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FONDUL SOCIAL EUROPEAN
Axa prioritară 1: Educaţia şi formarea în sprijinul creşterii economice şi dezvoltării societăţii bazate pe cunoaştere
Domeniul major de intervenţie 1.2: Programe de studii mai bune pentru studenți și piața muncii
Titlul proiectului: Aplicarea metodologiilor de cercetare științifică în domeniul științelor medicale și promovarea culturii
antreprenoriale pentru facilitarea inserției pe piața muncii a studenților mediciniști din ciclul de studii universitare de
licență
Numărul de identificare al contractului: POSDRU/156/1.2/G/141745
Beneficiar: Universitatea de Medicină şi Farmacie „Carol Davila” din Bucureşti
ETICĂ ȘI COMUNICARE
ÎN ANTREPRENORIATUL MEDICAL
Reader
CUPRINS
Cuvânt înainte
Acest reader conține o serie de texte menite să vă însoțească pe parcursul cursului on-
line de Etică și comunicare în antreprenoriatul medical, dar și dincolo de limita de timp
impusă de acesta. Ele au fost selectate nu atât pentru „reprezentativitatea” lor
academică, adică pentru faptul că au însemnat un punct de cotitură în literatura de
specialitate dedicată subiectului S1 sau S2, ci pentru valoarea lor didactică, pentru cât
de bine reușesc autorii să prezinte punctele de tensiune ale temei abordate. Ulterior, cei
interesați să aprofundeze una sau alta din temele acestui reader, o pot face consultând
bibliografia, ca punct de plecare.
Temele celor trei secțiuni au fost alese în mod special pentru relevanța lor pentru ideea
de antreprenoriat medical în România. De exemplu, etica publicității pentru cabinetele
medicale este un subiect straniu pentru un bioetician pur-sânge, adică pentru unul
ancorat în mediul academic și care arareori este implicat în zona de consultanță pentru
mediul de afaceri sau în zona medicală, însă ea vine în contextul în care în România
există foarte multă publicitate outdoor, in-print și în audiovizual pentru cabinete
medicale (de la reclamele cabinetelor stomatologice la cele pentru intervențiile
chirurgicale de eliminare a hemoroizilor, de la materialele publicitare on-line ale unor
spitale specializate în medicină bariatrică până la prezența, contra-cost, în studiourile
unor televiziuni de scandal a unor medici care prezintă beneficiile procedurilor de
medicină estetică pe care ei le realizează în propriile cabinete).
La finalul fiecărui capitol există un set de două întrebări menit să ajute înțelegerea tematicii
acestui reader și cursului aferent. Este de preferat ca după lectura fiecărui material,
participanții la programul de formare să formuleze pe cont propriu și alte întrebări la care
să încerce să răspundă nu doar în forul interior, ci și în discuții cu colegii.
SECȚIUNEA 1
ETICĂ ÎN AFACERI ȘI ETICĂ PROFESIONALĂ
PENTRU MEDICII-ANTREPRENORI
SUBTEMA: 1.1
*** (2012), Codul de deontologie medicală; Colegiul Medicilor din România, 30 martie.
A se vedea în mod special articolele 48-53.
A se vedea și:
COOTER, Roger & John Pickstone (2003), Companion Encyclopedia of Medicine in the
Twentieth Century, Chapter 31: „Media”; Routledge, New York, pp. 487-502.
OSTEHRR, Kirsten (2013), Medical Visions: Producing the Patient through Film,
Television, and Imaging Technologies; Oxford University Press, Oxford.
SUBTEMA: 1.2
*** (2012), Codul de deontologie medicală; Colegiul Medicilor din România, 30 martie.
A se vedea în mod special articolele 5-6, 8, 22, lit. h, și 23.
SCHACHTER, Steven C. & William Mandell & L. Scott Harshbarger & Randall
Grometstein (2008), Managing Relationships with Industry. A Physician’s Compliance
Manual; Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 17-20.
SUBTEMA: 1.3
LUNT, Neil & Richard Smith & Mark Exworthy & Stephen T. Green & Daniel
Horsfall & Russell Mannion (unk), Medical Tourism: Treatments, Markets and Health
System Implications: A scoping review; OECD, Directorate for Employment, Labour
and Social Affairs, pp. 37-40.
Un document care descrie responsabilitățile medicilor față de pacienții lor, dar și
constrângerile de natură etică implicate în turismul medical.
ÎNTREBĂRI
Q1. Care sunt rațiunile etice pentru care o reclamă la un cabinet de medicină
estetică nu ar trebui să folosească imagini cu proprii pacienți?
Q2. Spitalul X deține un aparat de RMN, însă acesta este vechi, uzat și nu oferă
claritatea necesară pregătirii unor intervenții medicale. Șeful secției de neurologie este
medic asociat și la un spital privat. Întrucât rezultatele RMN sunt indispensabile, el le
solicită pacienților să meargă și să își facă un RMN, însă nu la spitalul privat cu care
colaborează, ci la un altul, unde prețul este cu circa 20% mai mare. Medicul procedează în
acest fel pentru a nu fi acuzat de conflict de interese. Este corect din punct de vedere
moral?
CODUL DE DEONTOLOGIE MEDICALĂ din 30 martie 2012
al Colegiului Medicilor din România
EMITENT: COLEGIUL MEDICILOR DIN ROMÂNIA
PUBLICAT ÎN: MONITORUL OFICIAL nr. 298 din 7 mai 2012
CAP. I
Principiile fundamentale ale exercitării profesiei de medic
ART. 1
Scopul şi rolul profesiei medicale
Întreaga activitate profesională a medicului este dedicată exclusiv
apărării vieţii, sănătăţii şi integrităţii fizice şi psihice a fiinţei
umane.
ART. 2
Nediscriminarea
Actul profesional şi întreaga activitate a medicului se va
exercita, respectiv desfăşura, fără niciun fel de discriminare inclusiv
în ceea ce priveşte starea de sănătate sau şansele de vindecare ale
pacientului.
ART. 3
Respectul demnităţii fiinţei umane
În toate situaţiile actul profesional, în oricare formă sau
modalitate s-ar desfăşura, se va face cu respectarea strictă a
demnităţii umane ca valoare fundamentală a corpului profesional.
ART. 4
Primordialitatea interesului şi a binelui fiinţei umane
În toate deciziile cu caracter medical, medicul va trebui să se
asigure că interesul şi binele fiinţei umane prevalează interesului
societăţii ori al ştiinţei.
ART. 5
Obligativitatea normelor profesionale şi a celor de conduită
Medicul trebuie să depună toate diligenţele şi să se asigure că
orice intervenţie cu caracter medical pe care o execută sau decizie
profesională pe care o ia respectă normele şi obligaţiile profesionale
şi regulile de conduită specifice cazului respectiv.
ART. 6
Independenţa profesională
Medicul este dator să stăruie şi să îşi apere independenţa
profesională, fiind interzisă orice determinare a actului medical ori a
deciziei profesionale de raţiuni de rentabilitate economică sau de
ordin administrativ.
ART. 7
Caracterul relaţiei medic-pacient
Relaţia medicului cu pacientul va fi una exclusiv profesională şi
se va clădi pe respectul acestuia faţă de demnitatea umană, pe
înţelegere şi compasiune faţă de suferinţă.
1
ART. 8
Obligaţia diligenţei de mijloace
Medicul îşi va dedica întreaga ştiinţă şi pricepere interesului
pacientului său şi va depune toată diligenţa pentru a se asigura că
decizia luată este corectă, iar pacientul beneficiază de maximum de
garanţii în raport de condiţiile concrete, astfel încât starea sa de
sănătate să nu aibă de suferit.
ART. 9
Principiul specializării profesionale
Cu excepţia unor cazuri de urgenţă vitală, medicul acţionează
potrivit specialităţii, competenţelor şi practicii pe care le are.
ART. 10
Respectul faţă de confraţi
De-a lungul întregii sale activităţi, medicul îşi va respecta
confraţii, ferindu-se şi abţinându-se să-i denigreze ori să aducă
critici cu privire la activitatea profesională a acestora.
CAP. II
Consimţământul
ART. 11
Acordarea şi retragerea consimţământului
(1) Nicio intervenţie în domeniul sănătăţii nu se poate efectua
decât după ce persoana vizată şi-a dat consimţământul liber şi în
cunoştinţă de cauză.
(2) În aceleaşi condiţii, consimţământul se poate retrage în orice
moment de persoana vizată.
(3) Dispoziţiile privind retragerea consimţământului sunt valabile
şi în ceea ce priveşte consimţământul exprimat, în condiţiile legii, de
altă persoană sau instituţie decât persoana respectivă.
ART. 12
Consimţământul în cazul minorilor
(1) Atunci când, conform legii, un minor nu are capacitatea de a
consimţi la o intervenţie, aceasta nu se poate efectua fără acordul
reprezentantului său, autorizarea unei autorităţi sau a unei alte
persoane ori instanţe desemnate prin lege.
(2) Medicul, în funcţie de vârsta şi gradul de maturitate a
minorului şi numai strict în interesul acestuia, poate lua în
considerare şi părerea minorului.
ART. 13
Consimţământul persoanelor fără capacitatea de a consimţi
Atunci când, conform legii, un major nu are, din cauza unui
handicap mintal, a unei boli sau dintr-un motiv similar, capacitatea de
a consimţi la o intervenţie, aceasta nu se poate efectua fără acordul
reprezentantului său ori fără autorizarea unei autorităţi sau a unei
persoane ori instanţe desemnate prin lege.
ART. 14
Informarea prealabilă şi adecvată a persoanei
(1) Medicul va solicita şi va primi consimţământul numai după ce,
în prealabil, persoana respectivă sau cea îndreptăţită să îşi dea
acordul cu privire la intervenţia medicală a primit informaţii adecvate
2
în privinţa scopului şi naturii intervenţiei, precum şi în privinţa
consecinţelor şi a riscurilor previzibile şi în general acceptate de
societatea medicală.
(2) Pe cât posibil, medicul va urmări ca informarea să fie adecvată
şi raportată persoana care urmează să îşi manifeste consimţământul.
ART. 15
Lipsa consimţământului în situaţii de urgenţă
Atunci când, din cauza unei situaţii de urgenţă, nu se poate obţine
consimţământul adecvat, se va putea proceda imediat la orice
intervenţie indispensabilă din punct de vedere medical în folosul
sănătăţii persoanei vizate.
ART. 16
Consimţământul implicit
În interesul pacientului sunt valabile şi vor fi luate în
considerare autorizările şi dorinţele exprimate anterior cu privire la
o intervenţie medicală de către un pacient care, în momentul noii
intervenţii, nu este într-o stare care să îi permită să îşi exprime
voinţa sau dacă prin natura sa actul medical are o succesiune şi o
repetabilitate specifică.
CAP. III
Secretul profesional şi accesul la datele referitoare la starea de
sănătate
ART. 17
Secretul profesional
Medicul va păstra secretul profesional şi va acţiona în acord cu
dreptul legal al fiecărei persoane la respectul vieţii sale private din
punctul de vedere al informaţiilor referitoare la sănătatea sa.
ART. 18
Întinderea obligaţiei de păstrare a secretului profesional
(1) Obligaţia medicului de a păstra secretul profesional este
opozabilă inclusiv faţă de membrii familiei persoanei respective.
(2) Obligaţia medicului să păstreze secretul profesional persistă
şi după ce persoana respectivă a încetat să îi fie pacient sau a
decedat.
ART. 19
Transmiterea datelor referitoare la sănătatea persoanei
Medicul, la solicitarea persoanei în cauză, o va informa pe aceasta
sau pe persoana desemnată de aceasta cu privire la orice informaţie pe
care o deţine referitoare la starea de sănătate a persoanei în cauză.
ART. 20
Derogări de la regula păstrării secretului profesional
Derogările de la dreptul fiecărei persoane la respectul vieţii sale
private din punctul de vedere al informaţiilor referitoare la sănătate
sunt numai cele prevăzute în mod expres de lege.
3
CAP. IV
Reguli generale de comportament în activitatea medicală
ART. 21
Comportamentul profesional şi etic
(1) Medicul trebuie să fie un model de comportament profesional şi
etic, fiind în permanenţă preocupat de creşterea nivelului său
profesional şi moral, a autorităţii şi prestigiului profesiunii
medicale.
(2) Comportamentul profesional implică, fără a se limita la,
preocuparea constantă şi permanentă a medicului pentru aflarea, pe
orice cale, inclusiv prin intermediul formelor de educaţie medicală
continuă, a celor mai noi descoperiri, procedee şi tehnici medicale
asimilate şi agreate de comunitatea medicală.
ART. 22
Fapte şi acte nedeontologice
Sunt contrare principiilor fundamentale ale exercitării profesiei
de medic, în special, următoarele acte:
a) practicarea eutanasiei şi eugeniei;
b) cu excepţia situaţiilor prevăzute de lege sau de normele
profesiei, refuzul acordării serviciilor medicale;
c) abandonarea unui pacient fără asigurarea că acesta a fost
preluat de o altă unitate medicală sau de un alt medic ori că
beneficiază de condiţii adecvate situaţiei în care se află şi stării
sale de sănătate;
d) folosirea unor metode de diagnostic sau tratament nefundamentate
ştiinţific sau neacceptate de comunitatea medicală, cu risc pentru
pacient;
e) cu excepţia urgenţelor vitale, exercitarea profesiei medicale în
condiţii care ar putea compromite actul profesional sau ar putea afecta
calitatea actului medical;
f) emiterea unui document medical de complezenţă sau pentru
obţinerea unui folos nelegal sau imoral;
g) emiterea unui document medical pentru care nu există competenţă
profesională;
h) atragerea clientelei profitând de funcţia ocupată sau prin
intermediul unor promisiuni oneroase şi neconforme cu normele
publicităţii activităţilor medicale;
i) folosirea, invocarea sau lăsarea impresiei deţinerii unor
titluri profesionale, specialităţi ori competenţe profesionale
neconforme cu realitatea;
j) încălcarea principiilor fundamentale ale exercitării profesiei
de medic.
ART. 23
Atingeri ale independenţei profesionale
Constituie o atingere gravă adusă caracterului independent al
profesiei medicale următoarele acte:
a) cu excepţia situaţiilor prevăzute de lege şi cu anunţarea
prealabilă a organelor profesiei, asocierea sau colaborarea, sub orice
formă şi orice modalitate, directă ori indirectă, dintre un medic şi o
persoană care produce sau distribuie medicamente;
4
b) reclama, în orice mod, la medicamente, aparatură medicală sau
alte produse de uz medical;
c) implicarea, direct sau indirect, în distribuţia de medicamente,
dispozitive medicale, aparatură medicală sau de alte produse de uz
medical;
d) încălcarea principiului transparenţei în relaţia cu producătorii
şi distribuitorii de medicamente şi produse medicale;
e) primirea unor donaţii sub formă de cadouri în bani sau în natură
ori alte avantaje, a căror valoare le face să îşi piardă caracterul
simbolic şi care influenţează actul medical, de la una dintre
entităţile prevăzute la lit. a)-c).
ART. 24
Caracterul nemediat al relaţiei medic-pacient
Cu excepţia unor situaţii obiectiv excepţionale şi imposibil de
înlăturat, orice decizie medicală se va baza în primul rând pe
examinarea personală şi nemediată a pacientului de către medicul
respectiv.
ART. 25
Limitele angajamentului profesional
(1) În orice situaţie, angajamentul profesional al medicului nu
poate depăşi competenţa profesională, capacitatea tehnică şi de dotare
a cabinetului sau a unităţii sanitare ori baza materială afectată,
inclusiv prin convenţii sau colaborări ferme cu alte unităţi sanitare.
(2) Dacă medicul nu are suficiente cunoştinţe ori experienţa
necesară pentru a asigura o asistenţă medicală corespunzătoare, acesta
va solicita un consult adecvat situaţiei sau va îndruma bolnavul către
un astfel de consult la o altă unitate medicală. Aceleaşi dispoziţii se
vor aplica şi în cazul în care dotarea tehnică şi materială a unităţii
în care are loc consultul sau intervenţia medicală nu este adecvată
consultului, stabilirii diagnosticului sau intervenţiei medicale.
ART. 26
Diligenţa de claritate
Medicul care a răspuns unei solicitări cu caracter medical se va
asigura că persoana respectivă a înţeles pe deplin prescripţia,
recomandarea sau orice altă cerinţă a medicului, precum şi cu privire
la faptul că pacientul este, după caz, preluat de o altă unitate
medicală ori în supravegherea altui specialist în domeniu.
ART. 27
Colaborarea cu alţi specialişti
În situaţia în care pacientul a fost preluat sau îndrumat către un
alt specialist, medicul va colabora cu acesta din urmă, punându-i la
dispoziţie orice fel de date sau informaţii cu caracter medical
referitoare la persoana în cauză şi informândul cu privire la orice
altă chestiune legată de starea de sănătate a acesteia.
ART. 28
Consultul în echipă
În situaţia în care este necesar, medicul, cu consimţământul
pacientului sau, după caz, al persoanei respectiv instituţiei
abilitate, va solicita părerea unuia sau mai multor medici, cu care se
poate consulta, pentru luarea celor mai adecvate măsuri în interesul
pacientului.
5
ART. 29
Luarea deciziei şi comunicarea ei
(1) În cazul unui consult organizat de către medicul curant în
condiţiile art. 27, luarea şi comunicarea deciziei finale aparţine
medicului care l-a organizat.
(2) Dacă opinia majorităţii medicilor participanţi la un consult
organizat în condiţiile art. 27 diferă de a medicului care a organizat
consultul, pacientul ori, după caz, instituţia sau persoana abilitată
vor fi informaţi.
ART. 30
Dreptul la o a doua opinie medicală
În toate situaţiile medicul va respecta dreptul pacientului de a
obţine o a doua opinie medicală.
ART. 31
Actul medical de la distanţă
Investigaţia ori intervenţia medicală la distanţă, în oricare
dintre formele şi modalităţile existente, este permisă numai în
situaţia în care pacientul este asistat nemijlocit de către medicul
său, iar scopul investigaţiei şi procedurilor la care este supus
pacientul este acela de a ajuta medicul să determine diagnosticul, să
stabilească tratamentul sau să întreprindă orice altă măsură medicală
necesară finalizării actului medical sau intervenţiei medicale în cazul
operaţilor. Excepţie fac situaţiile de urgenţă.
ART. 32
Finalizarea obligaţiei asumate
(1) Medicul se va asigura că pacientul a înţeles natura şi
întinderea relaţiei medic-pacient, că are o aşteptare corectă cu
privire la rezultatele actului medical şi la serviciile medicale pe
care acesta urmează să le primească.
(2) Odată încheiată înţelegerea medic-pacient, medicul este ţinut
să ducă la îndeplinire toate obligaţiile asumate, aşa cum rezultă ele
din înţelegerea părţilor sau din obiceiurile şi cutumele profesiei
medicale.
ART. 33
Refuzul acordării serviciilor medicale
(1) Refuzul acordării asistenţei medicale poate avea loc strict în
condiţiile legii sau dacă prin solicitarea formulată persoana în cauză
îi cere medicului acte de natură a-i ştirbi independenţa profesională,
a-i afecta imaginea sau valorile morale ori solicitarea nu este
conformă cu principiile fundamentale ale exercitării profesiei de
medic, cu scopul şi rolul social al profesiei medicale.
(2) În toate cazurile, medicul îi va explica persoanei respective
motivele care au stat la baza refuzului său, se va asigura că prin
refuzul acordării serviciilor medicale viaţa sau sănătatea persoanei în
cauză nu sunt puse în pericol şi, în măsura în care refuzul este bazat
pe încălcarea convingerilor sale morale, va îndruma persoana în cauză
spre un alt coleg sau o altă unitate medicală.
6
CAP. V
Activităţile conexe actului medical
ART. 34
Legalitatea şi realitatea conţinutului documentelor medicale
Medicul va elibera persoanelor îndreptăţite numai documentele
permise de lege şi care atestă realitatea medicală aşa cum rezultă
aceasta din datele şi informaţiile pe care medicul le deţine în mod
legal ori aşa cum a rezultat ea în urma exercitării profesiei cu
privire la persoana respectivă.
ART. 35
Conformitatea documentului medical cu specialitatea medicală
(1) Documente medicale referitoare la starea de sănătate a
pacientului, întocmite de medic în urma exercitării personale a
profesiei, vor fi în limita specialităţii şi competenţelor profesionale
ale medicului respectiv.
(2) Orice activitate medicală se va consemna în documente adecvate
înregistrării activităţii respective.
ART. 36
Obligaţii referitoare la sănătatea publică
(1) Medicul are obligaţia profesională şi legală să se îngrijească
de respectarea regulilor de igienă şi de profilaxie. În acest scop, ori
de câte ori are ocazia şi este cazul, el va semnala persoanelor
respective responsabilitatea ce le revine acestora faţă de ei înşişi,
dar şi faţă de comunitate şi colectivitate.
(2) Medicul are obligaţia morală de a aduce la cunoştinţă organelor
competente orice situaţie de care află şi care reprezintă un pericol
pentru sănătatea publică.
ART. 37
Semnalarea erorilor profesionale
(1) Medicul care ia cunoştinţă despre fapte care, în opinia lui, ar
putea constitui erori profesionale va informa prin scrisoare medicală
medicul autor al faptei.
(2) Dacă eroarea nu este corectată ori apreciază că nu s-au
întreprins toate măsurile adecvate situaţiei, medicul va informa în mod
cât mai detaliat organismele corpului profesional şi, cu excepţia
situaţiilor prevăzute de lege, nu va face publice datele decât după ce
corpul profesional s-a pronunţat.
ART. 38
Primordialitatea concilierii
În orice situaţie litigioasă ori divergenţă profesională, înaintea
oricărui demers public este obligatorie procedura de conciliere din
cadrul corpului profesional.
ART. 39
Obligaţia de sprijin reciproc şi de loialitate
În toate situaţiile şi împrejurările legate de exercitarea
obligaţiilor profesionale, medicii îşi vor acorda sprijin reciproc şi
vor acţiona cu loialitate unul faţă de celălalt. Obligaţia de sprijin
şi loialitate subzistă şi faţă de corpul profesional şi organismele
sale.
7
CAP. VI
Cercetarea medicală
ART. 40
Principiul legalităţii şi eticii cercetării medicale
Orice activitate de cercetare medicală va fi efectuată cu
respectarea strictă a principiilor fundamentale ale exercitării
profesiei de medic, în respect deplin faţă de fiinţa şi de specia umană
şi cu respectarea strictă a condiţiilor prevăzute de lege şi normele
profesiei.
ART. 41
Cercetarea pe fiinţa umană
Cercetarea pe fiinţa umană are caracter de excepţie şi poate fi
făcută numai dacă, în mod cumulativ, sunt întrunite următoarele
condiţii:
a) nu există nicio metodă alternativă la cercetarea pe fiinţe
umane, de eficacitate comparabilă;
b) riscurile la care se poate expune persoana nu sunt
disproporţionate în comparaţie cu beneficiile potenţiale ale
cercetării;
c) proiectul de cercetare a fost aprobat de instanţa sau
autoritatea competentă după ce a făcut obiectul unei examinări
independente asupra pertinenţei sale ştiinţifice, inclusiv al unei
evaluări a importanţei obiectivului cercetării, precum şi al unei
examinări pluridisciplinare a acceptabilităţii sale pe plan etic;
d) persoana pe care se fac cercetări este informată asupra
drepturilor sale şi asupra garanţiilor prevăzute prin lege pentru
protecţia sa;
e) consimţământul a fost dat în mod expres, specific şi a fost
consemnat în scris. Acest consimţământ poate fi retras în orice moment,
în mod liber.
ART. 42
Cercetarea pe persoana fără capacitatea de a consimţi
Nu poate fi desfăşurată activitate de cercetare ştiinţifică
medicală pe o persoană care nu are capacitatea de a consimţi decât dacă
sunt întrunite cumulativ condiţiile următoare:
a) sunt îndeplinite condiţiile prevăzute la art. 41 lit. a)-d);
b) rezultatele cercetării au potenţialul de a produce beneficii
reale şi directe pentru sănătatea sa;
c) cercetarea nu se poate efectua cu o eficacitate comparabilă pe
subiecţi capabili să îşi dea consimţământul;
d) autorizarea necesară prevăzută la art. 41 lit. c) a fost dată
specific şi în scris;
e) persoana în cauză nu are obiecţii.
ART. 43
Diligenţa medicului
Medicul este dator să depună toată diligenţa şi să stăruie pentru
lămurirea tuturor împrejurărilor de fapt şi de drept atunci când este
implicat într-o activitate de cercetare medicală. În caz de nevoie,
pentru lămurirea deplină, medicul este dator să solicite sprijinul
organismelor profesiei medicale.
8
ART. 44
Intervenţia asupra persoanei
Nicio persoană nu va putea fi supusă experienţelor, testelor,
prelevărilor, tratamentelor sau altor intervenţii în scop de cercetare
decât în condiţiile expres şi limitativ prevăzute de lege.
ART. 45
Prelevarea şi transplantul de organe, ţesuturi şi celule de origine
umană de la donatori în viaţă
(1) Prelevarea şi transplantul de organe, ţesuturi şi celule de
origine umană de la donatori în viaţă se fac exclusiv în cazurile şi
condiţiile prevăzute de lege, cu acordul scris, liber, prealabil şi
expres al acestora şi numai după ce persoana respectivă a fost
informată, în prealabil, asupra riscurilor intervenţiei. În toate
cazurile, până în momentul prelevării, donatorul poate reveni asupra
consimţământului dat.
(2) În afara cazurilor expres prevăzute de lege, este interzisă
prelevarea de organe, ţesuturi şi celule de origine umană de la minori,
precum şi de la persoane aflate în viaţă, dar lipsite de discernământ
din cauza unui handicap mintal, unei tulburări mintale grave sau dintr-
un alt motiv similar.
ART. 46
Prelevarea de organe, ţesuturi şi celule umane de la persoane
decedate
Prelevarea de organe, ţesuturi şi celule umane, în scop terapeutic
sau ştiinţific, de la persoane decedate se efectuează numai în
condiţiile prevăzute de lege, cu acordul scris, exprimat în timpul
vieţii, al persoanei decedate sau, în lipsa acestuia, cu acordul scris,
liber, prealabil şi expres dat, în ordine, de soţul supravieţuitor, de
părinţi, de descendenţi ori, în sfârşit, de rudele în linie colaterală
până la gradul al patrulea inclusiv.
ART. 47
Limitări ale cercetării medicale
Sunt contrare scopului şi rolului profesiei de medic următoarele
activităţi în domeniul cercetării medicale:
a) orice intervenţie medicală asupra caracterelor genetice prin
care se urmăreşte modificarea descendenţei unei persoane. Excepţie fac
situaţiile care privesc prevenirea şi tratamentul unor maladii
genetice, situaţie în care se vor obţine toate autorizările adecvate;
b) orice intervenţie prin care se urmăreşte crearea unei fiinţe
umane genetic identică cu altă fiinţă umană vie sau moartă;
c) crearea de embrioni umani în scopuri de cercetare;
d) orice intervenţie de natură a determina sexul viitorului copil.
Excepţie fac situaţiile în care în mod obiectiv este necesară
determinarea sexului în scopul evitării unei boli ereditare grave
legate de sexul viitorului copil;
e) examinarea caracteristicilor genetice ale unei persoane în alt
scop decât medical şi strict în condiţiile şi procedurile legale;
f) orice intervenţie prin care s-ar urmări sau s-ar determina
selecţia persoanelor ori s-ar aduce atingere speciei umane;
g) participarea sau implicarea într-o activitate de identificare a
unei persoane pe baza amprentelor sale genetice altfel decât în cadrul
9
unei proceduri judiciare penale ori civile sau în scopuri strict
medicale ori de cercetare ştiinţifică, ambele efectuate strict în
condiţiile legii;
h) participarea la orice fel de acte care au ca obiect conferirea
unei valori patrimoniale corpului uman, elementelor sau produselor
sale, cu excepţia cazurilor expres prevăzute de lege.
CAP. VII
Publicitatea activităţilor medicale
ART. 48
Scopul publicităţii
(1) Publicitatea formelor de exercitare a profesiei este destinată
să asigure publicului informaţii cu privire la activitatea desfăşurată
de acestea.
(2) Publicitatea trebuie să fie veridică, neînşelătoare, să
respecte secretul profesional şi să fie realizată cu demnitate şi
prudenţă.
(3) Indiferent de mijlocul de publicitate utilizat, toate
menţiunile laudative sau comparative şi toate indicaţiile referitoare
la identitatea pacienţilor sunt interzise.
(4) Mijloacele de publicitate a formelor de exercitare a profesiei
nu pot fi folosite ca reclamă în scopul dobândirii de clientelă.
ART. 49
Mijloacele de publicitate
(1) Formele de exercitare a profesiei de medic pot utiliza unul sau
mai multe mijloace de publicitate, respectiv:
a) plasarea unei firme;
b) anunţuri de publicitate, potrivit prezentului cod de deontologie
medicală;
c) anunţuri şi menţiuni în anuare şi cărţi de telefon;
d) invitaţii, broşuri şi anunţuri de participare la conferinţe,
colocvii etc., profesionale şi de specialitate;
e) corespondenţă profesională şi cărţi de vizită profesionale;
f) adresă de internet.
(2) Nu este permisă utilizarea următoarelor mijloace de
publicitate:
a) oferirea serviciilor prin prezentare proprie sau prin
intermediar la domiciliul ori reşedinţa unei persoane sau într-un loc
public;
b) propunerea personalizată de prestări de servicii efectuată de o
formă de exercitare a profesiei, fără ca aceasta să fi fost în
prealabil solicitată în acest sens, indiferent dacă aceasta este făcută
sau nu în scopul racolării de pacienţi;
c) acordarea de consultaţii medicale realizate pe orice suport
material, precum şi prin orice alt mijloc de comunicare în masă,
inclusiv prin emisiuni radiofonice sau televizate, cu excepţia acelora
avizate de Colegiul Medicilor din România sau de alte organisme
acreditate de acesta în acest scop.
(3) În cadrul apariţiilor în mediile de informare, medicul va putea
prezenta procedee de diagnostic şi tratament, tehnici medicale
specifice ori alte procedee şi mijloace de investigare, dar nu va putea
10
folosi acest prilej pentru a-şi face reclamă pentru sine sau pentru
orice altă firmă implicată în producţia de medicamente ori dispozitive
medicale.
ART. 50
Firma
(1) Firma trebuie să aibă dimensiunile maxime de 40 x 80 cm şi va
fi amplasată la intrarea imobilului şi/sau a spaţiului ocupat în care
forma de exercitare a profesiei îşi are sediul profesional principal
sau secundar ori birou de lucru.
(2) Firma cuprinde următoarele menţiuni:
a) Colegiul Medicilor din România;
b) structura teritorială a Colegiului Medicilor din România;
c) denumirea formei de exercitare a profesiei;
d) menţiuni privind identificarea sediului (etaj, apartament);
e) menţiuni privind titlurile profesionale, academice, ştiinţifice,
specialităţile şi competenţele medicale;
f) menţiuni privind sediul principal şi sediul secundar.
ART. 51
Publicitatea prin mijloacele media
(1) Formele de exercitare a profesiei pot publica anunţuri în mica
sau în marea publicitate.
(2) Anunţurile publicate în anuarele profesionale privesc
activitatea formelor de exercitare a profesiei, numele şi principalele
specialităţi şi competenţe în care medicii îşi desfăşoară activitatea,
precum şi programul de activitate.
ART. 52
Corespondenţa
(1) Corespondenţa formei de exercitare a profesiei poate cuprinde:
a) numărul de telefon, fax, adresa de internet şi adresa
electronică (e-mail);
b) indicarea sediului principal şi, după caz, a sediului secundar
şi/sau a altui loc de muncă;
c) specialităţile şi competenţele medicale;
d) titlurile academice, ştiinţifice sau profesionale;
e) sigla formei respective de exercitare a profesiei.
(2) Cărţile de vizită profesionale ale medicului care îşi
desfăşoară activitatea în cadrul formei respective de exercitare a
profesiei pot cuprinde menţiunile permise corespondenţei, precum şi
calitatea medicului în forma de exercitare a profesiei.
ART. 53
Pagina web
(1) Medicii, precum şi formele de exercitare a profesiei pot avea
un website care poate cuprinde menţiuni referitoare la activitatea
desfăşurată, precum şi pe cele permise corespondenţei ori publicităţii.
(2) Conţinutul şi modul de prezentare a adresei de internet trebuie
să respecte demnitatea şi onoarea profesiei, precum şi secretul
profesional.
(3) Pagina web nu poate cuprinde nicio intercalare cu caracter de
reclamă sau menţiune publicitară pentru un produs sau serviciu diferit
de activităţile pe care are dreptul să le furnizeze medicul sau
respectiva formă de exercitare a profesiei.
11
(4) Pagina web nu poate conţine legături către alte adrese al căror
conţinut ar fi contrar principiilor esenţiale ale profesiei de medic.
(5) Pentru realizarea cerinţelor menţionate la alin. (4), medicul
sau forma de exercitare a profesiei deţinătoare a paginii web trebuie
să asigure în mod regulat vizitarea şi evaluarea paginilor proprii şi a
paginilor la care este permis accesul pe baza legăturilor realizate
prin intermediul adresei proprii şi trebuie să dispună fără întârziere
eliminarea lor în cazul în care conţinutul şi forma acestora sunt
contrare principiilor esenţiale privind exercitarea profesiei de medic.
CAP. VIII
Judecarea cauzelor deontologice
ART. 54
Celeritatea
(1) Cercetarea şi analiza oricărei sesizări privind existenţa unei
posibile încălcări a dispoziţiilor prezentului cod de deontologie
medicală se fac cu celeritate de către persoanele desemnate cu
cercetarea faptei ori de către cei cărora le-au fost solicitate date în
legătură cu soluţionarea sesizării, fiind obligate să acţioneze cu
maximă diligenţă, netergiversând sau prelungind realizarea
atribuţiilor, respectiv comunicarea datelor solicitate.
(2) În adresa de solicitare a unor date şi informaţii necesare
soluţionării cauzei disciplinare se va indica data până la care urmează
să se facă comunicarea datelor sau informaţiilor solicitate.
ART. 55
Prezumţia de nevinovăţie
(1) Cercetarea şi analiza oricărei sesizări se vor face având în
vedere şi respectând prezumţia de nevinovăţie a medicului.
(2) Persoanele desemnate cu cercetarea sesizării ori membrii
comisiei de disciplină vor acţiona cu tact şi moderaţie, fără a se
antepronunţa sau a emite opinii personale în niciun mod şi în niciun
sens pe timpul soluţionării sesizării.
ART. 56
Imparţialitatea
(1) Persoana desemnată cu cercetarea faptei reclamate ori membrii
comisiei de disciplină care are/au vreun interes personal în cauză, în
orice mod, ori are/au legături de rudenie cu medicul care face obiectul
cercetării sau cu persoana care a făcut reclamaţia îl va/vor informa pe
preşedintele comisiei de disciplină, care va decide, după caz,
menţinerea sau înlocuirea persoanei în cauză.
(2) Dispoziţiile alin. (1) se aplică şi în situaţia existenţei unor
situaţii conflictuale.
(3) Nicio persoană implicată în cercetarea sau soluţionarea cauzei
disciplinare nu va putea face declaraţii publice cu privire la cauza
respectivă până la soluţionarea ei definitivă.
ART. 57
Contradictorialitatea scrisă
(1) Comisia de disciplină va stărui pentru obţinerea în scris a
poziţiei fiecărei părţi implicate în cauza disciplinară.
(2) Contradictorialitatea orală directă se va desfăşura doar în
condiţiile în care pentru soluţionarea cauzei este strict necesară,
12
neputându-se soluţiona cauza altfel. În acest caz, preşedintele
şedinţei va acţiona cu tact şi înţelegere, fiind interzise adresările
directe între persoanele implicate sau emiterea de către membrii
comisiei de disciplină a unor aprecieri ori opinii în legătură cu cauza
respectivă.
ART. 58
Expertiza
(1) În funcţie de cauza supusă cercetării disciplinare, comisia de
disciplină poate solicita o expertiză de specialitate de la medici
specialişti cu reputaţie în domeniu.
(2) Dispoziţiile art. 55 se aplică şi în ceea ce priveşte experţii.
ART. 59
Desfăşurarea audierilor
(1) În cauza supusă soluţionării, membrii comisiei de disciplină se
vor adresa persoanelor audiate exclusiv prin intermediul preşedintelui
comisiei sau solicitându-i acestuia permisiunea şi exclusiv pentru a-i
pune persoanei în cauză întrebări utile şi relevante soluţionării
cauzei.
(2) Pe timpul audierii este interzisă emiterea de către membrii
comisiei de disciplină a unor opinii personale sau aprecieri de orice
natură. În caz de nevoie, preşedintele comisiei poate interveni şi
restabili cadrul decent al audierilor, inclusiv prin suspendarea
şedinţei comisiei.
CAP. IX
Dispoziţii finale
ART. 60
Aplicarea codului de deontologie medicală în timp
Cu excepţia situaţiilor mai favorabile, faptele săvârşite până la
intrarea în vigoare a prezentului cod de deontologie medicală vor fi
supuse prevederilor vechiului cod.
ART. 61
Data intrării în vigoare
Prezentul cod de deontologie medicală intră în vigoare în termen de
30 de zile de la data publicării lui în Monitorul Oficial al României,
Partea I.
___________
13
Chapter 1 / Background 17
A parallel development over the past two decades is the growing depen-
dence on drug and device companies to fund CME activities, whether
through MECCs or academic centers or medical societies. Commercial sup-
port for CME has more than doubled in the last decade. For example, as
of 2003, funding for 70% of continuing education for physicians came from
drug companies.49 Such support has increasingly facilitated the provision
of CME to physicians by medical specialty societies. Under the voluntary
codes of conduct and OIG Guidelines (to be discussed in detail later in
this book), the provision of unrestricted educational grants to host organi-
zations is permissible. However, because such grants may possibly serve a
marketing purpose in some instances, they have come under scrutiny by
Congress.50
49
John Abramson, MD, Overdosed America: The Broken Promise of American Medicine
(New York: Harper Collins, 2005), pp. 118–9.
50
Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, January 11, 2006, Grassley, Baucus
Seek More Details of Drug Company Grant Money to Promote Particular Medicines.
51
In the study by Campbell et al. (2007), A National Survey of Physician–Industry Rela-
tionships, only 3% of respondents reported receiving fees for enrolling subjects in industry-
sponsored drug trials. The survey was conducted between November 2003 and June 2004.
52
Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Drug Companies, p. 31, citing the DHHS, OIG,
Recruiting Human Subjects: Pressures in Industry-Sponsored Research, June 2000, OEI-01-97-
00195, 17.
53
Howard Brody, Hooked, p. 189.
54
Jerome Kassirer, On the Take, p. 9.
18 Managing Relationships with Industry
55
Jerry Avorn, Powerful Medicines, waxes eloquent on the beauty of the randomized,
controlled trial as a scientific technique. He points out (p. 54) that such tests are run double-
blind, that is, neither the patient nor the doctor knows whether the patient is receiving the
drug or a placebo. The doctor must be blind to the nature of the dose because the placebo
effect works on doctors as well as patients—especially if the doctor has a financial relationship
with the maker of the drug.
56
The federal anti-kickback statute was first enacted in the 1970s. Subsequently, in 1989,
Congress enacted the original Stark law (now called “Stark I”) to prohibit self-referrals for
clinical laboratory services. Final regulations to implement Stark I were published in 1995. In
the meantime, Congress passed a second bill (Stark II) in 1993 to prohibit referrals to a broad
array of “designated health services.” Regulations to implement Stark II have been issued in
three phases and include expanded exceptions to the prohibition. Currently, federal agencies
are considering further limits to the scope of permissible self-referrals under Stark. These are
discussed in detail in succeeding chapters.
Chapter 1 / Background 19
The important point is that doctors need to be made aware, as they are
with self-referrals, of the general ethical and legal boundaries related to
industry relationships even if the exact lines are still subject to debate and
redrawing.
Until recently, the medical community felt that ethical standards were
satisfactorily addressed by a physician if he or she disclosed any financial
interest they had with a drug or device company whose product was rel-
evant to a particular activity, such as a CME presentation, and that such
disclosure was sufficient to mitigate the potential bias of the physician.
Many reformers no longer view disclosure alone as an effective means to
prevent a conflict between a physician’s financial self-interest and his or
her professional responsibilities. In their view, financial interests involve the
problem of trying to serve two masters. The Hippocratic oath (“To keep the
good of the patient as the highest priority”) requires the doctor to place
the patient’s interests ahead of his or her own. Most physicians understand
that principle in the context of medical decision-making, but it applies to
financial matters as well. Doctors must also safeguard their patients’ inter-
ests and uphold the integrity of the medical profession over any financial
opportunities they may be offered. While there are instances in which both
interests can be harmonized, and pursuit of a legal financial opportunity will
not be in conflict with patient interests, physicians should carefully consider
whether such a scenario is realistically achievable or simply illusory.
