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ARGUMENT

In ultimul numar al revistei Echinox pe anul 2000, anuntam o amplificare a activitatii Fundatiei Culturale Echinox, o schimbare a formulei de aparitie de pina atunci prin publicarea a trei variante de expresie. Iata, intre timp aceasta promisiune a devenit realitate. Revista Echinox, intr-o conceptie noua, dinamica, sub conducerea lui Horea Poenar, a ajuns la al treilea numar pe acest an, Caietele Echinox publica acum primul lor volum, iar website-ul Fundatiei este in process de constructie, fiind prevazut sa fie deschis in aceasta toamna. Dupa cum aratam in articolul de directie "L'Echinox est mort. Vive les Echinoxes!", Caietele Echinox si-au propus un program al culturii de excelenta. Vom publica numere tematice (raminind insa deschisi la inovatii si sugestii), cuprinzind studii si materiale de tinuta academica, ce isi gasesc locul mai degraba intr-un volum sub forma de carte decit intr-o revista in format clasic. Pentru a asigura nivelul de performanta stiintifica, vom colabora cu institutii si centre de excelenta, cum sint Centrul de cercetare a imaginarului (pe care il vom prezenta in numarul viitor) sau Departamentul de literatura comparata de la Facultatea de Litere din Cluj. Pe aceasta linie se inscrie si conceptia acestui prim numar in simbioza cu Asociatia Romana de Literatura Comparata (ARLC), filiala a Asociatiei Internationale de Literatura Comparata (AILC). De asemenea, continuind traditia multiculturala si plurilingvistica a Echinoxului, vom publica articole nu doar in romana, ci si in diferite limbi de circulatie, incercind prin aceasta sa racordam cercetarea autohtona la reteaua internationala. *** Acest prim volum este consacrat unei teme de acuta actualitate, "Postcomunismul", ca o varianta rasariteana a studiilor de "Postcolonialism" din Apus. Ideea volumului ne-a fost sugerata de colocviul "Postcolonialism si interculturalitate" organizat de Asociatia Romana de Literatura Comparata in zilele de 31 martie - 1 aprilie 2001 la Cluj. impreuna cu presedintele Asociatiei, domnul Paul Cornea, am gasit profitabila ideea de a edita lucrarile simpozionului intr-un volum al Caietelor Echinox. Cum insa acest volum nu se dorea o simpla brosura a actelor colocviului, am solicitat o serie de alte materiale de la diferiti specialisti, pentru a oferi o imagine cit mai aprofundata asupra temei. intr-o prima varianta, 1

ne gindisem sa publicam, in doua sectiuni separate, pe de o parte lucrarile simpozionului, si de cealalta contributiile din afara. Pe masura insa ce cuprinsul volumului a capatat forma si densitate, am fost adusi la solutia prezenta, aceea de a dispune materialul nu dupa un criteriu pur formal, ci dupa unul organic. Am structurat asadar studiile tematic, in jurul citorva concepte de mare suprafata, legate intre ele printr-o retea freatica de sensuri, cum sint cele de multiculturalism si interculturalitate, de postcolonialism si postcomunism, de identitate si hibridare culturala. Cei doritori sa reconstituie si felul in care s-au desfasurat lucrarile ARLC, vor gasi, alaturi de Cuvintul domnului Paul Cornea, programul coloviului. *** Volumul este conceput in cinci sectiuni mari. Prima sectiune ofera citeva repere pentru delimitarea conceptului de multiculturalism. Avem placerea sa publicam doua conferinte si o masa rotunda sustinute de Richard Rorty la inceputul lunii mai 2001, la Universitatea "Babes-Bolyai", in care profesorul american dezvolta concepte precum cel de politici culturale, de cultura religiosa, filosofica si literara, de "intelectual" si "adevar mintuitor", de relativism postmodern, de toleranta interculturala. O alta contributie teoretica importanta este conceptul de "identitate multipla" elaborat de Victor Neumann. Cristian Moraru prezinta, din perspectiva unui universitar american, resursele culturale incrucisate de care dispune un comparatist in ziua de azi. A doua sectiune desfasoara citeva subiecte apartinind studiilor postcoloniale. Virgil Nemoianu ofera o perspectiva asupra istoriei europene care socheaza parerile mostenite: Europa nu mai este privita ca metropola colonizarii mondiale (fapt valabil doar pentru un interval de citeva secole), ci ca o mare colonie a altor civilizatii (pre-istorice, antice, medievale, cum e, spre exemplu, Islamul). O privire contemporana asupra imaginarului colonial medieval arunca si studiul meu despre rasele monstruoase in care europenii clasificau populatiile regiunilor terestre indepartate si necunoscute. Trei studii se apleaca in continuare asupra legaturilor dintre postcolonialism si citeva discipline conexe: studiile postcoloniale vs. canonul occidental (Mircea Martin), feminism vs. postcolonialism (Mihaela Frunza) si postcolonialism vs. postcomunism (Ion Bogdan Lefter). in pandant cu textele despre postcomunism ce urmeaza, Tomas Varnagy analizeaza o tema de istorie recenta, aplicata unei tari - Argentina - in perioada ce succede unei dictaturi nu de stinga, ci de dreapta. A treia sectiune trateaza subiecte ale lumii postcomuniste. atefan Borbly, Mircea Popa si Daniela Koleva reinterpreteaza, cu instrumentele noului istorism si ale psihoistoriei, istoria atit de ideologizata si falsificata a "revolutiilor" comuniste din Romania si Bulgaria. Adaptind sintagma franceza "trahison des clercs", Irina Badescu se ocupa de "tradarea intelectualilor" sub comunism. Doua cercetari, a lui Suzanne Travers & Edward Kanterian, si a Ruxandrei Cesereanu se apleaca asupra rolului si imaginii Securitatii in Romania comunista si postcomunista. Horvth Andor aduce in discutie judecata etica la care este supus creatorul din perioada dictaturii comuniste de catre comentatorii de dupa 1989. Claude Karnoouh investigheaza presiunea pe care ideologia comunista a exercitat-o asupra unui alt gen de arta, arta "publica" (statuarul, afisele, spectacolele de masa), gindita de partid ca un vehicul al politicului. in sfirsit, Augustin Ioan face o retropesctiva a evolutiei arhitecturii religioase in ultimii zece ani. A patra sectiune este consacrata temei identitatii nationale (sursa adeseori a nationalismului si sovinismului) si a hibridarii si comunicarii interculturale. Dintr-un studiu mult mai extins, in care propune pentru Romania conceptul de Post-imperialism, Monica Spiridon selecteaza un capitol despre dificultatile pe care romanii le-au intimpinat in definirea propriei identitati nationale. Despre problemele ridicate de postularea unei identitati basarabene trateaza si Elena Prus, care introduce ca factor suplimentar de analiza dihotomia urban vs. rural. Carmen-Maria Mecu si Nicolae Mecu dezvaluie capcanele identitatii romanesti pornind de la conceptiile lui Maiorescu sau Lovinescu, in timp ce Gabriel Cosoveanu si Carmen Musat discuta identitatile alternative si optiunile ce i s-au deschis intelectualului estic in perioada postcomunista. in sfirsit, Romanita Constantinescu discuta despre permeabilitatea sau impermeabilitatea frontierelor, atit fizice si politice, cit si culturale si mentale, in timp ce Cosana Nicolae si Madalina Nicolaescu se intereseaza de noi modalitati de circulatie a informatiei interculturale, cum ar fi constituirea de comunitati virtuale pe internet sau 2

publicitatea comerciala. O ultima sectiune este destinata unor teme de comparatistica. Reproducem masa rotunda pe care ARLC i-a dedicat-o lui Adrian Marino in cadrul Colocviului de la Cluj, in care este omagiata activitatea si opera comparatistului clujean. Memoriei unui alt om de cultura, care a reprezentat o veriga de legatura a literaturii noastre cu cea franceza, Henry Jacquier, ii este inchinata interventia lui Horvth Andor. in final, Vasile Voia prezinta figura lui Hugo Meltzl, comparatist la Universitatea din Cluj in ultimele decenii ale secolului al XIX-lea, care a publicat prima revista de literatura comparata din lume, Acta Comparationis Litterarum Universarum, in care se editau texte in nu mai putin de 12 limbi straine - si al carei succesor indepartat sint intr-un fel si aceste Caiete Echinox de azi. *** In incheiere, se cuvine adus un cuvint de multumire celor care au facut posibila, intelectual si financiar, aparitia acestei noi formule a Caietelor Echinox si a acestui volum. Pe de o parte, este vorba de Fundatia Concept din Bucuresti care, in cadrul unui program international de politici culturale, ne-a oferit un grant care sa acopere cheltuielile necesare lansarii si desfasurarii proiectului nostru. De cealalta parte, este vorba de Asociatia Romana de Literatura Comparata, care a contribuit nu doar la continutul tematic al acestui volum, ci si la cheltuielile legate de editarea lui (sumele pentru organizarea colocviului si publicarea actelor fiind obtinute de la un alt sponsor - Centrul de resurse pentru diversitate etnoculturala din Cluj). De asemenea, multumim Editura Dacia, cu care am intrat intr-o fructuoasa colaborare in vederea tiparirii pe mai departe a Caietelor.

PAUL CORNEA COLCOVIUL ARLC "POSTCOLONIALISM SI INTERCULTURALITATE" Colocviul Post-colonialism si Interculturalitate a fost initiat de Asociatia de Literatura Comparata si organizat la Cluj, la 31 martie-1 aprilie 2001, cu sprijinul Centrului de resurse pentru diversitate etnoculturala. Lucrarile s-au desfasurat in conditiile confortabile oferite de Centrul de caritate Bethlen Kata. A fost, ca si alte reuniuni ale Asociatiei noastre, o intrunire agreabila, intre specialisti veniti sa schimbe opinii si puncte de vedere intr-o atmosfera prieteneasca, dezinhibata si informala. Ne-a facut placere sa ne regasim si sa dezbatem probleme care au ecou in viata noastra si a comunitatii in care traim. in acest sens, punctul de virf al Colocviului l-a constituit omagiul adus lui Adrian Marino, presedintele de onoare al Asociatiei, cu ocazia implinirii virstei de 80 ani. E o mare satisfactie pentru mine si colegii mei ca, spre deosebire de ceea ce s-a intimplat cu alte prilejuri, de data asta comunicarile prezentate in cadrul Colocviului, imbogatite cu cateva texte valoroase pe aceeasi tema, au putut fi editate in Caietul pe care cititorul il are sub ochi. Sintem onorati de a fi colaborat in acest scop cu redactia Echinox-ului, la al carei efort perseverent pentru performanta intelectuala si compatibilitate culturala cu Vestul sintem foarte sensibili. Vreau sa le multumesc sincer tuturor celor gratie carora a fost cu putinta realizarea Colocviului si tiparirea Actelor sale: - Centrului de resurse pentru diversitate etnoculturala din Cluj, indeosebi d-lui Horvath Andor si d-nei Fulop Agnes - Administratiei Centrului de caritate "Bethlen Kata" - Conducerii revistei Echinox, indeosebi lui Corin Braga, initiatorul si artizanul publicatiei de fata 3

- Colegelor mele Monica Spiridon si Ioana Both care au investit timp, energie, rabdare si umor in treburile indigeste dar esentiale reusitei Colocviului, incorporate istoriei sale nespuse si repede uitate. Programul colocviului "Postcolonialism si interculturalitate" Simbata, 31 martie 9.30-13.00 Sesiune de comunicari. Moderator: Mircea Anghelescu 1. Adriana Babeti (Timisoara): Studiul comparat al literaturilor central- si sud-est europene 2. Irina Badescu (Bucuresti): La trahison des clercs. Editia 1968 3. Carmen-Maria si Nicolae Mecu (Bucuresti): Capcane identitare - "forma fara fond" si "fond fara forme" 4. Alexandru Musina (Brasov): Colonizarea "interna" si revolta "tinerilor intelectuali" - Generatia '80 5. Elena Prus (Chisinau): Identitate urbana - identitate rurala. Modele nationale de inteculturalitate europeana 15.30-18.00 Sesiune de comunicari. Moderator: Mircea Martin 1. Gabriel Cosoveanu (Craiova): Strategii de mitizare nationalista in critica literara din Estul European post-comunist 2. Dan Manuca (Iasi): O paralela: literatura germana din Romania si literatura romana din Republica Moldova 3. Ion Bogdan Lefter (Bucuresti): Post-communism si post-colonialism 4. Andor Horvth (Cluj): Textualitatea istoriei, istoricitatea textului. "inainte" si "dupa" in postcomunismul romanesc 5. Carmen Musat (Bucuresti): Identitati alternative - proiectul identitar in proza autobiografica si in fictiune 6. Madalina Nicolaescu (Bucuresti): Activitatea de consum ca o modalitate de dialog intercultural Duminica, 1 aprilie 9.30-11.30 Masa rotunda. Moderator: Paul Cornea Omagiu lui Adrian Marino Intervin: Mircea Anghelescu (Bucuresti), Mircea Martin (Bucuresti), Leon Volovici (Israel) 12.00-14.00 Sesiune de comunicari. Moderator: Mircea Anghelescu 1. Romanita Constantinescu (Bucuresti): Granicer peste granita. Despre permeabilitatea si impermeabilitatea frontierelor 2. Corin Braga (Cluj): Celalalt ca rasa monstruoasa. Radacini antice si medievale ale imaginarului colonial si eurocentric 3. Cosana Nicolae (Bucuresti): Romania virtuala 4. Mircea Popa (Cluj): Aspecte ale schimbarii modelului cultural de la Vest la Est in politica teatrala si editoriala 15.00 Adunare generala a membrilor Asociatiei Romane de Literatura Comparata

RICHARD RORTY POLITICA CULTURALA SI INTREBAREA REFERITOARE LA EXISTENTA LUI DUMNEZEU

Cultural Politics and the Question about the Existence of God Abstract: The article traces the distinction between the ontologic question regarding the existence of God and the issue of the cultural desirability of a discussion about God. Keywords: Richard Rorty; relativism; cultural politics; history of conscience; humanism

Termenul de "politica culturala" este o descriere folositoare a disputelor referitoare la cuvintele pe care trebuie sa le utilizam. Cand spunem ca francezii n-ar trebui sa mai foloseasca termenul de "Boches" (peiorativ, boches = nemti) cand se refera la germani, sau ca albii n-ar trebui sa-l mai foloseasca pe cel de "niggers" (niggers = negru, cioroi) cand se refera la negri, practicam politica culturala. Spunem, implicit, ca telurile noastre socio-politice - cresterea gradului de toleranta, pe care anumite grupuri de oameni il manifesta unul fata de altul, in speranta diminuarii cantitatii de violenta si cruzime din lume vor fi promovate prin abandonarea anumitor practici lingvistice. Adversarii nostri, printre ale caror teluri socio-politice se numara si subjugarea permanenta a negrilor de catre albi, sau suspiciunea permanenta a Frantei fata de Germania, practica politica culturala insistand sa utilizeze tocmai acele cuvinte despre care noi credem ca ar trebui excluse din limbaj. Politica culturala nu se limiteaza la dezbateri despre discursul urii. Ea cuprinde dezbateri despre proiecte referitoare la cum sa scapam de tematici intregi de discurs. Se spune adesea, de exemplu, ca ar trebui sa incetam a mai folosi conceptele de "rasa" si "casta", sa incetam a mai divide comunitatea umana pe baza descendentei genealogice. Motivul principal pentru a proceda astfel este diminuarea sanselor ca intrebarea "cine sunt parintii lui/ei?" sa mai fie pusa. Aceasta intrebare mai apare atunci cand parintilor li se spune cu cine vor sa se casatoreasca copiii lor, sau cand sunt dezbatute meritele aplicantilor pentru diverse pozitii. Cei care ne indeamna sa eliminam din limbaj cuvinte ca "sange albastru", "sange amestecat", "paria", "casatorie mixta", "nevrednic" si altele asemenea, sustin ca aceasta lume ar fi o lume mai buna daca potrivirea oamenilor ca soti, sau sotii, functionari sau demnitari, ar fi judecata exclusiv pe baza comportamentului lor si nu partial, cu referire la ascendenta lor. Aceasta linie de gandire este uneori contracarata prin replica "dar exista realmente diferente mostenite - ascendenta conteaza". Raspunsul la aceasta replica este ceva de genul: exista cu siguranta trasaturi fizice care pot fi mostenite, dar acestea nu sunt in corelatie cu nici o trasatura care ar putea furniza un motiv intemeiat pentru a desface o casatorie planificata, ori pentru a vota pro sau contra unui candidat. Avem nevoie de notiunea de transmisie genetica in scopuri medicale, insa nu in vreun alt scop. Deci in loc sa vorbim despre rase diferite propun sa vorbim despre gene diferite. Principalul argument in favoarea acestei propuneri este faptul ca termeni ca "rasa alba" sau "dinastia Han" sau "rasele barbare" au jucat roluri importante, servind drept scuze pentru razboaiele imperialiste si opresiunea colonialista. De vreme ce nu ne mai dorim sa avem parte de acestea din urma, ar trebui sa incetam sa mai folosim astfel de termeni. Exista o multime de modalitati de a imparti fiintele umane pe grupuri, iar noi ar trebui sa gasim unele care sa nu instige la violenta. Ideea potrivit careia trasaturile importante din punct de vedere moral - acel tip de trasaturi care ar putea fi relevante pentru planurile de casatorie sau pentru politicile de angajare - sunt transmise genetic, nu reprezinta altceva decat o incercare a celor care au detinut in mod traditional puterea de a pastra aceasta putere pentru descendentii lor. Discutia despre rasa este o scuza pentru pastrarea puterii, la fel de transparenta ca si discutia despre "sange albastru". 5

Atat in cazul "rasei", cat si in cel al "sangelui albastru", intrebarea "Exista oare asa ceva?" si intrebarea "Ar trebui oare sa vorbim despre asa ceva?" par a fi intersanjabile. De aceea tindem sa clasificam drept "politica", si nu "stiintifica" sau "filosofica", discutia referitoare la problema daca sa incetam sau nu sa vorbim despre rase diferite. insa exista alte cazuri in care pare ciudat sa identificam intrebarile despre ceea ce exista cu intrebarile despre ceea ce este dezirabil sa discutam. De exemplu, intrebarea daca sa vorbim despre neutroni pare o intrebare strict stiintifica. De aceea, oamenii care afirma ca fizicienii n-ar fi trebuit sa investigheze niciodata radioactivitatea, sau sa speculeze in legatura cu posibilitatea scindarii atomului, sunt acuzati de confuzie intre stiinta si politica. Pare firesc sa separam intrebarea politica daca a fost un lucru bun pentru umanitate faptul ca oamenii de stiinta au inceput sa se gandeasca la posibilitatea fisiunii atomice, de intrebari stiintifice referitoare la existenta si proprietatile particulelor elementare. Opozitia dintre cazul raselor si cel al neutronilor ridica intrebarea: cum putem distinge cand, in cazul in care acest lucru se intampla vreodata, o disputa referitoare la ceea ce exista ar trebui dezbatuta fara referire la telurile noastre socio-politice? Cum ar trebui sa scindam cultura in domenii pentru care politica culturala este relevanta si domenii care sa se afle in afara sferei ei de influenta? Cand este adecvat sa spunem "Am face bine sa vorbim despre aceste lucruri, pentru ca ele exista" si cand aceasta remarca nu este relevanta? Am ridicat aceasta ultima intrebare pentru ca este important sa dezbatem rolurile pe care religia si filosofia ar trebui sa le joace in societatea contemporana. Multi cred ca ar trebui sa incetam sa mai vorbim despre Dumnezeu - ca discutia despre Dumnezeu, precum si discutia despre un plan de existenta superior celui al lumii materiale, este un lucru rau. Ei cred acest lucru din aceleasi considerente pentru care cred ca discutia despre rasa si casta este un lucru rau. Lucrarea Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum a lui Lucretius e citata de doua milenii pentru a ne aminti ca o convingere religioasa poate fi folosita cu usurinta drept scuza pentru cruzime. Afirmatia lui Marx ca religia este opiu pentru mase rezuma banuiala, raspandita de la Iluminism incoace, ca institutiile ecleziastice se numara printre obstacolele principale in calea formarii bunastarii cooperative globale. Multi oameni sunt de acord cu Marx ca ar trebui sa incercam sa cream o lume in care fiintele umane sa-si dedice intreaga energie sporirii fericirii umane in aceasta lume, si nu sa-si faca timp pentru a se gandi la posibilitatea vietii de dupa moarte. A spune ca discutia despre Dumnezeu ar trebui abandonata, deoarece reprezinta o piedica in calea cautarii fericirii umane, inseamna a adopta o atitudine pragmatica fata de religie, pe care multi credinciosi religiosi o gasesc jignitoare si pe care unii teologi o considera nerelevanta. Potrivit acestora, relevant este faptul ca Dumnezeu exista sau, probabil, acela ca fiintele umane au realmente suflete nemuritoare. O data recunoscut faptul ca existenta lui Dumnezeu sau a unui suflet nemuritor este controversata, controversa cu pricina ar trebui sa se refere explicit la ceea ce exista, si nu la problema daca credinta religioasa contribuie la fericirea umana. Sa respectam prioritatile: ontologia precede politica culturala. 2. Conceptia lui William James despre religie. Prima mea teza din aceasta conferinta este aceea ca politica culturala ar trebui sa inlocuiasca ontologia. Cea de-a doua teza a mea este ca intrebarea daca ar trebui sau nu, este ea insasi o problema de politica culturala. Controversa daca sau cand sa ne angajam in ontologie este una care ar trebui solutionata recurgand la intrebarea ce ar spori cel mai mult fericirea umana. inainte de a trece la apararea acestor teze, vreau totusi sa subliniez importanta unor astfel de controverse pentru filosofi care, asemeni mie, privesc cu simpatie pragmatismul lui William James. James a fost de acord cu John Stuart Mill ca cel mai bun lucru care poate fi facut si, a fortiori, credinta corecta de dobandit, este intotdeauna aceea care contribuie cel mai mult la fericirea umana. Prin urmare, el a sprijinit o etica utilitara a credintei. James e adesea pe punctul de a afirma ca toate intrebarile, inclusiv intrebarile despre ceea ce exista, sunt intrebari despre ce sprijina cel mai bine incercarile noastre de a crea o lume mai buna. Disponibilitatea lui James de a afirma astfel de lucuri l-a facut pasibil de acuzatii de perversitate 6

intelectuala. Caci aceasta versiune de pragmatism pare sa sugereze ca atunci cand sunt aduse in discutie notiuni ca cea de "amestecare de rase" si "fisiune atomica", e potrivit sa exclamam: "Haideti sa nu vorbim despre astfel de lucruri! E prea periculos! Sa nu intram in acest subiect!" Prin urmare, James pare sa ne incurajeze sa facem ceea ce Peirce a interzis: sa blocam calea cercetarii, sa refuzam sa aflam cum este lumea cu adevarat deoarece acest lucru ar putea avea efecte daunatoare asupra fiintelor umane. Pentru o mai buna intelegere voi exemplifica printr-un exemplu concret: multi oameni au sustinut ca psihologii n-ar trebui sa incerce sa descopere daca exista o legatura intre culoarea pielii si inteligenta, pur si simplu datorita raului pe care un raspuns pozitiv la aceasta intrebare l-ar putea produce in plan social. Conceptia lui James despre adevar pare sa sugereze ca acesti oameni fac un lucru bun. Pe de alta parte, cei care sunt suspiciosi la adresa pragmatismului sustin ca a-i impiedica pe oamenii de stiinta sa faca experimente pentru a descoperi daca inteligenta este transmisibila genetic, e la fel de rau ca a-i impiedica sa afle daca nucleul atomic poate fi scindat. Desigur, spun ei, trebuie sa facem distinctia intre intrebarea daca eugenia ar trebui practicata, sau daca parintii ar trebui sa fie incurajati sa continue cercetarile legate de ascendenta sotiilor sau sotilor alesi de copiii lor, si intrebarea daca europenii sunt, in medie, mai prosti decat asiaticii - asa cum separam intrebarea daca putem construi o bomba cu neutroni de intrebarea daca ar trebui sa facem asta. James n-a fost criticat doar pentru ca blocheaza calea cercetarii si pentru ca este, astfel, prea restrictiv, ci si pentru ca este prea permisiv. Aceasta critica a fost cel mai adesea adresata eseului "The will to believe", despre care el spune ca ar fi trebuit sa se numeasca "The right to believe". James sustine in acea lucrare ca avem dreptul sa credem in existenta lui Dumnezeu pentru simplul motiv ca aceasta credinta contribuie la fericirea noastra. Cartea sa Tipurile experientei religioase sustinea ca multi oameni au experiente pe care le interpreteaza ca si constiinta a prezentei lui Dumnezeu si ca aceasta interpretare, desi optionala, este perfect rezonabila. James a recunoscut ca modul in care sunt descrise anumite experiente este o problema de conditionare culturala. intr-o cultura buddhista, descrierea unei anumite experiente poate fi exprimata in termenii recunoasterii propriei naturi-Buddha, intr-o cultura crestina, in termenii acceptarii lui Cristos ca salvator personal, iar intr-o cultura complet seculara, in termenii unei schimbari bruste la nivelul serotoninei. Dar James n-a considerat ca aceasta variatie in sine arunca vreo indoiala asupra dezirabilitatii credintei religioase. El ar fi regretat aparitia unei culturi complet seculare, deoarece era de parere ca credinta in Dumnezeu, definit ca o putere diferita de noi insine, care promoveaza dreptatea, putea fi o unealta eficienta pentru producerea unui univers mai bun. intorcandu-ma acum la intrebarea pe care am pus-o mai devreme, cred ca, pentru aceia dintre noi care simpatizam cu pragmatismul lui James, cea mai buna modalitate de a-i reafirma pozitia este sa spunem ca intrebarile despre ceea ce este prea permisiv si ceea ce este prea restrictiv sunt ele insele intrebari de politica culturala. De exemplu, intrebarea daca credinciosilor religiosi ar trebui sa li se ceara dovezi despre adevarul credintei lor si daca ar trebui sa fie considerati needucati sau irationali in cazul in care nu sunt in stare sa produca suficiente dovezi, este o intrebare privitoare la ce tip de rol vrem sa joace religia in societatea noastra. intrebarea daca ar trebui, de dragul pastrarii traditiilor stramosesti, sa le permitem parintilor sa perpetueze un sistem de casta dictandu-le copiilor lor variante de parteneri de casatorie, este acelasi tip de intrebare. Astfel de intrebari se ivesc ori de cate ori practici sociale noi incep sa concureze cu cele vechi - cand, de exemplu, Noua atiinta a Europei secolului al XVII-lea a inceput sa concureze cu bisericile crestine pentru obtinerea controlului asupra universitatilor, sau cand o cultura africana traditionala este expusa unor influente europene. intrebarea daca ar fi trebuit sa li se permita oamenilor de stiinta sa descopere daca atomul ar putea fi scindat, sau sa li se permita sa investigheze corelatia dintre inteligenta si culoarea pielii, nu e o intrebare la care se poate raspunde simplu spunand: "Nu blocati calea cercetarii!" sau "Cautati adevarul, chiar daca ar fi sa pice cerul!" asa cum nu este nici intrebarea daca Franta si Germania sunt indreptatite sa incrimineze negarea ocurentei Holocaustului. Exista multe de spus de amble parti. Argumentul in favoarea permiterii oamenilor de stiinta sa investigheze orice le place este acela ca, cu cat obtinem o abilitate de predictie mai mare, cu atat ne va merge mai bine pe termen lung. Argumentul in favoarea interzicerii anumitor subiecte este acela ca pericolele pe termen scurt sunt atat de mari incat depasesc sansele beneficiilor pe termen lung. 7

A spune ca abordarea lui James a adevarului si realitatii este in esenta corecta, inseamna a spune ca argumentele referitoare la utilitatea relativa sunt singurele care conteaza. De aceea asertiunea "Ar trebui sa vorbim despre acest lucru deoarece este real" e la fel de inutila ca propozitia "Ar trebui sa credem deoarece e adevarat". Atribuirea de realitate sau adevar este, in conceptia lui James, un compliment pe care il facem unor entitati sau credinte care si-au castigat faima, si-au platit datoriile, sau dovedit utile si, prin urmare, au fost incorporate in practici sociale acceptate. Cand aceste practici sunt contestate, e irelevant sa spunem ca realitatea sau adevarul este de partea unuia dintre contestatari. Astfel de pretentii sunt intotdeauna simple batai cu pumnul in masa si nu contributii serioase la politica culturala. O alta modalitatea de a exprima conceptia lui James este aceea de a spune ca adevarul si realitatea exista de dragul practicilor sociale si nu vice versa. Aceasta este o afirmatie obscura, dar voi incerca sa o fac mai clara si mai plauzibila pe parcursul acestei conferinte. Este o teza care isi are cea mai buna aparare in opera unui neo-hegelian contemporan, Robert Brandom. Scrierile lui Brandom furnizeaza cele mai bune arme pentru apararea unei versiuni a pragmatismului lui James. Mare parte din ceea ce am de spus se ridica la o expunere, sau cel putin o apropriere, a cartilor sale. 3. Brandom despre prioritatea ontologica a socialului Brandom il prezinta pe Heidegger ca fiind cel care a propus doctrina "primatului ontologic al socialului" . Acest primat consta in faptul ca "toate problemele de autoritate sau privilegiu, in particular, cele de autoritate epistemica, sunt probleme de practica sociala, si nu probleme de fapt obiective" . Brandom incearca sa faca aceasta doctrina plauzibila aratand ca societatea imparte cultura in trei arii. in prima dintre acestea autoritatea individului este suprema (ca atunci cand acesta face relatari sincere, la persoana intai despre sentimente sau ganduri). in cea de-a doua, lumea non-umana este suprema (ca intr-un experimentum crucis in care, de exemplu, hartiei de turnesol, sau aparatului de analiza a ADN-ului i se permite sa determine daca o teorie stiintifica va fi acceptata sau respinsa ori daca acuzatul va fi eliberat sau pedepsit). Dar exista o a treia arie in care societatea nu-si delega, ci isi retine dreptul de a decide pentru sine. Brandom face o analogie intre aceasta situatie si aranjamentele constitutionale ale Statelor Unite, potrivit carora, spune el, "puterii judecatoresti i se confera autoritatea si responsabilitatea de a interpreta domeniul corespunzator de autoritate si responsabilitate a fiecarei ramuri [adica a ramurii executive, legislative si judecatoresti a guvernului], inclusiv a ei insasi" . Disputa dintre James si oponentii sai se reduce la: exista o autoritate dincolo de cea a societatii pe care societatea ar trebui sa o recunoasca - o autoritate cum ar fi Dumnezeu sau Adevarul sau Realitatea? Punctul forte al celor care sunt de acord cu James si Brandom este apelul la Occam Razor: autoritatea atribuita acestor entitati non-umane poate fi explicata sociologic, iar aceasta explicatie sociologica nu invoca nici una dintre entitatile de-a dreptul misterioase de care ar avea nevoie o explicatie non-sociologica a repartizarii autoritatii. Sa presupunem ca cineva accepta teza primatului ontologic al socialului. Atunci, pentru acea persoana, intrebarea referitoare la existenta lui Dumnezeu va fi o intrebare referitoare la avantajele si dezavantajele utilizarii discutiei despre Dumnezeu in diferite scopuri, in raport cu alte moduri alternative de vorbire. Asa cum stau lucrurile in cazul 'rasei', asa stau si in cel al lui 'Dumnezeu'. in loc sa vorbim despre rase putem sa vorbim in multe scopuri despre gene. in loc sa vorbim despre Dumnezeu Creatorul putem (asa cum fac fizicienii) sa vorbim despre Big Bang. in alte scopuri, cum ar fi furnizarea fundamentelor pentru morala, putem vorbi (asa cum a facut Kant) despre ratiune, mai degraba decat despre vointa divina. Cand dezbatem viitorul omenirii, putem vorbi (asa cum a facut Marx) despre o utopie sociala seculara in loc de Judecata de Apoi. ai asa mai departe. Sa presupunem, totusi, ca cineva nu accepta prioritatea socialului, tocmai pentru ca este credincios religios si sustine ca Dumnezeu are autoritate asupra societatii umane, precum si asupra tuturor celorlalte lucruri. Potrivit lui Brandom, aceasta e ca si cum am sustine ca societatea umana este supusa autoritatii "realitatii" sau "experientei" sau "adevarului". Dupa parerea mea el ar sustine ca toate incercarile de a numi o autoritate superioara celei a societatii, sunt mutari deghizate in jocul politicii 8

culturale. Asta si trebuie sa fie, deoarece, in conceptia sa, acesta este singurul joc disponibil. Aceasta pretentie de exclusivitate poate fi facuta mai plauzibila luand in considerare ceea ce au oamenii in minte atunci cand spun ca Dumnezeu are autoritate asupra societatii umane. Ei nu spun asta decat daca au cat de cat o idee despre ceea ce Dumnezeu vrea ca fiintele umane sa faca - decat daca pot cita sfinte scripturi, sau cuvintele unui guru, sau invataturile unei traditii ecleziastice, sau ceva de acest gen. Dar, atat din punctul de vedere al ateilor cat si din al celor a caror scriptura sau guru sau traditie este diferita, ceea ce se pretinde ca e spus in numele lui Dumnezeu este spus de fapt in numele unor grupuri de interes - o secta sau o biserica, de exemplu. Este tipic pentru doua grupuri religioase rivale (sa spunem hindusi si musulmanii, sau mormonii si catolicii) sa afirme ca celalalt refuza de buna voie si blasfemitor sa se supuna autoritatii lui Dumnezeu. Se poate face o analogie intre bataliile dintre doua astfel de grupuri si disputa dintre avocati adversi, cand prezinta dosare de apel curtii supreme. Ambii avocati vor pretinde ca au autoritatea "legii" de partea lor. Alternativ, s-ar putea face o analogie cu batalia dintre doua teorii stiintifice care pretind ambele ca surprind adevarata "natura a realitatii". Brandom considera ca apelul la Dumnezeu, asemeni apelului la "lege" sau la "felul in care sunt cu adevarat lucrurile" este intotdeauna superfluu, de vreme ce atata timp cat exista dezacorduri cu privire la ceea ce spune presupusa autoritate, ideea de autoritate este improprie . Numai atunci cand comunitatea se decide sa adopte o credinta si nu alta, sau curtea decide in favoarea uneia din parti si nu a alteia, sau comunitatea stiintifica in favoarea unei teorii si nu a alteia, devine aplicabila ideea de "autoritate". Asa numita "autoritate" a oricarei alte entitati diferite de comunitate (sau de o persoana sau lucru sau cultura experta autorizata de comunitate sa ia decizii in numele ei) e doar o lovitura cu pumnul in masa. 4. Apelul la experienta religioasa si de alt gen Caracterul contra-intuitiv al afirmatiilor lui Brandom se datoreaza in parte popularitatii empirismului. Caci empiristii ne spun ca putem sa ne sustragem autoritatii comunitatii locale intrand in contact nemijlocit cu realitatea. Aceasta conceptie a incurajat ideea potrivit careia Europa a ajuns in cele din urma in contact cu realitatea atunci cand oameni de stiinta ca Galilei au avut curajul sa creada in dovezile simturilor lor, mai degraba decat sa se inchine autoritatii lui Aristotel si a bisericii catolice. Brandom e de acord cu profesorul sau Wilfrid Sellars ca ideea de a ajunge in contact direct cu realitatea, prin simturi, presupune o confuzie intre relatiile de justificare, care exista intre propozitii, si relatiile cauzale, care exista intre evenimente. in particular, e o confuzie intre abilitatea cauzala a anumitor evenimente de a produce credinte non-inferentiale in anumite organisme programate adecvat si o justificare pentru a detine acele credinte. Brandom e de acord cu Sellars ca "intreaga constiinta este o problema lingvistica". Potrivit acestei conceptii, creaturile care nu sunt programate sa foloseasca limbajul, cum ar fi cainii si copiii mici, reactioneaza la stimuli, dar nu sunt constienti de caracteristicile lucrurilor asa cum nici termostatele nu sunt constiente de caldura si frig. Prin urmare, exista doua motive pentru care practicile lingvistice ale comunitatii nu pot fi ignorate folosind simturile pentru a descoperi cum sunt lucrurile cu adevarat. Primul este acela ca: toate relatarile non-inferentiale bazate pe perceptie ("acesta este rosu", "asta este dezgustator", "acesta este Trupul lui Cristos") sunt facute in limbajul unei comunitati sau al alteia, un limbaj adaptat la nevoile acelei comunitati. Al doilea: comunitatea nu acorda autoritate acestor relatari in virtutea faptului ca ea crede intr-o relatie speciala intre realitate si organele de simt umane, ci pentru ca are dovezi empirice ca astfel de relatari sunt demne de incredere. Aceasta inseamna ca atunci cand cineva raporteaza ca a experimentat un obiect, dar comunitatea nu are nici un motiv sa-l considere un raportor demn de incredere cu privire la acel obiect, apelul sau la experienta da gres. Daca as afirma, contrar opiniei populare, ca patratele rotunde sunt posibile, pentru ca am vazut de fapt cateva astfel de patrate, nimeni nu m-ar lua in serios. Acelasi lucru s-ar intampla daca as iesi afara din padure pretinzand ca am localizat un unicorn. Daca as spune ca l-am experimentat pe "Dumnezeu", aceasta afirmatie ar avea sanse sa fie luata in serios, depinde ce intrebuintari ale termenului "Dumnezeu" sunt curente in comunitatea mea. Daca as explica unei 9

audiente crestine ca observatia personala mi-a dovedit ca Dumnezeu este, contrar opiniei populare, femeie, acea audienta ar rade. Daca as spune unei audiente politeiste ca un anumit zeu a vorbit cu mine si m-a informat ca el este unicul zeu adevarat, m-as expune probabil ridicolului. Dar daca as spune unei audiente hinduse ca am avut o viziune a lui Hanuman facand exact acel gen de lucruri care sunt tipice pentru Hanuman, sau unei audiente catolice ca l-am vazut pe Isus cel inviat in Duminica de Paste, la rasarit, se prea poate sa fiu privit cu respect si invidie. Pe scurt, relatarile despre Dumnezeu trebuie sa corespunda asteptarilor anterioare, intocmai cum corespund relatarile despre obiectele fizice. Ele nu pot, de unele singure, sa fie folosite pentru a respinge acele asteptari. Ele sunt folositoare in acest scop numai cand fac parte dintr-o initiativa cultural-politica matura, comuna. Asta se intampla atunci cand o noua religie sau biserica o inlocuieste pe una veche. Nu doar relatarile discipolilor despre un mormant gol sunt cele care au facut Europa sa creada ca Dumnezeu s-a incarnat in Cristos. Dar in contextul strategiei de relatii generale cu publicul ale Sf. Paul, acele relatari au avut efectul lor. in mod analog, nu relatarea lui Galilei despre puncte care se misca de-a lungul planetei Jupiter, determinate probabil de tranzitul lunii, este cea care a rasturnat autoritatea cosmologiei aristoteliciano-ptolemaice. Dar in contextul intiativei avute de tovarasii sai, politicienii culturali copernicani, acea relatare a avut o importanta considerabila. Pot rezuma ceea ce am spus despre apelurile la experienta dupa cum urmeaza: experienta nu ne ofera nici o modalitate de a delimita intre intrebarea despre ce ar trebui sa vorbim, intrebare ce tine de politica culturala, si intrebarea despre ceea ce exista realmente. Caci ceea ce conteaza ca relatare exacta a experientei este o problema ce tine de competenta comunitatii. Apelul empirismului la experienta este la fel de ineficient ca apelurile la Cuvantul lui Dumnezeu, daca nu este sustinut de o predispozitie din partea comunitatii de a lua in serios aceste apeluri. Prin urmare, experienta nu ne poate servi drept tribunal care sa judece disputele dintre politicienii culturali aflati in razboi. 5. Existenta lui Dumnezeu si existenta constiintei Pot sa fac putin mai vie ideea mea despre irelevanta experientei religioase pentru existenta lui Dumnezeu, comparandu-l pe Dumnezeul monoteismului ortodox occidental cu constiinta, asa cum este ea inteleasa de catre dualistii cartezieni. intr-un sens nefilosofic al termenului "constiinta", existenta constiintei este indiscutabila. Oamenilor care tocmai au lesinat dupa ce au fost loviti in cap sau celor care sunt in coma, le lipseste constiinta. in orice caz, asa cum este de altfel normal, oamenii sunt constienti atata timp cat se plimba si vorbesc. Dar exista un sens filosofic special al termenului "constiinta", in care insasi existenta constiintei este disputata. in acest sens, cuvantul "constiinta" se refera la ceva a carui absenta este pe deplin compatibila cu plimbatul si vorbitul. Este ceea ce le lipseste zombilor si ceea ce noi restul avem. Zombii se comporta exact ca oamenii normali, dar nu au viata interioara. Beculetul din creierele lor, sa spunem asa, nu se aprinde niciodata. Ei nu simt nimic, desi pot sa raspunda la intrebari despre cum se simt, in moduri conventionale, moduri care si-au dobandit locul pe care-l au in jocul de limbaj, in virtutea corelatiilor dintre rostirea lui "Doare", de exemplu, si atingerea unor sobe fierbinti, sau intepatura de ace si altele asemenea. A vorbi cu un zombi e la fel cu a vorbi cu oricine altcineva, de vreme ce lipsa de viata interioara a unui zombi nu se manifesta niciodata printr-un semn exterior si vizibil. De aceea, daca nu cumva neurologia va descoperi intr-o buna zi secretul starii de non-zombi, nu vom sti niciodata daca fiintele cele mai apropiate si mai dragi noua ne impartasesc sentimentele sau sunt simple masini. Filosofii si-au petrecut zeci de ani certandu-se cu privire la intrebarea daca acest sentiment de "constiinta" si acest sentiment de "zombi" au vreun sens. Problema in discutie este: se poate ca un termen descriptiv sa aiba sens in cazul in care aplicarea lui nu e reglementata de nici un criteriu public. Wittgenstein a considerat ca raspunsul la aceasta intrebare este "nu". Acest raspuns negativ este rezultatul urmatorului argument: Sa presupunem ca fiecare ar avea o cutie cu ceva in ea: numim acel ceva 'ganganie'. Nimeni nu se poate uita in cutia altcuiva si fiecare spune ca stie ce este o ganganie numai uitandu-se la gangania sa. 10

Ar fi posibil ca fiecare sa aiba ceva diferit in cutia sa. Ne-am putea chiar imagina ca acest lucru se schimba permanent. - Dar sa presupunem ca termenul de 'ganganie' are o intrebuintare in limbajul acestor oameni. - Daca e asa, atunci el n-ar fi folosit drept nume al unui lucru. Lucrul din cutie nu are nici un loc in jocul de limbaj; nici macar drept ceva: caci cutia s-ar putea chiar sa fie goala. - Nimeni nu poate 'opera o clasificare' cu ajutorul lucrului din cutie, el se anuleaza, orice ar fi. (Philosophical Investigations, I, sec. 293) Corespondentii acestor ganganii private sunt ceea ce filosofii, care cred in posibilitatea zombilor numesc "senzatii vii" sau "qualii" - acel tip de lucruri care ne arata 'cum e sa... [de exemplu, sa suferi, sa vezi ceva rosu]. Acesti filosofi cred ca stim cu totii cum e sa suferim, dar, zombii, in ciuda marturisirilor lor sincere, nu stiu. Wittgenstein ar spune ca termenul "suferinta" are un sens doar atata timp cat filosofii nu-l trateaza ca pe numele a ceva a carui prezenta sau absenta oscileaza independent de orice diferenta de mediu sau comportament. Potrivit acestei conceptii, filosofii care cred in "qualii" si care deplang expresiile de genul "cum e sa suferi" recomanda un nou joc de limbaj. in acest joc specific filosofic, folosim expresii a caror unica functie este aceea de a ne ajuta sa separam durerea de comportamentul in caz de durere. Le folosim pentru a distinge comportamentul exterior si corespondentii sai neurologici de ceva care nu e nici o stare a corpului si nici una a sistemului nervos. Pentru Wittgenstein jucarea acestui joc nu are nici un rost. Prin urmare, dupa cum afirma chiar el, suntem indreptatiti sa "operam clasificari" cu ajutorul qualiilor precum si cu al ganganiilor - deci sa le tratam, asa cum afirma Wittgenstein in alt pasaj, ca pe "o roata care se invarte desi nimic altceva nu se misca o data cu ea" si care, in consecinta, nu este "parte a mecanismului" (Philosophical Investigations I, sect. 271). Filosofii mintii, precum Daniel Dennett si Sellars, sunt de acord cu Wittgenstein in ceea ce priveste acest lucru. Dar acestia sunt criticati de filosofi care simpatizeaza mai mult cu Descartes: de exemplu, David Chalmers si Thomas Nagel. Pentru cei din urma existenta senzatiilor vii, a experientei "cum e sa...", este incontestabila. Ei resping doctrina impartasita de Sellars si Brandom, potrivit careia intreaga constiinta este o problema lingvistica. Exista, spun ei, constiinta despre mai mult decat putem exprima in cuvinte - limbajul poate indica lucruri pe care nu le poate descrie. A crede altfel inseamna a fi verificationist, iar verificationistii dau dovada de ceea ce Nagel considera a fi o lipsa indezirabila de "ambitie pentru transcendenta". Nagel scrie dupa cum urmeaza: "Numai un verificationist dogmatic ar nega posibilitatea alcatuirii unor concepte a caror raza de actiune sa se extinda dincolo de capacitatea noastra actuala de a la aplica. telul de a ajunge la o conceptie despre lume care sa nu ne aseze in nici un fel in centru [s.n.] solicita alcatuirea unor astfel de concepte" (The View from Nowhere, p. 24). Desigur ca doctrina lui Brandom despre prioritatea ontologica a socialului n-ar fi adoptata decat de catre cineva care nu are nici cel mai mic interes sa "ajunga la o conceptie despre lume care sa nu ne aseze in nici un fel in centru". Lui Brandom, Sellars si Wittgenstein le lipseste pur si simplu "ambitia pentru transcendenta" pe care Nagel, semanand in aceasta privinta cu teologii ortodocsi ai monoteismului occidental, considera ca e dezirabil sa o avem. Acesti teologi, in graba lor de a-l face pe Dumnezeu transcendent, l-au separat de lucrurile acestei lumi, descriindu-l ca fiind fara parti sau pasiuni, non-spatio-temporal si, prin urmare, incomparabil in orice privinta cu creaturile sale. Ei au mers mai departe, sustinand ca incomensurabilitatea lui Dumnezeu este compatibila totusi cu faptul ca el ni se face cunoscut prin experienta. Nagel si cei care doresc sa pastreze notiunea filosofica speciala de constiinta, ca acel lucru care le lipseste zombilor, procedeaza la fel. Ei incearca sa confere sens unui termen descriptiv, printr-o serie de negatii, sustinand in acelasi timp ca faptul ca constiinta nu se compara cu nimic altceva din univers este compatibil cu faptul ca noi suntem direct si incorigibil constienti ca nu suntem zombi. Atat cei care vor sa foloseasca termenul de "Dumnezeu" in modul in care il foloseste teologia ortodoxa, cat si cei care vor sa foloseasca termenul de "constiinta" asa cum il folosesc Chalmers si Nagel, pretind ca adversarii lor neaga evidenta. Multi teologi ortodocsi au afirmat ca negarea existentei lui Dumnezeu sfideaza experienta comuna a umanitatii. Nagel considera ca unele conceptii filosofice ca cea a lui Dennett "izvorasc dintr-un sentiment insuficient de puternic al realitatii si al independentei sale de orice forma particulara de intelegere umana". Multi credinciosi religiosi considera ca e necesara o doza considerabila de perversitate numai pentru a ne inchipui ca suntem atei. imi imaginez 11

ca Nagel crede ca e necesara o perversitate similara pentru a putea deveni un nominalist psihologic sellarsian, sau pentru a slabi sentimentul realitatii pana intr-atat incat sa incepem in mod serios sa sprijinim prioritatea ontologica a socialului. Morala pe care vreau s-o trag din analogia dintre Dumnezeu si constiinta este aceea ca existenta oricareia dintre cele doua entitati nu e o problema pe care apelurile la experienta sa o poata rezolva vreodata asa cum apelul la experienta nu ne poate ajuta sa stabilim daca mariajul intre caste sau rase este sau nu, in mod intrinsec dezgustator. Politica culturala poate crea o societate pentru care acesta din urma sa fie intr-adevar respingator, iar o politica culturala diferita poate crea una pentru care aceste mariaje sa fie ireprosabile. Nu exista nici o modalitate de a demonstra ca credinta in Dumnezeu sau in qualii este mai mult sau mai putin 'fireasca' decat necredinta, asa cum nu exista nici o modalitate de a ne da seama daca sentimentul apartenentei la o casta sau la o rasa este mai mult sau mai putin 'firesc' decat indiferenta totala fata de legaturile de sange. Ceea ce o parte a argumentului numeste "firesc", cealalta e gata sa numeasca "primitiv". in mod similar, politica culturala de tipul celei duse in Europa de la Iluminism incoace poate diminua sau creste alternativ evidenta existentei lui Dumnezeu si frecventa relatarilor despre experimentarea prezentei lui Dumnezeu. Politica culturala de tipul celei duse in cadrul departamentului de filosofie poate diminua sau creste numarul absolventilor pentru care e evident ca exista un astfel de lucru precum "cum e sa suferi" si la fel de evident ca unele fiinte umane ar putea fi zombi. Exista departamente care urmeaza tendinta Dennett si departamente care urmeaza tendinta Chalmers, iar dezacordul dintre ele nu e mai pasibil de adjudecare neutra decat este dezacordul dintre atei si teisti . A spune ca politica culturala are ultimul cuvant asupra acestor probleme inseamna a spune, inca o data, ca intrebarile "Ar trebui oare sa vorbim despre Dumnezeu?", "Ar trebui oare sa speculam despre zombi?", "Ar trebui sa vorbim despre carei rase ii apartin oamenii?" nu sunt posterioare intrebarilor "Exista oare Dumnezeu?", "Exista oare lucruri precum rase distincte in cadrul speciei umane?" si "S-ar putea oare ca unele dintre fiintele din aceasta incapere sa fie zombi?" Ele sunt aceleasi intrebari, caci orice consideratie relevanta pentru intrebarea cultural-politica este in egala masura relevanta pentru intrebarea ontologica si vice versa.

6. Brandom despre natura existentei Conceptia pe care i-am atribuit-o lui Brandom ne-ar putea face sa credem ca recunoasterea prioritatii ontologice a socialului atrage dupa sine posibilitatea ca existenta sa fie atribuita oricarui lucru despre care societatea gaseste ca e convenabil sa vorbeasca. insa acest lucru pare ridicol de contra-intuitiv. Chiar daca societatea ar intoarce spatele discutiei despre casta sau despre Dumnezeu, cu greu ar putea intoarce spatele discutiei despre stele si animale, dureri si placeri, adevar si fals - tuturor problemelor necontroversate despre care oamenii au vorbit intotdeauna si peste tot. Exista, dupa cum ar spune criticii prioritatii ontologice a socialului, limite ale capacitatii de a atribui si priva lucrurile de existenta. Brandom, James si Sellars ar fi de accord cu aceasta, dar ei ar sublinia ca e important sa specificam intocmai ce consideratii stabilesc aceste limite. Ele sunt, dupa cum cred ca ar spune Brandom, de trei feluri: (1) limite transcendentale stabilite de nevoia de a vorbi despre ceva - de a face referire la obiecte, lucruri pe care le putem reprezenta bine sau rau, si nu de a produce zgomote carora le lipseste intentionalitatea, chiar daca ele pot schimba comportamentul; (2) limite practice, stabilite de nevoia transculturala pe care o au toate fiintele umane de a distinge intre, de exemplu, substantele otravitoare si cele hranitoare, sus si jos, fiinte umane si bestii, adevarat si fals, barbat si femeie, durere si placere, dreapta si stanga; (3) limite culturale stabilite de deciziile noastre sociale anterioare - de normele in vigoare ale unei anumite societati. Brandom argumenteaza in favoarea existentei primului tip de limite afirmand ca nici o societate nu poate beneficia prea mult de limbaj, daca nu poseda notiunea de "a fi despre". Valoarea practica a discutiei despre obiecte este aceea ca limbajul nostru contine termeni singulari, care sunt folositi 12

pentru a ne referi la lucruri asupra carora putem gresi, si ca toti suntem supusi erorii in anumite privinte. Din contra, pentru cei mai multi dintre filosofii pe care Brandom ii numeste "reprezentationalisti", conceptul de 'obiect' si mai cu seama cel de 'obiect existent, non-fictiv', este primitiv si inexplicabil. Reprezentationalistii considera ca trebuie sa le intelegem pe amandoua pentru a ne face o idee despre ce ar putea fi limbajul, mintea sau rationalitatea. Caci toate aceste notiuni trebuie intelese prin prisma notiunii de reprezentare exacta a obiectelor existente. Dimpotriva, argumentul lui Brandom este ca aceasta din urma notiune e intr-adevar esentiala, dar ca e mai degraba derivata decat primitiva. Cele cu adevarat primitive sunt cele care fac posibila aplicarea normelor sociale. Iata descrierea pe care Brandom o face rolului jucat de distincta reprezentationalist-inferentialist in istoria filosofiei moderne: Aceasta strategie semantica explicativa, pentru care inferenta este conceptul de baza, e in opozitiei cu alta care a fost dominanta de la Iluminism incoace, pentru care reprezentarea este conceptul de baza. Strategiile semantice teoretice complementare ale reprezentationalismului si inferentialismului sunt constranse de aceeasi pereche de obligatii explicative generale sa explice conceptul tratat drept primitiv si sa ofere o descriere a altor concepte semantice prin prisma celui primitiv... De vreme ce aici e urmarit programul inferentialist, proprietatile inferentei care servesc drept primitive semantice sunt explicate in pragmatica; ele sunt implicite in practicile oferirii si solicitarii de argumente. Pentru inferentialisti, provocarea explicativa majora este mai degraba aceea de a explica dimensiunea reprezentationala a continutului semantic - de a interpreta relatiile referentiale prin prisma relatiilor inferentiale. (Making it Explicit, p. xvi) incercarea lui Brandom de a inversa ordinea reprezentationalista traditionala a explicatiei il conduce spre intrebarea neasteptata: "De ce exista obiecte de reprezentat?" El raspunde la aceasta intrebare oferind o deductie transcendentala a nevoii de a desfasura termeni singulari in cazul in care vrem sa existe o inferenta care sa faca uz in mod constient si explicit de notiuni logice ca "este identic cu", "tot", "niste" si "nu" (Vezi pg. 382-383 din Making it Explicit pentru concluzia acestei deductii). El ofera o demonstratie similara a nevoii de a considera ca acesti termeni se refera la obiecte in legatura cu care putem avea dreptate sau putem gresi (Vezi p. 592 ff). A proceda in maniera lui Brandom e echivalent cu a renunta la vechea intrebare sceptica, reprezentationalista "Cum reuseste mintea umana obtina reprezentari exacte ale realitatii?" in favoarea unor intrebari ca "De ce are nevoie comunitatea umana de notiunea de reprezentare exacta a obiectelor? De ce s-a pus problema intrarii in contact cu realitatea? Cum de am ajuns sa vedem un astfel de gol intre subiect si obiect ca cel descris de sceptic? Cum de am ajuns in pozitia in care indoieli sceptice ca cele ale lui Descartes par plauzibile?" Pentru scopul lucrarii de fata este important sa subliniez analogiile dintre aceasta schimbare a intrebarilor si trecerea de la o conceptie despre lume teista la una umanista. in secolele recente, in loc sa se intrebe daca Dumnezeu exista, oamenii au ales sa se intrebe daca e o idee buna sa continuam sa vorbim despre el si ce scopuri umane ar putea fi servite procedand astfel - pe scurt, sa se intrebe la ce le-ar putea fi de folos Dumnezeu fiintelor umane. Brandom sugereaza ca filosofii, in loc sa se intrebe daca suntem realmente in contact cu obiecte "exterioare mintii" - obiecte care sunt ceea ce sunt indiferent de ceea ce credem noi despre ele - ar trebui sa se intrebe ce scopuri umane sunt servite atunci cand se vorbeste despre aceste obiecte. Ar trebui sa reflectam asupra problemei daca discutia despre ele a fost o idee buna. Pe parcursul cartii sale, el argumenteaza nu numai ca a fost o idee buna, dar si ca a fost indispensabila din punct de vedere pragmatic. Caci daca n-am fi vorbit niciodata despre astfel de obiecte, n-am fi avut niciodata prea multe de spus. Limbajul nostru nu s-ar fi dezvoltat dincolo de un schimb de mormaieli intamplator eficace. Discutia despre obiecte independente de minte a fost valoroasa deoarece le-a ajutat pe antropoide sa devina umane, si nu pentru ca fiintele umane s-ar fi trezit la obligatia lor de a reprezenta exact astfel de obiecte - obligatia lor fata de "Adevar". Astfel, "pierderea lumii", pe care idealismul nu pare sa o fi putut evita, nu constituie o problema pentru inferentialismul lui Brandom, de vreme ce "... obiectivitatea este un aspect structural al formei social-perspectivale a continuturilor conceptuale. Distinctia permanenta dintre cum sunt lucrurile si cum sunt ele considerate de catre un interlocutor este inerenta articularii social-inferentiale a 13

conceptelor" (Making it Explicit, p. 597). Totusi, Brandom nu este chiar un "realist", caci acea distinctie este permanenta doar atata timp cat noi, fiintele umane, ne comportam asa cum o facem - si anume, in mod intelept. De aceea putem afirma ca "faptul ca avem proprietati fizice" coincide cu "faptul ca parem sa avem astfel de proprietati" (p. 292). in ordinea cauzala, ce poate fi reprezentata in mod exact o data ce fiintele umane initiaza practica distingerii intre cauze si efecte, lumea devine mai importanta decat practicile. Totusi, spatiul, timpul, substanta si cauzalitatea sunt ceea ce sunt deoarece fiintele umane trebuie sa vorbeasca in anumite moduri pentru a realiza anumite lucruri. Brandom substituie inexplicabila alcatuire transcendentala a mintii, proprie lui Kant, cu practici care au ajutat anumite specii biologice sa infloreasca. Brandom indica adesea analogii intre inferentialismul sau si cel al lui Spinoza. Dar exista desigur si numeroase nepotriviri. Acestea provin din faptul ca sarcina filosofiei era aceea de a-l uni pe om cu Dumnezeu - de a construi un pod peste prapastia dintre finit si infinit, aratand cum fiintele umane traiesc, se misca si isi au fiinta in Dumnezeu. Brandom considera ca rostul filosofiei este sa construiasca un pod peste abisul pe care reprezentationalismul l-a sapat intre fiintele umane si obiecte, abisul spre care scepticul epistemologic ne directioneaza constant atentia. Atat Brandom cat si Spinoza sunt holisti, insa intregul lui Brandom, asemeni celui al lui Hegel, este conversatia continua a omenirii, o conversatie supusa intotdeauna contingentelor care chinuie existenta finita. intregul lui Spinoza este o fiinta atemporala care poate fi obiectul a ceea ce el a numit scientia intuitiva, acel tip de cunoastere directa care face superflua orice alta conversatie, orice alta cercetare si orice alta utilizare a limbajului. Aceasta diferenta dintre Brandom si Spinoza incapsuleaza diferenta dintre filosofii pentru care procesul de cercetare nu are vreun final, si nici o alta curte de apel in afara descendentilor nostri, si cei care considera ca politica culturala nu poate avea ultimul cuvant - ca trebuie sa existe ceea ce Platon sperase, si anume, o modalitate de a ne ridica deasupra capriciilor contingente ale conversatiei la o viziune care transcende politica. Pentru Brandom, cercetarea filosofica a priori a ceea ce exista este epuizata o data ce s-a raspuns la intrebarea "De ce exista obiecte?" Oferirea unui argument transcendental pentru existenta obiectelor epuizeaza capacitatea filosofiei de a ne spune ce trebuie sa existe. Nu mai exista nici o disciplina numita "ontologie" care sa ne spuna ce termeni singulari trebuie sa avem in limbaj - daca avem sau nu nevoie de Dumnezeu, de exemplu. Discutia explicita a lui Brandom despre cercetarea ontologica este limitata la un excursus destul de scurt in mijlocul capitolului sapte al lucrarii Making it Explicit (pp. 440 ff). El incepe prin a fi de acord cu Kant ca existenta nu este un predicat, insa modul in care face acest lucru este foarte diferit de cel al lui Kant. Kant distinge intre notiuni "logice" ca "lucru" si "este identic cu", care se aplica atat fenomenalului cat si noumenalului, si categorii ale comprehensiunii ca "substanta" si "cauza", care se aplica doar celui dintai. Brandom considera ca atat Kant cat si Frege, ulterior, au gresit considerand "lucrul" si "obiectul" drept ceea ce el numeste "genuri veritabile", si considerand identitatea o proprietate care poate fi atribuita lucrurilor fara a specifica genul careia acestea ii apartin. Aceste erori fac plauzibila ideea rea ca lucrurile ne sunt date in doua feluri - existente si non-existente - si sugereaza astfel ca se cuvine sa putem spune ce au in comun toate cele existente. Ele incurajeaza, de asemenea, conceptia potrivit careia propozitia "totul este identic cu sine" este mai mult decat a spus Wittgenstein ca este - un splendid exemplu de enunt complet inutil (Philosophical Investigations, I, paragraful 216). Pentru a ne debarasa de aceste credinte rele, Brandom crede ca trebuie sa consideram cuvantul "lucru" ca fiind intotdeauna o prescurtare pentru "lucru de un anumit gen" si "identic cu" ca fiind intotdeauna o prescurtare pentri "identic in privinta... cu". El e de parere ca Frege ar fi trebuit sa considere ca cuantificatorii ne sunt dati cu restrictii de gen asupra substituentilor de termeni admisibili. "Caci", asa cum spune el, "cuantificatorii cuantifica, ei specifica, cel putin in termeni generali, cati sunt dependenti (asa cum indica remarcile lui Frege despre jocul de carti [remarci in care Frege afirma ca e important daca sunt numarate pachetele, cartile sau onoarea]) de ceea ce este numarat - de genul folosit pentru a-i identifica si individualiza" (Making it Explicit, p. 439). Discutia lui Kant despre existenta ia de la sine inteles faptul ca aceasta ne este data in doua moduri modul generic, in care atat creioanele cat si Dumnezeu au existenta si modul fenomenal, in care numai creioanele si ceilalti locuitori ai spatiului si timpului au existenta. Pentru Brandom existenta ne este data in multe moduri, atat de multe cate seturi de designatori canonici exista. Pentru el, un angajament 14

existential - o credinta ca ceva cu o anumita descriere exista - este "un anumit angajament cuantificational in care angajamentele justificatoare care-i determina continutul sunt restranse la designatori canonici" (p. 443). Cel mai bun mod de a intelege ce vrea sa spuna Brandom prin "designatori canonici" este sa luam in considerare cazul paradigmatic - "descrierile spatio-temporale egocentrice coordonate" (p. 445). Acesti designatori sunt descrierile locatiilor spatio-temporale intr-un grafic al carui punct de plecare este locul in care se afla acum vorbitorul. A spune ca un obiect fizic exista, inseamna a spune ca obiectul in cauza ocupa unul dintre acele puncte - ca ocupa o adresa specificata cu referire la coordonatele acelui grafic. in mod analog, a spune ca un obiect are existenta, insa nu fizica ci "in povestirile lui Sherlock Holmes" inseamna a alege ca set de designatori canonici toate si numai descrieri de persoane mentionate in acele povestiri, sau care pot fi deduse din ceea ce se spune in acele povestiri. Atunci cand spunem ca sotia domnului Watson exista dar cea a lui Holmes nu, intelegem prin aceasta ca o persoana mentionata in povestiri poate fi identificata cu cea dintai, dar ca nici o persoana nu poate fi mentionata in cazul celei din urma. Iarasi, a spune ca exista un numar prim intre 21 si 25, dar ca nu exista nici un numar prim intre 48 si 50 inseamna a lua ca designatori canonici numerele naturale. Fiecare dintre aceste liste de designatori furnizeaza o lista exhaustiva (finita sau infinita) de entitati cu care un anumit lucru trebuie sa fie identic pentru a exista. Singurul tip de existenta pe care Kant credea ca-l putem discuta inteligibil, era existenta fizica, iar domeniul spatiului logic designatorii canonici sunt, intr-adevar aceiasi pe care i-a ales Kant - nisele din graficul spatio-temporal. in sistemul lui Kant, Dumnezeu locuieste in spatiul logic dar nu si in spatiul empiric, fizic. Prin urmare, Kant credea ca intrebarea referitoare la existenta lui Dumnezeu este dincolo de cunoasterea noastra, caci cunoasterea existentei este co-extensiva cu cunoasterea existentei fizice. insa, intr-un fel, el merge mai departe si spune ca ne putem ocupa de aceasta intrebare cu ajutorul "ratiunii pure practice". Oricum, pentru Brandom problema este mai complicata. Avem o multime de spatii loogice la dispozitia noastra (si, fara indoiala, o multime pe cale sa apara) si putem dezbate existenta in oricare dintre ele. Avem la fel de multe astfel de spatii cate succesiuni infinite sau liste finite de designatori canonici. Putem, de exemplu, sa tratam Sfanta Scriptura a unei traditii religioase date, asa cum tratam povestirile cu Holmes - ca furnizandu-ne designatori canonici ce ne permit sa confirmam sau sa infirmam existenta obiectelor, desi nu si pe cea a obiectelor fizice. Kant a crezut pe buna dreptate nu exista nici un motiv pentru care existenta trebuie sa fie fizica (caci nici cea a numerelor prime si nici cea a clubului Baker Street Irregulars, nu este) insa a gresit crezand ca cunoasterea existentei este limitata la cunoasterea existentei fizice. Asta deoarece intrebarea daca nu cumva a vorbi despre existenta fiintelor imateriale si infinite nu este o problema de domeniul filosofiei transcendentale, ci mai degraba una care trebuie sa treaca in competenta politicii culturale. Un reprezentationalist optimist asemeni lui Nagel si-ar putea imagina ca suntem inconjurati de fapte posibil incognoscibile - obiecte pentru care nu vom avea niciodata cuvinte care sa intre in relatii pe care s-ar putea sa nu le intelegem niciodata - iar un reprezentationalist pesimist asemeni lui Kant ar putea obiecta. insa pentru un inferentialist, ceea ce conteaza ca obiect este determinat de acel ceva pentru care o cultura are o descriere clara, iar disputa despre ceea ce exista este determinata de catre designatorii canonici in vigoare. Cu toate acestea, orice cultura poate fi depasita de catre o alta, de vreme ce imaginatia umana poate inchipui multe alte descrieri clare si la fel de multe liste de designatori canonici. Nu exista limite "naturale", transculturale ale acestui proces de autotranscendere si nici nu putem vorbi de un tel predeterminat al acestuia. Cand o cultura vrea sa infiinteze un spatiu logic care sa includa, sa spunem, zeii si zeitele panteonului olimpic, nimic nu-i sta in cale, asa cum nimic nu i-a stat in cale lui Conan Doyle cand a creat lista designatorilor canonici holmesieni. A intreba, intr-o astfel de cultura daca "Exista realmente zei si zeite?" e echivalent cu a intreba daca "Exista realmente numere naturale?" sau daca "Exista realmente obiecte fizice?" Persoana care pune o astfel de intrebare trebuie sa aiba un bun motiv pentru a face asta. in cele din urma, un astfel de motiv bun se va dovedi a fi pretentia ca cultura ar fi intr-o forma mai buna daca s-ar renunta la dezbaterea lucrului cu pricina, daca intrebarile referitoare la existenta unor astfel de lucruri n-ar mai fi luate in serios. Cineva care are indoieli cu privire la zeii olimpici ar putea proceda astfel pentru ca, de exemplu, are sa ne recomande un alt panteon (pe cel egiptean, de 15

exemplu) sau pentru ca crede ca cultura sa ar duce-o mai bine fara nici un panteon. Repet, ontologia se va reduce la politica culturala. 7. Doua distinctii rele: literal-simbolic si sens-non-sens Conceptia lui Brandom poate fi lamurita comparand-o cu afirmatia facuta de Tillich si alti teologi crestini, potrivit careia, de vreme ce Dumnezeu e Fiinta-ca-atare, si nu o fiinta printre altele, incercarea de a-l identifica cu ajutorul unei liste deja disponibile de designatori canonici - este lipsita de speranta. Tillich a concluzionat ca intrebarea "Exista oare Dumnezeu?" este una rea - la fel de rea, ca sa revenim la analogia pe care am expus-o mai devreme, ca intrebarea "Exista relamente ceva de genul cum e sa fi constient?" sau "Sunt numerele realmente reale?" Nu exista nici o problema legata de conferirea unui loc intr-un joc de limbaj vreuneia din cele doua notiuni "cum e sa fii constient" sau "Dumnezeu, o fiinta fara parti sau pasiuni". Am avut nenumarate experiente privind cum sunt jucate ambele jocuri. insa in nici unul din cazuri nu are sens sa punem intrebari despre existenta, deoarece nu exista nici un spatiu logic neutru in care sa poata continua discutia dintre oameni inclinati sa nege si oameni inclinati sa afirme existenta entitatii in cauza. intrebarile metafizice ca "Exista oare Dumnezeu?" si "Este oare lumea spatio-temporala reala?" nu pot fi dezbatute deoarece nu exista nici o lista de designatori canonici "neutri" cu referire la care sa se poata raspunde la ele. De aceea "lucrul existent", un gen universal ca opus unuia regional, este doar un pseudo-gen. insasi ideea de gen universal este incoerenta, caci a fi un gen inseamna a fi insotit de un set de designatori canonici. Daca discutia despre existenta lui Dumnezeu sau realitatea lumii simtului comun ar fi fost discutabile (intr-un mod care nu se reduce la politica culturala), ar fi trebuit ca, intr-un fel, sa-l transcendem atat pe Dumnezeu cat si lumea, pentru a le vedea pe un fundal "neutru". Faptul ca "Exista oare Dumnezeu?" este o intrebare rea ne sugereaza ca o intrebare mai buna ar fi urmatoarea: vrem sa tratam una sau mai multe dintre diferitele traditii religioase (cu panteonurile aferente) drept un joc de limbaj ce trebuie tesut impreuna cu deliberarea noastra asupra dilemelor morale, cu cele mai profunde sperante ale noastre si cu nevoia noastra de a scapa de disperare? Alternativ: ne furnizeaza oare una sau mai multe dintre aceste traditii religioase limbajul pe care vrem sa-l folosim cand ne alcatuim imaginea-de-sine, determinand ce este cel mai important pentru noi? in cazul in care nu vrem sa folosim acel limbaj, vom trata acea traditie si panteonul ei ca oferindu-ne mai degraba o "mitologie" decat o religie. insa in cadrul acelei mitologii, la fel ca in cadrul povestirilor cu Holmes, va exista adevar si fals - adevar literal si fals - cu privire la pretentiile la existenta. Va fi adevarat, de exemplu, ca exista un copil al lui Zeus si Semele, dar fals ca exista un copil al lui Uranus si al Afroditei, adevarat ca exista a treia Persoana a Divinitatii, dar fals ca exista a treisprezecea. Decizia noastra in ceea ce priveste daca sa tratam traditia religioasa in care am fost crescuti ca religie sau ca mitologie va depinde de multi alti factori - de exemplu, daca continuam sa credem ca rugaciunea si adoratia vor influenta ceea ce ni se intampla, sau daca ajungem sa credem ca tehnologia va face mare parte din ceea ce credinciosii religiosi cred ca doar Providenta divina ar putea realiza. Dar nu exista nici un criteriu pentru a stabili cand e rational si cand e irational sa facem trecerea de la o conceptie despre traditie ca "mit" la o conceptie ca "religie" sau vice versa. Deciziile cu privire la ce jocuri de limbaj sa jucam, despre ce sa vorbim si despre ce sa nu vorbim, si in ce scopuri, nu se iau pe baza unor criterii asupra carora s-a ajuns la un acord. Politica culturala este activitatea umana cel mai putin guvernata de norme. Asta pentru ca ea este partea de revolta a generatiilor si, astfel, punctul culminant al culturii - locul in care traditiile, listele de designatori canonici si normele sunt disponibile toate. Marele teolog protestant Paul Tillich credea ca intr-o cultura occidentala post-iluminista, viziunea unei utopii social democrate a inceput sa joace rolul lui Dumnezeu. Ea a inceput sa fie simbolul grijii fundamentale pentru intelectualii ai caror stramosi il distribuisera pe Isus Cristos in acest rol. Tillich a oferit diverse argumente pentru a demonstra ca acea viziune era un simbol inadecvat, insa toate argumentele sale sunt de tipul celor neguvernate de criterii, pe care le-am incadrat sub titlul de "politica culturala". Aceste argumente au sustinut ca in cele din urma, fara simboluri specific religioase ale grijii fundamentale - simboluri de genul celor fara de care Iluminismul a crezut ca ne putem descurca foarte bine - vom fi condusi spre disperare. Potrivit acestor argumente, o persoana pentru care 16

ceea ce este important e schitat in termeni pur seculari, va avea mai putin succes in a dobandi ceea ce Tillich a numit "curajul de a fi" decat cei care folosesc termeni crestini. "A gasi un simbol adecvat pentru grija fundamentala" nu reprezinta o imbunatatire a unor expresii demodate ca "a gasi un sens in viata", "a formula o imagine-de-sine satisfacatoare" sau "a descoperi ce este Binele". De fapt, este chiar o idee mai rau decat acestea, deoarece se bazeaza pe o distinctie intre simbolic si literal, care este o relicva a filosofiei reprezentationaliste. Tillich considera ca credintele stiintifice sau de simt comun ar putea avea adevar literal, dar ca cele religioase n-ar putea avea decat adevar "simbolic". El credea asta pentru ca era convins ca cele dintai puteau fi considerate reprezentari precise ale realitatii, in timp ce notiunea de "acuratete" era nepotrivita pentru cele din urma. in orice caz, pentru un inferentialist brandomian distinctia literal-versus-simbolic nu are nici o utilitate. Singura distinctie relevanta pe care acesta o poate aproba este cea dintre spatiile logice alcatuite in anumite scopuri (de exemplu, cel al stiintei fizicii, cel al matematicii, cel al sahului) si alte spatii logice alcatuite in alte scopuri (de exemplu, cele furnizate de dialogurile platoniciene, povestirile cu Jataka, cu Holmes, Noul Testament crestin etc.). Dezbaterea cu privire la utilitatea acestor spatii logice si la dezirabilitatea sau indezirabilitatea unirii sau separarii lor unul de altul, este substanta politicii culturale. Din punctul de vedere comun lui Brandom si Hegel, stiinta naturii (sau, mai bine spus, discursul constituit prin unirea spatiului logic al simtului comun cotidian transcultural cu cel al stiintei moderne a naturii), nu prezinta nimic special, care s-o indreptateasca la termenul de "adevar literal". Acest termen provine din ideea kantiana rea, potrivit careia discursul despre obiecte fizice este cazul paradigmatic pentru emiterea pretentiilor de adevar, iar toate celelalte domenii ale discursului trebuie considerate "non-cognitive". Daca ne debarasam de aceasta idee, atunci ceea ce Nancy Frankenberry a numit "teologia formelor simbolice" nu va mai avea nici o utilitate pentru noi - incercarea (care provine cel putin de la Schleiermacher si Feuerbach) de a-i face loc lui Dumnezeu afirmand ca exista ceva de genul "adevarului simbolic" sau "adevarului imaginativ" sau "adevarului emotional" sau "adevarului metaforic" precum si a adevarului "literal" - nu va mai avea nici o utilitate pentru noi. Renuntarea la aceste notiuni ne conduce spre renuntarea la ideea ca Dumnezeu solicita sa se vorbeasca despre el intr-un mod special, deoarece este un tip special de fiinta. A spune ca Dumnezeu solicita sa se vorbeasca despre el intr-un anumit mod nu ne lamureste mai mult decat a spune ca numerele cardinale transfinite sau neutrinii solicita sa se vorbeasca despre ei intr-un anumit mod. De vreme ce n-am sti ce este oricare din aceste entitati daca n-am sti ca ele sunt entitatile despre care se vorbeste in aceste moduri, ideea ca ele "solicita" acest tratament este nefolositoare. Este ca si cum am lauda alegerea unei metafore de catre un poet pentru ca se potriveste perfect experientei noastre, care de altfel este indescriptibila. O astfel de lauda suna a gol pur si simplu pentru ca nu putem identifica experienta fara ajutorul metaforei. Este ca si cum, ca sa-l parafrazez pe Wittgenstein, am exclama incantati de faptul ca o figura geometrica plana se potriveste perfect in mediul sau inconjurator. La urma urmelor ce altceva ar putea face? Asemeni lui Wittgenstein, Brandom crede ca orice are un sens daca ii conferim unul. Mai consecvent decat Wittgenstein, el urmareste cu perseverenta aceasta idee, afirmand ca, orice ar fi filosofia, ea nu coincide cu identificarea nosensului (pace Kant, Tractatus, Carnap si unele pasaje prost concepute din Philosophical Investigations). Jocul de limbaj jucat de teologi cu termeni transcendentali, sau cu limbajul heideggerian, si cel jucat de filosofii mintii care vorbesc despre independenta qualiilor de comportament si mediu, sunt la fel de coerente ca cel jucat cu numere sau obiecte fizice. insa coerenta discutiei despre X nu garanteaza posibilitatea dezbaterii despre existenta lui X. Discutia despre numere este coerenta in mod ideal, insa aceasta coerenta nu ne ajuta sa dezbatem problema daca numeralele sunt nume pentru lucruri reale. Nici coerenta teologiei crestine nu ne ajuta sa dezbatem existenta lui Dumnezeu. ai asta nu e din cauza unei realitati ontologice privitoare la numere sau la Dumnezeu, ci din cauza unor realitati sociologice privitoare la indisponibilitatea unor norme care sa regleze dezbaterea. Filosoful preferat al lui Brandom este Hegel, iar in acest domeniu cea mai proeminenta diferenta dintre Kant si Hegel este aceea ca Hegel nu crede ca filosofia se poate ridica deasupra practicilor sociale ale timpului sau pentru a judeca dezirabilitatea cu referire la ceva care nu este la randu-i o practica sociala alternativa (trecuta sau viitoare, reala sau imaginara). Atat Hegel cat si Brandom 17

considera ca nu exista nici o norma care sa nu fie o norma a unei practici sociale. Prin urmare, cand sunt intrebati "Sunt aceste norme dezirabile?" sau "Este aceasta o practica sociala buna?" tot ceea ce ei pot face este sa intrebe la randul lor "Cu referire la ce practica sociala cuprinzatoare se presupune ca trebuie sa judecam dezirabilitatea?" sau, mai util, "Prin comparatie cu normele carei practici sociale alternative propuse?" La inceputul Introducerii in Fenomenologia spiritului, exista un pasaj care anticipeaza ceea ce a spus James in "The Will to Believe" despre W.K. Clifford, un filosof care a sustinut ca nu avem nici un drept sa credem in existenta lui Dumnezeu, data fiind lipsa unor dovezi relevante. James era de parere ca Clifford a fost gata sa sacrifice adevarul pentru a fi sigur ca nu va cadea niciodata prada erorii. Hegel a scris urmatoarele impotriva celor asemeni lui Clifford, care au trait inainte de acesta: "... daca grija de a cadea in eroare pune o neincredere in stiinta - stiinta care, fara asemenea scrupule, trece la lucrul insusi si cunoaste in mod efectiv -, nu trebuie trecut cu vederea nici de ce, invers, nu trebuie situata o neincredere in aceasta neincredere si trebuie avut de grija ca aceasta frica de eroare sa nu fie deja eroarea insasi. in fapt, aceasta teama presupune ceva, si anume ceva ca fiind adevar, si isi sprijina scurpulele si consecintele pe acest ceva, care el insusi ar trebui in prealabil examinat daca este adevar. Ea presupune, anume reprezentari despre cunoastere ca fiind un instrument sau mediu si presupune o deosebire a noastra de aceasta cunoastere; ea presupune anume ca absolutul sta intr-o parte, si ca cunoasterea, de partea cealalta, pentru sine si despartita de absolut, ar fi totusi ceva real; adica, altfel spus, ca cunoasterea, care fiind in afara absolutului este si in afara adevarului, este totusi adevarata; o pozitie prin care ceea ce se numeste frica de eroare se face mai curand cunoscuta ca fiind frica de adevar" . in locul cuvintelor "stiinta" si "cunoastere" din textul lui Hegel, banuiesc ca Brandom ar fi pus "conversatie". Acest lucru e sugerat de catre una dintre maximele care pot fi gasite in lucrarea Making it Explicit, o maxima care se numara de asemenea printre propozitiile mele favrite din acea carte: "Conversatia este cel mai mare bine pentru creaturile discursive" (p. 644). Daca am opera aceasta substituire, am putea interpreta pasajul de mai sus ca afirmand ca n-ar trebui sa credem ca exista o diferenta intre noi insine si practicile discursive in care suntem angajati si ca n-ar trebui sa consideram ca acele practici sunt mijloace in vederea unor scopuri, nici ca sunt un mijloc de reprezentare folosit pentru a intelege ceva corect. A fortiori, n-ar trebui sa credem ca exista un tel al cercetarii care este ceea ce este, indiferent de acele practici, si a carui cunoastere dinainte ne poate ajuta sa decidem ce practici sa avem. Ar trebui mai degraba sa ne multumim, asa cum ne sugereaza Hegel in alta parte, sa consideram filosofia drept timpul sau (adica, practicile noastre discursive prezente) prins in ganduri (adica, in opozitie cu practici alternative trecute sau viitoare). Ar trebui sa incetam sa situam practicile noastre discursive intr-un context mai larg, unul care sa formeze fundalul tuturor practicilor sociale posibile si care sa contina o lista de designatori canonici "neutri" care sa delimiteze odata pentru totdeauna domeniul existentului. Daca ar fi existat un astfel de context, el ar fi fost, desigur, obiectul adecvat de studiu al unei culturi experte insarcinate cu determinarea directiei viitoare a Conversatiei Umanitatii. insa nu exista un astfel de context. Prin urmare, ar trebui sa incetam sa ne mai imaginam ca o astfel de cultura experta ar fi dezirabila. 8. Religia publica si privata Am sustinut in aceasta lucrare ca ar trebui sa inlocuim intrebarea ontologica despre existenta lui Dumnezeu cu intrebarea referitoare la dezirabilitatea culturala a discutiei despre Dumnezeu. Dar am spus putine despre cum arata dezbaterea privitoare la cea dintai intrebare. Asa cum vad eu lucrurile, intrebarea daca sa continuam sa vorbim despre Dumnezeu, daca sa pastram deschis acel spatiu logic, trebuie sa fie impartita in doua intrebari secundare. Prima este o intrebare referitoare la dreptul individului de a fi religios, chiar daca nu e in stare sa-si justifice credintele sale religioase in fata celorlalti. Aceasta intrebare ar putea fi formulata la persoana intai astfel "Am oare dreptul sa practic 18

orice forma de devotament religios vreau, chiar daca nu pot sa-mi justific aceasta practica fata de semenii mei, deoarece nu exista nici o practica sociala care sa legitimizeze inferentele din sau la propozitiile de care ma folosesc in aceasta practica devotionala,?" Cred ca James a dat raspunsul corect la aceasta intrebare, si anume, "Desigur". Oamenii au acelasi drept la un astfel de devotament privat, cum au sa scrie poezii sau sa picteze tablouri carora nimeni altcineva nu le poate conferi un sens. Faptul ca religia noastra e problema noastra - ceva ce nu trebuie nici macar sa discutam cu altii, cu atat mai putin sa incercam sa o justificam in fata lor, daca nu simtim nevoia sa o facem, este o trasatura a ceea ce am ajuns sa consideram o societate democratica si pluralista dezirabila. O astfel de societate incearca sa lase cat mai mult spatiu liber posibil pentru ca indivizii sa-si dezvolte sentimentul lor de sine si scopurile vietilor lor, cerandu-le doar sa respecte preceptul lui Mill si sa extinda asupra celorlalti toleranta de care ei insisi se bucura. Dar o astfel de societate a fost, bineinteles, tulburata de o alta intrebare: "Ce se intampla cu religia organizata? Ce se intampla cu bisericile? Chiar daca urmam sfatul lui James si ignoram obiectiile de tipul celor aduse de Clifford impotriva "irationalitatii" credintei religioase, putem totusi continua sa credem ca atat Lucretius cat si Marx aveau dreptate. Deci e posibil sa fim de acord ca societatea ar trebui sa le confere autoritate indivizilor particulari pentru a-si formula sisteme private de credinta si sa fim in acelasi timp suspiciosi cu privire la existenta bisericilor. James si Mill ar fi fost probabil de acord fara prea multe ezitari ca nu e nimic in neregula cu bisericile existente in cazul in care activitatile lor nu sunt daunatoare pe plan social. Dar cand e sa decidem daca bisericile care exista in prezent provoaca astfel de daune, lucrurile se complica. Istoria socio-politica a Occidentului din ultimii doua sute de ani este presarata cu controverse ca cele legate de Statutul Libertatii Religioase a lui Jefferson, separarea de stat a Bisericii Irlandei, laicizarea educatiei in Franta, Kulturkampf in Germania, controversa actuala din Statele Unite privitoare la utilizarea fondurilor publice pentru a sprijini educatia religioasa, si altele asemenea. Nu am nimic nou sau interesant de adaugat cu privire la aceste subiecte, care difera de la o tara la alta si pentru a caror solutionare ar fi absurd sa invoc vreun set de norme pretinse a fi universal valabile. Tot ceea ce vreau sa afirm este ca dezbaterea privitoare la astfel de intrebari politice concrete este mai rodnica decat dezbaterea privitoare la existenta lui Dumnezeu. Ele sunt singurele intrebari care raman, o data ce renuntam la apelurile la experienta, simple lovituri cu pumnul in masa, si o data ce ajungem sa consideram teologia naturala ca fiind lipsita de sens. Vom concedia experienta religioasa daca ii urmam pe Wittgenstein, Sellars si Brandom considerand ca nu exista nici un intermediar de genul "cum a fost realmente experienta" intre starile schimbate ale sistemului nervos asociate cu invazia pretinsei experiente si angajamentele discursive rezultate, pe care le face un membru al unei comunitati care utilizeaza limbajul. Vom renunta la teologia naturala daca vom intelege imposibilitatea de a dezbate existenta lui Dumnezeu nu ca pe o dovada a statutului sau superior, ci ca pe o consecinta a incercarii de a-i conferi acel statut - un efect secundar al incercarii de a-l face atat de special incat sa fie o fiinta a carei existenta sa nu poata fi discutata cu referire la nici o lista anterioara de designatori canonici. Filosofia inferentialista a limbajului si mintii ne ajuta sa intelegem de ce nici apelurile la experienta nici apelurile la ceea ce exista in lume nu ne sunt de nici un folos pentru a decide despre ce sa vorbim. A ne muta in lumea intelectuala la care inferentialismul ne ofera acces ar insemna sa tratam intrebarile despre ce jocuri de limbaj sa folosim drept intrebari despre cum pot membrii unei societati democratice sa realizeze un echilibru intre responsabilitatile lor private fata de ei insisi si responsabilitatile lor publice ca cetateni. in romaneste de Mihaela Cabulea

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RICHARD RORTY DECLINUL ADEVARULUI REDEMPTIV SI APARITIA UNEI CULTURI LITERARE: CALEA PE CARE AU MERS INTELECTUALII OCCIDENTALI The Decline of the Redemptive Truth and the Rise of a Literary Culture, the Way the Western Intellectuals Went Abstract: The text is a sum of considerations regarding the nature (the evolution) of the concept of Truth from a pragmatist point of view. It also takes into account the origins of literature from this perspective as an alternative truth. Keywords: Richard Rorty; the Truth; literary discourse; pragmatism

ntrebari ca "Exista oare adevar?" sau "Crezi in adevar?" par inutile si lipsite de sens. tim cu totii ca diferenta dintre credintele adevarate si cele false este la fel de importanta ca cea dintre mancarurile hranitoare si cele otravitoare. Mai mult, una dintre principalele realizari ale filosofiei analitice recente este aceea de a fi aratat ca abilitatea de a manui conceptul de "credinta adevarata" este o conditie necesara pentru a fi un utilizator de limbaj si pentru a fi, astfel, un factor rational. Cu toate acestea, intrebarea "Crezi in adevar sau esti unul dintre acei postmoderni frivoli?" este adesea prima pe care jurnalistii o adreseaza intelectualilor pe care sunt desemnati sa-i intervieveze. Aceasta intrebare joaca acum rolul pe care il juca inainte intrebarea "Crezi in Dumnezeu, sau esti unul dintre acei atei periculosi?" Persoanelor cu preocupari literare li se spune mereu ca nu iubesc indeajuns adevarul. Astfel de avertismente sunt facute in acelasi spirit in care li se aminteau predecesorilor lor ca frica de Dumnezeu este inceputul intelepciunii. E evident ca sensul cuvantului "adevar" invocat in aceasta intrebare nu este cel cotidian. Nimeni nu-si face griji in privinta simplei nominalizari a adjectivului "adevarat". intrebarea "Crezi ca exista adevar?" este o forma prescurtata a intrebarii mai cuprinzatoare "Crezi ca exista un terminus firesc al cercetarii, un mod in care sunt realmente lucrurile si ca, intelegand care este acel mod, vom sti ce sa facem cu noi insine?" Aceia care, asemeni mie, se trezesc acuzati de frivolitate postmoderna, nu cred ca exista un astfel de terminus. Noi credem ca cercetarea este doar un alt nume pentru rezolvarea de probleme si nu ne putem imagina ca cercetarea privitoare la cum ar trebui sa traiasca fiintele umane, la ce ar trebui sa facem din noi insine, ar putea ajunge la final. Caci solutiile la vechile probleme vor da nastere unor noi probleme si asa mai departe, la nesfarsit. Acelasi lucru se intampla in cazul individului ca si in cel al societatii si speciilor: fiecare stadiu de maturizare va depasi dileme anterioare doar creand altele noi. Problemele de genul ce sa facem cu noi insine, ce scopuri sa servim, difera, in aceasta privinta, de problemele stiintifice. O stiinta completa si unificata final, un ansamblu armonios orchestrat de teorii stiintifice dintre care nici una nu va trebui sa mai fie revizuita vreodata, este un tel inteligibil. E posibil ca cercetarea stiintifica sa inceteze. Prin urmare, daca tot ceea ce se intelege prin "adevar" este o dare de seama unificata despre relatiile cauzale dintre evenimentele spatio-temporale, atunci chiar si persoanele de departe cele mai postmoderne n-ar avea nici un motiv sa se indoiasca de existenta adevarului. Existenta adevarului devine o problema numai atunci cand e in discutie un alt tip de adevar. Voi folosi termenul de "adevar redemptiv" pentru a desemna un set de credinte care ar pune capat, odata pentru totdeauna, procesului de reflectie la ceea ce am putea face cu noi insine. Adevarul redemptiv nu ar consta in teorii despre cum interactioneaza cauzal lucrurile, ci ar indeplini in schimb nevoia pe care religia si filosofia au incercat sa o satisfaca. Aceasta e nevoia de a potrivi totul - fiecare lucru, persoana, eveniment, idee si poezie - intr-un singur context, un context care se va dovedi a fi 20

natural, destinat si unic. El ar fi singurul context care ar conta in scopul modelarii vietilor noastre, deoarece ar fi singurul in care vietile noastre ar aparea asa cum sunt ele cu adevarat. A crede in adevarul redemptiv inseamna a considera ca exista ceva care sta la baza vietii umane, asa cum particulele elementare fizice stau la baza celor patru elemente - ceva care este realitatea de dincolo de aparenta, unica descriere adevarata a ceea ce se petrece, secretul final. Speranta ca un astfel de context poate fi descoperit este o specie a unui gen mai cuprinzator. Genul mai cuprinzator este ceea ce Heidegger a numit speranta de autenticitate - speranta de a fi mai degraba propria persoana decat simpla creatie a educatiei sau mediului nostru inconjurator. Asa cum a subliniat si Heidegger, a obtine autenticitatea, in acest sens, nu inseamna neaparat a ne respinge trecutul. in schimb ar putea fi o problema de reinterpretare a acelui trecut astfel incat sa-l facem mai adecvat propriilor scopuri. Ceea ce conteaza este sa fi vazut una sau mai multe alternative la scopurile pe care cei mai multi oameni le iau drept bune, si sa fi ales intre aceste alternative - creandu-ne astfel pe noi insine, intr-o oarecare masura. Asa cum ne-a amintit recent Harold Bloom, sensul citirii unui numar mare de carti este acela de a deveni constienti de un numar mare de scopuri alternative, iar sensul acestui lucru este acela de a deveni un sine autonom. Autonomia, in acest sens ne-kantian si specific bloomian, este in mare masura acelasi lucru cu autenticitatea heideggeriana. Voi defini un intelectual drept cineva care tanjeste dupa autonomia bloomiana si e destul de norocos pentru a dispune de banii si timpul liber necesar pentru a face ceva in acest sens: a vizita diferite biserici sau diferiti guru, a merge la diferite teatre sau muzee si, mai presus de toate, a citi o multime de carti diferite. insa cele mai multe fiinte umane, chiar si cele care dispun de timpul si banii necesari, nu sunt intelectuali. Daca citesc carti nu e pentru ca ar cauta izbavire, ci pentru ca vor fie sa se distreze sau sa-si distraga atentia, fie sa devina mai capabili sa-si duca la bun sfarsit unele scopuri anterioare. Ele nu citesc carti pentru a afla ce scopuri sa aiba. insa intelectualii fac acest lucru. Date fiind aceste definitii ale termenilor de "adevar redemptiv" si de "intelectual", pot sa imi expun teza. Ea este aceea ca intelectualii Occidentului au progresat de la Renastere incoace, parcurgand trei stadii: la inceput ei sperau in izbavire de la Dumnezeu, apoi de la filosofie, iar acum de la literatura. Religia monoteista ofera speranta izbavirii prin intrarea intr-o noua relatie cu o persoana non-umana, extrem de puternica. Credinta - cum ar fi credinta in articolele unui crez - poate fi doar incidentala pentru o astfel de relatie. Oricum, pentru filosofie, credintele sunt esentiale. Izbavirea prin filosofie se face prin dobandirea unui set de credinte, care reprezinta lucrurile asa cum sunt ele realmente. in sfarsit, literatura ofera izbavirea facandu-ne cunostinta cu o varietate cat mai mare posibil de fiinte umane. Aici, ca si in cazul religiei, credinta adevarata are putina importanta. Din interiorul unei culturi literare, religia si filosofia apar ca genuri literare. Astfel, ele sunt optionale. Asa cum un intelectual poate opta sa citeasca multe poezii dar putine romane, sau multe romane dar putine poezii, la fel acesta poate citi multa filosofie, sau multe scrieri religioase, dar relativ putine poezii si romane. Diferenta dintre lecturarea tuturor acestor carti de catre intelectualii literari si lecturarea lor de catre altii, este aceea ca locuitorul unei culturi literare trateaza cartile drept incercari umane de a satisface nevoi umane, mai degraba decat drept recunoasteri ale puterii unei fiinte care este ceea ce este, indiferent de orice astfel de nevoi. Dumnezeu si Adevarul sunt numele religios si, respectiv, filosofic pentru acest tip de fiinta. Trecerea de la religie la filosofie a inceput o data cu renasterea platonismului in Renastere, perioada in care umanistii au inceput sa puna aceleasi intrebari in legatura cu monoteismul crestin, pe care Socrate le pusese in legatura cu panteonul lui Hesiod. Socrate i-a sugerat lui Euthyphron ca adevarata problema nu era aceea daca actiunile cuiva erau pe placul zeilor, ci mai degraba care zei detineau conceptia corecta despre actiunile ce se cuveneau a fi facute. Cand aceasta din urma intrebare a fost inca o data luata in serios, s-a deschis drumul spre concluzia lui Kant ca pana si Cea Mai Sfanta dintre Evanghelii trebuie judecata in lumina propriei constiinte. Trecerea de la o cultura filosofica la una literara a inceput indata dupa Kant, cam in momentul in care Hegel ne prevenea ca filosofia isi picteaza cenusiul sau pe cenusiu numai atunci cand o forma de viata a imbatranit. Aceasta remarca i-a ajutat pe Kierkegaard si Marx sa realizeze ca filosofia nu avea sa indeplineasca niciodata rolul redemptiv pe care Hegel insusi il pretinsese pentru ea. Cele mai ambitioase pretentii ale lui Hegel pentru filosofie au cazut aproape imediat in opusul lor dialectic. Nici nu s-a publicat bine Sistemul sau, ca a si inceput sa fie tratat ca artefact ce se auto-consuma, ca 21

reductio ad absurdum a unei forme de viata intelectuala care brusc parea sa fie cu un picior in groapa. inca de pe vremea lui Hegel, intelectualii au inceput sa-si piarda increderea in filosofie, in ideea ca izbavirea poate veni sub forma credintelor adevarate. in cultura literara care s-a inaltat in ultimii doua sute de ani, intrebarea "Este adevarat?" a cedat locul de onoare intrebarii "Ce este nou?" Pentru Heidegger aceasta shimbare a insemnat un declin, o trecere de la gandirea serioasa la simpla curiozitate goala. Multi admiratori ai stiintei naturii, oameni care altfel il ignora pe Heidegger, ar fi de acord cu el asupra acestei chestiuni. Totusi, in relatarea pe care eu o ofer, aceasta schimbare reprezinta un pas inainte. Ea reprezinta o inlocuire dezirabila a intrebarilor rele ca "Ce este Fiinta?", "Ce este realmente real?" si "Ce este omul?" cu intrebarea sensibila "Are cineva vreo idee noua despre ce am putea face noi, fiintele umane, cu noi insine?" in forma sa pura, nediluata de catre filosofie, religia este o relatie cu o persoana non-umana. Aceasta relatie poate fi una de supunere idolatrizatoare sau de comuniune extatica sau de incredere tacita sau de vreo combinatie intre acestea. insa numai cand religia ajunge sa se amestece cu filosofia aceasta relatie redemptiva, non-cognitiva cu o persoana incepe sa fie mijlocita de un crez. Numai cand Dumnezeul filosofilor a inceput sa-l inlocuiasca pe Dumnezeul lui Abraham, Isaac si Iacob, credinta corecta e considerata esentiala pentru salvare. Pentru religie, in forma sa necontaminata, atat argumentul cat si credinta ies din discutie. Asa cum a subliniat Kierkegaard, a deveni o Noua Fiinta intru Cristos nu este acelasi lucru cu a fi fortat sa recunosti adevarul unei judecati pe parcursul reflectiei socratice, sau ca rezultat al dialecticii hegeliene. in masura in care religia solicita credinta intr-o judecata, aceasta este, asa cum a spus Locke, credinta bazata pe increderea proponentului, mai degraba decat credinta sustinuta prin argumente. Dar credintele sunt irelevante in cazul devotamentului special al credinciosului ignorant cu privire la Demeter, sau la Fecioara din Guadelupe, sau la micutul zeu gras de pe al treilea altar din stanga templului aflat in josul strazii. Tocmai aceasta irelevanta este cea pe care intelectuali ca Sf. Paul, Kierkegaard si Karl Barth - atleti spirituali care savureaza gandul ca credinta lor este o absurditate pentru greci - spera sa o redobandeasca. Pentru a lua in serios idealul filosofic al adevarului redemptiv trebuie sa credem atat ca viata in favoarea careia nu se poate argumenta cu succes nu merita traita, cat si ca argumentul persistent ii va conduce pe toti cercetatorii la acelasi set de credinte. Religia si literatura, in masura in care sunt necontaminate de filosofie, nu impartasesc nici una din aceste convingeri. Religia necontaminata poate fi monoteista, in sensul ca o comunitate poate considera ca e esential sa divinizeze doar un anumit zeu. Dar ideea ca nu poate exista decat un singur zeu, ca politeismul e contrar ratiunii, este una care nu se sustine numai dupa ce filosofia ne-a convins ca reflectiile fiecarei fiinte umane trebuie sa conduca la acelasi rezultat. in sensul in care folosesc eu termenii de "literatura" si de "cultura literara", o cultura care a inlocuit atat religia cat si filosofia cu literatura nu gaseste izbavire nici intr-o relatie non-cognitiva cu o persoana non-umana, nici intr-o relatie cognitiva cu judecatile, ci in relatii non-cognitive cu alte fiinte umane, relatii mijlocite de artefacte umane cum ar fi cartile si constructiile, tablourile si cantecele. Aceste artefacte ne ofera perspective asupra unor moduri alternative de a fi umani. Acest tip de cultura se debaraseaza de o presupozitie comuna religiei si filosofiei - aceea ca izbavirea trebuie sa vina dintro relatie cu ceva diferit de o simpla creatie umana. Kierkegaard a afirmat pe buna dreptate ca filosofia a inceput sa se contureze ca rivala a religiei atunci cand Socrate a sugerat ca cunoasterea-noastra-de-sine este o cunoastere a lui Dumnezeu - ca nu avem nevoie de ajutor din partea unei persoane non-umane, deoarece adevarul este deja inauntrul nostru. Dar literatura a inceput sa se contureze ca rivala a filosofiei atunci cand oameni ca Cervantes si Shakespeare au inceput sa suspecteze ca fiintele umane sunt, si trebuie sa fie, de altfel, atat de diverse incat nu are nici un sens sa se pretinda ca toate poarta un adevar unic in adancul inimii lor. Santayana a indicat aceasta schimbare culturala seismica in eseul sau "The absence of religion in Shakespeare". Acel eseu s-ar fi putut numi la fel de bine "The absence of either religion or philosophy in Shakespeare" sau simplu "The absence of truth in Shakespeare". Am sugerat mai devreme ca intrebarii "Crezi in adevar?" i se poate conferi atat sens cat si caracter imperios necesar daca este reformulata in felul urmator "Crezi ca exista un singur set de credinte care poate juca un rol redemptiv in vietile tuturor fiintelor umane, care sa poata fi rational justificat tuturor 22

fiintelor umane in conditii comunicative optime, si care astfel va constitui punctul terminus firesc al cercetarii?" A raspunde "Da" la aceasta intrebare reformulata inseamna a lua filosofia drept ghid pentru viata. inseamna a fi de acord cu Socrate ca exista un set de credinte care este atat pasibil de justificare rationala cat si de asa natura incat are, in mod justificat, prioritate in raport cu orice alta consideratie pe baza careia stabilim ce sa facem cu viata noastra. Premisa filosofiei este aceea ca exista un mod in care sunt realmente lucrurile - un mod in care umanitatea si restul universului este si va fi mereu, independent de orice nevoi si interese umane contingente. Cunoasterea acestui mod este redemptiva. ai, prin urnmare, poate inlocui religia. Lupta pentru Adevar poate lua locul cautarii lui Dumnezeu. Nu e clar daca Homer sau chiar Sophocle ar fi putut atribui vreun sens acestei sugestii. inainte ca Platon sa o fi nascocit, constelatia de idei necesare pentru a atribui un sens acestei sugestii, nu era disponibila. insa atat Cervantes cat si Shakespeare au inteles sugestia lui Platon si nu au avut incredere in motivele sale. Neincrederea lor i-a condus la incurajarea diversitatii si descurajarea trasaturile comune - la sublinirea diferentelor dintre fiintele umane, mai degraba decat la cautarea unei naturi umane comune. Aceasta schimbare de accent slabeste stapanirea asumptiei platonice dupa care toate aceste tipuri diferite de oameni ar trebui aranjate intr-o ierarhie, judecate pe baza succesului lor relativ in atingerea unui tel unic. Initiative precum cea a lui Cervantes si Shakespeare au ajutat la crearea unui nou tip de intelectuali - unul care nu ia drept buna disponibilitatea adevarului redemptiv si nici nu e prea interesat daca Dumnezeu sau Adevarul exista. Aceasta schimbare a ajutat la crearea culturii inalte de astazi, una pentru care religia si filosofia au devenit marginale. Cu siguranta, exista inca numerosi intelectuali religiosi, si chiar mai multi intelectuali filosofici. Dar tinerii carturari de astazi aflati in cautarea izbavirii cauta in primul rand in romane, piese de teatru si poezii. Acel gen de carti pe care secolul al XVIII-lea il socotea marginal a devenit acum central. Autorii romanelor Rasselas si Candide au contribuit la producerea, dar cu greu au putut prevedea, o cultura in care cei mai respectati scriitori nici nu scriu nici nu citesc predici sau tratate despre natura omului si universului. Pentru membrii culturii literare, izbavirea urmeaza sa fie dobandita intrand in contact cu limitele actuale ale imaginatiei umane. De aceea o cultura literara este intotdeauna in cautarea noutatii, spera intotdeauna sa identifice ceea ce Shelley a numit "umbrele pe care viitorul le arunca asupra prezentului", si nu incearca sa scape din temporal in etern. Una dintre premisele acestei culturi este ca desi imaginatia are limite prezente, aceste limite pot fi extinse mereu. Imaginatia consuma la nesfarsit propriile sale artefacte. Ea este un foc mereu viu, mereu in expansiune. Este la fel de supusa timpului si intamplarii precum mustele si viermii, dar in timp ce suporta si pastreaza amintirea trecutului sau, ea va continua sa-si transceanda limitele anterioare. Desi teama de intarziere este mereu prezenta in interiorul culturii literare, tocmai aceasta teama este cea care provoaca un incendiu si mai puternic. Tipul de persoana pe care eu il numesc "intelectual literar" considera ca viata care nu e traita aproape de limitele prezente ale imaginatiei umane nu merita traita. in locul ideii socratice de auto-examinare si cunoastere-de-sine, intelectualul literar pune ideea de amplificare a eului printr-o luare la cunostinta a cat mai multor moduri de a fi uman. Intelectualul literar substituie ideea religioasa potrivit careia o anumita carte sau traditie ne-ar putea lega de o persoana non-umana extrem de puternica sau extrem de iubitoare, cu ideea bloomiana dupa care cu cat citim mai multe carti, cu atat luam in considerare mai multe moduri de a fi uman, cu atat devenim mai umani - cu cat suntem mai putin tentati de vise de a scapa de timp si sansa, cu atat suntem mai convinsi ca noi, fiintele umane, nu ne putem baza decat unele pe altele.

