ISTORIA

TIMPULUI
PREZENT

Colecie coordonat de
ADRIAN CIOROIANU
Ileana Racheru este absolvent a masterului de Relaii
Internaionale, Facultatea de tiine Politice, Universitatea
din Bucureti. n prezent, este doctorand a colii Doctorale Ileana Racheru, Stanislav Secrieru, Angela Grmad
de tiine Politice a Universitii din Bucureti. Este autoa-
rea unei dizertaii cu titlul Dezbateri de politic extern n
relaiile UE i ale Rusiei cu Georgia i Ucraina i a mai mul-
tor articole academice despre relaiile Romniei cu statele din
Caucazul de Sud. A scris numeroase articole despre evoluiile
politice i de securitate din spaiul ex-sovietic n revistele 22
i Foreign Policy Romania, prilej cu care a realizat interviuri cu
diplomai, experi, decideni i lideri politici regionali.
Caucazul de Sud
Stanislav Secrieru este bursier la Colegiul Noua Europ n dup 20 de ani
cadrul programului Black Sea Link Fellowship i cercettor
asociat la Centrul de Studii Est-Europene i Asiatice (Bucu-
reti). Este doctor in tiine Politice (SNSPA). A desfurat
Regimuri politice, securitate i energie
cercetri la NATO Defense College (Rome) i Institute for
European Politics (Berlin). A colaborat n proiecte de cerce-
tare cu European Council on Foreign Relations (Londra),
DemosEuropa (Varovia), Europeum (Praga), Heinrich Bll
Foundation (Berlin), Finnish Institute for International
Affairs (Helsinki). Domenii de interes major: politica intern
South Caucasus
i extern rus, relaiile UE-Rusia, politica european de
vecintate. 20 Years After
Angela Grmad este doctorand n tiine Politice, spe-
cializarea Relaii Internaionale, coala Naional de Studii Political Regimes, Security, and Energy
Politice i Administrative, Bucureti, i liceniat n Relaii
Economice Internaionale, Institutul Relaii Internaionale
Perspectiva, Chiinu (2004). Este cercettor la Centrul de
Studii Est-Europene i Asiatice, Bucureti. Interesele de cer-
cetare prioritare sunt orientate spre studiul evoluiei rapor-
turilor dintre Federaia Rus, Statele Unite ale Americii i
Uniunea European n spaiul ex-sovietic, al proceselor de
democratizare din Republica Moldova, Ucraina i Georgia,
al politicii europene de vecintate, precum i spre studiul
redefinirii geopolitice a spaiului ex-sovietic.

BUCURETI, 2012
 Ileana Racheru, Stanislav Secrieru, Angela Grmad

Caucazul de Sud
dup 20 de ani
Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naionale a Romniei
RACHERU, ILEANA Regimuri politice, securitate i energie
Caucazul de Sud dup 20 de ani : regimuri politice,
securitate i energie = South Caucasus 20 years After :
Political Regimes, Security and Energy / Ileana Racheru,
Stanislav Secrieru, Angela Grmad ; pref.: Octavian Manea ;
trad.: Mihnea Gafia. - Bucureti : Curtea Veche Publishing,
2012
ISBN 978-606-588-274-4

I. Secrieru, Stanislav
II. Grmad, Angela
III. Manea, Octavian (pref.)
IV. Gafia, Mihnea (trad.)

94(479)
32.01(479)

Coperta: S.C. TRI DESIGN S.R.L.

CURTEA VECHE PUBLISHING, 2012

pentru prezenta ediie

ISBN 978-606-588-274-4

Aceast carte a fost realizat n cadrul programului
Promovarea valorilor europene n bazinul Mrii Negre
al Fundaiei Soros Romnia. mbuntirea dialogului i a
cooperrii ntre organizaiile societii civile de pe rmurile
estic i vestic ale Mrii Negre reprezint prioritatea acestui
program, prin care dorim s contribuim la cunoaterea
reciproc a societilor din regiune, precum i la dezvoltarea
unei contiine i adeziuni fa de un spaiu european extins,
perceput ca un areal comun de valori i principii sociale i
politice.
Scopul programului este de a ncuraja cunoaterea reci-
proc i o apropiere ntre societile civile din regiune prin
stabilirea unor legturi puternice i schimburi de resurse
intelectuale ntre Fundaia Soros Romnia i alte organizaii
din Romnia, pe de o parte, i organizaii similare din
Armenia, Azerbaijan i Georgia, pe de alt parte.
Sergiu Panainte
Coordonator Programe
Cuprins
Mulumiri ...................................................................... 11
Introducere .................................................................... 13
Regimuri politice n Caucazul de sud.
Democraia care ascunde autoritarisme
competitive (Ileana Racheru) .................................... 19
Ce este autoritarismul competitiv? ......................... 22
Georgia
Alegerile democratice, marele succes al revoluiei
trandafirilor ................................................................ 23
MNU, atotputernic n politica georgian .................. 27
Scena politic georgian ntre revoluie i reform ..... 27
Elite noi, reele clientare de putere noi ........................ 29
Mass-media convieuire imposibil cu regimul
politic .......................................................................... 31
Societatea civil, singura voce critic la adresa
regimului .................................................................... 34
Democraia care limiteaz presiunile Rusiei ................ 37
Armenia ........................................................................ 38 1.4.2. Est ....................................................................... 86
Alegerile care reconfirm acelai ctigtor .................. 39 1.4.3. Vest ..................................................................... 87
Un regim legitimat de conflictul din 1.4.4. Sud ...................................................................... 89
Nagorno-Karabah ....................................................... 43
Drepturi i liberti, doar dup dorina discreionar II. Dinamica intraregional n
a regimului politic ...................................................... 44 Caucazul de Sud ...................................................... 91
Mass-media de la putere i presa de opoziie .............. 47 2.1. Armenia-Azerbaidjan: pace improbabil,
Sprijinul Rusiei este indispensabil, UE este rzboi posibil ................................................................ 91
prea departe ............................................................... 49 2.2. Georgia-Armenia: resetarea pragmatismului ......... 100
2.3. Azerbaidjan-Georgia: tot mai aproape ...................... 109
Azerbaidjan .................................................................. 51
Alegerile care au ntotdeauna rezultatul cunoscut ....... 51 III. Caucazul de Sud: raporturile cu puterile
PNA rege pe scena politic de la Baku ................... 52 regionale .................................................................. 116
Corupia care funcioneaz perfect .............................. 54 3.1. Armenia: complementaritatea variabil .................... 116
Drepturi i liberti cu existen precar ..................... 56
3.1.1. Rusia ................................................................. 117
Mass-media nu poate fi dect la putere n
3.1.2. Iran .................................................................... 121
Azerbaidjan ................................................................ 59
3.1.3. SUA ................................................................... 124
Un petrostat atotputernic ............................................. 61
3.1.4. UE ..................................................................... 126
3.1.5. Turcia ................................................................ 129
Concluzii ....................................................................... 62
3.2. Azerbaidjan: independen strategic
Bibliografie .................................................................... 64
prin multivectorism ...................................................... 132
3.2.1. Turcia ................................................................ 133
Geometrie variabil n aciune: 3.2.2. Rusia ................................................................. 136
politica extern i de securitate 3.2.3. SUA ................................................................... 140
n Caucazul de Sud (Stanislav Secrieru) ............. 69 3.2.4. UE ..................................................................... 142
3.2.5. Iran .................................................................... 145
Introducere .................................................................... 71 3.3. Georgia: spre Occident ............................................ 148
3.3.1. SUA ................................................................... 149
I. Problema regionalitii Caucazului de Sud ........ 72 3.3.2. UE ..................................................................... 152
1.1. De la Transcaucazia la Caucazul de Sud ................... 72 3.3.3. Turcia ................................................................ 156
1.2. Este Caucazul de Sud o regiune? ................................ 73 3.3.4. Iran .................................................................... 159
1.3. Caucazul de Sud un complex subregional 3.3.5. Rusia ................................................................. 161
de securitate .................................................................. 78
1.4. Caucazul de Sud n contextul eurasiatic ..................... 82 Concluzii ..................................................................... 166
1.4.1. Nord .................................................................... 84 Bibliografie .................................................................. 167

8 9
Caucazul de Sud ntre economie politic i
politic energetic (Angela Grmad) ................ 183
I. Contextul macroeconomic de dezvoltare
a regiunii ................................................................... 185
1. Promovarea reformelor economice ntre necesitate
i incapacitate ............................................................. 187
2. Importana dezvoltrii mediului de afaceri i factorii
care influeneaz evoluia lui ........................................ 206
II. Economia politicilor energetice
n Caucazul de Sud .................................................. 211
1. Resurse energetice, economie i politici energetice ........... 213
2. Proiecte energetice i coridoare de transport
n Caucazul de Sud ..................................................... 227
Concluzii ..................................................................... 246
Bibliografie .................................................................. 247
Mulumiri
Studiul de fa are peste 200 de pagini, numr care este
mult mai mic dect mulimea cuvintelor de Mulumim! /
! / Thank you! pe care autorii trebuie s le adreseze
celor care au fcut posibile susinerea financiar, cltoria i
documentarea n Caucazul de Sud.
Prin interviurile realizate n cele trei capitale caucaziene,
am avut prilejul de a intra n contact cu elitele intelectuale
georgiene, azere sau armene, specialitii cei mai cunoscui ai
zonei, care ne-au mprtit informaii importante i inedite
despre actorii statali ai regiunii. Am discutat cu jurnaliti de
seam de la cele mai importante publicaii, care ne-au permis
s cunoatem lumea presei caucaziene i s nelegem specifi-
cul relaiilor dintre mass-media i regimurile politice. Ne-am
ntlnit i am discutat cu reprezentanii societii civile, de la
care am obinut o descriere a imaginii ONG-urilor care n-
cearc s cldeasc democraia n regimuri politice ostile.
Am intrat n contact cu membri ai parlamentului,
minitri sau ali oficiali de rang nalt care ne-au artat cum
funcionez elaborarea politicilor, cum gndesc elitele con-
ductoare n Caucazul de Sud.
Am discutat cu oficialii europeni din regiune de la care am
aflat ce nseamn negocierile diplomatice n Caucazul de Sud
i am obinut informaii necunoscute publicului larg despre
regimurile politice din Armenia, Georgia i Azerbaidjan.
 Am aflat din simple conversaii i plimbri prin Erevan,
Baku i Tbilisi cum gndesc, cum triesc i care sunt obice-
iurile armenilor, azerilor i georgienilor.
Mulumim! / ! / Thank you! tuturor celor care au
acceptat s fie intervievai pentru studiu, pentru c ne-au
alocat o parte din timpul lor i pentru rbdarea cu care au
rspuns ntrebrilor noastre.
Mulumim! Soros Romania pentru iniiativa unic i pen-
tru c ne-a selectat pentru a scrie primul studiu romnesc
despre evoluiile politice i economice din Caucazul de Sud,
bazat pe documentarea direct la Tbilisi, Baku i Erevan.
! / Thank you! Open Society Georgia, Open Caucazul de Sud, dar perspectiva asupra regiunii este mereu
Society Azerbaijan, Open Society Erevan pentru agendele
de interviuri, transport, acomodare.
Ileana Racheru
Stanislav Secrieru
Angela Grmad
Introducere
Discursul public din Romnia abund n referine despre
redus la cteva teme constante: Georgia, rzboiul din
august 2008, surs vital pentru asigurarea securitii ener-
getice a Europei. Demersul autorilor reinventeaz discursul
despre Caucaz n spaiul romnesc, oferind o radiografie
politic, economic i de securitate a regiunii. Destinat insti-
tuiilor care articuleaz politica extern a Romniei fa de
regiune i experilor din societatea civil, studiul realizat sub
egida Fundaiei Soros devine, totodat, un instrument i o
lectur obligatorie pentru jurnalitii i studenii care vor s
neleag complexitatea unei regiuni eseniale pentru secu-
ritatea Europei. Demersul analitic se fundamenteaz pe
aplicarea celor mai recente perspective de interpretare din
literatura de specialitate asupra evoluiilor politice i eco-
nomice din Caucazul de Sud. ns cel mai semnificativ
aspect este faptul c autorii au mers on the ground, la firul
ierbii, materia lor prim fiind regiunea nsi. Au avut posi-
bilitatea s acceseze, prin interviurile fcute la Erevan, Baku
i Tbilisi n perioada mai-iunie 2011, experii din ONG-uri,
formatorii de opinie, dar i tehnocraii din birocraia guver-
namental (uneori pn la cel mai nalt nivel).
Prima parte a studiului, redactat de Ileana Racheru,
se concentreaz pe radiografia politic a regiunii. Din per-
spectiva tipologiei regimurilor politice, Caucazul de Sud
13
reunete state care consacr autoritarismul competitiv ca i al sensibilitilor de securitate. Din perspectiva relaiilor
formul predilect de guvernare. Este n ADN-ul regimurilor internaionale, Caucazul de Sud reprezint un complex
locale s colonizeze i s mobilizeze statul n folosul puterii, subregional de securitate coagulat n jurul unei relaii de
nclinnd balana structural n defavoarea opoziiei i sum zero (Armenia i Azerbaidjan), la care se adaug o
ngrdind, totodat, posibilitile opoziiei de a participa la serie ntreag de raporturi de cooperare pragmatic sau
alegeri. Societatea pare ontologic plasat ntr-un raport ine- competiie conjunctural pe diverse compartimente ntre
gal, de subordonare fa de stat i de regimul aflat la putere. Georgia i Armenia i Georgia i Azerbaidjan. Natura inter-
n Georgia, dei formal exist pres independent, totui aciunilor dintre statele complexului subregional formeaz
puterea a gsit imediat mijloacele de a influena coninutul un veritabil puzzle al interdependenei: Georgia este o pies
editorial prin crearea unei reele extinse de investitori apro- vital pentru funcionarea Armeniei (70-75% din tranzitul
piai regimului care s o controleze. Efectul? Convertirea sa comercial al Armeniei acoper teritoriul georgian, iar portul
ntr-o portavoce a puterii. n Armenia, mediul alternativ Poti este o verig esenial n asigurarea securitii alimen-
statului, non-guvernamental, este prea slab pentru a coagu- tare; n plus, accesul Armeniei la internet depinde tot de
la n jurul su o mas critic democratic. Activismul civic racordarea sa la teritoriul georgian); n acelai timp, Georgia
reunete mai degrab o elit izolat, care nu penetreaz i depinde maximal de livrrile de gaz din Azerbaidjan, n
nu are aderen la populaia obinuit. Imaginea regimului timp ce accesul azer spre piaa european se face prin infra-
condus de preedintele Aliev, verificat empiric n ministe- structura care traverseaz teritoriul Georgiei. Interaciunea
rele de la Baku, pare desprins direct din depeele Wikileaks: cu puterile adiacente Caucazului de Sud are, de asemenea,
este un regim construit pe loialiti personale care au trecut un impact deosebit de semnificativ n interiorul complexu-
proba timpului. n Azerbaidjan, figura central n arhitec- lui local de securitate. De cele mai multe ori, instinctul
tura puterii e preedintele Aliev, care, dup modelul tatlui statelor din regiune este acela de a-i externaliza securitatea
su, ncearc s pstreze puterea n familie i nelege prin curtarea unei mari puteri capabile s le ofere garanii de
puterea statului ca pe o afacere de familie. Contient de aprare: dac pentru Georgia conteaz apropierea de struc-
limitele puterii sale, Aliev este un tactician abil, dar n turile de securitate europene (n special NATO i SUA ca
acelai timp i un foarte iscusit acrobat printre aliane care offshore balancer), pentru Armenia garania securitii sale
se exclud. Face o distincie clar ntre ceea ce este personal rmne Rusia, sub umbrela organizaiei de aprare colectiv
i ceea ce nseamn business. Preedintele Aliev promoveaz OTCS. i Azerbaidjanul, dei mult mai autosuficient,
o politic extern echilibrat, combinnd deschiderea ctre caut sprijin n domeniul securitii, prin tratatul cu Turcia
NATO i UE cu msuri de conciliere a marilor puteri vecine, i relaia bilateral militar cu SUA. Studiul arat ns c,
Rusia i Iranul. Dimpotriv, pe plan intern este o persona- dup rzboiul din august 2008, spaiul de manevr macro-
litate impulsiv, care are o ncredere oarb n guvernarea regional al Georgiei este unul tot mai ngust. Este o realitate
prin for i coerciie. n aceeai logic, orice provocare consolidat de politicile contradictorii ale unor state euro-
politic este perceput de Aliev ca o ameninare existenial pene care au sprijinit vnzarea de heliporturi Mistral Rusiei,
la adresa dinastiei sale politice. dar i de tot mai evidenta ndeprtare a Turciei de Uniunea
European. Pentru Tbilisi, inteniile regionale ale Ankarei
A doua parte, redactat de Stanislav Secrieru, descrie sunt tot mai neclare, Turcia nemaifiind perceput ca o putere
complexitatea raporturilor regionale de la nivelul politicilor care proiecteaz interesele Occidentului.

14 15
 Ultima parte, redactat de Angela Grmad, ofer o
prezentare economic a Caucazului de Sud. Studiul evi-
deniaz rolul foarte important pe care l joac n politica i
economia regiunii structurile de putere oligarhice i mono-
poliste. O constant sud-caucazian ar fi aceea c deciziile
economice i politice sunt decisiv influenate de interesele
unor grupuri private coagulate n monopoluri i oligopoluri.
Dei structural se prezint ca o realitate comun, exist de-
sigur o serie de nuane naionale specifice: dac n Georgia
i Armenia oligarhia este prezent deopotriv la guvernare
i n opoziie, n Azerbaidjan opoziia nu are n spatele su
oligarhi care s le sprijine iniiativele. n cele din urm, toi
aceti parametri biologici ai mediului economic i politic
sud-caucazian vor descuraja investitorii strini s intre pe
piee unde concurena neloial e un dat natural. n absena
unor legislaii antimonopol care s confere stabilitate i pre-
dictibilitate, regulile jocului vor depinde n continuare de
bunvoina diverselor structuri clientelare.
Atunci cnd vorbim la Bucureti despre Caucazul de
Sud, spunem instantaneu energie. Este avantajul compara-
tiv al Azerbaidjanului (ca stat cu resurse de petrol i gaz) i
al Georgiei (ca ar cu potenial de tranzit). Din aceast per-
spectiv, potenialul economic al regiunii depinde de capa-
citatea sa de a se conecta cu marile piee consumatoare de
energie (UE, Rusia i China). ns, deopotriv economic i
politic, regiunea rmne dezbinat, fragmentat, la anti-
podul funcionrii ca un ntreg unitar. Economic, unele
dintre state sunt atrase de modelele europene de dezvoltare
i cooperare (n special Georgia i Armenia), n timp ce
Azerbaidjanul manifest mai degrab o afinitate oriental.
Politic, Georgia este interesat de implementarea unor re-
forme instituionale interne la standarde europene, Armenia
de restabilirea relaiilor cu Turcia, n timp ce Azerbaidjanul
pare preocupat de o politic extern pur energetic, adeseori
n contradicie cu interesele vecinilor si. n esen, studiul
pledeaz pentru cutarea unui model economic de succes
16
care s asigure fundarea unui sistem regional stabil i care s
se concentreze pe cooperarea intraregional. Dar oare sunt
capabile statele din Caucazul de Sud s accepte concesiile
necesare pentru a-i crea propriul model caucazian de inte-
grare?
Studiul Caucazul de Sud dup 20 de ani: Regimuri politice,
securitate i energie este realizat n cadrul programului
Promovarea valorilor europene n bazinul Mrii Negre al
Fundaiei Soros Romnia. Agenda programului urmrete
reducerea deficitului de cunoatere despre Caucazul de Sud
n rndurile elitelor politice, administrative, academice i
jurnalistice romneti, pe de o parte, ncercnd plasarea
tematicii pe agenda instituiilor publice de profil Pree-
dinia Romniei, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe i trans-
formarea ei ntr-un subiect de interes public, pe de alt parte.
Fiind la grania estic a Uniunii Europene, Romnia poate
i trebuie s devin un liant ntre Caucaz i restul Uniunii.
Din aceast perspectiv, studiul e destinat inclusiv factorilor
de decizie de la nivel european, care pot sprijini i ncuraja
candidatura Romniei la rolul de coordonator al politicilor
comunitare n regiune.
Octavian Manea,
Redactor politic extern
Foreign Policy Romnia
i Revista 22
 Ileana Racheru

Regimuri politice n Caucazul de sud.

Democraia care ascunde
autoritarisme competitive
 Capitolul acesta analizeaz evoluia regimurilor politice
din Georgia, Armenia i Azerbaidjan n perioada care a
urmat instalrii n funcie a actualilor preedini. Demersul
acoper mandatele prezideniale ale lui Mihail Saakavili,
Ilham Aliev i Serge Sargsian.
Analiza pornete de la premisa c cele trei regimuri sunt
autoritarisme competitive i studiaz modul n care
autoritile au reuit s creeze i/sau s perpetueze mecanis-
mele de consolidare a puterii. Prima parte explic i descrie
ce este autoritarismul competitiv. Demersul analitic se va
concentra apoi pe fiecare stat n parte i va urmri evoluia
celor trei regimuri politice n raport cu organizarea alegeri-
lor, relaiile puterii cu opoziia/mass-media/societatea civil
i influena presiunilor externe asupra deciziilor politice
interne. Analiza folosete surse directe (interviuri realizate
de autoare n Caucazul de Sud i datele publicate de OSCE
i Freedom House) precum i studii de specialitate (teore-
tice sau analize despre regimurile politice din cele trei state).
Comportamentul regimului n relaia cu opoziia, presa i
societatea civil va fi urmrit n momente politice cheie:
alegeri, legiferare a unor proiecte considerate de importan
major pentru democratizare, proteste.