20 Managing Relationships with Industry
Doctors must safeguard their patients’ interests and uphold the integrity
of the medical profession over any financial opportunities they may be
offered.
57
Many commentators believe that the independence of many professional organizations
has already been compromised. See, e.g., Kassirer, On the Take, ch. 6; Angell, The Truth
About the Drug Companies, pp. 144ff.; and Brody, Hooked, ch. 12.
Medical Tourism: Treatments,
Markets and Health System
Implications: A scoping
review
1University of York
2London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine
3Royal Holloway University of London
4Sheffield Teaching Hospitals Foundation NHS Trust
5University of Birmingham
The opinions expressed and arguments employed here are the responsibility
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the OECD.
1. The global growth in the flow of patients and health professionals as well as medical technology,
capital funding and regulatory regimes across national borders has given rise to new patterns of
consumption and production of healthcare services over recent decades. A significant new element of a
growing trade in healthcare has involved the movement of patients across borders in the pursuit of medical
treatment and health; a phenomenon commonly termed ‗medical tourism‘. Medical tourism occurs when
consumers elect to travel across international borders with the intention of receiving some form of medical
treatment. This treatment may span the full range of medical services, but most commonly includes dental
care, cosmetic surgery, elective surgery, and fertility treatment. There has been a shift towards patients
from richer, more developed nations travelling to less developed countries to access health services, largely
driven by the low-cost treatments available in the latter and helped by cheap flights and internet sources of
information.
2. Despite high-profile media interest and coverage, there is a lack of hard research evidence on the
role and impact of medical tourism for OECD countries. Whilst there is an increasing amount written on
the subject of medical tourism, such material is hardly ever evidence-based. Medical tourism introduces a
range of attendant risks and opportunities for patients. This review identifies the key emerging policy
issues relating to the rise of ‗medical tourism‘.
3. The review details what is currently known about the flow of medical tourists between countries
and discusses the interaction of the demand for, and supply of, medical tourism services. It highlights the
different organisations and groups involved in the industry, including the range of intermediaries and
ancillary services that have grown up to service the industry. Treatment processes (including consideration
of quality, safety and risk) and system-level implications for countries of origin and destination (financial
issues; equity; and the impact on providers and professionals of medical tourism) are highlighted. The
review examines harm, liability and redress in medical tourism services with a particular focus on the
legal, ethical and quality-of-care considerations.
4. In light of this, our broad review outlines key health policy considerations, and draws attention to
significant gaps in the research evidence. The central conclusion from this review is that there is a lack of
systematic data concerning health services trade, both overall and at a disaggregated level in terms of
individual modes of delivery, and of specific countries. This is both in terms of the trade itself, as well as
its implications. Mechanisms are needed that help us track the balance of trade around medical tourism on
a regular basis. The evidence base is scant to enable us to assess who benefits and who loses out at the
level of system, programme, organisation and treatment.
2
RÉSUMÉ
2. Bien que le tourisme médical soit très médiatisé, rares sont les informations concrètes issues de la
recherche sur son rôle et son impact dans les pays de l‘OCDE. Même si l‘on écrit de plus en plus sur ce
thème, les travaux publiés se fondent rarement sur des données probantes. Le tourisme médical présente à
la fois des risques et des avantages pour les patients. La présente étude identifie les principaux enjeux liés à
l‘expansion du « tourisme médical ».
3. L‘étude fait le point des connaissances actuelles sur la circulation des touristes médicaux entre les
pays et examine les interactions de la demande et de l‘offre de services de tourisme médical. Elle présente
les divers groupes et organisations impliqués dans cette activité, y compris l‘ensemble des intermédiaires et
des services auxiliaires qui sont apparus parallèlement à son développement. L‘accent est mis sur les
modalités des traitements (qualité, sécurité et risques) et sur les conséquences systémiques du phénomène
pour les pays d‘origine et de destination (questions financières, équité et impact sur les prestataires et les
professionnels intervenant dans le tourisme médical). L‘étude envisage les services de tourisme médical
sous l‘angle des dommages, des responsabilités et des possibilités de recours en s‘intéressant
particulièrement aux aspects juridiques et éthiques ainsi qu‘à la qualité des soins.
4. Cette vaste étude présente donc d‘importantes considérations liées à la politique de la santé et
appelle l‘attention sur l‘existence de sérieuses lacunes dans les données disponibles. La principale
conclusion sur laquelle elle débouche est le manque de données systématiques, tant globales que
désagrégées sur le commerce des services de santé au niveau des différents modes de prestation et des
pays, et cela, à la fois sur le plan du commerce proprement dit et sur le plan de ses implications. Il est
nécessaire de mettre au point des mécanismes qui nous aident à suivre régulièrement l‘évolution des
échanges commerciaux liés au tourisme médical. Les données dont on dispose, qui sont insuffisantes, ne
permettent pas de déterminer qui est gagnant et qui est perdant au niveau des systèmes, des programmes,
de l‘organisation des soins et des traitements.
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................................2
RÉSUMÉ .........................................................................................................................................................3
BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................................6
Globalisation of the health care market .......................................................................................................6
Definitions of medical tourism and health tourism ......................................................................................7
Mobility of patients across international borders .........................................................................................8
Medical tourism or cross-border care?.........................................................................................................8
Globalisation and medical tourism ..............................................................................................................9
Structure of the report ................................................................................................................................10
SECTION ONE THE MEDICAL TOURISM MARKET ............................................................................11
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................11
Established and emerging medical tourism markets ..................................................................................13
Places of consumption and flows of medical tourists ................................................................................13
Demand-side drivers of mass-market medical tourism..............................................................................15
Decision-making ........................................................................................................................................16
Supply side: models of service delivery and funding ................................................................................17
SECTION TWO THE MEDICAL TOURISM INDUSTRY ........................................................................18
Medical tourism and the web .....................................................................................................................18
Quality of information ...............................................................................................................................19
Advertising and marketing.........................................................................................................................19
Brokers .......................................................................................................................................................20
Travel insurance .........................................................................................................................................21
Providers ....................................................................................................................................................21
National strategies......................................................................................................................................22
SECTION THREE TREATMENT PROCESSES ........................................................................................24
Quality, safety and risk ..............................................................................................................................24
Patient satisfaction .....................................................................................................................................24
Clinical outcomes ......................................................................................................................................25
Continuity of care ......................................................................................................................................26
Privacy and confidentiality ........................................................................................................................26
Infection and cross-border spread of antimicrobial resistance and dangerous pathogens .........................27
External Quality Assessment and accreditation .........................................................................................27
Accreditation ..............................................................................................................................................28
SECTION FOUR SYSTEM IMPLICATIONS: COUNTRY OF ORIGIN ..................................................30
Origin and destination ................................................................................................................................30
Financial impacts .......................................................................................................................................30
Exacerbation of a two-tier system..............................................................................................................30
Competitive pressure on local providers....................................................................................................32
4
SECTION FIVE SYSTEM IMPLICATIONS: DESTINATION COUNTRY..............................................33
Economic impacts ......................................................................................................................................33
Trickle down of best practice/technological transfer .................................................................................35
Internal brain drain and reverse brain drain ...............................................................................................35
Two-tier system .........................................................................................................................................36
SECTION SIX HARM, LIABILITY & REDRESS .....................................................................................37
Medico-legal issues (quality of care, redress, liability, litigation) .............................................................37
Issues for providers, ancillary interests and third-party funders ................................................................38
Ethical dimensions .....................................................................................................................................39
Nonmaleficence and beneficence ..............................................................................................................40
SECTION SEVEN CONCLUSIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ...............41
System issues .............................................................................................................................................41
Programme issues ......................................................................................................................................42
Organisation and clinical issues .................................................................................................................43
Summary ....................................................................................................................................................44
REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................................................45
Tables
Figures
5
BACKGROUND
5. The global growth in the flow of patients and health professionals as well as medical technology,
capital funding and regulatory regimes across national borders has given rise to new patterns of
consumption and production of healthcare services over recent decades.
6. The free movement of goods and services under the auspices of the World Trade Organization
and its General Agreement on Trade in Services (Smith, 2004, Smith et al,. 2009b) has accelerated the
liberalisation of the trade in health services, as have developments with regard to the use of regional and
bi-lateral trade agreements. As health care is predominantly a service industry, this has made health
services more tradable, global commodities. A significant new element of this trade has involved the
movement of patients across borders in the pursuit of medical treatment and health care, a phenomenon
commonly termed ‗medical tourism‘.
7. The consumption of health care in a foreign land is not a new phenomenon, and developments
must be situated within the historical context. Individuals have travelled abroad for health benefits since
ancient times, and during the 19th Century in Europe for example there was a fashion for the growing
middle-classes to travel to spa towns to ‗take the waters‘, which were believed to have health-enhancing
qualities. During the 20th Century, wealthy people from less developed areas of the world travelled to
developed nations to access better facilities and highly trained medics. However, the shifts that are
currently underway with regard to medical tourism are quantitatively and qualitatively different from
earlier forms of health-related travel. The key differences are a reversal of this flow from developed to less
developed nations, more regional movements, and the emergence of an ‗international market‘ for patients.
The key features of the new 21st Century style of medical tourism are summarized below:
The shift towards patients from richer, more developed nations travelling to less developed
countries to access health services, largely driven by the low-cost treatments and helped by cheap
flights and internet sources of information;
‗New‘ enabling infrastructure – affordable, accessible travel and readily available information
over the internet;
Industry development: both the private business sector and national governments in both
developed and developing nations have been instrumental in promoting medical tourism as a
potentially lucrative source of foreign revenue.
8. What are the implications of these changes in medical travel for OECD countries?
Fundamentally, such developments point towards a paradigm shift in the understanding and delivery of
health services. The market in medical tourists is set to grow, with potentially far-reaching impacts on
publicly-funded health care including the developing notion of patients as ‗consumers‘ of health care rather
than ‗citizens‘ with rights to health care services. There will of course also be a range of attendant risks and
6
opportunities for patients. Predictions for this emerging global market are difficult but the direction and
speed of its travel is becoming increasing clear. This report identifies the key emerging policy issues
relating to the rise of ‗medical tourism‘. In this introductory section we explore competing definitions and
concepts relating to medical tourism.
9. It is important to begin by defining what is meant by ‗medical tourism‘. For the purposes of this
report we define medical tourism as when consumers elect to travel across international borders with the
intention of receiving some form of medical treatment. This treatment may span the full range of medical
services, but most commonly includes dental care, cosmetic surgery, elective surgery, and fertility
treatment. Setting the boundary of what is health and counts as medical tourism for the purposes of trade
accounts is not straightforward. Within this range of treatments, not all would be included within health
trade. Cosmetic surgery for aesthetic rather than reconstructive reasons, for example, would be considered
outside the health boundary (OECD, 2010, pp.30-31).
10. Medical tourism is related to the broader notion of health tourism which, in some countries, has
longstanding historical antecedents of spa towns and coastal localities, and other therapeutic landscapes.
Some commentators have considered health and medical tourism as a combined phenomenon but with
different emphases. Carrera and Bridges (2006, p.447), for example, define health tourism as ―the
organised travel outside one‘s local environment for the maintenance, enhancement or restoration of an
individual‘s well-being in mind and body‖. This definition encompasses medical tourism which is
delimited to ―organised travel outside one‘s natural health care jurisdiction for the enhancement or
restoration of the individual‘s health through medical intervention‖.
11. As Figure 1 suggests, medical tourism is distinguished from health tourism by virtue of the
differences with regard to the types of intervention, setting and inputs.
7
Mobility of patients across international borders
12. Medical tourism can be understood as a subset of the wider notion of patient mobility which itself
may be sub-divided as follows:
13. Temporary visitors abroad: These include those individuals holidaying abroad who use health
services as a result of an accident or a sudden illness. Health services for tourists are funded variously
through the European Health Insurance Card (for EU citizens) for occasional or emergency treatment
within the EU, private insurance and out-of-pocket expenses. These would not be considered as ‗medical
tourists‘, more just ‗unfortunate tourists‘!
14. Long-term residents: There are increasing flows of EU citizens choosing to retire in countries
other than their country of origin, within the EU borders and indeed beyond (Rosenmöller et al., 2006), and
there are growing exchanges of working-age citizens within Europe. Such residents may receive health
services funded variously by the country of residence, the country of origin, private insurance, or through
private contributions. Again, these individuals would not be considered as ‗medical tourists‘.
15. Common borders: countries that share common borders may collaborate in providing cross-
national public funding for health care services from providers in other countries (Rosenmöller et al.,
2006).
16. Outsourced patients: are those patients opting to be sent abroad by health agencies using cross-
national purchasing agreements. Typically, such agreements are driven by long waiting lists and a lack of
available specialists and specialist equipment in the home country. These patients often travel relatively
short distances and contracted services (both public and private) are more likely to be subject to robust
safety audits and quality assurance (Lowson et al., 2002, Burge et al., 2004, Glinos et al., 2006, Muscat et
al., 2006). These individuals could be described as ‗collective‘ medical tourists, albeit they being state or
agency-sponsored rather than acting as individual consumers in the traditional sense.
17. Medical tourism more commonly refers to patients who are mobile through their own volition
and this type of patient mobility is the focus of this report. Such medical tourists do not make use of EU
rights (where the phenomenon is ordinarily known as ‗cross-border care‘) but choose to pay out-of pocket,
and therefore are better cast as consumers rather than as individuals exercising their European citizenship
rights (Lunt and Carrera, 2010).
18. Within the European context a medical tourist may be categorised in one of two ways. First, there
are those citizens who use their European citizenship rights to access medical care in EU Member States
and their national purchaser reimburses the costs of their treatment abroad. This is allowed because
European citizens, under specific circumstances, have rights to receive medical care in other EU countries.
Such rights have been established by successive rulings of the European Court of Justice on private cases
regarding consumption of health care in another EU Member State and reimbursement by the (national)
purchasing body in the home country (Bertinato et al., 2005).
19. There is ongoing debate about the most appropriate terminology to describe the movement of
individuals overseas for treatment. A range of nomenclature is used in the health services literature,
including international medical travel (Huat, 2006a, Fedorov et al., 2009, Cormany and Baloglu, 2010,
Crozier and Baylis, 2010), medical outsourcing (Jones and Keith, 2006), medical refugees (Milstein and
Smith, 2006), and even biotech pilgrims (Song, 2010). Although for the purposes of this report we adopt
the term medical tourism, some commentators object to the use of this term (Whittaker, 2008, Glinos et al.,
2010, Kangas, 2010).
8
―the industry-driven term ‗medical tourism‘ insinuates leisurely travelling and does not capture
the seriousness of most patient mobility‖ (Glinos et al., 2011, p. 1146).
―medical tourism is a misnomer, as it carries connotations of pleasure not always associated with
this travel…‖ (Whittaker, 2008, p.272).
―A term that suggests leisure and frivolity. The term promotes a market place model that
disregards the suffering that patients experience‖ (Kangas, 2010, p.350).
20. We believe that the concept of medical tourism does have analytical value. As a concept it
conveys both the willingness to travel and willingness to treat as core processes within the new global
market of health travel. It also captures the health sector element as well as the wider economic impact of
such travel. Such a focus facilitates an understanding of which individuals go where, why and for what,
and what the impact is for whom from this. Whilst we agree medical tourism may have little to do with
general tourism (cf Glinos et al., 2011), the term emphasises the commodification and commercialisation
of health travel. Medical tourism also highlights the role of the industry, issues of advertising, supplier-
induced demand and extends beyond the notion of ‗willingness to travel‘.
21. Health policies and health delivery have traditionally been bounded by the nation state or
between federal tiers of government. Within the UK, for example, the establishment of the National Health
Service in 1948 introduced primary and secondary health care services funded by public taxation and
delivered to the national population free at the point of use. In recent decades significant economic, social
and political changes have encouraged a more trans-national and international role for health policy
development. These national interconnections (political, economic, social and technical) include the
movement of people, products, capital and ideas and this has offered new opportunities and challenges for
health care delivery and regulation. A number of developments support this growth in medical travel:
Regulatory regimes (such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services and other World Trade
Organization agreements);
Industry development.
22. The medical tourist industry is dynamic and volatile and a range of factors including the
economic climate, domestic policy changes, political instability, travel restrictions, advertising practices,
geo-political shifts, and innovative and pioneering forms of treatment may all contribute towards shifts in
patterns of consumption and production of domestic and overseas health services. There are, for example,
important bilateral exchanges between OECD members (e.g. United States to Mexico; United States to
Korea; northern Europe to central and eastern Europe). Some OECD countries seek to leverage their own
strengths to become providers in the medical tourism market with all the attendant implications. There are
also flows of patients from OECD countries to Lower and Middle Income Countries (LMIC), in particular
India, Thailand, and Malaysia which will necessarily have potential repercussions for health systems of
OECD countries.
9
Structure of the report
23. The report is not a systematic and comprehensive overview of the literature. Rather, the attempt
is to identify policy issues at the systemic (regulation and finance), programmatic (system-level priorities),
organisation (management of services) and instrumental (clinical interface) levels (Frenk, 1994) (see
Section Seven ). The rest of this report is organised into seven sections:
Section One explores the market in medical tourists, and considers both established and emerging
medical tourism markets. We detail what is currently known about the flow of medical tourists
between countries and discuss the interaction of the demand for, and supply of, medical tourism
services.
Section Two provides an overview of the medical tourism industry, and describes the growth of a
range of supporting health information resources, including internet marketing. We also discuss
the different organisations and groups involved in the industry, including the range of
intermediaries and ancillary services that have grown up to service the industry. Alternative
provider models are discussed and we highlight a range of strategies that governments have used
to develop their own facilities for medical tourism.
Section Three focuses on treatment processes, including consideration of quality, safety and risk,
clinical outcomes, continuity of care and infection rates that are of crucial importance to
protecting the welfare of patients. We also discuss issues relating to the accreditation and
regulation of medical tourism services.
Sections Four and Five look at system-level implications for countries of origin and destination
for medical tourists. We examine the financial issues; equity; and the impact on providers and
professionals of medical tourism.
Section Six highlights issues that relate to harm, liability and redress in medical tourism services
with a particular focus on the legal, ethical and quality-of-care considerations.
Section Seven examines the future development of the medical tourism industry. We present a
conceptual framework for understanding medical tourism and discuss recent developments in
regulation, quality and safety policy.
10
SECTION ONE
THE MEDICAL TOURISM MARKET
Introduction
24. From marketing materials (both print and web-based sources), it is apparent that the range of
treatments available overseas for prospective medical tourists are wide, including:
Eye surgery
Collectively, not all of these treatments would be classed as acute and life-threatening and some are
clearly more marginal to mainstream health care. Some forms of plastic surgery would be excluded from
health spending (e.g. for solely cosmetic reasons); other forms of medical tourism (e.g. IVF) would be
counted within the remit of health trade (OECD, 2010).
25. A detailed online search derives a broad ‗menu‘ of available treatments and claims of cost
savings achieved by having treatment abroad compared to the UK private sector (see Table 1).
11
DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2011)3
Table 1: Medical tourism prices (in selected countries)
Heart bypass (CABG) 113 000 10 000 13 000 20 000 9 000 3 250 7 140 13 921
Heart Valve replacement 150 000 9 500 11 000 13 000 9 000 18 000 9 520
Hip replacement 47 000 9 000 12 000 11 000 10 000 17 300 6 120 7 500 12 000
Knee replacement 48 000 8 500 10 000 13 000 8 000 14 650 6 375 10 162
Rhinoplasty 4 500 2 000 2 500 4 375 2 083 3 200 1 535 1 700 2 858 3 500
Tummy Tuck 6 400 2 900 3 500 6 250 3 903 3 000 1 831 3 500 3 136 4 810
Breast reduction 5 200 2 500 3 750 8 000 3 343 3 000 1 668 3 146 3 490 5 075
Breast implants 6 000 2 200 2 600 8 000 3 308 2 500 1 248 5 243 3 871 4 350
Crown 385 180 243 400 250 300 246 322 330
Tooth whitening 289 100 100 400 350 174 350 500
Dental implants 1 188 1 100 1 429 1 500 2 636 950 953 650 1 600
12
Established and emerging medical tourism markets
26. Patterns of travel between source and destination countries are well-established. For example,
those accessing medical treatment in Hungary tend to be from Western Europe and some countries exploit
longstanding historical ties, for example between Malta and the UK or the UK and Cyprus (cf. Muscat,
2006). Other Western Europeans take advantage of the growing familiarity with countries as a result of the
opening of Eastern Europe and the former USSR (for example, between the UK and Poland). However,
more accurate data are required about patient flows between different countries and continents.
27. Whilst any global map of medical tourism destinations would include Asia (India, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand); South Africa; South and Central America (including Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba
and Mexico); the Middle East (particularly Dubai); and a range of European destinations (Western,
Scandinavian, Central and Southern Europe, Mediterranean), estimates rely on industry sources which may
be biased and inaccurate.
28. It would appear that geographical proximity is an important, but not a decisive, factor in shaping
individual decisions to travel to specific destinations for treatment (Exworthy and Peckham, 2006).
Whether this is a reflection of the ‗tourism‘ element, meaning that people are travelling with not just
medical treatment as the sole reason, but also factors related to the wider opportunities for tourism is not
clear. Travel distance is likely also related to cost.
29. The demand for services may also be volatile (MacReady, 2007, Gray and Poland, 2008) with
travel determined by both wider economic and external factors, as well as shifting consumer preferences
and exchange rates. Providers and national governments may seek to challenge existing suppliers, for
example Latin American fertility clinics (Smith et al., 2010). A number of governments are also promoting
their health facilities and emerging consumer markets are stimulated by brokers, websites and trade-fairs.
Exchange-rate fluctuations may also make countries more or less financially attractive, and restrictions on
travel and security concerns may prompt consumers to explore alternative markets. Moreover, an
unanswered question concerns the status of medical tourism as a luxury good or not. That is, do consumers
spend proportionately more on medical tourism treatments as their incomes rises, how use of services
varies with price (price elasticity) and does a worsening of wider economic conditions impact deleteriously
on the demand for medical tourism. It may even be that a declining economic climate has the reverse effect
because reduced public service provision at home prompts patients to look elsewhere to avoid waiting lists
and tighter eligibility criteria.
30. For some medical tourist destinations, attempts are being made to promote the cultural, heritage
and recreational opportunities. It is likely that for some treatments the vacation and convalescence
functions will be more marginal, for others it could be a significant component of consumer decision-
making. The reputation of places as highly customer-focused service providers is also a prevalent emphasis
in advertising (Turner, 2007). An emphasis on marketing services as high technology and high quality is
common, as well as a focus on clinicians that have overseas experience (training, employment,
registration) is also potentially important. Familiarity and cultural similarity is emphasised when services
are targeted at Diaspora populations, for example Korean health care services to those settled or second-
generation within the United States, Australia and New Zealand. Similarly, the colonial connection
between the UK and India appears to have encouraged a medical market between the two countries. While
Mexican migrants to the US return to Mexico for health services, this may be because they are uninsured,
have problems with accessing services in the US, or have particular preferences to return to Mexico
(Bergmark et al., 2008, Gill et al., 2008, Lee et al., 2010, Smith et al., 2011c).
13
31. Some destinations have marketed themselves as a healthcare city, or more widely as a
Biomedical City. Singapore, for example, from 2001 was promoted as a centre for biomedical and
biotechnological activities (Cyranoski, 2001). High-end medical tourism can be seen as part of this
development. Singapore is not alone in its pursuit of such recognition; the last ten years has also seen the
emergence of the Dubai Health Care City (DHCC). As Crone notes, perhaps unlike the Singaporean
Biopolis, the DHCC represents the product of an intentional programme that ―started from scratch‖ (Crone,
2008, p.119). Whereas the Singapore bio-city is a government supported networking of established and
emerging facilities and organisations, the DHCC represents a planned bio-city. The DHCC is an attempt to
attract the vast numbers of Middle Eastern medical tourists to stay within the Middle East rather than travel
to Asia. However, as Connell highlights, the key selling point of the DHCC is quality, rather than cost
(Connell, 2006). This is perhaps expected given the sheer scale of investment combined with its links with
Harvard Medical International. The DHCC is much more than a destination for medical tourists, hosting
clinics, accident and emergency sites, research units, and teaching sections (Crone, 2008).
32. Despite a number of countries offering relatively low-cost treatments, we currently know very
little about many of the key features of medical tourism. Indeed, there are no authoritative data on the
number and flow of medical tourists between nations and continents. While there is a general consensus
that the medical tourism industry has burgeoned over the past decade and that there is scope for even
further expansion, there remains disagreement as to the current size of the industry. Estimates of the
numbers of medical tourists generally lie on a continuum between statistics published by the Deloitte
management consultancy at one end of the spectrum and a more conservative estimate by McKinsey and
Company at the other. Figures that are regularly reproduced in the literature (Whittaker, 2010) draw on
data collected and projections made by Deloitte, which put the number of US citizens leaving the country
in search of treatment at 750,000 in 2007 (Keckley and Underwood, 2008). This number, Keckley insists,
would reach somewhere between 3 and 5 million by 2010 (Keckley and Underwood, 2008, Keckley and
Eselius, 2009). Given that US tourists are thought to represent roughly 10% of the global number of
medical tourists (Ehrbeck et al., 2008), this would suggest that total worldwide figures would lie
somewhere between 30 and 50 million medical tourists travelling for treatment each year. Even where
commentators avoid placing a figure on the number of medical tourists, the frequent citation of medical
tourism as a $60bn industry can be traced back to Deloitte‘s report (MacReady, 2007, Crone, 2008,
Keckley and Underwood, 2008).
33. The main objection to Deloitte‘s figures come from McKinsey and Co who suggest that, while
the potential for such large numbers exist, a more accurate worldwide figure would be between 60,000 and
85,000 medical tourists per year (Ehrbeck et al., 2008). In large part, this disparity may be due to different
definitions of medical tourism. For Ehrbeck, a medical tourist should only be included where they have
travelled for the purpose of elective surgery. This, he insists, excludes expatriates, those undergoing
emergency unplanned surgery, and outpatients. While Youngman agrees that some estimates are clearly
overstated, he rejects one of Ehrbeck‘s key principles, pointing out that although dental tourists are often
not inpatients, this nevertheless makes them no less a medical tourist (Youngman, 2009).
34. The numbers of medical tourists proffered by McKinsey still appear rather small, particularly
given the context of a US population of 360 million. While the often cited one million foreign visitors to
Thailand (Carabello, 2008, Crozier and Baylis, 2010) encompasses wellness tourists visiting spas, it also
includes a number of medical tourists who meet Ehrbeck‘s definition that far exceeds his estimate. It is
reported, for example, that the Bumrungrad hospital in Bangkok admitted close to 500,000 patients in 2003
(Turner, 2007, McClean, 2008). By 2005, the hospital admitted 93,000 Arab patients alone (MacReady,
2007). Given that even the most conservative estimates of inward medical tourism to India place the
number of tourists at 200,000 (Carabello, 2008, Crone, 2008, Youngman, 2009), alongside figures of
between 200,000 and 350,000 for Singapore (Huat, 2006b, Carabello, 2008, Youngman, 2009), 200,000
for Cuba (Crozier and Baylis, 2010), and between 50,000 and 100,000 for the UK (Youngman, 2009), it
14
would seem that McKinsey‘s numbers are unrealistically low. Youngman for his part stakes his claim at 5
million, based on the lowest estimates of official figures from providing countries (TreatmentAbroad,
2009, Youngman, 2009), though there is no way to assess the accuracy of this figure. In summary,
therefore we can narrow down the number of medical tourists worldwide as lying somewhere between
60,000 and 50 million! This huge gap is a clear pointer for the need to agree parameters and pilot robust
ways of collecting and analysing information on the number of medical tourists travelling for treatment.
Such numbers are important to quantify economic impact and also to assess potential risk to source health
systems. Clarification is required around the sources and surveys used to provide numbers, including the
role of national agencies and private facilities in providing numbers. Extrapolating from a country to a
more global perspective is difficult, as is ensuring ‗the count‘ is appropriate (do we count patients or
treatment episodes; day treatments or in-stay treatment; expatriates and those funded by their multinational
employers; only large and accredited providers?). That many of the flows are confidential to protect
privacy around treatments and choices makes the count further problematic. Such health trade is also not
seen as a priority for measurement by national stakeholders.
35. The patient profile of medical tourists is similarly opaque. Different drivers may exist for higher
and lower income patients groups travelling from North America and Western Europe. But we know
relatively little about socio-demographic profile, age, gender, existing health conditions and status in
attempting to map the composition of the medical tourism market. Medical tourists are likely to come
from certain social and population groups and future research should seek to identify this social patterning,
as it might increase inequality (cf Exworthy and Peckham, 2006).
36. While there is a disagreement over the total number of medical tourists, figures are relatively
consistent with regard to the costs of procedures. Table 1 shows that treatment outside the wealthier OECD
countries is much less expensive in South and Central America, Asia, and Africa. The potential savings
range from a 75% reduction in price compared with US inpatient prices, to a 90% reduction depending on
the type of procedure and the location. Ehrbeck et al (2008) note, however, that cost is not necessarily the
main driver, suggesting that availability and quality are the major factors for many medical tourists.
37. Drivers of medical tourism include globalisation – economic, social, cultural and technological.
Many domestic health systems are undergoing significant challenges and strain – tightened eligibility
criteria, waiting lists, and shifting priorities for health care may all impact on consumer decision making.
There is also the emergence of patient choice and forms of consumerism, including within countries that
traditionally have had public-funded services. Openness of information and development of diverse
providers competing on quality and price now cater for all demands.
38. Unlike other forms of patient mobility where decisions on behalf of the patient are made by an
expert clinician (the agency relationship), medical tourism involves individuals acting as a consumer and
making their own decisions regarding their health needs, how these can best be treated, and the most
appropriate provider. They are therefore especially prone to well-known problems related to information
asymmetry and provider-induced demand.
39. Glinos et al., (2006) identify five drivers behind the increases in demand for medical services
overseas: familiarity, availability, cost, quality and bioethical legislation (international travel for abortion
services, fertility treatment, and euthanasia services. In terms of familiarity, expatriates often have medical
care on their visits back to their ‗home‘ country, which would also show up as medical tourism, for
example, the large Indian Diaspora in the UK. Some treatments may not be available or may be subject to a
wait in the home country. This may include latest technology and techniques. Some treatments may not be
legal in the country of origin. The desire for privacy and the wish to combine traditional tourist attractions,
15
hotels, climate, food, cultural visits with medical procedures are also thought to be key contributing factors
to the growth in this market (see discussion in Connell, 2006, MacReady, 2007, Ramírez de Arellano,
2007).
40. The Flash Barometer survey (2007) – albeit focussed on the EU market for all forms of patient
mobility – lists the lack of availability of treatment at home; the better quality of treatment abroad; the
provision of services by specialists; faster treatment and the affordability of care as among the key drivers
that motivate citizens of EU member states to seek treatment outside of their home country (although this
includes individuals asserting their EU rights rather than simply paying out of their own pocket). There is,
however, little firm evidence on the relative importance of these different factors in influencing decisions
to seek treatment abroad. There remains a dearth of empirical research; for example, there is little that adds
to knowledge concerning the patient‘s decision to have domestic cosmetic treatments (Brown et al., 2007).
We know relatively little about particular treatments and source/destination countries. If proximity is an
important, but not a decisive, factor in shaping choices given peoples‘ ability and seeming willingness to
travel longer distances there is a need for a greater understanding of how trade-offs are made and how
these differ for different treatments and consumer groups (Exworthy and Peckham, 2006).
Decision-making
41. Important questions remain with regard to how consumers assimilate and synthesise the
information they retrieve from website searches, and how they take into account commercial interests and
bias when making decisions. Again there is no research evidence around this dimension of medical tourism
and this requires research investment, for example to know about patient understanding of risk. There is
some evidence relating to how breast augmentation patients use the internet, with one survey suggesting
that 68% of respondents utilized internet information, and of this subset of patients the information
influenced decision making around the choice of procedures (in 53% of cases), choice of surgeon (36% of
cases) and choice of hospital (25% of cases) (Losken et al., 2005). Elsewhere, Peterson et al., (2003)
suggest that consumers of medicine are aware of bias, commercialization and lack of regulation when they
explore health sites, but suggest that the context of what is being searched is important. They argue that
commercial considerations ―may have an impact on the motives for, and quality of, information‖. What is
unclear, for example, is whether potential consumers purposively seek information that cautions about
possible pitfalls and difficulties (perhaps through professional or regulatory sites), in addition to the more
aesthetic, clinical and cost attractions of medical tourism.
42. We need to know more about how individuals access, process and judge medical tourist
information they retrieve given such information may be confusing, overwhelming, and even
contradictory. An important distinction is likely to exist between how consumers actually conduct searches
and reach decisions from what they say they do. For instance, Bates et al., (2006) note that while
consumers may report that the credibility of the source is important in judging information quality,
observational studies would suggest this is rarely borne out in practice. Retrospective and prospective
studies are thus required. Marshall and Williams (2006) discuss the ways in which health information is
assessed by consumers and recommend improved public awareness of critical appraisal tools, developing
information literacy for health, and health information access points. Underpinning the search and
interpretation of sites is the fundamental issue of how trust and credibility of information are established
and maintained given there are limits of choice, the existence of uncertainty and the possibility of pain
incurred by treatments (Natalier and Willis, 2008). How information is used in supporting intended
cognitive, affective and behavioural shifts and how material is weighed alongside other forms of hard and
soft intelligence (including media reports, professional networks, and friends and family) requires
investigation.
16
43. A systematic review of 50 on-line websites from a UK consumer perspective examined the sites
using 10 key dimensions drawn from guidelines of the British Association for Plastic, Reconstructive and
Aesthetic Surgeons, looking for clear statements on the websites for each of these. Many of the sites
contained details on how long surgeons had been practicing (25 of the 38 provider sites). Qualifications
and affiliations were also frequently listed (25 of 38 provider sites), and the attachment of full CVs, copies
of certification on-line and publication lists were all commonplace. It was less common, however, to find
details of the number of procedures carried out – only 5 of the sites listed surgeon experience of each
procedure performed. For 10 of the provider websites there was a clear statement that pre-operative
consultative was available in the UK and Ireland. Typically, pre-operative consultation was conducted via
email exchange with a surgeon creating, at best, a virtual consulting room. Where UK/Ireland consultation
was available, it was not always conducted by the operating surgeon – in one case, for example, the pre-
operative assessment was carried out by a contracted nurse (Lunt and Carrera, 2011).
44. In terms of medical tourism delivery and funding, a number of private (and public) providers in
LMIC have targeted what they see as a lucrative medical tourism market. In part, the experience of many
UK and American private patient hospitals and hospital wings for wealthy patients has informed the
strategy of emergent medical tourism destinations with emphasis on quality and customer service. In
Thailand, provision for medical tourism developed to support the failing private sector where domestic
private patients were shifting to the publicly funded system.
45. As well as individual out-of-pocket payments for treatment, a potentially more lucrative source of
income would be the private and workplace insurance systems. To date there has been relatively limited
success by medical tourist providers in tapping these potential revenue streams. Examples of more
institutionalised arrangements do exist but are rare. In 2009, following its achieving international
accreditation, a hospital in Mexico arranged a deal with a US-based insurance group which enabled Blue
Cross and Blue Shield members to utilise that hospital‘s services. This arrangement is not just about
proximity but also reflects the close links with US Latino communities, especially on the West coast and in
the Southern states. Some places such as Juárez in Mexico are seeking to target the migrant population
(Bergmark et al., 2008, Cuddehe, 2009). Arguably, the industry is engaged in a process of legitimating and
marketing with an emphasis on promoting service quality and competitiveness and targeting
workplace/private/public health insurance schemes are part of this.
17
SECTION TWO
THE MEDICAL TOURISM INDUSTRY
46. Medical tourism is an emerging global industry, with a range of key stakeholders with
commercial interests including brokers, health care providers, insurance provision, website providers and
conference and media services. These commercial interests are summarised in Figure 2. This section
explores the role of a number of ancillary and supporting services for medical tourists.
Brokers
Insurance
Websites
Medical
Providers
Tourist
Financial
products
Travel,
Conference accomm., &
and media concièrge
47. A key driver in the medical tourism phenomenon is the technological platform provided by the
internet for consumers to access healthcare information and advertising from anywhere in the world.
Equally, the internet offers providers vital new avenues for marketing to reach into non-domestic markets.
Commercialisation is at the heart of the growth in medical tourism and in some part this is due to the
availability of web-based resources to provide consumers with information, advertisements and market
destinations, and to connect consumers with an array of healthcare providers and brokers. A review (Lunt
et al., 2010) suggests the following typology of websites:
media sites
18
consumer-driven sites
professional contributions (from sources such as professional associations and state regulatory
institutions are relatively rare).
48. Medical tourism sites satisfy a range of ends and needs. First and foremost, the scope of such
sites is to introduce and promote services to the consumer. The main services of the sites can be separated
into five main functions: as a gateway to medical and surgical information, connectivity to related health
services, the assessment and/or promotion of services, commerciality and opportunity for communication
(Lunt et al., 2010). The internet offers a range of functionalities and formats including discussion forums,
file sharing, posting information and sharing experience, member only pages, advertisements and online
tours. The internet also facilitates decisions regarding the purchase of treatments.
Quality of information
49. The range of medical tourism sites and related content raise concerns associated with unregulated
on-line health information (Eysenbach, 2001). The internet sites are relatively cheap to set up and run, and
contributors may post information without being subject to clear quality controls or advertising standards.
Selective information may be presented, or presented in a vacuum, ignoring for example issues such as
post-operative care and support. There is always the possibility of unreliable products being marketed via
the internet – poor-quality surgery or inadvisable treatments, unnecessary and even dangerous treatments.
As Mason and Wright (2011) note, medical tourist sites promote benefits and downplay the risks.
50. Given the large amount of material concerning how medical tourism is sourced on line, it raises
questions about the quality and veracity of the information used. Clear evidence from other studies
suggests that the quality of health information online is variable and should be used with caution
(Eysenbach et al., 2002). For example, when the Journal of the American Medical Association standards
for responsible print were used to judge the quality of infertility treatment information resources on the
web, information was found to be, at best variable and at the worst misleading (Okamura et al., 2002).
Similarly, in the area of domestic cosmetic surgery, a study using the search term ‗breast augmentation‘
located 130 sites and concluded that 34% of these sites contained information that was either false or
misleading (Jejurikar et al., 2002). Gordon et al (2001, p.176) examined the quality of plastic surgery
information concluding ―it is difficult for the average lay person to get authoritative information quickly
and easily on at least one aspect of cosmetic surgery‖. Commenting on Stem Cell sites, Murdoch and Scott
(2010) note such sites are thick with therapeutic language.
51. Given the role of advertising in influencing consumer decisions, there are questions relating to
asymmetry of information between provider and consumers where there are differences in access to
availability and quality of information, and issues of safety and informed choice that link to medical
tourism and Internet usage. Many of the sites are primarily adverts and ‗infomercials‘ (with a series of
buttons, banners and popups). It would appear there are relatively few sources that are non-commercial in
nature and provide independent information as opposed to information provided to serve commercial and
marketing ends. While there is some evidence that the presence of advertising on a website reduced its
credibility (Walther et al., 2004), there is no clear evidence for the medical tourism field.
52. The evidence of Direct-to-Consumer sales in other sectors suggests a number of potential
problems which may be present in medical tourism. Gollust et al., (2003) examine the Direct-to-Consumer
19
internet sales of genetic services and note that sites are likely to exaggerate the benefits of such services.
Datta et al., (2008) explore the quality of websites marketing home diagnostic tests and conclude that the
majority of websites provide information that is of inadequate quality. Illes et al., (2004) focus on Direct-
to-Consumer advertising in print and information brochures, concluding that such materials fail to provide
consumers with the sort of comprehensive and balanced information necessary for informed decision-
making. They suggest it is common to identify misinformation, unsubstantiated scientific claims, fear-
provoking threats, and a lack of information on the uncertainties and the risks of particular services – in
their case tomographic and magnetic resonance imaging. With regards to surgery, Salant and Santry (2006)
highlight the growth of web-based advertising of bariatric surgery centres. Bariatric surgery centres in the
US – in common with many medical tourist destinations – rely on patient self-referral and thus need to
stimulate demand for these services, ―constructing the need for bariatric surgery through strategic
advertising approaches‖ (p. 226). The marketing of unproven stem-cell treatments raises particular
concern, encouraging patients with severe diseases to travel to seek ‗unorthodox‘ therapies and cures
(Dedmon, 2009, Murdoch and Scott, 2010).