*** Sper ca ceea ce am spus pana acum a conferit putina plauzibilitate tezei mele dupa care ultimele cinci secole ale vietii intelectuale occidentale poate fi considerata in mod folositor, mai intai ca progres de la religie la filosofie si apoi de la filosofie la literatura. il numesc progres, deoarece consider filosofia un stadiu intermediar intr-un proces de crestere treptata a increderii-in-sine. Marea virtute a culturii 23

noastre literare nou infiintate este aceea ca le spune tinerilor intelectuali ca singura sursa de izbavire este imaginatia umana si ca acest fapt ar trebui sa fie prilej de mandrie si nu de disperare. Ideea de adevar redemptiv solicita convingerea ca un set de credinte care poate fi justificat tuturor fiintelor umane, va intampina de asemenea toate nevoile tuturor fiintelor umane. insa aceasta idee a fost un compromis inerent instabil intre indemnul masochist de a ne supune non-umanului si nevoia de a ne mandri corespunzator cu umanitatea noastra. Adevarul redemptiv este o incercare de a gasi ceva care sa nu fie opera fiintelr umane, dar cu care fiintele umane sa aiba o relatie speciala, privilegiata, neimpartasita de animale. Natura intrinseca a lucrurilor este asemeni unui zeu in independenta sa fata de noi, si totusi - dupa cum ne spun Socrate si Hegel - cunoasterea de sine e suficienta pentru a ne pune in contact cu ea. Unul dintre modurile de a intelege cautarea cunoasterii unei astfel de cvasi divinitati este cel in care Sartre a inteles-o: este o pasiune inutila, o incercare sortita pieirii de a deveni pentrusine-in-sine. insa ar fi mai bine sa consideram filosofia drept una dintre cele mai mari realizari ale imaginatiei, la egalitate cu inventia zeilor. Filosofii au descris adesea religia drept o incercare de filosofare primitiva si insuficient de meditativa. Dar, asa cum am afirmat mai devreme, o cultura literara pe deplin constienta de sine ar descrie atat religia cat si filosofia drept genuri literare primitive, si totusi glorioase. Ele sunt genuri in care devine din ce in ce mai dificil sa se scrie, insa s-ar fi putut ca genurile care le inlocuiesc acum sa nu fi aparut niciodata daca n-ar fi fost interpretate ca abateri de la religie, iar mai tarziu ca abateri de la filosofie. Din acest punct de vedere, religia si filosofia nu sunt simple scari de care ne putem debarasa. Ele sunt mai degraba stadii intr-un proces de maturizare, un proces la care ar trebui sa ne privim mereu inapoi si sa-l recapitulam, in speranta de a obtine o incredere-in-sine si mai mare. in speranta ca voi face mai plauzibila aceasta relatare despre filosofie ca gen intermediar, voi spune cate ceva despre cele doua mari miscari cu care a culminat filosofia. Filosofia a inceput sa-si intre in drepturi atunci cand filosofii iluminismului n-au mai fost nevoiti sa se ascunda in spatele mastilor purtate de Descartes, Hobbes si Spinoza, si au putut fi atei pe fata. Aceste masti au putut fi abandonate dupa Revolutia franceza. Acel eveniment, facand plauzibila ideea ca fiintele umane ar putea construi un nou rai si un nou pamant, a facut ca Dumnezeu sa para de departe mai putin necesar decat inainte. Acea incredere in sine nou fundamentata a dat nastere la doua mari sisteme metafizice cu care filosofia a culminat. in primul rand a aparut metafizica idealismului german, iar in al doilea, reactia impotriva idealismului care a fost metafizica materialista, apoteoza rezultatelor stiintei naturii. Prima miscare e de ordinul trecutului. in rice caz, metafizica materialista este inca printre noi. Ea este de fapt cam singura versiune de adevar redemptiv propusa in prezent. Este ultimul "urai" al filosofiei, ultima sa incercare de a oferi adevar redemptiv si de a evita astfel retrogradarea ei la statutul de gen literar. Nu este aici locul potrivit pentru a recapitula ascensiunea si caderea idealismului german, nici pentru a elogia ceea ce Heidegger a numit "maretia, profunzimea si originalitatea acelei lumi spirituale". Este suficient pentru scopurile mele prezente sa spun ca Hegel, cel mai original dintre idealisti, considera ca a oferit prima dovada satisfacatoare a existentei lui Dumnezeu, si prima solutie satisfacatoare la problema teologica traditionala a raului. El s-a considerat primul teolog natural care a repurtat un succes deplin - primul care l-a impacat pe Socrate cu Cristos, aratand ca intruparea n-a fost un act de gratie din partea lui Dumnezeu, ci mai degraba o necesitate. "Dumnezeu", a spus Hegel, "trebuia sa aiba un Fiu", pentru ca fara timp, eternitatea nu e nimic, fara om, Dumnezeu nu e nimic, iar fara emergenta sa istorica, Adevarul nu e nimic. in ochii lui Hegel, speranta platonica de a scapa de dimensiunea temporala in eternitate a fost un stadiu primitiv, dar necesar, al gandirii filosofice - un stadiu pe care doctrina crestina a intruparii ne-a ajutat sa-l depasim. Hegel credea ca, o data ce Kant ne-a deschis calea spre a considera mintea si lumea interdependente, suntem in masura sa vedem ca filosofia poate construi un pod peste distinctia kantiana dintre fenomenal si noumenal, la fel cum sederea lui Cristos pe pamant a invins distinctia dintre Dumnezeu si om. Pentru unele dintre cele mai luminate minti ale secolului al XIX-lea, metafizica idealista parea atat adevarata cat si demonstrabila. Josiah Royce, de exemplu, a scris carte dupa carte argumentand ca Hegel a avut dreptate: simpla reflectie academica asupra presupozitiilor simtului comun, exact tipul de filosofare pe care Socrate l-a practicat si laudat, ne va conduce garantat spre recunoasterea adevarului panteismului, asa cum reflectia asupra diagramelor geometrice ne va conduce spre Teorema lui 24

Pythagora. Dar verdictul culturii literare la adresa metafizicii a fost bine formulat de catre Kierkegaard atunci cand a spus "Daca Hegel ar fi scris la sfarsitul lucrarii sale Sistemul logicii 'acesta a fost doar un experiment al gandirii', el ar fi fost cel mai mare ganditor care a trait vreodata. Asa cum stau lucrurile, nu e decat un bufon". As reformula ideea lui Kierkegaard dupa cum urmeaza: daca Hegel ar fi fost in stare sa inceteze a mai crede ca ne-a oferit adevar redemptiv si ar fi pretins in schimb ca ne-a oferit ceva mai bun decat adevarul redemptiv - si anume, o modalitate de a cuprinde toate produsele anterioare ale imaginatiei umane intr-o singura viziune - el ar fi fost primul filosof care ar fi admis ca a iesit pe piata un produs cultural mai bun decat filosofia. El ar fi fost primul filosof care ar fi inlocuit constient filosofia cu literatura, intocmai cum Socrate si Platon au fost primii care au inlocuit constient religia cu filosofia. Dar, in schimb, Hegel s-a prezentat ca fiind cel care a descoperit Adevarul Absolut, iar oameni ca Royce l-au tratat cu seriozitate care acum ni se pare socant de plina de afectiune si ridicola in acelasi timp. Prin urmare, i-a revenit lui Nietzsche sarcina sa ne spuna, in Nasterea tragediei, ca premisa comuna lui Socrate si Hegel ar trebui respinsa, si ca inventia ideii de cunoastere-de-sine a fost un excelent produs al imaginatiei, dar care a supravietuit mai mult decat utilitatea sa. in orice caz, intre epoca lui Hegel si cea a lui Nietzsche, a aparut cea de-a doua mare miscare filosofica, una care se afla in aceeasi relatie cu Democrit si Lucretius, in care se afla Hegel cu Parmenide si Plotin. Aceasta a fost incercarea de a pune stiinta naturii atat in locul religiei cat si in cel al reflectiei socratice, de a considera ca cercetarea empirica ne furnizeaza exact ceea ce Socrate credea ca nu ne poate oferi niciodata - si anume, adevar redemptiv. Pana la mijlocul secolului al XIX-lea, devenise clar ca matematica si stiinta empirica aveau sa fie singurele domenii ale culturii in care se putea spera sa se ajunga la un acord rational, unanim singurele discipline in stare sa furnizeze credinte care sa nu fie rasturnate pe masura ce se deruleaza istoria. Ele erau singurele surse de rezultatea cumulative si de enunturi care reprezentau candidati plauzibili la statutul de perspective asupra modului in care sunt lucrurile in ele insele, independent de contingentele istoriei umane. atiinta naturii unificata mai este inca pentru multi intelectuali raspunsul la rugaciunile lui Socrate. Pe de alta parte, in secolul al XIX-lea, aproape toata lumea a ajuns sa fie de acord cu Hume ca modelul lui Platon de succes cognitiv - matematica - nu ne va oferi niciodata nimic redemptiv. Doar cativa neo-pitagoreici rataciti mai considerau ca matematica are mai mult decat un interes practic si estetic. Ca urmare, pozitivistii secolului al XIX-lea au tras concluzia ca singura sursa disponibila de acord rational si adevar incontestabil, stiinta empirica, trebuia sa aiba pur si simplu o functie redemptiva. De vreme ce filosofia ne-a invatat intotdeauna ca o relatare care leaga totul laolalta intr-un intreg coerent are valoare redemptiva si, de vreme ce colapsul metafizicii idealiste a facut din materialism singurul candidat posibil la o astfel de relatare, pozitivistii au conchis ca stiinta naturii este toata filosofia de care vom avea vreodata nevoie. Acest proiect de conferire a unui statut redemptiv stiintei empirice este ispititor pentru doua tipuri de intelectuali din prezent. Primul este tipul de filosof care sustine ca stiinta naturii ajunge la adevar obiectiv asa cum nici o alta portiune a culturii nu ajunge. Acesti filosofi merg de obicei mai departe si afirma ca omul de stiinta a naturii este posesorul paradigmatic al virtutilor intelectuale, indeosebi al iubirii de adevar, care nici macar nu sunt cautate printre criticii literari. Cel de-al doilea tip de intelectual care continua directiile trasate de pozitivistii secolului al XIX-lea, este genul de om de stiinta care proclama ca cele mai recente descoperiri din cadrul disciplinei sale au profunde implicatii filosofice: ca progresele in biologia evolutionista sau in stiinta cognitiva, de exemplu, nu se limiteaza la a ne spune cum functioneaza lucrurile si din ce sunt facute acestea. Ele ne spun, de asemenea, dupa cum afirma acesti oameni de stiinta, ceva despre cum sa traim, despre natura umana, despre ceea ce suntem realmente. Ele ne furnizeaza daca nu izbavire, atunci cel putin intelepciune - nu se limiteaza la a ne oferi simple instructiuni despre cum sa producem unelte mai eficiente pentru a obtine ceea ce dorim, ci ne ofera si sfaturi intelepte cu privire la ce ar trebui sa ne dorim. Ma voi ocupa separat de aceste doua grupuri de oameni. Problema in ceea ce priveste incercarea filosofilor de a trata omul de stiinta empiric drept paradigma de virtute intelectuala este aceea ca iubirea de adevar a astrofizicienilor nu pare deloc diferita de cea a filologului clasic sau a istoricului orientat spre studierea arhivelor. Toti acesti oameni incearca din greu sa realizeze ceva corespunzator. 25

La fel este si cazul maistrului tamplar, contabilului calificat si chirurgului grijuliu. Nevoia de a realiza ceva corespunzator este esentiala pentru toti acesti oameni: pentru ceea ce sunt ei si pentru ceea ce face ca vietile lor sa merite traite. Este evident ca fara astfel de oameni ale caror vieti sunt centrate pe aceasta nevoie, n-am fi avut prea multe realizari in planul civilizatiei. Jocul liber al imaginatiei este posibil numai datorita bazei pe care oamenii cu o dispozitie literara au construit-o. Fara mestesugari, nu exista nici poeti. Fara oameni de stiinta teoretici, care sa furnizeze tehnologia unei lumi industrializate, vor fi putini oameni cu bani suficienti pentru a-si trimite copiii sa fie initiati intr-o cultura literara. Dar nici un motiv nu ne indreptateste sa consideram ca contributiile omului de stiinta a naturii la aceasta baza au o semnificatie filosofica sau morala, care le lipseste celor ale tamplarului, contabilului si chirurgului. Pentru John Dewey, faptul ca fizicianul matematic se bucura de un prestigiu mai mare decat un mestesugar iscusit reprezenta o mostenire nefericita a distinctiei platonico-aristoteliciene dintre adevaruri eterne si adevaruri empirice, a inaltarii contemplatiei libere deasupra spiritului practic chinuit. Altfel spus, prestigiul teoreticianului stiintific este o mostenire nefericita a ideii socratice dupa care, acel ceva asupra caruia noi toti putem fi de acord ca este adevarat ca rezultat al unei dezbateri ratinale, este o reflectare a ceva mai mult decat simplul acord - a ideii ca, in conditii comunicative ideale, acordul intersubiectiv este un simbol al corespondentei cu modul in care sunt realmente lucrurile. Dezbaterea actuala dintre filosofii analitici, daca adevarul este o problema de corespondenta cu realitatea, si dezbaterea paralela referitoare la refuzul lui Kuhn de a accepta ca stiinta abordeaza asimptotic ceea ce este realmente real, sunt dispute intre cei care considera ca stiinta empirica indeplineste cel putin unele dintre sperantele lui Platon si cei care cred ca acele sperante ar trebui abandonate. Pentru cei dintai filosofi faptul ca adaugarea unei caramizi la edificiul cunoasterii este o problema de aliniere cat mai exacta a gandirii si limbajului la modul in care sunt realmente lucrurile, tine indiscutabil de simtul comun. Adversarii lor filosofici considera ca acest asa-numit simt comun nu este decat ceea ce credea Dewey: si anume, o relicva a sperantei religioase ca izbavirea poate veni de la contactul cu ceva non-uman si extrem de puternic. A abandona ideea din urma, ideea care leaga filosofia de religie, inseamna a recunoaste atat abilitatea oamenilor de stiinta de a adauga caramizi la edificiul cunoasterii cat si utilitatea practica a teoriilor stiintifice pentru predictie si a insista, in acelasi timp, asupra irelevantei ambelor realizari pentru cautarea izbavirii. Aceste dezbateri intre filosofii analitici au putin de-a face cu activitatile celui de-al doilea tip de oameni pe care i-am etichetat "metafizicieni materialisti". Acestia sunt oamenii de stiinta care cred ca marele public ar trebui sa se intereseze de cele mai recente descoperiri in materie de genomi, sau localizare cerebrala, sau dezvoltarea copilului, sau mecanica cuantica. Acesti oameni de stiinta se pricep sa dramatizeze contrastul dintre vechile teorii stiintifice si cele noi, stralucitoare, dar nu se pricep sa explice de ce ar trebui sa ne pese de diferenta. Ei sunt in aceeasi situatie ca si criticii de arta si literatura, care se pricep sa indice diferentele dintre romanele anilor 1890 si cele ale anilor 1920, sau dintre ceea ce umplea galeriile de arta acum zece ani si ceea ce le umple acum, dar nu se pricep sa explice de ce sunt importante aceste schimbari. Exista totusi o diferenta intre astfel de critici si acel tip de oameni de stiinta despre care vorbesc eu. Cei dintai au de obicei intelepciunea sa evite greseala pe care a facut-o Clement Greenberg - greseala de a afirma ca ceea ce umple galeriile de arta anul acesta este rezultatul tuturor epocilor si ca exista o logica interioara a istoriei produselor imaginatiei care a ajuns acum la rezultatul ce i-a fost destinat. Dar oamenii de stiinta pastreaza inca ideea dupa care cel mai recent produs al imaginatiei stiintifice nu este doar o imbunatatire in raport cu ceea ce a fost imaginat anterior, ci totodata este mai aproape de natura intrinseca a lucrurilor. De aceea li s-a parut atat de jignitoare sugestia lui Kuhn de a se considera oameni care solutioneaza probleme. Retorica lor ramane "Noi am inlocuit aparenta cu realitatea!" mai degraba decat "Noi am rezolvat niste probleme de lunga durata!" sau "Am reinnoit lucrurile!" Problema cu aceasta retorica este ca ea pune un strat de lac metafizic lucios pe un produs stiintific folositor. Ea ne sugereaza nu numai ca am invatat mai mult cu privire la cum sa prezicem si sa controlam mediul nostru inconjurator si pe noi insine, dar si ca am facut ceva mai mult - ceva cu semnificatie redemptiva. Dar realizarile succesive ale stiintei moderne si-au epuizat semnificatia lor filosofica atunci cand au aratat clar ca o justificare cauzala a relatiilor dintre evenimentele spatio26

temporale nu solicita actiunea fortelor non-fizice - cand aceasta [stiinta] ne-a demonstrat ca nu exista fantome. Pe scurt, stiinta moderna ne-a ajutat sa intelegem ca daca vrem o metafizica, atunci metafizica materialista este singura pe care trebuie sa o avem. insa nu ne-a oferit nici un motiv sa credem ca avem nevoie de o metafizica. Nevoia de metafizica a durat doar atat cat a durat speranta in adevarul redemptiv. Dar in momentul in care materialismul a triumfat asupra idealismului, aceasta speranta a intrat in declin. Ca urmare, reactia celor mai multi intelectuali contemporani la anunturi privitare la noi descoperiri stiintifice este "Ei si?" Aceasta reactie nu e, asa cum a crezut C.P. Snow, o o reactie a unor literati afectati si ignoranti care ii trateaza cu condescendenta pe cercetatorii empirici onesti, muncitori. Este o reactie perfect rezonabila din partea cuiva care vrea sa afle mai multe despre scopuri si caruia i se ofera informatii despre mijloace. Atitudinea culturii literare fata de metafizica materialista este, si trebuie sa fie, ceva de genul: in timp ce atat incercarile lui Platon cat si cele ale lui Hegel de a ne oferi ceva mai interesant decat fizica au fost incercari laudabile de a gasi o disciplina redemptiva care sa fie pusa in locul religiei, metafizica materialista este doar fizica ce se inalta deasupra ei insasi. atiinta moderna este un mod imaginativ glorios de a descrie lucrurile, extrem de reusit pentru scopurile in care a fost dezvoltata - si anume, prezicerea si controlarea fenomenelor. Dar n-ar trebui sa pretinda ca are acel tip de putere redemptiva pretinsa de rivala ei invinsa, metafizica idealista. intrebari de genul "Ei si?" au inceput sa le fie puse oamenilor de stiinta de catre intelectualii secolului al XIX-lea care invatau treptat, asa cum avea sa spuna mai tarziu Nietzsche, sa vada stiinta prin prisma artei, iar arta prin cea a vietii. Maestrul lui Nietzsche, Emerson, a fost o astfel de personalitate, iar Baudelaire alta. Cu toate ca multi dintre intelectualii literari ai acestei perioade considerau ca depasisera deja romantismul, totusi, ei ar fi fost de acord cu Schiller ca pe viitor maturizarea omenirii se va realiza mai degraba cu ajutorul a ceea Kant a numit "esteticul" decat cu ajutorul a ceea ce el a numit "eticul". Ei ar fi sprijinit, de asemenea, afirmatia lui Shelley ca marea sarcina a emanciparii umane de preoti si tirani ar fi putut fi realizata si fara "Locke, Hume, Gibbon, Voltaire si Rousseau" dar ca "e dincolo de granitele imaginatiei sa ne inchipuim care ar fi fost conditia morala a lumii daca Dante, Petrarca, Boccaccio, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Calderon, Lord Bacon si Milton n-ar fi existat niciodata; daca Raphael si Michelangelo nu s-ar fi nascut niciodata; daca poezia evreiasca n-ar fi fost niciodata tradusa, daca o renastere a studiului literaturii grecesti n-ar fi avut niciodata loc, daca nici un monument al vreunei sculpturi antice nu ne-ar fi fost lasat mostenire, si daca poezia si religia lumii antice s-ar fi naruit o data cu credinta ei". Cele spuse de Shelley despre Locke si Hume se aplica la fel de bine si in cazul lui Galilei, Newton si Lavoisier. Ceea ce a spus fiecare dintre ei a fost bine argumentat, folositor si adevarat. Dar, potrivit lui Shelley, acel tip de adevar care este produsul unui argument reusit nu ne poate imbunatati conditia noastra morala. in ceea ce priveste productiile lui Galilei si Locke suntem indreptatiti sa intrebam "Da, dar este oare adevarat?" insa, cum bine credea Shelley, nu prea are rost sa punem aceasta intrebare in cazul lui Milton. "Adevarat in mod obiectiv", in sensul de "astfel incat sa se obtina asentimentul tuturor membrilor viitori ai culturii experte in cauza", este o notiune care nu va fi niciodata folositoare pentru intelectualii literari, caci progresul imaginatiei literare nu este o problema de acumulare de rezultate. Noi filosofii care suntem acuzati ca nu avem suficient respect pentru adevarul obiectiv - cei pe care metafizicienilor materialisti le place sa ne numeasca "relativisti postmoderni" - consideram obiectivitatea drept intersubiectivitate. Prin urmare, putem fi bucurosi de acord ca oamenii de stiinta obtin adevar obiectiv, lucru care nu se intampla in cazul literatilor, si asta pur si simplu pentru ca oamenii de stiinta sunt organizati in culturi experte intr-un mod in care intelectualii literari nici macar n-ar trebui sa incerce sa se organizeze. Putem avea o cultura experta, daca suntem de acord asupra a ceea ce vrem sa obtinem, dar nu si daca ne intrebam ce tip de viata ar trebui sa ne dorim. atim ce scopuri se presupune ca trebuie sa serveasca teoriile stiintifice. Dar nu suntem acum si nu vom fi niciodata in masura sa spunem ce scopuri se presupune ca trebuie sa serveasca romanele, poeziile si piesele de teatru. Caci aceste carti redefinesc continuu scopurile noastre. *** 27

Pana acum nu am spus nimic despre relatia culturii literare cu politica. Vreau sa inchei trecand la aceasta tema. Caci disputa dintre cei care considera aparitia culturii literare un lucru bun si cei care o considera un lucru rau este, in mare masura, o disputa privitoare la ce tip de cultura inalta ar contribui cel mai mult la crearea si sustinerea climatului de toleranta care infloreste cel mai bine in societatile democratice. Cei care argumenteaza ca o cultura centrata pe stiinta este cea mai buna in acest scop contrabalanseaza ura, pasiunea, prejudecata, superstitia si toate celelalte forte ale irationalului de care, asa cum pretindeau Socrate si Platon, filosofia ne poate scapa, cu iubirea de adevar. Dar cei aflati de partea cealalta sunt suspiciosi in ceea ce priveste opozitia platonica dintre ratiune si irational. Pentru ei nu exista nici un motiv care sa justifice relationarea diferentei dintre conversabilitatea toleranta si incapatanarea rau voitoare de a nu asculta si partea cealalta, de o distinctie intre o parte a noastra superioara care ne permite sa obtinem izbavirea ajungand in legatura cu o realitate non-umana si o alta parte, care e doar animala. Punctul forte al celor care cred ca un respect adecvat fata de adevarul obiectiv si, astfel, fata de stiinta, este important pentru mentinerea unui climat de toleranta si bunavointa, e acela ca argumentul este esential atat pentru stiinta cat si pentru democratie. Atat atunci cand oamenii aleg intre teorii stiintifice alternative cat si atunci cand aleg intre parti alternative ale legislatiei, vrem ca ei sa-si bazeze deciziile pe argumente - argumente care pornesc de la premise ce pot fi facute plauzibile pentru oricine doreste sa cerceteze problema. Rareori preotii au furnizat astfel de argumente si nici intelectualii literari nu o fac. Deci este tentant sa consideram preferinta pentru literatura in raport cu stiinta, drept o respingere a argumentului in favoarea sentintelor oraculare - o regresie spre ceva inconfortabil cum ar fi stadiul religios, prefilosofic al vietii intelectuale occidentale. Vazuta din aceasta perspectiva aparitia unei culturi literare arata ca o tradare a functionarilor. insa aceia dintre noi care se bucura de emergenta culturii literare se pot opune acestei acuzatii spunand ca desi argumentatia este esentiala pentru proiecte de cooperare sociala, izbavirea este o problema individuala, privata. Asa cum aparitia tolerantei religioase a depins de realizarea unei distinctii intre nevoile societatii si nevoile individului si de afirmatia ca religia nu este necesara pentru cele dintai, la fel si cultura literara ne cere sa despartim deliberarea politica de proiectele de izbavire. Aceasta inseamna a recunoaste ca sperantele private de a dobandi autenticitate si autonomie ar trebui lasate acasa atunci cand cetatenii unei societati democratice se reunesc pentru a delibera in legatura cu ceea ce trebuie facut. A face aceasta mutare e echivalent cu a spune: singurul mod in care stiinta e relevanta pentru politica este acela ca oamenii de stiinta a naturii ofera un bun exemplu de cooperare sociala, de cultura experta in care argumentatia infloreste. Prin urmare, ei ofera un model pentru deliberarea politica - un model de onestitate, toleranta si incredere. Aceasta abilitate este mai degraba o problema de procedura decat de rezultate, motiv pentru care grupurile de tamplari sau echipele de ingineri pot oferi un model la fel de bun ca si departamentele de astrofizica. Diferenta dintre acordul argumentat asupra modalitatii de a solutiona o problema care s-a ivit pe parcursul construirii unei case sau a unui pod si acordul argumentat asupra a ceea ce fizicienii numesc "o teorie despre tot" este, in acest context, irelevanta. Caci orice ne-ar spune ultima teorie despre tot, nu va face nimic pentru a ne oferi indrumare politica sau izbavire individuala. Afirmatia pe care tocmai am facut-o pare aroganta si dogmatica, deoarece, cu siguranta unele dintre rezultatele cercetarii empirice au contribuit in trecut la imaginea-noastra-de-sine. Galilei si Darwin au eliminat o gama larga de fantome, demonstrand suficienta unei descrieri materialiste. Prin urmare, ei au facut mai simpla trecerea noastra de la o cultura inalta religioasa la una pur filosofica, seculara. Deci argumentul meu in numele culturii literare depinde de afirmatia potrivit careia descotorosirea de fantome, de actiunea cauzala care nu survine in cazul comportamentului particulelor elementare, a epuizat utilitatea stiintei naturii atat in scopuri redemptive cat si in scopuri politice. Nu inaintez aceasta afirmatie ca rezultat al unui rationament sau al unei patrunderi filosofice, ci doar ca pe o predictie cu privire la ceea ce ne rezerva viitorul. O predictie similara i-a determinat pe filosofii secolului al XVIII-lea sa creada ca religia crestina facuse tot ce-i statea in putinta pentru conditia morala a umanitatii, si ca era timpul sa lasam religia deoparte si sa punem in locul ei metafizica, fie pe 28

cea idealista fie pe cea materialista. Cand intelectualii literari asuma ca stiinta naturii nu ne poate oferi altceva decat un exemplu edificator de conversabilitate toleranta, ei procedeaza la fel ca filosofii, care au afirmat ca pana si cei mai buni dintre preoti nu ne pot oferi altceva decat exemple edificatoare de caritate si decenta. Reducerea stiintei de la o posibila sursa de adevar redemptiv la un model de cooperare rationala este corespondentul contemporan al reductiei Evangheliilor de la o reteta de obtinere a fericirii vesnice la un compendiu de sfaturi morale solide. Acesta e tipul de reductie recomandat de catre Kant si Jefferson si pe care protestantii liberali ai ultimelor doua secole l-au realizat treptat. Cu alte cuvinte: atat religia crestina cat si metafizica materialista s-au dovedit a fi artefacte autodistructive. Nevoia de ortodoxie religioasa a fost subminata de insistenta Sf. Paul asupra primatului iubirii si de realizarea treptata a faptului ca o religie a iubirii n-ar fi putut cere tuturor sa recite acelasi crez. Nevoia de metafizica a fost subminata de abilitatea stiintei moderne de a concepe mintea umana ca un sistem nervos extrem de complex si, astfel, de a se intelege pe sine mai degraba in termeni pragmatici decat metafizici. atiinta ne-a aratat cum sa concepem cercetarea empirica mai degraba drept utilizarea acestui echipament psihologic suplimentar in vederea castigarii unei stapaniri mereu mai mari asupra mediului inconjurator, decat ca pe o modalitate de inlocuire a aparentei cu realitatea. Asa cum secolul al XVIII-lea a fost in stare sa inteleaga crestinismul nu ca pe o revelatie din ceruri, ci ca aflandu-se intr-o relatie directa cu reflectia socratica, la fel si secolul XX a devenit capabil sa inteleaga stiinta naturii nu ca pe cea care dezvaluie natura intrinseca a realitatii, ci ca aflandu-se intr-o relatie directa cu acel tip de rezolvare-practica-de-probleme la care sunt buni atat castorii cat si tamplarii. A renunta la ideea ca exista o natura intrinseca a realitatii care trebuie descoperita fie de preoti, fie de filosofi, fie de oamenii de stiinta, inseamna a separa nevoia de izbavire de cautarea acordului universal. inseamna a renunta la cautarea unei relatari exacte despre natura umana si, astfel, a unei retete pentru a trai Viata cea Buna pentru Om. O data ce se renunta la aceste cautari, extinderea limitelor imaginatiei paseste in fata pentru a-si asuma rolul pe care obedienta fata de vointa divina l-a jucat intr-o cultura religioasa si rolul pe care descoperirea a ceea ce este realmente real, l-a jucat intr-o cultura filosofica. Dar aceasta inlocuire nu constituie un motiv pentru a renunta la cautarea unei forme utopice unice de viata politica - Buna Societatea Globala. *** Am spus tot ce se putea pentru a ma impotrivi sugestiei ca aparitia culturii literare reprezinta o recadere in irationalitate si ca un respect adecvat fata de abilitatea stiintei de a obtine adevar obiectiv este esential pentru moralul unei societati democratice. Dar exista o sugestie inrudita, mai vaga si mai greu de definit, insa nu mai putin persuasiva. Potrivit acestei sugestii, cultura literara este decadenta - ii lipseste gandirea pozitiva si vigoarea, comune crestinilor care fac prozelitism, pozitivistilor care divinizeaza stiinta si revolutionarilor marxisti. Se spune adesea ca o cultura inalta centrata pe literatura, una care nu-si doreste sa surprinda lucrurile corect ci sa le innoiasca, va fi o cultura de esteti plapanzi si absorbiti de propria persoana. Cea mai buna combatere a acestei sugestii este eseul lui Oscar Wilde "The soul of man under socialism". Mesajul acestui eseu il secondeaza pe cel al lui Mill din Despre libertate si pe cel al lui Rawls din A Theory of Justice. El este acela ca singurul rost pentru a scapa de preoti si de regi, pentru a instaura guverne democratice, pentru a lua de la fiecare dupa posibilitati si a da la fiecare dupa nevoi si, astfel, pentru a crea Buna Societate Globala, este acela de a oferi oamenilr sansa sa duca orice tip de viata prefera, atata timp cat acest lucru nu diminueaza sansele altora de a proceda la fel. Asa cum a spus Wilde "socialismul insusi va fi valoros pentru ca va duce la Individualism". Ceea ce vrea sa spuna Wilde este ca nu se poate aduce nici o obiectie estetilor absorbiti de propria persoana - adica, oamenilor a caror pasiune este aceea de a explora limitele actuale ale imaginatiei umane - atata timp cat acestia nu folosesc mai mult decat partea care li se cuvine din produsul social. Totusi, aceasta afirmatie ii socheaza pe multi oameni ca fiind decadenta. Acestia ar sublinia ca nu am fost pusi pe acest pamant pentru a ne simti bine, ci pentru a face ceea ce trebuie. Ei cred ca socialismul nu ne-ar fi inflacarat inimile daca nu ar fi fost mai mult decat un mijloc pentru Individualism, sau daca telul revolutiei proletare ar fi fost doar acela de a oferi fiecaruia sansa sa devina un intelectual burghez. 29

Aceasta parere, ca existenta umana are si un alt rost decat placerea, este cea care pastreaza vie batalia dintre Mill si Kant, in cursurile despre filosofia morala, asa cum parerea ca stiinta naturii trebuie sa aiba si un alt rost in afara de rezolvarea-practica-de-probleme, pastreaza vie batalia dintre Kuhn si adversarii sai, in cursurile de filosofia stiintei. Mill si Kuhn - si, in general, utilitaristii si pragmatistii sunt inca suspectati ca-si dezamagesc colegii de bransa, ca diminueaza demnitatea umana, ca reduc aspiratiile noastre cele mai nobile la stimularea permisiva a manunchiurilor noastre favorite de neuroni. Opozitia dintre cei care cred, impreuna cu Schiller si Wilde, ca fiintele umane sunt in forma lor cea mai buna atunci cand se distreaza, si cei care cred ca ele sunt in forma lor cea mai buna cand se lupta, mi se pare ca sta la baza conflictelor care au marcat aparitia culturii literare. As solicita din nou ca aceste conflicte sa fie intelese ca recapitulandu-le pe cele care au marcat trecerea de la religie la filosofie. in acea tranzitie timpurie, cei ce credeau ca o viata umana care nu lupta pentru supunere perfecta fata de vointa divina reprezenta o recadere in animalitate, se opuneau celor ce credeau ca idealul unei astfel de supuneri era nedemn de fiintele care puteau gandi pentru ele insele. in tranzitia actuala, oamenii care considera ca trebuie sa ne agatam de ideile kantiene ca "legea morala" si "lucrurile asa cum sunt in ele insele" se opun celor care considera ca aceste idei sunt simptome ale unei increderi in sine insuficiente, ale unei incercari auto-inselatoare de a gasi demnitate in acceptarea sclaviei si libertate in recunoasterea constrangerii. Mi se pare ca singura modalitate de a solutiona aceasta disputa este de a spune ca in randurile celor carora o societate utopica le-ar oferi resursele si timpul liber necesar pentru a-si rezolva problemele lor individuale, se numara atat luptatorii kantieni, cat si estetii absorbiti de propria persoana, atat oamenii care nu pot trai fara religie cat si cei care o dispretuiesc, atat metafizicienii naturii cat si pragmatistii naturii. Caci, asa cum a spus Rawls, in aceasta utopie nu va fi deloc nevoie ca oamenii sa fie de acord asupra rostului existentei umane, asupra vietii bune pentru om sau asupra oricarui alt subiect cu un grad de generalitate similar. Va fi suficient daca oamenii care nu sunt deloc de acord in privinta unor astfel de probleme vor fi de acord sa coopereze in ceea ce priveste functionarea practicilor si institutiilor care, asa cum spunea Wilde, au "substituit competitia cu cooperarea". Vom ajunge sa ne dam seama ca nu merita sa ne certam in ceea ce priveste disputa Kant versus Mill, sau disputa metafizicieni versus pragmatisti, asa cum nu merita nici disputa dintre credinciosi versus atei. Caci noi, fiintele umane, nu trebuie sa fim de acord in ceea ce priveste Natura sau Scopul Omului, pentru a oferi veciunului nostru posibilitatea de a actiona potrivit propriilor sale convingeri asupra acestor probleme, asa cum nici actiunile vecinului nostru nu intervin in calea libertatii noastre de a actiona potrivit propriilor noastre convingeri. Pe scurt, asa cum am invatat, in ultimele cateva secole, ca diferenta de opinie intre credincios si ateu nu trebuie sa fie stabilita inainte ca cei doi sa poata coopera in cazul unor proiecte obstesti, la fel putem invata sa inlaturam toate diferentele dintre variatele cautari ale izbavirii, atunci cand cooperam in vederea realizarii utopiei lui Wilde. in acea utopie, cultura literara nu va fi nici singura si nici forma dominanta de cultura inalta. ai asta pentru ca nu va fi nici o forma dominanta. Cultura inalta nu va mai fi considerata locul in care este dezbatut si decis telul societatii ca intreg si nici cel in care problema ce tip de intelectual domina grupul, este una de inters social. Nici nu vor mai exista multe griji in privinta prapastiei dintre cultura populara, cultura oamenilor care n-au simtit niciodata nevoia de izbavire, si cultura inalta a intelectualilor - oamenii care intotdeauna isi doresc sa fie ceva mai mult sau diferit de ceea ce sunt in prezent. in utopie, nevoia religioasa si filosofica de a fi la inaltimea non-umanului si nevoia intelectualilor literari de a explora limitele actuale ale imaginatiei umane vor deveni simple probleme de gust. Ele vor fi privite de catre non-intelectuali in acelasi mod relaxat, tolerant si neintelegator in care noi privim in prezent obsesia vecinei noastre pentru birdwatching, macrame, colectionarea de capace de roata sau descoperirea secretelor Marilor Piramide. Oricum, pentru a se intelege unii cu altii in utopie, intelectualii literari vor fi nevoiti sa-si potoleasca retorica. Anumite pasaje din Wilde n-ar putea fi repetate, ca de exemplu, acele pasaje in care vorbeste despre "poetii, filosofii, oamenii de stiinta, oamenii de cultura - intr-un cuvant, adevaratii oameni, oamenii care s-au realizat si prin care intreaga umanitate se realizeaza partial". Ideea ca unii oameni sunt mai oameni decat altii, contrazice intelepciunea lui Wilde, ce caracterizeaza unele dintre 30

afirmatiile sale ca: "Nu exista un singur tip de om. Exista tot atatea perfectiuni cati oameni imperfecti". Aceleasi cuvinte ar fi putut fi scrise si de catre Nietzsche, insa pentru a le lua in serios trebuie sa uitam dispretul lui Zarathustra fata de "ultimii oameni", oamneii care nu simt nici o nevoie de izbavire. in utopie, cultura literara va fi invatat sa nu-si dea aere. Ea nu va mai simti tentatia de a face distinctii discriminatorii si cvasi-metafizice intre oameni reali si mai putin reali. Pe scurt, sugerez sa privim cultura literara ca fiind ea insasi un artefact care se auto-consuma si, probabil ultimul de genul acesta. Caci in utopie, intelectualii vor fi renuntat la ideea ca exista un alt standard pe baza caruia produsele imaginatiei umane pot fi masurate, in afara de utilitatea lor sociala, asa cum este judecata aceasta utilitate de catre o comunitate globala, cat se poate de libera, toleranta si cu cat mai mult timp liber posibil. Ei vor fi incetat a mai crede ca imaginatia umana ajunge undeva, ca exista un eveniment cultural indepartat spre care se indreapta intreaga creatie culturala. Ei vor fi renuntat la identificarea izbavirii cu atingerea perfectiunii. Ei vor fi pus la suflet maxima potrivit careia calatoria e cea care conteaza. in romaneste de Mihaela Cabulea

ROUND TABLE ON RICHARD RORTY'S "THE DECLINE OF REDEMPTIVE TRUTH AND THE RISE OF A LITERARY CULTURE, THE WAY THE WESTERN INTELLECTUALS WENT" Liviu Cotrau: Ladies and gentlemen, to quote Professor Marga's recent quote of Harold Bloom's observation that "Richard Rorty is the most interesting philosopher in the world today," I think, by way of introduction, it is my duty to tell you why he is so interesting. I will try to respond to this issue by addressing the implicit question to whom does Rorty seem to be so interesting. He is surely interesting to people like Harold Bloom or like most of us here, literary people. However, for quite a large number of philosophers of mainly realist persuasions, he is not so interesting as extremely controversial. Simply stated, how could Rorty, the professional philosopher who places Charles Dickens and Milan Kundera above Hegel and Kant, be other than controversial? The truth is that Rorty has done recently probably more than any other philosopher of modern times to undermine the privileged status of philosophy. So how can Rorty expect the gratitude of professional philosophers, who, like the ancient priests of Egypt or the Celtic druids claim to be the sole proprietors of knowledge? Nietzsche said that God is dead. Since that fateful pronouncement we have had all kinds of deaths (that of tragedy, among others). Rorty tells us that philosophy is dead, or dying. A question arises: what is living then? Well, in Rorty's view, what is very much alive and kicking is, lo and behold, literary criticism!, precisely what we have been busy doing for more or less practical reasons. That's surely enough reason for us to love Rorty regardless of what he is saying about the rest. Thanks to Rorty and to people of the same bent, literary criticism is no longer a Cinderella among the other disciplines, but a profession that seems to be probably best positioned to cope with the postmodern situation. Philosophy, history and all the 'soft' fields of inquiry, as Rorty calls them, turn out to be so many fictive or rhetorical constructs. But literary criticism, by its proximity to and perhaps contamination by, or even better, as a result of its consanguine relation to the practice of fiction, provides the least deluded means of addressing the postmodern condition. In short, literary criticism frankly acknowledges its institutional role as a social and cultural practice, free of essentialist presuppositions and truth-claims. A frivolous activity? All the better, Rorty would reply, for it is through 'theory-talk' rather than high-handed 'theory', through the freeplay of meanings, that we can build Oscar Wilde's 31

utopia or the Good Global Society. Rorty may be less interesting and rather controversial for some literary critics as well. "One philosophical method which will do no good at all," Rorty says, "is 'analysis of meanings'. The problem is that one thinks there are too many meanings around and the other side too few" (quote from Philosophy and the Mirrror of Nature, 88). Such observations are likely to affect, in a significant way, pace Fish, the way we interpret literary texts. The notion that 'meaning' is out there in the text and that the business of a literary critic is to re-cover it (cover it again?) is deeply embedded in our literary practice. If American students of literature have long been exposed to New Criticism, with its insistence on the autonomy and self-sufficiency of texts, with its notion of the text as being a 'verbal icon', a structure of in-wrought irony or paradox, we, on the Continent, have been practising a kind of 'explication du texte' or close philological reading (in our Saxon schools they will study Goethe's Faustus for a year or two in the (vain?) hope of eliciting all the possible textual meanings by interpreting that most famous poem line by line). In other words, we have been entertaining the notion that we ought to be guided by such high standards as 'truth' and 'objectivity' in what we are doing with the text, by some high ground of principle or by some fixed standards of judgment (think of the way we have been doing 'aesthetics', by focusing on various essentialist concepts such as 'the beautiful', 'the sublime', etc.). We have adopted the Enlightenment ethos of theory, reason and truth; we have committed ourselves to what goes by the name of 'scientific realism'. The very notion of 'metaphor' meta - phoros - that is, beyond light - suggests that there may be something interesting, something new, perhaps essential to our being, behind that light. This, of course, doesn't mean that we never listened to what Nietzsche said about truth as being 'a moving army of metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphisms', or to Wittgenstein's descriptions of 'language games' and 'cultural forms of life'. However, the sense that we somehow manage to stand 'above' the text, inspecting it from a privileged position, has been stronger than our suspicion that the 'ultimate' reality of the text is in fact our own idiosyncratic fabrication. The worst scenario, some of us will say, is that there is no original meaning in the text, that the text is, to use Eco's words, like a picnic where the author brings the words, and the reader brings the meanings. To do justice to Rorty's philosophical practice would mean to recapitulate all the key moments, and why not? the details of the history of scientific, philosophical and literary practices. I can only say that such a synopsis is to be found in his wonderful and most influential work, which I have quoted previously, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980), a book which has been translated into 15 languages. Other major philosophical contributions of Rorty's are, in chronological order: The Linguistic Turn, 1967, updated in 1992; Consequences of Pragmatism, 1982; Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 1988, translated into 21 languages, Romanian included; Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical papers I., 1991; Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical papers II., 1991; Hoffnung statt Erkentnnis: Einleitung in die pragmatische Philosophie, 1994; Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth Century America, 1998; Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers III, 1998; Philosophy and Social Hope, a collection of non-technical esasays, which is forthcoming. After having served for almost two decades as Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University, and for sixteen years as Professor of the Humanities at the University of Virginia, Professor Rorty is currently Professor of Comparative Literature at Stanford University. Since last week, last Friday, to be precise, Professor Rorty has been a Doctor Honoris Causa member of the Babes-Bolyai academic community. In what follows I would like to ask Rector Marga to make a few comments on Professor Rorty's essay, which all the respondents have had the pleasure to read. Professor Marga, you have the word. Andrei Marga: Dear colleagues, Professor Rorty offered us for this discussion a text which has to be included in the general framework of his work, and this is the first step for understanding his text. I don't want to repeat the content of this text, but to say some words about its place within Rorty's work and within contemporary philosophy. To start this discussion, I will also raise some questions addressed to Professor Rorty based on his text. In the beginning I will say that "The Decline of Redemptive Truth and the Rise of a Literary Culture" is an excellent text in many respects. First of all, it is a summary of Rorty's philosophy, with regard to some crucial concepts: truth, philosophy, intellectual history, the difference between literature, literary culture, and philosophical culture and religious culture. The text is also an excellent challenge with 32

regard to our conceptual framework for approaching the raised problems: the modern, the advanced modern societies. I find it is an excellent approach and an attempt to offer intellectual tools for defining, for promoting human liberty, human solidarity. This text raises problems first of all with regard to other texts of Rorty. In this sense, I will show that this text, in my own interpretation, is a continuation of "Philosophy and Pragmatism", which was published as an introduction to the second volume published by Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, and in this introduction Rorty describes the idea of a post-philosophical culture. Now he has completed this idea by saying that this post-philosophical culture is, or could be, a literary culture. In so far as the connections with other previous works of Rorty's are concerned, I would also mention that Rorty does not touch for the first time the problem of the relationship between religion and philosophy. In at least two previous texts, for instance in "Is there a problem about fictional discourse?" from '79 and in "Deconstruction", another text, he approaches this problem. In both texts he takes distance from Derrida by not accepting the idea that all is a text, all is a general text, all is a kind of protuberance of a general text. Richard Rorty underlines the idea that literature and philosophy and science and so on are different kinds of texts. They must not be confused in the same text. As regards the place of this conceptualisation in the history of philosophy, I wonder about the proximity of Rorty's approach, or rather the comparability of his approach to other famous approaches. In this sense, I would ask Professor Rorty about his relationship with, for instance, Auguste Comte. Comte describes the evolution of the modern mind as a passage from the religious mind to the philosophic mind and then to the scientific mind. Rorty is using a scheme based on three concepts, but he differentiates the third one, saying that the last stage is not the scientific one, but rather the literary one. In this sense, I would like to ask him to compare his approach to the famous approach of Auguste Comte, which is familiar, which is notorious in our country, in our context. Furthermore, I was impressed by the links between Rorty and Emerson: the perspective in which he has interpreted the intellectual history of the last five centuries is maybe the perspective of self-reliance. We are familiar with the concept of 'self-reliance' based on Emerson's approach; in fact, Professor Stanciu, who is present here, has translated Emerson, precisely the text I am referring to. As far as philosophy is concerned, of course, Professor Rorty must be situated, in a sense, in the continuum of philosophical culture. It isn't very clear to me, Professor Rorty, whether you consider, in your criticism addressed to the philosophical culture, Philosophy, with a capital P, or mainly "many philosophies". Because in your introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism you mention mostly Philosophy with a capital P. Now, you have avoided this kind of speech and you have addressed strong criticism to philosophies without any distinction. Of course, we have different possibilities to choose from with regard to the relations between philosophy and literature. In my opinion, it is very difficult to separate literature, the literary culture, from philosophy. At least in our context, the European context, we are accustomed to the idea that philosophy is a kind of unavoidable structure or assumption. As I said yesterday, we are also very eager, very curious to have your reaction to the current interpretations of your relativism. Mostly in your text entitled "Philosophy and Solidarity" you mention the three meanings of relativism and you say that you are defending the third ethnocentric one, which means that you consider that the standards of truth, the criteria of rationality are placed within the interactions, within the various relationships in a society. As I mentioned yesterday, there is a danger in not separating rational structure, rational attitudes from non-rational ones. I am curious to see your position, your defense against the danger of not being sufficiently distant from the irrational or purely contextual approaches; and in this sense I have a personal curiosity to see your reaction to what Habermas said about your relativism. Habermas was most careful to distinguish your relativism in comparison to the long history of his own approach. Habermas said, I quote: "Rorty fhrt die Objektivitt ber Erkenntnis auf die Inter-Subjektivitt einer bereinstimmung zurck". I repeat, I want to see your reaction to this interpretation, which, I could say, is very popular among European philosophers, and not only among the Romanian ones. And, finally, my last remark. Of course, we can discuss about the relationship between philosophy and literature under different aspects. Is philosophy a kind of literature? Can we place philosophy with literature? Is there a succession between literature and philosophy, or could they cohabitate? According 33

to my understanding, you don't consider philosophy as a kind of literature. This disposition, which has been shared by Derrida, for instance, is avoided in your text. But I would like to see in more details your reactions to such questions. Thank you. Liviu Cotrau: Thank you. I wonder if Professor Rorty would like to answer straight away, or maybe he would like to take other questions. Richard Rorty: I'd be glad to answer straight away, at least to some of Rector Marga's questions. On the relation to Comte: it seems to me that what Comte called 'a positive stage of development' is just a form of what he called 'the metaphysical stage', the form which metaphysics takes when it becomes completely materialist and says that natural science gives us the Truth. It seems to me that the idea that natural science gives us the Truth is the result of the idea, the Platonic - Socratic idea that the Truth, in the sense of "that which all human beings most badly need to know", is "what all human beings can agree upon". Well, it turned out in the nineteenth century that the only thing that human beings could really agree on were the results of natural science. So people said OK, that must mean that natural science is what we'we always wanted to know. But, of course, it isn't. All natural science tells you is how things work. It's very nice to know how things work if you're interested in technology. But knowing how things work is of no use whatever in figuring out what to do with your life. So, natural science is not a source of the sort of truth that religion and philosophy try to get. Materialist metaphysics, physics, natural science as the answer to the old philosophical questions is a failure, because it doesn't speak to the old philosophical questions. The only thing you can say for it is that it is true: that is, everybody agrees on physical scientific theories. But truth is not the same as universal utility and all that science is good for is prediction and control of the environment. I don't have anything special to say about the relation to Emerson except that the Emersonian idea of self-reliance seems to me to have been taken over by Nietzsche, who read Emerson intensively, and who made more of the notion of self-reliance than Emerson managed to make, by transmuting it into the idea of self-creation. On the relation between literature and philosophy, I don't think of literature as taking the place of philosophy. I think of us as reading theological and philosophical texts in a literary way, that is not as attempts to get at the truth, but as imaginative suggestions about ways in which we might develop our self-image. So it isn't that one discipline will end and another discipline will take its place. The discipline of philosophy we will have with us forever. There will always be commentary on Plato, on Kant, on Hegel, on Nietzsche and so on, and you might as well call that philosophy, but this commentary will not be seen as a quasi-scientific discipline which will come up with results. It will merely be like literary criticism, an attempt to lay out the alternatives. On relativism I don't see that a purely contextualist approach is irrationalist. Here Habermas and I simply disagree. I think that every attribution of meaning, every attempt at appreciation or interpretation is a matter of putting something in a context. That's all we ever do. Contexts are used to putting things, texts, people, institutions, nations in context, which is useful for various purposes. To put something in a given context is never irrational; the only thing that's irrational is to insist that that is the only relevant context to put it in. If you have a diversity of contexts to put the same thing in, you don't have to be afraid of irrationalism. Habermas thinks there has to be a single universal context to overcome irrationalism, and I don't. One last question I'd like to take up. Rector Marga asked: is philosophy unavoidable? Well, the history of philosophy is for us, Europeans and Americans, unavoidable because it's part of what made us the people we are. To understand ourselves requires some sense of what we call the history of philosophy, that is the canonical texts from Plato to Nietzsche. If we don't study those texts, we lose a great deal, but that is not to say that there will always be a quasi-scientific discipline called 'philosophy'. There may or may not be and whether there is or not, I think, doesn't greatly matter. Liviu Cotrau: Should we understand, Professor Rorty, that philosophers and literary critics, theorists and anti-theorists, professionals and anti-professionals are all in the same boat, and while some are out there to steer the boat by some fixed coordinates, some are just rocking the boat to show that there are no such coordinates, and shall we then say that both procedures, both positions are valid on their own terms? Richard Rorty: Well, again, the difference between Habermas and myself is that he uses the notion of 34

validity, and I would prefer the notion of utility and say that various academic disciplines, political institutions, facts and so on have utility for one or another purpose, that if you want to ask: "is there a purpose", "are they valid", all you can be asking is "is this a purpose that it is worth bothering about?" Purposes become obsolete, so it may be that certain academic disciplines, certain texts, certain political institutions and so on, certain cultures, will become obsolete. To say that 'there is no fixed coordinate to steer the boat by' is just to say that as cultural politics becomes more and more democratic, more people will give up the idea of universal validity and will only consider: Has the decision about what purposes to serve been freely arrived at? It seems to me that if you can answer that question affirmatively, then you don't really need to worry about the political. Liviu Cotrau: As you may have noticed, most of the respondents here belong to the literary camp, so I wonder if there are any questions regarding the relationship between pragmatism and literature, that is, if there are any consequences of that sort of philosophy for literary practice, because at least one follower of Richard Rorty's, Stanley Fish, is an exemplary case of a literary critic who will strongly reject the implications and consequences of theory, claiming that theory has no consequences whatsoever for literary practice, it does not change one's beliefs. So I think this is a very common consequence of what we think we are doing in the field of literary studies. Richard Rorty: I think that Stanley Fish overstates his point. I think what he is entitled to say is that reading a theory book doesn't help you find what to say about a text, a novel, a poem, a play, in any way different than reading another novel or poem or play helps you figure out what to say about the first novel, poem or play. That is, works of theory, works of philosophy are just texts to be collated with other texts, compared to other texts, have similarities and differences pointed out. They don't stand on a different level than literary texts telling you what to do with literary texts. I think nothing can tell you what to do with a literary text. What you do with it is a fiction of the other books you've read, the other interests you have, the other people you know, the other concerns you have. If you are lucky, your particular constellation of interests, concerns, acquaintances and so on will produce a work of criticism which itself becomes a text worthy of studying. Great critics, Dr. Johnson, Hazlitt, Harold Bloom, Goethe, the canonical thinkers of national traditions of literary criticism write texts which we read in the same way that we read novels, plays, poems and so on. I think the notion that there can be such a thing as the professional study of literature is unfortunate. That young people should be given an oportunity in universities to write literary criticism is, I think, a very good idea. The idea that there can be a method of doing so I think is a very bad idea. The young students of literature should not be encouraged to practice a method, they should not be encouraged to think that now they understand how to find out the meanings of texts. It is enough for them to think: "perhaps some day I could do something like what Dr. Johnson did with Milton, perhaps some day I could do something like what Bloom did with Blake, perhaps some day I could do something like what Heidegger did with Socrates, perhaps some day I can say something interesting about one of my favorite books. This is a perfectly reasonable intellectual ambition, and universities are a good place in which to encourage this ambition. But the unfortunate idea that there is a quasi-scientific discipline called "literary interpretation" is, I think, something that we could give up without worrying. Liviu Cotrau: We are going to lose our jobs, Professor Rorty. Richard Rorty: For years I was told by audiences of philosophy students and professors that I was going to make them lose their jobs. Liviu Cotrau: Indeed, the philosophers would lose their jobs first. Richard Rorty: The philosopher's job is to read books that other people don't read and to talk about those books. I mean, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is a very hard book. And somebody has to figure out what it says, and relate it to the concerns of a new generation. Sooner or later somebody has to reread the literary canon and relate those texts to the concerns of a new generation. This job will always be open, whether there is a quasi-scientific discipline or not doesn't matter. It might be done outside the university, it might be done inside the university, but, again, that's a matter of allocation of resources. Liviu Cotrau: I would say the literati will be very pleased with your account of philosophy, but probably the linguists won't be that happy about it, for they think they are following, let's say, a 'more' scientific, 'more' scholarly, 'more' rational procedure. There are a few distinguished linguists around, so I wonder if Chomsky might be of any help in this discussion. 35

Mircea Borcila: Professor Rorty, I must start with the idea that I am not a Chomskyan myself. I would rather play the devil's advocate by reminding you about that confrontation Chomsky started in the 1980s with your philosophy, and pointing to one aspect that he thought was crucial, namely the fact that he denies the very principle of accessibility of a reflexive mind, of the basic structures of language and thought as such. In one word, he denies Vico's point of departure for building the humanities, and he tells us that the only way out is to go back to the Galilean method in the science of nature to find, not necessarily any truth, but to find a way, an access to, a contact with what he means to be the basic roots of our human nature. Now, I'm not aware of your reply to this criticism, and I must say I don't agree with Chomsky's position. Fundamentally I'm on your side, but I would be very much interested in your present-day reply to Chomsky. Richard Rorty: There has been a controversy between Chomsky and philosophers of language like Donald Davidson and incidentally myself on the question whether the notion of the structures of language is one that names a fruitful topic of research. Chomsky recently wrote an article saying that there is this huge scientific enterprise going on in linguistics, and Davidson is suggesting that it can't possibly take place, but it does take place, we are doing this; and I think that all one can say is that we just have to wait and see whether something interesting comes out of what is called 'MIT linguistics' or 'MIT cognitive science', the kind of enterprise which grew up around Chomsky and others. It may be that there are interesting linguistic universals of the sort that Chomsky is looking for, but we don't know that a priori. Davidson, I think, can show that there are no such universals, we can just say there is no particular reason to look for them. I think that all one can do is say to Chomsky: "O.K., well, keep doing the research, so far you haven't really shown us anything that is very exciting, but who knows, maybe you will." Mircea Borcila: What about the second generation of cognitive science, Lakoff's and Johnson's opposition to Chomsky as an alternative? Richard Rorty: I confess, I don't understand the work of Lakoff and Chomsky very well. They say it's important to figure out, you know, which words are metaphors and what their metaphorical meaning is. I can't see what the importance is. As Nietzsche said, as you put it, every word started out probably as some sort of metaphor, but I can't really care what sort. I don't see why I should care what metaphor each word can be traced back to, I don`t see what we would do with this knowledge if we had it. So, I don't see what Lakoff and Chomsky think there lies in the future, but I may simply not have read enough of their work to really grasp their program. Liviu Cotrau: Professor Stanciu has got something to say... Virgil Stanciu: Professor Rorty, if I may, I must confess I have a problem with the way you treat natural sciences and the materialist metaphysicians. Are we to understand that philosophy should be removed from the scientific field totally, along with the literary and artistic fields? And, if that is the case, what do we make of the fine philosophical works that are not really science, Stephen Hawking's, for instance? Richard Rorty: I can't see what further increase of knowledge about the Big Bang or about related matters would give us that would be more than, so to speak, 'greater elegance'. The completion of the project of a unifying science, finding out eveything one wants to know, finding out everything that every scientist wants to know would give us an enormously beautiful, intellectual, imaginative construction. But I think that it would leave us in very much the same spiritual position that we were in in the days of Democritus, you know. We now know a great deal of details that Democritus didn't know, but it's still atoms and void; and atoms and void aren't really very interesting. To qualify that a bit: it's sometimes said we now know that it isn`t atoms and void because of quantum indeterminacy, because of one or another special scientific result, but I seem to have a blind spot for appreciating the importance of these scientific results. The intellectual and imaginative power of the new scientific theories seems to me, you know, admirable, but I can't think of anything to do with these results. So even after we find out how the brain works, you know, how, molecule by molecule, information is processed, conceptual thought occurs, imagination happens and so on, I don't think we will have any better idea of what to do with our brain. Liviu Cotrau: Richard Rorty has been labeled a postmodern philosopher. I suppose Professor Matei Calinescu, who has done some interesting research work on the issue of postmodernism, would 36

perhaps like to situate Rorty's philosophy in the tradition of postmodern thinking. Matei Calinescu: Well, I will limit myself to asking you an unphilosophical question, or perhaps two. The first question has to do with what is happening in today's world in the West, in the United States primarily, with the discussion about literature. For instance, literature is under a double challenge at this point. From the academia come voices in English departments, in humanities departments, that say simply there is no such thing as literature, that this is an elitist invention, there are texts, there are advertisements, there are texts, there are literary works, there are simply texts, why don't we create departments of textual studies? There have been proposals to call English departments 'Departments of Textual Studies'. For there is a very strong challenge here. The idea of literature appears as elitist, class-based, politically and culturally incorrect. The canon is also under challenge. It has been totally politically incorrect. On the other hand, there is the challenge coming from popular culture, from the world of entertainment, the amusement industry and the Frankfurt School of philosophers. Sociologically, one may even know that there are people, young people in the US who pride themselves on not having ever read a book. Not to speak of novels or of more complex literary texts. So how do we go about recommending a literary model of organizing knowledge and deciding about purposes and the crisis of the idea of literature? That's one thing and then one marginal question you recommend, and I agree with you intellectually, the abandonment of any method, which brings me to the idea of Feyerabend's Against Method. On the other hand, students of literature and of other disciplines are looking for the purpose for studying this, finding finally a job in the area, there are intellectual fashions, there are people, for instance young people in the US, who undertake studies with psychoanalysis, or literary students who undertake studies in psychoanalysis, or Lacan or whatever, because the market is there. If you are a Lacanian, you find a job, if you are an old-fashioned stuffy liberal, you don't find a job. So what would be your response to these questions? Richard Rorty: On the first topic. It seems to me it's perfectly true that literature, in the sense of the canon, the stuff that has been usually been studied in literature departments, is an elitist invention. But it's the elite that invented it, and it has been a very useful elite. The intellectuals of the West who are bound together across the generations by studying those canonical texts have been a force for social good. They have organized themselves around those canonical texts in the way that religious people organize themselves around the sacred scriptures. In the paper that I distributed for this round table I called it 'Shelley's defense of poetry'. Shelley is saying we could have gotten along without the philosophers and the scientists, but think what human life in Europe would be like if we had not preserved Greek art, Greek literature, if we had not preserved Dante, if we had not preserved Shakespeare and so on! And I think he's absolutely right. These texts were vehicles for social progress, they were inspirations for the creation of human liberty. So it would not be a light thing to give up the study of that canon. There is nothing particularly wrong with elitism. The only question is: is it a good elite or a bad elite? And the elite that has organized around what we call 'literature' as a whole has been a good elite. On the question of how you get jobs if you live in a culture which is professionalized to the degree that university instruction is professionalized I think you just have to be cynical about it. If you have to look like a Lacanian, look like a Lacanian. Eventually you will get tenure, eventually they won't be able to fire you any more, and then you can look like what you want to look. I and many other people started our careers as philosophy professors by imitating the dominant fashions in philosophy and doing what we were expected to do, and then we got tenure, and then we did what we wanted to do. This seems to me a perfectly reasonable compromise. Marius Jucan: In support of what you were saying of the literary culture, what would be the Marxist critical tradition of the imagination, because in one of your most famous essays on Heidegger, "Dickens and Kundera", you actually oppose the novelist to the philosopher, and if I understood well, there is a kind of play versus the philosopher and the novelist, and under the guidance of the philosopher we recognize reason or rationalization, and under the guidance of the novelist we may recognize the freeplay of imagination. Now, the focus of my question would be on just how free is this play of imagination, in your conception? Richard Rorty: I'm not sure I understand. I mean how free is it compared with. with what? Marius Jucan: How free is it compared to the discourse of rationality? 37

Richard Rorty: Oh, I guess I think there is no such thing as 'the discourse of rationality', that there are simply conversations within expert cultures conducted according to whatever norms are prevalent within that expert culture at a certain time. I mean, to be a good philosopher in Germany in 1820, you conformed to a certain set of rules, you know, you had to fit within a certain expert culture, to be a good philosopher in the US at the present time you fit within another expert culture. Both expert cultures are rational discourses, one is just as rational as the other. I think that the nice thing about being a poet or being a novelist is there is. n't a relevant expert culture. If you're good enough, you may break through the conventions and do something so novel that it will take the literary critics a long time to figure out what it is that you did. And that's called 'literary greatness'. So, you know, one reason that literary bohemia has always seemed so different from the university is that within the university there are acknowledged experts and in the bohemia there are no acknowledged experts. You need both institutions, but it isn't because universities are rational and bohemia is irrational, it`s just that you need the conversability that comes from the participation in an expert culture, and you also need people who don't want to converse; they just want to create. Corin Braga: Professor Rorty, you give in your paper a convincing argument on the evolution of the idea of "redemptive truth". You make the distinction between three historical acceptations of what you consider to be the goal of human knowledge: God in the religious culture, Truth in the philosophical culture, and self-realization in the literary culture. Now, I would like to focus on some of the historical joints of this evolution. Firstly, you state that the shift from a philosophical truth to a literary vision first took shape in the works of some writers such as Cervantes and Shakespeare. These writers dropped the Platonic idea of some single and final essence of humanity, and they started searching for the actual polymorphous variety of humankind. Now, could this metamorphosis be the result of a conflict of visions that affected the ontological certainty of the Baroque thinkers? Let me explain this point. By the end of the sixteenth century, the Neo-platonic and magical philosophy of the Renaissance was bluntly contested by Christian theology. Reformation, and especially the Counter-Reformation, tried to reinstall the orthodox dogma, and this resulted in a brutal confrontation between two visions of the world, between two explanations of the world: the Christian and the Neo-platonic one. Could this conflict be the cause that led to a collapse of the certitude of a final truth (be it religious or philosophical) and reoriented the 'intellectuals' towards the literary exploration of the variety of human nature? Secondly, you state that the idea of a philosophical truth ended with Nietzsche, but was perpetrated in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by the idea of a scientific truth. So, in the nineteenth century the philosophical culture was, on the one hand, challenged and replaced by the literary culture, and, on the other hand, continued by positivism and natural sciences. Now, this picture could be restated in a different arrangement. We could say that the culture that in the nineteenth century challenged and disrupted metaphysics was positivistic, atheistic and materialistic natural science, and the culture that preserved the religious and philosophical idea of the sacred and the absolute, the shift from ethics to aesthetics, was literature. What do you think about such a restatement of the positions? Thirdly, you argue that contemporary intellectuals feel progressively disenchanted with the idea of a scientific final truth. This means that the scientific explanation, which is a prolongation of the metaphysical explanation, is also about to vanish. Could we place this phenomenon of vanishing under the name of postmodernism? I wouldn't ask this question if I didn't know that you consider postmodernism to be an inappropriate and misleading concept. And, finally, what do you think of the idea of relating postmodernism (which is currently connected to the postindustrial societies) to postcommunism? In the utopian model of 'literary' culture, the leading principle would be the respect for difference and the tolerance towards each individual truth. Just on the contrary, the communist totalitarian societies were built on the idea of a single absolute truth, elaborated by the Marxist ideology and put into practice by the communist party. Could communist societies be seen as one of the last social applications of the concept of a unique 'redemptive truth'? Thank you. Richard Rorty: On the first point, I'm not sure why you picked neo-Platonist philosophy versus Christianity as one of the causes of the ferment that produced, among other things, Cervantes and Shakespeare. I don't have any particular views about why these people occurred at that time except my 38

hunch would be that the Reformation must have had something to do with it. The fact that you had the clergy at war with one another for a century, that the unanimity of religious belief had broken up perhaps had something to do with the rise of modern literature. I suppose I would, this may be just because philosophers always do this, but I would tend to put the crucial conflict of the period not in the sixteenth century, but in the seventeenth century, in the conflict between the new science and the church, but I don't have any firm views about this. I don't think I'm a good enough intellectual historian to answer the question very well. About the sacred, it seems to me that the notion of 'the sacred' probably can't survive in a literary culture, because the sacred has to be special, it has to be reserved from the rest of life, it has to be set apart. It seems to me that the rise of literary culture replaces the notion of the sacred with that of the private, you know, that which you don't have to justify to the community, that which you can take full responsibility for yourself and which other people don't have the right to question you about. The private/public opposition seems to me a more useful opposition than the opposition between the sacred and the profane. I think that the idea of a single truth, redemptive truth, either in its religious or philosophical or materialist metaphysics form suggests that there is something sacred which all human beings have the same duty to acknowledge and once you get rid of something which all human beings have the duty to acknowledge other than their social responsibility of their human beings, then you don't have the idea of the sacred anymore. You just have the idea of the sphere of the individual as separate from the sphere of social responsibility. Professor Calinescu has written a lot about various ways in which the term 'postmodernism' is used, and one of the things he said that seemed to me most important is that there is a confusion between the idea of modernity and the idea of the literary and artistic avantgarde. I think modernity is, as Habermas says, an unfinished project that we still have with us. I don't think anything has changed since the Enlightenment in our social goals, our idea of what society ought to be like, so in that sense there is no such thing as social postmodernity. There are, of course, succesive avantgardes, the literary-artistic avantgarde of the first part of the twentieth century got called 'modernism', when it was time for a new avantgarde, they had to call themselves something different, so people began calling them 'postmodern', but that's a meaningless expression, it just means whatever avantgarde came after that avantgarde. And soon there would be another avantgarde, which will be post-postmodernism. You can keep this up forever if you want to. I don't think there is any such thing as post-industrial society. You know, the industrial society is going strong in the Third World, the people that make the clothing, make the sneakers, produce most of the stuff that the rest of the world uses, so I don't see much hope in industry going away. I mean, I can't quite imagine what a postindustrial society would look like. I think Daniel Bell's story about postindustrial society has some relevance to the economic situation of the United States, but not much to the world as a whole. I don't see much of a connection between communism and the idea of redemptive truth. Any gang of thugs that seizes control of the government, the Nazis, the Communists, the righ-wing Republicans in the United States, will say we stand for the one true something or other. That's what the Catholic Church said, it`s what the Communist Party said, that's what any gang that wants power will inevitably say. One reason not to believe that there is such a thing as redemptive truth is that we might be able to create a culture in which the very idea of claiming that our government has the truth just sounds ridiculous. We managed to create a situation in Europe in which the idea of a government saying 'we are on God's side' began to sound ridiculous because everybody said so, you know. Nobody took it seriously. I think we may be moving into a period when saying 'We stand for the truth' will sound equally important. Berszn Istvn: I have just one question. I have concluded from your paper that I could get pragmatist to a certain extent. I can accept how a philosophical question of what the truth is is transformed into the open question "what to do with ourselves". It seems to me that this question in your paper is opened only within a process of reflection, within a process of using signifiers or within a literary culture. The term 'literary' in its sense referring to the signifying activity or practice functions as a synecdoque here. It stands for any alternative practice, which means that reading and writing exercises or practices are happening exclusively on the scene of signifiers. Why do we not put again the open 39

question 'What to do with ourselves when we read or write?' It seems to me that this practice is reduced to the scene of signifiers in a literary culture. When we read or when we write it means that we use signifiers, and it seems to me there must be an answer to this open question, and if there is an answer, it is not an open question anymore. Richard Rorty: I guess I don't see what alternative to what you are calling 'the scene of signifiers' we have. We talk to one another and, you know, if you want to call it so, that's, you think, signifiers, we can't stop talking to each other, we shouldn't stop talking to each other, so, I mean, what's so bad about the scene of signifiers? Berszn Istvn: Because it's. the problem for me is that it's an exclusive scene! Richard Rorty: What's the alternative then? Berszn Istvn: I think it's quite hard to make a conference now on this topic because I began to serve these alternatives under the name of ritual reading and writing exercises, and, of course, when I'm speaking, when I'm formulating sentences, I am using signifiers. But the starting point for me was that when I read, there happen gestures which aren't inside the scene of signifiers, or they make another rhythm, not the rhythm of using signifiers, maybe another time. For me time is a temporization, making time, and it depends on the gestures which make the rhythm of this time. Richard Rorty: I read your paper on the subject and I can't really get the hang of your use of the notion of 'ritual'. I mean, I vaguely see what you're suggesting, but it rather reminds me of Bergson, you know. Bergson's attempt to escape from concepts into a realm of pure dure, of pure unspatialized temporality. it seems to me, you know, it was a nice idea, but nobody knew how to do it. I mean, it sounded good, but Bergson didn't explain how to do the tricks, and I sort of have the same questions about your notion of ritual. You know, how would I know whether I escaped the scene of signifiers? Just as in Bergson one wonders, you know: what would it be like not to have any concepts? Would I still be there? I have the feeling, if I left the scene of signifiers, I wouldn't recognize myself anymore. Berszn Istvn: OK. Thanks! Liviu Cotrau: What is really bothering me is the spin-off of these pragmatic and neo-pragmatic assumptions, the collapse of binary oppositions, the collapse of antinomies: 'subjective' versus 'objective', 'synthetic' versus 'analytical', 'true' versus 'false' and so on, with great names behind such distinctions. Take, for example, Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels' Against Theory. They say that an example of the tendency to generate theoretical problems is splitting apart terms which actually should be taken together; so, in their view, the mistake is to imagine the possibility or desirability of moving from one term to another. Now, in the field of literary studies we constantly operate with such distinctions and oppositions, for instance 'authorial intention' versus 'textual intention', what Eco has called intentio auctoris and intentio operis. This can hardly be taken as a futile distinction - witness the productivity of various kinds of inquiries - formalism, structuralism, New Criticism, etc. - into the nature of the text's intention and meaning. So my question, Professor Rorty, is to what extent would you endorse such radical denunciations as Knapp and Michaels' of the practice of literary criticism operating with structural and functional dichotomies? Richard Rorty: I guess I have the same doubts about the fruitfulness of structuralism and New Criticism and so on as I do about Chomsky and MIT cognitive science. It's produced some good books, just as MIT has produced some good books. But I have a feeling those books would have been written anyway, even without this, you know, huge theoretical structure. Chomsky has made some interesting observations about what may turn out to be a universal grammar, but he didn't have to surround these observations with this huge theory of innate structures. There were some good New Critics, but they didn't have to construct this big theory of the verbal icon in order to do what they did. I think what was alive in New Criticism was the example of Eliot's critical essays and some people were able to write essays almost as good as poems. Some people were able to produce essays almost as intriguing as Emerson's. But I don't see that literary criticism has been, you know, has had its level raised by this sort of huge professional movements that have been taking place. They've been movements in the direction of professionalization, and you can't have a profession without such claims about method, structure and so on. I just don't think that one should take them that seriously: you can use them to get a job, but after you use them to get a job, you shouldn't really pay too much attention to them. 40

Mircea Borcila: Professor Rorty, but does it go back to the question of how it works? I mean poetics or the theory of literature in this perspective asks itself a different question than literary criticism. My question is: is that question legitimate within a literary culture as you envision? Richard Rorty: Again, all I can say is I don't think that asking it has shown much fruit so far. That is, I think that asking the question 'how do literary texts work?' either means having a general theory about how texts work, which seems to me nobody has convincingly done, or it's just saying: 'this poem works this way, that novel works that way', don't bother me with the question of whether this is typical of the way poems or novels work. I prefer the lighter kind of criticism, and I just haven't seen the fruits of claims that this is the way that things in general would work. Liviu Cotrau: I am sure, ladies and gentlemen, that you would like to take part in our discussion, so would you like to address any question to Professor Rorty? Yes, please. Question: I am not a philosopher. I am a communicator, but I find this session particularly interesting. I think what I feel is we need to break out of the 'box'. In America they will say there are a lot of things inside the box, there they stand inside the box. Theory or philosophical theory, whatever kind of theory you want to talk about becomes obsolete. I don't agree that science is a truth, science has also become obsolete through the years, over and over again, It proved something wrong and we believed it was the truth. I found it out years ago. I was very young and objected to doing things just so inside the box, and I kind of equated that with theory, basing everything on theory. It was useful. I made a mistake. I wish I had acquired more skill. I think that theory is just simply that. The problem is, and I would agree with you, sir, that the problem is why we take that too seriously, why we take it as a truth, why we take it as a belief, or we use it as an exercise to find a reason, to experiment. I remember I sat with a group of Florentine artists once and I spent a month copying each other. That did not make me in the end an artist by that. It simply gave me some practice in learning to use some of those skills, and I think that's what theory can help us with. I frankly admit I only trust my own theories. I develop them. Thank you. Richard Rorty: I guess my only comment is to tell you a story about my most successful teaching. I once taught in a summer school for professors who came from different places to learn about literary theory, and I had one professor from South Africa who was writing a book on black women novelists in South Africa, and she didn't say anything at the seminar, but after six weeks she came up to me and said: 'I have finished my book and I have figured that it needed a methodological and theoretical preface, so I came to America for the summer to find out how to write a methodological and theoretical preface. And then I took your seminar and I realized I didn't have to write a methodological preface. Thank you.' Liviu Cotrau: Any other question? Yes, please. Question: From a pragmatical point of view, you are right. But how is one to decide what is true? Richard Rorty: I think that the word "true", like the word "good" is the word we use when we think that a view is justified when we recommend it and so on and so, of course, I think my view is true. It isn't true because it corresponds to the nature of things, it's just better than anybody else's view. What more can you say? Question: Why is that? Richard Rorty: That's a long story. I think, you know, all one can do is say: Here is an alternative which has the following disadvantages, here is another alternative which has the following disadvantages and so on, and you try to go through as many alternatives as possible, but what people would really like is, you know, a single, great big massive knock-down argument in favor of pragmatism, or, you know, whatever, and, of course, you'll never get that. All you can possibly mean by 'my view is true' is 'I have thought about the alternatives and on the whole this one seems the best.' Andrei Marga: You have a more detailed answer in your introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism, where you answer this question. Richard Rorty: Maybe I could enlarge on it by saying I think the test of a philosophical view is, you know, how well does it contribute to the formation of a freer and more democratic culture and society than we presently have, and Dewey and the other American pragmatists thought that if you want to have a philosophical view of truth that will contribute to the greatness of such a society, we recommend the pragmatist view of truth, in that, you know, it is recommended on the basis of social 41

utility. Liviu Cotrau: If there are no further questions, let me conclude this wonderful occasion on the melancholic tone of Bernard Shaw's observation that whilst the subject-matter is not exhausted, we may be exhausted. I would like to thank Professor Rorty for his willingness to take part in our panel discussion. Indeed pragmatism does have consequences. Thank you very much. (a consemnat Mihaela Ursa)

VICTOR NEUMANN PERSPECTIVE COMPARATIVE ASUPRA FILOZOFIEI MULTICULTURALE

Comparative perspectives on multicultural philosophy Abstract: The article presents the general issues regarding multiculturalism and discusses its foundation and reasons, paying attention to national identity, ideology and difference. Keywords: Multiculturalism; transculturalism; national identity; multiple identiy

Lui Warayuth Sriwarakuel* 1. Educatia si filozofia diferentialismului multicultural. Observatii pe marginea perspectivei lui Charles Taylor De unde izvoraste interesul pentru multiculturalism? Este acest concept cu adevarat o problema de interpretare derivata din experienta diverselor grupuri sau invatatii au fost indusi in eroare de speculatiile politicienilor? in ce masura diferitele acceptiuni ale multiculturalismului evidentiate de cercetatori beneficiaza de o examinare plurala, intelegind prin aceasta luarea in considerare atit a rezultatelor universitatilor occidentale, cit si a institutiilor similare din intinsul areal al Estului sau al Sudului? Studiile de caz dezvaluie similaritati intre societatile cu profil multicultural, dar si diferente apreciabile presupunind interpretari in functie de cadrul zonal ori regional. Avocatii educatiei si filozofiei multiculturalismului sint de parere ca toate culturile trebuie sa se bucure de un fel de integritate, sa beneficieze de un anumit respect, sa nu fie marginalizate, reduse la tacere sau supuse opresiunii de catre culturile dominante. in aceasta acceptiune, idealurile personale sau ale societatilor sint in primul rind idealuri ale culturilor particulare, aspiratii circumscrise traditiilor locale si care se bazeaza pe capacitatea de conservare a habitatului mostenit de la generatiile precedente. Ele reprezinta o gindire intemeiata pe trasaturi psihologice distincte ale comunitatilor regionale, nationale sau rasiale. Diferentialismul lingvistic devine in acest caz promotor al monoculturalismului, un constant reper pentru o ipotetica demnitate in care identitatea ar fi conferita in baza limbii vorbite. Problema ce o ridica societatea democratica liberala este cum anume sa fie respectate culturile ce 42

afiseaza atitudini de superioritate etnica sau rasiala, stiut fiind ca ele intra in contradictie cu alte culturi. Una dintre dificultatile majore priveste concilierea culturilor (pretins superioare) cu obligativitatea tratarii oamenilor ca fiinte egale. Prin urmare, exista limite ale cererii privind politica recunoasterii culturilor particulare1. Charles Taylor are in vedere ideea conform careia politicile diferentelor se dezvolta organic si in afara acelora ce se refera la demnitatea universala. Cererea de recunoastere a devenit una importanta pe masura ce a dobindit o relatie strinsa cu identitatea. Pornind de la clasicii filozofiei moderne, Taylor sustine ca recunoasterea nu este doar o forma de politete pe care noi oamenii o avem, ci este o necesitate umana vitala. Nerecunoasterea sau gresita recunoastere a cuiva poate deveni o forma de opresiune, de marginalizare, de excludere. Filozoful atrage atentia asupra tendintei grupurilor dominante de a dubla hegemonia lor prin inculcarea imaginii de inferioritate minoritatilor sau grupurilor subordonate politic, economic, numeric. in timpul marilor desocoperiri geografice, dar si mai tirziu in vremea celei dintii industrializari, europenii au procedat astfel dupa ce au supus diferite comunitati. Cazurile indienilor, filipinezilor, populatiilor africane, bastinasilor americani s.a. arata cum instrumentalizarea opresiunii a creat un puternic sentiment de autodepreciere. Taylor considera ca intre schimbarile majore care au determinat preocuparea modernilor pentru identitate si inevitabila recunoastere a fost sfirsitul ierarhiilor sociale. Temeiul onoarei in societatile aristocratice medievale fusese conferit de ierarhiile stabilite prin mostenire. E vorba de acea onoare strins legata de inegalitati. impotriva acestui fel de a intelege onoarea, lumea moderna a introdus conceptul de demnitate, folosit acum in sens universalist si egalitarist. Rousseau a fost intre cei dintii critici ai onoarei bazata pe ierarhii sociale. Discursul despre originile si fundamentele inegalitatii dintre oameni al ginditorului luminist este invocat de Taylor ca fiind acela in care s-a aratat pentru intiia oara si cu argumente credibile cum coruptia si injustitia apar atunci cind oamenii doresc recunoasteri, distinctii, preferinte. Asa se explica faptul ca aspiratia pentru drepturi egale caracteristica fiintei umane, cetateanului, a devenit deziderat revolutionar la 1789 si in toate momentele istorice in care procesul de modernizare necesita programe de emancipare sociala. Conceptul de demnitate a ajuns sa fie compatibil cu societatea democratica. in mod cert rolul sau in recunoasterea culturii democratice este esential 2. Cit priveste dezvoltarea notiunii moderne de identitate, Taylor o pune in legatura cu afirmarea politicii diferentelor. El observa ca exista un temei universal al diferentialismului, ca fiecare isi doreste o recunoastere particulara, asimilarea fiind pacatul cardinal impotriva oricarui ideal de autenticitate. El vede doua parti ale acestui diferentialism, unul, benign, altul, malign. Invocarea conceptiei romantice relativ la originalitatea Volk-ului este una care trimite spre o zona foarte complicata. Taylor spune ca ideea de recunoastere sta la baza afirmarii identitatilor colective, si deci, a separatismelor3. La fel de adevarat ar fi ca subjugarea oamenilor si a comunitatilor a generat cererea de recunoastere a identitatilor distincte, afirmatie ce are acoperire daca vedem fenomenul in temeiul spatiilor cucerite si colonizate. Cazul Americii, de pilda. Nu aceleasi motivatii identificam in istoria Europei. Exemplul diferentialismului etno-cultural german nu este revelator pentru ideea de eliberare, aspiratiile hegemonice ale Prusiei in secolul al XIX-lea indicind cealalta fateta a medaliei: inventarea ideologiei moderne de cuceritor prin drepturile conferite de asa numita specificitate rasiala. Scopul initial fusese unul national-statal, el devenind ulterior insasi justificarea agresiunii si a dorintei de dominare a lumii. in acest sens, conceptul de Volk avea sa devina fundamental in orientarea culturii si a gindirii politice. Cultivarea de catre un grup privilegiat a ideii apartenentei la o singura cultura a unui conglomerat de comunitati a generat teoria "neotribalismului" (K.R. Popper). Din istorie am retinut ca in perioada de la medieval la modern a avut loc o dezvoltare economica intemeiata pe comert si industrie, precum si aparitia burgheziei ca segment social ce reprezenta ideea de transformare structurala a administratiilor feudale. Paralel, ambitiile unor familii de aristocrati (pe urmele lor si ale unor invatati) au facut posibila supravietuirea teoriilor intemeiate pe: superioritatea originilor, puritatea limbilor, continuitatea istorica si dreptul primului venit. Astfel se explica de ce multe cercuri intelectuale si aristocratconservatoare au fost in masura sa substituie teoria egalitatii cu o alta forma de inechitate. in consecinta, nu putem lega decit partial procesul de formare moderna a natiunilor sau a etno-natiunilor cu acela al cererii de recunoastere a grupurilor (numite etnice) subjugate. O observatie asemanatoare a fost facuta si de Jurgen Habermas fara a fi fost legata de exemplul german invocat mai sus. 43

Din perspectiva filozofului Charles Taylor, forta distructiva a etnicismului (in sensul sau rasial, sovin, ignorant si/sau radical fata de minoritati) conceput in cultura germana a secolului al XIX-lea nu ar trebui luata in considerare. Or, in absenta decodarii acestui concept si a legaturii sale nemijlocite cu fenomenul multicultural vom avea serioase probleme de intelegere, elaborare si aplicare a principiilor si valorilor ce le presupune politica recunoasterii. Rolul jucat de conceptul de etnic in esentialismul nationalist a stat la baza formarii nu doar a celui dintii Reich german, dar si a statelor-natiune din Europa Centrala si din Europa de Sud-Est. O generalizare filtrata prin cunostintele privitoare la America de Nord pare insuficienta. Aceasta in pofida promovarii unor idei generoase ale autorului amintit. Taylor este incredintat ca evolutia teoriei identitare evidentiaza un nationalism in care putem distinge intre partile bune si acelea rele. Sub o forma usor diferita, dar continind acelasi mesaj regasim aceeasi gindire speculativa si la istoricul si politologul Michel Winock in teza "nationalism deschis" vs. "nationalism inchis". Observatia este discutabila de indata ce autenticitatea in temeiul careia ne identificam intr-un grup sau altul nu presupune neaparat nationalism, cum diferentialismul nu are in vedere in fiecare caz tolerarea celuilalt. Controversa creata de multiculturalism este demna de retinut si din acest motiv. La fel cum analiza semnificatiilor atribuite termenilor de etnic si national imi pare inca o data fundamentala pentru circumscrierea mai exacta a aceleiasi teorii4. Dincolo de aceste aspecte ce tin de evolutii culturale si politici ale recunoasterii pe care Taylor nu le ia in considerare, as aminti ca examinarea filozofului american retine atentia prin ipotezele metodologice sustinute cu argumente solide. intii de toate pune in prim plan ideea potrivit careia largirea si shimbarea curriculei este esentiala nu atit in numele unei culturi libere, deschise oricui, cit mai ales in sens de recunoastere a uneia ce a fost exclusa pina acum. Premiza acestei cereri este recunoasterea identitatii pierdute. "Lupta pentru libertate si egalitate trebuie sa treaca prin revizuirea imaginilor despre aceasta. Curricula multiculturala inseamna contributia la procesul de revizuire a imaginilor"5. Logica din spatele unora dintre cereri pare ca depinde de asezarea prezumtiei, respectiv, de asumarea respectului ce il datoram in mod egal tuturor culturilor. Conform aceleiasi prezumtii, scopul tuturor culturilor este acela de a anima societatile in intregul lor. Admitind citeva considerabile deformari datorate timpului si care trebuie privite ca exceptii, invocata prezumtie arata ca toate culturile au ceva de spus pentru toate fiintele umane. Reprosul adresat curriculei traditionale are rolul de a intari amintita convingere. "Cind am numit acest scop prezumtie (presumtion)- scrie Taylor - am inteles ca este o ipoteza de inceput prin intermediul careia se va studia oricare alta cultura. Validitatea scopului va fi demonstrata concret in actualul stadiu al culturii. Contopirea universurilor (the fusion of horizons) opereaza pe masura ce dezvoltarea noului vocabular al comparatiilor arata cum putem sa articulam contrastele"6. Ajungem sa gindim astfel prin transformarea partiala a standardelor noastre, fapt ce il datoram tuturor culturilor, pentru ca in fiecare din ele descoperim prezumtii ca aceea invocata. Constient de tentatia unora de a impune propriul set de valori in interpretarea culturilor, Taylor atrage atentia asupra pericolului de a face din fiecare ceva asemanator. Falsele perspective generate in aceste conditii fac inacceptabila cererea de recunoastere. Cum putem accepta prezumtia ca fiecare isi are locul sau definit in acest univers? Este aceasta o problema de morala? Concluzia este ca oamenii au nevoie sa inteleaga propriile lor limite, ei si culturile lor particulare fiind doar un fragment al intregii istorii umane. "Ceea ce prezumtia cere de la noi nu sint judecatile peremtorii si inautentice a valorilor egale, ci indeosebi pregatirea de a fi deschis la studiile culturale comparative ale calitatii ce trebuie sa deplaseze orizonturile noastre, transformindu-le in rezultate care fuzioneaza"7. Formula orizonturilor care interfereaza este preluata din Wahrheit und Methode a filozofului Gadamer, reflectie pe care o intilnim in filozofia holista si in religia budhista. Indiferent de prioritate, cred ca este una dintre cele mai generoase ipoteze de lucru, prin mijlocirea ei existind o sansa reala de a iesi din labirintul interpretarilor contradictorii sau confuze. Multiculturalismul va fi inteles astfel nu ca separare ci ca apropiere, ca forma de cunoastere reciproca si coparticipare la un ideal existential comun. 2. Sensurile ideologice ale multiculturalismului. Citeva comentarii pornind de la dezacordul lui Habermas fata de teoria lui Taylor

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Nu toate criticile aduse lui Taylor tin seama de invocata "the fusions of horizon". Asa se face ca inacceptarea multiculturalismului chiar si in formula argumentata a filozofului american intimpina rezistenta. Sa mentionez punctele de vedere formulate de Jurgen Habermas. Din perspectiva acestui autor, studiul lui Charles Taylor ar fi excesiv schematizat. Spunind ca este o dezbatere pe trei paliere: despre political correctness; un discurs filozofic incercind sa contribuie la intelegerea fenomenului; o chestiune de drepturi ale minoritatilor ofensate si nerespectate, Habermas nu pare sa acorde prea mult interes sensurilor filozofice si ideologice sugerate de Taylor. Aceasta in pofida faptului ca cercetarea invatatului american contine o bogatie de sugestii si se preteaza la o analiza din perspectiva miscarii ideilor contemporane. El este de parere ca Taylor contribuie putin la discutarea problemei recunoasterii in democratiile constitutionale, iar in ceea ce priveste partea filozofica ilustreaza doar dificultatile intelegerii interculturale, raminind marcat profund de nivelurile juridic si politic ale dezbaterii. Afirmatia imi pare nejustificata, reflectind chiar o anumita exagerare probabil utila lui Habermas in evidentierea unui punct corelat propriei sale orientari ideologice. Filozoful german observa ca multiculturalismul este un semn al fragmentarii societatilor si al confuziei babilonice a limbilor intr-o lume aspirind la globalism. De unde si scepticismul sau in legatura cu scopurile universale cognitive si normative ale unui atare demers. Habermas crede ca intr-o problema ca aceea a "politicii recunoasterii" dezbaterea despre rationalitate va trebui sa detina un rol de netagaduit. Conceptele de bine si de justitie vor fi luate in calcul pentru articularea gindirii privitoare la "politica recunoasterii". Tot el adauga: prezervarea identitatii comunitatii politice este aceea care va permite fundarea identitatii pe principii constitutionale si nu pe orientarile dictate de viata culturala dominanta in acea tara. Imigrantii vor accepta cultura politica a statului de adoptie fara a impune formele culturale ale tarii lor de origine8. Pe de alta parte, Habermas nu trece sub tacere faptul ca "absenta recunoasterii culturale este corelata cu o mare discrimnare sociala, ambele incurajindu-se reciproc9". Problema careia ii acorda interes filozoful german priveste ordinea cererilor de recunoastere, respectiv, daca aceea privitoare la elementul social este precedata de aceea culturala sau invers. Preocuparea pentru descoperirea unui posibil conflict intre cele doua cereri nu trebuie neglijata. La fel de important de subliniat este ca intilnim situatii in care cele doua se afla intr-un raport de complementaritate. Unii analisti profeseaza doar opinii divergente pe aceasta tema, afirmind ca daca una din cereri este rezolvata, cealalta trebuie neaparat subordonata sau exclusa. Asemenea ipoteze trec peste realitatile istorice si politice. Cred ca este preferabila o evaluare prudenta si formularea de optiuni interpretative deschise. Habermas este de acord cu Taylor atunci cind acesta recunoaste rolul prioritatii drepturilor personale in raport cu acelea colective. il critica insa atunci cind apreciaza ca liberalismul este o teorie care garanteaza oricarei asociatii libertatea de a alege si a actiona in conformitate cu drepturile de baza. in caz de conflict, Curtea judecatoreasca va decide de partea cui este adevarul si cine ce fel de drepturi are. Potrivit lui Taylor, acel principiu al respectului egal pentru fiecare persoana s-ar mentine doar in cazul protejarii autonomiei, adica fiecare persoana poate aspira sa-si realizeze proiectul propriei vieti. Aceasta interpretare a sistemului drepturilor - observa critic Habermas in interventia sa - este paternalista prin aceea ca ignora o jumatate din conceptul de autonomie. "O corecta intelegere a teoriei drepturilor pretinde o politica de recunoastere care protejeaza integritatea individului in contextul vietii in care el s-a format. Aceasta nu necesita existenta unui model alternativ care ar putea corecta tendinta sistemului drepturilor prin alte perspective normative"10. Pe de alta parte, autorul este incredintat ca lupta minoritatilor opresate pe considerente etno-culturale ar pretinde deschiderea unei discutii diferite, fiind vorba de o problema distincta. Filozoful german este indreptatit sa observe ca miscarile de eliberare in societatile multiculturale nu sint un fenomen uniform. intr-adevar, ele reprezinta diferite provocari, in cadrul lor cele mai profunde fiind acelea ce trimit la diferentialismele etnic, religios si rasial. Acestea tind sa devina fundamentaliste atunci cind se inregistreaza un regres in politica recunoasterii, in contextul neputintei coordonarii demersului si in cazul mobilizarii maselor pentru desteptarea constiintei si articularea noii identitati11. Nationalismul acestor grupuri minoritare este diferit de la caz la caz, filozoful facind trimitere la unul care ar fi inconfundabil in temeiul omogenitatii lingvistice si etnice. Intentia unui asemenea nationalism este de a-si conserva identitatea ca o comunitate, dar si de a reprezenta o natiune capabila de actiune politica. Comparatia istorica scoasa in relief de Habermas nu este pe de-a intregul 45

convingatoare. Potrivit acesteia, miscarile nationaliste ar fi fost modelate ele insele in sensul statului natiune generat de Revolutia Franceza. Trebuie spus ca faptele istorice nu confirma decit in parte un asemenea punct de vedere. Anume, revolutia din Franta de la 1789 a avut un alt fundal in raport cu marea majoritate a tarilor si regiunilor europene, unul care nu poate fi neglijat fara consecinte in deformarea interpretarilor: o traditie statala de lunga durata; o miscare luminista cu impact in diferite medii sociale, creatoare a clasei de mijloc; aspiratii privind depasirea inechitatilor sociale si chiar o filozofie (asa cum Taylor evidentiase in mod convingator) a egalitarismului promovata in ultimele decenii ale secolului al XVIII-lea; traditii diplomatice exersate in vecinatatile imediate sau mai indepartate; politica militara si rol de mare putere in Europa. Toate acestea si multe altele fac posibile si chiar cer nuantarile necesare. Nu numai ca Germania si Italia au fost intirziate in acest proces - asa cum explica sumar Habermas - dar ele nu existau din punct de vedere al ideii de stat ca atare. Orasele-stat ale lumilor germana si italiana nascute in evul mediu reprezentasera un reper inconfundabil in procesul de modernizare, dar traditia lor avea sa estompeze pentru multa vreme tendintele de grupare in jurul ideii nationale. in sfirsit, etno-culturalismul german aparut in secolul al XVIII-lea (Aufklarung-ul german are citeva note distincte care lasa sa se intrevada o asemenea evolutie) si afirmat in exces in cursul celui de-al XIX-lea nu are in vedere decit unele aspecte privind modernizarea promovate de revolutia franceza. Faptul ca natiunea etno-culturala preceda natiunea statala in exemplele german si italian ar trebui sa fie revelator pentru prezenta dezbatere. Habermas nu omite in partea finala a examinarii sale sa mentioneze diferenta intre Franta si Germania in functie de conceptul ce le-a ghidat afirmarea identitatii nationale12. in exemplul german este vorba de un proces istoric profund inradacinat, care a influentat covirsitor diferentialismul etnic in toate zonele atinse de curentul Sturm und Drang al culturii germane. Cultivarea constiintei in sensul in care o facusera invatatii germani ai secolului nationalitatilor nu a fost necesara in mediile franceze, cu toate ca nici acestea nu fusesera straine de teoria delimitarilor culturale. Intoleranta vecinatatilor si in primul rind a aceleia franceze timp de peste un secol isi are referinta dintii in principiul lui Kulturnation care este opus aceluia de citoyenit. Este stiut ca in jurul acestor principii s-a creat identitatea celor doua natiuni. Ce ar trebui sa intelegem din incercarile de estimare filozofica a multiculturalismului? Nu nationalismul francez a fost creator al intelligentsiei cu aspiratii pentru identitate culturala si nationala specifice asa cum pare sa sugereze si demonstratia lui Habermas, ci etno-nationalismul german structurat in jurul conceptului de Volk. Multiculturalismul la scara Europei continentale nu a fost generat de nationalismul statal francez invocat de filozof ca reper al constiintelor particulare, ci de diferentialismul etno-cultural promovat de filozofii si istoricii romantici si pozitivisti de limba germana. Cum anume a ajuns statul german la constructia identitatii pe criterii de singularitate si specificitate - monocultura etno-nationala - este posibil de aflat prin consultarea cartilor de filozofie, istorie si literatura elaborate si publicate de citiva dintre cei mai notorii carturari germani ai secolului al XIX-lea. Sensul specificitatii poate ramine unul in dezbatere, asa cum arata Habermas, ceea ce nu ne impiedica sa retinem ca marea tragedie a secolului al XX-lea a fost alimentata copios si lunga vreme de teoria creionata prin intermediul conceptului de Volksgeist. Observatiile de mai sus schimba insa fundamental datele interpretarii. Mediile academice prusiano-germane ale perioadei romantice si postromantice au creat un adevarat curent al destinului politic pe criterii diferentialiste. Exemplele unor intelectuali cultivind teorii de acest fel arata preocuparea acordata specificitatii. Pina la un punct aplecarea spre particularisme ar putea fi socotita legitima. Inechitatile generate de aceasta sint insa mult prea grave spre a admite ca nu e necesara analiza critica ori reinterpretarea tezelor derivate din amintitele teorii. Delimitarea rasiala intr-o lume europeana a amestecurilor de tot felul si a mostenirilor istorice plurale era nu numai o teza riscanta, dar si una lipsita de suport stiintific sau de credibilitate la nivelul bunului simt. Heinrich von Treitschke era un intelectual oficial cu o pozitie stridenta pe aceasta tema si care pret de doua decenii a fost istoricul favorit al establishment-ului german. O pleiada de alti invatati au exercitat influente decisive asupra educatiei oficiale, ceea ce nu putea sa nu lase urme asupra societatii. Asa se explica de ce in anii interbelici teza specificului rasial a putut fi impinsa la extrem, conducind la geneza "ideologiei mortii". Sa retinem pentru analiza noastra ca procesul de purificare etnica in favoarea grupului majoritar a fost acela care a facut posibila intreruperea existentei multiculturale germane. 46

Rezerva lui Habermas fata de teoria multiculturalismului formulata de Taylor isi poate avea originile in neacordarea importantei cuvenite criticii traditionalismului si revizuirii curriculei. Trimiterile oferite de Habermas cu privire la aparitia minoritatilor ca urmare a formarii statelor nationale in diferite parti ale Europei si ale lumii sint menite sa indice importanta abordarii diferentiate a fenomenului. Ceea ce - sa recunosc - este util pentru o cuprindere adecvata si pentru relevarea aspectelor particulare. Pretinzind ca eurocentrismul si hegemonia culturii occidentale sint in ultima analiza cuvintele de ordine ale luptei pentru recunoastere la nivel international, Habermas il critica indirect si pe nedrept pe Taylor. Filozoful american pusese accentul pe recunoastere si conservarea standardelor locale in orice raport, respingind ideea de dominatie sau subordonare culturala. Management-ul statal si local are ponderea lui in aplanarea starilor conflictuale si in propunerea normelor juridice si a convenientelor sociale necesare pentru coabitarea cetatenilor. Educatia are si ea rolul civic indiscutabil in procesul integrativ. Toate bune, doar ca in comentariile sale pe marginea teoriei lui Taylor, Habermas pune sub semnul intrebarii sau chiar elimina posibilitatea unei filozofii multi si interculturale. De fapt, cauta sa arate ca demersul nu se justifica indeajuns in cazul societatilor liberale. Acest punct de vedere nu numai ca este fals, dar arata un anume dogmatism derivat dintr-o perspectiva conservatoare asupra evolutiei valorilor culturale. El nu acorda interes trasaturilor derivate din istorie, dar nici acelora nascute ca urmare a confruntarilor moderne si contemporane. Dupa parerea mea, Europa regiunilor - poate mai mult decit oricare alta zona de pe glob - se preteaza la o abordare prin prisma relatiilor intercomunitare, deci, multiculturale, transculturale si interculturale. Mai mult, ea se intemeiaza pe coabitarea si interferenta culturilor traditionale, de unde geneza unei realitati definibila printr-un nou concept pe care il propun intr-unul din paragrafele urmatoare: identitate multipla. Fara sa-l preocupe in mod deosebit trimiterea la anumite cazuri concrete, Habermas pare sa reduca argumentatia criticii sale la o posibila interpretare a controversei de notorietate din Germania contemporana: conditia azilantilor. intr-adevar, in mentionata situatie nu este vorba de un fenomen multicultural in sens istoric. Este vorba de unul creat ca urmare a deplasarilor de populatie dinspre un continent spre altul sau dinspre o regiune spre alta avind ca prim obiectiv salvarea de saracie. Chestiunea se cuvine amintita pentru ca si in aceasta imprejurare exemplul dat de Habermas este menit sa respinga ipoteza nasterii vietii multi si interculturale in statele Uniunii Europene si mai ales in Germania. Punind obstacole etno-culturale in obtinerea cetateniei statale de catre unii emigranti, statul german a conservat principiul inradacinat al identitatii etno-culturale. Primirea preferentiala si, deci diferentialismul practicat astfel au un rol cheie in admiterea sau respingerea cererii de naturalizare. Este vorba de neputinta unora de a-si dovedi o inrudire sangvina cu o presupusa familie de origine germana din interiorul sau din exteriorul statului cu acelasi nume si de posibilitatea altora de a si-o dovedi. in functie de jus sangvinis persoanele nu pot sau pot deveni cetateni cu drepturi egale in Germania. intr-o scurta referinta, filozoful admite ca doctrina ce sta in spatele unei asemenea politici deriva din conceptul de Kulturnation, ceea ce inseamna ca nationalitatea este definita prin origine si nu prin apartenenta cetateneasca asa cum se intimpla in situatia entitatilor vest-europene13. Pentru imbogatirea continutului dezbaterii ar fi fost interesant daca Habermas s-ar fi oprit mai mult asupra teoriei etno-nationale, analizind exemplul german. De pilda, perspectiva comparativa a mono si multiculturalismului ar fi fost utila unei intelegeri credibile a fenomenului care a marcat lumea germana moderna, si, prin extensie si cu nuante diferite, regiunile Europei Centrale si de Sud-Est. Daca piesa de rezistenta a gindirii politice si juridice a statului de la Bismarck si pina astazi este monoculturalismul, ar fi de vazut cum anume intelligensia contemporana va crea reperele integrative pentru o viitoare comunicare transculturala intr-o lume europeana multiculturala. Sint de acord cu Habermas cind spune ca segregationsimul este inacceptabil. Doar ca multiculturalismul nu trebuie si nu poate fi vazut ca teorie ce atrage dupa sine segregationismul. Daca pentru cea mai mare parte a Europei de Nord, Centru si Est mostenirile istorice si culturale lasate de lumea prusiano-germana au fost imense, atunci se cere sa-i acordam un interes pe potriva. Insuficient de relevanta intelegere a lucrurilor cuprinsa in intinsul comentariu al lui Habermas pornind de la teza lui Charles Taylor ma face sa cred ca acele capitole ale dezbaterii care au fost sugerate de interventia critica de mai sus nu pot fi ocolite. in concluzie, identitarismul insusit de unele grupuri are componente belicoase, motiv pentru care redefinirea statului-natiune si mai ales a aceluia etno-natiune (suportul fiind etno-cultura) este un 47

demers cel putin complementar cu acela privind cunoasterea si profesarea multiculturalismului. Vazut ca rezultat al politicii diferentelor, multiculturalismul intimpina dificultati incredibile in societatile al caror exercitiu democratic se afla in faza incipienta. in primul rind pentru ca traditiile monoculturala si totalitara au lasat urme adinci in memoria oamenilor. in al doilea rind, organizatiile non-guvernamentale sint inca insuficiente si slabe spre a promova o gindire articulata pe tema pluralismului cultural si politic. Cit priveste institutiile statului ele nu sint pregatite pentru o asemenea reorientare de proportii si nici nu beneficiaza de o categorie de experti credibila care sa contribuie la insusirea informatiilor necesare privind minoritatile, terminologia aferenta in plan cultural si juridic, educatia multi si interculturala. Majoritatea, ca si minoritatea sint tentate sa-si descopere originile, legatura cu solul, cu arhetipul. in alt mod spus, ele retraiesc epoca romantica a inceputului de modernizare, fara a fi avut nicicind experienta luminista parcursa in profunzime. Adica, fara sa se fi pregatit pentru o tranzitie social-politica si institutionala necesara emanciparii segmentelor sociale numeric reprezentative. Asa se explica faptul ca adesea privesc dusmanos una catre alta sau, in cel mai fericit caz, isi intorc spatele. Exemplul iugoslav nu este singular nici in zona de rasarit a Europei si nici pe alte continente. Taylor - la fel ca Wil Kimlicka - nu beneficiaza de studii de caz relativ la zone si regiuni critice, prin urmare nu poate contribui la nuantarea lucrurilor pentru societatile non-occidentale. Era important in asemenea initiative ca observatiile sa fie facute comparativ, permitind explicatii ulterioare asupra fenomenului multiculturalist. Aceasta cu atit mai mult cu cit interesul clasei politice a devenit exagerat intr-un domeniu aflat in plina cercetare si inca marcat de confuzii si de interese partizane. Chiar si din perspectiva civilizatiei occidentale vazute lucrurile, o analiza a situatiilor din Europa si S.U.A. ar fi evidentiat o suma de apropieri, dar si de particularitati. 3.Contributia lui Harvey Siegel: Transculturalitatea Deschiderea spre alteritate, cuprinderea experientei celuilalt indica nu doar aspiratiile legitime ale individului, dar si pe acelea ale comunitatii. Vazute prin prisma firescului relatiilor interpersonale, societatile pot fi definite ca avind origini cultural-comunitare multiple si, deci, fiind marcate de o diversitate de semne moral-valorice. Trecerea dintr-o cultura in alta depinde de longevitatea coabitarii si de greutatea fostelor, respectiv, actualelor relatii comunitare. Limbile - plurilingvismul este o realitate care nu poate fi ignorata daca acceptam sa analizam complexitatea fenomenelor - au stimulat o anume mixtura a identitatilor. intr-un articol despre educatia si idealurile filozofice ale transculturalitatii, Harvey Siegel staruise asupra distinctiei terminologice intr-un sens ce mi s-a parut mai convingator decit al altora. Multiculturalismul este legitim in cazul in care accepta atit idealurile derivate din sensurile culturale specifice, cit si pe acelea care trimit spre doua sau mai multe culturi in acelasi timp. Aceasta din urma ipostaza a fost identificata prin conceptul de transculturalitate14. Problema este ca majoritatea teoriilor privind multiculturalismul resping o atare definire rationala. Harvey Siegel staruie asupra motivelor care il determina pe multiculturalist sa imbratiseze o singura maniera de legitimare potrivit careia idealurile filozofice si educatia ar fi in mod necesar specifice. in amintita acceptiune, legitimarea fortei idealurilor nu ar fi cu putinta dincolo de frontierele culturii in interiorul careia ele sint profesate15. Din unghiul de vedere al educatorului multiculturalist am fi obligati sa ne asumam o existenta multiculturala si in functie de contextul in care ne aflam sau sa tratam alte culturi ca pe a noastra proprie, iar pe membrii acestora cu deplin si justificat respect. Invocatul educator pune mare pret pe moralitatea acestui mod de comportare. Siegel sesizeaza ca de aici rezulta "coerenta indemnului multiculturalist". Conform avocatilor tezei multiculturale trebuie luate in considerare cererile de recunoastere ale abolirii dominatiei culturale si hegemoniei, scopul fiind dobindirea respectului cuvenit fiecarei culturi. Replica monoculturalistului la o asemenea teza este urmatoarea: s-ar putea ca dominatia si marginalizarea sa fie gresite din punctul de vedere al culturii celuilalt, dar ele sint bune din perspectiva culturii pe care o reprezint16. Autorul isi pune mai multe intrebari si avanseaza citeva ipoteze de lucru. intii de toate i se pare ca este necesara reformularea cererilor multiculturaliste. in al doilea rind, el apreciaza ca este nevoie de un anume context pentru a putea respinge monoculturalismul. in sfirsit, promovarea aspiratiei transculturale devine foarte importanta pe masura ce intelegem ca sint idealuri 48

care pot sa transceanda o cultura anume. Harvey Siegel invoca intre altele stralucitul exemplu al caracterului transcultural al unor acte normative, situatie in care forta argumentelor este aceea care impune recunoasterea si adoptarea lor de catre doua sau mai multe comunitati 17. intre filozofii care neaga sistematic existenta idealurilor transculturale se numara Richard Rorty. Potrivit versiunii sale - el a creat chiar un curent de opinie pe tema de fata - nu ar fi necesara cautarea unui punct de referinta pentru examinarea atenta a culturii. Motivul? Pragmaticii - spune Rorty - pot si trebuie sa privilegieze propriul lor grup. Prin urmare, etno-centrismul poate fi acela care se refera la solidaritatea noastra. Aceasta pozitie a atras alte speculatii nefondate in virtutea carora specificitatea ar fi singura utila definirii conceptelor fundamentale privind valorile culturale. Universalismul nu ar fi nimic altceva decit proiectia sau impunerea valorilor locale. Pornind de aici ar trebui sa admitem ca valorile nu pot fi universale, ci numai locale. Este etno-rasialul - prin crearea de particularitati artificiale - in masura sa se universalizeze asa cum sustin invatati din familia lui Rorty ? Siegel a vazut mai multe dificultati in a fi acceptata amintita asertiune18. Mai intii, dichotomia universal-local ramine problematica si aceasta pentru ca in asezarea idealurilor universalistul este liber sa identifice sau nu particularitatile. Principiile, valorile si idealurile nu trebuie neaparat concepute doar in relatie cu particularitatile locale. Siegel este incredintat ca dichotomia invocata este falsa si din cauza ca universalitatea nu poate fi respinsa in temeiul idealurilor locale. in al doilea rind, termenul de universal nu poate fi inteles cu sens de valoare transistorica si supersociala asa cum propune Richard Rorty si, pe urmele sale, David Theo Goldberg19. in sfirsit, de legitimitatea transculturalului nu pot face abstractie nici adversarii sai atunci cind interogatia are in vedere scopul cunoasterii. Potrivit lui Siegel - si inclin sa-i dau dreptate - concluzia este ca idealurile transculturale sint posibile. in ceea ce priveste multiculturalismul, acesta este pe deplin compatibil cu recunoasterea idealurilor filozofice si educationale transcendente. Trebuie recunoscut ca - pina si in culturile care neaga evidentele - exista citeva idealuri de sorginte universala.

