge Studies in International Relations (No. 110), 2009 3. Barash David P. Peace and Conflict studies, USA,SAGE, 2009

147

THEME 3 CONFLICT, VIOLENCE AND THE POWER OF NON-VIOLENCE

1. The concept of conflict, violence and nonviolence 2. Conflict triangle vs. violence triangle 3. Nonviolence as peaceful instrument

1. The concept of conflict, violence and nonviolence Conflict, from the Latin for to clash or engage in a fight, is usually defined as a confrontation between one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends. Conflict may be either manifest, recognizable through actions or behaviors, or latent, in which case it remains dormant for some time, as incompatibilities are unarticulated or are built into systems or such institutional arrangements as governments, corporations, or even civil society. Conflict is indispensable linked to violence, which can be considered as main characteristic of it. Violence is understood as psychological or physical force exerted for the purpose of threatening, injuring, damaging, or abusing people or property. In international relations, violent conflict typically refers to a clash of political interests between organized groups characterized by a sustained and large-scale use of force. In order to prevent violent actions and conflicts, mankind many times is focusing on nonviolence, a holistic belief in and practice of abstaining from violent acts. Such belief systems may stem from various religions and ethical codes, with the range of understandings varying equally. These may include degrees of rejection of mental harm or physical damage to the environment, the self, or others. In some instances, a conviction in nonviolence rejects the notion of adversaries. Normative nonviolencereligious, ethical, or principledmay be a creed, matter of spirituality, or system of morality. It can also be an article of faith. 2. Conflict triangle vs. violence triangle There are at least three aspects to any conflict the three corners of the conict, the ABC triangle. Conicts may start, and escalate, at any point of the triangle. To fully transform a conict, all three points must be addressed constructively. If any point of the triangle is left unaddressed, it can be a source of future conicts, and future violence. So, these corners are: A) Attitudes (how the people view, feel and understand conict)- fear, anger, sadness, powerlessness, sense of impotence, need for revenge, hatred, fear, blaming the other, dehumanization, demonization, we/they, good vs. evil, right-wrong, win-lose, violence is the only language they understand, violence is an acceptable means to achieve our goal, they started it, they have to finish it, if I keep my head low and dont make a fuss, it will incre ase 148

my chances of surviving, feeling of endangerment; concern for those you love, determination, commitment to work for peace and stop the violence, etc.; B) Behavior (how do people act physically)- killing, abuse, shooting, hurting, harming, torture, beating, bombing, kidnapping, attacking, sabotage, burning down businesses, blowing up homes, ofces, and roads; withdrawal, turning away, doing nothing, not getting involved, etc. and C) Contradiction (what the conict is all about or the underlying causes)- land issue, monopoly capitalism, feudalism, patriarchy, exclusion of minority groups, inequitable distribution of wealth, lack of participation, colonialism, interference by neighboring or foreign countries, gender inequality, inter-generation conict, political, military, economic, cultural and social issues, territorial and or national sovereignty issues, environmental and ecological problems, etc. Talking about the violence types, people normally think of violence as what we call here direct violence. In addition to direct violence, however, there are two other forms of violence, often more difficult to see, but also often much more devastating and deadly in their effects: structural violence and cultural violence. This three the DSC triangle together make up the three points of the violence triangle. Direct Violence, the most commonly identified form of violence, is violence carried out by an actor, i.e. a direct act. The person, group, organization which carries out the act of violence, as well the causal relationship between the doer, the act, and the affected party (victim) is immediately visible. Direct violence includes physical as well as emotional, verbal and psychological violence. Structural Violence is often much more difficult to see. It is the violence which is built into our political, social, and economic systems. It is the different allocation of goods, resources, power, opportunities, jobs, medicines, positions, and wealth between different groups, castes, classes, genders, nationalities, etc., built into the structure governing these relationships. Cultural Violence is what makes us think that direct violence is normal, acceptable, or a good way of dealing with conicts, and that structural violence is natural, just, the way the world should be. Cultural violence are the elements of our cultures, belief systems, and ways of viewing the world (cosmology) which legitimize, enforce, and make violence seem acceptable, normal and just. 3. Nonviolence as peaceful instrument People decide to use nonviolence in order to bring change in their respective communities and countries. This change can be economic, political, environmental or structural. Structural violence is frequent in countries where democracy is not effective. People can use nonviolence in this case to promote good governance. People should be trained in nonviolence so that they can understand what it is and how it works. In nonviolence, it is not allowed to touch the physical integrity of people. Injuries and killings are not allowed. According to Sharp, the types of nonviolence are non-resistance, active reconciliation, moral resistance, selective nonviolence, 149

passive resistance, peaceful resistance, nonviolent direct action, Gandian nonviolence (Satyagraha), and nonviolent revolution. Thats why nonviolence is called a holistic believed because it requires time and enough knowledge. There are three broad weapons of nonviolent struggle. The weapons have the capacity to alter power relationships at the social, political and economic levels. Parades, vigils, picketing, posters, mourning and protest meetings are some examples of nonviolent protests and persuasion. They are basically cluster of symbolic actions of peaceful opposition that transcends mere verbal expressions. It however, does not include non-cooperation and nonviolent intervention. Non-cooperation with the opponent refers to the conscious discontinuation with social, economic and political relationships with the opponent. Social non-cooperation may include boycotts, while economic non-cooperation may take the form of strikes and boycotts. Political non-cooperation is also known as political boycott. Nonviolent intervention entails intervention to disrupt or change situations. Fasts, creation of new social patterns and strikes, as well as deliberate seeking of imprisonment are some of the forms on nonviolent intervention.

Questions for discussions. 1. What are the main characteristics of conflict? 2. Explain the conflict and violence triangles. 3. How non-violence manifest itself? Individual work. 1. Communication: Mahatma Gandhi, Apostle of Nonviolence 2. Report: Conflicts dynamic in international relations 3. Comparative study: Violence types in modern society. Bibliography. 1. A glossary of terms and concepts in peace and conflict studies, University of Peace, 2005 2. Caltung J. Theories of Conflict. Oslo: PRIO, 1971 3. Caltung J. Violence,Peace and peace Resesrch. Journal of Peace Research vol. 6, no. 3, 1969 pp. 167-191. 4. Introduction to nonviolent struggle: theory, history and successes//

http://www.rosalux.sn/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Introduction-to-Non-ViolentStrugggle.pdf

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THEME 4 MEASURES OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1. Definition and types of peace operations 2. Traditional and modern models of UN peacekeeping operations. 3. Peacebuilding Activities

1. Definition and types of peace operations Peace operation can be defined as an operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. It is a generic term sometimes used to encompass peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding. Conflict prevention involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. Ideally, it should build on structured early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict. Conflict prevention activities may include the use of the SecretaryGenerals good offices, preventive deployment or confidence-building measures. Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. The United Nations Secretary-General, upon the request of the Security Council or the General Assembly or at his her own initiative, may exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations. Peacemaking efforts may also be under- taken by unofficial and nongovernmental groups, or by a prominent personality working independently. Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements military, police and civilian working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace. Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority. 151

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.

1,2,3

Traditional and modern models of UN peacekeeping operations.

Traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed as an interim measure to help manage a conflict and create conditions in which the negotiation of a lasting settlement can proceed. The tasks assigned to traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations by the Security Council are essentially military in character and may involve the following: Observation, monitoring and reporting using static posts, patrols, overflights or other technical means, with the agreement of the parties; -Supervision of cease-fire and support to verification mechanisms; -Interposition as a buffer and confidence-building measure. Traditional peacekeeping operations do not normally play a direct role in political efforts to resolve the conflict. Other actors such as bilateral partners to the parties, regional organizations or even special United Nations envoys may be working on longer-term political solutions, which will allow the peacekeeping operation to withdraw. As a result, some traditional peacekeeping operations are deployed for decades before a lasting political settlement is reached between the parties. multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are typically deployed in the dangerous aftermath of a violent internal conflict and may employ a mix of military, police and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement. The core functions of a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation are to: a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the States ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights; b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance; c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner. In contrast to traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations, multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations usually play a direct role in political efforts to resolve

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the conflict and are often mandated by the Security Council to provide good offices or promote national political dialogue and reconciliation. 1,2,3 Peacebuilding Activities

Experience has shown that the achievement of a sustainable peace requires progress in at least four critical areas: a) Restoring the States ability to provide security and maintain public order; b) Strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights; c) Supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes; d) Promoting social and economic recovery and development, including the safe return or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees uprooted by conflict. Peacekeeping operations play a catalytic role in the following critical peacebuilding activities: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants; Mine action; Security Sector Reform (SSR) and other rule of law-related activities; Protection and promotion of human rights; Electoral assistance; Support to the restoration and extension of State authority.

Questions for discussions. 1 2 3 What are differences between peace operations types? What is the UN role in peace operations? How you appreciate the peacebuilding activities?

Individual work. 1 2 3 Communication: The Basic Principles of United Nations Peacekeeping. Report: UN peacekeeping operations overview Analytical study: Global culture and peace operations

Bibliography. 1. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.Principles and Guidelines, New York, 2008 2. Nicholas SambanisShort-Term and Long-Term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations// http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/WB_EffectsofUNPeaceOps.pdf 3. Oliver G. The other side of Peacekeeping: Peace Enforcement and Who Should Do It? International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations, Volume 8, 2002, p. 99-117.

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THEME 5 TOLERANCE AS PEACEFUL INSTRUMENT

1. The concept and goals of tolerance. 2. Kinds of tolerance. 3. Intolerance

1. The concept and goals of tolerance. The United Nations defines tolerance as: Respect for the richness and diversity of cultures harmony in difference based on recognition of the universal rights of the human person According to UNESCO Declaration of principles on Tolerance, from 1995, tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference. Tolerance is not concession, condescension or indulgence. Tolerance is, above all, an active attitude prompted by recognition of the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms of others and tolerance is the responsibility that upholds human rights, pluralism (including cultural pluralism), democracy and the rule of law. Tolerance in democratic and pluralistic societies has four basic goals: Fostering social integration and cohesion as the foundation for any democratic system; Legitimising democratic systems by developing a comprehensive culture for dealing creatively with conflicts; Ensuring the system of checks and balances as a democratic principle for the whole of society; and Creating, increasing and defending respect for difference and diversity. Taken together, these goals increase the security of pluralistic societies while at the same time keeping a spirit of openness for new ideas, values and visions. 2. Kinds of tolerance. First, there is tolerance as a right (or, more accurately, a right to tolerance), meaning that a person has a right to be tolerated. The tolerant person puts up with the wrong or the repulsive because the other has a right to do the wrong thing or because the other has a right not to be harmed in spite of his repulsive features or manners. The main justification for this kind of tolerance is autonomy. The second kind of tolerance is pragmatic tolerance. Here, the tolerant person tolerates the other because he thinks that in given circumstances it is in his or society.s best interest to do so. The main feature of pragmatic tolerance is its temporary nature. It is all a question of risks and opportunities in a given time and place. Nevertheless, this kind of tolerance is not to be taken for granted. 154

The third kind of tolerance is tolerance out of mercy. One can tolerate other peoples physical or mental limitations just out of mercy although one finds them repulsive and would like to avoid their presence. 3. Intolerance Intolerance is often described as the unwillingness to accept the right of people to deviate from the dominant culture. It stems from a lack of respect for others. It often starts with a linguistic reduction of a person to a function, an opinion defining a human being in terms of race, color, gender or religion. Intolerance in multiethnic, multi-religious and multicultural societies can produce a range of negative consequences: lack of civility, contempt and animosity towards other people, violations of human rights, violence and armed clashes. If intolerance penetrates into the area of government and politics it could have such horrible results as racial discrimination and genocide.

Questions for discussions. 1 2 3 How you understand tolerance? Is there a predominant kind of tolerance? How manifest itself intolerance?

Individual work. 1 2 3 Communication: UNESCO Declaration of Principles on Tolerance from 1995 Report: Intolerance and its consequences Essay: Tolerance - a moral virtue?

Bibliography. 1. UNESCO Declaration of Principles on Tolerance from 1995 2. Tolerance and cultural diversity in Europe:Theoretical perspectives and contemporary Developments, Italy: European University Institute,2011 3. Tolerance. Basis for Democratic Interaction.Gutersloh:Bertelsmann Foundation,2000

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THEME 6 PEACE CULTURE: THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE

1. Concept of the Culture of Peace 2. Basic aspects of the Culture of Peace 3. The role of United Nations Organization in peace culture development.

1. Concept of the Culture of Peace The term culture of peace was used for the first time in 1989, in a decision taken by UNESCOs Executive Board in the context of its program of contribution to peace, human rights and the elimination of all forms of discrimination. It was taken up again almost immediately in the Yamoussoukro Declaration on Peace in the Minds of Men, approved by the International Congress on Peace in the Minds of Men, Yamoussoukro, Cte dIvoire, July 1989. According to UNESCO definition a culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes, traditions, modes of behavior and ways of life that reflect and inspire: respect for life and for all human rights; rejection of violence in all its forms and commitment to the prevention of violent conflicts by tackling their root causes through dialogue and negotiation; commitment to full participation in the process of equitably meeting the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations; promotion of the equal rights and opportunities of women and men; recognition of the rights of everyone to freedom of expression, opinion and information; devotion to the principles of freedom, justice, democracy, tolerance, solidarity, co-operation, pluralism, cultural diversity, dialogue and understanding between nations, between ethnic, religious, cultural and other groups, and between individuals. So, how Johan Caltung assets the culture of peace is culture that promotes peace. 2. Basic aspects of the Culture of Peace There can be distinguished seven major aspects of peace culture: human rights, democracy, tolerance, and promotion of development, education for peace, the free flow of information, and the wider participation of women. In the culture of peace all human rights are extended to "benefit the entire human family," in all its dimensions, as opposed to the culture of war in which rights "benefit exclusively the clan, the tribe or the nation" at the expense of others. Democratic participation and governance is necessary for the culture of peace, as opposed to the "authoritarian structures of power" that characterize the culture of war. Education, in the culture of peace, needs to be based on the "peace-making skills of dialogue, mediation, conflict transformation, consensus-building, cooperation and non-violent social change." The culture of peace requires that economic development be based on "sustainable human development for all." Social development, social justice and the eradication of poverty are indispensable as well 156

as preservation of our environment. Equality between men and women is essential to a culture of peace; hence, it is necessary to promote women's political and economic empowerment and equal representation at every level of decision-making so that women's experience, talents, visions and potential can make their full contribution to a culture of peace. Freedom of opinion, expression and information, recognized as an integral aspect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, is a vital factor in the strengthening of peace and international

understanding. Transparency is needed to replace the secrecy and manipulation of information which characterize the culture of war. In the culture of peace "enemy images" are transcended and superseded by "understanding, tolerance and solidarity among all peoples and cultures" because "there has never been a war without an enemy. And, of course, the culture of peace needs international peace and security based on disarmament and conversion of military industry to civilian production instead of the armaments, weapons and military facilities of the culture of war. Although these aspects of the culture of peace are each distinct one from another, they are also inter-related and together they make up an integral alternative to the culture of war. 3. The role of United Nations Organization in peace culture development. There are several noteworthy resolutions of the UN General Assembly that concern the concept of Culture of Peace, its importance, and its implementation: Resolution 52/13 was the first major general resolution on a Culture of Peace. Resolution 52/15 proclaimed the year 2000 as the International Year for the Culture of Peace. Resolution 53/22 proclaimed the year 2001 as the United Nations Year of Dialogue amon g Civilizations. It emphasizes the significant role of dialogue as a means to reach understanding, remove threats to peace and strengthen interaction and exchange among civilizations Resolution 53/25 proclaimed the decade 2001-2010 as the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World. It points out the fundamental importance of a Culture of Peace for core values of the United Nations, by stating that the task of the United Nations to save future generations from the scourge of war requires transformation towards a Culture of Peace, which consists of values, attitudes and behaviors that reflect and inspire social interaction and sharing based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights, tolerance and solidarity, that reject violence and endeavor to prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation. Finally, in 1999, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 53/243, the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace. This document is often considered one of the great documents ever produced by the United Nations, on a par with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and directed toward the organizations primary goal to abolish war.

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Questions for disscusions. 1. What is a culture for peace? 2. How are correlated the basic aspects of peace culture? 3. How to promote peace culture? Individual work. 1. Communication: UNESCO programs for peace culture promotion 2. Report: Culture of Peace in the Republic of Moldova. Bibliography. 1. Building a culture of peace for the present and future generations//

http://www.pathwaystopeace.org/documents/idp_essaycontest.pdf 2. Rivera J. Assessing the Basis for a Culture of Peace in Contemporary Societies// Journal of Peace Research,vol. 41, no. 5, 2004, pp. 531548 3. Mayor F. Culture of Peace // http://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C14/E1-37-0515.pdf

THEME 7 EDUCATION OF PEACE: TASKS AND OBJECTIVES

1. Peace education conceptualization. 2. Peace education goals. 3. Forms of peace education

1. Peace education conceptualization Peace education aims to reduce violence, support the transformation of conflicts, and advance the peace capabilities of individuals, groups, societies and institutions. Peace education builds on peoples capacities to learn. It develops skills, values and knowledge and thus helps to establish a global and sustainable culture of peace. Gavriel Salomon summarizes current peace education activities under four categories: peace education mainly as a matter of changing mindset, peace education mainly as a matter of cultivating a set of skills, peace education as mainly a matter of promoting human rights (particularly in the Third World countries), and finally, peace education as a matter of environmentalism, disarmament, and the promotion of a culture of peace. Also, there is a difference between education about peace and education for peace. Education about peace includes modules on war and peace and leaders of peace movements, such as Gandhi and King. Education for peace, on the other hand, intends to nurture knowledge, values, behaviors and capacities to confront violence. 158

1. Peace education goals. Peace education has an important social purpose. It seeks to transform the present human condition by changing social structures and patterns of thought that have created it. Hence, Peace education pursues the following goals: (1) to end war, (2) to reduce violence in family, society and politics, (3) to promote a perception of conflict as an opportunity for positive change, and finally (4) to develop visions of peace and solidarity among the worlds people, irrespective of ethnic origin, religion, gender, cultural or social background, and to make these visions a reality. Peace education initiates and supports social and political learning processes, in which positive social behavior, empathy and capacities for non-violent communication can evolve (peace capacity); knowledge about peace and war, conflict and violence can be acquired (peace competence); and the willingness to show civil courage and engage for peace is fostered (peace action). 2. Forms of peace education Among the various forms of peace education practice are: Disarmament Education, Human Rights Education, Global Education, Conflict Resolution Education, Multicultural Education, Education for International Understanding, Interfaith Education, Gender-fair/Nonsexist Education, Development Education and Environmental Education. Disarmament Education, evolved at first as a reaction to the threat of nuclear weapons. In later years, Disarmament Education included other weaponry such as biological weapons and chemical weapons. Human Rights Education started as movement towards educating people to respect human rights. Global Education is defined as all programs, projects, studies and activities that can help an individual learn and care more about the world beyond his or her community, and to transcend his or her culturally conditioned, ethnocentric perspectives, perception and behavior. Conflict Resolution Education involves creation of a cooperative climate that encourages parties to reach mutually acceptable solutions to disagreements. It also includes training in anger management as well as skills in attentive listening, effective communication, constructive dialogue and other positive techniques to arrive at a win-win solution to conflicts. Multicultural education is an educational movement that has developed first in countries that are multicultural or have a culturally diverse population. It encourages not only the appreciation and understanding of other cultures but also of ones own. It promotes the persons sense of the uniqueness of his own culture as a positive characteristic and enables one to accept the uniqueness of the cultures of others. Education for International Understanding has taken a more holistic meaning, encompassing not only peace at the global level but also its building blocks of nonviolent, just and sustainable living in the other levels of relationships. Interfaith education grew out of the interfaith movement sought to bring together religious and 159

spiritual leaders of diverse traditions to engage in dialogue, to educate each other and their audience about their respective traditions. The goal of development education is building peaceful communities by promoting an active democratic citizenry interested in the equitable sharing of the worlds resources. It also seeks to cultivate in the learners a critical consciousness that challenges injustice and undemocratic structures like those promoted by large transnational corporations. Gender-Fair Education seeks to foster among the learners respect for the abilities and rights of both sexes and to develop awareness of the gender biases and stereotyping that have been culturally perpetuated in order to change these. Finally, Environmental education is education about, for and through the environment. Each form of peace education practice also includes a particular knowledge base as well as a normative set of skills and value-orientations that it wants to develop.

Questions for disscusions. What is the essence of Peace education? Why there are different forms of peace education? Are there any impediments in peace education promotion? Individual work. 1 2 3 Communication: A holistic understanding of peace education. Report: Historic roots of peace education. Analytical study: Peace education in globalization era.

Bibliography. 1 Navaro-Castro L. Peace education. A pathway to a culture of peace. Philippines: Center for peace education, 2008 2 3 Education for peace. Reader. Canada: EFP Press, 2011 Harris I. Peace education: definition, approaches and future directions//

http://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C04/E1-39A-06.pd

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 I. . . , , , . , . , . . Disciplina Relaiile interetnice i soluionarea conflictelor reprezint un curs pentru studenii anului doi, specialitile social-umanitare. Specificul cursului const n abordarea interdisciplinar a fenomenelor i proceselor etnosociale. Categoriile relaii interetnice i soluionarea conflictelor sunt obiect de cercetare a etnosociologiei, etnologiei, etnopolitologie, etnoconflictologie, i altor tiine, fundamentele teoretice ale crora sunt utilizate pentru predarea cursului dat n cadrul concepieie de consolidare a pcii. Scopul acestui curs este de a familiarizarea studenilor cu fenomenele, procesele studiate, precum i cu consecinele acestora. n cadrul disciplinii date se examineaz problemele sociale sin punct de vedere a convieuirii panice a diferitor grupurui sociale.n cadrul cursului snt stusiate subiectele legate de relaiile interetnice ca form de interaciune social; etnicitatea i puterea; conflictele etnice n spaiul post-sovietic; prevenirea i soluionarea conflictelor; negocierile ca instrument de soluionare a conflictelor; etnicitatea i contiina. The University course Interethnic Relations and Conflict Resolution is a special course for second year students of social and humanitarian specialties. The specific of the course is the interdisciplinary approach to analysis of ethnic and social events and processes. The categories of interethnic relations and conflict resolution are the subject of the research of ethno sociology, ethnology, ethno and political science, ethnology and conflicts studies etc. The theoretical bases of these sciences are used in the teaching of this course on the base of peace building concept. The aim of the course is students acknowledgement with these issues, their processes and consequences. Within the discipline the social problems are examined from the point of view of different social groups peaceful coexistence. The following important subjects are studied there: interethnic relations as a form of social interaction; ethnicity and the power; ethnic conflicts in the post-soviet space, conflict prevention and resolution; negotiations as instrument of conflict resolution etc.

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2. Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Responses. Cambridge: Polity, 2010. 3. .., .., .. . .- ., 1999; 4. . // .-2007, 2,4,6. 5. .. : . . . . .- 3- -, . .- .: ,1996. 6. .. . : . .- .: -, 2004.-367 .

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 I. . , , , , , . . . . . , . , , , , , . . - . - , , , . , . Cursul Organizaii Internaionale este unul suplimentar n sistemul de nvamnt superior contemporan n domeniul istoric. El include analiza etapelor fundamentale de dezvoltare a relaiilor internaionale, sistematizarea concepiilor metodologice de baz dominante/existente n diferite perioade conceptelor, familiarizarea cu principalele coli i direcii n domeniul relaii internaionale, studierea lucrrilor reprezentanilor de vaz din domeniu, interpretarea principalelor probleme din domeniul relaiilor internaionale din punct de vedere a diferitor concepii i abordri metodologice. De asemenea, obiectul de studiu al cursului dat l reprezint locul i rolul conflictului n istoria i teoria relaiilor internaionale. Din aceast cauz, conflictului i se acord o anumit atenie n cadrul fiecrei teme studiate. Integrarea conflictului n contextul fiecrei etape de dezvoltare a relaiilor internaionale, permite actualizarea materialului predat. 165

Aceste obiective determin alegerea scopurilor i formelor de instruire a studenilor . Este important de notat c prezentat, n contextul propriei logici de dezvoltare, sistemul de relaii internaionale nu poate fi neles i analizat izolat de condiiile istorice din diferite perioade. Elaborarea principiilor metodologice de baz ale relaiilor internaionale, abordarea esenei relaiilor internaionale sunt legate indisolubil de evoluia abordrilor metodologice generale, analiza filosofic, formele dominante ale contiinei umane i psihologieie maselor, specificul proceselor social-politice. Toate acestea duc la necesitatea extinderii studierii obiectului n cadrul acestui curs. Analiza prioritar a dezvoltrii principiilor teoreticometodologice ale sistemului relaiilor internaionale trebuie s fie completat i de studiul tendinelor fundamentale de dezvoltare a societii. Principiul de sistematizare a materialului este cel cronologic, ns pentru fiecare etap se preconizeaz studierea problematicii, instituionalizarea relaiilor internaionale, reflectarea abordrilor i nelegerea aceastora n modaliti tradiionale filosofice i istorice. Ca rezultat al asimilrii cursului studentul trebuie s aplice cunotinele acumulate pentru contientizarea proceselor istorice n general i a celor din domeniul relaiilor internaionale. n cadrul cursului sunt studiate urmtoarele teme: sistemul de la Westphalia n cadrul relaiilor internaionale; tendinele dezvoltrii relaiilor internaionale n epoca modern i contemporan; relaiile internaionale n sec. XVII-XIX; relaiile internaionale din prima jumtate a sec. XX; relaiile internaionale din a doua jumtate a sec. XX. The University course International Relations is a facultative discipline in historical field of the high education system. It includes the analysis of fundamental phases of International Relations development, the systematization of methodological concepts, the acknowledgment with main schools and trends in the International Relations field, the study of researchers works in the field and interpretation of the main International Relations problems from different points of view, concepts and methodological approaches. Also, the course is focused on the study of the conflicts role and place in history and theory of the International Relations. The great attention is paid to conflicts in each subject, due to them the course subjects are actualized. It is worth to underline that International Relations system cannot be understood and analyzed out of general historical conditions during the one or another epoch. Development of the basic International Relations methodological principles and interpretation of its nature are directly linked to evolution of general methodological approaches, philosophical analysis, forms of social conscience and mass psychology, as well as to the specific of social and political processes. All these create the necessity to extent the subject of the course study. The analysis of theoretical and methodological processes of the International Relations system should be completed with the research of new tendencies of society development. The material systematization was done by chronological principle, but the study of problematic issues is foreseen for each stage, institutional aspect of the International Relations, reflection of approaches and their understanding in historical and philosophical traditions. As the result, the student should be able to use the main definitions and apply the obtained knowledge in analysis of general historical processes and those within the International Relations in particular. The following subjects are studied in the framework of the course: Westphalia system within International Relations; International Relations development tendencies in modern and contemporary epoch; International Relations in XVII-XIX centuries; International Relations in XX century etc.

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46. . 47. 48. 49. XIX . 50. - XIX . 51. XIX . 52. 53. ( ) 54. XIX . 55. : 56. 57. . 58. . 59. , . 60. . 61. . 62. , . 63. - .. 64. 65. , . : XXI . 66. 67. .. 68. . 69. : . 70. . 71. .. 72. . 73. ( ). 74. . 75. . 76. . 77. . . 78. 11 .2001 . 79. XXI . . . , , , (). . . , .

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4. : ; 5. : , 6. 7. 8. . 9. . .. 10. 11. 12. 13. XVIII . 14. XVIII 15. , 16. . 17. 18. XIX 19. XIX 20. - XIX 21. . 22. - . 23. - 24. . 25. - . 26. - 27. : . 28. . . 29. . 30. . VIII. : , , , , , (). 3. : 1. L012345678910 . , , , -

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17. . . : . 1998. 128. 18. . . . : ,2005, 288 . 19. . .: , 2010,192 . 20. . : . : .2010 1-2 21. . 4- ., 22. ., ., . . ., 2002 23. . . , 2007, 718 . 24. . ... : , 1986, 320 . 25. . . . 1993-1999. , 2006, 288 . 26. . . , 1996, 384 . 27. ., ., . . 40-50- : . , 2008, 807 . 28. . : .: , 2003, 569 . 29. . , :, 1991, 320 . 30. ., ., . , , : ,. 2005, 305 31. . 2- . :. 1989-1991 32. . . :, 1994, 869 . 33. . . . : , 2002, 288 . 34. . . . : -, 2003, 333 . 35. . 1918-1999.:, 2003,1306 . 36. 3- . 1985 37. .1998 . , 2000,494 . 38. ., . . . - .:-, 2002, 479 . 39. . .., 2007, 943 . 40. . . : , 2003, 279 41. . 280-220 . .. .1980,169 . 42. . . . , 1991, 336 . 43. . . : - 2004, 232 . 44. . . -, 2005, 320 . 45. . . , 2002, 208 . 46. . . :, 2004, 546 . 47. 8- . .1, . , 1988, 704 . 48. 8- ..2, . ,1992, 808 . 49. 8- ..3, . , 1993, 656 . 50. 8- ..4, (XVII-XVIII .). , 1994, 509 . 181

51. 8- ..5, . , 2000, 667 . 52. .1918-1945. . . . , 1989, 463 . 53. .1945-1990. . . . , 1993, 447 . 54. . . .-., . , 2005, 680 . 55. , . . . ., 2006, . 1, 602 . 56. , . . . . , 2006, .2, 587 . 57. . . , . , 2008, .1, 368 . 58. . . , . , 2008, .2, 368 . 59. ( 1054 .) . . , 2007 60. . , 2002, 432 . 61. . . . -, 2007, 332 . 62. .. .. . . 2004, 688 . 63. . .: 6 ..6. : , 1966, 742 . 64. . .1500-1789. : , 2006, 159 . 65. . 400-1500 . : , 2001, 384 . 66. . . : .1997. 849 . 67. . ? XXI .: , 2002 , 391 . 68. . . . . : , 2002,208 . 69. . : . : , 2004, 372 . 70. . . : ,2004, 272 . 71. . - . : . , 2012, 272 . 72. . - . .1988. 73. . . : -, 2003, 208 . 74. . . : .2005, 3-4. .119-126 75. . . : -, 2007, 365 . 76. . . -, 2007, 398 . 77. . : 3- ..3.:, 1988, 670 . 78. . XV-XVIII . , 2005, 192 . 79. . . . . :, 2004, 819 . 80. . .. :, 2005 81. . . 1987. 82. . . --,19967, 154 . 83. . : . : : 2005, 1-2, .142-167. 84. . , . : . 2004, 1-2, .161-197. 85. : . .: , 2006. 86. . . : , 1999, 673 87. . . 1945-1975: . 182

: , 2004. 88. . . . . .2008. 752 . 89. . . : ,1941, 156 90. .XVI-XIX . . .., .. , 2005, .1, 528 . 91. . 3- . , 2004, .2, 336 . 92. . 3- . , 2004, .3, 256 . 93. .. ..1968. 94. . . . -: : 2008, 320 . 95. .. . : , 2010, 416 . 96. . : . . 2000. 576 . 97. .., 2006, 255 . 98. .VI-XII . . . : , 1985, 364 . 99. ., ., . : , , . : - , 2001, 352 . 100. .. .2006. 101. .. IV VI . . 269 . 102. VII-VIII. : , 2007, 480 . 103. . . . : , 2004, 446 . 104. - XVIII ., 2003, 315 105. . : ...2005, 34, .66-81 106. . . . : , 1999, 584 . 107. . . . .2004, 991 . 108. . .:-,2009,158 . 109. . ., 1959, 440 . 110. . 1648 : , .... : - , 2001, 416 . 111. . . : , 2000, 269 . 112. . . ,:- 2003, 559 . 113. .. . : , 1992, 560 . 114. . . : , 2010, 584 . 115. . . : , 2004, 480 . 116. . . : , 2006, 261 . 117. . . . : . 2003, 368 . 118. . . : , 2007,288 . 119. . . :,2001, 426 . 120. . 1780 .-: ,1998, 306 . 121. . . . : ,2004, 632 . 122. . . : . 1996, 320 . 123. . : , , ,. 183

124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136.

: , 1995, 196 . . . . . 1975 -376 . . . . .1987. . . . 1987. . . . 1972. . .. 1996. . . 3- . , 1997. . . . 1962. . . : , 2007, 386 . . . : , 2010, 272 . . . , 2006, 300 . . . .1929-1941. : , 2004, 571 . . . : , 1989, 322 . . : . : , 2000. 304 .

1. http://www.inosmi.ru ; 2. http://www.intertrends.ru/ - ; 3. http://www.ipolitics.ru/ - ( ), , ( , ), ; 4. http://www.inter-rel.ru/ , , , , , , , , , ; 5. www.polit.ru ; 6. www.politcom.ru ; 7. www.politklass.ru ; 8. www.apn.ru ; 9. www.politjournal.ru .

184

CURSUL UNIVERSITAR CONFLICTUL TRANSNISTREAN CU Viorica, PANA Rodica

PRELIMINARII Fenomenul separatismului reprezint una din principalele surse ale conflictelor i ameninrilor la adresa pcii i securitii mondiale. ntr-o lume aflat n proces de globalizare i interdependen, separatismul afecteaz nsi fundamentul societii i reprezint un pericol considerabil pentru suveranitatea i integritatea statelor. Pentru Republica Moldova problema separatismului teritorial (regiunea transnistrean) e fundamental, fiind una din principalele sfidri aduse securitii naionale i nsi existenei statului. Separatismul transnistrean a trecut prin toate fazele dezvoltrii sale - de la forma latent la conflict armat, acest fenomen avnd manifestri anticonstituionale. Cursul presupune analiza profund i multilateral a cauzelor apariiei conflictului transnistrean i etapelor evoluiei lui, prin examinarea tuturor posibilitilor i a tuturor ncercrilor de ieire din criz fcute n timp, prin elaborarea unor principii concrete care trebuie respectate de prile aflate n conflict i propunerea unor ci de reglementare echitabil. The phenomenon of separatism is one of the main sources of conflicts and threats against global peace and security. In a world undergoing the process of globalization and interdependence, the separatism affects the foundation of society and poses a significant threat to the sovereignty and integrity of countries. The territorial separatism challenge in Moldova (Transdniestria) is fundamental, as one of the main challenges to national security and the very existence of the state. Transdniestrian separatism passed through all stages of its development from latent form of armed conflict, this phenomenon having unconstitutional manifestations. The course involves in-depth and multilateral analysis of the conflict arising and stages of its development considering all the possibilities and attempts to overcome the crisis, by developing specific principles to be followed by the parties involved into the conflict and to suggest ways of its fair resolution. The course syllabus includes the following themes: The role and the place of the conflict resolution in Security Researches; Transdniestrian conflict from the angle of conflict typology; Origins and premises of the secessionism in the eastern regions of the Republic of Moldova; Transdniestrian war (March - July 1992); Military issues of the Transdniestrian conflict; Characteristics of the regime in unrecognized Transdniestria; The establishment and role of the peacekeeping forces in the eastern regions of the Republic of Moldova; Mediation - integral part of the conflict resolution; Options and projects due the problem of solving the Transdniestrian conflict. (1992-2012); Perspectives of the Transdniestrian conflict settlement after the establishment of Shevchuk Government. . , , . ( ) , . - , .