53. A systematic review of 50 medical tourism websites, marketing treatments and services in
mainland Europe (Lunt and Carrera, 2011) found that the sites were variable. In a small number of sites,
both the grammar and spelling were poor, giving little confidence in a clinic‘s proficiency in the English
language and ability to communicate clearly. Sites contained details on arrival, treatment and travel home
arrangements and itineraries and length of recuperation but little was stated explicitly on arrangements for
follow-up (only 5 of the 50 sites). Surgery was presented as routine and itineraries listed in a vacation-like
fashion from day one of arrival to day of departure. Many sites included photographs, videos and virtual
tours of facilities – and often emphasised the modern and ‗hi-tech‘ features, cleanliness and infection-
control technique of facilities and services. However, few were explicit on the number of staff, size of the
establishment (e.g. bed numbers) and emergency arrangements and facilities (only 3 from 50 sites) (Lunt
and Carrera, 2010).
54. Underpinning the search and interpretation of sites are the fundamental issues of how trust and
credibility of information are established and maintained given there are limits of choice and a great deal of
uncertainty and information asymmetry when potential medical tourists make decisions around treatments,
providers and destinations. The fine line between editorial content and advertising of online sites does not
help assuring informed choice on the part of the patient.
55. Despite a growth in the number of websites dedicated to medical tourism, there is currently little
empirical evidence on the role, use and impact of these websites on the behaviour of health care
consumers. This is a major deficit in evidence. For example, from a consumer perspective there is a need to
understand how medical tourists view advertising and whether this changes with demographic group.
Brokers
56. There has been a steady rise in the number of companies and consultancies offering brokerage
arrangements for services and providing web-based information for prospective patients about available
services and choices, which can be attributed to the transaction costs associated with medical tourism,
where individuals have to assemble their own information and negotiate any treatment. Typically, brokers
and their web-sites tailor surgical packages to individual requirements: flights, treatment, hotel, and
recuperation (Whittaker, 2008, Cormany and Baloglu, 2010, Reddy and Qadeer, 2010, Lunt and Carrera,
2011). Brokers may specialise in particular target markets or procedures (treatments such as dentistry, or
cosmetic surgery), or destination countries (e.g. Poland, Hungary). A series of interrelated issues exist
around the precise role of these intermediaries in arranging overseas surgery: how do they determine their
market, source information, choose providers, and subsequently determine what the most appropriate
20
advice is? What is noteworthy is that website facilitation businesses may disappear as quickly as they
entered the market (Cormany and Baloglu, 2010).
57. Mirrer-Singer (2007) cites one company that is a network of pre-qualified hospitals (i.e. that are
inspected and verified and form a pool from which clients then choose). But it is not clear what these
processes consist of. A number of potential legal issues that arise with regard to brokerage are discussed in
Section Six.
Travel insurance
58. A market in travel insurance for medical tourists is emerging. Purchasing adequate specialist
travel health insurance may be problematic, especially if the intending medical tourist has significant pre-
existing health problems prior to travelling. Traditional insurance policies for travel and accommodation
(delay, loss of baggage) would exclude those individuals travelling for the purposes of planned medical
tourism. Insurance products have been developed that cover medical tourists for such contingencies when
travelling for surgery. Insurance products have also emerged that go beyond insuring travel and loss, and
which seek to cover the costs of further treatments that may be required as a result of complications and
dissatisfaction following surgery abroad. It is extremely unwise to travel outside of one‘s home country
without this type of insurance unless a deal has been negotiated with the provider hospital that they will
cover all possible eventualities.
Providers
59. Within the wide picture of medical tourism there is a diversity of participating providers – or as
Ackerman (2010) notes there are ―cottage industries and transnational enterprises‖. Providers are primarily
from the private sector but are also drawn from some public sectors (e.g. Singapore and within Cuba). The
NHS has some facility for treating foreign patients who pay and for those who do not.
60. Relatively small clinical providers may include solo practices or dual partnerships, offering a full
range of treatments. At the other end of the scale are extremely large medical tourism facilities (e.g.
Bumrungrad in Thailand, Raffles in Singapore, Yonsei Severance Hospital in South Korea) where clinical
specialism is the order of the day. Hospitals may be part of large corporations (the Apollo Group for
example has 50 hospitals within and outside India), and ownership itself may lie primarily in the higher
income countries from where patients mostly originate. We know relatively little about the development of
European and international industries and markets trading in medical tourism. As the review of patient
mobility in Europe4Patients (Rosenmöller et al., 2006, p.6) noted, a lack of data around mobility in general
is compounded in relation to information about the commercial sector.
61. Countries seeking to develop medical tourism have the options of growing their own health
service or inviting partnerships with large multinational players. Individual hospitals may develop relations
with travel agencies or wider brokerage companies (Whittaker, 2008). Securing accreditation from
international programmes may be a part of the development of services. In addition to accreditation, other
approaches to raising the profile of countries and their health facilities have been used. For example,
partnerships and oversight by overseas hospitals and universities, most often from the American private
sector, can fulfil a similar role. Formalised linkages with widely recognised medical providers and
educators (like Harvard Medical International, the Mayo Clinic, the Cleveland Clinic, John Hopkins
Hospital, are becoming increasingly popular among hospitals catering for medical travellers. (As Exworthy
and Peckham (2006, p.282) note, hospital reputation is based on many factors not solely the quality of
clinical services). Medical tourist facilities will often target particular cultural groups – Bumrungrad for
example has a wing for Middle East patients (Cohen, 2009, Reddy and Qadeer, 2010).
21
National strategies
62. A range of national government agencies and policy initiatives have sought to stimulate and
promote medical tourism in their countries. Many countries see significant economic development
potential in the emergent field of medical tourism. The Thai, Indian, Singaporean, Malaysian, Hungarian,
Polish and Maltese governments have all sought to promote their comparative advantage as medical
tourism destinations at large international trade fairs, via advertising within the overseas press, and official
support for activities as part of their economic development and tourism policy (Mudur, 2004, Chee, 2007,
Whittaker, 2008, Reisman, 2010).
63. Since 2003, SingaporeMedicine has been a multi-agency government-industry partnership aiming
to promote Singapore as a medical hub and a destination for advanced patient care. It is led by the Ministry
of Health, and has the support of the Development Board (new investments and healthcare industry
capabilities); International Enterprise Singapore (growth and expansion of Singapore's healthcare interests
overseas); Singapore Tourism Board (branding and marketing of its healthcare services).
64. India has introduced a special visa category – an M visa – to cater for the growing number of
medical tourists (Chinai and Goswami, 2007) as well as allowing tax breaks to providers. Sengupta (2008)
notes that medical tourism facilities allow increased rate of depreciation on life saving equipments, and
also prime land at subsidised rates.
65. In Malaysia, the National Committee for Promotion of Medical and Health Tourism was formed
by the Ministry of Health in 1998. It developed a strategic plan and networked both domestically and
overseas with relevant interests. Tax incentives were provided for buildings, equipment, training,
advertising and IT, and providers were encouraged to pursue accreditation with an emphasis on quality
(Chee, 2007).
66. Toyota (2011) suggests that the medical tourism markets of both Singapore and Dubai, alongside
those of India, Thailand, and Malaysia should be considered as the ‗first wave‘ of Asian medical tourism.
She points to the post-2008 expansion of both the Japanese and South Korean medical tourism markets as
representing a second wave, one marked by increasing state involvement. Both the Japanese and Korean
governments have declared publically the desire to place medical tourism at the heart of plans for future
economic growth (Sang-Hun, 2008, Hall, 2009, ITTimes, 2009, Independent, 2010, Kester, 2011) and both
have matched this commitment with a relaxation of visa laws (Sang-Hun, 2008, Toyota, 2011), making
inbound medical tourism easier. Here, however, the similarities largely end. In the Japanese case, the low
numbers of trained doctors and high cost of treatment has severely constrained the growth of the medical
tourism market (Hall, 2009, Toyota, 2011, p.10). Indeed, as Connell highlights, Japan has until recently
been primarily thought of as a source country rather than a destination country in terms of medical tourism,
with large numbers of Japanese citizens travelling abroad for healthcare (Connell, 2006, p.1096).
67. The Japanese government has recently outlined plans to reverse the outbound medical tourism
trend, rolling out a new organisation with the sole aim of increasing inbound medical tourism. This will
work alongside the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which currently coordinates medical
tourism strategies (Hall, 2009, Toyota, 2011, p.9). METI has placed particular emphasis on the high-end,
high-cost and skills-intensive procedures that are perhaps not offered or taken up in lower cost Asian
medical tourism markets such as India and Thailand (Hall, 2009). The rationale being that Japan cannot
compete with the lower costs offered in such markets and thus should concentrate on the types of
procedure where access and quality are the primary motivations for medical tourism rather than simply the
cost (Hall, 2009).
22
68. In contrast to Japan, the Korean government have matched their commitment to the expansion of
the inbound medical tourism market with investment in a market to directly compete with other Asian
countries. In particular, the Korean government have created through an Act of Government the Korean
Medical Institute (KMI), which alongside the Korean Tourism Organisation and the Korean International
Medical Association has actively sought to promote the healthcare industry, both domestically and
internationally (Toyota, 2011, p.5). Similarly, the state-funded Korean Health Industry Development
Institute has placed the development of a Korean market that is globally competitive at its heart (KHIDI,
2011). Where the Japanese market is somewhat stifled by domestic issues such as the number of doctors,
the cost of procedures, and the high internal demand for healthcare services, Korea markets itself as
offering high-quality care at ‗hospitals in the developed world‘, with lower costs (Sang-Hun, 2008,
ITTimes, 2009, Independent, 2010). The development of healthcare cities akin to the DHCC in Seoul
(Sang-Hun, 2008), Daegu (ITTimes, 2009) and Jeju (Sang-Hun, 2008, Toyota, 2011, p.6) are particular
strategies. The high quality and low cost of treatment is also being used as part of a targeted campaign to
encourage Korean expatriates and members of Korean communities in countries such as the United States
and New Zealand (Lee et al., 2010, pp.108-109) to opt for procedures in Korea with plans currently in train
to open a marketing office in Los Angeles to attract Korean-Americans (Sang-Hun, 2008, Toyota, 2011,
p.6). For some, the expansion of the Korean market, which has been put at between 40,000 and 60,000, is
simply a matter of time (ITTimes, 2009, Independent, 2010, Toyota, 2011, p.5).
69. State involvement in the medical tourism industry is not confined to Asia. As with Asian
countries, State involvement varies from country to country with a mixture of private and public facilities
catering for medical tourism. In Poland, a popular destination for dental tourists and cosmetic tourists,
medical tourism is facilitated through private companies, many of the clinics used are state-owned, serving
Polish citizens alongside medical tourism. This reflects the Polish government‘s desire to capture the
potential of medical tourism and marked by the creation of the Polish Medical Tourism Chamber of
Commerce (Reisman, 2010, p.133) and networking with the Polish Association of Medical Tourism
(PAMT). The Polish government is actively attempting to harness the potential of recent EU accession to
compete with more far-flung destinations for the custom of European medical tourists.
70. Hungary has also sought to harness the opportunities presented by EU accession and develop a
medical tourism industry. While many of the clinics offering treatment to medical tourists are undoubtedly
private, the role of the Hungarian government should not be overlooked. Terry refers to Hungary as the
―dental capital of the world‖ (2007, p.419) and only a cursory glance at medical tourism sites reveals that a
wide range of procedures are being actively marketed to tourists.
71. Beyond national strategies there a range of ways that national policy can directly foster the
domestic medical tourism industry. Examples include:
From 2009 the South Korean Government allowed hospitals to fully market health services to
foreign patients
Supporting trade fairs: many of which include government support (through tourism, airlines or
health) – UAE, Dubai, Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta.
In some cases, governments have directly supported the process by encouraging the acquisition
of international accreditation by their hospitals, for example in Singapore and Dubai (UAE).
23
SECTION THREE
TREATMENT PROCESSES
72. There are a range of organisational dimensions related to the quality and safety of medical
treatment abroad. Many of these are not necessarily unique to medical tourism in that health care is replete
with information asymmetries and potential threats to the quality and safety of patient care pathways, but
these are intensified given the dimensions of ―distance‖ including legal jurisdiction.
73. Ideally, a common regulatory platform and reporting system would serve as the basis of an
assessment of comparative quality of care using a range of performance indicators as facilitated by
international accreditation and certification. Presently, there is a lack of comparative quality and safety
data, and knowledge of infection rates for overseas institutions and reporting of adverse events is lacking.
Importantly, bodies like the World Health Organisation have yet to publish any firm guidance on this and
there does not appear to be any immediate intention to do so. For some, a lack of transparency on quality is
an impediment to a fully developed market in medical tourism (Ehrbeck et al., 2008, p.6). Availability of
evidence about the quality of a particular surgeon or clinical team, some suggest, would encourage more
people to pursue medical tourism (Unti, 2009).
74. As with all medical treatments, an element of risk exists to the patient‘s health, which is
supposedly outweighed by the potential benefits resulting from the treatment. What can be gleaned from
the literature concerning risk and safety-related incidents for medical tourism is limited. Whilst there is
evidence regarding, for example, the occurrence of adverse events in UK hospitals (Sari et al., 2007), there
is no similar overseas/international data.
75. Medical tourism adds a new dynamic to this element of risk, due to the overseas travel involved.
The journey home can be difficult and painful, especially following surgery. A study of Norwegian
patients found that this was perceived as the most negative aspect of visiting overseas providers (HELTEF,
2003). Travelling when unwell can lead to further health complications, including the possibility of deep
vein thrombosis (Crooks et al., 2010). Despite medical tourism involving air travel, there is no published
evidence on travel risk resulting from medical tourism, for example on thrombosis.
Patient satisfaction
76. Patient satisfaction is an important dimension of healthcare treatment. Relatively little is known
about the experience and satisfaction of medical tourists. According to Ehrbeck et al (2008, p.7), patients
report generally high satisfaction with quality of care received overseas but it is not clear that this can be
extrapolated outside of the US and to a range of treatments. Patient clinical outcomes and satisfaction do
not necessarily go together and satisfaction is not always the primary indicator for some treatments such as
dental work. Similarly, with regard to cosmetic surgery there is evidence that a small percentage of patients
may suffer from psychological body-related issues that make such judgements problematic (Grossbart and
Sarwer, 2003). Conversely, Hanna et al (2009) note that for a sample of outsourced patients (rather than
medical tourists) whilst the majority of patients operated upon abroad obtained comparable functional
results with those expected locally, they were often dissatisfied with the overall experience. There is a gap
24
in understanding of patient expectations and how these may be raised by individuals paying a market-price
and taking responsibility for choosing a provider.
Clinical outcomes
77. Evidence of clinical outcomes for medical tourist treatments is limited and reports are difficult to
obtain and verify. Little is known about the relative clinical effectiveness and outcomes for particular
treatments, institutions, clinicians and organisations. There is scant evidence on long or short-term follow-
up of patients returning to their home countries following treatments at the range of destinations.
78. That a positive treatment outcome should result is important, not least because the patient‘s local
health care provider takes on the responsibility and funding for post-operative care including treatment for
complications and to remedy side-effects (Cheung and Wilson, 2007). In the event of an adverse outcome,
it should be known whether, and to what extent, the patient has recourse for redress.
79. Patient follow-up by providers is rare; a study of 20 patients presenting at a German university
hospital after overseas refractive surgery concluded that there was insufficient management of
complications and a lack of post-operative care (Terzi et al., 2008). For ‗transplant tourism‘, Canales‘
(2006) study of kidney patients transplanted abroad found that there was a high incidence of serious post-
operative infections (6 serious infections for 4 patients), although graft survival and function were
concluded to be good – see also Geddes‘ follow-up of kidney patients who had travelled from Scotland to
Pakistan for treatment (Geddes et al., 2008). Similarly, Gill et al., (2008) followed 33 kidney transplant
patients and concluded that graft and patient survival are not significantly worse but that there was a more
complex post-transplantation course and higher incidence of acute rejection and severe infectious
complications.
80. With regard to cosmetic surgery, 203 out of 325 members of the British Association of Plastic,
Reconstructive and Aesthetic Surgeons responded to an Association survey and, of these, 76 (37%) had
seen patients in the NHS with complications arising from overseas cosmetic surgery (Jeevan and
Armstrong, 2008). In an audit of the pan-Thames region, 35 out of 65 consultants replied to requests about
cosmetic surgery impacts (Birch et al., 2007). Sixty per cent of those replying had seen complications and
the majority of these cases (66%) were emergencies that required inpatient admission. Australian research
on professionals raises a similar issue (MacReady, 2007) and there are detailed case studies of detrimental
outcomes from surgery abroad incurring significant public costs to rectify poor outcomes (Cheung and
Wilson, 2007). Birch et al., (2010) highlight the case of medical tourist patients who sought bariatric
surgery and required urgent surgical management at a tertiary care centre within Canada.
81. For the growing phenomenon of ‗fertility tourism‘, a UK study of 11 years follow-up of high
order multiple pregnancy found that 26% had fertility performed overseas (McKelvey et al., 2009).
82. In terms of dental treatment abroad there are some reported cases of complications having to be
dealt with by the home health system. Barrowman et al (2010) report cases histories of five Australian
travellers requiring attention by oral and maxillofacial surgeons because of dental implants. Case reporting
from the UK documents two returning dental tourists requiring hospital and dentist consultation
(Milosevic, 2009).
83. In sum, relatively little is known about readmission, morbidity and mortality following self-
funded medical treatment abroad (see also Balaban and Marano, 2010). The overseas and private nature of
delivery explains why there is such a dearth of information relating to clinical outcomes, post-operative
complications, lapses in safety and poor professional practice (cf Alleman et al., 2010).
25
Continuity of care
84. It is ethical to ensure that patients are as well cared for as possible and, to this end, patients
should receive appropriate advice and input at all stages of the caring process. When medical treatment is
sought abroad, the normal continuum of care may be interrupted. It is useful to consider the cycle of care
through all its possible stages, pre- or post- the period of hospital care.
There is a period prior to travelling, and if this involves travel to a country with a tropical or a
sub-tropical climate such as Thailand or India, where the disease ecosystem is different, then this
should be factored into the system.
There may be issues around pre-counselling and informed consent for procedures being
contemplated. Individuals may have a pre-existing illness (e.g. diabetes mellitus, cardiovascular
deficiency, respiratory disease, renal failure, HIV disease) or be taking significant medications
prior to travelling, which will need to be dealt with at the earliest possible opportunity.
The medical traveller/tourist may become ill while in the foreign country, perhaps in a way quite
unrelated to their primary reason for becoming a medical traveller, or they might develop
complications or side effects related to their treatment.
Problems can develop during the return flight, such as deep venous thrombosis and pulmonary
thromboembolism, or a myocardial infarct.
Subsequent to arriving home, complications, side-effects and post-operative care become the
responsibility of the home medical care system, and patients may encounter problems accessing
adequate healthcare. For example, physicians in the US may be uncomfortable dealing with
patients who had travelled overseas to another country and undergone an operation to implant a
kidney they had purchased (Boschert, 2007).
85. Patients should be aware that the quality of post-operative care can vary dramatically depending
on hospital and country, and may be different from US or Western European standards. The medical
traveller is usually in hospital for only a few days or even weeks, and then may go on the vacation portion
of their trip or return home, when complications, side-effects and post-operative care then become the
responsibility of the healthcare system in the patients‘ home country.
86. The use of IT information by professionals and how patient information flows across national
boundaries are further important questions for the regulation of the medical tourism industry. Continuity of
care can be facilitated by sharing of patient records. Data protection regulations among countries – even
within the EU, however, make difficult ease of access to medical records. It is not clear to what extent the
European Health Card will foster improvements in this regard.
87. According to the World Tourism Organization‘s ―Global Code of Ethics for Tourism‖ (1999),
there is an expectation that tourists and visitors should have the same rights as citizens of destination
countries with regard to the confidentiality of their personal data and information, especially when these
26
are stored in electronic formats. Laws and regulations will vary in different parts of the world in relation to
medical confidentiality, including the protection of data kept on computer. On the other hand, people may
travel to other countries for treatment for personal reasons related to an expectation of greater
confidentiality in that country compared to the home country (e.g. HIV care, treatment for infertility,
gender reassignment surgery).
88. There may also be issues of confidentiality related to the clients of companies who act as
facilitators of medical tourism. The staff of medical tourism facilitators‘ offices may be party to clinical
information on patients, and this private and sensitive information would need to be dealt with very
carefully and there is potential for them to sell the information to other medical service companies.
89. In the UK, signed informed consent prior to an elective procedure is considered best practice and
a standard requirement ensuring that patients are fully informed as to the benefits and adverse effects of a
procedure or treatment they are being advised to undergo, and they also have the opportunity to ask
questions and seek answers (GMC, 2008). This may not be available every time in the medical tourism
setting, and it is possible that medical tourists may come to regret this if there are failings in professional or
clinical practice (Pennings, 2004, Barclay, 2009, Jeevan et al., 2011).
90. The public health aspects of medical tourism have not been adequately studied. Of significance is
the potential for hazardous micro-organisms transferring between hospitals located in different parts of the
world on the body of a medical tourist (Green, 2008). These could include antimicrobial resistance, such as
the potential for Clostridium difficile, VRSA (CDC, 2005) or XDRTB (CDC, 2009), or a dangerous
pathogen, such as SARS or Congo-Crimean Haemorrhagic Fever, with potentially fatal implications for
hospital staff (Suleiman et al., 1980). The rapid spread of North American ―swine‖ flu out of the United
States and Mexico to the rest of the world in 2009 and after illustrates the ease with which micro-
organisms can be transported across borders.
91. Instances of infection outbreaks arising from treatment of US citizens at overseas ‗medical
tourist‘ facilities have been reported within the literature (Newman et al., 2005). Anecdotally, one author
(Green) is aware of cases where hepatitis B was acquired during cardiac surgery in Pakistan and renal
transplantation in India. A study of medical tourists undergoing kidney transplants concludes there was
inadequate communication of information regarding preoperative information and postoperative
immunosuppressive regimens (Canales et al., 2006).
92. Medical travellers may be travelling from home to countries with very different ecosystems and
disease profiles, and in some destinations may encounter diseases such as malaria, dengue and other
arthropod-borne infections. All people, whether medical travellers or not, who are travelling to different
countries should be made aware of the potential for acquiring diseases and injuries which are not common
in their own country. Immunisations, preventative medications (e.g. anti-malarials) and general precautions
should be considered and arranged for prior to the trip overseas. The lack of any routine data means there
is little idea of how prevalent infections are or how they compare with rates from regular tourists.
93. Quality maximisation and risk minimisation are two key ingredients for creating better and safer
health care services, whether they are providing services for domestic consumption or for medical
travellers. This can only be accomplished through the setting-up of appropriate forms of organisational
framework within the hospital or clinic designed to assess quality, identify risk, and deal with all relevant
issues, and at the same time promote a culture of remaining vigilant. At the present time, medical tourism
27
services remain largely unregulated and a huge issue that needs to be faced up to is whether or not the
quality and safety standards on offer through medical tourism are to be trusted.
94. External Quality Assessment (EQA) – the introduction of a trusted third party to assess quality
control – contains within it the potential for increasing both the information flow, especially exchange of
good practice between organisations, and transparency within organisations. A number of EQA models
exist that the medical tourism industry could draw upon:
Accreditation
95. Concerns for the quality and safety of the medical care provided overseas have also emerged due
to the lack of robust clinical governance arrangements and quality assurance procedures in provider
organisations, intended to safeguard the quality of care provided to tourists (Zahir, 2001). There have also
been questions over the training, qualifications, motivations and competence of health care professionals.
In response to such concerns, a range of independent accreditation schemes have been established with the
aim of assuring the care of medical tourists in a way that avoids potential conflicts of interest. Groups such
as the Joint Commission International from the United States (covering 44 countries:
http://www.jointcommissioninternational.org/Accreditation-and-Certification-Process/) and Quality
Healthcare Advice Trent Accreditation in the UK for example have accredited a number of health
providers centres around the world.
96. Accreditation is a form of EQA where surveying is carried out by a third-party conformity
assessment body known as an ―accreditation scheme‖, using a combination of self-assessment and external
peer review led by a team of external peer reviewers. Common characteristics of all accreditation schemes
are:
The means should be put into place by which problems can be identified prospectively and
corrected and continuous improvement ensured;
A mechanism within the accreditation process for ensuring follow-up action takes place on any
recommendations that arise from the survey and for correcting any problems identified by the
measurement process; and
The assessment process should be repeated periodically, usually between two to four years.
28
97. Potential problems with accreditation include:
The commercial needs and aspirations of the accreditation schemes themselves may be allowed
to dominate the picture. Many (but not all) of the accreditation schemes operating internationally
are private companies or corporations.
Less well-off countries may have no access to the accreditation process, or engaging in
accreditation may lead to financial hardship.
Accreditation processes may not tackle ethically contentious areas, such as organ trafficking,
payment issues around organ and tissue donation, selective gender abortion, surrogate pregnancy,
unnecessary operations, use of currently unproven therapies such as human stem-cell therapy for
cosmetic reasons.
98. Standards are at the heart of accreditation, and they must be directed towards those factors that
may make a difference to the quality of care. Accreditation schemes should be fit for purpose, based on the
results of the best available research, and sensitive to change.
99. There are therefore three categories of area where accreditation is of interest to the medical
tourism market:
a) Offering assurance to commercial interests of the quality and safety of the product they are
selling to the public, which in turn may reduce their liability and minimise bad publicity in the
future.
b) Potential access to funding from overseas sources: In the USA, accreditation schemes such as the
JCAHO, the American Osteopathic Association and DNV‘s National Integrated Accreditation for
Healthcare Organizations, are routes to US Medicare participation.
c) Attraction of business: Potential customers for medical tourism may look at whether or not a
hospital has accreditation, and hospitals can in turn advertise their being in possession of
accredited status.
100. Currently, there is no universal ―official agency/group‖, such as the United Nations, the World
Health Organization, the World Tourism Organization or the World Trade Organization, engaged in either
the delivery of accreditation, the co-ordination of delivery of accreditation, or licensing or studying the
existing schemes that deliver accreditation. Mandatory accreditation may appeal to governments and
commercial healthcare purchasers such as third-party payers (e.g. insurance companies and occupational
healthcare providers). Accreditation has most often been used as a marketing tool by wealthier provider
hospitals, medical tourism facilitators and the governments of provider countries seeking to grow their
share of the medical tourism business.
29
SECTION FOUR
SYSTEM IMPLICATIONS: COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
101. Some places may be simultaneously acting as countries of origin and destination in the medical
tourism marketplace. High-income countries may service overseas elites whilst at the same time their
citizens choose to travel as medical tourists to Lower and Middle Income Countries for treatments. Thus,
Harley Street in the UK and facilities including the Mayo and Cleveland Clinics in the United States have
longstanding reputations in the international provision of healthcare. Conversely, the emergence of lower-
cost treatments in Thailand, India or parts of Eastern Europe will attract individuals from higher incomes
countries who pursue treatments on the basis of cost. This section focuses on the implications for countries
from the perspective of them being an origin or source of medical tourists. In trade parlance, this concerns
the services that a country imports (if their patients go overseas to receive care, then effectively they are
importing a service). It explores a range of financial, social, political, ethical and legal issues, and
implications for local industry.
Financial impacts
102. There are financial impacts on individuals and their families. Some families may fall into debt to
fund treatments. It is also the case that not all medical tourism is treatment ‗on the cheap‘ – travel to
countries for experimental treatment may consume considerable family resources (Song, 2010). This
assertion of choice and autonomy may, however, lead to externalities at the system level.
103. There are a range of financial impacts for source countries that may arise for the publicly funded
health care system. Costs may result from overseas cosmetic surgery or dental work that requires
emergency or remedial treatment within home countries (Cheung and Wilson, 2007, Jeevan and
Armstrong, 2008, Healy, 2009). Infection outbreaks resulting from travel will also bring their own costs (cf
Newman et al., 2005). Similarly, there may be health and social care costs that arise from multiple births
(cf Ledger et al., 2006) arising from overseas fertility treatments. But there has been little systemic
collection of evidence or attempts to estimate overall system costs.
104. There are also potential impacts on private health activity – given that they potentially lose
business to overseas providers, for example cosmetic surgery. There are associated costs of patients
travelling overseas – the necessity to monitor/regulate advertising and provide detailed information and
advice to support potential or actual medical tourists carries its own costs. Again, there are no detailed
estimates of the implications.
105. There is the likelihood that large numbers of medical tourists will impact on the source country‘s
own health system, perhaps increasing trends that are encouraged by the current domestic private
provision. Outflows of high-income patients for example from LMIC will reduce both revenue and dilute
political support for developing local services. Such flows also reduce the pressure for investment in
particular facilities and technology. Indeed, there is an argument that some types of outflows of medical
tourists for treatments that could be provided locally signal a failure of policy and delivery in the sender
country.
106. But it is also within higher income countries where the possibilities of a exacerbating two-tier
system can emerge. If, for example, eligibility for services such as fertility or dental work is tightened, then
30
those with private resources may choose to travel overseas to maintain access (thus exercising choice and
exit). Those lacking the resources to travel may retain only the option of voice. Patients who are able to
circumvent waiting times highlight the familiar issues of access and equity.
107. In those countries where third-party insurers are exploring medical tourism as a provider option,
those that are insured under these plans – perhaps unable to get alternative cover – may find themselves
disadvantaged.
108. Clearly, however, source-country payers may benefit from outflows of patients – including
employers and employees contributing to health plans, and the public insurance system itself. There may
be some opportunities for financial benefit if medical tourism is an option. Mattoo and Rathindran (2006),
for example, highlight that for the United States 15 treatment that would show savings of $1.4b annually if
one in ten US patients chose to undergo treatment abroad. Such savings could be beneficial for public
health systems. For instance, a recent study looking at possible bi-lateral medical tourism trade between the
UK and India demonstrated substantial savings could accrue to the UK NHS from sending its patients to
India, both financially and in alleviating waiting lists (Chanda et al., 2011, Smith et al., 2011c, Smith et al.,
2011b, Smith et al., 2011a). If one takes the waiting lists for a selected number of procedures suitable for
medical tourism, and compares the cost of sending those patients (plus an accompanying adult) to India,
with the costs of getting treatment in the UK, the savings would be of the order of £120 million (Table 2).
This figure becomes £200 million if no accompanying adult is paid for (Table 3). Some subsets of the
population, such the Indian Diaspora, may prefer to go back ―home‖ for treatment, and may be happy to
cross-subsidise some of the costs, or may not need an accompanying adult, further increasing the amount
saved.
Procedure Cost Cost Cost of Hotel Total Cost Waiting Total saved
c d e
UK procedure flight Stay cost saved per list (£)
a b
(£) India (£) India operation
(£)
CABG 8,631 3,413 1000 230 4,643 3,988 97 386836
Coronary 2,269 2,363 1000 69 3,432 -1,163 25,241 Not worth it
angioplasty
Total hip 8,811 3,413 1000 322 4,735 4,076 28,800 117,388,800
replacement
Total knee 6,377 5,145 1000 161 6,306 71 53,911 3,827,681
replacement
Femoral hernia 1,595 819 1000 69 1,888 -293 1,686 Not worth it
repair
Inguinal hernia 1,595 717 1000 46 1,763 -168 65,064 Not worth it
repair
Total 121,603,317
a
NHS reference costs 2007-2008
b
From Fortis Healthcare Mohali (JCI accredited)
c
From British Airways, two week in advance of flying (i.e. 30th of September)
d
Used exchange rate £1=89.7 Rp £23/night in Mohali (where Fortis is), luxury accommodation (Imperial Hotel Mohali).
e
Obtained from Hospital Episode Statistics, Main procedures and operations 2007-2008
31
Table 3: Cost for only patient travelling
Procedure Cost UK Cost Cost Total Cost saved Waiting Total saved (£)
a d
(£) procedure of cost per list
b c
India (£) flight India operation
(£)
Coronary artery 8,631 3,413 500 3,913 4,718 97 457,646
bypass graft
(CABG)
Coronary 2,269 2,363 500 2,863 -594 25,241 Not worth it
angioplasty
Total hip 8,811 3,413 500 3,913 4,898 28,800 141,062,400
replacement
Total knee 6,377 5,145 500 5,645 732 53,911 39,462,852
replacement
Femoral hernia 1,595 819 500 1,319 276 1,686 465,336
repair
Inguinal hernia 1,595 717 500 1,217 378 65,064 24,594,192
repair
Total 206,042,426
a
NHS reference costs 2007-2008
b
Conversion used £1=$1.66, rounded to the nearest pound
c
From British Airways, two week in advance of flying (i.e. 30th of September)
d
Obtained from Hospital Episode Statistics, Main procedures and operations 2007-2008
109. Plausibly, the health systems within source countries could develop relations with off-shore
medical tourism facilities to leverage cost savings – providing individuals with a choice of overseas
destinations. This could also reduce waiting lists – and reflects a form of outsourcing or more ‗collective‘
medical travel (Smith et al., 2011c).
110. One of the drivers for medical tourism is price because treatments may often be available locally
within the private sector, but at greater cost. There are arguments that some medical systems are inefficient
and face restrictive barriers to entry. A development such as medical tourism can potentially exert
competitive pressure on systems importing health care and help drive down the costs and prices offered in
domestic systems (Herrick, 2007). Medical tourism may encourage economies to maximize their
comparative advantage in labour costs, technology and/or capacity.
32
SECTION FIVE
SYSTEM IMPLICATIONS: DESTINATION COUNTRY
111. We have seen in Section 4 that source counties – or those importing health services – may benefit
from medical tourism through alleviating waiting lists and lowering healthcare costs, but may risk quality
of care and legal liability. In this section we turn our attention to destination countries – or those exporting
health services. What potential benefits and risks do they face?
112. Medical tourism has historically been from lower to higher income countries, with better medical
facilities and more highly trained and qualified professionals. However, this trend is now reversing, and
most recently ―hubs‖ of medical excellence have developed which attract people regionally (Horowitz et
al., 2007, Lautier, 2008). Many countries participate in medical tourism as importers, exporters or both.
The main importing countries (those where the medical tourists come from) are in North America and
Western Europe. Although current levels of movement are relatively limited, as outlined in Section Four ,
the potential, if payment was covered by third-party payers, is significant. For instance, a study carried out
by Beecham (2002) suggested that 40% of the patients questioned in a UK nationwide poll would be
willing to travel outside the UK for treatment; 26% would apparently travel anywhere in the world!
113. The main exporting countries (those who provide the services to medical tourists) are located
across all continents, including Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. Countries have
specialised in certain procedures. For instance, Thailand and India specialise in orthopaedic and cardiac
surgery, whereas Eastern European countries are hotspots for dental surgery (Smith et al., 2011c). Thus,
although all countries may possibly be source and destination countries for medical tourists, this section
will take the view that it is predominantly LMIC who are the destination countries, and HIC the source
countries. Nonetheless, many of the issues are quite generic and will affect any destination country,
regardless of the level of economic development, just to a greater or lesser extent. It is also worth noting
that the magnitude of the possible effects being discussed is largely unknown – in many cases the potential
or actual occurrence of these effects has been observed, but the scale of effect, and how this scale may
differ between countries is an unknown quantity (Smith et al., 2009b).
Economic impacts
114. Most countries that engage in delivering care to medical tourists do so to increase the level of
direct foreign exchange earnings coming into their country; to improve their balance-of-payments position
(Timmermans, 2004, Ramírez de Arellano, 2007, Turner, 2007). To some extent this might be income
thought of as accruing directly to the health system. For instance, foreign patients purchase health care
services, and hence provide an income that can be used within hospitals to cross-subsidise care for
domestic patients, or could be used to help fund capital investment, such as MRI scanners, that are then
used by all patients in the hospital. For instance, in Singapore the authorities stress that involvement in
medical tourism enables them to provide a broader range of clinical services to the indigenous population
than would be the case if income was not being generated through medical tourism (India and Malta use
such arguments) (Lee, 2010, Lee and Hung, 2010). Similarly, Ramírez de Arellano (2011) suggests that the
Cuban experience is to reinvest income from foreign patients into the national system. It is therefore
possible that some countries may seek foreign patients in order to develop facilities to better serve local
patients (e.g. improve staff, investment, specialist expertise, cross-subsidise, etc) – although these
arguments are more likely to be ‗window dressing‘ of the core motive which is to earn foreign exchange.
33
115. However, one must remember that foreign patients are merely an addition to domestic private
patients; and this may be a significant or insignificant addition. There may also be different economic
implications depending if these patients are simply using spare capacity or competing with domestic
patients. For instance, the push by Thailand to be a hub for medical tourists in the 1990‘s was a result of
the economic crisis in Asia generating a fall in domestic private patients and hence leading to spare
capacity in their private sector. In this case, increasing foreign patients was more or less a net benefit to the
private health system with substantial income and little real opportunity cost. However, where there is not
spare capacity, and hence this capacity has to be developed, there are substantial potential costs in financial
terms, but also in the wider context of fears of two-tier system developments, internal brain drain, etc., as
outlined below.
116. Although there may be income generated for the health sector, it is typically not health care
income that concerns destination countries of course, but general increases in tourist income, since there is
hoped to be a substantial level of expenditure by medical tourists, and their companions, that is not related
to medical care (food, accommodation, sights, travel). Certainly medical tourism can be an important
source of foreign exchange. A report by the Tourism Research and Marketing Group estimates that there
are 37 million health-related trips each year, generating €33 billion (TRAM, 2006). A report carried out by
McKinsey and CII (2002) predicts that by 2012, India‘s medical tourism industry will be worth US$2
billion.
117. Indeed, it is the promise of these earnings that often drives government involvement in investing
directly or indirectly (tax incentives) in private hospitals and actively promoting medical tourism (Ramírez
de Arellano, 2007, Reed, 2008, Lee, 2010). Indeed, the Indian government stated in its National Health
Policy in 2002 that medical tourism was considered to be a ―deemed export‖ and therefore awarded it
fiscal incentives, including lower import duties, prime land at subsidised rates and tax concessions (Garud,
2005, Ramírez de Arellano, 2007, Sengupta, 2008). Similarly, the Thai policy promoting medical tourism
has been deemed to be such a success that it has recently been renewed. Thus, sectors other than medical
care – especially those associated with hospitality and travel – may benefit to some degree from increased
medical tourism, as will the government more centrally through increased taxation revenue. This revenue
can, of course, help support the domestic public health system, for example.
118. Nonetheless, the net income from medical tourism may not be as significant as it appears. Part of
the rationale for the pursuit of medical tourists is to generate additional tourism income, which presupposes
that these individuals (and their companion(s)) would not otherwise have been in the country. However, in
many cases medical tourists are either Diaspora or patients who have previously visited the country and are
likely to again. Thus, they are ‗regular‘ visitors who on one trip happen to ‗add in‘ an element of medical
care. In this situation it is highly likely that the non-health care revenue would have been raised
irrespective of their visit for medical reasons. In this situation clearly the additional income generated by
the ‗medical‘ element of medical tourism is far more limited, and the overall addition to the economy
consequently less, which may put a different perspective on the balance of benefits and risks.
119. Further, there are also financial costs to be borne from inviting medical tourists into a country. As
mentioned above, often there are requirements for upgraded infra-structure – either specifically within the
health sector (e.g. hospital facilities) and/or outside of that sector, such as roads, telecommunications etc.
However, such infrastructural investments will create favourable spillovers for non-medical tourists and
the local population. There are also likely to be costs concerned with appropriate staffing of facilities,
possible accreditation schemes, and other requirements to attract medial tourists.
120. For instance, 35 countries have sought accreditation from the US-based Joint Commission
International (JCI), the international arm of the Joint Commission, which accredits US hospitals. India has
already sought and obtained JCI accreditation for seventeen hospitals, and Thailand for fourteen (JCI,
34
2011). Other international accreditation bodies include the Australian Council for Healthcare Standards,
the Canadian Council on Health Services and the Society for International Healthcare Accreditation. This
high number of accreditation associations shows there is a strong commitment from exporting countries to
develop or strengthen their medical tourism industry. However, there are costs associated with increasing
and ensuring standards to meet these various criteria, maintenance of these accreditations, and the
processing costs themselves.
121. Stemming from the economic, or financial, benefits which are sought, there is an associated
argument around ‗trickle down‘ of best practice and technological diffusion. Part of this relates to the
increased ability to purchase the latest technology for example. However, part of this also relates to the
exposure to international patients and staff that may generate more qualitative advances. Thus, there is an
argument that servicing the needs of foreign patients may broaden the case-mix for staff, or may increase
throughput to enable them to become more skilled; it might open up the door to secondments to overseas
facilities which, provided migration is temporary, may lead to enhancement of human capital; it may
provide increased quality through ensuring compliance with (higher) international standards for care (as
alluded to above); and it may promote a culture of personal development in skills and technologies
available to treat patients generally, which local patients will of course benefit from.
122. However, there are also associated risks. For example, there is the possibility of resources being
taken away from the domestic population and invested into private hospitals; another possibility is that
investment is directed towards urban tertiary care rather than rural primary care centres which more
appropriately reflect domestic population needs. There may also be a skew in the resources devoted to the
conditions associated with medical tourists rather than those associated with local populations, such as a
focus on high technology orthopaedic, dental and reproductive care, rather than more basic public health
measures focused on infectious disease. It is also not clear how much the accreditation of private hospitals
dealing with medical tourists will be replicated in private, or public, hospitals which do not serve this client
base.