4. Conditiile aparitiei falselor premise ale multiculturalismului Acolo unde se presupune ca idealurile unui grup nu pot fi extinse dincolo de frontierele culturale proprii, acolo avem de-a face cu mesaje neadevarate. Sa retinem - pentru reperul nostru - ca inchiderea prin mijlocirea limbilor este teoria care a prefatat romantismul, o teorie in care au excelat citeva din scrierile lui Herder si Fichte20. Dincolo de descoperirile interesante ale curentului romantic, sa spunem ca limba vazuta ca o componenta organica a fiintei - asa cum pretinsesera aproape toti congenerii lui Herder si Fichte, - a facut posibila gindirea etnicitatii prin prisma apartenentei la un unic trib, unul cu puritate sangvinica. Herder fusese un promotor al acestui mod de a vedea culturile21. Reevaluarile de astazi nu tin seama intotdeauna de orientarile exclusiviste dezvoltate de romantici. Sa fie in discutie dorinta de a continua identificarea propriilor optiuni social-politice cu ajutorul unei culturi vazute ca singulare in evolutia ei istorica? Ceea ce observam la o privire atenta este ca herderianismul exercita inca o irezistibila atractie intelectuala, propunind interpretari ale valorilor culturale din unghiul asa-numitelor specificitati. Chiar atentia si interpretarea necritica a speculatiilor herderiene este un indiciu ca despartirea de acestea este inca o problema. Premergatoare culturii moderne si contemporane, gindirea politica a lui Herder continua sa fie populara in regiunile in care influenta germana a fost puternica. Ideologia multor institutii stiintifice si culturale din fosta Europa national-comunista poate fi socotita un element din suita acelora care confera credibilitate supozitiei mele. Ce anume deriva din profesarea amintitei ideologii? incercarea de conservare a unui statut privilegiat pentru comunitatile lingvistice care si-au insusit in secolul precedent teoria Volksgeist-ului face parte din constringerile in temeiul carora se creeaza o imensa presiune sociala pentru identificarea indivizilor cu un grup anume, majoritar sau minoritar. in cazul Europei de Est, astfel se explica o continua atractie si mitizare a lumii germane in pofida relatiilor politice bilaterale care nu s-au bazat pe fair-play decit arareori. Multiculturalismul pare atasat acestui moment al istoriei ideilor inca prea putin evidentiat prin prisma 49

numeroaselor sale fatete. Cum culturile nu imbraca nicicind o camasa de forta spre a se separa una de cealalta, iar viata spirituala a omului nu se identifica doar prin intermediul unei traditii, este limpede ca avem de-a face cu o fortare a termenilor. Prin urmare, din punctul de vedere al aceluia care incearca sa nu ocoleasca latura morala a discursului se cuvin puse urmatoarele intrebari: sint idealurile transculturale reprezentative pentru omenire? Daca da, atunci de ce sa nu preferam formele de existenta social-culturala compatibile cu realitatile politice ale vietii noastre contemporane? De ce anume am acorda interes multiculturalismului in sens de cultivare a specificitatilor si nu am acorda atentie valorilor culturale promovind deschiderea fata de alteritati? De ce sa nu admitem ca un numar important de regiuni de pe toate continentele se regasesc plenar doar asumindu-si multiplele radacini nascute din convergente si fuziuni ale traditiilor? Doar teama de asimilism in cazul unei minoritati sau aceea de pierdere a notei de autenticitate in cazul unei majoritati nu mi se pare o justificare nici credibila si nici morala. Una din sansele adeptului teoriei multiculturaliste este sa revina asupra limitelor interpretarii sale acceptind teza potrivit careia toate culturile trebuie sa fie de acord cu legitimitatea existentei celorlalte (traind conform propriilor idealuri mai mult sau mai putin specifice). Ca un pandant al acestui mod mai profund de a vedea lucrurile, el va admite ca propriile valori pot deveni si ale altora. Adica, transculturale. Chiar daca nu intotdeauna ne putem desprinde de o cultura locala spre a ne integra in alta, aceasta nu atrage dupa sine speculatia in temeiul careia valorile si idealurile nu pot fi relevante decit in cazul aplicarii lor la o comunitate istorica specifica. Oare monolingvismul sa fie o forma obligatorie de prezervare a identitatii, in vreme ce plurilingvismul una care contribuie la pierderea relatiei cu traditia? Exista localitati, regiuni, state, natiuni definibile doar prin prisma apartenentei la o singura limba, cultura, religie, traditie? Sint persoane care se regasesc doar intr-o singura forma comunitara, culturala, religioasa sau rasiala? Se pot ele recunoaste doar intr-o singura ipostaza? Multiculturalismul abordat prin prisma separatismelor de tot felul (rasiale, etno-culturale, religioase, lingvistice) este lipsit de relevanta. in incercarea de formulare a alternativei la gindirea politica actuala, rolul intelligentsiei ar putea fi unul semnificativ in conditia discursului liber. Presupusa ideala forma de expresie si de existenta aflata in minoritate nu poate fi construita in absenta dialogului bi si transcultural. Iata pentru ce este greu sa admit seriozitatea tezelor lui Samuel Huntington sau studiile care evidentiaza un exces de zel in invocarea cadrelor legislative privind coexistenta multiplelor identitati. Diferitele provocari ale lumii de astazi aflata intr-un proces de schimbari foarte rapide depind adesea de interogatiile si/ sau aspiratiile grupurilor aflate in minoritate. 5. Conceptul de identitate multipla Faptul ca in multe state ale lumii - inclusiv in cele mai experimentate democratii - descoperim cetateni de rangul intii si cetateni de rangul doi sau pur si simplu persoane discriminate in temeiul unei apartenente adesea presupuse ne indreptateste sa fim circumspecti cu notiuni precum autenticitatea si recunoasterea in temeiul autenticitatii. Adesea presupusa apartenenta rasiala, religia parintilor, numele si aparenta origine a obiceiurilor devin motiv de delimitare si excludere. Catalogarea unei persoane in functie de marimea numerica a comunitatii din care face parte a generat o suma de nedreptati nu numai prin diminuarea sanselor de exprimare libera a membrilor ei, dar mai ales prin marginalizarea indivizilor a caror identitate culturala este mixta/multipla. Modul in care este perceput acest fenomen arata ca etno-culturalismul si multiculturalismul au in comun tentatia de a exclude asa-numitele minoritati ale minoritatilor, motiv pentru care teoretizarea lor necesita redefiniri. Ele propun un mod liniar-dogmatic (un cerc inchis, putind conduce in lumea contemporana la drame, alienari, sinucideri) de a privi evolutia persoanei si a grupurilor de-a lungul vietii. Atit in cercurile majoritatilor, cit si in acelea ale minoritatilor se gindeste adesea prin aceasta grila. Mediile academice intentionind sa propuna o perspectiva lipsita de prejudecati asupra trecutului si prezentului s-au confruntat si ele cu replica, ignorarea sau chiar tabuizarea unor asemenea teme sensibile de catre institutiile statului, uneori, si de catre acelea ale societatii civile. S-a intimplat ca ele insele sa fi avut placerea de a contribui la dublarea argumentelor in favoarea schemelor standard de interpretare. Chiar si o intelligentsie liberala poate ajuta serios la perpetuarea si perfectionarea unor asemenea mituri nocive. Cit priveste optica institutiilor oficiale, sint destule situatii cind absenta 50

transparentei in cunoasterea unor episoade neplacute ale trecutului si prezentului indica preferinta pentru o "ideologie a tacerii". E si acesta un motiv pentru care cred ca teoria diferentialismului etnomulticultural poate fi speculata foarte bine de dogmatici provenind din toate orientarile. Problema identitatii fixe - pe care o sustin adeptii multiculturalismului si care poate fi vazuta de exemplu prin prisma apartenentei religioase decisa de parinti la nastere - intentioneaza sa creeze linii continue intre cele doua poluri care strajuiesc existenta fiintei umane. Deliberat sau nu, acest mod de a vedea lucrurile nu numai ca nu promoveaza libera circulatie a oamenilor dinspre o familie culturala spre alta, dar pur si simplu o respinge. La fel si setul de valori creat prin complementaritatea a doua sau mai multe radacini culturale. Fiintele nascute prin deplasarile dintr-o cultura in alta sint puse sub semnul incertitudinilor de tot felul, riscind sa traiasca intr-un disconfort psihic creat de identitatile culturale pretins curate. Cit priveste ecumenismul prelatilor, el nu este decit arareori materializat in practica imediata, fariseismul tinind locul unei intelegeri mature, responsabile si firesti fata de semeni. O asemenea observatie tulburatoare rezulta adesea din greoiul schimb de valori, din absenta permisivitatii mariajelor intercultuale si din intoleranta dogmatica. Un motiv in plus sa caut sa-mi explic incalculabilele daune morale aduse persoanei care traieste la granita dintre culturi, insusind doua (sau chiar trei) limbi "materne" si radacinile a doua (sau trei) culturi. Aceasta minoritate a minoritatilor exista si are acelasi drept la recunoastere ca si o majoritate sau o minoritate culturala. Ea poate fi un model pentru grupurile culturale cu pretentii excesive la distinctie. Avind in vedere gama de anomalii rezultate din coordonatele impuse prin constringere identitara, se pare ca nu gresim atunci cind spunem ca fiinta umana este dificil daca nu imposibil de asezat o data pentru totdeauna in cadre rigide precum: identitate etnica, identitate nationala (acolo unde conceptul de national trimite la originea etnica, dar si acolo unde este in discutie cetatenia) sau identitate construita pe unicitatea sau originalitatea unei dogme religioase. Cita vreme nu acceptam ca este vorba doar de simple conventii - oricind posibil de inlocuit cu altele - vom ramine tributari unui mod superficial si dogmatic de a privi natura umana. Casatoriile interreligioase, multipla identitate a copiilor proveniti din acestea, obiceiuri, traditii, repere si valori morale comune mai multor entitati reprezinta suficiente argumente spre a ma gindi la elaborarea unui concept complementar acelora mai sus prezentate si comentate. Cind m-am gindit la conceptul de identitate multipla am avut in vedere un concept flexibil privind identitatea persoanei si grupului/grupurilor. Prin mijlocirea lui intentionez sa sugerez o mai articulata "politica a recunoasterii", una care nu lasa loc interpretarilor si practicilor discriminatoare. in sfirsit, pentru o judecata de valoare, voi tine seama de faptul ca reala aspiratie interconfesionala si interculturala a indivizilor si grupurilor care astazi se misca frecvent dintr-o regiune intr-alta, dintr-un stat intr-altul sau de pe un continent pe altul este incalcata in principal de traditionalistii declarati ai mai multor religii, culturi, comunitati lingvistice. Am avut in vedere importanta contributiilor generate de experienta omului contemporan. Viata sa ar trebui sa fie recunoscuta potrivit valorilor culturale asumate in diverse imprejurari. Este conceptul de identitate multipla consecinta interferarii a doua sau mai multe culturi? Este identitatea multipla o provocare pentru filozofia politicii? Prin studiul istoriei convegentelor mai multor spiritualitati zonale am descoperit ca idealurile transculturale contin o realitate indiscutabila: ele reprezinta o noua miscare de idei tinzind sa articuleze aparent disparatele repere fundamentale ale gindirii contemporane. Am observat cum culturile de frontiera situate intre tari cu identitati lingvistice distincte sau cu religii distincte genereaza in primul rind compromisuri si mai putin sau deloc reactii de respingere. Relativitatea discursului identitar in asemenea zone a fost posibila, asa cum a fost posibila declararea multiplelor identitati: geografia si demografia Europei, Asiei, Americii contin nenumarate exemple care vin sa arate ca dezbaterea nu are cum sa faca abstractie de asemenea realitati, ele insele create de traditiile mixte nascute prin coabitare. Se impun citeva explicatii menite sa evidentieze sensul atribuit conceptului de identitate multipla. Liniile de frontiera intre natiuni si culturi au fost adesea trasate artificial. Dispozitiile si interesele politice atit ale unor mari puteri, cit si ale reprezentantilor unor comunitati lingvistice relativ numeroase aspirind la egala recunoastere au facut posibila trecerea de la un tip de discriminare la altul. in contextul aparitiei statului-natiune inainte si dupa primul razboi mondial multe foste minoritati discriminate au devenit majoritati discriminatoare. Procesul de inversare a rolurilor a fost favorizat de 51

colapsul imperiilor; de unificari si impartiri teritoriale; de stabilirea de noi centre administrative; de programe educationale tinzind spre generarea altor modalitati de uniformizare identitara. Redistributia puterii nu a tinut seama de identitatile regionale, de grup si personale, pierzind din vedere rostul oricarei raportari la pluralitatile existente ca urmare a evolutiei istorice. in statele in care vocatia intelligentsiei a fost inspirata de teorii totalitare, ideea abstracta de natiune sau de etno-natiune a luat treptat locul identitatilor regionale si civice. Pe de alta parte, conceptul de etnic a tins sa structureze o noua identitate bazata pe traditii rurale si nu urbane. Exceptia germana presupune si aici o analiza aparte. Acelasi concept avea sa contribuie la marginalizarea oricaror particularisme regionale reprezentind bogatia culturala a natiunilor moderne. Unificarea statelor - dupa citatul exemplu german - a incurajat asimilismul si/sau purificarea etnica, ceea ce a condus la excluderea sau marginalizarea fortata a minoritatilor reprezentind trasaturile culturale dintotdeauna plurale ale geografiei europene. Ideologiile etno-nationale si administratia statal-nationala construita pe criterii etnice a operat cu terminologia diferentialismului cultural, sustinind proiecte irationale in materie de convietuire a multiplelor identitati. Asimilarea fortata sau discriminarea a fost unica alternativa. Atunci cind a fost vorba de certificarea individului in sensul recunoasterii apartenentei sale la o colectivitate, criteriul consangvinitatii fusese aplicat in dauna oricarei evidente contrare. Experientele petrecute in preajma si in cursul celui de-al doilea razboi indica exemple care nu pot fi puse la indoiala. Degenerarea relatiilor dintre doua sau mai multe grupuri autodefinite ca etno-nationale in interiorul statelor-natiune a fost incurajata de setul de valori culturale pus in circulatie prin carti, reviste, ziare, dar mai cu seama prin curricula imbratisata de oficialii scolii. Implicarea permanenta - in sensul propagandistic - a oricarui act cultural a avut o pondere apreciabila in construirea discursului partizan. in jurul ego-ului colectiv imaginat a fi specific se construise monocultura necesara segmentului social-politic dominant, fapt care a stimulat "arderea etapelor" intr-un moment in care procesul de inradacinare in modernitate trebuia sa fi devenit prioritate absoluta. Spre deosebire de monoculturalitate, partial si in raport cu multiculturalismul, conceptul de identitate multipla are o incarcatura pozitiva. Cum ar trebui definit acest concept? Radacinile comunitare si lingvistice multiple ale majoritatii populatiei unui oras sau ale unei regiuni sugereaza existenta identitatii plurale a fiecarei persoane. Viata segmentelor sociale reprezentative care se bazeaza pe asumarea traditiilor culturale diverse (situatie in care este posibil sa se lase atrasa majoritatea locuitorilor unui spatiu) indica existenta identitatii culturale multiple. Exemplul cel mai des intilnit este acela care indica asumarea setului de valori autogenerat prin fuziunea citorva elemente particulare. Mostenirile plurale si inrudirile dintre mai multe culturi comunitare premoderne si moderne contribuie decisiv la construirea societatii civice. ai mai important de retinut este ca interferenta spirituala este generatoare de stabile valori morale, valori ce pot sta la baza oricarei "politici a recunoasterii". Neputinta departajarii pe criterii de specificitate, etnicitate, apartenenta rasiala, referinte culturale unice arata ca sint situatii in care avem de-a face cu un melting pot. De obicei, in interiorul acestuia orizonturile fuzioneaza in mod firesc. Comunitatile regionale indica foarte bine ce fel de acoperire are conceptul in discutie. Europa poate fi vazuta - cu mult beneficiu pentru proiectul unificarii ei - prin prisma tipului de apartenente multiple pe care l-am avut in vedere. Recunoasterea identitatii persoanelor in primul rind in functie de regiune face parte din aceeasi filozofie politica precum recunoasterea drepturilor minoritatilor lingvistice si religioase. Ce este de retinut ca fiind fundamental in conceptul de identitate regionala? in primul rind sansa acordata oricarei persoane de a deveni coparticipanta la activitatile din sfera publica in absenta criteriilor limitative de provenienta rasiala, etnica, religioasa, lingvistica sau in temeiul numarului colectivitatii din care provine. in al doilea rind, libertatea de optiune a fiintei umane in ceea ce priveste identificarea ei cu un grup local sau cu altul. intr-un asemenea caz identificarea in sau cu doua grupuri lingvistice, religioase, etnice in acelasi timp sau in succesiune (firescul naturii umane admite aceasta fara pierderea valorilor morale) este un aspect care trebuie luat in considerare. Asa se naste adesea noul reper al regiunilor in care orizonturile culturale (diferite la un moment dat) au fuzionat. Incontestabila dovada a familiilor mixte vine in sprijinul acestui punct de vedere, conferind o noua intelegere multi si interculturalitatii. Identitatea regionala are si mai mult de spus. Ea priveste existenta umana in baza unui acord tacit cu privire la setul de valori, vazut ca o coloana vertebrala a societatii in jurul careia se structureaza 52

relatiile dintre oameni, administratia, profesiunile. Acest aspect incurajeaza, conserva, garanteaza coabitarea pasnica. in fapt, astfel se intimpla sa se multiplice valorile morale, sa apara un raport firesc intre interioritatea noastra si lumea exterioara. Pentru o mai exacta circumscriere ar fi de precizat ca apartenentele multiple se pot defini si prin trimiteri la social, profesional, institutional etc. Depinde de tipul de conventie la care ne raportam. Am luat insa in considerare faptul ca un concept ca acela al identitatii multiple este mai lesne de admis aiita vreme cit operam prin intelegerea formelor de viata instituite la nivel regional. Pornind de la capitalul social plural al unui loc geografic, putem fi de acord cu existenta identitatii multiple a persoanei. Trimiterile concrete pot fi sugestive, asa ca le voi semnala in paragraful urmator. in lumea franco-germana din Alsacia folosirea concomitenta a limbilor franceza, germana si alsaciana indica o realitate multiculturala nu in sensul diferentelor, ci in acela al similitudinilor. Adoptarea a doua culturi in acelasi timp nu este doar posibila, dar si utila in sensul coabitarii. Controversa istorica a Alsaciei a fost creata de statul-natiune, respectiv, de intentia asimilarii/ocuparii germane sau franceze a regiunii in cauza. La fel, controversele polono-germana, cehoslovaco-maghiara, albanezo-iugoslava, bulgaro-turca, maghiaro-romana s.a. Ideea de compromitere a relatiilor firesti si de creare a starii conflictuale la scara regiunilor a fost una externa. Ea a tinut seama de interesele acelora care revendicasera teritoriul, nu si de realitatea ori interesele intern-comunitare. Exemplele oferite de atentatul la traditiile de convietuire din Tirol, Dalmatia adriatica, Cehia sudeta, Gorizzia italo-slovena si Klagenfurt-ul austro-sloven atrag atentia asupra importantei interpretarii istoriei, a traditiilor si a politicii regional-europene prin prisma unor concepte noi. Identitatile belgianului, olandezului, elvetianului sint si ele o parte a aceleiasi evolutii social-culturale multiple, incarcate de semnificatiile mult mai adinci ale lumii transfrontaliere. Comunitatile Dunarii de mijloc si ale bazinului carpatic au trasee inconfunadabile in amintitul sens. Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Transilvania, Rumelia, Voivodina, Banatul sint regiunile est-central si sud-est europene ale caror identitati concepute cu ajutorul conceptului de etnicitate induc in eroare. in locul realitatilor, o categorie politica dominanta impune ideologia diferentialismului si a discriminarilor derivate din acesta22. in fond, ar fi de dorit sa ne obisnuim cu ideea potrivit careia coexistenta mai multor grupuri face imposibila definirea pe criterii etno-nationale a regiunilor in cauza. Temeiul numeric invocat in multe texte ale istoricilor si sociologilor, precum si tezele etnografice etc. sint partizane si intotdeauna au tendinta de a escamota realitatea. Un motiv in plus sa nu judecam lucrurile doar prin prisma acestor cercetari. in toate spatiile invocate, atitudinea grupului majoritar (conducind dintr-un centru in care asimilismul a functionat ca reper fundamental al existentei) fata de minoritati este insotita fie de nepasare, fie de o formala recunoastere a minoritatilor si a identitatilor multiple. Ceea ce nu s-a retinut suficient (instructia scolara este coautoare in conservarea ignorantei) este ca, aidoma persoanei, grupurile au interese comune, schimba reciproc valori culturale, experiente sociale si economice. ai, ceea ce este si mai important, ele coabiteaza pina la nivelul mariajelor mixte, al interferarii obiceiurilor si culturilor religioase, al imprumuturilor sau reciprocei asimilari lingvistice. Mediile acestea au fost insa tinute intotdeauna sub supraveghere de adminstratiile nationale sau etno-cultural-nationale menite sa vegheze la conservarea statului-natiune sau a puritatii originii si continuitatii etno-natiunii si au fost tratate ca fiind nesigure ori neloiale majoritatii. in realitate, ele pusesera accentul pe setul de valori care a stat la baza familiei si a societatii civice mai mult decit o facusera comunitatile etno-culturale disputindu-si intiietatea teritoriala sau nobletea singelui. Conceptul de township invocat de Tocqueville cu trimitere la spatiul american a avut si in Europa rolul sau de coagulare sociala si modernizare, emancipind oamenii de sub servitutile medievale ori de sub acelea administrative. Acolo unde in istoria Europei descoperim o "burgerlichegeselshaft", o "civic society" sau o "comunita del popolo", acolo putem stii ca macar si partial orizonturile au fuzionat. Interferentele asumate constient si deschis ca urmare a conduitei rationale au facut posibila respingerea sau uitarea ideologiilor specific/separatiste in favoarea integrarii comunitar-civice. Asa cum conexiunile in interiorul orasului si regiunii sint cu putinta, tot astfel vor fi si acelea care leaga diferite orase, regiuni si state. Transculturalitatea presupune in mod egal dreptul dezvoltarii relatiilor transurbane, transregionale, transnationale, transcontinentale. Conceptul arata ca in orice proces integrativ avem de-a face cu o corelare intre educatie si idealurile filozofice. Cit priveste conceptul de identitate multipla, el se particularizeaza in raport cu acelea de multi si transculturalitate 53

prin faptul ca pune accentul pe negarea teoriei valorilor absolute, subliniind ca nimic nu ne indreptateste sa operam ierarhic si exclusivist prin mijlocirea termenilor de etnic, rasial, religios, regional, national-statal. Daca prin transculturalitate Siegel dezvaluia "idealuri care transcend culturi individuale", atunci, prin identitate multipla, eu am observat similitudinile valorilor umane, originile lor comune, posibilitatea asumarii pluralismului prin revendicarea apartenentei la mai multe identitati culturale. Admitind o atare interpretare, am subliniat relativitatea oricarui ideal. De aici presupozitia potrivit careia ar trebui sa avem in orice moment o perspectiva comparativa a evolutiei valorilor in jurul carora s-a format personalitatea individului si care ghideaza o anume societate. Complementar mai mult decit alternativ multiculturalismului, conceptul de identitate multipla stimuleaza iesirea din perimetrul prejudecatilor carora gindirea politica ii este inca tributara. Citeva concluzii in marginea analizei si ipotezelor formulate in acest studiu ar fi utile pentru evidentierea setului de argumente care arata importanta teoretica si practica a temei: 1. specificitatea nu exclude in principiu transculturalitatea si nici identitatea multipla; 2. aceasta inseamna ca adeptul unei culturi este de acord sa imbratiseze atit propriile valori cit si pe acelea apartinind unei lumi diferite de a sa; 3. multiculturalismul isi are o motivatie logica si un temei moral in cazul in care este capabil sa admita schimbul de valori intre doua sau mai multe culturi; 4. transculturalitatea si interculturalitatea contribuie la fuziunea orizonturilor aparent distincte, putind fi un suport in profesarea pedagogiei multiculturale; 5. conceptele de transculturalitate si interculturalitate favorizeaza atit comunicarea bi sau multilaterala cit si aparitia identitatilor personale, comunitar-civice, regionale, multiple; 6. radacinile culturale diverse nu numai ca nu se opun coabitarii, dar ele pot coagula viata segmentelor sociale, conferindu-i reguli; 7. transculturalitatea si interculturalitatea sint concepte care pot contribui la o corecta intelegere a identitatii multiple; 8. prin identitate multipla am presupus fie egala asumare a diverselor radacini culturale, lingvistice, religioase, fie geneza unei identitati diferite in raport cu acelea initiale, caz in care spatiile urban, regional, social ii confera noul nume; 9. dichotomia local-universal nu este revelatoare de indata ce acceptam ca probabila dispozitia noastra de a imbratisa idealuri si valori transculturale si universale23.

NOTE * Dr. Varayuth Srivarakuel este decan al Facultatii de Filozofie la Universitatea Assumtion din Bangkok, Taylanda. ii sint foarte recunoscator pentru discutiile purtate pe tema acestui text in perioada seminarului international organizat de prof. George McLean in lunile septembrie-noiembrie 2000 la The Catholic University of America, School of Philosophy, Washington, D.C. 1. Amy Gutmann, Introduction la Charles Taylor et alii, Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton University Press, 1994, edited and introduced by Amy Gutmann, p. 5. 2.Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition, Edited and Introduces by Amy Gutmann, Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 26- 27. 3. Ibidem, p. 30. 4. intii, conceptul de etnic poate trimite la o componenta exclusivista prin criteriile rasiale pe care le incumba la nivelul multor culturi. in al doilea rind, chiar si cind este vorba numai de trasaturi psihologice comune prin care se defineste un grup, probabilitatea de a provoca dispute si chiar conflicte armate nu se sterge. Explicatia deriva in acest caz din tendinta de conservare cu orice pret a setului de valori si, deci, din respingerea (fatisa sau nu) apropierii si intelegerii psihologiei alteritatilor. Disconfortul creat de prezenta minoritatilor in statele in care o majoritate etnica defineste natiunea este un indiciu deloc inselator ca pluralismul cultural este respins ori acceptat formal prin impunere din afara. Un al treilea element care poate fi luat in discutie este acela ca reprezentantii curentului etnocentrist folosesc conceptul (Volk) in sensul de originalitate a existentei cultural-comunitare, atribuindu-i dimensiuni mitice, adesea jignind vecinatatile imediate prin absenta masurii. Studiile de istorie, sociologie sau acelea teoretice circumscrise filozofiei istoriei ne conduc spre observatia potrivit 54

careia nici un grup (Volk) nu poate pretinde puritate culturala (cu atit mai putin rasiala) de indata ce se misca pe spatii foarte restrinse si coabiteaza de mult timp cu alte grupuri (Volk-uri). Cultura germana care a facut atita caz de acest demers si nu l-a pierdut din vedere pe toata durata secolelor al XIX-lea si al XX-lea - se afla ea insasi (mai mult decit altele) la confluenta unor lumi diverse ca provenienta, ele insele fecundate spiritual din mai multe directii. Ar fi suficient sa amintim aici ce pondere au avut evreii si populatiile de origine slava in definirea identitatii culturale germane. in alta ordine, comunitatile cu un neconvingator exercitiu democratic (ignorante in materie de cultura civica, egalitate si demnitate umana, drepturi individuale) si-au insusit foarte repede acceptiunea identitarismului (Voksgeist) practicata in cultura prusiano-germana, optind astfel aproape involuntar pentru falsificarea realitatilor istorice, dar mai ales a acelora local-regionale in numele dreptului colectiv. Aceasta maniera de a vedea originalitatea culturilor a promovat nu doar agresivitate verbala, cit mai ales razboaie cu inca neterminate consecinte. Rupturile de un sistem social-politic care confera identitate civica si juridica si profesarea teoriei etno-separatiste au creat divergente in ultimele doua secole, unele dintre ele dovedindu-se aproape imposibil de solutionat de o minte rationala. Sa retinem ca in comunitatile tirziu modernizate si adesea prin arderea etapelor exista un fel de minoritati dominante (nu intotdeauna ele reprezinta asa-zisa elita, cum le place sa se autocaracterizeze) care au de cules beneficii enorme din falsificarea realitatilor sau din starea de agitatie creata prin pseudo-teoriile puriste. Sint cazuri in care, ele se substituie tuturor valorilor morale in numele asa-zisului bine al colectivitatii etnice. in Europa rasariteana de pilda, ele au inca un cuvint de spus pe fondul tardivei si partialei emancipari populare; vezi si studiul meu intitulat Natiunea: Semnificatiile unui concept istoric. 5. Charles Taylor, op. cit., p. 65. 6. Ibidem, pp. 66-67. "But when I call this claim a `presumption`, I mean that it is a starting hypothesis with which we ought to approach the study of any other culture. The validity of the claim has to be demonstrated concretely in the actual study of culture. `The fusion of horizons` operates through our developing new vocabularies of comparison, by which we can articulate these contrasts". 7. Ibidem, p. 73. ." But what the presumption requires of us is not peremtory and inauthentic judgments of equal value, but willingness to be open to comparative cultural study of the kind that must displace our horizons in the resulting fusions". 8. Jurgen Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State", in Charles Taylor, op.cit., pp. 107-148. 9. Ibidem, p. 110. 10.Ibidem, p. 113. "A correctly understood theory of rights requires a politics of recognition that protects the integrity of the individual life contexts in which his or her identity is formed. This does not require an alternative model that would correct the individualistic design of the system of rights through other normative perspectives". 11. Ibidem, p145. 12. Ibidem. 13. Vezi si Ibidem, p146. 14. Harvey Siegel, "Multiculturalism and the Possibility of Transcultural Educational and Philosophical Ideals", in The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol.74, nr. 289, 1999, pp. 387-409. 15. Ibidem, p. 393-394. 16. Ibidem, p. 396. 17. Ibidem, p. 402. 18. Ibidem, pp. 402-403. 19. Ibidem, p. 404; ".Goldberg`s (and Rorty`s) denial of universality relies upon the presupposition that values, in order to be universal or transcultural, must be grounded in some impossibly neutral perspective. He argues, in effect, as follows: 1. Universal (moral) principles and values must be grounded on, or derived from, a `transhistorical or supersocial Godly` perspective. 2. There is no such perspective. 3. Therefore, there can be no universal principles or values. If `universal` is understood in this way, then I agree with Goldberg and Rorty that there can be no such universal values, principles or ideals. But we need not and should not understand the term in this way". 20. Victor Neumann, "National political cultures and regime changes in East-Central Europe", in 55

volumul History of Political Thought in National Context, Iain Hampsher-Monk & Dario Castiglione (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 228-246. Cf. si Idem, Ideologie si Fantasmagorie. Perspective comparative asupra istoriei gindirii politice in Europa Est-Centrala, vezi capitolul: "Herderianismul: o prefigurare a teoriei etno-nationaliste?" pp. 9-30. 21.A vedea in opera lui Herder punctul de pornire al teoriei pluraliste de astazi inseamna a trece cu vederea ca filozoful romantic fusese intre cei dintii ce promovasera teoria Volksgeist-ului, devenita argument forte al agresivitatii nationaliste din secolul al XIX-lea si de la inceputul secolului al XX-lea. Altfel, o asemenea ipoteza este indoielnica atita vreme cit sintem incredintati prin simpla lectura a textelor, dar si prin cercetari temeinice cum ca Herder avea o inclinatie excesiva spre speculatii.Vezi un comentariu legat de pluralismul herderian la Damon Linker, "The Reluctant Pluralism of J.G. Herder", in The Review of Politics, Notre Dame, Spring, 2000, pp. 1-14. 22. Vezi de exemplu, Hans Dipplich, Rumanisch-Deutsche Kulturbeziehungen im Banat und Rumanische Volkslieder. Relatiile culturale romano-germane in Banat, Biblioteca Romana Freiburg, 1960; Victor Neumann, Identitati multiple in Europa Regiunilor. Interculturalitatea Banatului. Identites multiples dans l`Europe des Regions. L`Interculturalite du Banat, Hestia, Timisoara, 1997. Abordarea fenomenului identitar prin prisma regiunilor si mai ales a acelora de granita, poate promova un alt mod de intelegere a evolutiilor national-statale. Studiind minoritatile polona si germana din regiunea de granita Flatow-Zlotow, Mathias Niendorf a ajuns la concluzii similare cu acelea ale cercetarilor noastre despre Banat. El a vazut foarte bine cum abordarea nationalista, rigida, specifica secolului al XX-lea si sustinuta de statul-natiune este falsa. Cf. Mathias Niendorf, Minderheiten an der Grenze: Deutsche und Polen in den Kreisen Flatow (Zlotow) und Zempelburg (Sepolno Krajenskie) 1900-1939, Wiesbaden, Harrasowitz, Deutsches Historisches Institut Warschau. Quellen und Studien, vol. 6, 1997. Cred ca redefinirea identitatilor intr-o viitoare Europa a regiunilor este o prioritate a cercetarilor contemporane de filozofia culturii si de filozofia politicii. 23. Acest studiu a fost posibil ca urmare a stagiului de cercetare si de profesorat in Statele Unite ale Americii in calitate de bursier Fulbright in anul academic 2000-2001. Multumesc profesorului George McLean, partenerul meu de la The Catholic University of America din Washington, D.C., care mi-a oferit ocazia de a lucra in citeva institutii academice de prestigiu din capitala S.U.A. si m-a invitat sa particip la un seminar international desfasurat pe durata a zece saptamini in care a fost abordata in mod special tema multiculturalismului.

56

CHRISTIAN MORARU PROMISING THEORY: PEDAGOGICAL CHALLENGES AND CROSSCULTURAL RESOURCES

Abstract: The article assesses the place of comparative literature among other literary studies. It also shows its growing pedagogical end as a result of its multidisciplinary methodologies. Keywords: Comparative literature; pedagogy; literary theory

For more than a decade now, comparatists throughout the country have deplored the accelerated shrinking of their field. This trend is certainly real, as the phasing out and downsizing of numerous comparative literature programs prove. Yet there is another way of looking at what's happening in--or to--the discipline, which may indicate, I think, that the glass is rather half full than half empty. Granted, it's no longer completely full--not according to how disciplinary plenitude, so to speak, was understood in the golden days of our teachers. Yet there is hope. Further, I would argue that the potentially significant consequences of this realization tie in tightly with issues of pedagogy, indeed, hinge on what I would call professional awareness and activism in the age of multiculturalism and globalization. Let me try to clarify these buzzwords. I strongly believe that the fate of comparative studies is currently being decided both within the traditional boundaries of the discipline and in English and those areas of the humanities--modern languages, but not only--where students in general and undergraduates in particular are required to take "theory" courses. For some time now, theory, primarily theory as part of the English curriculum, has been seized, by some of us at least, as comparative literature's mortal foe. Of course, I am not the first one to contend that, given the changing academy and the world at large, this enemy should be perceived rather as an ally. The famous "Bernheimer Report" and the whole debate around it have done that successfully. What I want to further stress, though, is that a quick look at the actual content of theory, multicultural, postmodern, and postcolonial courses taught nationwide and, increasingly, overseas, would indicate that those are comparative literature courses for the most part in that they pursue objectives, employ terminologies, and apply methods comparatists have pursued, employed, and applied all along. Naturally, the identity of scope, vocabulary, and methodology may not be always evident. Nor do, needless to say, the Weltanschauung, the cultural politics, or, tout court, the politics of the newest generation of postcolonialists, pop culture, and queer studies scholars overlap with Ren Wellek's. My very basic point is that, within theory and cultural analysis as a subfield of various fields that officially are not identified or recognized as comparative literature, comparatists can achieve their goals if they shape the courses accordingly and make, so to speak, the implicit explicit. Along these lines, I side with those who believe that, as a subfield and under various labels, the field of comparative literature is currently expanding rather than shrinking--and this is why I said that the glass might be half full than half empty. Beside graduate programs, where theory has been taught systematically and aggressively for two decades now, more and more four-year institutions are requiring English majors to take at least one, theory-based, "Approaches to the Study of Literature" class. This notable trend presents comparatists with a remarkable opportunity since, let me point out the obvious again, any "Literary and Cultural Theory" survey or "Introduction to Literary Interpretation" course not only recalls but actually calls, by definition if not openly, for a comparative and interdisciplinary approach. "Theory" is de facto a comparative topic; as such, it entails a comparative take defined both in terms of material selection and pedagogical methodology. 57

Since this is more apparent in the graduate seminar than in the undergraduate survey, here I would like to deal with the latter. Specifically, I want to dwell on a particular example, the English 303, "Approaches to the Study of Literature" class I regularly teach at University of North Carolina, Greensboro. What also interests me as a panel co-organizer is to foster, following the presentations, a conversation around the teaching methods comparatists have found successful in the literary and cultural theory class; the strategies they have adopted to turn the emerging multicultural classroom into a theory-friendly environment where students learn how to read and judge literature and culture; the best ways of helping students problematize their own backgrounds and identities to better understand, for instance, the difference between formalist and identity studies-informed paradigms or reading; the decision of using primary sources from different cultures and time periods to illustrate, say, models of reading worked out, for instance, by postcolonial critics; the pedagogically successful methodologies employed to provide students with the background information they need to grasp the role of certain disciplines in the development of modern literary and cultural theory: linguistics, semiotics, anthropology, philosophy, psychology and psychoanalysis, sociology, and the like; the ideological and political problems of theory teaching after the New Historicism and cultural studies; the new, turn-ofthe-millennium classroom, the rise of the "critical pedagogy" model and the challenges it mounts to the tradition of comparative literature discourse, and so forth. I also want at least to touch on the available resources, textbooks, handbooks, introductions, electronic tools, and other instruments that further the comparative teaching and learning of theory at all levels--but, again, primarily undergraduate. I teach, to come back to the example I want to work from, theory as a comparative-literature-for-theglobal-age class, and I am more and more convinced that this is the right approach. As is well known, theory has never been an "English" subject proper (or only). In fact, traditional philology and historicism have resisted it fiercely until recently, even though this is truer of the British and American than, say, the German and Italian academy. In any event, the fact is that English departments have lately proved its most hospitable homes. Now, as an English faculty, I am responsible primarily for a) theory and b) modern/postmodern American literature courses at all levels, from the freshman survey to the Ph. D. seminar, and the 300-level course mentioned above is the most relevant to the point I wish to make here. Unlike Carnegie Mellon, for instance, we do not have--and I am not convinced that we should have--a theory-centered undergraduate curriculum. But the English 303 course I am talking about is the template of professional literary studies for our majors. And since I teach it within a comparative framework, our English majors receive a modicum of training in a discipline that technically is not on the books except for certain World Literature or European Classics surveys fulfilling University Division general education requirements. In our time more than ever, comparative literature is to disciplinary classification what genre is to postmodern discourse. Traditional generic constraints and boundaries have crumbled. But have genres disappeared? Of course, not, as Ralph Cohen, among others, have argued. Genre is all over the place, indeed, in places where avant-garde and post-avant-garde generic crisscrossings would make it unlikely to operate, furthermore, control literary and cultural reception. The same holds true, I believe, in the case of comparative literature, as my example indicates. More remarkably still, most, if not all, of the textbooks, anthologies, and critical introductions to the field of criticism and theory, from Donald Keesey's widely used Contexts for Criticism to Wilfred Guerin's Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature to Peter Barry's excellent Beginning Theory, do not mention comparative literature, not even when they inform students of the "traditional," "humanistic" models of interpretation. On the other hand, their survey of the field is, overall, comparative, and, I for one, draw from this when I shape my theory courses, English 303 included. Let me try, in the remaining time, to tell you what we actually do and why I believe a comparative approach is best suited to what I want my students to get out of this class. We usually start out with a fairly informal conversation, based on an accessible example, around the distinction between "precritical" and "critical" reading. Now, this discussion can be carried in terms that may not necessarily engage literary and cultural comparison. But I make a point to engage it. Specifically, we place, say, a poem by Eliot or a tale by Hawthorne in the tradition of a genre, of a culture, of history and the history of ideas. Sooner or later, we address issues of literary and cultural intertextuality, which impels us to cross national and temporal boundaries, back and forth. Ultimately, students realize that 58

this move is unavoidable if they are to become able to re-enact on their own the intellectual scenario of "critical reading." Further, we spend some time organizing the course around the various elements that this type of "deep" and "informed" reading has privileged historically. To do this, we use Roman Jakobson's well-known article "Linguistics and Poetics" because it offers a comprehensive description of discourse as an act of communication activating certain functions and impinging upon factors such as the "sender" (author), the receiver, the message (or "text") and so on. In the past, I have used this moment of our class not only to convince students that the course has a structure, but also to foreground the transhistorical and crosscultural circulation of ideas in the field of literary and cultural analysis. Jakobson is an ideal case, much like other "formalists" (by the way, I always place the term within quotation marks). What we are here dealing with is one of the most influential scholars in our field, profoundly interdisciplinary and whose biography and bibliography tell students that "theory" is a comparative topic that requires a comparable approach. The same holds true with Bakhtin and Wellek, Propp and Lotman. Their contribution to the way we read, write on, and teach literature has been fundamental, and without contextualizing their work, without placing it in a certain intellectual history--literary, artistic, political--it simply cannot be correctly understood. I cannot get into all the details of the course here, but I want to stress that, by and large, this is the comparative strategy informing our class. Personally, I decline to use the "formalist" moment as a sort of whipping boy to better explain, say, the New Historicist revolution of "thick description." My work, our work, does not operate by emphasizing ruptures or violent paradigm "shifts." We do note and discuss these, too, of course. But I also encourage students to pursue filiations, legacies, echoes, continuities and reformulations of critical models across countries, cultures, languages, and ages. Let's go back to Jakobson for a second: we start with the OPOIAZ group, we follow Jakobson to Prague and just touch on the Prague circle, move on to France to note Jakobson's impact on Todorov, Genette, Barthes, structuralism, anthropology, and the Potique circle, and then we cross the Atlantic to discuss the distinctions between Russian "formalism" and the New Criticism. Alternatively, what we could do--and we will do it in the future--would be to tarry with the Prague moment a bit more, present Jan Mukarzhovsky's work as a means to introduce the marxian-sociological avatar of "formalism" and speed up the transition from text-oriented to reader-response criticism--through a Czech scholar like Mukarzhovsky or a Pole like Ingarden--or to context-oriented approaches to literature. Or, to go back in time and space, we could use the same "formalists" to take other two possible routes, again, essentially comparative. One could entail a more extensive discussion of V. I. Propp's "morphology of the folk tale" and, based on this, the fate of narrative theory from Propp's Parisian heirs--again, Todorov, Barthes, Genette, but also Greimas and Claude Bremond--to the "nation and narration" model of Homi Bhabha to Mieke Bal's "neo-narratological" paradigm where genre and gender are closely linked up. Another could zero in on Bakhtin, the most influential figure in 20th-century critical theory, according to Todorov. Bakhtin's--as well as formalism's or post-formalism's, if you want--posterity may be followed across continents and critical moments from the poetics of the 70's to the dialogism at play in feminism and postcolonialism to the neo-marxism of cultural studies that claims to carry on Bakhtin's critique of formalism. To conclude, we take the same comparative approach to trace gender studies, postcolonialism and the more recent paradigm of global studies back to their structuralist and poststructuralist sources. We emphasize such complex figures as Foucault, Kristeva, Spivak, Bhabha, Said, displaced and relocated scholars themselves whose biographies, again, reflect what their bibliographies tell us. Instead of moving from one ingredient to another of the contemporary smorgasbord of theory and criticism, we throw bridges carefully and take those roads where key figures from Ihab Hassan to Slavoj Zizek show the way. The primary or target texts that we use to illustrate various modalities of critical reading are both American (or British and American) and foreign (in translation). But they all indicate, as we read and reread them, that interpretation is a reconstruction of meaning whose end result is bound to overflow the boundaries of one single time, place, and language. I believe this is the right thing to do in an age that calls itself multicultural and prides itself of ushering its diverse body of students and teachers into a globalism that declines, at least in principle, to further former ethnocentric and exclusionary agendas.

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(Paper delivered at the 1999 Southern Comparative Literature Association Conference, Univ. of Tennessee, Knoxville, Oct. 1999) VIRGIL NEMOIANU EUROPE, YESTERDAY, TODAY, TOMORROW

Abstract: The article offers a very general perspective on the actual condition of Europe, from an anthropological perspective. The European continent is approached in itself and in relation to the other growing social-economic spaces of the world, in order to explain the reasons that positioned Europe in an essential place between 1650-1950. Keywords: Europe; eurocentrism; social studies; oikoumena

Let us begin by clarifying our terms, which is not always easy. I would describe Europe as a peninsula of the enormous Afro-Asian landmass, blessed with a favorable climate, a variety of relief forms, a rich ethnic diversity, abundant natural resources, and advantageous historical circumstances. This peninsula acquires a distinct identity around AD 500-1000 and plays a central role in human history for about three centuries, let us say approximately between 1650 and 1950. In other words, I maintain that it is erroneous and excessive for Europe to co-opt the great Mediterranean cultures (Greek-Roman Antiquity, the Egyptian world, the Judaic, PhoenicianCarthaginian, Sumerian, Islamic worlds and others). Europe emerges out of a combination between the civilization of Classical Antiquity, the spirit of Christianity and the traditions of Northern "barbarian" tribes (Germanic, Slav, Celtic, and a few others). Far from being primarily a "colonialist" force as usually accused (and often self-accused) Europe is the first great colony of the world, at least of the Western World; obviously in the Eastern world, in the world of China and India such colonizing phenomena also existed, probably even earlier. However all along Europe was a special kind of colony. A colony that succeeded to embrace tightly the Lebensform of its masters, a colony that never seemed to lose its pride and vigor, but rather changed adroitly its status from a shameful into a haughty one. This Europe proceeded to annex its past, to a great extent to impose its values, to staunchly resist outside pressures (why don't we re-read with fresh eyes the Chanson de Roland? - we would discover there how an uncouth peasant population kept fighting with tenacious rage to maintain its coarse identity when faced with a world-wide empire, a cosmopolitan, sophisticated adversary, intellectually and technologically well advanced and superior to it: the Arab-Islamic civilization.). More: it became aggressive and expansionist as soon as it was able to, before finally embarking upon a slow and elegant decline, one in its turn not devoid of some worth and even creativity. Until around 1500, this Europe was not too different from other civilizations on the planet with which it was quite imperfectly acquainted. The same living standards, analogous technological levels, similar political systems, of natural (or should we say biological?) derivation (feudal/monarchist), comparable artistic achievements. As a matter of fact, more than once Europeans used to throw flabbergasted and envious glances toward the accomplishments and abundances located elsewhere, on other meridians (the Chinese world, the Arab-Islamic one and others yet, indeed the African ones, real or imaginary.) At the time one can notice that this Europe was not particularly hospitable toward the Other, it did not show itself particularly eager to establish peaceful contacts, perhaps partly because of some inbuilt psychological insecurity, perhaps also because it was still engaged in self-invention. It is therefore only around 1500 that Europe feels emboldened and empowered to embark upon discovery, conquest, missionary work. In a relatively short stretch of time (300 years or a little bit 60

longer) it imposes, often by dint of eloquent conviction and example, but more than once by brutal constraint (historically European civilization was by no means less cruel and violent than its Asian sisters, although it brags otherwise) its own socioeconomic and conceptual grammar over the whole planet: technological urbanization, alienated individualism, empirical rationalism, ever more tenuous ties with nature and with transcendence, the prevalence of transactional-contractual relationships between human beings, the quantifying, mathematization, and digitalizing of the universe, the speeding up of communications and of historical advance and progress. How do we explain this formidable success, unique, one might argue, in the evolution of the human race? Let us speculate a little, thus avoiding comprehensive and definitive answers. First we explain the success through the very texture of the cultural entity in question. Precisely the colonial roots of Europe facilitated for it a certain pluri-centrism, a multiplication of layers, a diversity of angles and of positions which could provide advantages for itself, but also open it up to otherness (at least in principle or potentially!) and provide space for convenient diverse maneuvers. Again: this fundamental colonial Einstellung (the servant's quick wits, so often portrayed in literature!) was the one which taught Europe to improvise with stunning speed practical applications of inventions that as often as not (let us not forget) were due to and initiated in other cultures: gunpowder and typography, artistic or mathematical innovations, philosophical concepts, geographical and natural-science explorations. At the same time embracing the Judeo-Christian mode of communication with transcendence ensured a Weltanschauung against the background of which are born individual freedom, linear progress, the oneness of the universe, and other concepts yet; let me state this as clearly as I can: modern science is in my view a branch of Biblical religiosity and would never have taken off without it. Finally, let us remember that for a good number of centuries, thanks to the phenomenon of subsidiarity there functioned a certain balance between unity and diversity, between "Europe" and its components, be they national, religious, local, social, or otherwise. So here we truly have it: Europa Triumphans ! We are entitled however to ask ourselves why, under these circumstances, with even greater speed than it had grown, Europe tumbled (from a certain point on) to a secondary place in the affairs in the world. It is easy to give a concrete and specific answer. Two great "civil wars" (as they had been labeled by Ernst Junger and by others) or "world wars", as they are more often called, led to the internal collapse of "triumphant Europe". But there is more to say, over and beyond this military explanation. The European self-construction, to which I just alluded above, was never truly completed. Never did Europe succeed in defining itself: what are our limits? how hospitable ought we to be toward other identities, cultures, languages? what is the most appropriate kind of unity we should select? It is perhaps not erroneous to state that precisely the virtues that nourished Europe's victories had as the reverse of the coin the vices that ensured its defeats. Europe received with difficulty, with unpleasant reluctance and often with merciless violence the Jews, and with greater distaste and delays, others groups coming from Africa, Asia, the Middle East. Even more fundamentally, Europe did not seem willing or able to establish a modus vivendi with its own Eastern half; as a matter of fact it usually did not even liked to conceive or admit that it was even endowed with such an Eastern half. Nor was the coexistence with its own Western extensions all too happy: Northern and Southern America were long regarded with the same suspicion as Eastern Europe. Should we add here the gradual dissipation and dissolution of Europe's foundational spirituality? Should we add the relentless pressures of analytical empiricism and of all kinds of alienations that were slowly and surely chewing up its organicity and sacrality? Perhaps we do not even have to. It is only in this framework of thought that we can better understand why the "civil wars" of the century that is just coming to an end were so efficient in their destructive power: all the "dossier cases" that had remained unsolved for centuries took fire in a common flame, murderous both figuratively and in reality. Very well, you will answer, let us assume for the sake of discussion that you may be right (although in our inner selves we do not fully believe you), but will you be able to deny the radiant future of this Europe, Phoenix-like reborn from its ashes and reconstructing itself, this time in a rational way, rapidly, with vigorous deliberation? Are we not witnesses to ultimately a vast process of 61

Wiedergutmachung, of compensation, cleansing, and repair of the vices and errors that you just enumerated for us? With all due respect, I have some doubts. As a teenager, in the 1950s, I first heard of the early plans for European unification and I was truly enthusiastic. First and foremost because these plans seemed to irritate and worry somewhat the Communists: so they cannot be all bad, I thought in my mind. Beyond this rather childish judgment, I believed I discovered inside the preparations for European unity economic plans that seemed profound (Monnet), references to a Carolingian ideology (the horizons opened by the great Catholic statesmen De Gasperi, Adenauer, Robert Schumann), my thoughts wandered farther afield to analogies with Habsburg Austria, for me without the trace of a doubt the most judicious and inclusive system ever produced in Europe, where ethnic groups each had a substantial role and chances of progress, irrespective of their bickering and their petty dissatisfactions. In those years, Imperial Austria seemed to me (but even today my views have not changed too much) an ideal locus amoenus where the balance between advance and conservation was justly achieved. Meanwhile (West-)European structures kept progressing with each passing decade, they became ever more complex and soon my mind and undoubtedly a number of other, better, minds, were faced with two fundamental questions. The first regarded the exterior of the building: I mean the autonomy of the construction, the other regarded the inside, let us better say the organization of the new system. In each case one could imagine a good and a negative answer. Also zuerst Mal, the outside. For a good half-century (from 1945 to 1991 or so), a main theme of world politics turned around the tempting and rich stake of domination of Western Europe. Should the area belong to the Western extension (separated from Europe, but rooted in it: that is North America) or rather become a dependency of its own Eastern branch, that is to say the Soviet empire? This was a closer struggle than it sometimes seemed and the outcome was never truly and completely clear or categorical. Only now, as we are stepping into the dangerous 21st century do we truly know the decision: the Western (golden? olive?) branch is the winner. The much-coveted treasure has a possessor. Economically, culturally, technically this Europe means in fact little, almost nothing, it is meekly gleichgeschaltet to Wall Street, to Hollywood, to the Pentagon. Long gone are the days when a conservative like Charles De Gaulle would allow himself to cast out summarily the general quarters of NATO from the splendors of Fontainebleau Castle. Long gone are the days when a socialist like Franois Mitterand could forbid the American military airplanes to use the French airspace on their way to I forget what clownish aggressive frolic of the American cousins. Gone are the days when Margaret Thatcher could embark upon independent military enterprise, as well as offer socio-economic lessons and models to the United States. Even humble and timid Germany had the nerve, under the social-democrat Helmut Schmidt, to submit imperious advice to the American government. Today? In France the conservative Chirac and the socialist Jospin compete as to which of them knows how to prostrate and humiliate themselves in front of their American bosses. What would anyone expect from the laughable puppet Tony Blair but the most demeaning set of imitations? And so on, and so forth, country after country. The bottom line is that I do not see any reason to believe that the unification of Europe might lead to the emergence of an alternative center of power. I cannot imagine how this unification might be conducive to the increase and strengthening of diversity on our planet. On the contrary, this unification seems to intend an expansion, peaceful if possible, by unrestrained brutality if necessary, over other areas of Europe and Asia., it seems to pursue the imposition of "values" which are not even completely its own everywhere else. So from an exterior point of view there seem to be mighty few reasons for any optimism regarding a "renewal" of the culture and/or civilization of Europe. How then can we judge the inner self of a reinvented Europe? Perhaps there is more hope in that respect? Here, likewise, there seem to be two main options, common sense tells us. A unified Europe might well act as a kind of roof for a certain "regionalization" of the continent: a genuine federalization in the frame of which Burgundy, Catalonia, Bavaria, Flanders, Toscana and so many others might counteract the cold and hard systematization of the implacable national state, such as it had emerged in the 19th century, the very same national state that had pushed us toward disastrous developments, all too well-known and all too close in time to us. The second option. Full and real unification, in the strong sense of the word. Let us institute an additional level of oppressive bureaucracy over and above 62

those that already plague us; let us erase local diversities (the few that have somehow still survived) and establish a central power with eliminatory purposes and severe commandments. So what is the direction chosen today by semi-federalized Europe? You will answer: well, we do not know yet, it is too early to say anything categorically. Perhaps I am ready to agree: indeed, we don't have an absolute certainty. But, alas, I worry earnestly that the marching orders point in the second direction, not the first, toward compulsory homogeneity, rather than toward the creative carnival of multiplicities. Therefore, I feel that I am entitled, looking at both aspects, to remain a pessimist and a skeptic when debating the putative "renaissance" of Europe. It seems to me that that the circle of European history is now closing: this part of the world started and was born as colony, it fades away and comes to an end as a colony again. A number of events (partly economic, partly political) in the first half of 2001 gave the impression to some that indeed we can begin to speak about a certain independence or autonomy of unified Europe. I have the opposite impression. The behaviours and declarations coming out of the leading strata of Europe indicate the increasingly static, rigid, and inertial nature of the conglomerate, characteristic of colonized systems. Whereas in the case of America (and even China or Russia) one observes movement, change, internal contradictions, this is hardly the case in Europe. The former "centre of the world" is engaged in what one of its pre-unification prime-ministers described as "a vast anti-democratic strategy". Its antiAmerican tantrums are just that: the rebellious acts directed at a parent that is known to be ultimately forgiving and benevolent. This is followed soon by re-entry into obedience. Have I been saying all along that that the origins of Europe are rather shameful, its development short and guilt-laden, and the end inglorious? I hope I have not. Of course, I do not glimpse for Europe any admirable future. How and why should I when (West-) Europeans themselves distrust themselves: observe the nourishment of your eyes in the halls of movie theaters or on the screens of your TV right now in Paris and London, let alone Madrid and Amsterdam; watch the dress codes, the gestural behavior, the food and the music styles; notice the sterile, agitation, filled with anxiety no less than with boredom of the younger generation, as well as of people inclined toward creativity and enterprise - you will soon be convinced by the eloquence of real facts. Europe is fading away. What survives is, in Holderlin's undying words that blessed summer of fertility; by the simple fact that something "WAS", that it had existed, it continues to exist. The vital ferment in all fields of human endeavor, from the material to the spiritual ones is (let me here openly admit to sincere prejudice and preference) unparalleled in all the annals of our human race. The dynamics, the processuality of Europe are those that remain worth admiring and, yes, worth imitating. From there, from that relatively tiny geographical corner emerged the constitutive discourses of today's world, and these continue to uns zu gestalten and to serve as a strategic reserve of images and concepts. Perhaps in a century or so the future centers of the world will be found in Hong Kong and Beijing and Kuala Lumpur, in Sao Paolo and Pretoria, in Baghdad and Bombay. But I am firmly persuaded that the socioeconomic idioms which will shape this possible future world would be intelligible for us, precisely because they will be those that grew and matured on the mental soil of Europe. Why should it be otherwise when even today we witness a similar process of transfer, of adaptation? Evelyn Waugh has an admirable predictive and satirical short story in which a Europe of the remote future, fallen into ignorance and barbarity, is now being nurtured through the words and actions of African missionaries who have arrived to bring to it civilization and the word of the Christian God. Optimism? More than one alternative scenario can be imagined. What if a Germany, again unified as it is, manages within a few decades to polarize around itself the Central and Eastern parts of Europe? Would this not be described as a reinvention? We can only answer in the affirmative. What if the Romance and Balkan countries of Southern Europe assemble together with the Arab World, with Greece and Israel in a new Mediterranean circle, fresh and full of initiatives? Would this not be a new, alternative construction of Europe? It would, patently so. Or what if the Black Sea, as many (M. Malita among others) suggest, begins to act as the focus for a convergence of the Caucasian lands, of Eastern Europe, of the Turkish-Greek and Levantine world? Here too, the answer is quite obvious. The list of scenarios could well continue, but the last answer brings us to a very interesting point, one that is often overlooked. Let us envisage that erstwhile "Europa Triumphans" will continue inexorably its downward slide, moving toward the status of a "theme park" (NOTE' DAS IST SO WAS WIE EIN 63

DISNEYLAND, ABER THEMATISCH, JA?) attractive in an ever more emphatic and visible way for the ruins of its great cathedrals and castles, more generally for its museum-like features (which after all, are already extant). Even under such melancholy circumstances, Western Europe might preserve a certain global dignity and usefulness (provided it does not seek too obstinately the position of serf-like vassal in which it already threatens to install itself) - namely that of mediator, in other words claim for itself a place in which and through which "accelerated modernity", more generally "the future", can be communicated to and distilled for the rest of the planet, after a judicious process of polishing and temperation. This might prove to be an interesting, and surely not an unworthy task, an elegant, albeit modest role in the process of globalization. I notice however that I keep talking mostly about Western Europe. This is, mea culpa, a staggering error. If we persist in feeding the illusion of a Europe that continues to flourish and engages in a quest for some mode or another of rebirth, then our eyes have to turn toward East and Central Europe. One of the main reasons for Europe's decline and fall was, as I just said, precisely its own incomplete nature, tenaciously preserved, through economic exploitation, political or military violence (which unfortunately seems to continue), hegemonic visions and religious schisms. Well then, why should we not rather envisage a rounded Europe, specifically a Europe in which the most dynamic and creative emphases would move considerably eastward? Since we have been considering different "scenarios" why not the following also (a possible, no, a probable one)? On a pluralist planet, such as we hope for, such as we ought to hope for, Eastern Europe might affirm itself (along with the Pacific basin, along with the Muslim world, along with the Latin-American civilization) as a major player on the fields of the world. Western Europe could well preserve, as I just said, its mediating role but how much better, how much more ably and appropriately could such a role be played when coupled with the potentials of Eastern Europe! Though more deeply integrated than usually believed in the structures and the creative discourses of its Western twin, Eastern Europe nevertheless preserves communicative attachments with nature and sacrality, a nostalgia for long tradition, underlying layers of "third world". Communism had repressed all of these, but simultaneously, like a Paleolithic glacier, preserved them intact. That is how the conditions that encourage the vocation for mediation managed to survive in full, anarchic, vitality. I will not deny that the same communism was the one who, alas, grave deformed (even in the long term) the communicative abilities of the inhabitants both inside this part of the world and towards the exterior. This state of bedazzlement, confusion, and deafness of East Europeans will last for a good while. They express themselves not least by economic inadequacies, social chaos, psychological inhibitions; but above all, and most seriously, by an inability of self-understanding. The NorthAmerican military-economic block provides scant help in its clumsy (sometimes brutal) attempts at mimetic reconstruction. Still, my impression (and now, by way of symmetrical compensation, I become perhaps too optimistic) is that mimeticism has a relatively limited future, and that we should brace ourselves for some surprises. The, wounds, the frustrations, the bafflements, the psycho-repressions are temporary; the other "half of Europe" has still an abundant potential fund of genuine substance. So (realistically or not) I allow myself to envision a "renaissance" which will come from a different direction, still ambitious, still unexhausted, rather than from the bureaucratic structures of Brussels and Strasbourg. The merits of the European Abendland will remain for a long, long time staunch and majestic; the grateful appreciation we owe it must remain intact. But a renewal is, to repeat, highly improbable. If indeed, as any sane mind wants to hope, the future of our planet and species must be one of plurality, heterogeneity, diversity, then what we would like to happen is a displacement of Europe's gravitational center and focus toward the East, toward the South; only thus can we ensure the plural balances to which (in the past) Western Europe itself knew how to participate, in an agile and productive way.

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Virgil Nemoianu is William J. Byron Distinguished Professor of Literature and Ordinary Professor of Philosophy at the Catholic University of America in Washington D.C. He is a member of the European Academy of Arts and Sciences and Vice-President of the International Comparative Literature Association. He has published c. 16 books and c. 600 articles and reviews on four continents. Among these are "The Taming of Romanticism" (Harvard, 1985) and "The Theory of the Secondary" (Johns Hopkins, 1989) CORIN BRAGA L'AUTRE COMME RACE MONSTRUEUSE - RACINES ANTIQUES ET MEDIEVALES DE L'IMAGINAIRE COLONIAL ET EUROCENTRIQUE -

Abstract: Using imagological tools, the article analyses the image of the other (situated on the boundaries of the known world) produced by the explorers of the Renaissance. Keywords: Europe; Middle Ages; Renaissance; colonialism; the other; imagology; etnocentrism; monstruosity

Je me propose d'analyser l'image que l'homme de la fin du Moyen Age se faisait des peuples situs aux limites du monde connu. Or le discours sur l'inconnu pose une question d'imagologie. Selon Vincent Fournier, . La relation gographique construit une reprsentation de l'autre a travers les strotypes culturels du voyageur. L'image de l'altrit souffre un puissant phnomene d'investissement affectif et symbolique, dans une tentative inconsciente de la rduire a l'image de soi. Chaque poque projette sa propre Weltanschauung sur les territoires et les civilisations qu'elle dcouvre, chaque mouvement culturel imprime ses propres fins fantasmatiques aux voyageurs qu'il envoie au-dela de son propre contour gographique. L'image de l'autre s'avere donc etre modele, au-dela de l'exprience empirique et des contacts directs, par un systeme complexe de strotypes mythiques et de clichs culturels. L'Europen voyait les habitants des mondes priphriques comme des races monstrueuses, dont la figuration tait hrite de l'Antiquit classique ou de la mythologie chrtienne. Ces inconnus inquitants et menaants, gardiens de territoires fabuleux, personnifiaient les angoisses et les terreurs du monde mdival. Loin d'etre des relations "objectives", les rcits de voyage de l'poque, rels ou fictifs, taient plutt des documents intrieurs, qui tmoignaient sur les mcanismes de formation de la conscience de soi a travers la confrontation avec l'autre, sur les processus de projection des images dprciatives, sur les ressorts de la mentalit eurocentrique. En conjuguant les mthodes de la littrature compare, de l'imagologie et de l'histoire des mentalits, on pourrait puiser dans l'histoire de l'homme europen des informations rvlatrices pour une rflexion analytique sur les racines de l'intolrance et de l'incomprhension interculturelle. Le monde circulaire dans les cosmographies antiques et mdivales L'homme du Moyen Age pensait le monde sur des cartes qui se subordonnaient plutt a la pense religieuse qu'a l'exprience empirique. Telles sont les cartes T-O, dans lesquelles l'oikoumene (l'Europe, l'Asie et l'Afrique) s'organise sur un axe Est-Ouest, ayant comme centre la Jrusalem. Cration du monde et pch originel (le Paradis terrestre situ a l'extrmit orientale), incarnation du Christ et rachat de la condition humaine (la Jrusalem) et fin du monde (l'Occident qui envoie ses croiss pour rcuprer la Terre Sainte, dans une offensive qui prcede et annonce l'apocalypse), toute l'histoire chrtienne de l'humanit est dploye sur la mappemonde. La Terre est valorise a partir de 65

son centre sacr, ou le divin s'insere dans l'humain. On a ici les racines d'une pense ethnocentrique, qui d'ailleurs n'a pas t invente par le Moyen Age. Chez les crivains antiques, dja, d'Homere et Hrodote a Strabon, Pomponius Mla et Ptolme, le degr de civilisation va en dcroissant depuis le centre du monde (la Grece, la Perse, Rome etc.) vers ses limites caches. Le plus on se dplace vers des territoires loigns, limitrophes du fleuve Ocan, le plus on s'enfonce dans un univers primitif et chaotique. Une flore luxuriante ou completement strile, une faune monstrueuse et terrifiante, une humanit amphibie, domine par la bestialit, peuple ces rgions. On dirait que l'homme mdival projette dans l'image de l'autre, de l'inconnu qui habite ces zones non-explores du monde, tous les dsirs et les angoisses qu'il censure chez lui-meme. Chaque fois qu'il part, en voyage pratique ou imaginaire, vers le Nord glac, vers les Indes fabuleuses ou vers l'Afrique saharienne, il explore non pas tant une gographie extrieure, mais plutt la carte d'images et de symboles de son propre inconscient. La panoplie de mirabilia, soigneusement retransmise par tous les encyclopdistes et les rudits de l'poque, fonctionne comme une grille de clichs mythiques et de strotypes culturels, a travers laquelle l'homme europen peroit et interprete ce qu'il dcouvre. L'archtype culturel du monde circulaire remonte a Homere. Dans le XVIIIe chant de l'Iliade, Hphaistos confectionne un nouveau bouclier pour Achille. Sur la surface mtallique, le dieu reprsente l'image de l'univers. La forme que l'aede antique attribue a la terre est celle d'un disque contourn par le fleuve circulaire Ocan . Cette cosmographie sera perptre au long de l'Antiquit, en tant que vision dominante des croyances populaires. Les gographes antiques rectifient en gnral la forme circulaire a une forme trapzoidale, la chlamyde, sur laquelle se dploie l'oikumene, mais ils continuent de penser le monde en termes de centre et priphrie. Le maintien de l'ide de circularit est visible dans les deux grandes thories gographiques qui se confrontent vers le dbut de notre ere. La thorie des golfes, soutenue par un Strabon et d'autres, affirme que la masse terrestre (l'Europe, l'Asie et l'Afrique) s'rige comme une ile au milieu de la surface des eaux ; les mers intrieures (la Mditerrane, la Mer Rouge, la Caspique) sont des golfes de l'ocan extrieur. La thorie des isthmes, reprsente par un Ptolme et d'autres, garantit, tout au contraire, que ce sont les eaux qui se rassemblent dans les creux de l'tendue terrestre ; les trois continents de l'oikumene sont les isthmes d'une grande masse de terre qui couvre les marges circulaires des cartes. C'est a cause de ce prsuppos apriorique que, sur les cartes de Ptolme, le sud de l'Afrique est uni, tout a fait inexplicablement d'un point de vue empirique, avec le sud de l'Asie par une bande de terre qui fait de l'Ocan Indien une mer intrieure. Apres l'effondrement de la culture antique, les peres et les docteurs de l'Eglise chrtienne ont cart les subtilits de la gographie classique et sont revenus au modele primitif du monde circulaire. Dans les ditions ultrieures des tymologies d'Isidore de Sville, important trait d'rudition chrtienne qui a domin le premier millnaire, une esquisse graphique partage l'image du monde en trois secteurs de cercle : la moiti pour l'Asie et les deux autres quarts pour l'Europe et l'Afrique. Les cartes qui en drivent, tout au long du Moyen Age, sont appeles techniquement des cartes T-O. Le O reprsente l'Ocan circulaire, et les bras du T sont constitus par les eaux intrieures qui sparent les continents : le pied du T est la Mditerrane, entre l'Europe et l'Afrique ; le bras gauche est le Tanais (le Don) entre l'Europe et l'Asie ; et le bras droit est le Nil entre l'Afrique et l'Asie . Ces cartes sont appeles aussi des cartes " noachites ", d'apres No, qui aurait partag la terre entre ses trois fils, Cham (l'Asie), Sem (l'Afrique) et Japhet (l'Europe) . En contraste avec un autre type de cartes, dites macrobiennes (d'apres un dessin cosmographique figurant dans In somnio Scipionis de Macrobe) ou zodiacales (par ce qu'elles s'orientent en fonction des cercles du Zodiaque), les cartes T-O ne sont pas orientes sur l'axe Nord-Sud, mais sur l'axe Est-Ouest, de maniere qu'au haut de la carte se trouve le Paradis terrestre. Le diametre qui en descend coupe l'Asie en deux, sur la ligne des monts Taurus, rejoint le centre a Jrusalem, et continue par l'axe mditerranen jusqu'aux colonnes d'Hracles. De cette maniere, l'axe gographique suit l'histoire sacre du christianisme, a partir d'Adam jusqu'a Jsus (l'Ancien Testament), et de la premiere jusqu'a la deuxieme venue de Jsus (le Nouveau Testament), c'est-a-dire a l'Apocalypse, cense partir de l'Europe des croisades. Autovalorisation et dprciation de l'autre. L'ego- et l'ethnocentrisme 66

Il y a des multiples raisons pour motiver le recours des hommes antiques et mdivaux a la cosmographie circulaire : raisons magiques, cognitives, gomtriques, esthtiques etc. Je voudrais envisager ce qu'on pourrait appeler la raison axiologique. Les cartes anciennes se dploient a partir d'un point central, qui fonctionne comme une pointe de compas. Ce centre gomtrique coincide avec le centre de la civilisation humaine. La Perse, la Grece, plus tard la Palestine sont situes au centre de la terre habite ; le gographe et son publique consacre ces rgions comme un omphalos. Les habitants du centre reprsentent la civilisation, la culture, la spiritualit, la rvlation, la vraie croyance. A mesure qu'on s'loigne sur les rayons du cercle, la civilisation est remplace par la barbarie, la culture par la nature, l'orthodoxie par les hrsies et par l'ignorance religieuse. Les cartes circulaires formalisent une hirarchie entre le centre et la marge, entre le proche et le lointain, entre le connu et l'inconnu, entre les valeurs partages de son groupe et les valeurs des groupes trangers, entre nous et eux. L'autre, qui differe de moi par aspect, traditions, langue, pratiques sexuelles, alimentaires, sociales, est relgu aux marges de la mappemonde. A travers ces cartes, la perception gocentrique est amplifie a une vision ethnocentrique. L'autovalorisation de soi et la dprciation de l'autre devient autovalorisation de son peuple et dprciation des peuples diffrents, en vertu de considrants raciaux, ethniques, religieux et comportementaux. Bien sur, il y a bon nombre d'explications pour motiver ce comportement de groupe (qui pourrait remonter jusqu'au pattern animalier de la chasse en meute), je ne fais ici que souligner que les cartes circulaires sont un miroir visuel qui objective ces rflexes axiologiques. Le processus de dvalorisation fantasmatique des autres aura pour corollaire la transformation des peuples lointains en des races monstrueuses. La hirarchie axiologique est surimpose a une gradation cognitive. Sur les cartes antiques, la zone centrale (un cercle avec le centre dans le Proche Orient) se trouve apparemment sous la focalisation d'une loupe. Le monde connu est reprsent avec une prcision maximale des dtails. Les cartes T-O indiquent par des icnes tous les venements significatifs de la Bible, de No, Babel, Sodome et Gomorrhe, jusqu'a Bethlem et Golgotha. En plus, le cercle central comprend des informations sinon exactes du moins vridiques sur les places de l'Europe, du Proche et Moyen Orient et du nord de l'Afrique. Souvent, les limites du monde connu sont marques par des bornes mythiques : les colonnes d'Hracles, la borne de Dionysos, le poteau d'Alexandre, le poteau Artus. En dehors de ce cadre, les contours soufrent des dformations, deviennent flous et disparaissent dans le fabuleux. Quelles sont les marges de la terre ? Vers le Couchant, l'Europe se termine avec les iles britanniques, le cap Finisterre en Espagne et les colonnes d'Hracles. Derriere ces pays, sur un arc d'un quart de cercle, s'talent les iles fantastiques de l'Atlantique, qui nourriront l'imaginaire paradisiaque du Moyen Age et prpareront l'horizon d'attente pour la dcouverte des Amriques : de la " derniere Thul ", vers le nord, aux iles de Saint Brendan, d'Enoch et Elie, les Iles des Sept Eveques, les Iles Fortunes, les Hesprides, les Gorgades, O'Brazil. Au Nord de la mappemonde se trouvent les territoires des Scythes et autres peuples barbares plus ou moins fabuleux, s'avoisinant vers le ple avec le pays des Hyperborens. Au Sud on tombe sur l'Afrique transsaharienne, avec les monts Atlas et le mont de la Lune d'ou le Nil prend sa source. Enfin, vers le Levant, le diametre qui traverse la Mditerrane et la Jrusalem se prolonge par le " diaphragme ", c'est-a-dire les monts Taurus qui, fictivement, sparent l'Asie en deux. Dans la moiti gauche se trouvent les rgions des Seres (la Chine) et puis des peuples impurs, tel Gog et Magog (identifis plus tard aux mongols) ; dans la moiti droite, les Indes fabuleuses, qui couvrent un arc de cercle qui remonte du Nil (l'Inde moyenne), par l'Inde intra gangtique, jusqu'a l'Indochine (l'Inde Extra gangtique). Les races monstrueuses Tous ces habitats sont peupls par des races humaines monstrueuses, situes a la limit de l'animalit, ayant une condition amphibie entre la bete et l'homme. Travailles par les gographes, les encyclopdistes et les lettrs, les vagues informations sur les pays limitrophes ont t rapidement et inexorablement amplifies en des mythes sur des etres fantastiques. En contemplant les cartes du Moyen Age, on a l'impression que l'oikumene tait littralement assige par les hordes d'une humanit rgressive et chaotique, que seulement le pouvoir de la civilisation et des armes pouvait maintenir a distance. A partir d'Homere et d'Hrodote, de Ctsias, Mgasthene et Arrien, jusqu'a Strabon, 67

Pomponius Mela, Pline, Ptolme, Solin et Martianus Capella, l'Antiquit fabrique de toutes pieces un vritable panopticum de l'humanit bestiale. Ce bestiaire humain, que meme les plus sceptiques des rudits ne se permettaient pas d'ignorer, par respect a la tradition reue, a acquis une tonnante stabilit. A travers les ages, il s'est transform en une constellation de loci qui configurait l'imaginaire mdival. Les peres chrtiens et les encyclopdistes mdivaux, d'Isidore de Sville et Bda le Vnrable jusqu'a Vincent de Beauvais et Brunet Latin, ont prlev en bloc la gallrie tratomorphe, avec la description standard et l'iconologie fixe de chaque espece. Un trait spcifique (tete de chien, absence de la bouche, oreilles gigantesques, pied unique etc.) suffisait pour construire la carte d'identit de chaque figure. Certaines cartes, comme celle d'Ebstorf (XIIIe siecle), passaient en revue ces races dans une bande de cartouches dploye sur le primetre sud de l'oikumene. L'hritage antique de races monstrueuses se retrouve systmatis dans le rcit le plus lu, apres la Bible, pendant le Moyen Age : le Roman d'Alexandre. A partir d'un auteur du IIIe siecle d'Alexandrie, Pseudo-Calisthene, la figure du roi macdonien sort de l'histoire et entre dans le mythe et le fabuleux. Dans les innombrables variantes mdivales de la lgende, on voit Alexandre parcourir toute la surface de la mappemonde, en tant que conqurant autant par les armes que par le savoir. Il devient le hros prototypique de la quete d'exploration et de conquete de l'inconnu. Sur cet archtype seront projets symboliquement les voyages que les Europens vont entreprendre vers l'Est ou vers l'Ouest, depuis les pelerinages des moines des premiers siecles vers le Paradis terrestre jusqu'aux voyages diplomatiques, commerciaux et d'aventures dans l'Empire mongol des XIIIe et XIVe siecles, et depuis les immrama dans l'Atlantique d'un Saint Brendan jusqu'aux explorations de la Renaissance. Invitablement, tous ces voyageurs, personnages mythiques ou personnes relles, ne manqueront pas de peupler les territoires lointains avec les figures strotypes puises dans le panoptique classique. Quelles sont ces races monstrueuses ? On peut faire d'emble une distinction plus ou moins gnrale : la monstruosit des peuplades qui habitent au-dessus de la diaphragme, vers le Nord, est le plus souvent de nature morale ; celle des peuplades qui habitent les Indes fabuleuses, vers le Sud, est de nature physique. Les races du Nord ne different pas des Europens dans l'aspect corporel, ces hommes ont une anatomie parfaitement reconnaissable et homologue ; leur bestialit se manifeste dans les mours et le comportement. La barbarie des peuples scythiques et sibriens est rsume dans un trait emblmatique qui stigmatise de maniere irrvocable : le cannibalisme. Atteste par Hrodote, Strabon, Mla, Pline, Ammianus Marcellinus et autres, l'anthropophagie est conue comme l'empreinte la plus rpulsive de la dgnration humaine. Ces tribus, dont Alexandre dit " on n'a jamais vu d'etres aussi cruels depuis que Dieu cra le monde ", sont regroupes sous le nom de Gog et Magog, les peuples impurs qui constitueront l'arme de l'Antchrist. La lgende veut qu'Alexandre, apres les avoir vaincus, les ait enferms avec un mur gigantesque de mtal dans une valle aux confins nordiques de l'Asie. Ce geste a une signification civilisatrice, avec la meme porte que les tabous et les interdits alimentaires institus par les dieux ou les anciens in illo tempore. Le mur d'Alexandre exprime la rpulsion envers une conduite nutritive qui spare le monde civilis du monde animal. Comme les Titans faits prisonniers par les Olympiens dans le Tartare, les peuples de Gog et Magog enferms dans un huis clos personnifient les terreurs et les paniques refoules par l'homme mdival. Alexandre devient un personnage numineux, porteur de lumiere, qui, tel un archange, censure le mal qui menace de jaillir de l'inconscient collectif. Par cette subtile contamination christique de la figure d'Alexandre, les peuples du Nord sont assimils rien moins qu'a des hordes dmoniaques. Cette assimilation fonctionnera sans faille au XIIIe siecle, quand les Europens identifieront les troupes des tatars et des mongols aux " Tartares " de l'enfer et a Gog et Magog de l'apocalypse. Les peuples du Sud, par contre, ne font plus figure de dmons (le mal moral), mais de betes (l'anomalie physique). Les races qui habitent les Indes fabuleuses et la " Libye " (l'Afrique trans-saharienne) ont une condition semi-anthropomorphe. L'homme antique et mdival imagine une srie de mutants, dans un jeu combinatoire qui exprimente toutes les permutations possibles entre l'homme et le fauve. Les lettrs et les dessinateurs clonent sur le corps humain des organes animaliers, museaux, crocs, pattes, griffes, serres, queues, fourrure etc. Grace a de telles greffes, ces etres acquierent des fonctions et des capacits qui les apparentent aux regnes non-humains. A ce chaos organique, sans dlimitations gntiques, appartiennent les amyctyrae (hommes avec des levres gigantesques qui leur servent de parapluie), les androgynes, les antipodes (qui marchent la tete en bas), les artibatirae (qui marchent a 68

quatre pattes), les astomi (hommes sans bouche, qui ne se nourrissent que d'arme de fruits), les blemmyes (hommes sans tete, avec les yeux, le nez et la bouche sur la poitrine), les centaures et les satyres, les cyclopes, les cynocphales (hommes a tete de chien), les enotocoetes (hommes qui ont les pieds a l'envers, avec le talon devant), les epiphagi (avec les yeux sur les paules), les femmes a barbe, les gants, les himantopodes (avec les pieds comme des lanieres), les hippopodes (avec des pattes de cheval), les hommes a cornes, les ichtiophagi (ils nagent pendant des heures sous l'eau et ne se nourrissent que de poisson), les macrobes (longevives), les mangeurs de chair crue, les microbes (ils ne vivent que huit ans, leurs femmes conoivent a cinq ans), les monoculi, les ocypodes (ils courent plus vite que le cheval), les panoti (avec des oreilles gigantesques, dont ils se couvrent pendant le sommeil), les parossites (hommes sans nez et bouche, avec un seul orifice, par lequel ils se nourrissent a l'aide d'une paille), les pygmes, les hommes a pieds rouges, les sciapodes (hommes a un seul pied, tres grand, avec lequel ils se font l'ombre a midi), les sciritae (sans nez), les femmes avec des yeux qui brillent la nuit, les hommes a six mains, avec des pieds velouts, avec une queue de chien, les troglodytes (qui vivent sous la terre), les hommes qui naissent vieux et meurent jeunes etc. Ce dfil tratologique est repris presque sans changement autant par les auteurs de bestiaires humains que par les encyclopdistes et les cosmographes qui s'appliquent a reprsenter les recoins du monde. Les rudits de l'Antiquit et du Moyen Age ont labor plusieurs thories pour expliquer l'existence des races monstrueuses. Il y a la thorie des zones climatiques, selon laquelle seule la zone tempre (ou sont situes l'Europe et le Moyen Orient) est habitable, tandis que la zone glace du Nord et la zone torride de l'quateur sont, sinon inhabitables, du moins responsables des dformations de la nature humaine. Il y a puis la thorie de l'cartement, selon laquelle les races les plus loignes du centre ne participent plus des attributs de l'humanit. Il y a enfin la thorie de la rgression (spatiale et temporelle), qui situe les races monstrueuses quelque part au commencement du monde, voyant en elles le rsultat physique du pch d'Adam ou les rejetons de la cration, qui appartiennent plus au chaos pr-cosmogonique qu'au monde du Logos. Punition de Dieu ou dfaillance de la nature, la monstruosit est relgue a des causes extrieures, ce qui constitue un bon dguisement pour les processus de projection par lesquels l'observateur, l'homme europen, dforme son objet, l'autre loign. C'est a travers ce langage imaginal et symbolique que les voyageurs europens peroivent les contres inconnues qu'ils explorent. La cration de l'image de l'autre suppose un ddoublement de soi-meme et la projection de la partie la moins connue dans la figure de celui d'en face. Le voyageur se dcouvre par l'intermdiaire de l'homme qu'il dcouvre et qu'il utilise comme un miroir. Si le reflet que lui renvoie ce miroir est ngatif, cela n'est pas du tellement au "support" (a l'tranger rencontr) qu'a l'image (au matriel projet). Une mauvaise conscience et l'incapacit de contenir et d'assumer les pulsions rprhensibles poussent les explorateurs a culpabiliser les autres. L'Europen dveloppe assez souvent un complexe de supriorit, qui couvre en fait l'avaritia au sens large, le dsir de possder (des esclaves, des richesses, des terres, des titres). Les descriptions de l'ailleurs gographique sont en gnral constitues sur le canevas d'un discours ethnocentrique et imprialiste qui rejette son objet hors de l'espace et hors du temps. Les systemes de clichs visant les trangers sont une modalit de compromettre l'image de l'autre, pour mieux la dominer, la conqurir, l'asservir. Le regard mystifiant n'appartient d'ailleurs pas seulement a l'attitude agressive. Il caractrise aussi l'attitude de sympathie, qui est a son tour une forme de sduction et de conquete. Les colonisateurs partent avec des prjugs sur ce qu'ils veulent dcouvrir, et cela risque de les rendre aveugles a la spcificit irrductible des autres cultures. Les criteres de la monstruosit Y a t'il des criteres qui permettent de diffrencier entre l'humanit et la faune ? Bien que les frontieres de l'humain restent en gnral flottantes, les rudits du Moyen Age ont tabli une vritable grille de distinctions qui portent sur les diffrences entre les regnes. Ils ont dvelopp une casuistique minutieuse, qui rifie et substantive les moindres accidents et particularits. Pour donner un exemple de cette verve taxonomique, je m'arrete sur un trait du XVIIe siecle, Physica curiosa siva Mirabilia Naturae et Artis par Gasparus Schottus . Gaspare Schott est un pere jsuite qui se propose d'inventorier tous les prodiges et les miracles de la nature transmis par la tradition. Dans un dploiement 69

impressionnant d'rudition, il passe en revue la majorit des sources et, avec beaucoup de probit et meme d'esprit critique, il numere les arguments pro et contra l'existence de telle ou telle race. Nanmoins, il opere cette synthese d'un point de vue qui reste imbu par la " pense enchante " du Moyen Age, pense qui croit en merveilles en vertu de la croyance gnrale en Dieu. On ne saurait pas apporter des arguments dcisifs ou srieux contre l'existence des monstres humains si la ralit des anges et des dmons reste une vidence pour la philosophie du temps. Ce qui fait que la Physique curieuse soit un des derniers grands panoramas des mirabilia de l'imaginaire chrtien. Pour tablir les criteres d'homologation de l'animalit, Schott part des catgories d'Aristote, dans leur usage scolastique. Au chapitre I du Livre VII, il cite plusieurs dfinitions aristotliciennes-thomistes de l'animal : " vivens constans corpore, organis sensoriis instructo, & anima sensitiva " ; " substantiam animatam sensibilem " ; " corpus animatum sensibus praeditum ". En ce qui le concerne, il opte pour une dfinition rapide : l'animal est un etre vivant sensitif (" vivens sensitivum ") . Suivant la procdure aristotlicienne de la dfinition par des catgories toujours plus restrictives, pour isoler l'homme de l'animal il ajoute la caractristique de la raison. Il tombe donc sur la formule de Quintilien, devenue courante dans les manuels de logique de l'poque, " Homo est animal rationale ", l'homme est un animal dot par Dieu avec la capacit de penser. Le probleme est d'identifier le spcifique purement rationnel de toute une srie d'actions que l'homme n'est pas le seul a performer. Beaucoup de betes ont des gestes et des comportements qui ont la meme structure et fonction que les actions similaires des hommes. Avec acribie, Schott survole les arguments pour l'attribution de la facult mentale a des animaux en fonction de : I. leur habilit de communiquer (ex sermone mutuo brutorum), II. leur capacit d'etre duqus (ex capacitate discipline & instructionis) ; III. leur intelligence naturelle (ex sagacitate, industria, providentia, prudentia) ; IV. leurs affects et sentiments (ex virtutibus, amore, fidelitate, gratitudine) ; V. leur disponibilit ludique (ex discretione, ludo, & jocis) ; VI. leurs autres actions simili-humaines (ex variis aliis actionibus) ; VII. leur possibilit de rire et de prendre la position verticale (ex risu, & stetu) ; VIII. leur mmoire des choses passs (ex memoria insigni multorum) ; IX. leur capacit de juger et de dliberer (ex judicio, ac discursi seu rationatione) ; X. leur raction envers la libert (ex indifferentia animalium ad utrumlibet). Toutes ces habilits, que certains animaux partagent avec l'homme, leur donnent une certaine rationalit, analogue a la raison humaine. Mais la conclusion est tranchante : les animaux n'ont pas d'activit intellectuelle, telle que celle qu'on concede a l'homme (non habent vero, qualem homini concedimus). L'argument final est de nature transcendante, la raison est un don que Dieu a fait seulement a l'homme, et pas aux betes (hae dotes ita sint a Deo concessa hominibus, ut negatae penitus sint caeteris animantibus) . L'argument transcendant, qui surclasse l'analyse concrete, ne tranche pas le probleme et meme finit par faire exploser l'appareil analytique. Cela devient visible quand on essaie d'appliquer le protocole de distinction entre l'animal et l'humain aux races monstrueuses et on finit par constater qu'il est impossible d'arriver a une conclusion sur sa base. Schott numere centaures, hippocentaures, onocentaures, satyres, tritones, monstres marins a l'aspect de moines, nrides, nymphes, sirenes, cynocphales, nains et pygmes, gants, homines sylvestres, pilosi homines, homines caudati, homines longas aures habentibus (i.e. panotii), homines astomis, monoculis, acephalis (oculos in pectore habentes) (i.e. blemmyes), homines aversis plantis (i.e. antipodes), homines sciopodae, longaevus (i.e. macrobii), sexum mutantium etc . Certaines de ces especes remplissent toutes les conditions de rationalit numres auparavant, et bien plus, ils ont le langage, l'intelligence et la vie sociale, mais toutefois ne sont pas considres humaines. Les nains et les gants sont distribus aux hommes (gentes), les tritons, les sirenes et les cynocphales sont renvoys aux animaux marins et aux singes (non sunt homines), mais les cas des autres restent indcis. Quand l'effort critique ne russit plus a rduire les figures fantastiques a travers les catgories empiriques et/ou de vraisemblance, l'auteur se voit oblig de faire recours au critere transcendant. Le point archimdique de l'analyse est de dcider si Dieu a fait ou non le don d'humanit a telle ou telle race. Ce qui veut dire, qu'au final, l'appareil analytique n'est qu'une sorte de prothese thorique pour une dcision completement intuitive de la part de l'analyste. Le manque de prise de l'organon scolastique sur les mirabilia du Moyen Age fait possible leur manipulation idologique. Le jugement si la " monstruosit " (tant physique que morale ou sociale) de telle peuplade remet a la bestialit ou a l'humanit reste un verdict arbitraire, susceptible de convoyer 70

des intrets conscients ou inconscients. Je voudrais exemplifier cette situation par un dbat clebre a l'poque de la Renaissance, qui a attir dja l'attention d'Alain Finkelkraut. Il s'agit des deux sessions de la Junta convoque par l'empereur Charles Quint a Valladolid en 1550 et 1551. La conquete des Amriques avait confront les pouvoirs europens, et spcialement les rois d'Espagne, a des graves problemes de morale et de juridiction chrtienne. Tandis que les entrepreneurs et les aventuriers demandaient des liberts sans limites dans la colonisation (concrtises dans le clebre systeme des encomiendas - le colon recevrait par une capitulacin royale la concession d'une terre avec ses habitants indigenes), des voix s'levaient pour condamner le traitement bestial auquel taient soumis les amrindiens. L' " avocat " le plus acharn de la cause des indiens fut Fray Bartolom de las Casas, veque de Chiapas et " Apstol de los Indios ". L'infatigable moine a crit plusieurs apologies et traits dans lesquels il dnonce le massacre perptr dans les pays d'outre mer. C'est le cas de la terrible Breve informacin sobre la destruccin de las Indias, piece de conviction qui a pese lourd dans la constitution du " mythe noir " des espagnols en Europe, et de la vaste Historia de las Indias, concue comme une apologie en contre de l'ide que les Indiens sont des " bestias incapaces de doctrina y de virtud " . Soumis a la double pression, l'empereur a organis un dbat thologique et juridique, dans lequel, devant quatre docteurs de l'Eglise, trois dominicains et un franciscain, deux rudits devaient prsenter des arguments pro et contra la colonisation des Indes. L'un tait Juan Gins de Seplveda, humaniste, chroniquer imprial, philosophe et thologien, qui avait dja publi, en 1533, Democrates primus ou De la conformidad de la milicia con la Religin Cristiana, trait qui justifie la ncessit des actions militaires, inclusivement des guerres de religion, contre les hrtiques et, en 1544-1545, Democrates secundus ou De las justas causas de la guerra contra los indios, dans lequel, puisant ses informations dans La Historia general y natural de las Indias de Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, il donne de l'Indien la vision d'un etre infra-humain. Pendant la session de 1550 de la Junte, il prsente devant le petit concile une Apologie qui rsume l'argumentation de Democrates secundus. Son adversaire est Las Casas, qui crit a son tour une Apologie contre Seplveda et une Histoire apologtique contre Oviedo, ou il soutient que l'Indien est gal et meme suprieur aux autres races. Le dbat s'organise sur quatre arguments . Le premier est la " barbarie " des Indiens. Seplveda affirme que " les Indiens se trouvent dans un tel tat de barbarie qu'il est imprieux de les dominer par la force pour les librer de cet tat ". Dans son argumentation, il part d'Aristote, selon lequel " par raison naturelle il y a des hommes qui sont des maitres et d'autres qui sont des esclaves ", et il greffe la distinction maitre / esclave sur l'opposition homme / animal. Las Casas rpond en distinguant quatre types de barbarie (barbares sont ceux qui 1. sont cruels et inhumains ; 2. ne connaissent pas le langage littraire ; 3. sont conduits par les mauvais instincts ; 4. n'ont pas eu la rvlation du Christ). Selon lui, seulement la quatrieme acception s'applique de fait aux Indiens, les trois autres sont plus appropris pour les Espagnols eux-memes. En contraste avec la barbarie et cruaut des Chrtiens, qui font preuve d'un manque rvoltant de civilisation et d'humanit, chez les Indiens " existent des royaumes illustres, des grandes masses d'hommes qui vivent selon un rgime politique et social, des grandes cits, des rois, des juges et des lois " qui tmoignent pour une grande moralit et apptence pour les art libraux et mcaniques. Le deuxieme argument porte sur l' " idolatrie " des Indiens. Seplveda accuse la " religion impie " des Indiens de demander a ses croyants des sacrifices humains sanguinaires et des rituels horribles, comme la consommation de chair humaine. Par leurs croyances religieuses, " ces barbares sont soumis a des graves pchs contre la Loi naturelle " donne par Dieu. Las Casas ne nie pas l'existence de ces pratiques, mais conteste le droit des monarques chrtiens de punir pour sacrilege des hommes qui ne sont pas leurs sujets : " les mcrants qui n'ont pas adopt la croyance de Christ et ne sont pas soumis a un peuple chrtien ne peuvent pas etre chatis par les chrtiens ou par l'Eglise, quelle que fusse l'atrocit des crimes qu'ils commettent ". Le troisieme argument invoque la ncessit de sauver les victimes innocentes de la religion paienne. Impressionn par les relations concernant les milliers de victimes sacrifies chaque anne dans les rituels azteques, Seplveda soutient que " tous les hommes sont obligs par la loi divine, s'il leur est possible, de librer de telle injurie toutes les personnes " susceptibles de devenir des martyrs. A nouveau Las Casas ne nie pas l'vidence documentaire, mais contra-attaque par l'ide que le mal ne doit pas etre combattu par un mal pire : les guerres des chrtiens pour sauver des victimes innocentes 71

risquent de provoquer des massacres beaucoup plus terribles parmi toute la population des Indiens. " Le chatiment des dlits a pour but la correction du dloquent et la paix de la rpublique ; si ce but n'est pas atteint mais, au contraire, engendre des crimes encore plus grands, ce chatiment est plutt un vice et une injustice qu'une vertu ". Le quatrieme argument vise l'utilit des guerres de conquete pour l'vanglisation les Indiens. voquant l'empereur Constantin et autres champions de la Chrtient, Seplveda affirme que c'est " par droit naturel et divin qu'il faut corriger les hommes qui se dirigent directement vers leur damnation et les attirer vers leur rdemption, meme contre leur propre volont ". A son tour, Las Casas ne dsavoue pas l'ide du salut par la force, mais il objecte que Constantin, Thodose et autres princes qui ont interdit les cultes paiens ont agi dans les limites des leurs royaumes. En ce qui concerne les Indiens, qui ont leurs propres rois et systemes lgislatifs, l'ide de leur imposer une croyance par les armes est contre la notion de droit international. Comme on peut le voir, dans la plaidoirie de Seplveda, le concept de barbarie est amplifi au concept de monstruosit. La thorie des races tratologiques est transforme en un raisonnement racial eurocentrique, qui rabaisse la nature des Amrindiens a un statut sub-humain, pour les excepter du droit de libert qu'un Schott considere spcifiquement humain. Le dclassement physique est accompagn par une culpabilisation morale. En les crasant sous les accuses d'idolatrie, d'anthropophagie, de rituels sanguinaires, Seplveda identifie leur religion a une forme de dmonolatrie et satanise leur culture. Le deuxieme argument, sur les pchs contre la nature et contre Dieu des Indiens, prpare l'introduction du troisieme et du quatrieme arguments, dans lesquels les Europens font figure de sauveurs. Le theme messianique a t acclimat dans la conquete du Nouveau Monde (" ciel nouveau et terre nouvelle ") par Christophe Colon dja. Dans ses constructions fantasmatiques, l'amiral partait vers les Indes pour dcouvrir des richesses qui aurait permis aux souverains espagnols de financer la derniere croisade contre les musulmans. Apres que les " Indiens " ont t dcouverts, le systeme des croyances eschatologiques offrait aux apologistes de la conquete, pour motiver le sac de ces terres, l'argument des races impures. Assimils des fois meme textuellement aux peuples de Gog et Magog, les Amrindiens ont reu le sceau des anthropophages et d'autres peuples monstrueux de l'imaginaire classique et mdival. Comme le dmontre Serge Gruzinski, la conquete du Nouveau Monde fut aussi une "colonisation de l'imaginaire" et la guerre faite aux natifs - une "guerre des images" . Imbus par le systeme des clichs mythiques, les explorateurs regardaient et dcrivaient les terres nouvelles a travers leur propre dcoupage symbolique et conceptuel, qui fut, en fait, le seul langage que la science de leur temps mettait a leur disposition. Amazones, cynocphales, hommes a queue, anthropophages, ogres, gants, tout le bestiaire humain europen a t transport en Amriques. Colomb, Vespucci, Pigafetta, Verrazzano, Cartier, Orellana, Thevet, Lry, Staden, Raleigh et bien d'autres ont impos au monde amricain une grille de valeurs de manufacture europenne, qui falsifiait et trahissait les ralits gographiques et ethnographiques dcrites. Les techniques de la dmonisation des Indiens et de l'anglisation des Europens, a l'ouvre dans le dbat entre Seplveda et Las Casas, ont leur origine dans les ractions, ingnues mais pas moins diriges par le systeme de prconceptions hrit, des premiers dcouvreurs de l'Amrique. Kirkpatrick Sale a pu dmontrer que la polarisation des Amrindiens opre par Colomb, en bons Indiens (les Tainos) et mauvais Indiens (les anthropophages) est tout a fait imaginaire; l'amiral idalisait les populations accueillantes et culpabilisait les populations hostiles . Mais c'est ici que trouve son origine la double image que les conquistadors imposeront aux Amrindiens : indios de paz (les allis) et indios de guerra (les ennemis) . Pendant des siecles, on assiste a une vritable "guerre de propagande": les Indiens sont assimils aux fils maudits de Cham (le fils maudit de No) ou aux peuples de Gog et Magog; ils sont rduits a une condition bestiale, traits comme des cannibales, des primitifs, des retards et des sauvages; ils sont accuss d'hrsie, leurs croyances et leurs divinits sont identifies a l'idolatrie et au culte du dmon. Ces projections ont le rle d'abaisser, jusqu'a l'animalit, l'humanit d'un continent qu'on veut conqurir, assujettir et exploiter. Elles soulagent l'inconscient charg des conquistadors et tentent de minimiser, du point de vue symbolique, le plus grand gnocide de l'histoire . L'analyse des processus de projection permet de mieux comprendre les mcanismes de dformation de l'image de l'autre, dformation qui a pour rsultat un appauvrissement de l'humain, qui mene a la gnration, autant en 72

dehors qu'a l'intrieur de nous-memes, de ce que A. Finkelkraut appelle "l'humanit perdue".