I.

185

 , , , . : ; ; ; ( 1992); ; ; ; ; (1992-2012); .

II. OBIECTIVELE GENERALE/ STANDARD ALE DISCIPLINEI La nivel de cunoatere i nelegere : contientizarea elementelor conceptuale ale cursului; nsuirea noiunilor de baz ale aparatului categorial; cunoaterea actualitii problematicii cursului; evidenierea cauzelor ce au generat declanarea conflictului; determinarea naturii conflictului transnistrean prin prisma tipologiei conflictelor; nsuirea cunotinelor i abilitilor necesare realizrii unor negocieri eficiente; asimilarea unor metodologii i instrumente pentru gestionarea conflictelor; nelegerea corelaiei documentare-analiz-elaborare de soluii n procesul de reglementare a diferendului transnistrean; delimitarea locului i rolului comunitii internaionale n soluionarea conflictului transnistrean. La nivel de aplicare: analiza cadrului teoretico-conceptual al conflictelor prin prisma celor mai importante teorii ale relaiilor internaionale; dobndirea cunostiinelor fundamentale despre noiunile de criz, conflict, risc i soluionarea conflictelor; cunoaterea importanei comunicrii n mediere i nelegerea modului de folosire a tehnicilor de comunicare n soluionarea conflictului transnistrean; nelegerea necesitii parcurgerii fiecrei etape i a modalitilor de organizare a negocierilor i desfurare a acestora; consultarea diverselor tratate, acorduri elaborate n procesul de soluionare a conflictului transnistrean. La nivel de integrare : dezvoltarea abilitilor de negociere necesare identificrii soluiilor pentru rezolvarea conflictelor, inclusiv a conflictului transnistrean; transpunerea n practic a cunotinelor, prin realizarea unor sesiuni simulate de negociere i mediere; elaborarea unor proiecte de acorduri privind soluionarea conflitului transnisrean; 186

 manifestarea unei atitudini creative, personale i responsabile fa de desfurarea etapelor procedurii de mediere; cultivarea principiilor etice ale medierii, promovarea comunicrii i dialogului; promovarea unui sistem de valori culturale, morale i civice bazate pe dialog n reglementarea conflictului transnisrean.

III. TEMATICA I REPARTIZAREA ORIENTATIV A ORELOR Tematica i repartizarea orientativ a orelor la prelegeri i seminare

Nr.

Forma Nr. de Nr. de prezentrii ore ore (clasic, prelegeri seminare interactiv, cu folosirea noilor tehnolgii etc) 1. Introducere. Rolul i locul soluionrii clasic 2 2 conflictelor n cadrul studiilor de securitate 2. Diferendul transnistrean prin prisma prezentare 2 2 tipologiei conflictului powerpoint 3. Originea i premisele secesionismului n interactiv 2 2 raioanele de est ale Republicii Moldova 4. Rzboiul de pe Nistru (martie- iulie 1992) prezentare 2 2 powerpoint militare a conflictului interactiv 5. Aspectele 2 2 transnistrean 6. Particularitile regimului Autoproclamatei clasic 2 2 RMN prezentare 7. Instituirea i rolul forelor pacificatoare n 2 2 raioanele de est ale Republicii Moldova powerpoint interactiv 8. Medierea parte integrant a sistemului de interactiv 2 2 soluionare a conflictelor 9. Opiuni i proiecte n problema soluionrii clasic 2 2 diferendului transnistrean (1992-2012) 10. Perspective de soluionare a conflictului interactiv 2 2 transnistrean dup instituirea administraiei evciuc la putere TOTAL 40

Tema

187

IV. REFERINE BIBLIOGRAFICE:

Bibliografie obligatorie 1. Brsan V. Masacrul inocenilor, Rzboiul din Moldova, (1 martie 29 iulie 1992). Bucureti, 1993. 2. Gribincea M. Politica rus a bazelor militare: Georgia i Moldova. Chiinu, 1999. 3. Grecu M., ranu A. Trupele ruse n Republica Moldova. (Culegere de documente i materiale). Chiinu: Grupul Editorial Litera, 2004. 4. Cernencu M., .a. Republica Moldova: Istoria politic (1989-2000). Documente i materiale. Vol. I-II, Chiinu: CE USM, 2000. 5. Mnzrari D. Moldova rtcit n labirintul ncurcat al conflictului transnistrean. Chiinu: IDIS Viitorul, 2010. 6. Moldova-Transnistri: eforturi comune pentru un viitor prosper, procesul de negocieri. Chiinu, 2009. 7. : . , 2009. 8. : , c. , 2009. 9. Gorelova E., elari G. Costurile conflictului transnistrean i beneficiile soluionrii lui. Chiinu, 2009. Bibliografie opional 1. Brsan V. Procesul Ilacu. Bucureti: Fundaia Cultural Romn, 2004. 2. Boan I. Reglementarea transnistrean: o soluie european. Chiinu: ARC, 2009. 3. Boan I. Armonizarea relaiilor interetnice sfidri i oportuniti. Chiinu: Institutul de Politici Publice, 2005. 4. Budeanu G. Transnistria n flcri: (Reportajele unui corespondent de razboi). Chiinu: Universitas, 1993. 5. Cartev S. Conflictologia. Chiinu: Prut Internaional, 1996. 6. Dima N. Basarabia i Bucovina n jocul geopolitic al Rusiei Chiinu: Civitas. 7. Munteanu A., Ciubotaru N. Romnii de la Est. Rzboiul de pe Nistru. (1990-19992). Bucureti: AGER-Economistul, 2004. 8. Munteanu A. Sacrificiu i trdare : Rzboiul de secesiune din Republica Moldova (19901992). Bucureti: Fundaia European Titulescu, 2005. 9. Nantoi O. Aspecte ale conflictului transnistrean. Chiinu: tiinta, 2001. 10. Serebrian O. Va exploda Estul? Geopolitica spaiului pontic. Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1998. 11. Cojocaru Gh. Diferendul Transnistrean i rivalitile ruso-ucrainene. In: Arena Politic, An. I, Nr. 8, 1997, p. 35-40. 12. Du P., Du P. Conflictul transnistrean i securitatea Mrii Negre. In: Monitorul Strategic. Bucureti: Centrul de Studii Strategice de Aprare i Securitate, 2007. 13. Medar S.-T., Savu Gh. Conflicte ngheate n zona Mrii Negre. n: Buletinul Universitii Naionale de Aprare Carol I, Nr. 4, Bucureti: Universitii Naionale de Aprare, 2008, p. 189-192. Resurse Internet: www.transnistria.md.

188

CURSUL UNIVERSITAR SECURITATEA INTERNAIONAL PANA Rodica

I.

PRELIMINARII

Cursul presupune studierea conceptului, teoriei, instituiilor i importanei securitii internaionale ca element de baz a relaiilor internaionale, prezintnd ntr-o concepie unitar i coerent, problematica fundamental n domeniul securitii naionale integrate celei globale. Tematica se refer la urmtoarele aspecte concepte de securitate; elemente de doctrin a informaiilor pentru securitate; riscuri de securitate; crima organizat transfrontalier i principalele organizaii de tip mafiot; terorism internaional; strategii i politici de securitate; organizaii internaionale de securitate. O atenie sporit se acord corelaiei securitate naional - securitate internaional i instituiilor abilitate n domeniu. Pentru a facilita studierea proceselor i instituiilor, cursul presupune diviziunea pe nivele: global, regional i sub regional.

The course involves the concepts, theories, institutions and the importance of international security study, as a basic element of international relations and presents a unitary and coherent fundamental problem of the national security as a part of the global security. The topics refer to the following aspects: security concepts development, elements of information security doctrine, security risks, transnational organized crime and major mafia organizations, international terrorism, strategy and security policy, international security organizations. An increased attention is given to the correlation national security - international security and the competent institutions in the field. To facilitate the study of the processes and institutions the course requires its division into several levels: global, regional and sub regional. The course syllabus includes the following themes: Security concept: methodology and evolution; Security as power. Strategic researches and the definition of the insecurity; Security as peace. Conflicts structural violence; National security. Vulnerabilities, risks and threats; Societal security. The new Security Agenda of Europe; Ethno-religious dimension of security; International security environment at the beginning of the 21st century; Regional and subregional security bodies; Moldovas national security; Proliferation risk and regional security in the context of globalization; Organized crime international security implications; International terrorism - forms of expression and means to tackle; International migration and security dimensions; International security institutions; Security strategies and policies; States information and security services; Moldovas national security; Risks and threats against the national security of the Republic of Moldova. , , , . : ; ; ; ; ; ; .

189

 . , : , . : : ; . (); . ; . , ; . ; ; XXI ; ; ; ; ; - ; ; ; ; ; ; .

II. OBIECTIVELE GENERALE/ STANDARD ALE DISCIPLINEI La nivel de cunoatere i nelegere : S opereze cu principalele noiuni, termeni i concepte ale disciplinii; S determine locul i rolul securitii internaionale n contextul globalizrii proceselor politice i sociale; i s stabilrasc impactul politicilor naionale asupra securitii internaionale i rolul structurilor specializate n meninerea securitii; S precizeze principalele caracteristici ale evoluiei istorice a securitii internaionale; S descrie specificul securitii naionale i internaionale. La nivel de aplicare: S analizeze noile concepii ce vizeaz sfera securitaii; S identifice factorii ce influeneaz fenomenele internaionale; S depisteze modalitile de soluionare a crizelor i conflictelor internaionale; S utilizeze adecvat aparatul categorial al cursului; S argumenteze, n baza literaturii de specialitate, poziia pe care o accept ca optim sau o respinge personal din diverse motive, obiective i subiective. La nivel de integrare: S elaboreze, n baza studiilor effectuate, propuneri privind reformarea organizaiilor internaionale de securitate; S proiecteze, n baza cunotinelor teoretice accumulate, modelul unui sistem ideal de securitate; S estimeze rolul organizaiilor internaionale de securitate n diferite perioade istorice; S cerceteze contextul modificrii conceptului de securitate n perioada post Rzboi Rece.

190

III. TEMATICA I REPARTIZAREA ORIENTATIV A ORELOR Tematica i repartizarea orientativ a orelor la prelegeri Nr. TEMA Forma prezentrii Nr. de ore (clasic, interactiv, cu folosirea noilor tehnologii etc) clasic 1. Introducere. 2 prezentare 2. Conceptul de securitate: evoluie i 2 metodologie. powerpoint interactiv 3. Securitatea ca putere. Studiile strategice i 2 definirea insecuritii. prezentare 4. Securitatea ca pace. Conflictul i violena 2 structural. powerpoint interactiv 5. Securitatea naional: vulnerabiliti, riscuri, 2 ameninri. clasic 6. Securitatea societal. Noua agend de 2 securitate n Europa. prezentare 7. Dimensiunea etnico-religioas a securitii. 2 powerpoint interactiv interactiv 8. Mediul internaional de securitate la 2 nceputul secolului XXI. clasic 9. Structuri regionale i subregionale de 2 securitate. interactiv 10. Securitatea naional a Republicii Moldova. 2 TOTAL PRELEGERI 20 Tematica i repartizarea orientativ a orelor la seminare Nr. TEMA Forma prezentrii Nr. de ore (clasic, interactiv, cu folosirea noilor tehnologii etc) clasic 1. Riscul proliferrii i securitatea regional n 2 contextul globalizrii. prezentare 2. Criminalitatea organizat- implicaii asupra 2 securitii internaionale. powerpoint interactiv 3. Terorismul international - forme de 2 manifestare i modalitti de combatere. prezentare 4. Migraia internaional i dimensiunile 2 securitii. powerpoint interactiv 5. Instituii internaionale de securitate. 2 clasic 6. Strategii i politici de securitate. 2 prezentare 7. Serviciile de informatii i securitate a statelor. 2 powerpoint interactiv interactiv 8. Securitatea naional a Republicii Moldova. 2 clasic 9. Ameninri i riscuri la adresa securitii 2 naionale a Republicii Moldova. interactiv 10. Conferina de totalizare. 2 TOTAL SEMINARE 20 191

IV. REFERINE BIBLIOGRAFICE: Bibliografie obligatorie 1. Buzan B., . a. Securitatea. Un nou cadru de analiz. Bucureti: CA Publishing, 2010. 2. Buzan B. Popoarele, statele i teama. Chiinu, 2000. 3. Colin S. Gray. Razboiul, pacea i relaiile internaionale. O introducere n istoria strategic. Iai: Polirom, 2010. 4. Dictionar de securitate internaional. Bucureti: CA Publishing, 2010. 5. Kaldor M. Securitate uman. Bucureti:CA Publishing, 2010. 6. Mearsheimer J. J. Tragedia politicii de for. Realismul ofensiv i lupta pentru putere. Bucureti, 2003. 7. Migraie i securitate. Bucuresti, 2009. 8. Provocari la adresa securitii i strategiei la nceputul secolului XXI. Bucureti, 2009. Bibliografie opional 1. Bamford J. Body of secrets: anatomy of the ultra-secret National Security Agency from the cold war through the dawn of a new century. N.Y.: Doubleday, 2001. 2. Bidu I. Meridiane de securitate. Bucureti, 2003. 3. Bonciuc S. Securitatea european n schimbare. Provocri i soluii Bucureti, 1995. 4. Dinamica mediului european de securitate. Bucuresti, 2007. 5. Ecobescu N. European Union Foreign, Security and Defence Policy. Bucureti, 2003. 6. George C. M. Un razboi al minii. Bucureti: Rao Books, 2010. 7. Griffits M. Relaii Internaionale. Curs Introductiv. Bucureti, 2003. 8. Hinsley F., Suveranitate. Chiinu, 1998. 9. Mgureanu V. Declinul sau apoteoza puterii? Bucureti, 2003. 10. Phyllis B., Michel M. Altered states. New York, 1993. 11. Pierre de Senarclens, La politique internationale. Paris, 2000. 12. Radoi M. Serviciile de informaii i decizia politic. Bucureti, 2003. 13. Securitate i cooperare n Europa: documente. Bucureti, 1993. 14. Ungureanu R.-S. Securitate, suveranitate i instituii internaionale. Iai: Polirom, 2010. 15. Wendt A. Organizaii internaionale Iai: Polirom, 2011. 16. Wright-Neville D., Dictionar de terorism. Bucureti: CA Publishing, 2010. 17. . . B: . . ., 1999, N 9, c. 119-123. 18. . . B: . . ., 1993, N 7, c. 30-40. 19. . XXI : (). B: . . ., 2002, N 1, c. 73-80. 20. . . , 2000. 21. . . B: . . ., 2002, N 1, c. 1923.

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COMPARTIMENTUL III.

READING PENTRU LUCRUL INDIVIDUAL LA STUDIILE DE PACE I CONFLICTELE INTERNAIONALE

CURSUL UNIVERSITAR PEACE STUDIES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Elaborat de MORARI Cristina

NOTE: textele propuse pentru reading-uri sunt prezentate n form de extrase, fr referine, anexe, bibliografie. Cu lucrarile originale n versiunea electronica putei s facei cunotin pe PAGINA WEB Reeaua Cercettorilor i Practicienilor Studiilor de Pace din Republica Moldova, pe adresa electronica www.peacebuilding.md

The Meanings of "Peace"

From: Theories of Peace. A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking by Johan Galtung, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1967, pp.12-17. The work Theories of peace. A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking was done for the UNESCO 1966-67 under a contract with the International Peace Research Association. It is an effort to make a comprehensive and relatively exhaustive survey of thinking about peace. Johan Galtung within this work presents the history of peace thinking, talks about the meanings of peace, typology of means to obtain peace, the special theories of peace, entropy and general theory of peace. The work presents a great value for peace studies. Here is an excerpt from the book on meanings of peace. Monografia Theories of peace. A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking a fost elaborat n cadrul colaborrii cu Asociaia Internaional de Cercetare pentru Pace pentru UNESCO 1966-67. Lucrarea dat prezint un studiu comprehensiv al cercetrilor privind pacea. Johan Caltung n cadrul acestei lucrri prezint istoria gndirii despre pace, vorbete despre semnificaia i esena pcii, descrie tipologia metodelor de obinere a pcii, teoriile pcii , precum i analizeaz entropia i teoria general a pcii. Aceast lucrare prezint o valoare major pentru studiile de pace. Mai jos este oferit un extras din carte despre esena pcii. Theories of peace. A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking UNESCO 1966-67 . . , Johan Caltung, , , , , .

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 . . So far we have used the term "peace" several times more or less with the understanding that the term has a reasonably clear, well understood and agreed upon meaning. Since this is far from the case, as already indicated in the introduction, the concept of peace has to be explored further. Without going into details, there seem to be three directions of precisation of "peace". First of all there is the old idea of peace as a synonym for stability or equilibrium. This conception of peace also refers to internal states of a human being, the person who is at peace with himself. It also covers the "law and order" concept, in other words the idea of a predictable social order even if this order is brought about by means of force and the threat of force. In general this concept does not exclude violence, since the soldier can have peace with himself on the battlefield. Then there is the idea of peace as the absence of organized collective violence, in other words violence between major human groups; particularly nations, but also between classes and between racial and ethnic groups because of the magnitude internal wars can have. We shall refer to this type of peace as negative peace. In stressing "collective violence" a limitation in the use of the word is indicated: most authors seem to use this word in such a way that it does not cover occasional homicide, i.e. unpatterned individual violence. It is the transition from this type of violence to violence across clear human borderlines, frontiers, so that it becomes group violence that constitutes a break of peace. But again, it is the organized group violence that the concept of peace excludes, not occasional outbursts, sporadic demonstrations and crowd behavior, etc. And then there is a third concept of peace which is less clearly defined. This is peace as a synonym for all other good things in the world community, particularly cooperation and integration between human groups, with less emphasis on the absence of violence. We shall refer to it as positive peace and clarify it later in this section only add here that the concept would exclude major violence, but tolerate occasional violence. It is a concept that seems to be particularly widespread in underprivileged groups, groups that are less status quo oriented, whereas both the first and the second concepts would meet with more ready acceptance in over privileged groups: they are interested in stability, law and order, and uninterested in violence since any violence would be directed against themselves. The first concept of peace is less interesting for our purpose since it does not explicitly include absence of major forms of violence, and includes an equilibrium assumption which probably is shared by very few groups or nations today. The concept of positive peace is also problematic as long as it remains so vague, and we shall follow the usage found among most authors and define "peace" in the 194

direction of "negative peace", and use it in the sense of "absence of organized, collective violence". The concept is problematic because the concept of "violence" is problematic, but for our purposes we shall use the word "violence" mainly in the sense of biological and physical force, in other words as efforts to cause bodily harm to other human beings. But the whole idea of "negative peace" is problematic. It can immediately be shown that a world where this value is realized is possible, even for a long time span, but not necessarily desirable for other reasons. We shall give two examples. Imagine that between all the nations in the world today high walls are erected, and much more efficient than walls currently existing between nations, so that no interaction at all is possible. There is no communication, no contact, no interactions between the nations. To obtain this physical walls are of course not the only means: one could also cut down interaction rates by law and supervise that the law is followed. What one would obtain in the world system of nations would be a set of dyads, all of them like the dyad Norway-Nepal today: there is complete absence of organized collective violence between the two nations, but this is only a special case of a complete absence of almost any kind of interaction between the two nations. Many other dyads in the total international system today are of the same kind (if we calculate with 135 nations today, then the number of dyads is 9.045), but very many people would probably say that this would be "peace" obtained at a rather high price. Thus, there seems to be a general feeling that the idea of peace also contains an element of contact and cooperation. It is not only the absence of negative interaction; it also implies the presence of an element of positive interaction. If this example sounds artificial, consider the following. One can organize the world in what is called a "feudal system", where big powers have a completely domineering influence and other nations are small, poor, uneducated, powerless, etc. In such a world all lines of communication would focus on the big powers, most of what happens in the system will happen between them, and the small powers (which may be colonies or "neo-colonies for that matter) are completely dependent on the big powers. They can be systematically exploited, but due to split and rule techniques they will have few opportunities to come together and join forces so as to oppose effectively the bigger powers. If now the big powers are able to keep peace between them, to cooperate in sharing the fruits of, exploitation for instance, then this system can remain "peaceful" for years, decades, centuries. At the level of individuals, classical caste structure in South Asia can serve as one example; at the level of nations some of the colonial empires the world has seen is another. The point is the centralization around the dominant power: as long as he or they are able to cooperate, then chances of avoiding violence are considerable simply because the big power does not need it and the small powers are unable to use violence for lack of resources and training and very 195

often have internalized the values of the big power so well that they do not want basic changes in the structure either. This is the reason why we refer to the system as feudal: it is reminiscent of the relations between serfs and lords in feudal Europe. But the question again is whether this is acceptable as "peace" or, put differently, whether a peace concept that does not exclude at least severe forms of inequality, subservience and exploitation is really fruitful. Put in more concrete terms: would not a peace concept, positively loaded as that word is, that defines feudal systems as peaceful also consecrate, accept such systems? The objection would be, just as above, that peace is something more than just absence of organized group violence, peace also contains an element of equality, of absence of exploitation. One could continue in this vein with more examples of societies where violence has been engineered away at the expense of some other values. But instead of presenting more examples, let us try and make more explicit some of these values. Since the search for peace is concerned with the relations between groups, it obviously divides into a negative and a positive part: the search for the conditions for the absence of negative relations, and the search for conditions that facilitate the presence of positive relations. These two aspects of the search for peace are not unrelated since most peace promoters probably would agree that the most promising way to reduce negative relations to a minimum is via an increase of positive relations but empirical correlation does not imply logical dependence, for which reason the two concepts should be kept separate. And which are these "positive relations"? Just to mention some examples: 1. Presence of cooperation 2. Freedom from fear 3. Freedom from want 4. Economic growth and development 5. Absence of exploitation 6. Equality 7. Justice 8. Freedom of action 9. Pluralism 10. Dynamism All these values can be discussed at the intra-national level of individuals as well as at the international level of nations. One can talk about individuals exploiting each other and nations exploiting each other, about individuals living in fear and anxiety and nations doing so, about individuals having a wide range of actions open to themselves so that they can live "rich lives"

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and individuals that have a very narrow spectrum of actions from which they can choose, and one may talk about nations in the same way. Some comments of this set of ten values: By "presence of cooperation" we mean a pattern of interaction between nations so that there is an exchange of values between them, of commodities, services, knowledge, people etc. This is the opposite of isolation, it is interdependence between nations. By "freedom from fear" we mean a state of affairs such that individuals, and nations, predict with relatively high probability a major negative event in the future, an event with relatively high negative utility, and this expectation dominates their life and existence - whether they live in the shadow of floods, earth-quakes, hunger, war (internal or external) or other calamities. By "freedom from want" we mean that neither in the life of the individuals nor in the life of the nations should major, primary needs remain unsatisfied or unsatisfiable. Thus, we mainly refer to such needs as hunger, thirst, shelter, sex, basic security. By "economic growth and development" we mean an organization of the structure of nations and the relations between nations so that 1. resources per capita increase, and 2. these resources are better distributed. This is not only a question of technological development but also of social organization, at the national as well as at the international level. By "absence of exploitation" we mean that all value exchanges between individuals as well as between nations take place at, roughly, equal terms. Thus, no individual shall be able to receive very much more from another individual than he gives back to that individual (the example is, for instance, labor force in exchange for money), nor shall any nation be able to extract from another nation much more than she gives to that nation (the example here is, for instance, the rate at which raw materials are exchanged for industrial products in world trade). By "equality" we mean that all individuals and nations are regarded as having the same essential value, none is implicitly worth more and entitled to basically different types of life or existence than others. Extreme "gaps" in opportunities and resources at the disposal of individuals or of nations should not be tolerated. By "justice" one may mean roughly the same as by "equality", but there is also the dimension of basic, fundamental rights, not only individual or national worth or value. By "freedom of action" we mean that all individuals and nations should have a wide range of possible actions open to them - both that they have been stimulated to have the imagination to conceive of such action and that they have the means to carry them out. But the concept is problematic since it implies a kind of independence relative to other individuals or other nations that is incompatible with the interdependence. A person who is happily married renounces on certain types of freedom of action because he gains a wider range of possibilities - but whether the net gain is positive or negative may be a matter of debate. By "Pluralism" we mean that nations and the world should contain a large social and cultural diversity of forms co-existing side by side, and by "dynamism" 197

we mean that at least parts of the nations and parts of the world are constructed in such a way that a change or conditions for a change are built into the structure. In other words, there must be options left open for future generations, policies that exclude too many options are harmful from that point of view. The last two requirements will by many be considered unnecessarily sophisticated. However, they can easily be confronted with a world where neither pluralism nor dynamism are present, since most utopias were constructed according to that formula, where one part of the utopia is essentially a replication of other parts, and one time period of the existence in this utopia is a replication of another time period. This lack of diversity in time and space will probably not be seen as attractive either, to many people, for which reason requirements nos. 9 and 10 have been included in the list. One may now ask whether there is a logical contradiction inherent in these values, and the answer is probably no. There may be a contradiction in the sense that no empirically viable world exists that will maximize all ten at the same time - but this is a structural incompatibility, not a logical inconsistency. At a purely verbal or conceptual level an inspection of all pairs, triples, etc. of values from the list of ten elements above does not reveal any immediate logical inconsistency. This, however, does not mean that these values will stand on everybody's list as to what they desire for a future world, nor that it is not relatively easy to multiply the list by including, for instance, many of the so-called "human rights" and other values frequently praised in national anthems, national speeches, and important declarations. But the significance of this list for our purpose is more as a catalogue of analytical problems than as a complete list of what humanity is striving to obtain: the values serve to highlight some problems when they are considered in conjunction because of the difficulty in constructing a world that will maximize all ten - and, in addition, minimize the use of violence. The next question is whether the values can be said to be mutually independent. Again, we are referring to logical independence, not to whether there is a tendency towards positive correlation between them in the empirical worlds realized in past and present and likely to be realized in the future. In other words, the question is whether the value concepts are constructed in such a way that a relation or implication exists between one subset of them and another subset of them. It is difficult to see that this can be said to be the case. Thus, there may be complete absence of exploitation and still very limited freedom of action, there may be equality in the sense defined above and still exploitation (although this would be an unsatisfactory kind of equality to most people), there may be negative peace but based on fear, as in a system based of balance of terror, and there may be dynamism without pluralism and pluralism without dynamism although both of those combinations may be said to be unlikely. 198

Thus, there are many problems - to use a mild understatement. For in addition to the problem of reconciling relatively consensual values that could form a basis for morality in the world community of nations, and the national communities of individuals, come all the other values that individuals and nations pursue, values that are idiosyncratic and far from consensual. One nation may pursue security but do so by extending its sphere of influence so that the net result is subjugation of other nations and peoples. Another nation may be interested in economic growth and extend markets in a way that hampers rather than furthers economic growth in other countries, and so on. All such moves may or may not be reconcilable with the value of negative peace, but are usually not automatically reconcilable with that value particularly since there are nations that want to dominate, militarily, politically, economically, culturally, as a goal in its own right. To simplify this picture we shall make use of the following distinction: negative peace, which remains the "absence of organized collective violence", positive peace, which is the sum total of other relatively consensual values in the world community of nations -exemplified with the list of ten values given above, national values, which are expressions of other goals that nations pursue. To pursue peace then, narrowly conceived, becomes like an engineering problem: given the globe as it is, its 3.3 billion inhabitants, its division into nations and other groups; how should this system be organized so as to obtain negative peace? And to pursue peace, broadly conceived: How can this system be organized so as to obtain both negative and positive peace? The third group of values, the national values, is then left aside for nations to pursue to the extent they are not constrained from doing so by the efforts to realize negative and positive peace. The assumption underlying this whole work is that it is in the interest of mankind to look at this problem globally, as a technical problem of organization, and not as a problem that can best be discussed from the vantage points of special individuals, groups, nations. In particular one would be highly skeptical about the idea that these global values can be realized by adding up national efforts to realize national values; the assumption is that these values exist sui generis, at a higher level of social organization than the individuals and the nation states. It is to the examination of this type of thinking, thinking devoted to the promotion of peace that we now turn. By and large we shall stick to the old tradition of having negative peace in focus, but all the time with the values of positive peace as the background against which efforts to realize negative peace are to be judged.

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Idealist and Liberal Agendas for Peace

From: Peace in International Relations by Oliver P. Richmond, New York, Routledge, 2008, pp.22-27. The work Peace in International Relations is a complex overview of approaches of peace in theory of international relations. The author presents idealist, realist and Marxist version of peace as well as post-structuralist contributions to peace. Here is an excerpt from the book that reflects the idealist and liberal agendas for peace. Opera Peace in International Relations ofer un studiu profund al pcii n cadrul teoriei relaiilor internaionale. Autorul prezint viziunile colilor realiste, idealiste i marxiste asupra pcii, precum i contribuiile post-structuralismului. Mai jos este oferit un extras din carte privind agenda pentu pace al idealitilor i liberalilor. Peace in International Relations . , , , , . . Idealist thinking about IR rested upon various notions of internationalism and interdependence, peace without war, disarmament, the hope that war could be eradicated eventually, the right of self-determination of all citizens, and the possibility of world government or a world federation. In this sense it saw itself as eminently practical rather than utopian, reecting an ontology of peace and harmony. The international organisation of sovereign states, in this case the League of Nations, was central to the idealist agenda, though it was also recognised that the spirit of international organisation (internationalism, democracy and trade) might be more important than an actual organisation itself. Underpinning this is the optimistic argument that human nature is not intrinsically violent and, even if it is, social and political norms, regimes and organization can prevent violence. By the early 1930s, the optimism of these idealist agendas was replaced with concern over the rise of Fascism and Nazism. This idealist agenda drew on and reected early liberal thinking of which there emerged three main strands. Locke focused on individualism and Bentham on utilitarianism; Adam Smith provided the foundations for the arguments for free trade and pacism; and Kant developed a republican internationalism. These provided the foundations for human rights and international law, though these were disputed amongst these thinkers. The core liberal assumptions are of universal rationality, individual liberty, connected with the idealist possibility if not probability of harmony and cooperation in domestic and international relations, and of the need for enlightened, rational, legitimate domestic government and international governance. There latter conditions were tempered, of course, by the Millian understanding that government was a necessary evil. Idealists and liberals assume that war is of no interest to peoples who operate 200

under the assumption of harmony and cooperation, that political pluralism, democracy and a broad distribution of rights and responsibility, are crucial to peace in IR. Incorporated into this are ideas associated with economic liberalism, derived from Adam Smith. The notion of free markets and trade as a hidden hand that would build up irrevocable and peaceful connections between states also became part of the liberal agenda for peace through interdependence. Effectively liberalism developed a moral account of free individuals in a social contract with a representative and benevolent government, framed by democratic and transparent institutions that reect these principles. There would be no arbitrary authority, there should be a free press and free speech, legal equality and freedom of property. Social and economic rights of welfare are also a concern, though this is balanced by a tendency to avoid highly centralized states. The implication of this is that individuals prefer peace, freedom, rights and prosperity, and that IR is, or should be, a zone of peace. Idealists, liberals and pluralists concur on this, offer a positive epistemology of peace as well as institutional support and normative concurrence for liberals, together with scientic proof on the part of pluralists. Aristotle wrote that we may have to make war that we may live in peace. Spinoza argued that peace is not an absence of war; it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, condence, and justice. These views help frame the liberal dilemma: in order to attain an approximation of an idealist view of peace that would provide peoples and states with rights, security, prosperity, and lead to disarmament, there rst has to be a suitable foundation. This can be a clean slate (terra nullis), a victory, an agreement, ceasere or treaty. In other words, violence often precedes peace, and indeed provides a foil for an ensuing peace that can then be created with liberal and pluralist tools. This creates a signicant doubt about this specic idealistliberalpluralist approach to peace that masquerades as ideal, but is based upon the enforcement of supposedly universal political norms, appeals to a limited pluralist theoretical scientic approach based on human needs and transnationalism, and in fact shares some characteristics with a realist version of peace (though it offers a much more developed account). Erasmus also discussed peace in his famous text, The Complaint of Peace. For him, war was to be avoided at all costs as it provided pretexts for crime, murder, brutality and self-interest. He helped establish a genre of peace plans, and from Eramus onwards there was a long line of similar writings (including those of Emeric Cruce, the Duc de Sully William Penn, Abbe St Pierre, Rousseau and, of course, Kant) aimed at avoiding war in Europe, often resting on the creation of a federation of states with a federal council that would act to prevent war between its members, as well as to promote free trade. These were seen as idealistic plans, though their authors regarded them as pragmatic.