21
 Prin urmare, capitolul i propune s afle ct de puternic
este guvernul/partidul aflat la guvernare i care sunt mijloa-
cele prin care exercit controlul autoritar asupra regimului
politic.
Ce este autoritarismul competitiv?
Autoritarismul competitiv este un regim hibrid rezultat
din mbinarea practicilor democraiei cu autoritarismul
(Levitsky i Way, 2010, 5). ntr-un regim autoritar competitiv,
puterea politic nu respect cel puin una dintre condiiile
democraiei: alegeri libere, garantarea libertilor civile, exis-
tena unui spaiu al jocului politic unde se pot exprima att
puterea ct i opoziia (Levitsky, 2010, 7).
Autoritarismul competitiv a fost definit prin diferenierea
acestuia de democraie i autoritarism.
Autoritarismul este regimul politic care nu permite opo-
ziiei s exprime legal nicio form de contestare (Levistsky,
2010, 7). Autoritarismul competitiv este regimul politic care
permite existena constituional a contestrii din partea
opoziiei. ntr-un regim autoritar competitiv, alegerile nu
sunt ntotdeauna libere i se desfoar ntr-un climat care
nu asigur anse egale pentru opoziie, dei legal aceasta se
poate nscrie n cursa electoral. Puterea poate manipula lis-
tele de alegtori i falsifica rezultatele scrutinului sau ngr-
di accesul opoziei n mass-media i la resursele financiare
(ibidem, 8).
Regimurile autoritare competitive garanteaz formal
libertile civile, dar acestea sunt violate frecvent: opoziia i
mass media libere sunt inta abuzurilor forelor de ordine/
poliiei/sistemului judiciar. Protestele, dei organizate prin
respectarea normelor, sunt adesea reprimate n for. Re-
strngerea libertilor civile poate avea i forma represiunii
legale prin metode mai subtile cum ar fi elaborarea i apli-
carea unor prevederi legislative, cu scopul de a da o form
legal aciunilor represive.
22
Levitsky i Way (2010, 10) au stabilit trei condiii pen-
tru existena unei competiii neloiale: instituiile statului
sunt folosite constant pentru scopuri partizane n folosul
puterii, puterea e tot timpul avantajat n dauna opoziiei,
posibilitile opoziiei de a participa la alegeri sunt serios
ngrdite.
Georgia
Alegerile democratice,
marele succes al revoluiei trandafirilor
Actualul regim politic de la Tbilisi este, n mare, rezulta-
tul revoluiei trandafirilor din 2003, cnd, prin ndelungi
proteste panice ale opoziiei politice i ale societii civile,
sprijinite de Occident, regimul autoritar al lui Eduard
evardnadze1 a fost nlturat. Dup fraudarea alegerilor
parlamentare din noiembrie 2003, evardnadze i-a anunat
demisia, cednd presiunilor occidentale i micrilor de
1 Fost lider al PC al RSS Georgia/Gruzia (1972-1985) i ministru
de externe al URSS (1985-1991), Eduard evardnadze a condus
Georgia din funcia de ef al Parlamentului n perioada 1992-1995 i
ca preedinte ales n mod direct ntre 1995 i 2003. n perioada n
care s-a aflat la putere, evardnadze a ncheiat cele dou acorduri de
pace care au pus capt confruntrilor armate din Abhazia (1994)
i Osetia de Sud (1992) cu medierea Rusiei i a ncheiat cu Moscova,
n 1995, un acord care prevedea staionarea pe teritoriul Georgiei a
patru baze militare ruseti pentru o perioad de 25 ani. Guvernarea
evardnadze a coincis cu primele ncercri de construcie a statului
georgian: identitatea naional diferit de manifestrile violente din
perioada Zviad Gamsahurdia.
n 1994, evardnadze, care avea o bun imagine n Occident,
a reuit s lanseze cu sprijin financiar vestic un program de reforme
economice.
n noiembrie 2003, cnd evardnadze a fost nlturat de la putere,
reformele economice erau un eec n Georgia, care era considerat
unul dintre statele cu cel mai nalt nivel de corupie din lume. Regimul
condus de evardnadze a fost considerat de specialiti ca fiind unul
autoritar.
23
strad, iar Uniunea Cetenilor din Georgia, partidul aflat la
putere pn atunci, s-a autodizolvat.
Noua configuraie a puterii, cu o componen hibrid,
a fost rezultatul coagulrii forelor de opoziie care aveau ca
obiectiv comun nlturarea lui evardnadze i ctigarea
puterii. Actuala putere de la Tbilisi, instalat dup organi-
zarea de alegeri prezideniale n ianuarie 2004, a fost for-
mat din contestatari din interior ai regimului evardnadze
(Nino Burjanadze, Mihail Saakavili2 i Zviad Zvania),
transformai n critici ai regimului i favorabili adoptrii
normelor democratice la nivel intern i apropierii de Occi-
dent n politica extern. n urma scrutinului din ianuarie
2004, Saakavili, candidat unic al Micrii Naionale Unite
(MNU) i al Democrailor Unii a fost ales preedinte cu
96,2% din sufragii, iar aliaii si Burjanadze i Zvania au
ocupat funciile de preedinte/purttor de cuvnt al legisla-
tivului i, respectiv, ministru de stat3. Alegerile din ianuarie
2004 au fost primul proces electoral, evaluat de observatorii
internaionali ca apropiat de standardele democratice i
a marcat nceputul celei de-a doua tranziii n Georgia, dup
proclamarea independenei n 1991.
Scrutinul legislativ din noiembrie 2003 a fost declarat nul
i noi alegeri au fost organizate n martie 2004, hotrre
considerat suspect de ctre observatorii internaionali pen-
tru c a fost aplicat doar pentru mandatele parlamentare
2 Educat n SUA la universitile Columbia (master) i George
Washington (doctorat), Mihail Saakavili a fost membru al Parla-
mentului (1995-1999) i ministru de justiie n regimul evardnadze
(2000-2001). n 2001, a demisionat din funcia de ministru al
Justiiei, acuznd guvernul de corupie. n acelai an, a creat blocul
de opoziie Partidul Micarea Naional, cu care a ctigat alegerile
prezideniale n 2004 i 2008 (CRS report, 2011, 1).
3 Potrivit Constituiei din 1995, cea mai important funcie n
Georgia era cea de preedinte. Sistemul prezidenial instaurat prin
Legea fundamental nu prevedea existena postului de premier, ci a
funciei de ministru de stat, care avea sarcina de a superviza corpul
de minitri care erau responsabili n faa preedintelui.
24
delegate prin scrutin proporional4. n noua curs electoral
s-au nscris 16 partide i aliane electorale, care s-au angajat
trziu n campania electoral, nu au exprimat oferte electo-
rale sau programe ideologice, limitndu-se la atacuri la adresa
contracandidailor. Competiia a consolidat poziia alianei
dintre Micarea Naional i Democraii Unii, care a obinut
67% din sufragii (135 locuri) i a adus opoziiei de dreapta
(Noua Dreapt i Industria va salva Georgia) 7,6% voturi
(15 locuri)5. OSCE a remarcat mbuntirea condiiilor n
care s-a desfurat procesul electoral fa de scrutinurile
anterioare, dar a menionat i inexistena separaiei ntre
administraia de stat i structurile de partid i potenialul
partidelor de a folosi n interese electorale resursele adminis-
trative (OSCE, 2004, 3).
Urmtorul scrutin desfurat n Georgia, cel pentru
alegerile locale din 2006, a fost considerat un element-cheie
pentru evoluia noului regim politic de la Tbilisi. Scrutinul,
dei calificat de ctre observatorii internaionali ca fiind, n
termeni generali, n acord cu normele democraiei, a artat
o repetare a practicilor n care resursele statului (angajri n
funcii publice, mrirea temporar a pensiilor, acordarea
unor voucher-e sociale) au fost folosite de partidele aflate la
putere pentru a obine voturi. n competiia electoral,
ctigat de MNU, s-au nscris 5 partide, o alian i civa
candidai independeni. n 27,5% circumscripii majoritare
i 8,7% proporionale, candidaii MNU sau listele depuse
de aceasta au fost competitori unici (OSCE, 2006, 2).
n 2008, georgienii au fost din nou chemai la urne, pentru
un scrutin prezidenial anticipat i pentru alegeri legislative.
Scrutinul a fost apreciat ca fiind prima curs electoral
prezidenial post-independen cu adevrat competitiv.
4 Legea fundamental n vigoare n 2004 n Georgia statua c
Parlamentul era compus din 235 alei, din care 150 erau votai prin
scrutin proporional pe liste i 85 potrivit sistemului majoritar un
mandat pentru un district.
5 n Parlamentul georgian 10 locuri sunt ocupate de reprezen-
tanii persoanelor dislocate din Abhazia i Osetia de Sud.
25
Mihail Saakavili a folosit resursele administrative ale sta-
tului n campania electoral, iar numrarea voturilor i pro-
cedurile de nregistrare au fost deficitare (OSCE a), 2008, 1).
Principalul contracandidat al lui Saakavili a fost Levan
Gachechiladze, susinut de nou partide de opoziie aliante
n Micarea Naional Unit. Saakavili a obinut peste
53% din sufragii din primul tur, Gachechiladze a acumulat
25,69%, iar restul voturilor au fost distribuite ntre ali cinci
competitori (fiecare a luat sub 1%). Primii doi clasai au
avut agende electorale cu aceleai obiective de politic extern
(aderarea Georgiei la NATO) i viziuni diferite cu privire la
configurarea regimului politic intern (semiprezidenialism,
eliminarea corupiei i a srciei i integrarea Abhaziei i a
Osetiei de Sud Saakavili; monarhia parlamentar, ncu-
rajarea mediului de afaceri Gachechiladze).
Alegerile parlamentare din 2008 au oferit n mod clar
poporului georgian oportunitatea de a-i alege reprezentanii
dintr-o palet larg de opiuni, dar ca i la scrutinele ante-
rioare, MNU a folosit resursele administrative ale statului pen-
tru a-i asigura voturi (OSCE b) 2008: 1) Partidul prezidenial
a obinut 59,18% din sufragii (119 locuri), Blocul electoral al
opoziiei a acumulat 17,73% din voturi (17 locuri), Cretin
Democraii 8,66% (6 locuri), Partidul Muncii 7,44% (6 locuri),
Partidul Republican din Georgia 3,78% (2 locuri)6.
La alegerile locale din 30 martie 2010, partidul aflat la
putere a folosit resursele administrative n campania electo-
ral, iar membrii acestuia aflai n funcii publice s-au impli-
cat n campania electoral. Rezultatul scrutinului a indicat
ctigtoare MNU cu 73,9% la nivel naional i cu 55,2%
(pentru primari) din primul tur i 52,5% (n consiliul
municipal) la primria oraului Tbilisi, considerat cel mai
important pot n cursa pentru alegerile locale.
6 La 28 martie 2008, Constituia Georgiei a fost amendat, iar
numrul de parlamentari a fost redus de la 253 la 150 (75 alei prin
scrutin proporional ntr-o singur circumscripie naional i 75 prin
vot majoritar n circumscripii inegale ca mrime care se suprapun
districtelor administrative).
26
MNU, atotputernic n politica georgian
Partidul prezidenial din Georgia este acum partidul de
putere (Max Bader, 2008, 5), care, mpreun cu alte cteva
partide de opoziie, construiete imaginea unui regim politic
prezidenial cu practici n aceeai msur democratice i
autoritare.
Dup patru ani de guvernare, MNU a reuit s menin
majoritatea parlamentar, chiar dac are o poziie mai slab
fa de rezultatul scrutinului din 2004, dar opoziia, care
nu a cumulat nici mcar jumtate din sufragiile partidului
prezidenial, nu este un adversar redutabil. Rezultatele
ultimelor dou scrutine (legislativ din 2008 i local din
2010) arat c MNU a reuit s menin majoritatea i
dup ce preedintele Saakavili a pierdut aproape jumtate
din voturi la alegerile prezideniale din 2008. Prin alegerile
locale, MNU i-a consolidat reeaua de putere i la nivel
local, fapt ce i va oferi un avantaj electoral considerabil la
urmtoarele scrutine. MNU are n prezent o reea bine con-
solidat de putere n ntreaga Georgie, controlul electoral al
partidului variind ntre 50 i 70%.
Scena politic georgian ntre revoluie i reform
Scena politic de la Tbilisi pstreaz atmosfera de con-
fruntare extrem din anii 90, nici puterea, nici opoziia nu
au experiena negocierilor i a compromisului sau programe
ideologice. MNU nu are nicio ideologie i susine c repre-
zint ntreaga societate georgian (IDEA, 2006, 7), iar cele-
lalte partide, dei i proclam apartenena la stnga sau la
drepta sau centrismul, nu caut dect s elimine critica
absenei ideologiei. Comportamentul i discursul partide-
lor de la Tbilisi distinge mai degrab moderaii-reformatori
aflai la putere de radicalii-revoluionari din opoziie.
Majoritatea partidelor din opoziia7 de la Tbilisi reclam
7 n Georgia exist un singur partid de centru-stnga, Partidul
Muncii.
27
o ideologie de dreapta, valorile de stnga fiind negate, de-
oarece sunt asociate direct sau indirect comunismului.
Scena politic de la Tbilisi are un grad redus de polari-
zare (Nodia, 2006, 109), care nu se manifest la nivel ideo-
logic, ci prin refuzul de a participa la dezbateri, acceptarea
suportului venit din Rusia (Partidul lui Nino Burjanadze)
i modul n care se raporteaz la revoluia trandafirilor8
(ibidem, 115). Crearea de coaliii/aliane i desfacerea acesto-
ra este un fenomen frecvent pe scena politic de la Tbilisi
care se petrece n orice moment al ciclului electoral sau doar
conjunctural n parlament pentru a susine anumite iniia-
tive/proiecte.
MNU a venit la putere cu o platform revoluionar, pe
care ulterior a reuit s o transforme, cu sprijin occidental,
ntr-un program de reforme. MNU a ncercat s ofere un
rspuns pozitiv la ntrebarea fundamental pentru georgieni:
a fost revoluia din 2003 ultima revoluie din Georgia?
Opoziia nu a renunat la obiectivele revoluionare pe care
le-a clamat prin proteste de strad i pe parcurs numrul
celor care s-au alturat manifestaiilor s-a redus foarte mult.
O nou revoluie i demisia preedintelui au fost principalele
obiective ale opoziiei, crora guvernul le-a opus reformele
i programul electoral Georgia fr srcie. La toate dez-
baterile care vizau reforma statului, opoziia a ameninat c
se retrage de la discuii i a organizat proteste. n plus, opo-
ziia a acuzat puterea de fraudarea alegerilor, dei observa-
torii internaionali au remarcat progresele fcute de MNU
n organizarea scrutinelor.
Agenda politic a ambelor tabere are ca obiectiv prioritar
democratizarea asociat cu occidentalizarea i europeni-
zarea, dar cu strategii diferite de realizare. Pentru opoziie
mijloacele sunt revoluia, iar pentru putere reforme adeseori
radicale, care ncearc s aplice norme occidentale fr a ine
8 Partidul Republican i Partidul Conservator s-au implicat n
revoluia trandafirilor. Noul Partid Conservator, Industriaii i
Partidul Muncii nu au susinut evenimentele din 2003.
28
cont de specificul local. Anticomunismul sub forma lustraiei
radicale este de asemenea prezent pe agenda puterii.
Partidul aflat la guvernare n Georgia a creat un spaiu al
jocului politic n care opoziia poate participa la alegeri cu
anse reale, dar nu a renunat total la practicile administra-
tive neloiale care i-au oferit avantaje electorale. Consoli-
darea puterii MNU se datoreaz i incapacitii opoziiei de
a se autoconstrui n contracandidai importani pentru putere
(la alegerile parlamentare din 2004, cei mai muli candidai
au refuzat invitaii din partea mass-media i nu au avut ac-
iuni de campanie televizate). MNU este cel mai puternic
partid din Georgia, dar ar putea fi contestat de o opoziie
puternic, ntruct acesta le las contracandidailor posibi-
liti largi de exprimare i un climat politic care nu exclude
competiia. Dei MNU are majoritatea n parlament, opo-
ziia poate penetra sistemul (de exemplu, n 2005, toate
partidele de opoziie s-au coalizat pentru a propune alegerea
primarului oraului Tbilisi n mod direct i au respins iniia-
tiva de a fi ales de consiliul municipal). Confruntarea dintre
partide n Georgia are loc n cadrul organizat: procese elec-
torale, sau dezbateri parlamentare sau n strad (manifestaii
panice sau violene) i bti n parlament. Confruntarea
violent nu nseamn doar msuri luate de forele de ordine
la adresa opoziiei. Partidele din Georgia pstreaz o tra-
diie, anterioar revoluiei trandafirilor, a confruntrilor
violente fiecare partid are un SonderKommando, grupuri de
btui, care le ajut s fac fa unor eventuale provocri
ale adversarilor (Nodia, 2006, 117).
Elite noi, reele clientare de putere noi
Imaginea i practicile elitelor politice de la Tbilisi
amestec motenirea sovietic cu adaptarea la tranziie i la
obiectivul perpetuu al democratizrii. Motenirea sovietic
se reflect n existena unui lider puternic i eliminarea
efilor de stat care nu au acest atribut. Mihail Saakavili este
liderul puternic de la Tbilisi, poziie construit prin succesul
29
revoluiei trandafirilor, ctigarea alegerilor cu 97% sau
53% i reforme. Adaptarea la tranziie a nsemnat crearea
unui cadru legislativ care s respecte normele democraiei,
dar care s favorizeze puterea.
Reformarea legislativ a statului a fost un alt mijloc prin
care regimul Saakavili i-a consolidat puterea n Georgia
prin modificarea Constituiei i configurarea unui regim
prezidenial puternic: preedintele poate demite guvernul i
parlamentul (dac acesta nu acord votul de ncredere suc-
cesiv pentru trei cabinete). Dei formal a pretins reforma i
a oferit un paravan pentru aceasta prin introducerea funciei
de premier (care, n aparen, mparte puterea executiv cu
preedintele) i confirmarea acestuia de parlament, n prac-
tic a fost ntrit puterea preedintului, n jurul persoanei
cruia a fost construit noul regim politic.
Noua elit creat de Saakavili este n primul rnd dife-
rit de cea sovietic din jurul lui evardnadze sau de radi-
calii naionaliti din anii 90: toi minitrii au un trecut
asemntor preedintelui studii n Occident i susin
reforma statului dup model vestic. Baza puterii MNU din-
colo de susinerea electoral (explicat n parte prin dorina
populaiei de a obine stabilitatea politic) este reprezentat
de reelele de patronaj de la nivel nalt, a cror loialitate se
bazeaz pe corupie: instituiile publice au fost curate de
corupie n funciile de execuie. Acesta este cel mai mare
succes al guvernrii Saakavili. Dar la nivel nalt nimeni nu
s-a atins de corupi9. n funciile superioare corupia i-a
schimbat doar forma. Acum miza este controlul afacerilor i
al pieelor10. Regimul mizeaz pe loialitatea mediului de
afaceri i a funciilor administrative, nu i a posturilor
ministeriale (schimbarea din funcie a minitrilor este o
practic constant la Tbilisi). Dar guvernarea Saakavili nu
a reuit s obin i susinerea popular ca rezultat al re-
formelor iniiate, deoarece schimbarea n bine, dei vizibil
9 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
10 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
30
pe strzile din Tbilisi sau Batumi, nu a ajuns la majoritatea
populaiei care triete n srcie.
Mass-media convieuire imposibil cu regimul
politic
Relaia puterii de la Tbilisi cu mass-media este una spe-
cific regimurilor autoritare i suprapune o legislaie demo-
cratic peste practici nedemocratice. n cei aproape 8 ani de
cnd se afl la putere, MNU a reuit s aduc sub controlul
su aproape ntreaga mass-media. Dei a creat condiiile
legale pentru existena unei prese independente, regimul
Saakavili a identificat foarte repede modaliti prin care
poate influena coninutul editorial: aducerea sub propria
influen a presei finanate de stat i crearea unei reele prin
care poate controla presa privat (investitori apropiai
regimului i chiar membri ai parlamentului), convertind-o
din pres independent/critic la adresa regimului n porta-
vocea puterii.
Legislaia care reglementeaz audio-vizualul n Georgia
a fost calificat de Freedom House ca ntrunind toate
normele democratice. Parlamentul de la Tbilisi a completat
dup anul 2004 prevederile legislative cu privire la situaia
mass-media. Noua legislaie a adus mbuntiri semnifica-
tive legii din 1991: prin garantarea libertii de expresie i
prin clarificarea constrngerilor legale la care sunt supui
jurnalitii, dezincriminarea calomniei (Freedom House
Georgia, 2006).
Televiziunea reprezint principal surs de informaie
pentru georgieni, iar mass-media tiprit are tiraje reduse i
acoper, n general, mediile educate i se distribuie mai mult
n Tbilisi i n alte orae mai mari. n Georgia, exist
mass-media finanat din fonduri publice (un singur post de
televiziuneTV1), trei canale tv private (Kanal 1, Rustavi 2,
Imedi) i cteva ziare care sunt parial subvenionate de stat.
Regimul Saakavili a preluat presa cu finanare public de
sub controlul lui evardnadze pentru a o aduce, dup 2004,
31
sub propria influen. Situaia a fost similar cu mass-media
din Ajaria, care fost plasat de sub controlul i cenzura
autoritilor de la Batumi sub influena puterii de la Tbilisi.
Dup venirea la putere a MNU i a lui Mihail Saakavili,
postul public de televiziune a devenit principalul vehicul
mediatic folosit de regim n toate campaniile electorale.
Dei la nivel formal (prin legislaia cu privire la dreptul la
liber exprimare i modul de desemnare a conducerii, postul
respect normele democratice) postul TV public are toate
prghiile necesare pentru a informa ntr-un mod nepartizan,
acesta a continuat practicile autocenzurii asociate presei
dintr-un regim autoritar.
Mass-media privat nu este capabil s se autosusin
financiar, din cauza pieei de publicitate extrem de
restrnse, situaie care o face vulnerabil n faa presiunilor
editoriale adesea cu caracter politic exercitate de finanatori.
Investitorii privai din mass-media georgian sunt ne-
cunoscui; companii obscure cu sediul n paradisuri fiscale,
n spatele crora este speculat prezena unor actori politici
de la putere sau din opoziie. Posturile tv private au mari
deficite financiare i nimeni nu tie din ce se finaneaz11.
Se pare c dup 2004, principalele trei posturi private de
televiziune (Rustavi 2, Imedi TV, TV Mze) au fost cumprate
de ctre persoane apropiate guvernului sau parlamentari,
dup ce propietarii au fost supui unor presiuni.
Problemele financiare ale mass-media creeaz depen-
dena acesteia nu doar de investitori privai, ci i de modul
n care sunt achitate datoriile fa de autoriti. Regimul
s-a folosit de forme legale de presiune asupra mass-media
(sub forma controalelor poliiei financiare) sau mesaje infor-
male (critici ale oficialilor la adresa jurnalitilor, interzicerea
accesului la evenimente organizate de instituii publice
practic a Ministerului Securitii). n 2004, guvernul a re-
ealonat datoriile Rustavi 2, ulterior postul a fost cumprat
de un investitor apropiat guvernului, situaie care se pare c
11 Interviu cu un jurnalist, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
32
ar fi temperat poziia critic a postului TV la adresa autori-
tilor (Freedom House Georgia, 2005).
Situaia financiar a presei georgiene influeneaz coni-
nutul editorial al informaiilor transmise publicului. Adesea
mass-media privat se autocenzureaz pentru a evita presiu-
nile finanatorului. n presa georgian au aprut mai multe
scandaluri n care jurnalitii au acuzat imixtiuni ale inves-
titorilor: retragerea unor documentare despre corupia din
poliie sau interzicerea unor emisiuni ai cror moderatori
criticau guvernul. Jurnalitii acuz presiuni din partea pro-
prietarilor trustului la care sunt angajai: Este imposibil s
scrii i s publici un articol despre un actor politic aflat la
putere sau n opoziie, implicat n fapte de corupie, dac
eful tu nu este de acord12.
Presiunile regimului asupra mass-media s-au manifestat
mai ales n momente de tensiune pentru putere (alegeri,
proteste ale opoziiei, rzboiul din 2008) i au ajuns la
violene fizice sau suspendarea transmisiei televiziunilor.
La alegerile parlamentare din 2004, toate cele 16 partide i
aliane electorale care au participat la scrutin au fost pre-
zente n mass-media, dar tendina general att a posturilor
TV private ct i a celei publice a fost de a favoriza Micarea
Naional, aflat la putere. TV 1 finanat din fonduri pu-
blice a transmis tiri cu caracter pozitiv n proporie de 80%
despre MNU i nu a oferit dezbateri electorale (OSCE,
2004, 2 i 15). Rustavi 2, post privat, a acoperit campania
electoral n mod similar. Urmtoarele scrutine au artat o
perpetuare a practicilor de la alegerile din 2004.
Forele de ordine au agresat fizic jurnaliti, n special pe
cei care au transmis informaii de la protestele din 2005 i
2007. Preedintele Saakavili a decretat n noiembrie 2007
starea de urgen, interzicnd transmisiunile TV cu excepia
postului public. n aceeai perioad, posturile Imedi i
Kavkasia Tv au fost suspendate pe motiv c ar fi incitat
protestatarii (Freedom House Georgia, 2008). n timpul
12 Interviu cu un jurnalist, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
33
rzboiului ruso-georgian din 2008, toate posturile tv din
Georgia au difuzat doar informaii favorabile autoritilor
de la Tbilisi, iar dup noiembrie 2007, talk-show-urile i ana-
lizele au disprut din grila de programe.
Regimul de la Tbilisi a reuit s elimine de pe piaa de
media georgian mass-media independent, dar nu a supri-
mat pluralismul, deoarece investitorii nu sunt doar politi-
cieni sau persoane apropiate puterii, ci i membri/susintori
ai opoziiei politice: Acum n Georgia exist pres pentru
putere i mass-media pentru opoziie 13. n prezent, cel mai
important post de televiziune de opoziie este Maestro TV,
apropiat de opoziia radical reprezentat de Nino Burja-
nadze.
Societatea civil, singura voce critic la adresa
regimului
Regimul de la Tbilisi a oscilat ntre practicile democratice
i cele autoritare n relaia cu opoziia i societatea civil.
Controlul regimului asupra exercitrii drepturilor i libert-
ilor civile este unul limitat i se rsfrnge mai ales asupra
dezbaterilor pe marginea legislaiei care vizeaz reforma
statului i a dreptului de a protesta/contesta puterea.
A doua tranziie n Georgia a presupus retrasarea cadru-
lui legislativ n care s-au desfurat alegerile i reconfigu-
rarea legal a regimului politic. Imediat dup instalarea la
putere, MNU a anunat c va organiza consultri pe mar-
ginea proiectului de Cod Electoral Unificat i a amenda-
mentelor aduse Constituiei. Puterea de la Tbilisi a ncercat
i a reuit s monopolizeze dezbaterile publice prin dou
mecanisme: votul majoritii parlamentare i organizarea
unor dezbateri de faad cu opoziia i societatea civil
(pentru a arat, cel puin formal, c respect regulile dia-
logului politic cerute de Occident). Puterea a beneficiat,
13 Interviu cu un jurnalist, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
34
n plus, de polarizarea extrem a mediului politic, de modul
extrem n care opoziia a neles s negocieze prin retragerea
de la discuii i organizarea de proteste.
Observatorii internaionali au criticat frecvent modul n
care au fost organizate consultrile cu societatea civil i
partidele de opoziie pe marginea modificrii legislaiei elec-
torale i a amendrii constituiei: ntr-un interval de timp
limitat14 i cu favorizarea puterii. n 2004, la iniiativa
guvernului, parlamentul a modificat legea electoral, prin
nclcarea procedurilor de deliberare. Dezbaterile cu privire
la modificarea structurii parlamentului (reducerea numrului
de membri) au nceput n 2008, cu doar dou luni nainte
de alegeri, iar iniiativa a fost calificat de OSCE (2008, 1)
ca afectnd egalitatea votului. n plus, msura e favorabil
MNU, deoarece acesta obinuse la scrutinele anterioare cele
mai multe mandate majoritare. Legea electoral n varianta
MNU conine i o prevedere controversat, care le permite
oficialilor s se implice n campania electoral.
Regimul de la Tbilisi a promovat o dubl abordare a
relaiei cu opoziia politic: raporturi panice/conforme
normelor democraiei occidentale i msuri violente sau
scandaluri/intimidri.
Guvernul de la Tbilisi a oferit opoziiei posibilitatea de
a participa la alegeri cu anse reale de a acumula voturi (nu
a refuzat n mod abuziv niciunui candidat/partid nscrierea
n competiiile electorale). Opoziia i-a putut exercita n
mod liber dreptul legal de a organiza proteste anti-Saakavili,
ns forele de ordine au reprimat prin violen mai multe
manifestaii ale contestatarilor. n noiembrie 2007, guver-
nul a reprimat n for protestele partidelor de opoziie
grupate ntr-un Consiliu Naional pentru a solicita decalarea
(mai devreme) datei alegerilor parlamentare i demisia
preedintelui. Urmtoarele proteste ale opoziiei, organizate
14 Pe 26 august 2006, preedintele Saakavili a semnat un decret
prin care anuna c alegerile locale vor avea loc pe 5 octombrie 2006.
Timpul alocat dezbaterilor pentru modificarea legislaiei privind
organizarea alegerilor locale a fost de doar dou sptmni.
35
sub forma unor demonstraii masive timp de 2 luni, au fost
ntmpinate panic de regim. Poliia a folosit fora, n mai
2011, mpotriva opozanilor grupai n jurul lui Nino Burja-
nadze, incidente soldate cu moartea a 4 persoane i rnirea
altor ctorva zeci. Unul dintre reprezentanii opoziiei a fost
ncarcerat.
Georgia este singurul stat din Caucazul de Sud n care
societatea civil a reuit s transmit prin proteste panice
mesajul populaiei ctre guvernarea evardnadze i s nde-
plineasc principalele obiective ale manifestaiilor: anularea
alegerilor fraudate i organizarea unui nou scrutin, demisia
preedintelui. Dup 2004, societatea civil a reuit doar
parial s schimbe relaiile cu regimul politic. Guvernul de la
Tbilisi are o dubl abordare a relaiei cu mediul ONG: pro-
movarea unei politici de deschidere fa de societatea civil
la nivel formal i evitarea dialogului atunci cnd sunt aduse
n dezbatere chestiuni de politic intern.
Legislaia n vigoare n Georgia nu mpiedic apariia
ONG-urilor i regimul de la Tbilisi nu a ncercat s ofere
subvenii din partea statului pentru a influena n favoarea
sa activitile mediul non-guvernamental. ONG-urile cele
mai active primesc finanare din Occident. Au existat, ns,
situaii n care diferite organizaii non-guvernamentale au
exprimat opiuni partizane (cel mai bun exemplu este cel al
Institutului Libertatea, susintor al revoluiei trandafirilor,
al crui director s-a implicat n politic n cadrul MNU,
dup 2004).
Rolul clasic al societii civile de a transmite mesajele
cetenilor ctre guvern este limitat, deoarece executivul nu
e dispus s participe la dezbaterile organizate de ONG-uri
sau s permit influena societii civile asupra deciziei n
politicile publice. Spre deosebire de perioada evardnadze,
guvernul manifest aparent deschidere fa de proiectele
societii civile n special n cazul ONG-urilor ce deruleaz
aciuni n parteneriat cu diverse instituii ale UE, pentru a
evita astfel eventualele critici venite de la Bruxelles. Dar
36
membrii guvernului au refuzat s dea curs unor invitaii din
partea ONG-urilor pentru a participa la dezbaterile pe mar-
ginea amendrii constituiei.
Totui, regimul georgian poate fi penetrat, dei cu greu,
de iniiative ale societii civile. n 2004, la propunerea
Institutului Libertatea, parlamentul a modificat legea presei,
dezincriminnd calomnia i stabilind prevederi cu privire la
accesul la informaia public. Peste patru ani, guvernul geor-
gian a cedat n faa presiunilor opiniei publice, a opoziiei i
a acceptat reorganizarea mass-mediei subvenionate din
fonduri publice (Freedom House Georgia, 2005).
Reprezentanii ONG-urilor au acces liber n mass-media,
particip adesea la dezbaterile televizate. Niciunul dintre
activitii societii civile intervievai pentru acest raport nu
a cerut s-i fie declinat identitatea i nu s-a temut s critice
regimul politic.
Democraia care limiteaz presiunile Rusiei
Georgia este un stat mic, poziionat ntr-o regiune cu
multe conflicte (Caucazul de Nord, Abhazia, Osetia de Sud
i Nagorno-Karabah), situaie care creeaz necesitatea unui
aliat puternic. Paleta de opiuni e limitat la dou variante:
Rusia i Occidentul. Relaiile privilegiate cu Rusia, dei ar
fi favorizat ntrirea controlului i consolidarea puterii
MNU i a lui Mihail Saakavili, au fost excluse din progra-
mul electoral al acestora nc din 2003: att partidul, ct
i candidatul la preedinie au afiat ca obiective majore ale
viitoarei guvernri integrarea n UE i aderarea la NATO.
Ctigarea tuturor alegerilor ulterioare cu aceeai platform
prooccidental i larga susinere popular pentru aliana cu
Vestul au fcut ca meninerea la putere a regimului s fie
dependent de relaiile cu SUA i UE. Puterea de la Tbilisi
a iniiat cu sprijin financiar occidental reformarea institu-
iilor interne: a mritt de cteva ori salariile funcionarilor
publici (aflate n perioada evardnadze sub limita supravie-
uirii), a modificat structura aparatului birocratic, a asigurat
37
training-uri pentru a mbunti performanele angajailor i
a eliminat corpuia.
Occidentul i-a condiionat, ns, sprijinul pentru adop-
tarea reformelor democratice, fapt ce a determinat guver-
narea de la Tbilisi s-i tempereze tendinele autoritare i s
oscileze ntre msuri democratice, cum ar fi organizarea
alegerilor dup normele OSCE, i reprimarea prin for a
protestelor opoziiei sau brutalizarea jurnalitilor. Regimul
de la Tbilisi pstreaz memoria recent a eecului guvernrii
evardnadze, care a pierdut sprijinul Occidentului pentru c
nu a adoptat reforme, a deteriorat situaia economic i a
fost nlturat prin proteste. Presiunea strzii este exercitat
i asupra regimului Saakavili, care a reuit s fac fa mai
multor proteste care aveau ca obiectiv schimbarea puterii.
Relaiile cu Rusia, dup friciunile comerciale (mrirea
preului la gaze de ctre Moscova i sistarea importurilor de
ap mineral din Georgia) s-au deteriorat total dup rzboiul
din august 2008. Rusia este marele inamic al regimului geor-
gian care, potrivit discursului oficial, a ncercat de mai multe
ori, dup 2008, s organizeze nlturarea de la putere a lui
Saakavili.
Presiunile Occidentului pentru democratizarea regimului
de la Tbilisi au o dubl coordonat: intern (meninerea la
putere prin promovarea unei agende provestice i contra-
cararea ncercrilor Moscovei de a-l nlocui) i extern (nece-
sitatea unui partener puternic care s-i asigure securitatea).
Armenia
Regimul politic din Armenia15 este rezultatul perpe-
turii, ncepnd din 1998, a puterii unui singur grup politic
15 Armenia i-a declarat independena fa de URSS n august
1990. Levon Ter-Petrosian a devenit, n 1991, primul preedinte al
Armeniei postcomuniste. Pn n 1998, Petrosian s-a aflat n fruntea
unui regim autoritar criticat frecvent de Occident pentru reprimarea
presei, nclcarea drepturilor i libertilor ceteneti i fraudarea
alegerilor parlamentare din 1995 i a celor prezideniale din 1998.
38
cu rdcini n Nagorno-Karabah16 (Petrosyan, 2010, 8) i al
transferului de putere dintre preedintele Kociarian i pre-
mierul Serge Sargsian17.
Dup preluarea puterii de ctre Sargsian, autoritile
armene au construit un regim politic hibrid n care practicile
democratice se mbin cu msurile autoritare. Dup venirea
la putere a lui Sargsian (ca premier n 2008), autoritile de
la Erevan au mbuntit modul de organizare a alegerilor.
Renunarea parial la practicile autoritare de organizare a
scrutinului este explicat prin inexistena unei opoziii
puternice i prin ncercarea de a oferi o imagine mai demo-
cratic regimului18.
Alegerile care reconfirm acelai ctigtor
Scrutinul legislativ din 2007 s-a desfurat n acord cu
normele OSCE i alte standarde internaionale cu privire la
organizarea de alegeri democratice (OSCE Armenia, 2007, 5).
16 Conflictul are la origine decizia lui Stalin din 1923 de a include
Oblastul Nagorno-Karabah, regiune cu o populaie majoritar armean,
n RSS Azerbaidjan. n 1988, armenii din Nagorno-Karabah i
Erevan au cerut, prin ample demonstaii, ca regiunea s fie inclus n
RSS Armenia, situaie care a dus la declanarea conflictului. n 1991,
Nagorno-Karabah s-a declarat independent de Azerbaidjan. Acordul
de ncetare a focului a fost semnat n 1994. De atunci, reprezentnd
14% din teritoriul Azerbaidjanului, Nagorno-Karabah se afl de facto
sub controlul Erevanului i de iure sub administraia de la Baku.
17 Originar din Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabah, Serge Sargsian
are o ndelungat carier n PC al RSS Armean i activitate n struc-
turile militare armene ca ef al Comitetului Forelor de Autoaprare
a Nagorno-Karabah (1989-1993) i ministru al Aprrii (1993-1995,
2000-2007). Dup 1995, a ocupat posturile de ministru al Secu-
ritii, ministru de Interne, diverse funcii n cadrul administraiei
prezideniale de la Erevan. n 2007, a devenit premier al Armeniei.
A fost considerat omul de ncredere al fostului preedinte armean,
Robert Kociarian.
18 Alegerile parlamentare din Armenia, desfurate n 2003, au
fost fraudate, situaie care a atras numeroase critici din partea Occi-
dentului i a observatorilor internaionali.
39
Partidul Republican aflat la putere a ctigat scrutinul cu 41
de mandate proporionale i 22 majoritare19. Celelalte par-
tide care au trecut pragul electoral20 au fost Armenia Prosper
(18 mandate proporionale i 7 majoritare), Federaia Revo-
luionar din Armenia Danacii-FRA (16 mandate pro-
porionale), Ornitas Yerkir-Supremaia Legii (8 proporionale
i 2 majoritare), Motenirea (7 proporionale), Partidul
Aliana (1 mandat majoritar), Iniiativa civic (non-parti-
zan, 9 mandate majoritare) (OSCE:2007 anexa). Niciunul
dintre competitori nu a depus candidaturi n toate circum-
scripiile i 2/3 dintre partidele i alianele angajate n cursa
electoral au depus doar liste pentru scrutinul proporional
(n 7 circumscripii s-au nscris candidai unici). Foarte
muli candidai (ai puterii i ai opoziiei) s-au retras din
cursa electoral dup nscrierea listelor sau depunerea can-
didaturilor pentru mandatele majoritare. Cu cteva ocazii,
Partidul Republican s-a folosit de resursele administrative
ale statului pentru a obine susinerea electoratului (OSCE
Armenia, 2007, 1) i i-a creat un spaiu de campanie favo-
rabil lui nsui i aliailor informali (Armenia Prosper i
parial pentru FRA).
Alegerile prezideniale din februarie 2008 au ntrunit,
n general, normele OSCE i standardele internaionale
cu privire la organizarea de alegeri libere. Rezultatele scru-
tinului l-au indicat ctigtor pe Serge Sargsian cu 52,8%
din sufragii din primul tur. Pe locul doi s-a aflat Levon
Ter-Petrosian cu 21,5% voturi. n ansamblu, procesul elec-
toral s-a desfurat cu favorizarea candidatului Partidului
Republican: preedintele n exerciiu i oficialii guvernului
au fcut campanie n favoarea acestuia, numrarea a 16%
din voturi s-a desfurat n condiii proaste sau foarte
proaste (OSCE Armenia, 2008, 4).
19 Potrivit Constituiei din 1995, amendat n 2005, Parlamentul
Armeniei este o instituie unicameral cu 131 de parlamentari (90
de mandate delegate prin scrutin proporional pe liste, i 41 prin vot
majoritar n circumscripii uninominale).
20 n Armenia, pragul electoral este de 5%.
40
n 2009, locuitorii Erevanului au fost chemai pentru
prima dat la urne pentru a-i alege pe membrii Consiliului
Municipal. Scrutinul, apreciat ca ntrunind n general nor-
mele Consiliului Europei, a fost marcat de aceleai practici
nedemocratice: cumprarea voturilor, tiprirea mai multor
buletine de vot, intimidarea alegtorilor. Dup numrarea
voturilor, Partidul Republican a obinut majoritatea n Con-
siliul Municipal (35 din cele 65 de locuri) i l-a reconfirmat
n funcie pe fostul primar.21
Mediul politic de la Erevan are un grad redus de polari-
zare, care se reflect doar n coninutul naionalist al agen-
dei politice cu privire la viitorul enclavei Nagorno-Karabah.
Cteva partide reclam includerea regiunii n statul armean
sau independena acesteia, iar altele organizarea unui refe-
rendum n care locuitorii din Nagorno-Karabah s se pro-
nune cu privire la viitorul provinciei. n politica intern,
att puterea, ct i opoziia afirm ca obiectiv prioritar
democratizarea i reformele, fr ca acestea s aib ca scop
final integrarea n UE: Noi nu excludem cooperarea cu UE,
dar tim c o eventual integrare este un obiectiv mult prea
ndeprtat22.
Dup alegerile parlamentare din 2007, Partidul Repu-
blican a creat o coaliie de guvernare cu Armenia Prosper,
Federaia Revoluionar Armean (FRA) i Ornitas Yerkir,
coaliie dominat de republicani. Armenia prosper este
controlat de fostul preedinte Kociarian, Ornitas are doar
doi membri n guvern (apropiai de Sargsian), despre care
se spune c informal fac parte din Partidul Republican
(Petrosyan, 2010, 10).
Opoziia parlamentar din Armenia include FRA i Mo-
tenirea (considerat opoziia real). n 2009, FRA a prsit
21 Pn n 2009, primarul Erevanului era numit de preedintele
statului. Dup amendarea Constituiei, n 2005, primarul Erevanului
este ales indirect de majoritatea membrilor Consiliului Municipal.
22 Interviu cu un membru al Adunrii Naionale a Armeniei, Ere-
van, iunie 2011.
41
coaliia de guvernare23, dar a continuat s susin informal
puterea contra unui pact de neagresiune informal (autori-
tile nu au luat msuri represive mpotriva membrilor aces-
teia).
Motenirea (Heritage) este considerat singurul partid de
opoziie din parlamentul armean i unica voce critic la
adresa guvernului att cu privire la politica extern (critic
investiiile Rusiei n economia armean pentru c sunt o
form de corupie, prezena bazei militare ruseti pe terito-
riul armean), ct i la cea intern (modul n care autoritile
au gestionat evenimentele din 2008 i urmrile acestora,
corupia). Membrii partidului au fost inta criticii guvernu-
lui i a violenei forelor de ordine.
Opoziia extraparlamentar din Armenia Consiliul
Naional Armean este o micare hibrid, compus din
18 partide politice (cu ideologii diverse) i organizaii co-
munitare (Petrosyan, 2010, 11) creat n jurul lui Levon
Ter-Petrosian. CNA critic frecvent guvernul pentru ncl-
carea drepturilor omului, corupie i nerespectarea ordinii
constituionale. Cele dou tabere ale opoziiei din Armenia
nu au reuit s creeze o for unic pentru a participa la
vreuna dintre cursele electorale. Totui, Heritage a protestat
n 2011 alturi de CNA, fr a adera la toate obiectivele
acestora.
Opoziia politic armean, dei a participat cu anse
reale de a concura puterea, la toate scrutinele organizate
dup adoptarea Constituiei din 1995, nu a avut suficient
influen electoral i nu s-a consolidat prin atragerea de
membri. Dup protestele din 2008, opoziia tradiional de
la Erevan s-a discreditat n faa populaiei, pentru c a con-
testat n mod nejustificat un scrutin apreciat ca fiind n
acord cu normele democratice occidentale.
23 FRA a prsit aliana de guvernare de la Erevan ca de protest
fa de semnarea, n octombrie 2009, a protocoalelor de la Zrich
pentru normalizarea relaiilor dintre Armenia i Turcia.
42
n prezent, Partidul Republican are un control electoral
de 50%, iar mbuntirea condiiilor de organizare a
alegerilor nu i-a afectat controlul asupra puterii. Partidul de
putere de la Erevan beneficiaz de avantajul unei opoziii
slabe mcinat de dispute i de parteneriate informale cu
o alt parte a opoziiei.
Un regim legitimat de conflictul din
Nagorno-Karabah
Actuala elit de la Erevan este rezultatul coaliiei, create
n anii 1990, ntre naionaliti i postcomuniti (Gallina,
2010, 24). Gruparea politic aflat la putere n Armenia
a aprut prin fuziunea dintre elita militar care a luptat n
Nagorno-Karabah n anii 1990 i corpul politic stabilit la
Erevan dup independen (ibidem, 25). Puterea de la
Erevan nu a cunoscut nicio schimbare n cei douzeci de ani
de la proclamarea independenei: alegerile au fost ctigate
de preedintele n exerciiu sau de premierul desemnat
informal ca succesor al acestuia. Regula succesiunii pre-
mierului la funcia de preedinte este confirmat inclusiv de
singurul moment n care transferul de putere nu s-a fcut
prin alegeri, nlocuirea lui Levon Ter-Petrosian, printr-o lovi-
tur soft de palat n 1998, cu Robert Kociarian. Puterea de
la Erevan a beneficiat de victoria mpotriva Azerbaidjanului
pentru a ntri controlul autoritar prin construirea unui
puternic aparat de coerciie (n armat i poliie), folosit cu
succes pentru a reprima amplele proteste ale opoziiei (Way,
2009, 111).
Potrivit Constituiei din 2005 (amendat n 2004),
Armenia are un regim semiprezidenial, dar informal puterea
e concentrat n minile preedintelui. Situaia este explica-
bil prin motenirea sovietic care a cultivat imaginea unui
lider puternic i prin practica politic postcomunist a unui
grup de lideri care au trebuit s fac fa unor ameninri de
securitate constante i s obin stabilitatea politic. Elita
politic aflat la putere este unificat n jurul preedintelui,
43
situaie determinat de necesitatea de a avea un lider puter- implementare a acestora e caracteristic spaiului post-sovietic.
nic care s negocieze soluionarea conflictului i de folosirea Regimul politic armean a nregistrat pn n prezent progrese
enclavei Nagorno-Karabah ca pretext pentru consolidarea importante n adoptarea sau modificarea de legi cu privire la
puterii i mijloc de legitimare (Gallina, 2010, 30). garantarea drepturilor i libertilor.
Reelele de putere ale regimului din Armenia sunt Constituia armean, modificat i democratizat n
motenite din perioada URSS sau construite n postcomu- 2005, creeaz la nivel legal premisele pluralismului i pen-
nism. Tranziia armean nu a nsemnat schimbarea total tru exercitarea supremaiei legii. n 2008, au fost adoptate
a instituiilor motenite din perioada sovietic, ci pstrarea alte msuri legislative cu scopul de a asigura transparena
structurii de stat aprope intact i loial pentru a controla i independena sistemului juridic. Dar sistemul juridic
formal instituiile i reelele informale (Stefes, 2009, 448). armean a rmas sub influena regimului politic, dovad fiind
Baza regimului sunt oficialii corupi (actualul prim-ministru msurile luate mpotriva protestatarilor n martie 2008 (ares-
a fost implicat n mai multe scandaluri financiare sau n tri suspecte, bti, probe ndoielnice, tergiversarea proce-
prejudicierea statului prin meninerea unei rate de schimb selor Freedom House, 2009, 68). n 2010, n Armenia
suspecte pentru drama armean) sau chiar relaiile de erau ncarcerai 14 deinui politici.
rudenie (se pare c oficialul care se bucur de cea mai mare n 2007, codul electoral armean a fost amendat, iar
ncredere la Erevan este fratele preedintelui, Alexander modificrile au adus, potrivit observatorilor internaionali,
Sarsgian). Majoritatea oficialilor au i un trecut criminal. mbuntiri substaniale fa de situaia de la alegerile din
Prezena constant la putere dup 1991 a fost un atu pen- 2003. Puterea de la Erevan a organizat potrivit regulilor
tru liderii de la Erevan care au reuit s creeze, n toat proprii discuiile cu opoziia i societatea civil pe marginea
aceast perioad, dou tipuri de loialiti: n rndul func- amendrii legislaiei electorale. Dei a anunat c e deschis
ionarilor administrativi ai statului i printre oligarhii care dezbaterilor, regimul de la Erevan a iniiat modificrile n an
au beneficiat de privatizri. Puterea politic din Armenia a electoral i cu doar cteva luni nainte de desfurarea
construit un mecanism de control al corupiei n care guver- scrutinului.
nul supravegheaz reelele unei corupii centralizate (ibidem, Puterea de la Erevan a oscilat ntre nclcarea i respec-
447) care are prghii de monitorizare i la nivel local. tarea dreptului la libera ntrunire. Legislaia armean ofer
Consolidarea puterii de la Erevan este explicabil i prin opoziiei politice dreptul de a contesta puterea prin mani-
modul n care opoziia a neles s participe la viaa politic: festaii de strad. Regimul nu a ezitat s foloseasc msuri
prin stabilirea unor relaii informale cu puterea sau refuzul violente mpotriva opoziiei politice. Dup alegerile preziden-
de a participa la dezbateri (boicotarea parlamentului n iale din 2008, opoziia, coalizat n jurul lui Ter-Petrosian,
perioada 2003-2008) sau protestele de strad. a protestat acuznd Partidul Republican c ar fi fraudat
alegerile n favoarea lui Sargsian. Forele de ordine au repri-
Drepturi i liberti, doar dup dorina discreionar mat protestele prin violene soldate cu moartea, rnirea sau
a regimului politic arestarea unor manifestani, iar instanele de judecat au
tergiversat pan n prezent verdictele. Preedintele a decre-
Retorica i legislaia promovate de regimul politic de la tat starea de urgen pentru 20 de zile i a restricionat
Erevan n privina respectrii drepturilor i libertilor omu- manifestaiile (situaie care persist i n prezent). Regimul
lui sunt specifice democraiilor occidentale, dar modul de a adoptat, de asemenea, msuri punitive (bti, arestri sau

