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Gaddis Razboiul Rece PDF
Gaddis Razboiul Rece PDF
aaDS, J 9 - G 3
CAPITOLUL UNU
RENVIEREA FRICII
I
II
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doilea front n nordul Franei, Armata Roie ar fi venit ctre Frana.
i j A n e x a t e de I u g o s l a v i a
l ... [Noi] am cochetat cu ideea ajungerii la Paris". 11 Spre deosebire
i j Date Bulgariei
r-, de Hitler ns, Stalin nu urma nici lin fel de orar fix. Salutase
/ FINLANDA i
! \ debarcrile din Ziua Z, n ciuda faptului c acestea aveau s
>
NORVEGIA / Lacul mpiedice Armata Roie s ajung n Europa de Vest prea curnd:
I\irkv.il4-uiii! Helsinki/ Ladoga
(leased to Ruva} i .r nfrngerea Germaniei era prima prioritate. Pe de alt parte, nici nu
Leningrad renunase la diplomaie n ncercarea de a-i atinge.obiectivele, n
Oslo.
<Talinn.v
r ;
Stockolm- ESTONIA^
primul rnd pentru c se ateptase - cel puin pentru un timp - la
Marea \ Moscova.
SUEDIA Baltic cooperarea americanilor pentru ndeplinirea lor. Nu spusese
Riga Roosevelt c Statele Unite se vor abine de la a-i cuta propria
LETONIA \ o Mile 100 200
sfer de influen n Europa? Stalin avefc, aadar, o viziune mrea:
DANEMARCA 0 Kihmelri
Copenhaga-
Kaliningrad UTUANIA^ } 200 obinerea pe cale panic, dar net determinat istoric, a dominaiei
(Komngsberg) ^ d /
Gdansk (Ranzig)". / -Minsk clare asupra Europei. Era ns, n acelai timp, i o viziune eronat
/ PRUSIA [ V- > i UNIUNEA i imperfect, cci nu reuea s in cont de obiectivele postbelice
, Szczecin (Stettin)- V ^ O'RlEliJTAi \ x n derulare ale Statelor Unite.
SOVIETIC
Berlin. ^GERMANIA Va.rovia 6 0 L 0 N J
df.f.st Ide est?
" POLONIA V Kiev
\
4 GERMANIA .Wroclaw (Breslau) "<
J
^ Praga Cracovia, \ III
\ , Vi-NORDUL BUCOVINEI
--i CEHOSLOVACIA
(
' " " u - . n . . \ Bfat'slav^ - "^'-.L J X l ^ \BASARABIA Ce doreau americanii dup rzboi? Fr ndoial tot securitate,
I ( Vrena RUTENIA \ v
'''"austria i ' SUBCARPATICA \ ^'Odessa dar, spre deosebire de Stalin, erau mult mai puin siguri de ceea ce
^ ELVEIA^-, UNGARIA / \ vor trebui s fac pentru a o obine. Motivul avea de-a face cu
V L
T f v ROMNIA "
Tnestej, WENEZIAV." \ situaia dificil n care-i pusese cel de-al Doilea Rzboi Mondial:
^G1UL,A Belgrad^ Bucureti
( ITALIA anume c Statele Unite nu puteau s continue s serveasc drept
IUGOSLAVIA "x ' ^Dobiogea model pentru restul lumii dac rmneau separate fa de restul
4c, '> BULGARIA lumii.
'<? i Sofia
/^Istanbul De-a lungul celei mai lungi perioade din istoria lor, americanii
. Roma > 1 \
''"Tirana, I " ncercaser s fac asta. Nu fusese necesar s-i fac prea multe
ALBANIA
> TURCIA griji n legtur cu securitatea, cci oceanele i separaser de toate
Marea
Mediteran f/ GRECIA M'SJrffny I. Ward celelalte state care ar fi putut s le provoace vreun ru.
30 JOHN LEWIS GADDIS
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NOTE
12. Comentariul lui Paine se afl n pamfletul su din 1776, Common Sense,
reprodus parial n Dennis Merrill i Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Major
Problems in American Foreign Policy, ed. a 6-a (New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 2005), I, 34.