123. Some exporting countries have taken advantage of the growth of medical tourism to attract back
to their home country health workers who had emigrated, thus reversing the ‗brain drain‘ (Chinai and
Goswami, 2007, Dunn, 2007, Connell, 2008). It is argued that this is possible since hospitals catering for
medical tourists can offer competitive salaries and working conditions more comparable with overseas
institutions. This has the double benefit of giving a high quality signal, as international patients are more
likely to trust doctors who have trained or practiced in their countries of origin, as well as ensuring that
precious human resources are brought back to the country or are less likely to leave (Connell, 2008).
124. However, there is uncertainty over the precise magnitude of this affect, and also of the extent to
which human resources are made available for the domestic population and thus of benefit to the domestic
health system, or rather are simply an ‗internal export‘ by only treating the same patients that they would
have if they had migrated, it is just that they are doing this ‗at home‘.
125. Closely related to this, is that whilst the prospect of reversing the international brain drain is very
positive, there are concerns that medical tourism will cause an internal brain drain, with health
professionals leaving the public health system to work for the hospitals that attract medical tourists, lured
by the better salaries and work opportunities just alluded to (Arunanondchai and Fink, 2006, Burkett, 2007,
Chinai and Goswami, 2007). This would decrease the quality of the public health system and the doctor-to-
patient ratio. As with other aspects of medical tourism, there is little empirical evidence of whether this is
35
happening, and to what extent; and what there is, is unclear. For instance, Vijaya (2010) found that there
was an internal brain drain from the Thai public to private system. However, another study which assessed
the influence of medical tourism on the internal brain drain in Thailand concluded that it is not the influx of
foreign patients, but the numbers of Thai private patients that have the highest influence on the internal
brain drain (Wibulpolprasert and Pachanee, 2008). As raised earlier, it is important – and seldom if ever
done – to separate the effects of private care from the additional impact of a sub-sample of foreign private
patients and seek to isolate the effect that being a foreign private patient per se has.
Two-tier system
126. All of this, of course, leads us to the primary concern about the possibility of medical tourism
generating – or at the least exacerbating – a two-tiered health system, where foreign patients benefit from
sophisticated private hospitals with a high staff-to-patient ratio and expensive, state-of-the-art medical
equipment, whereas the local population only has access to basic, under-resourced health facilities
(Chanda, 2002, Garud, 2005, Ramírez de Arellano, 2007, Connell, 2008, Leahy, 2008).
127. Certainly there is the potential for medical tourism to have effects in terms of the distribution of
healthcare resources for the less well-off local population, unless the government has some sort of policy
of wealth redistribution in place, or there are robust charitable ventures in place to assist the local
population (Chee, 2008, Heung et al., 2010). There is anecdotal evidence that may support this. For
instance, there have been various accusations that in some countries private-sector medical tourists may be
accumulating medical resources and taking healthcare services and personnel away from the local
population (Sengupta, 2011), and one study (Pennings, 2007) suggests that although private hospitals in
India may have a responsibility under the Public Trust Act to provide free health care to the extent of 20%
of resources, there are no checks undertaken to ensure that this occurs and others have suggested that
Indian hospitals renege on promises to provide free healthcare (Shetty, 2010).
128. Nonetheless, as with much in this area, there is no strong evidence that medical tourism creates a
two-tier system (especially given the point earlier about the extent to which they may simply add some
additional private patients to an already sizable domestic private sector), or even that they may exacerbate
this.
36
SECTION SIX
HARM, LIABILITY & REDRESS
129. Whilst ethical and legal issues arise for all forms of medical care – informed consent, liability
and legislating for clinical malpractice – these are intensified for medical tourism. ‗Cosmetic tourism‘,
‗fertility tourism‘, ‗transplant tourism‘, to say nothing of recent developments in the areas of ‗stem cell‘-
tourism‘ and ‗euthanasia tourism‘, raise ever-more complex medico-legal and ethical questions. We are
entering relatively uncharted and rapidly developing territory with regards to the legal dimensions.
Currently, there is no clear legislative picture or developed body of case law to guide practice in this area.
Clearly, however, as the range of treatments and sites offering them expands there is a need to understand
these issues – for patients, surgeons, overseas facilities and legal systems.
130. In the event of an adverse outcome arising from failings in clinical and professional practice, how
do patient fare in seeking redress given there is no international regulation of medical tourism? There are
warnings that clinics overseas are not necessarily regulated according to source-country standards and
regulations. Choosing an overseas treatment centre brings a number of challenges – difficulties in assessing
comparative quality and performance of alternative providers, differences in legal liability and knowledge
concerning the processes of how to pursue complaints and receive redress (MacReady, 2007).
131. If patients experience poor-quality treatment which results in adverse outcomes and as a result
wish to bring a civil or criminal case, they face potential confusion with a number issues not fully clarified
(Vick, 2010). A combination of services may contribute towards the medical tourist experience including
product advertising, initial internet consultation, a brokerage service, surgery itself, and various mixes
therein.
132. With regards to advertising and promotional material, there are typically national and European
restrictions on what can be advertised, but given the role of the internet in promoting medical tourism this
may be difficult to regulate and hold miscreants to account.
133. There are complexities regarding who could be subject to legal proceedings, the jurisdiction of
hearing any case, and the country‘s law that should govern any case (Svantesson, 2008, Vick, 2010). There
are questions about who to sue and whether a dissatisfied medical tourist should sue the individual
surgeon, the clinical team, the hospital, or even the broker that may have arranged the treatment. The
jurisdiction question concerns where any legal case would be heard and the laws and legislation that would
govern it. For an Australian citizen for example, domestic legislation would provide three potential routes
for redress: action for breach of contract; action for tort of negligence; action under the misrepresentation
of Trade Practice (contracts) Act (1974) (Svantesson, 2008, see also Vick, 2010 for a UK analysis).
134. A potential difficulty in pursuing a breach of contract or clinical negligence is that medical
tourists may be encouraged to sign legal disclaimers prior to receiving treatment that restrict where any
subsequent case will be held, the law that will cover it, and include further liability limitation or exclusion
clauses. Such clauses may seriously reduce effective redress options, although they are themselves
potentially subject to legislation with regard to the fairness of their contract terms (Vick, 2010).
37
135. Pursuing a legal case overseas brings its own difficulties. Should complications arise during
medical tourism, patients may not be covered by insurance or indemnity policies that are carried by the
hospital, the surgeon or physician treating them, and they may have little recourse to local courts or
medical boards.
136. Travelling to an overseas country to pursue a legal case also involves having to employ a suitable
lawyer, and problems with regard to arranging travel and accommodation as well as the potential legal,
language and cultural difficulties of courtroom understanding. In India, for example a civil case could be
brought using the Fatal Accidents Act and Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (or via a
consumer route under consumer protection legislation). But 95% of cases are dismissed because there is
not a culture of professional critique (Howze, 2007). If a favourable judgement is handed down in an
overseas jurisdiction – to what extent is this enforceable or likely to ensure a significant financial award?
Patients should be made aware that other countries might have different malpractice laws and legal
traditions and these will impact on the size of malpractice payouts. One reason US health care is so
expensive is the size of malpractice premiums, an indication that US citizens are litigious and value their
right to seek legal redress. Unti (2009) cites the example of professional liability insurance premiums for
surgeons in India that are estimated at only 4% the premium for a similar practicing surgeon in New York.
137. Informed-consent practices for undergoing procedures vary around the world, and may in fact not
be available in some countries. What happens if there is a complication and the patient‘s subsequent
necessary spell in the Intensive Care Unit is beyond their ability to pay? Will the hospital repatriate the
body of a patient who dies on the operating table? What if the patient acquires VRSA, HIV or Clostridium
difficile while an in-patient at the overseas hospital? As suggested earlier, there are strong arguments that
consent is given in writing.
138. The current legal uncertainly with regard to medical tourism raises key issues for those providing
medical tourism treatments and services. As Vick (2010) suggests ―By promoting their services across
international borders to attract overseas patients, clinics may not appreciate that they may become subject
to the jurisdiction and laws of those countries, with important implications for litigation and insurance
cover‖.
139. New insurance products exist that do provide legal and financial protection for the patient should
medical malpractice arise while they are overseas undergoing treatment, and such insurance and financial
services are increasingly becoming available. Clearly with such products the devil is often in the detail and
medical tourists need to check carefully any exemptions the policy may carry. It may also be advisable for
medical tourist brokers to consider insurance cover for themselves given they potentially could become
subject to claims for damages whether via commercial or criminal routes.
140. Issues clinics are well advised to pay close attention to include:
fully informed consent and consideration of risk, particularly when there are vulnerable patients
(including those with psychological issues, the seriously ill, and children)
38
clarifying the relationships of the clinic and its surgical and clinical staff
141. Beyond the liability of brokers, surgeons and clinics, what are potential liability issues for Health
Maintenance Organizations that decide to include overseas providers within their suite of referrals? Under
such circumstances should they be expected to validate the credentials of physicians, and are they likely to
be subject to vicarious liability, or is this avoidable through disclaimers? Within some states in the US,
regulatory power over health insurance will prevent those insurers within the state from offering plans that
require the insured to travel overseas to receive healthcare services (Cohen, 2010).
142. In summary, there are several important issues relating to the legal context and redress
mechanisms available to medical tourists. Should regulation be introduced to tackle the range of issues
outlined above and, if so, how would it operate? Furthermore, what legal information is available to
prospective and actual medical tourists? A starting point is the requirement to comprehensively review
national frameworks and practices in terms of legal redress, and to review and analyse the experience of
bilateral legal proceedings to date. Legal remedies are dealt with in Section Seven.
Ethical dimensions
143. An established framework for healthcare ethics suggests the importance of:
Autonomy (respecting a person‘s right to be their own person and make their own decisions, and
ensuring those are reasoned informed choices).
Nonmaleficence (avoid doing harm and endeavour to reduce risk – whilst all treatments will
involve some measure of harm, it should not be disproportionate to the treatment benefits).
Justice (consider benefits, risks and costs distribution; patients in similar positions should be
treated in a similar manner) (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001).
144. To what extent do these hold for medical tourism? At its root medical tourism is underpinned by
trade in health services and competition amongst providers. Whilst there have always been some traditions
of fee for service, medical tourism is qualitatively different – what is the balance of commercial and
professional ethics? Price as an allocation mechanism in the competitive marketplace provides the
opportunity to avoid long waiting lists in the home country but also – within an unregulated market – to
offer unproven and potentially illegal treatments. Moreover, does medical tourism reflect deeper ethical
dilemmas such as existing forms of health care funding and delivery that allow the number of uninsured to
grow (cf Pennings, 2007)?
145. Who should fund the treatment of any medical complications and adverse health outcomes for
patients returning from overseas private surgery? Should a patient‘s local health care system take on the
responsibility and foot the bill for post-operative care including treatment for complications and side-
effects? Discussions in the US, UK and Australia have all pointed towards costs being imposed on publicly
funded health systems and the implications for local population health (e.g. exacerbating waiting lists even
further) (Cheung and Wilson, 2007, Jeevan and Armstrong, 2008, Barrowman et al., 2010).
39
146. As outlined in Section Five, medical tourism raises particular issues when treatments are carried
out in LMIC destinations. Questions include whether economic and health benefits trickle down to local
populations (Mudur, 2004, Bose, 2005, Sengupta and Nundy, 2005, Meghani, 2011) and does the use of
local health care professionals, doctors and nurses reduce the level and quality of health provision for local
populations.
147. Different ethical standards may operate in different parts of the world due to religious and
cultural differences, for example in relation to treatments including fertility therapy, organ donation and
plastic surgery. Stem-cell therapy may not involve fully developed notions of informed consent and there
may be little involvement of ethics review boards compared to practices within developed countries
(MacReady, 2009). Some countries may seek to provide treatments that are illegal or highly experimental
in other countries (Cortez, 2008). For example, rewarded kidney donation is controversial and even illegal
in some parts of the world but not in others (Rouchi et al., 2009). There are major concerns about the
vulnerability of organ donors motivated by financial incentives (The Declaration of Istanbul of Organ
Trafficking and Transplant Tourism has condemned transplant tourism and the associated practices).
Particular worries concern the possibility of poor aftercare and absence of separate clinical advocacy for
donors. Officially it has become illegal for the organs of executed Chinese prisoners to be made available
for transplant to foreign transplant tourists (Rhodes and Schiano, 2010). Questions remain, however, over
how transplant programmes in high-income countries should deal with returning patients who have
managed to circumvent overseas restrictions.
148. Given that ability to pay rather than need alone is the allocative mechanism in the medical
tourism market, there are concerns that commercial rather than professional priorities are privileged in
decision-making. This may include unnecessary or multiple treatments being offered to patients. There are
also treatments where there are more likely to be associated psychological factors than with the broader
population – such as those seeking cosmetic surgery who may have associated conditions such as body
dysmorphic disorder (Grossbart and Sarwer, 2003).
149. Human stem-cell therapies are a controversial procedure and scientifically are of unproven value,
especially as beauty therapies. Within the medical tourism field there are examples of countries offering
stem-cell therapies targeted at specific conditions including Parkinson‘s, stroke and brain infections. What
should be made of such treatments given there are no clinical trials to assess efficacy and effectiveness?
The pursuit of unproven – and even dangerous – therapies across national boundaries may be particularly
marketed as treatments for desperate patients who cannot obtain these in their own country of origin. There
are particular ethical issues when these are pursued for children (Zarzeczny and Caulfield, 2010), and
complex ethical dilemmas of ‗hopeful‘ treatments being marketed to those who are gravely ill (Murdoch
and Scott, 2010).
150. There are therefore many potential roles for professional associations, regulatory authorities and
domestic physicians in counselling, advising, providing information and in the extreme possibly deterring
would-be medical tourists. Such activity itself needs to be balanced with consideration of the principle of
patient autonomy.
40
SECTION SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
151. Despite high-profile media interest and coverage, there is a lack of hard research evidence on the
role and impact of medical tourism. Whilst there is an increasing amount written on the subject of medical
tourism, such material is hardly ever evidence-based. In light of this, our broad review outlines key health
policy considerations, and draws attention to significant gaps in the research evidence. In order to make
sense of the diversity of material and the gaps in extant knowledge, it is worth framing the conclusions and
recommendations in terms of Frenk‘s (1994) framework for health policy analysis. This hierarchical
framework presents four levels within any health system: systemic (regulation and finance), programmatic
(system priorities), organisational (service management) and instrumental (clinical interface with patients).
System issues
152. Key issues at this level relate to the finance and regulation of medical tourism. Despite concerns
generated by the current financial crisis, there is no sign that economic liberalization is slowing down. As
the trading opportunities in other sectors become exhausted, as experience within services trade generally
expands, and as the financial climate stabilises, countries will increasingly look to the opportunities that
international trade in services has to offer. For importing services, this will centre on cost, quality and
timeliness. For exporting services, this will centre on technology transfer, skill enhancements and foreign
income.
153. At present, medical tourism is driven by commercial interests lying outside of organised and
state-run health policy-making and delivery. Are there possibilities to bring it more within the remit of
domestic policy competency, involving for example third-party payers sending patients overseas? Given
the heavily ‗politicized‘ nature of health care in all countries (even those with substantial private health
care sectors), there will also be concerns about the threats this poses, including aspects related to brain
drain, quality of care and equity. The Crisp Report (2007), commissioned to look at how UK experience
and expertise in health could be used to best effect to help improve health in developing countries, argues
that by engaging in country-level agreements, and drawing up Memorandum of Understandings between
two countries, international recruitment of health professionals can be done ethically and based on a
‗twinning‘ arrangement of reciprocal movement and benefit. If an agreement is achieved to send patients
abroad on a more bi-lateral basis, then this may open channels for other agreements such as these, which
can then combine international recruitment with training and work experience programmes to address brain
drain issues in the importing country. If such a route were taken, this would effectively be a form of
outsourcing, with such agreement typically following the well-worn tracks of medical tourist mobility. At
this point medical tourism would begin to merge into other forms of patient mobility (EU-cross border care
and state-sponsored outsourcing).
154. Countries continue to evaluate their positions on trade liberalization in health, as part of wider bi-
lateral, regional and multilateral trade agreements. The latter especially has been the focus of debate,
centred on the World Trade Organization‘s General Agreement on Trade in Services (Blouin et al., 2006).
However, there is widespread recognition that the trade agenda (in services generally, and health
specifically) is increasingly pursued at the regional or bi-lateral levels (Smith et al., 2009a). Not only have
multi-lateral trade negotiations ‗stalled‘ with the ongoing Doha round of WTO trade negotiations, but
neighbouring countries often have similar culture, language and economic systems, as well as shorter
41
travel times, facilitating engagement in trade relations. As a result, trading blocs, such as the European
Union (EU) or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have developed, where a significant
proportion of international trade takes place. Additionally, many countries bypass the GATS system and
engage in direct bi-lateral trade agreements (Smith et al., 2009a). Could this development be broadened to
include medical tourist exchanges with countries where travel distance are longer, culture and language
less familiar, but where cost savings to the public purse are more apparent?
155. This is an important shift in the dialogue, as greater bi-lateral and regional trade may reduce
many of the concerns expressed over health services trade, and offer greater benefits. For instance, it may
result in greater quality assurance, as well as better litigation procedures. However, much of the research
evidence, anecdote and opinion on trade in health services remain focussed on this multi-lateral
perspective. It is important, therefore, to explore bi-lateral trade in more detail, and to assess how it
compares to multi-lateral trade. Such a focus would move discussion from the level of global medical
tourism to more specific bilateral exchanges – for particular treatments, under specific quality-assured
conditions (Smith et al., 2011c).
156. Beyond the national level, medical tourism raises questions for trans-national and global
structures and processes. How, indeed if at all, should the medical tourism industry be best regulated, and
where is intervention most likely to be effective? There is currently a lack of agreed international standards
for assessing and ensuring quality and safety of medical tourism providers and health professionals, and no
obligation for them to ensure quality and safety other than an ethical one. Currently, there is no universal
―official agency/group‖, such as the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the World Tourism
Organization or the World Trade Organization, engaged in either the delivery of accreditation, the co-
ordination of delivery of accreditation, or licensing or studying the existing schemes that deliver
accreditation. There is a range of possible solutions (both national and transnational) ranging from
interventions that provide more information (although by whom and at what points is not clear); those that
restrict choice of potential consumers (either directly prohibited or through discouragement); or attempts to
restrict supply (whether approving or licensing providers or intermediaries). There are also interventions
that may aim to offer consumer protection around poor-quality treatments which could involve
encouraging independent holistic accreditation by recognised schemes, advising that clinicians responsible
for delivering services take out personal medical indemnity which would compensate their patients in the
event of problems occurring as a consequence of their seeking healthcare, or requiring medical tourists to
take out insurance coverage (Cohen, 2010). Source health systems may attempt to shift risk onto individual
medical tourists, for example with disclaimers to prevent medical tourists from seeking to rectify poor
outcomes at cost to the public purse.
Programme issues
157. What are the programme priorities surrounding medical tourism for both source and destination
countries? As outlined, medical tourist choice may lead to externalities at the system and programme level.
Costs may result from overseas cosmetic surgery or dental work that requires subsequent treatment within
home countries. There are few case reports or studies of these aspects and the scale of any problem is not
clear. Large numbers of medical tourists will also impact on the source country‘s own health system,
because outflows reduce both revenue and support for local services. Patients who circumvent waiting
times make access and equity for the wider population more problematic. Opportunities for financial
benefit from medical tourism include potentially exerting competitive pressure on systems importing
health care and may help drive down the costs and prices offered in domestic systems, or relaxing legal
restictions in order to stimulate domestic provision of treatments.
158. Most countries that engage in delivering care to medical tourists do so to increase their level of
direct foreign exchange earnings. Some countries may promote health services in order to develop facilities
42
to better serve local patients, although the possibility of resources being diverted from the domestic
population and invested into private hospitals and away from rural areas remains a potential dysfunctional
outcome. Similarly, whilst the prospect of reversing the international brain drain is very positive, there are
concerns that medical tourism will cause an internal brain drain, with health professionals leaving the
public health system to work for the hospitals that attract medical tourists.
159. Research is needed on the economic impact for source and destination countries, particularly
those low- and middle-income countries where there is speculation but little evidence about the impact of
medical tourism treatments on local citizens, either in a health sense or indeed an economic sense. Country
case studies of such state-driven support for medical tourism would be a useful starting point to better
understand the positive and negative impacts on country finances and populations of involvement with
medical tourism.
160. In terms of management of services and treatments, there are continuing questions about the
range of information and its quality. Given the role of the internet, how (if at all) the quality of medical
tourism information is best addressed is unclear: ranging from codes of conduct, through quality labels,
user guidance tool, third-party quality and accreditation labels, to educating users and assisting those
wishing to search (Lunt et al., 2010). Frontier medicine and the marketing of biotechnologies present a
particular issue (Murdoch and Scott, 2010) given that such treatments may not be based on proven clinical
trials.
161. A number of business models (e.g. brokers, ownership forms) are emerging within medical
tourism. These should be better documented and understood, including their strengths and drawbacks, as
well as the implications for managing quality, safety and risk. The relations of emerging business models
(e.g. partnership, multinational providers) and patterns and trends of accreditation require investigation.
162. The roles and responsibilities of clinicians and healthcare providers within both provider
countries and countries of origin, and organisations responsible for credentialing and continuing
professional development of clinicians in provider countries, require clarification regarding their duties in
relation to patients who seek help and advice in advance of engaging in medical tourism. What is the role
of informing, persuading and advocating for individuals that intend to travel abroad, and the role on return?
What about the public health dimensions, such as pre-travel vaccination, anti-malarial prophylaxis etc.?
How may publicly-funded providers and professional associations be involved? Should clinical ethics
committees with lay membership have a greater role?
163. At the clinical interface the normal continuum of care may be interrupted. Full medical
documentation, both pre and post-treatment, is crucial in order to minimise risk. In the UK, signed
informed consent prior to an elective procedure is considered best practice and a standard requirement
ensuring that patients are fully informed as to the benefits and adverse effects of a procedure or treatment.
Patient-clinician dialogue may be problematic given language and distance, and treatment decisions may
be unduly influenced by patients having already arrived in the destination country for pre-treatment
consultation. Relatively little is known about readmission, morbidity and mortality following self-funded
medical treatment abroad. Within treatment speciality there is a need to link together reports of adverse
infection control or sub-optimal outcomes. Any legal cases that are pursued should also be documented so
that it is possible to build national and international understanding of the implications of trade in health
services.
43
Summary
164. The central conclusion from this review is that there is a grave lack of systematic data concerning
health services trade, both overall and at a disaggregated level in terms of individual modes of delivery,
and of specific countries. This is both in terms of the trade itself, as well as its implications. For instance,
there is little robust evidence that medical tourism adds especially to the economies of destination
countries, as figures tend to be quoted in aggregate, but not at the marginal level of the additional tourist-
related income specifically resulting from medical tourism. This review has also touched upon overarching
legal and ethical considerations surrounding medical tourism. Prior to considering any regulation we need
more information and understanding (cf. Smith et al., 2009a).
165. Research and evaluation has not kept pace with the development of medical tourism and there is
a need for national governments and potentially international bodies (e.g. EU, OECD, WHO) to invest in
research this area. To this end, the UK National Institute for Health Research has recently commissioned
research on the implications for the NHS of inward and outward medical tourism and it is hoped that the
evidence generated from this study will help inform the development of future policy and practice in this
area (Lunt et al., 2011).
166. The lack of data is significant if countries are to keep fully informed about the significance
(potential or actual) of medical tourism for their health systems. Mechanisms are needed that help us track
the balance of trade around medical tourism on a regular basis. The evidence base is scant to enable us to
assess who benefits and who loses out at the level of system, programme, organisation and treatment. On
balance there is a pressing need to explore further as to whether medical tourism is virus, symptom, or
cure.
44
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54
RECENT RELATED OECD PUBLICATIONS
ACHIEVING BETTER VALUE FOR MONEY IN HEALTH CARE (2009), OECD HEALTH POLICY
STUDIES
THE LOOMING CRISIS IN THE HEALTH WORKFORCE: CAN OECD COUNTRIES RESPOND? (2008)
LONG-TERM CARE FOR OLDER PEOPLE (2005), OECD HEALTH PROJECT SERIES
HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES AND DECISION MAKING (2005), OECD HEALTH PROJECT SERIES
55
Chapter 8
This chapter contains the opinions, analysis, and statements of the author. It is the
responsibility of every reader to evaluate the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of
any information, opinion, advice, or other content contained in this chapter.
Successful business enterprises typically provide smart solutions to fill a market demand.
Sustainable solutions not only meet market demand, but also provide high perceived quality. In
healthcare, quality focused and patient safety practices yielding positive medical outcomes have
become the hallmark of successful hospital strategies. As hospitals consider expanding into the
medical tourism market, transitioning from a traditional domestic strategy to global outreach
requires a fundamental shift from a focus on purely domestic quality agendas to expanding and
including strategies that proactively address cultural bias, social/psychological preferences, travel
constraints, and effective transitions of care to the locally based provider.
Medical tourism is a nascent industry. In this chapter we review quality program development.
In summary we aim to
1. Define the different medical tourism groupings and general patient flow.
2. Identify resulting medical tourism risks (that quality programs seek to manage).
3. Highlight the importance of transparency to manage risks.
4. Outline system-level quality and propose tools to support quality initiatives.
5. Suggest medical tourism quality outcomes measures (medical, functional, patient satisfac-
tion) as well as patient preference groupings.
To put quality initiatives in context, Figure 8.1 summarizes the general strategic development of
a medical tourism strategy.
65
66 ◾ Handbook of Medical Tourism Program Development
Measurement
Market Demand
• Impact of program on
Assessment
overall strategy
• Identify markets (focus
• Impact of program on
groups, interviews)
patient outcomes
• Define services and costs
(medical, functional, and
• Distribution channels
social/psychological)
Risk Assessment
• Based on market demand,
identify risks (market,
patient, medical treatment
and transfer)
• Evaluate quality programs to
mitigate risks (proactive)
This chapter does not define market demand assessment, but does outline the two general
demand groupings (general and selective medical tourists) and two general venues (domestic
and international). It also provides important ideas regarding risk assessment for these groupings
and venues, how quality initiatives can mitigate these risks, and the measurement of outcomes
(medical, functional, social/psychological). At the end of the chapter are recommended metrics for
the industry to begin assessing medical and social outcomes of medical tourism.
* A hospital that provides specialty services typically associated with high volume and positive medical outcomes.
Although the U.S. government has criteria for the term, some hospitals and insurers have created their own
criteria for defining a Center of Excellence.
† “Relation between hospital orthopaedic specialization and outcomes in patients aged 65 and older: Retrospective
analysis of U.S. Medicare data,” BMJ 2010; 340 doi 10.1136/bmj.c165 (Published 11 February 2010).
‡ “Provider volume and clinical outcomes in surgery: Issues and implications,” Lee, Clara N., MD, MPP, Daly,
John M., MD, FACS: June 2002, Bulletin of the American College of Surgeons.
Quality and Safety Transparency ◾ 67
Figure 8.2 Diagram of the relationship between selective and general medical tourism.
occurs as an “exception,” and is termed selective medical tourism. Selective medical tourism is
driven by specialization, typically at important institutions (Centers of Excellence) with proven
medical quality outcomes.
The concept of medical care outsourcing for complex cases or selective treatments is not a new
idea; however, the expansion of the concept to attract patients in the general population (general
medical tourism) requires a shift in focus. General medical tourism defines those cases where an
individual selects an alternative (not home-based) venue to receive medical treatment. The general
medical tourist typically seeks treatment for a straightforward intervention, including elective and
cosmetic treatments, at a reasonable cost. The medical treatment may take place in a hospital that
is not considered a Center of Excellence. Competition for these services is growing; therefore cost
(rather than specialization) is often an important criterion. Selective medical tourism is a subset of
general medical tourism. See Figure 8.2.
Home Cross-Border
Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation
Hatched boxes
represent a
typical patient
Patient flow if there Home
Home
or home was not a Hospital
provider medical
initiate tourism event
medical
tourism
event
Home Cross-Border
Provider Hospital
Cross-Border
Provider Medical treatment risk (domestic
Transition risk (medical and
geographic) (domestic and and international):
international): - Risk of the treatment, procedure,
- Evidence-based fit-to-fly guidelines intervention
- Cross-border hotel amenities - System-level quality
- Followup care upon return - Clinical expertise
◾◾ Medical treatment/intervention
◾◾ Travel, transition of care (medical transition, getting to and from the destination and follow-
up care)
Successful management of these aspects increases the likelihood of a positive medical outcome.
These two aspects of a medical tourism event are susceptible to four distinct risks*: market risk,
transition risk, medical treatment risk, and patient risk. Effective identification and management
of these risks increases likelihood of a quality medical outcome.
In a domestic medical tourism event, the market in which the care is received is similar to the
home environment so there are limited compatibility risks. However, when the event is interna-
tional, there is not only market risk, but the market characteristics influence the other risk groups.
Market risk assessment requires a solid understanding of the market elements that could affect a
safe patient journey. These include regulations regarding medical device and pharmaceutical import-
ing, the level of healthcare innovation, as well as the importance of efficiency and effectiveness. For
example, if a patient elects to undergo knee replacement surgery in an international market, match-
ing the device regulations to the home market is critical both for follow-up care (a home doctor may
refuse to manage a complication on a device that is not accepted in the home market) as well as for a
positive medical outcome (if the inserted device fails in a shorter period of time than other options).
Another example is Singapore, which has a strong medical quality history including superior blood
management and supply protocols. However, the donor population could potentially be infected
with dengue,* adding a patient safety issue that might be important to an individual (who may
prefer to bring his own blood). Finally, matching legal liability differences may also be important to
identify, particularly if a patient is receiving care in a market with substantially different malpractice
regulations. Market risk affects all other risks (transition, medical treatment, and patient).
Transition risk refers to both the administrative management of the travel itself, as well as the
clinical components of ensuring fitness to fly/travel and coordinating medical follow-up when
the patient returns home. For example, a patient seeking bariatric banding may determine that the
procedure does not require any follow-up at home. However, both in terms of clinical outcomes
and creating transparency, all treatments are ideally discussed with the home provider to ensure a
complete patient history.
An important development in reducing transition risk of a medical tourism event is the advance-
ment of telemedicine. Telemedicine is defined as “the use of medical information exchanged from
one site to another via electronic communications for the health and education of the patient or
healthcare provider and for the purpose of improving patient care. Telemedicine includes consul-
tative, diagnostic, and treatment services.Ӡ Advancing telemedicine techniques will support the
globalization of healthcare by enabling the distant medical provider to follow up with the patient
directly rather than solely depending on the home provider.
Medical treatment risk identifies the potential hazards that arise from the treatment and include
a clinical and facility components. Here are four types of risk typically identified.
◾◾ System risk: The chance that a bottleneck in the hospital system will negatively affect patient
safety (e.g., patient discharge was delayed due to the attending physician being on vacation,
ensuring equipment use is understood and practiced regularly, use of checklists, practices to
manage similar sounding drug names)
◾◾ Medical risk: The hazard of the medical treatment itself (e.g., the chance of a poor medical
outcome, impact of comorbid conditions, new and available technology)
◾◾ Human management risk: the risk that the clinical expertise or sufficient patient care is not
available (e.g., the chance that the attending physician is not apprised of best practices for a
new surgery or medical technology)
◾◾ Infrastructure risk: the chance that something will go wrong due to poor infrastructure man-
agement (e.g., the patient had an adverse outcome because of the lack of necessary equip-
ment such as an MRI machine needed to diagnose a head injury and necessary treatment)
2010.
70 ◾ Handbook of Medical Tourism Program Development
Patient risk for medical tourism treatments includes not only basic medical underwriting (e.g.,
assessing the individual risk of the treatment due to high body mass index (BMI), smoking his-
tory, chronic diseases, etc.), but also environmental underwriting (e.g., risks associated with the
home or medical tourism venue that could complicate a positive medical outcome including pol-
lution levels, infectious diseases, and food-borne illnesses), and personal preferences (e.g., if the
patient feels strongly about the country having a positive human rights track record, or if the
person is afraid of being away from family and friends for a long period of time). All of these issues
affect a patient outcome. With these risks effectively identified, the development of quality and
safety transparency begins.
Patient Identify the difference between the home and medical tourism
destination corruption levels for possible communication or behavior
concerns
Medical treatment Identify differences in hospital and healthcare regulations between the
home and medical tourism destination and how market transparency
could affect (e.g., counterfeit medicines, using a medical device that is
not supported by evidence-based medicine, etc.)
Map the likelihood of an adverse event based on the identified market
differences
includes understanding the difference between the patient market and the target medical tour-
ism market so that gaps are identified and addressed. Table 8.1 identifies some important issues
to consider.
* Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century, National Academies
Press; 1 edition (July 18, 2001).
† Donabedian, A., 1988, “The quality of care: How can it be assessed” JAMA 260, (12); 1743–1748.
72 ◾ Handbook of Medical Tourism Program Development
Accreditation
Hospital accreditation seeks to improve healthcare delivery and quality of care. The concept is
broadly accepted by the international community including the World Health Organization
(WHO) which views accreditation as an important component of healthcare quality.*
Internationally, there are many hospital credentialing groups including: Trent Accreditation
Scheme (United Kingdom–Europe), Joint Commission International (JCI; United States),
Australian Council for Healthcare Standards International (ACHSI), and the Canadian Council
on Health Services (CCHSA). If your hospital strategy is focused on targeting one specific
country, consider the accreditation most closely associated with it. Additional domestic and
international safety standards include ISQUA (International Society for Quality HealthCare).
In 1999 it launched the International Accreditation Programme (IAP), designed to “Accredit
the Accreditors.Ӡ
Patient Safety
Patient safety focuses on prevention of errors leading to adverse events. This can include physi-
cal patient safety (avoiding slips and falls) and negative medical outcomes such as postsurgical
infections. Safety includes continuous identification of potentially harmful issues and methods to
measure and manage them.
Along with the vast quality credentialing and safety approaches, there are growing informa-
tion resources on the Internet that offer information on safety issues that potential patients can
access. These information sources may create both real and imagined quality obstacles that hospi-
tals should be able to address. Consider the availability of instant online information in the form
of “Google Alerts” and as well as the impact of country geography (tsunamis, pandemics, etc.).
Proactively identify, address, and communicate safety issues that may be present in your environ-
ment. Both hospital and patient safety initiatives primarily work to reduce medical treatment risk.
Errors of ignorance can be reduced by research, knowledge sharing, and incentives to use best
international evidence-based medicine when treating a patient. Evidence-based medicine develop-
ment includes identifying clinical information needs, searching published objective literature for
findings, and application to a clinical pathway.§
* http://www.emro.who.int/mei/HA.htm
† ISQua website: http://www.isqua.org/accreditations.htm. Extracted 21 November 2010.
‡ Gawande, A., The Checklist Manifesto. Metropolitan Books; 1st edition (December 22, 2009).
§ Sackett, D.L.; Rosenberg, W.M.; Gray, J.A.; Haynes, R.B.; and Richardson, W.S. (1996). Evidence based medi-
Errors of ineptitude can be reduced by adopting best practices through the use of checklists.
Checklists, or lists of items that need to be completed before completing a procedure, treatment, or
surgery, are a growing source of discussion in the medical field.* Sample surgical checklists (aimed
at transparency) collect information confirming patient status, specific steps required in the brief-
ing process, contingency plans with defined action items listed, as well as a debriefing of the episode
postsurgery including counting instruments. The World Health Organization offers a surgical safety
checklist and documentation in concert with the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (www.ihi.
org).† In both instances, transparency in information (defining the particular best practice), and use
of checklists (to identify action items) emerge as consistent with a best medical practice.
◾◾ Market Risk
−− Depending on your strategy (general or selective medical tourism; domestic or interna-
tional patients) identify potential risks, and proactively manage.
◾◾ Transition Risk
−− Access evidence-based guidelines on fitness to fly or travel for medical care.
−− Ensure appropriate accommodations including culture-specific issues (local language televi-
sion) as well as physical site issues (telephone in the bathroom, wheelchair accommodation).
−− Identify potential transition risks including: pharmaceutical management (pre- and
posttreatment), local regulations regarding durable medical equipment or medical
device sourcing.
−− Create a standard process to communicate and confirm follow-up treatment with the
local provider, including follow-up assessments up to 36 months post discharge
−− Create measurements to identify (internally) management of the transition risks (both
clinical and geographic).
◾◾ Medical Treatment Risk
−− If checklists are part of the surgical process, document which were included and affect
patient safety, evaluate impact of use on patient outcome.
−− Identify best practices for the procedure, treatment, or intervention and the general
clinical pathway.
−− Create a case management protocol for internal use to identify clinical and social issues
potentially impeding a positive medical outcome.
◾◾ Patient Risk
−− Identify medical, environmental, and personal preference risks specific to your hospital
strategy.
* Gawande, A.l, The Checklist Manifesto, Metropolitan Books; First Edition (December 22, 2009). New York, NY.
† W H O S u r g i c a l S a f e t y C h e c k l i s t : h t t p : // w w w. i h i . o r g / I H I / P r o g r a m s / I m p r o v e m e n t M a p /
WHOSurgicalSafetyChecklist.htm (extracted 22 November 2010)
74 ◾ Handbook of Medical Tourism Program Development
With these four risk groupings evaluated and proactively managed prior to the medical treatment,
assess medical outcomes posttreatment.
Measuring Outcomes
Medical approaches are affected by culture. From the practice of alternative treatments in China,
to the aggressive medical treatments in the United States,* understanding the medical approach
(and managing patient expectations) is important to a long-term positive outcome. Although it is
difficult to separate the physician from the culture, the impact on outcomes is even less obvious.
For this reason, the mapping of both clinical as well as patient satisfaction rates is critical to the
growth of the industry.
Overall health outcome measures refer to the impact of the treatment on the patient (all things
being equal). For medical tourism treatments for the general population, collect data on three
aspects of medical tourism: (1) medical outcomes, (2) patient improvement and functional health,
and (3) patient satisfaction.
Each hospital may collect outcome data on specific issues; however, for potential comparison
purposes in the medical tourism arena, the following medical outcome data are suggested:
◾◾ Surgical site infection rates: Postoperative infection is a major cause of patient injury, mor-
tality and healthcare cost. Specifically, in the United States:†
−− An estimated 2.6% of 30 million operations are complicated by surgical site infections
(SSIs) annually.
−− Infection rates up to 11% are reported for certain types of operations.
−− Each infection is estimated to increase a hospital stay by an average of 7 days and add
over $3,000 in charges (1992 data).
−− Appropriate preoperative administration of antibiotics is effective in preventing infection.
◾◾ Readmission rates within seven and 30 days (both for initial diagnosis as well as any other
diagnosis): Readmissions are an important quality metric pointing to potential quality issues
in the initial patient stay. Categorizing the type of readmission (related and nonrelated to
the initial admission) is important to capture, as it provides insight into both quality and
population characteristics. As an example, the Mayo Clinic defines a hospital readmission
as a patient admitted to a hospital within seven days after being discharged from an earlier
hospital stay. The standard benchmark used by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
(CMS) is the seven-day readmission rate. Rates at the 75th percentile or lower are considered
optimal by CMS.‡
◾◾ Mortality rates and discharge status: to capture patients discharged to home, or to hotel or
a long-term care facility. Basic discharge status options: discharged to home, discharged to
hotel, discharged to rehabilitation, and death.
There are challenges collecting these data,§ particularly if hospitals are not required to provide
them to a regulatory body. If the results are not audited, assessing validity and reliability can be
* Payer, L.. Medicine and Culture, New York: Holt Paperbacks (November 15, 1996).
† Institute for Healthcare Improvement: http://www.ihi.org/IHI/Topics/PatientSafety/SurgicalSiteInfections/
(extracted 22 November 2010).
‡ Mayo Clinic website: http://www.mayoclinic.org/quality/readmission-rates.html (extracted 24 November 2010).
§ Any analysis of medical outcomes requires a robust assessment of demographics and diagnoses to ensure case
problematic, particularly in corrupt markets. This could discourage sharing outcome data pub-
licly. One alternative is to give an international governing group the authority to verify the veracity
of results, so that there is a perceived fair environment. Alternatively, objective and licensed third-
party administrators or licensed insurers could also fulfill this role.
Assess patient satisfaction and functional status. For patient improvement and functional status,
consider using the Short Form 36 (SF 36) questionnaire (developed by RAND) at both pre- and
posttreatments. The SF 36 surveys patient health and is used in economic studies as a variable in
the calculation of a Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY). QALYs are used in studies to measure the
cost-effectiveness of procedures or treatments.