44 45
ncarcerarea cu amnarea procesului) mpotriva membrilor
familiilor opozanilor (interviu cu membrul unui partid de
opoziie). n 2009, Parlamentul a creat o comisie de studiere
a evenimentelor din 2008 a crei activitate s-a finalizat cu
un raport. Potrivit Adunrii Parlamentare a Consiliului
Europei, documentul emis parlamentului armean disculp
autoritile i acuz opoziia din jurul lui Ter-Petrosian, si-
tuaie care submineaz credibilitatea raportului (2009, 3).
Noi proteste ale opoziiei din CNA au avut loc n martie
2011, fr a fi reprimate n for de poliie. n plus, puterea
i-a anunat intenia de a ncepe dialogul cu opoziia, a eli-
berat doi deinui politici (ncarcerai dup violenele din
2008) i a permis manifestaiile n Piaa Libertii (unde
opoziiei i fusese interzis accesul din 2008).
Legislaia armean i mediul politic de la Erevan au per-
mis crearea i desfurarea de proiecte de ctre organizaiile
non-guvernamentale. Regimul manifest totui o atitudine
ostil fa de ONG-uri, considerndu-le poteniali competi-
tori politici (Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 2009, 67)
i ncearc s evite cooperarea cu acestea. Oficialii statului
nu au dat curs invitaiilor la dezbaterile organizate de
ONG-uri i nu permit societii civile s influeneze luarea
deciziilor cu privire la politicile publice. Pentru a-i amelio-
ra imaginea, regimul a ncercat totui s iniieze un dialog
cu societatea civil prin crearea unor comisii de discuii:
ne-au chemat doar ca s facem figuraie, pentru c luau
deciziile fr a ne consulta Aa c ne-am retras.24
Cele mai multe ONG-uri primesc finanare din Occident
i nu au afilieri partizane. Mediul societii civile armene
are, ns, i actori conectai partidelor politice care au fcut
campanie electoral pentru acestea sau candidaii lor la
preedinie (OSCE Armenia, 2007, 11).
24 Interviu cu directorul unui ONG de la Erevan, Erevan, iunie
2011.
46
Mass-media de la putere i presa de opoziie
Regimul de la Erevan exercit un control parial asupra
mass-media prin mijloacele de finanare, presiuni adminis-
trative (controleaz licenele) i cenzurarea coninutului
editorial.
Legislaia armean creeaz la nivel formal condiiile exis-
tenei unei mass-media independente. n Armenia exist
pres finanat din fonduri publice i mass-media privat.
Principala surs de informare pentru armeni e televiziunea
(doar postul public H1 transmite pe ntreg teritoriul armean),
iar presa tiprit nu are un tiraj mai mare de 6.000 de exem-
plare (pentru o publicaie) i nu se bucur de o larg circu-
laie numai aproximativ 8% dintre armeni citesc ziarele
(OSCE Armenia, 2007, 14).
Presa subvenionat din fonduri publice este n proporie
de 100% aservit regimului politic. Asupra mass-media pri-
vate, regimul de la Erevan exercit dou forme de control:
investiii ale unor finanatori apropiai puterii i controlul
asupra organismului care ofer licenele de transmisie tele-
vizate. Principalele surse de finanare pentru mass-media
sunt vnzrile de tiraj i publicitatea care aduc venituri
foarte reduse, la care se adaug banii oferii de diveri actori
politici sau investitori privai: 30% din finanarea acestui
cotidian sunt bani negri (interviu cu directorul unui coti-
dian generalist de la Erevan). Din cauza finanrii precare
salariile jurnalitilor din mass-media privat armean sunt
la limita supravieuirii: un tnr debutant are un salariu de
aproximativ 250$, iar un director de publicaie catig
maxim 1000$25. Situaia financiar precar a presei a fost
folosit de puterea politic pentru a-i asigura loialiti n
rndul jurnalitilor: n presa de stat, jurnalitii pot ctiga
i 10.000$, dar cea mai mare parte a veniturilor lor sunt din
surse nedeclarate26.Toate cele trei posturi private TV sunt
controlate de oligarhi asociai regimului, iar n ultimii ani
25 Interviu cu un director de cotidian, Erevan, iunie 2011.
26 Interviu cu un director de cotidian, Erevan, iunie 2011.
47
au oferit licene de emisie doar posturilor despre care se tia
clar c nu vor crea probleme la nivel politic. n prezent pro-
cesul de digitalizare e un alt instrument de presiune asupra
televiziunilor folosit de autoriti.
Presa tiprit este de opoziie, afiliat puterii sau inde-
pendent (un singur ziar n spatele cruia este speculat
influena guvernului).
Accesul la internet nu a fost restricionat de autoritile
de la Erevan, iar presa i extinde rapid activitatea n mediul
online. n mediul online din Armenia activeaz i autori de
bloguri, dar procesul de extindere a blogurilor critice la
adresa regimului este atent monitorizat de autoriti27.
Opoziia real poate transmite mesaje populaiei doar
prin presa tiprit i prin internet. RFA, partid de opoziie
apropiat guvernului, apare i la posturile TV controlate de
regim.
Calitatea produselor de media din Armenia e influenat
de pregtirea slab a jurnalitilor, presiunile autoritilor,
finanarea. n interviurile realizate pentru acest raport, jur-
nalitii cu experien de la Erevan au acuzat lipsa de profe-
sionalism a tinerilor jurnaliti.
Televiziunea armean este n totalitate monopolizat de
puterea politic, iar informaiile oferite de aceasta sunt
favorabile regimului: Timp de cinci zile am urmrit doar
informaiile transmise de televiziunile armene. Dup ce am
avut acces la alte surse de informare mi-am dat seama c n
cele cinci zile trisem ntr-o alt realitate, creat artificial de
regimul politic.28
Presiunile autoritilor asupra coninutului materialelor
de pres sunt evidente mai ales n perioadele electorale:
Atunci apar i media-killers, dar acetia nu sunt la fel de
agresivi ca cei din Rusia. Articolele de investigaie sunt
aproape absente n presa armean: Apare cte un articol pe
lun. i doar o singur organizaie Hedk subvenionat
27 Interviu cu un reprezentant al societii civile, Erevan, iunie 2011.
28 Interviu cu un reprezentant al societii civile, Erevan, iunie 2011.
48
din Occident produce astfel de materiale, dar nu inves-
tigheaz marile cazuri de corupie, se limiteaz la profe-
sori/micii funcionari care primesc mit29. n rest jurnalitii
se autocenzureaz pentru a nu avea probleme cu finana-
torii sau cu autoritile.
La nivel local, situaia mass-media din Armenia este i
mai dificil: Trebuie s fac fa presiunilor guvernatorului,
autoritilor regionale. Supravieuiete la fel ca ntr-un regim
autoritar sau dictatorial.30 Exist un singur post TV local
independent, cruia i-a fost refuzat obinerea unei licene
pentru a transmite la nivel naional i care a fost obligat s
strng cu ajutorul publicului o sum uria pentru a putea
plti pretinse datorii ctre stat.
Niciunul dintre jurnalitii intervievai la Erevan nu s-a
temut s critice regimul politic.
Sprijinul Rusiei este indispensabil, UE este prea
departe
Presiunile externe pentru democratizarea regimului
politic din Armenia depind de insecuritatea din Caucazul de
sud, dependena de actori externi ca Rusia i Occidentul,
competiia ntre statele regiunii, influena actorilor externi
asupra societii armene.
Armenia este un stat mic, izolat geografic, aflat ntr-o
regiune cu o securitate precar. Erevanul are relaii tensio-
nate cu doi dintre vecinii si (Azerbaidjanul i Turcia31),
situaie care l face complet dependent de garaniile de secu-
ritate oferite de Rusia. Pentru a menine statu quo-ul creat
dup rzboiul din Nagorno-Karabah, Erevanul are nevoie
29 Interviu cu un jurnalist, Erevan, iunie 2011.
30 Interviu cu un jurnalist, Erevan, iunie 2011.
31 n cei 20 de ani de la proclamarea independenei, autoritile
armene nu au reuit s ajung la o nelegere cu Turcia cu privire la
genocidul turcilor mpotriva populaiei armene din 1915. n plus,
Turcia este principalul aliat din regiune al Azerbaidjanului, susinnd
integritatea teritorial a acestuia.
49
permanent de sprijinul Moscovei, care dup 1998/1999 a
devenit principalul investitor n economia armean i al
crei sprijin nu este condiionat de democratizarea regimu-
lui intern.
Statul armean este lipsit de resurse, situaie care impune
atragerea de ajutoare/fonduri occidentale i care l face vul-
nerabil la presiunile i sanciunile SUA i UE, care au criti-
cat msurile autoritare luate la nivel intern i au ameninat
cu retragerea sprijinului financiar. Meninerea relaiilor
cordiale cu Occidentul este esenial i pentru a evita trans-
formarea Moscovei n aliat unic. n acest sens, regimul de la
Erevan nu a putut evita adoptarea i implementarea, cel
puin la nivel formal, a normelor democratice. Spre deose-
bire de Georgia i Azerbaidjan, care pot ntreine o relaie de
interdependen cu Occidentul, prima pentru tranzitul hidro-
carburilor i a doua pentru resursele energetice, Armenia
este doar dependent de ajutorul vestic. n plus, dup 2003,
Georgia, n pofida sincopelor n procesul de democratizare,
a devenit un model de succes pentru Caucazul de sud i
partenerul privilegiat al Occidentului.
Regimul de la Erevan nu este presat la nivel intern de
societate pentru a ntreine relaii privilegiate cu Occiden-
tul: Armenii nu sunt prorui i anti-UE. Dar i dau seama
ca aderarea la UE nu este un obietiv realist i privesc cu
scepticism ideea de europenizare32. n plus, n cei 20 de ani
de independen, puterea de la Erevan, indiferent de culoa-
rea politic, a promovat n mass-media ideea c Rusia este
marele nostru aliat. Mediul non-guvernamental, dei are
finanare extern, este prea slab pentru a reui n imple-
mentarea modelului democratic: organizaii concentrate n
Erevan care nu pot desfura aciuni n alte regiuni, activitii
sunt mai mult o elit care nu penetreaz i nu are aderen
la populaia obinuit.
32 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
50
Azerbaidjan
Actualul regim politic de la Baku este rezultatul transfe-
rului de putere ntre Heidar33 i Ilham34 Aliev i al ntririi
controlului autoritar de ctre ultimul asupra tuturor pr-
ghiilor puterii.
Alegerile care au ntotdeauna rezultatul cunoscut
Prima msur prin care regimul controlat de Ilham Aliev
a ntrit controlul asupra puterii, a fost fraudarea i cti-
garea alegerilor.
n 2003, alegerile prezideniale din Azerbaidjan s-au
desfurat dup modelul introdus n perioada Heidar Aliev.
Candidatul Partidului Noul Azerbaidjan Yeni Azerbaycan
Partiyas (PNA) a fost favorizat n campania electoral de
mass-media, iar autoritile au fraudat alegerile n favoarea
lui Ilham Iliev sau au recurs la metode de intimidare a
opoziiei. Rezultatele scrutinului l-au indicat ctigtor cu
33 Heidar Aliev, fost lider al PC al RSS Azerbaidjan i ex-colabo-
rator KGB, a fost ales preedinte al Azerbaidjanului n 1993 i 1998.
Cele dou mandate ale lui Heidar Aliev au coincis cu ntrirea con-
trolului preedintelui i a apropiailor si asupra regimului politic de
la Baku. Regimul Aliev-senior a fost permanent criticat de Occident
pentru msurile autoritare promovate la nivel intern i fraudarea
alegerilor. Guvernarea Aliev senior a coincis cu stabilizarea regimului
intern i ncheirea unui acord de pace cu Armenia, n 1994, n con-
flictul din Nagorno-Karabah. Aliev-senior a reuit s lanseze, cu
investiii occidentale n industria petrolifer, economia azer.
n 2003, Heidar Aliev, n vrst de 80 de ani, candidatul PNA
anunat la alegerile prezideniale, a murit i a fost nlocuit de fiul su
Ilham Aliev n cursa pentru preedinia Azerbaidjanului.
34 Absolvent al Institutului de Relaii Internaionale din Mos-
cova, Ilham Aliev a fost ef al SOCAR la nceputul anilor 1990 i
apoi membru al Parlamentului azer (1995-2000). ntre 1999 i 2003
a ocupat poziia secund n ierarhia PNA (liderul partidului era
Heidar Aliev). n 2003 a devenit premier i apoi a fost ales preedinte
al Azerbaidjanulu (Jim Nichol, 2010, 8).
51
76,84% din sufragii pe Ilham Aliev, iar urmtorul clasat, Isa
Gambar, a obinut 13,94% din voturi. Alegerile prezideniale
din 2008 au avut un rezultat previzibil, fiind organizate
doar pentru a nu atrage i mai multe critici din partea
Occidentului i a-l reconfirma n funcie pe Ilham Aliev.
Scrutinul nu a ntrunit standardele pentru alegeri democra-
tice ale OSCE, chiar dac modul de organizare a procesului
electoral a cunoscut mbuntiri fa de alegerile parlamen- vot, la scrutinul din 200547%), situaie favorabil regimu-
tare din 2005. n cursa electoral s-au mai nscris, n afar
de preedintele n exerciiu, ase candidai. a ctigat Ilham mai puine sufragii.
Aliev cu 88,73% din sufragii. Ceilali competitori nu au
reuit s acumuleze mai mult de 2,86% din voturi.
n 2005 i 2010, regimul Aliev a organizat n mod simi-
lar i alegerile legislative. La scrutinul din 2005, PNA a
obinut 61 mandate parlamentare din totalul de 125. n
2010, PNA a obinut din nou majoritatea mandatelor par-
lamentare 74 de locuri. n parlamentul azer au mai intrat
39 candidai independeni (care n realitate susin PNA),
9 locuri pentru partide minore (care sprijin PNA), 1 loc
(Partidul Sperana, care reprezint opoziia real) (OSCE:
2010 32). La ultimul scrutin, puterea a reuit s nlture din
parlament, pentru prima dat de la proclamarea indepen-
denei Azerbaidjanului, opoziia tradiional Blocul Frontul
Popular-Musavat.
PNA rege pe scena politic de la Baku
n cei 8 ani de cnd se afl la putere, regimul Ilham Aliev
a reuit s transforme opoziia dintr-un competitor, care n
2003 avea ansa de a deposeda PNA de putere, ntr-o pre-
zen formal, aproape inexistent pe scena politic. PNA
este un partid care controleaz total puterea n Azerbaidjan
dup ce a fraudat toate alegerile, a creat o opoziie artifi-
cial n parlament i a eliminat prin mijloace neconcu-
reniale opoziia real. Potrivit rezultatelor alegerilor, PNA
i Aliev au un control electoral de peste 70% (n realitate
controlul este total). Reducerea nsemnat a numrului de
52
voturi obinut de opoziie la ultimele alegeri indic consoli-
darea puterii i tendina progresiv de a scoate opoziia din
jocul politic. Rezultatul cunoscut al alegerilor i msurile
represive ale autoritilor mpotriva forelor contestatare au
transformat populaia ntr-un corp a crui participare la vot
a sczut cu fiecare scrutin organizat dup 2003 (la alegerile
parlamentare din 2003, 69% dintre azeri s-au prezentat la
lui, care n condiiile absenteismului trebuie s controleze
Analiza partidelor de opoziie din Azerbaidjan are ca
prim criteriu existena acestora i nu platformele electorale
sau programele ideologice. Cele mai importante partide de
opoziie Musavat, Partidul Independent din Azerbaidjan,
Partidul Democrat i Frontul Popular sunt aproape invi-
zibile pe scena politic de la Baku din cauza msurilor repre-
sive ale puterii. Imaginea acestor partide este construit n
jurul liderilor. Discursul opoziiei este unul comun, centrat
pe critica la adresa PNA.
Un al doilea criteriu, n funcie de care poate fi analizat
opoziia de la Baku, este relaia acesteia cu PNA. Opoziia
politic din Azerbaidjan este divizat n dou tabere: opo-
ziia parlamentar, apropiat partidului aflat la guvernare i
opoziia extraparlamentar (real, critic la adresa regimului
Aliev). La ultimele alegeri prezideniale opoziia extraparla-
mentar nu a depus candidaturi, motivnd c nu dorete s
participe la un scrutin fraudat de putere.35
Confruntarea putere-opoziia real a fost ntodeauna vio-
lent i se reduce la reprimarea protestelor/manifestaiilor
celei din urm de ctre forele de ordine. Relaia PNA cu
opoziia exclude negocierile, dialogul sau compromisul.
Ultimele negocieri dintre putere i opoziie au avut loc dup
35 Partidul Musavat (Liberal), Partidul Liberal, Partidul Frontul
Popular, Forumul Public pentru Binele Azerbaidjanului i Partidul
Cetean i Dezvoltare au creat o alian informal Frontul Comun
al Forelor Democratice i au cerut cetenilor s nu participe la
alegeri (OSCE Azerbaidjan: 2008, 5).
53
alegerile din 2005, cnd, prin medierea ambasadorului SUA,
puterea a ncercat s negocieze cu opoziia numrul de
locuri obinute de ultima n legislativ.
Corupia care funcioneaz perfect
ntrebarea fundamental care se pune n legtur cu
venirea la putere a lui Ilham Aliev: a fost ntr-adevr o
schimbare de putere? Puterea de la Baku pstreaz structura
de clan motenit din perioada sovietic i epoca lui Heidar
Aliev din regiunea Nachicevan. Elementul nou pentru
perioada Ilham Aliev este confruntarea invizibil la nivel
formal ntre vechii oficiali, motenii din perioada Heidar,
noua elit, apropiat de fiu i cu idei occidentale (Ishiyama,
2008, 46) i familia Aliev.
Resursele administrative i petrolifere ale statului, pre-
cum i afacerile de succes sunt mprite ntre: Ramiz Meh-
diev, eful admnistraiei prezideniale i vechea gard din
jurul acestuia, oligarhi i familia Aliev. Primul controleaz
mpreuna cu ministrul de interne i procuroul ef numirile
n funciile publice i organizarea alegerilor.
n grupul oligarhilor se disting ministrul transportului i
cel al situaiilor de urgen i preedintele SOCAR care con-
troleaz vmile, schimburile comerciale, proiectele de infra-
structur i afaceri imobiliare (ICG, 2010, 8-10).
n familia Aliev exist dou tabere: una conservatoare, n
fruntea creia se afl Bailar Eibov (rud prin alian cu
Ilham) i reformatorii familia Paaiev, din care provine
Mehriban Aliev, soia preedintelui azer. Eibov controleaz
afacerile din vestul Azerbaidjanului, iar Paaievii au activiti
n turism, asigurri, bnci (ICG, 2010, 10-11).
Regimul lui Ilham Aliev se bazeaz pe dou tipuri de
loialiti: din sistemul public sau mediul privat i loialitatea
ocazional (obinut cu puin timp nainte de alegeri) a
cetenilor.
Regimul politic azer este construit pe loialiti personale
vechi, privatizri frauduloase, afaceri cu petrol i corupie:
54
Aici toi minitrii au afaceri. Nu exist oficial care s nu fie
corupt (interviu cu un oficial UE). Figura principal n
ansamblul de putere de la Baku este preedintele Aliev, care,
dup modelul tatlui su ncearc s pstreze puterea n
familie i nelege puterea statului ca o afacere de familie
(Guliev, 2005, 241). Probabil c Azerbaidjanul are unii din-
tre cei mai longevivi minitri din lume: n acel tablou este
ministrul nostru cu fostul nostru preedinte, Heidar Aliev.
n cellalt tablou, domnul ministru este cu actualul pree-
dinte (discuie cu un funcionar de la Baku). Schimbrile
de minitri la Baku sunt evenimente cu totul neobinuite
pe scena politic: Eu sunt ministru aici de peste zece ani,
nu neleg de ce minitrii se schimb att de des n Georgia
(interviu cu un oficial de la Baku).
Chiar i funcionarii publici de rnd i sunt loiali pre-
edintelui: n tabloul acela l putei vedea pe Heidar Aliev,
primul nostru preedinte. tii, el a fcut foarte multe pen-
tru noi, este liderul naional al Azerbaidjanului.36
n perioadele electorale, regimul de la Baku face cadouri
electorale populaiei. Un expert ne-a relatat povestea unei
btrane cu 80 manai pensie, care a primit nainte de alegeri
o scrisoare de la preedintele rii prin care era anunat c
nu mai trebuie s plteasc o datorie de 300 manai pentru
electricitate.
Prin partidul aflat la putere, Aliev i grupul din jurul su
oblig la loialitate. PNA este o structur birocratic pirami-
dal care mbin interesele de afaceri cu apartenena politic:
Calitatea de membru n PNA este o cerin obligatorie pen-
tru posturile de rang nalt ale statului i pentru multe slujbe
importante din sectorul privat37.
Existena financiar a PNA depinde att de spolierea
resurselor statului, ct i de contribuiile mediului de afaceri
(Goul&Sickner, 2008, 754).
36 Discuie cu un funcionar ministerial, Baku, iunie 2011.
37 Interviu cu un oficial european, Baku, iunie 2011.
55
 Drepturi i liberti cu existen precar n realitate, muli candidai ai opoziiei nu au avut resurse-
le necesare pentru a-i face campanie la nivelul ntregii ri,
Potrivit Constituiei din 1995, Azerbaidjanul este un stat iar n unele regiuni, doar PNA i-a promovat candidatul.
democratic bazat pe supremaia legii i principiul separaiei Drepturile pe care puterea de la Baku le ofer n mod real
puterilor. Constituia azer este doar un text care exist for- opoziiei sunt (aproape) inexistente. Regimul Aliev nu per-
mal fr s fi fost vreodat aplicat n absena acordului de la mite existena niciunei surse de finanare pentru opoziia
nivel politic. Sistemul juridic din Azerbaidjan este n totali-
real: Nu tiu din ce triesc liderii Musavat. Regimul i m-
tate subordonat deciziilor politice i aplic adesea normele
piedic s obin un serviciu la fel i pe membrii familiilor
juridice n interesul regimului. Dup venirea la putere a lui
lor. Partidul nu ar putea fi finanat de niciun om de afaceri
Ilham Aliev, parlamentul de la Baku a confecionat un
pentru c autoritile i-ar nchide imediat activitatea.38
ambalaj legislativ democratic pentru msurile autoritare.
Legislaia din Azerbaidjan, modificat n 2005 i 2008
Pentru a da un aspect democratic procesului electoral,
dup standardele democraiilor consolidate, permite organi-
regimul politic din Azerbaidjan a modificat de mai multe ori
zarea de proteste mpotriva aciunilor puterii; autoritile
dup 2003 legislaia electoral, fr a organiza ns dezba-
teri democratice pe marginea modificrilor i fr a respecta azere au interpretat, ns, prevederile legii n interesul pute-
n totalitate recomandrile fcute de Comisia de la Veneia. rii i au refuzat aprobarea manifestaiilor.
Comisia electoral central a fost ntotdeauna controlat de Puterea de la Baku a folosit i violena fizic pentru a-i
PNA, iar campania electoral a avut ca protagonist princi- ndeprta adversarii din opoziie: mai muli lideri ai partide-
pal partidul aflat la putere sau candidatul acestuia. Cu toate lor de opoziie au fost atacai pe strad. Dup fiecare scrutin
acestea, OSCE a considerat c noile norme pot asigura legislativ sau prezidenial, opoziia a protestat mpotriva
desfurarea unui proces electoral democratic (2008, 1). fraudrii scrutinului, iar autoritile au reprimat manifesta-
Aproape la fiecare scrutin, autoritile azere, n frunte cu iile prin violen. n martie 2011, autoritile au mobilizat
preedintele Aliev, adopt msuri de imagine nainte de chiar forele armatei la Baku pentru a preveni organizarea
organizarea alegerilor: retrasarea cadrului legislativ pentru unor manifestaii ale opoziiei care srbtoreau o lun de la
a permite formal organizarea unui scrutin corect sau decizii nlturea de la putere a lui Hosni Mubarak.
cu caracter popular. Prima msur vizeaz mbuntirea Puterea de la Baku folosete i o retoric agresiv de pro-
imaginii regimului n faa observatorilor electorali inter- pagand antiopoziie: Cetatea azer asediat de servicii
naionali, iar a doua n relaiile cu alegtorii. Ilham Aliev secrete din Armenia sau de Occident care ncearc s orga-
nu i-a fcut campanie electoral n mod direct, susinnd nizeze o revoluie colorat la Baku, toi inamicii strini
c vrea s ofere anse reale opoziiei (OSCE, 2008, 2). Pre- acionnd n complicitate cu reprezentani ai opoziiei.
edintele a decretat msuri legislative sau a refuzat s-i fac Aceleai mesaje agresive au fost transmise n mass-media i
o campanie electoral pentru a crea impresia c opoziia despre ONG-urile care au criticat regimul politic.
are avantaje electorale pe care nu reuete s le foloseasc. Regimul politic azer a dezvoltat i prghii de control al
n 2005, preedintele a semnat un decret care meniona c societii civile: fie prin nfiinarea i finanarea unor
ONG-urile i opoziia i pot desfura liber activitatea n ONG-uri fantom (GONGO-uri) sau prin presiuni asupra
campania electoral i c funcionarii statului care nu vor organizaiilor independente. Regimul a creat chiar o instituie
permite organizarea de alegeri libere i democratice vor
rspunde n faa legii (Freedom House Azerbaidjan, 2006). 38 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.