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Locke, one of the fathers of modern liberalism, saw human reason as the key to controlling the state of nature. What was crucial for him was the development of a social contract through which subjects and rules developed mutual constitutive roles in order to protect life, liberty and private property (this inuenced Thomas Jefferson and the American Declaration of Independence). This, combined with Benthams view of the need for liberal institutions as opposed to imperialism and competitive tariffs, led into a discussion of the qualities of the liberal state, which many idealists saw as the basis for an international peace. The Kantian Perpetual Peace is perhaps the archetypal version of these agendas, and their inuential status in IR and in thinking about world politics and peace more generally. It is indicative of a common impetus, shared by idealist, liberal and pluralist approaches to overcome the negative epistemology and ontology of realism, which at best provides for a domestic and international peace that is subservient to defensive requirements and preparedness against potential threats. In the post-Enlightenment world, however, the major agenda for a new peace came to be associated with overcoming these primitive notions of peace in IR, through liberal internationalism, liberal institutionalism and the modernist era, through what were supposed to be more scientic forms of pluralism. Whereas realism presents war as part of the fall of humanity, and a necessary stabilisation mechanism for international order, idealism and liberalism sees fallen man as retrievable through suitable planning and organisation. This involves the rejection of the negative epistemology and ontology in realist IR. Idealists, liberals and pluralists concur on the creation of institutions and safeguards to protect key norms and to provide for individuals, so cementing a social contract which preserves the polity. Kant presented perhaps the most comprehensive representation of a liberal and, some would argue, idealist, understanding of an international order which could be termed peaceful in liberal normative terms. He developed an account of peace that rested upon his belief that a categorical imperative existed as an innate and universal moral law, specically at three levels: domestic, international, cosmopolitan. As Geuss has pointed out, this was little more than a half-secularised version of . . . theocratic ethics. This dictated that human beings should be treated as ends rather than means, and required just laws that would be reected in a republican political order, which would also extend to international relations. Kant argued that war was brought about by the absence of an international rule of law and democracy, and that trade enabled peaceful relations. Accordingly there was a general will to adopt codes of conduct that minimised violence, creating a law of peoples. This system was preferable to world government (which might lead to despotism). Kant believed that there were acceptable limits for behaviour established by the categorical imperative, but also that the international system should not be made vulnerable to despotism by imbuing it with the tensions inherent in the existence of 202

autonomous governments for separate states, all controlled by a common normative system. Consequently, Perpetual Peace established a vision of a liberal order, rested upon the notion that human behaviour is motivated by social learning rather than merely nature and that peace did not preclude defensive wars, which was later to be repeated in UN Charter. The only universal rule was one of hospitality to others, and war came about because of the failings of non-Republican states. Kantian strands of liberalism also gave rise to the contemporary democratic peace thesis, as well as the concept of human rights. As already alluded to, Kant also pointed to a signicant problem inherent in these more idealist readings of peace: peace might be used to disguise domination or hegemony. Kantian thinking represented an emerging cosmopolitan ethic forming the basis of a number of European peace projects. The most well-known inuence on Kantian thought, for example, was the Project for Perpetual Peace developed by Abbe de St-Pierre (1713). This was followed by many others, including those of Kant, Rousseau, Bentham, and Penn. They all sought to establish a pragmatic process by which political relations in Europe were pacied. These often drew upon (or in the case of Rousseau, critiqued) Abbe de Saint-Pierres peace plan, which had argued in what now seem very familiar terms for a European treaty leading to a federation of states, based upon justice, equality and reciprocity between both Christian and Muslim sovereigns. This federal organisation would not intervene in the affairs of member states but would have intelligence and self-defence capacities, and would be able to militarily intervene in other states if it was necessary to preserve the peace. This version of peace represented a consensual order between states mature enough to be able to see that cooperation was a viable expectation and that conict led to more conict. Via other additions to this genre of European peace projects, it was a short step to the idea of an embryonic European parliament. In a prescient work, Penn demolished a key classical realist assumption that international organisation would undermine the sovereignty of princes. In stating the obvious that peace would prevent bloodshed, save the reputation of Christianity in the sight of indels, save money, preserve cities and towns, allow movement and create friendship he made an important connection between peace and liberal governance (this has become the core assumption of the contemporary liberalinternational order). Even so, it still proved intellectually difcult to resist realist assumptions about the nature of state interests, power and the resulting international system, mainly because of their simplicity in determining states as unitary actors, with simple interests, determined by the collective capacity to act upon them from which would emerge a limited peace. By contrast, liberal thinking represented a much more complex peace system requiring social, political and economic organisation, across several levels of analysis. John Stuart Mill conceded, for example, 203

that a Leviathan was still required, though it should be legitimate (meaning it should draw on a broad consensus) and protect individual freedoms. Jeremy Bentham similarly argued that peace would need to be constructed partly through disarmament but also through state maximisation of the interests of its citizens. This genre of peace plans was essentially based upon a Christian, liberal ethic and set of norms, and offered liberals and idealists alike hopes of a sophisticated, sustainable, form of peace. A signicant contribution to this emerging discourse on peace was Grotius notion of natural law, founded in the right of self-preservation and private property, which are extended to states that protect themselves in the context of norms and rules. This pointed to the morality of coexistence and non-intervention, resting on states rights of selfdefence and the concept of just war. The conduct of the Napoleonic Wars were indicative of realist order dened as by Hobbes, but the ensuing Congress of Vienna of 1815 was an attempt to develop a formal liberal international order. Fixed meetings between representatives of the great powers were to be instituted on a regular basis in what came to be known as a conference system, which would be most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe. Of course, this was also underpinned by a reconstituted balance of power and mutual guarantees between its proponents. In essence this version of peace rested upon the capacity to intervene, or refrain from intervening, in the affairs of other states as well as cooperation in order to continue the pre-war notion of peace which the victors of the Napoleonic Wars had aspired to. It was indicative of the conservative and liberal debates of this era about peace and war. For conservative thinkers peace lay in the preservation of the existing order, perhaps through the use of war. For liberal thinkers, peace would arrive via a transformation brought about by economic and social progress. Obviously, the development of international norms, cooperation and organisation could not be unilaterally undertaken, and would require some form of international organisation and law whereby the interests inherent in the international may outweigh those of the parochial (as formulated by Grotius work on natural law, based upon human sociability and international norms guaranteeing self-preservation). Yet, in a common counterargument, the romanticism of political community described by Herder indicated the danger that nationalism posed towards such liberalinternationalism, especially in the expression of selfdetermination symbolised by the French and American Revolutions. Ironically, self-determination, originally a prescription for liberal freedoms and associated with the idealism of a common community, was to give rise to conicting claims over territorial sovereignty in other words inter-state or anti-colonial conict. Self-determination aimed at constructing a just peace but instead, it underlined the impossibility of a type of justice built upon the redistribution of territory and sovereignty 204

according to [ethno] national identity. Yet, it rapidly became an antidote to imperialism and colonialism. This version of peace rested upon rampant self-determination and nationalism, and was in fact no peace at all Early attempts at self-determination, which appealed to such contradictory idealist and liberal sentiments, such as that of Greece from the Ottoman Empire, strove to create a peaceful nation state through violence. By 1871, this was the order of the day in Europe, in combination with the frantic search for empire. Nationalists took control of this agenda, which for conservatives was to preserve their wealth and power, and for liberals had become a civilising mission.These two aims combined in a tumultuous period during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, during which nationalism, imperialism and industrialisation appeared to combine to offer a future, utopian peace in the minds of many a new peace. Liberal imperialism softened the notion that prot could be made from virgin territories, supposedly establishing a responsibility through which the imperial or colonial power should aid in the development of that territory and its peoples. For example, in the late nineteenth century British Prime Ministers Disraeli and Gladstone had opposed each other on the peace project that was derived from British imperialism, with Disraeli believing that the empire only had responsibility to itself (meaning Britain itself), while Gladstone had a vision of liberal imperialism through which the empire spread the benets of peace to its subjects. Formal and informal colonial rule continued this trend towards a basic consideration of the legitimacy of such adventures. But there was a growing tension between occupier and local inhabitants over whether this could be termed peace given the cultural and racial attitudes of superiority normally adopted by the coloniser, such as in British India and in the light of the political developments outlined above, imperialism and colonialism lost their legitimacy amongst both the states and peoples of the world in the twentieth century.

Origins of the New Wars Concept

From: The New Wars Debate Revisited: an Empirical Evaluation of the Atrociousness of New Wars' by Erik Melander, Magnus berg and Jonathan Hall, Sweden, Uppsala Peace Research Papers, No. 9, pp.6-15. The work The New Wars Debate Revisited: an Empirical Evaluation of the Atrociousness of New Wars is a complex study of new wars. Authors explain the difference between old and new wars, gave causes that have led to new wars. Also, there are given empirical evidence for new wars, data and analysis of new wars features. Here is an excerpt from the book that speaks about the origins of the new wars concept. Monografia The New Wars Debate Revisited: an Empirical Evaluation of the Atrociousness of New Wars este un studiu complex al noilor rzboaie. Autorii explic diferena dintre rzboiale vechi i noi i prezint cauzele care au condus la rzboaiele de nou tip 205

din prezent. De asemenea, n studiu snt aduse date empirice ce explic rzboaiele de tip nou i este efectuat analiza trsaturilor acestui fenomen. Mai jos este oferit un extras din carte despre originea conceptului de rzboi de tip nou. The New Wars Debate Revisited: an Empirical Evaluation of the Atrociousness of New Wa . , . . , . The conceptualization of old state-based wars in which political calculus motivates leaders to construct states, armies and economies in order to wage wars of overwhelming force against similarly organized opponents is thought to be a far cry from todays wars. The new wars are thought to blur the distinction between internal and external, public and private, political and economic, civilian and military and even war and peace itself (Holsti, 1996: 36-40; Kaldor, 2002: 5, 29). Occurring in failing or failed states, these are understood to be essentially nonpolitical, identity-based, organizationally deconstructed wars of aggrandizement waged among a myriad of actors unified only in their disregard for legitimacy, ideological goals and military restraint (Snow, 1996: 100-102). What is thought to have caused such a dramatic shift in the form of warfare? Three causes are offered: the failure of modernity, globalization and the end of the Cold War. Modernity is referred to in the new wars literature primarily as the cause of the structure of old wars. In particular, old wars are associated with the rise of the modern nation-state system (Kaldor, 2002: 13-30). As portrayed in Clausewitzs On War, modern warfare is a conflict between organized armies on the battlefield and is a continuation of politics by other means, the logic of which tends toward extremes in warfare. The consolidation of political power, the creation of large standing armies, and the harnessing of the power of the economy via the creation of the military-industrial complex are conducted to serve this end. The collapse of statebuilding projects in poorer countries is thus equated with a failure of modernity itself, which is operationalized as inclusive thinking and the creation of centralized authority structures. The interplay between state-building and warfare both builds society and eventually destroys it, providing social structure and organization, but also creating the conditions for the totalizing wars of the early twentieth century. In terms of their all encompassing and genocidal tendencies, the two World Wars are the culmination of the logic of old wars, foreshadowing the coming brutality and destructiveness of new wars (Shaw, 1999). Thus, modernity contains within it the seeds of its own demise. The modern state and warfare model are understood to have remained intact through the Cold War, although already the process of globalization was increasing the erosion of its foundations. 206

In identifying the causes of new wars, certain scholars focus particularly on the weakening of these state structures (Duffield, 2002; Holsti, 1996). Some theorists argue that society requires a powerful agent to enforce social order, and that the undermining of the states gewalt or its capability and actual use of force is a fundamental cause of the rise of alternative loci of power (Brzoska, 2004: 109). Duffield (Duffield, 2002) offers an alternative to the dominant notion among new wars theorists that the changing nature of warfare is a failure of modernity, arguing instead that new wars represent a form of resistance to the global liberal economy. This reflexive modernity offers an alternative political, economic and social model to protect the livelihoods of the poorest who would otherwise suffer under liberal free market economics and the current dominant global power structure whose main proponents are wealthy developed states. Nevertheless, the dominant view among proponents of the new wars concept is that todays wars are, on a fundamental level, socially degenerate (Shaw, 1999). The philosophical importance of modernity is also brought to bear in the analysis of new wars. Kaldor (Kaldor, 2002: 76-89) describes new wars as essentially a struggle between inclusive and exclusive principles of social organization: whereas identities (such as nationalism), ideas (such as national interest) and ideologies (such as liberalism, socialism, or fascism) animating old wars are thought to be inherently inclusive, the organizing principles of new wars are inherently exclusive. Examples of the latter include religion, language, ethnicity and rigid forms of nationalism3. The failure of the nation-state and the rise of exclusive identities are perceived as a failure of modern thought, organization and power structure. The trajectory of modern warfare thus traces the rise and fall of enlightenment philosophy. Just as the two World Wars brought about the undermining of the confidence of modern positivism, so the same period appears to signal the end of the modern state and the modern warfare model. However, despite the theoretical coherence of this analysis of war, its correspondence to reality is less obvious. An important counter point to note is that modern states have not completely failed. Quite the contrary; most modern states are thriving under globalization. In fact, the theory of democratic peace is at least partially based upon the beneficial qualities of liberal interdependence (Hegre et al., 2001; Russett & Oneal, 2001). Globalization is presented as both the primary cause (Kaldor, 1999, 2002) and primary aspect (Duffield, 2000; Kaldor, 1999) of new wars. For Kaldor (Kaldor, 2002: 3), globalization is conceived of vaguely as the the intensification of global interconnectedness political, economic, military and cultural. This is seen as increasing dramatically during the Cold War, albeit in the context of regional blocks rather than truly global exchanges. The ideology of Cold War politics lessened national identity barriers in the face of a common enemy, providing a common vocabulary on which to build transnational civil society. During this period, military 207

cooperation was increasing on a dramatic scale, tying state armies into inseparable cooperative international frameworks (Kaldor, 2002: 28). Economic interactions increased through assistance programs like that of the Marshall Plan and through trade agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). State sovereignty was also relinquished through membership in intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In regards to Third World states in particular, the military, economic and diplomatic assistance given by the Cold War rivals in the course of global competition for influence and control within the states system deepened their reliance on the outside world. International bank lending and repayment increased dependency on Western states and led to further weakening of state capabilities through liberal structural adjustment programs (primarily regulated by the IMF). Although aimed at curbing corruption and increasing efficiency, these programs often had the effect of slashing state benefits. This, coupled with the partial deregulation and privatization of state-owned industries and a reduction in state oversight, increased both incentives and opportunities for participation in the global illicit economy. As the Cold War came to an end, it is argued, globalization exacted its final price on the legitimacy and capacity of the state. The end of the Cold War is thought to precipitate the collapse of modernity, accelerate the process of globalization, and create an inherently less stable distribution of power in comparison to that of the previous bi-polar world order. According to Snow (Snow, 1996: 4), The international system that evolved during the Cold War was a highly structured and, after a time, highly predictable set of relationshipsthere evolved a competition for influence between the superpowers that in turn created a framework within which the internal and international behavior of Third World states was regulated. With the end of the Cold War, the erosion of state sovereignty and capacity to govern in the Third World was precipitated by the withdrawal of support by the Soviet Union and the United States. In addition, the break-up of the Soviet Union resulted in the discrediting of the ideology of socialism. Kaldor (Kaldor, 2002: 82) points out that Aspost-independence hopes faded, many politicians began to appeal to particularistic tendencies. Thus, with end of the Cold War, we see a greater reliance among leaders on alternative means of social mobilization such as religion and ethnicity. What is more, the demise of the Cold War order is thought to signal the end of a stable era of bi-polar balance within the international system. This stability is thought to arise from a balance of military power, but also from restraints imposed upon warring parties. As Snow argues, The bottom line is that the end of the Cold War has been accompanied by an apparently reduced willingness and ability to control internal violenceGovernments and potential insurgents no longer have ideological patrons who provide them with the wherewithal to commit violence and then expect some influence over how that violence is carried out. (Snow, 1996: 46) Furthermore, the assistance 208

given to states served to strengthen otherwise weak or failing states. Finally, the Cold War provided regimes with higher ideological goals and roles within the global struggle that provided a source of legitimacy. With the collapse of the Cold War, greater instability was introduced into the global system, increasing the likelihood of the outbreak of violent conflict and opening the doors to atrocities. As a result of the failure of modernity, the corrosiveness of globalization and the end of bi-polar Cold War stability, we are thought to be witnessing fundamental changes in the social relations governing the way in which wars are fought. In this deadly nexus, Widespread human rights abuse is not part of the collateral damage of the new wars, it is organic to how they are fought and their aims realized (Duffield, 2002: 1051).4 Occurring under weak or failed states, war becomes primarily a competition for resources, including the remnants of the state, the assets of the population and available inflows of materials, food and money. Military stores are ransacked, populations are terrorized and humanitarian and other forms of financial aid are taxed or siphoned off. Other sources of external funding include remittances from diaspora populations and participation in global illicit trade, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs, people and easily extractable resources. In such a situation, the state of war is preferable to peace because in war there are greater opportunities for extracting rents, and cover is provided for illegal economic activity. In short, a sort of new economic logic is built in to the functioning of the war economy such that war is no longer productive, as it was in old wars, but rather destructive and predatory (Kaldor, 2002: 90).

Conflict Dimension: Global Trends in Armed Conflict

From: Global Report 2011, Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility by Monty G. Marshall, Benjamin R. Cole, USA 2011, pp. 3-8.

The Global Report 2011 - Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility give a complex analysis of global system within the context of globalization, trends of armed conflicts, global trends in governance and state fragility. Important data and deep analysis provided by the report represent a considerable resource for research in peace and conflict studies. Here is presented an excerpt on the global trends in armed conflict. Raportul Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility din anul 2011 ofer o analiz complex al sistemului global n era globalizrii, al tendinelor conflictelor armate, al tendinelor globale n guvernare i fragilitii statale. Datele i studiul oferit de raport prezint o important surs pentru cercetrile n domeniul studiilor de pace i conflict. Mai jos este oferit un extras din raport privind tendinele globale ale conflictelor armate.

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 Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility , , . . . The most encompassing observation that can be made regarding global system performance in regard to its conflict dimension concerns the status of major episodes of political violence (armed conflict). These include societal (civil, ethnic, and communal) and interstate (including independence) warfare. The global trend in major armed conflict has continued its dramatic decline during the globalization era both in numbers of states affected by major armed conflicts and in total magnitude. According to our calculations, the global magnitude of warfare has decreased by over sixty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end of 2010 to its lowest level since 1961. Societal warfare has been the predominant mode of warfare since the mid-1950s; increasing steeply and steadily through the Cold War period. This steep, linear increase in societal warfare is largely explained by a general tendency toward longer, more protracted, wars during that period; internal wars often received crucial military and/or material support from foreign states and often linked to the competition between the superpowers. On the other hand, the rate of onset of new societal wars has remained constant since 1946 with an average of about four new societal wars per year. In contrast, the global trend in interstate warfare has remained at a relatively low level since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations. Organization (UN). The UN was specially designed to maintain international peace and security without interven[ing] in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. Although there was a moderate increase in interstate wars during the latter years of the Cold War, from 1977 to 1987, like civil warfare, interstate warfare has also declined substantially since the end of the Cold War. Of the interstate wars that took place during the Cold War period, many of the most serious were wars of independence fought during the decolonization of the third world during the first half of the Cold Warperiod. Onsets of interstate wars occurred at the rate of about one and one-half eventsper year. Three-quarters of the sixty-seven interstate wars remained at fairly low levels of violence. The conventional distinction between inter-state and intra-state wars has been blurred by increased global activism directed toward humanitarian operations and the responsibility to protect. High magnitude interstate wars were limited to the several Arab-Israeli wars, the Vietnamese wars, the Afghanistan wars, the Iraqi wars, the India-Pakistan wars, and the recent 210

war between Ethiopia and Eritrea; all except the Iraq-Iran (1980-88) war and the first Gulf War (1990-91) had some domestic, or former-domestic, conflict element (i.e., internationalized civil wars). Over the entire period, since 1946, wars have been quite common: there have been 326 distinct episodes of major armed conflict in the worlds 164 countries. During the past twentyfive years (since 1986), over one-half of all countries have experienced some major armed conflict (83 of 164 countries; in addition, the armed conflict in the Comoros islands, though relatively major, did not reach 500 deaths). In late 2011, there were twenty-one countries experiencing major armed conflicts within their territory; all of these are beset by societal warfare: Mexico, Colombia, Nigeria (north), Chad, Central African Republic, Sudan (Darfur and south Sudan),Democratic Republic of Congo (northeast), Ethiopia (Ogaden), Somalia, Yemen, Israel (Gaza), Iraq, Syria, Turkey (Kurds), Russia (eastern Transcaucasus), Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (Kashmir, Maoist, and Assam), Myanmar (various non-Burman groups), Thailand (Malays), and the Philippines (Moro). Four of the current, major armed conflicts have a substantial drug production and trafficking component: Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and Myanmar (Burma). The several episodes of warfare plaguing the central and eastern Africa region involve roving militias and cross-border tensions. Militants from Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi take refuge and continue to create havoc in the northeastern DRC and southern Sudan. The global mapping of State Fragility and Warfare in the Global System indicates that state fragility and warfare are closely connected, topics that will be examined in more detail later in this report. The fifteen recently ended wars are numerically tagged on the map. In many of these locations, political tensions and/or low level violence continue to challenge state authorities. Recently ended conflicts include those in 1) United States (al Qaeda, Iraq, and Afghanistan); 2) Haiti; 3) Russia (Chechnya); 4) Georgia-Russia; 5) Lebanon; 6) Egypt; 7) Libya; 8) Ivory Coast; 9) Nigeria (Delta); 10) Uganda; 11) Kenya; 12) Saudi Arabia; 13) Sri Lanka (Tamils); 14) Nepal; and 15) Kyrgyzstan. The down side of the dramatic decrease in the general magnitude of armed conflict in the global system since the early 1990s is a dramatic increase in the number of post-war recovery states. War ravaged societies are highly prone to humanitarian crises and are in dire need of broad-based assistance. Perhaps the greatest challenge in post-war recovery is the oversupply of arms and skilled militants under conditions ripe for economic exploitation and the expansion of organized crime. Of course, countries bordering on war-torn and war-recovery states experience serious diffusion and spillover effects that further increase and expand the reach of organized crime, stimulate political tensions and corruption, increase local and regional insecurity,

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challenge local authorities, and overwhelm the already severely limited provision of crucial social services. One of the current wars in remission has been touted as a global war (the global war on terrorism led by the United States); in terms of systematic and sustained attacks, however, that global war has been confined almost entirely to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Increased armed conflict in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen in 2010 and 2011 indicate that the largely localized, foreign interventionary wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may be fueling or are otherwise symptomatic of a larger, regional conflict, although that activity appears to be diminishing in late 2011. There have been increases in militant activity in almost all areas along the periphery of the Muslim region. Islamic militants are almost entirely responsible for the dramatic increase in high casualty terrorist bombings (HCTB) since September 2001 (i.e., bombings by non -state actors resulting in fifteen or more deaths). These bombings killing and maiming mainly noncombatants are very often directed at a specific political target. HCTB events have been concentrated in Muslim countries and in Muslim-majority regions in neighboring countries and the vast majority of casualties that have occurred have been among local, fellow-Muslims. To be fair, foreign interventionary forces have relied heavily on aerial and drone bomb attacks in these same theaters of warfare and noncombatants often figure prominently among the resulting casualties. While the frequency and lethality of "international terrorism" does not appear to have increased much in recent years and, in any case, remains at extremely low levels when compared with any other form of political or criminal violence, the tactical use of "low-tech, smart bombs" (mainly car bombs and suicide bombers) against "soft targets" (mainly political and civilian targets) has increased dramatically since the 9/11/01 attacks (in which 2,982 people were killed). However, most of the increase in these high profile terrorist attacks have been confined to a handful of localities: Russia, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Israel, and, especially, Iraq (there has not been an HCTB event in Israel since August 2004 and there had not been an attack in Russia since the Beslan attack on September 1, 2004, until August 2009). While the rise of the "super-empowered terrorist" as an innovation in tactical or criminal violence is certainly a disturbing trend, the evidence shows that it remained an extreme and relatively rare event, outside the extremist nightmare that has engulfed Iraq since mid-2003. HCTB attacks have killed more than 26,000 people since the 9/11 events, with sixty percent of the killings having taken place in Iraq. The frequency of HCTB attacks in Iraq decreased dramatically beginning in September 2007, falling to less than 20% of the toll at the peak of HCTB attacks (falling from 2677 to 512). The number of HCTB deaths in Iraq has remained fairly steady since 2007, with numbers varying between 500 and 1000 in each 6-month period 212

since the peak. HCTB attacks in Pakistan have increased dramatically since 2007 and, especially, in late 2009 in conjunction with the governments military offensive against Taliban and al Qaeda strongholds. As mentioned, the several loosely aligned armed conflicts comprising the global war on terror stand as a serious challenge to progressive globalization. These conflicts have the potential for escalating to a more conventional regional war: Pakistan has already been drawn in, Russia and Turkey have been drawn back in, and Algeria is experiencing continued low-level violence. Egypt, Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia are also experiencing serious spillover effects from armed conflicts in this region. Increasing competition over oil supplies can only complicate, if not directly fuel, conflict dynamics in this region, just as disputes over property rights and revenue shares from more recently discovered and exploited oil reserves have complicated conflict dynamics in many African countries, such as Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Sri Lankas adoption of total war tactics in defeating Tamil (LTTE) separatists in 2009 has been touted by some as an example of effective resolution for long-standing armed societal wars. Such an extreme approach to effective resolution requires serious reflection on what constitutes the effective prosecution of military victory and the systemic consequences of such victory. Donor fatigue and engagement frustration over the long course of recovery and development in the global ghettos may contribute to acquiescence in favor of, or even support for, more extreme solutions to intractable conflicts, greater neglect of the more insoluble development problems, and acceptance of repressive and predatory governance. The military prosecution of societal conflict has always played out on an unlevel playing field and military victory in such asymmetrical contests, while ending the fighting, has generally resulted in severe consequences for civilian populations and favored an uncompromising maintenance of the status quo.

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Violence, Peace, and Peace Research

by Johan Caltung, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1969, pp. 168-172.

Johan Caltung is known as parent of peace studies. This article presents an analysis of idea of peace, concepts of peace and peace research, dimensions of violence, the means of personal and structural violence. Here is presented an excerpt from the article. Johan Caltung este considerat printele studiilor de pace. Articolul dat prezint o analiz al ideii pcii, conceptului de pace i cercetare a pcii, al dimensiunilor violenei i al mijloacelor violenei structurale. Mai jos este oferit un extras din articol. Johan Caltung . , , . . As a point of departure, let us say that violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations. This statement may lead to more problems than it solves. However, it will soon be clear why we are rejecting the narrow concept of violence - according to which violence is somatic incapacitation, or deprivation of health, alone (with killing as the extreme form), at the hands of an actor who intends this to be the consequence. If this were all violence is about, and peace is seen as its negation, then too little is rejected when peace is held up as an ideal. Highly unacceptable social orders would still be compatible with peace. Hence, an extended concept of violence is indispensable but that concept should be a logical extensicn, not merely a list of undesirables. The definition points to at least six important dimensions of violence. But first some remarks about the use of the key words above, actual and potential. Violence is here defined as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is. Violence is that which increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance. Thus, if a person died from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century it would be hard to conceive of this as violence since it might have been quite unavoidable, but if he dies from it today, despite all the medical resources in the world, then violence is present according to our definition. Correspondingly, the case of people dying from earthquakes today would not warrant an analysis in terms of violence, but the day after tomorrow, when earthquakes may become avoidable, such deaths may be seen as the result of violence. In other words, when the potential is higher than the actual is by definition avoidable and when it is avoidable, then violence is present. 214

When the actual is unavoidable, then violence is not present even if the actual is at a very low level. A life expectancy of thirty years only, during the Neolithic period, was not an expression of violence, but the same life-expectancy today (whether due to wars, or social injustice, or both) would be seen as violence according to our definition. Thus, the potential level of realization is that which is possible with a given level of insight and resources. If insight and/or resources are monopolized by a group or class or are used for other purposes, then the actual level falls below the potential level, and violence is present in the system. In addition to these types of indirect violence there is also the direct violence where means of realization are not withheld, but directly destroyed. Thus, when a war is fought there is direct violence since killing or hurting a person certainly puts his actual somatic realization below his potential somatic realization. But there is also indirect violence insofar as insight and resources are channeled away from constructive efforts to bring the actual closer to the potential. The meaning of potential realizations is highly problematic, especially when we move from somatic aspects of human life, where consensus is more readily obtained, to mental aspects. Our guide here would probably often have to be whether the value to be realized is fairly consensual or not, although this is by no means satisfactory. For example, literacy is held in high regard almost everywhere, whereas the value of being Christian is highly controversial. Hence, we would talk about violence if the level of literacy is lower than what it could have been, not if the level of Christianity is lower than what it could have been. We shall not try to explore this difficult point further in this context, but turn to the dimensions of violence. To discuss them, it is useful to conceive of violence in terms of influence, as indicated in the statement we used as a point of departure above. A complete influence relation presupposes an influencer, an influence, and a mode of influencing. In the case of persons, we can put it very simply: a subject, an object, and an action. But this conception of violence in terms of a complete interpersonal influence relation will lead us astray by focussing on a very special type of violence only; also truncated versions where either subject or object or both are absent are highly significant. To approach this we shall start with two dimensions characterizing the violent action itself, or the mode of influence. The first distinction to be made is between physical and psychological violence. The distinction is trite but important mainly because the narrow concept of violence mentioned above concentrates on physical violence only. Under physical violence human beings are hurt somatically, to the point of killing. It is useful to distinguish further between biological violence, which reduces somatic capability (below what is potentially possible), and physical violence as such, which increases the constraint on human movements - as when a person is imprisoned or put in chains, but also when access to transportation is very unevenly distributed, 215

keeping large segments of a population at the same place with mobility a monopoly of the selected few. But that distinction is less important than the basic distinction between violence that works on the body, and violence that works on the soul; where the latter would include lies, brainwashing, indoctrination of various kinds, threats, etc. that serve to decrease mental potentialities. (Incidentally, it is interesting that such English words as hurt and hit can be used to express psychological as well as physical violence: this doubleness is already built into the language.) The second distinction is between the negative and positive approach to influence. Thus, a person can be influenced not only by punishing him when he does what the influencer considers wrong, but also by rewarding him when he does what the influencer considers right. Instead of increasing the constraints on his movements the constraints may be decreased instead of increased, and somatic capabilities extended instead of reduced. This may be readily agreed to, but does it have anything to do with violence? Yes, because the net result may still be that human beings are effectively prevented from realizing their potentialities. Thus, many contemporary thinkers9 emphasize that the consumers society rewards amply he who goes in for consumption, while not positively punishing him who does not. The system is rewardoriented, based on promises of euphoria, but in so being also narrows down the ranges of action. It may be disputed whether this is better or worse than a system that limits the range of action because of the dysphoric consequences of staying outside the permitted range. It is perhaps better in terms of giving pleasure rather than pain, worse in terms of being more manipulatory, less overt. But the important point is, the awareness of the concept of violence can be extended in this direction, since it yields a much richer basis for discussion. The third distinction to be made is on the object side: whether or not there is an object that is hurt. Can we talk about violence when no physical or biological object is hurt? This would be a case of what is referred to above as truncated violence, but nevertheless highly meaningful. When a person, a group, a nation is displaying the means of physical violence, whether throwing stones around or testing nuclear arms, there may not be violence in the sense that anyone is hit or hurt, but there is nevertheless the threat of physical violence and indirect threat of mental violence that may even be characterized as some type of psychological violence since it constrains human action. Indeed, this is also the intention: the famous balance of power doctrine is based on efforts to obtain precisely this effect. And correspondingly with psychological violence that does not reach any object: a lie does not become more of a truth because nobody believes in the lie. Untruthfulness is violence according to this kind of thinking under any condition, which does not mean that it cannot be the least evil under some widely discussed circumstances. 216

Is destruction of things violence? Again, it would not be violence according to the complete definition above, but possibly some degenerate form. But in at least two senses it can be seen as psychological violence: the destruction of things as a foreboding or threat of possible destruction of persons,10 and the destruction of things as destruction of something very dear to persons referred to as consumers or owners)! The fourth distinction to be made and the most important one is on the subject side: whether or not there is a subject (person) who acts. Again it may be asked: can we talk about violence when nobody is committing direct violence, is acting? This would also be a case of what is referred to above as truncated violence, but again highly meaningful. We shall refer to the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as personal or direct, and to violence where there is no such actor as structural or indirect. In both cases individuals may be killed or mutilated, hit or hurt in both senses of these words, and manipulated by means of stick or carrot strategies. But whereas in the first case these consequences can be traced back to concrete persons as actors, in the second case this is no longer meaningful. There may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances. Resources are unevenly distributed, as when income distributions are heavily skewed, literacy/education unevenly distributed, medical services existent in some districts and for some groups only, and so on. Above all the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed. The situation is aggravated further if the persons low on income are also low in education, low on health, and low on power - as is frequently the case because these rank dimensions tend to be heavily correlated due to the way they are tied together in the social structure. Marxist criticism of capitalist society emphasizes how the power to decide over the surplus from the production process is reserved for the owners of the means of production, who then can buy themselves into top positions on all other rank dimensions because money is highly convertible in a capitalist society - if you have money to convert, that is. Liberal criticism of socialist society similarly emphasizes how power to decide is monopolized by a small group who convert power in one field into power in another field simply because the opposition cannot reach the stage of effective articulation. The important point here is that if people are starving when this is objectively avoidable, then violence is committed, regardless of whether there is a clear subject-action-object relation, as during a siege yesterday or no such clear relation, as in the way world economic relations are organized today. We have baptized the distinction in two different ways, using the word-pairs personal structural and direct-indirect respectively. Violence with a clear subject-object relation is manifest because it is visible as action. It corresponds to our ideas of what drama is, and it is 217

personal because there are persons committing the violence. It is easily captured and expressed verbally since it has the same structure as elementary sentences in (at least Indo- European) languages: subject-verb-object, with both subject and object being persons. Violence without this relation is structural, built into structure. Thus, when one husband beats his wife there is a clear case of personal violence, but when one million husbands keep one million wives in ignorance there is structural violence. Correspondingly, in a society where life expectancy is twice as high in the upper as in the lower classes, violence is exercised even if there are no concrete actors one can point to directly attacking others, as when one person kills another. In order not to overwork the word violence we shall sometimes refer to the condition of structural violence as Social injustice. The term exploitation will not be used, for several reasons. First, it belongs to a political vocabulary, and has so many political and emotional overtones that the use of this term will hardly facilitate communication. Second, the term lends itself too easily to expressions involving the verb exploit, which in turn may lead attention away from the structural as opposed to the personal nature of this phenomenon - and even lead to often unfounded accusations about intended structural violence. The fifth distinction to be made is between violence that is intended or unintended. This distinction is important when guilt is to be decided, since the concept of guilt has been tied more to intention, both in Judaeo-Christian ethics and in Roman jurisprudence, than to consequence (whereas the present definition of violence is entirely located on the consequence side). This connection is important because it brings into focus a bias present in so much thinking about violence, peace, and related concepts: ethical systems directed against intended violence will easily fail to capture structural violence in their nets - and may hence be catching the small fry and letting the big fish loose. From this fallacy it does not follow, in our mind, that the opposite fallacy of directing all attention against structural violence is elevated into wisdom. If the concern is with peace, and peace is absence of violence, then action should be directed against personal as well as structural violence; a point to be developed below. Sixth, there is the traditional distinction between two levels of violence, the manifest and the latent. Manifest violence, whether personal or structural, is observable; although not directly since the theoretical entity of potential realization also enters the picture. Latent violence is something which is not there, yet might easily come about. Since violence by definition is the cause of the difference (or of maintaining the nondecrease) between actual and potential realization, increased violence may come about by increases in the potential as well as by decreases in the actual levels. However, we shall limit ourselves to the latter and say that there is latent violence when the situation is so unstable that the actual realization level easily decreases. For personal violence this would mean a situation where a little challenge would 218

trigger considerable killing and atrocity, as is often the case in connection with racial fights. In such cases we need a way of expressing that the personal violence is also there the day, hour, minute, second before the first bomb, shot, fist-fight, cry - and this is what the concept of latent, personal violence does for us. It indicates a situation of unstable equilibrium, where the level of actual realization is not sufficiently protected against deterioriation by upholding mechanisms. Similarly with structural violence: we could imagine a relatively egalitarian structure insufficiently protected against sudden feudalization, against crystallization into a much more stable, even petrified, hierarchical structure. A revolution brought about by means of a highly hierarchical military organization may after a brilliant period of egaliatarianism, and after major challenge, revert to a hierarchical structure. One way of avoiding this, of course, is to avoid hierarchical group struggle organizations in the first run, and use nonviolent nonhierarchical guerrilla organizations in the fight so as to let the means be a preview of the egalitarian goal. That concludes our list of dimensions of violence, although many more could be included. One question that immediately arises is whether any combinations from these six dichotomies can be ruled out a priori, but there seems to be no such case. Structural violence without objects is also meaningful; truncation of the complete violence relation can go so far as to eliminate both subjects and objects. Personal violence is meaningful as a threat, a demonstration even when nobody is hit, and structural violence is also meaningful as a blueprint, as an abstract form without social life, used to threaten people into subordination: if you do not behave, we shall have to reintroduce all the disagreeable structures we had before.