The original SF 36 was constructed by the RAND Corporation (http://rand.org) and is a
multipurpose survey profiling both functional health and well-being. It is a generic measure rather
than disease- or age-specific. The questionnaire has been translated in more than 50 countries as
part of the International Quality of Life Assessment (IQOLA) Project.*
The SF survey evaluates patient health from the following perspectives: health perception (and
change over time), physical limitations and impact on personal life, personal mental health (feel-
ings of negativity or uselessness), and the individual’s perspective on physical impairments. A
critical advantage of the SF approach is that the survey has been tested in multiple languages. This
enables the beginning of documentation regarding health improvement (or deterioration) upon
completing a medical tourism treatment. This approach, therefore, includes a cultural sensitivity
that may be lacking in other methodologies.
Patient satisfaction surveys should be designed to address the specific medical tourism grouping
(general or selective) as well as venue (domestic or international). Surveys should include satisfac-
tion with the medical treatment, the medical outcome, the provider’s capabilities and communica-
tion, the hotel or rehabilitation accommodations (functional, social, and longevity), and the ease
of transitioning back home to receive follow-up care.
Although follow-ups after 7 days and 30 days after discharge occur, for the medical tourism
patient, perform overall follow-ups for up to 36 months posthospital discharge to ensure solid
understanding of issues in health, transitioning care, follow-up treatment, and any personal behav-
ioral changes as a result of the experience.
An additional aspect to medical outcomes analysis particular to medical tourism is to profile
the demographics of your patient base. This information enables retrospective review of market
characteristics, which can be linked to patient outcomes. Specifically, track the following demo-
graphic data:
◾◾ Reasons for medical tourism event: where the medical tourist emerged and reason he or she
sought medical tourism
◾◾ Insurances: insurances held (or not; including travel insurance)
◾◾ Travel history: passports held, languages spoken, last time on a flight, frequent flyer status,
general use of Internet to book travel, and so forth
◾◾ Preferences and fears: country requirements (e.g., human rights or personal safety), personal
concerns/fears. Fears are important to identify as they may impede an otherwise healthy
medical outcome and include issues such as, “I am worried I will not understand my doctor,
fearful of the long flight, and missing my family and friends.”
With these cumulative data, hospitals can identify quality gaps and opportunities to proactively
address patient concerns and preferences.
This chapter contains the opinions, analysis, and statements of the author. It is the
responsibility of every reader to evaluate the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of
any information, opinion, advice, or other content contained in this chapter.
Tracy H. Simons
President, Custom Assurance Placements, Ltd.
How does the liability exposure of the medical travel industry affect you? The question that seems
to be on everyone’s mind is,“What if something goes wrong for a medical traveler?”
Stakeholders have done a good job in setting standards of care for the medical travel industry.
There is an AMA recommendation on the topic of medical tourism. In addition there are many
other studies and scholars who have explored and published findings about the criteria for setting
benchmarks for quality care in the medical travel industry. Stakeholders are using provider cre-
dentialing tools, developing procedures for medical records, hiring medical professionals to advise
patients, implementing privacy protections, and introducing many other services to provide high-
quality care and service to medical travelers. However, the industry is still in the developmental
stages of setting self-regulating guidelines to determine what the quality and safety requirements
should include and where the liability for administrators, facilitators, hospitals, employers, and
individuals begins and ends.
It has taken several years to develop insurance solutions that provide coverage for all the
aspects of liability for all the stakeholders involved. The products are continuously changing as
claim exposure is realized through loss experience and exposures are assessed and understood in
international settings. What are the known exposures?
77
78 ◾ Handbook of Medical Tourism Program Development
The individual will look to a “professional advisor” (i.e., facilitator), receiving hospital, or
employer to solve unforeseen problems during the course of travel or while under care. He or she will
have an expectation of knowledge that is assumed from verbal and published descriptions of service,
from descriptions of high-quality medical care, and from any other direct, implied, or assumed level
of expertise that is expected by the client. This exposure is called “managed healthcare liability.”
Managed healthcare liability, broadly defined, includes services and activities performed
whether by the organization itself or performed by others on the organization’s behalf (vicarious
liability) and it includes these activities whether they are provided on paper, in person, electroni-
cally, or in any other form.
Services and activities include all of the following:
◾◾ Provider selection
◾◾ Utilization review
◾◾ Care coordination
◾◾ Advertising, marketing, selling, or enrollment for sponsored benefit plans
◾◾ Claim services
◾◾ Establishing provider networks
◾◾ Reviewing the quality of medical services or providing quality assurance; design or imple-
mentation of financial incentive plans
◾◾ Wellness or health promotion education
◾◾ Development or implementation of clinical guidelines, practice parameters, or protocols
◾◾ Approval of payment for covered medical services or directives on what services would
be allowable
◾◾ Services or activities performed in the selection, administration, servicing, or management
of, including but not limited to, handling records in conjunction with such plans, or affect-
ing enrollment, termination, or cancelation of coverage for participants under such plans.
In the medical travel arena, this can be broadened to include other aspects of the services
provided by a medical travel service stakeholder, and then adding the exposure of an interna-
tional setting.
Risk management provides a solution, and a venue to stand out from the competition. There
are two lines of defense, liability insurance and accident insurance. Insurance has helped indus-
tries be on the developing edge of emerging markets by allowing those at risk to transfer it to an
insurer. This is evidenced from the first ship that was insured from a coffee house in London,
which later became known as Lloyd’s of London.
Risk Management and Liability Mitigation in the Medical Travel Industry ◾ 79
◾◾ Liability Insurance
−− Managed healthcare liability
• Includes vicarious liability—the liability associated with the act of another party.
• Includes defense costs.
• Includes damages and settlements.
• Is available from a few carriers in the United States.
• You will need a local representative to purchase this type of coverage in your home
country.
◾◾ Accident Insurance
−− First-party coverage
• These types of policies do not require one to recover from an at-fault party. The
claimant is also the insured.
• Claim payments are intended to make the injured party whole and mitigate the need
for a lawsuit against an at-fault party.
Accident insurance has long been used as a risk mitigation tool. Your everyday and common liability
policies include a no-fault accident benefit for the purpose of mitigating a liability claim proceeding.
Note: Be careful when assuming that a regular travel accident policy will meet the needs of a medical
traveler. There are specific exclusions on travel accident policies for persons traveling for the purpose
of receiving medical care. There is also no coverage for complications on these policies. Furthermore,
specially designed medical travel accident policies vary greatly in what they will cover. Make sure
that you explore and compare the policies and know the strengths and weaknesses of each.
Here are some types of coverage typically on a medical travel accident policy.
Coverage can also include an accidental injury not associated with the procedure: that is, the
taxi accident or trip and fall that could be blamed on the result of traveling for a medical procedure.
Who is buying this coverage?
BREEN, Kerry J. & Stephen M. Cordner & Colin Jh. Thomson & Vernon D.
Plueckhahn (2010), Good Medical Practice. Professionalism, Ethics, and Law, Chapter 3:
„Communication Skills”; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 33-48.
ÎNTREBĂRI
Q1. Un medic de familie obișnuiește să țină ușa de la cabinet larg deschisă pe
parcursul discuțiilor cu pacienții. Este un obicei pe care foarte puțini pacienți l-au observat,
iar aceștia închid ușa de fiecare dată când intră în cabinet. Între cabinet și sala de așteptare
este o distanță foarte mică, de numai 1 metru. Există rațiuni pentru care medicul să fie
blamabil din punct de vedere moral?
Q2. Un pacient a ajuns la medicul stomatolog după o seara de petrece, încă amețit
de aburii alcoolului. Acesta are un comportament agresiv, ceea ce îl deranjează pe medicul
său, care decide într-un final să respingă efectuarea unui consult de urgență pentru un
abces destul de grav. Ca urmare, medicul îi dă fișa medicală pacientului și îl poftește să
părăsească spațiul cabinetului, lucru care se și întâmplă. Este acest comportament unul
corect din punct de vedere moral?
3 COMMUNICATION SKILLS
hapter 1 emphasised how respect for patient autonomy has become more
C central to the doctor–patient relationship while beneficence has been dimin-
ished in importance because of its paternalistic overtones. Effective commu-
nication strengthens patient autonomy by enhancing understanding and is
essential for good medical practice. It is the means of history taking, obtain-
ing consent for examinations and procedures, and explaining diagnoses and
treatment. Effective communicators are able to establish rapport, trust and
confidence with patients more easily than ineffective communicators, thereby
enhancing the flow of crucial information and increasing the likelihood that
advice will be heeded. Effective communication decreases the likelihood of
complaints [1], acrimony or legal action if adverse events occur [2–3]. Good
communication skills alone are not sufficient for professional medical prac-
tice and must be accompanied by clinical competence, empathy and ethical
behaviour [4]. Good communication skills are also a necessary prerequisite if
the doctor is to provide effective leadership of the ‘health-care team’.
Effective communication also improves the quality of health care [5–6] and
can have a very positive effect on the satisfaction gained from a consultation by
both doctor and patient. Breakdowns in communication are the most common
basis of patient dissatisfaction. Surveys show that dissatisfied patients criticise
their doctor for not listening, for not providing adequate explanations or for
appearing disinterested. Satisfied patients perceive their doctor to demonstrate
humaneness, understanding, ability to listen without hurrying the patient, and
the skill of involving the patient in decision making [7–9]. Poor performance
in communication skills as assessed at licensing examinations in Canada pre-
dict complaints to medical boards [1], a finding consistent with the fact that
failure of communication underlies the majority of complaints made against
doctors (see Chapters 7 and 8). The opportunity for a patient to exercise
his or her autonomy is undermined when a doctor is a poor communicator
or appears to be unapproachable or unwilling to respond to the questions
or concerns of patients. A large proportion of problems of a medico-legal
33
34 Good Medical Practice
nature which arise in clinical practice are generally precipitated by the latter
factors [10]. Even the tone of the surgeon’s voice has been shown to correlate
with malpractice claims [11].
A traditional perception has been that the possession of good communica-
tion skills (‘a good bedside manner’) was innate, but it is now well accepted that
effective communication is a clinical skill that can be taught and practised [7–8,
12–13]. Doctors who graduated prior to the provision of teaching in these skills
had to learn their communication skills ‘on the job’ and from good role mod-
els. Role models remain an important influence on students and young doctors,
although negative effects may also result [14]. Workshops in communication skills
for doctors in practice are available from a variety of sources.
This chapter highlights obstacles to communication, describes key skills for
effective communication and provides advice in regard to such matters as the
use of interpreters, how to respond when patients are angry or when things have
gone wrong and how to approach sensitive issues such as discussing sexuality.
The chapter briefly mentions the importance of good written communication but
Chapter 6, on medical record keeping, should also be consulted.
attempt should be made to minimise this. When calls are taken, an explanation or
apology should be made to the patient who is with you and consideration given
to the need to move to another telephone. As described later, time constraints,
real or anticipated by the patient, can also interfere with communication.
at this stage; ‘Hello Mary, I’m Dr Smith’ sends a different message from ‘Hello
Mrs Jones, I’m Dr Smith’.
Pre-reading existing records or a letter of referral before the patient is brought
into the consultation room allows the conversation to begin immediately, permits
maintenance of eye contact at a crucial time, shows respect for the patient and
avoids the impression for review patients that the doctor may have totally forgot-
ten them. A helpful open introductory question such as ‘Perhaps you can tell me
in your own words what brings you to see me today’ or ‘How can I help you?’ or
‘How have you been since I last saw you?’ should be used to open the consulta-
tion. A broad opening question is more inviting and ultimately more productive
than a closed question.
Having commenced the consultation, it is important to avoid premature con-
trol of the flow of spontaneous information by the use of direct and closed ques-
tions. Studies have shown that doctors interrupt patients on average within twenty
seconds of the start of the consultation. The same studies have demonstrated that
patients are able to convey their issues adequately if the doctor permits them to
express themselves in an uninterrupted fashion for 90–120 seconds. Such listening
improves patient satisfaction and improves the quality of the communication [18–
19]. Premature interruption of this phase of the consultation is likely to prevent
the expression of the patient’s real concerns and may lead to the doctor focus-
ing on irrelevant matters. In addition, early interruption reduces the chances of
establishing good rapport and trust. There are exceptions to this general advice,
as one’s approach needs to be modified for garrulous or demented patients and in
emergencies.
wish them to continue. Summarising briefly back to the patient also reassures the
patient that the doctor has listened effectively, as well as providing the patient
with the opportunity to correct any misunderstanding.
same sex as the patient. Family members or other hospital staff should not be
used to interpret medical information. Where in an emergency this is unavoid-
able, a qualified interpreter should be called as soon as practicable after the event
to ensure that accurate information has been obtained. Contact details for access
to telephone interpreters are provided in Chapter 15.
Using an interpreter appropriately is a skill that needs to be learnt. Medical
interpreters undertake formal training of which doctors should be aware (see
Chapter 15). Problems may arise if the language of the patient has not been cor-
rectly identified and if the interpreter has not been arranged in a timely manner. It
may be appropriate to provide the interpreter with some background information
about the patient and the purpose of the consultation. The interpreter should be
introduced by name to the patient and his or her role explained. When using
an interpreter, the questions and eye contact should be directed at the patient,
not at the interpreter. Questions should be brief or, where this is not possible,
care should be taken to break up the passages to be interpreted. In addition, the
doctor should be alert to signals from the interpreter that he or she is being over-
loaded and to any hint that the patient is not comfortable with the interpreter
[26–28].
For doctors working in areas where a large proportion of their patients are
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander, or are drawn from cultural groups new to
Australia, information about their culture and beliefs, especially as this might
pertain to issues around health and health-care practices, should be regarded as
essential. Several helpful articles and books on these topics relating to Aboriginal
or Torres Strait Islander and immigrant Australians are listed at the end of this
chapter.
explanation will prepare the patient and at the same time make it clear that the
doctor is comfortable in having such a discussion.
References
1. Tamblyn R, Abrahamowicz M, Dauphinee D et al. Physician scores on a national
clinical skills examination as predictors of complaints to medical regulatory
authorities. JAMA 2007; 298: 993–1001.
2. Simpson M, Buckman R, Stewart M, Maguire P, Lipkin M, Novack D et al.
Doctor–patient communication: the Toronto consensus statement. BMJ 1991; 303:
1385–7.
46 Good Medical Practice
25. Barbour AB. Caring for Patients: A Critique of the Medical Model. Stanford
University Press, Stanford, 1995.
26. Department of Human Services Victoria. Making the Connection. http://www.dhs.vic.
gov.au/multicultural/connection/index.htm
27. ACT Office of Multicultural Affairs. Working with Interpreters. http://www.dhcs.act.
gov.au/matsia/multicultural/publications
28. Multicultural Disability Advocacy Association. Using Interpreters Successfully.
http://www.mdaa.org.au/faqs/interpreters.html
29. Dobson R. Sharing of uncertainty can unnerve patients. BMJ 2002; 325: 1319.
30. Niselle P. Angered patients and the medical profession. Med J Aust 1999; 170:
576–7.
31. Vincent C, Young M, Phillips A. Why do people sue doctors? A study of patients and
relatives taking legal action. Lancet 1994; 343: 1609–13.
32. Hickson GB, Clayton EW, Githens PB et al. Factors that prompted families to file
medical malpractice claims following perinatal injuries. JAMA 1992; 267: 1359–63.
33. Kraman SS, Hamm G. Risk management: extreme honesty may be best policy. Annals
Int Med 1999; 131: 963–7.
34. Niselle P. Caring for angry patients. Australian Doctor 16 July 1999, p. 56.
35. Daniel AE, Burn RJ, Horarik S. Patients’ complaints about medical practice. Med J
Aust 1999; 170: 598–602.
36. Myerscough PR. Talking With Patients: A Basic Clinical Skill. Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1989.
37. Hinton J. Whom do dying patients tell? Br Med J 1980; 281: 1328–30.
38. Charlton RC. Breaking bad news. Med J Aust 1992; 157: 615–21.
39. Kubler-Ross E. On Death and Dying. Macmillan, New York, 1969.
40. Hinton J. Dying 2nd edn. Penguin, Harmondsworth, Mddx, 1972.
Additional reading
Ainsworth-Vaughan N. Claiming Power in Doctor–Patient Talk. Oxford University Press,
New York, 1998.
Anderson I. Koori Health in Koori Hands: An Orientation Manual in Aboriginal Health
for Health-care Providers. Koori Health Unit, Health Dept., Melbourne, Victoria,
1988.
Del Mar CB. Communicating well in general practice. Med J Aust 1994; 160: 367–70.
Ferguson B, Browne E (eds). Health Care and Immigrants: A Guide for the Helping
Professions. MacLennan & Petty, Sydney, 1991.
Gask L, Usherwood T. ABC of psychological medicine: the consultation. BMJ 2002; 324:
681–2.
Hinton J. Dying. 2nd edn. Penguin, Harmondsworth, Mddx, 1972.
Kerr DN. Teaching communication skills in post-graduate medical education. J R Soc Med
1986; 79: 575–80.
48 Good Medical Practice
Kleinman A, Eisenberg L, Good B. Culture, illness and care: lessons from anthropologic
and cross-cultural research. Ann Intern Med 1978, 88; 251–8.
Kubler-Ross E. On Death and Dying. Macmillan, New York, 1969.
Myerscough PR. Talking with Patients: A Basic Clinical Skill. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1989.
National Health and Medical Research Council. Cultural Competency in Health: A Guide
for Policy, Partnerships and Participation. NHMRC, Canberra, 2006.
Pauwels A. Cross Cultural Communication in the Health Sciences: Communicating with
Migrant Patients. Macmillan Education Australia, South Melbourne, 1995.
Pendeleton D, Schofield T, Tate P et al. The New Consultation: Developing
Doctor–Patient Communication. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.
Reid J, Trompf P (eds). The Health of Aboriginal Australia. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
Sydney, 1991.
Silverman J, Kurtz S, Draper J. Skills for Communicating with Patients. Radcliffe Medical
Press, Oxford, 1998.
Stewart MA, Roter D (eds). Communicating with Medical Patients. Sage Publications,
Newbury Park, CA, 1989.
Whitehouse CR. The teaching of communication skills in United Kingdom medical
schools. Med Educ 1991; 25: 311–18.
4 CONSENT AND INFORMED DECISION
MAKING
here are ethical and legal reasons why doctors must adequately inform
T patients about proposed treatments or procedures, especially in regard to
risks and dangers, and be satisfied that patients understand and consent to
such measures. Ethically, this arises principally out of respect for the auton-
omy of the patient. The two-way information exchange required in order to
bring patients to a position from which they can provide meaningful consent
(an exchange referred to as ‘shared decision making’) is an essential compo-
nent of good medical practice. Doctors who fail to adequately inform their
patients about their condition, treatment options or material risks of treat-
ment may be sued on the grounds of negligence (see Chapter 7). Exceptions to
the requirement for consent are uncommon but include genuine emergencies
and situations where treatment has been authorised by a court. In addition, if
a doctor undertakes any procedure that involves touching the patient without
consent, the doctor is guilty of an assault or, more precisely in legal terms, a
battery, and an action in trespass may be brought against the doctor in a civil
or a criminal court.
Just as there are both ethical and legal reasons for seeking informed con-
sent, so too there are ethical and legal paths to understanding the principles
involved in seeking informed consent. The legal pathway involves a detailed
appreciation of what the courts in Australia and elsewhere have said about
consent [1]. The ethical or professional pathway involves seeking good com-
munication with the patient, as has been outlined in the previous chapter. The
present chapter refers briefly to the relevant legal cases where appropriate, but
in general adopts the ethical pathway as this is more likely to be readily under-
stood, assimilated and applied by medical trainees and medical practitioners
and is as likely to conform to legal obligations. The Australian High Court
has suggested that the term ‘duty to disclose’ might be preferable to ‘informed
consent’ [2]. Others have suggested the use of terms such as ‘shared and/or
informed decision making’. We have retained the term ‘informed consent’ as
it remains in widespread use and appears to be well understood. Although the
49
50 Good Medical Practice
term ‘informed consent’ has become enshrined in law in the USA, this is not the
case in Australia.
While the ethical and legal requirements of obtaining informed consent are
accepted and broadly understood by doctors, difficulties in obtaining a patient’s
consent still arise, particularly in regard to what and how much information needs
to be disclosed, what constitutes a material risk, what to do when dealing with
minors, or adults who may not be competent to give consent, what constitutes
implied consent and whether ‘therapeutic privilege’ can be claimed. This chapter
provides advice in regard to these difficulties and identifies recent professional
and legal developments that have helped clarify how doctors should meet these
difficulties.
discussion took place. Traditionally, written consent has not been obtained when
medications are prescribed, but nevertheless the duty to warn patients of signifi-
cant side effects must not be overlooked. Depending upon each clinical situation,
doctors may be wise to make a note of any discussion held of the possible serious
side effects of drug treatments and diagnostic procedures. The documentation of
consent for more major procedures, especially surgical, is outlined below.
In everyday medical practice, for example when patients attend for consul-
tations, accept prescriptions or proffer an arm for blood pressure measurement,
venesection or injection, consent is either implied or verbal. Depending upon any
pre-existing doctor–patient relationship that provides a basis for mutual under-
standing, the nature of the clinical problem, and the patient’s attitude and capacity
to understand, more or less time may need to be devoted to communication specifi-
cally directed towards consent. It is not possible to provide advice that predictably
or fully covers every eventuality. The following list of situations where special con-
sideration in regard to oral or implied consent should be given is neither exclusive
nor ranked in any order of importance. This list does not contain reference to
major surgery or more serious therapeutic procedures, as consent for these should
be documented and must fulfil the requirements of valid consent noted above.
Consent to surgical or other major invasive procedures is discussed in more detail
below.
r History taking, in regard to sexual or personal questions, where the link with
the patient’s reason for attending may not be immediately apparent to the
patient
r Physical examination, for any intimate or invasive examination, especially
where the patient is young or inexperienced as a patient or where there are
any reasons to anticipate communication difficulties, such as undue anxiety,
cultural differences or language barriers
r Laboratory investigations, in situations where the outcomes may be of special
significance as in testing for HIV and in genetic testing. In both of these
examples consent needs to be accompanied by counselling. Pre-test counselling
may be a legal requirement in certain situations. For example in both Victoria
and Tasmania, it is a legal requirement to counsel patients before seeking
consent for HIV testing (see also Chapter 26). Other investigations that may
be precursors to major interventions, such as screening tests for cancer, should
be looked at in a similar light.
r Minor procedures, such as certain injections and inoculations, which carry
real and serious although rare complications
r Prescribing medications, especially when prescribing a medication for the first
time and where the medication carries known serious or predictable side effects
r Diagnostic procedures, especially where there has been no prior discussion of
risks inherent in procedures such as invasive radiology, endoscopy and organ
biopsy. For these procedures, most hospitals insist on written documentation
of consent.
52 Good Medical Practice
r Release of information to other parties, especially if this does not fall within
the usual expectation of the patient (see also Chapter 7 on confidentiality and
privacy)
r Participation in medical research: there are additional ethical considerations
involved in seeking such consent and these are covered in Chapter 17.
If at any point in undertaking an examination, treatment or procedure, a
patient should resist the attention or withdraw consent, the doctor should not
continue even if discontinuation is likely to see the patient’s condition deteriorate.
Even where a doctor believes that a patient will certainly die without treatment,
a request by that patient to be left alone must be heeded. Every attempt should
be made to advise the patient of consequences of his or her decision. Such situa-
tions arise infrequently. Where they do, the doctor will be wise to seek a second
opinion and/or take advice from a medical indemnity assurer or a clinical ethics
committee. Refusal of treatment is discussed in more detail on page 66 and in
Chapter 22.
discussed with patients and provides practical advice about achieving effective
communication. The following advice is drawn directly from the latter guidelines:
Patients seek many types of information and advice from doctors. To enable
them to participate meaningfully in decisions affecting their health care,
patients need relevant information presented in a way they can understand.
It is not possible, however, to provide information about every detail of all
intervention∗ options, potential benefits or harms, and all possible outcomes.
It is also not possible to assess risks with complete certainty, and this uncer-
tainty should be communicated to patients.
Where possible, information about the benefits and risks of interven-
tions should be framed in ways which assist the patient to best under-
stand his or her situation (for example using absolute, rather than relative,
risk data) and to understand the nature of the risk. The patient should
be advised of material risks, as described by the High Court in Rogers v
Whitaker in 1992 [2]. Material risks are those to which a reasonable per-
son in the patient’s position is likely to attach significance, or those to which
the doctor knows or ought to know the particular patient is likely to attach
significance.
Known risks that reasonable people would regard as significant should be
disclosed, whether an adverse outcome is common and the detriment slight, or
whether an adverse event is severe though its occurrence is rare.
The communication process described in this Advice should enable a doctor
to become aware of risks that a particular patient would treat as significant.
∗ The NHMRC advice explains the term ‘intervention’ thus: ‘The general term “Intervention” is
intended to cover diagnostic procedures and tests, and all forms of treatment (pharmaceutical, surgical
etc). The principles involved in providing information for decision making may extend to other
interventions including counselling and screening for diseases (eg genetic screening tests) wherever
the intervention brings with it risks be they physical, emotional, financial or other.’
54 Good Medical Practice
r likely short- and long-term consequences that may arise if they choose not
to proceed with the proposed intervention or with any intervention at all.
The patient should be advised of proposed follow-up arrangements including:
r clearly stated arrangements for providing the results of the intervention
(usually an investigation), and where relevant
r feasibility and costs of the follow-up arrangements.
Complex interventions usually require the provision of detailed information,
as do treatments where the patient has no physical illness, for example cosmetic
surgery.
be handled sensitively and with respect for the cultural background that is pro-
ducing the difficulty. With time, most families can appreciate that withholding
information completely is virtually impossible and that the patient’s confidence
in the doctor will be seriously undermined if the doctor is not free to respond
to questions and impart crucial information. The distress that family members
are expressing in this situation is often their own and not that of the patient.
Placed theoretically in the patient’s position, they can usually accept the need for
open communication; acceptance is made easier if they perceive the doctor to be
compassionate and tactful.
Understanding relevant information: Please tell me in your own words what I have
told you about your health problem, recommended treatment, and benefits, risks or
discomfort of the proposed treatment, any other options and the risks and benefits of no
treatment.
Appreciating the situation and its consequences: Please tell me what you believe is
wrong with your health now, whether you believe you need treatment, what the
treatment will do for you and what you think will happen if you have no treatment.
Reasoning about treatment options: How did you decide to accept or reject the
recommended treatment? What makes this choice better than another option?
∗
Table modified from [7–8].
Their Families Act 1997 (Tas)), while in the Australian Capital Territory a young
person is defined as aged 12 to 17 years. There is no uniform age of consent
for medical treatment but South Australia and New South Wales have legislation
covering the rights of children to consent to treatment (see below).
Parents can generally consent to medical procedures for their children provided
that the proposed procedure is in the child’s ‘best interests’. However, doctors
should not proceed without the additional consent of the child if the child is aged
14 or older.
In common law, the starting point is that a minor does not have the compe-
tence to consent to medical treatment, unless it is demonstrated that the minor
is competent via ‘achieving a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable
him or her to understand fully what is proposed’ [9]. Where a proposed proce-
dure is relatively minor, older children can provide consent themselves. For more
serious procedures or operations, a doctor will need to very carefully assess the
competence of the young patient and generally should also seek the consent of
a parent or guardian, other than in true emergencies. In New South Wales, the
Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 allows minors over 14 years of age
to give consent for medical and dental treatment. Despite this provision, doctors
should proceed cautiously if any treatment is opposed by the parents. The same
Act provides protection from liability for assault when a doctor treats a minor
under 16 years of age with the consent of a parent or guardian. Where the parents
are requesting that a procedure be done but a competent child aged over 14 years
old is opposed to the treatment, the refusal of the minor should be respected and
independent advice sought. Such conflicts between parent and child might best
be resolved by a court order. In South Australia, under the Consent to Medical
Consent and informed decision making 59
Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995, doctors can accept the consent of a child,
provided the child is capable of understanding what is proposed, the treatment is
in the child’s best interests, and a second doctor has assessed the child and has
concurred in writing.
A frequently faced problem is the request from a sexually active teenage girl for
advice on contraception, where the teenager makes it clear that her parents are not
to be informed of her attendance. Each case should be judged on its merits, but for
practical purposes it is generally permissible for doctors to treat teenagers who are
16 years or over, provided they are mature and appear to understand the proposed
treatment. If they meet these criteria, they are also entitled to have their medical
information kept confidential from their parents. When the teenager is under 16
or where doubt exists as to the maturity of a teenager over 16 years, greater care
must be taken and the doctor should endeavour to explain to the teenager the
need to obtain the consent of the parent or guardian as well, unless the minor
clearly objects. The doctor is not necessarily obliged to provide treatment to such
a minor, other than in an emergency.
Another practical difficulty that may emerge is where parents are separated or
divorced and the custody of the child is at issue. In the absence of a court order,
both parents remain responsible for the care of children under 18 years and either
parent is entitled to provide consent. Nevertheless, other than in an emergency,
doctors should take care to accurately establish the social and legal situation with
regard to which parent is able to consent on behalf of the child, especially when
procedures carrying risks are proposed. The situation can be made more complex
if the separated parents are not communicating well, or if one parent has custody
but the other is responsible for medical expenses.
Where a child is temporarily in the care of a teacher, babysitter, relative,
sports coach or the like, again care should be taken to obtain consent from a
parent for medical treatment other than for first aid or in an emergency. Legal
protection for certain emergency procedures on children exists in some states.
Thus in Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, Tasmania and the Australian
Capital Territory, blood transfusions may be given in a life-threatening emergency
without the consent of the parents. In Northern Territory, the Emergency Medical
Operations Act 1973 permits emergency surgery without the consent of parents,
while in South Australia, the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care
Act 1995 places an obligation on the doctor to seek the consent of the parent or
guardian. In both the Northern Territory and South Australia, there are require-
ments for a second medical opinion. In New South Wales, the Children and Young
Persons (Care and Protection) 1998 provides for emergency treatment without
consent ‘in order to save his or her life or to prevent serious damage to his or her
health’.
Special rules apply for non-therapeutic procedures such as sterilisation, or
treatment or surgery that may incidentally lead to permanent infertility. In New
60 Good Medical Practice
South Wales, the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998
provides that such special medical treatment on a child is permitted in matters of
urgency or where authorised by the Guardianship Tribunal.
Most states have similar specific legislation covering such issues. In addition,
the Family Law Act 1975 also provides the Family Court with the power to autho-
rise such procedures. Order 23B of the Family Law Rules ‘applies to applications
for a declaration that a person is authorised to consent to a medical or surgical
procedure for a child’. Such applications may be made by:
r a parent, guardian or custodian of the child
r any other person who has an interest in the welfare of the child
r if a parent, guardian or custodian is not the applicant, he or she must be joined
as a respondent to the applicant.
Applications are made on a special form and the applicant must lodge with the
application affidavits, which include relevant medical and psychological reports.
These must set out the exact nature and purpose of the proposed medical or
surgical procedure and the likely long-term effects of the procedure on the child.
In addition the following information must also be provided:
r that alternative and less invasive procedures or treatments would be, or have
proved to be, inadequate
r that the procedure proposed is necessary for the welfare of the child
r that the child is incapable of making his or her own decision about undergoing
the procedure
r that the child is unlikely to develop sufficiently to be able to make an informed
judgment about undergoing the procedure within the time in which the pro-
cedure should be carried out, or within the foreseeable future
r that there are any other reasons for granting the application.
Where there are two relatives in the same position (for example, a brother and
sister) the elder will be the person responsible.
When a relative or carer accepts the role of person responsible, there are obli-
gations and restrictions. Decisions must be made in the best interests of the patient
and efforts must be made to determine the wishes of the patient and the patient’s
Consent and informed decision making 63
record that treatment will promote the patient’s health and wellbeing and that
the patient is not objecting. Where major treatment is proposed and a person
responsible cannot be identified, the New South Wales Guardianship Tribunal
must be approached.
In Victoria, the legislation does not differentiate between major and minor
treatment but permits a doctor to carry out non-urgent treatment (other than
special procedures – see above) without consent if there has been failure to locate
a person responsible, and where the proposed treatment is in the best interests
of the person, the doctor gives notice in writing to the Public Advocate ahead of
the treatment, and the Office of the Public Advocate confirms by phone that the
legislation is being complied with. In Queensland, similar provisions apply but
only to treatment that is ‘minor and uncontroversial’, while in Tasmania section 41
of the Act states that, where a person responsible is not available, the doctor may
proceed if the treatment is deemed necessary, is to be provided in the form that
‘will most successfully’ promote the person’s health and wellbeing, the person
does not object and the doctor documents all the above in the person’s medical
record.
the patient’s capacity to give consent. Only if this capacity is lacking is it necessary
to refer to the relevant state legislation.
Under the relevant Mental Health Act (or similar title), provisions are made
to ensure that consent for most treatments, other than electroconvulsive therapy
or psychosurgery, can be obtained from an authorised person. In New South
Wales, Victoria, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory, specific
and stricter provisions apply when electroconvulsive therapy or psychosurgery
is being contemplated. The Mental Health Act 1996 in Western Australia leaves
decisions in the hands of the treating psychiatrist, while the Mental Health Act
2000 in Queensland has different requirements according to whether the patient
has been admitted voluntarily or involuntarily or whether the treatment is required
urgently.
This legislation does not cover non-emergency treatment and, for those situations
involving children, advice should be sought from the Guardianship Board.
References
1. Mulheron R. Twelve tests to identify whether a medical risk is ‘material’. National
Law Review 2000; 11: 1–19 (also accessible at http://www.pandora.nla.gov.au).
2. Rogers v Whitaker [1992] 109 ALR 625.
3. General Guidelines for Medical Practitioners on Providing Information to Patients
and Communicating with Patients: Advice for Medical Practitioners. NHMRC,
Canberra 2004. http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/publications/synopses/e57syn.htm and
http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/publications/synopses/e58syn.htm
4. Australian Medical Association. Position Statement on Informed Financial Consent.
2006. http://www.ama.com.au/web.nsf/doc/WOOD-6S987R
5. Making Decisions About Tests and Treatments: Principles for Better Communication
Between Healthcare Consumers and Healthcare Providers. NHMRC, Canberra, 2005.
http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/publications/synopses/hpr25syn.htm
6. Savelescu J, Kerridge IH. Competence and consent. Med J Aust 2001; 175: 313–15.
7. Appelbaum PS. Clinical practice. Assessment of patients’ competence to consent to
treatment. NEJM 2007; 357: 1834–40.
8. Grisso T, Applebaum PS. Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment: A Guide for
Physicians and Other Health Professionals. Oxford University Press, New York, 1998.
9. Gillick v West Norfolk AHA [1986] AC 112.
68 Good Medical Practice
10. Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (1992)
FLC 92–293.
11. Skene L. Law and Medical Practice. Rights, Duties, Claims and Defences 3rd edn.
LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2008, p. 168.
12. Guardianship and Administration Board Act 1986 (Vic). http://www.dms.dpc.vic.gov.
au/
13. New South Wales Guardianship Tribunal. Substitute Consent. http://www.gt.nsw.gov.
au/information/doc 14 substitute consent.htm
14. Medical/Dental Treatment for Patients Who Cannot Consent: The Person
Responsible. Office of the Public Advocate Victoria. http://www.publicadvocate.vic.
gov.au/Medical-Consent.html
15. Tasmania Guardianship and Administration Board. Consent to Medical and Dental
Treatment. http://www.guardianship.tas.gov.au/consent for treatment
16. New South Wales Health Department 2004. Using Advance Care Directives.
http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/pubs/2004/adcaredirectives.html
17. New South Wales Health Department 2005. End-of-Life Care and Decision-Making
Guidelines. http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/policies/gl/2005/GL2005 057.html
18. Stewart C, Kerridge I, Parker M. The Australian Medico-Legal Handbook. Churchill
Livingstone Elsevier, 2008, pp. 121–3.
19. Clark S, Oakley J (eds). Informed Consent and Clinical Accountability. The Ethics of
Report Cards on Surgeon Performance. Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2007.
4
Law and Bioethics:
A Rights-Based Relationship and
Its Troubling Implications
Daniel Sperling*
Some argue that law is the discipline which has mixed most prominently with
bioethics,¹ and that ‘bioethicists can be seduced by the law and by legal pro-
cedures’.² While there is a great consensus that law has influenced bioethics in
significant and important ways, certainly much more than it influenced other
‘law and . . .’ disciplines,³ scholars dispute as to the exact role which the law
plays in bioethics, the goals it purports to achieve, and the implications of its
relationship with the discipline of bioethics. Th is chapter aims to explore the
relationship between law and bioethics and calls for a careful evaluation of
the law’s contributions to bioethics. Specifically, it will be argued that while
the law contributed extensively to the development of bioethics it introduced a
language and a way of thinking that are not necessarily appropriate to handle
and resolve bioethical issues, and which, in a significant portion of cases, was
irrelevant and had little impact on decision-making and behavioural patterns
of patients. Moreover, law’s interference with and shaping of bioethical issues
resulted in serious threats to some of the major characteristics of such issues and
brought about other societal concerns which the law did not consider seriously.
There are two main areas in which the law has significantly contributed to the
field of bioethics. The law facilitated the transformation and evolution of the field
of medical ethics into the discipline of bioethics. More importantly, that law has
introduced the rights discourse to the therapeutic relationship and bioethical
issues more generally.
⁴ DW Brock, ‘Legal Rights and Moral Responsibilities in the Health Care Process’ in
SF Spicker, JM Healey, and HT Engelhardt (eds), The Law-Medicine Relation: A Philosophical
Exploration (Boston: Reidel, 1981) 279.
⁵ Of course, some paternalism is and must be embedded in the physician-patient relationship,
the latter of which is premised on the specific technical training and competency of the physician.
As Mark Siegler and Dudley Goldblatt note, such specialized knowledge and proficiency serves
to assist the patient in her illness and suffering and is an inherent part of the therapeutic context.
M Siegler and D Goldblatt, ‘Clinical Intuition: A Procedure for Balancing the rights of Patients
and the Responsibilities of Physicians’ in SF Spicker, JM Healey, and HT Engelhardt (eds), The
Law-Medicine Relation: A Philosophical Exploration (Boston: Reidel, 1981) 5, 6.
⁶ cf D Oken, ‘What to Tell Cancer Patients: A Study of Medical Attitudes’ (1961) 175(13)
JAMA 1120 (a study showing that only 12% of physicians told patients they had cancer while most
patients wanted to know).
⁷ DJ Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside: A History of How Law and Bioethics Transformed Medical
Decision Making (New York: Basic Books, 1991) 1,2 (hereinafter ‘Rothman, Strangers’).
⁸ DJ Rothman, ‘The Origins and Consequences of Patient Autonomy: A 25-Year Retrospective’
(2001) 9 Health Care Analysis 255, 257 (hereinafter ‘Rothman, Origins and Consequences’).
⁹ Jonsen, (n 1 above) 5.
¹⁰ ibid 6.
¹¹ WT Reich, ‘Introduction’ in Reich (ed), The Encyclopedia of Bioethics (revised edn). (New York:
Simon Schuster Macmillan, 1995), mentioned in Jonsen (n 1 above) vii. The term ‘bioethics’ was
first suggested by Van Rensselaer Potter, a biochemist and professor of oncology at the University
of Wisconsin (Madison) in ‘Bioethics: Bridge to the Future’ (C P Swanson, (ed), 1971) mentioned
in MA Rothstein, ‘The Growth of Health Law and Bioethics’ (2004) 14 Health Matrix 213. Some
attribute the first use of the word ‘bioethics’ to the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, which was estab-
lished in 1971. Others claim that Sargent Shriver was the first to introduce the term ‘bioethics’ to
Andre Hellegers who was organizing the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University.
Capron and Michel, (n 3 above) 26, n 6.
Along with these substantial changes there were few scandals, the most
serious of which took place during the Nazi regime, which discredited the faith
in health providers, exposed an inherent potential for exploiting the patient or
the human subject of clinical trials, and challenged the idea that the physician’s
main purpose is to benefit the patient. A series of disgraceful actions revealed
how a medical team may be self-interested and mainly concerned with pursuing
the reputation of its members, and gaining professional credit and wealth even
at the cost of the patient’s well-being.¹² Examples of these scandals include the
Nazi medical experiments on inmates in concentration and extermination camps
aiming to ascertain how long individuals survive in freezing water and how well
they function at different pressure levels existing at high altitudes. Other dread-
ful experiments included the practicality of various sterilization techniques, the
development of new vaccines, and novel surgical techniques. In addition, Nazi
physicians were involved in implementing the ‘euthanasia programme’ which
involved ‘the systematic and secret execution of the aged, insane, incurably ill, or
deformed children and other persons, by gas, lethal injections and diverse other
means in nursing homes, hospitals and asylums’.¹³ After the Second World War,
twelve US military trials were held in Nuremberg from 1946 to 1949. One of
the trials (US v Karl Brandt et al ) was concerned with the prosecution of twen-
ty-three physicians responsible for carrying out of these medical experiments.