56 57
care se ocup de finanarea organizaiilor neguvernamentale:
Consiliul de stat pentru susinerea organizaiilor neguverna-
mentale, ale crui fonduri au crescut n fiecare an dup
boom-ul petrolier (exemplul cel mai elocvent este Fundaia
Heidar Aliev, finanat n exclusivitate de la bugetul statului)
i organizarea unor competiii pentru granturi sau oferirea
pe ci neoficiale a finanrii: M-au rugat s-mi finaneze nessmeni ntr-un regim sovietic adaptat la capitalism. Fr
programele. Dar, cnd am vzut c toate organizaiile care
primesc bani de la stat fac doar ce spun autoritile, am
refuzat.39
GONGO-urile pot fi, ns, finanate i de organizaii
occidentale care ofer granturi pentru dezvoltarea societii
civile din Azerbaidjan: Nu considerm c, dac un ONG a
primit bani din fondul creat de stat pentru societatea civil,
nu este eligibil pentru programele noastre40.
Presiunea asupra societii civile a avut i forme legale
(de tipul controalelor fiscale ale autoritilor) sau chiar vio-
lene, ameninri i intimidri. Pe parcursul interviurilor
pentru acest raport, foarte muli activiti ai societii civile
s-au temut s critice regimul politic, au rspuns evaziv la
ntrebri ori au cerut s nu le fie citate numele. Presiunile
regimului asupra societii civile sunt mai mari n perioadele
electorale (n 2008 niciun ONG nu a fost lsat de autoriti
s monitorizeze campania electoral).
n Azerbaidjan elaborarea politicilor publice e un atribut
unic al puterii i orice proiect al societii civile este per-
ceput ca fiind politic (Gahramanova, 2008, 787). Informal,
reprezentanii societiile civile din Azerbaidjan consider
c rolul acesteia este de a implementa programe (indiferent
de finalitatea lor), pentru a-i realiza sarcinile de serviciu,
avnd certitudinea c mediul ONG nu poate influena n
niciun fel decizia politic.
Corupia este o alt form de nclcare a drepturilor
omului de ctre regimul de la Baku. Dei a adoptat un pachet
39 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
40 Interviu cu un funcionar ONG, Baku, iunie 2011.
58
legislativ anticorupie, regimul nu a pus n practic prevede-
rile acestuia: Nu exist funcionar care s nu fie corupt aici.
Ar fi imposibil s supravieuiasc, la ct de mici sunt sala-
riile41. Corupia este instrumentul prin care regimul i-a
asigurat loialiti n ntrega structur administrativ a sta-
tului: Toi minitrii au afaceri n Azerbaidjan, sunt busi-
corupie regimul ar fi mort.42 n Azerbaidjan, nu exist
transparen n nicio instituie public. Puterea politic nu
are niciun interes s lupte mpotriva corupiei, iar sistemul
juridic care i este subordonat este i el corupt, nu a luat
niciodat horrri care s protejeze drepturile i libertile
civile i a organizat i pronunat hotrri judectoreti n
favoarea regimului.
Mass-media nu poate fi dect la putere n
Azerbaidjan
n perioada care a urmat dup instalarea la putere a lui
Ilham Aliev, regimul de la Baku a preluat aproape exclusiv
controlul asupra presei.
Televiziunea este cea mai important surs de informare
din Azerbaidjan, acoperind aproape ntreg teritoriul statu-
lui. Toate posturile TV din Azerbaidjan se afl sub controlul
regimului politic, care exercit presiuni directe asupra
canalului finanat din fonduri publice (AzTV), sau indirecte
asupra posturilor private care sunt susinute de investitori
apropiai regimului politic.
Presa tiprit din Azerbaidjan este parial controlat de
regim. La Baku apar i cteva cotidiene de opoziie, a cror
circulaie nu acoper ntreg teritoriul azer.
Calitatea materialelor de pres din Azerbaidjan este
influenat de cenzura regimului, pregtirea jurnalitilor i
de finanarea disponibil. Articole de investigaie nu exist
41 Interviu cu un oficial european, Baku, iunie 2001.
42 Interviu cu un oficial european, Baku, iunie 2001.
59
n presa azer i jurnalitii se autocenzureaz pentru a evita
presiuni ale finanatorilor sau ale autoritilor.
Regimul de la Baku exercit i o presiune legal asupra
mass-media strine i a jurnalitilor. n 2008, autoritile au
cenzurat mass-media prin adoptarea unei legi ce nu permite
transmisiunea pe frecvenele naionale a posturilor strine
Radio Europa Liber, BBC i Vocea Americii pe teritoriul
azer. Presiunea asupra jurnalitilor se exercit prin inter-
mediul legislaiei care incrimineaz calomnia (pasibil de
pedepse penale) / defimarea i prin folosirea violenei de
ctre forele de ordine. n 2010, patru jurnaliti azeri se
aflau n nchisoare.43 Forele de ordine au recurs la violene
mpotriva jurnalitilor n toat perioada de dup instalarea
la putere a lui llham Aliev.
n ultimii ani presiunile regimului asupra mass-media
azere au crescut. Acestea se manifest n general n cam-
paniile electorale. n mass-media azer, controlat de regim,
toate campaniile electorale s-au desfurat cu favorizarea
PNA sau a lui llham Aliev, despre care sunt difuzate doar
informaii cu caracter pozitiv i crora li se acord cea mai
mare parte a timpului de transmisie. Pn n 2008, tele-
viziunea public din Azerbaidjan era obligat s asigure
tututor candidailor un timp egal de anten. Potrivit modi-
ficrilor aduse legii n 2008, TvAZ nu mai poate transmite
emisiuni cu caracter electoral. Toate televiziunile au prezen-
tat doar informaii pozitive despre PNA sau Ilham Aliev pe
parcursul tuturor campaniilor electorale de dup 2003, iar
opoziia a aprut doar sporadic n emisiunile informative.44
43 Curtea European a Drepturilor Omului a cerut n 2010 autori-
tilor azere s-l elibereze pe jurnalistul Eiula Fatulaiev (Freedom
House Azerbaijan: 2011, 85). Pn n 2011, regimul azer nu a pus n
aplicare cererea CEDO, chiar dac judectorii au retras acuzaiile la
adresa acestuia.
44 n 2008, TvAZ a furnizat n programele de tiri sau cu caracter
politic 92% informaii pozitive despre putere (din care 72% au aco-
perit doar activitile preedintelui n exerciiu OSCE, 2008, 16).
60
Presa tiprit, finanat de stat, s-a conformat doar preve-
derilor legale minimale i a acordat dreptul la exprimare
opoziiei, n rest a furnizat doar informaii despre candidaii
puterii. Doar cotidianul de opoziie Yeni Musavat a publicat
informaii detaliate despre campania electoral a opoziiei.
Un petrostat atotputernic
Influena actorilor externi asupra procesului de democra-
tizare din Azerbaidjan depinde de securitatea regiunii, depen-
dena regimului de relaii cordiale cu Rusia i Occidentul,
competiia ntre statele din Caucazul de Sud i influena
presiunii actorilor strini asupra societii azere.
Rusia e principalul sprijin pe care se poate baza Armenia
pentru a menine controlul asupra enclavei Nagorno-Karabah,
situaie care face Azerbaidjanul vulnerabil n faa presiunilor
Moscovei pentru a obine integritatea teritorial. Dar
relaiile cordiale cu Moscova nu nseamn presiune pentru
democratizarea regimului politic intern, situaie care se
transform ntr-un mare atu pentru msurile autoritare ale
puterii de la Baku.
Azerbaidjanul este singurul stat cu resurse nsemnate de
hidrocarburi din Caucazul de Sud, situaie care i asigur
o relaie de interdependen n raport cu Occidentul: Baku
are nevoie de piaa vestic pentru a vinde gazul i petrolul
i statele UE vor s evite dependena de Rusia ca singur
furnizor de energie. Prin urmare, chiar dac la nivel formal
condamn msurile autoritare ale regimului Aliev, Occi-
dentul nu se poate lipsi de resursele acestuia i nu poate
sista relaiile comerciale ca mijloc de presiune pentru lipsa
performanelor democratice. n plus, resursele energetice au
fcut ca Azerbaidjanul s nu aib mare nevoie de sprijin
financiar occidental (de exemplu, Azerbaidjanul nu a accep-
tat iniial granturile oferite prin Politica European de
Vecintate sau prin Corporaia Provocrile Mileniului).
Azerbaidjanul e cel mai mare stat din Caucazul de Sud
i, spre deosebire de Georgia i Armenia, e bogat n resurse,
61
situaie care i asigur din start supremaia regional, i nu
este interesat de o competiie care s aib ca miz transfor-
marea ntr-un model de democraie n zon. Revoluia
trandafirilor din Georgia a influenat msurile autoritare
luate de puterea de la Baku, care s-a temut de un scenariu
asemntor n Azerbaidjan.
Societatea azer este neutr n raport cu modelul politic
occidental din trei motive: azerii sunt contieni c UE i
europenizarea sunt un model mult prea ndeprtat, Rusia nu
este vzut ca inamic (dei menine ocupaia armean n
Nagorno-Karabah), azerii au legturi culturale cu societile
orientale i cu Turcia. Societatea civil azer, format din
grupuri de elititi, este izolat de populaie, mesajele acesteia
penetreaz doar Baku i mprejurimile acestuia. Prin urmare,
mesajele de democratizare, chiar dac nu sunt reprimate de
regim, nu au larg rspndire printre azeri.
Concluzii
O privire general asupra regimurilor politice din Cauca-
zul de Sud arat evoluii i trsturi comune: foste republici
sovietice, tranziii repetate care nu au avut ca finalitate
democratizarea, conflicte teritoriale i/sau interetnice, relaii
complicate cu Rusia i Occidentul. n acelai timp, fiecare
regim politic din Caucazul de Sud are propriile particulari-
ti, care sunt influenate de proiectele locale de construcie
a statului, de existena sau absena resurselor energetice, de
problemele teritoriale.
Elita politic georgian se afl la 20 de ani de la procla-
marea independenei n faa acelorai ntrebri: autoritarism
sau democraie? Pentru liderii de la Baku ntrebarea funda-
mental este: pn unde pot fi extinse msurile autoritare n
Azerbaidjan i cum putem asigura prezena ct mai ndelun-
gat la putere a actualilor lideri? Regimul de la Erevan caut
s afle care sunt limitele msurilor democratice n Armenia
i cum se poate pstra autoritarismul salvnd aparenele
62
democraiei. n Armenia, regimul a oscilat ntre fundamen-
tarea puterii prin legitimitatea dat de procesele electorale
organizate dup normele democratice i construirea unui
centru de putere bazat pe msuri autoritare. Pentru azeri,
conservarea puterii n jurul Alievilor i loialitile politice au
fost elementele-cheie ale unui regim care nu i-a pus proble-
ma legitimitii.
n toate aceste state, democraia electoral a fost ntr-o
msur mai mare sau mai mic un mijloc de consolidare a
puterii (Shirinian, 2003). Toate cele trei regimuri din Cau-
cazul de Sud folosesc aceleai instrumente pentru acapara-
rea i consolidarea puterii i au avantajul unei opoziii slabe.
ntr-un top al performanelor democratice n Caucazul de
Sud, Georgia se afl pe primul loc, iar Azerbaidjanul pe
ultimul.
Pn n prezent regimul de la Tbilisi este unul competi-
tiv-autoritar aflat nc n perioada de tranziie; el va fi
condiionat n viitor s adopte i mai multe msuri de
democratizare din cauza dependenei de sprijinul Occiden-
tului i a presiunii/influenei pe care o exercit Rusia prin
stimularea micrilor de contestare a regimului. Preedintele
Aliev este liderul unei structuri de putere centralizate n care
politicul guverneaz asupra celorlalte puteri (legislativ i
judiciar), care exist doar pentru a crea false aparene demo-
cratice. Puterea de la Baku a euat n organizarea alegerilor,
crearea unei relaii democratice cu mass-media i nu a garan-
tat drepturile i libertile ceteneti. n ultimii ani, Ilham
Aliev i aliaii si au creat un regim competitiv autoritar,
care n viitor se va transforma ntr-unul autoritar stabil sau
un petro-autoritarism dup modelul rusesc.
Puterea de la Erevan a realizat un melanj ntre practici
autoritare i msuri democratice. Fiindc a euat n garan-
tarea drepturilor i libertilor ceteneti, regimul Sargsian
este n prezent unul competitiv-autoritar, iar pe viitor nu
exist anse de transformare a acestuia sau de nlocuire prin
alegeri.
63
 Bibliografie:
Aprasizde David, 2009. State-Building and Democratization in
Georgia: Have the Limits Been Reached?, n OSCE-Yearbook
2008, IFSH, Hamburg, 63-71.
Bader Max, 2008. Fluid Party Politics and the Challenge
for Democracy Assistance in Georgia, n Caucasian Review
of International Affairs, 2(2), 1-10.
Bader Max, 2010. Party politics in Georgia and Ukraine
and the Failure of Western Assistance, n Democratization,
17(6), 1085-1107.
Chiaberashvili Zurab i Tevzadze Gigi, 2005. Power Elites in
Georgia: Old and New, n Fluri H. Cole, Philipp Eden,
From Revolution to Reform. Georgias Struggle with Democratic
Institution Building and Security Sector Reform, National
Defense Academy, Viena, 187-207.
Dannreuther Roland (ed.), 2004. European Union Foreign and
Security Policy. Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, Routledge,
Londra.
Fulvio Aitana, Rossi Rossa (ed.), 2004. European Neighbour-
hood Policy: Political, Ecomonic and Social Issue, Jean Monnet
Project, Catania.
Gould John A. & Carl Sickner, Making Market Democra-
cies? The Contingent Loyalties of Post-privatization Elites
in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Serbia, n Review of Interna-
tional Political Economy, 15(5), 740-769.
Franke Anja, Gawrich Andrea i Alakbarov Gurban,
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States:
Resource Incomes and Autocracy as a Double Curse, n Post-
Soviet Regimes Europe-Asia Studies, 61(1), 109-140.
Ishanian Armine, 2008. Democracy Building and Civil Society
in Post-Soviet Armenia, Routledge, New York.
Ishiyama John, 2008. Political Party Development and
Party Gravity in Semi-Authoritarian States. The Cases
of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, n Taiwan
Journal of Democracy, 4 (1), 33-53.
64
Karakhanian, Aghavni, 2003. Political Culture & Democracy
Building:The Case of Armenia, n Political Culture Studies,
Research & Assessment Branch, Swindon, 3-13.
Levistky Steven, Way Luncan, 2010. Competitive Authoritari-
anism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Mackinnon Mark, 2007. The New Cold War. Revolutions,
Rigged Elections, and Pipeline Politics in the Former Soviet
Union, Carroll&Graf Publishers, New York.
Nichol Jim, CRS Report Georgia [Republic] Most Recent
Developments and US Interests, June 15 2011, http://www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-727.pdf, accesat la 18 septembrie
2011.
Nichol Jim, CRS Report Georgias January 2008 Presidential
Election: Outcome and Implications, January 25, 2008,
http://www.opencrs.com/document/RS22794/ accesat la
18 septembrie 2011.
Niklas Nilsson, Svante E. Cornell, 2008. Georgias May
2008 Parliamentary Elections Setting Sail in a Storm, http://
www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0805
Georgia.pdf, accesat la 18 septembrie 2011.
Nodia Ghia i Pinto Scholtbach lvaro, 2006. The Political
Landscape of Georgia, Delft, Eburon.
Nodia Ghia (ed.) 2010. Political Forum: 10 Questions on
Georgias Political Development, CIPDD, Tbilisi.
Nodia Ghia, Dynamics of State Building in Georgia, http://
www.belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2370/dyn
amics_of_statebuilding_in_georgia.html?bread-
crumb=%2Fpublication%2Fby_type%2Fbook_chap-
ter%3Fpage%3D38, accesat la 18 septembrie 2011.
Petrosyan David, 2010. The Political System of Armenia:
Form and Content, n Caucasus Analytical Digest, (17),
8-12.
Stefes, H. Christoph, Governance, the State and Systemic
Corruption: Armenia and Georgia in Comparison, n
Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 2(2), 73-83.
Timm Christian, 2010. Neopatrimonialism by Default. State
Politics and Domination in Georgia after the Rose Revolution,
65
 German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)
http://www.gigahamburg.de/content/fsp1/pdf/neopat/pap
er_neopat_workshop_timm.pdf, accesat la 18 septembrie
2011.
Svante E. Cornell, 2005. Small Nations and Great Powers.
A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Routledge
Curzon, New York.
Waal de Thomas, 2003. Black Garden Armenia and Azerbaijan
Trough Peace and War, New York University Press, New
York.
Waters Christopher (ed.), 2005. The State of Law in the South
Caucasus, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
Commission Staff Working Paper Country Report Georgia,
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm, acce-
sat la 5 august 2011.
The European Neighbourhood Fishes on Partners, http://www.
ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm, accesat la
2 august 2011
Freedom House Country Report Azerbaijan 2006, http://www.
freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=390&ye
ar=2006, accesat la 12 august 2011.
Freedom House Country Report Azerbaijan 2008, http://www.
freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=445&ye
ar=2008 accesat la 12 august 2011.
Freedom House Country Report Azerbaijan 2011, http://www.
freedomhouse.org/images/File/nit/2011/NIT-2011-
Azerbaijan.pdf, accesat la 18 septembrie 2011.
Freedom House Country Report Georgia 2005, http://www.free-
domhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=363&year=
2005, accesat la 16 septembrie 2011.
Freedom House Country Report Georgia 2006, http://www.free-
domhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&co
untry=6967. accesat la 12 august 2011.
Freedom House Country Report Georgia 2008, http://www.free-
domhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=452&year=
2008, accesat la 16 septembrie 2011.
66
International Crisis Group (ICG), 2010. Azerbaijan Vulnera-
ble Stability. Europe Report 107, 1-32 (http://www.crisis-
group.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/azerbai-
jan/207%20Azerbaijan%20%20Vulnerable%20Stability.
ashx, accesat la 18 septembrie 2011).
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assis-
tance (IDEA), Georgia Country Report based on Research and
Dialogue with Political Parties. 2006, Stockholm, http://
www.idea.int/parties/upload/Georgia_report.pdf, accesat
la 14 septembrie 2011.
OSCE, Republic of Armenia Parliamentary Elections 12 May
2007, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/26606,
accesat la 12 august 2011.
OSCE, Republic of Armenia Presidential Elections 19 February
2008, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/32115,
accesat la 12 august 2011.
OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan Presidential Elections 15 October
2003, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan/
13467, accesat la 15 august 2011.
OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan Parliamentary Elections 6 Nov-
ember 2005, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbai-
jan/17946, accesat la 15 august 2011.
OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan Parliamentary Elections 7 Nov-
ember 2010, accesat la 15 august 2011.
OSCE, Georgia Partial Repeat Parliamentary Elections 28 March
2004, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/34196,
accesat la 15 septembrie 2011.
OSCE, Georgia Municipal Elections 5 October 2006, http://
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/23510, accesat la 7 august
2011.
OSCE a), Georgia Extraordinary Presidential Elections 5 January
2008, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/30959,
accesat la 8 august 2011.
OSCE b), Georgia Parliamentary Elections 21 May 2008, http://
www.civil.ge/files/files/32898_en.pdf, accesat la 7 august
2011.
67
 Stanislav Secrieru

Geometrie variabil n aciune:

politica extern i de securitate
n Caucazul de Sud
 Introducere

Acest demers i propune s supun analizei detaliate

politica extern i de securitate regional a statelor din
Caucazul de Sud la dou decenii de la disoluia Uniunii
Sovietice. De la rectigarea independenei au fost propuse
mai multe formule tri- sau multilaterale de integrare n
Caucazul de Sud, care ns nu s-au materializat. Pe de alt
parte, comunitatea academic i politicienii au contestat
nsi existena Caucazului de Sud ca regiune. Prin urmare,
n prima parte a lucrrii se va realiza radiografia dezbaterii
curente asupra regionalitii n Caucazul de Sud. Aceasta va
ngloba impactul rzboiului ruso-georgian din 2008 asupra
percepiei existenei sau inexistenei Caucazului de Sud ca
regiune. Totodat, aceast seciune va descrie mediul macro-
regional n care evolueaz statele din Caucazul de Sud.
Tonul i atmosfera politic n Caucazul de Sud sunt date de
dinamica raporturilor intraregionale. A doua parte se va
focaliza asupra relaiilor bilaterale dintre cele trei state din
Caucazul de Sud. Se va pune accent pe raporturile comer-
ciale, proiectele de infrastructur, conflictele teritoriale nc
nesoluionate, percepia public, situaia minoritilor
naionale, cooperarea militar, demarcarea frontierelor i
alte aspecte care fac parte din agenda bilateral. Prbuirea
Uniunii Sovietice a lichidat unipolaritatea n regiune i a
multiplicat numrul actorilor capabili s influeneze n mod

71
semnificativ evoluiile n Caucazul de Sud. Lund n conside-
rare pluralitatea actorilor cu pondere regional, o parte im-
portant a analizei va fi dedicat relaiilor dintre statele din
Caucazul de Sud i SUA, UE, Rusia, Turcia i Iran. Prezen-
tul demers analitic va fi ghidat de percepia intraregional.
Astfel, n prezentarea dezbaterilor despre regionalitatea
Caucazului de Sud, relaiile intraregionale i raporturile cu
actorii externi va prima optica celor trei republici, reconsti-
tuit preponderent prin intermediul interviurilor realizate
cu oficiali i experi din Armenia, Azerbaidjan i Georgia.
I. Problema regionalitii Caucazului de Sud
1.1. De la Transcaucazia la Caucazul de Sud
Transcaucazia, termen precursor al Caucazului de Sud,
a fost introdus n limbajul diplomatic al Rusiei ariste la
nceputul secolului al XIX-lea. Transcaucazia marca terito-
riul controlat de Rusia la sud de Munii Caucazului pn la
graniele cu Imperiul Persan i cel Otoman. n cadrul Rusiei
ariste, Transcaucazia a fost divizat n 5 gubernii: Tiflis,
Baku, Erevan, Kutaisi i Elizavetpol (a se vedea harta 1).
Revoluia din 1917 din Rusia arist a declanat procese
centrifuge la periferia imperiului. n 1918, Transcaucazia i
declar independena i pentru prima dat formeaz o
structur politic integrat Republica Democratic
Federal Transcaucazian. ns, dup o lun de coexisten, n anii 90, de aceast dat sub umbrela Platformei de
Georgia, Armenia i Azerbaidjan i declar independena.
Cele trei state sunt ncorporate militar n Uniunea Sovietic
n 1922 sub forma Republicii Sovietice Federale Trans-
caucaziene. Prin Constituia URSS din 1936, Federaia
Transcaucazian este desfiinat i sunt create trei republici
unionale, care i pstreaz acest statut pn n 1991 (a se
vedea harta 2).
Redobndirea independenei de ctre Armenia, Azer-
baidjan i Georgia (vezi harta 3) declaneaz dezbaterea cu
privire la denumirea i viitorul regiunii. n discursul politic
72
i academic sunt vehiculate o serie de formule optimiste de
integrare regional: Statele Unite ale Caucazului, Cauca-
zul Casa Comun, Piaa Comun Caucazian. De aseme-
nea, se propun scheme de cooperare 3+1, n care Rusia sau
Turcia servesc drept locomotive ale integrrii regionale
(Ismailov i Papava, 2007, 13-14). Tot atunci, se fac primii
pai pentru a nlocui vechea etichet politico-geografic
Transcaucazia. Un oficial i aduce aminte: Ne-a luat patru
ani s convingem UE s schimbe limbajul n documentele
oficiale din Transcaucazia n Caucazul de Sud1. Treptat,
termenul de Caucazul de Sud se afirm n vocabularul
diplomatic la nivel internaional i este folosit pe larg de
actorii cu interese n regiune, inclusiv Rusia. Declaraia
comun a preedinilor Federaiei Ruse, Armeniei i
Azerbaidjanului din 2008 face referire explicit la Caucazul
de Sud, i nu la Transcaucazia (Prezident Rossii, 2008).
Schimbarea terminologic este reflectat la nivelul organiz-
rii birocratice i n politicile promovate de actorii regionali.
De exemplu, n 2003 UE a creat un post de Reprezentant
special pentru Caucazul de Sud, pstrat dup reorganizrile
structurale implementate n baza Tratatului de la Lisabona.
n 2005 i 2006 blocarea de ctre Cipru a negocierilor cu
privire la planul de aciune UE-Azerbaidjdan a motivat UE
s decaleze negocierea planurilor similare cu Georgia i
Armenia (Popescu, 2011, 102). n 2008, Turcia a renviat
ideea Pactului de stabilitate n Caucazul de Sud lansat
stabilitate i cooperare n Caucaz n formatul 3+2 (Rusia,
Turcia, Armenia, Azerbaidjan i Georgia).
1.2. Este Caucazul de Sud o regiune?
Utilizarea conceptului la nivel internaional a evoluat n
paralel cu afirmarea curentului puternic de negare a regio-
nalitii Caucazului de Sud. Un expert explic: Geografic
1 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
73

Harta 1 Transcaucazia n componena Rusiei ariste
(sursa: Andrew Andersen 2003/2007)
Harta 2 Caucazul de Sud n componena URSS
(sursa: Wikipedia)
74
Harta 3 Armenia, Azerbaidjan i Georgia n perioada postsovietic
(sursa: RFE/RL 2002)
noi suntem o regiune, dar asta nu e suficient [] n epoca
globalizrii regiunile se construiesc.2 Or, n termeni de co-
operare economic, politic sau militar trilateral Caucazul
de Sud este paralizat. Proiectele de infrastructur care s
includ toate cele trei state lipsesc, iar coordonarea pozi-
iilor pe plan extern n format trilateral este de neconceput.
Nu exist nici umbrela integrat de securitate. Statele din
regiune apeleaz la diveri actori regionali pentru a-i garan-
ta securitatea militar.3 Aadar, dac comparm Caucazul
de Sud cu zona baltic, atunci Caucazul de Sud nu este o
regiune4, concluzioneaz un alt expert. Indubitabil, trans-
formarea Caucazului de Sud ntr-o regiune funcional dup
modelul european rmne mai mult un deziderat dect o
realitate. Tentativele UE de a iniia cooperarea regional nu
au produs efectele scontate. Lansat de UE n 2010, progra-
mul Management integrat al frontierei n Caucazul de Sud
se realizeaz bilateral ntre Georgia i Armenia, pe de o parte,
2 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
3 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
4 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
75
i ntre Georgia i Azerbaidjan, pe de alt parte. La scar
redus, se implementeaz proiecte trilaterale n domeniul
mediului nconjurtor, finanate de UE. ns n cele mai
multe cazuri soluiile unilaterale sau bilaterale prevaleaz.
Aa cum a mrturisit un oficial referindu-se la un dosar care
implic cele trei state: Noi nu avem timp s ateptm
Georgia sau Armenia [...], noi vom soluiona problema de
sine stttor.5 Dei au loc contacte la nivelul societilor
civile, intensitatea acestora a sczut dup 2007.6 Printre
puinele proiecte trilaterale n curs de realizare este progra-
mul care faciliteaz comunicarea ntre tinerii din regiune i
prin care acetia nva s conceap i s dezvolte proiecte instituional la Occident. ns rzboiul ruso-georgian din
locale i transfrontaliere (Eurasia Partnership Foundation,
2009a).
Contestarea regionalitii Caucazului de Sud i a oricror
perspective de viitor regional se face i ntr-o alt dimen-
siune. Observatorii din regiune au remarcat c statelor din
Caucazul de Sud le lipsete o identitate regional, sau n cel
mai bun caz, aceasta este subdezvoltat. Viziunea cu privire
la Caucazul de Sud nu exist n societatea noastr7, ob-
serv un expert din Armenia. Ataamentul fa de regiune
n Azerbaidjan este destul de redus [deoarece] identitatea
noastr include, pe lng elementele caucaziene, pe cele
caspice i orientale8, remarc un formator de opinie din
Azerbaidjan. Relativa izolare a Armeniei n regiune i asu-
marea de ctre Azerbaidjan a rolului de pod ntre Vest i Est
dilueaz sensul apartenenei acestor state la Caucazul de
Sud. De asemenea, obiectivele de politic extern i impe-
rativele dezvoltrii interne mobilizeaz statele s caute
soluii extraregionale. Georgia este de departe cel mai activ
stat din regiune la capitolul tentativelor de evadare din
regiune. nc din a doua jumtate a anilor 90 Georgia a
5 Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.
6 Interviu cu experi, Erevan, iunie 2011.
7 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
8 Interviu cu un exepert, Baku, iunie 2011.
76
dezvoltat profilul de stat la Marea Neagr. Dup valuri
consecutive de extindere a NATO i UE Georgia a dublat
eforturile pentru a se desprinde de Caucazul de Sud perce-
put ca o regiune cu un handicap de imagine imens (Nilsson,
2009, 100), i a se altura proiectului occidental n con-
strucie zona lrgit a Mrii Negre (Asmus i Jackson,
2004). Noi am ncercat s redefinim identitatea noastr,
punnd accent pe plasamentul nostru de la Marea Neagr9,
explic un expert. Pentru autoritile de la Tbilisi, migrarea
spre zona lrgit a Mrii Negre nseamn prsirea Cauca-
zului i o etap intermediar n apropierea i conectarea
2008 a nruit aceste sperane i a determinat schimbarea de
optic la Tbilisi. Georgia ncearc s profite de pe urma
Parteneriatul Estic pentru a se poziiona ca un stat din
Europa de Est. Important de observat este c noul discurs
are att o component regional, ct i una individualist.
Caucazul de Sud face parte din Europa de Est [...], de ce se
face distincie n cadrul Parteneriatului Estic ntre Caucazul
de Sud i celelalte state?10, ntreab un oficial guvernamen-
tal. n termeni de performan [la integrare european],
Georgia este mult mai aproape de Ucraina i Moldova11,
adaug reprezentantul guvernului, introducnd n acelai
timp n ecuaie elemente de difereniere n raport cu cele-
lalte republici din Caucazul de Sud. Se pare c n urm-
toarea perioad Georgia se va inspira pe larg din povestea de
evadare din Balcanii de Vest i integrarea (prognozat)
Croaiei n UE.12
Concluzionnd, tabra pesimitilor anticipeaz c blo-
cajul la nivelul cooperrii trilaterale i orientrile externe
divergente ale statelor vor stimula dispersarea a ceea ce a
mai rmas din regiune, astfel nct ntr-o perioad de 15-20
9 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
10 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
11 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
12 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
77
de ani termenul de Caucazul de Sud, o inerie postsovietic,
nu va mai avea nici o valoare descriptiv.13
1.3. Caucazul de Sud un complex subregional de
securitate
Dei reflect n mod obiectiv realitatea regional, contes-
tatarii regionalitii Caucazului de Sud omit dou aspecte:
pluralitatea regionalismelor i impactul rzboiului ruso-geor-
gian din 2008. Aadar, negarea regionalitii Caucazului de
Sud pornete de la accepiunea restrns a conceptului de
regiune, care face posibil existena unei regiuni, la nivel
teoretic i practic, doar sub forma comunitii de securi-
tate caracterizat printr-un grad nalt de integrare i elimi-
narea violenei ca soluie la problemele din interiorul comu-
nitii (Deutsch, 2006, 41-42). Comunitatea transatlantic
este un exemplu clasic n literatura de specialitate. Prin
urmare comparaia Caucazului de Sud cu Regiunea Baltic,
ultima fiind parte component a comunitii transatlantice,
nu este una ntmpltoare. ns comunitatea de securitate
este un tip ideal i cu aplicaie geografic destul de limitat.
n relaiile internaionale, regionalismul se poate manifesta
n diverse forme. Printre formulele mai puin benigne figu-
reaz regionalismul disfuncional i regionalismul geo-
politic. n cadrul acestora, statele au euat n a dezvolta o
cooperare regional solid, iar regiunea este n centrul unei
rivaliti pentru sfere de influen care implic puteri
regionale (Emerson, 2008, 2-4).
Dac depim concepia idealist cu privire la regiune i
acceptm faptul c integrarea nu este singurul criteriu pen-
tru determinarea regionalitii i c interdependena poate
fi nu doar pozitiv, ci i una negativ, atunci Caucazul de
Sud este o regiune. Conceptul de complex de securitate,
elaborat n literatura de specialitate consacrat securitii
internaionale, ofer o platform analitic comprehensiv
care ncapsuleaz modele cooperative i disfuncionale de
13 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
78
regionalism i, prin urmare, poate fi extrem de util n stu-
diul regionalitii n Caucazul de Sud (Buzan i Weaver,
2003, 419-423; Simao i Freire, 2008, 225-226). Prin com-
plex de securitate se nelege existena unui grup de state
ale cror percepii i preocupri majore cu privire la securi-
tate sunt interconectate n aa msur, nct problemele lor
de securitate naional nu pot fi analizate sau soluionate
separat una fa de cealalt (Buzan, Weaver i De Wilde,
1998, 12). Trebuie precizat c autorii acestei construcii
analitice ader la interpretarea extensiv a securitii
naionale care include, dincolo de tradiionalul sector poli-
tico-militar, securitatea ecologic, economic i societal
(ibidem, 198-199).
Privit prin aceast lentil teoretic, Caucazul de Sud este
un complex subregional de securitate. Acesta este definit de
o relaie de inamiciie ntre Armenia i Azerbaidjan i o serie
de raporturi sectoriale de prietenie pragmatic i/sau com-
petiie situaional ntre Georgia i Armenia i ntre Georgia
i Azerbaidjan. De exemplu, securitatea Azerbaidjanului n
domeniul gestionrii fluxurilor de ap i calitii acesteia
depind de cooperarea cu Georgia i Armenia state riverane
in amonte pentru rurile Kura i Aras, care curg spre
Azerbaidjan. Securitatea energetic a Georgiei nu poate fi
asigurat fr Azerbaidjan, iar un eventual rzboi ntre
Armenia i Azerbaidjan va submina semnificativ securitatea
economic a Georgiei. La rndul su, sigurana tranzitului
terestru prin Georgia este vital pentru economia Armeniei
i (ntr-o msur mai mic) cea a Azerbaidjanului. Aceast
niruire poate continua. Factori obiectivi care leag aceast
regiune cu geometrii variabile (statele fac parte selectiv din
CSI, OTSC, OCEMN sau GUAM14; intensitatea relaiilor cu
UE i NATO de asemenea variaz) au impact asupra per-
cepiilor i calculelor strategice cu privire la managementul
14 CSI Comunitatea Statelor Independente; OTCS Organi-
zaia Tratatului de Securitate Colectiv; OCEMN Organizaia
Cooperrii Economice a Mrii Negre; GUAM Georgia-Ucraina-Azer-
baidjan-Moldova.
79
securitii naionale. Armenia i Azerbaidjan urmresc foarte
atent raporturile pe care fiecare stat le dezvolt cu NATO.
Dac astzi se prezint reprezentantul Armeniei i solicit de a se debarasa de eticheta regional, care fac Caucazul de
cooperarea ntr-un anumit sector, e foarte probabil ca mine
s primim o solicitare similar din partea Azerbaidjanului
[...] i vice versa15, mrturisete un oficial. Confirmarea
corelrii la nivel regional a deciziilor de cooperare cu NATO
o gsim n motivarea deciziei Armeniei de a tripla contin-
gentul forelor de meninere a pcii n Afganistan n 2011.
Potrivit ministrului Aprrii, Armenia nu trebuie s fie
ultima n Caucazul de Sud la acest [prezena militar n
Afganistan] capitol (Massis Post, 2011). ncercarea de a
reintegra militar Osetia de Sud n Georgia a fost perceput
negativ n Armenia. Vzut de la Erevan, un eventual succes
al Georgiei ar ncuraja Azerbaidjanul i ar spori ansele unei
soluii militare n Nagorno-Karabah.16 La fel, Georgia, gazda
unui numr semnificativ de persoane strmutate intern (PSI)
urmrete cu atenie negocierile ntre Azerbaidjan i
Armenia, n special soluia la care cele dou pri vor ajunge
cu privire la PSI din Nagorno-Karabah. Acestea sunt doar
cteva preocupri suprapuse ale statelor din zon care de-
monstreaz existena unui complex subregional de securitate
n Caucazul de Sud.
Aadar, n ciuda accentelor divergente n politica extern
i de securitate a statelor din regiune, exist un grad sporit
de interdependen. Dependena reciproc n Caucazul de
Sud nu este mereu una pozitiv, dar acest fapt nu infirm
existena regiunii, ci descrie natura legturilor regionale.
Probabil comparaia cu Balcanii de Vest este mult mai indi-
cat atunci cnd cutm exemple similare de regionalism
pentru Caucazul de Sud. Aceast opinie o mprtesc unii
politicieni i analiti din zon. Caucazul de Sud reprezint
al doilea focar de probleme dup Balcani17, declar un
15 Interviu cu un oficial NATO.
16 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
17 Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.
80
oficial de la Baku. Exist o serie de similitudini, precum
istoria dominaiei imperiale, memoria rzboiului, ncercrile
Sud comparabil cu Balcanii de Vest18, observ un expert de
la Tbilisi.
n pofida tentativelor de a prsi regiunea, statele au
fost forate s revin n Caucazul de Sud dup rzboiul
ruso-georgian. Pn n 2008 regiunea era pe cale de dez-
integrare, [ns] rzboiul din Georgia a schimbat aceast
dinamic, fornd statele s i refocalizeze atenia asupra
regiunii19, explic un influent analist local. n consecin,
rzboiul a readus contiina i gndirea regional. Georgia
a deteriorat atmosfera n regiune20, declar tranant un
expert din regiune cu referire la conflictul armat ruso-geor-
gian. Rzboiul din 2008 a schimbat n negativ percepia
despre Caucazul de Sud n Europa i n lume21, l com-
pleteaz alt observator. Confruntarea armat din 2008 a
scos n eviden ameninrile regionale la adresa securitii
europene, dei Caucazul de Sud prezint multiple oportu-
niti pentru Europa. Acest deficit de imagine a afectat
toate statele din regiune. n cercurile academice se ncearc
depirea handicapului de imagine prin schimbarea etiche-
telor. De pild, doi autori consacrai ntr-un studiu detaliat
dedicat regiunii argumenteaz c cele trei state caucaziene
fac parte din Caucazul Central, i nu din Caucazul de Sud
(Ismailov i Papava, 2008, 287-289). De observat c logica
de argumentare este aproape identic cu cea a statelor din
Europa de Est la mijlocul anilor 90, care doreau sa fie
ncadrate politic i economic n Europa Central.
De asemenea, n 2008, rile din Caucazul de Sud au
redescoperit vulnerabilitatea i interconectarea regional.
Statele au sporit monitorizarea activitii vecinilor i i-au
ajustat strategiile de securitate lund n calcul mediul
18 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
19 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
20 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
21 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
81
regional modificat. Integrarea accelerat a Georgiei n se dezvolt. Dinamica intraregional n Caucazul de Sud
NATO a euat, ceea ce a determinat Tbilisi s promoveze o nu face excepie. n virtutea poziionrii geografice a Cau-
politic extern regional mai echilibrat. Sistarea tempo- cazului de Sud, impactul mediului regional asupra statelor
rar a tranzitului comercial prin Georgia n august 2008 este probabil mai mare dect n cazul altor regiuni (a se vedea
a grbit negocierile Armeniei cu Turcia n vederea norma- harta 4). Fiind la intersecia ctorva complexe regionale de
lizrii relaiilor bilaterale. Rzboiul din Georgia a diminuat securitate, fiecare stat n parte, dar i Caucazul de Sud ca
interesul Azerbaidjanului fa de NATO i a introdus noi regiune, resimt din plin ocurile politice, crizele economice
elemente n politica energetic. Totodat, discursul politic sau ascensiunea unor actori regionali n vecintatea ime-
a fost adaptat la realitatea post-conflict. Rentoarcerea diat. n literatura de specialitate, un complex sub-regional
Georgiei n regiune a fost anunat de preedintele Georgiei: de securitate care se afl la intersecia unor complexe regio-
Caucazul trebuie s se uneasc (Grigoryan, 2009). Prin nale de securitate i procese de securitate paralele la nivel
urmare, el a resuscitat ideea Caucazul, Cas Comun. n macroregional este catalogat drept izolator (Buzan i Weaver,
opinia sa, aceasta ar trebui s ia forma unei uniuni trilate- 2003, 490). Aadar, fiind un punct unde se ntlnesc logici
rale care s fie capabil s creioneze o strategie politic i concurente de securitate pe plan regional, preocuprile de
economic regional (Ghazinyan, 2011). Ideea a fost pre- securitate ale statelor din Caucazul de Sud nu pot fi nelese
luat de societatea civil. Noi dorim realizarea conceptului izolat de contextul eurasiatic.
Caucazul Cas Comun sub auspiciile UE22, declar entu-
ziast un reprezentant al mass-media. Au fost introduse
nuane economice n discursul politic. Astfel, preedintele
Azerbaidjanului a declarat c economia Azerbaidjanului
reprezint 75% din economia Caucazului de Sud (News.Az,
2010), iar preedintele Georgiei a descris Tbilisi drept
capitala Caucazului (Civil.Ge, 2011a). Fr ndoial,
Caucazul, Cas Comun rmne n mare parte doar un
exerciiu retoric, iar datele cu privire la volumul economiei
Azerbaidjanului fac parte din jocul de intimidare la distan
ntre Armenia i Azerbaidjan. ns aspectele regionale ale
discursului i mai cu seam ajustarea politicilor statelor din
regiune dup 2008 demonstreaz c afirmaiile cu privire la
irelevana conceptului de Caucazul de Sud sunt premature.

1.4. Caucazul de Sud n contextul eurasiatic

Raporturile interstatale nu se desfoar ntr-un vacuum
politic, militar i economic. Ineria unor raporturi bilaterale
este mereu influenat de contextul regional n care acestea
Harta 4 Caucazul de Sud n contextul eurasiatic
22 Interviu cu un reprezentant al mass-media, Baku, iunie 2011. (sursa: Caspian Studies Program, Harvard University 2006)

82 83
 1.4.1. Nord
La nord, Caucazul de Sud se nvecineaz cu districtul
federal nord-caucazian i cel sudic al Federaiei Ruse (a se
vedea harta 5). Caucazul de Nord este una din cele mai
importante provocri la adresa securitii naionale a Rusiei.
Republicile din Caucazul de Nord se confrunt cu violene
aproape zilnice de intensitate mic i medie, rate mari de
omaj (n unele cazuri depesc 50%), corupie sistemic i
srcie. Autoritile de la Moscova mizeaz pe stabilitatea
situaional asigurat prin alocarea fondurilor federale i
militarizarea regiunii. De pild, bugetele Republicii Cecene
sau Inguetiei sunt acoperite n proporie de 91% din alo-
caii federale (Grove, 2011). Infuzia de bani asigur loiali-
tatea elitelor regionale. ns modul netrasparent de distri-
Harta 5 Caucazul de Sud i cel de Nord
buire a acestora exacerbeaz fenomenul corupiei. Rusia a
(sursa: Wikitravel)
dislocat n regiune un contingent de circa 88.000 militari
din diverse structuri de for (Nichol, 2011, 13) pentru a
Krasnodarskii krai este singura unitate administrativ
face fa insurgenei. Prezena militar terestr este ntrit
n componena districtului federal sud care se nvecineaz
prin dou baze militare ale flotilei caspice n Kaspiisk i
cu Caucazul de Sud, mai exact cu regiunea separatist din
Mahacikala. n 2011, Ministerul de Interne a trimis n Georgia Abhazia. Krasnodarskii krai gzduiete cel mai
Daghestan fore adiionale pentru a contracara campania important port rusesc de la Marea Neagr Novorossiisk,
de primvar a rebelilor. Situaia exploziv din Caucazul de care anterior nelegerilor ruso-ucrainene de la Harkov din
Nord i militarizarea regiunii afecteaz n mod direct secu- 2010, era considerat o alternativ la baza flotei ruseti de la
ritatea statelor din Caucazul de Sud. Calea ferat i con- Sevastopol. Strategia insurgenilor presupune extinderea
ducta de gaze care leag Daghestanul de Azerbaidjan a fost frontului din Caucazul de Nord n regiunile populate de
deseori inta atentatelor teroriste. De asemenea, au fost etnici rui. Astfel, Krasnodarskii krai, vecin direct cu republi-
nregistrate cazuri de traversare a frontierei n direcia cile caucaziene, import insecuritate din Caucazul de Nord.
Azerbaidjanului de ctre rebeli din Daghestan. Rusia acuz n ultimul deceniu, au avut loc o serie de atentate teroriste
sistematic Georgia de gzduirea i protejarea rebelilor din n aceast regiune. n acelai timp, desemnarea oraului Soci
Caucazul de Nord n defileul Kodori. Trebuie menionat c ca gazd a Jocurilor Olimpice de iarn din 2014 sporete
Kremlinul a continuat s acuze Georgia i dup preluarea pericolul comiterii atentatelor teroriste de proporii n
controlului asupra defileului Kodori de ctre miliiile abhaze Krasnodarskii krai. Explozia la calea ferat de lng Soci n
cu ajutorul trupelor regulate ruse. Nu n ultimul rnd, 2010 confirm cele mai pesimiste predicii. Utilizarea infra-
Armata a 58-a, dislocat n Caucazul de Nord, a constituit structurii i resurselor naturale ale Abhaziei n vederea
nucleul forelor armate ruseti care au participat n 2008 la pregtirii pentru Jocurile Olimpice din 2014 alimenteaz
rzboiul ruso-georgian. tensiuni la nivel regional ntre Rusia i Georgia.