Nonviolence More than the Absence of Violence

From: Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies, by Jorgen Johansenp, edited by Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, New York, Routledge, 2007, pp. 143-148. The Routledge Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies offers a transdisciplinary overview of the main issues, debates and key concepts in peace and conflict studies today. The volume is divided into four sections, commencing with Understanding and Transforming Conflict, moving sequentially through Creating Peace and Supporting Peace, and culminating with Peace Across the Disciplines. Each section features new essays by distinguished international scholars and/or professionals working in peace studies and conflict resolution and transformation. Here is presented an excerpt from the sequence Creating peace about non-violence by Jorgen Johansenp. Manualul Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies ofer o prezentare trandisciplinar al principalelor subiecte, discuii i concepte cheie n domeniul studiilor de pace i conflict. Volumul este divizat n patru capitole care relect transormarea conflictului, crearea pcii, meninerea pcii i studierea pcii n cadrul disciplinilor. Fiecare capitol este o culegere al lucrrilor cercettorilor internaionali n domeniul dat. Mai jos este oferit un extras din capitolul Crend paceacare abordeaz fenomenul nonviolenei de ctre Jorgen Johansenp. 219

 The Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies , . , , , . . , , Jorgen Johansenp.

Introduction Research on nonviolence has never dominated the academic field of Peace Research. Comparedto the focus on violent conflicts, peaceful ones have always been a minor sideline. The practice of nonviolence has on the other hand developed a lot over the last 100 years. In the following chapter, I will introduce the two main forms of nonviolence and then go deeper into the more nuanced views and advanced discussions in each of these fields. The most influential use of nonviolence in recent decades has been in political revolutions. This chapter will go through the waves of nonviolent revolutions that have washed over the world since the 1980s. At the end, I will try to look into the crystal ball and see what the future can bring.

The word Nonviolence is a word we can find in very many contexts. It is often used as a specifier for other topics and hence followed by another word nonviolent action, nonviolent philosophy, nonviolent communication, nonviolent defence and many more. In itself it is almost impossible to define. It consists of two words most people regard as negative: no and violence. In most languages it has the same construction. Among the European languages German stands out as a little different: gewaltfrei (free from violence). None of them have a completely positive connotation. In recent years some have done their best to introduce new concepts with a more attractive meaning. The German Gutekraft (good power) is one example.

Why nonviolence? Nonviolence is not always the first choice for people in conflict. Why some use nonviolence is a relevant and important question not only for theoretical reasons. It can also give guidance for those who search for help in how to act when in the midst of a conflict. For many pacifists life itself has an inviolable or sacred value and hence it will always be wrong to hurt other living beings. Some will restrict this to humans, for others all forms of life have an ultimate value.

220

For the more pragmatic minded, the situation is different. Many argue that by using violence to influence the outcome of a conflict it is often very difficult to reverse your actions in case you are wrong. It is easy to acknowledge for any honest person that we from time to time make wrong judgements. If we act violently based on wrong assumptions it is seldom possible to reverse our actions. It is obvious in extreme forms of violence: killing someone cannot be reversed, but the same goes for many forms of physical or serious psychological violence. In the same way, many argue that violence is too wide-ranging a tool. All persons have a number of roles and in most cases it is only one or a few of them we have conflicts with. Let us say you are a trade unionist, a woman, a mother, a football player, a friend, a daughter, an environmentalist, a Christian, a sociologist, a social democrat, a soldier and a Norwegian. Maybe it is only your role as a soldier I have a conflict with. If you are part of the occupation of Afghanistan by volunteering as an officer in ISAF forces in Afghanistan, I dont have problems with any role other than that you are a foreign soldier in an occupied country. If I shoot you, I will also kill all the other roles you have. Violence is not specific enough to separate the different roles. This is one of the main reasons against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The nuclear bombs the US dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 killed all forms of life within several square kilometres and destroyed life for many more. Violence is blind. Most nonviolent means are much more specific. They could be directed to one precise role of a person or a group of persons. It is, for instance, possible to boycott the owner of your local shop because he sells products from child labour and still cooperate with him as your trainer in football. Or you can take part in a protest against a decision by local politicians but still be friendly neighbours. When violence is used it will often result in counter-violence and be the first twist in a violent spiral which can escalate out of control. For many of those who opt for nonviolence, the fear of the consequences of violent means is a strong argument in favour of nonviolence. A long discussion within political movements is how the means influence the ends. Many of the most prominent figures within nonviolent movements have argued strongly that violent means result in violent ends. In recent years these discussions have been given attention in more than a few armed movements as well. Former guerrilla soldiers describe how military means grow from being a tool to totally dominating the movement. Some argue that armed means became the only focus for the movement and the political goals became less important. An intensive discussion on what are the most effective means takes place in many movements these days. Most of the discussions on the relations between means and ends have been focused on the problematic consequences of violent means. The degree to which the traditional nonviolent means always end up with nonviolent ends has not gotten the same attention. As we will see in the next section, on waves of nonviolence, there is need for more research on the long-term results of the 221

nonviolent revolutions in recent decades. It is not obvious that all nonviolent means will always result in nonviolent ends. Another frequent argument in favour of nonviolence is that the activists are fighting problems rather than persons. Violence can hit humans but not ideologies, decisions and policies. The roles of individuals in political conflicts have a tendency to be exaggerated. When individuals in central positions are replaced, the systems seem to survive and continue more or less as before. Many argue that nonviolence is more effective than violence. In most social movements there is not even a discussion about violent means; the only interesting topic is which nonviolent techniques are appropriate for the campaign in front of them. That violence creates new problems is an experience many have discovered. New conflicts, often far away from the focus they are interested in, pop up as a result of the use of violence. These conflicts remove the centre of attention and withdraw resources they could otherwise have used on their main goals.

Two overlapping traditions The history of nonviolence has two traditions with some connecting points: the pacifistic and the pragmatic traditions. In the pacifist tradition, we include nonviolent ideas, aspects, views and visions from religions, philosophies, ethics and lifestyles. For pacifists no goal justifies killing other human beings. Many pacifists are against all forms of harming humans and other living beings. The pragmatic school regards nonviolent actions as being important and effective as political tools, a collection of techniques, and as means for communication, for revolutions, for a social movement, and as a system of defence. Many within the pacifist school actively use the methods within the pragmatic tradition, but the majority of those using the nonviolent skills do not share the pacifist views. In the past, the pacifist traditions were larger. Pacifism has never been a majority view, but historically pacifist practitioners of nonviolence used to outnumber pragmatists. In modern times, we have the opposite situation. Those using active nonviolence for pragmatic reasons now outnumber pacifists. In the following section, I shall tell the history of both these traditions and distinguish the characteristics of each of them. Then I will see where there are overlaps and describe the latest developments within the research on and practice of nonviolence.

The pacifist tradition Religious traditions tend to dominate the history of pacifist nonviolence. Inspired by holy scriptures, gurus, gods, imams, priests and other leading persons from different religions, there have probably always been groups of religious believers who were committed to nonviolence. 222

Theistic pacifists believed that acts of violence were against the will of God and hence sinful. Some authors argue that prior to the rise of the leading religions of today, other faith systems with female goddesses rather than male gods were more peaceful than those now prevalent. Within all religions you will find representatives who do not find any justifications for the use of violence in their respective scriptures and oral traditions. But these are usually exceptions: most religious believers justify the use of violence as a means of defence in conflict situations, be that defence of attacked individuals, groups or states. There is no one correct interpretation of holy books, but nearly all of them tell stories where the god(s) goes to war for a good cause and uses extremely violent means against the enemies. Holy texts, such as The Lun Yu, Wu Ching, Bhagavad Gita, Koran, New Testament, Tanakh, Talmud, Tao-te-ching, Guru Granth Sahib and Veda are all interpreted in many different ways on the question of justification of violence. For many followers it is just as easy to find quotations in these texts which give good reason for the use of violence as it is for others to find guidance for a pacifistic conviction. Within every religion we find denominations that are more consistent pacifists than the mainstream followers. Within Christianity, so-called peace churches such as the Brethren, the Mennonites and the Quakers, are examples of such religious communities. Two religions, Jainism and Bahai, are very firm in their nonviolent views and practice. For them the philosophy of nonviolence is the core of their religions. The central part of a nonviolent philosophy is that the use of violence is morally wrong; that the aims do not justify the means. The most widespread understanding of nonviolence is the rejection of killing human beings. But most nonviolent philosophies have a much more nuanced view than this. They regard all sorts of physical and psychological harm against human beings as violations of the nonviolent norm. And many expand the scope to include not only human beings, but all sorts of living creatures. Some will include the whole global ecosystem as well as material objects. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi used the concept ahimsa in his philosophy. Ahimsa occurs in Bhagavad-Gita and is normally translated as nonviolence or non-harm. In the Bhagavad Gita, the concept is used narrowly, with other terms describing many other forms of no injury or no harm. Gandhi expands the use of it to include a number of different injuries. In the Gandhian philosophy it is not only a question of physical actions but he argued that ahimsa should be a principle guiding humans in their thoughts, words and deeds. Well aware of human nature, he was clear about the impossibility to completely fulfil such a norm, but that does not make it impossible to make every effort to reduce injury on other living creatures to an absolute minimum. Gandhi has wrongly been criticized for promoting passivity, whereas in reality he argued that passivity itself could be violence: every act of injury to a living creature and endorsement of such an act by refraining from non-violent effort, whenever possible, to 223

prevent it, is a breach of ahimsa.11 This attitude so widens the concept as to make it an act of violence to abstain from efforts to prevent injurious acts, for instance suppression, manipulation, exploitation (Nss 1974: 48). It can be useful to ask a few questions of this view. The first one is, is it universal? Shall the norm guide us in all situations and is it applicable for all human beings? Gandhi himself was not always clear on this point. There are situations in his text where he argues in favour of putting an end to life of a living being. One example is euthanasia. He describes a situation with a sick calf and the only way to end the terrible suffering is by giving the calf a deadly dose of poison. He adds: It was a surgical operation, and I should do exactly the same thing with my child, if he were in the same predicament (Galtung and Nss 1955: Ch. 3) This is a side of the Gandhian view on nonviolence not widely known or accepted today. What about other exceptional cases? What if someone falls in the river and cannot swim? When a brave swimmer tries to help, if the person in danger panics, the only way to rescue him is to knock him unconscious. Is that a violation of the ahimsa norm? Even if it includes physical violence, most people would easily justify such an act of unselfish and brave action. There are similarities in some of the common arguments for a national military defence and the situation with someone trying to save the life of others by inflicting some pain on them. The moral justification for military defence includes the idea that it can be right to sacrifice a few to save many. Few wars have been started without someone trying to justify them with arguments that they are carried out to defend higher values. The pacifist traditions do not accept such justifications of the use of violence in war situations. Neither do they justify slavery, colonialism, patriarchy or imperialism. These are all violent institutions justified by the majority just a few generations ago. Moral norms are seldom static. They change over time and differ from context to context. For pacifists, it is more complicated to judge actions which include the harming of oneself. Many persons within the nonviolent traditions have of their own free will done harm to their own bodies. Fasts and hunger strikes are two well-known types of action. Prisoners all over the world have used hunger strikes as a means to get attention for their demands. Gandhi went on open-ended hunger strikes on several occasions. On 11 June 1963, the Buddhist monk, Thich Quang Du, burned himself to death in protest against the Vietnam War. Thich Quang Du was protesting against the way the administration of the Vietnamese prime minister, Ngo Dinh Diem, was oppressing the Buddhist religion during the war. Several monks and nuns followed him. Four US citizens also self-immolated in protest against the US attack on Vietnam. These extremely painful forms of suicide are controversial in many respects. Within most religions, actions like these have relatively few supporters even if there is a deep respect for those who do end their lives in this way. Many believe that such actions will be rewarded after they pass away. 224

It is important to understand the variations among different religious contexts when it comes to judging actions like these. For some, like most Christians, the death is much more definite than for others. For a Hindu, with thousands more lives on earth, the passing away is much less dramatic. For Gandhi, the hunger strike was an action to show how much he was willing to suffer for the cause he was struggling with. He was solely responsible for the action and possible death. When political prisoners in Christian cultures are close to dying in hunger strikes, the media and public opinion often blame others (for instance, political leaders) for the possible death of a prisoner. To die is a very different process in different religions. Another factor of difference, when it comes to the use of violence, is whether or not ethical norms are seen as universal. Do they apply to all human beings? In the Western traditions there are widespread views that norms are valid for all or none. In, for instance, the Hindi tradition there are different norms depending on your karma and cast. For a Sadhu, it is a norm to avoid the use of violence in every situation, while someone from the warrior caste, the Kshatriyas, has a duty to use violent means to defend his people. Gier characterizes Hinduism as relative nonviolence and gives several reasons for this: (1) the prohibition against killing is relative to the person, yogis and Brahmins taking the vow most strictly; (2) it is also relative to the occasion, such as killing in war, in self-defence, and in sacrifice; and (3) it is relative to individual self-interest (Gier 2004: 34). Gandhi was not advocating a traditional Hindu view on these matters. He argued that the norm of ahimsa was universal and he opposed the common view among Hindus that a military defence is a necessity. Gandhi was often in doubt and experimented with different activities. He tested a number of diets, political actions and views on political and moral questions. Most of his writings are dated. In his original writings you can always see on which specific date he wrote each letter, article or comment. The reason is that he was always prepared to change his mind when he learned new things. He told his readers that, if in his writings they found several opinions on the same subject, they should trust the latest. This option for changing even your core values is important to remember when reading texts by or on Gandhi. Gandhi grew up in a home with a very strong relationship with his deeply religious mother. She belonged to a sect that combined Hindu and Muslim beliefs and she welcomed Christians and Jains in their house. One of the great Jain saints of modern India, Shrimad Rajchandra, settled many of Gandhis spiritual doubts and was a significant personal inspiration for him: local people referred to Rajchandra as Gandhis Guru (Hunter 2003). For Gandhi, philosophy was not enough. His vision was to develop and build a whole lifestyle based on nonviolent principles. He used the terms Nonviolence for the Weak about the pragmatic use of nonviolent techniques and Nonviolence of the Strong for those who committed themselves to a nonviolent lifestyle. That lifestyle was a totality of self-discipline, undemanding lifestyle, an inner search for truth, 225

the use of non-cooperation against unjust laws and decisions, constructive work, and civil courage to confront the opponent. Among the famous advocates of nonviolence based on a religious belief we find Leo Tolstoy, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Gandhi. For them, human life had an ultimate value, higher than everything else. Nothing was important enough to sacrifice human lives. This faith led them to a pacifist position and guided their activities in life. For many, nonviolence became part of their lifestyle and influenced all parts of their life. In daily life, nonviolence could decide what to eat, how to travel, what to consume, how to relate to other human beings (and nature), how to act in order to take responsibility for your local community, and what to do for leisure. People who lived with Gandhi, like JP (Narain 1978) and Narayan Desai (Desai 1980), use the term Total Revolution to describe the extensive implications of a nonviolent lifestyle. Political and social revolution are not enough; in addition there must be an inner revolution in each individual. And both JP and Narayan Desai are clear that the change within every individual is by far the most difficult one. Within this lifestyle-orientation we find the most obvious overlap between the pacifist tradition and the pragmatic tradition. Many, although not all, of those committed to a nonviolent lifestyle also tend to be engaged in nonviolent actions of different sorts. They include in their lifestyle a societal engagement and take part in civil society activities against what they regard as unjust, immoral or simply wrong policies and decisions. The pragmatic tradition The pragmatic tradition of nonviolence has its roots in those parts of society that have fought with peaceful means for freedom, democracy and respect for human rights. These tools are used by stakeholders to influence a conflict situation. They have adopted different nonviolent strategies and techniques and used them in their struggle against inhuman ideologies, policies, systems, decisions and laws. Their choice of means has been based more on what is effective than on ethical guidelines and moral values. Even if we can trace their history back further, it is fair to say that they have developed and been used more in the last 100 years. Today, the majority of those who deal with nonviolence, whether they use the term or not, belong to the pragmatic tradition. Nonviolent techniques are frequently used in most modern social and political movements. Within womens networks, trade unions, environmental groups, solidarity movements, peace organizations and other parts of civil society, nonviolent actions are used regularly to promote their ideas and struggle for their causes. Nonviolent actions are used either to create wider support for their goals, to directly reach their aims, or in order to prevent their opponents from achieving theirs. What is meant by nonviolence in the pragmatic school? It is obvious that there are diverse definitions used by different authors and activists. Many 226

practitioners have never needed or wanted to propose a full and distinct definition, but when asked have said that they dont use serious physical violence against other human beings. Others have wider definitions. Some will exclude all forms of psychological violence as well. At one extreme of a spectrum we find people who merely try to avoid killing humans, while at the other there are those who will avoid all disturbance of the harmony in life. The latter ones you will find among those who use nonviolent actions as a part of their lifestyle. The majority of nonviolent activists belong somewhere in the middle, but closer to not killing than perfect harmony. Whatever definition is used, there is one more aspect of these actions we need to clarify. Is it a nonviolent action just because it avoids the use of violence? In the early phase of his writing, Gandhi used the term passive resistance. That could be interpreted as nonviolence being some form of passivity; not doing anything. This is a misunderstanding we still find used in present discussions and in media coverage of nonviolent actions and movements. Gandhi changed the term to ahimsa and the English interpretation: nonviolence. Later he used Satyagraha, which literally means to keep to the truth. The point here is that we need to make clear what we mean by nonviolence. Vinthagen (2005: 13646) has developed and clarified the definition of the concept. He argues that in addition to without violence it must also be against violence. It is not enough that an activity is carried out without the use of violence. To fulfil the criteria of being labelled nonviolence it must in addition be done with the aim of reducing or eliminating violence or oppression.

The Basic Principles of United Nations Peacekeeping

From: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines, New York, 2010, pp. 21-25. The UN book Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines aims to define the nature, scope and core business of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations which are usually deployed as one part of a much broader international effort to build a sustainable peace in countries emerging from conflict. It identifies the comparative advantages and limitations of United Nations peacekeeping operations as a conflict management tool, and explains the basic principles that should guide their planning and conduct. Here is presented an excerpt from the book regarding the basic principles of UN peacekeeping. Manualul ONU Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelinesare drept scop s defineasc natura, scopul i misiunea operaiunilor de meninere a pcii a ONU, care snt desfurate n contextul efortului internaional de a construi o pace sustenabil n rile care au trecut printr-un conflict. Aceast lucrare identific avantajele i limitele operaiunilor de meninere a pcii a ONU privite ca un instrument de soluionare a conflictelor i explic principiile fundamentale care conduc aceste operaii. Mai jos este oferit un extras din manualul dat privind principiile fundamentale ale operaiunilor de meninere a pcii a ONU. 227

 Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines , , . , , , . .

Although the practice of United Nations peacekeeping has evolved significantly over the past six decades, three basic principles have traditionally served and continue to set United Nations peacekeeping operations apart as a tool for maintaining international peace and security: Consent of the parties Impartiality Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. These principles are inter-related and mutually reinforcing. It is important that their meaning and relationship to each other are clearly understood by all those involved in the planning and conduct of United Nations peacekeeping operations, so that they are applied effectively. Taken together, they provide a navigation aid, or compass, for practitioners both in the field and at United Nations Headquarters. Consent of the parties. United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict. This requires a commitment by the parties to a political process and their acceptance of a peacekeeping operation mandated to support that process. The consent of the main parties provides a United Nations peacekeeping operation with the necessary freedom of action, both political and physical, to carry out its mandated tasks. In the absence of such consent, a United Nations peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict; and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its intrinsic role of keeping the peace. In the implementation of its mandate, a United Nations peacekeeping operation must work continuously to ensure that it does not lose the consent of the main parties, while ensuring that the peace process moves forward. This requires that all peacekeeping personnel have a thorough understanding of the history and prevailing customs and culture in the mission area, as well as the capacity to assess the evolving interests and motivation of the parties. The absence of trust between the parties in a post-conflict environment can, at times, make consent uncertain and unreliable. Consent, particularly if given grudgingly under international pressure, may be withdrawn in a variety of ways when a party is not fully committed to the peace process. For instance, a party that has given its consent to the 228

deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation may subsequently seek to restrict the operations freedom of action, resulting in a de facto withdrawal of consent. The complete withdrawal of consent by one or more of the main parties challenges the rationale for the United Nations peacekeeping operation and will likely alter the core assumptions and parameters underpinning the international communitys strategy to support the peace process. The fact that the main parties have given their consent to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation does not necessarily imply or guarantee that there will also be consent at the local level, particularly if the main parties are internally divided or have weak command and control systems. Universality of consent becomes even less probable in volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed groups not under the control of any of the parties, or by the presence of other spoilers. The peacekeeping operation should continuously analyze its operating environment to detect and forestall any wavering of consent. A peacekeeping operation must have the political and analytical skills, the operational resources, and the will to manage situations where there is an absence or breakdown of local consent. In some cases this may require, as a last resort, the use of force. Impartiality. United Nations peacekeeping operations must implement their mandate without favour or prejudice to any party. Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity.United Nations peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate. The need for even-handedness towards the parties should not become an excuse for inaction in the face of behavior that clearly works against the peace process. Just as a good referee is impartial, but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds. Notwithstanding the need to establish and maintain good relations with the parties, a peacekeeping operation must scrupulously avoid activities that might compromise its image of impartiality. A mission should not shy away from a rigorous application of the principle of impartiality for fear of misinterpretation or retaliation, but before acting it is always prudent to ensure that the grounds for acting are well-established and can be clearly communicated to all. Failure to do so may undermine the peacekeeping operations credibility and legitimacy, and may lead to a withdrawal of consent for its presence by one or more of the parties. Where the peacekeeping operation is required to counter such breaches, it must do so with transparency, openness and effective communication as to the rationale and appropriate nature of its response. This will help to minimize opportunities to manipulate the perceptions against the mission, and 229

help to mitigate the potential backlash from the parties and their supporters. Even the best and fairest of referees should anticipate criticism from those affected negatively and should be in a position to explain their actions. Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. The principle of non-use of force except in self-defense dates back to the first deployment of armed United Nations peacekeepers in 1956. The notion of self-defense has subsequently come to include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peacekeeping operation from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council.23 United Nations peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. However, it is widely understood that they may use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defense and defense of the mandate. The environments into which United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed are often characterized by the presence of militias, criminal gangs, and other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace process or pose a threat to the civilian population. In such situations, the Security Council has given United Nations peacekeeping operations robust mandates authorizing them to use all necessary means to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order. By proactively using force in defense of their mandates, these United Nations peacekeeping operations have succeeded in improving the security situation and creating an environment conducive to longer-term peacebuilding in the countries where they are deployed. Although on the ground they may sometimes appear similar, robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement, as envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter. Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict. By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security Council. A United Nations peacekeeping operation should only use force as a measure of last resort, when other methods of persuasion have been exhausted, and an operation must always exercise restraint when doing so. The ultimate aim of the use of force is to influence and deter spoilers working against the peace process or seeking to harm civilians; and not to seek their military defeat. The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation should always be calibrated in a precise, proportional and appropriate manner, within the principle of the minimum force 230

necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate. In its use of force, a United Nations peacekeeping operation should always be mindful of the need for an early de-escalation of violence and a return to non-violent means of persuasion. The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation always has political implications and can often give rise to unforeseen circumstances. Judgments concerning its use will need to be made at the appropriate level within a mission, based on a combination of factors including mission capability; public perceptions; humanitarian impact; force protection; safety and security of personnel; and, most importantly, the effect that such action will have on national and local consent for the mission. The mission-wide ROE for the military and DUF for the police components of a United Nations peacekeeping operation will clarify the different levels of force that can be used in various circumstances, how each level of force should be used, and any authorizations that must be obtained by commanders. In the volatile and potentially dangerous environments into which contemporary peacekeeping operations are often deployed, these ROE and DUF should be sufficiently robust to ensure that a United Nations peacekeeping operation retains its credibility and freedom of action to implement its mandate. The mission leadership should ensure that these ROE and DUF are well understood by all relevant personnel in the mission and are being applied uniformly.

Disarmament and Survival

From: Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies by Marc Pilisuk, edited by Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, New York,Routledge, 2007, pp.95-101. The Routledge Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies offers a transdisciplinary overview of the main issues, debates and key concepts in peace and conflict studies today. The volume is divided into four sections, commencing with Understanding and Transforming Conflict, moving sequentially through Creating Peace and Supporting Peace, and culminating with Peace Across the Disciplines. Each section features new essays by distinguished international scholars and/or professionals working in peace studies and conflict resolution and transformation. Here is presented an excerpt from the sequence Understanding and Transforming Conflict about disarmament by Marc Pilisuk. Manualul Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studiesofer o prezentare trandisciplinar al principalelor subiecte, discuii i concepte cheie n domeniul studiilor de pace i conflict. Volumul este divizat n patru capitole care relect transormarea conflictului, crearea pcii, meninerea pcii i studierea pcii n cadrul disciplinilor. Fiecare capitol este o culegere al lucrrilor cercettorilor internaionali n domeniul dat. Mai jos este oferit un extras din capitolul Transformarea conflictului despre dezarmare de ctre Marc Pilisuk. The Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies , . , 231

 , , . . Marc Pilisuk. The more dovish alternatives that have been considered in the wake of violent conflicts include arms control and disarmament. The terms reflect a spectrum of alternatives from partial to complete elimination of weapons, from phased reductions to immediately enforced elimination of certain weapon categories, from unilateral to multilateral efforts, the latter often requiring tools for inspection and enforcement, and including the concept of global disarmament. The word disarmament is sometimes used interchangeably with arms control. Actually the two terms represent somewhat different concepts. Agreements among nation states to limit or even to reduce particular weapons occur in a pragmatic context. This context does not address directly the somewhat anarchic international environment in which autonomous nation states are assumed to compete for interests as defined by their governments. Military might is seen in this context as a tool to expand such interests and as a way of protecting against the aggression by other states. With the advent of highly destructive biochemical and nuclear weapons, the costs of waging war can grow to be incommensurate with any possible gains. Arms control does not aim to eliminate the competitive assumptions that drive nation states, or even to eliminate violent conflict. The objectives of arms control are better viewed as efforts to promote international stability and to reduce the likelihood of war. Other objectives are to reduce the costs of weaponry and the damage that follows once violent conflict occurs. Major states give consideration to arms control as part of their security policy. The US Congress, for example, established the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in 1961 to provide a bureaucratic institution for dealing with arms control issues (Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies 2005). Examples of arms control date back to twelfth-century Europe. The church at that time strived to ban crossbows in warfare among Christians. This attempt at arms control was not successful and crossbows remained in widespread use throughout Europe. During the past century, arms control negotiations played a major role in international relations. After the First World War, the major naval powers of the world made a serious effort to negotiate the relative force levels among them. The Washington Conference (19212) and the London Conference (1930) succeeded for a time in limiting naval armaments. Efforts by the League of Nations to advance international disarmament culminated in the Geneva Conference (19324). There an attempt was made to distinguish between defensive and offensive weapons and then to eliminate the offensive ones. That is often a difficult distinction since perceptions of intention can play a major role in what psychologists have called the attribution error. Armaments of an opponent are typically viewed as an indication of aggressive intent, while ones own arms are 232

seen as a defensive response to a situation presented by the behaviour of others. With the rise of German, Italian and Japanese imperialism during the 1930s, the Western liberal democracies felt threatened and this important effort at arms control came to an end (Maurer 2005). There are more successful stories of the disarming of borders between neighbouring states. The Rush-Bagot Agreement (1817) led to the successful demilitarization of the border between Canada and the United States. This has served as an illustration of the way disarmament between modern democracies can be achieved. The European Union has taken important steps in this direction. Such agreements do not actually call for the participating nations to reduce their weapons or the size of their military. But they affirm a non-military and collaborative relationship among the parties (Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies 2005). The pursuit of disarmament The goal of general disarmament is more far reaching and speaks to the need for a world in which competing states no longer have the responsibility to promote their own security in an international environment in which might makes right. The dream of disarmament envisions a world in which conflicts still occur but the rules for their resolution preclude the possible use of lethal weapons. It prescribes a world in which enforceable restrictions on the massing of armaments, and armed forces, are in place with a universal transparency and openness for early detection of violations. Disarmament calls for the support of institutions like the International Court of Justice that might be called upon to make binding judgements in disputes and for police functions available to monitor outbreaks of violence. In the present climate, most countries are unlikely to disarm voluntarily. In fact their leaders would consider such actions as suicidal as long as other nations did not also renounce war and armaments. Moreover, disarmament has a psychological or perhaps cultural component. It requires not only laws and institutions to make it happen but also a willingness of people to respect those laws and institutions as just and to consider the goal of pursuing peace by peaceful means to be a universal value on which the survival of life depends. Hence, disarmament is often considered a long-range goal that is associated with a fundamental reordering of the international political environment. That change aims inevitably at ending the law of the jungle among nations by establishing some form of world government or an effective system of collective security (Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies 2005; Myrdal 1982). The ideal of a world in which access to weapons of great destructive capability is banned, is often countered by the argument that weapons are needed to prevent a potential Adolph Hitler or otherwise obsessed national leader from dominating the world, that there will always be such deviant enemies, and that to disarm is to give an upper hand to those with evil intent. The responses to this are complex. The risks of disarmament may be greatly limited by strong and 233

enforceable universal agreements. The willingness to undertake such risks makes sense only in comparison to the risks incurred by allowing the current and costly patchwork of efforts at security to grow worse as the number of parties with access to weapons of mass destruction increases. Moreover, the core reasons for violent conflict remain with the use of weapons to deter adversaries. To address these reasons, the world will need to deal with gross inequality and exploitation of people and of habitats. We will need to address the paucity of education into effective forms of nonviolent resolution of conflict, including tools to convert rather than to confront potential enemies, and the insufficient resources now left for those committed to building cultures of peace. When resources are instead devoted to preparing for war, we continue a caste of military and corporate professionals whose life work is to find enemies and to fight them. One early example of disarmament occurred in Japan long before the twentieth century. For almost 200 years, beginning in the mid-1600s, the Japanese renounced and avoided the use of firearms for combat. During this entire period of self-imposed restriction, the sword remained the dominant weapon. The ban changed only in the middle of the nineteenth century after powerful outside powers threatened intervention in Japanese affairs. The end of Japans isolation within the international political system also brought this experiment in disarmament to an end (Maurer 2005). In the Western world, the origins of the idea of disarmament arose with the nineteenthcentury development of liberal doctrines about international politics. Advocates of disarmament believed that wars occurred because of the competition among major powers in armaments. The outbreak of the First World War was precipitated by an assassination of one leader and was rapidly escalated by the involvement of heavily armed states. This appeared to confirm the explanation that major increases in armaments were fundamental factors in the conflict. In a frequently quoted statement, Sir Edward Grey, Great Britains Foreign Secretary (190616), observed, The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them it was these that made war inevitable. This theory of why violent conflicts occur had an implication for subsequent policy. Disarmament could provide a way to reduce international tension and to prevent war. In an attempt to promote a humane international order, US President Woodrow Wilson called for disarmament as part of his peace programme known as the Fourteen Points. The disarmament called for did not actually happen and the failure of other powers to disarm after the First World War was used as an excuse by the Hitler regime for rearmament of Germany in the 1930s (Hyde 1988; Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies 2005).

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Bans upon particular weapons Efforts to ban particular types of weapons have had some measure of success. The horrible consequences of poison gas used in the First World War led to the acceptance of the Geneva Protocol in June 1925. Eventually 132 nations signed the Protocol. The Protocol bans the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons (UNIDC 2005). In January 1989, a conference was held in Paris to strengthen the Protocol. The United Nations had created a forum for discussion of disarmament-related issues. One product of its deliberations has been the Chemical Weapon Convention: 130 countries signed the original agreement in 1993 (OPCW 2005). In August 1992, the International Conference on Disarmaments Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons completed an effort begun in March 1980 to draft a ban on chemical weapons (CW). It was submitted to the UN General Assembly and recommended the text of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC); 130 states signed the convention at a ceremony in January 1993. The time spent on this indicated the concern of the member states. The committee had worked on the draft since 1980 and the CWC finally went into force in April 1997. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the treatys implementing organization, came into operation one month later. Under the treaty, each signatory nation agrees never to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons. It agrees, as well, not to use or prepare to use CW and not to assist others in acting against any of the prohibitions of the convention. The convention also requires states to destroy any CW in their possession, to destroy any of their own CW abandoned on the territory of another state, and to dismantle their CW production facilities (UNIDC 2005). One problem in restricting the use of chemical weapons is that the range of products produced is quite wide and most of the research and production activity is done secretly (Barnaby 1999). Antipersonnel landmines are a particularly insidious source of death and disability that continue long after actual combat has ended. Soldiers are typically demobilized and will usually turn in their guns when peace returns. Landmines do not recognize a ceasefire. They cannot be aimed but lie dormant until a person or animal triggers the detonating mechanism. Then, landmines kill or injure civilians, soldiers, peacekeepers and aid workers alike. Children are particularly susceptible. Mine deaths and injuries over the past decades now total in the hundreds of thousands. Estimates of 15,000 and 20,000 new casualties are caused by landmines and unexploded ordnance each year, some 1,500 new casualties each month, more than 40 new casualties a day. The numbers are an underestimate since some countries with a mine problem such as Myanmar (Burma), India and Pakistan fail to provide public information about the extent of the problem (International Campaign to Ban Landmines 2005a).