TOMAS VARNAGY HISTORY AND MEMORY SHORT STORIES OF ARGENTINE EXERCISES OF OBLIVION

Abstract: The text is a traceline of the history of Argentina in the second half of the 20th century, with a special stress on the non-democratic political systems that ruled the country. Keywords: Argentina; antiperonism; terrorism; dictatorship

Introduction The history of Argentina in the twentieth century is full of lack of memory, attempts of concealment, oblivion and covering up of events, ideas and people. In the opinion of the Argentine historian Dora Schwarzstein, it is a characteristic of this country to impose, officially and unofficially, active politics of "forgetting" . Argentina did not have a Holocaust neither a Stalinist regime, but irresponsibility, arrogance and evil lurked in different periods of its history through peoples and political parties in the government and the opposition, in the left and the right, in civilians and militaries alike. We could review Argentine history in an aseptic and value-free mode, but the task of memory must evaluate what is right and what is wrong and there should be a moral approach to these phenomena. "Crimes, terror and repression", be it in Nazi Germany, Stalinist regimes or Argentine dictatorships, must be condemned, memorized and kept for future generations. How many victims? 100 million, six, thirty thousand or just one human being... it does not matter, as the writer Jorge Luis Borges said on the desaparecidos ("missing or disappeared persons") in his country, "if there is only one, that is a crime against all of humanity" . Paraphrasing Saul Friedlnder , there is a great difficulty involved in grasping events of the recent past and becomes truly formidable when you try to reconstruct and interpret the most terrible moments of Argentina's recent history. Opposite to the paradox of the worldwide growing memory and consciousness of the Shoah, there is nothing similar or parallel in the case of Argentina; in fact, the tendency is to forget and cover up a painful local past. In this paper I will examine a few cases of oblivion in the recent history of Argentina: the military coup of 1955 decided that there should be no memory of Pern and Evita; the failure of the left in the 1960s and 70s should be forgotten and is not a debatable issue; state terrorism and the desaparecidos should not be remembered, be it an authoritarian or a democratic government; and, finally, antisemitism, which "does not exist" -for some- in Argentina. Antiperonism (1955) One interesting example of trying to erase the past was when the democratically elected -but highly controversial- Juan Domingo Pern (accused by his opponents of Fascist leanings and being a 73

"democratically elected dictator") was ousted in 1955, after ten years of office, by a coup dtat. Taking a fiercely anti-Peronist stance, the militaries dissolved Pern's old party and placed the labour unions under state administration. His name was, simply, forbidden to appear printed or pronounced. The media (newspapers, magazines, radio) could not mention him, therefore the euphemism "the fugitive tyrant" (because he escaped to Paraguay and, later, Spain) was used instead. It should be remembered that this action did not stop Pern to win, by absolute majority, the elections of 1973. The militaries did not only forbid Perons name, but also dismantled or abandoned many institutions made by Pern or his wife, especially if they belonged to the Fundacin Eva Pern. One example of this, which I recall very well because I worked closely, was the Evitas Childrens Hospital project, intended to be the best in Latin America and almost ready for inauguration in 1955. It was simply relinquished and it became the Albergue Warnes ("Warnes Shelter"), a huge complex of buildings on Warnes street converted into a refuge for outcasts and homeless people. Decades later it was demolished because it was already useless. The posthumous and morbid odyssey of Eva Perns corpse was another tentative of oblivion . She was the second wife of Argentine president Juan Pern, who, during her husband's first term as president (1946-52), became a powerful though unofficial political leader, revered by the lower economic classes and known as Evita. She won the adoration of the masses, and, after her death due to cancer, Evita remained a formidable influence in Argentine politics. Pern preserved Evitas body embalming it and planned, just as the Soviets had done with Lenins corpse, to exhibit it in a mausoleum. Her working-class followers tried unsuccessfully to have her canonized, and her enemies, in an effort to exorcise her as a national symbol of Peronism, stole her body in 1955 after Juan Pern was overthrown, and the embalmed corpse was hidden in a small cemetery in Milan, Italy, for 16 years. In 1971 the military government, bowing to Peronist demands, turned over her remains to his exiled widower in Madrid. In 1973, Pern returned to Argentina to run one last time for president and, after he died in office in July 1974, his third wife, Isabel Pern, hoping to gain favour among the populace, repatriated the remains and installed them next to the deceased leader in a crypt in the presidential palace. Two years later a new military coup hostile to Peronism removed the bodies; Evita's remains were finally buried in the Duarte family crypt in the famous and exclusive Recoleta cemetery .

The unrepentant left of the 1960s and 70s Some important components and characteristics of the leftist tradition in Argentina were full of authoritarianism, ignorance, unreasonableness, dogmatism, lack of knowledge and intellectual rigor, arrogance, disdain for democracy, fearful of discussion and debate, uncritical, irresponsible, suicidal, undemocratic, precipitated, triumphalistic, nightmarish... These epithets were not pronounced by the Fascist right but by the leftist Argentine intelligentsia in the 1990s . To understand what happened with the left in Argentina during this period we must make a short historical account. Since 1955 Peronism was forbidden and the elected presidents were voted without the participation of Pern or his party. A new military government (1966-73) was resisted by the population through revolts and demonstrations that marked the birth of guerrilla coming out from different factions of Peronism and the left. The main underground activities were organized by a Trotskyite (at the beginning) group, the ERP or Ejrcito Revolucionario del Pueblo ("Peoples Revolutionary Army"), and by Peronist groups, being the Montoneros the most important one. In the 1970s the terrorist acts by this groups increased, and Pern supported the Peronist guerrilla. The military government prevented Pern's own candidacy but could not stop the electoral victory of the Peronist coalition in March 1973. When the newly elected president, Hctor J. Cmpora, took office in May 1973 it was immediately clear that he was merely preparing the way for the return of Pern from exile. Tensions rose sharply among left (Montoneros) and right wing Peronists for influence. At the final return of Pern in June, there was a battle between right and left at Ezeiza International Airport. 74

The union leadership and an associate of Pern, Lpez Rega, launched a violent antileftist campaign through a death squad organization, the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA, or Triple A), which had the discreet support of Pern himself . Pern was elected president with his third wife, Mara Estela Martnez de Pern, known as "Isabel", as vice president. Taking office in October 1973, he continued the campaign against the left, and in May 1974 the victims of the purge acknowledged the break with their former leader and passed into opposition. Montoneros activity increased, and the Triple A, suspected by many to be close to the police and intelligence branches of the administration, began to crack down on leftist political, student, and union leaders. When Pern died on July 1, 1974, his widow Isabel was sworn in as the world's first woman president. Under the influence of Lpez Rega (leader of the Triple A), the government became even more inflexibly oriented toward the right, and violence reached new heights. Lpez Rega, who used the rightist crusade to consolidate his power base, favored labor and army leaders who personally supported him, and this created hostility among union, political, and military leaders. The unrest deepened and, on March 24, 1976, military officers -again- deposed the president and took over the government There were many different strategies adopted by the left in the beginning of the 1970s, one of them was the entrista ("entering one") believing that they could "enter" Peronism and with the Peronist voters, the figure of Pern and Evita, they could make the socialist revolution. There was a lot of wishful thinking that projected all hopes in the Peronist working masses. Others supported the Leninist idea of a party of professional revolutionaries. Did they read the Trotsky of 1905 or Rosa Luxemburg? Many self-proclaimed leftists not even read nor debated this issues, just imitated or aped the theories that produced the Gulag, Pol Pot or the Great Leap Forward. Were they aware of the social costs and the horrors of the grinding machine of ideas and flesh that was put in motion? In those days nobody dared, in leftist circles (with few exceptions), to criticize the Soviet Union or talk about bureaucracy in "really existing socialisms"; it seemed impossible to be on the left and not praise the Kremlin and their satellites . Stalinism in the Argentine Communist Party had been very strong, the Gulag existed, but everybody was looking somewhere else. The leadership of the party did not allow the minimal internal dissidence to their views, dictated from Moscow, but they were more flexible -for instance- with their policies at the university. That is why they were called oportunistas hacia fuera, sectarios hacia dentro ("opportunists in the outside and sectarians inside"). Today, what is the difference between Argentina and the countries of Eastern Central Europe? That in Argentina there is still a Communist Party, opportunistic and dogmatic as it always was. Trying to reason out events in a Marxist-Leninist sect was something against all reasonableness and against any empirical fact or evidence. One of the absurdities of a Trotskyst fraction was denouncing the military coup of 1976 as a pro-Soviet maneuver of the Argentine armed forces. Another paradox was that the different Trotskyte factions fought (and still do) against each other with more zeal than against the bourgeoisie and the capitalists. Argentina lacked a strong or significant "peasant" class, but when you strolled around university premises you could see posters, aping the Soviet Union or China in an incredible import of recipes, asking for the unity of obreros y campesinos ("workers and peasants"). Today, even the working class is a class in extinction in Argentina but some leftist parties still use this denomination. The Maoist groups had an imaginary China, which was beautiful and it was not bad because it was completely false. It was an "easy" leftist position -as some militant defined it-, because they denunciated the Soviet Union and all the "real existing socialisms", so they were to the left of the left, even to the left of the Trotskysts, who maintained that the "Workers State" had gone through a process of bureaucratization. It was the most radical and "leftist" position and they thought of the revolution in Argentina with Chinese categories and a total lack of the objective realities that separated these two countries. Montoneros, the most important Peronist guerrilla, did not fight for democratic liberties and the constitution, as they used to state. They fought for a strange idea of "socialism" (they came from the right of the political spectrum and, as time passed, turned to use some Marxist points of view) to be 75

discussed somewhere else, and, even with democratic elections in 1973, their slogan synthesized their position: Con las urnas al gobierno, con las armas al poder ("Get the government with votes, get the power with arms"). This slogan can be anything but democratic; therefore, their struggle for democratic liberties was false, a simple lie that tried to conceal their real aims. When I mentioned suicidal irresponsibility, I was thinking of the methodology of the guerrilla (Montoneros and ERP) which went underground (1974) in a democratically elected government, avoiding a democratic debate in the organization and importing foreign theories without analyzing them properly. In many cases, there was a precipitated adoption of armed struggle , believing that Argentine reality could be assimilated to the ones in Argelia, China or Vietnam. A couple of years ago I went to see a new documentary film, Cazadores de Utopas ("Utopia Hunters"), an eulogy of Montoneros, which show them as "freedom fighters" and as the "armed arm of the Argentine youth". Young people at the movie were very enthusiastic about it and I felt uncomfortable, because it was a simplistic and manichean view of the world: the good ones (Montoneros and the Peronist masses) against evil (the militaries and the bourgeoisie), and they appeared as heroes in the struggle for freedom, when they were just a group of armed guerrillas with little support of the population, and much less from the Peronist masses after Pern himself threw them out of the Party in the Plaza de Mayo. Due to these absurd positions, the leftist political parties were always, and still are, minor parts of the political game: their weakness was and is connate. Paraphrasing the joke on Gorbachevs Nobel prize for chemistry (because he converted "socialism" in dust), it could be stated that the left in Argentina has been pulverized to almost its extinction, but there is a great abstention in debating this failure. Some people on the left believe that what happened in the Soviet Union had no relationship with "Socialism" or "Marxism" but, undoubtedly, it strongly affected the whole left, if there is any left. This is an issue that must be discussed critically and kept in the memory of future generations to avoid bloody mistakes. Somebody must take up the responsibility of what happened, farther away or closer, but nobody seems to be referred to. Too many things, good and bad, happened since the term "left" was invented during the French Revolution, and some of the bad things that happened are their responsibility. The left did not yet discussed nor debated the meaning of the fall of "real existing socialisms", its connections and relationship with them, and the event itself was quickly annulled or simply assimilated as the result of the tergiversation made by Stalinism. This way, the intellectual certainties and politics of the left were not compromised by the Fall of the Wall in 1989. One hypothesis, mainly in Trotskyst circles, explained it as the sign that the masses were retaking the betrayed revolution and reincorporate those countries to the revolutionary struggle to establish a more radical democracy. The miscalculation of the guerrillas (Montoneros, ERP and others) were several: first, they did not have the support of the population; second, the "objective reality" finally showed that the time was not ripe for "revolution"; and, finally, they were fighting against a much superior military force, and they were easily decimated. They hide the facts that show their failure and only memory will avoid to repeat this dangerous actions supported by a triumphalistic view which was nothing else than a childish fantasy that sent many young idealists to their deaths. Most of the left (be it Maoist, Trotskyst, Castrist or Soviet) was infatuated with a mystical revolutionary idea that failed in Argentina, a failure that can be extended to the Che Guevara in Bolivia. On the one hand, most of the leftist survivors do not want to ask themselves about this painful events, do not want to know about them it because most of them -and it is perfectly understandable- were tortured, have dear relatives and friends in the list of desaparecidos, had to keep silent and hide, or leave the country in an arduous exile. This collective process was exultant at one time, and pathetically tragic some time later. On the other hand, some characters of the left dramatically shifted their views and today you can find them in high political positions in a "bourgeois" government or working in multinational corporations. These are some reasons for which the left, the responsible ones of past mistakes, failures and changes, prefer to conceal it. Concluding, as the leftist academic Eduardo Grner states: "I am very much worried about the resignation of important sectors of what we considered the leftist intelligentsia in Argentina to start a really deep debate [...]. There is an outspoken, noteworthy, anesthesia in the Argentine intellectual 76

environment..." . This lack of discussion and not assuming the past, according to Leon Rozitchner, mistakes makes that "in this country nothing can be done to make memory play. They talk about the memory of the deceased: here we are all dead, most of the present Argentine thinking is dead" , because the ones who took part now they do not want to know about it, it is better to forget . State Terrorism (1976-83) The coup in March 1976, closed Congress, imposed censorship, banned trade unions, and brought state and municipal government under military control. They initiated the infamous Process of National Reorganization, known subsequently as the Guerra Sucia ("Dirty War"), in which some 13,000-30,000 citizens were killed, often following their imprisonment and torture. The Argentine military government, maintained that it was fighting a civil war and initially faced little public opposition, but this began to change in the late 1970s, with growing evidence of civil rights violations. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, who lost children in the Dirty War, began calling international attention to the plight of the desaparecidos through weekly Thursday afternoon vigils to know the whereabouts of their relatives in the Plaza de Mayo, fronting the presidential palace. For the most part, however, opposition was choked off by rigorous censorship, strict curfews, and fear of the servicios (secret services of the armed forces). The military dictatorship was responsible for thousand of desaparecidos: kidnapped, tortured and put to death. They did not want to have the world's media against them like it happened in Pinochets Chile, therefore they planned a different way to treat the alleged "subversives" (I put in quotation marks because most of the desaparecidos were not members of guerrilla or subversive groups): the militaries simply concealed the fact stating that they (the "subversives") probably left the country or were hiding somewhere. At the end of the dictatorship the military officers allegedly destroyed (or hide) every document that could incriminate them. When the militaries were accused in international forums for the abuses of human rights, the regime just disclaimed responsibility for brutality, trying to convince international bureaucracies, media and foreign administrators to ignore the veracity of the allegations. There was an instrumentation of a state terrorist machine, which acted anonymously and tried to behave as if nothing happened. Most of the population ignored or were unaware, at the beginning, what was going on as a consequence of the deep silence of the press. The ones who knew adapted by going about their lives as if terrible things were not happening . Most of the kidnappings and murders happened in 1976-77 and, in 1978 when most of the guerrilla cells have been disbanded and have lost the battle in military terms, the dictatorship organized the World Soccer Cup, won by the Argentine team and which the militaries used to try to enhance the image of Argentina. There are accounts of detained people in unofficial jails that cheered the Argentine team and were enthusiastic with the winning of the World Cup. Soccer became extremely important as a consequence of the regime's program to improve its image in the outside world and, also, provided a strong incentive to overlook and forget domestic brutality. An overwhelming number of Argentines was easily manipulated to believe that the country was given a false image of abusing human rights and the population at large sided with the military regime. They thought that there was a "campaign against Argentina" and it was felt as an aggression against their country. During that period, almost everybody forgot, or did not want to hear, about the desaparecidos. As a personal recollection, I must say that the day in which Argentina won the World Cup was one of the saddest of my life. We lived downtown Buenos Aires and there were so many people on the streets, chanting and jumping of joy, that we decided to take a stroll with my pregnant wife and my one and a half year old son in his little cart. We knew that very close to where hundreds of thousands of people met to celebrate the Cup there were desaparecidos detainees in underground parking lots . Argentina was visited in 1979, against the wishes of the military regime, by the Interamerican Commission of Human Rights (CIDH in Spanish) to receive in situ the reports of crimes by family members of desaparecidos, mainly mothers which founded the association of Madres de Plaza de Mayo. The militaries still denied any responsibility of missing people, in fact, they invented the slogan 77

Los argentinos somos derechos y humanos ("Argentines are human and upright" ) and made thousand of stickers which could be seen in cars and trucks, as a large portion of the citizenry supported the official thesis. This slogan tried to cover up the fact of thousands of people detained, tortured and murdered in a concealed way. The idea was conceived to show that the "Argentine people" do not commit crimes against humanity, that no human rights were violated because Argentines are "human and upright". Many people, who did not know about desaparecidos (because the media was forbidden to mention the issue) took it as an attack to their nation and tried to defend it sending letters to world leaders and organizations. The most popular ladies' weekly magazine (Para ti) printed postcards to be sent to politicians and journalists of other countries with this slogan. Many people, besides the ones who really did not know about the situation, simply decided to look the other way, as if pretending that nothing was going on would erase the violence and the pain. Acting as if everything continued to operate normally became customary in many Argentine circles. People stripped horrific events of their meaning and avoided direct confrontation with the most terrifying situations. A macabre example of this is when the union of undertakers in the province of Crdoba submitted a formal request to the military government to improve their working conditions due to the multiplication (ten to twentyfold) of the number of bodies unloaded from army trucks . The corpses of this desaparecidos became an excuse for a bureaucratic step that would secure the undertakers of reduced work schedules, extended holidays and an early retirement. The massive murders had become routine, and most of the people regarded this massive killings (when they started to know) as inevitable, normal events. Everybody was "acting as if" nothing worthy of concern was actually happening; the regime's strategy of denying its involvement in brutal practices was accompanied by the citizen's avoidance strategy . Paradoxically -or not so-, some variations of the "left" in Argentina (I put it in quotation marks because the "left", here, had some lines of conduct which were against their own ideals) supported the military dictatorship. In fact the Communist Party of Argentina had a "critical support" for Videla, the first dictator in 1976. Something worst happened with the Socialist Democratic Party led by Amrico Ghioldi, who openly supported the militaries and was rewarded with a diplomatic mission in Europe. The main customer for Argentine wheat during the dictatorship was the Soviet Union, because there was a worldwide embargo due to the invasion of Afghanistan. When the United Nations wanted to punish the Argentina military government due to the violation of human rights, the Soviet Union vetoed it concealing a situation that the democratic and liberal countries of the world were worried about. In this case, probably, the reports of the Argentine Communist Party to the Soviet Union and the economic interests of both countries had a large influence on the decision. By the beginning of the 1980s the military dictatorship was failing in social, economic and political issues. The fact of missing people started to appear in the media and Galtieri, one of the last dictators, seem to have read Aristotle and his suggestions to tyrants to keep in power (I do not think that he read the Politics, but he did follow his advice). The Stagirite mentions that if the tyrant has too many problems, the best way to make people forget about them is to start a war, because with a war everybody will follow their leader and think about the war and not other problems . With popular support at home, Argentine troops landed on the Malvinas/Falklands in April 1982. A British naval force sailed to the South Atlantic and retook, after a brief land campaign, the islands. It is interesting to mention that there were huge demonstrations against Galtieri and the militaries one week before the islands were invaded. One week later, there were huge demonstrations in favor of Galtieri. Surprisingly (or not so much), most of the left (although not all of it) favored the invasion because they saw it as an anti-imperialist war against colonialism, as if a right-wing dictatorship would transform itself in the standard-bearer of the oppressed in the world. This was another deceit to the "Argentine people", in which most of the left and Argentines participated uncritically. The issue of the Malvinas/Falkland is related to the fact, in my opinion, that a great part of the population in the country accepted the game created by the militaries and converted them in accomplices of the dictatorship due to their unconditional support of the war. It was part of another concealed "social covenant" that in the name of the "glorious" Argentine people took the islands if they close their eyes on the desaparecidos . Nationalistic feelings were used -again- to cover up the "dirty 78

war". Today no one wants to talk about the Malvinas/Falkland affair, and much less remember about their support to that lost cause. Veterans try to voice their grievances: lack of work, psychological problems, high rate of suicide and others, but most of the population and authorities conceal the issue, suffering a similar fate as the Vietnam war veterans in the United States. This process is called desmalvinizacin ("de-malvinization") and consists of forgetting that other "little, dirty war". Restoration of democracy (1983 to present) After the Malvinas/Falkland war the militaries lost power and under the last dictator, political parties were allowed to resume activities, and general elections were announced; meanwhile, elements of the armed forces worked to conceal evidence of crimes committed during the Dirty War. Democracy came back to Argentina in 1983, not because of civil society fighting for it but because the militaries lost the war . The newly elected President Alfonsn promised to bring to justice and prosecute those persons responsible for human rights abuses perpetrated during the military rule. Eventually some trials were conducted, there were some convictions of high ranking military officers and some of them went to prison. In 1984 Alfonsn created the CONADEP, an abbreviation of the Comisin Nacional sobre la Desaparicin de Personas ["National Commission on the Dissappearance of Persons"], a commission of "notables" or outstanding people (among them the famous writer Ernesto Sbato), which had to receive and compile denunciations on human rights abuses and dispatch them to the judicial power. Their labor was compiled in a book entitled Nunca ms ["Never Again"] because that was their intention: avoid the repetition of similar events. The peoples vision of what happened during the dictatorship shifted dramatically after the civilian administration stepped in 1983 and investigators and human rights advocates began to dig out hundreds of human remains of desaparecidos in clandestine common graves: many people, even those who supported the military, could not believe that things had gone so far. The media reported widely, specially on television, the recovery of hundreds of NN (unknown) corpses in different places around the country. The well-known forensic anthropologist Clyde C. Snow came to Argentina in 1984 at the request of the newly elected civilian government to help with the identification of remains of the desaparecidos. He taught his Argentine associates to recover, clean, repair, preserve and analyze human remains. A year later he returned to give expert testimony at the trial of the militaries which helped to condemn many of them . Some people even suspects that the trial of the military junta harbored real responsibility of other sectors that supported the dictatorship, like the economic power, the media, the judicial power, the Catholic church and the collaborationist political parties. In the same line of reasoning, the creation of the CONADEP symbolized that there was no need anymore of the many human rights organization, because -now- the government was taking care of human rights, now they were guaranteed and the Madres de Plaza de Mayo and relatives of desparecidos can go home, stop worrying, and turn another page of Argentine history. The conclusion is that very few militaries were put in trial, all of them were pardoned and no supporter of them was ever molested. The same government that put in trial some rights abusers made two bills, Punto Final ("Full Stop") and Obediencia Debida ("Due Obedience") in 1996 and 1997 which exonerated most of accused of perpetrating "atrocious" or "aberrant" acts. The final act of this humiliating drawback to military power and the process of erasing and oblivion of the bloodiest period of Argentine contemporary history was made by another democratically elected President in 1989, Carlos Menem, when he pardoned, in 1989 and 1990, officers convicted or indicted by civilian courts for human rights violations, drawing a veil over the past. This official strategy of impunity frustrated the high expectations posited in the trials. State crime was not punished, was pardoned without the apropiate repentance of the criminals. The democratic government failed to do enough about past human rights abuses and violations, and the authority of the 79

judicial power to avoid future abuses (i.e., through punishment) was politically erased. One of the last gestures of former president Carlos Menem was to propose the demolition of the ESMA building, Escuela Mecnica de la Armada ("Mechanical School of the Navy"), a place that was widely used to hold desaparecidos, torturing and murdering them, in many cases throwing their bodies (drugged, but still alive) to the river/sea near the city. There was an original idea of converting the building in a Museum of State Terrorism, but what Menem wanted to do was to make a "national reconciliation" park in order to forget the horrors housed in that building, which still belongs and functions for the Navy. The government's proposal of pulling down the building was with the intention of "eliminating everything and putting into practice an active oblivion policy" . The idea of making a Museum of State Terrorism would serve to the same purpose as the Vergangenheitsbewltigung in Germany, that is, to reproduce the military dictatorship's past and the horror of the desaparecidos for "the purposes of education, remembrance, and entertainment" and, also, as a "therapeutic treatment of the descendants of the perpetrators and bystanders" . This, of course -due to the politics of "forgetting"- is something very difficult to do in present day Argentina because the self-critical elements in influential parts of our society are lacking. Self-criticism is memory, the opposite is oblivion, the winner -until today- of this game. A non-solved situation: racism and antisemitism There is a sporadic display, by some politicians and public-opinion formers, of prejudice towards certain immigration groups, specially darker Latin Americans and Jews, in which the notion of a tolerant and pluralistic society, advocated by many, has not yet become a reality. But, if you ask any Argentine they will answer that they are not racists neither antisemitic, that the country is a "melting pot" of different "races" and cultures, and so on. An old, popular saying, states that "Mexicans descend from the Aztecs, Peruvians from the Incas, and Argentines... from the ships". One fact is that the indigenous population, and some black Africans, melted or were practically exterminated in the XIX century and their total population today is less than 200,000, living in far away provinces with a standard of living well below the average and with higher rates of illiteracy, unemployment and chronic diseases than the rest of the population. There is a continued hostility towards the new immigrants, especially from Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru, some of whom have entered Argentina illegally for economic reasons and their skin is a little bit darker than the average Argentine . There are historical roots of the relative intolerance towards Jews. Their immigration in the beginning of the XXth century was not regarded as particularly desirable and there were anti-Jewish pogroms in 1919. The strong influence of the French right-wing, Fascism and Nazism in the Argentine militaries and ruling elite produced anti-leftist and anti-Jewish biases in the 1930s and 1940s. In the post-war period Argentina received thousands of immigrants from Germany and many other Central and Eastern European countries, many of them with Nazi-Fascist leanings, among some war criminals. During the 1960s there was a strong anti-Semitic movement, specially after Israels kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann in May 1960, an episode generally regarded within the country as the Jewish states trampling in Argentine sovereignty. Of 313 anti-Semitic incidents recorded worldwide in 1967, 142 took place in Argentina, ruled at the time by a military regime . During the period of state terrorism under the dictatorship of 1976-83 an estimated ten percent of the more of 10,000 documented cases of disappearance are estimated to have been Jews (more than a tenfold of their population proportion). The Jewish prisoners received "special" treatment in the clandestine detention centers that were found to have anti-Semitic and Nazi slogans on their walls . There is a high number of unsolved attacks against the Jewish community (specially their cemeteries) in Argentina, including two of the most important ones: the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in March 1992 and the headquarters of the Asociacin Mutual Israelita Argentina [AMIA, "Argentine Jewish Mutual Association"] in 1994. This situation prompted a Catholic priest, Hugo Mugica, to wonder whether it was naive to expect that cases of Jewish concern would be solved. Both attacks are suspected to be originated in the Middle East with support from local (Argentine) groups, some of 80

them -allegedly- related to the provincial police force in the case of AMIA. Some Jews are very unhappy with the "progress" of the investigations of the bombings and frequently challenge government officials. Laura Ginsberg, of the Memoria Activa group (Active Memory), which represents relatives of the embassy of Israel and AMIA bombing victims, spoke at a ceremony commemorating the victims of the attacks. Following her highly charged speech, Buenos Aires provincial governor and future presidential candidate, Eduardo Duhalde, was reported as saying that Ginsbergs words were an "understandable Jewish exaggeration". On the fifth anniversary of the Israeli embassy bombing, a Senator from the Peronist Party, Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner, along with the opposition parties, suggested that the second attack against Jews (AMIA) was linked to the governments lack of will to clarify the first (the Embassy). The president of the Unin Cvica Radical (UCR, one of the two most important political parties of Argentina in the XXth century), Rodolfo Terragno, said that the attackers had enjoyed a measure of protection from official "incompetence, negligence or complicity". The Foreign Minister Di Tella considered that the results of the Supreme Court Investigation were "regrettable". Whith such an inconclusive state of affairs the (then) Israeli ambassador in Buenos Aires, Yitzhak Aviran, warned about the possibility of a third attack. Xenophobia and other prejudices cannot be ignored in Argentine society and, even though there is not a prevalence of antisemitism in the country, a survey made in December 1992 and sponsored by the American Jewish Committee and the Argentine DAIA ("Argentine Delegation of Israeli [as synonym of Jew] Associations") showed that 47 percent of the population did "not believe Jews to be a part of [Argentine] society". If asked, many people believe in the so-called Andinia plan, an anti-Jewish myth about the takeover of Argentina by the international Jewry. It is not casual that you cannot find Jews (there are some exceptions) in the armed forces: for many years aspiring professional soldiers had to disclose the religious affiliation of parents and grandparents when filling applications for admission to the Colegio Militar, the armys officer training school. The requirement was aimed to avoid non-Catholic candidates. In the last years this requirement was dropped by the army leadership (General Balza), but the beneficiaries of this change have been Protestants, not Jews or other non-Catholics . Final words The elected governments weaknesses since the advent of democracy in 1983, including Alfonsns amnesties and Menems pardons for human rights violators plus the lack of a political decision to clarify the attacks against Jewish institutions, deepened the culture of impunity and covered the issues as if nothing happened. To avoid future mistakes our past must be confronted and collectively memorized. Events must be given a certain meaning to have a decisive influence on the ulterior development of facts which will not allow their repetition, and -for this- we must have a total conscience of the horrors, and must be responsible to avoid them and this can only be done by keeping the memory of the events, not just in a neutral, value-free social science, but with an ethical stance and a strong moral attitude that will prevent, through education, the repetition of human mistakes that produce abuses of human rights. Education is a crucial point for future generations to awaken people's conscience The only way to modify authoritarian or totalitarian trends in any society, be it in Eastern Central Europe or South America, will be keeping the memory, the knowledge of the facts that have to be reinterpreted to enable a society to enter a path compatible with a rights-based democracy. This is not something which develops spontaneously, there is a requirement of an institutional remedy like the Vergangenheitsbewltigung in Germany, but also a due process of law in which criminal prosecution, punishment and repentance are voiced. When we talk about memory in Argentina, the core, the articulating focal point from which all oblivion arise, is the question of the desaparecidos, because there it is possible to find the different levels and responsibilities of forgetfulness, the ones committed by antiperonism, the left, the militaries, the democratic governments. This memory has inside, dialectically and paradoxically, its own negation: 81

oblivion, impunity, exclusion and fear. I would like to finish this paper with the words of a dear Argentine professor of philosophy who died recently: "Even though death is the most powerful agent of oblivion, forgetfulness is not omnipotent, because you can always fight against it, in our case with the desaparecidos and the stolen children. Mankind has erected walls of remembrances in such a way that make paths which allow to follow its memories and, for sure, these are the signs of the existence of human culture" .

BIBLIOGRAPHY ARISTOTLE [ARISTTELES in Spanish] (1983): Poltica [Politics]. Bilingual, Greek and Spanish, edition]. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales. CONADEP (1984): Nunca ms [Never Again]. (Buenos Aires: Edudeba). "CONADEP" is an abbreviation of the Comisin Nacional sobre la Desaparicin de Personas ["National Commission on the Dissappearance of Persons"]. FRIEDLNDER (1998), Saul: "Writing the History of the Shoah: Some Major Dilemmas", in Horst Walter Blanke, Friedrich Jaeger, Thomas Sandkuehler: Dimensionen der Historik. Geschichtstheorie, Wissenschaftsgeschichte und Geschichtskultur heute. (Kln, Weimar, Wien: Boehlau Verlag). Pp. 407414. GUBER (1996), Rosana: "Las manos de la memoria" [The Hands of Memory] in Desarrollo Econmico, vol. 36, Ns 141, April-June. HAVILAND (1990), William A.: Anthropology. 6th ed. (Orlando, FL: Holt, Rinehart and Winston). INSTITUTE (1999) for Jewish Policy Research and American Jewish Committee, JPR. http./www.jpr.org.uk (June 2001). KANSTEINER (1999), Wulf: "Mandarins in the Public Sphere. Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung and the Paradigm of Social History in the Federal Republic of Germany", in German Politics and Society, Issue 52, Vol. 17, Ns 3, Fall. LEVENSON (2000), Gregorio: De los bolcheviques a la gesta montonera. Memorias de nuestro siglo [From the Bolchevics to the Montoneros Gestae. Memories of our Century]. Buenos Aires: Colihue. MALAMUD GOTI (1999), Jaime: Terror y justicia en la Argentina [Terror and Justice in Argentina]. Buenos Aires: Ediciones de la Flor. MARTINEZ (1995), Toms Eloy: Santa Evita (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana/Planeta). It has been translated to several languages (English included). MORENO (2001), Liliana: "Argentina from Mouth to Mouth", interview (June 17) of Dora Schwarzstein in the newspaper Clarn. Dora Schwarzstein, historian, founded and directs, since 1994, the Program of Oral History at the Universidad de Buenos Aires. Also, she was part of the founding committee of the International Association of Oral History. SCHWARZSTEIN (2001), Dora: "Oral History in a Museum of Terror. Reflections on the representation of the past in contemporary Argentina" in Rezende Martins, Estevao de (comp.): Memory and Identity: How Societies Construct and Administer their Past? (mimeo to be published in New York by Columbia University Press). SEOANE (1991), Maria: Todo o nada. La historia secreta y la historia publica del jefe guerrillero Mario Roberto Santucho. [All or nothing. The secret story and the public story of the guerrilla chief Mario Roberto Santucho]. Buenos Aires: Planeta. TRIMBOLI (1998), Javier: La izquierda en la Argentina. Conversaciones con [The left in Argentina: Conversations with] Carlos Altamirano, Martin Caparros, Horacio Gonzalez, Eduardo Gruner, Emilio de Ipola, Leon Rozitchner, Beatriz Sarlo, Horacio Tarcus. Buenos Aires: Manantial. VARNAGY (1992), Tomas: "La colonizacion de Escobar: bolivianos" [The Colonization of Escobar: Bolivians], monthly journal: El porteno (March). VRNAGY (1979), Toms: "Love starts at Home" in the English language newspaper Buenos Aires Herald (16 November). 82

MIRCEA MARTIN HAROLD BLOOM - CANONIZATORUL SI "CANONADELE" SALE "MA SIMT FOARTE SINGUR IN ZILELE NOASTRE, INCERCIND SA APAR AUTONOMIA ESTETICULUI"

Harold Bloom - the canon maker and his "cannon shots" Abstract: The article is a reaction to Harold Bloom's Western Canon deploring the absence of significant Eastern authors. It also describes the theoretical importance of this book in the 90s' American context and discusses the social importance of the canon. Keywords: Harold Bloom; canon; feminism; ideology; political corectness H. Bloomin prologul, in epilogul precum si in Elegie pentru canon, care constituie primul capitol al epocalei sale carti din 1994 (aparuta in traducere romaneasca la editura Univers in 1998), Harold Bloom lanseaza veritabile canonade impotriva tuturor acelor care, dinspre toate domeniile vietii intelectuale si politice americane s-au decis sa conteste traditia literara euroatlantica si criteriile ei constitutive. Pentru a intelege mai bine contextul in care o carte precum Canonul Occidental a devenit posibila si chiar necesara, ar trebui sa ne intoarcem in urma cu mai bine de treizeci de ani cind autori ca Foucault si Derrida "traduceau" in termenii unei noi apistemologii istorice si literare avintul contestatar al tineretului intelectual parizian. Caracterul opresiv al oricarei autoritati stiintifice si culturale, precum si prejudecatile discriminatorii ale activitatii intelectuale curente erau puse in evidenta cu pasiune si stralucire. Acestor "maestri de gindire" li s-au adaugat si altii precum Lacan sau Roland Barthes, in conditiile in care stinga intelectuala occidentala in ansamblul ei acorda un credit sporit unui marxism inteles ca un fel de "doctrina a doctrinelor", pe care incerca in cel mai bun caz sa o actualizeze, fara insa a o revizui esential. O asemenea atitudine decanonizatoare prin excelenta s-a propagat pe diferite filiere si in mai multe directii in campusurile universitare din Statele Unite, unde a produs mai intii deconstructionismul apoi feminismul, multiculturalismul, etc. Indiferent de domeniile lor de activitate si de obiectivele specifice, toate aceste miscari si grupuri sint anticanonice in spiritul lor si au provocat si o reactie in lant impotriva ideii insesi de canonicitate, a criteriilor de selectie, a modului in care s-a constituit canonul occidental. Atacul anticanonic concentric viza in primul rind traditia insasi, ordinea ierarhica pe care ea o presupunea si impunea, precum si criteriul acestei ierarhii - valoarea estetica. in fapt, se contesta omogenitatea acestei traditii occidentale, se respingea exclusivismul estetic al selectiei si, in genere, caracterul restrictiv, arbitrar si opresiv, al autoritatii canonice. Cele mai numeroase si pasionate energii polemice le-a stirnit insa ideea de centru intruchipata de canon. Paradoxul este ca, pina la aparitia cartii lui Harold Bloom, toate aceste atacuri erau indreptate contra unei cetati mai degraba imaginare: nimeni pina la Bloom n-a intentionat sa intocmeasca un corpus al operelor canonice ale Occidentului si sa defineasca respectivul canon. Acesta era tangibil numai in versiunea lui curriculara, scolara si universitara, si, nu intimplator, de aici au pornit ostilitatile si tot aici noile orientari au cucerit cele dintii pozitii; departamentele de studii culturale din universitati, cu politica lor inspirata dintr-un marxism uneori incredibil de rudimentar. Tot in acest domeniu 83

educational s-au putut constata si primele efecte ale schimbarii canonului. O carte precum inchiderea mintilor americane (The closing of the American Mind, 1987) le constata cu ingrijorare. Asa se face ca, in 1994, cind aparea prima editie a cartii sale, Harold Bloom nu-si propunea numai sa apere canonul occidental, dar si sa-l compuna pentru prima data sau, mai exact, sa-l recompuna astfel incit importanta, anvergura si coerenta acestuia sa fie evidente pentru toti cei ce il neaga sau vor sa-l "deschida". Ceea ce s-a cladit de-a lungul veacurilor si a fost consolidat prin anexiuni succesive prudente, exigente, nu poate fi darimat intr-un an sau un deceniu, oricita patima negatoare, demagogie populista sau discreditare interesata s-ar investi intr-o asemenea actiune. De altfel, negatia canonului precede, de regula, printr-o "pregatire de artilerie", "deschiderea" lui. in opinia lui Bloom, operatia insasi de "deschidere a canonului" este una "complet redundanta", caci "nici unul din canoanele laice nu e inchis vreodata". Dar, tot el ne spune ca, in practica revizionista, "extinderea canonului a insemnat distrugerea lui". Explicatia e simpla: "Autorii predati acum in scoli nu sint in nici un caz scriitori dintre cei mai buni care se intimpla sa fie si femei, africani, sudamericani sau asiatici, ci mai degraba scriitori care nu au de oferit decit resentimente crescute ca pasta integranta a felului cum isi inteleg ei propria identitate." Intram astfel chiar in miezul problemei si al disputei canonice. Pentru ca, dincolo de capetele de acuzare ale unuia sau altuia dintre contestatarii care urmareau, de fapt, penetrarea canonului si dincoace de aspectele complexe pe care le invoca Bloom insusi in incercarea sa de a da seama despre consistenta si dinamismul acestui canon, un lucru ramine sigur: ceea ce se respinge dintr-o parte si se apara din cealalta parte nu este altceva decit insasi valoarea estetica, sau, mai exact, criteriul valorii estetice. Luindu-si precautiile necesare, autorul nostru recunoaste "imensele complexitati si contradictii ce constituie esenta canonului occidental", precum si faptul ca acesta nu este o unitate si o structura stabila. ai, intr-adevar, e destul de greu sa ne gindim la aria larga de cuprindere si la durata lui - chiar daca nu am masura-o decit incepind de la Shakespeare - spre a-i da imediat dreptate. ai, totusi, in ciuda bogatiei, a diversitatii si complexitatii, se manifesta aici un principiu de unitate sau cel putin de coerenta; acest canon a fost stabilit si intarit prin verificari succesive avind la baza criteriul etetic. "Dar esteticul si agonalul sint unul si acelasi lucru - afirma cu justete Harold Bloom, disociindu-se ferm nu numai de inamicii sai, asazicind naturali, adica universitarii si ziaristii pe care ii numeste ironic "scoala resentimentului", ci si de "aparatorii de dreapta ai canonului", care il sustin pentru "presupusele (dar inexistentele) sale valori morale". Atit idealismul dreptei, care proclama o armonie morala (inadecvata), cit si idealismul stingii, care revendica o "armonie sociala" cladita pe "repararea nedreptatilor istorice", sint considerate inacceptabile de catre "inventatorul" "canonului occidental", tocmai pentru ca amindoua "condamna competitia in literatura ca si in viata". Iar o asemenea competitie e de presupus ca nu poate avea alte repere decat cele de ordin valoric. Revenind acum la intrebarea pusa initial in legatura cu efectele "deschiderii" canonului, cred ca este momentul sa facem anumite precizari. Daca, in principiu, orice canon laic nu este inchis niciodata, deschiderea lui e complet redundanta. Dar, in practica, adica de-a lungul istoriei literare, asa au stat - si stau - cu adevarat, lucrurile in ce priveste canonul occidental? Tot in principiu, extinderea canonului occidental n-ar trebui sa conduca la "distrugerea" lui; ar fi, din contra, proba ca "deschiderea" lui e reala, deci realizabila. in practica propriu-zisa, adica in cultura americana a ultimelor decenii, ceea ce s-a petrecut a fost, intr-adevar, distrugerea canonului. Dar el a fost distrus nu pentru ca n-a putut fi deschis, ci pentru ca nu se dorea mentinerea lui. O eventuala "deschidere", o largire a listei canonice, nu se putea face decit respectind conditiile constitutive, acceptind drept criteriu fundamental valoarea estetica. "Resentimentarii" au inteles insa foarte bine ca respectivul canon trebuia mai intii schimbat, inlocuit, pentru ca ei sa poata intra in cuprinsul lui; cu alte cuvinte, ei au patruns intr-un alt canon decit in cel al carui deschidere o reclamau. Argumentele lor erau indreptate tocmai impotriva criteriului esential constitutiv al canonului - valoarea estetica - in care nu vedeau altceva decit "o mistificare in serviciul unei clase dominante", dupa cum alegerile de ordin artistic le considerau simple"masti pentru influente sociale si politice". intreaga disputa era astfel mutata din teritoriul estetic specific in cimpul ideologic si politic. Mai mult, actualizindu-se tezele vechi ale lui Gramsci, referitoare la falsa independenta a intelectualului in raport cu grupul social dominant, s-a ajuns chiar la asertiunea conform careia, ceea ce se numeste valoare estetica provine din lupta de clasa". 84

Confruntat cu astfel de asertiuni (prea bine cunoscute noua, celor din Est), Harold Bloom e indreptatit sa exclame si sa-i sfideze laolalta pe neo-marxistii de azi, fie ca sint multiculturalisti, neoistoristi sau feministe: "Ori exista valori estetice, ori numai determinatii ale rasei, clasei sociale sau sexului." Refuzul de a recunoaste specificitatea domeniului artistic si impunerea inlauntrul lui a unor norme care isi au originea si justificarea in alte domenii nu poate produce altceva decit o confuzie a valorilor. "Extinderea canonului" inseamna, de fapt, pentru contestatari, extinderea principiului "corectitudinii politice" in literatura si cultura. Ceea ce este sinonim cu a distruge "toate standardele intelectuale si estetice in domeniul umanist si al stiintelor sociale in numele dreptatii sociale." Or, pentru Harold Bloom, canonul implica "standarde estetice si cognitive", nu "un program de salvare sociala". in conceptia sa, "marea literatura se afirma intotdeauna ca suficienta siesi fata de cele mai valoroase cauze." Socialul nu pare a fi implicat nici in cauzele, nici in efectele artei: "Sinele individual este singura metoda si unicul standard pentru intelegerea valorii estetice." "Esteticul este (.) o preocupare mai degraba individuala decit societala, etc. Se intimpla, insa ca, exasperat de confuziile provocate de adversarii sai, autorul nostru se lanseaza, din pacate, la rindul lui in absolutizari de sens contrar. Atent sa respinga intruziunea fortata a politicului in spatiul canonic, el neaga orice functie sociala sau morala a operelor canonice si, implicit, a artei in genere. "Cei mai mari scriitori ai Occidentului, scrie el, sint subversivi fata de toate valorile, atit ale noastre cit si ale lor insisi. Ceea ce nu cred sa insemne, insa, ca eficienta lor educativa nu exista, ci doar ca se manifesta in moduri indirecte, ocolite, complexe. A o nega e ca si cum am confunda moralismul cu moralizarea. Literatura in genere, cu atit mai mult marea literatura, isi creeaza cititori pe masura complexitatii ei. "Studiul literaturii, oricum va fi condus, nu va salva nici un individ si nu va indrepta nici o societate. Shakespeare nu ne va face mai buni si nici mai rai, dar el ne poate invata sa ne ascultam ca pe niste necunoscuti, atunci cind vorbim cu noi insine. Astfel - continua autorul - ne poate invata cum sa acceptam schimbarea in noi si in ceilalti." Dar a accepta, adica a intelege, schimbarea "in noi si in ceilalti" nu reprezinta un spor de stiinta, o garantie de toleranta, un pas inainte intr-o ordine morala si sociala? Lectura e, fara indoiala, un act individual, dar efectele ei, - oricit de indepartate - nu sint exclusiv individuale. "Lectura autentica e o activitate solitara, spune mai departe Harold Bloom, si nu te invata sa devii un mai bun cetatean." Cred, dimpotriva, ca literatura te invata, printre altele, si sa fii un bun cetatean - al unei tari sau al lumii intregi - tocmai pentru ca, invitindu-te la reflectie si la dialog interior, iti intareste constiinta identitatii, dar o dezvolta si pe aceea a alteritatii. Shakespeare, adauga autorul, ne invata sa acceptam "chiar si forma ultima a schimbarii". Frazele capata in continuare un aer solemn, memorabil, fara nici un efort de ordin retoric: "Hamlet este ambasadorul mortii pentru noi, probabil unu dintre putinii trimisi vreodata de catre moarte, care nu ne minte in legatura cu inevitabila conexiune intre noi si acel tarim necunoscut." Fara indoiala ca aici iesim din social in existential si metafizic, dar aceaste e inca una din functiile recunoscute ale literaturii (alaturi de aceea educativ sociala) si indeosebi ale marii literaturi. Harold Bloom isi proiecteaza in continuare intuitia in teritoriul canonic sustinind ca, "departe de a fi slujitorul clasei sociale dominante" (cum afirma resentimentarii), canonul este el insusi "mesagerul mortii". Intuitia ramine si aici extrem de stimulatoare si sugestiva prin chiar calitatea de a fi traversat mai multe planuri de referinta posibile, dar am impresia ca, de aceasta data, nu se constituie decit intrun punct de opozitie cit mai indepartat de acela reprezentat de investirea social-politica. intre aceste doua limite, canonul functioneaza, totusi, fara a fi nici "slujitorul clasei dominante", nici "mesagerul mortii", fiind dimpotriva, as fi tentat s-o spun, mesagerul vietii de dupa moarte, al nemuririi spre care tinde - si pe care o si atinge in puntele ei culminante - creatia artistica. "O poezie, un roman sau o piesa buna de teatru - scrie Harold Bloom - aduna in ele toate tulburarile omenirii, printre care si teama de moarte, care in arta literara devine dorinta de a apartine canonului, de a ramine in memoria comuna, sociala." Dar, daca aceasta dorinta, aceasta anxietate despre care ni se spune ca se confunda cu literarul insusi se implineste prin intrarea in canon, iar aceasta e sinonima cu fixarea in memoria colectiva, am putea sa negam utilitatea sociala a literaturii canonice? Din insasi aceasta deschidere a canonului spre metafizic deducem ca exclusivismul estetic al profesorului american este, totusi, mai nuantat decit polemica indirjita purtata cu decanonizatorii l-a lasat sa para. Nu asistam in pledoaria lui, cum ne-am fi asteptat, nici la o supralicitare a principiului, prin excelenta idiosincratic, al placerii. Dimpotriva, in opozitie cu "anumiti parizieni", el crede ca, "un 85

text de valoare nu ofera placere, ci neplacere, sau o placere mai dificil de obtinut decit cea oferita de un text facil." Aluzia la Roland Barthes si la "placerea textului" este stravezie. Daca partea a doua a asertiunii de mai sus a lui Bloom nu comporta discutii, prima parte, in care e vorba despre neplacerea textului (high unpleasure), are de ce sa socheze. Ne putem intreba care mai poate fi mobilul recitirii unei carti daca placerea lipseste? Autorul insusi considera pe buna dreptate recitirea drept un test canonic vechi si sigur si, mai mult, nu ezita sa propuna analogia erotica. Apreciez curajul intelectual al lui Harold Bloom de a se pune singur in contradictie si de a afirma ca exista si neplacere in lectura capodoperelor. Desi, in afara de invocarea dificultatilor, el nu ne spune in ce consta aceasta neplacere, un raspuns cred ca l-am putea gasi in definitia pe care o da ofertei canonice: "o buna folosire a propriei solitudini, acea solitudine a carei forma finala este confruntarea individului cu propria conditie muritoare." Oricit de mare ar fi puterea de transfigurare a textului - sau tocmai datorita acestei puteri - nu poate fi vorba de placere aici. Tot in legatura cu lectura, autorul nostru mai arunca o sageata in directia lui Barthes, si a multor altora: "A citi fiind in slujba vreunei ideologii inseamna, dupa parerea mea, a nu citi deloc" - scrie el. Aici nu se infrunta numai ":coala Resentimentului" de acum, nici teoria angajarii de la Gramsci la Sartre, ci mai ales acea doctrina difuza in rindurile intelectualitatii europene de stinga, impregnata puternic si in demersurile Noii critici franceze, care l-a facut si pe Roland Barthes sa ceara oricarui interpret anuntarea prealabila a "sistemului de lectura", adica a ideologiei (inevitabile) in numele careia vorbeste. Tocmai caracterul reductiv al oricarei interpretari literare calauzite de o anume ideologie il supara pe Harold Bloom, cu atit mai mult daca aceasta se aplica scriitorilor canonici. El reactioneaza impotriva "diminuarii pragmatice" si istoricizante a lui Shakespeare. Convingerea sa este ca reducerea lui Shakespeare "la propriul context", cum vor neoistoristii, nu va indrepta lumea, in schimb va rata unicitatea creatorului si sansa noastra "de a ne cunoaste propriul sine oricine am fi." Autorul nostru ramine un adversar ferm al oricarei intruziuni ideologice in creatia ori in receptarea literaturii, chiar daca in paginile Concluziei (sale) elegiace admite ca alegerea estetica poate fi considerata ea insasi o "ideologie" (cum n-au pregetat sa sustina activistii sociali de toate culorile), sau ca formarea canonului este un "fenomen ambivalent" (highly ambivalent phenomenon), reflectind atit interese de clasa, cit si, bineinteles, o "politica a spiritului", adica interesele si anxietatile lumii scriitoricesti. Tot in paginile finale Harold Bloom demonteaza convingator unul din miturile "idealistilor postmarxisti" - "accesul universal la cultura" - cu intrebarea plina de bun simt intelectual: ".dar cum se poate avea acces universal la Paradisul pierdut sau la Faust II? Raspunsul vine aproape de la sine: "Poezia buna, puternica, e prea dificila, cognitiv si imaginativ, si nu poate fi citita in profunzime decit de citiva din fiecare clasa sociala, sex, rasa, etnie." Cum se poate lesne remarca, argumentatia autorului iese uneori din cadrul estetist, dar niciodata din acela elitist. O proba ultima si peremptorie in legatura cu caracterul nefiresc fortat al intereselor de clasa, sex, rasiale si nationale, date drept cauze ale marii literaturi, o constituie insasi neinvocarea lor in cazul celorlalte traditii estetice, al artelor vizuale si mai cu seama al muzicii. Sarcasmul profesorului loveste in plin cind remarca faptul incontestabil ca Stravinski nu se afla in nici un pericol de a fi inlocuit de o muzica corecta din punct de vedere politic pentru companiile de balet ale lumii.

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MIHAELA FRUNZA POSTCOLONIALISM SI FEMINISM O PARALELA CONCEPTUALA SI TEMATICA

Postcolonialism and feminism. A conceptual and thematic comparison Abstract: The study enlists the general causes that led to the postcolonialist and feminist approaches in the intelectual debate of the 20th century. Keywords: Postcolonialism; feminism; multiculturalism

in acest articol vom urmari relatia dintre feminism si postcolonialism din perspectiva unor concepte relevante ale teoriei postcoloniale in stiintele socio-umane. Aceasta pentru ca feminismul s-a impus in cimpul stiintelor socio-umane ca o paradigma ce urmarea noi dezvoltari in aceste discipline prin evidentierea unor zone neexplorate (circumscrise terminologic cu ajutorul unor notiuni integrate in sfera "genului"), intimpinind pozitiv orice alta teorie similara (de tipul multiculturalismului, transnationalismului sau postcolonialismului). Astfel, exista teme comune in feminism si postcolonialism, dar si notiuni imprumutate pentru valenta lor explicativa si chiar critici care vizeaza punctele slabe impartasite. Aceste zone de intersectie si convergenta vor fi explorate in continuare. inainte de a intra in zona apropierilor conceptuale, vom incerca sa circumscriem, prin citeva definitii "de lucru" termenii pe care dorim sa-i analizam. Aceste definitii tradeaza mai putin o pretentie de exhaustivitate, oricum riscanta datorita polivocitatii termenilor, cit un decupaj din sfera definitiilor posibile. Astfel, intelegem prin feminism in principal acea ideologie politica ce poate fi circumscrisa in jurul a trei concepte cheie: cel de femei ca si grup social distinct, cel de experienta ca modalitate de a impartasi trairi si opinii comune si cel de opresiune ca experienta comuna (in diferite grade de intensitate) a tuturor femeilor . Teoria feminista propusa de Juliet Mitchell, Catharine MacKinnon, Gerda Lerner, Judith Butler (lista ar putea continua) poate fi descrisa ca tentativa de explicatie ce pune accent pe dimensiunea genului (ocultata in filosofia traditionala, care prefera sa vorbeasca de "persoane umane", "fiinte" sau "indivizi" abstracti si in buna masura asexuati"). Curentul feminist incorporeaza astfel atit o doctrina a drepturilor egale pentru femei cit si o ideologie a transformarilor sociopolitice tintind catre crearea unei societati care sa fie dincolo de simpla egalitate. Termenul de postcolonialism pare sa faca trimitere (potrivit prefixului post-) la evolutia culturilor de dupa realizarea independentei de sub puterile coloniale. Totusi, teoria postcoloniala se refera atit la dominatia politica efectiva din imperiile coloniale, cit si la dominatia culturala (europocentrica sau mai general a "rasei albe"). Viziunea postcoloniala, dezvoltata de autori ca Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha, Rey Chow, se preocupa de probleme de tipul identitatii in relatie cu imperialismul si nationalismul; rolul statului in aceste conflicte; conflictele dintre culturile traditionale si cele contemporane . Se poate remarca din simpla alaturare a acestor definitii ca atit feminismul cit si postcolonialismul se raporteaza in mod opozitiv (reactiv, ar spune cu malitiozitate un ginditor ca Nietzsche) la o forma de dominatie si simultan la o sursa de opresiune (fie ca aceasta este "dominatia patriarhala" sau cea 87

coloniala), fata de care se constituie ca alternativa politica. Lasind la o parte simplele definitii, vom trece la prima similaritate dintre feminism si postcolonialism, observind ca ele intretin o relatie speciala cu (cel putin) alte trei paradigme explicative extrem de influente in discutiile contemporane din disciplinele socio-umane: postmodernismul, pluralismul si multiculturalismul. Ne vom referi in continuare pe scurt la acestea si la zonele lor de intersectie cu conceptele investigate. La fel ca si conceptele ce dau titlul acestei lucrari, postmodernismul este un termen care poate fi cu greu prins in limitele analitice ale unei definitii. Ca si curent filosofic, acesta isi trage radacinile din lucrarile precursorilor Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger si Georg Simmel, pentru a se consacra in partea a doua a secolului al XX-lea prin lucrarile lui Jacques Derrida, Jean-Franois Lyotard, Michel Foucault sau Jean Baudrillard. Utilizind din punct de vedere metodologic deconstructia, postmodernismul critica fundamentele rationalist-universale ale filosofiei traditionale, proclamind "sfirsitul marilor naratiuni intemeietoare", renuntarea la fundamente, colapsul ierarhiilor cunoasterii (preferinta pentru aspectul local in detrimentul celui universal), migrarea de la logocentrism la iconocentrism (sub influenta noilor tehnologii ale informatiei si comunicarii) . Prin toate aceste caracteristici, postmodernismul a pregatit terenul pentru dezvoltarile postcolonialismului si feminismului. Renuntarea la explicatiile intemeietoare, critica valorilor traditionale, reevaluarea aspectului local, a specificului si a generalului in detrimentul particularului si universalului fac parte din "arsenalul" conceptual comun atit postcolonialismului, cit si postmodernismului. De asemenea, postmodernismul este imbratisat de o parte din reprezentantele feminismului, cum ar fi Linda Nicholson, Nancy Fraser sau Seyla Benhabib. in acest sens, unii filosofi se declara "feministi postmoderni" sau "post-feministi" . Totusi, relatia feminism-postmodernism nu este una lipsita total de tensiuni, deoarece abandonarea totala a teoriei si renuntarea la criteriile obiective nu pot fi acceptate de acele feministe al caror demers are si o incarcatura politica. Aceasta pentru ca, in absenta reperelor valorice, ideea eliminarii opresiunii femeilor nu mai poate pretinde intiietate in fata afirmarii discriminarilor de gen. Mai mult, "sfirsitul marilor povestiri intemeietoare" atinge si meta-naratiunea feminista, in fond o simpla povestire intemeietoare pe marginea idealului (particular) al sororitatii universale. Totusi, trebuie sa acceptam ca, nu numai in domeniul politicii, dar si in celelalte domenii (religios, economic, cultural), postmodernismul se prezinta ca un "Ianus bifrons", dupa metafora lui Agnes Heller si Ferenc Fehr . Pe de o parte apar atitudini relativiste de tip "anything goes", pe de alta parte se manifesta anumite reconfigurari ale unor politici instaurative (de tip "politicile verzi" ecologiste, noile politici economice, noile politici mediatice ). Daca cele din urma incearca renegocierea unor valori postmoraliste potrivit unei logici suple si articulate, atitudinea de tip "anything goes", care ne "neutralizeaza simtului tabu-ului" favorizeaza reaparitia fundamentalismelor de toate tipurile, revigorarea nationalismelor si a rasismului. impotriva acestora, postmodernismul poate gasi aliati utili in postcolonialism si feminism, iar conlucrarea lor activa poate eventual indeparta aceste spectre pe viitor. Doua dintre caracteristicile postmodernismului pe care le preiau atit postcolonialismul cit si feminismul sint heterogenitatea si heteronomia. Ambele se opun conceptual omogenitatii, inteleasa ca si aplicatie neproblematica a Ratiunii. Omogenitatea, fie ca este inteleasa "naturalist" (ca si conditie naturala prealabila a existentei sociale umane), fie ca este inteleasa "Humean" (ca si legitimare a traditiilor si obiceiurilor deja existente) a fost denuntata de sustinatorii feministi ca apelind la metoda omogenizarii si deci a unei forme de represiune. Desigur, alternativa acesteia, heterogenitatea, nu trebuie sa fie acceptata fara rezerve; ca si restul caracteristicilor postmoderne, este ambivalenta, putind duce atit la miscari emancipatoare cit si fasciste; insa, dupa cum subliniaza David Theo Goldberg, heterogenitatea este conditia reprezentativa a umanitatii (cel putin de la modernitate incoace) , in sens de amestec, de migratii, de miscare necontenita. Heteronomia este un alt tip de mozaic, care provine din decalajele propriului timp istoric. Ambele caracterizeaza atit postmodenitatea cit si multiculturalitatea postcoloniala, creind premisele acelui tip de cultura mozaicata, care cultiva fragmentul si (bri)colajul, amestecul culturilor si subculturilor. Pluralismul se afirma pe plan politic si epistemologic o data cu postmodernismul, desi radacinile sale 88

conceptuale sint mult mai vechi, curentul pluralist putind invoca printre teoreticienii precursori filosofi de talia lui Platon sau Leibniz. Totusi, spre deosebire de postmodernism, pluralismul este un concept mai difuz, "un sindrom sau o aglomerare intelectuala", dupa expresia lui Gregor McLennan , mai degraba decit o traditie fixa. El functioneaza cu succes la trei niveluri disciplinare interconectate: metodologic (la Thomas Kuhn sau Paul Feyerabend), sociocultural si politic (la Stuart Hall, Michel Walzer, P.A. Dahl sau Iris Marion Young). La toate aceste niveluri, pluralismul se intersecteaza cu abordarile postcoloniale si feministe. Asemanarile si divergentele dintre aceste curente apar in strinsa conexiune cu diferentele de opinii din cadrul pluralismului insusi. La nivel metodologic, diversitatea metodologica atit a studiilor etnice postcoloniale cit si a studiilor de gen (ai caror cercetatori uzeaza in studiile lor o varietate de metode socio-antropologice, etnografice, istorice, psiho-sociologice s.a.) reprezinta cu siguranta un exemplu de pluralism aplicat in aceste domenii. La nivel socio-politic, postcolonianismul si feminismul sint de acord cu pluralismul postmodern, care afirma ca toate teoriile si strategiile politice sint "orizonturi imaginare construite" prin raportare la care se creeaza si re-creeaza identitatile si colectivitatile. O alta paralela semnificativa la acest nivel, care apropie pluralismul in mare masura de feminism, este problema gasirii unor criterii care sa limiteze proliferarea necontenita de curente culturale si teorii politice. Dupa cum exista pericolul "pulverizarii" politice a pluralismului in entitati care polemizeaza la nesfirsit intre ele, tot astfel unele feministe acuza "spargerea" feminismului in nenumarate feminisme particulariste (al femeilor de culoare, al lesbienelor, al femeilor din lumea a treia), lucru care ar primejdiu idealurile comune ale feminismului, de denuntare a oprimarii universale a femeilor si de realizare a solidaritatii (sororitatii) generale. Multiculturalismul poate fi definit cu titlu general ca fiind raspunsul normativ oferit in fata diversitatii culturale de tip comunitar. Ideologia multiculturala, formulata de Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka sau Bhikhu Parekh se refera cu precadere la diversitatea grupurilor minoritare cu o cultura diferita de cea a majoritatii. Astfel, multiculturalismul incearca sa propuna solutii de prezervare si dezvoltare a culturii minoritare prin mijloace altenative la solutiile monoculturale ale asimilarii sau integrarii. Adeptii multiculturalismului obisnuiesc sa vorbeasca despre postcolonialism ca raportindu-se la mostenirea istorica specifica a fostelor colonii, in mod retroactiv, in timp ce multiculturalismul se ocupa de diversitatea geopolitica atit in fostele colonii cit si in restul statelor. insa raportarea celor doi termeni este departe de a fi simplu complementara; astfel, multiculturalismul poate fi uneori invocat ca un mod de a semnala divergentele fata de un monoculturalism identificat in mod eronat cu "Occidentul" sau "Europa", iar aici se intersecteaza in mod semnificativ cu conceptele postcoloniale . De cealalta parte, raporturile dintre feminism si multiculturalism se stabilesc in special pe terenul drepturilor speciale solicitate (fie ca este vorba de drepturi speciale pentru femei, fie ca este vorba de drepturile minoritatilor), insa si la nivelul actiunilor politice propriu-zise. Astfel, atit feminismul cit si multiculturalismul se afla sub semnul "politicilor diferentei", teoretizate de Charles Taylor sau de Iris Marion Young. Prin aceste politici, se solicita deschiderea fata de diferente si acceptarea grupurilor ca avind identitati si nevoi distincte . in felul acesta, multiculturalismul ofera un cadru teoretic si simultan un spatiu de manevra atit feminismului cit si postcolonialismului . De asemenea, postmodernismul si pluralismul creeaza premisele conceptuale ale dezvoltarilor teoriilor feministe si postcoloniale. Pe linga aceste similaritati generale, exista unele teme care pot fi reperate atit in interiorul feminismului cit si al postcolonialismului. Astfel, ambele curente se arata critice fata de rationalitatea discursului occidental, interogind aceasta problema cu mijloace specifice. Feminismul se situeaza critic fata de rationalitate in special prin modul in care o coreleaza pe aceasta cu asa-numita "gindire dualista" (modul dihotomic de a se raporta la lume al gindirii umane). Analiza gindirii dualiste in feminism prezinta similaritati cu categoriile opozitive investigate de structuralisti si cu metoda deconstructiva. Astfel, se porneste de la seriile de echivalente traditional atribuite filosofiei grecesti: principiu masculin - minte - ratiune - act; respectiv principiu feminin - materie - corp potenta - pasivitate, la care filosofia moderna a adaugat, seriei "masculinului" spiritul - ratiunea obiectivitatea - transcendentalul, iar seriei "feminine" corpul - pasiunea - subiectivitatea - empiricul . Se poate observa ca acesti termeni prezinta, prima serie o realitate "pozitiva", iar cea de-a doua serie, o realitate "privativa". 89

Prin identificarea termenilor "pozitivi" cu masculinul, iar a celor "privativi" cu femininul s-a produs, in terminologia feminista, o legitimare a valorilor masculine in detrimentul celor feminine. Prin extensie, nu doar valorile, ci chiar rationalitatea asa cum este inteleasa astazi (impersonala, adica destrupata; obiectiva, adica non-subiectiva) este perceputa de unele feministe ca o rationalitate "masculina" . Aceasta pozitie a fost la rindul sau criticata in feminism, in special de pe pozitiile asa-numitului "postfeminism". Astfel, Andrei Cornea identifica cel putin doua tipuri de critica: una interna, feminista (critica rationalitatii duce la pierderea criteriilor obiectivitatii si la dizolvarea feminismului intr-un particularism oarecare), alta externa, nefeminista (pretentia de a critica rationalitatea "citeaza pe ascuns" o anume rationalitate fara de care vocile feministelor nu ar putea fi receptate) . Totusi, chiar si pozitiile feministe care accepta superioritatea modelului rationalitatii occidentale incearca sa corecteze sau sa completeze acest model, prin integrarea valorilor si caracteristicilor "feminine" (cel mai la indemina exemplu este "etica grijii" ca o completare mai degraba decit o alternativa radicala la "etica dreptatii"). in ce priveste postcolonialismul, aici rationalitatea occidentala este criticata in special sub ceea ce are ea "occidental", adica europocentric. Teoria postcoloniala se arata sceptica fata de rationalitate in spiritul suspiciunii postmoderne fata de "marile naratiuni", care au impus istoria occidentala in detrimentul istoriilor locale multiple. Ratiunea si valorile legitimate de ea au fost instrumentele care au permis (adesea prin violenta si prin distrugere) condamnarea Celuilalt ca fiind salbatic, ne-civilizat, inuman, contribuind la colonizarea lui . O alta problema comuna in discursul feminist si postcolonial este cea a locului si a dislocarii in limbaj. Aceasta tema este tratata cu minutiozitate de unele curente feministe la care influenta postcoloniala este atit de marcata incit ne permite sa vorbim chiar de un feminiem postcolonial. Feminismul postcolonial (Ofelia Schutte, Gayatri Spivak, Aparajita Sagar, Gloria Anzaldua) se constituie la intersectia dintre feminism si postcolonialism, avind ca punct de plecare critica dominatiei si exploatarii Celuilalt diferentiat din punct de vedere cultural, insa o critica ce nu incearca sa restabileasca distinctia rigida eu-celalalt. in plus, o critica severa este directionata impotriva stereotipurilor de gen si constructelor simbolice ale corpului feminin folosite pentru a intari notiunile masculiniste de identitate nationala. Ca o solutie, feministele propun decolonizarea ca tentativa de eliberare a genealogiei proprii sau a traditiei culturale colective de sub povara culturii coloniale mostenite. Decolonizarea trebuie dublata de comunicarea inter- si multi- culturala, care poate intari retelele locale (si globale) de solidaritate. Dupa cum spune si Gayatri Spivak, critica postcoloniala trebuie sa ofere celui dezavantajat, celui "subaltern" un loc in istorie, o voce care sa vorbeasca din interiorul grupului si nu pentru sau despre grupul respectiv. Conceptul de "subaltern" este de altfel interpretat de Spivak ca fiind o alegorie pentru dislocarea subiectului colonizat de fortele colonizatoare. Solutia propusa de Spivak este cea a formarii "identitatilor-in-rezistenta" colective . Pe linga aceste teme comune, exista anumite concepte elaborate in cadrul acestor curente, concepte cu o mare forta sugestiva si analitica si care se regasesc la nivelul teoretizarilor celor mai originale din ambele discursuri. Unul dintre conceptele de sorginte pluralista, postmoderna, dar mai ales post-coloniala, este cel de hibriditate. Idealul hibriditatii este rezultat al atitudinii, prezente in politicile postcoloniale si multiculturale, de "in-corporare", care urmareste continua negociere a spatiului sociocultural in vederea imputernicirii celor marginalizati, a fostilor "colonizati" - fie ca este vorba de o colonizare efectiva, geopolitica, sau de una culturala. Conceptul de hibriditate, teoretizat in special de Homi Bhabha, este si un punct comun al teoriei postcoloniale si a celei multiculturale. Dupa cum spune David Theo Goldberg, "Hibriditatile sint modalitatile in si prin care conditiile multiculturale sint traite si innoite" . in feminism, ideea hibriditatii este suprinsa extrem de plastic de catre Donna Haraway, in celebrul sau "Cyborg Manifesto". Cyborg-ul este pentru autoare un organism cibernetic, un hibrid intre om si masina, creatura a realitatii sociale ca si a celei fictionale. Cyborg-ul transcende dihotomiile "gindirii dualiste" de care aminteam anterior, depasind granitele dintre om si animal, dintre organism si masina, dintre fizic si non-fizic. Conditia oscilanta, multipla, nelocalizabila a identitatii hibride este ceea ce, in opinia Donnei Haraway, ne caracterizeaza pe toti: "La sfirsitul secolului... sintem cu totii himere, 90

hibrizi teoretizati si fabricati din masina si organism; pe scurt, sintem cu totii cyborgi" . Un alt concept preluat tot pe filiera postmoderna este cel al marginalitatii. Marginalitatea defineste, in conceptia unor feministe, conditia sociala a multora dintre femei. Conceptul este folosit fie pentru a explora similaritatile dintre conditia feminina si cea a altor categorii defavorizate (populatia de culoare) in feminismul multicultural, fie pentru a cerceta la acest nivel germenii transformarilor sociale viitoare. Exprimarea marginalitatii a imbracat in postcolonialism forme diverse: de la modelul simplei inversari (Frantz Fanon), la deconstructia structurilor dominatiei (Gayatri Spivak si Homi Bhabha). Astfel, fie se cauta o modalitate de definire a marginalului astfel incit sa se ignore centrul (strategie ce risca insa sa ramina prinsa in structurile de gindire si de dominatie coloniale), fie se incearca o resituare compensatoare a marginalitatii in centru (strategie care transforma marginalul intr-un particular ce nu mai poate pretinde nimic dincolo de particularitate si specificitate) . Ca si in cazul studiilor feministe, si aici problema apare in momentul in care se incearca aplicarea in planul actiunii politice al acestui concept: daca la nivelul teoretic marginalitatea poate fi definita ca refuz al centrului, ca afirmare a caracteristicilor "slabe" ale perifericului si localului in detrimentul centralitatii uniformizatoare, in momentul in care se incearca impunerea drepturilor celor anterior nereprezentati, discursul si practicile devin in mod inevitabil "tari", uniformizatoare, centralizatoare. Dupa cum s-a putut constata si pe parcursul acestui articol, exista, pe linga surse, teme si concepte comune, si o serie de critici aduse de pe pozitii asemanatoare, atit feminismului, cit si postcolonialismului. Astfel, fara a ne opri aici asupra criticilor exterioare, care urmaresc desfiintarea curentelor discutate, vom zabovi putin asupra criticilor "interne", care incearca, asumind o serie de presupozitii ale curentelor respective, sa demonstreze ca acestea nu se ridica la inaltimea propriilor teluri. Un bun exemplu de critica interna a postcolonialismului (ale carei argumente pot fi reproduse pas cu pas si in cazul feminismului) este cea intreprinsa de Dorothy Figuiera. Aceasta arata ca una dintre asumptiile majore ale teoriei postcoloniale - aceea de a oferi marginalilor o voce care sa vorbeasca impreuna cu ei si nu despre ei - nu a fost respectata. Teoriile postcoloniale au fost redactate (majoritatea lor) in engleza si franceza (limbile "colonizatorilor") si nu de catre reprezentantii "lumii a treia", ci de cei ai "lumii intii", autoerijati in reprezentanti ai lumii a treia . La fel, diversele reprezentante ale feminismelor particulare - de pilda, reprezentantele feminismului de culoare - au sustinut ca feministele "albe" pretind sa vorbeasca in numele tuturor femeilor, cind de cele mai multe ori ele insele nu se confrunta cu acele probleme . O alta tema supusa criticii de catre Dorothy Figueira este chiar posibilitatea unei unice teorii "postcoloniale", in conditiile in care diversele foste colonii au istorii specifice, care pot sa difere fundamental. Scopul teoreticienilor postcolonialismului nu este altul, in opinia autoarei, decit obtinerea unei puteri discursive, iar nu reprezentarea celor in numele carora pretinde ca actioneaza. Similar, feminismului i-a fost adusa acuza esentialismului: si anume, ca, folosind concepte de tipul "natura feminina", incearca sa stabileasca o unitate si o uniformizare acolo unde nu exista decit realitati specifice diverse. Acest gen de critica se dovedeste constructiv, atunci cind cei supusi criticii incearca sa tina seama de imputarile aduse si sa reformuleze teoria astfel incit sa le incorporeze si sa le rezolve. Este cazul atit al teoriilor postcoloniale, cit si al celor feministe, unde se practica in permanenta dialogul si transformarea criticilor in atuurile viitoare. Din aceasta perspectiva, teoria postcoloniala si cea feminista reprezinta inca un soi de work in progress viu si actual, ale caror provocari merita un raspuns.

91

ION BOGDAN LEFTER POATE FI CONSIDERAT POSTCOMUNISMUL UN POST-COLONIALISM?

Can postcommunism be considered a postcolonialism? Abstract: The article gatheres the pro- and contra- arguments that could associate the Romanian postcommunism to a form of postcolonialism. Keywords: Romania; postcommunism; postcolonialism; censorship

Punct de plecare: o propunere canadiana Voi incepe cu o mica istorie personala. Pe la mijlocul anilor '90, am fost solicitat de Revista canadiana de literatura comparata (Canadian Review of Comparative Literature/Revue Canadienne de Littrature Compare), editata de Universitatea din Toronto, sa scriu un articol despre literatura si piata editoriala de la noi dupa caderea regimului comunist. (Aparut in publicatia citata, Vol. 22, Nos 3-4, September/December 1995, textul e reluat in cartea mea A Guide to Romanian Literature. Novel, Experiment and the Post-Communist Book Industry, Editura Paralela 45, Pitesti, 1999.) Cerindu-mi colaborarea, editorul revistei canadiene, Steven Ttsy de Zepetnek, profesor la Universitatea Alberta din Edmonton, mi-a spus ca din fiecare tara fosta comunista va fi cite un eseu similar. Ceea ce o omis sa mentioneze a fost faptul ca situatia din regiunea noastra urma sa fie prezentata intr-un context mult mai larg, planetar: acela al post-colonialismului. Cind revista a aparut, asta am avut in fata: un volum compact de studii consacrate postcolonialismului. in acea perioada, conceptul intra in moda intelectuala Nord-americana, devenea trendy, conform unei anumite retete de lansare ritmica a unor idei cu putere de atractie si de stimulare a dezbaterii culturale. La noi nu se auzise inca de asa ceva - si nici azi termenul nu circula. Poate pentru ca nu prea ne-ar conveni - nu-i asa? - sa ne consideram "post-coloniali". Pe de alta parte, romanii sint oricum obisnuiti sa gindeasca asupra identitatii lor nationale si culturale fie in termenii unor modele inchise, suficiente siesi, fie prin comparatie doar cu citeva mari culturi occidentale, rar sau deloc in perspectiva adevaratului universalism, dincolo de spatiul euro-american. De ce post-colonialism? Vor fi fiind si mode terminologice superficiale, gratuite, superflue. Nu si aceasta. Sursele de elaborare a conceptului de post-colonialism sint chiar evolutiile politice si culturale internationale din ultima vreme. Sa le vedem pe scurt. in primul rind, ca motivatie preliminara, trebuie avut in vedere stadiul atins in dezbaterile intelectuale din spatiul occidental. La inceputul - cu aproximatie - al anilor '90 (implinirea in 1992 a 5 secole de la descoperirea Noului Continent e o data semnificativa in acest sens), democratiile Nord-americane si Vest-europene au dezvoltat o ampla dezbatere asupra vechilor lor istorii expansioniste, delimitindu-se in termeni morali de atitudinile colonialiste de alta-data. Concomitent, procesul de emancipare politica 92

si culturala a fostelor colonii a avansat, cu - de-acum - sprijinul direct al celor care le-au fost "stapini". Insistenta asupra situatiilor post-coloniale e direct legata de aceasta asumare a "vinei" istorice a fostilor opresori. Fundalul conceptual este - se deduce - acela al corectitudinii politice. O a doua sursa ar fi evolutia cercetarii post-structuraliste in disciplinele culturale, in critica de arta, in stiintele umane in genere, si anume in directii care recupereaza toate contextele socio-culturale posibile. Traditiile, conditionarile istorice si politice au revenit puternic in atentie. Din atari perspective metodologice, situatia tarilor cindva ocupate colonial apare ca un cimp tematic foarte ofertant. in sfirsit, merita considerata si inclinatia postmodernitatii catre recuperarea tuturor diversitatilor, a tuturor marginalitatilor. Filozofiile pluraliste, modelele policentrismului cultural au inlocuit vechile imperialisme ale vechilor "centre de putere" mondiala. "Provinciile" au sansa unei pina acum nesperate puneri in valoare. intre ele - fireste - si postcoloniile. Acestea fiind spuse si acceptate ca motivatii ale elaborarilor conceptuale in discutie, ne putem apropia de problema romaneasca si de cea a intregii regiuni Central-europene: poate fi considerat postcomunismul de la noi, din Polonia, Cehia, Ungaria, Bulgaria s.a.m.d. un post-colonialism? Se pot aduce argumente si pro, si contra. in ce masura comunismul nu a fost un colonialism Iata mai intii argumentele contra, in trei planuri pe care le gasesc semnificative in ordinea de idei data: Politic vorbind, nici Romania, nici celelalte state in care Uniunea Sovietica si-a "exportat" dupa al doilea razboi mondial sistemul nu au fost colonii la propriu. Administrate de partidele comuniste locale, cu guverne proprii, cu o autonomie de miscare mult clamata dupa "dezghetul" hrusciovist (vezi principiul "neamestecului in treburile interne" asupra caruia discursul regimului Ceausescu a pedalat permanent), tarile in cauza au facut parte din "lagarul socialist", dar fara sa fie incluse efectiv, administrativ in imperiul sovietic. Prin comparatie, tarile baltice sau Basarabia pot fi considerate spatii colonizate (sau chiar mai mult decit atit!), nu si Romania, Ungaria si celelalte. Atare situatie a condus in planul mentalitatilor la modelari in consecinta: in timp ce balticii s-au considerat mereu "ocupati", noi sau polonezii am avut permanent constiinta independentei noastre, chiar daca Moscova exercita influenta stiuta. Pe aceste baze s-au si construit - de altfel - neonationalismele postbelice din Europa Centrala. Romania a fost un caz extrem: in special dupa 1968, cind a speculat cu mare abilitate momentul interventiei armatelor Tratatului de la Varsovia in Cehoslovacia, Nicolae Ceausescu a mizat clar pe cartea mindriei romanilor, pe vechile lor sentimente anti-rusesti si anti-maghiare, incit combinatia "national-comunismului" (calc dupa "nationalsocialismul" hitlerist), cel putin la noi, se justifica, daca nu si in alte citeva cazuri, precum Albania sau - dincolo de spatiul european - Cuba. in sfirsit, as aduce in discutie planul esential al limbii si al culturii: in perioada comunista, ele s-au mentinut in tarile despre care vorbim. Or, in spatiile propriu-zis coloniale, imperiile si-au impus limbile si culturile, ceea ce condus la existenta actuala a unei Africi francofone, a alteia anglofone, a limbii si culturii neerlandofone afrikaans etc. etc. Nici Romania, nici celelalte state ale Europei Centrale n-au devenit rusofone in deceniile de "ocupatie" comunista. Trasaturi - totusi - coloniale ale comunismului Iata si argumentele pro, in aceleasi trei planuri: Politic, desi n-au fost incluse formal in Marea Uniune de la Rasarit, Romania si suratele ei Centraleuropene n-au fost de facto independente. Centrul sistemului a ramas Moscova, de unde s-a impus mai sever in anii '50, mai "blind" in anii '70-'80 - "linia". La inceputurile comunismului prin partile noastre se spunea (formulez aproximativ) ca daca cineva tuseste acolo sus, la Kremlin, altcineva raceste la Bucuresti! Chiar si relaxarea sistemului, impinsa in 1956 la Budapesta sau in 1968 la Praga pina la limita subversiunii oficializate, a fost consecinta nemediata a "dezghetului" decis la Moscova. De asemenea, destructurarea "lagarului" catre sfirsitul anilor '80 a fost urmarea politicii de perestroika si glasnost promovata de ultimul sef al Uniunii Sovietice, Mihail Gorbaciov. Relativa libertate, acceptarea analizei critice din interiorul regimului, transparenta discursurilor publice au creat conditiile 93

emanciparii care a dus la prabusirea sistemului. Mai mult decit atit, dependenta de tip colonial (sau - sa admitem - semi-colonial) s-a tradus pina si in ocupatia militara de care tarile noastre au avut parte imediat dupa razboiul mondial. Prezenta contingentelor Armatei Rosii a jucat rolul unui factor de presiune si de coercitie politica. Din Romania trupele sovietice s-au retras in 1957, in timp ce in restul statelor "ocupate" au ramas pina la sfirsit, retrase fiind abia la inceputul anilor '90. ai in planul mentalitatilor se poate vorbi despre consecinte insidioase atit ale relatiei de subordonare fata de Centrul comunismului mondial, cit si ale existentei in totalitarism. Continua sa fie reperabila cu ochiul liber lipsa de reactie a majoritatii populatiei in multe situatii, oamenii parind dezorientati intr-o lume noua, in care ar trebui "sa-si ia viata in miini", "pe cont propriu". Deceniile traite intr-un stat paternalist au lasat urme grele, "tocind" instinctul independentei, intelegerea statutului si a importantei proprietatii private si alte asemenea lucruri esentiale intr-o democratie. Altfel spus, comportamentul pasiv al multor contemporani ai nostri poate fi citit drept manifestare a unei mentalitati colective de popor "sub ocupatie". De aici si teama viscerala "de rusi", nu o data exprimata public in deceniul trecut, in deplina ignorare a situatiei actuale de la Moscova si a evolutiilor internationale, care fac imposibil un nou expansionism. insa reflexul, cultivat vreme indelungata, se sterge greu. in privinta limbii si a culturii, se pot - de asemenea - evoca o serie intreaga de date de tip colonial. Romana, ceha, maghiara, poloneza au ramas oficiale, dar tentative de "rusificare", de "rusofonizare" au fost, mai ales in perioada de instalare si de consolidare a regimurilor comuniste in regiune. Imperiul a incercat pe toate caile sa-si impuna cultura: au fost "exportate" catre noi propaganda sovietica, realismul socialist, Donul linistit si tot restul. A existat in anii '50 o editura specializata numita Cartea Rusa. ai - iarasi - asa mai departe. Despre utilitatea unui concept Revenind la intrebare: la iesirea dintr-o istorie in care am fost aproape "ocupati", in care am suportat un regim impus din afara, de catre un Centru de tip imperial, ne putem considera post-coloniali? Seamana destinele noastre indeajuns de mult cu cele ale fostelor colonii britanice, franceze, portugheze, olandeze? Poate fi considerat postcomunismul un post-colonialism? Argumentele contra cred ca arata destul de elocvent ca adecvarea conceptului la situatia tarilor noastre e foarte discutabila. Moscova a avut - intr-adevar - un comportament imperial in zona de influenta in care si-a putut impune sistemul, in tarile noastre au fost astfel induse unele trasaturi de tip colonial (sau semi-colonial), insa nu mai mult decit atit: unele trasaturi. in rest, si anume in cea mai mare masura, profilul societatilor si al culturilor noastre nu poate fi definit in termeni post-coloniali. Nu inseamna sa respingem conceptul cu totul. Dupa cum se vede chiar si dintr-o asemenea schita de analiza a adecvarii lui la realitatea noastra, insasi raportarea la modelul colonial ne poate ajuta sa ne descriem mai bine istoria recenta. Nu vom fi traind in post-colonialism, dar sintem cu siguranta in postcomunism, adica intr-o perioada de "tranzitie" care lasa in urma un anumit fel de "ocupatie" politica si culturala. Diferentele specifice sint elocvente, insa examinarea genului proxim ne poate fi utila. E un cimp problematic care merita explorat mai in detaliu.

94

STEFAN BORBLY POLITICS AS MEMORY DISTORTION: A CASE STUDY

Abstract: The paper intends to show how real facts concerning the coup and the insurrection of August 23, 1944 were to be distorted by the communist propaganda and used as an ideological strategy of political self-legitimation. Keywords: Romania; communism; abusive propaganda; censorship; distortion

Between 1948 and 1990, Romania's National Day was August 23. It commemorated the coup and insurrection of August 23, 1944, when young King Michael I arrested the pro-German chief of state, Marshall Ion Antonescu, overthrew his fascist, pro-Axis government, formed a new leading political coalition (which also included communists), and accepted the armistice proposed to Romania by the USSR, Great Britain and the United States of America. The outcome on the battlefield completely changed the rules of war in the region: the Romanian army turned unexpectedly against their former allies, the Germans, joined the Soviet forces which were invading from the East, cleared Bucharest and the Prahova Valley from German occupation, and considerably eased the advancement of the Soviet front westwards, across the Carpathians and through the hills of Transylvania. Since Hitler had given the North-Western part of Transylvania back to Hungary, through the Ribbentrop-Ciano arbitrage signed in Vienna on August 30, 1940, Romania claimed its territorial reintegration as a reward for its new political and military commitment. Transylvania had been completely freed from the Germans by October 25, 1944, and was reintegrated into Romania. As a personal reward for the coup, "the Soviet Union hailed Michael as a hero and presented him with its rare diamond-studded Order of Victory" (on July 6, 1945). A few years later, on December 30, 1947, the newly installed communist power forced King Michael I to abdicate from his duties and leave the country by train; on March 4, 1948, "he repudiated his abdication, claiming that it had been imposed on him by force to clear the way for a communist government "utterly unrepresentative of the will of the Romanian people"." Aim of the paper This paper intends to show how real facts concerning the coup and the insurrection of August 23, 1944 were to be distorted by the communist propaganda, and used as an ideological strategy of political selflegitimation. Furthermore, in the coming decades the name and the meaning of the coup and insurrection underwent several changes, reflecting both the ideology and the power struggles within the party. The names of some of the initial participants were deleted from the public memory, while other names - in no way connected to the coup or insurrection - were added to the list. The ideological significance of the event also changed according to the major shifts in the political representation of the nations' recent history. Within three decades, the events that had taken place on August 23, 1944 were to be hailed differently: at the very beginning (in the late fifties and early sixties), as an "armed insurrection, conceived and led by the Romanian Communist Party"; then, in the early seventies, as an "armed, national and antifascist insurrection"; and finally, in the eighties, as a climactic "social, national, antifascist and anti-imperialist liberation revolution". The interpretation given to the events 95

was also altered to express the self-representation of each period. In its final section, the paper will reveal this tide of distortion by using resource materials from four different years: 1959, 1965, 1971 and 1984. THE IDEOLOGY OF DISTORTION (preliminary considerations) It is worth mentioning that the political distortion of the August 23, 1944 events began as soon as they occurred, with the very first documents concerning the coup, and that these distortions did not belong solely to the communists. There were four political parties that had taken part in the coup, and, of course, by far exceeding all these four together was the role played by the king: in the aftermath of the events, each party gave its particular representation of the coup, offering different versions of the role played by the other partners or by the king. The communists seized power after the November 1946 so-called "free, democratic" elections, and after they forced the king to abdicate on December 30, 1947. The documents show that the communists did not have a single, generally acknowledged representation of the coup or insurrection, mainly because they seemed to have played a minor role in the most important event of the first part of the insurrection, Marshall Ion Antonescu's removal from office by the king. The communists were also distressed because of the role played by the king, an authority they had forced to leave the country. Consequently, the presence of the king was to be minimized in the future descriptions of the events, as was to be the role played by the great historical parties (see below). Moreover, in the fifties the Romanian Communist Party went through a rather strenuous power struggle period, until Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej secured his pre-eminence by being elected Prime Secretary in 1959; he kept the power firmly in his hands until March 1965, when he died and was replaced by Nicolae Ceausescu. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej had not played any role in the August 23, 1944 coup or insurrection, so he was given one. Even more distressing for the new communist school of propaganda was the fact that a document of the insurrection had been signed by the communist leader Lucretiu Patrascanu, who fell in disgrace in the fifties, was put to a mock trial and rapidly assassinated. Patrascanu's name was, of course, deleted from the textbooks and from the public memory until 1968, when Nicolae Ceausescu rehabilitated him. A final change operated by the communists distorted the ideological meaning of the events. To be more specific: the communists adjusted the public - and the only officially admitted - representation of the August 1944 events to make them fit into the Marxist theory of history conceived as a social class struggle, led and won by the proletarians. Social classes and groups progressively replaced persons in the communist textbooks or in the officially approved memoirs, which stressed the role played by the "Romanian people" in the events, a people whose "expression" was the Communist Party. Following the domestic "cultural revolution" of 1971, and advancing towards the personal megalomaniac paranoia of the eighties, Nicolae Ceausescu's propaganda machine went even further, because the new leader was only 26 at the time of the coup, and had had no leading role in the party at all when the 1944 events occurred. He was not cast in a leading role at the inner core of the insurrection, for such a historical distortion would clearly have been unsustainable before the public and would have seemed quite ridiculous to many old members of the party but, by way of compensation, the propaganda machine assigned him a sort of major "shadow-figure" role, enlarging the "antifascist" and "antiimperialist" significance of the event to a scale at which the real event - the coup itself - simply seemed to vanish in the fiery torment of a planetary antifascist and anti-imperialist liberation movement orchestrated from Bucharest. Sources, methodology For the study of these changes I have relied on historical or political documents revealed by the mass media, on source books and on textbooks. In order to understand better the ups and downs of these representations, it is important to point out that the communists kept the public interpretation of events between 1948 and 1989 under strict control, each new detail of the official version having to be approved first by the propaganda departments of the party and by the leaders themselves. Accordingly, 96

one cannot find any unbiased scholarly interpretation of the coup and insurrection in this period: all we get are ideological vulgatas, shaping the memory of subsequent generations. Direct access to documents or source materials was denied; moreover, even if you did get permission to study them - or if you happened to have a librarian acquaintance to sneak you inside the archives, close the doors behind you and keep cave for coffee or a packet of Kent -, you were unable to publish the information or to make it public through articles, lectures or conferences. History thus became conspiratorial, and was completely replaced by ideological memory, borrowed from the media or from political vulgatas. The COUP AND the insurrection (a historical reconstruction of the events) A neat reconstruction of the events surrounding the insurrection of August 23, 1944 runs as follows: a) Romania's general political context. Remote or close events related to the coup On July 24, 1927 Corneliu Zelea Codreanu created "St. Michael the Archangel's Legion", which in March 1930 became the "Iron Guard" and in June 1935 was transformed into a party called "Everything for the Country". The new political organization advocated collective and individual spiritual resurrection through nationalism and orthodoxy, hailed Mussolini's corporatism, overtly manifested fascist, pro-German attitudes, and practised political violence to reach its goals. On December 10, 1933, Prime Minister I. Gh. Duca dissolved the Iron Guard; in retaliation, on December 29 the same year, he was assassinated by Iron Guard members on the platform of the Sinaia railway station. Less than five years later, on February 10, 1938 King Carol II dissolved the government and imposed his personal, royal dictatorship onto the country. At the end of November that year (29-30), the leader of the Iron Guard, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and other members of his party were shot at orders given by the king. On March 7, 1939, a new government was formed by Armand Calinescu; on September 21 the same year, he was assassinated by Iron Guard members, who sought revenge for C. Z. Codreanu's execution. On September 1, 1939 Germany attacked Poland; Romania declared its neutrality on September 7, but allowed the free trespassing of its territory by military convoys en route to Poland. On July 4, 1940 Ion Gigurtu's new government included Horia Sima, the new leader of the Iron Guard: the political pressure towards a future pro-German orientation of the country was increasing. On September 4, 1940 the Ion Gigurtu government resigned, and the power was seized by General Ion Antonescu (later: a Marshall), who suspended the Constitution and took over absolute power; the next day, King Carol II was forced to abdicate in favour of his son, Michael I (Mihai). On August 30, 1940 an arbitrage imposed upon Romania by the Germans and signed in Vienna seized the N-W part of Transylvania (42,243 km2) and gave it over to Hungary. Atrocities followed: the psychological effect on the public opinion was devastating. Antonescu advocated a pro-German attitude, visited Hitler at Berlin and Brechtesgaden several times and secured the political support of the Iron Guard: in retaliation for the previous shooting of its members, the Guard executed 67 political leaders in the Jilava prison (November 26-27, 1940), assassinated the great historian Nicolae Iorga at his residence the very next night, and finally instigated an armed rebellion on January 21-24, 1941, in order to eliminate Antonescu and to gain complete and sole political control over the country. Antonescu quelled the rebellion and formed a military government. By that time, Romania's proGerman orientation had become obvious: on May 29, 1940, Romania and Germany signed an economic cooperation treaty. Romania gave up its declaration of neutrality, but went on losing its territories: on June 26, 1940 the USSR annexed Bassarabia and the Northern part of Bukowina; on September 7 the same year, the southern part of Dobrudja was ceded to the Bulgarians. Antonescu took advantage of the traditional anti-Russian feelings of the people, pretending to forget that Germany and Bulgaria were equally responsible for the amputation of the national territory. As a consequence, on June 11-12, 1941, through a treaty signed in Mnchen and Brechtesgaden, Romania agreed to join the Germans in an imminent aggression against the Soviet Union. The Romanian army would cross the Prut river and march deep into the Soviet territory. 97

b) The coup and the insurrection b.1. Secret armistice negotiations between Romania and the Allies Even though in many communist textbooks the armistice was considered to be a catalyst for the August 23, 1944 events, no in-depth analysis has been dedicated to it so far, nor does the public opinion know, by any means, what actually happened. The Romanian government and/or the opposition ran three secret negotiations to reach a separate armistice agreement with the Allies: in Ankara, Cairo and Stockholm. The Ankara negotiations started in 1943 with an envoy appointed by Marshall Ion Antonescu offering the British and the Americans cooperation and military support if they should reach the Balkans before the Russians. Antonescu's emissary contacted the British military attach in Turkey, General A. C. Arnold, but received no satisfactory answer to his proposition: the British claimed that it should be presented to Great Britain, the US and the USSR simultaneously, and that the Romanian counterpart should agree to an unconditional surrender. The British also considered that the Romanian opposition would be a more tractable partner for the talks than the pro-German Ion Antonescu: consequently, on February 1, 1944, Lt. Col. Ted Masterson from the Special Operations Executive (SOE) informed the Romanians that the Allies were ready to meet a representative of the opposition in Cairo, and discuss a separate armistice agreement. Iuliu Maniu, President of the Romanian Peasants' Party and leader of the Romanian political opposition shipped Prince Barbu atirbey to Cairo; a few weeks later, on May 26, Constantin Visoianu joined him. Commencing the talks, Prince Barbu atirbey suggested that the armistice should involve Marshall Ion Antonescu rather than the opposition, as Antonescu "was prepared" for the armistice and his political and military power was superior to that of the opposition. The documents show that Iuliu Maniu and his domestic partners began the Cairo negotiations having the future geopolitical map of the region in mind: although they recognized that the Red Army was closer to Romania geographically, and more likely to carry out direct military actions than the British and the Americans, they wanted to avoid a stronger Soviet implication in the region and the grim perspective of Romania falling under the Soviet rule in the wake of the impending peace treaty. To do so, the Romanian emissaries preferred to shun General V. N. Novikov, the Russian counterpart to the negotiations, giving the impression that they were interested in talking only with the British and the Americans. Iuliu Maniu asked his counterparts to agree not to interfere in Romania's internal affairs, and to guarantee that the N-W part of Transylvania would be returned to Romania. A small incident happened on May 26, 1944, when the second Romanian emissary, Constantin Visoianu reached Cairo with a detailed message from Iuliu Maniu. Visoianu asked Christopher Steel, the British official to the talks, to guarantee that Great Britain would take a future interest in the region, and questioned him whether the British government would consider or not allowing communists in the next Romanian government. The question aroused Prime Minister Anthony Eden's anger, as he considered that the Romanians wanted to separate the Allies from the Soviet Union, and recommended that in future all Romanian propositions should be addressed to Christopher Steel and General V. N. Novikov simultaneously. The Allies also suggested that Iuliu Maniu should send an emissary to the eastern front, to contact the Red Army for a future armed cooperation. Maniu seems to have been reluctant to do so and transmitted new conditions to Cairo, which angered V. N. Novikov, who declared on June 1, 1944 that "the Soviet government will refuse to discuss any of these conditions until Maniu categorically states that he has accepted the proposed conditions of the armistice". The next day, the Allies let the Romanians know that "any continuation of the negotiations is useless" and that "if Mr. Maniu wants to take advantage of the conditions of the armistice prescribed by the three allied powers, he had better follow the advice he has already been given, and send an officer to the front to get in direct contact with the Red Army". Maniu conferred with the king and replied (on June 11, 1944) that the Romanian opposition had agreed to form a political unity front, the National Democratic Block, whose main aims were to depose Marshall Ion Antonescu, form a national unity government and join the Allies in their war against the Germans. Maniu also expressed his confidence that the proposed conditions of the armistice would be amended. The Allies remained silent. After setting up the National Democratic Block (on June 20, 1944), Maniu informed them that Marshall Ion Antonescu's overthrow was a matter of weeks, and asked for a massive Soviet military intervention to sustain the coup when it happened. He received no 98

answer for more than two months, until the coup of August 23, 1944. The Romanian opposition was amazed and overwhelmed by this unexpected silence, but carried out its plan nonetheless. As the documents and the public attitudes clearly show, the Allies' reluctance to respond was motivated by their fear to offend the Soviets, for they fully realized Maniu's interest in limiting the future Russian impact in the region. Geopolitically, this was impossible: the Allies knew that the Russians had started separate negotiations with the Romanians in Stockholm. The Stockholm talks started on December 25, 1943 and lasted until August 23, 1944, the time of the Romanian coup. On behalf of the Romanians, the negotiator was Ambassador Frederic C. Nanu; the Soviet delegation was led by Ambassador Aleksandra Kollontai, and included several other members, the most prominent of whom was V. Semenov. The talks had been initiated by the Russians, through a Bulgarian journalist, Goranov. That is to say: the Soviets were playing the game at their table, and were fully aware of this advantage. Mrs. Kollontai offered to negotiate with both Marshall Ion Antonescu and the opposition, leaving the Romanians to decide whether Antonescu or the opposition could carry out the conditions of the armistice, which mainly included the Romanians changing sides and turning against the Germans, speedy and complete Soviet military assistance to free Romania from the Germans, and an assurance that Transylvania would belong to Romania at the end of the war. Ambassador Frederic C. Nanu contacted Mihai Antonescu, Marshall Ion Antonescu's deputy, and negotiated with Kollontai on behalf of the government, which also seemed to be reluctant to accept a massive Soviet influence in the region. The messages received from Bucharest were, for this reason, confuse and rather controversial; Bucharest eventually agreed to send a special envoy to the negotiations: on August 22, 1944 he left for Stockholm only to learn that his trip had been made futile by the August 23 coup. b.2: The coup By the end of April 1944, the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party had formed the Workers Unity Front. The parties did not play a major role in Romania's political life: the Front had an insignificant manifestation on May 1 that year, which was barely noticed by the media and the major political forces of the country. Nevertheless, the Front was the creation of the Communist Party, a minor detail that would be inflated by the communist propaganda machine in the coming decades in order to belittle the role played by the so-called "historical parties" (the National Peasants' Party, led by Iuliu Maniu and the National Liberal Party, led by the Bratianu family). As a response to the armistice negotiations held in Cairo (see above) the political opposition created the National Democratic Block (on June 20, 1944), including the National Peasants' Party, the National Liberal Party, the Socialist Democratic Party and the Communist Party. The structure of the Block reflected the structure of the negotiations abroad: nobody would have considered including the communists if the Allies had not had the Soviets on their side. Moreover, as I have already pointed out, the Red Army was closer to Romania geographically than any other allied army. Therefore, even though Maniu and the Liberal leaders were reluctant to deal with the red agents, they were obliged to admit that Marshall Antonescu's overthrow and a favourable armistice with the Allies could not be achieved without a political concession to the Russians. The insurrection was secretly set for August 26, but Marshall Ion Antonescu's decision to leave Bucharest to inspect the Eastern front speeded up the events. The situation on the Eastern front was really dramatic: on August 20 the Russians launched a massive offensive on the Iassy-Kishinow line, and the Romanian army had to withdraw to a southern defensive line (Focsani-Namoloasa-Galati). In the evening of August 22, the German plenipotentiary minister in Bucharest, Carl Clodius visited Ion Antonescu, who assured him that in spite of the disasters on the eastern front, he would do his best to stop the Russians. This visit shows that Ion Antonescu had previously informed the Germans about the negotiations in Cairo, because Antonescu spoke to Clodius about his decision to reject the Cairo talks "given his allegiance" to the Germans, accusing them, at the same time, of not having secured the eastern front, in order to prevent the Soviet offensive. Clodius left and informed Berlin about his impression that Antonescu was playing a double game; before his departure, another appointment was set for the next day, at 5:30 p.m., but this never took place, as Antonescu was arrested.