The trial ended with fifteen defendants found guilty and sentenced to death and
with the enactment of the Nuremberg Code, leading to the establishment of the
Declaration of Helsinki regarding the rights of human research subjects in 1964.
A few years later, an article published in the New England Journal of Medicine
revealed a series of studies undertaken by medical researchers in the United States.
The studies were concerned with experiments subjecting normal newborns to
catheterization and multiple x-rays to study their bladders, examining the period
of hepatitis infectivity after children with mental defects were given the virus,
and exploring the rheumatic fever of men in service who were denied treatment
for streptococcal respiratory infection.¹⁴
During the same years, between 1932 and 1972, a large clinical study was con-
ducted in Tuskegee, Alabama, in which almost 400 poor and illiterate African
American were denied treatment for syphilis. The study was performed without the
subjects’ informed consent and was terminated after it was leaked to the press.¹⁵
¹² See generally G Annas and M Gordin (eds), The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
¹³ T Taylor, ‘The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials’ (April 1949) 450 International Conciliation
282, mentioned in SD Stein, ‘Nuremberg Trials Held by the United States of America Under
Control Council Law No. 10’, available at <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/cntrl10_trials.
htm#Overview> (accessed 18 July 2008).
¹⁴ HK Beecher, ‘Ethics and Clinical Research’ (1966) 274 New England Journal of
Medicine 1354.
¹⁵ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, ‘U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at
Tuskegee’, available at <http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/timeline.htm> (accessed 18 July 2008).
See generally JH Jones, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (New York: Macmillan
Publishing, 1993); SM Reverby (ed), Tuskegee’s Truths: Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
¹⁶ Van Der Burg (n 1 above) 96.
¹⁷ P Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and
the Making of a Vast Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982).
¹⁸ Rothman, Origins and Consequences, (n 8 above) 256.
¹⁹ S B Ruzek and J Becker, ‘The Women’s Health Movement in the United States: From
Grass-Roots Activism to Professional Agendas’ (1999) 54 Journal of American Medical Women’s
Association 4, 5.
²⁰ Even when advocacy was not pursued by lawyers, it focused on securing legal or statu-
tory change. MA Rodwin, ‘Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons from Medical
Consumerism and the Patients’ Rights, Women’s Health and Disability Rights Movements’ (1994)
20 American Journal of Law and Medicine 147.
²¹ See eg Schloendorf v Society of NY Hospital 105 NE 92, 93 (NY 1914) (‘Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he
is liable in damages.’). For the duty of care in connection with the duty to provide information to
patients, see eg Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582; Canterbury v
Spence, 464 F 2d 772 (DC Cir 1972).
²² Most notably this right was acknowledged in the area of abortion law as part of a woman’s
constitutional right to privacy: Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973).
patient with sufficient knowledge about treatment, risks, and alternatives so that
her giving of consent should not only be free but also informed.²³ Finally, case
law and advance directive legislation established the right to refuse treatment,
including life-sustaining treatment, and more generally to participate actively in
medical decision-making.²⁴
There were few reasons for the incorporation and active involvement of law in
bioethical matters.²⁵ On the personal level, many scholars who are concerned with
issues in medical ethics and bioethics have strong legal academic backgrounds.²⁶
A partial list of these scholars includes Gerorge Annas, Alexander Carpron,
Bernard Dickens, Michael Freeman, Lawrence Gostin, Angela Holder, Jay Katz,
John Robertson, Patricia King, William Winslade, and Joseph Healey.²⁷ These
and many other legal scholars have framed and reshaped the bioethical questions
in legal language, and offered original ways to address the moral problems raised
in the clinical setting as if they were legal problems deserving a ‘right’ justifi-
able answer. Along with this line, Carl Schneider argues that the language of law
‘enriched bioethical discourse by generating vivid and pressing instantiations of
bioethical issues, by scrutinizing them—in part—in moral terms, and by prof-
fering means of resolving them’.²⁸ Along with the development of health law and
the increased jurisprudence in this latter area of law, legal scholars contributed
their personal knowledge and familiarity with case law and legislation and used it
as a means to structure decision-making processes in bioethics.²⁹
Second, the methodology used in law to develop and sustain legal rules and
principles and to resolve disputes was found to be close enough to that used in
medical ethics. As a practical discipline providing guidance for clinical decisions,
bioethics was receptive to the methodologies of both principlism and casuistry.³⁰
While the first methodology calls for the application of four major moral abstract
²³ Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr University Board of Trustees 317 P 2d 170 (Cal Ct App 1957).
See also J Katz, Th e Silent World of Doctor and Patient (New York: Free Press, 1984) 59–84.
But cf Annas, who argues that the doctrine of informed consent was not born at case law but
at Article 1 of the Nuremberg Code (‘The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential’). GJ Annas, ‘American Bioethics after Nuremberg: Pragmatism, Politics and Human
Rights’ (Boston University Lecture, 2005), 8 (hereinafter ‘Annas, University Lecture’).
²⁴ For the discussion of a patient’s right to make health-related decisions under the autonomy
model see CE Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy: Patients, Doctors, and Medical Decisions (New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 11–32 (hereinafter ‘Schneider, Autonomy’).
²⁵ See also RB Dworkin, Limits: The Role of Law in Bioethical Decision Making (Bloomington
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996) 2.
²⁶ CE Schneider, ‘Bioethics in the Language of the Law’ (1994) 24(4) Hastings Center Report 16
(hereinafter ‘Schneider, Language’).
²⁷ Jonsen, (n 1 above) 342.
²⁸ Schneider, Language (n 26 above). However, Schneider also argues that since the law has
social goals and limits arising from its social purpose, the effect on and usefulness of law’s language
to bioethics are incomplete.
²⁹ For the development of health law see Rothstein (n 11 above).
³⁰ Other less dominant methodologies in bioethics include virtue ethics, the narrative method,
and the phenomenological method. See, ED Pellegrino, ‘Bioethics at Century’s Turn: Can
Normative Ethics Be Retrieved?’ (2000) 25(6) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 655, 663–5.
³¹ The major advocates of principlism are Tom Beauchamp and James Childress. See
TL Beauchamp and JF Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford University
Press, 4th edn, 1994).
³² The prominent advocates of that methodology are Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin.
See AR Jonsen and S Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkeley:
California University Press, 1998). Interestingly, the authors note that some regard such method-
ology as ‘common-law ethics model’ (ibid 330).
³³ MA Hall, ‘Law, Medicine, and Trust’ (2002–3) 55 Stanford Law Review 463, 469.
³⁴ C Scott, ‘Why Law Pervades Medicine? An Essay on Ethics in Health Care’ (2000) 14 Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 245, 272.
³⁵ ibid.
³⁶ MC Sullivan and DF Reynolds, ‘Where Law and Bioethics Meet . . . and Where They Don’t’
(1997–8) 75 University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 607.
³⁷ HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 1994) 6.
³⁸ D Callahan, ‘Escaping from Legalism: Is It Possible?’ (1996) 26(6) Hastings Center Report 34.
³⁹ A call to ensure patients’ rights in health care was also made by some medical sociologists,
most notably Eliot Freidson. See LR Staffen, ‘Heroic Medicine, Physician Autonomy, and Patient
Rights’ (1994) Law and Social Inquiry 753.
⁴⁰ GJ Annas and JM Healey, ‘The Patient Rights Advocate: Redefining the Doctor-Patient
Relationship in the Hospital Context’ (1974) 27 Vanderbilt Law Review 243, 245. See also
GJ Annas, The Rights of Hospital Patients: The Basic ACLU Guide to a Hospital Patient’s Rights (New
York: Discus, 1975).
⁴¹ G Annas, ‘Legal Rights in the Health Care Setting’ in SF Spicker, JM Healey, and
HT Engelhardt (eds), The Law-Medicine Relation: A Philosophical Exploration (Boston: Reidel,
1981) 265, 266 (hereinafter ‘Annas, Legal Rights’).
⁴² For the importance of constitutional rights in adjudication see Dworkin (n 25 above) 15–18.
⁴³ Scott (n 34 above) 263.
⁴⁴ Annas, Legal Rights (n 41 above) 268.
⁴⁵ TL Beauchamp and JF Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford
University Press, 5th edn, 2001) 355.
⁴⁶ ibid 362.
Much of the criticism against the rights movement in bioethics expressed in this
section can be explained by the more general critique of the Critical Legal Studies
movement of liberalism.⁴⁹ However, it is possible to identify five major areas of
criticism which are highly appealing to rights in the medical context.
A. Missing Right-Holder
First, since ethical dilemmas in the medical context were formed and articulated
in a language of rights, such a language was found inapplicable to certain parties
affected by bioethical issues who were incapable of holding rights. These include
⁵⁶ AM Capron, ‘What Contributions Have Social Science and the Law Made to the
Development of Policy on Bioethics?’ (1999) 128(4) Daedalus 295, 297.
⁵⁷ cf Wendy Mariner, who argues: ‘Of course, law is not a tool to enforce understanding. Just as
law cannot make people kind or generous, it cannot make them understand something. The best it
can do is require the presence of objectively observable factors that make understanding possible.’
WK Mariner, ‘Informed Consent in the Post-Modern Era’ (1988) 13 Law and Social Inquiry 385,
402. For the general role of procedure in law, see Dworkin (n 25 above) 6.
⁵⁸ JP Bishop and F Jotterand, ‘Bioethics as Biopolitics’ (2006) 31 Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy 205, 206.
⁵⁹ Pellegrino (n 30 above) 657.
⁶⁰ cf Halpern, who writes that membership of patient-rights advocacy groups is overwhelmingly
white, well-educated, and middle class, as patients in these demographic groups are most interested
in participating in medical decision-making. SA Halpern, ‘Medical Authority and the Culture of
Rights’ (2004) 29(4–5) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 835, 845.
⁶¹ WM Sage, ‘The Lawyerization of Medicine’ (2001) 26(5) Journal of Health Politics, Policy
and Law 1179, 1186.
⁶² DW Brock, ‘Broadening the Bioethics Agenda’ (2000) 10(1) Kennedy Institute of Ethics
Journal 21, 22.
⁶³ J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).
⁶⁴ cf Charity Scott who writes: ‘Law pervades medicine because ethics pervades medicine, and
in America, we use the law to resolve ethical dilemmas in health care’, and ‘In health care, our soci-
ety has used the law to ask (and answer) questions about what are ethically appropriate behaviors
among those who provide, or receive, or pay for health care services.’ Scott (n 34 above) 245, 248.
See also Annas, Standard of Care (n 1 above) 3: ‘It seems natural for Americans, for example, that
the morality of abortion has been recast as the “right to abortion” and that the morality of medical
treatment near the end of life is now called simply “the right to die”.’
⁶⁵ Dworkin (n 25 above) 7, 165.
⁶⁶ ‘By addressing what we have generally agreed is wrong behavior or bad actions, the law sets
the legal minimums for behavior; it does not address the ethical maximums. The law provides
sanctions for wrongdoing; it does not tend to provide rewards for doing good or even sanctions for
failing to do good.’ Scott (n 34 above) 260. The tendency to regard the physician-patient relation-
ship as a contract may also indicate the minimalism of the law. Van Der Burg (n 1 above) 102, n 30.
The contract model is also explained by the patient’s exercise of rights vis-à-vis her health provider.
See Brock (n 4 above) 280.
⁶⁷ R Levine, ‘Medical Ethics and Personal Doctors: Conflicts between What We Teach and
What We Want’ (1987) 13 American Journal of Law and Medicine 351, 362.
⁶⁸ Beauchamp and Childress (n 45 above) 361.
⁶⁹ Schneider, Language (n 26 above).
E. Rhetorical Contribution
Rather than having practical effects on ethical issues, the main contribution of
the rights movement to bioethics was its strong rhetorical and expressive func-
tion. The language of rights helped articulate and construct a balance between
competing interests, making the empowerment of patients more visible, but it
had limited consequences. In this important respect, the legal interference with
bioethics can exemplify how the ‘law in books’ stands in contradiction to ‘the law
in action’.
The limited effect of the rights movement in bioethics is best observed in the
right to refuse treatment which was regarded as correlative to the right to give
consent and consequently led to the establishment of three related patient rights:
the right to die with dignity and to refuse treatment; the right to receive assisted
suicide; and the right to leave a valid advance directive.
Although case law developed and made it a legal obligation to obtain patients’
approval for medical treatment, having explored the full consequences of such
treatment, empirical studies suggest that only a few physicians view consent as
integral to medical practice or give it much attention.⁷¹ Studies show that phy-
sicians prefer some treatments over others and are sceptical regarding whether
informed consent can bring any gain to their patients. Moreover, it is reported
that most patients prefer to leave treatment choices to their physicians, and that
less than a third want veto power over those decisions.⁷² Recent studies reveal
that almost half of respondent patients prefer to rely on physicians for medical
knowledge rather than seeking out information themselves.⁷³ Leading to these
data is the fact that many patients are incapable of comprehending and manipu-
lating complex information about risks associated with proposed treatment and
alternatives to it.⁷⁴ Hence, physicians frequently do not genuinely embrace the
goals of informed consent and these are not implemented within the physician-
patient relationship.⁷⁵ The lack of patients’ participation in medical decisions is
also observed in studies of intensive care units, where physicians insist that deci-
sions require understanding of technical information and that patients’ families
are too emotional to give or make medical choices.⁷⁶ Finally, in the context of
biomedical research, studies also show that researchers rarely supply broad infor-
mation about the process and goals of the type of research being conducted, and
as a result human subjects make false assumptions about the studies in which
they participate.⁷⁷
Beginning with Karen Ann Quinlan’s case, which addressed the right of an
unconscious patient to withdraw life-sustaining treatment as expressed by her
father,⁷⁸ courts have acknowledged a patient’s or surrogate’s right to accept or
refuse medical treatment, including a constitutional right to die with dignity.⁷⁹
Courts have also recognized the right of mentally competent patients to refuse
treatment even at the cost of death. Examples of the latter cases include the right
of a Jehovah’s Witness to refuse a blood transfusion,⁸⁰ and the right of a patient
with a disability to refuse nutrition and hydration.⁸¹
Indeed, the Quinlan case symbolizes the beginning of a new era where the
courts expand the patient’s rights to decline life-sustaining treatment, com-
pel physicians to respect patients’ Do-Not-Resuscitate demands, and even-
tually require physicians’ assisted help to terminate individuals’ lives. But, as
illuminated by Tina Stevens, this is a false genealogy since this era marks the
beginning of a fatal turn from the ambit of patients, health providers, and com-
munities to the sphere of the courtroom and the language and limitations of
rights.⁸² The court’s refusal to acknowledge Nancy Cruzan’s right not to be fed
by her doctors and its requirement for clear and convincing evidence to demon-
strate the wishes of an incompetent adult patient,⁸³ as well as the reluctance of
the US Supreme Court to recognize a general constitutionally protected right
to commit suicide with the help of her physician⁸⁴ suggests that the movement
is misdescribed.
The right to refuse treatment was not as fully acknowledged as its rhetorical
presentation might have suggested. Such a right was not respected by courts
when the interests of a minor were at stake or for the protection of a foetus.
For example, the court ordered that a mother of an infant who was a Jehovah’s
Witness should receive a blood transfusion,⁸⁵ and that doctors are free to force
⁸⁶ Jeff erson v Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority 274 SE 2d 457 (Ga 1981). For a detailed
analysis of legal interventions involving the bodies of pregnant women, see D Sperling, Management
of Post-Mortem Pregnancy: Legal and Philosophical Aspects (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006) 15–34.
⁸⁷ DA Asch, J Hansen-Flaschen and PN Lanken, ‘Decisions to Limit Life-Sustaining Treatment
by Critical Care Physicians in the US’ (1995) 151(2) American Journal of Respiratory and Critical
Care Medicine 288.
⁸⁸ Siegler and Goldblatt (n 5 above) 24.
⁸⁹ Staffen (n 39 above) 756. cf Robert Zussman, who writes that law’s impact is largely cere-
monial in that it influences how physicians document their decisions on DNR orders but not the
process through which such decisions are made. R Zussman, Intensive Care: Medical Ethics and
the Medical Profession (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), mentioned in Halpern (n 60
above) 841.
⁹⁰ EJ Emmanuel, ER Daniels, DL Fairclough, and BR Clarridge, ‘The Practice of Euthanasia
and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Uninted States’ (1998) 280(6) JAMA 507.
⁹¹ Vacco v Quill 521 US 793 (1997); Washington v Glucksberg 521 US 702 (1997); R (on the
Application of Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] 1 AC 800. Oregon is the only state in
the US which has passed a law (in 1994) permitting physician-assisted suicide under certain cir-
cumstances: Or Rev Stat §§ 127.800–127.897 (2005). The Act allows physicians to prescribe lethal
medication for competent terminally ill patients who make a written request, but removes the
to promulgate a new liberty interest in having assistance to end one’s own life
and saw no violation of the equal protection of the law by preventing compe-
tent terminally ill patients from receiving assistance as opposed to incompetent
patients. Moreover, courts concluded that every state might rationally forbid
anyone from assisting another to commit suicide.⁹² To secure the inexistence of
such a right, US Federal law prohibits the use of funds to subsidize physician-
assisted suicide,⁹³ and states also include a ban of physician-assisted suicide in
their national legislation.⁹⁴
The mere rhetorical function of the rights movement in bioethics is also
evidenced in the area of the right to leave a valid advance directive for the
determination of health treatment to be provided or withdrawn in the state of
incompetency. Such a right was acknowledged by national and federal legis-
lation in the United States,⁹⁵ Canada,⁹⁶ United Kingdom,⁹⁷ and many other
Western countries.⁹⁸ However, studies show that the law has had little effect
on the issuing and use of advance directives; that it is implemented by medical
institutions and personnel in a passive manner; and that the involvement of phy-
sicians in its implementation is lacking.⁹⁹ Beside the fundamental flaws in and
unexpected problems of advance directives, usually associated with the handing
of authority regarding incompetent patients to persons other than the person
who issues the directive,¹⁰⁰ completion rates among most patient groups run
at only 4 to 25 per cent and intensive education and promotion barely improve
those rates.¹⁰¹ Other studies suggest that the concept of advance directives may
physician from civil or criminal liability in compliance with such a request. A recent majority deci-
sion of the US Supreme Court held that an interpretive rule regarding the Controlled Substances
Act, making the use of a controlled substance to assist suicide not a legitimate medical practice
and an unlawful act, could not prohibit physicians from prescribing drugs for use in suicide under
Oregon law permitting the procedure, Gonzales and Ors v Oregon and Ors 546 US 243 (2006).
⁹² See Capron (n 56 above) 314–15.
⁹³ Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act, 42 USC (1997).
⁹⁴ Scott (n 34 above) 279, n 90.
⁹⁵ Patient Self Determination Act, 42 USC (1992). The Act requires that hospitals and other
health providers inform their patients of their right to make end-of-life decisions and issue an
advance directive.
⁹⁶ For an exhaustive description of legislation in Canada, see <http://www.utoronto.ca/jcb/
outreach/ documents/ JCB_Living_Will.pdf> (accessed 18 July 2008).
⁹⁷ Mental Capacity Act 2005, ss 24–26.
⁹⁸ Recently, Israel has enacted the Dying Patient Act 2005 which legalizes the withdrawal of
medical treatment from a patient suffering from an incurable medical condition and whose life
expectancy is no more than 6 months. Sections 31–36 regulate the issuing and validation of an
advance directive relating to such a physical state.
⁹⁹ JL Yates and H Glick, ‘The Failed Patient Self Determination Act and Policy Alternatives for
the Right to Die’ (1997) 9(4) Journal of Aging and Social Policy 29.
¹⁰⁰ R Dresser, ‘Relitigating Life and Death’ (1990) 51 Ohio Law Journal 426–37; Allen E
Buchanan and Dan W Brock, Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 185.
¹⁰¹ Henry S Perkins, ‘Controlling Death: The False Promise of Advance Directives’ (2007)
147(1) Annals of Internal Medicine 51.
As a result, physicians turned into strangers and became a group apart from their
patients. Emphasis on patient rights invited lawyers, clinical bioethicists, and
hospital ethics committees to protect and strengthen the patient’s role in med-
ical decision-making.¹⁰⁶ While the rights discourse was aimed at recovering the
physician-patient relationship, which suffered from excessive paternalism and
possible exploitation and abuse of patients, such discourse created an atmosphere
under which medicine becomes adversarial practice and physicians lack trust-
worthiness. As observed by Richard Sherlock: ‘The language of rights and the
language of trust move in opposite directions from one another. The scrupulous
insistence on observance of one’s rights is an admission that one does not trust
those at hand to care properly for one’s welfare.’¹⁰⁷ The physician’s response to
the increase in legal intrusions and control of medical practice also resulted in
viewing such an interference as an attack upon physicians’ competence, leading
to defensiveness and suspicion among physicians.
Second, emphasis on rights in bioethical issues, and especially an admiration
of autonomy, allowed physicians to detach themselves from the consequences of
their actions and involve themselves less in the exercise of discretion. As a result,
physicians became more remote from their patients and preferred to focus on for-
mal communication with them. William Sage summarizes this point nicely when
he comments: ‘Why grapple with moral dilemmas when one can concentrate on
achieving a technical result and let the patient decide if it is good or bad?’¹⁰⁸
¹¹⁰ Thompson and Ors v Western States Medical Center and Ors 535 US 358, 383 (2002) (referring
to a poll where 84% of patients reported that doctors accommodated such requests).
¹¹¹ A Holmer, ‘Direct-To-Consumer Marketing of Prescription Drug Advertising Builds
Bridges between Patients and Physicians’ (1999) 281(4) JAMA 380. See also MF Hollon,
‘Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of Prescription Drugs’ (1999) 281(4) JAMA 382.
¹¹² D Spurgeon, ‘Doctors Feel Pressurised by Direct to Consumer Advertising’ (1999) 319
BMJ 1321.
¹¹³ Halpern (n 60 above) 846. See also J Donohue, ‘A History of Drug Advertising: The Evolving
Roles of Consumers and Consumer Protection’ (2006) 84(4) The Milbank Quarterly 659.
¹¹⁴ M Schlesinger, ‘A Loss of Faith: The Sources of Reduced Political Legitimacy for the
American Medical Profession’ (2002) 80(2) The Milbank Quarterly 185.
¹¹⁵ See generally JL Morrison, JD Lantos, and W Levinson, ‘Aggression and Violence Directed
Toward Physicians’ (1998) 13(8) Journal of General Internal Medicine 556.
¹¹⁶ Halpern (n 60 above) 838–9.
¹¹⁷ Managed care programmes are: ‘Health insurance plans intended to reduce unnecessary
health care costs through a variety of mechanisms, including: economic incentives for physicians
and patients to select less costly forms of care; programs for reviewing the medical necessity of
specific services; increased beneficiary cost sharing; controls on inpatient admissions and lengths
of stay; the establishment of cost-sharing incentives for outpatient surgery; selective contracting
with health care providers; and the intensive management of high-cost health care cases. The
programs may be provided in a variety of settings, such as health maintenance organizations and
preferred provider organizations.’ Medical Subject Headings, US National Library of Medicine’s
controlled vocabulary, available at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez> (accessed
25 November 2007).
¹¹⁸ Sage (n 61 above) 1189. Interestingly, the US federal legislation reform in managed care was
referred to as a ‘patient’s bill of rights’. Scott (n 34 above) 235, n 23.
¹¹⁹ Sage (n 61 above) 1190–1.
¹²⁰ AJ Rosoff, ‘Antitrust Law and the Health Care Industry: New Warriors into an Old Battle’
(1979) 23 St Louis University Law Journal 446.
¹²¹ Van Der Burg (n 1 above) 106.
¹²² KM Malone and AR Hinman, ‘Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health Imperative and
Individual Rights’ in RE Hoff man, W Lopez, GW Matthews, MA Rothstein, and KL Foster (eds),
Law in Public Health (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2007) 338–60.
¹²³ See eg Reynolds v McNichols 488 F 2d 1378 (10th Cir 1973).
¹²⁴ Annas, University Lecture (n 23 above) 4.
¹²⁵ See GJ Annas, American Bioethics: Crossing Human Rights and Health Law Boundaries
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
¹²⁶ For a critique, see A Jonsen (Book Review) (2005) 5(3) American Journal of Bioethics 71–2.
¹²⁷ UNESCO’s Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is regarded as an attempt to
develop an international bioethics framework based on the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. See <http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=1883&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&
URL_SECTION =201.html> (accessed 18 July 2008).
and prevention, global health inequalities, and widespread diseases.¹²⁸ From this
perspective the rights revolution in bioethics is only just beginning.
The previous sections discussed one of the greatest contributions of law to bioeth-
ics, namely the integration of rights in ethical dilemmas and issues arising within
the medical context. Such a contribution nevertheless creates many difficulties
and has various implications, some of which go in different directions from those
originally expected. It is possible to anticipate three paths which bioethics may
take as a result.
The first is the search for support and justification of some substantive theory
and the conceptualization of basic principles to realize ethical dilemmas in the
medical context. Such theory may be developed from the area of ethics and the
disciplines of philosophy and religion more generally. By providing a universal,
applicable, and acceptable normative content, bioethics will regain faith as a
branch of ethics involving moral norms to evaluate human conduct. The norma-
tive theory will complement the procedural mechanism suggested by the rights
discourse and will become more dominant than law’s influence and interference
with bioethics.¹²⁹ Under such an alternative, law and ethics would become more
independent and distinct. The more there is a plurality of ethical approaches and
normative understanding of ethics, the more we can supplement the rights model
in bioethics and minimize the law’s strong effect on problems in medical ethics.
If we follow this approach we will not have to regress to the pre-rights model of
bioethics. Instead we will progress to a post-rights model under which morality
becomes a more important component of resolving problems and moral dilem-
mas in bioethics.¹³⁰
A second approach would be the search for a better understanding of ethical
issues in bioethics by an appeal to the social sciences and other related disciplines.
A social science critique of bioethics argues that traditional bioethics ideal-
izes rational thought and ignores social and cultural factors which shape one’s
thought and choices. As this chapter shows, this is made possible with the guise
of the rhetorical language of rights. The social science critique asks bioethicists to
support their claims in more empirical research, to be reflexive, and to challenge
theories which are based on evidence.¹³¹ A better understanding of social implica-
tions for and construction of health and disease and a closer look at the role social
science plays in framing and resolving decisions in bioethics may address serious
article. K Teele, ‘The Physician’s Dilemma: A Doctor’s View: What the Law Should Be’ (1975) 27
Baylor Law Review.
¹³⁸ ‘Physicians, by virtue of their responsibility for medical judgments are, partly by choice
and partly by default, charged with the responsibility of making ethical judgments which we are
sometimes ill-equipped to make . . . [The concept of ethics committees] diff uses the responsibility
of making these judgments. Many physicians, in many circumstances, would welcome this sharing
of responsibility’ Teele (n 137 above) 8–9.
¹³⁹ Re Quinlan 355 A 2d 647, 668 (NJ 1976). See also Re Colyer 660 P 2d 738 (1983).
¹⁴⁰ eg Tina Stevens mentions that legal counsel for the AMA, BJ Anderson, commented that
such ethics committees are unnecessary because ‘a treating physician is certainly able to determine
whether a patient is in a terminal condition. If he is unsure of anything, the doctor can ask for con-
sultation with another doctor.’ Stevens (n 82 above) 142. See also Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v Saikewicz 373 Mass. 728, 370 NE 2d 417 (1977).
¹⁴¹ Jonsen (n 1 above) 363.
¹⁴² G McGee, JP Spanogle, AL Caplan, D Penny, and DA Asch, ‘Successes and Failures of
Hospital Ethics Committees: A National Survey of Ethics Committees Chairs’ (2002) 11
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 87. The increase in the number of ethics committees was a
response to a 1991 mandate by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
and state legislation raising the status of such committees.
¹⁴³ cf Annas, who argues that the law contributed immensely to the development of ethics com-
mittees mainly through the threat of legal liability and community disapproval, which could have
led to new laws. Annas, Standard of Care (n 1 above) 6.
¹⁴⁴ Jonsen (n 1 above) 364.
¹⁴⁵ B Lo, ‘Behind Closed doors: Promises and Pitfalls of Ethics Committees’ (1987) 317(1) New
England Journal of Medicine 46.
¹⁴⁶ JC Fletcher and DE Hoff man, ‘Ethics Committees: Time to Experiment with Standards’
(1994) 120(4) Annals of Internal Medicine 335–8.
V. Conclusion
One of the major characteristics of the relationship between law and bioethics,
and probably the most important contribution of law to bioethics, concerns the
introduction of the idea and language of rights. As David Rothman argues, the
patient rights movement in bioethics was ‘highly democratizing, removing, as it
were, the hallow around the expert and giving encouragement to the laymen’.¹⁴⁹
The rights movement in bioethics seemed promising indeed. However, as this
chapter shows, the idea of rights is objectionable and creates many difficulties all
of which reflect the limits of the law in terms of shaping and influencing decision-
making in bioethical issues. Such a movement was proved too narrow to encom-
pass and realize many of the issues raised by new technologies and changing
therapeutic relationships in the modern era. The specific role the rights movement
has played in bioethics is therefore disputable and hinges upon, inter alia, our
understanding of the origins and future of bioethics. Did bioethics grow out of
the need to control scientific change and medical progress, purporting to deliver
exotic technologies into social acceptance?¹⁵⁰ Or did it evolve out of the necessity
to control and protect the basic freedoms of patients and human subjects? Should
bioethics continue to integrate with law or other disciplines, or should it become
a more autonomous and independent discipline? While scholars may continue
debate on these substantial questions it is clear that the time to re-evaluate the
direction which bioethics should take in the next years has come.
¹⁴⁷ MP Aulisio, RM Arnold, and SJ Youngner, ‘Health Care Ethics Consultation: Nature,
Goals and Competences’ (2000) 133(1) Annals of Internal Medicine 59.
¹⁴⁸ Dworkin (n 25 above) 170.
¹⁴⁹ Rothman, Origins and Consequences (n 8 above) 263.
¹⁵⁰ Stevens (n 82 above) 149.
SCHACHTER, Steven C. & William Mandell & L. Scott Harshbarger & Randall
Grometstein (2008), Managing Relationships with Industry. A Physician’s Compliance
Manual; Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 153-178.
Website-ul ProPublica din Statele Unite ale Americii este un foarte bun instrument pentru
a urmări cazuri specifice privind interacțiunea de ordin financiar între doctori și industria
Pharma: http://www.propublica.org/series/dollars-for-docs
ÎNTREBĂRI
Q1. Un medic cardiolog care lucrează atât într-un spital de stat, cât și în propriul
cabinet, a fost invitat să coordoneze un studiu clinic în calitate de expert în tahicardii
ventriculare. Respectivul studiu clinic urmărește să măsoare eficiența unui nou
medicament menit să regleze ritmul ventricular. Întrucât la cabinetul propriu are un număr
foarte ridicat de pacienți cu tahicardie ventriculara, medicul decide să selecteze dintre
aceștia posibili candidați pentru studiul clinic. Este acest lucru incorect din punct de vedere
moral?
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A Note to Readers
Our Daily Meds: How the Pharmaceutical Companies Transformed Themselves into Slick Marketing Machines and
Hooked the Nation on Prescription Drugs
by Melody Petersen
Sarah Crichton/Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 432 pp., $26.00
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be the case here. Biederman’s own studies of the drugs he advocates to treat childhood
bipolar disorder were, as The New York Times summarized the opinions of its expert
sources, “so small and loosely designed that they were largely inconclusive.”1
In June, Senator Grassley revealed that drug companies, including those that make drugs
he advocates for childhood bipolar disorder, had paid Biederman $1.6 million in consulting
and speaking fees between 2000 and 2007. Two of his colleagues received similar amounts.
After the revelation, the president of the Massachusetts General Hospital and the chairman
of its physician organization sent a letter to the hospital’s physicians expressing not shock
over the enormity of the conflicts of interest, but sympathy for the beneficiaries: “We know
this is an incredibly painful time for these doctors and their families, and our hearts go out
to them.”
Perhaps the most egregious case exposed so far by Senator Grassley is that of Dr. Charles
B. Nemeroff, chair of Emory University’s department of psychiatry and, along with
Schatzberg, coeditor of the influential Textbook of Psychopharmacology.2 Nemeroff was
the principal investigator on a five-year $3.95 million National Institute of Mental Health
grant—of which $1.35 million went to Emory for overhead—to study several drugs made
by GlaxoSmithKline. To comply with university and government regulations, he was
required to disclose to Emory income from GlaxoSmithKline, and Emory was required to
report amounts over $10,000 per year to the National Institutes of Health, along with
assurances that the conflict of interest would be managed or eliminated.
But according to Senator Grassley, who compared Emory’s records with those from the
company, Nemeroff failed to disclose approximately $500,000 he received from
GlaxoSmithKline for giving dozens of talks promoting the company’s drugs. In June 2004,
a year into the grant, Emory conducted its own investigation of Nemeroff’s activities, and
found multiple violations of its policies. Nemeroff responded by assuring Emory in a
memorandum, “In view of the NIMH/Emory/GSK grant, I shall limit my consulting to
GSK to under $10,000/year and I have informed GSK of this policy.” Yet that same year,
he received $171,031 from the company, while he reported to Emory just $9,999—a dollar
shy of the $10,000 threshold for reporting to the National Institutes of Health.
Emory benefited from Nemeroff’s grants and other activities, and that raises the question
of whether its lax oversight was influenced by its own conflicts of interest. As reported by
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Gardiner Harris in TheNew York Times,3 Nemeroff himself had pointed out his value to
Emory in a 2000 letter to the dean of the medical school, in which he justified his
membership on a dozen corporate advisory boards by saying:
ecause these psychiatrists were singled out by Senator Grassley, they received a great
deal of attention in the press, but similar conflicts of interest pervade medicine. (The
senator is now turning his attention to cardiologists.) Indeed, most doctors take money or
gifts from drug companies in one way or another. Many are paid consultants, speakers at
company-sponsored meetings, ghost-authors of papers written by drug companies or their
agents,4 and ostensible “researchers” whose contribution often consists merely of putting
their patients on a drug and transmitting some token information to the company. Still more
doctors are recipients of free meals and other out-and-out gifts. In addition, drug
companies subsidize most meetings of professional organizations and most of the
continuing medical education needed by doctors to maintain their state licenses.
No one knows the total amount provided by drug companies to physicians, but I estimate
from the annual reports of the top nine US drug companies that it comes to tens of billions
of dollars a year. By such means, the pharmaceutical industry has gained enormous control
over how doctors evaluate and use its own products. Its extensive ties to physicians,
particularly senior faculty at prestigious medical schools, affect the results of research, the
way medicine is practiced, and even the definition of what constitutes a disease.
Consider the clinical trials by which drugs are tested in human subjects.5 Before a new
drug can enter the market, its manufacturer must sponsor clinical trials to show the Food
and Drug Administration that the drug is safe and effective, usually as compared with a
placebo or dummy pill. The results of all the trials (there may be many) are submitted to
the FDA, and if one or two trials are positive—that is, they show effectiveness without
serious risk—the drug is usually approved, even if all the other trials are negative. Drugs
are approved only for a specified use—for example, to treat lung cancer—and it is illegal
for companies to promote them for any other use.
But physicians may prescribe approved drugs “off label”—i.e., without regard to the
specified use—and perhaps as many as half of all prescriptions are written for off-label
purposes. After drugs are on the market, companies continue to sponsor clinical trials,
sometimes to get FDA approval for additional uses, sometimes to demonstrate an
advantage over competitors, and often just as an excuse to get physicians to prescribe such
drugs for patients. (Such trials are aptly called “seeding” studies.)
Since drug companies don’t have direct access to human subjects, they need to outsource
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their clinical trials to medical schools, where researchers use patients from teaching
hospitals and clinics, or to private research companies (CROs), which organize
office-based physicians to enroll their patients. Although CROs are usually faster, sponsors
often prefer using medical schools, in part because the research is taken more seriously, but
mainly because it gives them access to highly influential faculty physicians—referred to by
the industry as “thought-leaders” or “key opinion leaders” (KOLs). These are the people
who write textbooks and medical journal papers, issue practice guidelines (treatment
recommendations), sit on FDA and other governmental advisory panels, head professional
societies, and speak at the innumerable meetings and dinners that take place every year to
teach clinicians about prescription drugs. Having KOLs like Dr. Biederman on the payroll
is worth every penny spent.
A few decades ago, medical schools did not have extensive financial dealings with
industry, and faculty investigators who carried out industry-sponsored research generally
did not have other ties to their sponsors. But schools now have their own manifold deals
with industry and are hardly in a moral position to object to their faculty behaving in the
same way. A recent survey found that about two thirds of academic medical centers hold
equity interest in companies that sponsor research within the same institution.6 A study of
medical school department chairs found that two thirds received departmental income from
drug companies and three fifths received personal income.7 In the 1980s medical schools
began to issue guidelines governing faculty conflicts of interest but they are highly
variable, generally quite permissive, and loosely enforced.
ecause drug companies insist as a condition of providing funding that they be intimately
involved in all aspects of the research they sponsor, they can easily introduce bias in order
to make their drugs look better and safer than they are. Before the 1980s, they generally
gave faculty investigators total responsibility for the conduct of the work, but now
company employees or their agents often design the studies, perform the analysis, write the
papers, and decide whether and in what form to publish the results. Sometimes the medical
faculty who serve as investigators are little more than hired hands, supplying patients and
collecting data according to instructions from the company.
In view of this control and the conflicts of interest that permeate the enterprise, it is not
surprising that industry-sponsored trials published in medical journals consistently favor
sponsors’ drugs—largely because negative results are not published, positive results are
repeatedly published in slightly different forms, and a positive spin is put on even negative
results. A review of seventy-four clinical trials of antidepressants, for example, found that
thirty-seven of thirty-eight positive studies were published.8 But of the thirty-six negative
studies, thirty-three were either not published or published in a form that conveyed a
positive outcome. It is not unusual for a published paper to shift the focus from the drug’s
intended effect to a secondary effect that seems more favorable.
The suppression of unfavorable research is the subject of Alison Bass’s engrossing book,
Side Effects: A Prosecutor, a Whistleblower, and a Bestselling Antidepressant on Trial.
This is the story of how the British drug giant GlaxoSmithKline buried evidence that its
top-selling antidepressant, Paxil, was ineffective and possibly harmful to children and
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adolescents. Bass, formerly a reporter for the Boston Globe, describes the involvement of
three people—a skeptical academic psychiatrist, a morally outraged assistant administrator
in Brown University’s department of psychiatry (whose chairman received in 1998 over
$500,000 in consulting fees from drug companies, including GlaxoSmithKline), and an
indefatigable New York assistant attorney general. They took on GlaxoSmithKline and part
of the psychiatry establishment and eventually prevailed against the odds.
Ephemera, Inc.
The book follows the individual struggles of these three people over many years,
culminating with GlaxoSmithKline finally agreeing in 2004 to settle charges of consumer
fraud for $2.5 million (a tiny fraction of the more than $2.7 billion in yearly Paxil sales
about that time). It also promised to release summaries of all clinical trials completed after
December 27, 2000. Of much greater significance was the attention called to the deliberate,
systematic practice of suppressing unfavorable research results, which would never have
been revealed without the legal discovery process. Previously undisclosed, one of
GlaxoSmithKline’s internal documents said, “It would be commercially unacceptable to
include a statement that efficacy had not been demonstrated, as this would undermine the
profile of paroxetine [Paxil].”9
any drugs that are assumed to be effective are probably little better than placebos, but
there is no way to know because negative results are hidden. One clue was provided six
years ago by four researchers who, using the Freedom of Information Act, obtained FDA
reviews of every placebo-controlled clinical trial submitted for initial approval of the six
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most widely used antidepressant drugs approved between 1987 and 1999—Prozac, Paxil,
Zoloft, Celexa, Serzone, and Effexor.10 They found that on average, placebos were 80
percent as effective as the drugs. The difference between drug and placebo was so small
that it was unlikely to be of any clinical significance. The results were much the same for
all six drugs: all were equally ineffective. But because favorable results were published and
unfavorable results buried (in this case, within the FDA), the public and the medical
profession believed these drugs were potent antidepressants.
Clinical trials are also biased through designs for research that are chosen to yield
favorable results for sponsors. For example, the sponsor’s drug may be compared with
another drug administered at a dose so low that the sponsor’s drug looks more powerful. Or
a drug that is likely to be used by older people will be tested in young people, so that side
effects are less likely to emerge. A common form of bias stems from the standard practice
of comparing a new drug with a placebo, when the relevant question is how it compares
with an existing drug. In short, it is often possible to make clinical trials come out pretty
much any way you want, which is why it’s so important that investigators be truly
disinterested in the outcome of their work.