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As of September 2005, 154 countries have signed on to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Forty countries including Russia, China and the United States have not signed up. Some antipersonnel landmines are from earlier conflicts. They claim victims in many parts of the world. The situation, though improved in recent years, nevertheless constitutes a global crisis. Antipersonnel landmines are still being planted today and minefields dating back decades continue to claim innocent victims. Vast stockpiles of landmines remain in warehouses around the world and a handful of countries still produce the weapon (Human Rights Watch 2003; International Campaign to Ban Landmines 2005b). The impact of nuclear weapons The advent of atomic weapons during the Second World War gave further impetus to advocates of disarmament. Many prominent writers, intellectuals and policy activists supported efforts to ban the bomb, even if this entailed unilateral disarmament. Nuclear disarmament became for many a moral imperative for the stakes at risk seemed nothing less than the extinction of the human species. Films and television popularized an apocalyptic vision, helping to garner significant support for the disarmament movement. The leaders of the superpowers gave considerable attention to arms control during the period of the Cold War. A relaxation of tensions in superpower relations, or dtente, was widely viewed to coincide with arms control agreements, such as the conclusion of the first round of SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) in 1972, the INF (intermediate nuclear forces) agreement in 1987 and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) in 1991. To many analysts of international relations, the superpower experience showed that arms control could play a useful (if modest) role in helping rival states to manage the uncertainty of their armaments competitions. Some advocates of disarmament, however, came to view arms control as a subterfuge employed by the leaders of the great powers to frustrate genuine disarmament. The Soviet Union sometimes abetted disarmament as a way of causing domestic political embarrassment for the governments of its principal adversaries, the United States and other countries in NATO. However, both superpowers could well be accused of having used the nuclear threat as a way to make the world safe for wars of domination that used only threats, economic pressures, political assassinations and conventional weapons in efforts to create allies in a polarized world (Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies 2005; UNIDC 2005). Nuclear weapons add a new dimension to discussions of disarmament. Their level of potential destructiveness far outweighs any gain from their use. A major exchange of nuclear weapons would so totally destroy places and people and so contaminate the earths capacity to provide uncontaminated food and water as to leave the planet unsuited to support life. The 236

weapons have been typically considered a requirement for deterring an attack from other countries. The argument has critical flaws. If the deterrent failed to deter, would a sane government choose to retaliate. To do so would likely create even greater destruction to ones own country. Would an aggressive enemy not be tempted then to consider the threat to retaliate to be merely a bluff? The country with the deterrent would need to convince its adversaries that the nuclear counter- attack would come. This can be done by preparing retaliatory capacities that will be immediate, automatic and incapable of retraction. The retaliatory promise is also augmented by a bellicose posture and a depiction of the enemy as hostile, evil and committed to ones own destruction. When such hostile images are communicated they affect not only an adversars belief that an attack would be foolhardy, but also the belief that the deterring nation is indeed sufficiently hostile to start a war. If only an irrational and deeply disturbed individual would launch an annihilating attack, how would threats of retaliation act as a deterrent? Angry and deranged individuals are far more likely to strike out, without fear of consequences, if they feel threatened. The dynamic is what game theorists have likened to the game of chicken, in which the drivers of opposing vehicles speed toward each other threatening not to be the first to veer off the white line (Rapoport 1960, 1965). It is not played by sane people who honour life. The degree to which actual policies mimic this game can only reflect a deep pathology of a system preparing for war but not for peace. The end of the Cold War has not dampened interest in disarmament and arms control. In the liberal democracies, organizations promoting disarmament retain some clout in the domestic political arena. A current view holds that modern liberal democracies can achieve effective disarmament among themselves because they seem less prone to make war on one another. The spread of democracy then conceivably advances the cause of disarmament (Maurer 2005). The US government has been the primary advocate of the theory that democracies are, at least, not sources of aggression. However, its own record has been one of military support for either democracies or dictatorial police states depending only upon the favourability of their policies to corporate economic interests in the US (Chomsky 2004; Pilisuk and Zassi 2006). In the aftermath of the Cold War, attempts to limit the geographical spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and to eliminate the use of chemical and biological agents as weapons of mass destruction, have also emerged as important policy concerns. Paradoxically, disarmament has even been used as a justification for resorting to war. The coalition that fought Iraq in 1991, for instance, aimed not only at restoring Kuwait as an independent sovereign state, but also at eliminating Iraqs ability to manufacture and use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The prospect for a major war in northeast Asia, brought about by North Koreas desire to build a nuclear arsenal, and the determination of the US and South Korea to prevent this 237

development, is also part of an attempt to further international disarmament on a selective basis. The establishment of a neo-liberal world order could therefore entail the paradox of fighting wars for the sake of disarmament. Hence the plea of disarmament advocates namely, that weapons themselves cause war might come to have a new, more ominous meaning. Arms and their use might be justified as instruments for disarming other countries by attacking them (Maurer 2005). The world owes much to the United Nations for whatever progress toward disarmament has occurred. UN responsibility falls upon the First Committee of the UN General Assembly (a committee of the whole), which is responsible for disarmament and security matters. All 191 Member states are included and literally hundreds of matters are discussed. The UN Disarmament Commission meets in New York once or twice a year to help refine the agenda proposed by the First Committee for the talks in the Conference on Disarmament. Resolutions are passed by a majority vote or by a two-thirds majority if deemed important issues (United Nations Department for Affairs Disarmament 1988). The more specialized UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), currently with 66 members, meets in Geneva to produce multilateral agreements. It is the only group given authority to negotiate actual treaties. This group sets its own agenda, taking into account recommendations from the UN General Assembly (UNGA), and it submits reports at least annually to the General Assembly. Its work has been slow, reflecting wide differences among members on what should be discussed. The dividing issue frequently is linkage. Some nations will refuse to participate in discussions limiting one type of weapon or the weapons in one particular area unless weapons threats from other sources are also up for consideration. For example, the US might wish to mobilize international support for disarming what it considers rogue states while others will only agree to such discussion if they include attention to the weapons within the US that threaten other nations. The US opposed any negotiating mandate on general nuclear disarmament while China, at the same time, opposed negotiating a fissile material cutoff treaty in the absence of negotiations on general nuclear disarmament. Egypt has urged Arab states not to sign the Chemical Weapons Treaty until Israel signs the Nuclear Proliferation treaty (INIDC 2005; United Nations 1996; Department for United Nations Disarmament Affairs 1988). The UN disarmament agenda in 2005 had the following priorities: cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear war (including all related matters), prevention of an arms race in outer space, effective international arrangements to assure nonnuclear weapon states that they would be protected against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (negative security assurances), new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons, comprehensive programme of disarmament, 238

transparency in armaments, and landmines (UNIDC 2005). While talks provide more basis for hope than belligerent unilateral proclamations, little significant progress was achieved on any of the items. To understand why, it is important to place the issue of disarmament in a larger economic, political and psychosocial context. Profits from weapons Arms make money. Small weapon transfers, for example, are a business in which independent entrepreneurs are often involved. Arms brokers have engaged in disturbing weapons transfers to highly abusive armed groups and to countries that are under UN arms embargoes. One wellknown arms broker, Victor Bout, has been implicated in violating or contributing to violating UN arms embargoes in Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The armed groups wreak havoc on innocent civilians. Yet, many arms brokers, including Bout, remain free and continue to traffic arms to human rights abusers outside of the purview of international regulations. In one example, arms brokers were reported to have shipped 3,117 surplus assault rifles from Nicaragua to Panama. The weapons were diverted to Colombias paramilitary Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). At the time, the AUC was accused of killing thousands of civilians and was on the US Department of State list of terrorist organizations (Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies 2005). There have been US and international efforts to stem such arms transfers. The US government adopted a law on arms brokering in 1996. The law covers a wide range of activities, including transporting and financing. It requires arms brokers both to register and to apply for a license for each activity. The US used this law to prosecute a British citizen for attempting to sell shoulder-fired missiles in the United States to a group intending to use the missiles to shoot down a commercial airliner. Many governments, however, have no law, or only very weak law, on arms brokering. For example, Irish law does not restrict brokers who arrange weapons supplies from foreign countries. Hence Ireland was unable to prosecute an arms broker that was reportedly involved in 2004 in efforts to supply 50 T72 tanks from Ukraine to the Sudanese military. In January 2004, the EU strengthened its arms embargo on Sudan out of concern for its ongoing civil war. The US law cannot be fully effective until similar laws are adopted and enforced by other governments. Since the adoption of the law, the US has only prosecuted five individuals. Because small arms transfers are quite important in abuses of human rights, Amnesty International has called for an international agreement to prevent arms brokering activity, such as transfers to governments and groups with consistent records of gross human rights violations (Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies 2005; Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements 2005)

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Models and Paradoxes of Toleration

From: Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe: Theoretical Perspectives and Contemporary Developments, ACCEPT PLURALISM Working Paper 3/2011, pp.9-17 The work Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe: Theoretical Perspectives and Contemporary Developments is a study of tolerance, its notion, models and paradoxes. Also it contains data about the history of liberal tolerance; cultural diversity in Europe and reflections about the importance of tolerance. Here is given an excerpt from this work. Lucrarea Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe: Theoretical Perspectives and Contemporary Developments este un studiu despre toleran, definiia, modelele i paradoxurile sale. De asemenea, se refer la istoria toleranei liberale, diversitatea cultural n Europa i ofer reflecii aupra importanei toleranei. Mai jos este oferit un extras din aceast lucrare. , , . , , . . There is a tendency to conceive of liberalism as synonymous with tolerance. Liberalism, however, is conventionally not the same as complete licence to do whatever one wants to do to oneself and others. Liberalism entails intolerance towards actions that harm the essential interests of others as equal moral and political subjects. Liberalism may also place certain limits on the actions of individuals who inflict harm on themselves. The latter is more disputed than the former. Arguably, some versions of libertarianism are based on a strong notion of selfownership, including even the idea that one can sell (parts of) oneself off to others as any other piece of property. This is often meant to be as a strong defence against (state) paternalism. In relation to others, the limits of liberal tolerance are clearer. First, liberalism insists on equal rights and opportunities for all adults and hence rejects legal rules that for example enforce gender inequality. Secondly, the limits of liberal tolerance are set where actions harm those interests of others which are so important that they should be protected by rights (McKinnon 2006, ch. 5). The liberal difficulty here is to establish the exact definition of which interests are important and should be protected by rights and what constitutes harm and therefore a violation of those rights. From the very beginning, this points to some ambiguity in liberal toleration and to its context-dependence. We illustrate such difficulties of toleration in more detail after the following introduction of meaning, scope and conceptual structure of toleration in political theory. Although we will use the two interchangeably, tolerance usually signifies an articulated normative principle whereas toleration refers to attitudes, virtues, practices and institutional regimes (Bader 2011).

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Toleration, according to a broadly accepted definition by Preston King (1976) means that a tolerator tolerates objected beliefs or practices even if he or she has the power not to tolerate. This power to interfere is not something that is forgotten (as in acquiescence) or omitted: the tolerator explicitly and consciously refrains from interference (see also McKinnon 2006, 14). The reasons and motives to interfere or not to tolerate, as we will suggest in part 2, can be as manifold as the reasons and motives for self-restraint. The object of toleration can be individual conscience, belief and collective practices and groups that are defined by beliefs or practices. In the case of individual tolerance, the tolerator (which may be individuals or collective actors) tolerates objected beliefs of individuals even if he has the power not to. The tolerated individual raises a claim, such as to be allowed to practise religion at least in private or for the freedom of exit from or entry into religious communities or organizations. In the case of collective toleration, the tolerator tolerates objected collective practices of individuals as belonging to and/or identifying with a specific group of practitioners in a situation where collective actors, for example states or religious majorities, have the power not to tolerate. The tolerated groups, associations, or organizations raise claims or rights to practise their religion collectively and publicly and also to various degrees of associational freedom or collective autonomy. The conceptual structure of toleration may be seen as implying a tension between two components (King 1976, 44-54), objection and acceptance. Those two components need to be balanced so that acceptance is sufficient for non-interference without invalidating the reasons for objection. Toleration is never pure or complete: it includes the ineliminable reference to the less than ideal (Horton 1992, 65), and the forbearance of toleration is motivated by reasons that override but that do not cancel out reasons for rejection. Reasons for rejection and reasons for acceptance thus stand in a difficult relationship that makes toleration a balancing act. This balance is not only historically changing, as we will suggest in part 2 in relation to Jewish emancipation, but also conceptually unstable. As such, it has led political theorists to consider various paradoxes running through the very idea of toleration. Paradoxes of toleration The first one is the paradox of the tolerant racist (Forst 2003, 33; McKinnon 2006, 22). Arguably, toleration is all the more commendable the more difficult it is for the tolerator to overcome his or her initial objection. What, however, are we to make of this effort when the initial reasons for rejection are obnoxious and morally objectionable? Paradoxically, a racist with strong ideological convictions on the biological inferiority of certain races may appear to be particularly tolerant when he or she refrains from acting on his or her reprehensible beliefs. Undoubtedly, those beliefs may be deeply felt and thus difficult to override. This has led some normative theorists to specify criteria as to what might count as legitimate reasons for objection 241

and to exclude those that do not pass a test of moral justification. Racism, for example, may be seen to fail this test of moral appropriateness, and racists, accordingly, may not be considered as tolerant when failing to act on their convictions (McKinnon 2006, 26). A second paradox arises just in relation to this test. For toleration to count as a virtue, initial reasons for objection need to be morally defensible. But if this is so, we might as well ask why objection should be overridden at all (Mendus 1989, 19; Forst 2003, 35-6). How can we prioritize moral reasons for acceptance over moral reasons for objection? The concern is that this would open the doors to some kind of value relativism. Toleration would then seem to be a position of moral cowardice, and this, in fact, is very much the thrust of contemporary attacks on tolerance (see part 5). This paradox of moral toleration has led political theorists to invoke the distinction between moral and ethical reasons, and to specify toleration in terms of acceptance that is ethical rather than moral. Morality is about the evaluation of specific actions. An ethical reason for toleration, by contrast, would be the appreciation of human beingsregardless of their particular convictions and actionsas involved in ongoing efforts to justify their values and their conduct. This would be a human characteristic that is worthy of consideration and some form of qualified respect (Forst 2003, 528-9, 588-600). Regardless of whether we follow this particular resolution of the paradox, it shows that toleration involves difficult decisions and the weighing of reasons.A third paradox regards the question of boundary-drawing. On one hand, the argument goes, there must be boundaries as tolerance would otherwise be meaningless. On the other hand each boundary that is drawn reflects particular values. It can always be questioned by whom and in what name boundaries are drawn. This holds true also for the construction of the refusal to tolerate intolerance as the definition of intolerance is also subject to particular values. Toleration means that one agent assumes evaluative authority over the beliefs and practices of the other. It is thus at risk of perpetuating social hierarchies and relationships of domination. This final paradox of toleration raises the difficult question of how to think of the nature of power in toleration. After all, even in situations of non-interference power may continue to be exercised and positions of subordination or domination may be perpetuated. Toleration may appear to involve a discretionary exercise of power, based on the arbitrary will of the tolerator. Those who (or whose practices) are tolerated, may still be subject to the threat of interference, should the tolerator change his or her mind about refraining from interfering. The situation in which people are systematically subject to the threat of interference, without necessarily being interfered with at a particular point in time, has been identified by contemporary neo-republican theorists, notably Philip Pettit (1997), as one of domination. The classic examples are those of the slave or the wife in a Victorian marriage; the master or husband has the right to interfere, but if well-intentioned or absent, may not choose to do so. But the status of the wife or slave remains 242

one of subordination, since a change of master or of inclination may result in their physical or psychological abuse.On this account, freedom is understood as the absence of domination, not simply the absence of interference, and involves a more secure status. One of the central aims of government should be to promote non-domination, by providing such a secure status against arbitrary incursions both by other individuals and institutions in society, and by government itself. This conception is more demanding than the conventional idea of liberal toleration, understood as the absence of interference. Whereas non-interference requires only that someone is not currently interfered with, non-domination requires that they have a status, and structures that secure this, which protects them from the constant threat of arbitrary interference. It also requires that people, instead of accommodating themselves to domination, can look others in the eye as equals. Institutions alone do not secure nondomination, which also requires the cultivation of attitudes of civility. Tolerance thus requires more than the absence of particular instances of interference, but a structure of institutions and relations that secures citizens from the arbitrary will of the state or others. This points to how toleration may be understood, rather than the simple absence of non-interference, along a spectrum of positions, some of them more demanding than others.

Toleration as a perceptual shift The standard model of liberal toleration that we have discussed before considers a relationship between two agents, individuals or groups, where one agent passes judgment on the other. In its concern with the act of moral evaluation, this model to some extent fails to recognize that the parties to any given relationship of toleration are socially situated and do not usually encounter one another ex novo. Toleration is predicated on prior social contact, encounters, relationships and learning. The overriding reason that makes toleration possible does not usually come in a flash of inspiration but as a result of drawn-out social relationships. A perspective that appears to take better account of this relational character of toleration and its social logics has been proposed by David Heyd. Tolerant people overcome the drive to interfere in the life of another not because they come to believe that the reasons for restraint are weightier than the reasons for disapproval, but because the attention is shifted from the object of disapproval to the humanity or the moral standing of the subject before them [Toleration] consists of the capacity to ignore, or rather suspend or bracket, a set of considerations, which do not thereby lose any of their original force. (Heyd 1996,12)

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The movement towards toleration is thus to be understood as a perceptual shift or a switch of perspective, a transformation of attitude, based not on the assessment of which reasons are overriding but on ignoring one type of reason altogether by focusing on the other (Heyd 1996, 13). Heyd draws attention to how the reasons of toleration are not beyond reappraisal, which may not least be a result of learning and ones exposure to cultural difference. Put simply, experiencing difference in actual social relationships may change ones estimation as to how what is different can be tolerated. Where too much emphasis may be placed on normative evaluation and doctrinal learning, the perceptual shift model thus highlights what has become apparent in recent years: when the question of toleration is posed, this is often not a result of moral re-evaluation. Toleration, Ingrid Creppell (2008, 322) suggests, does not come about because people resolve their differences but because they come to rebalance those differences through seeing their commitments and beliefs as broader than they did at the beginning of the encounter. Toleration is about relationships between individuals and groups in society; it is dependent on how differences and identities are socially perceived and negotiated. This social dependence of toleration may also work in the opposite direction, towards intolerance. Current anxieties over the public visibility of Islam in Europe are, for example, not necessarily best understood as expressions of a new intolerance that is based on moral evaluations. Cultural contact, such as the encounters with an increasingly publicly visible Islam, need to be considered to understand the social nature of both toleration and intolerance (Gle 2005). Intolerance becomes a stronger possibility the more what was previously unrecognized, underreported, or considered to be a private matter, is perceived to be an issue of public concern. Usually issues become politicized and groups or peoples come to see each other in political terms that need working out (ibid., emphasis in original). The history of tolerance that we will turn to in the following has seen a variety of such perceptual shifts and re-appraisals as well as processes of learning and exposure to difference.

The history of liberal tolerance The history of how practices of toleration emerged and how the related ideas were thought up, experimented with and transmitted in response to the religious diversity and religious strife of 16th, 17th and 18th century Europe has been written in various ways (see Collins 2009 for a recent overview). Accounts reflect preoccupations of their time, among them a narrative of triumphant liberalism that presented a storyline of how universal persecution gave way under the pressure of Enlightenment ideals. The persecuting society (Moore 1987) of medieval and early modern Europe is thus contrasted with contemporary liberalism and strong emphasis is put on 244

the role of public intellectuals, philosophes and hommes de lettres, spreading Enlightenment ideas in an emerging public sphere (e.g., Jordan 1936; Kamen 1967). 17th century ideas are seen to provide the early-modern point of departure for the journey towards contemporary liberalism. This emphasis on the role of philosophical innovation has been challenged on several accounts (see in particular Laursen and Nederman 1998). First, a history of tolerance in terms of ideas may neglect everyday practices preceding the development of philosophical principles. In her social history of toleration in England, Alexandra Walsham (2006, 5) forcefully suggests that to situate persecution and toleration at opposite ends of the intellectual and political spectrum is deeply misleading. John Locke, as is well known, envisaged tolerance to Protestant dissenters without carving out a sphere for religious toleration that was complete (Locke 2006). To the contrary, Lockes justification of tolerance reaffirmed the intolerable presence of Catholics and atheists (Creppell 1996). His concern to distinguish exactly the Business of Civil Government from that of Religion, and to settle the just Bounds that lie between the one and the other (John Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration) meant that whilst boundaries were shifted, they were not removed. Not all speculative opinions & religious worship (Locke 2006, 288) were considered as harmless to continued civil peace and could thus claim a title to universal toleration. In fact, in Lockes time as well as today, toleration for one group is perfectly compatible with the continued discrimination of another. More than that, the boundary shifts that bring one group into the domain of toleration may introduce new reasons for intolerance towards others. In Lockes political philosophy, emphasis on the freedom of individual conscience coincided with raisons d'tat for intolerance. Where Protestant dissenters become tolerable, the intolerable presence of Catholics whose perceived allegiance to the Pope made them a threat to civil peace was reaffirmed in a different way. Similar boundary shifts occur today: toleration in regard to freedom of sexual expression, for example, may go hand in hand with more intolerance with regard to religious expression (see part 5). Secondly, in addition to the changing philosophical justifications of toleration, the kind of social histories that Walsham or Benjamin Kaplan (2007) have provided, show a somewhat muddied picture. Accommodation and compromise were not necessarily sustained by philosophical principles but by localized and contextual moral reasons. Social practices of accommodation were often the result of local conditions, notably the need to share social spaces. Tracing social practices of toleration, however, is complicated by a lack of source material and for the simple reason that persecution, because it requires positive action and leaves a historical record, is easier to document than everyday toleration (Collins 2009,614). This may well remain an obstacle for contemporary analysis, which is at risk of putting too much emphasis on 245

principles and ideals. To remedy this bias and to arrive at a more complete picture of the social realities of toleration, we need to be concerned with local practices of accommodation and conviviality that are often supported by pragmatic reasons, as well as with local and contextualized moral reasons for granting toleration. Thirdly, the notion of continuity between modern and early-modern Europe makes it easy to dismiss ideas and practices that do not conform to the standards of liberal toleration. Practices of accommodation, for example in decidedly non-secular contexts, might not find a place in such histories. The values and types of reasoning underpinning Islamic practices of toleration or the group accommodation of the Ottoman millet system preceded the 17th century and are not grounded in European Enlightenment philosophy (Braude and Lewis 1982; Friedmann 2003; Barkey 2008). Equally, Buddhism has historically provided resources for toleration, such as when Ashoka propagated moral principles of both public and individual conduct intended to respond to the immense socio-cultural heterogeneity of his Indian Empire (Ashoka 1993; Bader 2010). But medieval Europe too, it is suggested, was not without resources for toleration. Tolerantia was present in medieval canonical law (Bejczy 1997). Cary Nederman (2000, 5) illustrates one horizon of toleration that he locates in Latin Christian theology of around 1100. Tolerance is required because intolerant practices are not and cannot be efficacious in light of some significant and irremovable dimension of human existence. Toleration is, therefore, not a good or an end in itself, but a course of action or inaction sanctioned, ultimately, by God himself inasmuch as He created and endowed humanity with certain capacities and frailties. Toleration can thus be justified on strictly religious grounds, such as by the idea that Gods omnipotence and the ultimate incomprehensibility of his actions should lead humans towards humility in their judgmentsthus towards toleration. These alternative sources of toleration may not fit easily with conventional definitions of liberal-secular tolerance as they may draw on different horizons of justification. They serve as a useful reminder that the history of tolerance can hardly be considered to be a unidirectional movement towards a contemporary state of affairs. The awareness of the diversity of intellectual frameworks that have generated viable defenses of toleration (Nederman and Laursen 1996, 5), and of everyday social practices of tolerance and accommodation, casts some doubt whether it was an intellectual movement of the 17th century that made toleration, as Perez Zagorin (2003) puts it, come to the west.

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CURSUL UNIVERSITAR CONFLICTE INTERNAIONALE

Elaborat de TEOSA Valentina

Global Conflict Panorama

Conflict Barometer. 2011. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. http://www.hiik.de/en/ The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) at the Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg is a registered non-profit association. It is dedicated to research, evaluation and documentation of intra- and interstate political conflicts. The HIIK evolved from the research project COSIMO (Conflict Simulation Model) led by Prof. Dr. Frank R. Pfetsch (University of Heidelberg) and financed by the German Research Association (DFG) in 1991. Analyzed Period 12/01/2010 - 12/31/2011 P.2-3: Between December 2010 and December 2011, a total of 388 conflicts were observed. Among these were twenty wars and eighteen limited wars, amounting to 38 highly violent conflicts. Another 148 conflicts were classified as violent crises, thereby exceeding last years all-time high. The remaining 202 conflicts were conducted without violent means, with 87 conflicts being judged as non-violent crises and 115 as disputes. Compared to the previous year, the total number of conflicts increased by eighteen, from 370 to 388. Most significant was the increase in the number of wars, from six cases in 2010 to twenty in 2011, while limited wars decreased by four from last years 22 cases. Furthermore, the number of crises rose by nine, from 139 to 148. In contrast, the number of non-violent conflicts decreased by two, with a drop of non-violent crises from 108 to 87 and a simultaneous rise of disputes from 95 to 115. With this years total of twenty, the number of wars reached an all-time high since the beginning of the observation period in 1945. Three new conflicts started as wars in 2011, all of them in the context of the Arab Spring protests and located in the region of Middle East and Maghreb: Yemen (various opposition groups), Libya (opposition), and Syria (various opposition groups). The six wars which had already been observed in 2010 remained on the same level of intensity in 2011: Iraq (Sunni militant groups), Afghanistan (Taliban et al.), Pakistan (various Islamist militant groups), Sudan (Darfur), Somalia (Islamist groups), and Mexiko (drug cartels). Furthermore, eleven already existing conflicts escalated into wars in 2011. Only the conflict in Nigeria (Northerners Southerners) escalated from a non-violent level into war, whereas six former violent crises turned to wars: Egypt (various opposition groups), Cte dIvoire (opposition), Nigeria (Boko Haram), Sudan (SPLM/A / South Sudan), Sudan (inter-ethnic violence) [since July South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)], and Sudan (SPLM/A various 247

militias) [since July South Sudan (various militias)]. Additionally, four former limited wars were fought out as wars in 2011: Turkey (PKK / Kurdish areas), Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia), Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 / Karen State, Kayah State), and Pakistan (Mohajirs Balochis, Pakhtuns, Sindhis). Among the eighteen limited wars monitored, three erupted anew in 2011. One of them also occurred in the course of the Arab Spring protests [1 Tunisia (various opposition groups)], two emerged due to the independence of South Sudan on July 9 [1 Sudan South Sudan, Sudan (SPLM/A-North / Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile)]. Another six conflicts escalated from violent crises in 2010 into limited wars in 2011: Mauritania (AQIM), Iran (PJAK / Kurdish areas), Thailand Cambodia (border), Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State), DR Congo (FDLR), and Colombia (paramilitary groups, drug cartels). The remaining nine limited wars had already been fought out on this level of intensity in 2010: Algeria (AQIM), Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territory), India (Naxalites), Pakistan (Taliban various tribes), Thailand (various Islamist separatist / southern border provinces), Uganda (LRA), Colombia (FARC), Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups), and Russia (Islamist militants / Dagestan). Eighteen new conflicts emerged in 2011. All new conflicts observed started violently in the very year of their beginning, six of them on a highly violent level. Most affected was the region of Middle East and Maghreb, accounting for thirteen new violent conflicts, among them three wars and one limited war. Furthermore, three new crises started in Asia and Oceania, while two limited wars erupted in Sub-Saharan Africa. Seven conflicts were considered to have ended during the observation period. Three of these were located in Sub-Saharan Africa, two in the Americas, and one each in Asia and Oceania, as well as in Europe. While conflicts in DR Congo (Enyele Boba), Somalia (al-Shabaab Hizbul Islam), Colombia Ecuador, and Russia Norway (Barents Sea) were solved by treaties or agreements between the conflict parties, Canadas (Bloc Qubcois / Quebec) was considered to have ended after the conflict actor Bloc Qubcois had lost its party status. The conflict between Bangladesh and India was resolved due to the improved relations between the two states [1 Bangladesh India]. Furthermore, the conflict between the Khartoum govern ment of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) ended with the independence of South Sudan on July 9, but was subsequently succeeded by the conflict between Sudan and the new state [1 Sudan South Sudan]. In order to reveal a long-term trend, the five intensity levels were categorized into three groups: The two non-violent levels were summarized as low intensity conflicts, while limited wars together with wars, as conflicts of high intensity. For this purpose violent crises were labeled medium intensity conflicts. As the graph below shows, the number of conflicts observed 248

rose more or less continuously from 83 in 1945 to 388 in 2011. However, this increase must partly be considered as a statistical artifact, as the scope and quality of available information on current conflicts augmented considerably in recent decades. Most of the observed conflicts were conflicts of low intensity. With regard to high intensity conflicts, their number increased almost constantly until 1992, when an all-time high was reached with 51 high-intensity conflicts shortly after the decline of the Soviet Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia. Afterwards, its number dropped sharply, but then rose again until it reached 45 in 2003. In the last eight years, the number of highly violent conflicts has ranged between 31 and 41. Teoria i practic gestionrii conflictelor i conflictualitii

Politici i strategii n gestionarea conflictualitii: 20-21 noiembrie 2008, Bucureti/ Universitatea Naional de Aprare Carol I. Vol.I-III. - Bucureti: Editura Universitii Naionale de Aprare Carol I, 2008. Vol. 242p.; vol.II 312p.; vol.III. 330p. Vezi articol: Emergena politicilor i strategiilor noncomflictuale n zonele cu conflicte ngheate. (Dr. Florian RPAN, Vol. I, p. 23-28) Lumea are astzi o mulime de probleme nesoluionate i chiar fr soluii. Pe msur ce unele se rezolv, crete numrul celor care i ateapt rndul la o posibil soluie. Pentru c au tot dreptul la rezolvare. Cea mai grav problem a lumii const n conflictualitatea ei. Dar tot conflictualitatea lumii este cea care genereaz micarea i dezvoltarea, ieirea din starea de echilibru static, neproductiv i intrarea n acel echilibru dinamic n care complexitatea domin hazardul i regenereaz spiritul creativ. i, poate ntr-o msur i mai mare, emerg, de aici, o mulime de politici i strategii nonconflictuale de soluionare a conflictualitii. Este o realitate n paradox, potrivit creia conflictualitatea genereaz politici i strategii nonconflictuale pentru soluionarea conflictualitii, tiut fiind faptul c politica este, n esena ei, o expresie centrat i concentrat a interesului, iar strategia a fost, este i va fi totdeauna tiina, experiena i arta de a pune n oper o decizie politic sau o anume politic. Exist, deci, o conflictualitate generativ, creativ, pozitiv, care izvorte din nempcarea fiinei umane cu stagnarea, cu inactivitatea, cu non-creaia i care-i are originea n spiritul Universului, n dialectica Universului, i o conflictualitate distructiv, negativ, care genereaz stagnarea i chiar regresul. i una, i cealalt se afl la originea crizei i a conflictului, inclusiv a conflictului armat, iar gestionarea conflictualitii pare a fi, de fapt, doar o soluie pentru... echilibrarea sau calibrarea conflictualitii la i pe lungimea de und a noii societi informaionale i cognitive.