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In the morning of August 23, 1944 Marshall Ion Antonescu met the Liberal leader Gheorghe Bratianu, and asked him for a letter of assent from the historical parties, which would authorize him to sign the armistice treaty. As expected, in his claim Antonescu disregarded the communists, whose party didn't count too much on the political chess table. The same day, the Marshall contacted the king for an audience and the appointment was set for 4 p.m. Antonescu had kept a last, feeble card in his pocket to present to the king, if necessary: he had been informed that Turkey was about to enter the war, which seemed likely to draw a massive British and American military force onto the Black Sea: the Marshall thought that it would be big enough an action to counterbalance the Soviet influence in the region. The king asked Antonescu whether he was or not ready to sign the armistice proposed by the Allies. Antonescu replied by mentioning his previous meeting with Gheorghe Bratianu; he said that he had been ready to sign the treaty, but that he had had to inform the Germans about this move. The king realized that by implicating Hitler, the plans of the armistice would be brought to light, and the Germans would retaliate. Making up an excuse that he had left his cigarettes behind, the king went out of the room for a few minutes, quickly consulted his aids waiting next door, and returned to inform Marshall Ion Antonescu about his decision to free him from the duties of chief of state. At 4:58 p.m. the king left the Yellow Room (where the audience had taken place), and a small military crew entered, led by Major Anton Dumitrescu. They arrested Ion Antonescu together with his deputy minister Mihai Antonescu, locked them up in a safe room on the first floor, where the royal stamp collection was kept, and detained them there until 3:30 in the morning, when a group sent by the Communist Party took them to a secret location situated in the Vatra Luminoasa neighbourhood. They stayed there until September 3, 1944, when the Communists handed them over to the Soviet Military Commandment (the Red Army had reached Bucharest by the end of August). Media reactions to the coup The coup was sealed by the king's Proclamation to the Nation and by a joint Manifest signed by the four parties previously reunited in the National Democratic Block. The king's Proclamation was first issued in the communist newspaper Romania libera (no. 11/ August 24, 1944); the independent, but pro-German influential newspaper Curentul published it in its August 25 issue (XVII, no. 5936). The proclamation was aired by Radio Bucharest on August 23, at 10:25 p.m. Its content reflected the new political orientation of the country: Romania had agreed to join the Allies in their war against the Germans, and had stopped any hostilities against the Soviet Union; it was pointed out that the domestic political dictatorship had come to an end, and that the Allies guaranteed the independence of the country, having "recognized the unfairness of the Vienna Dictate, under which Transylvania was taken away from us". The National Democratic Block's Manifest appeared in the communist Romania libera (no. 13, August 27), in Dreptatea, the official newspaper of the National Peasants' Party (no. 2, August 28) and in the 28 August issue of Curentul (no. 5938). The standard text was signed by the leaders of the four constituent parties of the Block (I. Maniu, president of the National Peasants' Party, C. I. C. Bratianu, president of the National Liberal Party, C. Titel-Petrescu, president of the Socialist Democratic Party and Lucretiu Patrascanu, leader of the Communist Party). The version published in Curentul ignored Patrascanu's name and signature, suggesting that the communists had had a separate position and that they had not play any role in the insurrection. This first, independent (!) distortion of the event appeared on the front cover of the paper, through the publication of a separate Proclamation to the Country, signed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Thus, the paper discretely suggested that the communists were acting separately in those hot insurrectional days. On the other hand, the communists kept on suggesting that the crew sent to arrest Marshall Ion Antonescu had comprised communist fighters led by atefan Mladin (information which randomly reappeared in several subsequent source books). However, as we have already seen, the communists had had nothing to do with the arrest itself, though it was true that they took over Antonescu at a later stage of the affair. It is my supposition that by allowing the communists to take Antonescu to a remote secret location belonging to the party, the king and the historical party leaders had in mind a potentially double strategic game, conceived to meet both ends of the ongoing events. On the one hand, handing 100

Antonescu over to the communists was meant to be a courtesy gesture towards the Russians. On the other hand, IF the plan failed, and IF the German retaliation annihilated the coup, the communists could be presented as scapegoats, suggesting that they alone had initiated the whole mess. The documents reveal that the historical parties tried to narrow down the implication of the communists, although the communist leader Lucretiu Patrascanu was appointed minister of justice. The first major misunderstanding between the communists and the historical parties occurred at the end of August the same year, when the new head of the Iron Guard, Horatiu Comaniciu, dissolved his Movement by a Proclamation (issued on August 26, 1944), whereby he urged the members to join the parties forming the National Democratic Front, "as their conscience urged them". Iuliu Maniu saluted the initiative, in a letter dated August 29, 1944 , and welcomed those members of the Legion "who were not guilty of crimes or of dishonest behaviour". In reply, the Communist Party claimed "no mercy for these traitors", and asked for severe and immediate punishment. The Communist Party's intolerant text was published by the independent media (for instance, it appeared in Curentul, no. 2, August 31, 1944), but it was suppressed by the Peasants' Party paper Dreptatea (no. 5, August 31, 1944), which restricted itself to releasing only the party leader Iuliu Maniu's letter to the former Iron Guard chief. Politics as History Distortion: Further communist propaganda The Romanian Communist Party numbered less than 1,000 members in August 1944: this hardly allowed the party to call itself "influential". The increasing Soviet influence in the region and the invitation launched to the communists to join the August 23, 1944 coup and insurrection gave a big push to the party, also sealed by the Yalta agreement, where Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt had decided that Romania would fall under Soviet protection after the war. The Russian presence in Romania electrified the tiny communist party: on October 12, 1944, it created the National Democratic Front, which retained the Social Democratic Party as a running mate from the glorious National Democratic Block, but repudiated the great historical parties. The separation became more obvious a little bit later: the stronger and stronger Communist Party imposed a democratic government, led by Dr. Petru Groza (March 6, 1945), destroyed the great historical parties by splitting them into different wings, won the November 19, 1946 " first free elections" (where the traditional, Bratianu wing of the National Liberal party and the Maniu wing of the National Peasants' Party were annihilated), and imposed the king's abdication on December 30, 1947, when the country was proclaimed The Popular Republic of Romania. The forthcoming ideological distortions of the August 23, 1944 coup and insurrection were to be closely connected to the bitter power struggle within the party. As seen above, the National Democratic Block Manifest had also been signed by communist leader Lucretiu Patrascanu, who was appointed minister of justice. The party was led by a committee at that time, controlled by Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca and Teohari Georgescu, that is: by an "exterior fraction" of the party, guided from the Kremlin, which was continuously challenged by the "interior fraction", led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. On May 26-27, 1952, the "external" group was repudiated, and five days later, communist leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (who had taken part in the king's abdication) became Prime Minister. He did not, however, gain complete control over the party: on April 6-13, 1954, Lucretiu Patrascanu (in house arrest since 1948) was put on trial and convicted by means of false accusations: he was rapidly executed on the night of 16-17 April (allegedly by Iosif Moldoveanu, his main prosecutor ). Having got rid of his major symbolic rival, Dej still couldn't seize power within the party: following Patrascanu's assassination, the April 19, 1954 Central Committee appointed Gheorghe Draghici as prime secretary. A year later, on October 1, 1955, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was finally elected prime secretary, and formally confirmed by the 3rd Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party (the 8th congress of the Communist Party - June 20-25, 1960). I have chosen four sets of documents to illustrate the communist ideological distortion of the events and of the significance related to the August 1944 coup: I.-III.: three school history textbooks (1959; 1965; 1971), and IV. the 1984 collection of the official party newspaper Scinteia, commemorating the 40th anniversary of the August 1944 coup. 101

The selection of the textbooks was dictated by ideological and historical reasons: the textbook of 1959 reflects the official version of the events from the fifties, following Patrascanu's execution; the textbook of 1965 was issued during the summer following Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej's death and his replacement by Nicolae Ceausescu: it is too early to notice a conceptual distinction, but the textbook shows the official interpretation of the coup in Dej's time; the textbook of 1971 is symptomatic for the first part of the Ceausescu era: it came out before June 1971, when Ceausescu launched his "cultural revolution", following a nice visit to China and North Korea, where he learned how a leader should be deified; the Scinteia collection of 1984 shows the peak of the political, ideological and personal paranoia of a leader who was frustrated because of not having taken part in the events; the 1984 celebration also marked the most grandiose Romanian commemoration ever dedicated to the August 1944 insurrection. Let us analyse them in chronological order: I. 1959 The coup is presented as an "armed insurrection, conceived and led by the Romanian Communist Party". The text says nothing about armistice treaty negotiations carried abroad, nothing about the king, and nothing about the National Democratic Block or the role played by the traditional historical parties; instead, it presents the war as the aggression of a terrorist, pro-German government against its own poor and helpless people. In this unbearable situation - the textbook says - the Romanian Communist Party remained the only political force to assess the context calmly - and to get strength from this recognition. The book maintains that the party enjoyed wide support from the people, who helped it to carry out the insurrection - alone. The stereotype of the period envisaged the communist party as the brains trust of all past popular victories. As such, the party is presented as a clever, coolheaded, collective organizational genius: no leader figure emerges or sticks out from the ranks of the party; since each leader is an integral part of his party, the party becomes an organic replacement for the entire nation. The text says nothing about Lucretiu Patrascanu, who had been murdered less than five years before; on the other hand, it presents the coup as a huge controlled mass movement, coordinated from a sacred centre, i.e. the communist party's headquarters. We can read in the textbook that "patriotic guards" penetrated the royal palace, and arrested the chief of state; that the workers' insurrection followed the pattern of a perfect plan, sending troops to occupy the vital points of the nation's political and economic network: the ministries, the government buildings, the main post office in Bucharest and the local railway station. The textbook also mentions the September 12 Moscow armistice treaty, in order to point out that the humanitarian Russians were eager to make a clear distinction between the innocence of the Romanian people and the guilt of its government. This sharp distinction will reappear as a stereotype in future books and scholarly studies, as it separates the good, eternal soul of the people from the sins of its ephemeral leaders. The impact of this separation goes much further beyond, because it sharply suggests that the Communist Party acted according to the expectations of the inner soul of the people, and by doing so, it became part and parcel of this soul. We must remember that even long after 1944, the Communist Party was still perceived as being alien to the Romanian people, as some sort of red import shipped to Bucharest from the Kremlin. Presenting the August 23 coup as the work of the people's soul, a soul that had reached self-expression through a feat accomplished by the communists, the party actually was actually working on its self-legitimation. II. 1965 As we have seen, by the end of the fifties the power struggle within the party had come to an end with Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej's victory; although he had not participated in the August 1944 coup, he had nevertheless played an important role in the abdication of the king on December 30, 1947. Dej was, by all means, the big boss when the textbook was written (but not when it was published, as he died in 102

March that year); the historians struggled, therefore, to adjust the 1944 events so that they could include Dej. Until August 13, 1944 (when he escaped), Dej had been in prison: as a consequence, the textbook presents the coup as the grand finale of an arduous antifascist fight, which had involved communists both inside and outside prisons. A favourite political stereotype of the time featured the horrendous Tirgu Jiu prison camp as a sort of communist meeting club, where the reds met, had free sittings and pulled all the political strings of the country. As such, the textbook says that the August 23 coup was the result of a "general plan of action" conceived in prison by Dej and his comrades. Of course, the plan couldn't have been carried out with its chief brain master behind bars: so the party helped him to escape on the dark night of August 12-13, just in time to join the crew which was ready to enter the royal palace, greet the king and treat Antonescu with a pair of rusty handcuffs. As further compulsory stereotypes the textbook mentions the Workers Unity Front (created by the communists) and the great "popular enthusiasm" stirred by the coup (hardly believable in times of war and, anyhow, a huge strategic mistake, because if it had happened, it would have revealed the whole secret to the Germans). These minor details did not bother the authors at all, as 1960-64 was a period of controlled mass enthusiasm in Romania. Accordingly, the coup was presented as an outburst of popular happiness and joy: who cared that the Germans wouldn't have stomached it in the middle of their desperate fight? The textbook also pictures Dej talking to the workers at a meeting held on August 30, 1944. A few years later, as seen in another picture, the speaker was Nicolae Ceausescu, sided by his gracious wife, Elena. III. 1971 The authors, Constantin Daicoviciu, Miron Constantinescu and atefan Pascu guaranteed the utmost official status of the textbooks: all of them were members of the Academy and high ranked professors and political officials at different universities. The textbook presents the coup as an "armed, national and antifascist insurrection" and as a "popular revolution", led - of course - by the communists alone. The books insists on the diversity of the social dissatisfaction which had led to the coup: the workers were oppressed, the peasants suffered requisitions, the intellectuals were "hurt by the Germans" (?) and even the factory owners were dissatisfied with their lives, seeing how their economic interests had been undermined by the Germans. The textbooks goes beyond the commonly admitted social classes (workers, peasants and intellectuals), pointing out that the army advocated mainly anti-German feelings and that even the Germans living in Romania hated Hitler, and organized antifascist actions against him. After Gheorghiu-Dej's death (1965), Lucretiu Patrascanu was rehabilitated: accordingly, the textbook mentions his involvement in the events, but says nothing about the armistice negotiations conducted by Antonescu or the opposition (because it would be unfair to suggest that the country's destiny could have been decided elsewhere than within its borders). The book goes on to present the coup as the outcome of massive social protests. It mentions the compulsory Workers' Unity Front and dares to suggest that Marshall Ion Antonescu was actually arrested by the king. Nevertheless, the royal palace and the great historical parties are presented as being rather hesitant and stuck into some sort of traditional mud or inertia; by contrast, the communist party proved to be efficient, determined and energetic. The book suggests, therefore, a combination of political and biological determination, portraying the coup as a struggle between two faces of history: the old and the new. It is worth noting that what we encounter here is a major obsession of the emerging Ceausescu regime, which perceived itself as an ideological front of the young and the restless, ready to wipe away the political reluctance and ideological inertia of the old and the rusty. IV. 1984 In 1984 Romania celebrated the 40th anniversary of the 1944 events: the entire year was dedicated to this celebration, which culminated in a huge mass meeting held in Bucharest on August 22. The denomination of the 1944 events shifted several times during that year: the word "insurrection" had dropped from the vocabulary by the beginning of the year, and the media started to use the term "liberation revolution". In the end, Nicolae Ceausescu consecrated the new title, pointing out with his 103

usual cleverness that the insurrection had been a "revolution of social, national, antifascist and antiimperialist liberation". Ceausescu's propaganda machine and the leader himself made a clear distinction between "insurrection" and "revolution": as Ceausescu put it in an interview taken by Pravda , an insurrection was only a part of a wider social, historical and political revolution. Thus, in his never-ending speech of August 1984 (which no important Western emissary attended), Ceausescu presented the insurrection as the "natural expression of the revolutionary tradition" of the Romanian people, suggesting that the Communist Party had expressed this tradition by leading the insurrection. That's why the keyword of Ceausescu's speech is "national": the war fought beside the Germans against the Russians had been - the leader said - "antinational", and the new government called to replace Ion Antonescu's outrageous dictatorship had also been one of national unity. Building up the revolution, and leading it to its perfection, the Communist Party had acted in a national way suggested the leader -, expressing the feelings not of a people, but of a whole nation. Accordingly, by becoming the political leader of the country, the Communist Party came to reign over the soul, rather than over the will of the people. It becomes easy to notice that the speech disclosed the crass selfsufficiency of a regime that equated ideology with nationalism. Let's finish by getting some smiles out of texts one usually doesn't read In its August 21, 1984 issue the Scinteia quoted some recollections belonging to very old people who had allegedly witnessed the 1944 events. Ion Dobocan, who used to be a worker at that time, recalled that he used his. bicycle to summon up 8,000 people for the insurrection. This frantic and speedy wigwagging throughout a capital jammed with unfriendly German uniforms, war machines and firearms happened on August 23, early in the evening, when "the lights went on. The people burst out into the streets. The joy overwhelmed everyone." The careful journalist and his even more careful political guardian and censor did not realize that since the king's message had been aired at as late as 10:25 p.m., the joy must have had to be postponed. An even funnier detail crops up in another section of the paper. Some journalists working for the paper travelled abroad to interview people living in Budapest about how fatherly the invading Romanian army had behaved, after liberating Transylvania and entering Hungary. The paper quotes among those who expressed their gratitude Mrs. Raiciki Istvn, "who has her house near the old horsetrack" .

104

MIRCEA POPA SCHIMBAREA DE PARADIGMA VEST-EST SAU OCUPATIA SOVIETICA IN CULTURA

The West-East shift of paradigm or the Soviet occupation in culture Abstract: The study is an analisys of the socio-cultural changes implemented in the Romanian society due to the newly emerged influence of the Soviet Union in the beginning of the 20th century. Keywords: Romania; Soviet Union; communism; cultural imperialism; censorship

in a sa Istorie a civilizatiei romane, E. Lovinescu a facut o analiza patrunzatoare a modului in care Romania a adoptat principiile si stilul de viata occidental. "Fortele revolutionare" au constituit-o dupa parerea sa liberalii, adica bonjuristii si tinerii intorsi de la studii din Apus, care s-au simtit datori sa remodeleze tara in raport cu valorile occidentale. Amprenta pusa de Franta asupra acestui proces a fost atat de puternica incat N. I. Apostolescu putea vorbi de un romantism generat de cel francez, iar Pompiliu Eliade putea afirma ca spiritul public din Principate e de sorginte franceza. in ciuda unor valuri succesive de reactii germane (junimismul, de pilda), orientarea noastra spre Franta ramane dominanta si in secolul urmator, al XX-lea. Realizarea statului roman unitar la 1 Decembrie 1918 a permis integrarea rapida si in toate compartimentele a Romaniei in ritmul de evolutie occidental, o sincronizare rapida si spectaculoasa a tarii noastre la pulsul ideilor europene, in care Franta nu mai detine monopolul. Dominatia tutelara a Vestului devine de acum totala, asigurand insa nu o ingenunchiere culturala a tarii, ci un vast sistem de vase comunicante, prin care cultura si literatura nationala raspund unor comandamente interne provocate de cele externe, gasindu-si spatiul stimulator si germinativ pentru o literatura si cultura proprie, asigurarea cadrului general protector pentru o dezvoltare libera sub toate aspectele. Acest lucru a fost posibil datorita mai multor factori care ar trebui avuti in vedere si pe care ii vom enumera in cele ce urmeaza: o politica europeana de aliante si de readucere in atentia Europei a tarilor mici si mijlocii care joaca in cadrul Natiunilor Unite un rol din ce in ce mai important (vezi reputatia internationala de care se bucura Titulescu) o moneda puternica, convertibila in aur, care asigura buna functionare a mecanismelor statale si o circulatie libera si eficienta a populatiei tarii in spatiul european prezenta unor institutii culturale si stiintifice de mare valoare (universitati, teatre, filarmonici, institute de cercetare, etc.), organizate dupa model european si la nivel european care asigura permanenta legatura cu institutiile similare din lume; existenta unei elite intelectuale de valoare, formata in mare parte in Apus, care a adus cu ea si aplicat in tara ultimele descoperiri si rezultate din domeniul stiintelor si artelor (vezi succesul international al lui Enescu, Brancusi, Tzara, Panait Istrati, Petre Neagoe, etc.) un invatamant national de buna calitate, competitiv si angajant, dotat cu cadre didactice de mare valoare (68 de universitari clujeni in 1930 si-au facut studiile la mari universitati europene); prezenta in tara a unor institutii culturale straine care au facut posibila intensificarea raporturilor cu tara de origine, crearea unui sistem de relatii si schimburi culturale avantajoase, cat si a unor biblioteci straine bine dotate, facilitand accesul la ultimul val de informatie; existenta unui sistem de burse si specializari in strainatate foarte bine pus la punct; prezenta activa in cultura europeana si mondiala a unor valori formate si crescute in Romania, care scriu si se manifesta in alte limbi, intretinand mereu viu cultul pentru spatiile de acasa; 105

prezenta unei aristocratii romanesti in cercurile europene influente si a unei diplomatii rafinate si abile; existenta in tara a unui numar mare de societati de cooperare intelectuala, sau a unor asociatii de prietenie care dezvoltau o rodnica activitate in domeniul relatiilor culturale si literare reciproce. Un rol important pentru deschiderea culturala a tarii noastre il joaca presa. Romania va continua si in perioada interbelica sa duca o politica activa de apropiere literara si culturala fata de principalele literaturi si culturi. in tara noastra exista o retea foarte bine pusa la punct de periodice si reviste culturale ce apar in limba ebraica sau sunt destinate comunitatii israelite din tara; exista reviste armene de literatura (Ararat), reviste poloneze, bulgaresti, grecesti, maghiare, etc. Pentru sud-estul european se infiinteaza in 1938 revista Balcania (1938-45), pentru relatiile cu Anglia este scoasa la Cernauti intre 1938 si 1039 revista Britania, pentru cele cu Italia un rol important il are revista Roma (1921-31), urmata de Studii italiene condusa de Al. Marcu intre 1934-1943, dar si Ausonia (1932-1933) a lui Pimen Constantinescu de la Focsani, sau Favonius (1926-1928), revista de literatura clasica aparuta la Craiova prin straduintele lui N. I. Herescu intre 1926-1928. in domeniul literaturii germane au aparut de-a lungul timpului mai multe reviste in aceasta limba, unele scoase de sasii transilvaneni care au legaturi dintre cele mai trainice cu miscarile literare germane din Apus (vezi Klingsor a lui Zilich de la Brasov), dar cea mai importanta pentru promovarea studiilor reciproce ramane cea initiata de profesorul S. Mandrescu sub numele de Revista germanistilor romani (1932-1938). Cel mai bogat sector al acestor raporturi il constituie insa revistele aparute in limba franceza. in acest domeniu exista o traditie de peste un secol si jumatate, de la L'etoile du Danube a lui Mihail Kogalniceanu la revista lui Ulisse de Marssillac, La voix de Roumanie, aparuta intre 1861-1866, apoi La Roumanie a lui Emile Galli din 1888, La Roumanie (1898-1916) a lui Paul Brataseanu, L'Ere nouvelle (1893-1894) a lui G. Diamandy, L'Orient (1877-1910) a lui Frdric Dam, La revue roumaine (1912-1916) a lui Adolphe Cantacuzene, Revue de Roumanie a lui C. Bacaloglu (1910) precum si a altora efemere, cum ar fi Catulle Mendes (1901), Victor Hugo (1902) sau Ronsard (1938). Cele mai importante publicatii in limba franceza aparute in perioada interbelica sunt insa La Nation, aparut ca un "cotidian politic, economic si literar" intre 23 decembrie 1928 si 20 iunie 1930 si Le Moment (1935-1940), cotidian ilustrat de informatii politice economice si sociale condus de Alfred Hefter. Amandoua aceste cotidiene beneficiaza de corespondenti de cea mai buna calitate, in general straini, si de o larga gama de colaboratori de prima mana, care scriu aici articole ce nu vor fi reluate in presa franceza, iar altele reluate dupa reviste si ziare de mare popularitate din Franta, precum Le Figaro, Le temps, Revue Mondiale, Midi etc., intre colaboratorii carora se numara Jean Cocteau sau Paul Hazard. Dintre detinatorii romani de rubrici putem aminti pe Lazar Iliescu (Viata politica), Ionel Jianu, Dan Botta si Clarnet la cronica literara, artistica si teatrala pe C. Brailoiu la "cronica muzicala", la care semneaza adesea si Cella Delavrancea, etc. Ziarul traduce mult din limba romana, popularizind literatura lui Eminescu, Caragiale, Delavrancea, Victor Eftimiu, Adrian Maniu, Tudor Arghezi, Lucian Blaga, Ionel Teodoreanu, Ion Barbu, Ion Vinea, George Bacovia, Mircea Eliade, etc. Realitatea straina este bine reprezentata prin cronici la carti nou aparute sau la spectacole de succes, tinand mereu cititorul roman la curent cu ceea ce se intampla in Apus. Acelasi lucru il face si ziarul Le Moment, care ne aduce adeseori in prim plan noutati din Franta, Belgia, Suedia, Cehia, Statele Unite, Croatia, si inainte de toate, cu noutati din domeniul literaturii si al culturii, multe din relatari fiind trimise de corespondenti speciali aflati la fata locului. De altfel, cu astfel, de relatari, ne vor obisnui si principalele reviste literare din Romania, care vor detine rubrici speciale din "Scrisori din..", cum ar fi Viata Romaneasca, Adevarul literar si artistic, Vremea, Revista Fundatiilor Regale, foarte multi dintre scriitorii nostri importanti fiind autori de astfel de informatii. Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran, Mihail Ralea, D. I. Suchianu, D. D. Rosca, Traian Chelariu, Al. Busuioceanu, Eugen Ionescu, Virgil Ierunca, Mihail Sebastian, Nichifor Crainic, Oscar Walter Cisek, etc. Apoi, majoritatea marilor noastre reviste detin rubrici speciale de Revista revistelor straine, unde sunt discutate si comentate principalele luari de cuvant straine, se trec in revista marile evenimente literare, aparitiile de succes din Apus, premiile literare obtinute de scriitori, congresele Pen-Clubului european, dandu-se totodata numeroase traduceri din cei mai importanti scriitori straini in voga sau intrati deja in patrimoniul universal. Unele dintre revistele noastre se bucura de o popularitate neindoielnica peste hotare cum ar fi Contimporanul, revista de avangarda, recenzata in reviste 106

maghiare, austriece, italiene, germane, franceze, sau Gandirea de la Cluj, mult laudata in unele cercuri scriitoricesti din tarile Europei centrale si nu numai. Astfel, in 1930, Nichifor Crainic insereaza la "Cronica marunta" a revistei opinia lui Hugo von Hoffmannsthal care s-ar fi rostit despre ea in termenii urmatori: "Noi scriitorii germani am fi mandri sa avem o revista literara ca a voastra. O comparatie cu La nouvelle revue franaise sau cu corespondenta ei de peste Rin Die Neue Rundschau e in avantajul Gandirii." E de remarcat ca pana tarziu in timpul razboiului al doilea mondial, cronicari literari de mare probitate ca Nicolae Steinhardt sau Virgil Ierunca dar si Octav aulutiu, Mihail Sebastian, Anton Holban scriu despre ultimele noutati din literatura franceza; George Mirea, Mirela Coanda, Al. Marcu. Claudiu Isopescu, Pimen Constantinescu scriu despre realitati italiene sau altii (atefan Baciu, Traian Chelariu, V. Horia) despre cele germane. Se poate afirma chiar ca in perioada 1940-1945 se inmultesc numarul prezentelor germane si italiene in paginile unor reviste si ziare cu orientare de dreapta, dar nu e mai putin adevarat ca altele, dimpotriva, pastreaza mereu viu interesul pentru realitatile literare franceze, engleze, americane, traducerile din aceste literaturi inmultindu-se simtitor (vezi Mihail Sebastian Nota despre literatura engleza in Romania). Secretarul ambasadei Statelor Unite in Romania pune chiar problemele traducerii si difuzarii operei dramaturgului american Eugen O'Neill printre argumentele ce vor trage in cumpana la masa tratativelor de pace, dupa cum declara Nicolae Margineanu ca ar fi spus intr-o convorbire. Realitatea e ca sub raport editorial, al traducerilor si editarilor de carte, Romania ramane unul dintre statele din centrul si sud-estul Europei cu cel mai ridicat consum de carte occidentala, procurata direct din librariile franceze in original. Nu exista scriitor strain mai important care sa nu fi fost tradus la noi in aceasta perioada, dupa cum nu exista scriitor german, englez, italian sau austriac care sa nu fi intrat in raza de atentie a oamenilor nostri de litere. Cand se va realiza o statistica a ceea ce s-a tradus la noi in materie de literatura se va vedea ca Romania sta pe unul dintre primele locuri in aceasta perioada si ca majoritatea traducerilor nu se mai fac prin intermediar ci se realizeaza direct din original. E de la sine inteles ce mare lovitura si ce crunta dezamagire a fost pentru intelectualul roman schimbarea paradigmei culturale vestice cu cea Estica, prin intrarea brusca a Romaniei sub raza de influenta sovietica de dupa cel de al doilea razboi mondial. Putine voci care mai invoca literatura Vestului european in a doua jumatate a anului 1944 aproape ca inceteaza la inceputul anului 1945, cand delatiunea, frica, amenintarea incep sa pluteasca tot mai mult asupra elitelor romane, ziua rafuielilor, a lichidarii conturilor anuntandu-se de la o saptamana la alta tot mai sumbra. Mai intai sunt acuzati de colaborationism o serie de scriitori, apoi de rataciri ideologice si de pactizare cu fascismul german, ceea ce creeaza panica si deruta in randul scriitorilor, care de teama represaliilor se inregimenteaza masiv in randurile PCR sau raspund unor comenzi politice imediate, scriind cu frenezie despre traduceri din literatura sovietica, indiferent daca acestea au anumite calitati sau sunt simpla maculatura. Se creeaza indata un nou contingent de scriitori, gata sa-si insuseasca repede si in chip radical lectia noii literaturi promovata de ideologi perfizi si amenintatori aparuti peste noapte in coloanele unor ziare ale propagandei de partid (Walter Roman, Iosiv Chisinevschi, Lotar Radaceanu, Silviu Brucan, Mihai Moraru, Mihai Novicov, C. I. Parhon, ultimul scriind despre "Vina intelectualilor" in ziarul Victoria, etc.) care, in dorinta de parvenire si glorie ii vor defaima pe cei dinaintea lor (vezi cuvintele aspre scrise de Ion Caraion la adresa lui Rebreanu, cele ale lui Oscar Lemnaru la adresa lui Mircea Eliade, etc.), astfel incat in curand scena literara va fi dominata de o literatura total aservita ideologiei comuniste. in librarii edituri si biblioteci epurarea cartii vechi este radicala. Cartile apartinand literaturii apusene sunt considerate nocive, periculoase, purtind in ele morbul descompunerii si al degradarii, viciul sistemului de viata capitalist, care trebuia combatut si repudiat. Numeroase biblioteci particulare sau publice sunt arse, zeci si mii de carti sunt aruncate la gunoi, transportate in pivnite si beciuri intunecoase, unora dintre cele mai importante arhive li se dau foc (cazul arhivei mitropoliei din Blaj in 1948). De teama de a nu fi acuzati si inchisi, multi intelectuali renunta de buna voie la cartile din bibliotecile lor, care iau drumul anticarelor sau al sobelor de incalzit. Acelasi lucru se intampla cu corespondenta unor importanti scriitori si oameni de cultura, care este fie confiscata si arsa de catre securistii zelosi cu ocazia perchezitiilor sau a arestarilor inopinate, fie distruse cu buna stiinta (mai ales ca toti proprietarii sunt deposedati atat de locuinte cat si de 107

intregul lor avut). Un fum gros de carte straina plutea peste orizontul oraselor iar cenusa marilor clasici ai lumii se aduna tot mai mult in stive. Nimic nu mai poate sta impotriva colosului sovietic care ar vrea sa faca una cu pamantul orice ramasita de arta burgheza de manifestare a identitatii nationale, rupand orice legatura intre noi si Basarabia si Bucovina, spre a pune in loc doar literatura proletara. in 1948 se tipareste brosura Publicatii interzise pana la 1 mai 1948, care ofera, pe 500 de pagini, suficiente elemente pentru o epurare totala. Cele mai vechi si mai renumite reviste literare romanesti fusesera sistate, astfel incat nici vorba ca ecoul unor lecturi din cartile straine sa mai razbata in paginile lor. Ia nastere in schimb editura Cartea Rusa si o puzderie de autori necunoscuti, schematici si tendentiosi isi fac aparitia pe tarabele pietelor, librariilor, universitatilor populare. Va fi aproape singura literatura ce se va mai putea citi in tara si generatii intregi de copii, elevi, sau studenti vor fi indoctrinati pana la refuz cu acest tip de literatura a omului nou. Marii nostri scriitori trecuti de partea baricadei ii vor veni in intampinare putandu-se citi tot mai des in ziarele vremii articole ca acestea: Lenin si literatura (G. Calinescu), Izvor nesecat de inspiratie (Camil Petrescu), Cartea sovietica in lupta pentu pace (Cezar Petrescu), Importanta mondiala a literaturii sovietice (Mihail Sadoveanu), Pilda creatoare a teatrului sovietic (Zaharia Stancu), Am vazut cu ochii mei, am pipait cu degetele mele (T. Arghezi), ca sa nu mai vorbim de altele de acest tip: Literatura sovietica mijloc de transformare a lumii (D. Corbea) Succesele stralucite ale literaturii sovietice (Tamara Gane), Pentru literatura vietii noi (Mihai Novicov), Literatura sovietica, farul luminos al literaturii progresiste din intreaga lume (Domnica Filimon), etc. Mai trist e ca aproape intreaga productie de carte este orientata exclusiv spre cartea sovietica. Oricine cerceteaza revistele vremii nu va gasi in ele decat recenzii si cronici la cele mai insipide carti sovietice, dupa cum cataloagele de carte abunda in mii de traduceri care imbacsesc mintile copiilor si adolescentilor dornici de lectura si care nu pot primi ca hrana spirituala decat cele prescrise de ideologul sovietic sau de politruc-culturnicul roman. Spre a ne edifica asupra literaturii din acest timp voi da citire unor pasaje dintr-o prefata a Tamarei Gane la Bibliografia Literatura rusa si sovietica in limba romana, realizata de Filip Roman si publicata in 1959, unde se spune: "incepand din 1944, odata cu infintarea editurii Cartea Rusa, ca organ al Asociatiei Romane pentru legaturile cu Uniunea Sovietica - ARLUS si pana aproximativ in 1949-1950, este o etapa de mare anvergura, de elan editorial, care trebuia sa satisfaca setea de cunoastere a experientei si realizarilor din tara prietena si eliberatoare, ani de-a randul invaluita in mister de catre cei care in mod deliberat lansasera faimoasa formula a pretinsului "mister sovietic". Aceasta sete a maselor din ce in ce mai largi de cititori trebuia satisfacuta operativ si pe toate diametrele de profiluri si preocupari. Se traduce si se publica in acei ani de catre Editura Cartea Rusa cu aceeasi intensitate, literatura beletristica de actualitate ca si cea consacrata Revolutiei sau Marelui Razboi pentru Apararea Patriei, romane voluminoase ca si brosuri de popularizare, lucrari de informatie si documentare ca si cele de teorie a artei sau literatura pentru copii (pana la infiintarea editurii Tineretului), fara un anumit criteriu preferential, fara un profil tematic bine definit. Cele mai valoroase opere, de importanta capitala, insa n-au fost omise. Asa, dintr-o scurta privire asupra traducerilor tiparite in anii trecuti, putem spicui cateva titluri care deschid larg portile literaturii sovietice la noi. incepand din anul 1944 se fac cunoscute opere ca Neinfrantii de D. Gorbatov, acoala urii si Pentru patrie de M. aolohov, Dragoste simpla de V. Vasilevskaia, Apararea Moscovei de K. Simonov, precum si multe altele. La aceasta succinta enumerare trebuiesc adaugate si primele lucrari traduse in romaneste si tiparite la Editura de limbi straine din Moscova, ca fiind cei dintai soli ai literaturii sovietice datand inca din 1944; Lagarul nimicirii - culegere de schite si reportaje de K. Simonov si piesa Invazia de Leonid Leonov, aceasta din urma fiind publicata intr-o noua versiune de Cartea Rusa in 1952. [.] in urmatorii 5-6 ani (1949-1954), tematica traducerilor din literatura sovietica va fi profilata dupa colectii. Pe langa operele capitale cu teme istorice sau de actualitate apar colectiile Literatura pentru copii, atiinta pentru toti, Lectura, Colectia satului, Colectia cultura generala, Biblioteca pentru toti, Colectia ARLUS. De asemenea nu suporta nici un termen de comparatie problema tirajelor, a caror medie in perioada dintre cele doua razboaie mondiale nu depaseste 15000 exemplare pe tiraj. Daca o carte atingea intr-o singura editie tirajul de 2000 exemplare, faptul era consemnat ca un insemnat eveniment in publicitatea literara. Astazi tirajul mediu la o carte sovietica este de cca 15000 exemplare, fara a mai vorbi de cartile de 108

larga circulatie sau de valoare consacrata ca Mama, Pamant destelenit, Pe Donul linistit, Asa s-a calit otelul, Tanara garda, intamplarile unui partizan si multe altele care au aparut in prezent in 6 pana la 8 editii fiecare numarand un tiraj de 30- 40000 exemplare per editie". in continuare autoarea ofera cateva exemple de modul cum a penetrat literatura sovietica la noi, insotindu-le cu elocvente date comparative. Nu e vorba atat de scrisul unor clasici ca Lev Tolstoi cu 40 de titluri, intr-un tiraj de 500000 exemplare, de Gorki, 65 titluri, intr-un tiraj de cca 800000 exemplare; de Cehov cu 35 titluri intr-un tiraj de 350000 exemplare, de aolohov, cu un tiraj de 500000 exemplare (Pamant destelenit - 196000 exemplare), Ilya Ehrenburg cu 380000 exemplare, de Alexei Tolstoi cu 100000 exemplare, de Maiakovski - 185000 exemplare, ci de autori de duzina ce ating uneori tiraje impresionante. Cifrele sunt si mai concludente atunci cand se are in vedere bilantul general. Aflam ca timp de 15 ani Cartea Rusa a editat 1691 titluri, cu un tiraj global de 19073700 exemplare, la care, daca se adauga editiile de la Editura Tineretului (786 titluri intr-un tiraj de 11060000 exemplare) si de la ESPLA, se obtine o cifra totala de peste 2500 titluri si un tiraj de 30000000 exemplare. Ce denota aceste date? Ca literatura romana a fost complet infeudata celei sovietice, al carei regim de ocupatie s-a resimtit pana tarziu in mintile unor intregi generatii a caror gandire a fost puternic influentata de lecturile lor din tinerete, pervertind gustul si formatia celor care au fost obligati sa suporte acest proces de mankurtizare, de pierdere a constiintei nationale si a unei reale scari de valori. Toate generatiile noastre postbelice care se mai afla inca in viata au fost puternic marcate de aceasta nefasta influenta care le-a siluit personalitatea si le-a deformat caracterul. Trist a fost ca in comparatie cu tirajele exorbitante ale acestei literaturi, literaturile straine erau reprezentate printr-un numar infirm de titluri si acelea in marea lor majoritate apartinand perioadei clasice si nu contemporane, lipsind astfel generatii intregi de un contact util si fertil cu gandirea creatoare a marilor literaturi apusene puse cu buna stiinta la index. Un studiu comparativ al situatiei se poate lesne intreprinde prin urmarirea apoi a cataloagelor editoriale care ne ofera o imagine dintre cele mai dezolante. in acelasi timp, ofensiva sovietica se manifesta si altfel: prin numarul volumelor de carte achizitionata in URSS, deci carte aparuta in limba rusa, care intrece de zeci de mii de ori cartea straina achizitionata, redusa in general la cateva titluri (4 engleze, 2 germane, 2 italiene, 14 franceze, 3 iberice, 4 grecesti) in timp ce volumele cu titlul "Cartea sovietica" in Biblioteca Academiei RSR contin cifre de-a dreptul naucitoare: cca 4000 de titluri in vol I, 2.114 in volumul II, 2776 in volumul III, 3221 in volumul V, 6693 in volumul VI, ceea ce dovedeste penetrarea acestei carti si in mod direct prin achizitii suportate de statul roman, pentru o carte pe care n-o folosea si n-o citea aproape nimeni din necunoasterea limbii si care decenii de-a randul a blocat toate depozitele bibliotecilor noastre. Ocupatia culturala sovietica a produs si alte neajunsuri: ea a blocat, daca n-a oprit definitiv procesul real de crestere a literaturii noastre, care in faza interbelica atinsese un nivel cu adevarat european, cu nimic mai prejos decat al altor literaturi europene, atat sub raport cantitativ cat si calitativ. A blocat si incetinit ritmul de dezvoltare, sentimentul valorii si al esteticului, lucru de pe urma caruia literatura noastra s-a resimtit pe deplin in anii epocii socialiste si, credem noi, se resimte si acum, deformand gandirea unei intregi generatii proletcultiste si tinand departe tinerele generatii de propria noastra literatura si cultura nationala, de constiinta propriei noastre meniri si valori.

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DANIELA KOLEVA WHAT DO YOU REMEMBER OF 9TH SEPTEMBER 1944? REMEMBERING COMMUNISM: OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL DISCOURSES

Abstract: The article gatheres information on the 9th of September1944 to set up a coherent discourse about the political changes Bulgaria went through at the end of World War II. Keywords: Bulgaria; communism; censorship; World War II

According to a tradition starting from Maurice Halbwachs (1996 [1950], esp. pp. 92-102) history and memory stand in opposition in a number of ways: history is an "objective" and abstract relation to the past, while memory is a personal and intimate relation to it; history follows a cognitive interest in the past, while memory is motivated by a quest for identity or a political will and refers to the "lessons of history", i. e. the uses of history. Memory is thus about the truth of the present, and history - about the reality of the past. While memory is spontaneous, unmediated, actual, history is a reconstruction of what is no longer there. That is why memory is interested in continuity, in how identity is preserved over time, while history gives "a picture of the changes" and accentuates discontinuity. Memory exists where the "warmth of tradition" is still felt, while in our contemporary society it is "sequestered" by history and only "places of memory" are left. Memory being partial in the sense of both incomplete and biased, history has to "enlighten it and help it out of its mistakes"; it has to find and dismantle the power over memory. On the other hand, both being relations to the past, history draws on memory and feeds it in its turn. History and memory retain different segments of experience; they have different modalities of relating to reality (designation and description respectively), different modes of analysis (conceptual in history and based on examples and details - in memory). Accordingly, history and memory achieve different kinds of truth: referential, about facts and intersubjective, about experiences. On the other hand, memory is apologetic, or at least, vulnerable to manipulations, while history is critical; the discourse of memory pertains to sacralization and that of history - to disenchantment. (cf. Halbwachs 1996 [1950], Nora 1997 [1978], Le Goff 1997 [1988], Todorov 1995, Lavabre 1998). In the following I am going to show the play of history and memory in personal recollections of only one historical event: the communist coup d'tat on the 9th of September 1944, which is considered the beginning of the period of state socialism in Bulgaria. The memories were recorded in the course of life-history interviews conducted between 1995 and 1999 with persons above the age of 60, whose active life coincided with the period mentioned. Two things struck me about these stories. At the start of the life-history project in 1995, it was expected that memories of important political events and processes would pop up spontaneously in the narratives. However, this was not the case, with two exceptions: WWII in the stories of men who took part in it and the collectivization of the farming land in the stories of persons who had been affected by it. Thus all of the testimonies cited here are answers to the question: What do you remember of 9th September 1944? The other striking thing was the banality of the accounts, which I will try to explain in what follows. First I will review what seem to be three types of accounts and then will compare them with some examples of a normative historical discourse, the one of the school textbooks in history. I. The aftermath of 9th September 1944: loyalty to the plot When asked to tell what they remember of that particular day, a few of the interviewees tell of its aftermath and of the impact it had on their lives, thus following the logic of a "plot" implied by the 110

perceived causal or meaningful connections between the events. Mrs. Doneva's memories are of this kind: "When I was in my second year at the university, the 9th of September came and I was suspended from the university because I had to produce a special certificate [of trustworthiness] issued by the Otechestven Front1. My father was - they called him 'koulak' - a well-to-do land owner and they did not give me such a certificate." After some time, she nevertheless managed to obtain a certificate, not from her place of birth but from the regional centre, with the help of a cousin who worked there. She graduated successfully from the university and her life career developed without any further impediments because of her "koulak" origin. In a similar way Mr. Murad, a Turk born 1915, when asked of the 9th Sept. 1944, told of his activities as secretary of the newly established party organization: "The 9th of September came. I was on my way round the villages, founding the party organization. I was not present at the first meeting - I wasn't at home. But when they [the party functionaries who came from town] founded the party organization, they said [to the villagers]: Look here now, this is something brand new for you. Now you need a party secretary. He may be absent at the moment, but think well. For the village will be in his hands from now on. Think of a sharp-witted man, a smart man..." D. K.: "But that was after the 9th of September, wasn't it?" Mr. M.: "Yes, afterwards." D. K.: "What about the very day? Do you remember it?" Mr. M.: "I do, I do." D. K.: "What happened exactly? Did people understand what was going on?" Mr. M.: "No one understood anything. Anything. At that time it was... the party was in town and here [in the village] the 9th of September was, so to say, normal. The people here didn't take part in the struggle for liberation." It is interesting here to note some details of the speaker's style as well as the "micropolitics" of the interview (i. e. the tacit negotiation of who he was, why he had the right to speak and why I should believe him). First, the contrast between the colloquial style of most of his story, and the last phrase, which is a shortcut for the formula "the struggle for liberation from fascism and capitalism", omnipresent for decades in speeches on official commemorative occasions, as title of textbook sections, etc. In 1995, Mr. Murad does not question if what had been going on in Bulgaria between 1941 and 1944 was precisely that. Although he did not take part himself in "the struggle", by using the shortcut and by putting colloquial expressions in the mouths of the party functionaries, he claims familiarity, even a kind of "intimacy" with it. In addition to the mixture of styles, this aspect of familiarity with the events of September 1944 is reinforced by his readiness to tell of "the very day" although, as it turns out, there is nothing to tell. No mention is ever made of what "the struggle" had been for, which was the party in question and what communism was all about. For Mr. Murad the 9th September 1944 was significant because it marked a change in his life career: he was the one elected party secretary at that first meeting. The chronological displacement in such stories can easily be explained with the so-called telescopic effect of memory - the condensation, merging together of temporally or meaningfully related events. But there is also something more to it. Rather than being just inaccurate, these accounts are very telling of their authors' interests: of how the event immediately affected their lives. Furthermore, they tell of a kind of "cultural code" or cultural consensus as to the meaning of the date 9th September, the establishment and reproduction of which was largely due to official propaganda and historiography. II. Personal recollections referring to public discourses: loyalty to the facts Most of the interviewees stick to (or, at least, begin with) what they have witnessed or felt themselves. Thus, for Mr. Philipov, born 1923, that day was very important; in some respects it determined his future life: "I remember this: my cousin Todor Monov, early on the 9th of September, between 6:30 and 7 in the morning, when I got up, he was standing in the garden and he said: Congratulations, we are already in power. He told me that he had listened to the radio and heard Kimon Gueorgiev's2 address to the Bulgarian people between 6 and 6:30 in the morning. [...] That same day the news spread all over the 111

village. We went to Berkovitsa [the regional centre]. They had already taken the power there. Todor Monov and I came back to our village and began to look for somebody to take the lead and establish the new power in the village and we couldn't find three people to establish the trichlenka [a commitee of three members] to represent the new authority. At last a relative of ours agreed, a second or third cousin, and he became the first mayor of the village after the 9th of September." Thus Mr. Philipov's association with the communist party began, which resulted in a successful administrative career. In an unintended way, his account, like Mr. Murad's story, undermines the officially sanctioned discourse of 9th Sept. as a "revolution", a "mass uprising", where "the whole people" followed the lead of the communist party. Other personal accounts do not seem to claim any relation to the "big" history or to the communist "master narrative". Thus, Mrs. Donkova, 11 years old at the time, remembers her fascination with the tanks and soldiers she had never seen before: "The 9th of September? You know, I didn't know then that it was 9th of September. The weather was warm, it was autumn, I heard everybody say: 'God, let it stop, let the war be over!' - for we were in the war already at that time. [...] I remember I saw a tank for the first time in my life, a tank coming along the road and dust, clouds of dust... and I remember the soldiers - exactly as the ones I've seen so many times since then on movies, photos, everywhere. [...] Can you imagine what it was for me to see a tank stopping in front of us and all the children climbing on, and me too, with a bunch of flowers in my hand. And they opened the top and more young guys came out: in helmets, smiling, laughing. And the gesture, when he took the flowers - he shook them like this and destroyed the bunch [...] I was offended - how can that be, such a good-looking young man and he destroyed my flowers." Mrs. Borissova, born 1932, remembers: "The 9th of September began precisely in the morning. [...] My mother woke us up early in the morning and told us: 'I only want to tell you not to be scared when you look through the window.' And when we looked through the window, we saw 5 or 6 men in drab clothes, standing in front of the police office... but the policemen were no longer there. These are my first memories... That is, I want to say, we just weren't let out in the street, that's why I don't remember. There was, as they say and as was later described, something like a small meeting, a demonstration in the centre [of the town]. I didn't see that. [...] Nothing... at least, I didn't realize. It is now a question, what happened where. I remember the blockades, but that was afterwards." Even when telling of their personal experiences on 9th Sept. 1944, most of the interviewees refer to a more general framework: their testimonies seem to add to some already familiar picture - the one seen "on photos and movies" - or, on the contrary, to contest it ("It is now a question, what happened where"). In each case, striving for loyalty to whatever did happen is demonstrated. But the very definition of "what happened" seems to be a problem: the question is not put at all, implying that what happened is already known and beyond any doubt. Indeed, it had been defined and explained, officially and unequivocally; had taken a stable shape and established a stable presence in people's minds blocking out what was not thus defined and explained. In contrast to this most viable "script" (consisting of both explanations and images), a number of accounts demonstrate loyalty to the "bare" facts and the minute details of personal experience rather than loyalty to the ideologically sanctioned script. They seem to pay attention to the external aspects of the events, rather than to their meaning, or to their "private" meaning rather than to the overall framework. This can also be seen as a tacit refusal to accept the "script", which was most readily available and indeed, used to be officially imposed till recently. The same effect is sometimes achieved with the anecdotal rendering of the stories. For instance, an interviewee remembers that, when he (aged 8 in 1944) heard from his parents that the Red Army was coming, he climbed on the roof of their house to see if the troops were already in view - he was eager to see the tanks - and got "a nice whipping" for that. The disappointment of the 11-year-old girl with the good-looking young soldier who destroyed her flowers also carries a sense of the comic aspect of the situation. Such anecdotal stories can sometimes also be prompted by a desire to debunk the official political myths.

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III. Generalized images instead of recollections: loyalty to the meanings Generalized images instead of personal recollections are by no means infrequent. Mrs. Milanova, born 1923, former partisan, did not even mention her personal situation at that moment: "The 9th of September is what we fought for. Bulgaria was liberated for the second time by the Soviet Army. After the liberation, with the help of the whole Bulgarian people, everybody began to live better - calm and free. The villages in the country transformed, they began to look like towns. Jobs were secured for everyone. And this made people feel secure - medical care was free, education was free as well. We used to live like normal people." In these statements, it seems that the memories worked out years ago and referring one's own life story to the "big" history, have remained intact despite the revision and the re-writing of the latter. Reiterating phrases from old textbooks, recalling previously imposed images, instead of their personal experience, they reproduce the "script" of the ideological constructions. Mrs. Staneva, born 1920, widowed for more than 40 years does not speak in the language of the official communist propaganda, but chooses another "script": "When 9th of September came, they cooked food in cauldrons and everybody went with their bowls to be served and they said: 'So it will be from now on, the land will be cultivated in common, nobody will be in trouble, there will be no rich and poor, no tax-collectors to take away one's cow or sewing machine.' There were many demonstrations, trucks passing with people dressed in national costumes..." The dubious reliability of this story enhances its symbolic quality. The meaning of this naive utopian vision becomes clear only against the backdrop of Mrs. Staneva's story of being forced with her children out of her own house by the local party "apparatchiks": the house was to become a museum of her cousin, a partisan who perished in the eve of 9th September 1944. In a more pathetic style the oppositional version is expressed by Mr. Anguelov, born 1914, formerly an active member of the Agrarian Party and supporter of its right wing, which stood in opposition to the communists in the first years after 1944. His story combines all three modes of telling: "On 9th of September I was at the railway station [bar]. And some communists came (most of them were communists). They wanted wine, they wanted to lynch me - one of them was particularly keen for they wanted me to give them drinks free. [...] I know of 1918, when the proletariat came [to power] in Russia, I remember the events. They uprooted everything, destroyed everything, the tsar's palace, just to come to power. They destroyed everything, all political parties. I kept this in mind. And when 9th September came, I remembered it. [...] As 9th of September 44 came, they carried the equipment out,3 two cousins of mine; they carried everything out, the seed-drill, the reaping machine... They said: In the Soviet Union they sow with airplanes - and then I remembered the events in Russia and I realized that it was going to be hard..." Comparing the 9th September 1944 with the Russian revolution is quite in compliance with the communist "master narrative": however, in the interviewee's assessment it has negative connotations. They are emphasized by another parallel, a tacit one - with the Ku-Klux Klan - suggested by the word "lynch". His pointing at the destruction of "all political parties" in Soviet Russia hints that Mr. Anguelov is talking as a member of a party and not just as a private person. This position seems to entitle him to some generalizations, such as the remark of the collectivization as a consequence of 9th September 1944 and to put his account in the broader framework of violence and repression. Offering propaganda clichs, utopian images and historical generalizations instead of their personal experience, the narrators from this group seem to make statements about their positions, about where they "speak from". Thus they demonstrate more of a loyalty to the meanings than to the facts. One's own memories of them are mediated by the versions of history. A persistent, accepted notion of the event serves as a corrective for the individual's memories. The "pattern", "matrix" has been borrowed from the official discourse or, as in the last case, from an oppositional one, only to be reproduced and, sometimes, to be filled in with the individual's own experiences. Thus individual memory becomes subject to certain rectifications reconciling it with some (more or less) accepted version. The private experience is subject to normalization and a coherence between biographical and historical narrative is ensured. This coherence sanctions the right of the teller to tell. It turns out, however, that one's ability to tell depends on (and is restricted by) the available rhetoric 113

and symbolic devices for the construction of a narrative structure, which could best "represent" the past. As Marsha Siefert has shown, in a totally different context indeed, "style" can hardly be irrelevant to "substance" (Siefert 1989). What is being said is not independent of the way of expressing it. The content is moulded by the rhetoric. Thus "style" works back upon "substance". But if so, then the thesis of the philosophy of science that there is no theory-neutral language, applies to the stories of the 9th September as well. Simply naming it a revolution or a coup d'etat means embedding it in a different narrative and is already taking side in a contest. Symptomatically, no one tries to subsume the event under a category. It is never referred to in any other way but by the date. So the date becomes reified, turns into a separate kind in itself. Mrs. Donkova's remark: "I didn't know then that it was 9th of September", does not mean that she did not know the date; rather, it means that she had no idea of the importance of the event and of the meanings that were to be attached to it later. Mrs. Borissova's statement: "The 9th of September began precisely in the morning", does not refer to the day as a phenomenon of nature, but to the developments she witnessed. On the other hand, in all stories, 9th of September always "came" - as if no one did anything about that, it just "came" with the regularity and imminence of a natural phenomenon or of "the wheel of history"4. This is in conformity with (or, to advance the stronger thesis, could be the result of) one of the primary justifications of the communist rule, legitimizing state socialism on the grounds of its inevitability (see Watson 1994). It is true that in the past decade new meaningful frameworks have been created to accommodate previously dissident memories. In spite of the transformation of the rhetorical environment from that of communism to that of democracy, there seems to be no readily available understandable set of codes, whereby "tacitly dissident experience" can be communicated. As far as the 9th Sept. 1944 is concerned, no new dominant narrative has been worked out yet. Debates started in Bulgarian historiography since the early 1990s as to whether there had been fascism in Bulgaria or not. The answer to this question would be instrumental for the reinterpretation and the reassessment of the "9th Sept. 1944". No consensus seems possible at present.5 The textbooks in history published in the first years after 1989 do not, as a rule, tackle the question at all. The current ones contain a paragraph on the event and its situation, providing more of a chronology and less interpretation. However, the latter is present in the very terms used by the authors. I looked at the four current textbooks in Bulgarian history approved by the Ministry of Education for the last year of secondary school (which means that teachers are free to choose any of them). The one published in 1993 as well as the one published in 1999 do not mention "anti-fascist struggle" at all; the authors use the phrases "communist resistance" and "civil war" respectively. They define the developments on 9 Sept. 1944 as a coup d'tat and stress more explicitly the role of the Soviet army. The two other textbooks, published in 1996, contain sections on the anti-fascist struggle. The authors contend that an armed uprising took place on 8-9 Sept. 1944 and put it in the broader context of the anti-Nazi struggle in WWII.6 The commemoration is also split:7 the sympathizers with the political Left accentuate the anti-Fascist character of "the struggle" and hold meetings in front of the monument to the Soviet Army; those who were repressed in the years of socialism and the descendants of the victims organize memorial services As K. Verdery points out, the socialist production of culture was a self-consciously constructed one, produced more through discourse and language than practice (Verdery 1995, 87-97), so control over the discursive realm and over the rhetoric was fundamental. That is why the production and survival of unsanctioned memories has been problematical. In conclusion: the oral history of 9th Sept. 1944 failed to extract counter-narratives, "hidden transcripts" (Scott) or "evocative transcripts" (Scott's concept adapted to Soviet-type systems by Humphrey 1994, 23) awaiting decoding. They rather proved the absence of shared alternative "scripts": most stories of the event either resort to the old symbolic and rhetoric framework, aided by "photos and movies", by monuments and ritual (though rendered suspect by the changing reality8) or stick to personal memory as more reliable (though partial and "private"). The latter seem to speak "past" rather than "back to" the official idiom. The oral history of 9th Sept. 1944 rendered once again problematic any simplistic conclusions of both the "monopolizing force" of official knowledge and the resources for resistance to it. 114

References: Deyanova, L. (ed.) 1997. The Spirit of Annales. Reader. Sofia: Critique and Humanism (in Bulg.). Halbwachs, M. 1996 [1950]. Mmoire Collective. (Bulgarian edition). Sofia: Critique and Humanism. Humphrey, C. 1994. "Remembering an "Enemy": The Bogd Khaan in Twentieth-Century Mongolia", in Watson 1994. Lavabre, M.-Cl. 1998. "History and Memory: Some Starting Points", Sotsiologicheski Problemi, 1-2, pp. 7-15 (in Bulgarian). Le Goff, J. 1997 [1988]. "Histoire", in id.: Histoire et Mmoire, Paris, Gallimard, pp. 179-186, 194200, 297-325. Bulgarian edition: Deyanova, L. 1997., pp. 100-129. Le Goff, J. 1997 [1988]. "Mmoire", in id.: Histoire et Mmoire, Paris, Gallimard, pp. 163-177. Bulgarian edition: Deyanova, L. 1997., pp. 130-139. Nora, P. 1984. "Entre Mmoire et Histoire", in: Nora, P. (ed.) Les lieux de mmoire. I. La Rpublique. Paris: Gallimard. Nora, P. 1997 [1978]. "Mmoire Collective ", in: La Nouvelle Histoire, Paris, pp. 398-401. Bulgarian edition: Deyanova, L. 1997., pp. 233-237. Siefert, M. 1989. "Style as Substance: Dorson as an Author of Folklore Scholarship", Journal of Folklore Research, 26 (1), January-April, pp. 61-79. Todorov, T. 1995. "La mmoire devant l'histoire", Terrain, 25, septembre, pp. 101-112. Verdery, K. 1995 [1991]. National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania. University of California Press. Watson, R. 1994. "Memory, History and Opposition under State Socialism. An Introduction", in: Watson, R. (ed.), Memory, History and Opposition under State Socialism. School of American Research Press, Santa Fe, New Mexico, pp. 1-20. Notes: 1 Fatherland Front - the anti-fascist coalition, dominated by the Communist party, which overtook the power on the 9th Sept. 1944. 2 Prime Minister in the first government of the Otechestven Front. 3 He refers to his joining the collective, which happened in the late 1940s. Answering to my specific question, Mr. Anguelov acknowledged that the collective was not established in 1944 but later. The exact year he could not remember. 4 "The wheel of history is turning and will be turning until the final victory of communism" - a much quoted sentence from G. Dimitrov's speech at the trial, organized by the Nazis after the Reichstag fire in 1933. 5 The changes and the continuities in post-communist historiography are the focus of the international research project "Historiography in Southeast Europe after the Fall of Communism" funded by the Austrian Ministry of Education, Science and Culture and lead by the Centre for the Study of Balkan Societies and Cultures (CSBSC), University of Graz. The project started in the spring of 2001. My colleague Ivan Elenkov and I are to trace the changes in paradigms, themes, institutions, etc. as well as the current debates in Bulgarian historiography and related disciplines. 6 To the best of my knowledge the textbook published by Prosveta (a publishing house specialized for educational books, the oldest among the four mentioned) is the one most widely used. Colleagues who have a closer look at school education of history tend to explain that with inertia among teachers to rely on the oldest and most established publisher 7 A brief look at several central newspapers from around 9 Sept. 1999 will prove this: Demokratsia, the paper of the then ruling Union of Democratic Forces, only announces the promotion of The Black Book of Communism in Bulgarian; on 12 Sept. the paper publishes a photo of the new monument to the victims of communism in the centre of Sofia with a short note, none of them is on the first page. Douma, the paper of the socialist party (ex-communist): 8 Sept. - whole-page article by historian and member of the Central Committee of the communist party Prof. Ilcho Dimitrov against the "new readings" of the 9th September; 9 Sept. - interview with "the only living participant in the commandment of the people's uprising on the 9th September" and reports of the inauguration of a memorial tablet to Todor Zhivkov (general secretary of the communist party and head of the state for 115

30 years till 1989) in his native town and a monument to Ivan Todorov-Gorunia who "first dared criticize Zhivkov's monocracy", both written in a respectful manner; 10 and 11 Sept. - reports of the commemorative meetings in different places. Two of the biggest dailies, Troud and 24 Chasa, publish photos of the monument to the victims of communism and brief reports of the commemoration in Sofia, bringing forth details of leading politicians' reactions. Under the title The Hero and the Victim 24 chasa puts side by side interviews with a partisan commander and a political prisoner and Troud publishes an article by a leading journalist entitled Uprising, Revolution, Coup d'tat or National Illusion and tracing the different appraisals, and another one by a left historian who argues that an impartial appraisal will be possible in 100 years. 8 That this officially managed imagery was devoid of its original meanings becomes clear from the accounts of the annual commemorations of 9th September: for most people it was an opportunity to visit friends and kin or catch up with domestic work, or simply another day off. A few city dwellers complain of having to take part in the demonstrations; others found it fun to meet colleagues in a different setting or demonstrate their new clothes.

IRINA BADESCU LA TRAHISON DES CLERCS : EDITION REVUE ET AUGMENTEE, 1968

Abstract: The article evaluates the position of the Romanian intellectuals to the communist regime, between May 68 and 1971. Keywords: Romania; communism; clerks; censorship

Un effet de mmoire pour commencer: meme si tout centre a aujourd'hui mauvaise rputation - et ce jusque dans la thmatique qui nous runit ici -, il en faut un a nos propos et je prendrai au hasard celuici. Je me suis longtemps demand, a force de les entendre se rpter tout au long de ma formation, ce que voulaient dire, dans les termes, gnration interrompue et gnration de sacrifice. La premiere de ces expressions tait claire, a tout le moins pour un age de la socit roumaine a l'issue de la seconde guerre: c'est la gnration coupe d'elle-meme et de son pass par la guerre et surtout par le rideau de fer. Pour la deuxieme, la, c'est un peu plus difficile, car l'appellation a t reprise depuis, avec chaque gnration d'age - et il en a pass, hlas! jusqu'a nos jours. Un modele est donc en train de se mettre en place a travers ses rptitions: comme chacun sait, une est aussi, culturellement parlant, une . D'autre part - la part justement rationalise, objectuellement homologue, voire conceptualise par le comparatisme classique, le -, je me suis demand comment pouvaient etre reprsents ces , ou (meme) qui donnent, tres particulierement a notre culture et notre littrature (mais non seulement) l'allure convulsive d'un objet, d'une rfrence chappant sans cesse au discours qui s'en rclame. Comment les donner a voir, les , ces tiquettes, dans/par le discours, au lieu de les laisser vibrer d'une nergie 116

informule, dans la tonalit ou plaintive, ou triomphaliste du mythe ou de l'idologie subitement noyautant le paradigme. Certes, les narratologies de tous bords ont eu raison en partie de ces rsistances, Whitehead l'a dit, ces rsistances ptries d'ethnocentrisme du plus pur et dur au plus clair, en partie, c'est-a-dire sous l'aspect technique d'organisation du discours justement. Si en France, ou ailleurs, ces techniques ont flanqu troitement la pulvrisation de la grande Histoire en petites, ou diverses, voire personnelles, plus rcupres les unes que les autres par leurs cultures et micro-cultures respectives, notre Histoire et par consquent Culture et Littrature redeviennent priodiquement majuscules et c'est parce que la rsistance n'y est pas affaire de discours, mais d'un hors discours dlibrment maintenu comme tel. :Maintenu dans l'incomparable. Je n'ai pas trouv de rponse one to one aux questions que j'ai rappeles. Mais cela m'a amene quand meme a rouvrir le dossier de la composante imitative de la culture roumaine dans le processus de modernisation, plus particulierement par rapport (et quelle que soit la forme de ce rapport) a la France. Les quelques rflexions que je vous propose tournent autour d'un cas plus que chronologique en partie tudi sous l'angle de la mmoire orale1: ici et maintenant, celle de notre groupe et de son dbat. I. Le bon usage de l'imitation, puisqu'il y en a un, meme si l'on s'en rallie sans restrictions ou nuances a la these telle quelle, a ce refrain encourageant ou plaintif insparable de la modernisation roumaine: . Puisqu'il ne faudrait pas non plus en infrer un manque de crativit meme pas d'originalits cratrices. Si modele a imiter il y a, il est tout dans ce que l'on en fait, dans son mode d'intgration - et c'est la un lieu commun dans l'anthropologie ou la littrature. Pour ce qui est du modele franais - que j'ai propos ailleurs2 d'envisager, dans sa dure roumaine, peut-etre balkanique, bien plus comme un modele de civilisation des mours que de pense ou d'action - il est certain que sa teneur consiste en ce qu'il a t peru comme un modele d'apprentissage. C'est dire que dans les acceptations inconditionnelles - de Heliade, Alecsandri a Pompiliu Eliade et aux manuels en cours dans les lyces roumains de l'entre-deux guerres - comme" dans les rejets des - a Mircea Eliade en passant par Blaga ce modele conserve toute son efficacit dans trois de ses composantes majeures: le caractere de au sens strict, l'impact sur le style de vie et la prsence d'une instance monitrice. Autant dire, sans entrer dans le dtail, qu'il y a la-dedans une large part d'laboration fictionnelle qui ne saurait se passer d'un agent porteur personnalis, fut-il celui-ci, personnage, auteur, en vogue ou rpertori, personnalit mythifie ou autre. Principal point d'ancrage de ce modele: l'utopie centraliste avec sa souche dans les Lumieres, mais remodele sur (formule d'ailleurs attribue a Louis XIV), les incontournables classiques, ayant pour lieu de prestige le Paris balzacien ou impressionniste ou etc. Je ne voudrais pas m'attarder sur les reprsentations qui peuplent ce modele; il suffirait d'ajouter qu'il a t explor dans sa seule composante livresque, particulierement littraire (lire-traduire surtout). On est surpris de voir encore dans le Jurnalul fericirii de N. Steinhardt, par exemple, a quel point la rfrence aux des civilits de l'Ancien Rgime se retrouve a travers des citations ou des franaises. Qu'il comporte, d'une poque, d'un groupe social ou meme d'une rgion roumaine a l'autre, un ordre diffrent de priorits, parmi lesquelles la lecture demeure en tete. Il est, ce modele, relevant pour ce que Huizinga dja appelait ce qui, dans une perspective culturelle et surtout communicationnelle, vide le concept d'imitation - si concept il y a - de son contenu, y compris de ses connotations si ameres pour nous. Des lors la question se dplace: de ce qu'est ce modele (s'il y en a un en soi, ce qui constitue le casse-tete rcurrent du comparatisme, en quelque sorte son ) a ceux qui l'utilisent, l'habitent et pour qui il fait modele. En d'autres termes, plus prcisment pour ce qui est du modele franais en Roumanie, il y a des chances que son efficacit ait t diffrente, a diffrentes poques, selon qu'il a t labor et habit par un groupe ou l'autre, ou - c'est le cas peut-etre de l'entre-deux guerres - par l'ensemble de la socit. Pour avoir longtemps frquent un objet <tranger>, la littrature franaise, plus particulierement le 18e siecle, auquel justement les dbuts de la modernisation roumaine, j'ai constat que, loin de se substituer l'une a l'autre - comme on ouvrirait completement ou fermerait hermtiquement des tiroirs les paradigmes tels que les envisageait la rflexion occidentale, coulissent les uns sur les autres, a des vitesses diffrentes, librant de pans d'histoire, de groupes, de gnrations, pans assortis de leurs idologies plus ou moins manipulatrices selon le rapport au pouvoir. A la limite de ce dplacement, les mentalits, les plus , sous-tendues par une doxa qui reprsente dans l'ensemble le rsiduel de la pense claire, noyau dur des paradigmes de rfrence. Des marginalits par rapport au centre, des illusions de pouvoir par rapport a une volont de pouvoir institue, institutionnalise. Mais nanmoins - et toutes 117

les tudes en anthropologie et histoire culturelle s'accordent la-dessus- entierement oprantes dans le social. localises, topologises de vcu log quelque part, sous l'image dans le pens, contre le pens, ainsi que l'a formul Franois Furet, voire l'image contre le vcu comme l'avait dja vis Lacan etc. Tout un dbat thorique - horribile dictu - peut etre engag la-dessus. Avec, peut-etre, au bout, une ou plusieurs rponses aux questions naives que je me suis poses au dbut. Mais tels que nous nous connaissons il vaut mieux je crois, en ce moment, voquer un cas nous appartenant. Thoriser est mauvais, vive le faire, n'est-ce pas? (a condition, j'ajouterais, que ce faire ne participe pas d'un mythe, lui aussi...) Cdons un moment a la tentation de moraliser l'histoire, qui est, elle, bien franaise. II. Il ne s'agit pas vraiment d'une tude de cas en bonne et due forme, mais d'un rappel, de l'vocation si vous voulez, de ce qu'en seraient les principaux lments. Et que je situerais sous le signe et le sens, toujours actuels et d'une meme force percutante, de La trahison des clercs de Julien Benda par laquelle se dsigne aussi le groupe social vis. Le , moment vnementiel commun France-Roumanie, a quelques mois pres, reprsentation quasi-emblmatique d'une synchronie que l'on n'esprait - et n'espere - presque plus soustraire du mythe de l'entre-deux guerres. Il y a meme une sorte de sursymbolisation du moment, plus interculturel que nature si on peut le dire (franco-roumain et bonheur! vice-versa), par la prsence du gnral de Gaulle en mai a Bucarest (visite justement abrge parce que se prcipitait a Paris) et la reconnaissance occidentale, surtout franaise, en aout, lors de l'invasion de Prague par les troupes sovitiques et satellites, de l' politique de la Roumanie. On sait ce que fut en France mai '68: principalement un changement de paradigme au sens fort, affleurant dans la violence sociale anticonsumriste, surtout dans la citadelle des mandarins, centre-bunker de savoir, mais non seulement. Corollaire - dans la bonne logique foucaldienne - mai '68 a dclench une releve idologique et, par consquent, visant le pouvoir, dans et de la gauche en expansion et durcissement depuis la fin de la guerre. On sait aussi ce qui a suivi cette flambe sociale: la culpabilisation des intellos et la rcupration des marginalits un instant rabattues vers le centre (le cas-limite de CohenBendit) et du pouvoir par le systeme (en termes de socit, par les ), la rcupration du savoir par le mandarinat , les Derrida, Foucauld et compagnie. La perception roumaine immdiate de mai '68 a t tres limite dans le dgel alors vcu intensment. C'tait le d'un petit groupe de trublions, tous des , devenus causeurs par oisivet. . Mais a examiner ce que fut aout '68 du moins pour le groupe correspondant de roumains, on constate deux choses assez surprenantes: des similitudes de structure de l'vnement pour le court terme et une diffrence d'inertie des contenus (institutionnels, de comportements etc.) sur le long terme. Autrement dit, il y a bien eu un modele a imiter, et slectivement, comme je l'ai dit; mais ce modele n'tait plus viable, il ne plus qu'en clopinant au niveau du groupe meme des clercs, surtout pour l'ensemble de la socit. Aout '68, pour le rappeler brievement, c'est le moment maximum du dgel: au bout d'une relaxation intrieure tres apparente, amnistie politique (1964), bien-etre assorti de consumrisme en grande partie imaginaire (grace, entre autres, aux envoys de l'tranger), voyages dans les pays socialistes et meme plus loin, langues trangeres a l'honneur, livres trangers dans les librairies - aujourd'hui encore le bien-etre, chiffr a l'apparence, a l'image, demeure premier: . Bref, si changement il y a eu, c'est non de paradigme au sens strict (), mais d'image politique: image semblable, aussi efficace que le port quasignral de la mini-jupe. La reconnaissance de cette image par l'Occident a fait le reste; et, suite au refus de Ceautescu de participer a l'invasion de la Tchcoslovaquie, il y eut une rue d'entres au Parti (grande majorit d'intellectuels ) et une solidarisation sociale centre: libration contrle, harmonie consensuelle sur le theme de la libert (par rapport a l'URSS, le mauvais Autre) et de la souverainet, mythe homologu de source quarante-huitarde et unioniste (par l'Occident, le bon autre), qui dit mieux? Un moment, donc, ou la socit roumaine s'est vue , transparente a elle-meme, homogene. Mais c'est la, dans la non-transparence interne des clercs par rapport a l'ensemble social qu'intervient la trahison, dans l'ambiguit smantique que peut prendre le terme jusque dans le titre de Benda. Encourags a la fois par la pense de gauche franaise -, de Sartre a Tel Quel - et le Parti - ou l'on n'entrait plus que par - ils se sont vus lites a la franaise de la modernisation de la pense, moteurs du nouveau paradigme; alors qu'ils n'ont fait qu'emboiter le pas a l'ensemble social et, surtout qu'il n'y avait pas de changement de paradigme. Ils se sont en quelque sorte retrouvs par la pense contre cet ensemble dont la cohsion 118

tait au prix de la rsurgence du mythe national; et on sait ce que celui-ci est devenu. L'illusion dura peu pour les clercs: jusqu'aux theses de juillet 1971 ou il tait question justement d'interdire un changement de paradigme. Un plus long dlai pour l'ensemble de la socit dans le gel progressif du bien-etre. Pour simplifier et resymboliser la situation cette fois-ci dans la dissimilitude par rapport au modele, je dirais que mai '68 s'est achev sur le dpart du prsident de Gaulle et du modele dont il tait l'insigne et peut-etre dernier agent. Aout '68 s'est conclu par l'arrive de Ceautescu, porteur d'un autre modele lequel, s'il n'a pas dtruit volontairement le modele franais, l'a relegu dans un tiroir du clerc pig, ghettois, libre aujourd'hui de bien parler, voire de bien crire, bien se tenir chez lui, ou, au mieux, a la tl ou on le voit assez rarement pour qu'il fasse encore personnage. Un peu malade, un peu nvros ou excentrique, s'il a trahi jadis l'histoire, il en a t a son tour trahi. Avec la sienne propre, cela fait beaucoup d'histoires, de proportions diverses, dans le virtuel enjou de l'ordinateur qui, seul, l'entretient, plus nombreuses que les manuels alternatifs, que les fictions littraires - car seuls les mythes nationaux sont en nombre fini. Notes: 1 Voir le volume L'Engagement des intellectuels a l'Est, textes runis par Catherine Durandin, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1995. 2 cf. Le froumqin dans (tous) ses tats, New Europe CollegeYearbook, 1997

SUZANNE TRAVERS & EDWARD KANTERIAN CASTING LIGHT ON THE LONG SHADOW OF ROMANIA'S SECURITATE

Abstract: The article discusses the oppression structures instrumented by the communists' Securitate to manipulate the Romanian society and keep it in submission. Keywords: Romania; communism; censorship; Securitate

More than ten years have passed since the former communist countries of Eastern Europe embarked on the path of democratic transition. This is a difficult process that necessarily involves confrontations with the totalitarian past. In Romania, one of the main legacies of the communist period and a serious obstacle to democratization has been the shadowy presence of the former secret police, which has continued to play a role in the nation's politics and economy. Only recently have attempts to confront this legacy and the role of the secret police borne legal and institutional fruit. A council and law have been established to open secret police files and to prevent former Securitate members from holding political office. Though the country's recent elections revealed the extent to which Romania is still governed by forces with close ties to the old regime, they also indicated progress in excising the Securitate's powerful and damaging influence. In addressing the legacy of its secret police, Romania faces questions that arise for any society that has been through war or dictatorship as it attempts to find truth and forge reconciliation. When Romanian protesters took to the streets in December 1989, overthrowing dictator Nicolae 119

Ceausescu in the bloodiest of Eastern Europe's revolts against communist rule, included among the targets of popular loathing - poverty, communism, Ceausescu and his wife, Elena - was the Securitate, the Romanian secret service that had acted as a political police force under the dictatorship. Like the Stasi and the KGB, its counterparts in East Germany and the Soviet Union, the Securitate terrorized suspected opponents of the regime, using a network of informants and collaborators to foster internalized repression and social mistrust. Founded in 1948 with the aim of 'guaranteeing the achievement of democracy and the security of the People's Republic of Romania,' in practice the Securitate wiped out Romania's civil society after World War II, killing or deporting an unknown number of victims, estimated at between 200,000 and 1 million. By the time Ceausescu came to power in 1965, the Securitate had quelled outright opposition to the regime. Under his rule then, the secret service engaged in more subtle repression: widespread censorship, the monitoring and harassment of dissidents, the fomenting of fear, paranoia and mutual suspicion- all aimed at perpetuating its frightening image in the minds of Romanians and keeping them quiet and obedient - in short, to maintain despotic control. Ceausescu was of course executed in the revolution, but eleven years later, the Securitate remains a persistent presence in Romanian life, impeding progress towards democracy by maintaining a controlling hand in the nation's economic and political system. Despite its formal abolition in 1989, many of the organization's employees were quickly put under the charge of the army and then reconstituted as a successor agency, the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI). Thus, the Securitate has continued to function, proving itself adaptable in structure and resistant to attempts to reform it. Just one indicator of the Securitate's ongoing influence on present-day Romania has been the country's difficulty in obtaining NATO membership. The U.S. government has issued repeated requests for Romania to withdraw former Securitate members from the SRI, concerned about the ongoing ties between ex-Securitate and Russia's KGB. James B. Steinberg, accompanying former President Clinton on his visit to Romania in 1997 as deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs, told local journalists "the Romanian secret service is full of ex-Securitate officers whom we cannot offer access to NATO's secrets." Such exclusion from NATO has economic consequences for Romania, as membership in the organization would undoubtedly attract more Western investors to a country badly in need of foreign capital. But the Securitate's ongoing legacy poses serious problems within Romania as well. Former Securitate officers have remained visible in government and military posts, while others received 'first dibs' in the privatization of state-run enterprises or have benefited from illicit activity on the so-called 'gray market;' in 1994-95, for example, along with the Ministry of Transport, members of the SRI broke the embargo on oil trade with the former Yugoslavia at great profit to themselves. As then-president Constantinescu put it in November 2000, "The huge wealth accumulated illegally in the last 10 years, and especially in the first six years after the revolution, is not only related to the dramatic impoverishment of the population, but also with Romania's disqualification as a state of right and order." Former and current secret police members were involved in the crash of several financial institutions, including last year's FNI (National Investment Fund) debacle in which 190,000 private investors lost their savings. Government investigators found that most FNI board members were former Securitate or current SRI members, and that they had embezzled huge sums from the fund. Says Horia-Roman Patapievici, a prominent Romanian political analyst, 'Before 1989 Romania was massively infiltrated and continuously monitored by the Securitate's people. After 1989, this 'advantage' was aptly transformed [with the help of President Iliescu and his aides] into an almost total economic control over society and politics. The Securitate officers do not monitor us anymore; they have become 'privatized' and 'democrats' and they hold our harness.' In July, frustrated by his government's failure to achieve much-needed economic reform, efforts that were blocked by old school communists and ex-Securitate members now working in the PDSR (Social Democracy Party) and PRM (Greater Romania Party) parties or in the economy, President Constantinescu announced he would not seek re-election in formal protest against such widespread corruption and the Securitate's powerful influence. The outcome of those elections, held late last year, featured the revival of political forces that can be traced back to the Ceausescu period, as 65% of the vote was cast for candidates with direct ties to 120

communist rule and the Securitate. These included, for one, Vadim Tudor of the Greater Romania Party, an extreme nationalist candidate who served as Ceausescu's court poet and editor of Saptamina, an infamous weekly magazine and unofficial organ of the Securitate that published excerpts from the security service's archives with the purpose of defaming Ceausescu's enemies. Tudor surprised observers by capturing 27% of the vote in the election, sparking the need for a run-off. Several highranking members of the PRM are also former Securitate or SRI members. The eventual winner of the presidential race, Social Democracy Party candidate Ion Iliescu, is also closely linked to former communist rule. From 1974 to 1979, as a high-ranking communist official, Iliescu directly supervised, among others, a local Securitate department. Iliescu has been president before - he came to power during the December 1989 revolt against Ceausescu after being backed by a faction of the Securitate no longer in support of the dictator. In early 1990 he was then elected and served as president from 1990 to 1996. Though these days Iliescu paints himself as a democrat's democrat, many Romanians remember the Securitate-backed intimidation of opposition parties and opposition figures that occurred during Iliescu's first presidency, in particular several coal miners' marches that occurred in 1990 and 1991. On those occasions, Iliescu rallied the miners, who were also infiltrated by the Securitate, to march to Bucharest where they attacked protesting students and devastated the headquarters of the democratic opposition. This return to the past notwithstanding, some elements of the election did represent progress for the development of democratic practice in Romania and contained seeds for challenging the legacy of the Securitate. In spite of its failures at economic reform, Constantinescu's outgoing government can point to a few achievements, among them the establishment of the CNSAS (State Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives). Under a 1999 law this state council is charged with investigating the Securitate archives for evidence that current candidates for political office collaborated with the former secret police. In the weeks leading up to the elections, this council found that 38 candidates had ties to the Securitate; they were consequently asked by their parties to withdraw from their respective races. The law opening the Securitate archives and establishing a council to administer them is significant because it offers one way for Romania to address the Securitate's ongoing presence in its political life. Addressing this presence means both confronting in a critical way the state's totalitarian past and striving to keep persons with formal links to the Securitate out of current politics. The implied justification for this condemnation is as follows: post-1989 Romania was founded on a revolt against pre-1989 Romania, and as such, the new state was conceived of as democratic and constitutional, in explicit opposition to communist and totalitarian rule. The institutions of the Ceausescu era, in particular the Securitate as well as its members and collaborators, are therefore considered 'unconstitutional' in the sense that they belonged to an undemocratic regime. Other former communist countries such as Czech Republic and Hungary passed similar laws, known as lustration, as part of their transitions to democratic rule. These laws, though varied, generally enable the screening of political candidates, restricting persons who held certain positions in the communist regime, or who appear in archived records of the secret police as a collaborator or employee, from holding public office. None of these laws, the Romanian included, are concerned with prosecuting individual secret police members or collaborators for crimes they committed under the old regime. Rather, the laws aim to keep these persons out of current democratic politics, thereby diminishing their caustic influence on present-day political life. The Czech and Hungarian laws, as well as that of the former German Democratic Republic, were passed within a few years of those countries' overthrow of communist rule. Yet despite the fact that the Securitate had been one of the most powerful and repressive secret services' in the region, in Romania laws forming the CNSAS state council were only passed in December 1999, and then with difficulty. A version of the lustrace law was proposed as early as 1990 by George Serban, then serving in Parliament as a member of the Democratic Party -- under that bill, any person found to have been involved with the Securitate would have been prohibited from holding public office. At the time, the newly elected President Iliescu and his parliamentary supporters from the National Salvation Front rejected the law outright, showing no interest in opening the archives nor in cleansing the country's political life of the Securitate. Instead, Iliescu formed the SRI, allowing over 60% of former Securitate members to join the new service. Iliescu also named former Securitate head Virgil Magureanu, his 121

anti-Ceausescu ally, as SRI chief. Between 1990 and 1996, the government made no efforts to open the archives or address the Securitate past, apart from the publication of selected Securitate protocols. These were contained in five books that detailed, among other things, the pre-1989 monitoring of some writers and intellectuals; they contained no information about secret police terror or its perpetrators and did nothing to identify former Securitate officers. On the contrary, the books tried to justify the existence of the communist state and the Securitate as having served 'the nation's interests.' When aerban again put forth a lustrace law in 1996, still under Iliescu's presidency, the law was overshadowed by Romania's increasing economic woes, received little attention, and was again rejected in parliament. In 1997, however, after Constantinescu's election, a former dissident and member of the Peasant's Party, Ticu Dumitrescu, proposed a new lustration law that would not only open individual citizens' personal files, but would also publish the names of all Securitate collaborators and forbid all former Securitate members access to official government positions. Only in the former German Democratic Republic were citizens given such access to their own secret police files. Hearings on the law began that year but were slowed by the refusal of members of some parties to show up at these meetings. Opponents indicated that the proposed law was too strict, perhaps fearing the effects of its application on their own political careers, but also predicting turmoil and upheaval at such digging through the past. During the course of the debate, Dumitrescu's proposal was changed and the power and scope of the law was weakened. Though citizens' personal files would be opened upon individual request, the files of current secret service officers were to be kept closed for thirty years, thereby protecting the large number of ex-Securitate members who continued to serve in the SRI. In this gutted form, the law passed in 1999, provoking its proposer Dumitrescu to call it 'the law of covering up the Securitate,' not 'of uncovering it.' As passed, the law does allow the CNSAS council to make public the names of the former employees or informants of the Securitate, especially if those persons play a current political role or are running for office. The council is also allowed to decide whether certain activities described in a particular document constituted collaboration with the Securitate, and is committed to entering information from the archives into the congressional record of the Romanian parliament. Rather than barring those with Securitate ties from holding political office, the law leaves it to political parties and, ultimately, to voters, to decide these persons' political fates. It is for this reason that CNSAS director Gheorghe Onisoru calls it, somewhat defensively, 'a moral law.' Importantly, the law also provides provisions for appeal by individuals who dispute the council's charges against them and outlines their rights in their defense. This means that the law can also be used to defend candidates from false allegations of Securitate ties by proving their innocence. In the recent national elections, many of the 38 candidates whose names surfaced in the archives either resigned their candidacies voluntarily or were asked to do so by their parties, suggesting that the information contained in the archives has had some success in serving the law's intended mission. Still, fulfilling the law's mandate and developing the CNSAS council have so far been difficult, sometimes cumbersome processes. Though the council is the legal owner of the Securitate archives (as well as of the files of the former military, justice department, and communist party), much of this classified material remains in the possession of the SRI, which has proved reluctant to give it up. This is little wonder, given the basic conflict of interest that arises from the CNSAS' objective of identifying ex-Securitate members, and the heavy composition of ex-Securitate members in the SRI's membership. Last June CNSAS issued an official complaint about the SRI that claimed the service was not only denying access to important files, but also altering certain files before handing them over to the council. Files on both the leading presidential candidates, Tudor, and Iliescu, are not available disappeared from the SRI archives in the former case and presumed destroyed in the latter, given the customary periodic destruction of classified files among high-ranking members of the communist party before 1989. Notably, the SRI also has veto power when it believes a file contains information related to current national security, and in those cases has legal authority to retain the files. (The president does have ultimate power to intervene in such cases.) Though the CNSAS recently made the shocking discovery that several ex-Securitate officers are members of the new parliament, the council could not 122

publish their names because they continue to serve as undercover agents for the SRI and national interests would arguably be at stake in exposing them. From a logistical perspective, there are some 35 km of files scattered in institutions across the country, although by the SRI's own estimates as many as 39,000 files seem to have 'disappeared' from the archives soon after the revolution. As in the cases of Tudor and Iliescu, these missing files of course mean that other candidates with Securitate ties may also evade CNSAS investigations. Sufficient funding for the council is also a concern. Initially backed by its board members, who include such reputable intellectuals and former dissidents as Patapievici, poet Mircea Dinescu, and former foreign secretary Andrei Plesu, the CNSAS council now has an annual budget of $2 million. This figure may be compared to the $200 million budget of the Gauck Authority operating in eastern Germany under a similar mandate. (The CNSAS in fact has a partnership with Gauck which entails the transfer of knowledge and computer equipment.) Technically part of Romania's Ministry of the Interior, the CNSAS council will now depend on President Iliescu's government for this small budget. Adequate staffing of the council is an issue as well - the one hundred staff members charged with investigating the archives before the December elections were given just one month of training. Such questions of funding and staffing highlight perhaps the largest obstacle of all, mastering the huge amount of material to be combed through in a relatively short amount of time. To that end, staff members must concern themselves with the problem of how to filter the archives for relevant information and with how to decide what constitutes this category in the first place. That such legal and logistical issues have hampered CNSAS' effectiveness is clear in post-election criticism of the law and the recent case of a newly appointed high-level official in Iliescu's administration, Ristea Priboi, who passed two CNSAS checks before the elections but in February was found to have worked for the Securitate. In the wake of the elections, critics have maintained that the law is inadequate to differentiate between victims and collaborators of the communist era. For example, Liberal party members Mircea Ionescu-Quintus, president of the Senate under Constantinescu, and Alexandru Paleologu, both of whom were among the 38 candidates found to have Securitate ties before the election, argued that though they had carried out minor services for the Securitate at one time, they had served and suffered in communist prisons during the dark period of repression in the 50's and 60's. At the same time, they noted, 'collaborators' deeply embedded in the communist system such as Iliescu and dozens of others managed to emerge with totally clean shirts. Quintus and Paleologu decided not to withdraw their candidacies and were subsequently elected into the parliament. Though the 'moral' appeal of the law remained largely intact because it enabled Romanian voters to pass judgment on these candidates' political pasts, some council supporters worried that their seemingly justified decision not to withdraw might establish a precedent for less innocent collaborators. A similar precedent may already have been established by the recent case of Ristea Priboi. Despite two attempts to check his files, CNSAS was unable to confirm Priboi's Securitate ties before the election, and he was appointed to control the country's foreign intelligence agency under Iliescu. But after a member of the Liberal Party charged Priboi with Securitate involvement, Iliescu's Social Democracy Party admitted in February 2001 that Priboi had worked previously for the Securitate's foreign intelligence branch, where he supervised a department in charge of spying on the US. Priboi, who after 1989 kept his job at the foreign intelligence, is also suspected of involvement in the 1981 bombing of the Munich headquarters of US funded "Radio Free Europe," a major Securitate foe. Although the case has stirred huge controversy, Priboi is firmly backed by Tudor and by prime minister Adrian Nastase of the Social Democracy Party who furiously expressed support for his long-time advisor as long as no proof exists that Priboi was directly responsible for any 'damage.' Moreover, Nastase downplayed the recent scandals regarding the involvement of ex-Securitate members in politics by calling them 'internal political games' of no relevance whatsoever. In defending Priboi, his backers have come to interpret the law, which condemns every collaborator or employee of the Securitate, as applying only to collaborators and not to former officers. Without a strong commitment from politicians as well as voters, the 'moral law' may turn out not to be a law at all. Be this as it may, in spite of its limitations it is undeniable that the council's work has led to increased public attention on the Securitate question. Just recently, accusations similar to the ones against Priboi 123

have been raised regarding the nominations of the new head of the SRI and the new defense secretary. The fact that the Priboi case and others have provoked a discourse that is anchored on a state council and not merely on debates led by a few intellectuals and journalists, as had been the case, should be seen as a step in a gradual healing process. The obstacles the council faces should not obscure the fact that the mere existence of this law and the CNSAS is an achievement. Just as the council contributes to diminishing the influence of the Securitate in Romanian political life, the CNSAS also aims to contribute to the country's renewal of democratic practice and civic culture, replacing one brick in the structure of Romanian civil society that the Securitate helped destroy. It will continue to do so, though so far there is not much indication the new president will help. Unsympathetic to the issue of the archives during his previous term, it appears Iliescu will not deal with the Securitate's legacy and the council very differently this time around. During a press conference shortly before the elections he called the board members of the CNSAS 'disabled losers'. Yet if he is to be the true democrat he now claims he is and if he wants his country to be taken seriously by the Western alliance, he must forge not only economic reforms but also what Germany's Joachim Gauck called 'the therapy of memory,' the attempt of a former communist society and its institutions to address and resolve the ongoing legacy of a shadowy political past.