Conflicts of interest affect more than research. They also directly shape the way medicine
is practiced, through their influence on practice guidelines issued by professional and
governmental bodies, and through their effects on FDA decisions. A few examples: in a
survey of two hundred expert panels that issued practice guidelines, one third of the panel
members acknowledged that they had some financial interest in the drugs they
considered.11 In 2004, after the National Cholesterol Education Program called for sharply
lowering the desired levels of “bad” cholesterol, it was revealed that eight of nine members
of the panel writing the recommendations had financial ties to the makers of cholesterol-
lowering drugs.12 Of the 170 contributors to the most recent edition of the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM),
ninety-five had financial ties to drug companies, including all of the contributors to the
sections on mood disorders and schizophrenia.13 Perhaps most important, many members
of the standing committees of experts that advise the FDA on drug approvals also have
financial ties to the pharmaceutical industry.14
n recent years, drug companies have perfected a new and highly effective method to
expand their markets. Instead of promoting drugs to treat diseases, they have begun to
promote diseases to fit their drugs. The strategy is to convince as many people as possible
(along with their doctors, of course) that they have medical conditions that require
long-term drug treatment. Sometimes called “disease-mongering,” this is a focus of two
new books: Melody Petersen’s Our Daily Meds: How the Pharmaceutical Companies
Transformed Themselves into Slick Marketing Machines and Hooked the Nation on
Prescription Drugs and Christopher Lane’s Shyness: How Normal Behavior Became a
Sickness.
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dysphoric disorder” or PMMD; and shyness is “social anxiety disorder” (no abbreviation
yet). Note that these are ill-defined chronic conditions that affect essentially normal people,
so the market is huge and easily expanded. For example, a senior marketing executive
advised sales representatives on how to expand the use of Neurontin: “Neurontin for pain,
Neurontin for monotherapy, Neurontin for bipolar, Neurontin for everything.”15 It seems
that the strategy of the drug marketers—and it has been remarkably successful—is to
convince Americans that there are only two kinds of people: those with medical conditions
that require drug treatment and those who don’t know it yet. While the strategy originated
in the industry, it could not be implemented without the complicity of the medical
profession.
Melody Petersen, who was a reporter for The New York Times, has written a broad,
convincing indictment of the pharmaceutical industry.16 She lays out in detail the many
ways, both legal and illegal, that drug companies can create “blockbusters” (drugs with
yearly sales of over a billion dollars) and the essential role that KOLs play. Her main
example is Neurontin, which was initially approved only for a very narrow use—to treat
epilepsy when other drugs failed to control seizures. By paying academic experts to put
their names on articles extolling Neurontin for other uses—bipolar disease, post-traumatic
stress disorder, insomnia, restless legs syndrome, hot flashes, migraines, tension headaches,
and more—and by funding conferences at which these uses were promoted, the
manufacturer was able to parlay the drug into a blockbuster, with sales of $2.7 billion in
2003. The following year, in a case covered extensively by Petersen for the Times, Pfizer
pleaded guilty to illegal marketing and agreed to pay $430 million to resolve the criminal
and civil charges against it. A lot of money, but for Pfizer, it was just the cost of doing
business, and well worth it because Neurontin continued to be used like an all-purpose
tonic, generating billions of dollars in annual sales.
hristopher Lane’s book has a narrower focus—the rapid increase in the number of
psychiatric diagnoses in the American population and in the use of psychoactive drugs
(drugs that affect mental states) to treat them. Since there are no objective tests for mental
illness and the boundaries between normal and abnormal are often uncertain, psychiatry is
a particularly fertile field for creating new diagnoses or broadening old ones.17 Diagnostic
criteria are pretty much the exclusive province of the current edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, which is the product of a panel of psychiatrists,
most of whom, as I mentioned earlier, had financial ties to the pharmaceutical industry.
Lane, a research professor of literature at Northwestern University, traces the evolution of
the DSM from its modest beginnings in 1952 as a small, spiral-bound handbook (DSM-I)
to its current 943-page incarnation (the revised version of DSM-IV) as the undisputed
“bible” of psychiatry—the standard reference for courts, prisons, schools, insurance
companies, emergency rooms, doctors’ offices, and medical facilities of all kinds.
Given its importance, you might think that the DSM represents the authoritative distillation
of a large body of scientific evidence. But Lane, using unpublished records from the
archives of the American Psychiatric Association and interviews with the princi-pals,
shows that it is instead the product of a complex of academic politics, personal ambition,
ideology, and, perhaps most important, the influence of the pharmaceutical industry. What
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the DSM lacks is evidence. Lane quotes one contributor to the DSM-III task force:
There was very little systematic research, and much of the research that existed was
really a hodgepodge—scattered, inconsistent, and ambiguous. I think the majority of
us recognized that the amount of good, solid science upon which we were making our
decisions was pretty modest.
Some of the biggest blockbusters are psychoactive drugs. The theory that psychiatric
conditions stem from a biochemical imbalance is used as a justification for their
widespread use, even though the theory has yet to be proved. Children are particularly
vulnerable targets. What parents dare say “No” when a physician says their difficult child
is sick and recommends drug treatment? We are now in the midst of an apparent epidemic
of bipolar disease in children (which seems to be replacing attention-deficit hyperactivity
disorder as the most publicized condition in childhood), with a forty-fold increase in the
diagnosis between 1994 and 2003.18 These children are often treated with multiple drugs
off-label, many of which, whatever their other properties, are sedating, and nearly all of
which have potentially serious side effects.
he problems I’ve discussed are not limited to psychiatry, although they reach their most
florid form there. Similar conflicts of interest and biases exist in virtually every field of
medicine, particularly those that rely heavily on drugs or devices. It is simply no longer
possible to believe much of the clinical research that is published, or to rely on the
judgment of trusted physicians or authoritative medical guidelines. I take no pleasure in
this conclusion, which I reached slowly and reluctantly over my two decades as an editor
of TheNew England Journal of Medicine.
One result of the pervasive bias is that physicians learn to practice a very drug-intensive
style of medicine. Even when changes in lifestyle would be more effective, doctors and
their patients often believe that for every ailment and discontent there is a drug. Physicians
are also led to believe that the newest, most expensive brand-name drugs are superior to
older drugs or generics, even though there is seldom any evidence to that effect because
sponsors do not usually compare their drugs with older drugs at equivalent doses. In
addition, physicians, swayed by prestigious medical school faculty, learn to prescribe drugs
for off-label uses without good evidence of effectiveness.
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It is easy to fault drug companies for this situation, and they certainly deserve a great deal
of blame. Most of the big drug companies have settled charges of fraud, off-label
marketing, and other offenses. TAP Pharmaceuticals, for example, in 2001 pleaded guilty
and agreed to pay $875 million to settle criminal and civil charges brought under the
federal False Claims Act over its fraudulent marketing of Lupron, a drug used for treatment
of prostate cancer. In addition to GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, and TAP, other companies that
have settled charges of fraud include Merck, Eli Lilly, and Abbott. The costs, while
enormous in some cases, are still dwarfed by the profits generated by these illegal
activities, and are therefore not much of a deterrent. Still, apologists might argue that the
pharmaceutical industry is merely trying to do its primary job—further the interests of its
investors—and sometimes it goes a little too far.
Physicians, medical schools, and professional organizations have no such excuse, since
their only fiduciary responsibility is to patients. The mission of medical schools and
teaching hospitals—and what justifies their tax-exempt status—is to educate the next
generation of physicians, carry out scientifically important research, and care for the
sickest members of society. It is not to enter into lucrative commercial alliances with the
pharmaceutical industry. As reprehensible as many industry practices are, I believe the
behavior of much of the medical profession is even more culpable.19 Drug companies are
not charities; they expect something in return for the money they spend, and they evidently
get it or they wouldn’t keep paying.
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o many reforms would be necessary to restore integrity to clinical research and medical
practice that they cannot be summarized briefly. Many would involve congressional
legislation and changes in the FDA, including its drug approval process. But there is
clearly also a need for the medical profession to wean itself from industry money almost
entirely. Although industry–academic collaboration can make important scientific
contributions, it is usually in carrying out basic research, not clinical trials, and even here,
it is arguable whether it necessitates the personal enrichment of investigators. Members of
medical school faculties who conduct clinical trials should not accept any payments from
drug companies except research support, and that support should have no strings attached,
including control by drug companies over the design, interpretation, and publication of
research results.
Medical schools and teaching hospitals should rigorously enforce that rule, and should not
enter into deals with companies whose products members of their faculty are studying.
Finally, there is seldom a legitimate reason for physicians to accept gifts from drug
companies, even small ones, and they should pay for their own meetings and continuing
education.
After much unfavorable publicity, medical schools and professional organizations are
beginning to talk about controlling conflicts of interest, but so far the response has been
tepid. They consistently refer to “potential” conflicts of interest, as though that were
different from the real thing, and about disclosing and “managing” them, not about
prohibiting them. In short, there seems to be a desire to eliminate the smell of corruption,
while keeping the money. Breaking the dependence of the medical profession on the
pharmaceutical industry will take more than appointing committees and other gestures. It
will take a sharp break from an extremely lucrative pattern of behavior. But if the medical
profession does not put an end to this corruption voluntarily, it will lose the confidence of
the public, and the government (not just Senator Grassley) will step in and impose
regulation. No one in medicine wants that.
Letters
A Puzlax For Readers March 12, 2009
1 Gardiner Harris and Benedict Carey, “Researchers Fail to Reveal Full Drug Pay,” The New York Times, June 8, 2008.↩
2 Most of the information in these paragraphs, including Nemeroff’s quote in the summer of 2004, is drawn from a long letter written by Senator
Grassley to James W. Wagner, President of Emory University, on October 2, 2008.↩
3 See Gardiner Harris, “Leading Psychiatrist Didn’t Report Drug Makers’ Pay,” The New York Times, October 4, 2008.↩
4 Senator Grassley is current investigating Wyeth for paying a medical writing firm to ghost-write articles favorable to its hormone-replacement
drug Prempro.↩
5 Some of this material is drawn from my article “Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research: A Broken System,” TheJournal of the American
Medical Association, September 3, 2008.↩
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6 Justin E. Bekelman et al., “Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review,” The Journal of
the American Medical Association, January 22, 2003.↩
7 Eric G. Campbell et al., “Institutional Academic–Industry Relationships,” The Journal of the American Medical Association, October 17,
2007.↩
8 Erick H. Turner et al., “Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and Its Influence on Apparent Efficacy,” The New England Journal of
Medicine, January 17, 2008.↩
9 See Wayne Kondro and Barb Sibbald, “Drug Company Experts Advised Staff to Withhold Data About SSRI Use in Children,” Canadian
Medical Association Journal, March 2, 2004.↩
10 Irving Kirsch et al., “The Emperor’s New Drugs: An Analysis of Antidepressant Medication Data Submitted to the US Food and Drug
Administration,” Prevention & Treatment, July 15, 2002.↩
11 Rosie Taylor and Jim Giles, “Cash Interests Taint Drug Advice,” Nature, October 20, 2005.↩
12 David Tuller, “Seeking a Fuller Picture of Statins,” The New York Times, July 20, 2004.↩
13 Lisa Cosgrove et al., “Financial Ties Between DSM-IV Panel Members and the Pharmaceutical Industry,” Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics,
Vol. 75, No. 3 (2006).↩
14 On August 4, 2008, the FDA announced that $50,000 is now the “maximum personal financial interest an advisor may have in all companies
that may be affected by a particular meeting.” Waivers may be granted for amounts less than that.↩
16 Petersen’s book is a part of a second wave of books exposing the deceptive practices of the pharmaceutical industry. The first included
Katharine Greider’s The Big Fix: How the Pharmaceutical Industry Rips Off American Consumers (PublicAffairs, 2003), Merrill Goozner’s
The $800 Million Pill: The Truth Behind the Cost of New Drugs (University of California Press, 2004), Jerome Avorn’s Powerful Medicines:
The Benefits, Risks, and Costs of Prescription Drugs (Knopf, 2004), John Abramson’s Overdo$ed America: The Broken Promise of American
Medicine (HarperCollins, 2004), and my own The Truth About the Drug Companies: How They Deceive Us and What to Do About It (Random
House, 2004).↩
17 See the review by Frederick Crews of Lane’s book and two others, The New York Review, December 6, 2007.↩
18 See Gardiner Harris and Benedict Carey, “Researchers Fail to Reveal Full Drug Pay,” The New York Times, June 8, 2008.↩
19 This point is made powerfully in Jerome P. Kassirer’s disturbing book, On the Take: How Medicine’s Complicity With Big Business Can
Endanger Your Health (Oxford University Press, 2005).↩
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COD HCP ARPIM
CODUL ARPIM DE ETICĂ ÎN PROMOVAREA
MEDICAMENTELOR ELIBERATE PE BAZĂ DE
PRESCRIPŢIE MEDICALĂ ŞI ÎN INTERACŢIUNILE CU
PROFESIONIŞTII DIN DOMENIUL SANITAR
*
Aplicabil de la data de 1 Ianuarie 2015.
1
Articolul 7. Transparenţa promovării
Secţiunea 7.01. Promovarea nu trebuie să fie deghizată.
Secţiunea 7.02. Studiile non-interventionale, evaluările post-autorizare sau orice alte colectări de
date nu trebuie să constituie promovare deghizată. Evaluările, programele şi studiile de acest fel
trebuie efectuate în primul rând în scop ştiinţific sau educaţional.
Secţiunea 7.03. Atunci când se publică în presă materiale promoţionale ca urmare a unor servicii
angajate de către un membru ARPIM, de un afiliat al său sau de o companie asociată (de exemplu,
compania de relaţii publice - RP - a membrului ARPIM), materialul promoţional trebuie să
precizeze cu claritate compania membră ARPIM care a comandat articolul sau beneficiarul final al
articolului. Articolele de acest fel nu trebuie să se asemene cu materialele editoriale independente.
Secţiunea 7.04. Fiecare membru ARPIM este răspunzător pentru materialele informative referitoare
la produsele sale medicamentoase, fie că sunt de natură promoţională sau nu. În cazul în care aceste
materiale sunt difuzate de agenţiile de relaţii publice cu care compania membră ARPIM se află sub
contract, aceasta trebuie să se asigure că este clar indicat faptul că difuzarea a fost sponsorizată de
către respectivul membru ARPIM.
2
a) majoritatea invitaţilor sunt din afara României şi, date fiind ţările de origine ale celor mai
multţi invitaţi, are mai mult sens din punct de vedere logistic ca evenimentul să aibă loc
într-o altă ţară, sau
b) dată fiind localizarea resurselor sau a expertizei relevante care constituie obiectul sau
subiectul evenimentului, are mai mult sens din punct de vedere logistic ca evenimentul să
aibă loc într-o altă ţară (un “eveniment internaţional”).
Secţiunea 10.03. Informaţiile promoţionale care apar pe standurile de prezentare sau sunt distribuite
participanţilor la evenimente internaţionale pot, în afară de cazul în care acest lucru este interzis sau
altfel reglementat prin legi şi reglementări locale, să se refere la produse medicamentoase (sau
indicaţii) care nu sunt înregistrate în ţara în care are loc evenimentul sau sunt înregistrate în condiţii
diferite, atâta timp cât:
(i) orice astfel de material promoţional (exclusiv ajutoarele promoţionale) are
ataşată o declaraţie corespunzătoare care să indice ţările în care este înregistrat
produsul şi să clarifice că produsul sau indicaţia nu este înregistrată la nivel local
şi
(ii) orice astfel de material promoţional care se referă la informaţiile de prescriere
(indicaţii, atenţionări, etc.) autorizate într-o ţară sau în ţări în care medicamentele
sunt autorizate trebuie să aibă ataşată o declaraţie explicativă menţionând că, la nivel
internaţional, condiţiile de înregistrare diferă.
3
Articolul 11 Sponsorizări/Donaţii/Subsidii care sprijină asistenţa medicală sau cercetarea
Secţiunea 11.01. Sponsorizările/Donaţiile şi/sau Subsidiile (în numerar sau în natură sau în alt mod)
către instituţii publice, organizaţii sau asociaţii care sunt formate din profesionişti din domeniul
sanitar şi/sau care oferă servicii de îngrijire medicală sau de cercetare (care nu sunt reglementate în
alt mod de prezentul Cod ARPIM sau de Codul ARPIM de practică etică în interacţiunea cu
organizaţiile de pacienţi ) sunt permise dacă:
(i) sunt realizate cu scopul de a sprijini îngrijirea sănătăţii sau cercetarea;
(ii) sunt documentate şi arhivate de către sponsor/persoana care a acordat subsidiul; şi
(iii) nu constituie un îndemn de a recomanda, prescrie, achiziţiona, distribui, vinde sau
administra anumite produse medicamentoase.
(iv) se bazează pe solicitarea specifică a instituţiei / organizaţiei respective
Donaţiile şi subsidiile acordate individual profesioniştilor din domeniul sanitar nu sunt permise
conform acestei secţiuni. Sponsorizarea de către companie a profesioniştilor din domeniul sanitar
pentru participarea la evenimente internaţionale este acoperită de Articolul 13. Companiile sunt
încurajate să facă publice informaţiile legate de donaţii şi subsidii (în numerar sau în natură sau
altfel) acoperite în această Secţiune 11.01.
4
Articolul 14. Utilizarea consultanţilor
Secţiunea 14.01. Este permis ca membrii ARPIM să angajeze profesionişti din domeniul sănătăţii
pentru servicii, cum ar fi, dar fără a se limita la următoarele: prelegeri, consultare şi/sau consiliere
(participare la şedinţele de tip „advisory board”, dar fără a se limita la aceasta), şi implicarea în
activităţi şi studii medicale/ştiinţifice, servicii de training şi participarea la cercetări de piaţă, atât în
grupuri cât şi în mod individual.
Toate formalităţile care acoperă aceste servicii de consultanţă sau alte servicii trebuie, în măsura în
care este relevant pentru angajamentul respectiv, să îndeplinească criteriile următoare:
a) un contract sau un acord scris este agreat înainte de începerea prestării serviciilor: Acesta
specifică natura acestor servicii şi, conform clauzei (g) de mai jos, este baza pentru plata
acestor servicii;
b) o nevoie legitimă pentru serviciile respective a fost clar identificată înainte de solicitarea
serviciilor şi de încheierea acordurilor cu viitorii consultanţi;
c) criteriile de selectare a consultanţilor sunt legate în mod direct de nevoia identificată, iar
persoanele responsabile pentru selectarea consultanţilor au expertiza necesară pentru a
evalua dacă profesioniştii respectivi din domeniul sanitar îndeplinesc aceste criterii;
d) numărul profesioniştilor din domeniul sanitar implicaţi/angajaţi nu este mai mare decât
numărul necesar în mod rezonabil pentru a îndeplini nevoia identificată;
e) compania contractantă ţine evidenţe privitoare la serviciile prestate de consultanţi şi le
utilizează în mod corespunzător;
f) angajarea profesionistului din domeniul sanitar pentru a presta serviciul relevant nu este un
îndemn pentru a recomanda, a prescrie, a achiziţiona, a distribui, a vinde sau a administra un
produs medicamentos; şi
g) compensarea pentru servicii este rezonabilă şi reflectă valoarea corectă de piaţă a serviciilor
prestate; în acest sens, acordurile de consultanţă nu trebuie utilizate pentru a justifica
compensarea profesioniştilor din domeniul sanitar.
Secţiunea 14.02. Pentru serviciile prestate, consultanţilor externi li se vor oferi compensaţii
rezonabile, inclusiv rambursarea cheltuielilor rezonabile de călătorie, masă şi cazare (dacă este
cazul). Limitele considerate rezonabile (tarife orare nete) sunt descrise în secţiunea “Punerea în
aplicare şi Normele de Procedură” din Codul ARPIM şi trebuie respectate de companiile membre
ARPIM.
Secţiunea 14.03. În contractele scrise încheiate cu consultanţii, companiile sunt puternic încurajate
să includă prevederi privitoare la obligaţia consultantului de a declara că este consultant pentru
companie ori de câte ori scrie sau vorbeşte în public în legătură cu un aspect care este subiect al
acordului sau cu orice alt subiect referitor la companie. În mod similar, companiile care angajează,
part-time, profesionişti din domeniul sanitar care continuă să îşi practice şi profesia sunt încurajate
cu tărie să se asigure că aceste persoane au obligaţia de a-şi declara acordul de angajare cu
compania ori de câte ori scriu sau vorbesc în public despre o chestiune care este subiect al angajării
sau orice alt aspect legat de companie. Prevederile acestei Secţiuni 14.03 se aplică chiar dacă Codul
ARPIM nu acoperă în alt mod informaţiile nepromoţionale, generale în legătură cu companiile
(discutate la secţiunea “Sfera de Aplicare” a Codului ARPIM).
Secţiunea 14.04. Cercetarea de piaţă restrânsă, cum ar fi interviurile telefonice de tip „one-off” sau
chestionarele prin poştă/e-mail/internet sunt excluse din sfera de aplicare a acestui Articol 14, cu
condiţia ca profesionistul din domeniul sanitar să nu fie consultat într-un mod repetat (atât în ceea
ce priveşte frecvenţa apelurilor în general, cât şi a apelurilor legate de aceeaşi cercetare) şi ca
remuneraţia să fie minimă.
Secţiunea 14.05. Dacă un profesionist din domeniul sanitar participă la un eveniment (un eveniment
internaţional sau de alt fel) în calitate de consultant sau consilier, se vor aplica prevederile relevante
din Articolul 10.
5
Secţiunea 14.06. Companiile membre ARPIM îşi vor defini intern sumele nete maxime rezonabile
pentru astfel de servicii care pot fi plătite individual unui profesionist din domeniul sanitar în
decursul unui an fiscal.
6
Plata taxelor de membru în asociaţii medicale naţionale sau internaţionale sau susţinerea
profesioniştilor din domeniul sanitar în vederea editării de literatură medicală nu sunt permise.
7
conformitate cu cerinţele codului ARPIM şi cu legile şi reglementările din România,
respectă rezumatul caracteristicilor produsului şi reprezintă o prezentare corectă, echilibrată
şi de încredere a dovezilor privitoare la produsul medicamentos, având valoare ştiinţifică.
c) Fiecare membru ARPIM trebuie să implementeze un program de training pentru toţi
angajaţii - atât la angajare, cât şi de fiecare dată când au loc schimbări semnificative în
Codul ARPIM sau în legile şi reglementările româneşti în vigoare.
8
Table of Contents
Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 2
Most physicians strive to work ethically, render high-quality medical care to their
patients, and submit proper claims for payment. Society places enormous trust in
physicians, and rightly so. Trust is at the core of the physician-patient relationship.
When our health is at its most vulnerable, we rely on physicians to use their expert
medical training to put us on the road to a healthy recovery.
The Federal Government also places enormous trust in physicians. Medicare, Medicaid,
and other Federal health care programs rely on physicians’ medical judgment to treat
beneficiaries with appropriate services. When reimbursing physicians
and hospitals for services provided to program beneficiaries, the
Federal Government relies on physicians to submit accurate
and truthful claims information.
2
Fraud and Abuse Laws
The five most important Federal fraud and abuse laws that apply to physicians are the
False Claims Act (FCA), the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), the Physician Self-Referral
Law (Stark law), the Exclusion Authorities, and the Civil Monetary Penalties Law
(CMPL). Government agencies, including the Department of Justice, the Department
of Health & Human Services Office of Inspector General (OIG), and the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), are charged with enforcing these laws. As you
begin your career, it is crucial to understand these laws not only because following
them is the right thing to do, but also because violating them could result in criminal
penalties, civil fines, exclusion from the Federal health care programs, or loss of your
medical license from your State medical board.
The civil FCA protects the Government from being overcharged or sold shoddy
goods or services. It is illegal to submit claims for payment to Medicare or
Medicaid that you know or should know are false or fraudulent. Filing false
claims may result in fines of up to three times the programs’ loss plus $11,000 per claim
filed. Under the civil FCA, each instance of an item or a service billed to Medicare or
Medicaid counts as a claim, so fines can add up quickly. The fact that a claim results
from a kickback or is made in violation of the Stark law also may render it false or
fraudulent, creating liability under the civil FCA as well as the AKS or Stark law.
Under the civil FCA, no specific intent to defraud is required. The civil FCA defines
“knowing” to include not only actual knowledge but also instances in which the
person acted in deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of
the information. Further, the civil FCA contains a whistleblower provision that allows
a private individual to file a lawsuit on behalf of the United States and entitles that
whistleblower to a percentage of any recoveries. Whistleblowers could be current or
ex-business partners, hospital or office staff, patients, or competitors.
There also is a criminal FCA (18 U.S.C. § 287). Criminal penalties for submitting false
claims include imprisonment and criminal fines. Physicians have gone to prison for
submitting false health care claims. OIG also may impose administrative civil monetary
penalties for false or fraudulent claims, as discussed below.
3
Anti-Kickback Statute [42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)]
The AKS is a criminal law that prohibits the knowing and willful payment of
“remuneration” to induce or reward patient referrals or the generation of business
involving any item or service payable by the Federal health care programs (e.g., drugs,
supplies, or health care services for Medicare or Medicaid patients). Remuneration
includes anything of value and can take many forms besides cash, such as free
rent, expensive hotel stays and meals, and excessive compensation for medical
directorships or consultancies. In some industries, it is acceptable to
reward those who refer business to you. However, in the
Federal health care programs, paying for
referrals is a crime. The statute covers the payers
of kickbacks—those who offer or pay remuneration—
as well as the recipients of kickbacks—those who
solicit or receive remuneration. Each party’s intent is a
key element of their liability under the AKS.
Safe harbors protect certain payment and business practices that could otherwise
implicate the AKS from criminal and civil prosecution. To be protected by a safe harbor,
an arrangement must fit squarely in the safe harbor and satisfy all of its requirements.
Some safe harbors address personal services and rental agreements, investments in
ambulatory surgical centers, and payments to bona fide employees.
For additional information on safe harbors, see “OIG’s Safe Harbor Regulations”
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/safeharborregulations.asp.
4
Many people and companies want your patients’ business and would pay you to send
that business their way. Just as it is illegal for you to take money from providers and
suppliers in return for the referral of your Medicare and Medicaid patients, it is illegal
for you to pay others to refer their Medicare and Medicaid patients to you.
BB Overutilization
BB Increased program costs
BB Corruption of medical decisionmaking
BB Patient steering
BB Unfair competition
The Government does not need to prove patient harm or financial loss to the programs
to show that a physician violated the AKS. A physician can be guilty of violating
the AKS even if the physician actually rendered the service and the service was
medically necessary. Taking money or gifts from a drug or device company
or a durable medical equipment (DME) supplier is not justified by the
argument that you would have prescribed that drug or ordered that
wheelchair even without a kickback.
5
Physician Self-Referral Law [42 U.S.C. § 1395nn]
The Physician Self-Referral Law, commonly referred to as the Stark law, prohibits
physicians from referring patients to receive “designated health services” payable by
Medicare or Medicaid from entities with which the physician or an immediate family
member has a financial relationship, unless an exception applies. Financial relationships
include both ownership/investment interests and compensation arrangements. For
example, if you invest in an imaging center, the Stark law requires the resulting
financial relationship to fit within an exception or you may not refer patients to the
facility and the entity may not bill for the referred imaging services.
For more information, see CMS’s Stark law Web site available at
http://www.cms.gov/physicianselfreferral/.
6
Exclusion Statute [42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7]
OIG is legally required to exclude from participation in all Federal health care
programs individuals and entities convicted of the following types of criminal offenses:
(1) Medicare or Medicaid fraud, as well as any other offenses related to the delivery of
items or services under Medicare or Medicaid; (2) patient abuse or neglect; (3) felony
convictions for other health-care-related fraud, theft, or other financial misconduct;
and (4) felony convictions for unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or
dispensing of controlled substances. OIG has discretion to exclude individuals and
entities on several other grounds, including misdemeanor convictions related to
health care fraud other than Medicare or Medicaid fraud or misdemeanor
convictions in connection with the unlawful manufacture, distribution,
prescription, or dispensing of controlled substances; suspension,
revocation, or surrender of a license to provide health care for reasons
bearing on professional competence, professional performance,
or financial integrity; provision of unnecessary or substandard
services; submission of false or fraudulent claims to a Federal health
care program; engaging in unlawful kickback arrangements; and
defaulting on health education loan or scholarship obligations.
For more information, see OIG’s Special Advisory Bulletin entitled “The Effect of
Exclusion From Participation in Federal Health Care Programs” available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/effected.htm.
7
You are responsible for ensuring that you do not employ or contract with excluded
individuals or entities, whether in a physician practice, a clinic, or in any capacity
or setting in which Federal health care programs may reimburse for the items or
services furnished by those employees or contractors. This responsibility requires
screening all current and prospective employees and contractors against OIG’s List of
Excluded Individuals and Entities. This online database can be accessed from OIG’s
Exclusion Web site. If you employ or contract with an excluded individual or entity
and Federal health care program payment is made for items or services that person or
entity furnishes, whether directly or indirectly, you may be subject to a civil monetary
penalty and/or an obligation to repay any amounts attributable to the services of the
excluded individual or entity.
OIG may seek civil monetary penalties and sometimes exclusion for a wide variety of
conduct and is authorized to seek different amounts of penalties and assessments based
on the type of violation at issue. Penalties range from $10,000 to $50,000 per violation.
Some examples of CMPL violations include:
BB presenting a claim that the person knows or should know is for an item or service
that was not provided as claimed or is false or fraudulent;
BB presenting a claim that the person knows or should know is for an item or service
for which payment may not be made;
BB violating the AKS;
BB violating Medicare assignment provisions;
BB violating the Medicare physician agreement;
BB providing false or misleading information expected to influence a decision to
discharge;
BB failing to provide an adequate medical screening examination for patients
who present to a hospital emergency department with an emergency medical
condition or in labor; and
BB making false statements or misrepresentations on applications or contracts to
participate in the Federal health care programs.
8
I. Physician Relationships With Payers
During residency, you probably are not focused on who pays for your patients’ care.
Once you start practicing, it is important to understand who the payers are. The U.S.
health care system relies heavily on third-party payers, and, therefore, your patients
often are not the ones who pay most of their medical bills. Third-party payers include
commercial insurers and the Federal and State governments. When the Federal
Government covers items or services rendered to Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries, the Federal fraud and abuse laws apply. Many States also
have adopted similar laws that apply to your provision of care under State-financed
programs and to private-pay patients. Consequently, you should recognize that the
issues discussed here may apply to your care of all insured patients.
Payers trust you, as a physician, to provide necessary, cost-effective, and quality care.
You exert significant influence over what services your patients receive, you control the
documentation describing what services they actually received, and your documentation
serves as the basis for bills sent to insurers for
services you provided. The Government’s
payment of claims is generally based solely
on your representations in the claims
documents.
9
When you submit a claim for services performed for a Medicare or
Medicaid beneficiary, you are filing a bill with the Federal Government
and certifying that you have earned the payment requested and complied
with the billing requirements. If you knew or should have known that the submitted
claim was false, then the attempt to collect unearned money constitutes a violation. A
common type of false claim is “upcoding,” which refers to using billing codes that
reflect a more severe illness than actually existed or a more expensive treatment than
was provided. Additional examples of improper claims include:
10
Case Examples of Fraudulent Billing
• A psychiatrist was fined $400,000 and
permanently excluded from participating in the
Federal health care programs for misrepresenting
that he provided therapy sessions requiring
30 or 60 minutes of face-to-face time with the
patient, when he had provided only medication checks for
15 minutes or less. The psychiatrist also misrepresented that he provided
therapy sessions when in fact a non-licensed individual conducted the sessions.
• A cardiologist paid the Government $435,000 and entered into a 5-year Integrity
Agreement with OIG to settle allegations that he knowingly submitted claims for
consultation services that were not supported by patient medical records and did
not meet the criteria for a consultation. The physician also allegedly knowingly
submitted false claims for E&M services when he had already received payment for
such services in connection with previous claims for nuclear stress testing.
11
Physician Documentation
Physicians should maintain accurate and complete medical records and documentation
of the services they provide. Physicians also should ensure that the claims they submit
for payment are supported by the documentation. The Medicare
and Medicaid programs may review beneficiaries’ medical
records. Good documentation practice helps ensure that
your patients receive appropriate care from you and
other providers who may rely on your records for
patients’ past medical histories. It also helps you address
challenges raised against the integrity of your bills. You may have
heard the saying regarding malpractice litigation: “If you didn’t
document it, it’s the same as if you didn’t do it.” The same can be
said for Medicare and Medicaid billing.
12
For tips you can share with your patients on how they can protect themselves from
medical identity theft, see OIG’s brochure entitled “Tips to Avoid Medical ID
Theft” available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/IDTheft/OIG_Medical_Identity_Theft_Brochure.pdf.
Prescription Authority
13
Assignment Issues in Medicare Reimbursement
The second, less common, way to obtain Medicare reimbursement is to bill as a non-
participating provider. Non-participating providers do not receive direct payment
from the Medicare program. Rather, they bill their patients and the patients seek
reimbursement from Medicare. Although non-participating providers are not subject to
the assignment rules, they still must limit the dollar amount of their charges to Medicare
patients. Generally, non-participating providers may not charge Medicare beneficiaries
more than 15 percent in excess of the Medicare fee schedule amount. It is illegal to
charge patients more than the limiting charge established for physicians’ services.
You may see advertisements offering to help you convert your practice into a “boutique,”
“concierge,” or “retainer” practice. Many such solicitations promise to help you work
less, yet earn more money. If you are a participating or non-participating
physician, you may not ask Medicare patients to pay a second time for
services for which Medicare has already paid. It is legal to charge patients
for services that are not covered by Medicare. However, charging an “access fee” or
“administrative fee” that simply allows them to obtain Medicare-covered services
from your practice constitutes double billing.
14
Case Example of a Physician Violating an Assignment
Agreement by Charging Beneficiaries Extra Fees
• A physician paid $107,000 to resolve potential
liability for charging patients, including Medicare
beneficiaries, an annual fee. In exchange for
the fee, the physician offered: (1) an annual
physical; (2) same- or next-day appointments;
(3) dedicated support personnel; (4) around-the-clock
physician availability; (5) prescription facilitation; (6) expedited and
coordinated referrals; and (7) other amenities at the physician’s discretion. The
physician’s activities allegedly violated the assignment agreement because some of
the services outlined in the annual fee were already covered by Medicare.
15
II. Physician Relationships With Fellow
Providers: Physicians, Hospitals,
Nursing Homes, Etc.
Any time a health care business offers something to you for free or at below fair market
value, you always should ask yourself, “Why?” For example, if a DME supplier offers to
give you cash or to pay for your summer vacation, you should suspect that the supplier
is trying to induce you to refer your patients to that vendor. If a laboratory offers to
decorate your patient waiting room, you should suspect that it is trying to induce you
to send your lab business its way.
fellow providers, see OIG’s “Compliance Program Guidance for Individual and
Small Group Physician Practices” available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/physician.pdf;
16
can expose beneficiaries to harm from unnecessary services. Many of these
investment relationships have serious legal risks under the AKS and Stark law.
If you are invited to invest in a health care business whose products you might order or
to which you might refer your patients, you should ask the following questions. If the
answer is “yes” to any of them, you should consider carefully whether you are investing
for legitimate reasons.
VV Are you being offered an investment interest for a nominal capital contribution?
VV Will your ownership share be larger than your share of the aggregate capital
contributions made to the venture?
VV Is the venture promising you high rates of return for little or no financial risk?
VV Is the venture or any potential business partner offering to loan you the money to
make your capital contribution?
VV Are you being asked to promise or guarantee that you will refer patients or order
items or services from the venture?
VV Do you believe you will be more likely to refer more patients for the items and
services provided by the venture if you make the investment?
VV Do you believe you will be more likely to refer to the venture just because you
made the investment?
VV Will the venture have sufficient capital from other sources to fund its ongoing
operations?
17
For more information on physician investments, see:
• A physician paid the Government $203,000 to settle allegations that he violated the
physician self-referral prohibition in the Stark law for routinely referring Medicare
patients to an oxygen supply company he owned.
18
Physician Recruitment
19
Tips for Medical Directors
• Two orthopedic surgeons paid $450,000 and $250,000 to settle allegations related
to improper medical directorships with a company that operated a diagnostic imaging
center, a rehabilitation facility, and an ambulatory surgery center. The company
allegedly provided the physicians with valuable compensation, including free use
of the corporate jet, under the medical directorship agreements, which required the
physicians to render limited services in return. The agreements with the physicians
allegedly called for redundant services and served to encourage the physicians to
refer their patients to the facilities operated by the company.
20
III. Physician Relationships With Vendors
Free Samples
21
Relationships With the Pharmaceutical and Medical
Device Industries
Physician-industry collaboration can produce important medical advances. However,
some pharmaceutical and device companies have used sham consulting agreements
and other arrangements to buy physician loyalty to their products. Such illegal
arrangements induce physicians to prescribe or use products on the basis of that loyalty
to the company or to get more money from the company, rather than because it is the
best treatment for the patient.
22
If your contribution is your time and effort or your ability to generate useful ideas and
the payment you receive is fair market value compensation for your services without
regard to referrals, then, depending on the circumstances, you may legitimately serve
as a bona fide consultant. If your contribution is your ability to prescribe a
drug or use a medical device or refer your patients for particular services
or supplies, the proposed consulting arrangement likely is one you should
avoid as it could violate fraud and abuse laws.
For example, if a drug company offers to pay you and a hundred other
“thought leaders” to attend a conference in the Bahamas without
requiring preparatory work on your part or information about
your expertise in the field (other than the fact that you are a
licensed physician), you should be suspicious that the company
is attempting to influence you to prescribe its drug.
23
Transparency in Physician-Industry Relationships
Although some physicians believe that free lunches, subsidized trips, and gifts do
not affect their medical judgment, research shows that these types of perquisites can
influence prescribing practices. Recent pharmaceutical company settlements with
the Department of Justice and OIG require “transparency” in physician-industry
relationships, whether by requiring the pharmaceutical company to provide the
Government with a list of physicians whom the company paid and/or by requiring
ongoing public disclosure by the company of physician payments. The public will
soon know what gifts and payments a physician receives from industry.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 requires drug, device, and
biologic companies to publicly report nearly all gifts or payments they make to
physicians beginning in 2013.
Both the pharmaceutical industry (through PhRMA) and the medical device
industry (through AdvaMed) have adopted codes of ethics for their respective
industries regarding relationships with health care professionals. Both codes are
available online.
Conflict-of-Interest Disclosures
24
Continuing Medical Education
For example, if speakers recommend use of a drug to treat conditions for which
there is no FDA approval or use of a drug by children when FDA has approved
only adult use, you should independently seek out the empirical data that support
these recommendations. Note that although physicians may prescribe
drugs for off-label uses, it is illegal under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act for drug manufacturers to promote off-label uses
of drugs.
Advertisements and other promotional materials for drugs, biologics, and medical
devices must be truthful, not misleading, and limited to approved uses. FDA is
requesting physicians’ assistance in identifying misleading advertisements through
its Bad Ad Program. If you spot advertising violations, you should report them to
FDA by calling 877-RX-DDMAC (877-793-3622) or by emailing badad@fda.gov.
If you are invited to serve as faculty for industry-sponsored CME, ask yourself the
following questions:
25
Compliance Programs for Physicians
Establishing and following a compliance program will help physicians avoid fraudulent
activities and ensure that they are submitting true and accurate claims. The following
seven components provide a solid basis upon which a physician practice can create a
voluntary compliance program:
When you are considering whether or not to engage in a particular billing practice;
enter into a particular business venture; or pursue an employment, consulting, or other
personal services relationship, it is prudent to evaluate the arrangement for potential
compliance problems. The following is a list of possible resources that can help you.
ЈЈ Experienced health care lawyers can analyze your issues and provide a
legal evaluation and risk analysis of the proposed venture, relationship, or
arrangement.
26
ЈЈ The Bar Association in your State may have a directory of attorneys in your area
who practice in the health care field.
ЈЈ Your State or local medical society may be a good resource for issues affecting
physicians and may have listings of health care lawyers in your area.
ЈЈ Your specialty society may have information on additional risk areas specific to
your type of practice.
ЈЈ CMS’s local contractor medical directors are a valuable source of information
on Medicare coverage policies and appropriate billing practices. The contact
information for local contractors is available at
http://www.cms.gov/MLNGenInfo/30_contactus.asp.
ЈЈ CMS’s “Medicare Physician Guide: A Resource for Residents, Practicing
Physicians, and Other Health Care Professionals” available at
http://www.cms.gov/MLNProducts/downloads/physicianguide.pdf, provides an
overview of the Medicare program and information on Medicare reimbursement
and payment policies.
ЈЈ The OIG’s Web site, available at http://oig.hhs.gov, provides substantial
fraud and abuse guidance.
ЈЈ As discussed above, OIG issues Compliance Program Guidance documents that
include compliance recommendations and discussions of fraud and abuse risk
areas. These guidance documents are available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/complianceguidance.asp.
ЈЈ OIG issues advisory opinions to parties who seek advice on the application of the
AKS, CMPL, and Exclusion Authorities. Information on how to request an OIG
advisory opinion and links to previously published OIG advisory opinions are
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/advisoryopinions.asp.