84 85
 Problemele de securitate n Caucazul de Nord trebuie
puse n contextul ambiiilor regionale ale Rusiei. Kremlinul,
n mod tradiional, a considerat vital prezena militar n
Caucazul de Sud pentru meninerea controlului asupra
Caucazului de Nord. Aceast gndire este determinat de
istoria cuceririi Caucazului. Din punct de vedere cronologic,
Rusia arist mai nti a ocupat Caucazul de Sud n urma
confruntrii directe cu alte puteri regionale. Abia dup ce
a asigurat controlul asupra teritoriului de la sud de Munii
Caucaz, Rusia a declanat campania decisiv pentru
cucerirea integral a Caucazului de Nord (regiunile de est i
vest), care s-a ncheiat n a doua jumtate a secolului al
XIX-lea (Trenin, 2009, 143). Legtura ntre Caucazul de Sud
i de Nord n gndirea strategic rus s-a reflectat parial n sper s blocheze proiectele transcaspice de interes major
logica aciunilor din 2008. Pe lng subminarea poziiilor
SUA n regiune i prevenirea extinderii NATO n Caucazul
de Sud, intervenia militar a trimis un semnal ferm repub-
licilor din Caucazul de Nord (ibidem, 149). Aadar, vulnera-
bilitatea obiectiv n Caucazul de Nord i ambiia de a avea
o sfer de influen n spaiul post-sovietic motiveaz aspi- nceput s livreze petrol n Europa prin oleoductul Baku-
raia Rusiei de a fi principalul gestionar al securitii n
Caucaz (ibidem, 154).
1.4.2. Est
Caucazul de Sud este flancat la est de Marea Caspic i
la vest de Marea Neagr. Aceast poziie geografic n com-
binaie cu vastele resurse energetice din regiunea Caspic
confer Caucazului de Sud funcia de important nod ener-
getic n Eurasia. Marea Caspic servete drept legtur ntre
Caucazul de Sud i Asia Central, n special cu dou repu-
blici post-sovietice, Kazahstan i Turkmenistan. Cele dou
state sunt guvernate de regimuri autoritare consolidate
(Freedom House, 2011), care i asigur supravieuirea nu n
ultimul rnd prin intermediul politicii externe multivecto-
riale. Preedintele Nazarbaev este de 19 ani la crma rii
(egalat doar de preedintele Uzbekistanului, Karimov), fiind
86
cel mai longeviv lider n spaiul postsovietic. n aprilie 2011,
Nazarbaev a fost reales pentru un nou mandat de cinci ani.
n Turkmenistan, decesul subit al preedintelui Niazov n
2006 a fcut posibil, tranziia de putere, dup 15 ani de la
declararea independenei, care ns nu a schimbat natura
autoritar a regimului. Kazahstan i Turkmenistan sunt
petro-statele cu cele mai mari rezerve de hidrocarburi n
Asia Central. Rusia i China ncearc s monopolizeze
importul de gaze naturale i petrol din regiunea caspic:
Rusia pentru a le distribui apoi n UE i statele post-sovie-
tice din Europa de Est, China pentru a satisface consumul
intern n continu cretere. Pe de alt parte, Iranul, prin
poziia rigid cu privire la statutul juridic al Mrii Caspice,
pentru securitatea energetic a UE. De asemenea, disputa
azero-turkmen cu privire la delimitarea sectoarelor
naionale n Marea Caspic mpiedic realizarea conductei
de gaze transcaspice. n ciuda tuturor acestor obstacole,
Kazahstanul (din 2008) i Turkmenistanul (din 2010) au
Tbilisi-Ceihan (BTC). Kazahstanul mai folosete ruta
adiional de export prin portul georgian Batumi. Legtura
maritim ntre Azerbaidjan, Turkmenistan i Kazahstan este
asigurat prin curse regulate cu feribotul: Baku-Turkmenbai
i Baku-Aktau. Arterele de transport care leag Georgia i
Azerbaidjan cu Kazahstanul i Turkmenistanul fac parte din
reeaua de distribuie nordic care aprovizioneaz forele
NATO i SUA n Afganistan. Cu toate acestea, Rusia i
Iranul dein n continuare supremaia militar naval la
Marea Caspic.
1.4.3. Vest
Marea Neagr este unica legtur direct a Caucazului
de Sud cu UE i NATO. Ultimul val de extindere a trans-
format UE ntr-o putere la Marea Neagr. n acelai timp,
extinderea din 2004 a mrit prezena NATO n regiune.
87
Noua stare de fapt pe de o parte, i interesele statelor nou
venite pe de alt parte, au declanat procesul de formulare
a politicilor n regiunea Mrii Negre. n consecin, UE
a lansat dou iniiative care acoper aceast arie: Sinergia
Mrii Negre (2007) i Parteneriatul Estic (2009). n 2011,
Parlamentul European a adoptat strategia UE pentru
regiunea Mrii Negre. Dei au existat iniiative de a elabora
o strategie similar a NATO i pn atunci, acestea au fost
barate n ultim instan de Turcia.23 Romnia i Bulgaria
sunt democraii semiconsolidate (Freedom House, 2011)
cu interese economice n Caucazul de Sud. Imperativele de
securitate energetic au determinat cele dou state s se al-
ture proiectului gazoductului Nabucco i s dezvolte relaii
economice i politice apropiate cu Azerbaidjan i Georgia.
Primatul intereselor economice explic pasivitatea Bulgariei
i Romniei n promovarea agendei democratice n Georgia
i Azerbaidjan.
Pe lng noii membri ai UE, din regiunea Mrii Negre fac
parte dou state cu aspiraii europene, Ucraina i Moldova.
Cele dou ri riverane sunt guvernate de regimuri politice
hibride (Freedom House 2011) i au cele mai avansate
relaii cu UE din grupul rilor Parteneriatului Estic. n
scopul accelerrii integrrii europene, ntre Ucraina,
Moldova i Georgia are loc un schimb intens de experien
la diferite nivele n privina implementrii reformelor i
purtrii negocierilor cu UE. Din regiunea Mrii Negre mai
fac parte doi actori care n mare msur determin dinami-
ca de securitate n zon Turcia i Rusia. n ultimul dece-
niu, relaiile politice, militare i economice ntre Moscova i
Ankara au cunoscut o traiectorie ascendent. Schimburile
comerciale bilaterale au crescut substanial, Rusia devenind
al doilea partener comercial al Turciei dup UE (EU
Commission, 2011a). Cele dou state au eliminat vizele
pentru cltoriile de scurt durat i au creat Consiliul de
Cooperare Strategic la Nivel nalt. De asemenea, Turcia
23 Interviu cu un oficial NATO.
88
este printre puinele state membre NATO care a achiziio-
nat armament de producie ruseasc. Apropierea ruso-turc
nu este ns fr precedent n istoria recent. n anii 70,
Turcia i URSS au avut o perioad de nclzire a relaiilor
politice i economice bilaterale, care s-a datorat, nu n ulti-
mul rnd, tensiunilor ntre cei doi aliai, SUA i Turcia
(Altunisik i Tur, 2005, 108). mbuntirea relaiilor
ruso-turce n anii 2000 s-a produs pe fondul deteriorrii
relaiilor turco-americane, marcate de campania militar a
SUA n Irak i planurile Washingtonului de internaionalizare
a Mrii Negre. Acest dinamic a grbit formarea n regiu-
nea Mrii Negre a condominiului ruso-turc informal ori-
entat spre meninerea statu quo-ului regional (Socor, 2009;
Triantaphyllou, 2009, 232). Drept urmare, Turcia s-a opus
extinderii operaiunii NATO Active Endeavour n Marea
Neagr i a aprobat o prezen militar limitat a NATO n
Marea Neagr pe durata conflictului ruso-georgian din 2008
(Lesser, 2011, 2-3). Acest alian tactic ns nu este lip-
sit de interese divergente i competiie n Caucazul de Sud,
fapt demonstrat de reacia Rusiei la tentativele de norma-
lizare a relaiilor turco-armene (Torbakov, 2010).
1.4.4. Sud
n sud, Caucazul se nvecineaz cu dou puteri din
Orientul Mijlociu, Iran i Turcia, ultima fiind i o putere
regional european. Iranul este un vecin incomod (nu i
pentru Armenia), dar, n acelai timp, un partener necesar
pentru statele din Caucazul de Sud. Programul nuclear i
instabilitatea politic intern n Iran alimenteaz starea
de incertitudine n regiune. Teheranul urmrete cel puin
patru obiective n Caucazul de Sud: prevenirea perceputei
ncercuiri de ctre Occident, garantarea neutralitii statelor
n caz de conflict armat cu SUA, spargerea izolrii inter-
naionale i legitimarea regimului politic, sporirea influenei
regionale prin proiectarea puterii blnde i expansiunea
economic. Coerena politicii regionale a Iranului e afectat
89
de diviziunile n cadrul regimului de la Teheran i problema
succesiunii generate de alegerile prezideniale din 2009 i
protestele de mas ce le-au urmat (Nader, Thaler i
Bohandy, 2011). De pild, vizita preedintelui Ahmadinejad
n Armenia n 2011 a fost anulat nu doar din motive
externe invocate oficial de Teheran, dar i de ordin intern.
Interdicia de a prsi ara impus n ajunul vizitei unor ofi-
ciali de rang nalt din anturajul preedintelui i intenia lui
Ahmadinejad de a nu ceda n faa presiunilor ayatollahului
Khamenei se pare c au contribuit la decizia de a reprogra-
ma vizita la Erevan.24
Turcia a trecut prin transformri interne majore n anii
2000. Ratele de cretere economic ridicate i stagnarea
negocierilor de aderare la UE au contribuit la auto-ncre-
dere, o politic extern independent i o strategie activ
n vecintatea imediat a rii (Tocci, 2011). Politica turc
regional zero probleme cu vecinii a consolidat pozi-
iile politice i economice ale Turciei n Orientul Mijlociu,
Balcanii de Vest, Caucazul de Sud i regiunea caspic
(Akyol, 2011). Discursul premierului Recep Erdogan dup
ctigarea alegerilor n 2011, n timpul cruia el s-a adresat
populaiei din Damasc, Sarajevo i Baku, confirm conti-
nuitatea politicii regionale ambiioase a Turciei. Caucazul de
Sud este important n viziunea Turciei pentru transformarea
rii ntr-un major nod energetic eurasiatic. Rzboiul ruso-
georgian, care a pus n pericol aceste planuri, a impulsionat
implicarea mai activ a Turciei n dosarele de securitate
regional. Normalizarea relaiilor cu Armenia era perceput
ca un pas care ar putea redesena arhitectura regional i
multiplica prghiile de influen ale Turciei n Caucazul de
Sud. Dei a nregistrat succese notabile, politica de vecin-
tate a Turciei se confrunt cu dou provocri majore: ps-
trarea balanei ntre competiia i cooperarea cu Rusia i ges-
tionarea consecinelor politice i economice ale revoluiilor
din lumea arab. Nu n ultimul rnd, regimurile politice din
24 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
90
Caucazul de Sud au urmrit cu mare preocupare revirimen-
tul democratic din rile arabe. Declanarea campaniei de
combatere a corupiei n Azerbaidjan i dialogul ntre putere
i opoziie n Armenia au coincis cu valul revoluionar din
Orientul Mijlociu, confirmnd expunerea Caucazului de
Sud la procesele de democratizare care au loc n vecintate.
II. Dinamica intraregional n Caucazul de Sud
Starea de conflict ntre Armenia i Azerbaidjan transfor-
m Georgia ntr-un stat pivot n Caucazul de Sud. Singurele
relaii stabile n regiune, pe care le au cele dou pri anga-
jate n conflictul din Nagorno-Karabah sunt cu Georgia. Pe
de alt parte, poziia cheie a Georgiei n regiune impune
autoritilor de la Tbilisi pstrarea unui echilibru subtil n
raporturile cu Armenia i Azerbaidjan.
2.1 Armenia-Azerbaidjan: pace improbabil, rzboi posibil
ntre Armenia i Azerbaidjan nu exist relaii diploma-
tice, grania este nchis i nu exist comunicare direct
terestr sau pe calea aerului. Zborul ntre cele dou capitale
se face cu escal la Moscova, Kiev sau Istanbul. Cu toate
c unii oficiali afirm c ntre Armenia i Azerbaidjan are
loc comerul prin teri25, cel mai probabil prin Georgia, este
extrem de dificil de verificat i de cuantificat volumul aces-
tuia. Singurul loc confirmat din Georgia unde avea loc co-
merul ntre armeni i azeri a fost satul Sadahlo la grania
ntre Armenia i Georgia, nu foarte departe de punctul unde
frontiera celor trei state din Caucazul de Sud se intersec-
teaz (Poghosyan, 2011). ns piaa din Sadahlo a fost n-
chis n 2005. Exist interaciune limitat ntre ONG-urile
din cele dou ri, ns nivelul de cooperare a sczut dup
2005.26 ntlnirile au loc, de regul, n Georgia sau n
Armenia, deoarece este mai dificil de organizat activiti de
25 Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.
26 Interviu cu un reprezentant mass-media, Baku, iunie 2011.
91
acest gen n Azerbaidjan.27 Participanii armeni la Baku aproximativ 600.000 de PSI n Azerbaidjan. Potrivit organi-
sau azeri la Erevan beneficiaz de protecia personal, iar zaiilor non-guvernamentale internaionale, Azerbaidjanul
paapoartele nu sunt tampilate la intrarea i ieirea din se afl n topul primelor 10 ri din lume cu cea mai mare
ar, astfel nct nu exist dovada c ei au vizitat vreodat rat de PSI pe cap de locuitor (Internal Displacement
Armenia sau Azerbaidjanul.28 Tentativele de a reconecta Monitoring Center, 2011).
cele dou societi prin dialog cultural sunt blocate de cele
mai multe ori. n 2010, un ONG din Armenia a avut iniia-
tiva de a organiza sptmna filmului azer n Armenia, ns,
n ciuda msurilor oganizatorice preliminare, evenimentul
nu a avut loc (Grigoryan, 2010). Ctigarea finalei con-
cursului Eurovision 2011 de ctre Azerbaidjan a declanat o
dezbatere public ampl n Armenia cu privire la eventuala
participare sau neparticipare la ediia Eurovison 2012.
Relaiile conflictuale ntre Armenia i Azerbaidjan sunt
rezultatul rzboiului purtat ntre cele dou state la
nceputul anilor 90 pentru Nagorno-Karabah, care pn la
disoluia Uniunii Sovietice a fost n componena Azerbai- Harta 6 Nagorno-Karabah i alte apte regiuni ocupate
djanului. n prezent Armenia controleaz Nagorno-Karabah ale Azerbaidjanului
i alte apte regiuni (dou parial) ale Azerbaidjanului n (sursa: The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Londra, 2011)
jurul enclavei (vezi harta 6).29 Prin urmare, Azerbaidjanul
nu controleaz n jur de 14% din teritoriul su recunoscut
De iure, cele dou ri sunt n stare de rzboi. Opera-
internaional (Waal, 2003, 286). n Armenia, cele apte
iunile militare au fost sistate n 1994 n urma semnrii
regiuni ale Azerbaidjanului sunt numite teritorii eliberate
armistiiului de la Bikek. Azerbaidjanul s-a opus desf-
i servesc dou obiective strategice: asigur legtura ntre
urrii forelor de meninere a pcii ruse pe linia frontului.
Nagorno-Karabah i Armenia i asigur spaiul necesar
Astfel, respectarea acordului de ncetare a focului cade n
pentru aprarea avansat a Nagorno-Karabahului. De
sarcina prilor beligerante. Dei din 1994 n zona de con-
asemenea, la Erevan, nu este exclus posibilitatea folosirii
flict nu au avut loc confruntri militare de proporii, prile
regiunilor (cu excepia Lacinului i Kelbajarului, care separ
sunt angajate sistematic n schimburi de focuri. Violena de
Armenia de Nagorno-Karabah) drept moned de schimb n
mic intensitate numit de unii experi rzboiul lunetiti-
negocierile asupra viitorului statut al Nagorno-Karabahului
lor30 s-a soldat cu 3000 de victime din 1994 pn n 2009
i a unor garanii de securitate credibile. Pe lng distrugerea
(International Crisis Group, 2009, 1). n ultimii trei ani,
infrastructurii i numeroase victime, rzboiul a generat
violarea armistiiului a devenit o practic mai frecvent,
sporind probabilitatea reizbucnirii conflictului armat
27 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011. (International Crisis Group, 2011a). Aa cum remarc un
28 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011. expert din regiune scopul eforturilor diplomatice la nivel
29 Cele apte regiuni sunt: Kelbajar, Lacin, Kubatli, Jebrail, Zan-

ghelan, Agdam i Fizuli. 30 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

92 93
nalt n acest an [2011] a fost mai degrab prevenirea
rzboiului dect identificarea unei soluii pentru conflict.31
Nagorno-Karabah este principala problem de politic
extern i de securitate a Azerbaidjanului. Potrivit sonda-
jelor de opinie, conflictul cu Armenia este cea mai impor-
tant preocupare pentru 51% din cetenii Azerbaidjanului
(Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). n acelai timp,
problema pcii (implicit conflictul cu Azerbaidjanul) ocup
doar locul trei cu 9%, dup omaj (46%) i srcie (10%),
n topul preocuprilor cetenilor Armeniei (Caucasus
Research Resource Centers, 2010). Aceast diferen poate
fi explicat prin: Azerbaidjanul este perdantul rzboiului
din 1992-1994; petrodolarii distribuii diverselor categorii
sociale n mod relativ atenueaz, n percepia public, efectele
corupiei i omajului, care urmeaz n lista preocuprilor;
guvernul de la Baku controleaz strns spaiul public i, prin
urmare, instrumentalizeaz eficient conflictul cu Armenia
pentru a preveni n dezbaterea public primordialitatea
problemelor de ordin intern asupra celor generate extern. Pe
de alt parte, sondajul din Armenia arat c armenii se simt
mult mai confortabil cu actualul statu quo pe linia frontu-
lui, dar n acelai timp resimt mai puternic efectele conflic-
tului, care, parial, este responsabil pentru situaia econo-
mic dificil. Totodat, rezultatele sondajului n Armenia
arat c sistemul politic este mai deschis n comparaie cu
cel din Azerbaidjan, iar societatea depete lent logica
fortreei asediate. n consecin, n prim plan ies proble-
mele care afecteaz viaa de zi cu zi a cetenilor i crete
cererea societal pentru soluionarea lor.
Pentru a apra sau schimba statu quo-ul n problema Na-
gorno-Karabahului, Armenia, pe de o parte, i Azerbaidjan,
pe de alt parte, aloc resurse financiare i umane impor-
tante n rzboiul juridic, diplomatic, istoriografic, economic
i militar purtat pe linia frontului, n spaiul informaional
31 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
94
sau n cadrul forurilor internaionale. Grania actual dintre
Azerbaidjan i Armenia este printre cele mai militarizate
din lume. Armenia i Nagorno-Karabah au edificat trei linii
de aprare i se pare c a patra este n faza de construcie.32
Armenia sprijin financiar i contribuie cu militari n termen
la sistemul de aprare a Nagorno-Karabahului. Potrivit esti-
mrilor, forele armate ale Armeniei i Nagorno-Karabahului
totalizeaz 70.000 de militari, n timp ce armata Azerbai-
djanului numr circa 95.000 de militari (International
Crisis Group, 2011a, 1). Armatele celor dou state organi-
zeaz cu regularitate demonstraii de for prin intermediul
exerciiilor militare n apropierea liniei frontului. Armenia i
Azerbaidjan sunt angajate n cursa narmrilor reflectat n
creterea spectaculoas a bugetelor de aprare i achiziii de
tehnic militar. n perioada 2000-2009, bugetul de aprare
al Armeniei a crescut de la 3,6% la 4,2% din PIB, iar al
Azerbaidjanului de la 2,3% la 3,4 din PIB (SIPRI, 2011).
n anii 2000-2010, Azerbaidjanul a alocat pentru aprare
$9,2 miliarde, iar Armenia $2,6 miliarde (News.Az 2011a).
n 2010, guvernul de la Baku a stabilit bugetul de aprare la
nivelul de $2,1 miliarde, ceea ce depete bugetul naional
consolidat al Armeniei ($1,8 miliarde).
Pe lng dorina de a demonstra schimbarea echilibrului
de fore, Baku intete extenuarea economic a Armeniei
prin continuarea cursei narmrilor. nchiderea frontierei
azero-armene i turco-armene i excluderea Armeniei din
proiectele regionale de infrastructur sunt ghidate de aceeai
logic. Una din recentele tentative de a pune presiune eco-
nomic pe Armenia a fost invocarea, dup accidentul de la
Fukushima, a pericolului pe care l reprezint pentru ntrea-
ga regiune centrala nuclear Metsamor, de construcie so-
vietic, care produce aproximativ 40% din energia electric
la nivel naional (News. Az, 2011b). Eventuala nchidere a
centralei de la Metsamor, fr a identifica surse alternative
32 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
95
de energie sau construcia unei noi centrale, va pune ntr-o
situaie dificil ntreaga economie a Armeniei. Baku sper c
strategia de hruire permanent n combinaie cu creterea
economic proprie, alimentat de exporturile de hidrocarburi,
va fora Armenia s negocieze de pe o poziie de inferiori-
tate n ultim instan. Azerbaidjanul nu exclude nici opiu-
nea militar pentru a recupera Nagorno-Karabah.
La rndul su, dei efortul financiar pentru aprare este
substanial pentru economia Armeniei, pstrarea balanei
militare este asigurat, nu n ultimul rnd, cu sprijinul dia-
sporei i prin achiziii de armament din Rusia la preuri sub
nivelul pieei mondiale. Armenia ncearc s minimalizeze
efectele izolrii economice regionale prin dezvoltarea
proiectelor energetice alternative i blocarea iniiativelor
promovate de Azerbaidjan. De exemplu, Armenia s-a opus
activ alocrii finanrii externe pentru proiectul de cale ferat
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars. Dezizolarea vizeaz nu doar Armenia,
dar i Nagorno-Karabahul. Astfel, diaspora a contribuit cu
$3 milioane la reconstrucia aeroportului din Stepanakert,
a crui redeschidere a fost amnat ns n 2011. Erevanul,
ca msur de retorsiune pentru nchiderea frontierelor cu
Azerbaidjan i Turcia, blocheaz legtura direct a Azerbai-
djanului cu enclava sa Nahicevan, care la sud se nvecineaz
cu Iranul i pe o fie foarte scurt (11 km) cu Turcia.
Ambele state desfoar o campanie internaional
activ de informare pe problema Nagorno-Karabahului,
care s capteze suportul ct mai larg al comunitii inter-
naionale. Experii nu exclud faptul c decizia din 2011 a
Azerbaidjanului de a se altura Micrii de Nealiniere din
care fac parte 180 de ri vizeaz parial utilizarea acestei
platforme pentru mobilizarea sprijinului pentru Baku n
rndul statelor care se confrunt cu probleme teritoriale
similare.33 Prile n conflict fac uz de o istoriografie care
exclude sau minimalizeaz prezena reciproc n Nagorno-
Karabah pe parcursul istoriei. De asemenea, prile apeleaz
33 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
96
fie la dreptul de autodeterminare a populaiei, care a fost
victima unei agresiuni a guvernului central, fie la agresiunea
teritorial a unui stat mpotriva altui stat i campania de
epurri etnice. Pe lng implicarea activ n campanii de
informare a corpului diplomatic, administraiile preziden-
iale din Armenia i Azerbaidjan includ n componena lor
departamente specializate care monitorizeaz mesajele con-
curente i gestioneaz eforturile de neutralizare a acestora n
spaiul informaional.34 Diaspora este un emitor impor-
tant de mesaje n campaniile de lobby ale Armeniei i
Azerbaidjanului. Diaspora armean din Frana i SUA este
cunoscut pentru buna organizare i impactul pe care l are
asupra unor decizii de politic extern. ntr-un efort de re-
cuperare, n ultimii ani, autoritile de la Baku au acordat
mai mult atenie organizrii diasporei pentru promovarea
cauzei Azerbaidjanului la nivel internaional (News.Az,
2011c). Pe de alt parte, Baku a repurtat o serie de succese
diplomatice tactice. n 2008 Adunarea General al ONU a
adoptat rezoluia cu privire la situaia pe teritoriul ocupat
al Azerbaidjanului n care se solicit retragerea imediat,
complet i necondiionat a Armeniei de pe teritoriul
Azerbaidjanului (UN, 2008). n 2011, Adunarea Parlamen-
tar a Consiliului Europei a decis restabilirea subcomitetu-
lui pentru Nagorno-Karabah, anterior suspendat.
Rivalitatea n forurile diplomatice se desfoar n para-
lel cu negocierile mediate de grupul de la Minsk creat sub
egida OSCE i care include Rusia, Frana i SUA n calitate
de copreedini. Dup conflictul ruso-georgian activitatea
grupului, i n special a Rusiei, n cadrul acestuia a fost
revigorat. Rusia a gzduit ntre 2008 i 2011 nou ntlniri
ntre preedinii Armeniei i Azerbaidjanului, care s-au sol-
dat cu semnarea unei serii de declaraii comune i schimb de
prizoneri sau corpurile militarilor ucii n aciune. Duma de
Stat a intermediat n 2010 la Moscova un dialog informal
34 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011; interviu cu un expert,
Erevan, iunie 2011.
97
ntre membrii Milli Majlis-ului i Adunrii Naionale. n
ciuda presiunii din partea SUA, Franei i Rusiei n ajunul
ultimului summit de la Kazan n 2011, Baku i Erevan nu
au reuit s ajung la un acord cu privire la principiile de
soluionare a conflictului, propuse de co-preedini n cadrul
conferinei ministeriale OSCE, n 2007, la Madrid. Dup
runde succesive de negocieri, principiile de la Madrid n
forma nc neacceptat de pri includ: retragerea Armeniei
din regiunile din jurul Nagorno-Karabahului cu reglemen-
tri speciale pentru Lacin i Kelbajar; un statut provizoriu
pentru Nagorno-Karabah garantat internaional; garantarea
securitii Nagorno-Karabahului i desfurarea forelor
internaionale de meninere a pcii; dreptul refugiailor i
PSI de a se ntoarce n zone anterior locuite; redeschiderea
comunicaiilor, reluarea comerului i implementarea
msurilor de reabilitare post-conflict finanate de donatori
externi; determinarea statutului Nagorno-Karabahului n
urma unui referendum. Se pare c punctele care ridic pro-
bleme sunt graficul retragerii forelor armene din regiunile
ocupate n jurul Karabahului, asigurarea coridorului de
comunicare ntre Armenia i Karabah i natura statutului
interimar al Karabahului (RFE, 2010a).
Observatorii sunt sceptici cu privire la soluionarea
conflictului n perspectiva apropiat. Chiar dac liderii
Armeniei i Azerbaidjanului vor conveni asupra principiilor
de la Madrid i foii de parcurs, nu exist precondiii la nivel
social pentru implementarea acestora35, remarc un analist.
Discursul politic agresiv promovat la Baku i Erevan reduce
spaiul de manevr pentru liderii politici i face acceptarea
unui eventual consens la nivel nalt inacceptabil pentru
ambele societi. Potrivit sondajelor de opinie, 97% din
azeri consider c Armenia este cel mai important rival i
91% din armeni percep Azerbaidjanul drept principala
ameninare politic i economic (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, 2010; International Republican Institute, 2008a).
35 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
98
De asemenea, 70% din cei chestionai n Azerbaidjan con-
sider c guvernul nu ar trebui s accepte niciun compromis
pentru a soluiona panic conflictul (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung 2010). Or fr compromis, care se reflect n prin-
cipiile de la Madrid, nu poate exista o soluie nonviolent a
conflictului. Cu toate c 78% din armeni consider c situa-
ia din Nagorno-Karabah poate fi rezolvat pe cale amiabil
(International Republican Institute, 2008a), se pare c la
Erevan i Stepanakert exist preocupri cu privire la imple-
mentarea unei astfel de soluii. Noi dorim o dat previzibil
pentru organizarea referendumului prin care se va decide
statutul Nagorno-Karabahului36, dezvluie un oficial una
din preocupri. Totodat, se pune ntrebarea cu privire la
credibilitatea forelor de meninere a pcii i capacitatea lor
de a ndeplini misiunea. Cine ne asigur c unele eveni-
mente din Balcani nu se vor repeta n Nagorno-Karabah?37,
ntreab un analist cu aluzie la masacrul de la Srebrenia i
inaciunea forelor internaionale de meninere a pcii. Se
pare c reticena fa de desfurarea pacificatorilor are i
rdcini economice. Armata regiunii separatiste este princi-
palul angajator pentru un segment important al populaiei
masculine din Nagorno-Karabah. Prin urmare, desfurarea
trupelor de meninere a pcii va genera reducerea efectivu-
lui forelor armate ale regiunii separatiste, cu impact social
i economic sever imediat.38
Aadar, implementarea unui plan de pace n Nagorno-Ka-
rabah poate fi comparat cu mersul pe un cmp minat
(Economist, 2011). Acesta poate fi traversat cu succes dac
negocierile politice vor fi combinate cu msuri care vor pre-
gti societile pentru pacea sustenabil. Dac regimurile
politice de la Baku i Erevan au voin i sunt capabile de
aa ceva, rmne o ntrebare deschis. Se pare c tot mai
muli observatori din regiune consider c, fr o autentic
36 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.
37 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
38 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
99
democratizare, Armenia i Azerbaidjanul nu vor reui s
fac progrese substaniale n problema Nagorno-Karabahu-
lui.39 Pn atunci, cel mai plauzibil scenariu mprtit n
ambele tabere este statu quo-ul care poate fi sintetizat n for-
mula pacea rapid este imposibil, rzboiul rapid e proba-
bil40. Pe termen scurt, ns, reizbucnirea conflictului este
descurajat, se pare, de un factor de natur non-militar.
Gzduirea finalei Eurovisionului n mai 2012 reprezint
o ans rar de a proiecta internaional o imagine pozitiv
despre Azerbaidjan, pe care, fr ndoial, autoritile de la
Baku nu vor s o iroseasc prin escaladarea conflictului.41
2.2. Georgia Armenia: resetarea pragmatismului
Relaiile ntre Georgia i Armenia sunt caracterizate de o
interdependen preponderent pozitiv, n unele sectoare
asimetric, care este gestionat ntr-un mod pragmatic de
ambele guverne. Dialogul politic armeano-georgian s-a
intensificat calitativ i cantitativ dup rzboiul din Georgia
din 2008. Comentatorii observ c chimia personal ntre
cei doi preedini contribuie la valene pozitive n relaiile
bilaterale.42 Interaciunea pe linia ministerelor de externe
aduce un plus de valoare relaiei la nivel nalt. n 2011, efii
diplomaiei au convenit s se ntlneasc de cel puin patru
ori pe an pentru a avea un dialog continuu pe problemati-
cile bilaterale i regionale. Erevan i Tbilisi recunosc exis-
tena problemelor bilaterale, dar nici una dintre acestea nu
este considerat insurmontabil (Civil.Ge 2011b). Dei
relaiile politice s-au mbuntit considerabil n ultimii doi
ani, la nivelul opiniei publice persist animoziti.43
39 Interviu cu un reprezentant mass-media, Baku, iunie 2011.
Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
40 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un oficial,
Erevan, iunie 2011.
41 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
42 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
43 Interviu cu experi, Erevan, iunie 2011.
100
Potrivit sondajelor de opinie, 75% din respondeni n
Georgia i 62% din cei chestionai n Armenia consider c
relaiile bilaterale sunt bune (International Republican
Institute, 2011; International Republican Institute, 2008a).
La capitolul state prietene i inamici, pentru 8% din geor-
gieni Armenia reprezint cel mai important partener
(International Republican Institute, 2011), i pentru 24%
din armeni Georgia este principalul partener (International
Republican Institute, 2008a). Aceast diferen poate fi
explicat prin importana strategic pe care o are Georgia
n calitate de ar tranzit pentru fluxurile comerciale ale
Armeniei. Volumul schimburilor comerciale bilaterale nu
este semnificativ, statisticile pentru 2010 demonstreaz c
Georgia este al 8-lea partener comercial al Armeniei (2,2%
pondere n comer), n timp ce Armenia este al 12-lea
partener comercial al Georgiei cu doar 1,5% pondere n
comer (EU Commision, 2011b; EU Commission, 2011c).
Cercetrile sociologice arat, pe deasupra, c 31% din
respondeni n Armenia privesc Georgia drept principala
ameninare politic i economic (International Republican
Institute, 2008a). n Georgia, 3% din ceteni percep
Armenia n mod similar (International Republican Institute,
2011). Este posibil ca din 2008, cnd s-a fcut ultima cer-
cetare n Armenia, numrul celor care trateaz Georgia
drept o ameninare s fi sczut. Totodat, percepia public
negativ n Armenia reflect foarte probabil ngrijorarea n
privina aspectelor asimetrice n relaiile economice, preocu-
parea pentru drepturile minoritii armene din Samhe-
Javaheti i participarea statului vecin la proiecte regionale
care exclud Armenia.
La nivelul opiniei publice din Georgia, Armenia este
deseori privit drept aliat militar al Kremlinului n Caucazul
de Sud. Dat fiind atitudinea georgienilor fa de politica
rus n regiune, are loc un transfer negativ asupra imaginii
Armeniei, fapt reflectat n sondajele de opinie.
n pofida accentelor diferite n politica extern, la Tbilisi
i Erevan exist nelegere c fiecare i face propriul joc n
101
regiune, determinat de situaia politic i raiuni de secu-
ritate naional.44 De pild, Erevanul a perceput n mod
negativ aciunile militare ale Georgiei n Osetia de Sud din
2008, care puteau stabili un precedent periculos pentru
Armenia. Conducerea politic de la Erevan s-a abinut de la
un discurs critic la adresa Georgiei, care ar fi sprijinit reto-
rica agresiv a Rusiei. n schimb, Armenia a jucat un rol
important n evacuarea personalului diplomatic i cet-
enilor strini din Georgia n timpul conflictului,45 lucru
apreciat de autoritile georgiene. n perioada postconflict,
Armenia a rezistat presiunilor de la Moscova pentru a
recunoate independena Abhaziei i Osetiei de Sud46,
iar preedintele Armeniei a fcut o vizit oficial la Tbilisi
n septembrie 2008. n 2009 preedintele Georgiei a fost
decorat cu cea mai nalt distincie de stat a Armeniei
Ordinul de Onoare, fapt care a strnit critici din partea
Moscovei. Pe de alt parte, Georgia nu agreeaz prezena
militar rus n Armenia, ns autoritile de la Tbilisi rea-
lizeaz c nu pot schimba situaia radical i c n mediul de
securitate actual este important s pstreze o relaie amia-
bil cu Armenia.47 Cu toate c a denunat n 2011 acordul
de tranzit militar cu Rusia folosit pentru alimentarea bazei
ruseti din Gyumri, Georgia aprob n continuare tranzitul
cargourilor militare destinate forelor armate armene prin
spaiului su aerian.48 Partea georgian a asigurat Erevanul
c denunarea acordului cu Rusia, care nu funciona din
2008, este una tehnic (prevenirea prelungirii automate
a acordului pe cinci ani) i nu va afecta cooperarea cu
Ministerul Aprrii din Armenia. Noi am dorit s primim
asigurri c securitatea noastr nu va fi afectat de aceast
decizie [], noi le-am primit49, explic un reprezentant
44 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011. Interviu cu un expert,
Erevan, iunie 2011.
45 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.
46 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
47 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
48 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.
49 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.
102
guvernamental. Aceste garanii au fost date de ministrul
georgian al Aprrii n cadrul vizitei la Erevan, care a prece-
dat votul din parlamentul de la Tbilisi cu privire la acordul
de tranzit militar cu Rusia. Tot atunci, partea georgian a
oferit posibilitatea pregtirii militarilor armeni la baza
montan de antrenament din Sacihere. Aadar, maniera
echilibrat de abordare a acestui dosar confirm atitudinea
pragmatic la Erevan i Tbilisi.
Resetarea pragmatic a relaiilor bilaterale dup 2008
nu este, ns, ntmpltoare. Georgia este un nod vital de
transport pentru economia Armeniei. Potrivit estimrilor
guvernului de la Erevan, sistarea tranzitului prin Georgia pe
durata rzboiului din 2008 a produs o pagub de circa $670
milioane. Prin urmare Armenia era interesat n restabilirea
ct mai rapid a comunicaiilor. Ameninarea militar de la
nord motiveaz Tbilisi s detensioneze relaiile cu vecinii
apropiai. Dup conflictul cu Rusia, problema minoritii
armene din Georgia a fost identificat la Tbilisi ca un factor
vulnerabil care poate fi speculat de Rusia. Astfel, guvernul
georgian a dedicat mai mult atenie relaiilor cu Armenia,
n paralel cu proiectele de dezvoltare n Samhe-Javaheti.
Suprapunerea celor dou obiective a dat un suflu nou rela-
iilor bilaterale.
Georgia asigur n jur de 70-75% din tranzitul comercial
al Armeniei. n prezent, exist legtur feroviar ntre Ere-
van i portul Batumi, iar prile coopereaz la construcia
autostrzii Gyumri-Ahaliihe-Batumi care s faciliteze trafi-
cul rutier. Portul Poti joac un rol important pentru securi-
tatea alimentar a Armeniei, deoarece asigur n proporie
semnificativ importurile de gru ale rii. Portul Batumi
deservete traficul de pasageri: astfel, n 2009 au fost
relansate curse de feribot ntre Batumi i Soci. Aceast rut
este de interes pentru Armenia, deoarece Soci gzduiete
o diaspor armean numeroas stabilit nc din secolul al
XIX-lea, iar muli armeni aleg s petreac vacana la Soci.
Cu ocazia pregtirilor pentru Jocurile Olimpice de Iarn din
2014, Soci a devenit o destinaie atractiv pentru armeni
103
n cutarea oportunitilor de angajare sezonier. Traficul
aerian de pasageri ntre Erevan i Tbilisi n ultimii doi ani a
fost suspendat din raiuni economice pe timp de iarn i
reluat n primavar sau var.
n 2010, Georgia i Rusia au czut de acord s redeschid
singurul punct vamal ntre cele dou ri Verhni Lars-
Kazbeghi, n urma negocierilor mediate de Elveia. Astfel,
dup trei ani de pauz, Armenia beneficiaz din nou de le-
gtur terestr cu Rusia prin Georgia. Aproximativ 70-80%
din exporturile din Armenia spre Rusia tranziteaz Georgia.
n loc s utilizeze rute maritime ocolitoare Batumi-Varna/
Burgas-Novorossiisk, exportatorii din Armenia au acum
acces la Drumul Militar Georgian care face legtur ntre
Tbilisi i capitala Osetiei de Nord, Vladikavkaz. Tranzitul
terestru spre Rusia prin Verhni Lars-Kazbeghi reduce cos-
turile de transport cu 20-25% (Zhahanina, 2010). Volumul
mare al tranzitului comercial aduce profituri importante
statului georgian. n 2008-2009, grania armeano-georgian
a fost traversat de 4.594 de trenuri marfare i 273.478 de
vehicule (OSCE Yerevan Office, 2010, 5). ns guvernul de
la Erevan consider c Georgia profit de pe urma inter-
dependenei asimetrice, promovnd o politic de taxare a
tranzitului care sporete semnificativ costurile pentru
agenii economici din Armenia (Civil.Ge, 2009a).
Armenia este conectat la Georgia prin infrastructura
energetic i de telecomunicaii. Conexiunea la internet i
telefonie internaional n Armenia este asigurat prin cablul
de fibr optic care traverseaz Georgia. ntr-un incident
din 2011, cuttorii de fier vechi au tiat cablul de internet
n apropiere de Tbilisi, lsnd o bun parte din abonaii din
Armenia fr internet timp de cteva ore (Bedwell, 2011).
Sistemele electrice ntre Armenia i Georgia sunt interconec-
tate prin intermediul a trei linii de transmisie. Gazoductul
prin care Gazpromul livreaz gaze naturale Armeniei trece
de asemenea prin Georgia. n 2010, n urma alunecrilor de
teren, Georgia a suspendat tranzitul de gaze pentru msuri
de mentenan necesare relurii livrrilor. Armenia a recurs
104
la depozitele de gaze subterane pentru a acoperi consumul
intern. n 2010, parlamentul georgian a eliminat conducta
de gaze ce face legtur cu Armenia de pe lista obiectivelor
care nu pot fi privatizate. Acest lucru a trezit nelinite la
Erevan: n cel mai pesimist scenariu, Azerbaidjanul putea
s preia controlul asupra magistralei care garanteaz secu-
ritatea energetic a Armeniei. Autoritile de la Tbilisi au
asigurat Armenia c statul georgian nu va renuna la pache-
tul majoritar n ntreprinderea care gestioneaz conducta
(Civil.Ge, 2011c).
n ultimii doi ani, Georgia a devenit o destinaie atrac-
tiv pentru investitorii din Armenia. De exemplu, n 2011,
compania de dulciuri din Armenia Grand Candy a decis
s se extind pe piaa georgian, iar grupul Jermuk a pre-
luat producia Pepsi din Georgia. Potrivit datelor pentru
2010, 103 companii din Armenia au fost nregistrate n
Georgia. Experii estimeaz c n total n Georgia opereaz
n jur de 4 mii de afaceri mici i mijlocii cu capital armean.
Prezena mai activ pe piaa georgian a investitorilor din
Armenia a condus la nfiinarea Uniunii Antreprenorilor
Armeni (Vardanyan, 2011). O serie de factori determin
aceast tendin: pe de o parte, sunt corupia, multiplele
obstacole de ordin birocratic pentru oamenii de afaceri i
piaa mic a Armeniei; pe de alt parte, sunt condiiile mai
favorabile pentru deschiderea i organizarea afacerii, scu-
tirea de taxe pentru afacerile nou nfiinate, nivelul de
corupie redus i infrastructura din Georgia.50 Clasamentul
Doing Business al Bncii Mondiale confirm diferena
dintre Armenia i Georgia la capitolul mediu de afaceri,
rile ocupnd n 2011 locurile 48 i, respectiv 12 (World
Bank, 2011). Totodat, Georgia i n special litoralul su
(Batumi i Kobuleti) sunt o destinaie turistic preferat
pentru tot mai muli turiti din Armenia. n 2009, numrul
cetenilor armeni care au vizitat Georgia a depit 300.000
(Chkhikvadze, 2010), iar acest numr a atins aproape
50 Interviu cu experti, Erevan, iunie 2011.
105
200.000 de turiti doar n perioada ianuarie-aprilie 2011
(News.Am, 2011a).
Cooperarea bilateral ns nu s-a focalizat exclusiv asupra
domeniului economic i extinderii comunicaiilor de trans-
port. Agenda bilateral conine unele dosare care, dac sunt
neglijate, pot complica semnificativ relaiile ntre Georgia i
Armenia. n dorina de a elimina de pe agend subiectele
litigioase, guvernul de la Tbilisi a abordat problemele mino-
ritii armene: nregistrarea bisericii armeneti (Biserica
Apostolic Armean) i demarcarea i gestionarea frontierei.
ns nu toate iniiativele guvernului s-au bucurat de sprijinul
populaiei. La rndul lor, autoritile de la Erevan au rspuns
de o manier cooperant la aceste eforturi. n spaiul public,
executivul sau conducerea bisericii armeneti au fost criticate
pentru luri de poziii uneori prea flexibile.
Frontiera armeano-georgian nu este delimitat i demar-
cat integral pn n prezent. n lipsa demarcrii clare, n (n jur de 100.000 au fost deportai din regiune n Asia
localitile de frontier uneori este dificil de stabilit pn
unde se extinde dreptul de proprietate asupra unui lot de
pmnt. Prin urmare, au loc incidente legate de accesul ra-
nilor la terenurile agricole. Prile au depus eforturi pentru
a grbi procedura de delimitare i demarcare a frontierei.
n 2010, Comisia interguvernamental de profil a convenit
asupra delimitrii i demarcrii a 160 km (71%) din cei 225
(OSCE Yerevan Office, 2010, 13, 15). Totodat, Armenia i
Georgia au ajuns la un acord politic cu privire la gestionarea
comun a trei din cele ase puncte de trecere a frontierei
(RFE, 2011a). Implementarea acestei iniiative este menit
s faciliteze fluxurile de pasageri i cele comerciale ntre cele
dou ri.
n Georgia, exist comuniti armeneti n Tbilisi (circa
83.000 de persoane n 2002), Batumi (aproximativ 800
n 2002) i regiunea separatist Abhazia (n jur de 45.000
n 2005). ns cea mai numeroas prezen se nregistreaz
n Samhe-Javaheti (aproape 125.000 n 2002), regiunea
din sudul Georgiei care se nvecineaz cu Armenia i Turcia.
106
n perioada sovietic, regiunea a gzduit baza militar din
Ahalkalaki care fcea parte din districtul militar transcau-
cazian. Din acest motiv, regiunea avea un regim semi-nchis
i era relativ izolat de restul Georgiei.51 Dup disoluia
Uniunii Sovietice, Rusia a preluat controlul asupra bazei
militare, care a devenit principalul angajator i surs de
venit pentru populaia local (Overland, 2009). n 2007,
baza din Ahalkalaki a fost evacuat, ridicnd semne de
ntrebare cu privire la perspectivele economice ale regiunii.
La Tbilisi, a existat teama c Rusia va ncerca s destabi-
lizeze regiunea, provocnd tensiuni interetnice n Samhe-
Javaheti. ngrijorrile nu au fost lipsite de temei. Aa cum
confirm partea armean, Rusia a avut cteva tentative de a
mobiliza minoritatea armean mpotriva guvernului de la
Tbilisi nainte i dup rzboiul din 2008, fie prin anunarea
repatrierii iminente a turcilor meshetini n Samhe-Javaheti
Central n 1944), fie relund discursul despre discrimi-
narea armenilor n Georgia.52
Pe lng introducerea msurilor adiionale de securitate53,
guvernul de la Tbilisi a implementat o strategie complex
pentru integrarea regiunii i populaiei n circuitul economic
i educaional al Georgiei. n 2008 i 2010 au fost executate
proiecte de renovare sau construcie de autostrad care au
legat regiunea cu vestul Georgiei i Tbilisi. Odat cu finali-
zarea proiectului de cale ferat Baku-Tbilisi-Kars, distana
ntre Samhe-Javaheti i Tbilisi va fi parcurs n aproximativ
dou ore. Executivul de la Tbilisi a realizat investiii masive
n infrastructura local: coli, spitale, sisteme de distribuie
a apei i energiei electrice (International Crisis Group,
2011b, 6). O alt component a strategiei a vizat educaia.
Necunoaterea limbii georgiene reduce semnificativ ansele
tinerilor din regiune de a face studii sau de a beneficia de
51 Interviu cu un reprezentant mass-media, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
52 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
53 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
107
oportuniti de angajare. Cu ajutorul donatorilor externi, scoate de pe ordinea zilei chestiunea nregistrrii bisericii
au fost organizate cursuri gratuite de studiere a limbii. De armeneti n Georgia. ns soluionarea problemelor de pro-
asemenea, a fost facilitat accesul armenilor din Samhe-Java- prietate asupra lcaelor de cult va necesita mai mult timp
heti la studii superioare n instituiile de nvmnt din i rbdare din partea ambelor pri. Protestele de strad de
Georgia.54 Reprezentanii societii civile din Armenia care la Tbilisi, declanate n urma amendrii legislaiei cu privire
au vizitat regiunea n 2010-2011 au constatat c populaia la minoritile religioase, arat ct de sensibil este acest
este mult mai optimist n privina situaiei economice i subiect i ct de ateni trebuie s fie n continuare liderii
sociale, dect cu civa ani n urm. Cererea pentru studierea politici pentru a pstra o dinamic pozitiv n raporturile
limbii georgiene a crescut. n loc s mearg la Erevan, tot mai bilaterale din ultimii ani.
muli armeni din regiune opteaz pentru universitile din
Tbilisi.55 Autoritile de la Erevan au adaptat discursul fa 2.3. Azerbaidjan Georgia: tot mai aproape
de minoritatea armean din Georgia la schimbrile din regiu- ntre Azerbaidjan i Georgia s-a dezvoltat n timp o
ne. Preedintele Armeniei a apreciat eforturile executivului relaie politic i economic foarte strns care se bazeaz,
georgian pentru a mbunti situaia socio-economic n nu n ultimul rnd, pe o experien istoric pozitiv n scurta
Samhe-Javaheti i a anunat disponibilitatea de a asista perioad de independen de dup Primul Rzboi Mondial.
acest proces (Civil.Ge, 2009b). n perioada post-sovietic relaiile personale apropiate ntre
Un alt factor iritant n relaiile bilaterale o reprezint preedinii evardnadze i Aliev au solidificat raporturile
problema nregistrrii bisericii armeneti n Georgia i ntre Azerbaidjan i Georgia. De la nceputul anilor 90, cele
cererile reciproce de restituire a lcaelor de cult. Aadar, dou ri se confrunt cu conflicte teritoriale, iar restabili-
partea armean pretinde o serie de biserici n Tbilisi i n rea integritii teritoriale devine principalul laitmotiv care
Samhe-Javaheti. n acelai timp, partea georgian reclam sudeaz relaia din punct de vedere politic. n 2008,
dreptul de proprietate asupra unor biserici medievale din Georgia s-a numrat printre cele 39 de state care au votat n
nordul Armeniei de la grania cu Georgia (Civil.Ge, 2011d). favoarea rezoluiei Adunrii Generale a ONU cu privire la
Pn de curnd, potrivit legislaiei georgiene, minoritile situaia pe teritoriul ocupat al Azerbaidjanului. n august
religioase nu puteau fi nregistrate n calitate de persoane 2008, dup izbucnirea conflictului militar n Osetia de Sud,
juridice de drept public. Astfel, statul proteja biserica orto- Ministerul Afacerilor Externe din Azerbaidjan a calificat
dox din Georgia, refuznd calitatea similar altor culte din aciunile Georgiei n vederea restabilirii integritii terito-
ar, inclusiv bisericii armeneti. ns, n 2011, Catolicosul riale ca fiind n conformitate cu dreptul internaional
tuturor armenilor a efectuat o vizit istoric n Georgia, (Today.Az, 2008). Pentru autoritile de la Baku, rzboiul
prima vizit a unei nalte fee bisericeti armene n ara avea implicaii directe asupra situaiei din Nagorno-Karabah.
vecin din 1894. n cadrul acesteia, au fost ridicate cele Fr ndoial, recuperarea Osetiei de Sud de ctre Georgia
dou probleme. La foarte scurt timp, parlamentul Georgiei n 2008 ar fi pus presiune pe regimul de la Baku. Dac
a modificat legea n sensul admiterii nregistrrii altor culte Georgia a reuit, noi de ce s nu ncercm? ar fi fost
ca persoane juridice de drept public. Modificarea legislativ mesajul popular care ar fi mpins guvernul dincolo de reto-
rica belicoas al crei prizonier a devenit. ns nfrngerea
54 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, mai 2011. Georgiei a redus, n unele cercuri, entuziasmul pentru o
55 Interviu cu experi, Erevan, iunie 2011. soluie militar, care n contextul postconflict are mai puine