RUXANDRA CESEREANU IMAGINEA SECURITATII IN LITERATURA ROMANA IN COMUNISM SI POSTCOMUNISM - STUDIU DE CAZ -

The image of the Securitate in communist and postcommunist Romanian literature\ Abstract: The article is a synthesis on the image of the Securitate in the Romanian communist and postcommunist literature, underlining the repression mechanisms the System used to establish terror. Keywords: Romania; communism; Romanian literature; censorship; Securitate

Ma voi referi aici doar la aspectul literaturizat al imaginii Securitatii, punctand cativa autori de marca sau macar onorabili care au avut in vedere o asemenea reflectare. Nu ma voi ocupa de victime si nici preponderent de figura dictatorului comunist, ci de aparatul de represiune care a instaurat teroarea si care a instrumentat-o ca atare. Textele panoramate sunt fie scrieri realiste, fie antiutopii si parabole. Membrii aparatului de represiune din Romania comunista, asa cum apar in aceste scrieri, pot fi clasificati dupa cum urmeaza: anchetatorul fals serafic, tortionarul propriu-zis (cu doua nuante tortionarul robot, care tortureaza in virtutea obisnuintei sau chiar blazat-mecanic, si acela fanatic, sadic), si bufonul balcanizat (acesta nu tortureaza, eventual palmuieste; dar, in general, este un grobian lingvistic). Eminentele cenusii ale represiunii comuniste apar si ele reflectate in literatura romana, fie prin figurile unor comisari sau comisarese "de fier", fie prin diversi lideri comunisti care au calauzit represiunea. in literatura de dinainte de 1989, publicata in Romania, figura preponderenta este aceea a anchetatorului fals serafic si a bufonului balcanizat; aceea a tortionarului este minoritar ilustrata. 124

Romanul obsedantului deceniu, de pilda, exceleaza in a acorda importanta anchetatorului fals serafic, cand, in realitate, figura marcanta a securistului roman, pentru acea perioada, a fost cea a "boxerului", cum apare acesta numit adesea, intrucat anchetatorul fals serafic a fost dublat intotdeauna de un tortionar moderat, eventual. Inadecvarea tine si de faptul ca reprezentantii Securitatii in prima etapa a comunismului nu au fost niste intelectuali causeuri (acestia apar de-abia in anii asa-zisului "dezghet", adica dupa 1964) ci niste duri notorii. De remarcat, insa, ca in literatura de dinainte de 1989 este, in schimb, veridic redat felul in care functiona sistemul de delatiune: romanele obsedantului deceniu abunda in dari de seama asupra unui adevarat asediu asupra societatii romanesti, din partea turnatorilor. in antiutopii, parabole si alegorii, securistii si Securitatea sunt infatisati ca reprezentind o societate oculta, construita dupa modelul caracatitei mafiotice, dar care este investita cu valente "misionare" sau monahal-disciplinare. in literatura de dupa 1989, membrii aparatului de represiune apar in toate cele trei ipostaze prezentate, concentrat, mai sus (anchetator fals serafic, tortionar, bufon balcanizat), egali ca portrete fiind, insa, atat anchetatorul fals serafic (causeur destul de rafinat), cat si tortionarul brutal (figura acestuia ii obsedeaza pe autorii cei mai tineri ale caror texte le analizez in acest eseu, amandoi nascuti in perioada de asa-zisa liberalizare a Romaniei comuniste). in comunism Imaginea Securitatii apare punctata in romanul obsedantului deceniu, acesta alternand intre o relativa disidenta fata de regimul comunist si o indeniabila impostura. Este vorba despre niste scrieri apartinand unor autori care au facut anumite compromisuri, pentru a nu irita regimul care le-a permis publicarea. Fata de marturiile de un realism atroce care au aparut dupa 1989, romanul obsedantului deceniu reflecta lumea Gulagului printr-o oglinda aburita. Fara sa ajunga intr-un registru alegoric, el adopta o scriitura uneori veridica, alteori esopica, inclusiv in ceea ce priveste imaginea Securitatii. Arestat si anchetat pentru un "manuscris dusmanos", un jurnal politico-moral al vremurilor, Chiril Merisor, personajul lui Constantin toiu din Galeria cu vita salbatica (editia a doua, postfatata de autor, cuvantul editorului de Valeriu Rapeanu, Bucuresti, Editura Eminescu, 1979), este interogat de maiorul Roadevin, un securist mult prea rafinat pentru anul 1958, cand al doilea val al terorii (dupa revolutia din Ungaria) influenta tehnica de ancheta a Securitatii. Cu ani inaintea arestarii, Chiril fusese demascat zelos, dat fiind ca vremurile excelau in delatiuni, iar delatorii erau incurajati, intrucat, suna un slogan, delatorul care era credincios partidului nu era considerat turnator. Securistul Roadevin este un "filozofpolitist", cum isi spune el insusi, o "contradictie in carne si oase": pe de o parte agent al represiunii, pe de alta polemist rafinat si pretentios, cu background filozofic. La inceputul carierei sale, Roadevin este aghiotantul unei femei-comisar, o Doamna de fier cu stil de aristocrata, marcata, totusi, de ferocitate ideologica. Mai tarziu, Roadevin intra in pielea anchetatorului fals serafic, supunandu-l pe Chiril Merisor unui interogatoriu de tip panza de paianjen, in care au loc dezbateri filologice, filozofice, comentarii de citate, interogatoriu care seamana mai degraba cu o prelegere faramitata de morala. Roadevin tine sa se deosebeasca de securistii amorfi, dar si de brute. "Suntem oameni inteligenti, nu putem sa ne pacalim unul pe altul", ii spune el lui Chiril Merisor, considerandu-se, ca si victima sa, a fi tot un intelectual care are indoieli. Dar indoielile sale sunt doar o momeala, iar bonomia si inteligenta sa sunt dublate de dogmatism, demagogie si fanatism ideologic. Roadevin stie ca, in subsoluri, colegii sai, brutele, executa altfel de interogatorii. El isi considera victima, pe Chiril, a fi un solitar interesant, si este fascinat de stranietatea si unicitatea "vanatului" sau. De aceea, il supune unui altfel de interogatoriu decat cel obisnuit, adica unui interogatoriu fara traume fizice. Regreta sinuciderea lui Chiril, survenita, de altfel, tocmai datorita interogatoriului sau paienjenos inauntrul caruia victima recunoscuse ca este doar o "musca" si, in perioada de "dezghet", adica dupa 1964, lasa ca ofranda Galeriei cu vita salbatica (aceasta fiind inteleasa ca un confesional politic al vremurilor) tocmai "manuscrisul dusmanos" de odinioara al lui Chiril. La ceasul cind Constantin toiu publica romanul, cativa ani dupa tezele din iulie 1971, o asemenea perspectiva nu se potrivea cu realitatea. Era artificial ca Securitatea sa fie infatisata prin intermediul maiorului Roadevin, care aduce mai degraba cu un personaj rafinat-decadent, decat cu un tehnician si practician al terorii. Probabil, insa, ca autorul a avut in vedere doar categoria securistului "serafic", selectat dintre intelectuali. "Voi, scriitorii, sinteti neinformati, de-aia cartile voastre nu sint bune, dar din pacate nici noi nu va 125

putem inca pune la dispozitie unele documente si materiale care v-ar inspira. Ce sa facem? Nu putem! Istoria e inca prea cruda si lucrurile ar putea fi intelese gresit. Dar intr-o zi se vor deschide multe arhive si nu cred ca ziua asta o sa fie chiar asa de departata." Cuvintele, reale sau nu, ii apartin lui Gheorghiu Dej in romanul Cel mai iubit dintre pamanteni de Marin Preda (3 volume, Bucuresti, Editura Cartea Romaneasca, 1980) si ele sunt esentiale tocmai pentru nasterea juridica a romanului obsedantului deceniu. Arestat pentru a fi banuit ca face parte dintr-o organizatie subversiva si nu pentru manuscrisul "dusmanos-deviationist" intitulat Era ticalosilor, personajul Victor Petrini este moralizator cu propriul sau anchetator, tot unul fals serafic, care nu aplica tortura fizica. Pe parcursul incarcerarii sale, personajul va intalni, insa, atat bufoni balcanizati, cat si primitivi; pericolul, in ceea ce-l priveste, vine nu dinspre anchetatorii rafinati, ci dinspre brute. Clasificarea pe care o face personajul, la adresa membrilor aparatului de represiune, este urmatoarea: exista frustratii explozivi, adesea, duri (aici intra figura capitanului care l-a arestat pe Petrini); exista, apoi, bufonul care intra in categoria cretinului (este cazul colonelului de Securitate care se considera superior "rasial" unui militian); exista, apoi, Generalul de Securitate cu purtare de plutonier rudimentar si demagog; si exista gardianul analfabet si periculos, intrucat are alergie la intelectuali. Securistii sunt perceputi ca virusi si anomalii, recrutati, in general, dintre oamenii simpli, pentru a semana cu victimele lor. "Nu erau automate, cum s-ar putea crede [ii portretizeaza Victor Petrini]. Simteau ca traiesc in mod firesc torturandu-ma pe mine si aveau surasuri fine cand de fiecare data protestam". in general, securistii sunt tineri, nu poseda o tehnica anume, ci au in sange si in instinct insusirea de a fi membri ai aparatului de represiune, alcatuind o "masina de produs dovezi". La ancheta, Victor Petrini are parte de alternanta anchetator bland-anchetator grobian-anchetator cinic. Acestia stiu ca sunt niste stapani ai lumii, pentru ei realitatea si oamenii care o locuiesc avand o singura grila: inauntru si afara. Cel mai interesant fragment din roman ramane secventa detentiei lui Victor Petrini si mai ales cea a relatiei dintre victima si gardian, in care cei doi ajung la un fel de comuniune, inainte ca victima sa ucida punitiv calaul. Gardianul analfabet considera ca fiinta lui Petrini se opune fapturii sale simple de gardian, drept care doreste sa-l ucida. Petrini este pentru calaul sau un inamic (ganditor) care trebuie executat tacit, dar un fel de selectie darwinista face ca tocmai victima sa reuseasca anihilarea calaului. O alta scena paradoxala si simbolica de comuniune intre victima si calau apare in romanul Somnul vamesului (3 volume, prefata de Nicolae Manolescu, postfata de autor, Bucuresti, Editura Eminescu, 1981) de Bujor Nedelcovici. Un fost calau (gardian la o colonie de detinuti politici din Delta Dunarii) si fiul unei victime discuta banalitati, pana cand, prin hazard, fiecare afla cine este celalalt. Chestionat daca il uraste pe fostul gardian, fiul victimei refuza aceasta partitura, dar il sfatuieste pe fostul calau, astazi pensionar bonom, sa nu le deconspire niciodata nepotilor identitatea sa de odinioara, pentru a nu fi repudiat. Fostul calau se mira ca fiul victimei nu il uraste, intrucat o asemenea reactie i s-ar fi parut legitima. El insusi recunoaste crimele de odinioara ale regimului, dar se disculpa prin concluzia ca marii vinovati sunt "creierele" represiunii, si nu executantii de jos, neaparat. in Fetele tacerii de Augustin Buzura (Bucuresti, Editura Cartea Romaneasca, 1974), calaul si victima au roluri si marturii egale ca intindere, problema pe care o pune autorul fiind aceea a culpabilitatii. in ceea ce priveste personajul securistului, acesta este un calau decazut care continua sa poarte razboi mental impotriva victimei sale care are dreptul sa nu-l ierte. Problema lui Gheorghe Radu (calaul) este nu doar hartuiala cu victima sa, prelungita in timp, ci si clamata sa conditie de victima a propriilor sai stapani teoretici, eminente cenusii ale represiunii din Romania comunista. Ca agent al cooperativizarii si persecutor al rezistentei anticomuniste din munti, Radu vrea sa dea seama despre primii ani tulburi ai comunismului, aruncand vina pe teoreticienii terorii. intr-o prima varianta, marturia lui Radu este relativ credibila, ca si a victimei sale (Carol Magureanu, singurul urmas al unei familii persecutate de Radu), dar ea se sprijina in mod perfid pe logica victimelor necesare si pe fals. De-abia a doua oara, fostul calau va face o marturisire mai apropiata de adevar, obligat fiind de marturia decisiva a victimei sale. Voi discuta mai pe larg, in cele ce urmeaza, figura lui Radu. Asa cum am spus, acesta a fost un securist actant in luptele din munti, cu partizanii anticomunisti, si intreaga sa rememorare urmareste sa relateze cum a fost initiat in legea urii si cum a devenit practician al terorii si hartuitor frenetic de oameni. Radu nu ezita, de altfel, sa-si clasifice fostii colegi, mai intai la nivel generationist: astfel, intro prima etapa au actionat si au detinut puterea primitivii, teluricii, mai violenti si patimasi; intr-o a 126

doua etapa, au venit la putere indivizi mai reci, intelectuali, rationali chiar, si ironici. Alaturi de Radu, inca trei figuri de "duri" apar in roman: Coza (politrucul-sef), Brainea (securistul ascuns, fanatic) si Lupse (mercenarul). Augustin Buzura prezinta, din cand in cand, abuzurile Securitatii in mediul rural: incendiatori frenetici de carti interzise, ca intr-o "ceremonie tribala"; taranci torturate ca sa-i tradeze pe luptatorii anticomunisti din munti; meciurile de "box" si "fotbal" ale securistilor cu fratii lui Carol Magureanu; torturarea mamei lui Carol Magureanu, purtata ritualic in padure, ca sa-si ademeneasca fiii anticomunisti, santajati prin urletele ei; batjocorirea cadavrelor partizanilor capturati. Radu marturiseste ca s-a salbaticit ca actant al terorii si de frica de a nu deveni el insusi "dusman al poporului"; dar, chiar si pensionat, el se considera un securist vigilent. in tineretea sa de persecutor, a fost ofensat de dispretul aratat de victimele sale; apoi faptul ca a fost umilit de Sterian (seful partizanilor), fiind silit sa-si manance carnetul de partid, l-a facut sa aleaga teroarea ca metoda de razbunare. Desi batran, el este securistul care isi uraste fostele victime: toate necazurile pe care le are, odata cu decaderea sa politica, le considera a fi cauzate de cei pe care i-a hartuit, crezand ca el insusi este o victima. Evident, este o falsa victima: el este, de fapt, un calau batran care are remuscari, dar care nu stie sau nu vrea, totusi, sa se caiasca. in Orgolii de acelasi Augustin Buzura (Cluj, Editura Dacia, 1977), figura interesanta este cea a calaului si mai putin cea a victimei. ai aici avem doua marturii, cea a lui Constantin Redman, calaul, (de fapt Redman are doua variante ale "adevarului": una dulceaga pentru cei straini de anii terorii, si alta reala, pentru chiar victima sa) si cea a lui Ion Cristian, victima, o marturie silita, mai mult pentru a-si contracara calaul. Relatia victima-calau este mai spectaculoasa decat in Fetele tacerii, pentru ca victima si calaul nu se vor ierta, ci vor ramane fiecare ceea ce sunt. Ion Cristian nu-l iarta pe Redman, dar accepta ca si acesta va fi trecut prin tunelul victimelor; Cristian poate ierta bruta (securistul Varlaam), dar nu si pe Iuda (fostul sau prieten Redman). Relatia dintre Cristian si Redman este interesanta insa si din alt punct de vedere, caci, fiind vorba despre doi prieteni, dintre care unul alege sa fie calau, iar celalalt alege sa fie victima, teoretic ne putem gandi la experimentul Pitesti (reeducarea violenta fizic, mental si moral) care a avut loc in Romania intre 1949-1952, in cadrul caruia victimele erau silite sa devina, de la un punct incolo, calai. De altfel, Varlaam va incerca la un moment dat sa-i "pitestizeze" pe cei doi; Cristian refuza, insa, rolul de calau, asa incat "pitestizarea" nu este posibila. Augustin Buzura prezinta mai multe tipuri de securisti-calai. Cel dintai, cel mai important, este Varlaam, intrucat acesta se dovedeste a fi un Janus bifrons: si bruta, si anchetator machiavelic. La inceput, Varlaam isi manifesta conditia de mercenar fanatic; el este "animalul", bipedul rudimentar, posedat de ura sa de calau sau suferind de un complex de superioritate de calau. Varlaam a fost candva macelar si boxer amator, dar prin zelul in aplicarea terorii el a devenit un calau ambitios (mai exact ar fi, poate, termenul de calau harnic), unealta a anchetatorului fals serafic care nu isi murdareste mainile prin schingiuirea victimelor. La inceput, deci, Varlaam face parte din familia batausilor, a brutelor primitive. El renunta sa-l mai atinga violent pe Cristian, atunci cand intuieste ca, prin lovirea acestuia, ar institui irevocabil conditia de victima a schingiuitului sau. Ceea ce-l intereseaza pe Varlaam este sa-l infranga pe Cristian, dar nu oricum, ci distrugandu-i orgoliul de victima. infruntarea dintre victima si calau, asa cum o percep ambii parteneri, devine o batalie a creierelor si un joc al vointelor. Pe parcursul experientei sale de tortionar si anchetator al lui Cristian, Varlaam se preschimba in altceva decat a fost initial: nu mai este rudimentar si brutal, ci a devenit chiar un calau rafinat, dar care-si absolutizeaza omnipotenta. Ca va veni candva si randul decaderii sale este altceva, este doar istoria care merge inainte si care poate inversa rolurile. Cu totul altceva reprezinta Redman, care se recunoaste a fi las si care refuza sa fie victima, prin urmare accepta orice compromis si isi tradeaza prietenul, dar nu oricum, ci prin "pitestizare". El explica, de altfel, ce il catalizeaza pe un tradator sa devina asa ceva: frica, invidia, dorinta de parvenire. Bolnav de cancer, fostul prieten delator si martor al acuzarii, vine la victima sa (Cristian, medic celebru la multi ani dupa detentia politica) pentru a-i cere iertare, apasat fiind de vinovatia tradarii. Dar cainta sa este formala, nu are substanta, iar de la un punct incolo devine chiar acuzatoare. Treptat, Redman, desi decazut, reintra in pielea Iudei si isi acuza fosta victima ca este o victima aroganta. Apoi, Redman isi reintra si in pielea de delator, participand cu informatii mincinoase la darile de seama pe care personajul Canaris le face in scris la adresa lui Cristian si care sunt adresate organelor de Securitate. Delatiunile care impanzesc contrapunctic romanul lui Augustin Buzura demonstreaza faptul 127

ca societatea romaneasca a anilor optzeci era controlata prin turnatori mercenari. Ar mai fi de amintit, faptul ca, la un moment dat, Varlaam il sileste pe Redman sa-l loveasca pe Cristian: la inceput, Redman loveste timid, apoi, catalizat si azmutit de Varlaam, Redman consimte sa devina calau efemer; cand Cristian, la randul sau, este somat sa-l loveasca el pe Redman, victima refuza indaratnic, pricepand pericolul decaderii morale si al "pitestizarii". Tot din galeria calailor, in Orgolii, intra gardianul Fasole, hartuitor al detinutilor politici, si plutonierul Olteanu, cel din urma reprezentand un caz aparte. Olteanu este pe de o parte o bruta, dar el este si cel care-l ajuta pe Cristian (este de remarcat aici, cum autorul a construit un securist hibrid, cand monstruos, cand uman). Olteanu este robot doar in fata superiorilor sai: el il bate zelos pe Cristian tocmai pentru a nu fi banuit ca-l ajuta; pe de alta parte tot el este cel care-l hraneste clandestin pe Cristian, dandu-i tigari si comunicandu-i informatii politice. Dac-ar fi sa-l clasific cumva, as spune ca personajul lui Olteanu este un "autopitestizat". Dupa aceasta galerie de calai, se deduce ca Augustin Buzura a tinut in mod special sa nuanteze membrii aparatului de represiune, sa creeze tipuri veridice, si nu schematice. Spre deosebire de Constantin toiu si poate chiar de Ivasiuc, Buzura nu exagereaza rolul anchetatorului fals serafic, acordand un loc aparte daca nu schingiuitorului de performanta, atunci tortionarului moderat care a fost, probabil, cel mai frecvent tip de securist roman. Interval, Cunoastere de noapte si Iluminari de Alexandru Ivasiuc, sunt romane care trateaza tema excluderii si a proceselor comuniste de demascare, in care personajele tipice, pe langa victime, sunt colaborationistii si delatorii mercenari. Romanul Iluminari (Bucuresti, Editura Eminescu, 1977), in special, este axat pe demontarea mecanismului sedintelor de acuzare intr-un institut, cercetatorii fiind sacrificati in lectii practice de demascare. Aici apare personajul Ionescu, omul cu dosarele, lucrator la Securitate, candva, pe care noua etapa politica (presupusul "dezghet") il nemultumeste, intrucat romanii nu mai manifesta frica (de inchisoare, de moarte, de excludere). Lipsa fricii il intarata si indispune pe Ionescu, decazut din ipostaza sa de fost "creier" al fricii. in viziunea lui de fost ofiter de Securitate, actualmente sef al personalului din institut, fiecare cercetator trebuie sa aiba un dosar pigmentat cu note secrete, informative, Ionescu fiind stapanul retelei de informatori si supraveghind, ca un paianjen totalitar, intregul institut. El instrumenteaza cazuri de delatiune intre prieteni, speculand, dupa chiar marturisirea sa, defectele si slabiciunile oamenilor. Ca si "staret totalitar", este perfect camuflat intr-un functionar cenusiu sub care pulseaza un mercenar ahtiat de putere. Tot de sfera represiunii apartine Bobeica, delator paranoic specialist in intocmirea unei genealogii de "dusmani" ai institutului si adept al incapsularii omului intr-un dosar! in romanul Pasarile de Alexandru Ivasiuc (Bucuresti, Editura Cartea Romaneasca, 1970), santierul unde lucreaza Liviu Dunca este invadat de agentii unei lumi suspicioase si exterminatoare, soferi si secretare stalinieni ce infiltreaza o atmosfera concentrationara (o secretara cenusie se preschimba, in cateva zile, intr-un fel de "comisareasa" taciturna). aantierul se metamorfozeaza intr-un lagar mereu dilatabil (nu se mai lucreaza, ci se ancheteaza non stop), sindrom al mecanismului aberant al istoriei. Liviu Dunca este arestat de doi securisti complementari (politicosul si rautaciosul), pretinzandu-i-se complicitate intr-un proces inscenat de sabotaj si explicandu-i-se ca este doar o rotita in sistem. Cum Dunca refuza sa fie martor al acuzarii, el devine acuzat. Prietenul sau, inginerul Mateescu, care il va trada, considera ca autosacrificiul nu are nici un rost intr-un proces de demascare, intrucat tehnica aparatului de represiune este urmatoarea: "intai se lichideaza niste adversari potentiali, apoi inhiba si infricoseaza pe alti adversari potentiali". Securitatea este, in viziunea lui Mateescu, un "parinte sever" care are dreptul sa inspire respect, teama, sa incurajeze sau sa pedepseasca; modelul este acela al familiei patriarhale, "fiii" revoltati cuvenindu-se a fi imblanziti si domesticiti prin violenta. "Mitul" Securitatii este explicat prin ideea de intemeiere, caci niste "intemeietori" au dreptul sa faca orice: "Totul are caracter de mitologie, pina si exorcismul, spalarea greutatilor, a unor pacate si insuficiente, prin victime". in aceasta lume de victime, martori acuzatori si calai, singur salvator, chiar daca reprobabil, este pactul cu Puterea si, deci, cu Securitatea, considera vocile colaborationiste din roman: distinctia intre noi (posibile si actuale victime) si ei (pronuntat cu respect fata de Putere; aici intra securistii si nomenclaturistii) este necesara, pentru a permite victimelor maleabile sa acceada la gradul "superior" politic de calai. Cel de-al doilea personaj care ii tine teoria Securitatii "benefice" lui Dunca este colonelul Cherestesiu. in cautarea acestuia, Dunca rataceste intr-o cladire previzibila, cu labirinturi de coridoare intunecoase, 128

cu paznici, secretare si detinuti politici (silentiosi, insa, iar nu torturati pe fata). Cherestesiu ii explica fostului sau prieten ca ideea de inocenta este anulata, fiind inlocuita de aceea de necesitate a gasirii victimelor. Cherestesiu insusi, desi ofiter de Securitate, se considera a fi doar un pion intr-o ierarhie si retea ampla de pioni in care abuzurile si injustitia isi au rostul lor. De aceea, singura solutie a victimelor trebuie sa fie cedarea. Dar Cherestesiu isi are, totusi, indoielile sale, marturisind patetic ca nu isi poate permite sa se indoiasca de "ai sai" (comunistii): odata ce a ales sa fie securist, trebuie sa mearga pe calea aceasta, chiar daca a asistat la torturi aplicate asupra unor victime si chiar daca el nu a practicat niciodata asa ceva (este lipsit de veridicitate acest "romantism" al unui colonel de Securitate din anii obsedantului deceniu). Neputand sa-l convinga pe Dunca de necesitatea colaborarii si a cedarii, il muta pe fostul sau prieten direct la subsol, unde acesta va fi anchetat dur (desi nu Cherestesiu va fi tortionarul de serviciu). in sanatoriul nomenclaturii unde este internat ca bolnav, Petre Curta, personajul din Biblioteca din Alexandria de Petre Salcudeanu (editia a treia, Bucuresti, Editura Fundatiei Culturale Romane, 1992), este pe post de confesor, fie al calailor, fie al celor care nu inteleg istoria si represiunea (toate aceste confesiuni vor alcatui manuscrisul "dusmanos" al lui Curta). Exista aici cateva personaje care isi dezbat statutul neacceptat de calau: Baciu, care explica avalansa delatiunilor in calitate de expert (cu cat se inventeaza mai mult, cu atat intervine pofta de a exagera, adica inventivitatea maladiva); Olariu, prosovietic chinuit de "fratii" sai comunisti care, integrandu-se in organele de represiune, devine comandant de inchisoare in chiar locul unde fratii sai de sange sunt detinuti politici si vor fi executati; Cozmin, eminenta cenusie a represiunii, "aventurier al revolutiei", care poate ucide oameni pentru cauza bolsevica, dar care va fi debarcat si va deveni el insusi victima dupa caderea Anei Pauker; Landesman, fost activist si participant cu de-a sila la represiune, care se va converti la preotie; Pintica, tradator, fara sa vrea, al luptarilor anticomunisti din munti. Sanatoriul este doar o fantosa, intrucat comunismul agreseaza si aici, spitalul devenind un spatiu concentrationar, condus de un bolnav dogmatic (Morascu) ce confectioneaza denunturi si racoleaza delatori, intocmind dosare ale tuturor, medici si bolnavi, si transformand sanatoriul intr-o micro Securitate. Dar cartea lui Petre Salcudeanu cultiva jumatatea de masura, relatand mai ales injustitiile suferite de comunistii "onesti" din partea comunistilor oportunisti sau pervertiti si legitimand anumite denaturari ale oficialitatilor comuniste: de pilda, lupta anticomunista din muntii Romaniei este atribuita unor legionari malefici si bestiali. Securistii care il aresteaza pe Curta sunt oameni in haine de piele, impasibili, roboti, arestand inclusiv carti (Camasa lui Christos si poeme de Esenin; este un paradox aici, intrucat Camasa lui Christos va fi lectura paradigmatica din Jurnalul fericirii de N. Steinhardt). La a doua arestare, securistii sunt deja perfizi si initiati in personalitatea victimei lor. Curta este anchetat mai intai pentru a i se explica semnificatia represiunii, apoi pentru manuscrisul blamat la care lucreaza si in care transcrie confesiunile periculoase ale unor fosti calai. Figura anchetatorului fals serafic, a securistului "luminat", colectionar de manuscrise, avand o biblioteca internationala de erezii comuniste si anticomuniste care, candva, de ce nu, vor fi date la tipar, este esentiala pentru alta fraza strategica pe care o rosteste: "Scotand asemenea lucrari la lumina, nu numai ca aparem in fata contemporaneitatii curajosi si obiectivi, dar ne facem si o datorie de onoare de a repune treptat istoria in propriile ei drepturi." Romanele despre obsedantul deceniu, pare a spune acest securist, colectionar de erezii, nu mai reusesc sa denigreze Puterea comunista in mod real, de aceea ele pot fi publicate si chiar aplaudate, caci micile gesturi de curaj isi au rostul lor in strategia puternicilor zilei. Anchetatorul acesta este un intelectual care se considera un initiat si care, inteligent si viclean, isi intoarce victima pe toate fetele. De fapt, el colectioneaza erezii anticomuniste pentru a fisa, adnota si tria personaje, prin astfel de fise antrenandu-se pentru disidentii pe care ii va ancheta. Este o metoda de a invata cum sa detecteze "dusmanii poporului", acest securist vazand in manuscrisele anticomuniste niste adevarate manuale. De aceea, inclusiv manuscrisul lui Curta va fi pentru el nu altceva decat un prilej de antrenament, pentru a deveni suprainitiat in adulmecarea disidentilor, ca un veritabil vanator. Voi aminti acum un roman (nu neaparat al obsedantului deceniu), pentru varietatea sa la nivelul personajelor de securisti, chiar daca acestea sunt episodice: cu putini ani inaintea caderii regimului Ceausescu, Ion Baiesu a publicat Balanta (prefata de Eugen Simion, nota bibliografica de Radu Vladut, Editura Minerva, 1990), romanul aparand intr-o editie necenzurata dupa 1989. Figurile securistilor nu sunt tratate amplu, ci mai degraba expediate, dar ele sunt variate si excentrice, dupa cum se va vedea. 129

Mai intai tatal Nelei, fost colonel in Securitate, pe care fiica sa il adora si care a decazut atunci cand a inceput destalinizarea (colonelul simtindu-se vinovat pentru crimele lui Stalin pe care il idolatriza); in perioada stalinismului, colonelul isi terorizase propria sotie, anchetand-o noaptea, intrucat o banuia ca este evreica. Romanul este pigmentat, apoi, cu securisti grobieni (lingvistic) din perioada Ceausescu, cu indivizi misteriosi sau functionari roboti, cu securisti bolnavi de conspirationita care vor sa confiste manuscrise mistice, considerate periculoase ideologic. Dar alaturi de asemenea specimene obisnuite, apar si extravagantii care se caiesc sau isi schimba meseria: e vorba despre un tigan (actant intr-un grup de arestare nocturna) care s-a indragostit de o aristocrata persecutata si care, din pricina aceasta, a renuntat sa mai fie agent al terorii; sau despre plutonierul-major care, dupa ce a evacuat violent, ucigand chiar, deportati, s-a sinucis, mai tarziu, dintr-o vinovatie asumata. Rolul romanului obsedantului deceniu a fost acela de a oculta teroarea rafinata din epoca Ceausescu prin acuza adusa terorii brutale din epoca Dej, dar fara a face o analiza profunda a sistemului represiv romanesc. De aceea, acest tip de roman a facut parte din strategiile Puterii comuniste si poate chiar ale Securitatii de a manipula constiintele prin distragerea atentiei. Tensiunile colective din timpul epocii Ceausescu erau neutralizate prin deturnarea lor asupra unei stari trecute. Despre reusita acestei strategii depune marturie larga audienta de care s-a bucurat tema obsedantului deceniu. Planul functiona cu atat mai bine cu cat dadea impresia unei disidente reale, speculate de eminentele cenusii care au aprobat publicarea acestui tip de roman. Reprosul meu fata de romanul obsedantului deceniu ramane procustianizarea adevarului si prezentarea Securitatii mai ales prin membrii sai "luminati", intelectuali, ceea ce este un fals, intrucat, marturiile de inchisoare publicate dupa 1989 atesta ca figura majoritar actanta in cadrul aparatului de represiune era bruta sau, eventual, bufonul balcanizat. n postcomunism Exista apoi o serie de romane care, desi au aparut in strainatate inainte de 1989, in Romania au fost publicate de-abia dupa caderea comunismului, fie datorita autorilor lor care erau anticomunisti refugiati in Occident, fie datorita chiar textelor lor care faceau portretul membrilor aparatului de represiune intr-o ipostaza care, evident, nu convenea regimului comunist din Romania. Scriitorul roman care a abordat obsesiv, soljenitian, tema represiunii comuniste este Paul Goma. Alaturi de marturii (Gherla, Culorile curcubeului '77), mai ales doua din romanele sale au facut cariera in ceea ce priveste tema Gulagului - Patimile dupa Pitesti si Ostinato. Emblematic mi se pare mai ales romanul Patimile dupa Pitesti (Bucuresti, Editura Cartea Romaneasca, 1990) care trimite direct la centrul infernului din inchisoarea Pitesti (1949-1952) prin personajul Eugen turcanu, inspirat de realitatea tortionarului turcanu. Acesta urmareste confectionarea artizanala a unei culpabilitati colective prin delatiune, autodemascare si tortura, ridicandu-si functia de reeducator la rang sacerdotal. El vrea sa obtina din detinutii politici, niste purificati ideologic, invocand criteriul de recuperare a deseurilor; metoda lui tine de culpabilizarea tuturor, uniformizandu-i procustian. Romanul Patimile dupa Pitesti este o "evanghelie neagra", fara sa se centreze, totusi, pe imaginea Securitatii, ci pe ideea de intretortura, de tortura reciproca intre detinutii politici, asa cum a fost ea instrumentata de aparatul de represiune la inchisoarea Pitesti. in aproape toate celelalte romane ale lui Paul Goma, securistii apar in doua ipostaze: ca bufoni onomatopeici (analfabeti hatri) din cand in cand batausi, apoi ca ofiteri aroganti, suspiciosi, ranchiunosi. in Ostinato (Bucuresti, Editura Univers, 1991), autorul ironizeaza securistul prost fudul, dar, pe langa acesta, mai apar medicul semi-tortionar si securistul blazat. Una dintre chestiunile esentiale pe care Paul Goma o discuta la sfarsitul romanului este aceea a statutului calaului, dupa ce victima a iesit din universul concentrationar. Ce este de facut cu acesti calai, pot fi ei iertati? Daca ii pedepsesti, risti sa ii transformi in eroi, previne un personaj, intrucat justitia omeneasca nu va fi recunoscuta, iar calaul pedepsit poate poza in victima. Totusi, ei trebuie pedepsiti, dar cine sa o faca? Actul punitiv nu trebuie sa-i apartina nici lui Dumnezeu, nici oamenilor, ci sa vina de la calaii insisi, clameaza personajele lui Paul Goma; dar, dupa cum e de presupus, calaul pocait este o utopie. Singura modalitate de a-i sanctiona pe membrii aparatului de represiune ramane aceea de a scrie despre ei, de a-i imortaliza in negru, de a nu-i tacea, cum obisnuieste Goma sa spuna. 130

in romanul Usa noastra cea de toate zilele (Bucuresti, Editura Cartea Romaneasca, 1992), autorul portretizeaza de data aceasta o fosta femeie-comisar, activista si agent al cooperativizarii violente, odinioara, care ajunsese inclusiv in ipostaza de tortionara psihica fata de unchiul sau. intrebata de fiul unei victime, daca se caieste, fosta comisareasa admite ca si-ar putea regreta faptele la nivel omenesc, simtindu-se, insa, impacata la nivel ideologic. in romanul Arta refugii (cu o prefata de Marta Petreu, Editura Dacia, Cluj, 1991), cel care are de-a face cu securistii de toate calibrele este un adolescent basarabean care-si cauta parintii sechestrati. Galeria membrilor aparatului de represiune este variata: exista securistii robotizati, ca niste placi stricate, apoi cei fuduli in vigilenta si omnipotenta lor, care il batjocoresc si agreseaza oral pe minor, tocmai fiindca se simt asediati de acesta. intre comandantul Securitatii care este politicos, dar inflexibil, si aghiotantii plebei ai acestuia, adolescentul descopera o minina diferenta de suprafata: altfel, cu totii sunt niste "animale", niste jumatati de om, fie ca sunt pitici ubuesti, sau, dimpotriva, barbati bine legati la trup si chipesi. Microromanul Nouasprezece trandafiri (editie ingrijita si prefatata de Mircea Handoca, Bucuresti, Editura Romanul, 1991) de Mircea Eliade implica, prin actiunea sa, si prezenta Securitatii. Securistul din roman este un intelectual care, suferind de insomnie acuta, citeste, noaptea, carti gnostice (intelectualismul acestui securist ii este acordat ca un fel de "gratie" doar in virtutea anului de deschidere si de liberalizare -1966- in care se petrece actiunea romanului). Pe de o parte el este un initiat si un reprezentant al unei "elite" intelectuale, pe de alta parte este un intrigant colportor, intrucat organizeaza in jurul scriitorului Pandele o intreaga retea de filaj. Iar atunci cand acesta dispare in mod mistic-misterios, "neofitul" explica astfel: Securitatea este o Biserica avand legi si ierarhii exacte, drept care ea nu admite farseuri de tipul lui Simon Magul. in aceeasi ordine de idei, Securitatea este obsedata, in acest roman, de o serie de conspiratii oculte, paraumane care, insa, nu sunt decat pretexte pentru reglarea conturilor intre diferiti nomenclaturisti care vor sa puna mana pe putere. in antiutopii si alegorii (o parte au fost publicate in strainatate inainte de caderea comunismului, iar in Romania doar dupa 1989), Securitatea apare prin intermediul unor constructe kafkiene si orwelliene. in romanul Biserica Neagra de A. E. Baconsky (in Scrieri II. Proze, editie ingrijita, note, cronologie si bibliografie de Pavel tugui, studiu introductiv de Mircea Martin, Bucuresti, Editura Cartea Romaneasca, 1990), epidemia de cersetori care cuceresc si domina orasul, hartuind locuitorii prin agresivitate, atesta ca ipostaza de cersetor reprezinta gradul de initiere intr-o societare oculta si sacerdotala: Liga Cersetorilor se dovedeste a fi, de fapt, un partid totalitar, iar Biserica Neagra devine un Anti-Vatican potrivit la noile vremuri. Intelectualii sunt subordonati cersetorilor, fie ca delatori, fie ca mascarici, iar artistii plastici incarneaza mania poporului si au misiunea sa participe la procesele publice inscenate carora li se da o tenta sacerdotala. Muzeele si bibliotecile sunt evacuate, cartile sunt arse, cersetorii instaureaza o dictatura cu aparenta de calugarie. in final, lupta pentru putere dintre elita Ligii si disidenti sfarseste prin asaltarea Bisericii Negre si instalarea unei generatii progresiste (fostii proscrisi), dar la fel de totalitare: cu alte cuvinte, epoca Dej este inlocuita de epoca Ceausescu. Ideea de preotie perfida in represiune apare nuantat si in alte antiutopii romanesti; Marcus Winter, din romanul Adio, Europa ! de I. D. Sirbu (2 volume, Bucuresti, Editura Cartea Romaneasca, 1992, 1993), ca lucrator in agia din Isarlak (agia fiind denumirea pentru aparatul de represiune, iar Isarlak, denumirea esopica pentru Romania comunista din faza ceausista) considera ca aceasta alcatuieste "o confrerie monahala - un fel de templieri sau ioaniti - in slujba unei fanatice religii atee, dar cu foarte multi sfinti si dumnezei marunti si de conjunctura." Consilierul Sultanului defineste o "dictatura ortodoxa", cvasireligioasa, in care Partidul este o biserica ce functioneaza prin evanghelisti ideologici; impostura acestui Partid-Biserica ajunge la apogeu atunci cind isi propune sa-l revendice si sa-l confiste harismatic pe Hristos ca pe un comunist arhetipal, Partidul urmarind prin aceasta trecerea la etapa unui "socialism ascetic". Perimetrul Zero din romanul cu acelasi nume al Oanei Orlea (traducere din limba franceza de Ioana Triculescu, revizuita de autoare, Bucuresti, Editura Cartea Romaneasca, 1991) este, la randu-i, un spatiu totalitar. El reprezinta zona elitelor, fiind un fel de Oras interzis, dar nu chinezesc, ci romanesc, rezervat cuplului dictatorial Kuty si Mult-Iubita (in care pot fi cititi Nicolae si Elena Ceausescu), garzii, sosiilor si instructorilor lor. Perimetrul este populat de o echipa intreaga de falsificatori de oameni intre care se distinge Maestrul de Ceremonii (supraveghetor al unui lot de sosii masculine si feminine ale cuplului dictatorial, care sunt instruite alternativ), Instructorii, Actrita, machiorii. Toti cei 131

din jurul sosiei Leontina, femeia-cobai (sosia perfecta a Mult-Iubitei), vor fi pervertiti de Putere: fiul ei Marc devine informator al Serviciului Politic Secret, aspirand sa fie fiul Mult-Iubitei, iar ca sot legal i se va impune un agent de supraveghere. Spatiul represiunii din Al doilea mesager de Bujor Nedelcovici (Bucuresti, Editura Eminescu, 1991) il reprezinta Insula Victoriei, patronata de Guvernator si transformata intr-o uriasa cazarma, spatiu unde visele sunt cenzurate, erosul este disciplinat, hranirea rationalizata, batai colective defulatorii sunt ingaduite pe stadioane. Locuitorul Insulei are chip standardizat, el este omul clonat, nascut din aceeasi mama (Insula) si acelasi tata (Guvernatorul). Insula este structurata ca o societate geometrica compusa din ligi elitiste, coordonate de Guvernator. Guvernatorul, singurul om liber din Insula, este Marele Pescar, iar aghiotantii sai (membrii ai ligii si ai Institutului de indrumare, educatie si invatamant, in fapt un institut de reeducare) sunt "pescari de suflete", rastalmacind voit ipostaza apostolilor crestini ca membri ai aparatului de represiune. Organul punitiv din Insula este Institutul, care se bazeaza pe autodelatiune si reeducare. Acest institut este proiectat ca o "manastire politica", singurii indivizi care nu au nevoie sa se autodenunte si pot gandi liber fiind membrii Ligii (nomenclatura si securistii). Desi seamana cu un spital psihiatric, Institutul este o institutie profilactica, remodelatoare. Este vorba despre o reeducare fara tortura, mizand pe o autodemascare blanda si indelungata si pe remodelare. in cadrul Institutului nu se foloseste nici tortura fizica, nici cea morala, nici medicamentatie, ci ideoterapia, indivizii si societatea fiind reeducati printr-o dirijare ideologica a subconstientului colectiv. in urma reeducarii prin ideoterapie, locuitorii se "curata", printr-un fel de mancurtizare, de gandurile neconforme cu Insula si Guvernatorul, fiecare individ fiind in acelasi timp victima si calau pentru sine insusi. Oamenii Puterii din Isarlak, in romanul Adio, Europa! de I. D. Sirbu, sunt organizati intr-o ierarhie turcocrata arhitecturala (spahiu, bei, capuchehaie, pasa, aga, vizir, sultan), in care dictatorul (Suleiman atotstiutorul) apare doar invocat. Politia politica este organizata mafiotic dupa modelul "caracatitei", alternand intre o teroare fie anarhica, fie calculata (sufletele au devenit dosare cercetate de slujbasii agiei). Agia apare proiectata ca o institutie aproape mistica, mediatoare intre Divan (Partid) si populatie. Ca si Bujor Nedelcovici, Ion D. Sirbu apeleaza la un bestiar simbolic, tortionarii si delatorii fiind proiectati ca gasteropode, batracieni, sobolani, hiene, plosnite, lipitori, uriasi sau pitici ubuesti. Procesul de metamorfoza se numeste sobolanizare si indemonire si el tine de un nou tip de iad, in care diavolii nu mai sunt necesari, oamenii insisi substituindu-i voluntar. inchisorile si lagarele, chiar daca inactuale in Isarlak, au fost candva laboratoare de dresare si de restructurare biometapsihica. La nivelul terorii, Puterea aplica "efectul K.", alternand speranta cu frica pana cand individul nu se mai revolta, ci se disciplineaza pavlovian, fiind "castrat" de vointa. Agia mizeaza pe crearea unei dualitati juridice in care indivizii sa fie acuzati si acuzatori in acelasi timp. Membrii aparatului turcocrat de represiune sunt clasificati in trei tipuri: ruri (tortionari cruzi, fanatici), eunuci (tortionari din oportunism, brute clasice) si apteri (non-tortionari, anchetatori si birocrati care servesc institutia de represiune). Ion Eremia, in Gulliver in Tara Minciunilor (prefata de Petre Raileanu, Bucuresti, Editura Fundatiei Culturale Romane, 1992) prezinta Romania comunista sub numele Kukunia, Tara Minciunilor. Aici, dictatorul Granit este o figura de "geambas" combinata cu un Piticot de iarmaroc, emanand o filozofie a puterii numita "granitism"; el este inconjurat de o "Sfanta Familie", intre care sfetnicii de baza sunt Marele Inchizitor (seful politiei secrete), Marele Kiromant (consilierul dictatorului) si Leva, femeie diabolica (inspirata atat de Ana Pauker, cat si de Elena Ceausescu, dar probabil si de Vida Nedici, tortionara de origine sarba, specializata pe organele genitale, in prima etapa a comunismului romanesc). Personaje jumatate molieresti, jumatate ubuesti, reprezentantii aparatului de represiune sunt indivizi obezi, fie pitici, fie uriasi, cultivand un cod penal dupa care orice crima teoretic posibila este catalogata ca fiind savarsita; in acest cod, tortura este metoda de cercetare si de cautare a adevarului. Femeia-comisar Leva, regizoare a spectacolelor de schingiuire, explica voluptatea tortionarului pentru care tortura este un afrodisiac ca o "betie rece", creand un sentiment de superioritate si un catharsis pervers. Academia din Kukunia este o fortareata dotata cu laboratoare experimentale unde membrii aparatului de represiune si cercetatorii testeaza pe animale "teoria devotamentului ca produs al fricii", altoindu-se noi genuri umane precum omul fara stomac, omulrumegator, omul imblanit si omul jumatate bivol, jumatate urs; ispita finala este, insa, crearea unui 132

mancator de pamant, pamantul comestibil fiind singura hrana care ar putea face din om un animal rentabil. Sertarul cu aplauze (Bucuresti, Editura Tinerama, 1992), romanul Anei Blandiana, ar putea fi incadrat, partial, in seria antiutopiilor, parabolelor si alegoriilor, dar eu prefer sa-l plasez pe lista romanelor realiste care au tratat ultima perioada a ceausismului, infatisand reeducarea disidentilor intr-un azil psihiatric. in alta ordine de idei, romanul este flancat, din cand in cand, de insertii ale unui jurnal real al Anei Blandiana, din si despre perioada in care i s-a interzis semnatura, in ultima etapa a comunismului din Romania, cu atmosfera ei demolatoare la propriu. Securistii din roman, care invadeaza casa lui Alexandru aerban, hartuindu-l, sunt o suita de diavoli adaptati a la roumaine, trei "tehnicieni de serviciu", imprumutati parca din romanul Maestrul si Margareta de Mihail Bulgakov, mai exact, aducand aminte de Woland, Koroviev si Azazello (eventual Behemoth). Cel care ii conduce, "patronul", este un intelectual relativ civilizat, dar perfid, dotat cu o pipa de raisonneur; ceilalti doi sunt un roscovan corpolent si grobian (care vorbeste deformat si vulgar si care este dotat cu "copite", chiar daca metaforice, acestea fiind semnele diavolului din el) si un individ cu figura de politist din filme, obraznic, ironic, opus fizic celui dinainte, prin subtirimea sa. Toti trei au ceva golanesc sau smecheresc (mai ales ultimii doi), fiind niste invadatori, care terorizeaza prin gesturi excentrice: ocupa locuintele, se duseaza, dorm in casele victimelor lor, le inventariaza lenjeria intima, initiaza ritualuri lascive, provoaca scene de farsa grotesca si absurda. Securistii acestia sunt niste diavoli schiopi, hatri inca, bufi, care se maimutaresc, se scalambaie, cum scrie Ana Blandiana, pentru ca una din tehnicile de teroare este batjocorirea si umilirea victimelor, pentru a le distruge sistemul de aparare. in finalul romanului, cei trei reapar si ard manuscrisele "dusmanoase" ale lui Alexandru aerban. inainte, insa, de a ajunge la acest final, autoarea prezinta felul in care Securitatea dirija o intreaga arhitectura de cercuri concentrice ale delatiunii, chiar si prietenii cei mai siguri ai unui individ devenind delatori de ocazie, din oportunism, frica sau slabiciune. Personajul central, disidentul Alexandru aerban, este momit spre a fi internat intr-un "complex de reeducare", adica intr-un azil psihiatric (spital penitenciar) aflat intr-o fosta manastire. Trebuie reamintit aici ca, in poststalinism, dupa renuntarea teoretica la Gulag, toate regimurile comuniste europene, sub influenta Moscovei, au promovat internarea disidentilor in azile psihiatrice, incercand un fel de "spalare a creierului"asupra acestora; intelectualii protestatari (scriitori si oameni de stiinta) au fost supusi unor metode de lavaj cerebral (de obicei, prin drogare farmaceutica sau socuri electrice, dar si prin alte metode), opozitia fata de regimul comunist fiind declarata boala mentala sau schizomistie. Detinutii de constiinta, internati in azile psihiatrice, erau supusi unor tratamente abuzive, in virtutea bolii care li se fabrica si care era numita "schizofrenie atipica". Nemairecunoscand termenul de detinut politic, statele comuniste preferau sa-si interneze opozantii si disidentii in azile psihiatrice, cu justificarea ca "nebunii" ("indivizi periculosi din punct de vedere social", cum scria in fisele lor medicale) trebuiau calmati si reeducati! Ca virtual reeeducat, Alexandru aerban este testat psihologic, pentru a i se detecta radacinile comportamentului antisocial, fiind mai apoi supus unei terapii auditive intensive si unei gimnastici faciale a entuziasmului. Centrul de reeducare este condus de o femeie-comisar, tovarasa Mardare, care are ca subordonati o serie de medici-gardieni, tot cu alura de diavoli, dar nu bufi si hatri, ci ispititori si reeducatori (precum doctoral Bentan, cel care ii este repartizat lui Alexandru aerban). Scopul acestui centru de reeducare este sa-i faca pe antisociali si disidenti sa invete sa aplaude fericiti, ca niste roboti (aplauzele sunt de diferite tipuri: reticente, entuziaste, aclamative, cu urale, obosite, sacadate, prelungite s.a.m.d.), pe aceasta cale realizandu-se o "spalare a creierului" de tip auditiv. Securistul tipic a fost surclasat de medicul-reeducator. Evadand din azilul psihiatric, unde reeducarea nu fusese izbutita asupra lui, Alexandru aerban descopera ca oamenii aflati in libertate sunt, cu totii deja (cateva exceptii exista, totusi), niste reeducati performanti. Desi romanul Playback de Stelian Tanase a fost publicat in 1995 (Bucuresti, Editura Fundatiei Culturale Romane), el a fost terminat in 1983. Autorul urmareste, intr-o galerie ampla de portrete, diferite tipuri de securisti, inserand povesti despre carieristi si mercenari, pe cateva studii de caz, urmarind, in paralel, si ramificatiile delatiunii din societatea romaneasca dinainte de perioada de liberalizare, adica la sfarsitul obsedantului deceniu. Realitatea imediata si concreta, constata un 133

membru al aparatului de represiune din roman, este o "mina de aur", in care informatorii se cuvin a fi raspanditi, pentru a stoarce "interesantul" din oamenii care par banali, dar care, de fapt, nu sunt. "Denuntul este ca masturbatia, o boala a copilariei, precum stangismul pentru proletariat", strecoara, la un moment dat, autorul, infatisand ierarhia bine stabilita a delatorilor: mici, medii si marcanti. Stelian Tanase califica securistii drept "diavoli fara cornite si copite", dar care propun, fara drept de apel, pactul de colaborare intre victima si calau. Cu alte cuvinte, securistii sunt diavoli decazuti, dar obstinati si inteligenti, totusi: pentru a innobila tradarea victimelor lor si incheierea pactului, ei le propun acestora statutul de "duhovnici" ai populatiei supravegheate. Personajul securistului Copilu, un strateg insidios, ridica delatiunea la rang de act teologic, pactul constand, dupa cum marturiseste un posibil delator, in cedarea sufletului pentru cateva cuvinte goale. Nu in zadar apare amintit Cicikov, personajul din Suflete moarte de Gogol: securistii vor sa fie niste culegatori de suflete vii pe care, prin pact, le preschimba in suflete moarte. Trimiterea simbolica a autorului este si la un timp preapocaliptic, in care Diavolul este manipulator si eminenta cenusie a aparatului de represiune; dar un manipulator care seamana cu un "gainar" si escroc, un Diavol decazut care poate juca, la un moment dat, inclusiv roluri simpatice, captand bunavointa victimelor; Stelian Tanase il vede ca pe un negociator dupa legea cererii si a ofertei. Trifu, cel asupra caruia se incearca racolarea ca informator, recunoaste ca propunerea de delatiune i-a inculcat "bucuria de a face rau" si "libertatea de a-ti casuna pe cineva", intrucat libertatea poate deveni in acest caz "instrument de tortura". Din fericire, pana la urma, Trifu se va autodenunta, ca sa scape de povara de a ajunge delator. Cum am spus, deja, galeria securistilor este nuantata si ampla. Exista, mai intai, anchetatorii zelosi, pervertiti complet de gustul puterii, care ii verifica si supravegheaza pana si pe membrii nomenclaturii. Exista, apoi, securisti radicali, rigizi, intepeniti in morga lor cazona, care infiltreaza in fiecare cerc un delator de serviciu si care au predispozitie pentru umilirea victimelor. Exista si blazatii pur si simplu. Dar si analistii cu sange rece, care poseda fisele psihologice ale celor pe care ii supravegheaza, scanandu-le acestora trasaturile de caracter, viciile, si alegand punctul slab, pentru a ataca si a propune colaborarea. Exista, apoi, "hedonisti" carora le face placere sa simta frica victimei si sa se joace cu ea. Acestia sunt teoreticienii care ravnesc sa instituie o ierarhie a delatiunii (se poate turna din bucuria de a face rau, din teama, din santaj, din oportunism), considerandu-se a fi niste stapani care fac si desfac destinele muritorilor (ei inalta sau coboara social-politic un individ); subtextul dominatiei lor este acela ca raul mentine echilibrul psihic. Exista, apoi, "boxerii", practicienii-batausi, si creierele torturii care gandesc maltratarea fizica de soc, urmata apoi de hartuiala, pana cand victima cedeaza. ai exista fosti calai, deveniti posibile victime, care inrudesc figura securistului cu aceea unui gunoier, constientizand structura moral-scatologica a membrilor aparatului de represiune. Ciudatenii umane pot fi inregistrate si printre cadrele securiste: este cazul radiofonistului care asculta si inregistreaza telefoanele banuitilor "dusmani ai poporului" si care, daca si-ar fi urmat chemarea, s-ar fi facut muzician, intrucat are un simt auditiv de exceptie. Pentru acesta, telefoanele ascultate reprezinta un Turn Babel, adica insasi Lumea, ele facandu-l sa se simta nu doar stapan, ci si initiat. La nivel de generatii in represiune, membrii "varstei de aur" ai securismului se plang ca noua generatie nu mai are rafinamentul si histrionismul intemeietorilor, cei din urma fiind matematici, exacti si fara afecte, adica reprezentand, as spune, "varsta de argint". Noua generatie nu mai are fler in represiune, ci doar instructie tehnica avansata. De aceea, presimtind ca perioada "batranilor" se va incheia curand, un astfel de veteran pregateste dosare de santaj ale maimarilor zilei, pentru a fi pensionat onorabil si nu inculpat pentru abuzurile sale in represiunea survenita odata cu instaurarea comunismului in Romania. Mircea Cartarescu isi plaseaza in perioada de liberalizare personajul securistului Ion Stanila din romanul Orbitor (Bucuresti, Editura Humanitas, 1996). inainte de a face portretul acestuia, autorul clasifica, la randul lui, securistii in doua tipuri si doua generatii antitetice. Pe de o parte exista "zbirii vulgari", "batranii" stalinisti care practicasera tortura in mod plebeu in primii ani ai comunismului romanesc, si care erau niste "tarani pe care uniforma nu voia sa stea nicicum". Pe de alta parte exista "junii papitoi", cum ii numesc veteranii, cu aere de intelectuali imbracati impecabil, avand ca prototip spionul performant de tipul unui Poirot corcit cu James Bond. Cei din urma sunt niste tehnicieni crezand in rolul lor mesianic si ravnind sa preschimbe Romania intr-un miracol comunist. Ca tehnicieni performanti, acestia practicau, in majoritatea cazurilor, spionajul industrial, dar se ocupau, de pilda, si de o clinica-laborator unde cetateni semanand fizic cu Ceausescu deveneau, prin operatie 134

estetica, sosii ale dictatorului, disparand din viata reala; sau aveau misiunea de a supraveghea in mod autorizat constructii stranii -tunele sau buncare. Ion Stanila este un securist care a cunoscut, prin familia sa, abuzurile regimului comunist: un frate mutilat in timpul colectivizarii, parintii-tarani carora le-a fost confiscata averea; cu toate acestea, el se simte norocos ca membru al aparatului de represiune, parvenind si prin intermediul nevestei sale, o propagandista mercenara in ritualurile dogmatice ale comunismului. Principalul atu structural al lui Stanila este viclenia taraneasca: aceasta il fereste si de rivalitatile celorlalti securisti, dar si de afacerile murdare (tortura, de pilda) in care un membru al aparatului de represiune ar ramane manjit pentru totdeauna, fiind santajabil. Munca sa de rutina consta in recrutarea de informatori si panoramarea delatiunilor acestora, majoritatea bazate pe bancuri politice (acestea fiind, dupa cum recunoaste personajul, create chiar de Securitate si raspandite, cu diferite nuante, in toate tarile din Est). Stanila este scos din rutina sa de catre implicarea in decamuflarea unei conspiratii a circarilor care, la balciuri, iarmaroace si targuri (pe intreg teritoriul tarilor din lagarul sovietic) ar fi desfasurat o activitate subversiva. Personajul este repartizat ca actant intr-un astfel de balci, unde i se pare ca descopera un complot extraterestru impotriva comunismului. Internat intr-un azil psihiatric, Stanila trece prin faze de semi-spalare a creierului precum victimele noii generatii de tehnicieni-securisti, colegii sai, fiindu-i injectat inclusiv celebrul "drog al adevarului", care inovase metodele de interogatoriu fara tortura. Chiar daca va reveni la realitate si va fi reintegrat in structurile Securitatii, Ion Stanila devine un securist schismatic, un dedublat. Desi autorul nu da o explicatie morala a preschimbarii personajului, in subsidiar poate fi valabila ideea ca Stanila a fost pedepsit pentru mercenariatul sau securist, intrucat rolul sau ar fi trebuit sa fie, de fapt, de victima. Securitatea devine si mai amanuntit infatisata in textele care prezinta structurile acesteia atat inainte cat si dupa 1989. Un studiu de caz il poate oferi romanul Quo Vadis Domine? (Bucuresti, Editura Humanitas, 1993) de Mihai Sin. Personajul Dominic Vanga, un frontierist, cercetator in fizica atomica si jurnalist ocazional, este anchetat, testat si racolat de Securitatea anului 1988, care pregateste momentul decembrie 1989. "Antrenorii" lui Vanga sunt securisti de diverse tipuri. Cel dintai este maiorul Murza, care alterneaza intre duritate fizica fata de victima si bonomie mimata. Murza este nici rudimentar, nici rafinat, muncind la intretinerea mitului Securitatii, sprijinita pe o piramida de informatori al caror numar nici chiar temuta institutie nu il cunoaste. El ii declara victimei sale si, se presupune, viitorului lider politic homunculus care va fi obtinut in eprubeta asa-zisei revolutii, ca Securitatea il poate manipula si controla inclusiv pe Ceausescu (prin informatii confectionate si adevaruri cosmetizate), aripa reformatoare a aparatului de represiune optand penntru un traseu distinct de acela al dictaturii clasice si rigide. Lectia lui Murza se doreste a fi usor de invatat: exista securisti zelosi, profund ceausisti, si securisti in expectativa (precum Murza); dar cu totii sunt niste actori si histrioni. Institutia nu mai practica tortura, ci doar bataia, iar aceasta este variata: exista brute ("boxerii"), precauti si rafinati. Unii sunt decenti, altii sunt aroganti si fara limite in aplicarea discretionara a puterii. Securitatea este, de fapt, o secta deasupra puterii dictatorului, dat fiind ca are specialisti in diferite domenii ("parohii"). Tehnica aparatului de represiune este compromiterea tuturor romanilor prin ramificarea delatiunii; dar este folosita si tehnica santajului patriotic in virtutea careia o dictatura pur romaneasca este preferabila unei noi invazii sovietice. Alaturi de anchetatorii rafinati si creierele represiunii, exista robotii obedienti si robotii patimasi (care isi urasc animalic victimele). in general,"baietii" (securistii prefera aceasta porecla juvenila, care ar sugera perenitatea, vesnica tinerete a aparatului de represiune) se doresc a fi membrii unei secte de atleti ai supravegherii si raspandirii suspiciunii. Asa cum ii analizeaza, insa, sub lupa Dominic Vanga, securistii nu par sa apartina vreunei natii, fiind niste apatrizi care recunosc o singura autoritate, anume Securitatea ca matrie si natiune. Al doilea "antrenor" al lui Dominic Vanga este colonelul Coldea, un securist mic-burghez si manierat, care admite el insusi ca este cameleonic, adaptandu-se situatiei in functie de victimele sale. Coldea sustine ca Securitatea este o institutie secretoasa, care isi reinnoieste continuu tainele, astfel incat marturisirile demistificatoare ale unui Pacepa sunt depasite, dat fiind ca fiecare membru cunoaste doar departamentul de care apartine si pionul urmator in ierarhia represiva, fiind o simpla veriga in lant. Coldea ii marturiseste lui Vanga ca diferitele acte de curaj disident fata de dictatura au fost ingaduite pentru a fi scrutate in mod adecvat si profesionist nemultumirile si tipul de gandire al celor recalcitranti. Tot colonelul explica necesitatea pactului intre agresori si victima: Vanga nu va fi torturat 135

si nu va cunoaste detentia indelungata, intrucat este santajabil si, deci, remodelabil; prin pact, Vanga va deveni omul Securitatii, nu in sensul de delator, ci de lider confectionat, antrenat in eventualitatea unei schimbari de garda in structura dictaturii. Personajului i se atrage atentia ca Securitatea pedepseste doua lucruri: tradarea si iresponsabilitatea. Principala tehnica de control a aparatului de represiune este sistemul piramidal al delatiunii, care a devenit metoda de existenta (inclusiv carciuma a devenit o institutie inregimentata, pentru supravegherea si controlul populatiei). Treptat, Dominic Vanga este scrutat, ca un cobai, de diferite esaloane ale Securitatii, travestit si purtat incognito la un loc conspirativ al aripii reformatoare care vrea sa rastoarne regimul Ceausescu. Complotistii sunt, in aparenta, securisti impecabili, fideli dictatorului. Cladirea lor are o arhitectura mistificatoare, cu incaperi triplate, ascunzatori secrete si un tunel de evacuare. Aici, lui Vanga i se destainuie solutia puciului anticeausist, reteaua de conspiratori (acestia isi spun membrii ai grupului de rezistenta -imitand, la nivel terminologic, rezistenta anticomunista din muntii Romaniei- si nu se cunosc intre ei decat partial), fiind condusa de un General. Fata de Securitatea traditionala, conspiratorii militeaza pentru o modernizare a institutiei care ar putea fi reformata, dar care nu va disparea niciodata, fiind necesara oricand. De aceea, in complot sunt angrenati si indivizi imaculati, dinafara Securitatii, care ar putea deveni liderii Romaniei viitoare, sustinuta de aripa progresista a aparatului de represiune. in vederea puciului, securistii nu racoleaza si antreneaza anticomunisti notorii (acestia nu ar fi acceptat nici un fel de colaborare cu Securitatea si nici o eventuala impartire a securistilor, in "buni" si "rai"), ci doar de rangul doi sau trei, precum Vanga. Pana la urma, Vanga accepta pactul cu Diavolul, ca pion pastrat in rezerva si propulsat, mai tarziu, la putere, dupa caderea lui Ceausescu. impreuna cu alti anticeausisti, el va trai intr-o casa conspirativa, in care fiecare cobaiuman reprezinta un individ dintr-o anumita sfera socio-politica si culturala. Dupa modelarea lor in laborator, cobaii isi vor juca, fiecare, rolul politic in cacealmaua de dupa instaurarea noului regim. (Din pacate, desi un aplicat studiu de caz pe Securitate, romanul lui Mihai Sin este rudimentar si plat ca scriitura.) in romanul Viata pe fuga (Bucuresti, Editura Sirius, 1998), Mirela Roznoveanu se concentreaza pe intrigile Politiei secrete in timpul evenimentelor din decembrie 1989, apoi, dupa 1989, pe reactivarea ei, in cazul Pietei Universitatii din 1990, al celei dintai mineriade (cu molestarea si uciderea anticomunistilor), in discreditarea opozitiei politice care protesta impotriva abuzurilor de putere ale primului presedinte postdecembrist, Ion Iliescu, si in monitorizarea reinfiltrarilor securiste in cazul ziarului "Romania libera". (in paranteza fie spus, despre Valea Jiului, ca butoi cu pulbere al Romaniei, populata de mineri manipulati de resturile fostei Securitati care a instrumentat, prin agenti secreti, evenimentele din 13-15 iunie 1990, apar date relevante si in Prea tirziu, de Rasvan Popescu -cu un argument de Lucian Pintilie, Bucuresti, Editura Humanitas, 1996.) Sistemul delatiunii a ramas valabil si dupa 1989, este concluzia acestui roman, anonimele, amenintarile, santajul, constituind aceleasi metode ale Securitatii de odinioara, chiar daca travestita. Autoarea speculeaza, de asemenea, asupra rolului Securitatii in asasinarea lui Ioan Petru Culianu si in sicanarea regelui Mihai in calatoriile si conferintele sale occidentale. Pacepa este, si el, un personaj ambiguu, caruia autoarea ii gaseste o noua inregimentare in secta Securitatii, dar a uneia care depaseste statutul sau romanesc. De specificat, personajele nu apar sub numele lor din realitatea istorica, dar identitatea lor este transparenta. in flash-uri, Mirela Roznoveanu prezinta si structura Securitatii din preajma lui decembrie 1989, care, pe langa latura sa represiva, se comporta ca o inalta societate oculta, posedand fiinte si obiecte simbolice. Trei sunt acestea: astfel, in custodia Securitatii se afla magiciana si vizionara Dokia, ale carei preziceri il iritasera pe Ceausescu, drept care, arestata si supusa torturii, magiciana fusese silita sa-i impartaseasca dictatorului tainele nemuririi; tot supravegheat si cu domiciliu fortat in propria-i manastire este Marele Sihastru, un calugar si profet anticomunist; nu in ultimul rand, Securitatea poseda o Biblioteca Interzisa, un depozit subteran care adaposteste carti anticomuniste, erezii comuniste, manuscrise sau, pur si simplu, carti neingaduie de comunisti (aceasta biblioteca nu poate fi suprimata, incendiata, intrucat ea este un organism viu care se apara, ratacindu-si prin subterane agresorii). in ultima faza ceausista a comunismului, Securitatea nu mai tortura si nu mai ucidea brutal, ci iradia nonconformistii si disidentii, executandu-i "curat" (in anumite cazuri, Securitatea "sinucidea", totusi, victimele, aruncandu-le de la etaj). Iradierea demonstra, sustine un securist "progresist" din roman, ca victima era un vanat de pret. in perioada premergatoare lui decembrie 1989, disidentii nu 136

mai scriau texte inrudite cu romanul obsedantului deceniu ("Adevaruri palide, drame soptite pentru a nu fi cenzurate", care alcatuiau "o cultura a subintelesurilor, provincializata prin ezoterismul aluziilor''), ci texte care discutau represiunea ca atare. intr-un astfel de manuscris "dusmanos", este narata atmosfera de represiune si de demolari activata prin proiectarea ansamblului arhitectonic mamut al Casei Poporului, dar este pusa in discutie si chestiunea fenomenului Pitesti (chiar daca acesta nu este numit ca atare), in relatia vicioasa dintre victima si calau: "calaul care lacrima rugandu-si victima sa-l inteleaga ca trebuie sa ucida sau victima care se lasa ucisa intelegand si acceptand ratiunile calaului?" Principala demonstratie a romanului Viata pe fuga ramane, insa, analiza asasinatului lui Ioan Petru Culianu, instrumentata de catre o societate conspirativa care urmarea sa stopeze viziunile politice profetice ale lui Culianu, societate dirijata de Securitate, aceasta ravnind sa fie nu doar un centru de putere care manipuleaza Lumea, ci chiar un centru mistic-ocult, al carui omfalos se afla in Romania. Ma voi ocupa acum de doi tineri autori de teatru, Radu Macrinici si Horia Garbea, care au tratat, in ultimii ani, chestiunea Securitatii, intr-un mod transant si chiar revelatoriu, as spune, intrucat analiza lor a mizat pe o dezinhibata radiografie a relatiei dintre victima si calau si pe un portret concret al securistului-tortionar. Perceptia celor doi autori este una neviciata de tabu-uri sau de false mituri, avand o prospetime absurd-suprarealista, in primul caz, antiutopica in cel de-al doilea, in ceea ce priveste imaginea Securitatii. in tara mea (Bucuresti, Editura Unitext, 1998), Radu Macrinici pune pe tapet povestea unui tortionar comunist din ultima faza a ceausismului, pentru care tortura era transpusa simbolic-cinic in denumirea de "jertfa", iar cladirea Securitatii si odaia de schingiuire, prin intermediul aceluiasi jargon specializat, devenisera un "templu". Tortionarul din piesa lui Macrinici se doreste a fi un profesionist al trupului, drept care studiaza patimas atlasul de anatomie pentru a ajunge expert in tortura, refuzand uciderea victimei din greseala. Acest securist se antreneaza ca tehnician al torturii cu propria-i sotie, ravnind sa devina un schingiuitor desavarsit. Antrenamentul in familie este posibil cu atat mai mult cu cat tortionarul, sotia si fetita sa locuiesc chiar in camera de schingiuire, rudele fiind evacuate din celula doar in clipa in care calaului ii sunt repartizate victime. Pentru a acoperi tipetele acestora, tortionarul asculta romante (nu muzica simfonica precum tortionarii sovietici si nazisti, nici muzica rock sau disco precum alti tortionari din a doua jumatate a secolului XX). Totusi, in ciuda "profesionismului" sau, securistul ucide un om, fapt care ii dovedeste ca nu este un tehnician perfect. Din acest moment, el constientizeaza conditia sa de faptura imorala si decazuta si, odata cu evenimentele din decembrie 1989, se ascunde vinovat, pentru a nu da socoteala pentru meseria sa. Piesa se incheie cu primele alegeri libere din Romania, cand fostul securist si tortionar este reactivat pentru a participa la evacuarea violenta a Pietei Universitatii, din 1990. Interesant in piesa lui Macrinici este si felul in care sotia tortionarului accepta masochist schingiuirile-experiment propuse de partenerul sau de viata, pe care le percepe ca pe un afrodisiac excentric, sau felul in care fetita tortionarului ajunge sa constientizeze impostura imaginii Romaniei pe care regimul comunist o proiecta ca pe o matrie absoluta, mancurtizand copiii prin slogane. Aceasta fetita reprezinta, in mod simbolic, chiar generatia politica a lui Macrinici si Garbea si, probabil, a mea. Horia Garbea este si mai radical in Decembrie, in direct (Bucuresti, Editura Allfa, 1999), prezentand schimbarea rolurilor dintre calau si victima. Personajele sunt doua si previzibile: Anchetatorul (securistul) si Prizonierul (disidentul, fiu al unui membru al nomenclaturii). Anchetatorul recunoaste ca tortureaza in virtutea unui contract si ca, in calitate de profesionist al schingiuirii, va obtine marturia victimei sale in cateva ore. Sunt criminal, fiindca asta mi-e meseria, admite Anchetatorul (care este un boxer ratat). Prizonierul are, insa, ambitia de a-i dovedi calaului sau ca acesta este manipulat ca o marioneta. Mai mult chiar, victima ravneste sa-si converteasca si sa-si ilumineze calaul, devenind chiar ea manipulatoarea tortionarului sau: drept care ii propune sa se alieze si sa devina parteneri. in preajma evenimentelor din decembrie 1989 (se subintelege), calaul isi elibereaza victima, ambii participand la miscarile de strada impotriva dictaturii. Dar, din aceasta clipa, fosta victima devine acuzatoarea fostului calau. Pentru fostul prizonier politic, Securitatea este o institutie care trebuie pastrata, intrucat este folositoare in orice regim, ca oficiu de control profilactic si supraveghere. in viziunea fostei victime, tortionarii comunisti care i-au ucis pe disidenti sunt niste profesionisti, in timp ce fostul sau anchetator care l-a eliberat este un tradator si un ratat, fiindca a pactizat cu victima. De aceea, ca viitor lider politic, in urma evenimentelor din decembrie 1989, fosta victima nu il va credita pe cel care a salvat-o, dovedindu-se mai cinica decat fostul sau tortionar. Cel din urma devine, in mod concret, 137

victima, fiind schingiuit pana la moarte de fosta sa victima, incadrata dupa revolutie, ca tortionar profesionist in Securitatea reformata. Paradoxul si morala-antimorala a piesei lui Horia Garbea este aceea ca victima, pusa in conditii de tortionar, se dovedeste a fi mai dura, mai calau, decat tortionarul sau. Aceasta inseamna ca granitele dintre victima si calau sunt sterse si ca, in ultima instanta, experimentul reeducarii din inchisoarea Pitesti (1949-1952), cand victimele erau silite sa devina tortionari, a reusit. Antimorala piesei lui Garbea este, insa, cu atat mai dura cu cat, aici, victima devine tortionar, fara sa fie obligata. O face din vocatie revelata, cum s-ar spune. O scurta concluzie este de la sine inteles, dupa aceasta panorama tematica a romanului romanesc. Mai intai, aceea ca imaginea Securitatii l-a preocupat, chiar obsedat, in anumite cazuri, pe scriitorul roman, el neputand sa se detaseze, totusi, de chiar mitul pe care insusi aparatul de represiune l-a raspandit in randurile poporului roman: Securitatea ca societate oculta, atotputernica, manipulatoare a constiintei colective si individuale. Mai toti scriitorii pe care i-am analizat in acest eseu au punctat, in textele lor, o arhitectura a delatiunii raspandita la nivelul intregului popor roman. Aceasta a fost, poate, constanta organizationala a Securitatii: dirijarea unui sistem piramidal al fricii si al turnatoriei prin care sa poata fi controlat si supravegheat profilactic un intreg popor. De la aceasta arhitectura a delatiunii porneste si concluzia mea, aceea ca, daca fenomenul Pitesti a esuat la nivel fizic, el a izbutit la nivel mental si moral: reeducarea poporului roman a reusit in cele din urma, chiar daca nu intr-o forma brutala, ci intruna mentala, relativ rafinata. De aceea, e timpul sa fie initiata contrareeducarea si deconstructia "spalarii creierului". Poate ca romanul romanesc din mileniul trei va face acest lucru.

HORVTH ANDOR AUTORUL IN DISCURSUL POSTCOMUNIST

The author in the postcommunist discourse Abstract: The article discusses the general tendencies in the Romanian postcommunist literary criticism highlighting the (social) importance of the author, a phenomenon that causes the lack of interest in fiction. Keywords: Romania; Romanian literature; communist; authorship Istoria in care am trait a fost o fictiune. Istoria in care am trait devine o fictiune. Care din cele doua afirmatii este mai aproape de adevar? Dar care adevar: cel al istoriei sau cel al fictiunii? A trai in istorie, nu este, cu siguranta, o fictiune. A o rememora, a o povesti insa este, cu certitudine, si fictiune. Odata consumata, prin cresterea caracterului ei de exterioritate - arata Paul Ricoeur - istoria trebuie de fapt reinvatata chiar si pentru cei care au trait-o1. Ne familiarizam, sub forma unei repovestiri, cu propria noastra istorie. Are loc un proces de initiere in propriul nostru destin, in propriile noastre trairi din trecut. Istoria nu se rescrie ci se reinventeaza. Dar istoria, inclusiv cea a comunismului, a fost deja inventata odata sub forma de text. Nu o singura data, ci chiar de doua ori. Prima data in acele texte premonitorii care ii anuntau venirea. A doua oara in textele care o infatisau ca prezenta intr-o idealitate si o eternitate imaginare. Aragon povesteste la un 138

moment dat istoria rupturii sale cu Andr Breton si cu miscarea suprarealista. Breton, spune el, se afla la inceput mai la stanga ca el. Il entuziasmase sintagma, folosita de Stalin intr-un discurs indreptat impotriva lui Trotki si in care vorbea despre "construirea socialismului intr-o singura tara". Desi este foarte probabil, adauga Aragon, ca mai mult decat ideea ca atare, pe Breton il captiva caracterul de litanie al expresiei, al repetarii ei in discursul amintit2. Textul se inscrie in istorie sub chipul pervers al tezei si al melodiei, al vointei si al imaginii. Ramanand inca la episodul suprarealist, este interesant de rememorat ca Aragon atribuie gestul sau de a fi aderat in 1926 la partidul comunist, interventiei militare a Frantei in Maroc care il revoltase si fata de care numai partidul comunist luase o atitudine de condamnare. Acesta este si momentul cand, indemnat de Breton, el citeste cu atentie literatura ganditorilor politici sovietici. Aragon isi povesteste viata lui Dominique Arban in 1968 - an istoric si acesta, dupa care incepe de fapt si pentru el o alta istorie, o noua rescriere a istoriei3. Suprarealismul a fost locul privilegiat de jonctiune in secolul 20 dintre text, autor si istorie. Citez un fragment din celebra scrisoare deschisa a suprarealistilor catre Paul Claudel: "Peu nous importe la cration. Nous souhaitons de toutes nos forces que les rvolutions, les guerres et les insurrections coloniales viennent anantir cette civilisation occidentale dont vous dfendez jusqu'en Orient la vermine et nous appelons cette destruction comme l'tat de choses le moins inacceptable pour l'esprit. Il ne saurait y avoir pour nous ni quilibre ni grand art. Voici dja longtemps que l'ide de Beaut s'est rassise. Il ne reste debout qu'une ide morale, a savoir par exemple qu'on ne peut etre a la fois ambassadeur de France et poete"4. Sa remarcam mai intai o ciudata dedublare a textului la suprarealisti, valabila si pentru alte curente de avangarda. Nici opera lui Balzac, nici cea a lui Baudelaire nu se compun din texte poetice ori de fictiune pe de o parte si prefete, manifeste, scrisori si interventii publicistice de aceeasi dimensiune si greutate pe de alta parte. Sesizam in aceasta dedublare caracterul ambiguu al pozitiei de avangarda: fie contextualitate absoluta, un referential direct, explicit, indreptat intentionat catre actiune, fie stergerea totala a oricarei referentialitati in textul poetic. Fie ultimele consecinte, mergand pana la autodistrugere, ale textului auto-suficient, fie postura poetului care urca pe baricade. Cum insa istoria nu admite a la longue ambiguitatea, cele doua directii vor tinde spre o coerenta univoca si va trebui ca poetul sa aleaga in curand intre ceea ce se numea angajare sociala si intre universul poeziei conceput ca text in sine, fara repere contextuale si istorice. in mod inevitabil, in coordonatele istorice ale modernitatii, textul si autorul fac obiectul a doua recuperari antagonice: ori in directia unui semnificat extra-estetic si a unei finalitati sociale, ori in cea a saturatiei estetice autoreferentiale. "Atunci cand Andr Breton, intotdeauna activ, dar mai putin vigilent, lasa o expozitie a suprarealismului sa se transforme intr-o manifestatie pariziana care ii anima pe toti cronicarii mondeni, ce invatatura putem trage din cel mai important eveniment literar al acestei jumatati de secol? in primul rand, faptul ca pe planul revendicarii sociale, al agresiunii revolutionare, societatea a infrant radicalismul suprarealist. Cum a fost posibil acest lucru?"5 intrebarea ii apartine lui Maurice Pleynet, iar raspunsul pe care o propune pune in discutie, in termenii filozofiei progresului, relatia dintre istorie si ruptura, dintre "constiinta istoriei" si "constiinta in istorie"6. Iata, in exemplul citat, o forma de recuperare in negativ, am spune, de catre istorie, a gestului artistic. Pe celalalt versant: recuperarea pozitiva, adica cea conforma cu intentiile si optiunile actantului, ale autorului. in sensul acesta istoria moderna recupereaza intr-un fel sau altul orice actiune auctoriala. intre a oficia o parada a modei sau un meeting revolutionar, diferenta este de grad si de nuanta, dar nu de esenta. Numai textul este - daca este - nerecuperabil de catre istorie. Asistam la noi, de mai bine de zece ani, la rescrierea istoriei, inclusiv a istoriei literare. Dar ce se rescrie de fapt cand se vorbeste de istorie literara? Istoria institutiilor sau a canoanelor estetice? Istoria textelor sau cea a biografiei autorilor? Cum se rescrie, prin aceste incercari, istoria propriu zisa, cum se construiesc adica, prin investigarea trecutului, proiectii si imagini ale viitorului? 139

Ma voi folosi in continuare de una dintre multele definitii ale modernitatii tarzii, cea, de o mare concizie, pe care o datoram lui Grard Granel. Cu decenii in urma - observa el - generalul de Gaulle spunea cu indreptatire: "l'Europe, et sa fille, l'Amrique", astazi insa termenii acestei sintagme trebuie inversati, astfel ca avem motive sa spunem "l'Amrique, et l'Europe, sa fille", deoarece Lumea Noua este teritoriul unde s-a realizat jonctiunea dintre cele trei componente ale modernitatii. Acestea sunt, conform definitiei ganditorului, urmatoarele: in primul rand "interpretarea subiectivitatii crestine in termenii unei subiectivitati egologice (subjectivit gologique) a persoanei umane, opera a spiritului protestant". Pretul acestei componente este ablatia (l'ablation) oricarei rezerve mistice si, implicit, disparitia oricarei legaturi posibile dintre subiectul modern si "umanitatile naturale" (humanits naturelles) izvorate din religia crestina. Cea de-a doua componenta este desavarsirea "determinarii corpului social drept corp de productie", ceea ce inseamna ca sfera economica devine independenta de domeniul politic si, prin consecinta, de cel etic. in sfarsit, Granel identifica cea de-a treia componenta a modernitatii in asimilarea si adoptarea de catre stiinta insasi a "logicii dezvoltarii" 6. Invocam, fara a intra in detalii de interpretare, aceste consideratii pentru a circumscrie miza discursului critic postcomunist. Rescrierea istoriei literare constituie un capitol important al acestui discurs tocmai pentru ca el se intersecteaza in mod inevitabil cu istoria. Lectura institutiilor culturale din timpul comunismului, a evolutiei literaturii si artei contureaza, in mod implicit, raspunsuri la problematica modernitatii. Ipoteza de lucru de la care vom porni la inceputul acestor randuri este urmatoarea: deconstructia trecutului recent in discursul postcomunist din Romania tradeaza unele semne de neintelegere si de neacceptare a modernitatii, asa cum o concepem in acord cu definitia citata mai inainte. Obiectul de cercetare a istoriei literaturii are o multime de definitii. El poate include, dupa preferinte, istoria institutiilor sau a canoanelor, etapele succesive ale receptarii sau evolutia stilurilor, a genurilor si a curentelor literare etc. Discursul postcomunist din Romania rescrie in ultimii zece ani istoria literaturii cu o vadita preferinta pentru persoana autorului. Textul, operele au intrat intr-o penumbra a dezafectarii care prevesteste fie uitarea deplina si irevocabila, fie o reinterpretare care nu-si gaseste inca orizontul. Fascicolele de lumina sunt indreptate cu insistenta catre autor. Care era statutul sau in regimul comunist? Cine l-a creat si cum s-a impus el? Care era gradul de libertate de care dispunea, cu ce fel de constrangeri se confrunta el? Tot atatea intrebari justificate si pertinente ce privesc problema auctoritatii dar si cea, mult mai larga, a autoritatii ca atare. Sunt postulate de obicei, in reconstituirile critice ale perioadei comuniste, doua ipostaze din trecut ale autorului: cea de victima si cea de colaborator, respectiv de scriitor angajat. intre aceste doua ipostaze sunt situate, in studii de specialitate, alte tipologii comportamentale, cum ar fi cele subsumate notiunii generice de "rezistenta prin cultura", sub forma literaturii de evaziune, de disidenta si de subversiune. Consistenta oricaruia dintre acesti termeni este reala si ea poate fi argumentata suficient de solid. Simptomatica mi se pare totusi insistenta cu care critica postcomunista isi focalizeaza atentia pe efortul de clasificare a acestei tipologii, preferand unei istorii literare a textelor literare ample dezbateri consacrate autorilor. (Dintre multele exemple se pot aminti: Jurnalul lui Mircea Zaciu, polemicile provocate de scrierile memorialistice ale lui Paul Goma, volumul de cronici literare Unde scurte de Monica Lovinescu.) Traim asadar examenul retrospectiv sub forma unei ere a autorului. Nu poate fi, bineinteles, pusa sub semnul intrebarii legitimitatea unor reparatii morale fata de scriitori persecutati si interzisi. Cum de altfel cu greu poate fi contestata si rostirea unor adevaruri incomode pe seama unor personalitati cu biografii cosmetizate, trunchiate, pana la urma false. Clasificari ale literaturii dupa gradul de rezistenta a autorului la presiunile ideologiei oficiale pot fi, de asemenea, de folos in efortul de interpretare si de sistematizare a epocii studiate. Cu toate acestea o atare supradimensionare a autorului in rescrierea istoriei literare prezinta cateva carente si comporta anumite urmari discutabile. As include printre ele urmatoarele: 1. Ea personalizeaza in mod excesiv ideea de literatura. Publicului ii este sugerata in mod consecvent senzatia ca literatura este autorul plus opera. 2. Ea creeaza confuzie in privinta raportului dintre autor si opera, inducand falsa impresie ca ar exista o relatie directa intre comportamentul moral al autorului si valoarea estetica a operei literare. 3. Ea atribuie vietii literare infatisarea unui camp de lupta unde cei drepti se confrunta cu cei rai, cei vii cu cei morti, cei ce apartin trecutului cu cei ce reprezinta viitorul, aceste adversitati fiind intr-un fel consubstantiale cu conditia de scriitor. 140

Dincolo insa de aceste insuficiente, fenomenele aratate ni se par problematice prin consecintele lor de ordin mai general. Ma refer in primul rand la dificultatea unei interpretari adecvate a asa numitei literaturi angajate sau, mai larg, a locului scriitorului si artistului in regimul comunist, iar prin prisma aceasta la imaginea epocii comuniste ca atare. Interogatii de alt gen starneste apoi lectura, intr-un cadru mai larg, a notiunii de auctoritate si de autoritate. in absenta unor studii comparate privind politicile culturale din tarile satelite ale Uniunii Sovietice dupa preluarea puterii de catre partidele comuniste din aceste tari, este greu de apreciat daca teroarea comunista prezenta diferente semnificative de la o tara la alta. Tinde, oricum, sa fie acreditata de discursul postcomunist din Romania, ideea ca la noi teroarea s-a instaurat cu o deosebita cruzime ce depasea nivelul atins in alte tari. Ca o consecinta directa a acestei teze, reprezentantii clasei politice, ai elitelor sociale si intelectuale de la noi sunt prezentati in postura de martiri supusi unei torturi deosebit de concentrate, de lunga durata si nimicitoare de catre un regim inuman si antinational. Pe de alta parte discursul postcomunist are de interpretat fenomenul unei aderente masive a scriitorilor si artistilor la ideologia noului regim si la canoanele culturii propovaduite de el. Imaginea generala care se desprinde din aceste comentarii este ca noua elita culturala s-a constituit fie sub presiunea terorii, fie ca rezultat al unei demisii morale inexplicabile, printr-un compromis dezonorant si condamnabil cu noua putere. Fara a nega realitatea si importanta acestor factori, credem ca se greseste in aceste aprecieri prin simplificare atunci cand sunt scoase din calcul motivatiile de alt ordin, cum ar fi identificarea spontana si libera cu ideologia regimului, precum si acceptarea, de buna voie, a rolului oferit de regim si numit de un comentator cel al "artistului de stat"7. Studierea mentalitatii compromisului etic, al devierii si abdicarii de la adevarata vocatie de intelectual pot imbogati cunostintele noastre privind sufletul uman, configuratia morala a semenilor nostri, ea ocoleste insa, daca e pusa in termeni gresiti, problema fundamentala, anume caracterul regimului in contextul sau istoric. A minimaliza aria de extindere a unei adeziuni libere la principile asa-numitului realism socialist si, implicit, la regimul comunist, echivaleaza cu teza potrivit careia comunismul s-a mentinut numai gratie aparatului sau represiv. Principala obiectie fata de aceasta teza nu priveste gradul de acceptare populara a regimului ci natura insasi a regimului comunist din Romania care, timp de mai bine de patru decenii nu a fost supus nici unei contestari de masa efective, nici tendintelor interne de reforma, si a supravietuit intr-o formula deosebit de dura si de dogmatica, cu un sprijin larg al unor categorii de intelectuali, inclusiv scriitori. Or, in ciuda unor clissee de larga raspandire, regimul comunist a intervenit - desigur, prin metode barbare si, de cele mai multe ori cu costuri catastrofale - in directia modernizarii Romaniei. Industrializarea si urbanizarea, intreprinse, repet, in conditii si cu consecinte dezastruoase, sunt doar doua din exemplele posibile. Pe cat de justificata este asadar condamnarea comunismului pentru crimele sale, pe atat ramane de discutabila perspectiva reintoarcerii la un trecut precomunist zugravit adeseori sub culorile unei nostalgii poetizate. Existenta unor elite de specialitate este un fapt sociologic de netagaduit in lumea moderna. Aceste elite se constituie si functioneaza insa intr-o mare independenta unele de altele, fara sa existe intre ele relatii formale de ierarhie. in sensul acesta democratia moderna este societatea unde - dupa cum arata Claude Lefort in studiile sale consacrate deosebirii dintre democratie si totalitarism - puterea nu se mai incarneaza in vreo persoana sau institutie, locul sacru din centru al regelui ramane vid, nimeni nu-si poate revendica titlul de unic depozitar al legitimitatii puterii8. Democratia moderna, cea din modernitatea tarzie, societatea in care traim, sunt lipsite de o autoritate unica, de necontestat. Democratia inseamna insasi aceasta pendulare intre diversele instante partiale, fragmentate ale legitimarii puterii: sfera juridica, sfera speculatiei intelectuale, sfera moralei practice. Din aceasta perspectiva tentativele de a directiona discursul public catre problema autorului si, in mod implicit, a autoritatii, cu greu pot fi interpretate altfel decat ca forme de cautare, mai precis, de regasire a unui centru si de identificare in acest centru a autoritatii absente. Cand scriitorii vorbesc despre ceilalti, ei vorbesc, fie si indirect, despre ei insisi. Ei o fac in calitate de autori, accentuand prin prezenta lor publica semnificatia unui apel catre autoritate. Simpatiile promonarhice ale unor scriitori si artisti sunt graitoare in aceasta privinta. Nu o invocam aici ca o optiune politica in sens restrans ci in calitatea ei de recurs direct la ideea unei autoritati incontestabile, "transistorice". La fel de bine, regandirea statutului traditional al religiei si al bisericii nu intra in discutie aici ca si forme de cautare a unor instante morale, ci numai in sensul in care, la o categorie de ganditori contemporani, ea vizeaza 141

restabilirea, in domeniul vietii publice, a unor forme ale autoritatii transcendente si absolute9. Cand spunem ca asemenea vederi pot fi catalogate drept interventii antimoderne, avem in vedere definitia lui Granel, citata mai sus, privind componentele modernitatii. Cred ca unul din paradoxurile conditiei postmoderne in general, dar cu atat mai mult in sfera postcomunista, consta in faptul ca adeziunea la modernitate are loc in conditiile unui dezacord cu multe din postulatele si perspectivele sale, fara a i se putea opune insa o alternativa mai buna. in rest: asteptam textele care sa vorbeasca nu in locul autorilor, ci pentru autori. Note 1 v. Paul Ricoeur, La mmoire, l'histoire, l'oubli. Paris, d. du Seuil, 2000. 512-513. 2 v. Aragon parle avec Dominique Arban. Paris, d. Seghers, 1968. Editia in limba maghiara, Budapesta, Europa /f.a./ 85. 3 op. cit.87. 4 v. Le Surralisme. Par Henri Bhar et Michel Carassou. Paris, Le Livre de Poche (Textes et dbats). Librairie Gnrale Francaise, 1984. 26-27. 5 v. Maurice Pleynet, "Problemele avangardei", in Pentru o teorie a textului. Antologie "Tel Quel" 1960-1971. Introducere, antologie si traducere de Adriana Babeti si Delia Sepetean-Vasiliu. Bucuresti, Ed. Univers. 1980. 432-433. 6 op. cit. 434. 6 v. Grard Granel, "L'Europe de Husserl", in crits logiques et politiques. Paris, d. Galile. 2000. 50-53. 7 cf. Mikls Haraszti, L'artiste d'tat. Paris, Fayard, 1983. 8 v. Claude Lefort, Essais sur la politique. Paris, d. du Seuil, 1986. "La dmocratie s'institue et se maintient dans la dissolution des reperes de la certitude", p. 29. 9 Cele spuse aici nu inseamna catusi de putin contestarea autoritatii institutionale, impersonale care este fundamentul societatii moderne.

CLAUDE KARNOOUH CONTINUITE ET OCCULTATION ART ET POLITIQUE EN EUROPE POSTCOMMUNISTE : L'EXEMPLE DU MUSEE DE L'ART SOCIALISTE DE BUDAPEST*

Abstract: The article studies the survival of the communist mass mentalities in Eastern Europe during the postcommunist era. Keywords: Europe; Romania; postcommunism; East-European identity Prologue

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Entre 1989 et 1997, les effets de la chute des rgimes communistes de l'Est europen ont inspir quelques films d'une rare perspicacit. Semblables aux grands romans naturalistes du XIXe siecle, chacun, conu comme une fresque, nous offre une mtaphore de ce moment inoui de notre histoire2, et, parmi ceux-ci, par son ambition, Le Voyage d'Ulysse se prsente a coup sur comme l'un des plus somptueux. Une scene servira a illustrer mon propos, celle ou le hros, un grec amricain originaire de Constanta en Roumanie, part en quete d'un pass balkanique des longtemps dchir de violents conflits entre des peuples rcemment librs de la domination ottomane, au moment ou brusquement ils accedent au statut d'tats-nations modernes. De retour dans la ville de son enfance, il entreprend de remonter le Danube depuis son embouchure jusqu'a Belgrade. La grande barge qui l'y conduit est lourdement charge d'une gigantesque statue de Lnine destine a grossir les collections d'un muse allemand. Tout au long de son chemin, le hros dfile lentement non loin des berges limoneuses du grand fleuve ; la, il rencontre des pecheurs, vieux-croyants russes venus d'un autre age, s'tonne des thories de cargos rouillant au mouillage, embrasse du regard de colossales ruines industrielles et des villages misreux, entrevoit, au sommet des rives, des gens hagards, fixant, comme hypnotiss, cet trange colosse de pierre blonde au flanc duquel un homme contemple un spectacle qui l'tonne bien plus que la dcouverte, aujourd'hui banale, d'une quelconque ile exotique. La dissonance entre l'Europe de l'Est et l'Europe de l'Ouest demeure. Entre un monde puis par un frntique dveloppement industriel et urbain et un monde qui a dja accompli la troisieme rvolution moderne - celle de l'lectronique et de l'informatique ; entre un monde ou toutes les choses du pass communiste - comme le ralisme socialiste - sont honnies et moques, et celui ou tout devient marchandise et objet de muse, le contraste perdure.3 Un Lnine fig dans sa pierre monumentale entre dans un muse occidental, tandis qu'en Europe de l'Est tous cherchent a l'oublier. En dpit d'une mutation conomique radicale, une nouvelle incarnation du contraste Est/Ouest se manifeste dans ce rapport au pass. Construction et destruction La mise en scene esthtique du pouvoir politique par lui-meme n'est pas un phnomene propre aux rgimes dictatoriaux du XXe siecle. Depuis la naissance de la civilisation urbaine, dans la cit ou se tient le centre du pouvoir, des monuments, des statues, des bas-reliefs, des peintures murales, ont reprsent, symbolis, mis en formes allgoriques et symboliques le pouvoir du moment, que des pouvoirs postrieurs ont dtruit.4 Des lors qu'il y a Cit-tat, ville royale, capitale d'un tat, quelle que soit la forme du pouvoir politique, il y a mise en scene esthtique du politique. Plus tard, le dploiement de la modernit mit en scene les reprsentations d'entits politiques et sociales abstraites : la Rpublique, la libert, l'galit, l'Etre supreme en France, la Germanie en Allemagne wilhelmienne, la Constitution, la Paix entre les peuples, telle ou telle doctrine, etc. On y vit encore la mise en ouvre de cultes de la personnalit que l'on avait cru dpasss par l'avenement de l'empire de la Raison raisonnante et raisonnable. Ainsi, allgories et symboles coexisterent avec des reprsentations plus personnalises du pouvoir. Aucun systeme politique n'y chappa, pas meme les Etats-Unis avec les sculptures des premiers prsidents de l'Union tailles au flanc du mont Skidmore. En Union sovitique, apres l'explosion des multiples avant-gardes, leur mise au pas, commence a la fin des annes 1930, puis a la fin des annes 1940 par les tats communistes d'Europe centrale et orientale, apporte de puissantes contributions a l'expansion de cette production esthtico-politique.5 Parmi elles, plus que la peinture de chevalet, le graphisme (avec des affiches ou subsistent encore des procds avant-gardistes accepts dans les annes 1940) et la statuaire, parce qu'ils sont exposs directement a la vue quotidienne des passants, parce qu'ils occupent des lieux dans la ville ou le pouvoir ralise son auto-affirmation par des crmonies qu'il organise, et explicitent ainsi plus clairement les enjeux politiques de l'esthtique. Apres 1948, la statutaire des lieux publics des pays d'Europe centrale et orientale, devenus le glacis sovitique, subit une profonde transformation, et nombre d'ouvres installes sous les anciens rgimes y furent dtruites ou soustraites au regard pour etre remplaces par de nouvelles, produites selon les canons du ralisme socialiste tel que Jdanov les fixa en 1947, apres les hsitations et les conflits des annes 1930 en Union sovitique.6 En 1989, la chute du communisme entraine une nouvelle transformation, dont les significations 143

politiques, sociales et esthtiques rvelent les nouveaux rfrents symboliques grace auxquels ces socits en " transition " s'identifient au nouveau cours " dmocratique et libral " du politique, du social, de l'conomique. Ce qui change aujourd'hui n'est pas la statuaire raliste socialiste de l'poque stalinienne. Apres le XXe Congres du PCUS, et surtout a la suite de ses effets en Europe centrale et orientale - les rvoltes et les rvolutions qui branlerent la Pologne, la R.D.A. et surtout la Hongrie - la situation se compliqua. Staline ne fit plus l'objet du culte quasi mystique qui lui tait rendu sous la forme de portraits et de statues gigantesques. On revint a Lnine et a une slection de figures de l'histoire nationale acceptables par les dogmes marxiste-lninistes - par ailleurs fluctuants - appliqus a l'histoire politique et sociale, tout en continuant a favoriser les reprsentations des acteurs collectifs privilgis de la socit communiste en construction : les divers types de " travailleurs ", l'ouvrier industriel et agricole, le soldat de l'arme populaire, le savant et l'intellectuel reconnu, le sportif, le cosmonaute. Certes, nombre de sujets demeurent d'emble exclus : bien sur les collaborateurs des rgimes fascistes ou nationalistes, mais encore les exclus de gauche ou de droite du mouvement communiste international ; il n'empeche, une continuit se fait jour qui, de facto, rompt avec la tabula rasa du pass pour donner a voir des hros historiques " bourgeois "7. Une lente rhabilitation de l'histoire nationale s'labore selon diverses modalits, au fur et a mesure que chaque pays communiste dploie ses propres inclinations dans la maniere de renouer avec son pass.8 Mais, quoi qu'il en fut, il s'agissait toujours de lire l'histoire nationale dans la perspective de la fabrication de l'" homme nouveau ". Cette deuxieme phase du communisme en Europe centrale et orientale est marque par un dveloppement sans prcdent de l'urbanisme ; quand ils ne sont pas dfigurs, voire dtruits, de gigantesques banlieues viennent enserrer les centres historiques des villes. Dans ce mouvement, qui n'est, au bout du compte, que l'une des formes du dploiement de la modernit, des espaces publics sont occups par la statuaire propre a cette deuxieme priode. C'est cette statuaire qui, apres la chute des pouvoirs communistes, subit une importante transformation. Ce n'est guere la un phnomene original. Destructions et reconstructions de statues et de monuments occupent une place de choix dans l'histoire europenne mdivale, moderne et contemporaine. Si certains sont surpris de ces transformations, cela tient a une double vision du monde qui domine aujourd'hui les esprits. D'une part, on s'tonne qu'en un siecle ou la Raison aurait du triompher, des destructions incommensurables, qu'elles soient le fait de la guerre totale ou de l'urbanisme moderne, ont boulevers de fond en comble des paysages urbains qui, longtemps, s'taient dvelopps en cercles concentriques autour des premiers centres historiques9. D'autre part, notre temps est travaill par l'obsession de la conservation, qui, depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, a transform la plupart des villes d'Europe occidentale en muses. De ce point de vue, l'Europe orientale manifeste un dcalage certain avec l'tat d'esprit occidental ; ici, la musographie des villes, hormis Prague, Ljubljana ou Budapest, n'est pas encore entre dans les mours communes. Aussi le pass rcent, surtout s'il devient un pass honni, a-t-il perdu toute valeur reprsentative. A cette diffrence il convient d'ajouter l'ambiguit des criteres esthtiques du ralisme socialiste. En effet, si le dogme raliste socialiste apparait essentiellement comme une raction aux avant-gardes cubistes, formalistes, constructivistes ou suprmatistes, celui-la n'a jamais, comme ceux-ci, repouss les ouvres classiques de l'histoire de l'art europen, mais, selon une orientation dicte par Lnine, le cours nouveau de l'histoire devait faire apparaitre un autre sens, peut-etre plus cach, et cependant plus en conformit avec le matrialisme historique, afin d'ouvrer a l'ducation politique du peuple. " Le marxisme [.] loin de rejeter les plus grandes conquetes de l'poque bourgeoise, [.] a - bien au contraire - assimil et repens tout ce qu'il y avait de prcieux dans la pense et la culture humaines plus de deux fois millnaires. Seul le travail effectu sur cette base et dans ce sens, anim par l'exprience de la dictature du proltariat, [.], peut etre considr comme le dveloppement d'une culture vraiment socialiste. "10 En bref, pour le pouvoir bolchevique, des les annes 1920 la cration socialiste n'est rien de moins que l'hritage de toute la culture europenne, soumise a l'clairage critique du matrialisme historique et dialectique : ce n'est donc pas la forme esthtique qui prime, mais bien une lecture de l'origine et du dveloppement pour une Bildung tendue vers un nouveau destinataire, le " proltaire-ide " selon l'interprtation qu'en donne Berdiaev.11 Le sens de l'histoire de l'art s'laborera dsormais comme un 144

pan d'une histoire gnrale regarde a l'aune du dveloppement des forces productives. Une fois liquid ou remplac le culte stalinien de la personnalit - et tout en demeurant partiellement fidele au ralisme socialiste -, la voie tait ouverte a la rcupration contrle de certains aspects de l'histoire nationale de chaque pays communiste (ceux qui pouvaient supporter une vidente et claire rinterprtation marxiste-lniniste), si bien qu'apres les annes 1960, la reprsentation statuaire publique manifestait un syncrtisme thmatique et formel, certes fortement marqu par le ralisme naturaliste propre a l'art acadmique du XIXe siecle, mais ouverte a des courants un peu plus modernes, naguere condamns par le dogme jdanovien. Dans certains pays, comme la Hongrie et la Pologne on vit meme rapparaitre des formes statuaires proches du groupe franais de l'Entre-deuxguerres, les Forces nouvelles dont Gromaire ou Lhote taient les chefs de file. Apres 1989, c'est l'ensemble htroclite de ces ouvres qui sera retir des lieux publics ou tourn en drision par des tags ou des enveloppements emprunts respectivement a Basquiat et a Christo. Conservation, limination, occultation Selon la politique culturelle de chaque pays de l'Est, le traitement de la statuaire publique rvele les relations que les nouvelles-anciennes lites entretiennent tant avec l'poque communiste qu'avec les poques prcdentes. En effet, les statues occupant l'espace urbain sont autant de signes qui soutiennent une interprtation historique et soulignent une mise en exergue de situations et d'vnements, ainsi que les personnages en renom qui y participerent ; en bref, la statuaire manifeste le choix d'une scnographie historico-politique, au dtriment d'autres possibles. Le muse en plein air de l'art socialiste de Budapest en offre un exemple pertinent, ou complexit et ambiguit font apparaitre les enjeux politiques de la statuaire publique dans le cours de la " transition ". Il suffit de lire avec attention le catalogue qui en prsente les intentions pour saisir les contradictions qui habitent les rsultats obtenus12. Situ dans une lointaine banlieue quasi rurale, rejet aux marges occidentales de la ville sur l'ancienne route qui mene au lac Balaton, le muse s'y est install dans une position excentre. Apres une heure de voyage en autobus, depuis le centre de la ville on y accede difficilement ; aussi, la distance et la difficult dissuadent-elles nombre de touristes trangers de s'y rendre. Si la plupart des lites hongroises s'accordent prsentement a vanter les mrites de l'conomie capitaliste, il appert qu'une telle situation ne facilite guere l'affluence des visiteurs, et donc affecte la rentabilit du muse. Cette contradiction montre, mieux que bien des discours, l'amphibologie des relations que ces lites entretiennent avec le pass communiste. De fait, il s'agit bien d'une mise a l'cart puisque les ouvres, sorties du contexte urbain ou le pouvoir les avait places, n'ont pas meme t rinstalles dans des salles consacres a cet effet qui auraient pu etre ouvertes, par exemple, au sein du muse national d'art (Nepszpmvzet Galeria) situ dans le batiment central et les deux ailes du chateau royal, sis sur l'une des collines de Budapest qui domine le Danube au centre de la ville. C'est bien la le " cimetiere des statues " comme l'indique le titre de l'article du catalogue qui prsente le muse aux visiteurs.13 Certes, le pass n'a pas t enfoui dans quelques rserves inaccessibles de lointains muses de province, il n'empeche, l'ide de crer un " cimetiere " manifeste une volont d'expulsion hors la ville de toutes ces figures qui marquaient auparavant non seulement l'histoire politique du pouvoir communiste depuis 1948, mais aussi celle d'vnements qui jouerent un rle important dans l'histoire politique et sociale de la Hongrie depuis la Premiere Guerre mondiale : les luttes de la Commune de Budapest en 1919, la rpression de la " terreur blanche ", l'installation de la dictature horthyste, les conflits sociaux qui suivirent, la monte du fascisme au cours des annes 1930, la libration de Budapest par les troupes sovitiques. Si l'on reprend le texte du meme auteur, on y trouve le dessein de l'architecte, Akos Eled, concepteur du muse et ralisateur de la mise en scene des statues qui y sont exposes. On y entre par une porte monumentale de briques rouges flanque de deux grands arcs ou se tiennent les gigantesques statues des figures tutlaires du communisme : a droite, le couple fondateur, Marx et Engels, a gauche le prophete, Lnine. Cette entre " triomphale " vise, selon son auteur, a crer chez le visiteur un " sentiment d'oppression ". Toutefois, si tel tait le but, on ne comprend pas pourquoi ne s'y dresserait point une statue de Staline. En effet, pour crer un authentique " sentiment d'oppression ", une 145

majestueuse statue de Staline eut t plus efficace encore en rappelant celui qui dploya totalement la terreur rouge comme moyen de gouvernement. Ni statue de Staline, ni statues de ses mules hongrois, Rkosi et Gr, renverss et mis a l'cart a la veille de la rvolution de 1956 ; elles auraient eu pourtant lgitimement leur place dans ce " cimetiere " des statues, qui n'est rien moins que le cimetiere de l'histoire. Malgr son excentricit topographique, le muse se veut une " prsentation pertinente des statues, une reprsentation qui chappe a toute drision pour formuler une critique de l'idologie qui fut la sage-femme de ces ouvres. [.] une prsentation guide par la modration d'une froide objectivit "14. Pourquoi, des lors, liminer les statues des figures ponymes du stalinisme ? De meme que sont limines les statues reprsentants les diverses figures du peuple emblmatises pendant les annes 1950, comme s'il tait honteux de prsenter sous les traits d'un naturalisme idalis les gens ordinaires dans leurs activits quotidiennes ou leurs loisirs. Par exemple, pourquoi ne pas avoir prsent les groupes sculpts par Lajos Ungvri, Les Lycens (1954), Dezs Gyri, Les Gymnastes (1958), Sndor Mikus, Les Joueurs de football (1958) et Dezs Erdei, Les coureurs de relais (1958), naguere installs dans le parc du " Stade du peuple ". Si, comme l'affirme son crateur, l'objectif de ce muse avait t la mise en scene d'une " froide objectivit ", il eut fallu une autre prsentation. En effet, si Marx et Engels n'ont eu aucun rapport chronologique avec le monde des avant-gardes (quoiqu'ils aient du connaitre les premiers Impressionnistes), il en va autrement de Lnine. Meme si ses gouts et son interprtation du rle dvolu a l'art dans la nouvelle socit qu'il se proposait de batir n'avaient rien qui puisse s'accorder avec les avant-gardes, il n'empeche, c'est sous son pouvoir que ces memes avant-gardes purent exprimer pleinement leur pouvoir cratif, leurs conflits et les significations politiques qu'elles leur attribuaient, au point que des trains de propagande envoys sur les territoires reconquis par l'arme Rouge taient dcors par les plus radicaux des futuristes, des constructivistes et des suprmatistes15. N'est-ce pas a Tatline, artiste d'avant-garde par excellence, que fut command en 1919 le monument commmoratif de la IIIe Internationale et dont le deuxieme modele fut expos a Paris en 1925, apres la mort de Lnine, lors de l'Exposition internationale des arts dcoratifs et de l'industrie ?16. Ainsi, le ralisme socialiste ne fut seul a entretenir des relations troites avec l'idologie marxiste-lniniste : les avantgardes en firent autant, comme le prouve l'tonnant article de Malvitch qui, a la mort de Lnine, fit du Carr noir son icne suprmatiste, son statement de l'essence contre toute reprsentation, figurative qualifie par l'artiste de ractionnaire.17 Si, aux ouvres d'avant-gardes directement lies a l'idologie marxiste-lniniste l'on avait adjoint la statuaire proprement stalinienne, commune a tous les pays de l'Est dont les nombreuses ralisations furent dtruites ou sont dissimules dans les rserves des muses18, le spectacle ainsi offert n'aurait point manqu de montrer combien au XXe siecle les rapports de la politique a l'art relevent de soubassements beaucoup plus complexes.19 On rencontre dans cet oubli une ambiguit qui touche aux origines memes du mouvement bolchevique, a la Commune de Budapest mais aussi a la libration de Budapest par l'Arme rouge au dbut de l'hiver 1944-1945. Nombre d'ouvres exposes traduisent par leur forme cette ambiguit en ce qu'elles sont des produits tardifs du communisme hongrois et portent dja les lments d'une modernit qui eut t refuse naguere par les censeurs du ralisme socialiste. Ainsi le mmorial ddi a Bla Kun, Jn Landler et Tibor Szamuely ne traduit aucunement une quelconque " froide objectivit ". Il s'agit de personnages de la gauche communiste hongroise qui jouerent un rle important pendant l'Entre-deux-guerres. Bla Kun, chef de la Commune de 1919 fut liquid en Union sovitique lors de la derniere grande purge en 1939 ; Jn Landler mourut exil en France en 1928 et Tibor Szamuely est souponn d'avoir t assassin ou de s'etre suicid en Autriche, apres avoir pass clandestinement la frontiere en aout 1919. Mettre dans le " cimetiere " du ralisme socialiste ces monuments raliss tardivement, pendant le " communisme goulasch " du kadarisme, et consacrs a ces personnages engags dans l'poque rvolutionnaire et contre-rvolutionnaire qui suit immdiatement la tragdie des grandes danses macabres de la Premiere Guerre mondiale, c'est faire preuve d'anachronisme, car nul ne peut ignorer que parmi les premiers militants du parti communiste hongrois se trouvaient des artistes d'avant-garde qui furent appels, comme dans la Russie bolchevique, a raliser des ouvres (en particulier des affiches) illustrant le mouvement rvolutionnaire.20 De meme, le groupe de civils et de soldats, prsent comme un thatre d'ombres dcoup dans de la tle et domin par un Bla Kun de bronze 146

stylis, aranguant cette foule sous un rverbere, rappelle la Commune et le rel soutien populaire dont elle fit l'objet lors de ses premiers mois. Du point de vue stylistique, il parait impossible de saisir en quoi ce groupe ressort aux canons formels du ralisme socialiste. Ralise en 1986, cette ouvre annonce dja une facture plutt postmoderne par la simultanit des styles et des matriaux composites employs, et s'carte ainsi de tous les dogmes esthtiques imposs en 1947 par Jdanov21. De fait, l'ouvre que l'on juge ici en l'exilant au " cimetiere " n'est autre que l'histoire. Maniere propre a la " transition " de jeter aux " poubelles de l'histoire " les vnements du pass qui ne conviennent plus aux visions du prsent. Ici la "froide objectivit " s'apparente a la chaude subjectivit de l'anachronisme. Une meme intention confuse anime la prsence en ce muse du monument ddi en 1968 aux combattants hongrois des brigades internationales, dont les figures symboliques levent le poing, s'inspire explicitement du style de Gromaire, dont les choix formels ne devaient rien au ralisme socialiste. Ce n'est donc point la forme et son origine idologique telle que l'a dfinie le crateur du muse qui est ici condamne, mais bien le rfrent historique. C'est pourquoi, aucune statue avantgardiste reprsentant ou symbolisant des vnements engendrs par la rvolution bolchevique, en Russie ou en Europe de l'Est, n'y sont prsents. Enfin les statues des deux officiers de l'Arme rouge tus en avril 1944, au moment ou ils taient envoys exiger la reddition des troupes germano-hongroises assiges, levent bien le voile sur les enjeux idologiques du muse. Eriges en 1951, leur facture reprsente une fidele incarnation des normes du ralisme socialiste. Ce rfrent formel lgitimerait donc leur place dans ce " cimetiere ". Toutefois, les expulser de la ville revient a attribuer une signification ngative a l'vnement de cette libration, et, quelles que soient les critiques qu'un point de vue thique (et non esthtique) conduit a porter sur l'Union sovitique de 1944, cette expulsion voue a l'oubli l'enjeu tragique de cette guerre, les combats sans merci mens par les deux totalitarismes, ou la Hongrie eut sa part de responsabilit du ct de l'Axe, et les communistes de l'autre. C'est occulter le rle dcisif jou par l'Arme rouge dans l'puisement de l'Allemagne nazi et sa dfaite finale, et ce quel que soit notre jugement sur les erreurs stratgiques et tactiques de ses chefs et les carnages qu'elles entrainerent.22 D'autres statues maintenues par le rgime communiste, ou construites sous son gide, n'ont pas t mises au rebut quoiqu'elles prsentent un style naturaliste-raliste idalis, ou un kitsch historiciste qui n'a rien a envier au ralisme socialiste. Ainsi apparait a un vritable regard froid la statue de Kossuth rige sur la place du Parlement.23 Mais ici, il s'agit d'exalter une histoire nationale tout autant mythifie que celle du communisme. On le constate, l'enjeu de ce muse n'est pas essentiellement la question des styles et de leurs origines idologiques, mais bien celle des titres des ouvres quel qu'en soit le style. C'est pourquoi les choix ressortissent a une question de sens. Or, de par leur position topographique, les ouvres fonctionnent dans la ville (ou plutt a l'extrieur de la ville) comme celles produites naguere selon les canons du ralisme socialiste ou plus tard selon des criteres formels plus composites permise par le kadarisme : viction ou maintien, ensemble elles scandent une nouvelle lecture de l'histoire. La mise a l'cart de cette statuaire composite ne vise a rien d'autre qu'a mettre entre parentheses, pardela l'exprience du rgime communiste, un aspect essentiel de l'Entre-deux-guerres : le mouvement social, rvolutionnaire, le mouvement syndical et, par-dela, pour ce qui tient de l'histoire l'art, la complexit des rapports entre les avant-gardes artistiques, les arriere-gardes acadmiques et les avantgardes politiques24. Certes, si comme l'affirme l'auteur, ce muse ne s'apparente en rien " a une plaisanterie ", en revanche, il traduit une intention critique fonde sur une dcontextualisation des vnements qui, au bout du compte, se prsente comme la mise en scene d'un moment de notre histoire contemporaine envisage uniquement sous un angle moraliste (et non thique) no-post c'est-a-dire regarde comme malfaisant et nfaste. Jamais l'histoire des hommes n'a t morale, et y faire face, " la regarder dans le blanc des yeux " comme le suggere Heiner Mller dans ses mmoires, n'est rien que la prise en compte d'une prsence qui demeure toujours a etre pense. En mesurant ce moment d'histoire a l'aune du moralisme banal de notre modernit tardive, on fait montre d'une paresse d'esprit qui carte toute possibilit d'aboutir a une hermneutique contextuelle. Il est significatif que la plupart des visiteurs du muse soient les touristes occidentaux en visite a Budapest, mais sa place excentre ne leur permet point de saisir combien le kitsch raliste fin-de-siecle qu'ils admirent dans la ville (par exemple, le groupe du Millenium (1880) qui reprsente des chefs des 147

tribus magyares domins par rpd) s'apparente au kitsch socialiste expos dans ce muse. Peu de visiteurs hongrois s'y rendent pour le montrer a leurs enfants ; une telle rserve, s'apparente a ce que la psychanalyse nomme la dngation : " Je sais bien mais quand meme. ". Voila un tat propice a engendrer des attitudes schizoides chez les sujets de la " transition " qui se trouvent ainsi plongs dans l'incapacit d'assumer clairement leur propre pass en l'absence des symboles du pass collectif. Il en va de meme avec les suppressions d'aujourd'hui. C'est pourquoi il convient d'interroger le sens de cette dmarche qui prtend, au travers des ouvres esthtiques, repousser la totalit de l'exprience du rgime communiste. Le pouvoir communiste aussi a dmoli des statues, lui aussi en a cach dans les rserves de muse afin de les soustraire a la vue de la population, comme si cela eut suffi a faire oublier ce que les sujets et les acteurs de l'histoire vcurent ou subirent auparavant.25 Cela se sait, la mmoire des vnements de la priode antrieure au rgime communiste politiques - aurait-elle t vcue positivement ou ngativement - ne disparut point de la conscience de la population hongroise, comme le prouverent les destructions populaires et spontanes accomplies pendant la rvolution de 1956. Pourquoi celle de la derniere poque communiste disparaitrait-elle aussi rapidement ? Certes, les choix n'taient guere aiss : toute soustraction, toute addition d'ouvres pose en effet le probleme d'une relecture de l'histoire, tant de l'histoire de l'art que de l'histoire politique et sociale. Nanmoins, celui qui prtend travailler dans l'esprit d'une " froide objectivit " aurait du avertir le visiteur que toute exposition, releve toujours de l'ambiguit et de l'quivoque, puisque l'on dcontextualise. Ainsi exposer des statues en un lieu qui n'est plus celui de leur premiere monstration, n'est rien moins qu'un acte de musographie, impliquant le constat que tel ou tel art est devenu une chose morte, une chose qui vient enrichir la frnsie ncrologique des cryptes musales qui dornavant envahissent le monde. La " froide objectivit " eut t, me semble-t-il, de laisser les statues dans leur contexte urbain, voire de leur adjoindre certaines autres, dboulonnes en 1956. Pour lors le visiteur, le passant, eut t conduit a saisir avec une plus grande lisibilit le dcor statuaire de la ville dans son contexte historique, a le naturaliser, a le normaliser en quelque sorte, et donc a accepter l'histoire telle qu'elle fut.26 L'attitude adopte par le concepteur du muse ne differe guere de celle des communistes : comme eux, il travaille a une inversion de sens. On change d'glise, mais point de style. Quoiqu'il se montre sous un jour beaucoup moins agressif, ce muse " cimetiere " rappelle encore quelque chose de plus inquitant, a savoir l'exposition de l'art dgnr organise par les nazis en 1937 a Munich. Cependant, a la diffrence des tenants de l'art teutonique, martial et acadmique, ici, il est bien moins question de formes que de sens ou de possibilit de sens de l'histoire. Aussi, le choix des ouvres exposes, ainsi que leur mise en scene, traduisent-ils parfaitement l'idologie dominante de notre poque postcommuniste, celle qui regarde le tragique de l'exprience communiste comme une sorte de tratologie de la politique, comme une maladie honteuse qu'il conviendrait de gurir a tout jamais. Tout fonctionne comme si l'extrmisme politique de masse ressortissait a une pathologie sociale27, comme si le communisme de type sovitique et ses avatars europens n'taient pas dfinitivement morts et dja entrs dans les arcanes et les controverses des interprtations historiques, comme si enfin l'avenement plantaire de l'conomie de march ne signait pas la fin de l'histoire dans un devenir rgl par la production et la gestion des changes de marchandises et des flux financiers. Ce faisant, sans qu'il le sache le crateur de ce muse a plac sa scnographie au cour la modernit tardive (ou de la postmodernit), au cour de cette transhistoricit faite de simultanits et de juxtapositions synchroniques et diachroniques qui abolit toute rfrence contextuelle, et qui, de ce fait, rend impossible de penser les conditions de possibilit (au sens kantien) de cette poque singulierement tragique et meurtriere.28 Car, en ultime instance, ce sont toujours des hommes bien vivants, et non des lmures, qui commettent les crimes collectifs. Voila qui demeure encore la grande nigme. Notes * Une premiere version de ce texte est parue dans Lieux de mmoire en Europe mdiane. Reprsentations identitaires, sous la direction d'Antoine Mars, Publications de l'INALCO, Paris, 1999. Dans cet essai il n'est pas question de traiter des artistes plus ou moins marginaux qui, apres la fin du stalinisme, chercherent a se synchroniser avec les mouvements esthtiques occidentaux. Il s'agit de l'art officiel financ par les institutions culturelles de l'tat. 148