ЈЈ CMS issues advisory opinions to parties who seek advice on the Stark law.
Information on how to request a CMS advisory opinion and links to previously
published CMS advisory opinions are available at
http://www.cms.gov/PhysicianSelfReferral/95_advisory_opinions.asp.
27
What To Do If You Think You Have a Problem
If you are engaged in a relationship you think is problematic or have been following
billing practices you now realize were wrong:
28
What To Do If You Have Information About
Fraud and Abuse Against Federal Health
Care Programs
If you have information about fraud and abuse against Federal health care programs,
use the OIG Fraud Hotline to report that information to the appropriate authorities. The
Hotline allows the option of reporting anonymously.
For additional information about the Hotline, visit the OIG Web site at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/hotline/.
29
This publication is available on the OIG Web site. You may reproduce, reprint,
and distribute this publication for educational purposes. You may not charge a
fee for this publication. http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/PhysicianEducation/
Chap t er
5
••••••••••
There are over 920,000 active physicians and 600,000 non-physician licensed
healthcare practitioners who are legally authorized to write prescriptions in
the United States for approximately 8000 different pharmaceutical products
in various forms, strengths and doses.1 The American Medical Association
(AMA) and other professional associations have estimated that there is one
drug company sales representative for every 4.7 physicians in the United
States2 and approximately one drug sales representative for every two U.S.
physicians who actively write prescriptions.3 When direct and independent
distributor sales representatives for device companies are added to the mix,
the ratio between sales people and physicians may be in the 1–3 range.
It is estimated that pharmaceutical companies alone spend $19 billion
annually on doctors in the form of lecture honoraria, conference registration
1
Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the United States, 2008, American Medical
Association; IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, No. 06-cv-280-PB (D.N.H. April 30, 2007).
2
J.L. Rose, Physicians’ Expectations of Industry and Sales Personnel (American Medical
Association, 2002) p. 4.
3
Daren Fonda and Barbara Kiviat, Curbing the Drug Marketers, Time, July 5, 2004, p. 41.
© 2008 Steven Schachter, William Mandell, Scott Harshbarger, and Randall Grometstein
Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 153
154 Managing Relationships with Industry
fees, research grants, trips, meals, drug samples and other gifts.4 A signifi-
cant percentage of these clinicians have considerable influence over which
prescriptions are written by their colleagues, and which medical devices
and other items are purchased for use in surgeries, procedures and other
treatments. The amount spent ($3.8 billion) on direct-to-consumer adver-
tising for roughly the same period pales by comparison.5 Drug companies
increased their total spending on promotion in the United States by 93%
from 1997 to 2002.6
Clearly, the interaction between physicians and industry sales forces has
been and will continue to be pervasive. As reviewed throughout this book, a
major paradigm shift has taken place within the realm of physician–industry
relationships. Focus and concern by the public and the U.S. federal and
state governments, as well as healthcare purchasers and public advocates,
over the legality of certain types of relationships has resulted in major gov-
ernment prosecutions and whistleblower law suits, culminating in billions of
dollars of liability for drug and device companies and significant legal and
financial risks for physicians. Virtually, all of the major pharmaceutical and
device companies have adopted compliance programs along the lines sug-
gested by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in its 2003 Compliance
Guidance for Pharmaceutical Companies. Companies that have settled civil
and criminal cases have significantly curtailed their prior marketing prac-
tices to physicians, such as promotion of off-label uses. Under Corporate
Integrity Agreements (CIAs) entered into with the OIG, companies have also
been required to use outside monitors to oversee their marketing activities
as part of their settlements with the federal government.
In addition to government regulatory guidance and prosecutorial push
back against industry marketing practices, the voluntary professional and
trade association codes of conduct outlined in Chapter 4 have moved the
line of legal and ethical acceptability away from gifts of substantial value to
physicians and from arrangements that have little or no educational and/or
scientific purpose.
Also, the media, particularly the New York Times, Wall Street Journal
and Boston Globe, have focused their health reporting extensively on the
influence of industry on medical treatment and product approvals. The
medical field itself is undergoing a process of self-scrutiny and criticism
about its relationship with industry, as evidenced by the recent spate of
physician-authored books, medical journal articles and blogs challenging the
ethics, legality and societal costs of the medical profession’s interactions
4
Press Release, U.S. Special Committee on Aging, June 27, 2007, Kohl Examines Drug
Industry Practice of Providing Payments to Doctors, Influencing Prescribing Behaviors.
5
Michael Blanding, Bad Medicine, Boston Magazine, February 2005, p. 57, 62.
6
Daren Fonda and Barbara Kiviat, Curbing the Drug Marketers, Time, July 5, 2004, p. 41.
Chapter 5 / Specific Physician–Industry Financial Relationships 155
with drug and device companies. This public exposure and re-evaluation,
along with the prosecutions and lawsuits described in Chapter 3, are the
main driving forces toward the reformation of the acceptable norms of
industry-physician interactions.
Drug and device companies, academic medical centers (AMCs) and
some major physician groups and professional associations have adopted
updated compliance plans and codes of conduct to self-regulate financial
relationships between industry and physicians. These efforts have resulted
in better staff training on the acceptable parameters of these relationships.
Drug and device companies have taken major strides to establish internal
organizational procedures to provide further guidance and legal counsel on
questions and proposed relationships, and to establish internal reporting
systems to detect and address violations of codes of conduct and conflict-
of-interest policies.
In the meantime, though, federal and state governments are reacting
to public concern over drug and device company marketing to physicians
and other healthcare providers by proposing and passing laws that require
public disclosure of payments and gifts by companies to physicians and
other healthcare organizations. Further, while the norms of drug and device
marketing to the medical profession have undergone profound change in the
last decade, these marketing efforts have also become more sophisticated
and subtle. As blatantly questionable activities, such as payments to doctors
for switching patients to different prescription drug products, are on the
decline, other questionable gift-giving practices and financial relationships
continue to exist, and there is a high level of uncertainty and confusion
among physicians and medical organizations about what is acceptable and
advisable from legal and ethical perspectives.
In his update of Blues legend Sonny Boy Williamson’s song “Cross My
Heart,” Bruce Springsteen sings the following new verse that he added:
This verse aptly states the dilemma faced by many physicians today who
have financial relationships with drug and device companies. The acceptable
legal and ethical lines for their interactions with industry may not be clear.
This lack of clarity is undoubtedly widespread. As confirmed by the results
of a national survey mailed to 3000 U.S. physicians and published in 2007
7
Cross My Heart, Copyright © Bruce Springsteen (ASCAP) 1992.
156 Managing Relationships with Industry
Physicians may disagree about the extent to which relationships with indus-
try influence medical care, the benefit or harm resulting from that influ-
ence, and the overall ethical propriety of each type of relationship. But one
thing, confirmed by this study, is clear: Physician–industry relationships
are pervasive in the U.S.11
8
Eric Campbell, PhD, et al., A National Survey of Physician–Industry Relationships. NEJM,
Vol. 356, April 26, 2007, p. 1742. The authors conducted a national survey of 3167 physicians in
six specialties (anesthesiology, cardiology, family practice, general surgery, internal medicine
and pediatrics) in late 2003 and early 2004 with a weighted response rate of 58%.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Allan S. Brett, MD, Relationships Between Physicians and Industry—A Survey. Journal
Watch General Medicine, April 25, 2007 available at http://general-medicine.jwatch.org/
cgi/content/full/2007/425/1.
Chapter 5 / Specific Physician–Industry Financial Relationships 157
were paid speakers, 7% who were company officers, 9% who were founders
of companies and 11% who served on a company board of directors.12
This survey also found that two-thirds of AMC departments had rela-
tionships with industry. Clinical departments were substantially more likely
than non-clinical departments to receive research equipment, unrestricted
funds, residency or fellowship training financial assistance and CME sup-
port, while non-clinical departments were more likely to receive funding
from intellectual property licensing.
Similar to the findings from Dr. Campbell’s previous general study of
physician–industry relationships, more than two-thirds of the respondents
believed that having a relationship with industry had no effect on their
professional activities. However, 72% said there is a negative impact on
a department’s ability to conduct independent unbiased research when a
department chair has more than one industry-related activity.13
Advocates for reform within medicine have proposed more stringent
ethical standards beyond the mere limits of legality in order to preserve the
independence and integrity of the profession itself against encroachment
by commercial interests. These voices challenge the profession to further
push the lines back beyond those espoused in the voluntary trade codes
and the 2003 OIG Guidance to a more absolute and restrictive position,
including bans on all gifts and complete barriers between corporate sponsors
for educational and research activities and recipient physicians.
Physicians who understand the importance of medicine’s relationships
with industry but want to be sure to respect and uphold the integrity and
independence of their own clinical, educational and scientific judgment
and activities, and those of their specialty societies, therefore need greater
clarity on how to approach actual situations in which they may interact with
drug and device companies. Indeed, the current state of affairs on physician
relationships with industry is anything but clear for physicians and their
professional organizations, medical practices and facilities.
In this chapter, we give very focused, concrete and practical guidance to
physicians and medical organizations broken down by each type of industry–
medicine interaction. Where necessary, we repeat elements of relevant laws
and trade association codes of conduct that pertain to the discussion.
The guidance set forth in this chapter is not intended to supplant spe-
cific legal advice that may be appropriate in any given situation. No physician
or medical organization should venture into uncertain types of relationships
12
Eric G. Campbell, PhD, et al., Institutional Academic–Industry Relationships. JAMA, Vol.
298, 2007, pp. 1779–86. (The survey, conducted in 2006, was sent to 688 department chairs
of 125 accredited allopathic medical schools and 15 of the largest U.S. independent teaching
hospitals, and a total of 459 completed the survey yielding an overall response rate of 67%.)
13
Id.
158 Managing Relationships with Industry
without getting their own legal advice from a competent and knowledgeable
healthcare attorney. As discussed in Chapter 6, effective management of
industry relationships should include a vibrant compliance program, with
established organizational policies on industry relationships, as well as legal
review of specific proposed relationships that are in an uncertain legal or
ethical zone.
No physician or medical organization should venture into uncertain types
of relationships without getting their own legal advice from a competent
and knowledgeable healthcare attorney.
Beyond the general legal standards, this chapter also identifies a stan-
dard conflict-of-interest approach in each case for physicians and their
organizations that is realistic and workable. While directed to physicians and
their professional groups and societies, these suggestions also have applica-
tion to and can be instructive for non-physician practitioners who have pre-
scribing authority, as well as executives and compliance staff at community
hospitals, AMCs and other facilities that have interactions between their
staff physicians and industry.
As a threshold summation of prior legal sources, for all relationships
between industry and physicians or medical facilities, the arrangement
should not have the “potential to interfere with, or skew, clinical decision-
making”14 nor can any remuneration included in the relationship have as
even one of its purposes the inducement of physicians to order or prescribe
in any fashion.
14
OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. at
23,743 (May 5, 2003).
Chapter 5 / Specific Physician–Industry Financial Relationships 159
Some studies have questioned the value of in-person meetings with drug
or device sales representatives. A study published in 1995 in JAMA concluded
that 11% of the in-person statements made to physicians by pharmaceuti-
cal sales representatives contradicted information that was readily available
to them.15 Sales representatives and independent distributors are generally
working on a commission basis and many have come from sales positions in
other fields, and there is a tendency for their message to be an extension of
company promotion. On the other hand, representatives of drug and device
companies are often an important source of valid information about their com-
panies’ products for physicians in independent practices, particularly those
isolated from AMCs.16 A spokesperson for the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) points out that many sales represen-
tatives are nurses or pharmacists by background and thus are well-trained
technically to talk to doctors “about when to use medicines properly.”17
Medical offices and departments handle their interactions with com-
pany sales representatives in a variety of ways. Some allow easy access.
Others are becoming increasingly reluctant to allow meeting time during
their day with sales representatives, especially without an appointment, if
at all. Meanwhile, reacting to the decreasing amount of direct face time
with physicians, pharmaceutical and device companies and their consul-
tants are devising alternative marketing techniques to reach and influence
physicians, such as direct mail, online strategies (including eDetailing) and
using “experiential marketing”—a novel marketing approach that diverges
from traditional marketing focused on selling based on a product’s features
and benefits to one that strives to link the customer emotionally to a brand,
thereby creating brand loyalty.
Many companies have national and regional medical science liaison
staffs that operate outside of their sales departments. Often a medical sci-
ence liaison (MSL) is called upon to be the source of information on the
clinical aspects of a drug or device product, to interact with a physician
who will be a presenter at an educational program funded by that liaison’s
company, or to answer questions and disseminate requested safety and effi-
cacy information about the off-label uses of his or her company’s products.
MSLs are frequently licensed professionals with advanced scientific train-
ing and degrees in life sciences. Jane Chin, PhD, founder and president of
the Medical Science Liaison Institute, which advocates for ethical practices
15
Michael G. Ziegler, Pauline Lew and Brian C. Singer, The Accuracy of Drug Information
from Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives. JAMA, Vol. 273, 1995, pp. 1296–8.
16
See blog www.kevinmd.com in which blogger and internist, Kevin Pho, MD, of Nashua,
NH, has made the case that rural practices would not have access to data and free drug samples
without visits by drug representatives.
17
Michael Blanding, Bad Medicine, Boston Magazine, February 2005, p. 57, 64.
160 Managing Relationships with Industry
18
Jane Chin, PhD, Medical Science Liaisons: An Overview, 2000, available at http://
www.mslinstitute.com/article_MSL_an_overview.php.
Chapter 5 / Specific Physician–Industry Financial Relationships 161
19
Testimony of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel to the Inspector General, Allegations of Waste,
Fraud and Abuse in Pharmaceutical Pricing: Financial Impacts on Federal Health Pro-
grams and the Federal Taxpayer, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Hearing, February 9, 2007, p. 6.
20
Troyen Brennan, MD, MPH, et al., Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of
Interest. JAMA, Vol. 295, No. 4, 2006.
21
James L. Wofford and Christopher A. Ohl, Teaching Appropriate Interactions with Phar-
maceutical Company Representatives: The Impact of an Innovative Workshop on Student
Attitudes. BMC Medical Education, Vol. 5, No. 5, 2005 available at http://www.biomedcentral.
com/1472-6920/5/5.
22
P. Palmisano and J. Edelstein, Teaching Drug Promotion Abuses to Health Profession
Students. Journal of Medical Education, Vol. 55, 1980, pp. 453–55.
23
F. Sierles, et al., Medical Students’ Exposure to and Attitudes About Drug Company
Interactions. JAMA, Vol. 294, No. 9, 2005, pp. 1034–42.
162 Managing Relationships with Industry
24
Troyen Brennan, MD, MPH, et al., Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of
Interest. JAMA, Vol. 295, No. 4, January 25, 2006, p. 430.
25
See Stephanie Saul, Drug Makers Pay for Lunch as They Pitch, The New York Times, July
28, 2006.
26
See Myrle Croasdale, Some Medical Schools Say No to Drug Reps’ Free Lunch, AMNews,
October 9, 2006.
27
See http://med.stanford.edu/coi/siip/.
28
E.G. Campbell, Doctors and Drug Companies—Scrutinizing Influential Relationships.
NEJM, Vol. 357, 2007, pp. 1796–7.
29
Myrle Croasdale, Some Medical Schools Say No to Drug Reps’ Free Lunch, AMNews
staff. October 9, 2006.
Chapter 5 / Specific Physician–Industry Financial Relationships 163
reason for an AMC to adopt a ban like Stanford’s comes from studies demon-
strating that physicians form their attitudes and develop their ethical stan-
dards about industry marketing during medical school and residency, while
they spend excessive amounts of time in AMC settings.30
These are exactly the goals that Brennan et al. had in mind: to improve
the public perception and thus confidence in the independence of its physi-
cians and to positively influence those now training to be physicians and to
set an example for physicians practicing outside the academic setting.31 Yet
it is interesting to note that there is variance among current AMC policies.
Despite the growing number of AMCs adopting some or all of Brennan
et al.’s recommendations (JAMA 2006;295:429–33), the majority of med-
ical practices, particularly office/outpatient based groups, continue to
engage with sales representatives. And while industry sales representatives
acknowledge that their member companies’ practices of lavish gift giving
have been significantly curtailed, others reveal that doctors continue to
receive gifts, watches, leather jackets and golfing trips despite extensive
compliance efforts of the drug and device industry.32 Even in the face of
OIG’s regulatory guidance and heightened concerns of prosecution or civil
liability, physicians continue to be offered, and continue to request and
receive, free items of value from sales representatives.33
An increasingly common practice used by sales representatives to stay
within the limits on gift giving suggested by the AMA, PhRMA Code and
OIG Guidance is to give doctors and their staffs free meals. Morning cof-
fee, gourmet sandwiches for lunch, pizza dinners and other sundries are
frequently delivered to medical offices and hospital staff conference rooms,
ostensibly to curry favor with physicians and their staffs. By doing so, sales
representatives hope that the recipients will be more receptive to listening
to a presentation about their company’s products. These practices, when
offered on more than an occasional basis in conjunction with a bona fide
educational or scientifically valuable program, are questionable, and as we
conclude below, could form the basis for a legal action against both the
offering company and the receiving medical organization.
30
F. Sierles, et al., Medical Students’ Exposure to and Attitudes About Drug Company
Interactions. JAMA, Vol. 294, No. 9, 2005, pp. 1034–42; B.B. McCormick, G. Tomlinson, P. Brill-
Edwards and A.S. Detsky, Effect of Restricting Contact Between Pharmaceutical Company
Representatives and Internal Medicine Residents on Post-Training Attitudes and Behavior.
JAMA, Vol. 286, 2001, pp. 1994–9.
31
Troyen Brennan, MD, MPH, et al., Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of
Interest. JAMA, Vol. 295, No. 429, 2006, p. 430.
32
Julie Appleby, States Want Info About Drugmakers’ Gifts to Doctors, USA Today,
February 16, 2006.
33
See Gardiner Harris, Senators to Push for Registry of Drug Makers’ Gifts to Doctors,
The New York Times, June 28, 2007.
164 Managing Relationships with Industry
Similarly, the giving of pens, pads, coffee mugs and other usable items
labeled with the name of a company’s latest product also continues to be
common during office visits by sales representatives and in the exhibition
hall at virtually all national conferences of professional medical societies.
Going one step further, many innovative companies are attuned to the
lifestyles of today’s doctors and offer other complimentary items, such as
yoga mats and running gear, bearing the logo of the latest product name for
physicians who hold a visit in their office with the sales rep, or come by the
company’s booth at the national meeting.
34
OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. at
23 745 (May 5, 2003).
35
Reasonable accommodations for travel and meals provided for physicians rendering legit-
imate and contracted services are permitted and are covered later in this chapter.
Chapter 5 / Specific Physician–Industry Financial Relationships 165
36
Id. pp. 23 738.
166 Managing Relationships with Industry
that they are of modest value and are beneficial to the provision of medical
services and for patient care. The IFPMA Code also prohibits holding med-
ical and scientific meetings at “renowned or extravagant venues” and limits
having them outside the attendees’ home country unless it is appropriate
and justified to do so logistically, such as international scientific congresses
and symposia that include participants from many countries, or for security
reasons. Also, entertainment and hospitality provided at sponsored events
cannot be in excess of the level for which physicians would personally
pay. The IFPMA membership includes the largest pharmaceutical compa-
nies such as Pfizer, Eli Lilly, Novartis, Merck and AstraZeneca, as well as
national trade associations, including PhRMA.
Under both the PhRMA and IFPMA Codes, the provision of free drug
samples for patient use in accordance with the Prescription Drug Market-
ing Act (PDMA) is also deemed to come within this acceptable gift-giving
category and is covered more extensively later in this chapter.
On the device side, the AdvaMed Code similarly admonishes its mem-
bers to adhere to the anti-kickback statute and all other applicable laws in
the realm of gifts and all other physician–industry relationships. Therefore,
its focus is on both the value of gifts and services and the parties’ intent.
Specifically, the scope of permissible gift giving is virtually the same as
the PhRMA and IFPMA Codes. Also, the AdvaMed Code permits modest
occasional meals and other hospitalities conducive to the exchange of infor-
mation that is necessary to discuss product features, contract negotiations
or sales terms. Such meals and hospitalities, however, are permitted for only
those physicians who need to attend the meeting with device company sales
representatives on these topics.
Physicians must keep in mind that the federal and most state anti-
kickback laws prohibit not only the offering and paying of such inducements
but also the solicitation or receipt of the gift by the physician as well. Thus,
physicians who simply call their local drug company sales representative
and ask for a couple of concert tickets, or for a free lunch for their entire
office staffs, or a complimentary meal at a restaurant, have essentially com-
mitted an act that potentially could be the subject of a criminal prosecution,
agency enforcement action and government program exclusion, as well as
a whistleblower private lawsuit, even if the request was not granted.
Physicians must keep in mind that the federal and most state anti-kickback
laws prohibit not only the offering and paying of such inducements but also
the solicitation or receipt of the gift by the physician as well. Ultimately,
the asking for or receipt of any gift, however small, potentially implicates
federal and state anti-kickback statutes, if any one purpose of the gift is to
generate business for the offering company.
Chapter 5 / Specific Physician–Industry Financial Relationships 167
Ultimately, the asking for or receipt of any gift, however small, poten-
tially implicates federal and state anti-kickback statutes, if any one purpose
of the gift is to generate business for the offering company, a purpose that
may not necessarily be obvious to the gift recipient. Where such a purpose
exists, compliance with the PhRMA, IFPMA or AdvaMed Code guidelines
will not serve as a safe harbor from possible enforcement action, civil suit or
prosecution. The OIG clearly states that “under the [federal] anti-kickback
statute, neither a legitimate purpose for an arrangement (e.g., physician
education), nor a fair market value payment, will necessarily protect remu-
neration if there is also an illegal purpose (i.e., the purposeful inducement
of business).”37 Thus, while the risks of legal action as a result of the request
or acceptance of nominal items or items that provide patient benefit are
remote, the only sure-fire way to eliminate the legal risk is to adopt a policy
banning the receipt of any and all gifts.
Manufacturer’s support
Another issue under gifts and free items is whether physicians and providers
can accept assistance or support for free that is provided as part of the
sale of an item by the manufacturer. For example, can a drug manufacturer
offer assistance to a medical practice with third party payer reimbursement,
including patient pre-qualifications and credit for payment denials? Such a
reimbursement assistance program was reviewed by the OIG in Advisory
Opinion No. 00-10.38 The OIG stated that where such added services have
no “independent value” to providers apart from the products, that is, they
are properly considered part of the products purchased and their cost is
already included in the products’ prices, the added services would not
implicate the federal anti-kickback statute. An example of this would be a
drug manufacturer’s offer of free assistance to a medical practice by serving
as a clearinghouse for information regarding insurance coverage criteria and
reimbursement levels for its products.
By comparison, if the manufacturer offers services or programs that
do confer an independent financial benefit to referring providers, then the
arrangement would violate the anti-kickback law. The OIG cites as an exam-
ple of such independent benefit the coupling of a reimbursement support ser-
vice with a program either (1) requiring payment for ordered products only if
the referring provider is paid or (2) guaranteeing a minimum “spread” between
37
Id.
38
OIG Advisory Opinion No. 00-10 (December 15, 2000) available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/
advisoryopinions/opinions0097.html.
168 Managing Relationships with Industry
the purchase price and third party reimbursement levels. These types of pro-
grams may implicate the anti-kickback statute if they eliminate the normal
financial risks facing providers, potentially raising the risk of over-utilization
and increased federal healthcare program costs. For example, in the case
presented in Advisory Opinion 00-10, the OIG concluded that while the com-
pany’s offering of extended payment terms and credits did confer indepen-
dent value to the referring physicians, implicating the anti-kickback statute,
OIG would not impose sanctions because the program was limited in scope,
the drug company agreed to provide assistance to low-income patients and
in the opinion of the OIG it would not result in over-utilization.39
Device companies commonly provide their customers with technical
assistance on the use of purchased devices. The AdvaMed Code states that
technical instruction and reimbursement support to aid in the proper use
and billing of purchase devices are permissible unless they are offered by
the device company for the purpose of unlawfully inducing the purchase of
its products.40
Therefore, physicians being offered free technical instruction and reim-
bursement support from drug and device companies must steer clear of
any offers simply intended to induce the ordering of the product. However,
where the instruction or support has no real independent value separate
and apart from the acquired products, there should be little or no risk of
liability. Hopefully, the OIG will provide more guidance in the future on
the definition of “independent value,” but for now, providers may consider
programs that have such value if they are limited, include free products
or services for under- and uninsured patients, and have safeguards against
over- or unnecessary utilization.
Acceptance of meals and gifts by physicians is just one of the many finan-
cial relationships between doctors and industry for which Congress and
many state legislatures have a growing interest and concern. As discussed
in Chapter 4, some states have passed laws requiring public disclosure by
drug companies of gifts and financial relationships with physicians.41 These
39
Id.
40
AdvaMed Code of Ethics on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals, p. 5, available at
http://www.advamed.org/MemberPortal/About/code/default.htm.
41
Gardiner Harris, Senators Seek Public Listing of Payments to Doctors, The New York
Times, September 7, 2007. As of the date of publication, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, Vermont,
West Virginia and Washington, DC have passed laws on drug companies’ disclosure of gifts
and relationships and other states are considering similar measures. The Minnesota disclosure
Chapter 5 / Specific Physician–Industry Financial Relationships 169
state laws generally require reporting and public disclosure of physician gifts
and other forms of consideration from drug companies, such as consulting
fees, but the language varies from state to state. Some states are proposing
statutes that would only require reporting of gifts and fees actually received
by physicians, hospitals, pharmacists, nursing homes and other providers,
while others would more broadly require reporting of any gift, fee, payment,
subsidy, or other economic benefit provided in connection with detailing or
promotional activities, which arguably would require reporting and public
disclosure of company grants to professional societies and academic depart-
ments, as well as gifts made to a charity at the request of or on behalf of a
physician.42
On the other hand, Vermont has passed, and other states are consid-
ering, a reporting law that does not require disclosure of the names of
individual recipients. Further, many of these marketing reporting laws would
categorically exempt several areas, such as free drug samples, fair market
value payments for clinical research and scholarships for medical students.
There are, however, a growing number of states that are considering the
passage of laws establishing mandatory public disclosure of commercial
sponsors of clinical trials.
California has enacted a law that requires drug companies to adopt
a compliance program governing their marketing practices, including the
giving of gifts, and other interactions with healthcare professionals. The
Drug Marketing Practices Law43 mandates that the drug company compli-
ance program conforms to the OIG Compliance Guidance for Pharmaceu-
tical Companies and the PhRMA Code, including a specific annual dollar
limit on gifts or other donated promotional items, other than free sam-
ples, CME grants and scholarships, and consulting agreement fees that
meet the requirements of the anti-kickback law. The law requires that
pharmaceutical companies post these mandated compliance plans on their
websites.
As this book went to press, there was pending federal legislation entitled
The Physician Payments Sunshine Act, which would create a national
registry of gifts and payments to doctors by medical device as well as drug
system has revealed that between 1997 and 2005, drug companies paid more than 5,500 doctors,
nurses and other healthcare workers in Minnesota at least $57 million. Another $40 million
went to clinics, research centers and other organizations. More than 20% of the state’s licensed
physicians received payment from drug companies, with the median payment per professional
at $1,000 and more than 100 professionals received more than $100,000. See Gardiner Harris
and Janet Roberts, Doctors’ Ties to Drug Makers Are Put on Close View, The New York Times,
March 21, 2007.
42
See generally The National Conference of State Legislatures 2007 Prescription Drug State
Legislation Website, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/drugbill07.htm.
43
California Health and Safety Code §§119,400 et seq.
170 Managing Relationships with Industry
Right now the public has no way to know whether a doctor’s been given
money that might affect prescribing habits. This bill is about letting the sun
shine in so that the public can know. Whether it’s dinner at a restaurant or
tens of thousands of dollars or more in fees and travel, patients shouldn’t
be in the dark about whether their doctors are getting money from drug
and device makers.46
While there are voluntary guidelines already in place, it is clear they are
not being followed. I intend to vigorously pursue stronger adherence to
these guidelines, as well as propose a national registry to require disclosure
of payments and gifts. We need transparency, at the minimum and at the
outset. Many of these gifts are not illegal, but we need them disclosed.
44
Id.; Gardiner Harris, Senators to Push for Registry of Drug Makers’ Gifts to Doctors,
The New York Times, June 28, 2007.
45
The Physician Payments Sunshine Act is also co-sponsored by Senators Claire McCaskill,
Chuck Schumer, Amy Klobuchar and Ted Kennedy. It would apply to manufacturers with $100
million or more in annual gross revenues. The Act would require drug and device manufacturers
to disclose to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, on a quarterly basis, anything of
value given to doctors, such as payments, gifts, honoraria or travel. The reporting companies
would have to report the name of the physician, the value of the nature and remuneration and
the date of the payment or gift, its purpose, and what, if anything, was received in exchange.
Penalties for not reporting would range from $10,000 to $100,000 per violation. The legislation
requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to create a website and post-payment
information in a clear and understandable manner.
46
U.S. Senate Press Release, September 6, 2007, Grassley, Kohl Say Public Should
Know When Pharmaceutical Makers Give Money to Doctors, available at http://www.finance.
senate.gov/press/Gpress/2007/prg090607a.pdf.
Chapter 5 / Specific Physician–Industry Financial Relationships 171
47
U.S. Special Committee on Aging, Press Release, June 27 2007, Kohl Examines Drug
Industry Practice of Providing Payments to Doctors, Influencing Prescribing Behaviors.
48
See Section on Grants, later in this Chapter.
49
See pp. 132–139.
50
Troyen Brennan, MD, MPH, et al., Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of
Interest. JAMA, Vol. 295, No. 429, 2006, p. 429.
172 Managing Relationships with Industry
postulate that even small gifts such as pens and writing pads, as well as
meals, have a substantial influence on a physician’s prescribing and order-
ing,51 a view bolstered by others studying the interactions between industry
and medicine.52
Meanwhile, the AMA and most medical specialty societies, as well as
PhRMA and AdvaMed, continue to permit certain gift-giving practices. The
AMA, however, in clarifying this ethical opinion through a question and
answer addendum in 2000, has clearly stated that the acceptance of gifts
that are related to a physician’s work are unethical if they have substantial
value, such as handheld devices or other electronic equipment.53
Ethically the question each physician must answer for himself or herself
is whether the acceptance of even a nominal gift that could benefit patients
or is related to their practice of medicine could subconsciously influence
their clinical judgment. It is, of course, difficult to become consciously
aware of a subconscious influence. Physicians may realize the extent of
the subconscious influence only if they completely forego gifts or other
financial considerations from drug and device companies for an extended
period and reevaluate their prescribing habits and their opinions regarding
the treatments sold by companies they had previously received gifts from, as
expressed in their educational presentations or publications. Additionally,
each physician must ask himself or herself whether the acceptance of such
a gift, if known to the patient, would potentially appear to the patient as a
conflict of interest or improper. What about the perception of the patient
who sits next to the drug company representative in the waiting room and
observes the representative outwardly touting his company’s products to
the office staff?
These may seem like mundane and non-consequential considerations,
but they draw on the essence of ethics and conflicts of interest. Profession-
als should not only avoid actual conflicts but must strive to avoid even
the appearance of a conflict.
While many physicians considering these real-life scenarios may rea-
sonably conclude that the acceptance of nominal items with product logos
displayed and seen by patients will not have any adverse affect on their rela-
tionships with patients and their ability to act in the patients’ best interests.
51
Id.
52
John G. Scott, MD, assistant professor of Family Medicine at the University of Medicine and
Dentistry of New Jersey-Robert Wood Johnson Medical School, after conducting an examination
of the interaction between medical practices and drug company sales representatives found
that some offices got breakfast and lunch every day and concluded that food was the “currency”
that bought access to doctors’ offices for drug representatives. See Stephanie Saul, Drug
Makers Pay for Lunch as They Pitch, The New York Times, July 28, 2006.
53
AMA E-11.02 Clarification of Opinion 8.061 available at www.ama-assn.org.
Chapter 5 / Specific Physician–Industry Financial Relationships 173
These doctors may rightfully believe that since their patient relationships are
built on a sufficient level of trust and familiarity, an item emblazoned with
a drug company product, or a drug company sales representative observed
marketing in the office, will not cause the patient to question the doctor’s
judgment or result in a loss of confidence in the doctor’s ethical standards.
By contrast, the ethical arguments in favor of an absolute ban on gifts,
free meals and interactions with company representatives are as follows:
Another consideration that may eventually drive more physicians and medi-
cal practices to shun all but nominal gifts is the growing number of state and
possibly federal marketing reporting mandates on companies. As previously
discussed, the resulting public disclosure of company gifts, grants and fees
will likely lead to the public identification of physician and other provider
recipients, even if their identities are not required to be disclosed by the
reporting companies.
A contrary view to an absolute ban on gifts is held by the pharma-
ceutical and device industries, the AMA and most professional associations
and medical societies. To generalize, their view is that an absolute legal
ban on gifts, meals and meetings with company sales representatives is
not necessary to ensure unbiased prescription and ordering decisions and
ethical behavior, and may even have adverse consequences. For exam-
ple, an absolute ban might limit the autonomy and professional discre-
tion that one would expect of a physician because a ban may make it
more difficult for physicians to receive valuable and needed information
with clinical and medical value about new products. Furthermore, certain
gifts, particularly free drug samples, may also have significant benefit for
patients.
However, a growing number of AMCs and health systems have con-
cluded that a total ban on gifts and meals makes sense especially within
the circles of academic medicine among medical students, residents and
fellows. Likewise, medical schools should also be encouraged to include
174 Managing Relationships with Industry
within their required courses information on the law and ethics of industry
and financial relationships.
The argument for such a prohibition, however, among independent,
non-AMC medical practices may be different. Physicians who follow the
ethical and legal standards on accepting gifts only of the type and in the lim-
ited circumstances described above and do not solicit any gifts can engage
in legal and ethical behavior without refusing to accept all offered items.
Strictly following the existing ethical guidance on gifts would result in a
significant diminution of the compromising situations that have the great-
est tendency to influence a physician’s prescribing and ordering decisions.
The most effective way to ensure that this happens is through the adop-
tion of a compliance program and an understandable and clear policy on
industry interactions along with annual training on the policy and an organi-
zational official charged with overseeing the program, as further described
in Chapter 6.
Yet while most physicians realize that the era of the “dine and dash”
is over and a growing number are heeding the call of the reformers and
are refusing all gifts and requests for meetings with sales representatives,
there continues to be a cohort of physicians who continue to take whatever
is offered from company representatives.54 Interestingly, some surveys of
the medical profession show that a majority of respondents believe that
physicians can be influenced by gifts from industry and interactions with
sales representatives but that they do not believe their own interactions
and acceptance of gifts has any effect on their own prescription or device
ordering practices.55
Meanwhile, those advocating for an absolute ban on any gifts have
pointed to the increased use of free meals by sales representatives as evi-
dence that the voluntary ethical standards established by industry have not
been sufficient to control market-driven conflicts of interest.56 They have
also suggested that an absolute ban eliminates potential gray areas that can
greatly ease the burden of compliance.57
54
See Gifts to Emergency Physicians from the Biomedical Industry, American College
of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) Policy Resource and Education Paper—explication of the
ACEP Policy Statement Gifts to Emergency Physicians from the Biomedical Industry, revised
and approved, April 2005 at http://www.acep.org/practres.aspx?id=29482.
55
M.A. Steinman, M.C. Shilpak and S.J. McPhee, Of Principles & Pens: Attitudes of Medicine
House Staff Toward Pharmaceutical Industry Promotions. American Journal of Medicine,Vol.
110, 2001, pp. 551–7; see also, W. McKinney, et al. Attitudes of Internal Medicine Faculty and
Residents Toward Professional Interaction with Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives. JAMA,
Vol. 264, 1990, pp. 1693–7.
56
Troyen Brennan, MD, MPH, et al., Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of
Interest. JAMA, Vol. 295, No. 429, 2006, p. 433.
57
Id., p. 431.
Chapter 5 / Specific Physician–Industry Financial Relationships 175
58
One former pharmaceutical representative who founded a national lunch-ordering com-
pany estimated that pharma companies were spending about $4 million a day—or as much as
$1 billion a year—on meals for doctors’ offices. Stephanie Saul, Drug Makers Pay for Lunch
as They Pitch, The New York Times, July 28, 2006.
59
L. Lewis Wall, MD, DPhil, and Douglas Brown, PhD, The High Cost of Free Lunch,
Obstetrics & Gynecology, Vol. 110, 2007, pp. 169–73.
60
See www.nofreelunch.org. The American Medical Student Association has also been quite
passionate in its policy statements and advocacy on the relationship with industry. It launched
a national Pharm Free Campaign and holds an annual Pharm Free day to educate and train
medical students to interact “professionally and ethically with the pharmaceutical industry.”
It also offers its members the opportunity to sign a PharmFree pledge, which states they will
“accept no money, gifts or hospitality from the pharmaceutical industry” and “seek unbiased
sources of information.” AMSA is the only national medical organization to ban all pharmaceu-
tical advertising in its publications and at its events. See www.amsa.org.
176 Managing Relationships with Industry
61
Arlene Weintraub and Amy Barrett, Medicine in Conflict, BusinessWeek, October 23,
2006. See also Arlene Weintraub, Cracking Down on Pharma Swag, BusinessWeek, On Line
Extra, October 23, 2006 (quoting Dr. David Korn, senior vice-president of the Associa-
tion of American Medical Colleges, as stating “[m]ost doctors tell me they aren’t influ-
enced by gifts, and I think they believe that…[b]ut there are real neuropsychological
changes that occur when you get a gift, even a ballpoint pen, for God’s sake.”) available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_43/b4006085.htm?chan=search.
62
Ray Moynihan, Who Pays for the Pizza? Redefining the Relationships Between Doctors
and Drug Companies. BMJ, Vol. 326, May 31, 2003, pp. 1189–92; D. Katz, A. Caplan and J.
Merz. All Gifts Large and Small: Toward and Understanding of the Ethics of Pharmaceutical
Industry Gift Giving. American Journal of Bioethics, Vol. 3, 2003, pp. 39–46.
63
Troyen Brennan, MD, MPH, et al., Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of
Interest, JAMA, Vol. 295, No. 429, 2006, p. 431 citing at footnote 21, N. Lurie, E.C. Rich,
D.E. Simpson, et al., Pharmaceutical Representatives in Academic Medical Centers. Journal of
General Internal Medicine,Vol. 5, 1990, pp. 240–243.
64
Michael Blanding, Bad Medicine, Boston Magazine, February 2005, p. 57, 65.
Chapter 5 / Specific Physician–Industry Financial Relationships 177
65
American College of Physicians. Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry (Position
Paper). Annals of Internal Medicine, Vol. 112, 1990, pp. 624–6.
178 Managing Relationships with Industry
solicit items of value from drug and device company representatives for
their own personal use or pleasure. These actions are not only unethical but
also illegal.
To conclude this section, consider the findings of a study by Dr. Allen
Brett and two coauthors from the Department of Medicine at the University
of South Carolina School of Medicine, in their 2003 Archives of Internal
Medicine article, Are Gifts from Pharmaceutical Companies Ethically
Problematic?66 The authors surveyed faculty members and residents with
questions on the ethics of 18 pharmaceutical company scenarios. Among
other findings, the authors point out that both faculty and residents had
more ethical concerns as the value of the gift or consideration bestowed
upon the physician went higher. Dr. Brett and his coauthors suggest that
doctors who engage with drug and device companies or are offered gifts
should pay more attention to the underlying rationale for the offer to the
doctor and less on the fine distinctions among the types and value of gifts.67
As a spokesperson for PhRMA has said, “It’s up to doctors to set limits on
their exposure to sales representatives and to assess the information they
receive.”68
Another area of risk related to gifts is the making of contributions to
charity by drug and device companies on behalf of physicians. The making of
the contribution itself is not illegal or unethical. But if the contribution was
also tied to another relationship, it could violate the anti-kickback statute—
for example, if the physician had pledged funds to the charity and asked the
company to make the donation on his or her behalf or if the company knew
the physician served on the board of the charity and would be benefited by
the making of the contribution in some fashion. Asking for contributions is
not the problem; the risk would arise if there was evidence the contribution
was made to benefit the physician and was intended to induce or influence
the prescribing or ordering of the company’s products by the physician or
other physicians he or she has influence over.
Physicians should never accept gifts of cash, gifts tied to prescription or
ordering practices, or gifts or gratuities with an aggregate value in excess
of $100 per year from any one company. They should never solicit items
of value from drug and device company representatives for their own
personal use or pleasure.
66
Allan S. Brett, MD, Wayne Burr, MD and Jamaluddin Moloo, MD, MPH, Are Gifts from
Pharmaceutical Companies Ethically Problematic? Archives of Internal Medicine, Vol. 163,
2003, pp. 2213–8.
67
Id.
68
Michael Blanding, Bad Medicine, Boston Magazine, February 2005, p. 57, 64.
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