108 109
anse de succes.56 Situaia economic dificil din Georgia,
dup rzboiul din 2008, a motivat guvenul de la Baku s
ofere sprijin statului n a crui existen i supravieuire este
direct interesat.
Azerbaidjanul i Georgia sunt interdependente n sec-
torul energetic. Georgia depinde de livrrile de gaze din
Azerbaidjan aproape n totalitate. n schimb, principalele
rute de export de gaze i petrol dinspre Azerbaidjan spre
piaa european traverseaz Georgia. Un eventual rzboi
ntre Armenia i Azerbaidjan poate afecta livrrile spre
Georgia prin conducta de gaze Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, care
trece la o distan nu foarte mare de zona de conflict.
Experii avertizeaz c, n cazul reizbucnirii conflictului din
Nagorno-Karabah, reelele energetice vor fi inta predilect
a forelor armene (International Crisis Group, 2011a, 14).
n aceste circumstane, Georgia va fi nevoit s apeleze la
Gazprom pentru a-i acoperi consumul de gaze. Similar,
conflictul pe teritoriul Georgiei poate duce la distrugerea
reelelor energetice de transport afectnd exporturile de
hidrocarburi ale Azerbaidjanului. n astfel de condiii, Rusia
devine un partener nu foarte dorit, dar necesar pentru Azer-
baidjan. n august 2008, Azerbaidjanul a reorientat o parte
din exporturile de petrol care tranziteaz Georgia (Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceihan i Baku-Supsa) spre conducta Baku-Novo-
rossisk.
Relaia ntre Baku i Tbilisi este cimentat de schimburi
economice i dialog politic intensiv. La nivel nalt sau minis-
terial au loc multiple ntlniri i consultri. Potrivit statisti-
cilor, n 2010 Azerbaidjanul a fost al 4-lea partener comer-
cial al Georgiei cu o pondere de 7,8% (EU Commission,
2011c). De asemenea, n 2010, Azerbaidjan s-a numrat
printre principalii investitori strini n Georgia, plasndu-se
pe locul cinci cu $58 milioane (Civil.Ge, 2011e). Ponderea
Georgiei este semnificativ mai redus n comerul Azerbai-
djanului (1,5%), indicnd o asimetrie economic n relaiile
56 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
110
bilaterale (EU Commission, 2011d). La nivelul opiniei
publice, 22% din respondenii din Georgia au calificat Azer-
baidjanul ca fiind cel mai important partener al Georgiei
(International Republican Institute, 2011). n Azerbaidjan,
11,3% consider Georgia un stat prieten (Puls-R/Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Aceast diferen reflect importana
sporit a Azerbaidjanului, n percepia public, pentru
securitatea energetic a Georgiei. Trebuie menionat ns, c
n cazul Azerbaidjanului numrul simpatizanilor Georgiei
aproape s-a dublat din 2006 (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, 2010). Aceast dinamic poate fi explicat prin
creterea simpatiei la nivel popular pentru cauza reintegrrii
Georgiei dup rzboiul din 2008 i rolul Georgiei n tran-
zitul petrolului i gazelor.
Azerbaidjanul a intervenit decisiv pentru a garanta nece-
sarul de gaze pentru Georgia de dou ori n ultimii cinci ani.
Prima dat, n 2006, atunci cnd Gazpromul a ntrerupt
livrrile spre Georgia, mrind drastic preul la gaze. A doua
oar, n 2008, imediat dup rzboi, cnd Baku i Tbilisi au
convenit asupra contractului de furnizare a gazelor pe cinci
ani, n 2009 gazele fiind livrate la un pre preferenial
(Alieva, 2009, 2). Ulterior, prile au ajuns la un acord de
a prelungi contractul pn n 2020 fr a modifica preul
de baz la gaze naturale (AZE.Az, 2010). Nivelul nalt de
ncredere ntre Baku i Tbilisi a facilitat intrarea Azerbai-
djanului n sectorul energetic din Georgia. Compania de stat
SOCAR controleaz terminalul petrolier de la Kulevi care
a devenit operabil din 2008. Totodat, SOCAR a intrat pe
piaa distribuiei de gaze din Georgia, avnd o cot de pia
de aproape 75%. Compania preconizeaz construcia a
1500 km de conducte care vor aduga la reeaua de gaze
deja existent ali 150.000 de consumatori (ABC.Az, 2011).
Georgia este o pies important n proiectul AGRI (Azer-
baidjan-Georgia-Romnia Interconnector) la care particip
SOCAR. Acesta prevede transportul gazelor din Azerbai-
djan spre terminalul Kulevi, de unde vor fi transportate n
continuare n portul Constana n form lichefiat (LNG).
111
ns relaia de ncredere ntre Baku i Tbilisi are limite. Dei
s-a vehiculat ideea c Azerbaidjanul a oferit Georgiei $500
milioane pentru a achiziiona conducta prin care se furni-
zeaz gaze spre Armenia (Asbarez Post, 2010), autoritile
de la Tbilisi au exclus posibilitatea cedrii pachetului
majoritar. Preluarea acestei conducte de ctre Azerbaidjan
ar spori potenialul de conflict ntre Baku i Erevan, lucru pe
care Georgia vrea s-l evite din raiuni de securitate energe-
tic naional i regional.
Din perspectiva Azerbaidjanului, participarea rii vecine
este crucial pentru realizarea legturii feroviare cu Turcia.
Iniial se preconiza c proiectul Baku-Tbilisi-Kars va bene-
ficia de finanare internaional, cu ajutorul creia Georgia
va putea desfura lucrrile de reabilitare i construcie pe
sectorul Marabda-Ahalkalaki-Karahi. ns donatorii externi
au refuzat s ofere mprumuturi pentru proiect, pe motiv c
acesta nu contribuie la integrarea regional. Dat fiind
importana proiectului, Azerbaidjan a aprobat dou mpru-
muturi n condiii avantajoase pentru Georgia (pe 25 ani
cu 1% dobnd pe an) din care s fie finanate lucrrile.
n 2007, Baku a oferit $200 milioane, iar n 2011 alte $575
milioane. Condiiile de creditare prevd rambursarea mpru-
muturilor din veniturile realizate de Georgia de pe urma
exploatrii acestui segment de cale ferat, care ar deveni
operaional ncepnd cu 2013 (Civil.Ge, 2011f). Prin pris-
ma sectorului turistic georgian, Azerbaidjanul este vzut ca
un rezervor important de turiti. Conexiunea direct Baku-
Tbilisi pe calea aerului este suplimentat de numeroase
curse de autocar. n ultimii zece ani, numrul vizitatorilor
din Azerbaidjan a crescut considerabil, ajungnd n 2009 la
aproape 400.000 (Chkhikvadze, 2010). Numrul turitilor
se anticipeaz s cresc: doar n perioada ianuarie-aprilie
2011 Georgia a fost vizitat de 244.000 de ceteni azeri
(ArmeniaNews, 2011).
Cu toate c se dezvolt rapid, relaiile dintre Baku i
Tbilisi nu sunt lipsite de probleme care afecteaz atmosfera
bilateral sau pot tensiona relaiile. Prile recunosc existena
112
dosarelor iritante, dar reitereaz determinarea de a le solu-
iona ntr-un mod amiabil. Dup douzeci de ani de la re-
dobndirea independenei, cei doi vecini nc nu au fina-
lizat delimitarea i demarcarea frontierei. n 1996, a fost
nfiinat comisia interguvernamental pentru delimitarea
i demarcarea frontierei. n 2010, Baku i Tbilisi au con-
venit asupra delimitrii a 300 km (66%) din cei 480 km de
frontier (Trend, 2011a). Procesul avanseaz lent, nu n
ultimul rnd din cauza disputei n jurul mnstirii David
Gareja, care se afl parial n regiunea georgian Kakheti i
parial n regiunea Agstafa din Azerbaidjan. Complexul
David Gareja gzduiete peste 20 de biserici i numeroase
peteri pe o distan de 25 km. Mnstirea are o valoare
istoric, cultural i spiritual pentru Georgia, care ar dori
s fac un schimb de terenuri pentru a controla integral teri-
toriul mnstirii. Printre posibilele variante de compensare
s-a vehiculat cedarea satului Erismedi, o localitate de fron-
tier disputat ntre cele dou ri. Pentru partea azer ns
biserica Bertubani care face parte din mnstire este con-
siderat important din punct de vedere strategic, din cauza
altitudinii la care se afl. Prin urmare, Baku respinge orice
compensaie teritorial n schimbul renunrii la partea sa
din complexul David Gareja. n cadrul negocierilor, Azer-
baidjanul a lansat idea transformrii mnstirii ntr-o zon
turistic deschis. Biserica ortodox georgian s-a opus
categoric acestei propuneri. n 2007, preedinii celor dou
ri au discutat posibilitatea cedrii mnstirii n favoarea
Georgiei, n condiiile n care Azerbaidjan menine controlul
asupra punctelor strategice la altitudini. ns, dincolo de
discuii, prile nu au avansat n procesul de identificare a
unei soluii pn n prezent (Petriashvili i Ismayilov, 2006;
Kazimov, 2011).
Minoritatea azer locuiete compact n regiunile Kvemo
Kartli, Kaheti i Mheta-Mtianeti de-a lungul graniei cu
Azerbaidjan i Armenia. Populaia azer a Georgiei, potrivit
ultimului recensmnt, atinge aproximativ 285.000 de
locuitori. Situaia minoritii azere din Georgia s-a bucurat
113
de mai puin atenie internaional, deoarece nu era con-
siderat o problem cu potenial social i politic exploziv
(Cornell et al., 2005, 24). ns minoritatea se confrunt cu
numeroase probleme de infrastructur, necunoaterea limbii
de stat i accesul limitat la funcii publice locale sau edu-
caie superioar, frontiera nedemarcat armeano-georgian
i abuzurile sporadice din partea grnicerilor armeni, precum
i subdezvoltare economic. Dei unele probleme de infra-
structur au fost abordate de guvernul de la Tbilisi n ultimii
ani, sistemul de asigurare a apei potabile, reparaia drumu-
rilor rurale i sectorul agricol au fost neglijate. De asemenea,
problema cunoaterii limbii georgiene rmne acut, nu sunt
suficieni instructori bilingvi i interesul pentru nvarea
limbii rmne sczut. Majoritatea tinerilor din regiune pre-
fer s-i continue studiile n Azerbaidjan (CIPDD, GYLA i
Safeworld, 2011). nchiderea n 2005 a pieei din Sadahlo,
sat populat de azeri, a lsat 5.000 de oameni fr un venit
stabil. Condiiile economice dificile din Kvemo Kartli i
foreaz pe etnicii azeri s migreze n rile din vecintate n pentru integritatea teritorial a Azerbaidjanului i asigurarea
cutarea oportunitilor de angajare.
n 2010, Rusia a acuzat Georgia de violarea drepturilor
minoritilor etnice i a chemat Tbilisi s normalizeze rela-
iile cu minoritile de pe teritoriul su, inclusiv cu azerii
(Socor, 2010). Azerbaidjanul a rmas impasibil la tentativa
de manipulare a Rusiei. De altfel, Baku a evitat s politizeze
problemele minoritii azere din Georgia. Azerbaidjanul s-a
comportat n spiritul neimplicrii n ceea ce consider afa-
cerile interne ale Georgiei. n virtutea intereselor economice
i politice, fragmentarea Georgiei este mpotriva intereselor
Azerbaidjanului. Prin urmare, autoritile de la Baku au
ncurajat loialitatea minoritii azere fa de statul georgian.
ns guvernul de la Baku recunoate tacit multilplele pro-
bleme de ordin economic i social ale minoritii azere. n
consecin, Azerbaidjanul, prin intermediul fundaiilor sau
companiilor, s-a implicat n proiecte de infrastructur i
programe sociale n regiunile populate de azeri (Today.Az,
2011). De exemplu, companiile Akord i Azerinshaat au luat
114
parte la reabilitarea poriunii de drum Telet-Samhe-Java-
heti. Fondul Heydar Aliev a finanat reabilitarea sau con-
strucia de coli n Kvemo Kartli n 2009-2010 (MES
Georgia, 2010). Cu toate c problema minoritii azere nu
a fost politizat de Baku, aceasta are potenial destabiliza-
tor la nivel social. n 2006, dou ziare ale Asociaiei Naio-
nale a Azerilor din Georgia cu sediul la Baku, care militeaz
pentru recunoaterea limbii azere drept a doua limb de
stat, au fost suspendate (RFE, 2009). n 2005, comunitatea
azer a protestat mpotriva nchiderii pieii din Sadahlo,
solicitnd autoritilor centrale s revin asupra deciziei.
Nu n ultimul rnd, sustenabilitatea coabitrii preponderent
panice a comunitii armene i azere n Kvemo Kartli poate
fi testat de reizbucnirea conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah.
Pe lng chestiunile cu privire la minoritile naionale
i demarcarea frontierei, factorul armean poate genera ten-
siuni n relaiile bilaterale. Georgia este pus tot mai mult
n situaia dificil de a pstra echilibrul ntre sprijin politic
tranzitului comercial pentru Armenia. Privind prin prisma
integritii teritoriale i cooperrii n sectorul energetic,
Baku dorete ca balana s ncline n favoarea sa. Dei la
nceputul anilor 90 a ncercat s conving fr succes
Georgia s se alture blocadei economice a Armeniei, Baku
a tolerat, n general, schimburile comerciale ntre Armenia
i Georgia. Evacuarea bazei militare din Ahalkalaki n 2007,
ns, a trezit ngrijorare la Baku, deoarece o parte a arsena-
lului urma s fie transferat n Armenia, n dotarea forelor
ruseti de la baza din Gyumri. Dei acordul ruso-georgian
stipula obligaia Rusiei de a nu transfera armament forelor
armene, nu existau mijloace credibile de a verifica respec-
tarea de ctre Moscova a obligaiilor asumate (Socor, 2007).
Desigur, Azerbaidjanul ar prefera ca echipamentul militar
s fie transferat integral n Rusia. n 2011, ambasadorul
Azerbaidjanului n Georgia a prezentat, n termeni deloc
diplomatici, presupusul pericol al cooperarii economice ar-
meano-georgiene i al comunitii armene pentru integritatea
115
teritorial a Georgiei. Diplomatul a chemat Georgia i Azer-
baidjanul s-i uneasc eforturile pentru a se opune politicii
Armeniei n regiune (Apa News, 2011). n timp ce apelul
nu va schimba optica guvernului georgian fa de Armenia,
discursul rezoneaz cu unele segmente sociale marginale n
Georgia aa cum arat rezultatele sondajelor de opinie
public. Este puin probabil ca la Baku s existe iluzia c
executivul de la Tbilisi i va schimba radical politica fa de
Armenia. n acelai timp, acest discurs probabil semnaleaz
o stare de iritare la Baku cu privire la efectele resetului
pragmatic ale relaiilor armeano-georgiene. n condiiile date,
Georgia va avea nevoie de mult ndemnare diplomatic
pentru a naviga ntre aspiraiile adeseori contradictorii ale
vecinilor si din Caucazul de Sud.
III. Caucazul de Sud: raporturile cu puterile
regionale
Procesele regionale nu sunt doar produsul raporturilor
ntre cele trei republici din Caucazul de Sud. Regiunea este
un teren pe care actori cu importan regional precum
SUA, UE, Rusia, Turcia i Iran concureaz economic, poli-
tic, militar i cultural. n acelai timp, republicile caucaziene
ncearc s extrag maximum din aceast competiie pentru
a-i promova propriile agende de securitate naional pe
plan regional.
3.1. Armenia: complementaritatea variabil
Politica extern a Armeniei urmrete o serie de obiective
majore: garantarea aprrii n cazul unui atac convenional
din partea Azerbaidjanului, pstrarea statu quo-ului sau
soluionarea conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah respectnd
dreptul la autodeterminare a popoarelor, spargerea blocadei
impuse de Azerbaidjan i Turcia, atragerea unor investiii
strine i asistenei financiare internaionale pentru dezvol-
tarea economic, recunoaterea internaional a genocidului
116
armenilor. Pentru a realiza aceste obiective, politica extern
a Armeniei se conduce dup principiul complementaritii.
Aceasta presupune ca Armenia s dezvolte relaii apropiate
cu principalii actori regionali astfel nct sinergia acestora s
contribuie sectorial la promovarea i realizarea obiectivelor
de politic extern. n domeniul economic, complementa-
ritatea este expresia dependenei economice a Armeniei de
donatorii externi. La nivelul securitii militare, comple-
mentaritatea este rspunsul la dependena de Rusia.
3.1.1. Rusia
Din gama parteneriatelor i alianelor dezvoltate de
Armenia, cea cu Rusia este de importan vital. Rusia este
unul din copreedinii activi ai Grupului de la Minsk i este
un actor indispensabil n procesul de negociere n dosarul
Nagorno-Karabahului. n plus, aliana este condiionat de
dependena economic, energetic i militar a Armeniei de
Rusia. Aliana cu Rusia se bucur de sprijinul a 95% din
cetenii Armeniei (International Republican Institute
2008a).
n plan militar, Armenia face parte din OTSC, fapt care,
teoretic, garanteaz securitatea rii prin clauza care pre-
supune intervenia organizaiei n cazul unei agresiuni
mpotriva unui membru. Pentru Erevan OTSC este Rusia,
iar n caz de agresiune se ateapt la asistena militar a
Rusiei, i nu a Belarusului sau a republicilor din Asia Cen-
tral.57 Pe durata preedeniei OTSC, Armenia a sprijinit
activ crearea forelor de reacie rapid n ideea asigurrii
unei intervenii nentrziate a organizaiei n caz de necesi-
tate58. n 2010, unul dintre exerciiile forelor de reacie
rapid a avut loc n Rostov, n sudul Rusiei. Pe lng clauza
de securitate, OTSC ofer posibilitatea procurrii arma-
mentului rusesc la preuri interne sau, n cazuri speciale,
57 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
58 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.
117
transferuri gratuite de echipamente. NATO nu ofer aa
ceva59, contrapune un expert local avantajele de participare
la o alt alian militar. Garantarea securitii militare,
ns, nu se reduce la nelegeri multilaterale n cadrul OTSC.
Armenia gzduiete dou baze militare ruseti, la Gyumri
i Erevan, care numr aproximativ 4.000 de militari. De
asemenea, pe teritoriul Armeniei activeaz grniceri rui
care asigur protecia frontierei de stat cu Turcia i Iran. n
2010, Armenia a extins prezena militarilor rui pn n
2044. Potrivit autoritilor de la Erevan, n urma acordului,
aria de activitate a forelor ruse n Armenia nu mai e limi-
tat la frontiera extern a ex-Uniunii Sovietice (Danielyan
2010). Rusia s-a angajat s protejeze interesele regionale
ale Armeniei60, explic semnificaia acordului un oficial.
Rusia a promis livrarea de armament i deschiderea unor
societi mixte din industria de aprare a Armeniei.
Dei se bucur de o dubl asigurare din partea Rusiei,
n Armenia exist dubii cu privire la momentul interveniei
Moscovei n eventualitatea eruperii conflictului. Clauza
de aprare nu a fost testat niciodat [], Rusia nu i va
permite s nu intervin, cci i va pierde credibilitatea, [dar]
cnd o va face: dup sau naintea unei decizii a Consiliului
de Securitate a ONU, dup ce vom pierde o parte din teri-
toriul Nagorno-Karabahului sau imediat dup izbucnirea
conflictului?61, se ntreab un expert. Partea rus a comu-
nicat c va interveni la timpul potrivit. Aceast ambiguitate
induce suspiciune i determin Armenia s se asigure c, cel
puin n prima faz a conflictului, va fi capabil s poarte
singur ostilitile.62
n plan economic, Armenia este prizoniera relaiilor
conflictuale dintre Georgia i Rusia, iar rzboiul din 2008
a demonstrat acest lucru ct se poate de bine (Markedonov,
59 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
60 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.
61 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
62 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
118
2011). Un rzboi ntre cele dou state las Armenia cu o
singur frontier deschis i rut de tranzit comercial
Iran. Dincolo de aceste aspecte, Armenia este interesat de
accesul la piaa rus, de importurile de gaze, suportul finan-
ciar i investiiile ruse. Rusia este al doilea partener comer-
cial al Armeniei, cu o pondere de aproape 21% n comer
(EU Commission, 2011b). Rusia rmne n continuare des-
tinaia preferat pentru muncitorii sezonieri din Armenia, al
cror numr se ridic la proximativ 2 milioane. Muncitorii
armeni din strintate au transferat acas $1,3 miliarde
n 2010, ceea ce reprezint 13% din PIB-ul rii (Danielyan,
2011). Experii estimeaz c 75% din remitene au ca ar
de origine Rusia.63 Armenia depinde n proporie de 80%
de livrrile de gaze din Rusia i aproximativ 80% din reeaua
de distribuie a gazelor este controlat de Gazprom. De
asemenea, monopolul rus a preluat controlul asupra poriu-
nii armene a gazoductului Tabriz-Ersah care leag Armenia
cu Iranul. n schimb, Armenia pltete cel mai mic pre n
CSI pentru gazele naturale din Rusia, $210 pe o mie m/c
(Armtown.Com, 2011a). Totodat, Rusia este gata s par-
ticipe la construcia noilor uniti de la centrala nuclear
Metsamor, care s nlocuiasc reactoarele care trebuie s fie
scoase din uz pn n 2017.
Pentru dezvoltarea economic n condiii de semi-izolare
regional, Armenia caut investiii pe termen lung i sprijin
finanicar. n anii 2000, Armenia a acceptat intrarea masiv
a capitalului rus n sectoare de importan strategic: tele-
comunicaii, ci ferate, sectorul financiar-bancar, industria
grea. Rusia a preluat cile ferate armene pe o durat de 30
de ani, obligndu-se s investeasc n modernizarea lor
$570 milioane. Un model de succes la Erevan este conside-
rat investiia de $70 milioane realizat de Rusal n re-
tehnologizarea uzinei locale de aluminiu. Prin urmare, Rusia
a rmas principalul investitor al Armeniei n 2010 cu $270
milioane (Mediamax, 2011). Criza economic a afectat
63 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
119
puternic Armenia. n 2010, guvernul rus a anunat c va
acorda Armeniei un mprumut de $500 milioane pentru
stabilizarea macroeconomic. n 2011, Moscova i Erevanul
au ajuns la un acord de principiu cu privire la acordarea
unui credit n valoare de $400 milioane din fondul anticriz
al Comunitii Economice Eurasiatice (EurAsEc), organi-
zaie n care Armenia este doar observator (Hayrumyan,
2011). Se preconizeaz c banii vor fi investii n moder-
nizarea uzinei chimice Nairit, care a suferit de pe urma
crizei economice globale.
Dependena de Rusia restrnge autonomia autoritilor
de Erevan n plan extern i are un impact semnificativ pe
plan intern. Rusia a pus presiune pe Armenia s nu ia parte
la exerciiul NATO din Georgia n 200964 i la sesiunea
Adunrii Parlamentare NATO de la Tbilisi n 201165. Se
pare c lista instituiilor guvernamentale la care sunt ataai
consilieri UE n Armenia a fost influenat de Moscova
(Popescu, 2009). La insistena, nu n ultimul rnd a Rusiei,
diametrul gazoductului ntre Armenia i Iran a fost redus.66
Erevanul nu a fost pregtit n vara 2011 pentru semnarea
unor acorduri n domeniul energetic cu Iranul din cauza opo-
ziiei Moscovei.67 Aliana cu Rusia are efecte adverse pentru
Armenia, ceea ce creeaz tensiuni n relaiile bilaterale.
Relaiile sunt departe de a fi calde68, confirm un diplomat.
Reprezentanii comunitii de afaceri reclam c investitorii
rui export modelul corupt de a face afaceri, care amplific
fenomenul corupiei n Armenia. Deseori investitorii rui
nu i onoreaz obligaiile rezultate din planul de investiii,
iar ntreprinderile nu funcioneaz la capacitatea maxim
sau activitatea acestora este sistat (Hayrumyan, 2010).
Evaluarea curii de conturi cu privire la activitatea com-
paniei ruse GPM Gold care controleaz minele de aur din
64 Interviu cu un oficial NATO.
65 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
66 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
67 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
68 Interviu cu un diplomat.
120
Sodk i Megradzor este semnificativ din acest punct de
vedere (RFE, 2010b). Activitatea centrelor ruse de recrutare
de pe teritoriul Armeniei care le ofer cetenilor armeni
cetenie rus cu condiia stabilirii domiciliului n regiunile
preponderent non-europene ale Rusiei a strnit un val de
proteste printre reprezentanii societii civile, n mass-media
i spaiul virtual. O iniiativ care a provocat iritare a fost
propunerea de a introduce limba rus ca mijloc de comuni-
care interetnic n Armenia, unde aproape 98% din locui-
tori sunt armeni. De asemenea, propunerea legislativ care
a declanat o dezbatere public aprins cu privire la colile
cu predare n limb strin a fost vzut de muli ca un act
normativ care va autoriza activitatea colilor cu predare n
limb rus. tirile despre uciderea muncitorilor armeni n
Rusia din motive xenofobe nu au adugat popularitate
Rusiei n Armenia.69
3.1.2. Iran
Efectele adverse ale alianei cu Rusia mping Armenia s
contrabalanseze dependena de Moscova. Iranul este veci-
nul imediat al Armeniei spre care privete Erevanul n efor-
turile sale de a diversifica opiunile economice i a garanta
poziia favorabil n conflictul din Nagorno-Karabah. Iranul
asigur ntre 25-30% din tranzitul comercial al Armeniei i
este o surs important de bunuri de larg consum. Astfel,
Iranul este al patrulea partener comercial al Armeniei, cu o
pondere de 5,6% (EU Commission 2011b). ns, la fel ca i
ruta prin Georgia, tranzitul prin Iran nu este sigur din cauza
relaiilor tensionate ntre Teheran i Washington i Teheran
i Ierusalim.
n ciuda diferenelor religioase, Armenia se simte confor-
tabil cu Iranul i nu l percepe drept o ameninare la adresa
securitii sale.70 n ultimele sondaje de opinie, 37% din cei
chestionai consider Iranul principalul partener al Armeniei
69 Interviu cu experi, Erevan 2011.
70 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.
121
i doar 5% l privesc prin prisma inamiciiei (International
Republican Institute, 2008a). Starea de siguran deriv, nu
n ultimul rnd, din tratamentul favorabil al minoritii
armene n Iran, care numr ntre 40 i 80.000 de oameni.
Armenii din Iran sunt printre cele mai puternice minoriti
religioase, fapt confirmat prin alocarea a dou locuri n
parlamentul de la Teheran. Atitudinea pozitiv a armenilor
se bazeaz i pe interaciunea intensiv pe linie turistic.
Armenia este o destinaie popular n Iran. Mii de turiti
iranieni viziteaz Armenia pentru srbtoarea Novruz Bai-
ram i vacana de var. n 2011, 28.000 de iranieni au venit
n Armenia cu ocazia Novruz Bairam (News.Am, 2011b).
Pentru iranieni, Armenia este Europa, unde ei se pot relaxa
aa cum regulile din Iran nu le permit71, explic un analist
interesul iranienilor pentru Armenia. ntre cele dou ri,
exist curse de avion regulate. Pn n prezent, Armenia i
Iran nu sunt conectate prin cale ferat. n perioada sovie-
tic, legtura era realizat prin Azerbaidjan. n 2009, Erevan
i Teheran au czut de acord s construiasc o cale ferat
direct ntre cele dou ri, care s se extind pn la Golful Iran. n primvara lui 2011, edina interguvernamental
Persic. Valoarea proiectului se ridic la $1,8 miliarde. n
2010, Armenia a dus o campanie activ pentru identificarea
finanatorilor externi pentru acest proiect (RFE, 2010c).
Compatibilitatea ntre cele dou ri este sudat de
sentimentul de izolare regional (Coene, 2010, 180), pe
care Armenia i Iranul ncearc s o depeasc inclusiv cu
ajutor reciproc. Dup suspendarea tranzitului militar prin
Georgia, Iran a oferit spaiu aerian pentru cargoul militar
destinat bazei militare din Gyumri cel puin o dat. Dete-
riorarea relaiilor ruso-iraniene dup aprobarea de ctre
Consiliul de Securitate al ONU a sanciunilor mpotriva
Iranului a pus Armenia ntr-o situaie dificil. Experii nu
exclud faptul c partea armean ncearc s intermedieze
aprobarea tranzitului spre Gyumri de ctre Teheran pentru
urmtoarea ncrctur.72 Erevanul apreciaz, de asemenea,
71 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
72 Interviu cu experi, Erevan, iunie 2011.
122
poziia Iranului n problema Nagorno-Karabahului. Iranul
nu ncurajeaz schimbarea statu quo-ului, fiind preocupat de
implicaiile asupra securitii sale n cazul retragerii chiar i
limitate a Armeniei i desfurrii forelor internaionale de
meninere a pcii, care ar putea include SUA i rile mem-
bre UE, foarte aproape de frontiera sa.73 Discuiile tele-
fonice ale preedintelui iranian cu omologul din Azerbaidjan
i Armenia n ajunul summit-ului de la Kazan confirm
preocuparea Teheranului cu privire la efectele regionale ale
tratativelor purtate ntre Baku, Erevan i Moscova.
Cooperarea n domeniul energetic cu Iranul este impor-
tant pentru Armenia din trei motive: alimentarea cu gaze
n cazul sistrii livrrilor dinspre Georgia, care va acoperi
necesarul pe o perioad limitat; diminuarea gradual a
dependenei de Rusia; i aprovizionarea forelor armate cu
combustibil n cazul relurii ostilitilor n Nagorno-Karabah.
Armenia i Iran sunt conectate prin dou linii de transmisie
electric. O parte din gazele iraniene importate este folosit
pentru a genera i exporta energie electric din Armenia n
la Teheran a pregtit o serie de acorduri n domeniul infra-
structurii i energiei: construcia unei linii electrice de trans-
misie i a hidrocentralei de pe rul Aras (PanArmenian.Net,
2011). De asemenea, a fost reluat ideea construciei unui
oleoduct ntre cele dou ri. ns vizita preedintelui
iranian n Armenia, n vara 2011, n cadrul creia trebuia
s fie definitivate i semnate acordurile nu a avut loc. Tehe-
ranul a decalat vizita invocnd probleme la Erevan. Pe lng
deja amintita influen a Moscovei i calculele de ordin
intern ale preedintelui iranian, care au contribuit la
amnarea vizitei, se pare c nici Washingtonul nu agreeaz
unele proiecte care permit Teheranului s sparg izolarea
internaional.74
73 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011; interviu cu un expert,
Erevan, iunie 2011.
74 Interviu cu un diplomat.
123
 3.1.3. SUA
Dei la o distan geografic apreciabil de Caucazul de
Sud, SUA sunt o pies grea n angrenajul politico-diploma-
tic i economic al Armeniei. SUA sunt unul dintre co-pree-
dinii Grupului de la Minsk, gzduiesc o diaspor armean
numeroas i influent i sunt un donator extern important
pentru dezvoltarea economic a Armeniei. SUA au fost al
aptelea partener comercial al Armeniei n 2010 cu o pon-
dere de 4,1% (EU Commission, 2011b). Mai mult de 8%
din totalul remitenelor n Armenia i au originea n SUA
(New Europe, 2011). ncepnd cu 2006, Armenia a bene-
ficiat de fonduri nerambursabile n valoare de $235,6 mi-
lioane prin intermediul Corporaiei Provocrile Mileniului,
ns violenele postelectorale de la Erevan din 2008 au de-
terminat SUA s suspende finanarea proiectelor n cadrul
acestui program. Chiar i n aceste condiii Armenia rmne
n lista statelor cu cel mai mare ajutor din partea SUA pe
cap de locuitor. Asistena SUA acordat Armeniei n perioa-
da 1992-2005 depete $1 miliard (Nichol, 2011, 27). n
2011, Congresul SUA a aprobat pentru Armenia asisten
economic n valoare de $44 milioane, asisten militar n
valoare $3,5 milioane i $450.000 pentru pregtire militar.
De asemenea, SUA aloc anual sume pentru finanarea pro-
iectelor de reconstrucie i dezvoltare n Nagorno-Karabah.
Anul 2011 nu este o excepie, SUA alocnd $8 milioane pen-
tru programe de asisten n aceast regiune (RFE, 2010d).
n 1998-2008, SUA au acordat ajutor umanitar Nagorno-
Karabahului n valoare de $32 milioane (Nichol, 2011, 27).
Diaspora armean din SUA este esenial pentru Erevan
n eforturile de a obine asisten financiar n cadrul dez-
baterilor bugetare din legislativul american, de a bloca sau
a reduce asistena similar pentru Azerbaidjan, de a preveni
abrogarea seciunii 907 din Freedom Support Act aplicat
Azerbaidjanului, de a bloca unele numiri diplomatice ne-
convenabile (de pild, procedura de confirmare a actualului
ambasador n Azerbaidjan), de recunoatere a genocidului
124
armean. Pe lng activitatea de lobby depus la Washington,
comunitatea armean contribuie direct la dezvoltarea eco-
nomic prin finanarea unor proiecte de infrastructur n
Armenia. ns interesele diasporei i ale autoritilor de la
Erevan nu se suprapun mereu. n 2008 i 2009, conducerea
de la Erevan a fost mult mai favorabil presiunilor pe care le
puneau SUA asupra Turciei n vederea normalizrii relaiilor
cu Armenia. Temerea diasporei armene din SUA a fost c
Erevanul va reduce intensitatea campaniei pentru recunoa-
terea genocidului armenilor odat cu restabilirea relaiilor cu
Ankara. De asemenea, unii reprezentani ai diasporei care
au dorit s investeasc n Armenia au reclamat nivelul nalt
al corupiei i blocajele la nivel administrativ care mpiedic
dezvoltarea afacerilor.75
n contextul redefinirii prioritilor de securitate ale SUA
dup atentatele teroriste de la 11 septembrie 2001 i des-
furrii celor dou campanii militare majore din Afganistan
i Irak, Armenia i-a reactivat cooperarea n sectorul militar
cu SUA. O linie similar a fost promovat de Erevan fa de
NATO. Autoritile de la Erevan au perceput aceste evoluii
drept ocazii favorabile de a diversifica opiunile lor de
securitate, de a beneficia de asistena tehnic i a acumula
experien. Armenia a reuit s instituie un dialog strategic
regulat cu SUA i a semnat Planul de Aciuni Individuale ale
Parteneriatului cu NATO. Cu sprijinul SUA a fost deschis n
Armenia centrul specializat n pregtirea specialitilor n
dezamorsarea minelor. n 2010 Armenia a gzduit pentru
prima dat pe teritoriul su un exerciiu NATO. n perspec-
tiv sunt preconizate primele exerciii militare armeano-ame-
ricane. Armenia a trimis 46 de militari n Irak i 45 de mi-
litari n Afganistan. n 2011, Armenia i-a mrit substanial
prezena n Afganistan, deplasnd n teatrul de operaiuni
un contingent de 81 de militari. Toate acestea, n ansamblu,
nu intesc decuplarea Armeniei de aliana cu Federaia Rus.
75 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
125
n condiiile actualului statu quo n regiune, acest lucru ar fi
imposibil. n schimb, dorind s-i mreasc spaiul de mane-
vr pe plan extern, autoritile de la Erevan trimit Rusiei
semnalul c Armenia are i alte opiuni pentru a-i asigura
securitatea militar76. ntrebarea rmne ct de credibile
sunt aceste semnale pentru Rusia, care dispune de o gam
diversificat de instrumente pentru a preveni schimbarea
radical a cursului de politic extern a Armeniei.
3.1.4. UE
Cutnd s amplifice efectul diversificrii, n ultimii ani
Armenia i-a ndreptat atenia spre UE. Relaiile economice
Armeniei cu UE s-au intensificat rapid ncepnd cu 2005-
2006. Includerea Armeniei n politica de vecintate a UE i
semnarea planului de aciune UE-Armenia au impulsionat
acest proces. n consecin, Erevanul percepe UE drept o
resurs tot mai important pentru stabilitatea macro-finan-
ciar i dezvoltarea economic a Armeniei. Mrturisete un
observator: Cnd vorbim despre UE, prima ntrebare este
dac i ci bani ne vor da?77. Ultimul barometru de opinie
public arat c 29% din respondeni consider UE cel mai
important partener al Armeniei (International Republican
Institute, 2008a).
Armenia beneficiaz de asisten financiar semnifica-
tiv din partea UE. n perioada 2007-2010, UE a alocat
98,4 milioane, iar pentru perioada 2011-2013 sunt buge-
tate 157,3 milioane i alte 40 milioane care pot fi atrase
de Armenia din alte programe finanate de UE (Navasar-
dian, 2011, 65). n 2011 UE i Armenia au semnat un
memorandum cu privire la acordarea sprijinului macro-
financiar Armeniei pentru a depi efectele crizei economice
globale n valoare de 100 milioane, din care 65 milioane
sub form de mprumut i 35 milioane n calitate de grant
(Eteris, 2011). De asemenea, UE finaneaz programe
76 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
77 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
126
pentru mbuntirea securitii nucleare din Armenia.
UE a propus s acopere parial costurile nchiderii centralei
nucleare Metsamor. n plus, UE este al doilea investitor n
Armenia dup Rusia. Statele membre UE, Frana i Olanda,
sunt pe locul doi i trei n topul investitorilor n Armenia
n 2010, cu $146,7 i respectiv $64,3 milioane (Mediamax,
2011). n plan economic, UE este principalul partener
comercial al Armeniei, cu o pondere de 32,1% n 2010 (EU
Commission, 2011b). Acest lucru s-a datorat, nu n ultimul
rnd, extinderii din 2009 a Sistemului Generalizat de Prefe-
rine Plus (SGP+) asupra Armeniei, care a facilitat accesul
produselor autohtone pe piaa european. n 2008, UE a
comandat un studiu de fezabilitate cu privire la crearea unei
Zone de Comer Liber, Aprofundat i Cuprinztor (ZCLAC)
cu Armenia.
La Erevan, aproape toate forele politice sprijin apro-
pierea de UE. Exist un interes real pentru UE la Erevan78,
confirm un diplomat. Interesul este ntrit prin documen-
tele oficiale. Strategia naional de securitate adoptat n
2007 menioneaz integrarea european printre obiectivele
Armeniei (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). ns integrarea
n UE este conceput la Erevan altfel dect la Kiev, Chiinu
sau Tbilisi. ntrebat despre integrarea european, un oficial
a explicat: Noi nu vom bate la ua UE precum o fac vecinii.
Nu ne vom precipita. Integrarea european este un proces de
durat n cadrul cruia, pe msur ce soluionm problemele
noastre interne, vom atinge nivelul apropiat de dezvoltare
din statele membre UE. Abia atunci vom calcula dac merit
s devenim membri cu drepturi depline sau nu.79 Pe de
o parte, aceast poziionare fa de integrare demonstreaz
o gndire realist cu privire la perspectivele Armeniei de a
deveni membru UE n viitorul previzibil. Se pare c Erevanul
este relativ mulumit cu ceea ce a fost propus de UE vecinilor
din Est i ncearc s extrag maximum din oferta actual.
78 Interviu cu un diplomat.
79 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.
127
Pe de alt parte, aceast abordare arat c Erevanul este
interesat de cooperarea tehnic (introducerea standardelor
tehnice) i n acelai timp vrea s previn intruziunea exce-
siv a UE n afacerile politice interne, pstrnd o anumit
distan. Aa cum a observat un analist local conducerea
politic se ferete s-i asume prea multe obligaii n relaia
cu UE; statutul de membru al Consiliului Europei i pro-
blematica drepturilor omului genereaz deja prea multe bti
de cap pentru guvernani80.
Agenda de cooperare a Armeniei cu UE nu se reduce doar
la aspecte economice. Drept confirmare, n 2010 Armenia
s-a alturat celor 28 din cele 44 declaraii ale UE n dome-
niul politicii externe i de securitate la care a fost invitat s
se alinieze (EU Commission, 2011e). Cooperarea Armeniei
cu UE n domeniul politicii externe i de securitate are
conexiune direct cu disputa cu Azerbaidjanul i relaia difi-
cil cu Turcia. Pentru noi UE este o uniune a statelor cre-
tine81, declar un oficial. Fr a nominaliza Azerbaidjan i
Turcia, Armenia se pare c d de neles c cele dou state
nu au ce cuta n UE. Alternativ, acestea trebuie s-i
rezolve chestiunile contradictorii cu Armenia ca s poat
avansa pe calea integrrii n UE. Confirmnd aceast pozi-
ie, autoritile de la Erevan au exprimat dezamgire n
legtur cu faptul c soluionarea problemelor istorice i
deschiderea frontierei turco-armene nu au fost incluse de
UE ca precondiii pentru declanarea negocierilor de aderare
a Turciei (Navasardian, 2011, 64). Dei UE nu particip n
formatul de negocieri n chestiunea Nagorno-Karabahului,
Frana, stat membru al UE, este copreedintele Grupului
de la Minsk. Anterior au existat propuneri ca Frana s fie
nlocuit n Grupul de la Minsk de ctre un diplomat UE.
Armenia bucurndu-se de o legtur privilegiat cu Frana,
ara-gazd a unei diaspore armene influente, a blocat
aceast iniiativ (Popescu, 2011, 105). Aadar, obiectivele
80 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
81 Interviu cu un official, Erevan, iunie 2011.
128
diplomaiei armene n interaciunea cu instituiile UE sunt
pstrarea statu quo-ului n formatul de negocieri i blocarea
unor documente sau a unor iniiative care dezavantajeaz
Armenia n raport cu Azerbaidjanul. De regul, UE ncearc
s pstreze neutralitatea n raporturile cu cele dou ri. n
consecin, documentele UE deseori includ formulri care
satisfac i, n acelai timp, provoac nemulumiri la Erevan
sau Baku. De exemplu, Armenia a avut o reacie critic la
adresa rezoluiei care cheam UE s dezvolte o strategie fa
de Caucazul de Sud, care a fost adoptat de Parlamentul
European n 2010. Documentul cere n mod explicit retra-
gerea forelor militare armene de pe teritoriul ocupat al
Azerbaidjanului (EU Parliament, 2010), reiternd practic
mesajul rezoluiei Adunrii Generale ale ONU din 2008. n
acelai timp, pasajul n care UE este chemat s ofere ajutor
umanitar populaiei din Nagorno-Karabah este n armonie
cu eforturile Armeniei de dezizolare a Nagorno-Karabahului.
3.1.5. Turcia
Primul lucru pe care l fac muli din locuitorii Erevanului
dimineaa este s priveasc spre Turcia, admirnd mag-
nificul Ararat, muntele cu ncrctur istoric i simbolic
pentru armeni. Dei privirile sunt aintite spre Turcia, sunt
o serie de lucruri care i separ pe armeni de vecinul imediat
din vest. La nceputul anilor 90, Erevanul i Ankara s-au
aflat pe diferite pri ale baricadei n conflictul din Nagor-
no-Karabah. Rzboiul i nchiderea graniei cu Turcia i
Azerbaidjan care i-a urmat au resuscitat sentimentul de
ameninare turc nrdcinat n memoria istoric colectiv
a armenilor. Campania pentru recunoaterea genocidului
armean i referirea n Constituia Armeniei la provinciile de
est ale Turciei drept Armenia de Vest au adncit i mai mult
fractura dintre Erevan i Ankara.
ncepnd cu 2008, la nivel politic, Armenia a cutat
activ s depeasc animozitile. Rzboiul ruso-georgian a
grbit acest proces, care ar fi fost imposibil dac ambele
pri nu fceau mici pai spre normalizarea relaiilor. Ankara
129
a dat primele semne de apropiere n 2005-2007 prin restau-
rarea unor biserici armeneti pn atunci neglijate. Printre