13. Discursul lui John Quincy Adams, 4 iulie, 1821, n ibid., 1,132.
14. Discurs inut n faa Congresului, 2 aprilie, 1917, n ibid., 1, 431.
15. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy,
1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 70.
16. Discurs inut n faa International Student Assembly, 3 septembrie 1942, n
Samuel 1. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.
Roosevelt (New York: Random House, 1941-1950), XI, 353.
17. Roy Jenkins, Churchill: A Biography (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
2001), pp. 350-351.
18. Vojtech Mastny, Russia 's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy. Warfare, and
the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1979), pp. 156-162.
19. Nikolai Novikov ctre ministrul de Externe sovietic, 27 septembrie, 1946, n
Kenneth M. Jensen, ed., Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov. Kennan, and
Roberts Long Telegrams" of 1946, ediie revzut (Washington: United
States Institute of Peace, 1993), pp. 3^t.
20. Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War, p. 270. Pentru acordul
Stalin-Churchill, vezi Kimball, The Juggler, pp. 160-164.
21. Pechatnov i Edmondson, The Russian Perspective", p. 98.
22. W. Averell Harriman i Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin,
1941-1946 (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 444.
23. Pechatnov i Edmondson, The Russian Perspective", p. 109.
24. Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet
Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1995), pp. 69-140.
25. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of
Japan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005), ofer cea
mai recent versiune a evenimentelor
26. Pentru o relatare detaliatJa operaiunilor David Greenglass-Julius Rosenberg
i Klaus Fuchs, vezi Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen
Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), pp. 27-198. A treia ncercare,
cea a lui Ted Hali, este discutat n Kai Bird i Martin J. Sherwin, American
Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (New
York: Knopf, 2005), pp. 286-287, i ntr-un interviu cu Hali n CNN Cold
War, episodul 21, Spies".
S, <e
RZBOIUL RECE 67
27. Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar (New York:
Knopf, 2004), p. 502.
28. Ibid.
29. Stalin ctre Molotov, Beria, Mikoian i Malenkov, 9 decembrie 1945, n
Levering et al., Debating the Origins of the Cold War, p. 155.
30. Pentru informaii mai detaliate, vezi Robert Jervis, Perception and
Misperception in International Politics (Idiliceton: Princeton University
Press, 1976), pp. 62-67.
31. Albert Resis, ed., Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversa-
tions with Felix Chuev (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), p. 8.
32. Ibid., p. 73.
33. Pentru informaii suplimentare despre aceste crize, vezi Fernande Scheid
Raine, The Iranian Crisis of 1946 and the Origins of the Cold War"| n
Leffler i Painter, ed., Origins of the Cold War, pp. 93-111; i Eduard Mark,
The Turkish War Scare of 1946", n ibid., pp. 112-133.
34. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, pp. 292-295.
35. Kennan la Departamentul de Stat, 22 februarie, 1946, U.S. Department of
State, Foreign Relations of the United States [de aici ncolo FRUS]: 19^6,
VI, 699-700; X" [George F. Kennan], The Sources of Soviet Conduct",
Foreign Affairs, 25 (iulie, 1947), 575, sublinierea autorului.
36. Pechatnov i Edmondson, The Russian Perspective", p. 116.
37. Novikov ctre ministrul de Externe sovietic, 27 septembrie 1946, n Jensen,
ed., Origins of the Cold War The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts Long
Telegrams" of 1946, pp. 3-16.
38. Viktor L. Malkov, Commentary", n ibid., p. 75.
39. Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History: 7929-1969 (New York: Norton,
1973), p. 263.
40. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 178-179.
41. Yoram Gorlizki i Oleg Khievniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling
Circle, 1945-1953 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.35-36.
42. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, p. 326.
43. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War Histoiy (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 41-42.
44. Montefiore, Stalin, p. 569.
45. John A. Armitage, The View from Czechoslovakia", n Thomas T.
Hammond, ed., Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold War (Seattle: Univer-
sity of Washington Press, 1982), pp. 225-226.
40 JOHN LEWIS GADD1|>