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De unde rezult c a domina sau, mai nou, a gestiona conflictualitatea nseamn, n primul rnd, a o cunoate. Numai o foarte bun cunoatere a meandrelor i efectelor conflictualitii poate duce la nghearea spaiilor ei periculoase, adic a zonelor cu conflictualitate ridicat i rzboaie de tot felul i la dezghearea acelor orizonturi care tempereaz violena, fr a ucide competiia, lupta i spiritul de nvingtor. Conflictualitatea lumii nu se dezvolt linear, ci nelinear i chiar haotic. tim foarte puine lucruri despre ce se va ntmpla cu adevrat mine. Aceasta este, dealtfel, esena unui determinism dinamic i complex. tim doar c exist o astfel de conflictualitate, i simim i i suportm desfurrile, meandrele i efectele, ne folosim uneori de ea, cnd avem nevoie, i o repugnm atunci cnd ne simim frustrai, ameninai sau neputincioi n faa ei. tim c ea exist independent de noi i de voina noastr, aa cum exist ape linitite, dar i ape nvolburate, peisaje mirifice, dar i cutremure, inundaii, catastrofe ecologice i tehnologice, rzboaie i conflicte armate, acceptm aceast realitate, dar ne revoltm profund cnd ne sunt ameninate sau nclcate drepturile, demnitatea, onoarea, existena, viaa. Summum-ul conflictualitii l reprezint rzboiul. El este cel care presupune rnduirea lumii n tabere ostile ce se lupt ntre ele mereu, de cnd exist lumea, cu uoare i relative momente de pace. i chiar dac pacea este foarte scump oamenilor, ei nu pot iei din propriile lor falii i limite, din precedentul pe care l-au creat i nici din faptul mplinit pe care l-au generat i l regenereaz mereu. Toi tim acest lucru, l acceptm i ncercm s ne ameliorm ct mai benefic cu putin relaia cu el. Dar, din pcate, trim prea mult ntr-o lume a efectelor. Dar nu a oricror efecte adic a rezultatelor unor evoluii i revoluii care au schimbat lumea , ci ntr-un univers al efectelor care genereaz cauze, care se structureaz i se cumuleaz n tensiuni productoare de conflicte i conflictualitate. Nu mulumirea, ci nemulumirea l mpinge pe om nainte, spre noi i incomensurabile orizonturi. i tot ea l arunc n lume i l rtcete n labirinturi conflictuale, uneori, fr ieire. Efectele ns rmn. Aa cum n zonele de contact al plcilor tectonice, se nasc piscuri uriae sau imense gropi subduse n oceane, tot astfel i n confruntrile dintre marile interese ale plcilor tectonice umane, dac ne este permis s le spunem aa, se afl malformaii i deformaii ale marilor friciuni, care genereaz i vor genera mereu conflictualitate. Aproape toate zonele de falii strategice zona islamic, zona caucazian, zona african, zona sud-est asiatic, zona balcanic, zona Orientului Apropiat etc. sunt zone de efect generator de conflict, sunt, din pcate, zone de rzboaie i de conflicte armate. Evident, oamenii, fiecare ar n parte, organizaiile i organismele internaionale ONU, OSCE, NATO, Uniunea European ca i ntreaga gam de organizaii de securitate i cooperare regionale, ncearc s pun sub control conflictualitatea, s-o nghee acolo unde nu o 250

poate soluiona i s-o soluioneze efectiv acolo unde nu o poate nghea. ntre aceste dou componente ngheare i soluionare exist relaii foarte complexe, una condiionnd-o semnificativ pe cealalt. nghearea este un fel de anticamer a soluionrii i ine de raionalitatea lumii, iar soluionarea este o ieire din ngheare, prin dezghearea sau dezamorsarea, deopotriv, a efectelor i a cauzelor care genereaz conflicte i rzboaie. ntre aceste dou componente ale politicilor i strategiilor de gestionare a conflictualitii lumii exist, bineneles, foarte mult flexibilitate, dar i prea mult fluiditate. Prin flexibilitate nelegem capacitatea celor dou componente de a-i modifica parametrii, n funcie de situaiile concrete, de a se extinde sau a se restrnge, de a accepta i dezvolta relaii de complementaritate complex, fapt care le scoate din rigiditate i le face viabile, realiste i pertinente. Prin fluiditate nelegem, pe de o parte, capacitatea politicilor i strategiilor de a -i schimba forma i coninutul, de a escalada cu uurin ntregul spectru, de a iei din identitate, de a scpa raiunii i nelegerii profunde. Prin fluiditatea politicilor i strategiilor nelegem nu doar continuitatea lor, curgerea lor n fgae trasate, aleatoare i sau intempestive, ci i capacitatea de a iei din limite, de a trece peste margini, de a se folosi de saltul de culoare, de nuan i de frecven; nelegem, cu alte cuvinte, i cameleonismul lor. Vezi articol: Migraia cauz i efect n sfera securitii i conflictualitii. Dimensiuni sociale i psihosociale, politice i militare. (Dr. Alexandra SARCINSCHI, Vol.I, p. 65-75) Migration is about emigrants and immigrant, security and insecurity, peace and conflict. It has an important impact on each dimension of security, especially on psycho-social one. In our days the entire world is confronting not only the problem of emigrants who weaken the human resource of their states of origin, but the issue of immigrants as an insecurity source. Also, immigration is about discrimination, marginalization and cheap labor force, concomitant with rising productivity and living conditions. That is why this paper argues that migration is dual in its nature. It is a result of insecurity and conflict from case to case, but also a source of security and, in the same time, a source of conflict. Dimensiunea politic a securitii este influenat de i influeneaz, pozitiv sau negativ, migraia internaional prin prisma ideologiilor i politicilor promovate de guverne i conductori. Acestea pot constitui, la un moment dat, una dintre principalele cauze ale migraiei forate. Din punct de vedere istoric, guvernele nedemocratice, totalitariste au forat emigraia ca modalitate de gestionare a problemelor cauzate de existena disidenilor politici i a dumanilor statului. Pentru acetia din urm, emigrarea era singura alternativ la un tratament degradant sau inuman aplicat de ctre guvern. Aici se poate vorbi despre dou categorii de migrani, adesea exclui din statisticile referitoare la imigraie: refugiai i azilani. Refugiaii sunt persoane care prsesc ara de origine 251

din cauza persecuiilor sau a temerii c vor fi persecutai pe criterii rasiale, religioase, de naionalitate, de apartenen la un anumit grup social sau politic10. Azilanii sunt persoane care au prsit ara de origine, au depus cerere pentru a fi recunoscui ca refugiai n alt ar i ateapt o decizie n acest sens. Ca i refugiaii, azilanii fug de persecuii, dar situaia lor nu este analizat, nc, prin prisma definiiei ONU referitoare la refugiai. Conform analizelor Ageniei ONU pentru refugiai, n ultimii ani, numrul total al refugiailor a rmas constant 11 , n timp ce numrul total al cererilor de azil formulate n 36 de ri industrializate este n continu scdere (exceptnd a doua jumtate a lui 2006 cnd a crescut brusc)12. Dintre cele 95 de ri analizate, n primele ase luni ale anului 2006, au fost raportate noi sosiri de peste 1.000 de persoane n 14 ri (Figura nr. 3), iar ca ri de origine au fos t identificate - 9 (Figura nr. 4). Dimensiunea politic a securitii este influenat de migraie i prin aceea c nu numai conflictele politice determin apariia unor fluxuri de refugiai, ci i refugiaii creeaz conflicte politice. Pe de o parte, prin recunoaterea statutului de refugiat unor persoane, ara de destinaie admite faptul c ara de origine are un regim politic ce practic persecuia i opresiunea, rezultnd tensiuni ntre cei doi actori. Pe de alt parte, n rile de destinaie, refugiaii pot crea probleme de securitate prin angajarea n micri de opoziie la adresa guvernelor rilor de origine sau chiar n reele teroriste transnaionale. Este evident c, din aceast perspectiv, se pot face corelaii i ntre dimensiunea militar a securitii i migraia internaional, tot n termeni de refugiai i azilani. Implicaiile migraiei asupra dimensiunii politice pot deveni cu uurin efecte ale acesteia asupra dimensiunii militare a securitii, tensiunile dintre ara de origine i cea de destinaie, precum i aciunile reelelor teroriste putnd cpta caracteristici militare pregnante. De asemenea, conflictele armate constituie o cauz major a apariiei fluxurilor de refugiai, n special, dar i de azilani. n acelai timp, poate fi indus i migraia forat cu scopul de a slbi resursele umane ale prilor implicate n respectivul conflict armat. Din statisticile prezentate anterior se observ c multe dintre principalele ri de origine pentru imigrani, refugiai i azilani sunt ri implicate n conflicte armate: Afganistan, Algeria, Burundi, Coasta de Filde, Columbia, R. D. Congo, Irak, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda etc. Conflictele armate pot fi, de asemenea, surs a problemelor economice, dar i a degradrii mediului, ceea, ce influeneaz semnificativ micarea populaiei. Este evident faptul c, n timp ce nevoile umane prevaleaz asupra preocuprilor de alt natur n timp de criz sau 252

conflict, legturile dintre securitatea uman i celelalte dimensiuni ale securitii sunt indisolubile. Toate dimensiunile securitii sunt interrelaionate i, de aceea, impactul migraiei internationale asupra lor, dar i influena acestora asupra fenomenului menionat nu se pot analiza separat, ci n corelaie. Aadar, migraia internaional afecteaz i, la rndul su, este influenat de toate dimensiunile securitii, ns, n sfera conflictualitii, cele mai importante sunt: social i psihosocial, politic i militar. Reprezentarea pe care cetenii rii de destinaie i-o formeaz despre imigrani, azilani sau refugiai determin n mare parte msurile care se iau n sprijinul sau mpotriva acestora. De asemenea, determin atitudini, ce pot crea tensiuni, crize i chiar conflicte ntre ambele pri implicate. n acest climat psihosocial, migranii constituie o surs de beneficii, dar i de problem economice, sociale, politice, militare i ecologice att pentru ara de destinaie, ct i pentru cea de origine.

Vezi articol: Paradoxul asimetriei n conflictele internaionale n actuala etap. (Dr. Andriy VOLOIN, Victor MELICA, Vol.II, p. 53-64) Studiile privind asimetria n politica internaional, ne conduc la discuii despre relaiile dintre for, norme i valori n sistemul internaional actual i stimuleaz un studiu mai aprofundat a paradigmelor care guverneaz jocul principalilor actori n politica mondial fora celui mai slab i slbiciunea celui mai puternic. O revenire la problemele asigurrii securitii nu face dect s readuc n actualitate faptul c fora este un fenomen complex i nu poate fi definit ca o totalitate a resurselor de putere economic i uman, i c n condiiile unui conflict real, avantajul dat de ctre fora militar poate fi compensat prin gsirea punctelor sl abe a inamicului mai puternic. n ziua de azi, rezultatele studiilor confirm faptul c n situaii de conflict asimetrice, una din condiiile de baz ale securitii este unitatea normativo-valoric a spaiului ca rezultat al contiinei voluntare n cadrul creia marea majoritate a participanilor la aciune trebuie s respecte regulile jocului voluntar, ns aceast condiie a armonizrii n relaiile internaionale deocamdat nu funcioneaz, acest lucru fiind subliniat i de cunoscutul cercettor M. Mandelbaum: ntreaga imens putere militar i economic a SUA nu poate garanta ceea ce se petrece n spatele forei militare i a banilor Prezentnd elemente comune ale cazurilor mai sus amintite, se pot defini cteva trsturi principale ale conflictelor asimetrice: - imposibilitatea de a anticipa rezultatul, datorit imposibilitii de a dimensiona forele i statutul prilor combatante; 253

- utilizarea de ctre partea mai slab a strategiei de cutare a slbiciunii celui puternic; - posibilitatea ca partea mai slab s utilizeze mijloace interzise n aciunile militare pe care le desfoar; - tactica aciunilor militare indirecte folosit de ctre partea mai slab; - imposibilitatea prii mai puternice de a-i apra poziiile i de al anihila total pe cel mai slab. n acest context se poate spune c asimetria caracterizeaz situaiile paradoxale de conflict n care combatantul mai puternic nu este capabil s se apere i s obin victoria mpotriva celui mai slab5. n marea majoritate a conflictelor de acest gen, combatantul mai slab nu este capabil s obin victoria asupra celui puternic. ns acesta, de obicei reuete s mping desfurarea conflictului spre un punct care-l avantajeaz. n acest sens cel mai slab l oblig pe cel mai puternic s reacioneze cum dorete el i n acest fel obine victoria n plan politic pentru care de altfel s-a folosit fora, dac privim din punctul de vedere al definiiei clasice a rzboiului. Din anii `60 conceptul asimetric s-a folosit pentru analiza conflictelor dintre statele dezvoltate i cele n curs de dezvoltare. Conceptul a fost studiat de ctre experi politologi, militari, i n relaiile internaionale. Studiul paradoxului conflictelor asimetrice, i ncercrile de a gsi bazele teoretice ale acestora sunt prezentate n lucrrile E. Makka, A. Errigin-Tafta, M. Fisherkeller, Z. Maoz, G. Merom i alii. n lucrrile lor se vehiculeaz ideea c succesul unei campanii militare ntr-un asemenea conflict depinde nu numai de potenialul de for al combatanilor ci i de interaciunea factorilor strategico-militari i tactici cu factorii nemilitari care conduc la victorie, adic cu parametrii politic, psihologici i ideologici ai situaiei. Dup cum subliniaz marea majoritate a cercetrilor, pentru obinerea victoriei este necesar susinerea rzboiului de ctre ntreaga societate a trii combatante, adic a legitimitii lui. Acest factor este hotrtor att pentru partea puternic, ct i pentru partea mai slab.

Vezi articol: Conflictele ngheate i securitatea naional a statelor de proximitate. ( Dr. Petre DUU, Vol.II, p. 87-95) The frozen conflicts are a reality of our days. The have negative impact on national security of the neighbur states. There are two reasons for generating and making them topical: separatist movements]n some states and some of the strategic interests of the great powers. In addition, the frozen conflicts have negative influence on the promotion of the national interests and values of both states that are directlyimplicated and proximity states.

1. Consideraii preliminare privind conflictele ngheate. Astzi, conflictele ngheate

reprezint o realitate de netgduit. Ele au primit acest nume deoarece acordurile de ncetare a focului ncheiate ntre prile implicate nu au reglementat i statutul politic al provinciilor care-i reclam, nc, astzi, independena. Dou, se pare c, sunt motivele principale ale acestor 254

fenomene de natur complex. Un prim motiv l constituie separatismul politic, adic acel tip de micare social, care anim n unele state un segment relativ nsemnat de populaie. Acesta din urm, din raiuni diferite, dorete ruperea teritoriului pe care locuiesc de statul de apartenen i constituirea unei noi entiti statale autonome, independente politic i de sine-stttoare. De exemplu, pe continentul european, este cazul Transnistriei (entitate de pe teritoriul Republicii Moldova i Osetiei de Sud (entitate de pe teritoriul Georgiei) care a fost recent recunoscut (26.08.2008) de ctre Rusia, ca stat independent i autonom. Practic, se asist la manifestarea puternic a separatismului politic n statele care s -au destrmat dup 1990. Este vorba, nainte de toate, de URSS i Iugoslavia. Desigur, exist i n alte state europene manifestri separatiste. n prezent, se observ procese de integrare i de separare n Europa. Potrivit estimrilor experilor, mai mult de 10 noi state sunt teoretic susceptibile s apar pe Vechiul Continent n secolul XXI... Este evident c asupra securitii naionale a oricrui stat aflat relativ n apropierea conflictelor ngheate, acestea din urm exercit un impact semnificativ i consistent. Impactul este semnificativ pentru c afecteaz toate componentele securitii naionale, n mod nentrerupt, la fel cum este i riscul de securitate reprezentat de conflictul respectiv. Atributul consistent deriv din intensitatea cu care conflictul ngheat influeneaz securitatea naional, n ntregul su, dar cu precdere asupra componentei umane. Din punct de vedere sociologic, orice conflict, indiferent c este social, militar, politic, interpersonal etc., n evoluia sa parcurge obligatoriu etapele urmtoare: dezacordul; confruntarea; escaladarea; de-escaladarea; rezolvarea. n cazul conflictului armat ngheat, evoluia acestuia este oprit, prin diverse metode i instrumente adecvate, fie de ctre beligerani, fie de tere pri, el rmnnd aa un timp variabil. Practic, dac condiiile i motivele stoprii evoluiei sale se schimb atunci el reizbucnete cu i mai mult for. Aceasta ntruct actorii implicai direct vor s ajung la soluionarea sa, adic acesta s parcurg, de fapt, etapele sau etapa la care a fost anterior oprit. Chiar dac intervin ali actori - statali i non statali -, acetia cu greu, mai pot face ceva pentru stoparea violenelor i crearea climatului propice rezolvrii sale. Orice conflict ngheat are la originea sa interesele prilor implicate, interese, de regul, divergente. De aceea, dac nu se gsete o soluie adecvat pentru satisfacerea pe cale non violent a intereselor aflate n joc se ajunge invariabil la conflict deschis ce poate lua forma unui conflict violent susinut inclusiv prin mijloace militare. n zilele noastre, exemple de acest fel sunt suficiente. Printre acestea se pot aminti: Kosovo, Transnistria, Osetia de Sud i Abhazia. n acest context, securitatea naional a fiecrui stat din vecintatea zonelor de conflicte ngheate este influenat puternic negativ. n rndul acestor state se numr i Romnia, a crei securitate 255

naional este afectat semnificativ i consistent de toate conflictele ngheate din ex -Iugoslavia i fosta Uniune Sovietic. . 2. Caracteristici ale conflictelor ngheate de pe continentul European. Analiza unor conflicte ngheate de pe continentul european, de exemplu, Kosovo, Transnistria, Osetia de Sud i Abhazia, - permite evidenierea principalelor lor caracteristici. n opinia mea, printre caracteristicile definitorii ale conflictelor ngheate menionate se numr urmtoarele: a) ele au aprut dup dezintegrarea unor state de tip federativ, proces produs dup 1990. Este vorba aici de Iugoslavia i de URSS, ambele state fiind constituite dup ncheierea Primului Rzboi Mondial iar mprirea lor n state unionale s-a fcut dup criterii politice, conforme cu ideologia celor aflai la conducerea statelor respective. Practic, cnd s-au constituit noile entiti unionale sau federative nu s-a inut seama de criterii etnice, lingvistice, de aspiraiile locuitorilor de pe aceste teritorii sau de forma lor administrativ anterioar constituirii statelor de tip federativ. De fapt, s-au conturat noile state unionale n aa fel nct sentimentul naional i al apartenenei la un popor anume (adic cu un trecut i o istorie proprie) s dispar i s se formeze sentimente fa de statul nou creat (adic de poporul iugoslav i de poporul sovietic creaii ale unor mini bolnave, n opinia mea); b) izbucnirea i derularea unui rzboi ntre forele militare i/sau de ordine public ale statului i forele paramilitare ale separatitilor. Acesta a fost cazul n Kosovo, n Transistria, n Osetia de Sud i Abhazia. Astfel, n 1992, a izbucnit un rzboi civil ntre forele Ministerului de Interne ale R. Moldova i forele paramilitare ale separatitilor din Transnitria. Conflictul armat s-a ncheiat nedecis, prin semnarea unui acord de ncetare a focului fr a soluiona litigiul dintre beligerani. La fel au evoluat lucrurile i n Osetia de Sud i Abhazia; c) maniera ambigu n care s-au ncheiat aceste rzboaie3. De fapt, n cazul fiecruia dintre aceste conflicte s-a semnat, la intervenia comunitii internaionale, un acord de ncetare a focului dar nu s-a definit i statutul politic al respectivelor entiti statale rezultate n urma separrii de statul de apartenen. Cu excepia provinciei Kosovo... 3. Impactul conflictelor ngheate europene asupra securitii naionale a Romniei. Securitatea naional a rii noastre este puternic afectat de existena tuturor conflictelor ngheate de pe continentul european. Motive pentru susinerea unei astfel de afirmaii sunt, n opinia mea, suficiente i convingtoare. Astfel, printer principalele riscuri i ameninri care pot pune n pericol securitatea naional a Romniei, valorile i interesele sale ca stat membru al comunitii europene i euroatlantice se numr i conflictele regionale6. Astfel, sursa citat, apreciaz c prin numrul lor mare, aa-numitele conflicte ngheate din aceast regiune, alturi de alte stri tensionate, dispute teritoriale, tendine separatiste i situaii de instabilitate prezente n proximitatea strategic a Romniei, genereaz incertitudine strategic, determin 256

irosirea multor resurse i perpetueaz srcia. Ele alimenteaz, de asemenea, alte forme de violen i criminalitate i favorizeaz terorismul internaional. Un alt efect al prezenei conflictelor ngheate n vecintatea rii noastre l constituie amplificarea responsabilitilor Romniei, datorit dublului su statut de membru NATO i UE, n ceea ce privete monitorizarea continu, atent i riguroas a evoluiei conflictelor ngheate din Kosovo i Transnistria, ndeosebi. Acest lucru semnific alocarea de resurse umane, materiale i financiare de ctre statul roman pentru a cunoate oportun i operativ starea i tendinele de evoluie a conflictelor menionate. ...

Vezi articol: Posibile soluii de rezolvare a conflictelor viitoare. (Dr. Mihai Marcel NEAG, Vol.II, p. 96-103)

The matters involred into solving a possible military conflicts presupposes an approach to both the military and the non-military actions . In this respect, we mention a series of symmetrical and asymmetrical elements that occur in the event of a conflict. Future conflicts will further epitomize the expression of political, economic and social confrontation, with an asymmetric nature, mainly with atypical actions. ...Vulnerabilitile lumii contemporane se asociaz cu resursele materiale existente, condiiile de mediu, cu multiple ipostaze ale naturii i comportamentului actorilor statali i nonstatali. Ct privete ameninrile, acestea sunt legate de consecinele negative ale globalizrii economiei, soldate cu srcirea a milioane de oameni, de proliferarea armelor de distrugere n mas, de terorismul internaional la care se adaug reelele crimei organizate care amenin stabilitatea mondial, precum i conflictele locale i interne, inter-religioase i interetnice. Conflictul militar. Este foarte greu de fcut o distincie clar ntre o situaie conflictual i una nonconflictual,ntre conflictele militare i cele nonmilitare, acestea modelndu-se, practic, din punctul de vedere al gestionrii i dezamorsrii, dup aceeai filozofie i dup aceeai metodologie. Dac, n ceea ce privete conflictele militare, avem de a face, n principi u, cu simetrii sau disimetrii, ntruct este vorba de armate sau structuri militare care se confrunt, n conflictele nonmilitare predomin asimetriile. Dac disimetria se refer la disproporionalitate i chiar incompatibilitate, corespunzndu-i rzboiul disproporionat, cum au fost cele din Irak, n 1991 i 2003, asimetria se refer, n principal, la cile de adaptare la o situaie concret, pornind de la condiiile iniiale conjugate cu cele prezente prin exploatarea, n mod direct sau indirect, a vulnerabilitilor adversarului. Distingem, astfel, urmtoarele forme (tipuri) de conflicte n care se evideniaz elemente simetrice i, n mod deosebit, elemente asimetrice, ce pot fi grupate dup cum urmeaz: aciunile militare cuprind: rzboiul noncontact, rzboiul disproporionat, rzboiul popular (total), gherila, revoluia armat, rzboiul civil i terorismul/ciberterorismul; aciunile 257

violente i nonviolente, n rndul crora se nscriu conflictele de mic intensitate sau medie, rzboiul psihologic, rzboiul informaional i mediatic i ciberconflictul. O ultim categorie este reprezentat de aciunile nonmilitare, unde se nscriu ndiguirea, embargoul i blocada economic, separatismul etnic i religios, precum i boicotul. Obiectul i nivelele conflictului militar. Conflictul exprim o nenelegere, ciocnire de interese, dezacord, antagonism, ceart, diferend, discuie (violent). Conflictele sociale se caracterizeaz prin opoziii ntre grupuri umane sau n interiorul acestora, mpotriviri ce decurg din situarea obiectiv a oamenilor pe poziii divergente fa de anumite aspecte existeniale ce-i afecteaz direct sau indirect. Impunerea voinei unei pri ntr-o situaie conflictual interstatal, care exclude dialogul, tratativele, se poate face fie prin utilizarea forei militare cu scopul de a neutraliza gruparea advers, fie prin ncercarea de a controla direct factorii de putere, social-politici i economici, nct acetia s nu mai fie n msur s utilizeze forele armate pentru a se supune sau, n fine, prin aciuni de hruire intermitente, cu fore relativ mici, urmrindu-se realizarea unor scopuri pariale. n literatura de specialitate prima dintre situaii este asimilat fenomenului rzboi, cea de-a doua interveniei militare, iar cea de-a treia aciunii armate de mic intensitate. Conflictul armat este o stare la care se ajunge ca urmare a nenelegerii corecte a cauzelor ce genereaz strile conflictuale i a predispoziiei unui grup social de a-i impune propria voin prin mijloace militare. n concluzie, conflictele armate sunt fenomene sociale ce polarizeaz societile, implic direct forele politice i componenta militar n adoptarea unei soluii, iar finalitatea urmrit nu este de ordin militar. Aadar, conflictul poate fi catalogat, n funcie de obiectul apariiei, n: conflict de interese, conflict de necesiti, conflict de valori, conflict ideologic, conflict de credine, conflict de evaluare. Nivele conflictuale pot fi n cadrul grupului, ntre grupuri, n interiorul, organizaiei, ntre organizaii, n interiorul societii, internaionale ntre state, ntre organizaiile internaionale i state sau societi de state. Analiza conflictelor militare. Pentru a rezolva n mod constructiv un conflict, trebuie mai nti s l i nelegem. Conflictul trebuie s transpar nu doar n dinamica sa, cu forma i efectele sale, ci i n comportamentele, interesele i nevoile prilor implicate n el. n acest sens este foarte important s vedem la ce nivel al realitii se raporteaz informaiile i modurile de aciune. ntr-un conflict, diversele interese i nevoi concureaz cu diferitele nivele ale realitii i cu diferitele posibiliti de a se face auzit i de a exercita influen (putere). Analiza conflictelor nu are ca scop s adune tot felul de informaii, ci s interpreteze i s evalueze aceste informaii. S-a ncearcat de multe ori s se soluioneze conflictele prin diverse metode "tradiionale", ale cror ineficien s-a fcut dovedit de mult vreme.

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Printre aceste metode se numr strategiile de constrngere, de intimidare i de ameninare care ar avea ca scop obligarea prilor implicate s renune la conflict. Oamenii au ncercat mereu s despart prile conflictuale sau s le conving pe acestea s-i rezolve problemele comune, astfel nct s transpar noi perspective asupra conflictului. Aceste strategii pot, ntr-adevr, s conduc la o deviere situativ de la exerciiul deschis al conflictului, ele nu ajut ns cu mult la gsirea unei reglementri de durat, la detectarea precis a cauzelor conflictului sau la configurarea unor soluii constructive. ... Proiectul Misiunii OSCE (1996/2000) pentru soluionarea conflictului Transnistrean, prevedea semnarea Acordului cu privire la reglementarea definitiv a conflictului, avnd la baz implementarea urmtoarelor idei : 1. Amplificarea i activizarea participrii OSCE i comunitii internaionale la procesul de negocieri i soluionare a conflictului prin transformarea statutului Misiunii OSCE din observator n .garant al securitii. i mediator principal. 2. Pstrarea regimului existent al Zonei de securitate i obinerea ndeplinirii stricte de ctre toate prile a prevederilor Acordului din 1992, noului Acord i hotrrilor Comisiei Unificate de Control. Revizuirea i adaptarea ulterioar a documentelor menionate la noile condiii ale procesului de reglementare. 3. Elaborarea i implementarea unor msuri de consolidare a securitii i credibilitii prin obinerea transparenei depline a forelor armate i complexului industrial-militar. n calitate de aciune iniial n acest sens se propune inventarierea de ctre o comisie mixt. Demontarea potenialului militar al regimului separatist este direct dependent de scenariul politic al reglementrii acestui conflict i este mai mult dect evident faptul, c nici-un scenariu, variant sau model nu va avea oricare anse de succes pn cnd pe teritoriul Republicii Moldova se vor afla trupele militare ale Federaiei Ruse sub oricare form sau statut. n soluionarea conflitelor militare un rol esenial l reprezint comunicarea. Aceasta este factorul detensionant, iar tehnicile de perfecionare a ei devenind coordonate absolut necesare. Comunicarea poate reprezenta o resurs strategic, un element fundamental n depirea situaiilor tensionate sau conflictuale. Ca urmare a ultimelor conflicte militare din Georgia, Afganistan i Irak i a exagerbrii aciunilor executate de diferite organizaii teroriste, se apreciaz la nivel mondial c mediul de securitate reprezint un nou set de provocri i ameninri, care schimb fundamental regulile conflictului. Potenialii adversari pot fi reprezentai att de actorii statali, dar i cei non-statali, organizaii transnaionale, grupuri teroriste, alte elemente criminale. Aceast categorie de actori sunt multidimensionali, flexibili, distribuii peste tot, bine informai, se adapteaz rapid la strategiile i tacticile militare i n mod frecvent opereaz n afara legii i a dreptului conflictelor armate. Mai mult, aceste ameninri au 259

la dispoziie metode asimetrice, ieftine i eficiente de a crea efecte la scar mare. Profitnd de operaiile n derulare prin influenarea situaiei economice, politice, culturale, ei vor aciona fr constrngeri mpotriva forelor militare i vor cuta s opereze n zone urbane, precum i n teritoriul naional al aliailor i partenerilor de coaliie pentru manipularea opiniei politice, n special prin impact asupra necombatanilor. Devine tot mai evident faptul c, n etapa actual, declanarea, desfurarea i deznodmntul confruntrilor militare au determinri complexe, n care component strict militar nu mai are totdeauna rolul hotrtor. Conflictele militare ale nceputului de mileniu fac dovada trecerii componentelor politice, economice, culturale i de alt natur n planuri mai avansate dect celui ce i se atribuie segmentului militar. Ct privete componena violent a conflictelor militare, confruntarea armat, era informaional dar i cea nuclear vor aduce mutaii substaniale n soluionarea conflictelor. ... Vezi articol: Conflictualitatea de tip etnic caracteristici i frecven. (Ilie PENTILESCU, Vol.II, p. 129-139)

Only few states from the mapamond are homogens from the point of view of the ethny and religion. Near the majority population are living different minorities too, in almost all this countries. Important to take in consideration is the aspect proliferation of these minorities like an important aspect of the current period. It can be said that the number of the minorities being different from the major part of population by rase, colour, ethny, language, culture, religion. Now, at the beginning of 21st Century, when mankind can boast with its magnificent performance in the fields of science and technique, designed to contribute in solving the great problems that are still pulsing painfully in the body of humanity, begging both for the divine help, and for the help of the Governments in the real world, in order to make a more prosperous planet a better and safer one, a new dilemma of security appeared from hatred and intolerance, requires its blood sacrifice terrorist dilemma. Appeared in the history as a product of some causes that have their roots in the politics of some States, in the core of some religions, in nationalism, xenophobia, racism or other reason hidden under the mask of good intentions, TERRORISM has never cotributed in installing and maintaining peace on earth but, on the contrary, it amplified the restless, hatred and pain of some communities, which have already been unlucky facing several times the calamities of history. II. Locul conflictualitii de tip etnic n conflictualitatea actual a lumii. Confruntrile etnice sunt, de fapt, reacii, adesea disproporionate, la lipsa unor rspunsuri care s le mulumeasc. A condamna pur i simplu etniile sau, n cadrul statelor politice, minoritile etnice, pentru btlia pe care o duc de sute de ani pentru identitate i pentru putere nu este o soluie. Dar nici nu poate fi acceptat la infinit, ca pe o fatalitate, o astfel de situaie conflictual, extrem de primejdioas. De dragul dreptului la identitate al minoritilor etnice, nu pot fi 260

desfiinate peste noapte statele politice, singurele entiti care s-au dovedit pn acum viabile i chiar eficiente n att de fragilul echilibru al planetei oamenilor. Situaia este complex i suport un dinamism fr precedent. Determinrile vin deopotriv din trecut, dar i din viitor. Trecutul nseamn valori, experien, dar i traume, umilin, dorin de revan i tot ce ine de memoria colectiv, att de fidel i, totodat, att de prtinitoare. Viitorul nseamn speran, ncredere, uneori chiar optimism, dar i nesiguran, team, incertitudine. Prezentul adun toate aceste realiti i provocri ntr-un creuzet n care reaciile sunt, adesea, imprevizibile. n Imperiul Sovietic, de exemplu, triau peste o sut de etnii, fiecare cu istoria, obiceiurile, limba i cultura sa, dar toate nregimentate n acelai concept sovietic, n aceeai cetenie, n aceeai filosofie internaionale i uniformizatoare. Constituia din 1924 definea mai multe tipuri de entiti n interiorul spaiului sovietic: republici federative (Rusia), republici autonome (Ucraina, Belorusia, Moldova etc), regiuni autonome i teritorii autonome. Aceast msur nu a rezolvat problemele etnice, mai ales pe cele din zona caucazian, ntre care i cea a inutului Nagorno-Karabah. Acest inut, locuit, n proporie de 90%, de armeni, a fost dat Azerbadjanului, mai nti de britanici, interesai de petrolul caspic, apoi i de sovietici, interesai de controlul Caucazului i al ntregii regiuni. De fapt, ruii i colonizaser pe armeni, n spaiu, pentru a realiza un scut de protecie cretin mpotriva islamismului. n concepia sovieticilor, statul socialist trebuia s rezolve problema naional, prin dezvoltarea economic i fuziunea etniilor, acest proces ducnd la dispariia naiunilor i crend un om nou, meta-naional, care s vorbeasc limba rus i s triasc ntr-un nou tip de comunitate, cea socialist. Zona Caucazului (Rusia, Georgia, Armenia i Azerbadjan) este o zon de falie ntre religii i civilizaii, ntre imperiile de odinioar i ntre marile interese de acum. Amestecul de populaii dei nu este, statistic, mult prea diferit de alte regiuni, conine zone fierbini, ntotdeauna tensionate. Aceste tensiuni provin, dup cum este cazul regiunii Nagorno-Karabah, cel al Osetiei i cel al Ceceniei, din incompatibilitile dintre frontierele politice ale statelor i distribuia etniilor. Nagorno-Karabah, dup moartea lui Stalin, solicit s fie reataat la Armenia. Este trimis acolo un mareal, dar problema nu este rezolvat. Constituia din 1977 nici nu mai pomenete de autonomia regiunii, aa cum prevedea Constituia din 1936. n 1987, n timpul politicii gorbacioviene, perestroika i glasnost, se strng peste un milion de semnturi prin care se solicit trecerea regiunii Nagorno-Karabah la Armenia. n 1988, ncepe un lung i sngeros rzboi. Cele dou soluii propuse pentru Karabah (una american prin care se prevede independena regiunii Nagorno-Karabah, transferul la Armenia, al coridorului Lachin i, la