acestea s-a numrat biserica Akdamar aflat pe una dintre
insulele de pe lacul Van. Oficialii din Armenia au participat
la ceremonia de deschidere a bisericii, iar ulterior autori-
tile turce au permis oficierea unei slujbe pe an la biserica
Akdamar. Erevanul a sesizat deschiderea unei oportuniti
i l-a invitat pe preedintele Turciei n Armenia cu ocazia
meciului oficial de fotbal ntre cele dou echipe naionale.
n septembrie 2008, preedintele turc a fcut o vizit
istoric la Erevan, fiind primul lider al Turciei care a vizitat
Armenia. La aproape un an de la acest eveniment, Armenia
i Turcia au semnat protocoale care prevd stabilirea rela-
iilor diplomatice i redeschiderea frontierei turco-armene.
ns procesul de normalizare a relaiilor s-a mpotmolit n
cursul anului 2010, cnd ambele pri au renunat s mai
ratifice protocoalele, acuzndu-se reciproc pentru eec.
Trebuie menionat c nici Armenia, nici Turcia nu i-au
retras semnturile de pe protocoale. Astfel prile nu au pus
capt procesului, ci doar au ngheat procedura de ratificare.
Dei au euat n prim faz n 2010, Armenia i Turcia
au trecut de o etap psihologic important. Problema nu
se mai pune dac, ci cnd vor fi normalizate relaiile?82,
remarc un expert local influent. Sub egida politicii zero
probleme cu vecinii, Turcia a continuat procesul de restau-
rare a bisericilor armeneti i a eliminat Armenia din lista
statelor care reprezint o ameninare la adresa securitii
sale n 2010. Procesul nu este liniar ns. Armenia continu
campania internaional pentru recunoaterea genocidului
armenilor. Ca rspuns, primul-ministru turc amenin cu
expulzarea muncitorilor armeni din ar i cere demolarea
monumentului de reconciliere turco-armean din Kars.
ns majoritatea analitilor consider c procesul nu poate fi
oprit. Aa cum observ un bun cunosctor al regiunii:
Astzi nu turcii cu armenii, dar armenii ntre ei i turcii
82 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
130
ntre ei discut n contradictoriu ce trebuie de fcut pentru
mpcare [ntre armeni i turci] (Markedonov, 2011).
Din raiuni evidente procesul ntmpin opoziie la nivel
politic i social. Un oficial de la Erevan conchide ntr-o not
pesimist: Politica zero probleme cu vecinii nseamn pentru
Turcia inexistena vecinilor83. i la nivel social exist rezis-
ten la acest proces. Dar cifrele nu sunt att de descuraja-
toare pe ct ar trebui s fie reieind din percepia majoritar
negativ pe care turcii i armenii o au unii fa de alii. n
Turcia, potrivit unui sondaj de opinie, 50% din cei chestio-
nai se opun redeschiderii frontierei, 27% rspund afirmativ,
iar 22% rmn indecii. ntr-un sondaj de opinie realizat n
Armenia, 31% din cei chestionai s-au exprimat pentru
multiplicarea contactelor cu Turcia, un procent aproape
similar de respondeni se opun, iar 40% s-au declarat inde-
cii (Armtown.Com, 2011b). n Armenia prevaleaz factorii
comerciali n problema redeschiderii frontierei. Muli percep
acest proces ca pe o imens oportunitate de a explora piaa
din regiunea de est a Turciei. Acest gndire se regsete n
sondaje. Potrivit unui barometru de opinie public, 41% din
respondeni consider c redeschiderea frontierei cu Turcia
va avea un impact economic pozitiv imediat asupra rii,
iar 36% s-au declarat neutri sau nu sunt siguri de efectele
pozitive (RFE, 2011b).
n ciuda graniei nchise i a lipsei relaiilor diplomatice,
ntre cele dou ri exist schimburi comerciale, umanitare
i ocazional politice, care mping zi de zi Erevanul i Ankara
spre normalizarea relaiilor. Turcia a fost al aselea partener
comercial al Armeniei n 2010, cu o pondere de 4,4% (EU
Commission, 2011b). Oamenii de afaceri estimeaz c
schimburile comerciale bilaterale s-ar putea dubla dac
frontiera va fi redeschis (Markedonov, 2011). ntre Erevan
i Istanbul exist comunicare pe calea aerului. n Turcia
lucreaz sezonier ntre 40 i 70 de mii de armeni. Armenii
nu se feresc s mearg n vacan n Turcia; n jur de 50 de
mii de armeni au vizitat Antalia n 2009 (Ziflioglu, 2010).
83 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.
131
Nici turitii turci nu ocolesc Armenia. Au loc i evenimente
culturale bilaterale, n 2011 oraul armean Vanadzor gz-
duind sptmna filmului turcesc pentru a doua oar. Exist
numeroase contacte la nivelul societii civile i comunitii
de experi care ofer posibilitatea purtrii unui dialog infor-
mal ntre formatorii de opinie i oficiali din cele dou ri.
La Erevan, unii experi afirm c discuiile bilaterale n pri-
vina normalizrii relaiilor nu au fost sistate, dar au fost
mutate pe alt palier. Se pare c n cadrul acestora prile au
discutat posibilitatea implementrii limitate a protocoalelor
fr ratificarea acestora (de exemplu, deschiderea graniei
pentru doar cteva zile pe sptmn pentru camioane).84
Mesajul primului-ministru al Turciei dup ctigarea alege-
rilor parlamenare din 2011 cu privire la continuarea dia-
logului cu Erevanul (News.Az, 2011d) confirm c procesul
nu se va opri n ciuda multiplelor obstacole. Aceste evoluii,
dac au succes n timp, vor avea un impact major asupra
arhitecturii economice i de securitate n Caucazul de Sud.
ns pentru Turcia misiunea promite a fi extrem de dificil,
nu n ultimul rnd din cauza opoziiei Azerbaidjanului fa
de normalizarea necondiionat a relaiilor i legturilor
strnse ntre Ankara i Baku.
3.2. Azerbaidjan: independen strategic prin
multivectorism
Principalul obiectiv al politicii externe a Azerbaidjanului
este restabilirea integritii teritoriale. Strategia extern a
Azerbaidjanului urmrete, de asemenea, accesul la tehno-
logii i creterea potenialului de export al hidrocarburilor,
inclusiv prin multiplicarea rutelor de livrare a gazelor i
petrol pe pieele internaionale. La rndul su, factorul ener-
getic este instrumentalizat intern i extern pentru reinte-
grarea rii. Independena financiar asigurat de veniturile
substaniale generate de sectorul energetic ofer Azerbaidja-
nului o autonomie larg n raporturile cu puterile regionale.
84 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
132
Prin urmare, Azerbaidjanul promoveaz o politic extern
multivectorial, care se bucur de sprijinul a 41% din cet-
eni (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Accentele n
politica extern se schimb situaional pentru a scpa de
sub presiunea unei puteri regionale sau pentru a extrage de
la actorii regionali anumite concesii. Cu toate c asigur un
grad de independen strategic, acest curs este susceptibil
la crize ciclice n relaiile cu partenerii Azerbaidjanului.
3.2.1. Turcia
Probabil cele mai apropiate relaii regionale au fost dez-
voltate cu Ankara. Azerbaidjanul i Turcia sunt conectate
printr-o reea multilateral de contacte umanitare, econo-
mice, sociale, politice i militare care sudeaz aceast relaie.
La nivel politic au loc multiple ntlniri i consultri inter-
guvernamentale. Baku se simte confortabil n raporturile
cu Ankara, deoarece partea turc evit s critice evoluiile
politice interne din Azerbaidjan (Musabekov, 2011). n sec-
torul energetic, dou magistrale strategice azere de export a
gazelor i petrolului i au ca punct final orae din Turcia
Erzurum i, respectiv, Ceihan. Calea ferat care va conecta
Azerbaidjanul cu Turcia via Georgia este n construcie.
Turcia este al doilea partener comercial al Azerbaidjanului,
cu o pondere de 8,2% n 2010 (EU Commission, 2011d).
Totodat, Turcia este al cincilea investitor n Azerbaidjan,
cu 3,9% din totalul investiiilor n 2010 (News.Az, 2011e).
n ultimii ani, Azerbaidjanul a demonstrat interes pentru
piaa energetic din Turcia, realiznd o serie de investiii de
proporii. De exemplu, SOCAR a achiziionat un pachet de
51% n compania turc petrochimic Petkim, intenionnd
s investeasc n jur de $100 milioane n dezvoltarea
proiectelor energetice (News.Az, 2011f). Volumul cumulat
al investiiilor azere n Turcia este de $4 miliarde, Baku
planificnd alte investiii n valoare de $6 miliarde (Kardas,
2011). Pentru muli azeri, Turcia este o destinaie de studii
sau de lucru atractiv. Din 1992 pn n 2010, mai mult de
133
5.000 de studeni din Azerbaidjan au studiat n universiti
din Turcia prin intermediul burselor oferite de guvernul turc.
n plus, unii tineri au ales s plece n Turcia la studii pe cont
propriu. Tot mai muli prini i trimit copiii la grdinie,
coli primare i licee turce n Baku (Trend, 2011b). Reeaua
instituiilor de educaie turceti n Azerbaidjan este depit
doar de instituiile similare cu predare n limb rus (Musa-
bekov, 2011). ntr-un sondaj de opinie, Turcia este pe locul
trei (7,4%) n preferinele azerilor care ar alege s plece din
ar la munc (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Toate
acestea se reflect n atitudinea favorabil fa de Turcia la
nivelul societii. Astfel, 86,4% din respondeni n 2010
au apreciat c Turcia este un stat-prieten al Azerbaidjanului
(Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010).
Atitudinea favorabil fa de Turcia se explic inclusiv
prin asistena pe care a acordat-o Turcia Azerbaidjanului n
timpul i dup suspendarea aciunilor militare n Nagorno-
Karabah. O serie de organizaii nonguvernamentale din
Turcia au oferit ajutor umanitar PSI din Nagorno-Karabah,
acesta atingnd pn n prezent $6 milioane (News.Az,
2011). Dup sistarea ostilitilor, cooperarea n domeniul
militar s-a intensificat, ajutorul total acordat pn n 2010
depind $200 milioane potrivit Ministerului turc al
Aprrii (Artsakank News, 2011). Turcia a pregtit ofieri
i soldai azeri n instituiile sale de nvtmnt i n facili- barea de discurs la adresa Turciei, Baku a schimbat accentele
tile de antrenament militare. Prile coopereaz ntr-o
serie de proiecte comune n domeniul industriei de aprare.
Pe lng importul de armament din Turcia, Baku i Ankara
au nfiinat societi mixte n scopul produciei de muniie
i echipamente militare destinate forelor armate azere
(News.Az, 2011g). n 2010, Ankara i Baku au solidificat
relaia prin semnarea acordului privind parteneriatul strate-
gic i asistena mutual. Prile i-au asumat obligaia de a
oferi ajutor reciproc n caz de pericol la adresa securitii
naionale. Documentul, ns, nu ofer Azerbaidjanului ace-
leai garanii de securitate de care se bucur Armenia prin
134
tratatul OTSC.85 n caz de rzboi, Azerbaidjanul se ateapt
la sprijin politic i ajutor militar indirect din partea Turciei.86
Turcia joac un rol crucial n strategia Azerbaidjanului de
dezizolare i asigurare a securitii Nahicevanului. n 2010
a nceput construcia gazoductului din Turcia nspre Nahi-
cevan, iar Azerbaidjanul i Turcia au semnat un contract de
livrare a gazelor spre enclava azer, fr ca partea turc s
perceap tax de tranzit. Totodat, au fost lansate zboruri
directe ntre Istanbul i Nahicevan. Baku i Ankara anali-
zeaz posibilitatea conectrii Nahicevanului la calea ferat
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars. Nu n ultimul rnd, prezena militar a
Azerbaidjanului n Nahicevan a fost ntrit cu asistena
substanial a Turciei (Abbasov, 2010). Date fiind relaiile
tensionate ntre Azerbaidjan i Iran, Turcia caut s medieze
ntre cele dou state n spiritul noii politici de vecintate. n
2011, Turcia a organizat ntlnirea trilateral a minitrilor
de Externe, pentru a da un impuls pozitiv dialogului ntre
Baku i Teheran.
ns parteneriatul strategic turco-azer nu este lipsit de
probleme. Tentativa Turciei de a normaliza necondiionat
relaiile cu Armenia a fost perceput extrem de negativ la
Baku. Privit din Azerbaidjan, eventuala deschidere a fron-
tierei turco-armene reduce semnificativ ansele de a deter-
mina Erevanul s cad la un acord cu Baku. Pe lng schim-
n politica sa energetic. Aceasta a inclus revizuirea preului
gazelor livrate Turciei i implicarea n proiectul AGRI care
exclude nu doar Rusia, ci i Turcia. Semnalul dat de Azerbai-
djan Turciei a fost fr noi, nu putei fi hub energetic.87
Proiectul Nabucco a alimentat divergenele ntre Baku i
Ankara. Azerbaidjanul a respins oferta Turciei de a contracta
ntregul volum de gaze pentru ca ulterior s-l exporte pe
piaa european. Dei cetenii Azerbaidjanului beneficiaz
85 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
86 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
87 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
135
din 2008 de regimul liberalizat de cltorie n Turcia, autori-
tile de la Baku nu aplic un tratament similar cetenilor
turci. Ankara face presiuni ca Baku s liberalizeze regimul
de cltorie pentru cetenii si. Azerbaidjanul rezist invo- la Moscova) au facilitat acest proces. Interesele economice
cnd motive de securitate (traficul de droguri i migraia).
Iranul, la rndul su, pune presiune pe Baku s elimine
vizele pentru cetenii si. Experii aduc de asemenea n dis-
cuie motive de ordin intern. Regimul este preocupat de
creterea influenei politice i economice a Turciei n Azer-
baidjan88, detaliaz un analist preocuprile pe care oficialii
le trec sub tcere. Cu toate c n 2010 Turcia a reuit s
repare relaiile cu Azerbaidjan, gustul amar al tentativei de
a normaliza necondiionat relaia cu Armenia a rmas. La
Baku se ateapt ca Turcia s continue dialogul cu Armenia
dup alegeri.89 n aceste circumstane, este foarte posibil ca
Azerbaidjanul s foloseasc aici cooperarea sectorial cu
Rusia, pentru a deturna acest proces.
3.2.2. Rusia
n timpul rzboiului ruso-georgian din 2008, conducerea
Azerbaidjanului a avut o reacie moderat. Baku a evitat s
critice n mod deschis Rusia. Conformitatea aciunilor Geor-
giei cu dreptul internaional a fost anunat de purttorul
de cuvnt al Ministerului de Externe, i nu de un oficial de
rang nalt. Protestele din faa ambasadei ruse la Baku au fost
de scurt durat, fiind dispersate de forele de ordine. n
acelai timp, conflictul armat din 2008 i negocierile ntre
Turcia i Armenia au creat premisele pentru apropierea ntre
Moscova i Baku. Rolul pe care l joac Rusia n Grupul de
la Minsk i reactivarea dup 2008 a negocierilor de ctre
Moscova au determinat Azerbaidjanul, care se opune actua-
lului statu quo n Nagorno-Karabah, s admit punctual
interesele Rusiei, fr ns a trece limita pe care o impune
o politic extern multivectorial.
88 Interviu cu un un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
89 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
136
Compatibilitatea modelelor politice (democraia suvera-
n) i economice (petro-state), precum i multiplele legturi
personale cu Rusia ale preedintelui (care i-a fcut studiile
i fluxurile migraionale au contribuit la apropierea dintre
Moscova i Baku. Rusia este al treilea partener comercial
al Azerbaidjanului, cu o pondere de 7,4% n 2010 (EU Com-
mission, 2011d). Rusia, de asemenea, este a doua n lista
destinaiilor preferate de azerii care ar fi dispui s plece
din ar la munc (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010).
Potrivit estimrilor, n Rusia se afl ntre 1,3 i 1,8 milioane
azeri care anual trimit n ar $1,8 $2,4 miliarde (Valiyev,
2011). Limitarea accesului migranilor azeri n Rusia ar avea
un impact social negativ imens, care ar pune ntr-o situaie
dificil guvernul de la Baku.
Creterea importanei vectorului rusesc a contribuit la
eliminarea unor probleme de pe agenda bilateral. n 2010,
Azerbaidjanul i Rusia au semnat tratatul cu privire la fron-
tiera terestr de stat completnd acordul semnat n 2002
cu privire la delimitarea frontierei ntre cele dou state n
Marea Caspic. Cu aceast ocazie, Rusia a anunat c pro-
blema a dou sate din nordul Azerbaidjanului Urianoba
i Hrahoba , care se considerau temporar teritoriul Rusiei
(Republica Daghestan) a fost soluionat definitiv, cele dou
localiti revenind sub jurisdicia autoritilor de la Baku
(News.Az, 2011h). Tranarea problemei celor dou localiti
era important pentru guvernul azer preocupat de reven-
dicrile ocazionale ale minoritii lezghine din nordul rii,
care adeseori a folosit Moscova ca platform pentru a lansa
mesaje politice. Azerbaidjanul gzduiete o staie radar n
Gabala, pe care Rusia o nchiriaz pentru $7 milioane anual.
Aproximativ 1.000 de militari rui deservesc staia. Acordul
expir n anul 2012, dar prile au purtat deja o rund de
negocieri preliminare pe marginea prelungirii acordului.
Rusia s-a oferit s investeasc n modernizarea radarului.
Este foarte probabil ca Azerbaidjanul s extind termenul
137
de edere a militarilor rui cu nc cinci sau zece ani.90 Nu
este exclus ca un eventual acord s fie plata politic pentru
armamentul rusesc modern livrat Azerbaidjanului n 2010.
Unii experi consider c aderarea Azerbaidjanului la Mica-
rea de Nealiniere are legtur direct cu dinamica regional
post-2008. Se pare c prin aceast micare Baku a dorit s
comunice n principal Moscovei c nu caut aderarea la
aliane militare, nici la NATO, dar nici la OTSC.91
Acomodarea intereselor Rusiei a avut loc de asemenea n
domeniul energetic, economic i umanitar. O serie de com-
panii au fost admise pe piaa din Azerbaidjan. Banca VTB a
intrat pe piaa financiar n 2008. Alte dou companii ruse,
Rostelekom i Sistema, i-au declarat interesul s participe
la procesul de privatizare a Azertelekom i Baki Telefon
Rabitasi. Aproximativ 500 de companii ruse activeaz n
Azerbaidjan (Oxford Analytica, 2011). Rusia i Azerbaidjan
au ncheiat acordul cu privire la construcia unei noi linii de
transmisie electric, Iama-Derbent, care va spori capaci-
tatea de export a energiei electrice din Rusia. n 2008, Rusia
a evitat s bombardeze terminalul Kulevi, proprietatea
SOCAR-ului, i conducta Baku-Supsa. n 2010, Azerbai-
djanul a nceput exporturile de gaze spre Rusia. n 2011,
volumul exporturilor a fost majorat pn la 2 miliarde m/c.
n 2008, n Azerbaidjan, gazda celei mai numeroase diaspore
ruseti n Caucazul de Sud (160-170.000), a fost deschis
filiala Universitii de Stat de la Moscova. Aceast instituie
s-a adugat listei care include peste 200 de coli i faculti
din Azerbaidjan cu predare n limba rus (Musabekov,
2011). Azerbaidjanul e vizitat anual de 700.000 de ceteni
rui (Oxford Analytica). Toate acestea pstreaz n percepia
unei pri a populaiei o imagine pozitiv despre Rusia. Un
barometru de opinie public din 2010 arat c aproximativ
23% dintre azeri consider Rusia un stat-prieten. Rusia este
depit la acest capitol doar de Turcia (Puls-R/Friedrich
90 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
91 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
138
Ebert Stiftung, 2010), ns societatea azer este polarizat
n privina Rusiei. n acelai sondaj, aproape 17% dintre cei
chestionai au identificat Rusia drept stat duman (Puls-R/
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Fr ndoial, pe lng spri-
jinul acordat Armeniei n Nagorno-Karabah, imaginea Rusiei
a avut de suferit dup rzboiul din Georgia, simpatia popu-
laiei fiind preponderent de partea georgienilor.92 Un indica-
tor util n acest sens poate fi nivelul de sprijin pentru proce-
sele integraioniste n cadrul CSI, al cror motor este Rusia.
Din 2006 pn n 2010, sprijinul n Azerbaidjan pentru
integrarea n cadrul CSI a sczut de la aproximativ 24% la
15% (ibidem).
Cursul pragmatic al Azerbaidjanului fa de Rusia a fost
testat de o serie de situaii conflictuale. n 2009 informaia
circulat n mass-media despre transferul de armament n
valoare de $800 milioane din Rusia ctre Armenia a provo-
cat indignare n Azerbaidjan. Guvernul de la Baku a fost
dezamgit, deoarece Kremlinul, dup apropierea din 2008,
a promis s ofere extrasprijin Azerbaidjanului (Ismailzade,
2009). Ori, n timp ce intermedia negocieri ntre Erevan i
Baku, Kremlinul contribuia la echilibrarea balanei militare
ntre pri contrar obiectivelor Azerbaidjanului. Prelungirea
prezenei militare ruse n Armenia n 2010 de asemenea nu
a fost recepionat cu entuziasm la Baku. Comentnd poli-
tica militar rus n Caucazul de Sud, un oficial azer de rang
nalt a observat c a venit timpul de a nlocui tancurile de
lupt cu tancuri petroliere, [altfel spus] de a substitui pre-
zena militar cu cea economic (Aztag, 2011). Pe parcur-
sul anului 2008 au avut loc o serie de atacuri violente
xenofobe mpotriva cetenilor azeri n regiunea Moscovei.
Mass-media local a informat pe larg despre aceste crime,
strnind o reacie public negativ n Azerbaidjan. Sub
presiunea opiniei publice, guvernul de la Baku a ridicat pro-
blema securitii cetenilor azeri aflai n Rusia n cadrul
discuiilor bilaterale cu colegii de la Moscova. Pe poziii
92 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
139
diametral opuse s-au plasat prile n dezbaterea cu privire
la construcia conductei transcaspice. Dac ambasadorul rus
la Baku a invocat daune ce pot fi cauzate mediului ncon-
jurtor prin executarea acestui proiect i necesitatea acordu-
lui Rusiei i Iranului ca aceast iniiativa s progreseze,
reprezentantul SOCAR a replicat c negocierile cu privire la
conducta transcaspic vor avea loc fr Rusia (Fitzpatrick,
2011).
3.2.3. SUA
Sprijinul politic i economic al SUA a fost decisiv pentru
finalizarea la mijlocul deceniului 2001-2010 a rutelor ener-
getice care ocolesc Rusia i ofer autonomia internaional
de care se bucur Azerbaidjanul acum. Rolul SUA este n
continuare crucial pentru deblocarea dosarelor bilaterale
turkmeno-azere, care ar pune bazele transformrii Azerbai-
djanului n ar de tranzit a gazelor naturale dinspre Marea
Caspic. Totodat, ntre Azerbaidjan i SUA s-au dezvoltat
n timp relaii economice strnse. SUA sunt al doilea inves-
titor (9% din totalul investiiilor) i al patrulea partener
comercial al Azerbaidjanului n 2010, cu o pondere de 7%
(News.Az, 2011e; EU Commission, 2011d). Unele dintre
cele mai mari companii petroliere din SUA (Exxon Mobil,
Conoco Philips sau Chevron) sunt implicate n proiecte ener-
getice de proporii n Azerbaidjan. Adeseori, Azerbaidjanul
a apelat la lobby-ul companiilor petroliere americane pentru
a promova agenda sa naional la Washington.
Cooperarea bilateral n domeniul securitii a sporit
considerabil dup atentatele de la 11 septembrie 2001.
Azerbaidjanul a deschis spaiul su aerian pentru forele
armate ale SUA i a pus la dispoziie infrastructura terestr
pentru realimentarea avioanelor cu destinaia Afganistan.
Baku a desfurat un contingent de pacificatori n Afga-
nistan, care numr 80 de militari. Azerbaidjanul a oferit
suport SUA n cadrul operaiunii militare din Irak, contri-
buind la fora de stabilizare cu 150 de militari. De asemenea,
140
Azerbaidjanul reprezint un nod important, care asigur
funcionarea facil a reelei nordice de distribuie spre Af-
ganistan. ncepnd cu 2002, preedintele SUA a suspendat
anual aplicarea seciunii 907 din Freedom Support Act,
care bloca asistena financiar acordat Azerbaidjanului.
n 2010, SUA au acordat Azerbaidjanului asisten finan-
ciar n valoare de $22 milioane. n 2003, Departamentul
Aprrii american a nceput derularea programului de pre-
gtire i dotare cu echipament a grzii navale azere n Marea
Caspic. Anual forele armate ale SUA i Azerbaidjanului au
organizat exerciii militare comune.
ns n 2008 acest parteneriat a scos n eviden primele
fisuri, care s-au adncit n 2009 i 2010. n ciuda eforturilor
din partea ambelor pri de a menine aparena normalitii
la suprafa, relaiile nu mai sunt la fel de apropiate cum
au fost n primii ani 2000, n opinia unui oficial azer din
administraia prezidenial (News.Az, 2011i). Acest lucru
se reflect n sondajele de opinie, n care numai 6,5% din
respondeni au declarat c SUA sunt un stat prieten, cu 2%
mai puin comparativ cu Iranul (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, 2010). Din perspectiva azer, o serie de factori au
contribuit la rcirea relaiilor azero-americane. n general,
la nivelul elitei politice este mprtit pe larg sentimentul
c Azerbaidjanul a oferit mai mult dect a primit n schimb.
n percepia conducerii de la Baku, relaia cu SUA nu este
bazat pe valori, ci pe interese. Azerbaidjanul a sperat c
cooperarea n domeniul securitii i al sectorului energetic
va genera un sprijin masiv din partea SUA pentru soluiona-
rea conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah. Astfel, interpretnd
parteneriatul ca pe o relaie pur contractual, Baku simte c
nu a beneficiat suficient de pe urma sprijinului din partea
Washingtonului.93 O serie de aciuni de politic extern ale
SUA au provocat iritare la Baku: n primul rnd, rolul activ
jucat de SUA n semnarea protocoalelor de normalizare a
relaiilor dintre Armenia i Turcia; n al doilea rnd,
93 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
141
meninerea seciunii 907 din Freedom Support Act;94 i n
al treilea rnd, promovarea agendei democratice n Azerbai-
djan95. Administraia prezidenial a devenit extrasensibil
la presiunile de democratizare din partea SUA dup valul de
revolte populare din lumea arab.96 Votul SUA mpotriva
rezoluiei Adunrii Generale a ONU n 2008 cu privire la
situaia pe teritoriul ocupat al Azerbaidjanului, postul
vacant de ambasador al SUA la Baku timp de un an i ne-
invitarea preedintelui Azerbaidjanului la summit-ul privind
Securitatea Nuclear de la Washington, n 2010, la care au
participat efi de stat din Armenia i Georgia, sunt cteva
episoade n plus care au contribuit la distanarea Azerbai-
djanului de SUA.
n consecin, Baku a suspendat exerciiile militare
comune cu SUA n 2009, 2010 i 2011 i a virat situaio-
nal n plan extern spre Rusia. Administraia prezidenial
l-a detaat pe ministrul Aprrii al SUA la Baku pentru a
relansa relaia bilateral. A urmat vizita Secretarului de Stat
la Baku n 2010 i a ministrului de Externe azer la Washing-
ton n 2011. Cu toate c dialogul la nivel guvernamental
s-a intensificat n 2010 i 2011, poziia prilor n ceea ce
privete dosarele care i divizeaz a rmas aproape neschim-
bat. Un nou apel lansat la Istanbul n 2011 de Secretarul
de Stat al SUA, de a fi redeschis grania turco-armean,
a provocat o reacie previzibil la Baku (News.Az, 2011),
care menine prile ntr-un cerc vicios.
3.2.4. UE
ncepnd cu a doua jumtate a deceniului 2001-2010,
comerul Azerbaidjanului cu UE cunoate o traiectorie
ascendent. Astfel, n 2010, UE este de departe principalul
partener comercial al Azerbaidjanului cu o pondere de
46,9% n 2010 (EU Commission, 2011d). Trebuie observat
94 Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.
95 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
96 Interviu cu un reprezentant al mass media, Baku, iunie 2011.
142
c Azerbaidjanul este singurul stat din Parteneriatul Estic
care se bucur de o balan comercial pozitiv solid cu UE.
Principalul export al Azerbaidjanului sunt hidrocarburile.
Statele membre UE se numr printre cei mai mari investi-
tori n Azerbaidjan, cu Marea Britanie situndu-se detaat
pe primul loc n 2010 (52% din totalul investiiilor reali-
zate), urmat de Republica Ceh i Frana (News.Az, 2011e).
Pentru perioada 2007-2010 UE a alocat 92 milioane, iar
pentru perspectiva financiar 2011-2013 au fost repartizate
122,5 milioane (EEAS 2011). UE i integrarea european
sunt relativ populare la nivelul societii. Ultimul barometru
de opinie arat c 32,2% se pronun pentru integrarea
european, n cretere de la 27,7% n 2006. Totodat,
statele membre UE combinat reprezint prima opiune n
preferinele azerilor (11%) care ar fi dispui s plece la
munc n alt ar (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010).
n ciuda dinamicii comerciale pozitive, preponderent n
sectorul energetic, relaiile politice ale Azerbaidjanului cu
UE nu au un succes similar. Azerbaidjanul este un actor
financiar independent. Experii au estimat c n 2009
veniturile zilnice ale Azerbaidjanului din vnzrile de petrol
au oscilat ntre $40 i $60 milioane (Bayramov, 2009, 7).
Azerbaidjanul nsui dezvolt un profil de stat donator,
oferind n 2011 $1 milion Japoniei lovite de un cutremur
devastator.97 n aceste condiii, un milion n plus sau un
milion n minus din partea UE nu mai conteaz98, remar-
c un analist local. Noi nu avem aceeai motivaie de a ne
reforma precum Georgia sau Moldova99, explic alt expert.
Sigurana oferit de veniturile uriae i-a transformat pe
liderii azeri n interlocuitori extrem de dificili pentru UE.100
Reducerea asimetriei n relaiile bilaterale este confirmat
la Baku. Cooperarea noastr a trecut prin transformri
majore, de la accentul iniial pus pe ajutor spre cooperarea
97 Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.
98 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
99 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
100 Interviu cu un diplomat.
143
mutual avantajoas, remarc ministrul azer de Externe
(News.Az, 2011j). Prin urmare, Azerbaidjanul promoveaz
activ egalitatea n relaiile sale cu UE. Eschivarea de la
condiionalitatea UE face parte din acest efort. De pild,
Azerbaidjanul respinge ceea ce consider o abordare unidi-
mensional a problematicii drepturilor omului promovat
de UE. Drepturile omului, dincolo de libertile politice i
civile, includ aspecte economice i sociale, domenii n care
Baku anun progrese.101 n acelai timp, Baku dezvolt
parteneriate bilaterale privilegiate cu statele membre UE
pentru a dilua critica instituiilor comunitare la adresa sa.
Atunci cnd aceasta nu poate fi evitat, precum n cazul
reprimrii protestelor opoziiei n primvara anului 2011,
autoritile i exprim nemulumirea fa de poziia luat n 2010, guvernul de la Baku s-a alturat la 18 din 44 de
de UE (Azernews, 2011). Alternativ, Baku invoc abordarea
selectiv a UE fa de respectarea drepturilor omului, refe-
rindu-se mai ales la dezinteresul instituiilor europene pen-
tru drepturile PSI din Nagorno-Karabah (News.Az, 2011k).
Azerbaidjanul demonstreaz un comportament obstrucio-
nist n domeniile de interes pentru cetenii si, cum ar fi
regimul facilitat de vize cu UE. Autoritile afirm c
problema este n curtea UE, Comisia neavnd mandatul de
a ncepe negocierile.102 Experii ns deplng lipsa voinei
politice la Baku. Executivul se opune semnrii acordurilor
de readmisie necesare ncheierii unui acord de facilitare a
vizelor cu UE (Trend, 2011c). n schimb, n 2010, Azerbai-
djanul a nsprit regimul de vize pentru cetenii strini,
inclusiv UE.
n esen, aceste exemple reflect poziia guvernului de
la Baku cu privire la formula de integrare european preferat,
care se reduce la cooperarea economic. Se pare c, la capi-
tolul cooperare economic cu UE, Azerbaidjanul pune accent
pe sectorul energetic, din moment ce perspectiva ZCLAC
rmne irealizabil fr aderarea la Organizaia Mondial Azerbaidjan consider Iranul un stat inamic, i doar 8,8%
101 Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.
102 Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.
144
a Comerului (OMC). n 2006, UE a semnat cu Azerbaidjan
un memorandum cu privire la parteneriatul n sectorul ener-
getic, iar n 2011 preedintele Comisiei Europene i pree-
dintele Azerbaidjanului au semnat o declaraie comun cu
privire la coridorul sudic al gazului, a crui parte component
l reprezint proiectul Nabucco. Accesul pe pieele europene
trebuie s sporeasc veniturile i importana Azerbai-
djanului pentru securitatea energetic a UE (Aliyev, 2010).
Totodat, Azerbaidjanul aspir s converteasc interaciunea
cu UE n domeniul energiei n sprijin pentru reintegrarea
rii. Acest efort este suplimentat prin aderarea ocazional
la declaraiile UE n domeniul politicii externe i de secu-
ritate la care a fost invitat s se alinieze i Azerbaidjanul.
declaraii (EU Commission, 2011f). Azerbaidjanul nu per-
cepe UE ca putere major n regiune, deoarece i lipsete
componenta militar. Rzboiul ruso-georgian a fost exem-
plificativ pentru Baku.103 Prin urmare, conducerea politic
nu ateapt ca UE s joace un rol important n negocierile
pe marginea conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah pe termen
mediu i scurt. n acelai timp, diplomaia azer cultiv
relaii apropiate cu statele membre UE, printre care actuali
sau poteniali importatori de gaze din Azerbaidjan, pentru
a-i susine n interiorul UE poziia n conflictul din
Nagorno-Karabah.
3.2.5. Iran
Iranul, pe teritoriul cruia triesc circa 16 milioane de
etnici azeri, rmne un vecin incomod pentru Azerbaidjan.
Dei ntre cele dou ri exist puternice legturi istorice,
culturale i religioase, la nivelul percepiei publice din
Azerbaidjan exist nencredere i suspiciune fa de Iran.
ntr-un sondaj de opinie public, 10% din respondenii din
au apreciat c Iranul este un stat prieten (Puls-R/Friedrich
103 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
145
Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Schimburile comerciale bilaterale
sunt de o intensitate sczut. Iranul este al 17-lea partener
comercial al Azerbaidjanului, cu o pondere de 0,7 n 2010
(EU Commission, 2011d). La nivel politic are loc un dialog
insuficient instituionalizat, care alterneaz ntre elemente
de conflict i cooperare. Vizita preedintelui parlamentului
iranian la Baku n iunie 2011 are puine anse de a schim-
ba radical natura raporturilor ntre cele dou state. Printre
puinele proiecte bilaterale de cooperare existente n prezent
se numr schimburile sezoniere de energie electric.
Potrivit acordurilor bilaterale, Azerbaidjanul export energie
electric vara, iar Iranul export o cantitate similar toamna
i iarna. De asemenea, Iranul i Azerbaidjanul realizeaz
exporturi reciproce de gaze. Astfel, Iranul joac un rol im-
portant n asigurarea securitii energetice a Nahicevanului.
Iranul livreaz anual enclavei izolate de Armenia volumul
de gaze necesar. n schimb, Azerbaidjanul export gaze n
regiunile de nord ale Iranului. n 2009 i 2011 Azerbai-
djanul a mrit livrrile de gaze spre Iran (Nichol, 2011, 16).
Aparent, prin aceast majorare, Baku dorete s neutralizeze
potenialul efect negativ al relaiilor politice disfuncionale
asupra Nahicevanului.
Relaiile bilaterale sunt mpovrate de un numr de do-
sare bilaterale problematice, care afecteaz substanial inter-
aciunea ntre vecini. Iranul ocup ceea ce Azerbaidjanul
consider o poziie proarmean. Proiectele n domeniul
energetic sunt percepute negativ deoarece slbesc presiunea
exercitat de Azerbaidjan i Turcia asupra Armeniei prin
nchiderea granielor i excluderea Armeniei din proiectele
regionale de infrastructur. Baku a semnalat dezaprobarea
cooperrii armeano-iraniene n dialogul direct cu Teheranul
(News.Am 2011c). Aparent Iranul a intensificat cooperarea
cu Armenia, atunci cnd Azerbaidjanul s-a apropiat prea
mult, pentru Teheran, de Occident. De asemenea, chestiu-
nea frontierei e un alt dosar iritant n raporturile bilaterale.
Azerbaidjanul i Iranul nu au ajuns la un consens cu privire
la delimitarea graniei n Marea Caspic. Dezavantajat de
146
mprirea pe linia median n sectoare naionale, Teheranul
insist ca Marea Caspic s fie divizat n pri egale ntre
statele riverane. Prin urmare, n zona disputat de cele dou
state, Azerbaidjanul nu poate efectua lucrri de prospeciune
i exploatare. ntr-un incident din 2001, garda iranian a
forat un vas de cercetare al BP s se retrag din zona dispu-
tat. n 2005, au existat informaii cu privire la violarea spa-
iului aerian de ctre forele iraniene. Un alt incident grav
pe frontiera terestr a avut loc n iulie 2011. Un schimb de
focuri ntre grnicerii iranieni i cei azeri, n care un militar
azer a fost ucis, red ct se poate de bine atmosfera ncr-
cat n relaiile bilaterale (News.Az, 2011l).
Autoritile de la Baku sunt preocupate de activitatea
desfurat de Iran pe teritoriul Azerbaidjanului. n 2007,
la Baku, 15 ceteni azeri au fost reinui i gsii vinovai
de o instan judectoreasc azer de trdare n favoarea
Iranului. La Baku, tentativele Iranului de a exporta o ver-
siune mai conservatoare a Islamului dect cea practicat n
Azerbaidjan trezesc nelinite.104 n 2011, a fost arestat lide-
rul Partidului Islamic din Azerbaidjan, pentru implicarea sa
n organizarea protestelor n faa Ministerului Educaiei
mpotriva interzicerii purtrii hijab-ului n colile din Azer-
baidjan (Abbasov, 2011). Partidul considerat pro-iranian i
suspectat c este finanat de Teheran a fost scos n afara legii
n Azerbaidjan. Arestarea liderului acestuia a fost precedat
de declaraiile critice ale clericilor i politicienilor din Iran
cu privire la decizia guvernului azer de a interzice purtarea
hijab-ului n coli. Oficiali de rang nalt de la Teheran au
avertizat autoritile de la Baku cu privire la iminena unei
revolte populare dac dreptul la libertate religioas va fi
ngrdit n Azerbaidjan. Conducerea Azerbaidjanului este
ngrijorat de tentativele de a proiecta puterea blnd a
Iranului n Azerbaidjan, ameninnd astfel bazele actualului
regim politic. ncepnd din februarie 2010, Iranul a liberali-
zat unilateral regimul de vize pentru azeri, cu excepia unei
104 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.
147
singure categorii, jurnalitii. De atunci, Teheranul insist ca cursului de politic extern a fost adaptat la noua realitate
Baku s adopte msuri similare fa de cetenii iranieni. macroregional.
Teheranul finaneaz postul iranian TV Sahar, care emite n
azer i acoper partea de sud a Azerbaidjanului, n care 3.3.1. SUA
triete compact minoritatea tal, cultural i lingvistic
apropiat de Iran. Activitatea postului este echivalat la Dei relaiile bilaterale au fost depersonalizate n man-
Baku cu subminarea monopolului guvernului n spaiul datul preedintelui Obama, SUA joac n continuare un rol
informaional. Pe lng acuzaii la adresa autoritilor cen- important n strategia de politic extern a Georgiei. Tnra
trale pentru cooperarea cu SUA i Israelul, postul invit cu elit politic de la Tbilisi, educat n Occident, se inspir pe
regularitate reprezentani ai societii civile pentru a discu- larg n aciunile i politicile publice din modelul american.
ta despre derapajele democratice din Azerbaidjan.105 Astfel Cooperarea intensificat cu SUA se bucur de sprijinul popu-
de dezbateri au devenit mai frecvente odat cu declanarea lar. n sondajele de opinie din 2011, 58% din ceteni con-
valului revoluionar n Orientul Mijlociu. Toate acestea au sider SUA cel mai important partener politic i economic
ntrit la Baku percepia de ameninare din partea Iranului, al Georgiei, n scdere uoar (de la 63%) n 2008 (Inter-
motivnd o distanare pronunat a Azerbaidjanului de national Republican Institute, 2008b, 2011). Protestele
vecinul din sud. n acelai timp, amplificarea conflictului la organizate de unii reprezentani ai opoziiei n faa amba-
vrful conducerii n Iran este vzut ca un potenial factor sadei de la Tbilisi n 2011 nu s-au bucurat de o prezen
destabilizator n regiune, ceea ce ntreine starea de anxietate masiv i au fost denunate de cealalt parte a opoziiei
la Baku. georgiene.
Conducerea Georgiei a folosit relaia cu SUA dup rzbo-
iul din 2008 pentru a neutraliza strategia de marginalizare
3.3. Georgia: spre Occident
a regimului politic de la Tbilisi promovat de Rusia pe plan
Cu toate c rmne un obiectiv imposibil de realizat internaional. Astfel, n 2009 Georgia a semnat un docu-
ntr-un viitor previzibil, reintegrarea rii rmne preocu- ment cu privire la parteneriatul strategic cu SUA. Cu toate
parea major a autoritilor de la Tbilisi. Pe termen scurt c documentul nu ofer garanii de securitate similare celor
i mediu ns, Georgia i propune s ating pe plan extern din tratatul de securitate nipono-american, acesta a recon-
urmtoarele: descurajarea recunoaterii independenei Ab- firmat sprijinul politic al SUA. Acest sprijin politic s-a
haziei i Osetiei de Sud de ctre comunitatea internaional, reflectat ulterior n rezoluia Senatului cu privire la violarea
asigurarea securitii de-a lungul frontierei administrative de integritii teritoriale i suveranitii Georgiei de ctre Rusia
nord, atragerea investiiilor strine i asistenei financiare (US Senate, 2011). n 2009 i 2010, vicepreedintele Sta-
din partea donatorilor externi necesare dezvoltrii interne telor Unite i respectiv Secretarul de Stat au vizitat Tbilisi.
intensive, dezvoltarea relaiilor ct de posibil apropiate cu n 2010 a fost reluat dialogul direct ntre cei doi efi de stat.
NATO i UE, care ar facilita ntr-un context favorabil inte- Pe lng dezizolarea pe plan extern, Tbilisi a apelat la in-
grarea deplin n aceste instituii. Aadar, politica extern fluena SUA pentru a descuraja recunoaterea Abhaziei i a
a Georgiei este puternic orientat spre Occident. Dup Osetiei de Sud de ctre comunitatea internaional.106 Posi-
rzboiul din 2008, caracterul pronunat prooccidental al bilele efecte economice sau politice negative asupra relaiilor