2 Sur le theme du postcommunisme, je rappellerai le film du Roumain Pintilie, Trop tard, celui du Macdonien Milcho Manchevski, Before the Rain, Lamerica de l'Italien Gianni Amelio sur l'Albanie, le plus somptueusement flamboyant, celui de Kusturica, Underground, sur la dislocation de la Yougoslavie, et l'exceptionnel Voyage d'Ulysse de Tho Angelopoulos dont il sera ici question. 3 Cette affirmation doit etre quelque peu nuance. Ainsi, le ministere du tourisme roumain a rcemment dcid d'organiser pour de riches touristes occidentaux un circuit des anciennes rsidences officielles occupes dans le pays par le dernier secrtaire gnral du Parti communiste, Nicolae Ceausescu. 4 A cet gard, il convient de souligner une diffrence entre l'iconoclasme populaire spontan et l'iconoclasme organis par le pouvoir central, tat-cit, tat monarchique, Empire, Rpublique oligarchique, glise, etc. 5 Cette personnalisation de la reprsentation des figures emblmatiques d'un pouvoir politique dans le monde moderne appartient non seulement a tous les rgimes communistes d'outremer, mais aussi a tous les mouvements de libration et aux rgimes de droite ou de gauche qui leur ont succd apres la prise du pouvoir, y compris dans les pays de tradition musulmane. Ce phnomene mriterait une tude particuliere, car il s'agit d'un mode de reprsentation venu de la tradition tridimensionnelle occidentale dans des cultures qui n'avaient jamais connu ni l'ida platonicienne, ni la mimtik no-aristotlicienne et thomiste. En cela, il convient de regarder ce phnomene comme l'une des intrusions de la modernit, fut-elle exprime sous des formes naives et populaires. 6 Cf. " Le ralisme socialiste ou la victoire de la bourgeoise ", in Postcommunisme foin de siecle, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2000 (Traduit en roumain, in Comunism/postcomunism si modernitatii tirzie, Polirom, 2000). 7 Ce recours aux hros historiques avait dja un prcdent en U.R.S.S. qui en fit un large usage pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale et lors de la remobilisation de l'Apres-guerre pour la reconstruction du pays. Cf. les films Alexandre Nevski, Pierre Le Grand, etc. 8 Ainsi, au milieu des annes 1980, meme la R.D.A. de Honneker renoua avec Frdric le Grand, figure emblmatique du prussianisme longtemps dnonc par les communistes comme la source du militarisme germanique conqurant. 9 Certaines villes italiennes, dont Naples reprsente un parfait exemple, ont conserv cette organisation ou, du centre a la priphrie, on parcourt insensiblement une architecture qui va l'antiquit grecque puis latine aux immeubles imposants du XIXe siecle et aux affreux H.L.M. de la spculation fonciere. 10 Lnine, crits sur l'art et la littrature, ditions du progres, Moscou 1978. 11 Nicolas Berdiaev, Sources et sens du communisme russe, Gallimard, Paris, 1937. 12 Szoborp RK Muzeum, Budapest, Publications of the Statue Park, sd. Budapest. 13 Ibidem, Tibor Wehner, " Public Statue Cemetery from the Recent Past ". 14 C'est moi qui souligne. 15 Cf. le catalogue de l'exposition Paris-Moscou au Centre Georges Pompidou, Paris, 1979, illustration page 326, " Wagon de train d'agitprop d'octobre 1919 ". 16 Tatline, sous la direction de Larissa Jadova, Corvina, Budapest et Philippe Sers, Paris. Cf. illustration 186 et son commentaire. Dans le catalogue de l'exposition n V/4b. 17 Kasimir Malevitch, " Lnine ", in Macula, n 3/4, 1978, pp. 187-190 (traduit de l_allemand par Philippe Ivernel), p. 188. 18 Une information qui m'a t rapporte par Sorin Antohi (professeur d'histoire des ides a l'Universit de Bucarest) ne manque pas de surprendre et de compliquer l'interprtation du destin des statues. En Roumanie un certains nombres de statues de Staline, dont beaucoup de bustes, ont t recycles pour reprsenter l'crivain transylvain Ion Slavici, l'un des fondateurs du nationalisme roumain au XIXe siecle. Il est parfois des ressemblances surprenantes ! 19 Cf. les textes runis par Pter Gyrgy et Hedvig Turai sous le titre, Art and Society in the Age of Staline, Corvina, Budapest, 1992. 20 C'est dans l'appartement occup par le peintre et poete futuriste Lajos Kassk situ au 15 Visgradi Utca que fut fond le parti communiste hongrois, dont la plaque commmorative a t te en 1990, comme si l'vnement n'avait pas eu lieu. 21 Cf. Elisabeth Valkenier, Russian Realist Art, The State and Society : The Peredvziniki (Les 149

Ambulants) and Their Tradition, Ardis, Ann Arbor 1977, p. 169. 22 Philippe Masson, Histoire de l'arme allemande, 1939-1945, Librairie acadmique Perrin, 1994, p. 480. 23 Ce muse oublie significativement que meme pendant la priode stalinienne, les artistes firent appel a la plus classique des versions de l'histoire nationale. Ainsi le cadeau offert en 1952 par Mtys Rkosi (alors premier ministre) a son collegue est-allemand, Wilhem Pieck, n'est autre qu'une tapisserie de laine reprsentant Ptfi avec en haut, a gauche et a droite, deux figures tutlaires de petites tailles ; l'une reprsente un soldat hongrois portant le drapeau national, l'autre Staline portant le drapeau rouge. Ce n'est la que la rinterprtation d'un theme classique. Cf. Andreas Michaelis, DDR souvenirs, . et c'est un fond bien spcial, Benedikt Taschen, Cologne, 1994 ; et Mikls Pternk, " Nationalized Vision and the Allegorical Documentary ", in Art and Society, op. cit., pp. 87-98. 24 Kristina Passuth, Les Avant-gardes de l'Europe centrale, Flammarion, Paris, 1988, Cf. p. 41 le paragraphe " Rvolution morale et artistique : La revue MA ", on peut y lire en particulier le passage suivant : "Au dbut, MA est une revue presque exclusivement rvolutionnaire. Son but principal consiste en la libration matrielle et spirituelle de l'homme. L'homme, c'est bien sur le pauvre, l'opprim, le proltaire. Kassk veut librer l'homme misrable de ses chaines visibles et il veut aussi le sauver de lui-meme, de ses conceptions dpasses, des entraves antrieures. Pour Kassk [.], le mouvement lutte en meme temps pour l'avenement d'une socit nouvelle et de l'individu collectif qui pourrait s'y dvelopper. [.] la forme active ncessaire a la transformation des masses et a la rvolution morale rside dans l'avant-garde artistique. " 25 Cf. " Political Rituals : The Raising and Demolition of Monuments ", in , Art and Society in the Age of Stalin, op. cit., pp. 73-86. 26 Je tiens a remercier Anca Oroveanu, professeur d'histoire de l'art a l'Universit de Bucarest et directrice scientifique du New Europe College (Bucarest) qui, apres la lecture de mon manuscrit, m'a suggr cette interprtation fort judicieuse. 27 Pour une critique de la conception mdicale de la vie politique, cf. Sorin Antohi, " Les Roumains pendant les annes 1990. Gographie symbolique et identit sociale ", in Exerciciu distantiei, Nemira, Bucarest, 1998. En particulier le dernier paragraphe, " Le discours de pathologie sociale collective ". 28 Voir a cet effet l'ouvrage remarquable de Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century (1914-1989), Abacus, Londres, 1995, et plus particulierement la premiere partie : " The Age of Catastrophe ", pp. 21 et passim. Cf. Philippe Masson, op. cit.

AUGUSTIN IOAN ROMANIAN ORTHODOX ARCHITECTURE - A RETROSPECT AFTER TEN YEARS -

Abstract: The article offers a large panorama on the Romanian Orthodox architecture, underlining its limitations and subsequently, its involution in postcommunism. Keywords: Romania; orthodox architecture; postcommunism; clergy

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I have been a careful observer of the programme for building new Romanian Orthodox abodes after 1990 and, to a certain extent, even a direct participant1 in the process. Incidentally, I know personally the authors of the most interesting projects of new churches (not so incidentally practically none of the respective projects was carried out). I organized an exhibition entitled "New Churches" at the House of Latin America in 1996, which then travelled to the Romanian Cultural Centre of New York (1996) and the Accademia di Romania (1997). I edited an issue entitled "New Churches" of the Arhitectura magazine (1-2/1999) and a CD-ROM on the topic "Modern and Contemporary Christian Orthodox Architecture" at Paideia Publishing House (2000). I also wrote a few books addressing the matter of the sacred space2 both from the vantage of architecture and the hermeneutics of the biblical text. As this experience, as much as it is, directly connects with the topic of the sacred space and because it also pertains to the public space, involving to a great extent aspects of professional deontology and ethics of the actors of the public space, I will present several contemporary problems of the sacred space as perceived by the theorist and also by the practitioner of architecture. A Brief History After 1990 it became obvious that there will be a huge pressure to build rapidly new cult abodes for all the denominations. More than a thousand suggestions of new churches were put forth for approval by various specialized bodies, which also mushroomed. In the first years of the decade several national contests were organized, some under the umbrella of the Architects' Union. To name only the competition for the Heroes' Chapel at the cemetery of the martyrs of the 1989 Revolution, appended to the Bellu graveyard; the contest for the chapel of the Cristiana establishment; the competition for a cathedral in Suceava. After a while, these contests began to take place only very seldom, outside the rules established by the Architects' Union on the basis of the regulations of the International Architects' Union, (see the contest for the Brasov cathedral). Eventually, they stopped altogether. Finally, in 1999 a competition for the cathedral of the Redemption the Nation was organized by the Patriarchate and MLPAT on the fringes of the regulations mentioned. As to discussions of ideas on the programme worth mentioning is the first wide-scope event of this genre put together by the Ministry of Culture in Braila (on the occasion of the competition for the cathedral to be built there), in 1990. Andrei Plesu and Theodor Baconsky masterminded this "session of scientific talks attended by public". In the lobby of the theatre where the discussions were held an exhibition was also opened of related projects. Subsequently, the Union of Romanian Architects took over and organized in the first years of the decade several debates on contemporary Christian Orthodox architecture, inviting representatives of the clergy, hierarchs and fine artists to attend (Horia Bernea and Sorin Dumitrescu, for instance). Unfortunately, with the exception of random notes in the specialized magazine (Arhitext and Arhitectura) the contents of these debates, touching most variegated topics, were never made available to the public interested: from the architecture of the new religious abodes to the necessity of rebuilding the Vacaresti Monastery. In mid decade all preoccupation with the programme seemed to have faded, at last from the vantage of architects, judging by the meagre number of meetings, competitions or public conferences. Seemingly, the task devolved on the younger ones to take over, which some actually did (see the exhibition "New Churches"). Several books dedicated to the sacred space began, discreetly, to be printed. Among the first was the volume by Radu Dragan and myself (Being and Space, Bucharest, All, 1992). Others followed: dedicated to the churches demolished, a serious study strictly limited though to the documentary interest of the topic. Then recently, other studies focussing on the churches in Bucharest or the synagogues in Romania, or various other matters or the architecture of the Transylvanian wooden churches. Doctoral dissertations were defended at UAUIM on the architecture of the Christian Orthodox churches (Smaranda Bica, 1999) which, at least address this topic in the context of contemporary architecture. Studies on the roles of parishes or other religious abodes were published by the cultural press. I will mention here only the one on the roles of parishes in the makeup of the urban space by Prof. Dr. Sanda Voiculescu in Secolul 20 dedicated to Bucharest (1997). The study dealing with Bucharest between the Orient and the Occident written by Dana Harhoiu (Bucharest, Simetria, 151

1997) is basically a topological analysis of the situation in urban context of the Bucharest churches. In relation with the results thereof the book evinces a series of privileged positions and trajectories of urban composition (centre, directing axes, concentric circles) that are defined by cult abodes or monasteries. This is neither a bibliography sufficiently rich nor extremely variegated as level of analysis of the matter of sacred architecture. Its seems that Mircea Eliade's overwhelming presence somehow represses or simply postpones contemporary discussions, by new methodologies based on fresh results coming from the socio-humanistic sciences. The theoretical exercises and the research into the edified substance of the sacred space, due for nearly two decades now to architects like Ioan Andreescu, Vlad Gaivoroski (Timisoara) or Florin Biciusca (Bucharest) continue to remain unknown and therefore not localized as priorities at the time of their emergence because of the more general absence of a critical history of architecture on the present-day territory of Romania, and especially in the post-war epoch. The thoughts of theologians, if worded, continue to stay far from the public space and do not point to a constant, priority theoretical preoccupation to become manifest in volumes (even collective), in exhibitions, in symposia or at least in significant public interventions. The few texts written especially for magazines outside the theological sphere (Vatra, Transilvania, Arhitectura) are obviously circumstantial and lacking the substance of the applied study, no matter the conclusions arrived at. Most often than not, they are litanies strewn with uncommented quotes from the Bible called up to clinch the discussion even when (and especially then) their significance in the context invoked remains obscure. About Hybris in the New Christian Orthodox Architecture The first competition for the Heroes' Chapel (1991) was extremely interesting because it evinced for the first time a few things that could already be guessed: a) The science of founding and respectively the mastery of designing churches were lost in the fifty yeas when only by a happy accident new Christian Orthodox churches were built. b) There is a major break between the fascination of architects with modernity and, in general, "heroic" gestures on the one hand and, the way hierarchs and the clergy of the Romanian Orthodoxy understand the matter of building new religious abodes. At the end of the contest it had become clear for everybody that a hiatus existed, that the gestures to meet half way were but few and mostly rhetorical and that the very accommodation with arguments of the others, to say nothing of their acceptance, would take many years. To begin with, the clergy began to attack, supported in the background by several socialistic architects. Thus, for all their exceptional project the team of architects Dan Marin and Zeno Bogdanescu was awarded only the second prize. The opinion of the representative of the clergy and of the then minister of culture (although for different reasons) had the same result. It was not the respective project that was implemented and none those present in the competition either, although some of them were interesting.Error! Bookmark not defined. Subsequently, the protest against the modernity of the designs in competition was joined (most likely manipulated and anyway, guilty) by that coming from the association of the descendants of those deceased and buried in the cemetery to which the chapel was dedicated. What should have been a signal of radical renewal (the chapel dedicated to the heroes of the revolution) was designed by a team of anonymous persons to whom the project was directly and surreptitiously entrusted), erected on the q.t., and at present is one of the most ludicrous new constructions in Bucharest, that by this demarche belittles the very significance of the sacrifice the chapel is supposed to guard and honour. The competition for Cristiana, won by the same team of young architects (Dan Marin/Zeno Bogdanescu)4 had a less tragic result at the respective moment, meaning that it produced a first prize likewise outstanding by the ability of wielding and stylising the forms of traditional Christian Orthodox architecture in a contemporary vocabulary - which began to be implemented. At a certain moment, because of the disputes between the Patriarchate and the respective settlement, the works had to be stopped and to my knowledge they were not resumed. The competition for Suceava, sponsored by the then newly created Metropolitan of Moldavia, H.E. Daniel produced a result which then, as today, continues to seem strange. The winning team of 152

architect Constantin Gorcea proposed an object supported by a three-dimensional metallic structure on the east-west axis, the lateral facades becoming thus a sort of concrete and stone "strips" wrapping the body of a traditional church. The abode looked rather like a building site caught in full swing of work, with scaffoldings strangely put up, for the restoration of an object on which several innovative techniques of "packaging" had been attempted, similar to those practised by the Bulgarian-born artist Christo.5 As part of the results were published in their time by the specialized magazines we can note that the jury opted for radical renewal (even at the cost of disfiguring the traditional model). The fact that architects prevailed on that jury justifies, most likely, the respective decision. This church has not managed to go beyond the level of foundations and already seems a scrapped project. About the Brasov contest there is not a lot of public information. Through the good will of the authors I have managed, nonetheless, to obtain and publish two of the projects presented in the competition, one of them being the winner. Not even at the time of this text's writing (early 2000) are there any courses given in the architecture schools of Romania on the sacred architecture (the history of this programme in various denominations, theory and practice in the field). The church is not frequently found as a design topic, or diploma subject. In the rare cases when such a project was nonetheless suggested to the students priests or hierarchs were never invited to discuss with them. The results are matching, granted big marks and displayed in exhibitions. They put forth gigantic forms, so-called "symbolical', without any reference to tradition or at least to the spirit of the place, strange objects detached from the built and cultural context where they ought to function as a repository through time. However, the situation might change. Together with professor Florin Biciusca and a number of enthusiasts we are in the process of launching the anthropology of the sacred space as a field of undergraduate specialisation followed by a masters course in sacred architecture from the academic year 2001-2002. There are only several others in the world devoted to the question of sacred spaces and their present status (among the more prestigious is the MIT program on Islamic architecture sponsored by the Aga Khan Foundation) and none addresses the topic of Orthodox heritage and religious architecture. This could be a first step in the right direction. On the other hand though, the architectural education still lacks the kind of sensitivity that is vital to understanding and nourish such an approach: in restoration projects there is an infinite reluctance before any new intervention, or contemporary addition which, well poised, can illuminate exactly the aura of the past that such a restoration should give back to the monument or the ensemble. Finally, one or maximum two diplomas per class and not in all years, go to show that where there is no didactic interest it cannot be compensated by any such thing from the students either than by individual ricochet. Everywhere hundred of hotels, of towers darting to the sky, of mediatheques; hi-tech expressionism and radical deconstruction. No church though. This is a proportion that reflects the other way round that on the market where the future architects will actually work, and which, in the inverted relationship established rather mirrors the gap between present-day architectural education, research and production. This leaves the future professionals deprived of any trace of professionalism when it comes to meeting an order for a sacred space. The errors and the delay of all attempt to devise consistent, institutionalised, collaborative problems out of this topic become visible in time. Ten fingers are too many to number the successes scored in building Christian Orthodox churches built in Romania in the last ten years. Not all the failures can be laid on the architects, but no doubt that successes are due at least to yet another person: the hierarch of the place, the parish priest or the generous enlightened sponsor. The contest involving the Cathedral for the Redemption of the Nation showed one more time the dead-end where the Romanian Christian Orthodox architecture stands today and the confusion in which wallow those on whom its destiny depends.6 On the one hand, the few interesting projects were put into fact and commented publicly only by individual, isolated efforts. Most of these (still young) architects are radical and refuse meetings halfway, "concessions" to what they think to be the right path for the integral, unmitigated rewriting of the Christian Orthodox abodes. The presence of the interlocutors - community, clergy - bothers them and does nothing but further enhance their demiurgic spirit for which any failure to have a church erected exclusively as they want is one more proof that they are right. On the other hand, the current, massive 153

production of Christian Orthodox spaces is not discussed publicly, with examples, and in no way systematically. The huge majority of the clergy and the hierarchs, part of the architects are therefore explicitly against the renewal of the architectural idiom, be it in "moderate" forms. The schools of theology do not give critical courses going beyond the stage of encomiastic presentation of sacred architecture or any on the presentation of the contemporary sacred architecture in the other Christian churches and denominations, or at least of the other monotheist religions as it would be minimally necessary, given the admirable examples of mosques and synagogues designed by brilliant names of modern and contemporary architects. The Minister of Public Works' commission on religious architecture, set up in order to dam the flood of bad designs, features too few architects specialized in the field one way or another. It therefore takes upon itself competencies that it cannot prove or support, while vying with the local advisers in matters of town planning or architectural competence, thus saving them from the responsibility of their own signature. This becomes a mere formal act once the approval from "the upper echelons" is obtained. The commission stopped less failures than it gave green light to, or was detoured by with the complicity of local authorities. Customers, clergy and heads of local urban planning services perceive it as another instance of centralism, a new reason of alienation as to the oppressive "centre" and consequently, undermine, in their turn, its authority and efficiency by any means, in a natural selfdefence reaction. Modern vs. Traditional. An Identity Crisis I have attended the round tables organized by the Union of Romanian Architects on the topic and, in the absence of the reports thereof to quote from them, I would like to point again to the discrepancy between the discourses of the clergy and the architects. From then on, no gesture of reconciliation was made at institutional level. After ten years, given that there already exists a "critical mass" of projects and works already done, a comparison can already be made between them. Also a classification may be established of the various orientations that the architects privileged in their designs and that the sponsors accepted (where the church has been set up or where building efforts are under way) or rejected (where the least attempt to start building was stopped from the very first). In a previous book, referring to the history of the Romanian Orthodox architecture I gave a classification of the procedures by which the then architects in their attempt to create an identity for their edifices - and as a ricochet of the communities to which those churches were dedicated - put them at work. I will rephrase it here adding nuances that I have discovered meanwhile to be necessary and then I will try to notice to what extent such a classification is still relevant today. In relation with the identity mechanisms two big categories can be distinguished, as well as a third that ignores them deliberately: a) projects that use precedents belonging to the medireview past as source of inspiration, asserting therefore that although different, the planimetric, volume and decoration typologies from Wallachia and Moldavia can be used to reshape the national identity of the two provinces together (subsequent to 1918, of all). Here there are two sub-categories: a1) that of "regionalist" designs that use the data of the local context in designing the new abode, even if this means that between them and a building belonging to another cult or another ethnic group there is a bigger similarity than as to a Christian Orthodox church elsewhere (e.g. the inter-bella churches on Prahova Valley, the Constantin and Elena Church of Constanta, built in the same limestone and with a tower reminding of that of local mosques; some Christian Orthodox churches in Transylvania in the inter-bella period, similar to the Catholic or Protestant architecture of the place). a2) The "combinational" projects where the cult abode is the result of putting together elements proper to the medireview churches in the two historical provinces in one edifice (e.g. the new church of the Sinaia monastery, which is extremely important because it is a complex that for a long time was used as a princely/royal residence. b) Projects that refuse medireview precedents for the very reason they do not resemble as related to the project of erasing discrepancies between historical provinces and creating a nation state but which continue to believe identity to be a favourite topic of Christian Orthodox architecture. The use of the medireview precedent to establish a national specific raised two major problems for the Christian 154

Orthodox architecture : if the precedent was a village church it could not be used as an a equate model for urban cathedrals that had to be monumental. If the reference addressed ampler churches, monasteries, the problem arose of the inconvenient ethnic origin of the masters that erected them (Serbians in Wallachia, Caucasians and Slavs in Moldavia). In exchange, this new projects propose the celebration of the origin of the nation, be it the blood or religious origin. In this second category fall other two sub-classes: b 1) the projects here assert the Latinity and Romanity of the Romanians as a strong criterion of identity and therefore, along the line promoted also by the official lay architecture of the Carol II regime, they send rather to the rationalist and the neo-imperial architecture of Mussolini's epoch (for instance, the Church of the Kin, 1940, architects Constantin Joja and N. Goga, photo), projects for the competition of the Christian Orthodox Cathedral of Odessa, 1942, by the same architects, now in separate teams, photo. B 2) The other projects refer to the Byzantine origin of the Romanians' faith. Since the Romanians were born Christian Orthodox (a slogan that continues to be circulated even today by the clergy with the same lack of discernment) it results that the new Christian Orthodox architecture had to be Byzantine (for instance, the metropolitan Cathedral of Sibiu, St. Elefterie Nou and Casin of Bucharest, etc.) c) In the class of projects that invent a new Christian Orthodox architecture, urban as a rule, there are other two sub-classes. c1) Those that feature monumental elements belonging to sacred and lay programmes, local and western, an extremely proficient direction of architecture before the war, "eclectic" too (in the sense shown at a2) but ready to use - in order to endow its new edifices with an urban scale, as Tsar Peter the Great of Russia had done at St. Petersburg, - any sort of formally convenient imported element. This explains how come the Cluj Cathedral has a cupola that reminds equally of the Paris Pantheon and St. Paul's of London, just like the Neo-Romanian cathedrals of Petre Antonescu in New Churches mix elements impossible to identify as source, belonging both to the sacred architecture (pan-Christian) and the lay one (local and international). c2) Moreover, here we also have pre-eminently modern projects (as related to the time when they were laid down), where we can pinpoint very few achievements due especially to the programme for the construction of Christian Orthodox abodes in the '30s (the central cathedral of Hunedoara is such an example). Likewise, here we can speak of the theoretical consequences of Petre Antonescu's 1942 study quoted before where he puts together what we could call a rhetoric of the modernization of Christian Orthodox architecture in the name of changing materials (from wood to brick and stone, and hence to reinforced concrete), also as a result of this change, a new morphology that time and technologies impose. Before the war this direction stayed on the fringes of the production of sacred spaces. That moment put a stop to the becoming of Christian Orthodox architecture well after 1989. The few churches erected in the communist period in no way stand testimony to their historical time (see the Ghencea church, 1957, weirdly resembling a design by Petre Antonescu from Biserici noua or the Cuvioasa Paraschiva church of Bucharest by architect Anghel Marcu, see Architectura 1-2/99, 33. The biggest part of the good-quality architectural production (practically reduced to projects with a few notable exceptions) pertains to the latter direction, c2) in the above scheme, only theoretically imposed by Petru Antonescu. Modernization (more marked than what it meant in the '40s) presupposes now a radical architectural idiom even at the cost of a breach with the past: a breach that, in fact, actually spanned fifty years. The arguments of this modernizing direction are also consonant with the ones of the "eclectics" in category c1) of the classification suggested since present-day architects are ready to accommodate any contemporary direction (Mario Botta, himself author of famous churches, and also Tadao Ando are among the first and most influential recognizable agents) and to dress the Christian orthodox church in it, supposedly because since "types" stay constant, they can take any statement, no matter how contemporary. In other words, "Platonists" themselves, these architects think that the "essence" of a Christian Orthodox church can be extracted from the becoming of this architectural type and consequently garbed in contemporary attire. There are thus several projects that try to preserve the "canonical" planimetry (lacking the essential specification of the region of inspiration) one or two vaults and, perhaps a compulsorily "stylised" belfry, but attired in an architecture behind which the destination of the building is too severely camouflaged (proof of this stand some of the initial designs of the Timisoara team of Andreescu-Gaivoronski, of Florin Languri or the Suceava project of 155

Constantin Gorcea, mentioned above. If the "destination" (that is the ritual and the other aspects of the cult) are not modernized, architecture can update by itself - it is its duty to do it- the church: building, institution and ecclesia , this seems to be the slogan of the streamlining direction. As a sub-category of the streamlining direction we find the symbolists. They ask questions regarding the major significances of the sacred space or the metaphors describing it better and then try to transpose them in contemporary language. This is the case of the church/ship by Radu Teaca, which rhymes with the chapel by the new star of European architecture, Matti Sanaksenaho (better known and freely put together.7) The metaphor of hospitality, enhanced by the significance of the place to which it is destined, becomes obvious from the proposition of Virgil Luscov for the 1991 competition for the Heroes' Chapel the wall with the entrance and the one to the south too (to the graveyard), both concave, are modelled as two cupped hands (Arhitectura 1-2/99, 12). Now and then there are references to one or another of the medireview precedents, chosen according to exclusively "modern", minimalist" criteria (the infirmary of the Cozia Monastery, for instance) but they are often reduced to an alternation of stone courses and masonry, manifest when converted into decoration, when a masonry procedure is made apparent. This obviously "superfluous", "futile" procedure is used by the very adepts of the most severe minimalism, without being hit by the inaugural paradox of their demarche. Moreover, there are also makers of "collages" of elements, chosen at random from the architecture of prestigious precedents, Romanian and foreign, which they combine (necessarily "essentialized") in a new object. Along this line, it is interesting to note the attention acquired in the new Christian Orthodox architecture by the Greek cross plan, built extremely seldom in the Romanian medireview provinces. The project for the Christian Orthodox cathedral of Oradea (architect Radu Teaca) and many of the contributions to the competition for the Cathedral of the Nation use such an "alien" planimetry. In this procedure we find an echo of N. Goga's presentation in the competition for the Cathedral of Odessa, severely rebuked by some of the members of the jury for its modernism; the architect proposed to produce a symmetrical plan on both cardinal axes, therefore on the north-south axis too, a thing not seen with the wood house-churches in the Transylvanian Middle Ages where the symmetry is due though to the analogy between the inner spatial tripartite analogy of the dwelling and not to the deliberate gesture of the master builder. In order to obtain this "un-orthodox" effect, the architect introduces a buffer between the pronaos and the naos, innovating thus the planimetry of the Christian Orthodox architecture. Collages are also the projects like the ones for the Romanian settlement of Jericho (Photo) by architects Sorin Vasilescu and Horea Gavris, 1998 where traditional elements are joined, here and there updated by a contemporary reference (the wood structure of the vaults and of the cupola, for instance) that render more tensional the relationship between the new and the old. There are also some who make direct references to such inter-bella churches, whether built or not; in Platonist terms, they produce "copies of the copies". Antonescu himself is revisited in some of the "typified projects" he proposed in Biserici noua. I too did it with the planimetry of two of the churches I designed (Amara II and Fetesti-Colonisti). The fact that he saw possible the non-traditional use of reinforced concrete which, eventually would produce images to be recognized as belonging to the Christian Orthodox space, helps, no doubt, towards his re-assessment. Constantin Joja (alongside his colleague, N. Goga) is also rediscovered; here I claim a certain merit since I have written about his projects and republished several images of his 1940 and 1942 projects. The fact that these designs, without making any reference to the Romanian medireview past, manage to be absolutely contemporary, on the one hand, with the architecture of their time, and on the other hand be considered "genuinely Romanian," seemed to me an outstanding coincidence. Often, between the two terms the relation of opposition is made visible and not that of coincidence. This accounts for the fact that in the Dilema issue dedicated to the Cathedral of the Nation I proposed a new discussion of the most advanced conceptually of all the designs proposed by the Romanian Orthodox architecture, that put forth by the team Joja-Goga, dating to 1940. With the exception of H.E. Bartolomeu Anania - a fellow of the architect's once with the same Iron Guard convictions, and subsequently imprisoned with Joja - who in the same issue of Dilema thought possible a contemporary reinterpretation of a design for a big church to which Joja returned several times during his lifetime, 156

nobody else chimed in.8 Such a revisitation is likewise visible in some of the projects for the competitions for the Cathedral of the Nation, for instance that of the Tanascaux team that came with a superweight version of the above-mentioned 1940 Church of the Nation by the Joja-Goga team, yet situated on the spot of the former St. Vineri Church. Critical Regionalism - An Alternative? My point is the following: since there exists an actually irreconcilable diversity of medireview "exemplary models", to which recently was added the international success of the wood church, probably that the attitude the least "contaminated" by the counterfeit rhetoric of the national identity is that of "critical regionalism". This, localizing and a preserver of the local specific and/or regional, contextualist traits is the only one which, while allowing modernity to work can maintain a satisfactory index of "recognizability" by the community of the new edifice as a Christian Orthodox church. By producing the identification with the local tradition, this procedure permits acceptance by the community and thus can mould the context where it deviates and can renew it where it is retarded; in both cases, such architecture can impose the quality standards of the local built environment without it causing alienation through sudden modernization or "uprooted" forms. Likewise, my argument is related to the Christian architecture and has a scale component: the cathedral, especially, in towns, should preserve -at least to a certain extent, through the visual presence of the main belfry - distinction as related to the environment of the situation. Petre Antonescu in his turn demanded the same thing in 1940, only that he asked for a proportional aggrandizement of religious abodes; or if the block is not a scale increase of the traditional house why should the cathedral be strictly an amplification of the village church? At the same time with the erection of an imposing, central church I think as many district churches as possible are necessary which should articulate the parish as a basic element of the community. These are desperately needed in the blockof-flat districts of dormitory cities, whose inhabitants manage only with great difficulty to put together such abodes. These can operate first of all as what they actually are, anyway, that is socius: public places, as well as edifices, district centres, meeting places of the persons living in the neighbourhood. As (a modest though efficient) agora, the cult abode of a unit of vicinity can invent connections between people, can institute hierarchies in the aggregating community (through parish committees and donations to the cult abode) and therefore a form of articulation from the basis to the top of society. If the church is the vehicle by means of which a society can be structured today in Romania, then this vehicle should be used to the maximum, and the state and local administrations that are directly interested in social cohesion should support the efforts of the individuals that want this, but for the time being possess only material means sufficient to put up inadequate makeshift shelters with a wood cross on their roofs. The Cathedral of the Redemption of the Nation Discreetly put forth as early as 1990 as a future topic of meditation, the project for a monumental patriarchal cathedral became public in 1995 and, after the change of regime in 1996, it gained even sharper contours: next it garnered the direct support - encroaching all legal approval procedures in force at that time - of the then Premier Ciorbea, of the interim mayor of Bucharest Lis, and the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Ion Diaconescu.9 These ones, together with the minister of public works did not spare any effort in the media to manipulate the institutions and ignore all legal, professionally approaches needed from the city-planning vantage.10 Some intellectuals protested.11 In fact, the magazine 22 and Dilema dedicated specialized issues to the discussion of the project in general. Similarly, Vestitorul Ortodoxiei, the official organ of the Patriarchate, also began direct attacks at the intellectuals "isolated from the people, free masons, perverted by Illuminist ideas" as Mr. Constantin Balaceanu Stolnici define them in an interview granted to the BBC (Romanian department) in a programme dedicated to the topic by those who proposed it or had objections at the designs, ranging from the immorality of the founding hierarchs (Andrei Plesu), to the gigantism of the proposed object (Alexandru Beldiman). More details on the matter are to be found in the extremely rigorous 157

article dedicated to the compulsory steps to be taken from the legal, city-planning and architectural vantages, as worded and published in magazine 22, dedicated to the Cathedral, by the former architectin-chief of Bucharest, Prof. Dr. Peter Derer. The conflict on this topic with the interim mayor of Bucharest led to the resignation of Professor Derer from his position. After having the subject of location dominating all discussions and after the Commission of Monuments (in a mistaken move, given what happened subsequently) opposed categorically the location of the abode in the Carol Park,12 the decision was eventually made: the cathedral would be situated in the Union Plaza. I think it was an erroneous decision of the Commission which, under the pretext of preserving the place of the former 1906 royal exhibition as a historical site (unfortunately, not much is left of the respective spot) actually managed to conserve only the monument of communist "heroes", a very good example in its genre, for that matter (architect Maicu). A project to somehow include this monument or to convert it into a sacred space would be extremely interesting architecturally speaking (the five arcs could have supported the bells of the new abode, as the press of the time maintained, and the present monument of the unknown hero would have reached to the threshold of the church proper) especially if it had made the object of a contest of at least national scope. In the process, perhaps the place - that continues to be guarded arm in hand (against whom?) would have been exorcised. In point of city-planning, the choice of the Carol Park would have spared the centre of the city, already too suffocated, the presence of another colossal object, most likely instituting another height landmark in the makeup of the city, to lessen the importance of the current Republic House. Unfortunately, that option, which would have saved the centre of the city was bluntly rejected. The alternative aired, the Youth Park, was, in a much too visible way, a relegation of the respective church from the centre and, anyway, proved insulting, given the presence of a former garbage dump on the respective location. No other serious proposition was put forth. If think the position of the Commission of Historical Monuments would have been really interesting if, while rejecting the proposals of the Patriarchate, it had come up with viable alternative solutions. One idea that could hardly he turned down by the hierarchs would have been, for example, the reconstruction of the Vacaresti Monastery. This contained a church that was most spacious for the present liturgical needs of the Patriarchate. It featured enough space for the functions demanded by the sponsor (among which a museum of the Christian Orthodox faith would have been easily rounded off by one of the demolitions carried on); quite numerous and significant elements of the former church have been preserved (capitals and even column flutes, part of the frescoes) and since a considerable restoration work had been achieved in the years prior to the demolition there exists sufficient documentation for either a minute restoration (like the remaking of the old centre, Stare Miasto of Warsaw, destroyed by Nazi air raids), or one where the old and the new should stand side by side.13 Moreover, and this is the central argument, this would have been a gesture with a special symbolical value that would give back the city a stolen monument, proving, in the process, the regret, be it frail, of the hierarchs, for the loss of the holy abode. Whatever the truth, the thing is that very fast, the end-users of the building14 - as if knowing they are in the wrong as to the laws of the state and the professional demands of city-scaping and architecture but also in order to prevent any protest - placed there a road altar and proceeded to hallowing the place, a move subsequently corroborated by the Pope who kissed the altar when he visited Romania. Then a competition was staged of an ambiguous description: a city-planning contest that should have confirmed (or denied) the possibility for the Union Plaza to take over such a gigantic programme, the topic demanding architectural detailing of the cathedral itself. The ambiguity seems to have been desired and it leads to the suppression of the second stage, absolutely necessary in a competition of the kind, for the object proper. Further enhanced by the fact that the fist prize was not awarded (this would have made necessary the awarding of the project to the winning team), this state of indecision will very soon push to the surface a solution devised by someone that has nothing to do with the contest, that will observe none of the interesting variants proposed within the contest and will therefore turn the entire event - which the Romanian law requires for any public investment of such scope - farcical. When I write this text, the previous idea is just a forecast: it is very possible, I fear, that by the time this work is published, the projection will have turned real. This would be but the "logical" outcome of 158

the unforgivable way in which the entire process has gone on so far. NOTES 1 I designed six Christian Orthodox churches in the Slobozia and Calarasi bishopric through the good will of the then bishop, H.E. Nifon. Five of them are in various stages of progress, while because of the lack of funds only the foundation of the sixth having been laid; a body of cells at Sfintii Voievozi Monastery of Slobozia, a Baptist church at Zalau whose architecture was not observed in the process of construction; finally I have often published in the press on this topic. 2 Fiinta si spatiul, Being and Space, Bucharest, ALL, 1992 (with Radu Dragan); Symbols and Language in Sacred Christian Architecture, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1996 (with Radu Dragan); Visul lui Ezechiel, Ezekiel's Dream, Bucharest, Anastasia, 1996 3 For details see the magazine Arhitectura 1-2/1999 "Biserici noi", respectively the design for the Heroes' Chapel by Razvan Luscov. 4 The project is presented in the issue of the magazine presented in the previous note. 5 This one "wraps up" or "bandages" buildings with huge covers, like for instance the Reichstag before restoration, turning the buildings into forms whose unique significance is given by the scale of the original edifices. 6 This is the more obvious if we make a comparison with the Catholic programme for the millennium in Rome, culminating with the contest for the Church of the Year 2000, won by architect Richard Meier. 7 Author of the Finnish Pavilion at Expo Sevilla 1992. 8 Joja was obsessed with sacred architecture, especially the Transylvanian wooden one. He participated in the 1990 conference of Braila. After 1989, he even proposed the placing of a wooden church in the square of the National Theatre and in front of the Republic House. 9 In an interview granted to magazine 22, he deemed that the respective construction should be monumental, given that the present metropolitan cathedral is smaller than the church in his native village. 10 See the extremely rigorous article dedicated to the compulsory steps, from the legal, city-planning and architectural vantages, as worded and published in Romania literara by the former architect-inchief of Bucharest, Prof. Dr. Peter Derer. The conflict irrupting on the topic between the professor and the interim mayor led to the resignation of Mr. Derer from the relevant position, to a text I published on the subject in the architecture column of the Libertatea newspaper and the fuming public attack directed at me by Mr. Lis, at the beginning of the discussion in connection with the Cathedral, organized in 1997 by the Group of Social Dialogue. The magazine 22 and Dilema dedicated, in fact, specialized issues to this discussion of the matter related to the project in general, as Vestitorul Ortodoxiei, the official organ of the Patriarchate also began direct attacks at the intellectuals "isolated from the people, free masons, perverted by Illuminist ideas" as Mr. Constantin Balaceanu Stolnici defined them in an interview granted to the BBC (Romanian department) dedicated to the topic by those who proposed it or had objections at the designs, ranging from the immorality of the founding hierarchs (Andrei Plesu), the gigantism of the proposed object (Alexandru Beldiman) to the ignorance of location and feasibility studies (Peter Derer). 11 Andrei Plesu, "The Honour of the Church", editorial in Dilema # 243-4, 19-25 Sept, 1997: "The representatives of the civil society, of the Commission for Historical Monuments, of the political class had serious reserves as to a gigantic object which, the way it is conceived can become only an indecent embodiment of "futile vanity". If we all are the Church, then these voices come, in full justice, from the Church. More, they are outstanding voices of the Church. Not to mind their words is tantamount to excommunicating them. Can the hierarchs afford such a thing? In the name of what? In the name of what civic deed, in the name of what legal page? How can the Church suspend the freedoms and responsibilities of its members? In what other way than by worshipping its officials as an "avant-garde detachment" of all the faithful? This vanguard detachment made it a vocation, in the past fifty years, to allow itself to be defeated by the world. It vaunted the crimes of some apostates, it consented to 159

homage-paying kowtowing and the barbarian demolition of irreplaceable abodes. It rustled up mean and bombastic justifications to allow the national lie, the misery of the bodies and the rape of the souls. How many of our grand hierarchs, when confronted with the demon of the dictatorship, thought if not of martyrdom at least of a modest withdrawal into the wilderness? They preferred to deem themselves indispensable, to wrap their cowardice in pious words about patience, wisdom and saving compromise. They survived in a state of half-sleep, at peace with themselves, in the haze of well-heated cells. And now, when for decades they refused to defend the honour of the Church, they suddenly find interest in its world pump. They want immanent glory as a reward for a long lack of courage. They want to crown their resignation with a triumph. Like the teachers of the law and the Pharisees, they want to clean the outside of the cup and dish, but inside they are full of greed and self-indulgence. (Matthew, 23, 25 ) The result is foreseeable. The Cathedral of the Nation" will look like "whitewashed tombs", not even very beautiful on the outside while on the inside [it will be] full of dead men's bones and everything unclean. (Matthew, 23, 27) 12 Extremely funny was the point made on the public TV station by mayor Lis in support of the respective location. He maintained that the establishment should be positioned on a hill in order to be closer to God. 13 Along this line, see the studies before 1989 in favour of including the monastery in a new justice complex within the communist plans to turn the area monumental, as well as many other memorable documents on the demolition process in the book by the head of the entire operation, architect Gheorghe Leahu, The Demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery, 1997. 14 In other words, the patriarch and the elite on the Metropolitan Hill, as well as the political topsiders, no matter the hue, because such a church is not a parish one, therefore destined to the faithful people, but to the great official processions of the leaders of the Romanian Orthodox Church and of the state which, encroaching its laws, they despise.

MONICA SPIRIDON THE "IMPERIAL EYES" AND THE BORDERLAND ISSUE*

Abstract: The article discusses the Romanian geopolitical position between three political powers, the Ottoman Empire, the imperial Russia and the Habsburg Empire, in the late 19th century. Keywords: Romania; imperialism; political border

Paul Morand, a French traveler of the XIXth century, author of a book about the Romanian capital-city, used to say that more than a city, Bucharest was a meeting point. [Morand:1935]. Although he meant the city, his remark recommends itself as metonimic. From a purely geopolitical point of view, Morand's statement also points towards the interstitial [Bhabha, 1990a; 1990b] placement of Romania as a whole, between three greedy imperial powers (the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Empire, the imperial Russia). As an outcome of this borderland position, one Empire or another has been a permanent presence in 160

Romania's political, historical and cultural destiny and no less in structuring the local mentality as well as collective perceptions. The extreme closeness of the Empires and the position of a small country, conscious of a permanent threat of being engulfed, have been decisive in influencing the national identity and its legitimizing devices. This very fact resulted in a series of consequences that deserve careful consideration, before any further debate (on such issues as post-colonialism or the post-soviet era) is entered into. One of the very few foreign researchers specializing in Romanian history and working in the field of mentalities, Catherine Durandin, maintains that the Romanians never grew tired of defining their identity as a consequence, on every possible level, of the gap between themselves and an idealized Western Europe. [Durandin: 1995]. In this respect, the French historian fails to draw the full necessary conclusion: the proximity of Russia, with all its implications, has been the main measure in direct proportion with this gap. How was this national identity conceived and represented before, during and after the imposed communist influence as a consequence of Romania's position at the crossroads of the Empires? This is the point I am going to deal with here. My approach will be fairly general and will only point to a few relevant issues in this matter. *** The Romanian self-exiled writer Emil Cioran has placed the key issue regarding the debatable - and highly debated - condition of Romanian identity in an outstanding interrogation. Paraphrasing Montesquieu, his question sounds like this: "Comment peut-on etre Roumain?" Unfortunately, as Matei Calinescu points out later, Montesquieu does not also consider the case of a Persian asking himself: How can one be a Persian? [Calinescu.1983: 21]. In order to touch the sore spot of the Romanian national idea, we should lay a strong emphasis on its status as an emotional Counterreaction. In Romania, national identity emerged by way of compensation, as retaliation to the unhappy consciousness of being a Romanian, epitomized by Cioran's question. In coping with this collective insecurity - at the same time desire and doubt - one cannot ignore the mixed cultural heredity of Romanianness. The Western Roman linguistic legacy, on one side, and the Eastern Orthodox Christianity, on the other, have been the torn halves of the Romanian cultural identity. In the Romanian culture, the paradigmatic anxiety brought about by the obsession with identity can be tracked down in various areas of reference. The collective perceptions of the national idea fostered conflicting ideologies, rhetorical devices and topoi of the social imaginary; fashioned literary programs; forged symbolic topographies and sites of memory. During the first half of our century, the Romanian culture fostered various narrative scenarios relying on a total overlapping of history and collective memory, in the evocation of deep, sacred national origins: the holy memory of the holy nation [Norra.1989: 11]. On the agenda of the Romanian intellectual elites, genetic anxieties such as: Where are we coming from? And where is our symbolic cradle in Europe? Completely overshadowed the basic question: Who are we? On the level of mainstream perceptions, the epitome of the relationship oneself /the other was the implicit dictum: "Tell me where you are coming from, and I will tell you who you are." Especially after the first World War, when The Greater Romania was born, the process of nation building and the intellectual arguments about identity had come to dominate the academic curricula at almost every level and in every particular discipline: history, philosophy, ethnography, literary history, art and so on. This is why in the Romanian literature prestigious places, worshipped by the popular memory, have been shaped as national moulds. The Master tropes of nationalist literature were imperial spaces like Rome - the Western cradle of the Romanian Latinity - or Byzantium - the eastern mould of the Romanian orthodox Christianity. In the wake of a growing anxiety about national identity, literature has persistently built heterotopias [Foucault: 1986] prestigious models - as a Post-Byzantine Byzantium, the Forth Rome - , able to meet the requirements of legitimacy and to compensate for the discomfort of being a Romanian. It is also noteworthy that this persistent topographical leaning had 161

been closely intertwined with an obsessive public concern about Orient and Occident, as alternative geopolitical and cultural horizons of the Romanian identity. *** The 20 years between 1944 - the Soviet take over of Romania - and 1964 - Ceausescu' s advent - can be seen as a tireless battle of Nationalism against Marxism. [Vederey, 1991:11]. Nationalism eventually emerged the winner and National identity became the master cultural symbol, displaying highly structural properties. In this lapse of time, literature, history, collective memory had performed their converging parts in an overarching explanatory scenario. A discourse about unity and continuity (The Nation) had overcome the one about differentiation and change (Marxism). During Ceausescu's dictatorship, the virtually hegemonic force of national ideology ended up as an aggressive complex of superiority called Protochronism. Its main cultural statement was a boastful rejection of any sources, models or forerunners, in almost all-intellectual areas, in favour of a paradoxical theory of local priority, allegedly ignored, because of the marginal status of Romania. It is important to note that the same distressing question: How can one be a Romanian? Should be posited as the ultimate source of Protochronism. This time by way of compensation, being a Romanian becomes a privilege, a miracle and bliss. In Ceausescu's Romania, the "pride of being born Romanian" was the obsessive keynote of all official discourses In attempting to identify the first roots of Protochronism it is probably necessary to go as far back as the decades between the two world wars and focus on Mircea Eliade, another displaced Romanian. From this point of view, the Protochronist reaction is therefore ambiguous and double-edged. On the one hand, it is a clear statement of a deeply felt inferiority complex to the advanced Western Europe. On the other hand, it is a proud rejection of the imperial model of the Soviet occupant. In this case, the barbarity is that of the conqueror, the latter becoming from the carrier of civilization to be exact opposite. This is the explanation for the various elite intellectuals' (the prestigious Edgar Papu, for instance) brush with Protochronism. To find the key to this delicate issue it is necessary to find appropriate codes to interpret Alterity, to be more specific the Western versus the Eastern Alterity. The relationship with the Soviet occupant needs explaining in the context of the equation between the civilizing West versus the aggressive East, barbarian, domineering so much so that it threatened to sever the umbilical cord connected to the European matrix. This perspective must be kept in mind when attempting to retroactively analyze the great diversity of the cultural output during the communist era. In the second age of the national idea (Ceausescu's nationalist dictatorship), the previous cultural harmony and unity collapsed. History and memory fell apart. The official national history was relying on an integrated, dictatorial memory. A memory without a past - as Nora notices. [Norra.1989: 8]. An unbridgeable gulf was growing deeper and deeper between it and the living literary memory. The previous memory-nation, building sites of memory - lieux de mmoire - was the last occurrence of the joint venture memory / history. As far as, for instance, the fictional output of the period is concerned, especially during the eighties, the youngest generation of Romanian authors tried by all available means to counteract the take over of memory by the official political and historical discourse. They set out on a spontaneous criticism of nationalist paradigms, undermining their ideological and aesthetic foundations as well as their rhetorical devices. Along with the authors' growing scepticism concerning older national representations, fictional topographies became more contradictory tot he points of confusion. Romanian writers move from the urban novel to the travel epic, which, in the European literature, had previously offered generous opportunities for the teaming-up of fiction and meta-literature. The title of an original novel by Ioan Grosan: A Hundred Years at the Gates of the Orient mixes a twist on Gabriel Garca Mrques's Cien anos de soledad and one Raymond Poincar's famous remarks on the subject of Romania's borderland position: "Que voulez vous, nous sommes ici aux portes de l'Orient, ou tout est pris a la lgere?" (What do you expect? We are here at the gates of the Orient, where everything is easy-going). Moreover, in contemporary Romania, this remark grew to become a stereotype excuse for various civic, moral and political deficiencies. 162

The chronicle of a return-trip from Romania to the pontifical Rome, in the early seventeenth century, is a mere excuse to playfully re-read, re-write and re-live a hundred years of traditional literary stereotypes and of collective perceptions in national identity. Highly emotional clichs of the inter-war discourses - such as "We, the Romanians, we are the descendants of Rome." are being turned upside down or simply ignored. Authors like Grosan redefine previous identity hypotheses as obsolete scenarios of cultural memory. They grasp an essential process-taking place in the contemporary Romanian literature: the progressive retreat of identity paradigms into discourse. And, at the same time, they capture the passage of the arrogant national models and of their products into literary assets to be recycled. From a different point of view, the literature of the eighties pays a special attention to the virtual ghetto-structure imposed by the Bolshevik occupation on Romania. Novelist, memoirist, historian, journalist (and, after 1989, political analyst and member of the senate) Stelian Tanase is the keen chronicler of a Bucharest that communism expelled out of history into a state of day to day survival routine: a place where any model degenerates, and where even deliberate imitation miserably fails. Corpuri de iluminat (Lighting Devices) 1990 is the anthology of the malformations, anomalies, left overs of both the people and the city. As suggested by the metaphor in the title of one of his novels Playback -, the imaginary topography created by the novelist is a space of mystification and of perversion, where the technical method alluded to (a "playback") passes from the screen to real life. A city whose history has been forged, whose face has been disfigured by the shallow pharaonic models of the Ceausescu's era, the Bucharest described by Stelian Tanase is a version of the 30ties Moscow not unlike the Moscow imagined by Bulgakov. For Tanase, due to Romania's position at the meeting point of several agonising empires, Romanian identity is to be found in the interstitial spaces between different ends. And this is strikingly obvious in Bucharest: "In Bucharest - Tanase stubbornly maintains - the end of several great empires meet. The histories of the Byzantine Empire, of the Ottoman Empire as well that of the Russian Empire virtually ended in Bucharest."[Paleologu, Tanase, 1996: 430]. Over the last couple of years, Tanase has been working on a massive novel (to average about 1000 pages) set in Bucharest. As the writer explains in his diary - Ora oficiala de iarna (The Official WinterTime) 1995 - the starting point of the book is 1683, the year of the first printing of the Bible in Romanian (the so-called Bible of Bucharest). The end of the story is set exactly three hundred years later, in 1983. (1983 is usually seen as the most radical turning point of Ceausescu's cultural policy: The ideological conference of Neptun-Mangalia) These dates are highly significant in themselves both 1683 and 1983 simultaneously signify a beginning as well as an end. *** Catherine Durandin is right reaching the conclusion that the Roman conquest of Dacia triggered a persistent axiological tension, later enhanced by various circumstances and in various contexts. Nevertheless, among those circumstances not listed, it is worth mentioning the assimilation of Romania's administrative and political structures by one Empire after another, from Turkey to the later Soviet Russia. In today's postcommunist era, Durandin believes this tension can be identified in an overemphasized collective aspiration towards the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. Worth mentioning in passing is that the French historian chooses to go against the mainstream opinion in including Russia on equal footing with the Ottoman Empire among the pro-oriental Balkan pressures to which the Romanian culture was intensely subjected. In doing so, she ignores the essentially opposite nature of the Romanian historical reaction to the Turkish and respectively the Russian occupation. To mention only one of many, Eminescu in his articles displays a profound understanding of the issue, in preferring the former to the latter. Time doesn't permit here a detail analysis of his main arguments, however well founded. Enough evidence to support the above can be found in a few historical facts: the Turkish Empire never fully occupied Romania, neither did the Turks transform cities in Soviet raions, did they not impose repeated censorship on the local religions and they were never given the right to naturalize and to own land or properties in Romania. The Ottoman neighbours confined themselves to initially only confirming and they're nominating the princes of local 163

extraction, and subsequently to nominating Fanariot (e.g. Greek) rulers.) However, Durandin is correct in identifying a few of the main symptoms of a malady she never names nor examines closely and systematically. In my analyses I will call it "the imperial syndrome", accompanied as it was by interesting expressions in the Romanian cultural zone over decades, including the post-soviet era. A nation surrounded on all sides by arrogant empires strategically organizes its identity-related history and ideology in the framework of secure stereotypes that would legitimate its right to existence and to public recognition. In Romania this strategy frequently became part of the more general Orient versus Occident antinomy [Spiridon: 2000b]. Such a process of authoritarian semantic structuring of the identity space evolved on several stages. To pick one example of many available, a clear line can be drawn between the pre-soviet feverish quest for arrogant domineering models - inevitable creating an identity confusion and a creation pathos of identity debate, collective emotions, clichs and especially generating fierce polarization's - and the post-soviet occupation situation. During the communist period to follow, the identity, be it underground or officially accepted, failed to claim any models. The latter due to conscious rejection of any paradigmatic patronage and to the attempt to affirm an absolute national priority legitimized by the Protochronist dogma. As far as the underground is concerned, the cause is to be found in the purposeful deconstruction of the literary tradition displaying proud imperial models. See for instance Banulescu's - Cartea de la Metopolis (The Book of Metopolis) - or Sorescu's Raceala (A Cold) parodies of the Post- Byzantine imperial arrogance in the Southern Romanian area. At this point, I find it necessary to underline that my study is restricted to cultural projections, and namely to literary representation. On the ideological level, it is essential to distinguish between the two, because (and this is particularly true for the Romanian cultural environment) they have operated on parallel levels if not in totally opposite ways. [Spiridon: 2000a]. Apart from that, literature plays a key role in any society, a role transmitting network, irreplaceable and constantly used by ideologies. [Nemoianu: 1996]. *** A few concluding remarks. The paragraphs above have the role of merely providing a general framework for an ongoing analysis [Spiridon: 2000c]. In as little detail as possible, I have tried to point out that imperial apprehensions followed by various types of the " post-imperial syndrome" are part of a complex series of identity phenomena present in the Romanian cultural history. The imperial anxiety has been present more or less at all points in the Romanian history, as Catherine Durandin is very quick to notice. Post-imperial reactions however have been extremely diverse, if not contrasting. I won't go into details here, but the mark left by imperial Rome has been gradually included and assimilated in the Romanian legacy and tradition, becoming one of the deepest and furthest reaching roots of the national identity. The Byzantine legacy has been equally incorporated within the eastern branch of Christianity. Both have attracted a pronounced sense of pride, promptly illustrated in literature, which was also quick to come up with a parody of each, once the respective tradition grew obsolete. Post-Habsburg Transilvania features a productive process of reanalysis of the crossroads hybrid that is Central European legacy. As far as the traces of Turkish domination are concerned, they are subject to an extensive debate trenching on the issue of the Orient, of the Balkans etc. In any case, theorists such as Edward Said [Said: 1979] or Mary Louise Pratt [Pratt: 1992] are methodologically irrelevant in this respect, seeing as the Romanian Eastern dimension was one that took particular pride in itself. Moreover, this kind of orientalism only stretches as far as Greece, becoming a particular European orientalism. Last but not least, the relationship with the Soviet Union can only be analyzed within the guidelines of this post-imperial framework, a topic that I don't intend to dwell on but to which the analysis I have 164

attempted can be useful as a starting point. Trying to force these distinctive details into the tight conceptual framework of post colonialism is, in conclusion, a sterile error of method. Works Cited Bhabha, Homi. 1990a. "The Third Space", in Identity, Community, Culture, Difference, Edited by J. Rutherford. London: Lawrence & Wishart: 207-21. Bhabha, Homi.1990b. Nation and Narration. New York and London: Routledge. Calinescu, Matei. 1983. "Comment peut-on etre Roumain ?", in Cadmos, VI: 23-25. Durandin, Catherine.1995, L'histoire des roumains. Paris: Fayard. Eliade, Mircea. 1986. Briser le toit de la maison. La creativit et ses symboles. Paris: Gallimard NRF. Foucault, Michel.1986. "Of Other Spaces". Diacritics. 16: 22-27. Morand, Paul. 1935. Bucarest. Paris: Plon. Nemoianu, Virgil. 1996. Microarmonia. Iasi: Polirom Norra, Pierre.1989."Between Memory and History. Les Lieux de Mmoire". Reprsentations, 26:7-25. Paleologu, Alexandru, Tanase, Stelian.1996. Sfidarea memoriei, Convorbiri. Bucuresti: Ed. Du Style. Pratt, Mary Louise.1992. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation. London: Routledge. Romier, Lucien.1931. Le carrefour des empires morts. Paris: Hachette. Said, Edward.1979. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books Sarkany,Stephane. 1968. Paul Morand el le cosmopolitisme litteraire. Paris: Klincksieck. Spiridon, Monica. 2000 a. "Inventing Romania: Nationalism and Literature in the 20th Century" in Interliteraria, 1, V: Culture and Nation at the Turn of the Millenium, Tartu: Kirjastus: 76-87. Spiridon, Monica. 2000b. "Orient et Occident: Un strotype de l'identit culturelle roumaine au XXe siecle" in Eleni Politou-Marmarinou, Sophia Denissi (eds.), Identit et Altrit en Littrature, XVIIIeXXXe siecles, III: Processus historiques, thoriques et esthtiques. Athens: Ed. Domos, 2000: pp. 207235 Spiridon, Monica. 2000c. "Run-Away Identities: The Quest for the Other in European Travel Writings". in The Paths of Multiculturalism.Travel Writings and Postcolonialism, ed. by Maria-Alzira Seixo, John Noyes, Graca Abreu and Isabel Moutinho. Lisbon: Ediciones Cosmos, 2000:313-326 Verderey, Katherine.1991. National Ideology under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu' s Romania. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.

ELENA PRUS DICHOTOMIE URBAIN / RURAL FACTEURS DETERMINANTS DE L'INTERCULTURALITE EUROPEENE

Urban/rural dichotomy. Influential agents of the European interculturality Abstract: The article discusses the intercultural relations established among Europe's different nations, taking into account the general distinction between urban and rural areas. 165

Keywords: Europe; multiculturality; interculturality; national identity;

Apres la deuxieme guerre mondiale, Karl Jaspers dfinissait l'Europe comme une construction autour de trois mots : libert, histoire et science. Toute l'existence de l'Europe tant dialectique, il situait sur l'axe de polarits toutes les valeurs historiques nationales : autorit / critique libre, Antiquit / Chrtient, glise / tat, Catholicisme/Protestantisme, science/foi, technique/religion etc. Cette liste ouverte pourrait etre complte avec la dichotomie urbain /rural qui a dfinit toute l'histoire de la civilisation europenne : l'urbain caractrise surtout la civilisation occidentale, le rural - celle orientale. On va trouver chez Adrian Marino un commentaire exhaustif dans ce sens : " Par-dessus de tout, l'adhsion a l' " ide europenne " est une question de mentalit, expression directe d'une couche sociale et intellectuelle citadine. " L'Europe " est une conception avec des origines, traditions et formes de manifestation spcifiquement citadines. " Le village " ne peut pas etre " europen " parce que son horizon et sa mentalit profonde et spirituelle est fondamentalement locale, ethnique, isolationniste, avec, invitablement, des tendances nationalistes. Tant que nous restons " des villageois ternels de l'histoire " (pour reprendre une expression de E.M.Cioran), l'europanisation ne peut pas se produire. Seule " la ville " est, d'une faon organique, rceptive a l'idologie et a l'intgration europenne. Proces extremement complexe. La ville est ouverte aux influences - dans ce cas surtout " trangeres "-aux nouveaux courants d'ides, a la synchronisation aux valeurs culturelles et matrielles " europennes ". Il n'est pas question de dprcier " le village " ou d'exalter, en lui portant prjudice, d'une faon exagre, " la ville ". Il s'agit seulement de reconnaitre la ralit d'une volution sociale incontestablement europenne. Toute l'Europe occidentale actuelle est avec prdominance citadine. Seulement 8 % de la population de l'Union europenne s'occupe de l'agriculture. Et " le village " occidental, dans l'acception roumaine, n'existe pas depuis longtemps. Il est remplac par les " fermiers " ( type humain, social et conomique diffrent du " paysan " traditionnel), qui habitent dans un milieu et cadre < citadin >. Meme si, souvent, assez restreint comme extension urbaine. " (la traduction nous appartient; tous les auteurs roumains sont cits d'apres Secolul 20, 10-12/1999, 1-3, 2000, p.47-48). La ralit dmontre qu'il n'existe pas qu'une Europe des diffrences, les pilons fondamentaux pour l'identit nationale et, ventuellement, supernationale, tant la race, l'origine, la langue et la religion. En meme temps, on ne pourrait pas contestait le fait que, a la diffrence des autres parties du monde, l'Europe est un continent tres homogene, une partie du monde qui a vcu toujours comme un tout integre, tant peut-etre la seule qui a eu une supernationalit durant toute son histoire. Toute l'Europe est domine par la meme culture matrielle, la meme race, elle est exclusivement arienne comme langue et chrtienne sous rapport confessionnel. La Rpublique Moldova est aussi partie de l'Europe et meme si l'Europe n'est pas confronte avec ses problemes, ce sont nous qui sommes confronts avec les problemes de l'Europe. A l'tape actuelle non seulement l'Europe, mais toute l'humanit fonctionne dja comme un mcanisme unique. Des le dbut du XXe siecle, avec le dveloppement permanent des moyens de communication et de dplacement, la Terre est devenue un tout entier. Guerre ou idologies, technologies ou maladies ne sont pas confronts avec la dimension spatiale, l'humanit est confronte avec des problemes et dfis globaux qui se connaissent pas de frontieres ou de droits souverains. Tenant conte des ces ralits, il est temps de se dbarrasser de la mentalit priphrique hrite du pass. Notre pays est confront les dernieres dcennies avec une grave crise d'identit et, d'une certaine maniere, la Rpublique Moldova peut etre l'exemple le plus concluent du fait que l'identit collective peut devenir un probleme du premier rang. Depuis une dcennie la politique moldave est asservie a un discours identitaire, fait qui a influenc d'une faon malfique l'tat de la socit. Dans ce contexte, la superidentit europenne pourrait etre la solution de ce probleme. Apres dix ans de la dclaration de son indpendance, la Rpublique Moldova est un navire a boussole dtraque. La dgringolade des institutions, la scurit du citoyen, l'approfondissement des disparits sociales, l'absence du sentiment d'une solidarit civique et la dcomposition de la conscience nationale crent un tat dsolant que les statistiques confirment. La Rpublique Moldova prsente actuellement 166

un immense polygone ou on applique diverses techniques de manipulation qui ne vont rien apporter pour l'tat et le citoyen. Dans une saison de regroupements gopolitiques et d'une nouvelle configuration de la carte europenne, la Rpublique Moldova apparait comme une tache blanche, une terra incognita qui ne rpond pas d'une maniere adquate aux signaux lancs vers elle. Une telle attitude souleve un tonnement et une dception de la part des occidentaux qui voudraient nous aider s'ils avaient avec qui discuter. Apres la disparition de l'empire sovitique, en Bessarabie ( parte de la Moldavie occupe par les Russes) continue la distillation d'une identit " originelle " - diffrente de celle roumaine - de la population indigene. Le moldovenisme est un courant politique qui oppose les Moldaves aux autres Roumains, de dsagrgation de la nation roumaine par les mains propres, qui commence avec l'annexion de la Bessarabie a la Russie en 1812 et prend proportions dans la priode du kominterne, avec la formation de la Rpublique Autonome Sovitique Socialiste Moldave. Le moldovenisme primitif est fond sur l'ignorance et la superficialit, les promoteurs de ce courant loyal au rgime communiste obtenant des titres et des privileges qui ne correspondent pas a leur comptence ou mrites rels. Comment peut-on rconcilier le moldovenisme - crature d'un rgime totalitaire - avec la postmodernit occidentale, avec l'poque post-industrielle, dans laquelle une srie d'lments comme souverainet nationale, importance du territoire, relation centre - priphrie ou majorit-minorit ne sont plus formuls comme jusqu'ici. On assiste a une superposition des priodes historiques completement diffrente parce que la Bessarabie a manqu le rpit ncessaire pour accomplir sa phase nationale. Aujourd'hui on ne peut pas rsoudre les problemes d'identit en base des donns du XIXe siecle, mais par alignement aux dfis de la globalisation et de la rvolution informatique, auxquelles on doit rpondre avec promptitude si on ne veut pas etre limins de l'histoire. Le colonialisme, indiffremment d'tiquette, est fond sur des mthodes d'annihilation de la conscience nationale. Comme consquence apparait la crise d'identit nationale qui, dans le cas des Bessarabiens, est une crise d'identit roumaine. L'identit du Bessarabien, rejet a la priphrie de son etre ethnique, menac avec la suppression, tait de plus en plus douteuse et confuse, sous la pression d'une dlirante intoxication de la propagande. La rsistance tacite est venue plutt de la paresse et de l'ignorance que par conviction. La Bessarabie n'a pas form un seul dissident de marque, nos dissidents dclars allaient en exil.a Moscou ! Apres une dcennie d'existence " indpendante " et , l'article 13 de la Constitution de la Rpublique de Moldova dclare comme langue d'tat " la langue moldave " et non le roumain ; la russification connait une nouvelle dynamique, surtout apres la restauration du Parti Communiste au gouvernement ; la dpendance politique et conomique de la Rpublique Moldova de la Russie est cvasitotale, la prsence des troupes russes en Transnistrie transforme la souverainet et la libert de Chisinau en matiere de politique externe en une fiction. La Roumanie ne s'implique pas, en temps que la Russie s'est instaure a Chitinau avec plus de 15 postes de tlvision, avec de centaine de journaux et de revues, avec des milliers d'hommes d'affaires qui ont privatis depuis longtemps la Bessarabie. A l'poque ou tombent toutes les frontieres de l'Europe, une seule semble persister : celle entre Roumains et Roumains. Cette frontiere est difie de deux cts : du ct de l'Europe qui voudrait des frontieres scurises et du ct de la Rpublique Moldova, dclare par la Fdration Russe " zone des intrets russes ". Ici, aux portes de l'Europe, une lutte est mene entre la vie et la mort, entre vrit et mensonge, entre le bien et le mal, entre justice et injustice, entre libert et contrainte, entre Dieu et Satan. Approfondis dans des bovarysmes provinciales, la ralit autour nous nous chappe, sans avoir pour elle de langage ni une terminologie adquats pour les faire transmissibles et intelligibles aux partenaires trangers. La Rpublique Moldova peut etre compare avec un village plong dans les tnebres, effray par la possibilit d'etre repr par quelqu'un par erreur. Si on essaye de connaitre la vie d'une telle localit, on va se ressentir dans la peau du K.- l'arpenteur du Chateau de Kafka : la meme rticence devants les trangers, le meme dfaut de dsir de communication. Par contraste, a la ville la nouvelle bourgeoisie se donne en spectacle. La coexistence du fond traditionnel rural qui devient de plus en plus inerte et plus expos aux vicissitudes de la transition avec une urbanisation superficielle vulgaire ( qui est plus 167

facile a emprunte) contextualise le drame bessarabe. La pseudo-urbanisation a pntr aussi l'ame naive du paysan, devenu plus solitaire qu'il y a 50-60 ans. D'ailleurs, le paysan est un personnage complexe et tres significatif du paysage bessarabe. Si aujourd'hui on parle encore le roumain en Bessarabie, si on ne s'est completement dissous dans la masse slave - on le doit surtout au paysan. Il a conserv la langue et la foi de ses ancetres, il a envoy a l'cole en langue maternelle son fils, devenu ultrieurement intellectuel et porteur de l'esprit national, il nous a sauv l'etre national. De cette faon, le paysan conserve le fond non-altr de la civilisation roumaine. Dans le plan culturel, toutes les actions se sont limites au traditionalisme, la notion inclue non seulement la littrature, les beaux-arts ou les racines originaires, mais aussi les mours, le train de vie. On est a la phase rudimentaire de l'oralit et du folklore, on est rest dans une phase transitoire entre une culture orale et une audiovisuelle. Aujourd'hui, a une valuation exigeante des valeurs littraires, surtout en prose, on distingue deux directions videntes dans la littrature moldave. La premiere tient de la mthode du ralisme socialiste, monstre cre par la priode sovitique ; la deuxieme suit les meilleures traditions de la prose intellectualiste de la littrature mondiale. De meme que dans la littrature roumaine, l'idologie " moderniste " affirme la priorit du facteur esthtique sur le facteur thique et conteste l'quation canonique tablie par les gnrations antrieures entre < le ruralisme > et la spcificit culturelle. E. Lovinescu soutenait dans la littrature la reprsentation des changements de mentalit de la socit moderne, en se prononant pour une civilisation de type bourgeoise et citadine. Toute l'lite culturelle d'entre les deux guerres s'est implique dans cette dispute autour du rapport entre " tradition " (concept qui est loin d'etre univoque) et " europisme " (qui est le terme consacr), entre identit et progres, Occident et Orient, ville et village, etc. Avec ou sans guillemets, les expressions roman rural et roman citadin, une littrature a thmatique et ouvres aux sujets citadins se retrouve chez George Calinescu, Pompiliu Constantinescu, aerban Cioculescu, Nicolae Manolescu, Eugen Simion etc. Pendant plusieurs dcennies la prose rurale permettait aux crivains d'aborder des problemes d'un large intret, social et national, comme la conservation des racines du peuple, de la sagesse sculaire du peuple, des valeurs thiques, des mours et traditions nationaux. En Bessarabie, le nosamanatorisme et le nopoporanisme de la littrature d'apres-guerre ne vient pas de l'assimilation consciente et programme des doctrines et de la pratique des courants respectifs, presque inconnus par les crivains du temps, mais de l'attachement pour les hommes du village, d'ou ils descendaient en majorit, pour les valeurs thiques prennes et pour tout ce que contrevenait a la politique communiste de crer un peuple nouveau - le peuple sovitique, sans nationalit, sans racines profondes dans l'histoire (v. Ion Ciocanu, Romanul " rural" postbelic in perspectiva estetica, Chisinau, 2000). En Rpublique Moldova, ainsi que dans les autres rpubliques de l'ex-Union Sovitique, le danger de la dissolution - sous la tyrannie du systeme totalitaire - des valeurs spirituelles nationales a donn naissance a une direction appele prose rurale ou ruralisme, reprsente par les ouvres de Vasilii Choukchin, Valentin Rasputin, Vasilii Belov, Cinghiz Aitmatov et autres. Les " ruralistes " bessarabes ont exalt les mours, les traditions dsapprouvs par le systeme et ont glorifi le pass de la nation, ont abord en priorit des sujets humains ternels. On peut considrer le ruralisme des crivains d'apres-guerre non seulement comme une orientation thmatique, mais aussi comme la substance organique de la littrature et sa dimension fondamentale. La mise en premier plan des ouvres a " personnage insignifiant " de la littrature d'essence poporaniste ne signifiait pas, dans les conditions de la Bessarabie, une rptition inutile d'une pratique littraire vtuste, mais une modalit vive de prsentation de l'homme de la terre, de la vie de ceux qui sont nombreux, considrs par l'idologie communiste comme des pieces dans une machinerie sophistique dans laquelle valait seulement l'homme de parti, le dirigeant. Mais cette littrature s'est avre rceptive dans le temps aux formes artistiques d'expression moderne, aux proces d'intellectualisation, spcifiques pour la prose authentique. Par ses models positifs, notre littrature est tributaire a l'opposition ou a l'apparence (par le discours sopique, par la mtaphore, tonalit lgiaque ou baladesque) au contrle institutionnalis et au refus d'illustrer l'histoire officielle (la guerre, la collectivisation, l'industrialisation). 168

Apres 1966, anne de l'amlioration considrable du climat littraire, ont suivi plusieurs romans " ruraux " qui n'tait pas influencs d'une maniere directe par l'idologie communiste et consistant du point de vue artistique et esthtique. Dans les annes 80-90 la consistance pique et thique est approfondie par une analyse psychologique et intellectuelle (les romans Povara bunatati noastre, Clopotnita, Biserica alba de Ion Druta, Unchiul din Paris de Aureliu Busuoc, Viata si moartea nefericitului Filimon de Vladimir Besleaga). Des jeunes prosateurs apportent une contribution substantielle a la diversification des techniques narratives du roman rural : Martorul de Vasile Girnet, Cubul de zahar de Nicolae Popa et autres. " Mieux intgre qu'on ne le pense gnralement, dans les structures et les crativits de sa jumelle occidentale, l'Europe de l'Est conserve quand meme en soi tous les attachements communicatifs avec le naturel et le spirituel, la nostalgie du traditionalisme, des substrats du tiers monde " (V.Nemoianu, Europa ieri, azi, maine, In : Secolul 20, nr.10-12, 1999, nr. 1-3 2000, p.32, la traduction nous appartient). Laissant a ct les prjudices cultivs par les gnrations, la peur de notre inestimable spcifique local et l'inquitude de l'estompage " des traditions des ancetres ", la chance des Bessarabiens est de devenir immdiatement un anneau dans le proces de la globalisation. A ct du roman rural, il faudrait bien que se soit le roman citadin qui intervient en force, qui mettrait en lumiere les problemes de la ville bessarabienne et nous permettrait une intgration dans le proces littraire europen, qui, depuis les deux derniers siecles cultive ce genre. Sur la scene bessarabienne sont apparus dja des romans qui soulevent plusieurs problemes de la ville comme Disc de George Meniuc, Latrand la luna et Pactizand cu diavolul de Aureliu Busuioc, Nepotul de Vladimir Besleaga et autres. On entrevoit dans le futur une cohabitation de ces deux genres comme la syntese actuelle dans les pays occidentaux des phnomenes d'urbanisation et de ruralisation - la rururbanisation. Sorin Alexandrescu a nonc dans Les Europes provinciales le caractere d'interfrence de ces Europes, dans lesquelles la vielle paradigme ne disparait pas, elle coexiste avec celle nouvelle, sans conflit, ou devient permanence atemporelle. L'actualit immdiate est une des options fondamentales pour la Rpublique Moldova : Ouest ou Est, tertium non datur. La solution pour la Bessarabie, pour etre sincere, n'est pas de matrialiser les projections idylliques sur la socit d'avant ou d'apres l'invasion, mais le proces de la globalisation, qui change la nature des rapports entre les hommes, les institutions, les pays et les systemes politiques divergeant, en imposant des nouvelles regles de comportement sur le mappemonde. Un proces dans lequel on devrait etre des facteurs actifs, et non des pieces dans le jeu de quelqu'un. Il est impossible de s'imaginer que la Moldavie va longtemps rester une priphrie isole, un espace de quarantaine qui mlange indiscernablement des rsidus communistes, patriarcales et asiatiques, au bnfice des despotes locaux, qui vont s'opposer sans cesse a notre alignement aux tendances gnrales de l'humanit.

CARMEN-MARIA MECU SI NICOLAE MECU CAPCANE IDENTITARE: FORME FARA FOND, FOND FARA FORME

Identity traps: meaningless forms, formless meanings 169

Abstract: The article explains the cultural differences between Romania and Europe with a special stress on the Romanian educational system and its ability to reform itself. Keywords: Romania; pedagogy; identity; cultural conflict

Teoria maioresciana a formelor fara fond ca si critica la care ea a fost supusa de la A. D. Xenopol la E. Lovinescu si at. Zeletin, iar mai tarziu A. Marino, N. Manolescu, Z. Ornea si S. Alexandrescu sunt lucruri prea cunoscute pentru a le mai rezuma aici. Vom reaminti totusi cateva dintre cuvintele-cheie ale faimoasei analize maioresciene, care ne pot servi ca punct de plecare si ca elemente de referinta in demersul nostru. Maiorescu vorbeste insistent de letargia si barbaria orientala, ca si de graba pusa de reformatorii care s-au "patruns de efecte", "dar nepatrunzand pana la cauze", asa incat, intorsi in tara au imitat si reprodus doar aparentele culturii apusene" (intr-un recent articol polemic, Virgil Nemoianu a aratat ca lucrurile nu stateau deloc asa si a demonstrat soliditatea formatiei culturale si buna-credinta a celor incriminati de Maiorescu ). Ei, reformatorii grabiti, continua Maiorescu, sunt manati de "vanitatea (sub care lesne se poate ascunde un sentiment de inferioritate - am observa noi) de a arata popoarelor straine cu orice pret, chiar cu dispretul adevarului" (asadar construind rationalizari, justificari ale eventualelor esecuri, scotandu-i pe altii vinovati - cum ar spune un freudist), "ca le suntem egali in domeniul civilizatiunii". ingrijoratoare, mai zice criticul, este absenta puterii de a constientiza goliciunea, subrezenia formelor pe care ei insisi le produc. Dintre formele civilizatiunii moderne astfel imitate si falsificate, una cel putin pare a fi extrem de actuala: invatamantul, modernizat in lipsa specialistilor (v. celebra fraza: "inainte de a avea invatatori satesti, am facut scoli prin sate, si inainte de a avea profesori capabili, am deschis gimnazii si universitati si am falsificat instructiunea publica"). Ne aflam azi intr-o situatie tragi-comic similara. Am pornit o reforma scolara (ce-i drept, se pare ca daca nu se proceda cu grabire se pierdea ultimul tren cu bani de la Banca Mondiala!) elaborand documente cu terminologie occidentala, dar avem in scoli putini oameni care sa le stie citi si intelege, si mai ales oameni antrenati sa le puna in opera, sau macar binevoitori. Avem facultati private bastioane ale capitalismului universitar! - care s-au deschis uneori cu profesori respinsi din facultatile de stat de catre studentii revolutionari si senatele universitare in 1989 - 1990. Greselile, proasta functionare, se platesc, ca si pe vremea lui Maiorescu, din banul public. Mai spunea criticul, vizand compromiterea institutiilor culturale: "forma fara fond nu numai ca nu aduce nici un folos, dar este dea dreptul stricacioasa, fiindca nimiceste un puternic mijloc de cultura". Fraza ne aminteste vorba de duh care circula printre noi pe vremea - departe de a fi apus fara urme - a comunismului: "Vreti sa discreditati capitalismul? Veniti cu el in Romania, sa-l construim noi, aici!" in ce priveste strict critica lui Maiorescu, trecerea timpului a aratat ca formele, prin stimulare, cum s-a spus - si-au creat, treptat, fondul, devenind autentice. Schimband ce e de schimbat, contextul socio-politic si cultural actual seamana cu cel din vremea lui Maiorescu (afirmatia e desigur un truism). "Barbaria orientala", sub o forma mult mai agresiva si nimicitoare, ne-a scos din nou, vreme de 50 de ani, din istorie, punandu-ne, ca si pe conationalii nostri de acum un secol si jumatate, in fata unei crize de identitate - din anumite cauze si mai acuta si mai greu de rezolvat. Cativa mai norocosi scapau sa invete ceva mai serios ori aveau acces la bibliografii incomplete. Iar la ridicare cortinei, mai multi dintre noi ne-am putut alege grupuri sau persoane de referinta din cultura apuseana. Preocupati suntem si acum de imaginea de sine, pe care inca ne-o construim atenti la modul in care ne vede Europa (cea mereu cu ochii pe noi.). Fenomenul seamana cu criza identitara a adolescentului aflat in pericolul confuziei de rol, in pericolul de a dobandi o identitate neclara, al incoerentei si incongruentei personale. De aici, preocuparea excesiva pentru felul in care il vad altii, pentru construirea imaginii de sine prin altii. Ne aflam, asadar, intr-un fel de adolescenta in care ne definim rolurile culturale si scopurile. Situatia in care ne gasim mai suporta doua analogii: Prima se refera la conflictul de cultura teoretizat de romanul Nicolae Margineanu . Autorul vorbeste de conflictul dintre cultura rurala si cea urbana. Procesul de urbanizare poate avea o semnificatie 170

nevrotica (nota noastra: in acceptie psihanalitica), cu referire la sentimentul de inferioritate al oraseanului venit de la sat si insuficient integrat in noul mediu. Starea aceasta determina strategii identitare excesive: unii o fac pe ultrarafinatii (cu timpul exista posibilitatea ca aceasta sa devina o a doua natura - n.n.), dispretuiesc tot ce tine de sat, altii o fac pe "taranoii", socotind ca valorile si manierele rurale - traditionale - sunt singurele bune. Cea de-a doua analogie se refera la imigrantii care se lupta cu sentimentul devalorizarii de sine, o data ajunsi in culturi mai evoluate decat cea din care ei provin - fenomenul a fost descris de Hanna Malewska-Peyre, cercetatoare la CNRS , intr-un studiu din 1990, intitulat Procesul de devalorizare a identitatii si strategiile identitare. Judecatile altora, arata ea, pot influenta imaginea de sine pe care ne-o construim in situatia sociala unde o reprezentare negativa stereotipa este atribuita grupului nostru de apartenenta (nota noastra: poate fi vorba si despre apartenenta la un popor care produce "aurolaci", neglijeaza handicapatii, arunca pe piata cel mai mare numar de prostituate din toate tarile Europei de Est s.a.m.d.). Imigrantii isi construiesc doua tipuri (extreme, am adauga noi) de strategii identitare individuale impotriva devalorizarii de sine, pentru salvarea imaginii proprii. Prima consta in aceea ca ei se lasa asimilati, se straduiesc sa semene cat mai bine fizic si cultural cu persoanele din grupul de referinta (adica din cultura in care au intrat), ajung chiar sa imite vorbirea, accentul, felul de a fi al persoanelor din acest grup. Dau dovada de conformism cultural, renunta la identitate, prenume, nume, la parinti, la prieteni, la valori, la credinte. Fac eforturi de "dezlipire" ("dliaison"), emit rationalizari care sa le justifice atitudinea de abandon a grupului de apartenenta. A doua strategie identitara a imigrantului devalorizat (sau care se simte amenintat de devalorizare n.n.), la fel de excesiva ca si prima, dupa parerea noastra, este idealizarea propriului grup de apartenenta si dezvoltarea unei atitudini critice fata de civilizatia occidentala. Convalescenti in urma maladiei comuniste, romanii se afla inca intr-o situatie psihosociala si culturala pe care noi am numi-o de urgenta identitara. Ei trebuie sa-si redefineasca identitatea culturala din perspectiva europeana si chiar globala. Nu doar de amorul artei, ci - mai dur - pentru a primi ajutoarele financiare de care cultura, societatea noastra au nevoie spre a se debloca. in aceasta situatie de stress, se dezvolta doua strategii identitare limita. Caracterul lor excesiv (care le apropie de cele citate mai sus din literatura de specialitate) ne indreptateste sa le numim capcane identitare. Spre a le defini, ne vom folosi de termenii piagetieni de asimilare (adica: prelucrarea informatiei prin schemele subiectului, o subiectivizare a informatiei, a obiectului, in opinia noastra) si de acomodare (crearea de noi scheme pentru acomodarea cu informatie de tip nou, o obiectivare a subiectului, in termenii nostri). Capcana identitara a hiperacomodarii ar reprezenta o strategie identitara a excesului de europeism ori de globalism. in termenii lui Maiorescu, formele ("straine"), noile scheme, minimizeaza fondul (autohton), pana la stergerea lui. in termeni lingvistici, expresia tinde sa anihileze intelesurile si referentialele din vechea lume a subiectului. Exista situatii cand specialisti din alte domenii utilizeaza cu voluptate expresii din stiintele neuro-cognitive, unele referitoare la subtile mecanisme cerebrale pentru care nu au reprezentari stiintifice adecvate, nu cunosc "lumea" discursului pe care il rostesc. Autori de manuale se pot inspira (cu intentii laudabile, altminteri!) din manuale straine si pot concepe activitati similare pentru limba si literatura romana, fara a cunoaste principiile psiho-pedagogice care au stat la baza alcaturirii lor, de fapt intreaga cunoastere de specialitate care a ghidat conceperea lor. Lucrurile se complica atunci cand hiperacomodatorii, mimand usurinta utilizarii cunostintelor, spre a semana cat mai bine cu cei de referinta, se intalnesc cu vidul de cunoastere al beneficiarilor prestatiei lor, beneficiari care, natural, fac parte din grupul de apartenenta. Un exemplu ar fi utilizarea notiunilor de psihologie cognitiva pentru explicarea nivelurilor de prelucrare a unui text si a competentelor asociate, in volumul Ariei curriculare de limba si comunicare pentru clasa a X-a. in tara noastra, putini specialisti se pot lauda cu o intelegere adecvata a acestor notiuni. A le livra fara explicatii aprofundate, mai ales fara exemple si fara a indica surse bibliografice la care cei interesati sa poata apela (surse, desigur, accesibile) constituie o actiune sortita esecului. O rationalizare la indemana ar fi: "Ei tot nu citesc, chiar daca li se recomanda cevas chestiune de mentalitate. Trebuie sa dispara o generatie ca sa putem face ceva!" La polul opus, se situeaza cei care cad in capcana identitara a hiperasimilarii, reducand orice informatie noua la cliseele fondului atohton. Fondul autohton minimizeaza expresiile "straine", 171

schemele noi, pana la stergerea lor. in fapt, acesta e un fond fara forme, intrucat expresiile adecvate lui nu mai au cautare pe piata culturala europeana ori globala, nu le mai intelege nimeni. Imaginarul inform vehiculeaza un romanism desuet, care nu-si poate gasi expresia culturala in contemporaneitate. Fara capacitatea de a innoi schemele, expresia, nationalistii, sau, daca se prefera, traditionalistii devin fie de o agresivitate primara, fie se cufunda in starea psihanalitica de doliu. Acesta, doliul, poate fi tinut dupa invatamantul romanesc de pana mai ieri: "Reforma si manualele alternative ale lui Marga ne-au distrus invatamantul" sau dupa un mare scriitor: "Ni l-au luat pe Eminescu", ceea ce s-ar putea traduce prin: "Nu mai este acceptata constructia noastra imaginara despre poetul nostru national". Dinspre hiperacomodatori (europeistii extremi), hiperasimilatorii (traditionalistii, nationalistii, fundamentalistii) se vad, ca sa preluam lentilele lui Caragiale, drept "rromani verzi". Invers, hiperasimilatorii, caracterizati prin excesiva interioritate a constructiilor lor imaginare, folosind aceiasi ochelari, ii vad pe hiperacomodatori drept "moftangii" si "moftangioaice" - mai exact, in ipostaza in care acestia vorbesc romaneste numai "avec les domestiques", iar acum iau lectii de engleza sau si mai si: de americana! Ca si Maiorescu, putem vorbi si noi de o prapastie, dar nu intre clasele "superpuse" si poporul de jos, ci intre grupurile mentionate, situate la poli opusi. Dar trebuie sa facem remarca: in timp ce atat liberalii, cat si conservatorii junimisti acceptau modernizarea - diferenta fiind doar de modalitate: "mecanica", precum o numeste Sorin Alexandrescu, si organica -, intre cele doua grupuri exista falia care are in dreapta ei vointa (si politica) a modernizarii, iar in stanga opozitia (si politica) la modernizare. Aceasta tendinta de polarizare a persoanelor cu statut cultural ridicat - posibili si actuali lideri de opinie - creeaza o situatie precara pentru o mare parte a membrilor grupului lor de apartenenta, din nefericire, cei de care depinde aplicarea innoirilor culturale care ne-ar putea ajuta sa intram in dialogul european si global. Europeistii hiperacomodatori nu-i arunca ancore spre a o ajuta sa acceada la expresie si la semnificatia si sensurile ei, in vreme ce nationalistii hiperasmilatori fac presiuni inimaginabile spre a-i activa fantasmele primitive latente. Sa mai adaugam ca aceste impulsuri vin si din partea unor grupuri de presiune al caror discurs cultural e sustinut de un si mai agresiv discurs politic. Exista, desigur, oameni de cultura care resping ambele situari extreme, cautand - cu mai mult sau mai putin succes - solutii de armonizare a localului cu globalul. Paginile de fata - ebosa a unui studiu interdisciplinar - nu au pretentia de a oferi solutii maximal garantate. Le pot insa schita. Avand in vedere ca o prea mare cantitate de noutate blocheaza mecanismele de prelucrare ale celor carora ea li se adreseaza, ar fi posibile doua remedii, simultane si in regim homeopatic: Antrenamentul creativ al beneficiarilor (training-uri pentru adulti) spre a le diminua frica de noutate. Asemenea training-uri dezvoltand creativitatea ca flexibilitate (adica: solutii alternative), originalitate, sensibilitate fata de probleme / formulare de probleme; Introducerea treptata a noutatii, sau macar cautarea unor ancore (asemanari cat de vagi cu lucrurile deja cunoscute), sau: prezentarea lucrurilor noi ca solutii la probleme vechi (ca in reclame, a caror structura semnaleaza problema si ofera solutia). Ambele remedii pot fi cuprinse intr-unul singur: managementul cultural, care sa "umple" cu continut formele deja introduse. Managerul cultural e un mediator intre elite (care produc noutatea) si masa fara de care noutatea creata nu poate modifica ceva in mersul societatii (institutii, relatii, corpus-uri ale stiintei, artei etc). Ne vine din nou in minte Maiorescu, de data asta cu disertatia Despre progresul adevarului. Azi se stie ca o regula a invatarii este: rezultatele pozitive ale invatarii (mai ales cand ea implica o cantitate mai mare de noutate) se obtin in timps intr-o prima faza, ea produce dezordine, adica des-facerea vechilor structuri mentale, insa o dezordine ce contine - implicit - o noua ordine, care se actualizeaza in faza urmatoare. Revenind acum: Exemplul unui asemenea management ni l-a oferit Maiorescu insusi, care la 23 de ani, dupa ce obtinuse doctoratul in drept si in filozofie (in Occident), nu se simtea coborat cand alcatuia "regulele limbei romane pentru incepatori", menite a inlocui predarea abstracta si invatarea mecanica cu intuitia si intelegerea logica. Tot el a scris mai apoi un manual de logica, publicat in zeci de editii, 172

manualul de baza al tuturor, pana in 1948. Dar nu e intreaga activitate a lui Maiorescu una de manager cultural, activitate in care si-a pus el geniul, si nu in cea de creatie propriu-zisa? Respectand proportiile, tot asa au fost Jacob Negruzzi - vulgarizatorul si implantatorul nr.1 al programului maiorescian si junimist, Slavici - care pune in opera junimismul in spatiul transilvan, iar la 1900 Spiru Haret - care renunta la o cariera de creatie stiintifica pentru care era exceptional dotat, spre a reforma invatamantul. El a promovat creativitatea de masa (fara a o neglija pe cea a elitelor), si daca ne uitam intr-un dictionar, la cuvantul "haretism" gasim ca acesta e doctrina "potrivit careia orice politica reformatoare se va dovedi eficienta doar in masura in care, la realizarea ei practica, vor participa toate categoriile sociale". Haret oferea o solutie asemanatoare cu aceea pe care creatologii contemporani o propun Occidentului. Fiindca iata ce scrie H. J. Walberg intr-o lucrare relativ recenta despre "creativitate si talent ca invatare": "Datorita faptului ca indivizii si natiunile se confrunta cu un mare numar de noi descoperi si posibilitati de exploatare [a acestora], cele mai valoroase moduri de creativitate pot fi achizitionarea, selectia si implementarea. [...]. De exemplu, in contrast cu Anglia si Statele Unite, cu numarul lor mare de laureati Nobel, Japonia ilustreaza creativitatea sociala de masa, in domeniul achizitionarii si implementarii ideilors este bine cunoscut modul lor de a folosi le fel de bine capetele creative si mainile muncitorilor. Se pare ca se aloca prea mult din totalul finit al capitalului uman al unei natiuni pentru descoperiri originale si de varf, in detrimentul creativitatii mai putin prestigioase, dar mai vitale pentru bunastarea viitoare a unei natiuni" . Nu vom incheia propunand si noi, pentru Romania, un nou model, dupa cel suedez, spaniol etc. Ne e teama ca ar iesi o noua forma fara fond. De aceea o sugeram doar: asa-zicand cum grano. oryza, insistand asupra managementului cultural care mediaza intre creatia originala a elitei (de la noi si de aiurea) si masa, ca unul din mijloacele de a evita capcanele identitare despre care am vorbit.