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Azerbaidjan, al districtului Mehri respins de armeni -, i cealalt prin care se propune independena regiunii Karabah, n cadrul Azerbadjanului), nu au fost i nu pot fi aplicate. Dei, fostul preedinte rus Vladimir Putin a ripostat cnd s-a afirmat c rezolvarea situaiei depinde de Rusia, spunnd c o astfel de afirmaie ine de ultimele reminiscene ale gndirii imperialiste, interesul american (pentru stabilizarea zonei) i cel rus (pentru sigurana conductelor petroliere) vor juca un rol preventiv important. Soluia nu poate veni dect din dezvoltarea economic substanial a Caucazului, n cadrul unui proces complex de integrare european i euroasiatic. Situaia din Karabah se aseamn, cumva cu cea din Kosovo, dar Departamentul de Stat American a precizat c soluia pentru Kosovo nu poate fi aplicat i n Caucaz. Totui, din punct de vedere etnic, al cauzelor conflictelor, factorilor i mprejurrilor care au dus la acestea, cele dou regiuni, ca i altele, se asemn. Soluiile sunt complexe. Numai timpul i dezvoltarea economic a regiunilor le pot oferi. Toate celelalte rezolvri nu pot fi dect soluii de compromis, prin care s se previn degradarea n continuare a situaiei i ajungerea la conflict armat, s se protejeze viaa oamenilor, asigurndu-se un minimum de securitate prin cooperare i, n acelai timp, prin intervenia ferm a comunitii internaionale. Fenomenul etnic este obiectiv n obiectivitatea lui i subiectiv n subiectivitatea lui. Obiectivitatea const n identificarea comunitilor omeneti inclusiv a etniilor ca entiti care se deosebesc i, n deosebirile lor, se confrunt. Subiectivitatea const n faptul c suportul aciunii care duce la confruntare nu este valoarea, ci interesul. De unde rezult c, pentru a cunoate natura confruntrii, trebuie s cunoatem natura comunitilor care se confrunt i interesele acestora. Diferendul etnic (subiectiv i, deopotriv, obiectiv) poate sau nu poate s fie provocat. El poate fi ns totdeauna folosit i ncurajat. Fenomenul confruntrilor etnice exist n toat lumea. Aria lui de rspndire se afl, de regul, n spaiile de confluen (de confruntare) ntre marile entiti civilizaionale sau la periferiile acestora. Etniile sunt efectiv entiti sau, mai bine-zis, identiti culturale, care se raporteaz la origini. Ele se afl, din punct de vedere al distribuiei geografice, n cel puin patru situaii: arealul, neles ca spaiu de origine, corespunde n ntregime cu spaiul actual de dislocare; spaiul de dislocare nu corespunde cu spaiul de origine, iar etnia respectiv cunoate spaiul ei de etnogenez; nu exist un spaiu geografic anume n care etnia respectiv s fie dislocat, aceasta este dispersat; etnia nu are un spaiu permanent; ea este nomand. Relaia dintre spaiu i etnie este , n prima situaie, foarte puternic. Prezena altor etnii n acest areal va fi privit, de cele mai multe ori, cu ostilitate, ca nefireasc, nedreapt i, n situaii-limit, va deveni surs de conflict. Exist situaii n care, dei se afl n spaiul lor de 262

origine, anumite etnii sunt considerate ca tolerate, altcineva guvernnd sau stpnind acel spaiu. Este cazul palestinienilor, al celor 20 de milioane de kurzi grupai n arealul lor, dei acest areal se afl sub stpnirea Turciei, Iranului i Irakului. Natural c aici, n acest areal, vor fi tot timpul tensiuni i conflicte. n cea de a doua situaie, va exista mereu nostalgia spaiului-izvor i, de aici, cerina intrinsec a ntoarcerii la izvoare, i contradicia dintre spaiul de mprumut (adesea, cucerit cu armele sau prin alte mijloace) i calitile etniei (care vine dintr -un alt spaiu). n cea de a treia situaie, etnia respectiv se va simi tot timpul frustrat i va cuta s se adune ntr -un spaiu (care va fi celor de origine sau altul, care se va gsi). Etniile nomande (iganii), sunt n general, respinse. Ele sunt peste tot, dar nu-i afl locul nicieri. Conflictele pe care le genereaz nu sunt ns unele majore, ci unele care in de interesele nemijlocite ale vieii lor zilnice i mai ales ca urmare a respingerii strategiilor de integrare sau de asimilare a acestora de ctre etniile majoritare. Cu toate acestea, n anumite organisme internaionale, s-au creat structuri care s contribuie la rezolvarea problemelor minoritilor naionale. Aceste structuri sunt privite de majoritatea statelor europene ca modaliti de presiune mpotriva suveranitii i sunt tratate ca un ru necesar. Oricum, problemele etniilor se cer rezolvate n spiritul dreptului internaional i n numele dreptului la identitate. Exist o convenie-cadru pentru protecia minoritilor naionale. La art.1 se prevede c Protecia minoritilor naionale i a drepturilor i libertilor persoanelor aparinnd acestora face parte integrant din protecia internaional a drepturilor omului i, ca atare, constituie domeniu de cooperare internaional. La punctul 13 din raportul explicativ se prevede c Implementarea principiilor enunate n prezenta convenie-cadru se va face prin legislaia naional i politici guvernamentale corespunztoare. Ea nu implic recunoaterea drepturilor colective. Accentul este pus pe proiecia persoanelor aparinnd minoritilor naionale, care pot exercita drepturile n mod individual i comun cu alii. O minoritate etnic se definete tocmai prin anumite trsturi comune, prin etnogenez. Conflictul nu intervine atunci cnd nu sunt respectate drepturile individului aparinnd respectivei etnii (sau minoriti), ci atunci cnd etnia (sau minoritatea), ca entitate (economic, lingvistic, socio-cultural etc.), solicit drept la statut colectiv, la teritoriu propriu, la sistem de autoconducere sau auto guvernare, ceea ce se consider o ameninare la adresa statului din care minoritatea respectiv face parte. Pentru a rezolva astfel de ameninri, n unele state se aplic principiul discriminrii pozitive. Acest principiu nu se refer ns la ansamblul minoritii ci la indivizii care-i aparin. Astfel, la ora actual, n Statele Unite ale Americii, dac pentru un post de funcionar public candideaz trei albi i un negru, la aceeai performan este preferat negrul. Principiul discriminrii pozitive nu rezolv ns problemele minoritilor, ci doar pe cele ale indivizilor care aparin minoritilor. De aceea, cnd este vorba de etnii, dei discriminarea 263

pozitiv are un anumit efect n prevenirea situaiilor tensionate, ea nu rezolv problemele comunitare ale etniei, problemele ei colective, i, mai ales, pe cele ale raporturilor cu alate etnii. De obicei, etniile generatoare de confruntri i conflicte nu comunic ntre ele, nu-i coordoneaz aciunile i nu-i unesc forele. Dei cauzele care genereaz diferendele etnice (care nu sunt ns etnice, ci politice, ntruct au la baz interese) sunt cam aceleai, mprejurrile, locurile i interesele sunt att de diferite, nct cel puin pn acum, nu s -a realizat o unitate a acestora i cu att mai puin o uniune mondial a etniilor care submineaz, spre exemplu, atotputernicia statelor naionale. n ultimul timp, se simte ns o anumit colaborare ntre minoritile generatoare de confruntri. Spre exemplu, dei ETA i IRA sunt dou entiti cu totul diferite, ntre aceste dou organizaii exist legturi destul de strnse. Legtura ntre lupta catolicilor irlandezi i cea a naionalitilor basci nu este doar aparent. Nu numai aceste dou micri rmn principalele puncte de fixaie, n Europa occidental, a vechilor lupte ale minoritilor ireductibile mpotriva marilor state. Dar relaiile dintre conductorii lor sunt constante: reprezentanii lui Sinn Fein i cei ai lui Herri Batasuna, vitrina politic a ETA, s-au ntlnit de mai multe ori, fiecare urmrind cu atenie evoluia procesului de pace la cellalt. Diferendele etnice au devenit o problem mondial, care nu poate avea ns soluii mondiale. Exist o adevrat ofensiv a minoritilor etnice mpotriva statelor naionale. Se pare c o astfel de lupt este caracteristica fundamental a diferendelor etnice. Finalul acestei lupte l poate constitui fie frmiarea violent (exemplul Iugoslaviei) sau neviolent (exemplul Cehiei i Slovaciei) a statelor respective, fie crearea unei stri de haos, care poate favoriza sau impune o nou ordine mondial. Aceast nou ordine poate fi realizat de marile centre de putere mondial sau, dimpotriv, de marile interese care submineaz unitatea lumii i sistemele de valori. Fenomenul etnic nu este o reacie la globalizare. El a aprut cu mult naintea strategiilor de globalizare economic i informaional i are alt fel de determinaii. Etniile in de etnogenez i au n matricea lor, ca trstur fundamental, nevoia de identitate cultural, mai exact de recunoatere a acesteia. n cazul etniilor, memoria afectiv este foarte puternic i se leag de un anumit spaiu geografic (care poate fi cel de origine sau unul de mprumut). Dei constituirea societilor de tip informaional i globalizarea informaiei constituie efectiv o ameninare la adresa pstrrii sistemelor proprii de valori, etniile (minoritile etnice) nu reacioneaz n primul rnd mpotriva celor care promoveaz aceste strategii, ci mpotriva statelor naionale din care fac parte, adic exact n sensul n care acioneaz i generatorii fenomenului de mondializare. Unii autori consider c gestionarii globalizrii se folosesc de diferendele etnice, mai exact, de presiunile etnice, pentru diminuarea rezistenei statelor naionale la globalizare, ncurajnd tendinele autonomiste ale minoritilor i multiculturalismului. Exist fenomenul 264

presiunilor exercitate de naiunea majoritar mpotriva minoritilor naionale (maghiarizarea forat a populaiilor din Bazinul Carpailor, n timpul Imperiului austro-ungar, dar i maghiarizarea actual a populaiei romneti din judeele Covasna i Harghita). Astfel de presiuni nu sunt ncurajate de marile puteri, care, n genere, au tendina de a ine sub control diferendele etnice, mai ales n apropierea frontierelor proprii. Conflictele din Afganistan, ca i cele din Azerbaidjan, din zona Caucazului, n general, au fost tratate n mod diferit de Uniunea Sovietic . Aceasta s-a amestecat n conflictul din Afganistan, de partea afganilor, mpotriva talibanilor, pe motiv c are 1200 Km frontier cu aceast ar i nu poate accepta o situaie instabil la frontierele ei. n realitate, era vorba de controlul strategic al zonei de asigurare a unui glacis care s permit supravegherea coridorului islamic i influena n sudul Asiei. Era vorba deci de btlia pentru Asia care ncepuse nc de atunci. Conflictul dintre azeri i armeni unul intern, pe vremea URSS crea o situaie foarte periculoas n zona Caucazului i, din acest motiv, el trebuia stopat. Actualmente, btlia se duce aici att pentru rezolvarea unor probleme etnice, ct i pentru controlul strategic al culoarului maritim. n fond, btlia se duce pentru petrolul caspic i pentru traseele viitoarelor oleoducte. Organismele internaionale nu accept diferendele etnice. Dimpotriv, le consider ameninarea strategic numrul unu i, din acest motiv, ONU, OSCE, Consiliul European au elaborat o mulime de documente i de reglementri ale problemelor minoritilor n sistemul relaiilor internaionale, astfel nct, pe ct posibil, conflictele interetnice s fie prevenite.

Vezi articol: Soluii noi la provocri conflictuale noi. (Dr. Costic SILION, Vol.III, p. 30-39) The hope of a peaceful society of states is now replaced by an ominous vision of a world withdiverse peoples and hostile, with a low probability of occurrence of any form of universal culture and values, to overcome deep differences between them. Countering new threats requires a world solidarity of the States in all areas of life, the establishment of forms of action conjugate of all nations, which share interests and values. Identification of responses to new threats need to start from the fact that they often occur atlarge distance, are more dynamic and more complex. Simplitatea aparent a perioadei rzboiului rece, ntinzndu-se n linii mari de la sfritul celui de-al doilea rzboi mondial i pn la dispariia brusc a Uniunii Sovietice n decembrie 1991, a fost nlocuit de ceea ce pare a fi o lume nou, care sfideaz explicaiile i percepiile facile. Aceasta este o lume asaltat de ameninri fr precedent la adresa securitii. Spre deosebire de echilibrul precar al transferurilor de putere din perioada anterioar celui de-al doilea rzboi mondial, balana puterii, bipolar i nuclear a rzboiului rece a prut c ofer o pace incomod, orchestrat sub baghetele a dou superputeri raionale i prudente. Dei 265

fiecare se pregtea de pentru un Armagedon nuclear, fiecare fcea n aceeai msur eforturi pentru a coopera cu rivala pentru a preveni un rzboi nuclear accidental, neintenionat sau involuntar. Astzi invidiem stabilitatea i sigurana aparent previzibil a rzboiului rece i balana terorii nucleare dintre superputeri. Se proiecteaz viitorul sumbru al unei abundene tot mai mari de centre de putere statale i nonstatale care apar fr ca cineva s fie responsabil de a face ordine n afacerile mondiale. Parteneri altdat apropiai n cadrul Alianei Atlantice se contrazic acum n privina politicilor de securitate globale, ruptur deja evident n diferena dintre reaciile opuse venite din Europa i din America, referitoare la rzboaiele din Balcani din anii ,90, rzboiul din Irak din 2003 i nu n ultimul rnd Georgia n 2008. Se prevede un viitor ntunecat, cu ciocniri ntre culturi. Conflicte n escaladare, aparent fr rezolvare, ntre culturile lumii par s stea la baza unor conflicte interstatale, naionale, etnice, rasiale, deja n mare parte agresive. Nu pot fi create puni ntre credine religioase, memorii istorice, tradiii, obiceiuri comune i perspective conflictuale asupra lumii, ncorporate n culturi contrastante, liniile de falie dintre ele constituind invitaii la ciocniri violente. Globalizarea, drept curent, definiie, stare de fapt, certitudine, stimuleaz conflictele politice, culturale, economice, sociale, nu le nbu. Progresele rapide n eficientizarea mijloacelor de transport, a comunicaiilor i a tehnologiilor electronice au redus distanele. Popoare i culturi altdat izolate, care intrau rareori n contact cu strinii, precum aborigenii australieni timp de peste 40000 de ani, se afl acum n strns legtur unele cu altele. Contactele sporite i susinute provoac animoziti reciproce, nu toleran. Conflictele legate de valori fundamentale a cui religie este cea adevrat? par s fie dificile i de nerezolvat prin compromis atunci cnd sunt comparate cu disputele privind resurse materiale sau chiar cu cele privind graniele de stat. Purificarea etnic i episoadele de genocid din Rwanda i Africa Central, Sudan, Balcani i Indonezia sunt prevestitoare ale unui viitor sumbru, deja prezent. Actorii i factorii presupui a orienta politica internaional sunt reprezentai de statele i popoarele care mprtesc valori culturale, ideologii politice sau identiti naionale, etnice ori tribale, structuri sistemice precum pieele globale sau sistemul interstatal i corporaiile multinaionale. Astfel, actori diferii sunt dispui s obin ceea ce-i doresc de la alii prin conflict sau cooperare sau o combinaie ntre aceste abordri, n funcie de condiiile schimburilor dintre ei. Este de ateptat ca fiecare s fac uz de for sau s amenine cu fora pentru a obine ceea ce vrea i s reziste sau s insiste asupra controlului i limitri i uzului de for de ctre alii n rezolvarea conflictelor.

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Vezi articol: Independena Republicii Kosovo - Soluia final pentru ncheierea unui conflict . (Adriana UNGUREANU, Vol.III, p. 40-46) An independent Kosovo was the final solution for the conflict, but not all EU countries are in favor of an independent Kosovo. Many countries have expressed concerns and reservations, primarily because of their own domestic situation. Thus, despite some countries' reluctance to recognize Kosovo, none of them will be foolish enough to sabotage the EU, UN and NATOs efforts to maintain stability. However, a prolonged delay of the international recognition of Kosovo leads to insufficient economic recovery and the unsolved problems between Serbs and Albanians will not allow Kosovo to succeed politically, economically and socially as an independent state and will have a great contribution in destabilizing its neighborhood. Statul Kosovo va trebui s demonstreze ns c se poate guverna singur i c aceast independen nu va destabiliza ntreaga zon. Primul ministru Thaci i Preedintele Sejdiu vor trebui s se asigure c un Kosovo independent va depune toate eforturile pentru a se dezvolta economic, politic, social i vor trebui s conving state ca Romnia, Grecia, Slovacia, Spania i Cipru c aceast independen nu reprezint doar un precedent secesionist nefericit generator de instabilitate. Oricum, trebuie s admitem c vorbim de un statu nascendi atunci cnd ne referim la Kosovo pentru c puterea politic organizat este una de import. Este foarte clar c n absena EULEX, UNMIK i KFOR, dar i a susinerii financiare externe, statul independent Kosovo nu ar putea funciona.

Vezi articol: Conflictul - ntre apariie i evoluie. (Gabriela GOGO, Vol.III, p. 183-188)

Conflict is when people disagree on an issue, or can't get along well. This is just a part of life. It's natural for people to disagree at times, because we all have different interests, values, goals and needs. Sometimes we don't understand other people and what they really mean, or they dont understand us. Conflict happens n personal relationships, with family, parents, caregivers, friends, partners, teachers and work mates. Conflict also happens n wider society, among groups with different interests and values, different religions, races, countries, political parties and even sporting teams. You can probably think of many other examples. Conflict can also happen within yourself when you learn something new that is different to what you always believed. The conflict inside yourself can make you want to hang on tightly to your old beliefs or it can lead you to change your beliefs. Orice conflict interpersonal debutez printr-o diferen de opinii ntre dou sau mai mute pri ntr-o anumit problem. Odat cu trecerea timpului, aceast diferen de opinii se accentueaz i se ajunge ca prile implicate n acest conflict s fie mai interesate de victoria ntr un astfel de conflict dect s se concentreze asupra rezolvrii situaiei conflictuale. ... 267

Stilul ocolitor. Acest stil de management al conflictelor este caracterizat de capacitatea redus de afirmare a intereselor proprii i pe de alt parte de o foarte redus colaborare cu partenerul de negociere. Mai poate fi numit i strategia struul cu capul n nisip. Cu toate c nu este cea mai indicat strategie, totui poate constitui o politic bun n cazul n care este urmat de msuri practice de mbuntire a situatiei. Cu alte cuvinte, este cea mai indicat metod de a ctiga timp, cu condiia ca acest timp s fie bine folosit. Stilul ndatoritor. Un stil de management ndatoritor presupune o minim realizare a intereselor personale i o maxim realizare a cooperrii. Astfel, se pun bazele unei relaii de parteneriat, dac se doreste, care are toate ansele s continue. Acest stil se poate explica astfel: A l ajuta pe B fr a-i pretinde nimic pentru moment, avnd mai mult de ctigat n viitor. Unii aprecieaz c un astfel de management este un semn de slabiciune dar el poate fi considerat un bun model de cooperare, dar i un mod de ndatorare. Stilul competitiv. Prin aceast metod de management se impune interesul propriu i de asemena reduce orice forma de cooperare. Astfel se realizeaz o dictatur a celui care este mai puternic i care nu este n nici un fel interesat de colaborarea cu partenerii de talie mai joas. Singura condiie pentru ca un astfel de stil s fie eficient att n viitor ct i n prezent este ca el sa fie adoptat de o persoan, companie care are monopol, sau are o cota majoritar de pia, i are estimri exacte cu privire la dezvoltarea pieei i a companiei. Stilul concesiv. n concesia dintre dou companii care negociaz sau dintre dou pri se urmrete att impunerea n cote mari a intereselor ct i maximizarea pe ct posibil a cooperarii. Cuvntul cheie al ntregului sistem este COMPROMISUL, iar compromisul nu este cea mai indicat soluie n cazul n care este vorba despre imparirea asimetrica a puterii. Cum puterea ntre dou companii, sau dou pri ale aceleiai companii nu este aproape niciodat simetric, acest stil de mamagement al conflictelor este cel mai puin indicat. Stilul colaborativ. n final, acest ultim stil de management al conflictelor este cel mai indicat pentru ca el presupune maximizarea att a intereselor personale ct i a comunicrii. Este stilul cel mai indicat ntre dou companii care au n comun o problem. Astfel se pune problema acordului de ctre ambele pri. Prin aceast metod de colaborare se poate spori productivitatea. Alte modaliti recomandate de a rezolva conflictele vizeaz cteva reguli care pot transforma un conflict n cooperare, i anume: Separm oamenii de problem. Dac ne imaginam situatia conflictual ca pe o tabl de ah unde se desfaoar o partid, putem analiza cu o minte clar problema, ntruct nfruntarea este pe table de ah i nu ntre oamenii care mut piesele. Problema este datorat poziiilor favorabile ori defavorabile a unor piese din ambele tabere. Problema nu este ntre juctorii de ah ci ntre piesele de pe tabl.

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Urmrim s fim oneti. A cuta s l nelm pe cellalt n rezolvarea unei dispute astfel nct s ieim n avantaj atrage de multe ori escaladarea conflictului i nu soluionarea lui. Mai mult, cealalt parte va raspunde cu aceeasi moneda. Astfel c vom asista la o disput ntre dou vulpi, (iretenie) care vor deveni la un moment dat doi lupi, (agresivitate) ce-i imagineaz unul despre altul c cellalt este doar o oaie rtcit. Angajndu-ne cu onestitate n rezolvarea conflictului crem fundamentul de ncredere i respect n gsirea unei soluii favorabile pentru amandoi. Tcerea este de aur, iar vorba de argint. Cnd una dintre pri este intens implicat emoional i se manifest n consecin este de dorit s pastrezi tcerea, observnd cu atenie ceea ce exprim. Dac cerinele sunt exagerate ori amenintoare, prelungirea tcerii va creea insecuritate emoional n cealalt persoan. O astfel de tehnic seamana cu aikido prin care se raspunde atacurilor folosindu-se fora de atac a adversarului. Descoperim solutii creative alternative la rezolvarea problemei. Reinem c interesele noastre sunt diferite, iar poziiile asemntoare. Depinde de fiecare dintre noi atitudinea adecvat n abordarea unui conflict. Se recomand o atitudine deschis i onest cnd cineva intr ntr-un conflict. Dar inainte de abordarea unei situaii tensionate este bine s ne ntrebm mi doresc eu ca i cealalt persoan s fie n ctig n urma discuiilor? Dac nu, atunci urmeaz un joc psihologic care s-ar numi de-a vntoarea, la pnd ori care pe care. n via, situatiile sunt mult mai complicate, dar regulile sunt aceleai indifferent c avem un mr de mprit ori o zon maritim cu zcminte de petrol i gaze naturale. De fiecare dintre noi depinde soluionarea sau agravarea unui conflict, dispute ori nenelegere. Chiar dac participm la diverse cursuri, nu vom dobndi abiliti de gestionare a conflictelor pn cnd, n interiorul nostru, cadrul mental i atitudinal nu se mut pe frecvena balanei onestitii, echitii i preocuprii pentru binele celuilalt. Vezi articol: Minoritile etnice i dezvoltarea conflictelor. (Aurel CORDUNEANU, Alexandru STOICA, Vol.III, p. 214-223) The conscience development of the linguistic, cultural and ethnic groups, the increase willing of identity affirmation of these groups and the development of the national feeling generated a change of the minority groups perception. The connection between the minority groups existence in the territory of other countries and international security is obvious, especially after the communist system collapse. The ethnicity revival leads to enhance of tensions with a direct impact on a possible interstates or intrastate conflict. In some given circumstances these conflicts, even if at the beginning emerge and develop in one country, could become international due to the fact of other neighbor countries involvement or even the involvement of a large part of the international community. An analysis of security concept evolution reveals the direct link established between international security and minorities issue. 269

Dezvoltarea contiinei apartenenei la grupuri lingvistice, culturale i etnice i dorina tot mai pregnant de afirmare a identitii acestor grupuri, dar i dezvoltarea sentimentului naional au produs o schimbare la nivelul percepiei grupurilor minoritare. Este un proces ale crui nceputuri se ntrezresc nc din secolul al XVIlea, favorizat fiind, ntr-o anumit msur, de Reforma bisericeasc i ntrit de numeroasele rzboaie ce au jucat rolul unui catalizator n afirmarea identitii unui grup n opoziie cu altul. Acest proces devine evident la sfritul secolului al XVIII-lea i n secolul al XIX-lea. Astfel, la sfritul secolului al XVIII-lea, putem deja identifica primele semne ale naiunii moderne, n revoluiile american i francez. Prin urmare, ncepnd cu secolul al XIX -lea, nu vom mai vorbi numai de minoriti religioase, ci i de alte minoriti, n primul rnd etnice. Primul document internaional care va acorda drepturi unor astfel de minoriti, actul final al Congresului de la Viena din 1815, prevedea ocrotirea supuilor polonezi i conservarea naionalitii acestora, n statele semnatare ale documentului. Revoluia francez, prin principiile n numele crora a acionat i prin lupta mpotriva structurilor vechiului regim, a favorizat procesul de formare a statelornaiune moderne. Proclamarea dreptului popoarelor de a dispune de ele nsele a afectat, n mare msur, toate marile puteri continentale, repunnd n cauz dreptul monarhic european. Succesul Revoluiei franceze n stabilirea unui spirit de unitate i solidaritate naional a ncurajat manifestri naionaliste peste tot n Europa, unde se acorda o nou importan cutumelor locale i culturii tradiionale, limbii i credinelor mprtite la nivel naional. Imperialismul napoleonian a dat un nou impuls acestor evoluii naionaliste, mai mult prin provocarea unui spirit de rezisten fa de dominaia francez i fa de mpovrtoarele sarcini militare i financiare care o nsoeau, dect prin existena unui plan al lui Napoleon, care s mplineasc aspiraiile naionale ale popoarelor supuse. Secolul al XIX-lea este, prin urmare, secolul n care statele puternice, precum Germania, Spania sau Italia i desvresc procesul de creare al statelor-naiune moderne. La rndul lor, statele mici asprir i ele la obinerea suveranitii, i astfel ncep, n aceast perioad, s se afirme micrile naionale. Rezultatul acestora este activarea problemei minoritilor naionale n cadrul marilor imperii. De soluionarea acestei probleme depindea, n cele din urm, pacea Europei. Iniial, s-a ncearcat contracararea tendinelor naionaliste prin crearea Sfintei Aliane, o alian a forelor conservatoare mpotriva tendinelor revoluionare. Micrilor de eliberare naional i revoluiilor liberale desfurate n prima jumtate a secolului, li s-a rspuns cu violen, n majoritatea cazurilor. Violenele depesc limitele statelor, revoluiile fiind reprimate cu sprijin din exterior, fr a se mai ine seam de diferenele religioase proclamate, n numele

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Sfintei Aliane a dinastiilor, a crei autoritate de a interveni pentru restabilirea ordinii fusese instituit la Viena, n 1815. Sperana de a restabili vechea ordine a nceput s se nruie treptat, la numai 5 ani de la Congresul de la Viena, manifestndu-se primele micri naionale i de eliberare n Spania, Italia, Grecia, Romnia, Belgia i n afara Europei, n America Latin. Nu toate aceste micri au avut succes nc de la nceput, reprezentnd ns premisele victoriilor viitoare, obinute n cea de-a doua jumtate a secolului al XIXlea. Se emancipeaz mai nti grecii, apoi srbii, romnii i bulgarii, iar creterea numrului de naiuni care au ajuns la contiina existenei lor ca entiti sporete ocaziile de conflict. Minoritile naionale acionau ca nite fore centrifuge mpingnd spre destrmare imperiul habsburgilor, anul revoluionar 1848 zguduind puternic imperiul. Imperiul Otoman s-a confruntat i el cu aspiraiile naionale ale popoarelor din Balcani care treptat i vor cuceri independena. Astfel, la nceputul secolului, mai exact la sfritul rzboaielor balcanice (19121913), otomanii erau izgonii din Europa, singura lor posesiune pe continent rmnnd oraul Constantinopol i un spaiu restrns din jurul acestuia. Nu numai aceast zon a Europei s -a confruntat cu problema naionalitilor n aceast epoc. n Insulele Britanice plutea pericolul unui conflict ntre naionalitii irlandezi catolici, care i doreau independena, i protestanii din Ulster care nu doreau s se separe de Regatul Unit. Situaia era ncordat i ntre Frana i Germania n legtur cu populaia francez din Alsacia i Lorena, aflat sub stpnirea germanilor ncepnd din 1871. n Italia, aspiraiile italienilor pentru edificarea unui stat naional se confrunt cu opoziia austriecilor i francezilor, austriecii reocup Peninsula Italic; francezii nving revoluionarii lui Giuseppe Mazzini (1849). La nceputul secolului al XX-lea, orice criz care afecta una dintre marile puteri ale Europei nu putea s nu aib repercusiuni i asupra celorlalte. Astfel problemele legate de minoritile naionale ale acestor imperii s-au resfrnt asupra ntregului continent, afectndu-i puternic securitatea. Vezi articol: Efectele globale ale istoriei conflictelor din Orientul Mijlociu (Mariana ANCU, III, 245-254) Its indubitabily that Orient and Occident are the two faces of a coin. Everyone know s that the history of Orient is much older and is also an well-know fact that the echoes of this history we head now. To understand, even partially, the main events from that period can give us resemblance, a sketchy one of course, of the background of present events. Secolul XXI poate fi numit, fr a exagera, secolul marilor transformri ne arat o lume care n doar cteva decenii a avut parte de schimbri care, de regul, se fceau pe parcursul a sute 271

de ani, marcate majoritatea din ele de o violen extraordinar. Pe de alt parte avem un Occident care este confuz, supus unei presiuni venite din dou pri, una de pe peste ocean, cealalt venit dinspre Urali, ambele luptnd pentru putere i pentru piee noi de desfacere. Colaborarea euroatlantic a dus la ocuparea a dou ri musulmane, Afganistan i Irak, a dus, sub acoperirea ONU i NATO, la angajarea de fore n Liban, Kosovo, n Cecenia dar i la instalarea de baze militare n multe alte ri. Fie c o recunoatem sau nu, Occidentul este n rz boi cu Orientul, fie el Mijlociu sau ndeprtat. Iar consecinele acestei relaii se pot vedea clar: din ce n ce mai muli cretini se convertesc la islamism (o dovedesc statisticile ONU sau UE) 1, din ce n ce mai muli oameni ader la cauza islamic fr a trece la aceast religie, condamnnd ambiiile imperialiste ale marilor puteri i goana lor dup resurse, aparent nelimitate n zona oriental.

Vezi articol: Baze teoretice n studiul conflictelor. (Dr. Gheorghe CALOPREANU Vol.III, p. 271-275) The basic theory of conflicts is limited in that it does not provide much explanation on the phenomenon of the armed conflict. Equally, it is important because it offers guidance as to where to look when analyzing certain conflicts. The concept of conflict explains many of social life aspects such as social disagreement, conflicts of interests, and fights between individuals, groups, and/or organizations. The theoretical basis of the knowledge on conflict is both limited and important. Therefore the correct understanding of the terminology related to the subject of conflict is essential. Therefore, the definitions of war, conflict, revolution and words like them describe violent opposition between states or armed organized groups are not precise enough to clearly distinguish one from another. Conflicte de toate genurile au marcat societatea uman n multimilenara existen a acesteia. O lume a calmului i a linitii globale rmne o utopie chiar i pentru cei mai optimiti dintre noi. Din aceast perspectiv, lumea de ieri i cea de azi nu se deosebesc fundamental ambele sunt suprasaturate de conflicte globale cu o trstur imposibil de nlturat: continuitatea. Nici viitorul, n msura i n limitele n care poate fi scrutat, nu face excepie. Fiecare zi relev crime, atacuri teroriste, rzboaie etc., toate acestea cu consecine extrem de negative asupra strii de bine a umanitii. Dac analizm numai perioada 1990 1999, vom contabiliza nu mai puin de conflicte armate1, care au implicat 80 de state i dou regiuni non-statale i au dus la pierderea a peste ase milioane de viei omeneti i la incalculabile pagube materiale. Producerea acestora ar fi fost cel puin limitat dac s-ar fi evitat escaladarea lor n lupte armate sau durata lor ar fi putut fi scurtat prin msuri ferme de natur diplomatic sau economic. Estimarea, chiar cu acuratee relativ a efectelor i condiiilor la ncheierea unui conflict, dup ce prevenirea acestuia a fost ratat, se afl ntr-o cot ascendent n preocuprile a tot mai 272

numeroi specialiti. nelegerea conflictelor armate ca i fenomene i a cauzalitii acestora va maximiza ntotdeauna ansele ca ele s revin la caracteristici belicoase, dup ce, aparent, fuseser create condiiile de ncheiere. Terminologia ambigu sau insuficient clarificat a conflictelor a dus adesea la interpretri i nelegeri diferite ale chiar domeniului de referin, motiv pentru care propun n acest articol explicarea unor termeni care s vin n sprijinul celor care studiaz fenomenul complex al conflictelor. Primul, operaiile altele dect rzboiul, cuprinde toate tipurile de operaii i aciuni care se planific i desfoar n afara celor ce definesc noiunea de rzboi convenional, cum sunt aciunile insurgente, contrainsurgente, operaiile de meninere a pcii, de impunere a pcii, non-combatante de evacuare, cele interne (nlturarea efectelor calamitilor naturale inundaii, cutremure etc.) sau ajutorul umanitar. Conflictul, urmtorul termen asupra cruia am s ma opresc n acest stadiu al lucrrii, este descris ntr-o definiie general ca o opoziie, dezacord sau incompatibilitate ntre dou sau mai multe pri. Extrem de variat, tipologia conflictelor este determinat de o multitudine de factori, cauzalitatea, la care m voi referi pe larg pe parcursul lucrrii, fiind una dintre cele mai evidente. Lupta cu unele calamiti naturale - foamete, secet, incendii devastatoare n natur sau uragane puternice este inclus n categoria conflictelor de numeroase doctrine i lucrri de specialitate. De asemenea, apariia unor contradicii de interese politice, ideologice sau economice ale unor grupuri sociale duce adesea la conflicte armate violente; dac ele se manifest la nivel macro, posibilitatea izbucnirii unor rzboaie interstatale poate atinge cote maxime. Urmtorii termeni definii, ncheierea i rezolvarea conflictelor, desemneaz, de fapt, dou etape distincte din viaa unui conflict, primul, ncheierea conflictelor, reprezentnd un proces care poate conduce la realizarea celui de al doilea, precum i la identificarea i acceptarea condiiilor finale necesare restabilirii ordinii i pcii iniiale. Pe lng utilizarea forelor militare, ncheierea conflictelor poate implica i o serie de instrumente ale puterii politice, economice sau informaionale. Dac ne referim la nivelul politic, acesta trebuie s prevad pn i timpul cnd nceteaz ostilitile. Necesitatea unei concordane a planurilor la nivelurile militar, politic i naional este esenial pentru succesul aciunilor. Din perspectiva planificrii i utilizrii forelor armate, nimic nu se va ntmpla fr nelegerea cu exactitate de ctre parte militar a scopurilor aciunilor planificate dar i a situaiei create la finalui acestora.

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Vezi articol: Despre rolul i locul aciunilor militare n conflictele contemporane (Dr. Gheorghe CALOPREANU, Vol.III, p. 276-280) The nature of modern conflicts has made clear distinction between civil and inter-state wars difficult as he nature of contemporary violent conflicts has changed dramatically in the past few decades. Civil wars with indirect external involvement and intra-state violence have become more typical than inter-state wars. Domestic wars and disputes are an important source of inter-state tension and domestic fighting is often combined with external involvement in favour of one of the conflicting parties. In certain circumstances, in domestic wars different regions of countries behave differently. Schimbrile rapide de viziune n ceea ce privete politica de securitate i aprare a majoritii rilor lumii, dar i a tuturor organizaiilor internaionale n ultimele decenii sugereaz c ameninrile majore prezente i viitoare sunt i vor fi netradiionale, asimetrice, de tip insurgento-terorist, nlocuind astfel rzboaiele la scar larg, purtate ntre diferite state sau grupuri de state, pentru care numeroi planificatori n domeniul aprrii au fcut adevrate obsesii pe durata secolului trecut. Devine astfel evident c structurile, doctrinele, planificarea i programele de achiziii ale forelor armate actuale trebuie s se adapteze permanent, pentru a fi n msur s rspund eficient noilor provocri la adresa securitii internaionale. Situaia creat astfel solicit noi fundamentarea unor noi concepte privind ducerea aciunilor militare care, realist gndite i aplicate, vor conduce la stabilirea unor prioriti corecte privind organizarea forelor armate i vor evita angajarea acestora n conflicte militare fr sfrit. Vezi articol: Conflictele i mass-media. (Zoltan BALINT, Florin HULEA, Vol.III, p. 308-311) This paper explores how the mass media, more than just reflecting the problems and actually issues are important social actors in society and shape the public sphere in romanian and international media area and which is implication to democracy. n accepia DEX, conflictele reprezint nenelegere, ciocnire de interese, dezacord, diferend, treapt acut n evoluia contradiciilor antagoniste, ciocnire material sau moral violent. n orice col al lumii, cnd vorbim despre conflicte, implicit vorbim de pres, denumit generic mass-media. Mass-media reprezint totalitatea mijloacelor tehnice de comunicare n mas a informaiilor(radio, televiziune, cinematograf, publicaii, magnetofon, disc). Massmedia este o for n orice stat al lumii, fiind principala surs de informare a populaiei, bucurndu-se de ncrederea acesteia. O bun relaie cu jurnalitii garanteaz o imagine real i previne apariia informaiilor neverificate. Rolul ofierului de pres este foarte important, de el depinznd, n mare masur, percepia populaiei faa de instituia pe care o reprezint.

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Vezi articol: Intervenia militar, soluie a conflictelor n secolul XXI? (Cosmina COVATARIU, Vol.III, p. 317-329) The security environment passes through a very complex transformation process defined by two antagonistic trends: on one hand, the extension of the democratization process, the recognition of human rights and market economy principles, simultaneous with a larger cooperation and integration in European and Euro-Atlantic structures; on the other hand, a disintegration and division process of the multinational states entities. It can also be observed the continuity and diversity of military and nonmilitary risks, mainly the terrorism and also the increasing vulnerabilities of the national and international institutions towards these risks. In the UN Charter, the prohibition to use force and force menace appears to be essential in the juridical construction of the international societies, being the result of a constant normative and historical evolution. However, we find the military action all over the world, and its fundamental political purpose is to enforce to the opposite side a certain political will by military force. Lumea contemporan se caracterizeaz printr-o complexitate i o diversitate fr precedent, generate de marile transformri revoluionare, de mutaiile care se produc pe toate planurile politic, economic, social, tehnico-tiinific i mai ales al raporturilor de for. Toate aceste transformri imprim la rndul lor, caracteristici specifice vieii internaionale, relaiilor dintre state, prin aducerea n prim plan a unor fenomene, tendine i evenimente care trebuie descifrate spre a li se gsi soluii corespunztoare pentru ca pacea omenirii, securitatea i progresul popoarelor s fie asigurate. Folosirea forei i a ameninrii cu fora, sub orice form, inclusiv rzboiului, sunt deja incriminate ca ilicite i repudiate printr-o serie de tratate internaionale cu recunoatere universal, i n primul rnd Carta Organizaiei Naiunilor Unite. Cu toate acestea, din pcate, fora, sub diferite forme ale rzboiului, continu s fie folosit pentru promovarea propriilor interese de ctre unele state, invocnd diferite situaii i motive umanitare, respectarea drepturilor omului, democraia, reprimarea terorismului, care s justifice recurgerea preventiv la folosirea forei.

Vezi articol: Consideraii privind starea conflictual mondial la nceput de mileniu. (Nicuor MOLDOVAN, Amelia-Mariana MOLDOVAN, Vol.III, p. 296-308) People are defined by both genetic inheritance and culture. Besides their instinct for conflict and the struggle to survive, we also need to take into account aspects like cultural cooperation mechanisms and prosocial behaviour. Conflicts create a logic of violent confrontation which is never useful in debates or peaceful political confrontations. Conflicts occur at regular intervals of time in the lives of people, groups, communities or countries and they are caused by different issues. Despite promising theoretical approaches and attempts to deal with this issue, armed conflicts have occurred quite often. Even though the costs are extremely high, we must keep in mind that prevention is essential when it comes to armed conflicts.

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n literatura de specialitate, precum i n mass-media, un loc deosebit de important l ocup analiza problematicii conflictelor socio-politice actuale. i dac pn nu demult aceasta se rezuma la critica teoriei conflictelor, n prezent se observ o atitudine concret fa de aceast problem, se observ o necesitate stringent de formulare a unei concepii cuprinztoare a conflictelor. Instabilitatea situaiei politice interne din mai multe state, ascuirea contradiciilor cu caracter teritorial i naional-etnic, precum i diferenierea social-politic din unele state, creterea dependenei energetice i de materii prime, agravarea contradiciilor economice pot duce la situaii de conflict n diverse state i regiuni ale lumii. n vremea parteneriatelor strategice, cnd principala dimensiune a acestora o reprezint suportul economic i financiar, conflictualitatea nu dispare, ci se bifurc, mbrcnd forme mai puin evidente, camuflate sau modelate de ecuaii complexe, nelineare. Orict de puternice ar fi parteneriatele, ele nu pot exclude concurena, btlia pentru piee i resurse, dinamismul economic-financiar al lumii. Noutatea const n generalizare, n globalizare, n extinderea confruntrii, a conflictualitii economice i financiare la nivel planetar. La nceputul mileniului al III-lea omenirea se confrunt cu foarte multe probleme: revendicri teritoriale, creterea decalajului dintre rile dezvoltate i cele n curs de dezvoltare, srcia i chiar foametea, omajul, globalizarea, degradarea mediului natural, nclzirea global, diminuarea resurselor vitale vieii (ap, petrol, gaze naturale, minereuri etc.) i accesul nechitabil la acestea, competiia tot mai acerb pentru controlul materiilor prime creterea polulaiei globului (pe fondul scderii n unele ri sau regiuni), scderea natalitii i creterea mortalitii, afectarea din ce n ce mai mult a strii de sntate a indivizilor, accentuarea fenomenului migraionist etc. Pe lng aceste probleme, a cror manifestare are drept cauz aciunea sau inaciunea individului, omenirea este greu ncercat i de o serie de dezastre natural (cutremure, inundaii, incendii, alunecri de teren etc.). Toate acestea pot declana sau alimenta violena, contribuind, ntr-o msur mai mic sau mai mare (n funcie de o serie de factori), la apariia unor noi conflicte, la reizbucnirea celor latente (ngheate), la meninerea i/sau acutizarea celor existente. Situaiile/strile conflictuale din lume sunt determinate de factori dintre cei mai diferii, de cele mai multe ori fiind implicai doi sau chiar mai muli. Dintre conflictele care nc se manifest la nivel mondial, putem meniona: -ara Bascilor i Catalonia n Spania; -ara Gguzilor n Republica Moldova; -Rwanda i Burundi (rivalitatea dintre populaiile Hutu i Tutsi); -Sri Lanka (populaia Tamil); -Irlanda de Nord (catolicii i protestanii); 276

-Filipine (minoritatea islamic din insulele Mindanao i Sulu dorete s obin independena, statul filipinez avnd ca religie predominant cretinismul); -Belgia (valonii i flamanzii, respectiv vorbitorii de limb francez i cei de limb olandez); -Italia (ntre Nordul dezvoltat i Mezogiorno/Sudul mai puin dezvoltat); -provincia Kosovo din Iugoslavia (etnicii albanezi de religie islamic versus srbii de religie ortodox); -Republica Cecenia i Daghestanul n Federaia Rus (cecenii i daghestanii, de religie islamic, fa de rui, de religie ortodox); -Sudan (conflict etnic i confesional ntre populaia arab, de religie islamic, din nordul rii, i populaia negroid, de religie cretin, din sudul rii); -Armenia-Azerbaidjan (conflictul avnd drept obiect teritoriile NagornoKarabah, enclava armean n Azerbaidjan, i Nahicevan, enclava azer n Armenia; armenii sunt cretini, iar azerii - islamici); -Catalonia n Spania (etnicii catalani, dei au obinut autonomia n 1977, doresc independena i din motive economice, aceast provincie fiind cea mai dezvoltat economic din ar); -statul Chiapas n Mexic (revolta armat a ameridienilor, izbucnita n 1994, ca urmare a disparitilor economice i sociale din ar; ameridienii, care reprezint 14% din populaia Mexicului, se consider dezavantajai n comparaie cu metiii i albanii); -conflictul bosniac (1992 - 1995, ntre comunitile musulman, srb i croat) i cel kosovar (declanat n 1999, ntre albanezi, de religie musulman i srbii de religie ortodox). Cauzele care au generat aceste conflicte, au fost numeroase, printre cele mai des ntlnite evideniindu-se: economice: lupta pentru resurse, srcia, deteriorarea mediului etc.; politice: remprirea unor sfere de influen, impunerea unor regimuri politice de dreapta sau de stnga, interesele marilor puteri, tendinele revizioniste, sececioniste sau unioniste, diferende istorice etc.; sociale: incapacitatea guvernelor de a asigura un nivel minim de trai pentru populaie i securitatea ceteanului; religioase: diferenele religioase marcante dintre anumite comuniti etc.; etnice: intoleran, ur etnic, ovinismul, ultranaionalismul, discriminarea. Caracteristicile conflictelor contemporane au scos n eviden faptul c a crescut dimensiunea neconvenional a acestora, apreciindu-se c rzboiul secolului XXI va fi unul preponderent informaional.

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. : : ( - ): / ; . . -, . . . . : CEP USM, 2011. 113 p. ; , , . n lucrare au fost supuse analizei istoriografia i problemele strategiilor internaionale contemporane n tiina politic i teoria relaiilor internaionale; a fost determinat specificul, tendinele i perspectivele formrii i implementrii acestora n contextul proceselor globale contemporane, ceea ce a permis ca autorul s expun ntr-o nou manier rolul factorilor internaionali i direciile internaionale a strategiilor de soluionare a conflictelor regionale. In the research paper was analyzed historiography and issues of contemporary international strategies in political science and international relations theory, it was determined the characteristics and trends of training and efficient international strategies for resolving the Palestine Israeli conflict, which also allowed the author to expose for the first time the role of international factors and international directions of strategies to resolve regional conflicts. .18-19: , , , , . , , -, ., ., ., ., ., ., ., . . , , , , , . , , , , , , .

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COMPARTIMENTUL IV.

RESURSELE ELECTRONICE I INFORMAIONALE

INSTITUII I ONG N DOMENIUL STUDIILOR DE PACE Misiunea OSCE n Moldova -a fost nfiinat n anul 1993 pentru a asista la negocierea unei soluii politice durabile n conflictul dintre Republica Moldova i regiunea transnistrean. De asemenea, Misiunea are mandatul s ofere consultan i expertiz n problemele privind drepturile omului i ale minoritilor, transformrile democratice i repatrierea refugiailor ca parte a Dimensiunii umane. Mai multe detalii snt disponibile pe adresa electronic http://www.osce.org/moldova Institutul de Cercetare pentru Pace din Oslo (PRIO) a fost fondat n anul 1959. Efectueaz cercetri n domeniul studiilor de pace, cauzelor i noilor tendine al conflictelor armate precum i a prevenirii acestora. Studiile sale pot fi accesate pe adresa electronic http://www.prio.no Institutul Internaional de Cercetare pentru Pace din Stocholm(SIPRI) - a fost fondat n anul 1966. Este un institut internaional independent dedicate cercetrii conflictelor, controlului narmrii i dezarmrii. Studiile sale pot fi accesate pe adresa electronic http://www.sipri.org Institutul Internaional pentru Pace- a fost fondat n anul 1970. Misiunea sa este de a preveni conflictele ntre state prin promovarea pcii i asigurarea securitii. Studiile sale pot fi accesate pe adresa electronic http://www.ipacademy.org Institutul pentru Pace al SUA - a fost fondat n anul 1984. Se preocup de cercetarea conflictelor i soluionarea non-violent a conflictelor. Studiile sale pot fi accesate pe adresa electronic http://www.usip.org Institutul Romn pentru Aciune, Instruire i Cercetare(PRIO)- a fost fondat n anul 2001. Scopul PATRIR este de a promovaconstruirea pacii si transformarea constructiva a conflictelor pentru a preveni toate formele de violenta directa, structurala si culturala - in Romania si la nivel international. Studiile sale pot fi accesate pe adresa electronic http://www.patrir.ro Hilfswerk Austria n Republica Moldova este filiala organizaiei de frunte din Austria ce promoveaz cooperarea pentru dezvoltare i ajutorul umanitar la nivel mondial. Mai multe detalii snt disponibile pe pagina oficial pe adresa electronic http://www.hilfswerk-austria.md The Independent Institute for Law and Civil Society - este un ONG fondat n Tiraspol n anul 2002. Misiunea ong-ului este de a contribui la dezvoltarea societii civile n Transnistria prin intermediul parteneriatului social i iniiative civice. Mai multe detalii snt disponibile pe adresa electronic http://www.lawcivilsociety.com/ CReDO Centrul de Resurse pentru Drepturile Omului - este o organizaie nonprofit pentru drepturile omului, advocacy i democratizarea societii civilefondat n 1999. Viziunea:Institutii democratice stabile ale RM si drepturile omului respectate n conformitate cu traditiile Europene. Mai multe detalii snt dispinibile pe pagina oficial pe adresa electronic http://www.credo.md/ 297

Civil Defense Research Centre CDSC (Civilian Defence Research Center) was founded in 1988 and has since then contributed to the development of social research on peace and security issues in Italy and Europe. Activities: CSDC is working combining research, training, advocacy and field work. On research, CSDC published several books and articles on peacebuilding, conflict prevention and civil society work in conflict areas. Recently, it is researching on civilian peacekeeping. CSDC also conducted trainings on peace-related issues and its trainers are involved in several academic and executive courses and Masters. CSDC is also working on advocacy for more peacebuilding and conflict prevention tools in Italy and in Europe. In Europe, CSDC is part of the European Network for Civil Peace Services (EN.CPS) and through this network is also collaborating with the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO). At the Italian level, CSDC has regular meetings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and occasionally with other Ministries. Field work is also part of CSDC activities, with project experiences in Kosovo, Cyprus and Georgia. Finally, CSDC is a member organisation of Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP), an international NGO committed with civilian peacekeeping in conflict areas. Vision and Mission: We think that conflict is a natural and unavoidable aspect of human existence. The way in which we manage personal and social conflicts influence chances to accomplish a balanced and open society. The responsibility to control violence is up to Statedirected armed forces. The transformation of violence, the research for less destructive defence methods and the effective reduction of conflicts negative effects is up to the responsibility of society. Social cohesion does not only come from declared goals, it depends mainly on the quality of its glue interpersonal relations. CSDC mission is the spreading of constructive conflict management tools to overcome intra and inter-state tensions. CSDC operates in the fields of research and training to promote collaborations at a national and international level. Principal aims of the CSDC are: - to promote non armed civilian defence (or nonviolent popular defence); - to support peacebuilding and conflict prevention tools; - to promote the research concerning nonviolent conflict management; - to develop historical researches on non armed cases of Resistance. The CDSC working method is inspired by Gandhis principle that a seed is equivalent to a tree.

Contact: Address:Via della Cellulosa, 112, 00166 Rome Email: roma@pacedifesa.org Website: www.pacedifesa.org

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Centrul Programelor de Contribuie Civic CEPO (Civic Engagement Program Office) reprezint un proiect de succes a catedrei organizat n parteneriat cu Universitatea Rutgers (New Jersey. SUA) ste finanat de Departamentul de Stat al Guvernului SUA (2002-2005). Proiectul se axeaz pe dezvoltarea curriculumului universitar i este considerat un instrument de aprofundare a pregtirii profesionale a specialitilor n domeniul Relaiilor Internaionale, ct i o ans pentru studenii diferitor faculti ale USM implicai n proiect de a-i dezvolta abilitile practice n cadrul cursurilor cu componen de contribuie civic. Activitatea CEPO este organizat n trei direcii: modernizrii curriculare prin introducerea elementelor de activitate civic i social; , implicarea studenilor n activitile extracurriculare comunitare; extinderea i consolidarea parteneriatului ntre comunitile locale, sectorul civic, de afaceri i mediu universitar. Exist, de asemenea, cteva servicii importante: de informare, relaii publice, tehnice, organizatorice i financiare. n perioada 2002-2005 CEPO a fost recunoscut de ctre comunitatea universitar ca unul dintre modelele de educaie civic i social pentru nvmntul superior. Au fost elaborate i puse n aplicare peste 25 curriculumuri cu componentul CEPO pentru mai mult de 10 faculti ale USM, s-au stabilit relaii de parteneriat cu comunitile locale teritoriale din Cricova, Larga, UTA Gagauzia i puse n aplicare diferite mini proiecte civice i sociale; s-au stabilit relaii de parteneriat cu alte universiti din Bli, Comrat i Chiinu. Ca urmare a activitii CEPO s-a iniiat un nou parteneriat cu ONG Hilfswerk Austria n Moldova care se realizeaz n baz centrului comun Austro-Moldav i programelor educaionale. n prezent CEPO organizeaz conferine, mese rotunde i training-uri cu element civic.

Contacte: Adresa Str. Testemieanu, 6, et. 3. sala 311 E-mail: catedrari@yahoo.com

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Centrul Moldo-Austriac pentru Iniiative de Pace, Schimbri Democratice i Soluionarea Conflictelor (CPI) n pregtirea eficient al specialitilor Relaiilor Internaionale, catedra Relaii Internaionale combin armonios pregtirea teoretic al studenilor cu aspectele sociale, culturale i civice. Astfel, Centrul Moldo-Austriac pentru Iniiative de Pace, Schimbri Democratice i Soluionarea Conflictelor (CPI) prezint un centru de resurse att pentru profesori ct i studeni n domeniul dezvoltrii democratice, studiilor de pace i managementului conflictelor, avnd drept obiectiv principal de a determina politica educaional pentru consolidarea democraiei n Republica Moldova i educarea tinerilor n spiritul valorilor europene. Centrul Moldo-Austriac a fost nfiinat n anul 2009 de ctre Hilfswerk Austria n Moldova, n cooperare cu Universitatea de Stat din Moldova, Institutul de Istorie, Stat i Drept n Moldova, Centrul Informaional Fereastra spre Lume, regiunea transnistran, fiind finanat de ctre Cooperarea Austriac pentru Dezvoltare. CPI este profund preocupat de studierea conflictelor i de de toate aspectele ce in de transformarea panic al acestora. Totodat, se acord o atenie major promovrii culturii pcii prin intermediul educaiei pentru pace. n acest scop snt organizate i desfurate un ir de conferine i seminare naionale i internaionale, mese rotunde, lecii publice, dezbateri etc. n acest context, se nscrie cu succes un ir de evenimente petrecute de CPI cum ar fi: - Seminarul internaional cu genericul Democratic governance in the security sector, organizat n parteneriat cu Centrul pentru Studii de Securitate European (CESS), Olanda, i catedra RI a Universitaii de Stat din Moldova, FRIPA; - Programul educaional internaional Secessiont Conflict in Moldova: Conflict Management and Accomodative Policiesstudiu de schimb de experien n cadrul cruia au participat studenii Universitii de Stat din Moldova, din Transnistria i grupul de 10 studeni i 2 profesori de la Universitatea Tartu, Estonia. n perioada acestui program au fost petrecute un ir de activiti: lecii, mese rotunde, ntrevederi cu experi din cadrul structurilor guvernamentale i organizaiilor non-guvernamentale, vizita de studiu la Tiraspol cu ntrevederi cu profesorii i studenii transnistreni; - Activitatea sub genericul Moldova stat integru. Datorit acestui eveniment studenii RI au obinut oportunitatea excelent de a schimba experiene a diferitor regiuni a rii natale din punct de vedere politico-economic i socio-cultural. Pentru promovarea studiilor de pace i a soluionrii conflictelor, CPI mpreun cu Centro Studi Difesa Civile (Roma, Italia) desfoar n prezent proiectul ,,Moldovan Peace Scholars and Practitioners Network. n cadrul acestuia snt petrecute un ir de seminare teoretico-metodologice cu participarea universitilor i ONG-urilor din toat Republica Moldova. n cadrul seminarelor snt discutate probleme ce in de rolul i locul studiilor de pace i a polemologiei n curricula universitar din Republica Moldova i promovarea studiilor de ace n Republica Moldova. Rezultatele acestui proiect se cristalizeaz prin editarea ghidului de fa, dar i crearea i funcionarea paginii web al reelei naionale de studii de pace care poate fi accesat pe adresa electronic: www.peacebuilding.md Contacte: Adresa Str. Testemieanu, 6, et. 3. sala 316 E-mail: catedrari@yahoo.com 300

DESPRE AUTORI COJOCARU Igor, doctor n politologie, ef Catedra tiine Socioumane. Locul de munc: Universitatea de Stat Alecu Russo din Bli, Facultatea de Psihologie i Asisten social, Catedra tiine Socioumane. Cursuri: politologie, politici publice i sociale, dezvoltare i planificare regional. Domenii de interes: politici publice, politici europene, politici transfrontaliere, dezvoltare regional. e-mail: cojocaru.igor@usb.md; iiddcojocaru@gmail.com COJOCARU Igor, Ph.D in Political Science, Head of the Department of Social and Human Sciences. Work place: Alecu Russo State University of Balti, Faculty of Psychology and Social work, Courses: Political Science, Social Politics, Public Policy, Regional Development and Planning. Research interests: public policy, European policy, cross-border policy, regional development. , , - . : , , - . , , , . : , , , . CUJUICLU Elena, doctorand, lector universitar. Locul de munc: Universitatea din Comrat, Catedra tiine Sociale. Cursuri: tiina politic, relaii interetnice, soluionarea conlictelor. Domenii de interes: politici etnice, minoriti etnice/naionale, integrarea minoritilor etnice/naionale. e-mail: elena.cuijuclu@gmail.com , , . : , . : , , . : , / , / . CUJUICLU Elena, PhD Studnet, lecturer. Work place: Comrat State University, Department of Social Sciences. Courses: Political Science, Interethnic Relations and Conflict Resolution. Research interests: ethnic politics, ethnic/national minorities, integration of ethnic/national minorities.

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EJOVA Cristina, doctor n tiine politice, confereniar universitar. Locul de munc: Universitatea de Stat din Moldova, Facultatea Relaii Internaionale, tiine Politice i Administrative, Catedra Relaii Internaionale. Sfera de interese: combaterea terorismului i asigurarea securitii internaionale, reglementarea conflictelor regionale i internaionale, factorul civilizaional n politica mondial, probleme politice n relaii internaionale i dezvoltrii globale. e-mail: doctorkb@mail.ru EJOVA Cristina, PhD in Political Sciences, Associate Professor. Work place: Moldova State University, Faculty of International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations. Research interests: the fight against terrorism, international security, resolution of international and regional conflicts, civilizational factor in world politics, the political problems of international relations and global development. , , . : , , , . : ; ; ; . EANU Constantin, doctor habilitat n tiine istorice, profesor universitar. Locul de munc: Universitatea de Stat din Moldova, Facultatea Relaii Internaionale, tiine Politice i Administrative, Catedra Relaii Internaionale. Domenii de interes: ideologia n relaiile internaionale, teoria relaiilor internaionale, probleme actuale ale dezvoltrii globale, prevenirea conflictelor i gestionarea crizelor internaionale, politica mondial i relaii internaionale. e-mail: catedra_ri@yahoo.com EANU Constantin, Professor, Doctor Habilitatus in Histrory. Work place: Moldova State University, Faculty of International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations. Research interests: ideology in international relations, international relations theory, contemporary issues of global development, international conflict prevention and crisis management, world politics and international relations. , , . : , , , . : , , , , . 302

ILACIUC Dinu, doctor n istorie, confereniar universitar Locul de munc: Universitatea de Stat din Moldova, Facultatea Relaii Internaionale, tiine Politice i Administrative, Catedra Relaii Internaionale. Domenii de interes: globalistica, securitatea internaional, organizaiile internaionale, serviciul diplomatic i consular, diplomaia multilateral, colaborarea internaional a serviciilor speciale. e-mail: catedra_ri@yahoo.com ILACIUC Dinu, PhD in History, Associate Professor. Work place: Moldova State University, Faculty of International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations. Research interests: globalization, international security, international organizations, diplomatic and consular service, multilateral diplomacy, international cooperation of special services.
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JACOTA-DRAGAN Olga, doctorand, magistru n tiine politice, asistent universitar. Locul de munc: Universitatea de Stat ,,Alecu Russo din Bli, Facultatea de Psihologie i Asisten Social, Catedra de tiine Socioumane. Cursuri: Politologia, Politici publice i sociale, Sociologia, Filosofia. Domenii de interes: instituii i procese politice, tiine administrative, studii de pace, studii europene, etc. e-mail: oligajacota@mail.ru JACOTA-DRAGAN Olga, PhD student, MA in Political Sciences, Lecturer. Work place:,Alecu Russo Balti State University, Faculty of Psychology and Social Assistance, Department of Social and Human Sciences. Courses: Politology, Social and Public Policy, Sociology, Philosophy. Research interests: political process and institutions, administrative sciences, peace studies, European studies, etc. - , , , . : , , - . : , , , . : , , , , .

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LISENCO Vlada, doctor n drept, jurist n drept internaional, lector superior. Locul de munc: Misiunea OSCE n Moldova, oficiul din Tiraspol, consilier juridic. Domenii de interes: autor a mai mult de 30 de articole tiinifice pe problemele integrrii europene, reglementrii moldo-transnistreane, activitii intituiilor societii civile i mecanismelor internaionale de aprare a drepturilor omului. Autorul manualului Introducere n dreptul necomercial, Tiraspol 2004; monografiei Organizaiile nonguvernamentale i societatea civil: aspecte intrastatale i internaionale, LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing GmbH & Co.KG. e-mail: vlada.lisenco@mail.ru , , , . : , , . : 30 , - , . , 2004; : , LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing GmbH & Co.KG. LISENCO Vlada, PhD, National Legal Adviser, Senior Lecturer. Place of work: OSCE Mission to Moldova, Tiraspol office, National Legal Adviser. Research interests: author of more than 30 scientific articles on European integration, MoldovaTransnsitria conflict regulation, activity of public associations and civil society, human rights protection. Author of the textbook Introduction to the non-for-profit law and the book NGO and civil society: state and international aspects of regulation, LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing GmbH & Co.KG. MORARI Cristina, manager al proiectului actual, doctorand, magistru n Relaii Internaionale, lector universitar. Locul de munc: Universitatea de Stat din Moldova, Facultatea Relaii Internaionale, tiine Politice i Administrative, Catedra Relaii Internaionale. Cursuri: integrare european, studii de pace in teoria i practica relaiilor internaionale, probleme actuale ale UE, cooperare regional, geopolitica, politica extern a Federaiei Ruse, bazele conceptuale ale politicii externe ale SUA, drepturile omului n relaiile internaionale. Domenii de interes: studii de pace, studii europene, cooperare regional, geopolitic etc. e-mail: morari.kristina@gmail.com MORARI Cristina, Project manager, PhD student, MA in International Relations, Lecturer. Work place: Moldova State University, Faculty of International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations. Courses: European Integration, Peace Studies in International Relations Theory and Practice, Current Problems of the EU, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, Foreign Policy of Russian Feredation, Conceptual bases of U.S. foreign policy, Humans Rights in International Relations. Research interests: peace studies, European studies, regional cooperation, geopolitics. etc.

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O , , , , . : , , , . : , , , , , , , . , , , . MURSA Elena, doctorand, magistru n Relaii Internationale, lector universitar, Preedinte al Asociaiei de Instruire i Informare European. Locul de munc: Univeritatea PERSPECTIVA-INT. Cursuri: securitatea internaional, globalizarea, istoria Europei Centrale i de Sud-Est. Domenii de interes: studii de pace, cultura pcii, studii europene. e-mail:elenamursa@ahoo.com MURSA Elena, PhD Student, MA in International Relations, Lecturer, the Chairmen of European Education and Information Association. Work place: PERSPECTIVA-INT University. Courses: International Security, Globalization, History of Central and South-East Europe. Research interests: peace studies, culture of peace, european studies. , , , , . : PERSPECTIVA-INT. : , , . : , , .

PANA Rodica, doctorand, magistru n relaii internaionale (Studii Europene), lector universitar, ef al Centrului de Informare i Documentare tiinific. Locul de munc: Universitatea Liber Internaional din Moldova, Istorie i Relaii Internaionale, Catedra Relaii Internaionale i Politologie. Domenii de interes: procese politice contemporane, diplomaie i politic extern. e-mail: pisarencu@yahoo.com, rpanta@ulim.md PANA Rodica, PhD student, MA in International Relations (European Studies), Lecturer, head of Scientific Information and Documentation Centre, Work place: Free International University of Moldova, Faculty of History and International Relations, Department of International Relations and Political Science. Research interests: contemporary political processes, diplomacy and foreign policy.

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PAPOVA Alla, lector superior. Locul de munc: Universitatea de Stat din Comrat, Catedra tiine Sociale. Cursuri: filosofia, istoria civilizaiei europene, relaiile internaionale n istoria Europei de Sud-Est, Epistemilogia i filosofia stiinei. Domenii de interes: filosofia (social), istoria Europei, istoria antic, relaii internaionale. e-mail: papcova@mail.ru , . : , . : , , - , . C : , , , , . PAPOVA Alla, Superior Lecturer. Work place: State University of Comrat, Department of Social Science. Courses: philosophy, the history of European civilization, international relations in the history of South East Europa, Epistemilog and philosophy of science. Research interests: (social) philosophy, European history, ancient history, international relations.

ROTARU Veronica, magistru n tiine politice, lector univesitar. Locul de munc: Universitatea de Stat din Moldova, Facultatea Relaii Internaionale, tiine Politice i Administrative, Catedra Relaii Internaionale. Domenii de interes: protocolul i ceremonialul diplomatic, negocierile diplomatice n relaiile internaionale, diplomaia cultural, actualitatea internaional.

ROTARU Veronica, MA in Political Science, Lecturer. Work place: Moldova State University, Faculty of International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations. Research interests: diplomatic protocol and ceremonial, diplomatic negotiations in international relations, cultural diplomacy.

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SLOBODENIUC Ghenadie, coordonator al paginii WEB, doctor n politologie, lector universitar. Locul de munc: Universitatea de Stat din Moldova, Facultatea Relaii Internaionale, tiine Politice i Administrative, Catedra Relaii Internaionale. n prezent - responsabil de dezvoltarea asociaiilor diasporale n cadrul Biroului pentru Relaii cu Diaspora (BRD), Cancelaria de Stat a Republicii Moldova. Cursuri: teoria conflictelor, politica mondial, organizaii internaionale etc. Domenii de interes: dezvoltarea potenialului uman i instituional, migraia internaional i dialogul intercultural, medierea conflictelor, diplomaia prin tiin, tehnologie i inovaie, Foresight strategic, procesul de luare a deciziei, managementul proiectelor, metode de analiz politic, contribuie civic, etc. e-mail: slobodeniucgh@yahoo.com SLOBODENIUC Ghenadie, WEB Page Coordinator, PhD in Political Sciences, Lecturer. Work place: Moldova State University, Faculty of International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations. Currently - reponsible for the Diaspora Associations Development within the Bureau of Diaspora Relations, State Chancellery of the Republic of Moldova. Courses: Conflict Theory, Global Politics, International Organizations etc. Research interests: human potential development, international migration and interethnic dialogue, conflict mediation, diplomacy through science, technology and innovation, strategic foresight, decision-making process, civic contribution etc. , WEB , , . : , , , , - (BRD), : , , . : , , , , , , , , , .

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TEOSA Valentina, Coordonator al proiectului actual, doctor habilitat n tiine politice, profesor universitar, ef catedr. Locul de munc: Universitatea de Stat din Moldova, Facultatea Relaii Internaionale, tiine Politice i Administrative, Catedra Relaii Internaionale. Domenii de interes: multiculturalismul i tolerana n relaiile internaionale, strategiile sociale europne, integrarea social a minoritilor etnice, aspecte internaionale i strategii naionale de securitate, teoria politic i filozofia n SUA, conflictele internaionale, aspecte practice n cercetarea relaiilor internaionale. e-mail: vteosa@yahoo.com TEOSA Valentina, Project coordinator, Doctor Habilitatus in Political Sciences, Professor, Head of the Department. Work place: Moldova State University, Faculty of International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations. Research interests: multiculturalism and tolerance in international relations, European social strategies, social integration of ethnic minorities, international issues and national security strategy, political theory and philosophy in the U.S., international conflicts, practical issues in international relations research.
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, , . : , , , . : , , , , , , . ICU Viorica, doctorand, magistru n istorie (Studii Sud-Est Europene), lector superior. Locul de munc: Universitatea Liber Internaional din Moldova, Facultatea Istorie i Relaii Internaionale, Catedra Relaii Internaionale i Politologie. Domenii de interes: geopolitic i geostrategie, Uniunea European, conflictul transnistrean. e-mail: ticuviorica@yahoo.com ICU Viorica, PhD.Student, MA in History (Southeast European Studies), Superior Lecturer. Work place: Free International University of Moldova, Faculty of History and International Relations, Department of International Relations and Political Science. Research interests: geopolitics and geostrategy, European Union, transnistrian conflict. , , (- ), . : , , . : , , 308

VENTURI Bernard, Project coordinator, holds a PhD in Political Studies at the University of Bologna. Currently, he is a Research Fellow at the University of Bologna, Director of Centro Studi Difesa Civile (CSDC) and Lecturer at the Marist College, Florence Campus. He is also a member of the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) steering committee. Periods of research led him to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), to the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and to the Moldova State University. Bernardo Venturi has been lectures and research fellow for several universities and research centres and he has published extensively on peace and conflict related issues. e-mail:"Bernardo Venturi" b.venturi@pacedifesa.org VENTURI Bernardo, Coordonator al proiectului actual, Doctor n tiine Politice, Universitatea de la Bologna. n prezent colaborator tiinific la Universitatea din Bologna, Director al centrului Studi Difesa Civile (CSDC) i lector universitar la Colegiul Marist, Florena. De asemenea, este membru al comitetului din cadrul Oficiului European pentru Consolidarea Pcii. A efectuat cercetri n cadrul Institutului pentru Pace din SUA (USIP), Institutul de Cercetare pentru Pace din Oslo (PRIO) i Universitatea de Stat din Moldova. Este autorul unui ir de articole n domeniul studiilor de pace i conflict. , , , . , Studi Difesa Civile (CSDC) Marist, . . , (USIP), , (PRIO) . .

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STUDII INTERNAIONALE

Coordonatori: Valentina Teosa Bernardo Venturi

STUDII DE PACE I SOLUIONAREA CONFLICTELOR N CURRICULUM-UL UNIVERSITAR GHID TEORETICO-METODOLOGIC

Bun de tipar 19.04.2013. Formatul 60x84 1/8. Coli de tipar 38,75. Coli editoriale 20,38 Comanda 63/13. Tirajul 200 ex. Centrul editorial-Poligrafic al USM Str. Al. Mateevici, 60. Chiinu, MD 2009 310