GABRIEL COSOVEANU INTELECTUALUL ESTIC, INTRE NATIONALISM SI CIVISM

The Eastern intelectual between nationalism and civic spirit Abstract: The article approaches the national and civic identity of the Eastern intelectual in the communist regime and after. Keywords: Eastern Europe; Romania; national identity; communism

De cite ori se pune problema identitatii regionale care sa consune cu identitatea europeana, ma gindesc ca am putea proceda mai pragmatic, si anume prin apelul la exemple sustinute de trasee biografice "vii". Nicolae Balota, de pilda, care timp de 21 de ani a trecut frecvent din Germania in Franta si invers, sesizeaza, abordind tema Minoritate si cultura1, ca urile ce pareau seculare, adica "structurale", "eterne", intre etnii cu atitea razboaie la activ, s-au stins. Dialogul s-a depasionalizat, pentru ca 173

oamenii, pur si simplu informati, n-au aratat receptivitate la provocari si manipulari. Au inteles ca satul planetar are destin unic, recte comunitar, ceea ce atesta o constientizare culturala a societatii deschise si prospere. A intervenit, constata Balota, faptul ca resemantizarea nationalismului si a gloriolei sale sa produs pe cale intens - desi discret - pedagogica. Eruditul avertizeaza sec: "Revendicarea orgoliosagresiva a oricarei puritati este profund impura". De aici, o premonitie - "Razboaiele viitorului vor fi cultural-religioase" -, raportabila imediat la doua imagini defavorabile romanilor, una mai veche, apartinind lui Keyserling, cel din Analiza spectrala a Europei, alta de notorietate recenta, construita de Samuel Huntingdon, in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Ambele studii imagologice sugereaza ca aceasta zona a Balcanilor, greu domptabila, ar mai ramine in stand-by pina la autoclarificari identitare. Autoscopicul, de care sintem atit de mindri in proza (in epica masiva eseistica) confera si intretine un sentiment cetos al abisalitatii comportamentale, mit evident nationalist. Nu e de mirare ca situarea logocratilor fata de Dostoievski este necritica, pasionala. Noica insusi, hibrid ideologic si multipla constiinta culturala, se ridica impotriva Germaniei untului si a societatii lui bye-bye, dar executa, simultan, si o corectie de orbita, foarte in spirit postcolonialist, spunind ca omenirea isi va afla identitatea in bloc, in momentul roirii galactice, a intilnirii cu alteritatea in sensul ei tare. Estul european voteaza cu spiritualizarea frontierelor, interesat de un curs evenimential care sa infirme bariera Huntingdon. Prin memoria Europei mincinoase, din era intoxicarii cu sovietism, accesam multe mesaje apte inca de resuscitare. Simptomatica pentru spatiul aflat in asteptare este acea afirmatie cu succesorat fastuos a lui Franois Mitterand, conform careia fara dezvoltare economica, libertatea nu inseamna nimic2. Daca ar fi asa, ar trebui sa acceptam prelungirea tranzitiei pina la uniformizarea produselor, sincronizarea legislativa (efectiva, nu proclamativa) si impunerea monedei unice europene. Apoi, interculturalitatea nu ar avea sanse in fata fantasmei compensatorii a etnocentrismului. O analogie student (in sensul englezesc, larg, de asimilant) si consumator de literatura mi se pare profitabila. Ambii consuma, in tari cu identitate fluida, niste complexe ideologice: curs (manual)predare-auxiliare pe linie idealizanta, si, respectiv, beletristica-talk-show-uri-recenzii si ierarhii interesate (sau care ignora deliberat teritorii - cazul canonului lui Harold Bloom). ai unul, si celalat nu pot fi decit victime: ale mistificarii (daca se lasa pacaliti), ale schizoidiei comandate (daca insaileaza un mic discurs demagogic de intimpinare, in timp ce mintea zboara la alte tari de soare pline), sau, in sfirsit, pot fi victime ale proastei notari sau cotari publice, in ipoteza ca opteaza pentru ignorarea palierului nationalist axat pe mitul poporului ales 3. insa adevarata alternativa la Europa carcerala (stalinista sau poststalinista) ar fi, dupa opinia aceluiasi Nicolae Balota, imblinzirea pedagogica a dialogului dintre mentalitati. De cite ori sporeste controlul etatist, explicabil, mereu, printr-un paternalism botezat protectionism pur patriotic, de tot atitea ori scriitorii cu replica au de suferit. Bosniac sau basarabean, baltic ori roman, artistul netranzactionist pare condamnat la statutul de subversiv. Daca e sa-l creditam, fara nici o satisfactie stiintifica, pe Cioran, care afirma ca omenirea e condamnata sa oscileze intre oportunism si disperare, atunci fiecare dintre noi, nedorind sa recunoasca vreuna dintre cele doua stari, a experimentat subversivitatea. A contestat, subteran, ca ar avea ceva de-a face cu aceste ipostaze ce dauneaza, atit de eficace, acelui look indispensabil in media. Dinamica nationalismelor emergente dupa asa-zisa stabilitate asigurata de dictatura pare sa instituie un criteriu : scriitorul care riposteaza se trezeste acuzat de subversivitate situatie pasabila in raport cu acuzatia de subminare a interselor statului-natiune, de tradare sau cu actiunea concreta de filare, cum s-a petrecut cu grupul timisorean A treia Europa - acel scriitor, zic, se distanteaza mai salubru de nationalism. Nu e de mirare ca, pina la urma, cu simt tactic remarcabil, speculativi de talia lui Derrida au integrat in discurs si civismul, proiectind o retea de orase-refugii pentru artistii refuzati de nationalisme (sau, in general, de fundamentalisme ideologice). Mitizarea nationalista are in comun cu politicul pur si dur mania scopurilor. Termenul mesaj e asteptat cu infrigurare de nationalistii de ambe sexe, iar rivna identificarii nexului autohtonist cu parfum xenofob consuma atita energie, incit e considerata demna sa gliseze in manualele scolare, sub forma ditirambilor nebulosi despre puritatea morala a neamului, ditirambi semnati, ieri ca si azi, de un Dumitru Almas. Teleologia ilustrata maniacal in textele "pe linia" partidului-unic-ginditor l-a alungat, prin teroarea implicita, pe Dorin Tudoran - printre altii - din tara. El comenteaza aspectul intr-o convorbire cu Sorin Alexandrescu: "...orice ai scrie e declarat politic. Un exemplu: am scris cindva un 174

pastel de toamna care nu s-a publicat. La Consiliul Culturii, cineva - care nu era deloc prost, ci dimpotriva - mi-a explicat motivul: si din poezia mea se refereau, evident, la conflictul dintre rusi si chinezi ! Cind ai saptaminal astfel de discutii, este greu sa crezi ca poti realiza ceva." 4 Nu cred ca am comite o rautate sau o fortare epistemologica daca am socoti ca nu un Dumitru Almas comprima pentru colportare eficienta vulgata bunului roman, ci scriitorii en titre par sa dezvolte, cind barochist, cind transparent, miturile imacularii etnice. Centrala e teza exceptionalismului destinului istoric al poporului. Cu astfel de parti pris-uri, stima pentru Soljenitin, spre pilda, icon al poporului sau, se reduce la notarea curajului personal si a luciditatii conjuncturale. Starea de dubla constiinta - de rus si european - ii era straina. Oboseala epistemologica pare sa fie cauza principala : atitudinea critica, in general, la adresa patologiei relatiilor umane (activa, fara discutie, in Arhipelagul Gulag), a pierdut din viteza (din acuitatea termenilor) basculind in mult mai confortabilul, netensionatul discurs pro domo, cu succes asigurat. Carentele dexteritatii retorice joaca feste multor constiinte validabile punctual, amendabile insa in durata lunga, cind slabirea - o fatalitate! - a tonului contextualizant a virat, din asertiv in palinodie. Cazul textelor "relativizante" ale lui Gorbaciov e numai unul. Glasnost si perestroika - iata vocabule sortite oboselii prin insusi gradul lor redus de acuitate. Pina la urma au ajuns sa desemneze contrariul, cind tancurile rusesti ale "reformistului" lider moscovit i-au agresat pe baltici. Arsenalul triumfalist n-ar fi nociv in sine: sa evocam numai discursurile cutarui presedinte american (oricare dintre cei recenti, de preferinta Clinton, dotat cu buni "compozitori" de discurs) despre starea natiunii, cataloage de mostre ale gindirii pozitive. insa la politicieni funtioneaza circumstantele atenuante - mania scopurilor, cum spune Gadamer. Dar la literati? Ce-i mina pe ei in lupta sa decreteze, la peste un deceniu de la caderea Zidului, reprovincializarea prin apelul la "sfinta" cutuma regionala, nereformabila? Un exemplu recent: S. Damian parcurge cu atentie ultimul roman al lui George Cusnarencu (Trandafirul tacerii depline), cu miez de spionaj aplicat pe cotitura din decembrie 1989. "Tezele urite de sorginte xenofoba", constata criticul, mai au portanta epica. Cusnarencu observa mercantilismul si amoralismul strainilor pentru a le opune calitatile noastre, pina la teza "superioritatii etniei autohtone in fata restului lumii, in bloc". Grav e paradoxul obtinut, in ciuda bunelor intentii: "Atit de exaltat e elogiul unor virtuti specifice, incit el se extinde, ca ilustrare, si in domeniul de exercitare a controlului, in cel al reprimarii necrutatoare". ai, in final, un dus rece pentru ethosul bazat pe autointelegere: "Confruntate cu un public avizat, international, aceste sageti [...] ar discredita din primul contact, definitiv, un romancier care bate la portile consacrarii". 5 La noi, cum vedem, mitologiile etnocentrice se configureaza ca niste demonologii. Un critic, in Contemporanul, deplinge propagarea "romanului american de actiune" pe piata noastra, intrucit, la Norman Mailer, de pilda, sau la Saul Bellow, avem de-a face cu "naratiune continua, opaca la fior metafizic". Autorul minicomparatismului 6, Henri Zalis, are credinta, cu parfum maniheist, ca, in epica americana, "metamorfozele curente au in vedere criminalitatea din peisajul curent si foarte putin vocatia spre pozitivitate". Alte lucruri rele americanesti: "excesul de sex, riscul buimac, impulsivitatea". Editorii mai sint acuzati ca incurajeaza microromanul si "complet eronatul romannuvela". Un rechizitoriu in toata regula. Melanjul de optiuni estetice de peste Prut e derutant si absolut instructiv7. Unii virstnici (din nefericire, majoritatea), pledind pentru apararea traditiei, valorilor neamului (valori sfinte, cum altfel?), pentru poezia folclorica si "pudoare" in scris, se ridica viforos contra a ceea ce numesc ei spirit "diabolic" in cultura, respectiv impotriva "pornografiei", a poeziei "fara suflet si rima", a "postmodernismului agresiv, plamadit in subteranele KGB-ului". Aflam ca astfel de caderi in premodern (pentru a folosi expresia lui Sorin Alexandrescu) sint gazduite, de exemplu, intr-o publicatie ca Literatura si Arta. Dezagreabil se prezinta si cazul lui Ion Druta - intr-o vreme regasibil in manuale romanesti de literatura pentru liceu - separatist notoriu, erijat in profet si exponent al unui limbaj biblic ce incurajeaza prosternarea nebuloasa a basarabenilor si-i atita contra imperialismului occidental. Optiunea promoscovita, echidistanta sa de partea puterii filoruse sint transparente, insa marele public tinde sa creada versiunea aberanta a recrutarii criticilor lui de catre KGB. Cum am vazut, in chip stupefiant, cine atrage atentia ca prostratia in fata unor realitati asa-zis "destinale" nu tine loc de solutie pentru inceput de mileniu trei, acela devine produs KGB. Trend-ul actual pare alimentat de afluentii neamenintati de seceta ai mitizarii nationaliste. Ne 175

intoarcem la problema manageriatul cultural, ale carui propulsii depind, in acest cronotop, de pozitionarea fata de un aforism ce spune multe despre conditia hermeneutului azi: "Nu se poate realiza spiritualmente cel care n-a luptat niciodata, cu buna-credinta, pentru o cauza pierduta"8. Cauza pierduta e, deocamdata, relaxarea institutionala, cea care produce raporturi interumane firesti, fara teleologii politice. De aceea vad, in acest moment, oportunitatea unei interventii a acelui segment subtire de responsabilitate la nivel macro - si am numit comparatistii - asimilabil, mutatis mutandis, veritabilelor centre de putere, americanele think tanks (rezervoare de gindire). Uniunea Scriitorilor, de pilda, structura sindicala, pepiniera recunoscuta a dizidentei, nu functioneaza - si nici nu-si propune, probabil, acest lucru - ca un rezervor de gindire. Desi, la rigoare, poate fi asimilata, cum spun politologii, unui "centru autonom de gindire independenta". Din acest motiv, de pilda, atunci cind consumatorii de literatura cauta solutii taumaturgice, samaniste, pentru chinurile lor, nu cred ca un fictionar ar fi potrivit sa conduca Uniunea Scriitorilor. O noua critica de directie, pro spiritul european regasibil, dupa Mircea Martin, in notiuni ca sedimentarea valorilor, istorie si civism, se naste deja, cu aportul unor generatii diferite, si cu argumentare pluridisciplinara, de la Adrian Marino la Caius Dobrescu si la Sorin Antohi, ceea ce infirma teza generationista dupa care tinerii ar fi mai sincronizabili decit virstnicii. Maligna e ascensiunea culturii de publicisti (cum ar spune Adrian Marino), populisti, unii, fara scrupule, dedati la valorizarea unor sintagme ce au ajus, prin valoarea de repetitie, tractante ale gustului literar (C-asa-i romanul, Noi sintem romani, la noi stapini, Sintem saraci, plini de nevoi, Doamne, ocroteste-i pe romani etc). Iata si o glosa stiintifica, enervanta, desigur, pentru pescuitorii in ape tulburi: Christopher Dawson, intr-o carte mai veche, The Making of Europe, subliniaza, foarte actual, ca nationalismul Europei moderne este o mostenire a barbarilor, care au opus ideea de trib ideii imperiale si eclesiastice. Originalitatea pe care o reclama fiecare dintre nationalismele contemporane este, prin urmare, suficient de suspecta. Astfel de puneri la punct, depasionalizante, sint vitale, si ele n-au cum sa vina, aici si acum, din sfera media, ci din zone intelectuale de reflectie si deschidere globalizanta. Un exemplu: Colegiul Noua Europa. Facultatile de litere si de stiinte politice pot sa observe ceea ce numea Habermas patriotism constitutional, fara sa simta vreo ingerinta. Clarificarea accentului politologic ii apartine lui Vladimir Tismaneanu: "Dezvoltarea societatii civile in statele blocului sovietic nu poate fi separata de existenta centrelor autonome de gindire independenta. Trairea intru adevar, desi adesea vazuta ca o atitudine de idealism moral cu semnificatie sociala redusa, s-a dovedit mobilizatoare pentru crearea de cai alternative de gindire si actiune"9. Din pacate, specializarea dobindita in ale "sopirlelor" din anii comunismului a dus la o falsa constiinta. Clandestinitatea prelungita, lupta cu cenzura pot ucide sau devia, dupa caz, demnitatea polemistului, a intelectualului ce refuza captivitatea propriei minti. Multi au sesizat partea spectaculara a subversiunii (in vreme ce substanta ei e, de fapt, dramatica): s-au apucat sa submineze cu voie de la politie. Dar, desigur, ei, luati de damful reputatiei de curajosi, vor exclama precum Cetateanul turmentat, initial "tirit" si el de "curent": "Da ! vom lupta contra... (sughitind si schimbind tonul) adica nu ... Eu nu lupt contra guvernului !..." (actul II, scena XIV). Astfel se naste, meandric, de la acest stadiu ascuns inca in pliurile vietii personale (maniera omologata de Omul fara insusiri), artistul de stat, care nu lupta contra cui nu trebuie. El, din pacate, pe orice meridian, nu mai distinge, sau nu mai vrea sa distinga, intre nationalism si civism. Note: 1. vezi Apostrof, nr. 3 / 2000. 2. Jean-Franois Revel, Cunoasterea inutila, Humanitas, 1993, pp. 129-130. 3. Delia Verdes, (So)lemnitate identitara, in Dilema nr. 244, pe tema C-asa-i romanu. 4. Sorin Alexandrescu, Identitate in ruptura. Mentalitati romanesti postbelice, Univers, 2000, p. 151. 5. v. 22, nr. 3 / 2001. 6. v. Contemporanul nr. 5 / 2001. 7. Un dosar al "atmosferei" intelectuale si nu numai, percutant si inevitabil emotionant, realizeaza Vitalie Ciobanu in Frica de diferenta, Editura Fundatiei Culturale Romane, 1999. 8. Aforismul ii apartine "combatantului" Gheorghe Grigurcu. 176

9. Vladimir Tismaneanu, Reinventarea politicului. Europa rasariteana de la Stalin la Havel, Polirom, 1997, in special capitolul "Deschizind cutia Pandorei. Nationalism, populism si alte amenintari la adresa pluralismului in Europa Rasariteana".

CARMEN MUSAT IDENTITATI ALTERNATIVE - VARIATIILE IDENTITATII IN SPATIUL PUBLIC POSTCOMUNIST -

Alternative identities in the postcommunist public space Abstract: The article discusses the impact of the postcommunist reality on different types of public and media identity in Romania after 1989. Keywords: Romania; communism; national identity; cultural identity; postcommunism

Triumful simulacrelor "ai daca realitatea s-ar dizolva sub ochii nostri? Nu in neant, ci in mai real decit realul (triumful simulacrelor)? [.] Daca informatia nu ar mai trimite la un eveniment, ci la promovarea informatiei insesi ca eveniment? Daca Istoria nu ar mai fi decit o memorie fara trecut, acumulativa si instantanee? Daca societatea noastra nu ar mai fi cea a , cum se spunea in '68, ci, mai cinic, cea a ceremoniei? [.] Daca strategia ar inlocui atunci psihologia? Daca nu ar mai exista un alt comportament posibil decit cel de a invata, ironic, sa dispari? Daca nu ar mai exista fracturi, linii de fuga si rupturi, ci doar o suprafata plina si continua, fara profunzime, neintrerupta?" Iata un sir de intrebari care incheie cartea din 1987 a lui Jean Baudrillard, Celalalt prin sine insusi, in fond un pseudofinal, cita vreme incercarea de a raspunde acestor interogatii, doar aparent retorice, prelungeste lectura dincolo de limitele fizice ale textului. Am ales acest scurt pasaj ca punct de plecare pentru demersul meu, deoarece problematica identitatii - fie ea individuala sau colectiva - este indisociabil legata de cea a memoriei si de cea a realitatii sociale. Cei unsprezece ani care s-au scurs de la violenta prabusire a regimului totalitar comunist au adus in prim-plan o serie de transformari, atit in ceea ce priveste destinele individuale, cit si structurile si institutiile sociale. Am asistat, in toti acesti ani, la succesive crize ale identitatii care au marcat in mod decisiv nu doar identitatea individuala, ci si cea colectiva, determinind adeseori spectaculoase tentative de redefinire, in plan politic sau cultural, fie prin ignorarea sistematica a trecutului, fie prin rescrierea acestuia in functie de interese de moment. "Triumful simulacrelor" invocat de Baudrillard ca pandant al unei progresive dizolvari a realitatii - este si efectul unui proces continuu de revizuire, dublat de unul la fel de pregnant de inventare a identitatii sociale, care se desfasoara simultan pe doua coordonate majore: pe de o parte similaritatea cu ipostazele personale anterioare sau cu un grup social anume si, pe de alta parte, diferenta in raport cu sine insusi, dar si fata de ceilalti. in primul capitol din Identitatea sociala, volum aparut in 1996, Richard Jenkins considera ca 177

"identitatea nu poate fi inteleasa decit ca proces. Ca sau ca . Identitatea sociala a cuiva - de fapt, identitatile sociale ale cuiva, deoarece despre cine sintem nu se poate vorbi niciodata decit atit la singular, cit si la plural - nu este niciodata o chestiune finalizata, pe deplin clarificata. Nici macar moartea nu poate ingheta imaginea cuiva: exista intotdeauna posibilitatea unei revizuiri post mortem a identitatii". in conceptia lui Jenkins - care se recunoaste indatorat in mod special teoriilor lui George Herbert Mead, Anthony Giddens, Erving Goffman si Frederik Barth -, identitatile umane sint conotate social, fiind, in fapt, identitati sociale, a caror constructie presupune interactiunea si institutionalizarea, ele fiind supuse permanent reificarii. in noul context post-comunist, procesul continuu de edificare a identitatilor umane dobindeste o serie de trasaturi specifice, determinate de socul provocat de trecerea de la societatea totalitara inchisa, in care libertatea informatiei este inexistenta, in care ideologia partidului unic controleaza toate palierele vietii sociale, la o societate deschisa, cu toate imperfectiunile inerente unui inceput de drum. Daca in plan institutional, politic sau economic schimbarile radicale se produc cu mare intirziere, nu acelasi lucru se poate spune despre modul in care au evoluat lucrurile in plan individual-personal si social-cultural. Ceea ce a urmat entuziasmului general din decembrie 1989 a fost un moment (prelungit) de revelatie a golului, a falsului institutionalizat. Odata cu prabusirea insemnelor exterioare ale comunismului - vezi, in acest sens comentariul percutant pe marginea semnificatiei "golului din steagul Romaniei", cu care debuteaza cartea lui Slavoj Zizek din 1993, Tarrying with the Negative -, incep sa se clatine si sa dispara nu doar institutii sau forme de organizare socio-economice, ci si o serie de certitudini de ordin individual sau cultural, sint reconsiderate evenimente si personaje publice din trecutul imediat sau indepartat, ceea ce contribuie la acutizarea si constientizarea crizei identitare generalizate. Identitati problematice Pina in 1989, accesul la informatiile despre perioada interbelica sau despre primul deceniu de regim comunist era limitat cu strictete de cenzura partidului-stat. Manualele de istorie - unul singur pentru fiecare an de invatamint - propuneau o interpretare a evenimentelor istorice conforma nu cu adevarul istoric sau cu logica faptelor, ci cu interesele partidului comunist care dobindea astfel, in ochii generatiilor nascute dupa 1945, legitimitate ti credibilitate. Mai mult decit atit, biografiile oamenilor politici, precum ti cele ale scriitorilor sau artittilor romani - indiferent din ce epoca - au fost sistematic "aranjate", ocultate sau adaptate in functie de criterii preponderent ideologice, manipularea istoriei fiind una dintre practicile frecvente, de altfel, ale sregimului totalitar. Dupa '89, a survenit o schimbare radicala in modul nostru de raportare la trecut. Faptul ca in prim-planul vietii publice au aparut o serie de personalitati care au traversat secolul, care au cunoscut, de-a lungul existentei lor, epoci si regimuri politice diverse, apoi reeditarea unor carti interzise, surghiunite in timpul dictaturii proletariatului in "fondul secret" al bibliotecilor publice si inaccesibile publicului decenii la rind, recuperarea exilului, toate acestea contribuie in mod decisiv nu doar la reconsiderarea ierarhiilor existente pina in 1989, ci la cunoasterea multiplelor fatete ale unei realitati - politice, sociale, economice, culturale distorsionate in anii regimului comunist. Daca pina in 1989, marii scriitori interbelici, precum si cei care supravietuisera instaurarii comunismului in Romania, semnind "pactul cu diavolul", erau perceputi exclusiv prin prisma operelor lor (mai ales de catre generatiile nascute dupa 1945), ultimul deceniu a fost cel al "marilor descoperiri biografice", al revelatiilor identitare, care au declansat, in repetate rinduri, dezbateri acerbe in mass media de la noi. Efectul imediat al dezvaluirilor de ordin biografic a fost initierea unui amplu proces de revizuire a identitatilor, care atinge atit personalitatile a caror existenta s-a incheiat deja - fiind vorba, asadar, despre o revizuire post mortem -, cit si o serie de persoane publice contemporane noua, grav compromise in timpul dictaturii comuniste si aflate acum in plina campanie de reconstructie a identitatii lor sociale. De altfel, exista un paralelism evident intre modul precaut in care ne raportam la trecut - tematori sa abordam subiecte "dificile", cum ar fi optiunile prolegionare ale lui Mircea Eliade sau abdicarea morala a lui G. Calinescu, dupa instaurarea comunistilor la putere - si modul in care reactionam in fata tentativelor repetate ale unor personaje precum Corneliu Vadim Tudor, Adrian Paunescu, Eugen Florescu si altii eiusdem farinae de a-si construi identitati sociale alternative, eludind aspectele incomode, "detaliile" compromitatoare, atitudinile servile fata de Puterea comunista sau faptele 178

reprobabile comise cu buna-stiinta pina in 1989. Mizind pe lacunele memoriei colective si pe indiferenta societatii civile, utilizind mass media, in special televiziunea, ca instrument de modelare si promovare a unor imagini-cliseu - Justitiarul, Poetul National, Patriotul, Bunul Samaritean etc. dincolo de care se ascund identitatile personale autentice, cele reale si nu cele inventate ad usum Delphini, cei numiti mai sus ilustreaza elocvent categoria identitatii in ruptura. La inceputul anilor '90, initiativa dezbaterii articolelor legionare semnate de Mircea Eliade in tinerete a intimpinat o rezistenta redutabila, care venea, in mod surprinzator, din partea unor intelectuali recunoscuti pentru vederile lor democratice. S-a spus atunci ca, inainte de a comenta devierile de dreapta ale unora dintre personalitatile culturale marcante ale epocii interbelice, trebuie cunoscut si sanctionat trecutul imediat, cedarile, tradarile si crimele celor care au devenit, in timp, "unelte" ale partidului comunist. Aceeasi atitudine reticenta, acelasi refuz de a discuta deschis contradictiile si discontinuitatile ipostazelor identitare ale unor scriitori precum Mihail Sadoveanu, Camil Petrescu, G. Calinescu, Tudor Arghezi s.a. a caracterizat scena culturala romaneasca si atunci cind a fost vorba despre modul lamentabil in care s-au comportat acestia dupa cel de-al doilea razboi mondial. in ambele situatii, societatea romaneasca, mai conservatoare si debordind de complexe (citeva dintre acestea au fost abordate de Mircea Martin intr-una dintre cele mai serioase analize a operei calinesciene, G. Calinescu si complexele literaturii romane), pare mai degraba predispusa sa inalte si sa lustruiasca statui sau sa accepte, pasiv, comportamente duplicitare, decit sa adopte o atitudine critica. Acest reflex conditionat, evident cind este vorba despre personalitatile trecutului, functioneaza la fel de prompt si in cazul contemporanilor nostri care vin din regimul comunist cu identitati "patate" de o colaborare prea strinsa cu regimul totalitar. Pentru cei nascuti dupa 1960, dupa ce partidul comunist parea sa se fi instalat pentru totdeauna la putere, accesul la istorie, fie ea generala sau culturala, a fost permanent cenzurat de institutiile partidului-stat. Percepute exclusiv in ipostaza lor de persona, personalitatile istoriei si cele ale culturii noastre - indiferent ca era vorba despre :tefan cel Mare, Alexandru Ioan Cuza, Mircea Eliade sau G. Calinescu - erau ignorate ca persoane. Regimul totalitar comunist nu avea nevoie de biografii, ci de legende, putindu-se lesne dispensa de oamenii concreti, imperfecti deoarece erau mult prea umani, pentru a-i inlocui cu fictiuni eroice ireprosabile. Fuga de realitate a imbracat si forma refuzului consecvent de a accepta ca domnitorii, scriitorii sau artistii au si biografii concrete, nu doar destine exemplare, redactate oficial si consacrate post mortem. Nu e de mirare asadar ca recuperarea tardiva a unor biografii problematice, marcate de simpatii legionare sau de compromisuri grave cu puterea comunista, a declansat reactii atit de surprinzator-asemanatoare, care incercau sa acrediteze ideea inoportunitatii oricarei discutii pe marginea discontinuitatilor identitare.

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ROMANITA CONSTANTINESCU GRANICER PESTE GRANITA. DESPRE PERMEABILITATEA SI IMPERMEABILITATEA HOTARELOR GRENZWCHTER UND GRENZGNGER. EINE GRENZSITUATION

Border guard abroad. On the (im)permeability of the borders Abstract: The article discusses the interethnic relations created in postcommunist Europe. Keywords: Europe; Romania; interculturality; national identity; imagology; borderland

Titlul excursului meu se joaca cu cuvintele: nu am in romana cuvinte inrudite pentru a-l desemna pe cel care trece granita si pe cel care-o pazeste. "Frontalier" si "granicer" vin din vremuri si limbi diferite si nu evoca posibilitatea unei polaritati recursive intre cei doi termeni. Am incercat atunci sa exprim ambiguitatea acestei situatii limita - care este a "granitei" - cu ajutorul constructiei prepozitionale: "granicer peste granita" vrea sa spuna in acelasi timp "stapan peste", "deasupra" si "dincolo de". in nuvela La salade a lui Petru Dumitriu (dupa care Lucian Pintilie a facut in 1994 exceptionalul O vara de neuitat) - care-mi va sluji drept corectiv exemplar al unor modele teoretice de intelegere a interculturalitatii - granicerul Dimitriu se teme si se apara de Ceilalti, ii apara si ii adaposteste pe Ceilalti, traieste in Cadrilater, precum si in povestirile din Caucaz ale lui Tolstoi sau la poalele lui Fuji Yama si in utopia Revolutiei Maghiare de la 1919, e dincoace si dincolo, si deasupra acestor orizonturi. "Granitele sunt permeabile, iar zeii straini se furiseaza peste ele", spune undeva Leon Wieseltier (op. cit., p. 34). Acelasi lucru se intampla in Itic atrul, dezertor, nuvela lui Liviu Rebreanu. Numai jocul de go, pe care il invoca alt personaj in aceeasi situatie de risc, in romanul verii japoneze al lui Adolf Muschg, are aceasta complexitate de a gandi ce este inauntru si isi permite sa ramana un inauntru si ce este afara si isi permite sa ramana afara, si anume depinzand de constelatiile jocului, mai apropiate sau mai departate, trecute, prezente, posibile. "Identitatea e calduta. Ea transmite un sentiment al interiorului; dar acest sentiment ne vine dinspre exterior. Interiorul, exteriorul trebuie cartografiate cu grija" (Wieseltier, p. 50). Numai cine are o privire constelativa poate spera sa rezolve minusculele preschimbari dintre inauntru si in afara si astfel sa joace, sa lucreze spre beneficiul sau. in acest spirit voi incerca in cele ce urmeaza sa schitez cateva linii ale unei traditii a gandirii sinelui ca Celalalt, la finele viziunilor despre libertatea unui sine fara si impotriva societatii precum si despre o societate fara si impotriva sinelui, despre un cetatean din doua lumi adverse si disproportionate, una autentica si alta inautentica, a sinelui si a Celorlalti, amintind de Rousseau, Kant, Fichte sau Hegel. intrebarea despre exterioritatea oricarei priviri interioare este in acelasi timp si veche, si noua1. George Herbert Mead spunea ca orice individ se afla in cautarea unei audiente - eul este mai intai un Altul. Cu alte cuvinte, individul probeaza perspectiva interlocutorului pentru a verifica succesul propriei incercari de comunicare si pentru a putea anticipa reactiile celuilalt. Astfel isi apare siesi, se reflecta pe sine ca obiect al schimbului social si devine capabil sa-si articuleze propria identitate. ai fiecare asa zisa privire de sine se compune nu dintr-una, ci dintr-o seama de priviri straine pe care le-a jucat. Ce este inauntru, ce este in afara? Modelele perceptiei interpersonale sunt si modelele perceptiei interculturale, care nu reprezinta la urma urmei decat o nuanta mai mult sau mai putin vizibila a oricarei intalniri. in stiintele sociale, cel putin incepand cu interactionismul simbolic, perspective interne pure asupra propriei identitati personale si culturale nu exista, precum nici perspective straine 180

pure, fiecare identitate se traieste in focusul unei pluralitati de perspective mai mult sau mai putin dezvoltate. Hermeneutica, in laturile ei de ars intelligendi si ars applicandi, problematizand si reflectand intelegerea unor texte si contexte devenite straine, pare predestinata sa ofere modele ale perceptiei si intelegerii interculturale, modele dialogice. S-a vorbit chiar cu entuziasm despre o asanumita hermeneutica interculturala, o disciplina inca fictiva, si pentru ca, desi nu despre asta vom vorbi aici, hermeneuticile nationale nu s-au indreptat una spre cealalta, cu toate ca ingemanarea premizelor la autori precum Emilio Betti, Paul Ricoeur, Hans Georg Gadamer, Karl-Otto Apel sau E. D. Hirsch e evidenta. Una dintre explicatiile pentru marginalitatea acestei teme in istoria disciplinei este remanenta idealului antic in hermeneutica secolului al XIX-lea, precum si ocultarea unora dintre propriile traditii, in favoarea altora. Despre rezistenta modelului intelegerii Celuilalt conturat de Friedrich Schleiermacher vom vorbi in continuare, ca si despre traditiile vechii formule dialectice, dupa care abia in experienta a ceea ce este strain vii catre tine si vom sfarsi prin a ne intreba fara inconjur, precum Jrgen Habermas despre Karl Jaspers, in ce masura aceste figuri de gandire sunt potrivite ca "model pentru o intelegere interculturala imperios necesara astazi din motive politice" (op. cit., p. 44). Atunci cand granitele intre inauntru si in afara sunt aproape numai conventionale, deschise asadar de conventia insasi, nimic nu e mai simplu decat a iesi din sine pentru a cobori in Celalalt. in hermeneutica traditionala in descendenta lui Schleiermacher individul poseda competenta de a se transpune in acelasi timp fara rest si fara sine in Celalalt (modelul lui sich versetzen, al empatiei la Dilthey) ocupandu-l, cunoscandu-l, insusindu-si-l astfel. Celalalt nu pare atat de strain, nici reticent si nici eul cuprins de subite idiosincrazii ori de angoasa alienarii. Patologia distantei nu s-a instalat inca. Izvorul mistic al comuniunii - dorinta de a suferi impreuna suferintele cele mai tainice, compasiunea se tulbura in apele interesate ale convertirii Celuilalt, dinspre slabiciunile lui cele mai profunde. Robert Musil a facut din ideea lui Schleiermacher motorul unei scene parodice: Profesorul August Lindner, intamplatorul confident si asa-zisul salvator al Agathei din romanul Omul fara insusiri, imaginandu-si un astfel de suflet simtitor, "un suflet care ar fi fost in stare sa se transpuna intru totul inlauntrul semenilor" (Musil IV, p. 6) isi indreapta privirea "plin de certitudinea victoriei si cu un repros prietenos" catre o pereche de indragostiti, care, strans imbratisati ii ies in intampinare: "Era insa doar o pereche de indragostiti foarte obisnuiti, si tanarul pierde-vara, care reprezenta jumatatea masculina a acestei perechi, stranse din pleoape cand fu sa-i raspunda privirii lui, isi scoase pe neasteptate limba si spuse: Be!". Lindner se sperie, cauta cu privirea pe garantul linistii publice, facand aceasta ignora o piatra de care se impiedica, ceea ce starneste un stol de vrabii, "care se instalasera in largul lor la masa oferita prin mila providentei de o gramada de baliga de cal". Zborul pasarilor il aduce pe profesor la realitate, ceea ce-i ingaduie sa dantuiasca peste acest dublu obstacol, inainte de a cadea la pamant, nu fara a-si repeta o sententa din secolul al XVII-lea - "Trebuie sa stii sa fii dur ca un diamant si plin de tandrete ca o mama!" (ibidem., p. 8). Modelul interactionismului simbolic in varianta G. H. Mead nu vine cu o premiza atat de extravaganta: perspectiva celuilalt e reconstruita pe propriul risc, e o perspectiva jucata, nu o pozitie ocupata. in hermeneutica, o intreaga linie de gandire a unui perspectivism mai elaborat decat simpla transpunere in celalalt - care incepe cu punctul de vedere al lui Chladenius din Introducere in interpretarea corecta a cuvantarilor si scrierilor chibzuite (1742) si se continua prin reprezentarile despre campul vizual la Herder si despre punctul de vedere oscilatoriu din fragmentele lui Friedrich Schlegel - se cufunda in uitare. Urme renegate apar abia in metaforica teoriei orizontului intelegerii si a intrepatrunderii orizonturilor la Hans Georg Gadamer, ea vine sa limiteze intr-un tarziu entuziasmul "transpunerilor". Dar in secolul al XIX-lea ceva esential s-a pierdut, si anume acele elemente ale unei intelegeri multiperspectivice si cosmopolitice care se conturasera incepand cu jumatatea secolului al XVIII-lea la Chladenius pentru care intelegerea era marcata de situare in sens complet, adica de unghi de vedere, de localizare geografica, de apartenenta culturala, la Fr. Schlegel care vedea omul modern traindu-si identitatea in focusul unei pluralitati de perspective mai mult sau mai putin dezvoltate, reciproc suspendandu-se si anihilandu-se, pe faliile dintre culturile de contact, in cazul lui Anglia, Germania si Franta. in hermeneutica traditionala, tributara modelului transpunerii, problema interculturalitatii ramane cu totul marginala. in Teoria comertului comunicativ (1981), Jrgen Habermas nu-i dedica nici un capitol. 181

in 1995, in schimb, cu ocazia decernarii Premiului Karl Jaspers al orasului si al Universitatii din Heidelberg, Habermas atinge aceasta tema, dar numai pentru a subscrie la o traditie pe care o vede in pericol. Nu este intamplator faptul ca discursul raspunde fara sa-l numeasca lui Samuel P. Huntington si tezelor sale despre conflictul culturilor si al credintelor la finele secolului al XX-lea, dupa caderea imperiului sovietic si la sfarsitul razboiului rece2. La mijloc intre un universalism sigur pe sine dupa care ratiunea innascuta tuturor oamenilor este aceeasi pretutindeni, iar ea se slujeste de standardele stiintei si filosofiei ca puncte de reper pentru interpretarea a ceea ce poate trece drept rational si intre un relativism nesigur, care pleaca de la premiza ca fiecarei traditii puternice ii sunt proprii anume masuri ale adevarului si falsului, oriunde articulandu-se un alt concept de rationalitate, Habermas ia drept model al intelegerii interculturale figura de gandire jaspersiana a comunicarii fara frontiere3, o comunicare existentiala, imaginata dupa modelul polemicii amicale intre filosofi, intre prieteni intru symfilosofare, asa cum Jaspers insusi polemizase cu Schelling. imprumutand argumentele lui Jaspers, Habermas se situeaza el insusi in descendenta polemicii gadameriene si jaspersiene cu istorismul, adica in opozitie fata de o varianta a modelului transpunerii, o transpunere oarba, dar cu pretentia obiectivitatii in Celalalt. La Jaspers comunicarea existentiala nu urmareste consensul asupra continuturilor credintelor, ci consensul in privinta autenticitatii acestora. Convingerea in privinta autenticitatii unei credinte naste respectul fata de ea. Andrei Cornea, intr-o carte la randul ei polemica fata de doctrinele relativismului, inlocuieste pentru lumea statelor seculare "credinta" cu "incredere". Conceptul lui Jaspers are un continut intrucatva asemanator, "Glauben" este mai degraba "Vertrauen"; el se inspira din existentialismul timpuriu kierkegaardian, modificandu-l insa. Altfel decat Kierkegaard, Jaspers tematizeaza experientele din Biblie, dar fara a se bizui pe credinta particulara a revelatiei lor, vorbind despre o religiozitate reflectata fara siguranta mantuirii insa. Habermas spune ca Jaspers se comporta fata de Kierkeggard, precum neohegelienii fata de Hegel: "precum voiau acestia sa pastreze miscarea dialectica de sine a spiritului, fara sa ia in calcul spiritul absolut, tot astfel Jaspers vrea sa realizeze trecerea de la stadiul etic la cel religios, dar fara a ajunge la Isus Christos" (op.cit., p. 50). O intelegere de sine limpede nu se poate obtine insa fara o intelegere la fel de clara a lumii, propria existenta nu se lasa patrunsa de lumina fara iluminarea transcendentei. Dar transcendenta este la Jaspers tot ceea ce ne poarta si ne inconjoara, orizontul structurat prin limbaj al lumii vietii, adica in primul rand intersubiectivitate. Michael Theunissen exprima acest lucru trimitand catre Luca 17, 21: "imparatia lui Dumnezeu este inauntrul (in mijlocul) vostru (intre voi)", ca un viitor prezent. Gasim un impuls si o indrumare catre a voi sa fii insuti/insati numai din comunicarea cu un alt sine: A-fi-sine si a-fi-in-comunicare sunt de nedespartit. Jaspers se gandeste aici, spune Habermas, la convorbirea eticexistentiala (das ethisch-existentielle Gesprch), datatoare de claritate propriei orientari in viata. Este o confruntare polemic-prietenoasa cu schite concurente de viata. Din intalnirea cu existente straine castigam claritate asupra puterii credintei, din care isi extrage forta propria existenta. Iata aici lupta credintelor purtata in sine, in formele de viata antagonice, unele atragand, altele respingand. in locul adevarului si falsului cifrurilor unor credinte, aceste optiuni negociate, traite si impartasite in intalnirea cu Celalalt. intelegerea interculturala, dupa Habermas, nu poate reusi decat in conditiile unor libertati postulate simetric si a unor preluari de perspective reciproce, dincolo de adevarul de dogma, pseudomonocultural al propriilor credinte (op.cit., p.58). Modelul comunicarii fara frontiere nu este desigur un model al comunicarii fara granita, adica fara cezuri si rupturi. Coborand din predica, el a fost creat insa ca instrument pentru managementul diferendelor de opinie in lumea academica si, mai tarziu, adaptat diplomatiei, aspect foarte limpede la Habermas. Aceste circumstante, pe care adeptii universalizarii modelului ar vrea sa le faca uitate, nu trebuie sa pericliteze valabilitatea lui, in limitele de relevanta pe care modelul comunicarii fara limite si le-a pus. in acest punct ar trebui spus ceva teribil de banal, si anume ca, pentru a-l cita din nou pe Leon Wieseltier, "Identitatea in vremuri grele nu e acelasi lucru cu identitatea in vremuri bune. (.) E impertinent sa aplici o critica a identitatii celor cu o existenta amenintata" (op. cit., p. 42). in sociologie este oricand posibila abdicarea de la teoriile eului plural in cazul "societatilor totale" cum numea Erving Goffman inchisorile, azilele ori lagarele de orice fel, tot aici s-a dezvoltat o intreaga directie de cercetare, empirica in primul rand, a conflictelor, a identitatilor periclitate, de care Habermas nu e catusi de putin strain. E neadecvat, daca nu de-a dreptul ofensator, sa vorbesti in situatia unui conflict armat despre imperativul de a veni catre sine in experienta Celuilalt. Variantele acestui imperativ la 182

Hegel, Kierkegaard, Theunissen, Jaspers ori Habermas raman fara grai. Nu se mai poate spune, fara o tresarire, impreuna cu Hegel, ca "fiecare este mijlocul Celuilalt, prin care fiecare sine se intermediaza si se inchide. Se recunosc ca recunoscandu-se reciproc" ("jedes ist dem Anderen die Mitte, durch welche jedes sich mit sich selbst vermittelt und zusammenschliet ... Sie anerkennen sich als gegenseitig sich anerkennend", op.cit., p. 147). ai nici precum Kierkegaard in Boala de moarte: Sinelui ii poate reusi sinele, numai pentru ca el se comporta - punandu-se pe sine - fata de un Altul, prin care el insusi a fost pus. Ca si in cazul perceptiei interpersonale in modelele perceptiei interculturale trebuie avuta in vedere o intreaga serie de proiectii, proiectii de raspuns si corecturi, reidentificari, distantari, presupuneri, preconceptii, prejudecati, stereotipii, stilizari, asteptari, lanturi asociative, incalcari de tabu-uri si licitari ale violentei, praguri de toleranta, reconfigurari de intentii si metaperspective, vizibile mai ales in cazul dificultatilor extreme in comunicarea interculturala4. Numai ca toate aceste spirale se deseneaza rareori atat de direct ca intre doua persoane, ele sunt stratificate si fragmentate istoric si conditionate medial. Toleranta apare in acest caz nu numai ca ingaduinta fata de Celalaltdiferitul, fata de ce stiu ca este altfel decat mine, ci fata de necunoscut chiar, toleranta fata de ambiguitate, cu un termen al lui Lothar Krappmann, fata de ceea ce inca nu inteleg, de contradictie, fara reducerea complexitatii. Raportul identitatii amenintate de Celalalt cu acesta este unul paradoxal: pe de o parte se impune evidentei necesitatea afirmarii narcisiste, a izolarii, in credinta "cruzimii lumii si a eternitatii luptei". Aceasta identitate "totala" mobilizeaza resursele experientei personale si pe cele colective, chemandu-l in ajutorul sinelui pe un Altul al nostalgiei sau al sperantei. Identificarea cu acest eu trecut, suprapersonal si devenit strain, iluzoriu, provoaca strangeri de inima, nesiguranta pe un nou teritoriu de conflict mai mult sau mai putin constient cu sine. Eul care isi cauta un adapost este dintr-odata in afara. Pe de alta parte, pacea sinelui survine abia in afara, in necesitatea alienarii intr-un sine devenit la fel de strain ca Strainul. "Identitatea care ieri a schimbat istoria, spune Leon Wieseltier, azi e redundanta" (op.cit., p. 42). Eroul trebuie sa se separe, daca nu chiar sa se renege de sine: "Daca nu are loc o ruptura a identitatii, se va face dreptate, insa nu va fi liniste" (ibidem). Sunt si sceptici in privinta vreunei linisti, precum Petru Dumitriu si Lucian Pintilie. Ori Liviu Rebreanu, in Itic atrul, dezertor. Asemenea alegeri exclud modelele lirice ale intalnirii dintre Sine si Celalalt-Strainul. A veni catre Sine in experienta Celuilalt nu este un lucru simplu in cazul unei identitati amenintate. Caprarul Ghioaga (nume predestinat) al lui Rebreanu se simte ingrozit alaturi de victima sa, soldatul Itic, iar capitanului Dimitriu ii dispar oamenii sub loviturile comitagiilor. in scena intai a filmului O vara de neuitat camera s-a incurcat printre picioarele cailor fugind mancand pamantul undeva dincolo, pe malul drept al Dunarii. Imaginea ilustreaza o poetica a freneziei in a-l cunoaste pe Celalalt, cunoastere urmata de o imbucuratoare intoarcere la sine. Granicerul isi mana caii entuziast inspre casa sau inspre bulgari, lucrul nu e foarte limpede. Evadare incolo si incoace, tema revine in destinul familiei capitanului de graniceri Dimitriu. Dar entuziasmul se conjuga in imaginile zguduite ale camerei de filmat cu frica, cu dezorientarea si vertijul. intalnirea cu Celalalt nu mai este "forma de indragostire, aventura amoroasa cu final previzibil" (Deciu, p. 56) - redescoperirea imbogatita a sinelui. intre prieteni de peste zece ani, care s-au ajutat la nevoie, precum Itic si Ghioaga s-a instalat suspiciunea, imputarea muta, panda. Familia capitanului Dimitriu se ofera nuda ochilor straini, e in film o idilica scena de baie surprinsa de o femeie straina, intunecata, muta, cu doi copii, care refuza intimitatea cu acesti noi veniti care se cred in paradis. Imaginea despre sine incepe sa tremure, e mincinoasa. Oglinda venetiana - oglinda mincinoasa - adusa de familia Dimitriu la fort e sparta intr-o zi si se va arata mai tarziu nu de copiii bulgarilor cu piatra, ci de glont. Identitatea personala reala, dar si cea ideala, oglindita in acest obiect pretios tarat in pustie, precum si identitatea ideala a cuplului care se viseaza in oglinda ("avem amandoi ochii albastri", spune Maria Theresa, iar sotul trebuie sa o contrazica, ca apoi sa o aprobe urmandu-i visul) sunt brisate. intre cel ce a fost in sat caprarul Ghioaga si cel care-l insoteste acum pe Itic se desfac imoral legaturile, intai nu pot vorbi ca altadata despre toate pe care le stiu si le-au trait in lumea de unde vin, apoi deodata se pun pe povestit despre lucrurile din trecut, dar fara a veni cumva inspre patrularea fara rost intre liniile inamice. La granita nu mai avem "un subtil consumator si cultivator de diferenta" (Deciu, ibidem), ci o victima, un eu spart. Aceasta si pentru ca ceea ce numim generic Celalalt face parte chiar politic vorbind dintr-un Sine care se desface. Astfel Itic e un soldat roman, altfel decat altii pentru ca incearca sa depaseasca in proprii 183

ochi imaginea stereotip-stigmatizatoare a unui evreu fricos. El spera sa fie decorat de statul roman si sa obtina recunoasterea celorlalti, confirmarea scump platita a unei apartenente. Ghioaga se simte solidar cu Itic: vin din acelasi sat. Petco-bulgarul e el insusi un roman, ca si Dimitriu, de unde si mirarea lui in fata persecutiilor, devreme ce si-a indeplinit toate indatoririle de loialitate, chiar si pe cele mai putin placute: "De ce ne bate? Noi n-am facut nimic. Odata am fost la Bulgaria, am platit bir, am mers la armata; acum suntem la Rumania, platim bir, mergem la armata. Cand am fost eu copil mic, la scoala, am cantat pentru tarul Ferdinand si ne-a invatat ca rumanii sunt rai; acum copiii mei merg la scoala, canta pentru regele Ferdinand si-i invata ca bulgarii sunt rai (.) Era firesc sa fie batuti. Era firesc sa se mute frontierele peste ei incoace si incolo, cu acompaniamentul lor de imnuri regale si de lectii de dusmanie la scoala". Pe unul dintre prizonierii care muncesc la salate in gradina granicerului Dimitriu il cheama Dimitar, iar Dimitriu (in roman Dumitriu) se simte solidar cu Dimitar, in vreme ce autorul lor, Petru Dumitriu se vede probabil in amandoi. Alienarea se face simtita nu numai in apropierea neverosimila si primejdioasa de Celalalt, ci si, intocmai precum in Gulliver, in sentimentul de superioritate care-l instraineaza pe capitanul Dimitriu sau pe caprarul Ghioaga de ai lor si-l tradeaza in proprii ochi si in vulnerabilitatea fata de sine si fata de straini, intinzandu-le cupa de miasme a dezamagirii. Ghioaga refuza sa indeplineasca ordinul de a-l ucide pe Itic undeva pe granita dintre "noi" si "ceilalti", punandu-se in pericol fata de superiori, punandu-se in pericol fata de sine pentru ca nu scapa de povara de a-l fi abandonat pe Itic in fata liniilor inamice. Familia Dimitriu s-a dezlegat de datoriile si legaturile cu cei apropiati - Maria Theresa nu face caz de inrudirea ei cu familia Lascari, si incearca sentimente de solidaritate noi fata de niste straini si fatale si unora si celorlalti. Loialitatea fata de strainul aflat in suferinta, fata de prizonierii bulgari meniti sa ispaseasca delictele altora, merge atat de departe incat mama pasind in minte alaturi de condamnati isi impinge de la sine copilul. La sfarsitul filmului, fetita Mariei Theresa fuge absurd catre siluetele amenintatoare ale femeilor bulgarilor. Ea si mama ei nu pot fi salvate de la linsaj decat cu un foc de arma, cu pretul mortii uneia dintre femei. Eul coplesit de vinovatie si neputincios vrea sa faca schimb cu Celalalt, s-ar ascunde in chiar destinul tragic al Celuilalt, dar acest lucru ii ramane interzis, ba este chiar un lucru infricosator, vinovat. Ghioaga crede ca poate impartasi stigmatul tragic cu Itic: "Vai de sufletele noastre". Lamentatia care-i alatura e insa imorala. Maria Theresa isi cheama copiii de langa prizonierul Petco, acum gradinar la salatele familiei Dimitriu, nu de frica lui, ci in revelatia substibilitatii destinelor: "De ce sa-mi fie frica, ca se face gradinar? Mai bine gradinar, decat soldat". Propria gradina este cultivata de Celalalt, aici condamnatul. Modelele concurente ale non-fuziunii cu Celalalt, ale invulnerabilitatii sinelui care respecta autonomia Celuilalt, apud Baudrillard, sunt la fel de nepotrivite in situatia pe care exemplar ne-o evoca O vara de neuitat. Impasibilitatea pe care ar pastra-o Sinele pentru a se proteja de invaziunea Celuilalt ar fi o forma grava nu de stoicism, ci de cinism criminal: capitanul Dimitriu are a decide asupra vietii sau mortii prizonierilor sai bulgari, la fel cum caprarul Ghioaga il poate ucide sau il poate salva pe Itic. Ghioaga nu poate fi nepasator fata de Itic si nu-i intoarce spatele cu nepasare, ci cu neputinta.. El nu poate fi un exot nici in sensul unei posibile fuziuni cu Celalalt (este ceea ce Baudrillard acuza ca fiind un exotism trivial dezgustator, sentimentalism-tentativa de asimilare), fuziune interzisa de vinovatie, de recursivitatea incredere-neincredere, dar nici exot in sensul golirii de continut a Celuilalt, peste care privirea sa alunece fascinata, dar nepreocupata de dezlegarea cifrurilor sau de deschideri transcendente. "Adevarata cunoastere, spune Baudrillard, este aceea a ce nu vom intelege niciodata din Celalalt, a ceea ce exista in celalalt spre a garanta diferenta lui fata de noi insine, astfel incat Celalalt sa nu poata fi despartit de sine, nici alienat de privirea noastra, nici stabilizat prin identitate ori diferenta" (La transparence du Mal. Essai sur les phnomenes extremes, 1990, apud Deciu, op. cit., p. 59). Exotismul acesta baudrillardesc e jucat pana la un punct de Maria Theresa, in dorinta ei de a vibra intrun mediu fara trasaturi doar prin propriile puteri, cu o energie care nu datoreaza nimic locurilor. in dealul galben din fata fortului ea vede pe Fugi Yama si in juru-i aude povestirile lui Tolstoi, figuralisme care nu aduc nicidecum peisajul natural si uman in lizibil, ci ii sporesc mirajul. Ecouri ale entuziasmului sarbatoresc al mamei transpar in replica ambigua a copilului ei - vocea din off este a unui adult: "Mama - cand mai vine Petco - am mai intrebat-o a doua, a treia zi din nou. Mama nu raspundea nimic, apoi a inceput sa bea, iar eu l-am uitat curand pe Petco. Dar vara aceea n-am uitat-o niciodata. A fost o vara extraordinara. Cea mai frumoasa din copilaria mea". ai, in acelasi timp, "de 184

neuitat", asa cum spune si titlul, un superlativ pentru vremea de gratie, pentru care raul ramane incomprehensibil, dar si posibil semn pentru chinurile amintirii, pentru incercarea mistica a unei impacari retroactive, care se opune uitarii, precum si uitarii uitarii. La limita, am putea spune ca fiul Mariei Theresa vrea sa nu uite ca a uitat. Pana si amintirea Celuilalt la generatia care nu mai traieste drama poate fi rasturnata in semnul ei, asa cum a fost trait de parinti. Amintire si speranta - sunt doua teme contrapunctice in Vara de neuitat, altfel decat in nuvela lui Petru Dumitriu, prinsa in volumul al doilea al Cronicii de familie, acolo unde vocea fiului Mariei Theresa nu se aude, iar destinul capitanului Dimitriu-Dumitriu se opreste cu o volta neverosimila curand dupa 1944. Amintire si speranta, viitor dintr-un trecut uitat - acestea sunt mai degraba temele filmului lui Pintilie. Maria Theresa incercase cu un gest de femeie a Luminilor sa intretina speranta prizonierilor, platindu-le drept, din banii ei, munca silnica la ingrijitul gradinii cu salate. Pe ultimul drum al prizonierilor, atunci cand ea insasi nu mai are nici o iluzie, se straduie totusi sa-l imbarbateze pe Petco, cum ca se va intoarce, ca sa i se plateasca ultima zi de lucru. La fel caprarul Ghioaga e preocupat ca nu i-a platit "datoria" lui Itic, o datorie devenita simbolica, caci el nu-si face pana la capat datoria de solidaritate cu victima. Calaul ii multumeste Mariei Theresa, spaimele condamnatilor s-au risipit si-i poate duce, fara suplimentare eforturi fizice ori morale din partea-i, ca pe miei, la taiere. Dreptul la ultima speranta e instrumentalizat si intors: e ceea ce chiar il condamna pe cel care spera - semnul mortii lui e ambiguu, amintirea neclara. La fel in Itic atrul, dezertor, speranta pe care incearca sa i-o insufleteasca Ghioaga plecand, speranta ca ar putea gasi scapare predandu-se inamicului maculeaza destinul lui Itic. Itic refuza speranta tradatoare pentru ceea ce viata lui are de spus. Uzand de aceasta speranta ar fi confirmat condamnarea celorlalti. Totusi semnul mortii lui in singuratate ramane ambiguu, in afara scenariului dramatic pentru care Ghioaga - autorul lui - s-ar simti mult mai responsabil (in cazul, de pilda, in care inamicul l-ar fi impuscat pe Itic sau acesta, intorcanduse ar fi fost condamnat la moarte de ai sai) si totodata acest semn al mortii ramane opac pentru camarazii care vin din urma. Poate ca a murit asa, poate altfel, in orice caz vinovatiile sunt estompate, caci Petco a murit poate nestiutor, inca fericit, iar sinuciderea lui Itic poate fi pusa, ca orice asemenea gest, in seama unor cauze obscure. Celalalt ramane la sfarsit mut. Femeia care insoteste trasura familiei Dimitriu, prezenta intunecata, nu poate in mutenia ei decat sa strige numele lui Petco. intalnirea dintre eu si Celalalt nu e una colocviala, ci muta. Mama nu mai raspunde fiului, eul e mut. Mutilat, precum cadavrele soldatilor carora comitagii le taiau buzele, lasandu-i cu dintii ranjiti. Iar Celalalt e ucis, atat de "Ceilalti", cat si de catre sine. E potrivita aici metafora vanatorii de iepuri din amintitul roman al lui Adolf Muschg si care se insinueaza si in povestirea lui Rebreanu, und Itic este iepurele, dar si Ghioaga-fricosul. Patrularea lor printre linii seamana cu goana iepurilor fugariti din spate de un vanator invizibil. Iar iepurele cand e vanat isi cauta un adapost intr-o vizuina straina, a altui iepure, pe care il impinge afara, in bataia pustii vanatorului. Tot astfel, acest sine solidar cu Celalalt il impinge in afara, fara sa poarte nemijlocit vinovatia pentru acest lucru, fara sa-l doreasca si totusi fara sa-l poata impiedica, ramanand impostor in locul victimei, fara compasiune. Eul, un stramutat in Celalalt pe care l-a ucis. Zusammenfassung Der Titel meiner Ausfhrungen - "Grenzer ber der Grenze" spielt mit den Worten: das Rumnische kennt keine verwandten Wrter zur Bezeichnung dessen, der die Grenze passiert und dessen, der sie bewacht, Grenzgnger und Grenzwchter. Die Novelle La salade (Der Salat) von Petru Dimitriu, von Lucian Pintilie 1994 auergewhnlich verfilmt als O vara de neuitat (Ein unvergesslicher Sommer), sowie Itic atrul, dezertor (Itic atrul, deserteur) von Liviu Rebreanu dienen mir als Mittel zum Verstndnis einiger theoretischer Modelle von Interkulturalitt. Der Grenzer Dimitriu frchtet sich und schtzt sich vor dem Anderen, schtzt und beherbergt ihn; Dimitriu lebt in Cadrilater, so wie in den kaukasischen Erzhlungen Tolstois, am Fue des Fuji Yama, und in der Utopie der magyarischen Revolution von 1919, ist, wie der Korporal Ghioaga oder Itic diesseits und jenseits und ber diesen Horizonten. "Die Grenzen sind durchlssig und fremde Gtter schleichen ber sie hinweg" schreibt Leon Wieseltier (op. cit, p. 34). Nur das Go-Spiel, das in Adolph Muschgs Roman des japanischen Sommers eine andere Figur in der gleichen Risiko-Situation beschwrt, bietet die ntige Komplexitt, um bedenken zu knnen, was innerhalb ist und sich ein Inneres, was auerhalb ist und sich ein 185

ueres zu bleiben gestattet, und zwar in Abhngigkeit von der Konstellation des Spiels, nher oder ferner, vergangen, prsent, mglich. "Die Identitt ist lauwarm. Sie bertrgt ein Gefhl des Inneren; aber dieses Gefhl kommt uns von Auen. Inneres und ueres heischen sorgsame Kartographierung" (Wieseltier, p. 50). Nur wer die Konstellation berschaut, darf hoffen, die winzigen Verschiebungen zwischen Innen und Auen zu erkennen und so zu spielen, da es ihm zum Nutzen sei. Note 1 "Die Frage nach der Auensicht der Innensicht ist antizipatorisch und antiquiert zugleich", Michel, p.13. 2 Habermas angajeaza un dialog inca din titlul conferintei cu formula lui Max Weber despre fortele antagonice ale credintelor (" Kampf der Glaubensmchte") si in subsidiar cu teza lui Huntington despre conflictul culturilor ("Kampf der Kulturen"): "Nach dem Zerfall des Sowjetimperiums und dem Ende einer gesellschaftspolitisch begriffenen Polarisierung der Welt werden Konflikte zunehmend unter kulturellen Gesichtspunkten definiert - als der Zusammenprall von Vlkern und Kulturen (subl. mea, R. C., vezi Huntington "clash of civilisations"), die in ihrem Selbstverstndnis durch den traditionellen Gegensatz der Weltreligionen geprgt sind" (op. cit, pp. 41-42). 3 Termenul "grenzenlose Kommunikation" apare in "Cuvantul inainte" la o opera tarzie a lui Karl Jaspers, "Der philosophische Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung" (1962): "Wir suchen heute den Boden, auf dem Menschen aus allen Glaubensherknften sich ber die Welt hin sinnvoll begegnen knnen, bereit, ihre je eigene geschichtliche berlieferung neu anzueignen, zu reinigen und zu verwandeln, aber nicht preiszugeben. Der gemeinsame Boden fr die (Pluralitt) des Glaubens wre allein die Kalrheit der Denkungsart, die Wahrhaftigkeit und ein gemeinsames Grundwissen. Erst diese (drei Elemente) ermglichen jene greneznlose Kommunikation, in der die Glaubensurspnge vermge ihres Ernstes einander anziehen" (op.cit., p. 317). 4 Habermas absolutizeaza transparenta comunicarii, intelegere nu exista decat daca cele doua parti asteapta sa invete ceva una de la cealalta: "Verstndigung ist nur zwischen Parteien mglich, die erwarten, voneinander lernen zu knnen" (op.cit., p. 46). Ignorand orice alt interes care ar putea fi purtat de comunicare, Habermas se grabeste sa extraga potentialul de universalitate al ratiunii intruchipate verbal: "So gewinnt die Hermeneutik aus den Bedingungen gelingender Kommunikation selbst das universalistische Potential einer sprachlich verkrperten Vernunft und ermutigt zum Versuch interkultureller Verstndigung" (ibidem). Opere citate Baudrillard, Jean: America, trad. Alina Beiu Desliu, Editura Albatros, Bucuresti, 1994. Cornea, Andrei: Turnirul khazar. impotriva relativismului contemporan, Nemira, Bucuresti, 1997. Deciu, Andreea: "Gulliver in postmodernitate", in "Secolul XX", Exilul, 10-11-12/1997, 1-2-3/1998, Bucuresti, 1998, p. 56-62. Dumitriu, Petre: Cronica de familie, Editura de Stat pentru Literatura si arta, 1956. Jaspers, Karl: Der philosophische Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung, Mnchen, 1984. Habermas, Jrgen: "Vom Kampf der Glaubenmchte. Karl Jaspers zum Konflikt der Kulturen", in Vom sinnlichen Eindruck zum symbolischen Ausdruck. Philosophische Essays, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1997, pp. 41-58. Hegel, Georg W. Fr.: Theorie Werkausgabe, Phnomenologie des Geistes, Frankfurt am Main, 1970. Kierkegaard, Sren: Boala de moarte. Un expozeu de psihologie crestina in vederea edificarii si a desteptarii, trad. din germ., prefata si note de Madalina Diaconu, Humanitas, Bucuresti, 1999. Krappmann, Lothar: Soziologische Dimensionen der Identitt. Strukturelle Bedingungen fr die Teilnahme an Interaktionsprozessen, Stuttgart, 1982. Mead, George Herbert: Mind, Self and Society. From the standpoint of a social behaviorist, Chicago, 1934. Michel, Willy: "Die Auensicht der Innensicht. Zur Hermeneutik einer interkulturell ausgerichteten Germanistik" in Jahrbuch DaF, vol. 17, 1991, pp. 13-33. 186

Muschg, Adolph: Im Sommer des Hasens, Frankfurt am Main, 1965. Musil, Robert: Omul fara insusiri, traducere de Mircea Ivanescu, opera antuma si postuma, Univers, Bucuresti, 1995. Rebreanu, Liviu: Itic atrul, dezertor, in Rafuiala si alte nuvele, antologie si postfata de Virgil Bulat, Dacia, Cluj, 1983, p.191-203. Wieseltier, Leon: impotriva identitatii, traducere si prefata de Mircea Mihaies, Polirom, Iasi, 1997. precum si O vara de neuitat, un film de Lucian Pintilie. Scenariul si regia: Lucian Pintilie. Dupa nuvela La salade de Petru Dumitriu. Producator Lucian Pintilie. Producator executiv Constantin Popescu. Muzica: Anton auteu. Imaginea: Sanda Iorgulescu. Cu: Kristin Scott-Thomas, Claudiu Bleont, Olga Tudorache, George Constantin, Ion Pavlescu, s. a., Romania, 1994.

COSANA NICOLAE THE ROMANIAN "DIGITAL DIASPORA"

Abstract: In this text an internet-based "exile" proving the reality of a new (virtual) inter-national comunity reemerges from the traditional concept of diaspora. Keywords: Romania; Romanian diaspora; net group; public sphere; virtual identity

In a recent anthology dedicated to home, exile, and their visual correspondences Homi Bhabha coined the phrase "digital diaspora". He made an apology for the proteic possibilities offered by the Internet ontology. In other words, You do not have to be whom you say you are, You can recreate yourself or What you see is not necessarily what you need to know are valid sentences for the lure of this "new communitarianism". Consequently, according to Bhabha, virtual reality depletes our life of its historical memory"(Bhabha in Naficy: 9), whether stored either in the real or the imaginary homeland, to use Salman Rushdie's phrase. Wherever we live, if connected to the Internet, we can become cybernauts and navigators within present tense. At the same time, we reterritorialize in cyberspace, that is, inside the virtual geography of online communities. This paper addresses the notion of public space online, while analyzing the impact and consequences of a site for Romanians all around the world called romaniaBYNET.com. It also investigates some different definitions of cyberspace that will prove useful in context for notion such as social interaction, agency, and identity. The analysis accounts for the mode in which a certain audience/public is constructed on the Internet, specifically for a Romanian virtualized social space replicating real life. While exploring the national imaginary as it is restructured online, one can discover the way in which virtual politics operates across real-life categories. The goal would be to reveal a different version of Romanian citizenship, showing how what I would call Romanianness is imbricated in the overall national definition through identification in other than juridical terms. The discussion becomes thus part of the ongoing debates about virtualized citizenship and the negotiation of public sphere online. Once an arcane means of communication for researchers and academics, cyberspace has now become 187

the ideal medium for any human activity, from shopping to chatting or cybersex. Originally a term from William Gibson's science-fiction novel Neuromancer (1985), it is the name one uses for the conceptual space where words, human relationships, data, wealth, and power are manifested by people using CMC technology. In other words, according to Neil Postman in an interview on radio, "cyberspace is a metaphorical idea which is supposed to be the space where your consciousness is located when you're using computer technology on the Internet, for example, and I'm not entirely sure it's such a useful term, but I think that's what most people mean by it." As a culturally constructed phenomenon, cyberspace is made up of "ongoing processes of definition, performance, enactment, and identity creation (.) not a place (as Gertrude Stein might say, there is no there there), but rather a locus around which coalesce a hypertext of texts, modes of social interaction, commercial interests, and other discursive and imaging practices" (Kolko, Nakamura, and Rodman: 10). No longer hampered by corporeal demands, our identity in cyberspace relies more than everywhere on the power of discourse and its various practices. Although cyberculture is made possible by the network's wires, cables, servers, and terminals, it thrives where users meet within the wires and upon the interfaces. These online social interactions, or what Allucquere Rosanne Stone calls "virtual systems," are as broad as they are diverse and take place within basic email, newsgroups, reflectors, and listservs, bulletin board systems (BBSs) and Usenet, MOOs and MUDs, Internet Relay Chat (IRC), electronic chat rooms, and interactive sites on the World Wide Web. (Kolko 33) For Slavoj Zizek, cyberspace represents nothing else but the "unbearable closure of being", as it is the carrier of the phantasmatic logic of social reality to its extreme: it proves the increasing handing-over of the subject's self to the Symbolic order which virtualizes the self. Zizek claims that the Internet enables the symbolic order to inscribe itself isotopically on and in subjects' most intimately bodily zones and deepest libidinal recesses. Insofar as this is valid, we witness a pernicious full colonization of the subject by the symbolic order. This is the collapse of the distance between subject and the sublime object that ideology requires in order to maintain itself as a frame within which the subject's psychosocial fantasies are organized and managed. (Zizek 143) Without arguing against Zizek's point of view, this paper holds that online communities reconstruct a different type of intersubjectivity as to one in habitual terms, and also replicate social interactions. The subject online no longer belongs to the official line regulated by the social practices that it has to accomplish every day. Cyberspace offers the vision of new communities by allowing one to transpose oneself ideally into the virtual realm: Although spatial imagery and a sense of place help convey the experience of dwelling in a virtual community, biological imagery is often more appropriate to describe the way cyberculture changes. In terms of the way the whole system is propagating and evolving, think of cyberspace as a social petri dish, the Net as the agar medium, and virtual communities, in all their diversity, as the colonies of microorganisms that grow in petri dishes. Each of the small colonies of microorganisms--the communities on the Net--is a social experiment that nobody planned but that is happening nevertheless. (Rheingold, online version) RomaniaBYNET.com represents an online version of the public sphere. From this point of view it is a communitarian space, defined through policies of consumption and a new type of public, constructed on the web site and made up of disincorporated social actors. It is created by WebBYNET.com, which is according to its own words, a global Internet company producing country-specific portals containing dynamic comprehensive information in a rich community environment. They offer access to the culture, history and products of different countries having the aim to be the ultimate online source for in-depth country-specific information, resources, and e-commerce and services including travel, communications and various community-type features. (Online text) According to the chapter "Chatter in the Age of Electronic Reproduction" in The Phantom Public Sphere the public becomes an objective, it has to be produced (Robbins 100). My contention is that the notion of publicness (the terms belongs to the German Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge in their late influential Public Sphere and Experience) is much easier created online. Here one encounters a set of prescribed options for opinion formation, since everything is framed in such a way. For example, 188

messages posted in the chat do account for a special type of public opinion feedback. In other words, the public is itself socially constructed insofar as "it creatively invokes an imagined space defined by individuals' freedom alongside their social responsibility. It is where the various demands for equality are negotiated" (Eisestein 6). In the age of the postcommunist state, Romanians want to recreate the hopes of public participation and a different public realm untarnished by the frustrations and disappointments of real-life politics. According to Caius Dobrescu, many young Romanians would connect themselves to the Internet because this is a chance for them to reconstruct a virtualized Romania far and away from the perils of the real social and economic reality. He adds this to the "gallery of self-projections in the marvellous world of the future" (212). A new "sheltering sky" for whoever accesses it is explored and enjoyed in the serendipitous egalitarianism of the Internet. The young project themselves into the future as settlers of a brand new cyber Romania because "the Internet represents one of the 'clean' places, with no memory (.) where a new life could begin" (213). In July 2000, through a specified service, I contacted the server administrators asking for extra information concerning the Romanian staff. The kind reply came in an e-mail from Ionut Stavar, one of the editors-in-chief. The site-editors and collaborators, according to the profile that Ionut was kind to offer me for my analysis, are all in their twenties and thirties. He also underscored that the site has a certain policy as to monitoring discussions online. According to prerequisites posted on the site, like actors on a bare stage, members of an online discussion create the illusion of a place or scene that others can watch or join through words and graphical gestures or icons. As the interactions become more complex, several roles become available for the sustainers of the group conversation. Often these roles are filled intuitively; small understandings are smoothed out, visitors welcomed, etc., simply because it feels right. (Online text) Different communities of interpretation, from anthropology to economics, have different criteria for studying whether a group of people is a community. In trying to apply traditional analysis of community behaviour to the kinds of interactions emerging from the Net, Marc Smith, a graduate student in sociology at the University of California at Los Angeles, who has been doing his fieldwork in the WELL and the Net, focuses on the concept of "collective goods." Every cooperative group of people exists in the face of a competitive world because that group of people recognizes there is something valuable that they can gain only by banding together. Looking for a group's collective goods is a way of looking for the elements that bind isolated individuals into a community. The three kinds of collective goods that Smith proposes as the social glue that binds the WELL into something resembling a community are social network capital, knowledge capital, and communion (Kollock and Smith, 1999). What kind of capital is thus circulated in the Romanian cyberspace we are discussing here? The reason for "launching" the site was the widespread need of feeling closer to home. Therefore, in the anniversary message, romaniaBYNET.com attempts at a "connection between Romania and people gone away". According to this scheme, social network capital is to be found in the 27,000 people whom romaniaBYNET.com, launched in cyberspace in May 1999, counts to have as regular members, not to mention the various visitors whose numbers, according to the statistics of the site administrators, exceeds 500,000. Knowledge capital could be found in the various levels of expertise that members of this community can provide during chats or in their editorials on various topics that range from political analyses to sports, to instilling a sense of belonging to the site. As for communion, this is something likely to happen provided people who communicate online shared the wish to dedicate themselves to a goal altogether. This third level, political, derives from the middle, social level, for the role of communications media among the citizenry is particularly important. A sense of communion is induced in the very persuasiveness of belonging to the site as a member, the instrumentalization of national emblems (the Romanian flag and anthem), or the invitation to participate in online chats on sociological or entertaining topics. It is here, between these two levels that we can talk about the notion of public sphere online, that is recognition of a living web of citizen-to-citizen communication otherwise well known as civil society or the public sphere. As the recent Romanian socio-political context proves, in the absence of a cohesive and fulfilling activity in the public sphere (the "shrinking public", as Lisa Duggan puts it in a forthcoming book), 189

and the crisis of the representational politics - this could be read as the crisis of a certain communicative model based on the principle of propaganda and persuasion. This has been noticed by the editors of romaniaBYNET.com, who in their message posted to celebrate one year online, underscore their attempt at offering quality services, "all these in a country with a low rating, with major economical problems and social disorders, with a low life level and a rushing inflation, but with a hope for better times". Notions such as exile or diaspora are eluded since this is meant as an online comprehensive approach to Romanian all around the world where citizenship or geographical actual space is irrelevant. This 'Romania' is a cultural construct, since one can never pretend to hold all possible information and knowledge about one single country as a source of information. The editors of romaniaBYNET.com offer the version of their own Romania, a territory to which members are supposed to subscribe after surfing it. They become citizens only after a click. How does this "cyberRomania" look like? On the home page, the bilingual information accessible from the left side of the opening page lists the following order: Community, Entertainment, Info, Services, Shopping, Romania (this one with the sub-categories - Religion, Destinations, Politics), Literature Corner, and Careers. Each person becoming a romaniaBYNET.com "citizen" will at the same time receive regular e-mails updating the information posted on the site. According to Luis Althusser, interpellation theory accounts for the implicit presence of ideology in any given text. In Althusser's view, individuals are always already interpellated subjects, "hailed" to belong to a specific representation and hence always already ideologically oriented. Interpellation refers to the way each of us is hailed by our social order in a particular way. According to this notion, a social formation constructs and locates us as subjects whom respond and consent to it in certain ways. Therefore, individuals recognize or misrecognize themselves in the way they are interpellated by ideology. Althusser assigned to the concept of ideology "a system of representations", that is images and notions that impose themselves "as structures", through a process that escapes the control of individuals; and as a means by which they make sense of their experience and conceive of their place in the world - ".ideology is a matter of the lived relation between men and their world. In ideology men do indeed express . . . the way they live the relation between them and their conditions". (Althusser 54) Therefore, Romania is structured, hailed according to religion, geography and socio-political life. The chief-in-editor wraps up his editorial by saying, "So help us God", thus dispersing any impression that Romanians are not an overall religious people. On the consumerist side, the possibility to buy Eastern Orthodox icons and other church products underscores this religiosity online. At the same tine, most photos posted on the site depict monasteries around the country. In the chapter Destinations, all historical territories are there: Transylvania, Wallachia, and Moldavia, each with the corresponding data, as well as mountain resorts, Black Sea coast and the Danube Delta. The capital of the country, Bucharest is a visual omission, although present in a thorough historical description. As a full-fledged community is thus constructed, the site promotes its own literary and cultural information. For example, at the end of May 2000 and 2001, the site promptly covered the editions of Bookarest, the largest book fair in the country. On the other hand, a canonical decentralization is noticeable in the literature corner, available only in Romanian, where any reader can post one's literary creations online debased from the real-life inhibitions when facing a non-gratifying public. (Wallace, 1999) The production of these most of the times young authors is beyond control and any valorizing validation. Members are also gratified with periodic updates on sport, weather, politics, and Romanian domestic affairs. In the chapter dedicated to politics, the analysis makes reference to the ten years that have passed since 1989. The discourse online deploys a sombre rhetoric when referring to the economic situation of the country viewed as one of the laggards of Eastern Europe. As the classified section is bilingual, one might expect to find similar notions both in Romanian and English. One year ago, in 2000, the English version of matrimonial ads hardly represented the same thing as the so-called original. It reflected more a commodification of Romanian bodies willing to offer escort services, Virtualized bodies thus became the screening room for teleported corporeal desires abroad. Such postings have now long disappeared and romanticism has returned with a vengeance in an ideal attempt to imbue the site with 190

a more positively reflected spirit. As a matter of fact, online citizenship offers ideal conditions, namely restrictions and borders become fragile, porous, and ultimately irrelevant. Individuals can act freely, without being hampered by censorship, and they can also attempt new socializing structures. Cyber-Romania is no more fractured by economic and social distinctions. It is a user-friendly and updated hyper-reality. References Althusser, Louis, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, Trans. Ben Brewster, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971 Dobrescu, Caius, "Romania in the 90s: Breakaway to Fantasia" in Tanasescu, Antoaneta and Petre, Cipriana Ed. Ten Steps Closer to Romania, Bucharest: The Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, 1999 Eisenstein, Zillah, Global Obscenities. Patriarchy, Capitalism, and the Lure of Cyberfantasy, New York and London: New York University Press, 1998 Kolko, Beth E., Nakamura, Lisa, and Rodman, Gilbert B. Eds. Race in Cyberspace, New York and London: Routledge, 2000 Kollock, Peter and Marc A. Smith, Eds. Communities in Cyberspace. London; New York: Routledge, 1999 Naficy, Hamid ed., Home, Exile, Homeland: Film, Media and the Politics of Place, New York and London: Routledge, 1999 Rheingold, Howard, The Virtual Community (online version), Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publications, 1993 Robbins, Bruce ed., The Phantom Public Sphere (for the Social Text Collective), Cultural Politics, Volume 5, Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993 Zizek, Slavoj, The Plague of Fantasies, New York and London: Verso, 1997 Wallace, Patricia, The Psychology of the Internet, Cambridge University Press, 1999 www.romaniaBYNET.com www.worldBYNET.com Bibliography The Cybercultures Reader, New York, and London: Routledge, 2000

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MADALINA NICOLAESCU CONSUMUL - DIALOG INTERCULTURAL

Consumerism - an intercultural dialogue Abstract: Taking into account some commercials, the article describes the impact of cultural globalization on specific ethnic groups. Keywords: Romania; globalization; consumerism; interculturality

Globalizare si consum - doua fenomene ale modernitatii tirzii care incep sa se faca simtite si Romania. Reactiile elitelor noastre sunt inca vagi, cele doua fenomene fiind totusi de data recenta la noi, iar analiza lor presupunind instrumente de investigatie apartinind unor sisteme teoretice ce nu au avut un succes deosebit la noi. Care ar fi constructiile teoretice cele mai importante cu care se opereaza in intelegerea globalizarii culturale, privita sub aspectul intersectiei sale cu consumul de masa? in ce masura putem vorbi despre unele forme de consum ca modalitati de interactiune culturala? Ce semnifica in termenii concreti ai vietii cotidiene conceptul de "hibriditate culturala"? Iata citeva intrebari la care voi incerca sa raspund analizind textul a doua reclame publicate la noi in luna martie de doua mari firme multinationale. I. Din punct de vedere teoretic s-au conturat doua mari curente in abordarea globalizarii . Primul avertizeaza asupra pericolului uniformizarii si omogenizarii culturale ce ne ameninta. Este vorba despre asa numitul pericol al "macdonaldizarii" societatii si a practicilor culturale, ca urmare a patrunderii masive a companiilor multinationale si a mass mediei occidentale. Acest proces de omogenizare este perceput ca o forma de imperialism cultural, de impunere a unei hegemonii occidentale, mai exact spus nord americane. Formele de fundamentalism sau nationalism care s-au raspindit in ultima vreme sunt percepute ca un fel de rezistenta la caracterul agresiv al globalului. Ele reproduc insa tendinta de omogenizare a globalului, in sensul opus al "purificarii" de elemente straine, "poluante". Unei lumi de tipul "macworld" ii corespunde o alta de tipul jihadului musulman. Al doilea curent respinge teza omogenizarii invocind atitudinea activa, creativa a oricarui receptor cultural. Tendintei de omogenizare a globalului i se opune rezistenta culturala a localului. Astfel au loc in mod inevitabil negocierei culturale in care globalul este supus unui proces de translatie, de resemnificare din perspectiva localului, rezultatele acestei interactiuni fiind produse culturale hibride. in ambele cazuri interesul cercetarii este axat nu atit pe global cit pe componenta localului a procesului de globalizare, localul dovedindu-se un teren deosebit de contestat si de controversat. Abordarea mea se inscrie in cel de al doilea tip de demers ce evidentiaza heterogenitatea produselor culturale generate in cadrul globalizarii. ai in ceea ce priveste consumul cultural perspectivele teoretice sunt relativ divergente: Pozitia "clasica", imbratisata inca de multi analisti, are ca baza critica acolii de la Frankfurt ce privea consumul ca un fel de abdicare a propriei identitati, cu dorintele si nevoile individuale respective, in fata presiunii integratoare si normalizatoare ale pietii. Demarcindu-se de acesta pozitie, abordarile antropologice precum si cele din cadrul studiilor culturale subliniaza caracterul creativ al consumului cultural. in continuarea lucrarilor lui Jean Baudrillard (Sistemul de obiecte si Societatea de consum) unde consumul, chiar daca este in continuare perceput ca alienant si normalizant, este regindit ca o forma de limbaj, Marz Douglas sustine ca el este o forma 192

de comunicare sociala, o modalitate de exprimarea creativa a identitatii sociale si culturale a indivizilor.1 in contextul globalizarii actuale, consumul este un loc privilegiat al operatiunilor de translare si recontextualizare a globalului in termenii localului. Daniel Miller releva procesul de apropriere culturala si recontextualizare ce are loc in momentul consumului, proces in care bunurile respective ori sunt folosite in scopuri diferite fata de cele pentru care au fost concepute initial ori semnificatia culturala si sociala cu care au fost investite sufera transformari importante.2 La aceste considerente ar trebui adaugate perspectivele trasate de catre Bourdieu cu privire la functia de a opera distinctii sociale ce-i revine consumului.3 De subliniat ca in perioada actuala demarcarile dintre indivizi sau grupuri sociale sunt operate aproape exclusiv in zona consumului, vechiul concept de homo economicus aplicat producatorului fiind inlocuit de cel al consumatorului. II. Am sa incep analiza formelor autohtone de consum globalizat cu o reclama pentru Land Rover Freelander publicata in numarul din martie al revistei Privirea. Atit imaginea cit si textul sunt difuzate in mod global de catre firma Rover. Filialele sale nu a initiat campanii promotionale cu reclame produse local, cum este de exemplu cazul reclamelor de la Connex. Acelasi mesaj este reprodus peste tot indiferent de specificul cultural al tarii in care este diseminat. Care sunt semnificatiile pe care Rover doreste sa le asocieze cu masina sa de teren si care ar fi valorile ce se cer a fi preluate odata cu achizitionarea acestei masini? (De remarcat latura "educationala" a consumului de obiecte din vest, prin care se disemineaza sistemul simbolic si valoric al economiei de piata. in fostele tari socialiste consumul, prin activitatile si practicile adiacente - reclame, marketing dar si achizitionarea de obiecte -, s-a dovedit a fi modalitatea cea mai eficace de asimilare a sistemului capitalist.4) Roverul este fotografiat la poalele unor munti intr-un tinut arid, nepopulat, cu un teren nisipos, dificil de strabatut, asemanator celui din desert. Traseul sugerat nu se opreste la acest tinut ci urca pe culmile muntilor. El include misterul, aventura, satisfactia escaladarii unor virfuri dificile. Acest lucru este subliniat in textul reprodus in romana: "Va intrebati ce se ascunde dupa linia orizontului? Pentru a afla raspunsul, urcati la volanul lui LAND ROVER FREELANDER". Ne asteptam ca viitorul cumparator sa foloseasca Roverul pe un teren accidentat, fara drumuri marcate sau pe drumuri de tara desfundate, punind astfel in valoare dotarile deosebite ale masinii, dotari detaliate in textul reclamei. Nu ne asteptam ca el s-o foloseasca pe strazile aglomerate ale capitalei mergind la serviciu sau la cumparaturi si parcind-o in fata hotelului Hilton. (Aproximativ o treime din masinile parcate in fata Atheneului sunt masini de teren de tipul Roverului.) Calitatea execrabila a drumurilor de la noi ofera desigur o justificare pentru cererea mare de masini de teren. Textul reclamei - Acest autoturism a fost conceput pentru a va duce la destinatie. La orice destinatie -, promite depasirea unor bariere importante pe care infrastructura noastra defectuoasa le pune in calea desfasurarii rapide si eficiente a afacerilor, comunicatiilor, etc. Substantiale mi se par insa si obiectiile ce pot fi aduse impotriva folosirii acestui autoturism aproape exclusiv in Bucuresti, un oras conceput pentru calesti, cu strazi relativ inguste si in special cu spatii de parcare foarte reduse. Pornind de la aceste obiectii m-as hazarda sa sustin ca cererea foarte mare de autoturisme de tipul Land Rover-ului trebuie inteleasa mai curind ca o reactie post-comunista fata de consum. Este vorba de a marca prin consum o noua stratificare sociala si de a depasi astfel stadiul de uniformizare si nivelare din perioada anterioara. Roverul nu este cumparat la noi numai din ratiuni practice (este potrivit pentru infrastructura rutiera dezastruoasa de la noi) ci pentru a impresiona prin gabaritul si dotarea sa tehnica deosebita. Un Land Rover, un jeep Grand Cherokee este in primul rind foarte mare, de la volanul sau te uiti cu superioritate si condescendenta la celelalte autoturisme. Te simti tare in jungla noastra rutieras mai nimeni nu indrazneste sa te infrunte. Astfel de masini pot prin urmare exprima in termenii cei mai frapanti posibil puterea financiara si statutul social al posesorului. Se apeleaza la ele deorece masinile de lux traditionale, precum Mercedesul, fiind supuse unei compactizari si reduceri a dimensiunilor, nu mai pot indeplini aceasta functie. Ele nu mai ies in evidenta. in plus masini ca Mercedes sau Renault sunt in mod inerent asociate cu fosta elita politica comunista. Din acest punct de vedre achizitionarea de masini de teren in loc de Mercedesuri pare sa semnaleze o dorinta de ruptura cu identitatea si 193

simbolurile perioadei anterioare. Cererea pentru masini de teren trimite in consecinta la recontextualizarea produsului occidental analizata de Daniel Miller. Aceste masini dobindesc valori noi - ele devin obiecte de lux cu o vizibilitate sociala marita - si corespund dorintei specifice pentru perioada post-comunista de "consum ostentativ" (pentru a folosi termenul lui Veblen). Aceasta dorinta isi are radacinile nu numai in oferta foarte limitata de bunuri din perioada anterioara dar si in anxietatea pe care uniformizarea comunista a produs-o. Pe de alta parte nevoia de a exhiba puterea financiara prin dimensiunile sporite ale masinii achizitionate denota si dubiile pe care le resimt posesorii respectivi referitor la legitimitatea pozitiei pe care o reclama. O masina precum Land Roverul nu este folosita doar pentru a marca diferente sociale ci si pentru a le consolida, ea conferind un prestigiu sporit posesorilor lor. Ca atare ea serveste drept instrument de accelerare a mobilitatii sociale. Asigurarea pe care ne-o da reclama - Acest autoturism a fost conceput pentru a va duce la destinatie. La orice destinatie - poate fi citita ca o promisiune pentru succesul social pe care cumpararea acestei masini il garanteaza. Temeritatea, spiritul intreprinzator, hotarirea de a strabate drumuri inaccesibile sunt valori traditionale ale societatii capitaliste occidentale pe care reclama se bazeaza si pe care in acelasi timp le vinde o data cu produsul. Ele sunt preluate in procesul consumului insa intr-o versiune localizata, ce se indeparteaza poate semnificativ de continutul original al acestor valori. III. A doua reclama pe care vreau s-o discut ridica problema constructiei alteritatii in cadrul consumului global. Voi face referire la catalogul cu produse cosmetice difuzat de catre firma The Body Shop in luna martie prin intermediul revistei UNICA. Atit campania promotionala a firmei The Body Shop cit si noua linie de produse pe care le comercializeaza se inscriu intr-o abordare globalizanta a consumului. Produsele pe care le ofera sunt obtinute din substante "exotice" cultivate in spatiul lumii a treia, sau mai precis in fostele colonii britanice. Prin intermediul diferitelor creme, uleiuri si arome, The Body Shop propune recuperarea naturii: "Suntem pentru inspiratia din natura" - este titlul catalogului -, natura care pentru consumatorul din tarile industrializate nu se mai regaseste decit in locurile exotice ale lumii a treia. Noua campanie pare sa fie cit se poate de "politically correct", ea se incadreaza intr-un proiect mai amplu numit Community Trade, scopul afisat fiind acela de ajuta comunitati defavorizate, fara a le plasa prin aceasta in pozitie de inferioritate, ci dimpotriva tratindu-le ca pe niste parteneri egali. Dar desi isi propune sa depaseasca decalajele economice si culturale dintre cele doua lumi, The Body Shop de fapt intareste inca opozitia binara dintre pe de-o parte identitatea subiectului occidental si pe de alta parte cea a celuilalt, definit mai mult ca oricind ca o alteritate exotica.5 Interesanta in acest context este juxtapunerea dintre fotografia reprezentind femei dintr-o cooperativa din Ghana uscind boabe de cacao la soare si textul de pe pagina alaturata. Acest text, in care sunt enumerate diferite produse ademenitoare prin exotismul lor- untul de shea si de cacao din Ghana, miere naturala si ceara din Zambia, uleiuri de susan din Nicaragua, sfirseste cu indemul "..petreceti o seara cu Africa Spa si rasfatati-va". Distributia de roluri ce reiese din aceasta juxtapunere nu mai este tocmai "politically correct": pe o pagina femeile din Ghana muncind manual, pe cealalta pagina consumatorulconsumatoarea occidentala, rasfatindu-se cu produsele muncii africane. Unde se plaseaza insa consumatorul-consumatoarea din Romania cind parcurge acest text? Catalogul firmei The Body Shop postuleaza un consumator universal, anulind diferentele dintre regiunile ale globului. Dupa cum am vazut, insa, in spatele acestui consumator universal se regasesc femeile din Europa occidentala, in relatie cu care femeile din Ghana, de exemplu, se constituie in alteritate. in calitate lor de consumatoare, cititoarele din Romania se identifica cu pozitia forte a subiectului occidental, si prin aceasta sporesc placerea pe care o deriva din ingrijirea si rasfatarea corpului cu substantele cultivate in Africa sau America de Sud. Afirmarea centrului in raport cu marginea, respectiv a unui subiect normativ in raport cu celalalt se reconstituie pe coordonate geografice si economice atipice, adica intr-o tara ca Romania, localizata intr-o zona mai degraba periferica decit centrala. 194

Identificarea fantasmatica a cititorului cu o pozitie de subiect forte, in mare masura apartinind lumii afluente a Europei occidentale, constituie o premiza importanta pentru incurajarea consumului de articole de lux si de cosmetice in rindurile femeilor6. Aceasta strategie este promovata si de reviste precum Cosmopolitan, Elle, Avantaje, a caror principala menire este comercializarea diferitelor produse cosmetice sau articole de moda. Este surprinzator faptul ca The Body Shop isi permite insa riscul de a abandona aceasta pozitie comfortabila, publicind in catalogul sau laolalta cu prezentarea produselor sale fotografia tulburatoare a unui copil ce scormoneste printre gunoaie. Sau poate de fapt nu aceasta a fost intentia initiala a firmei ci s-a conturat astfel in contextul specific al consumului din Romania? Revistele mai sus amintite adopta si ele o orientare politica progresista, abordind subiecte cum ar fi violenta in familie (Cosmopolitan) sau hartuirea sexuala (Avantaje), fara insa a tulbura reveriile si dorintele generate de reclamele publicate. Nici o fotografie disturbanta nu-i este atasata articolului pe tema violentei domestice din numarul din martie al revistei Cosmopolitan, ci dimpotriva ii este juxtapusa o reclama seducatoare a ultimului parfum Nina Ricci. in ton cu spiritul revistei cititoarele trebuie sa adopte o pozitie activa fata de violenta domestica, continuind cu aceasi fermitate sa consume parfumul Nina Ricci. De fapt revista isi asigura cititoarele de pozitia lor privilegiata in raport cu victimele violentei (o femeie Cosmo nu este afectata de acest flagel), reclama intarind aceasta convingere si ajutind cititoarele sa ignore sau sa atenueze eventuale dubii in aceasta privinta. inclin sa cred ca nici fotografia publicata in catalogul The Body Shop si care exemplifica campania in sprijinul drepturilor omului nu se indeparteaza fundamental de logica urmarita de Cosmopolitan. Asupra publicului britanic fotografia cu pricina poate avea efectul paradoxal de linistire: ea reprezinta alteritatea, tulburatoare e drept, dar aflata la mare distanta, distanta ce este confirmata prin insasi consumul de produse The Body Shop. Confruntate cu aceasta fotografie, cititoarele de la noi nu se mai pot lesne identifica cu pozitia forte a consumatoarei occidentale, pentru ca realitatea prezentata seamana prea tare cu cea de acasa, unde vezi sau auzi frecvent de copii scormonind printre gunoaie. Pozitia confortabila ce conditioneaza dorinta de a consuma poate fi astfel puternic zdruncinata. Avind in vedere riscul ca constructia celuilalt, conceput drept alteritate culturala si economica, sa nu fie perceputa ca atare in Romania, ci dimpotriva, campania publicitara a firmei The Body Shop poate sa esueze. Responsabila pentru aceasta este abordarea globalizanta, omogenizanta ce ignora diferentele locale si reproduce aceleasi imagini peste tot. Localul se razbuna insa generind reactii subversive. Note: 1 Mary Douglas and Bernard Isherwood, The World of Goods. Towards an Anthropology of Consumption. London: Routledge, 1996. 2 Daniel Miller, Material Culture and Mass Consumption . Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987s si Acknowledging Consumption: A Review of New Studies. London: Routledge, 1995. 3 Pierre Bourdieu, A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 1984 4 Jaqui True, "Expanding Markets and Marketing Gender : The Integration of Post Socialist Czech Republic", Review of International Political Economy, 6:3, 1999. 5 Vezi Sarah Franklin, Celia Lury, Jackie Stacey, Global Nature, Global Culture, London: Sage,2000. 6 Madalina Nicolaescu, "Globalizarea si femeile din Romania", Sfera politica, 71,72, 1999.

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MASA ROTUNDA OMAGIALA: ADRIAN MARINO LA OPTZECI DE ANI

Adrian Marino: Eu reprezint - prin forta biologica a lucrurilor, nu prin alte merite - o alta faza a comparatismului romanesc. Am activat intr-un cu totul alt context, intr-o cu totul alta forma de organizare, cu totul alte eforturi si rezultate si ma bucur ca se afla printre noi o veche colaboratoare a noastra, doamna Irina Badescu, care este martor ocular al eforturilor noastre din perioada Cahiers roumaines d'tudes littraires, care aparea foarte, foarte greu si care a fost sub "conducerea" mea vreo zece ani. Trebuie sa stiti ca a existat in Romania o vreme - toate astea se petreceau cu patru decenii in urma, ceea ce este foarte important; traim un alt context politic, ideologic si cultural; sintem intr-o alta faza, o cu totul alta faza, care nu are nici o legatura cu ce se intimpla acum - exista, totusi, din motive de imagine externa, un comitet national, Comit National de Littrature Compare, care era afiliat unei Acadmie de Sciences Sociales et Politiques. Programul sau era revista Synthesis, pe care nu stiu daca multi dintre dumneavoatra au vazut-o - unii au vazut-o, altii nu -, realizata de colegul nostru regretat Alexandru Dutu si prezidata de doamna Zoe Dumitrescu-Busulenga. Eram afiliati prin Synthesis Academiei de atiinte Sociale si Politice a lui Mihnea Gheorghiu. in acelasi timp, printr-un sistem vechi de relatii - pentru ca Romania este, sa stiti, tara relatiilor, tara unde totul este personalizat! - cu o expresie splendida a lui Tismaneanu, aparuta intr-o carte: "cumetria-patria-anarhia" (e foarte buna expresia!) - noi am reusit sa facem ceva, si anume la Editura Univers am reusit sa facem o pseudorevista care se cheama Cahiers roumains d'tudes littraires, care nu avea statut de revista, ci de culegere periodica de studii. Eu i-am dat o orientare comparatistica si am facut numere monografice toate numerele erau consacrate unei teme. Sumarul era tematic, dupa aceea urma cronica traducerilor, unde recenzam carti de autori romani tradusi in strainatate. Deci, cam astea au fost "organele" prin care comparatistul roman - sintem in '69, sintem in '82 - se exprima. Sintem intr-o faza de blocada totala in Occident si prin acest subterfugiu, prin aceste doua mici subterfugii, Romania, de bine, de rau, avea niste mici relatii internationale. Pot sa va spun ca acest Cahiers roumains. a avut un anumit ecou, a fost singura revista romaneasca ce avea la Biblioteca Nationala de la Paris o caseta personala, particulara. Asta era situatia pina in '89; dupa aceea nu am mai verificat. Deci acesta ar fi cadrul institutional al vechiului comparatism. Ar fi multe de spus, cite reclamatii aveam, cite handicapuri, cite eforturi, cite relatii personale intrau in joc. Esentialul este ca, de bine, de rau, aceasta revista a aparut timp de zece ani si este o mica realizare, nu exagerez deloc importanta ei. in acelasi timp trebuie sa va spun si politica mea personala, de ce m-am implicat in aceasta aventura; pentru ca a fost o aventura care m-a costat si timp, si bani, si reclamatii, si anchete si asa mai departe. Trec peste asta. Era pentru mine o metoda de a iesi din izolare. E foarte important acest lucru; pentru mine comparatistica a reprezentat o metoda de a sparge o gheata, de a iesi in lume, de a sfida cenzura, pe cai oarecum semilegale-semiilegale si, in acelasi timp, de a ma exprima liber - era o forma de manifestare libera. in acest cadru, prin aceste legaturi, eu am devenit timp de opt ani - si cind vorbesc despre mine, fatalmente, va rog sa ma scuzati, devin megaloman si narcisist! - opt ani am fost membru in comitetul international al Association de Littrature Compare, care scotea o serie de volume care se chemau Histoire compare des littratures du monde europen. Unul dintre ele este Les avangardes europenes du XX-eme siecle, al carui al doilea volum este aproape in intregime scris de mine, carte din pacate necunoscuta in Romania. Dupa cum total necunoscuta in Romania este si aceasta carte cu cheie: Etiemble ou le comparatisme militant. Am luat ca emblema si ca pavaza de protectie numele si activitatea comparatistului francez tiemble si am publicat cartea semiclandestin la Gallimard. tiemble ou le comparatisme militant a aparut in 1982. Sumarul este exploziv, de aceea n-am avut curajul s-o pun in circulatie, s-o fac publica. Va citez doua-trei capitole: "Contra imperialismului", "Internationalism", "Relation et change", "Cooperation" si un capitol cu totul exploziv, "Communication libre". Sintem in 1982, este o mica data de istorie literara. Gallimard nu era chiar o editura banala. A aparut foarte repede si asta era oarecum in apararea noastra. Pe baza acestei versiuni 196

franceze s-a facut si o versiune japoneza: primul critic roman tradus in Japonia. Pentru mine, mai important decit toate aceste lucruri, care tin de bibliografie, este starea de spirit. Starea de spirit ma impingea, deci, sa sparg o blocada, sa mentin comunicarea cu strainatatea, sa pot participa la congrese internationale, sa colaborez la publicatii straine (aceasta carte a avut aprobari legale pentru trei capitole si unul este clandestin sau semiclandestin, cum vreti sa-i spuneti) si in felul acesta noi ne-am realizat un anumit ideal de europeism, de solidarizare cu cultura Europei occidentale. Eu am facut comparatistica si teoria literaturii si ceea ce am mai facut ca o forma de supravietuire intelectuala. Nu uitati ca eu veneam de unde veneam si trebuia sa ma fac suportat si tolerat in limitele publicistice ale epocii. Din '63 si pina acum eu nu am ocupat nici un post, am f