105 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011. 106 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

148 149
bilaterale cu Washingtonul n cazul recunoaterii celor dou
regiuni separatiste au fost un motiv puternic pentru multe
state din emisfera vestic de a refuza oferta Moscovei.
Resimind acut deficitul de securitate, Georgia a depus
eforturi pentru a adnci cooperarea n domeniul militar cu
SUA i NATO. n 2008, a fost creat Comisia NATO-Geor-
gia pentru a intensifica consultrile politice i cooperarea
practic. ncepnd cu 2009, Georgia implementeaz progra-
mul anual naional care intete reforme n sectorul de secu-
ritate. Modelul programelor anuale este, de regul, aplicat
statelor care au primit Planul de aciune n vederea obinerii
calitii de membru al NATO (MAP), Georgia reprezentnd
astfel o excepie. Georgia este parte a reelei de distibuie
nord spre Afganistan, a crei importan a crescut n contex-
tul vulnerabilitii tot mai mari a tranzitului prin Pakistan
i al creterii numrului trupelor americane n Afganistan.
Portul Poti servete ca punct de legtur cu Azerbaidjanul,
de unde cargourile continu tranzitul peste Marea Caspic.
Guvernul de la Tbilisi a mrit substanial prezena militar
n Afganistan. Cu 937 de militari desfurai n 2010,
Georgia se numr printre cei mai mari contribuitori dintre
statele care nu fac parte din NATO la misiunile de stabili-
zare n Afganistan. Autoritile de la Tbilisi pregtesc nt-
rirea contingentului din Afganistan cu ali 600 de militari
(Civil.Ge, 2011g). n schimb, Tbilisi a ncercat s obin
contracte de achiziii de armament i echipamente, care s
restabileasc capacitatea de aprare serios afectat de
rzboiul din 2008. Administraia american a evitat s dea
curs acestor solicitri i a oferit n schimb mai multe pro-
grame de pregtire militar i exerciii comune (Charap i
Welt, 2011, 56-57). Guvernul american a fcut donaii
ocazionale de natur militar sau a investit n modernizarea
echipamentelor aflate n dotarea forelor armate georgiene.
n 2011, au fost donate 40 de autovehicule uor blindate
Humvee contingentului militar georgian care se deplasa
n teatrul de operaiuni din Afganistan (Civil.Ge, 2011h).
De asemenea, guvernul american a finanat lucrrile de
150
modernizare la trei vase de patrulare ale grzii de coast
georgiene i construcia unui atelier pentru reparaii navale
(GHN News Agency, 2011).
Dei guvernul SUA s-a ferit s livreze armament, politica
de resetare a relaiilor cu Rusia a produs efecte pozitive
asupra securitii naionale a Georgiei. Detensionarea
relaiilor ruso-americane garanteaz ntr-o oarecare msur
securitatea militar a Georgiei, n sensul diminurii anselor
unui atac convenional masiv din partea Rusiei.107 SUA
au descurajat activ Rusia s iniieze aciuni agresive deschise
mpotriva Georgiei. Discuiile de la Moscova, din 2009,
ntre preedinii Rusiei i SUA n condiiile escaladrii uoare
a situaiei n zonele de conflict sunt exemplificative.108 Geor-
gia percepe resetul ruso-american ca o evoluie conjuctural,
iar conflictul cu Rusia o constant a politicii externe pentru
un viitor previzibil. Ct de mult va dura resetul ruso-ame-
rican?, ntreab un analist de la Tbilisi, evalund alterna-
tivele de a garanta securitatea militar a Georgiei. Rzboiul
rece nu s-a ncheiat pentru Georgia109, l completeaz un
oficial. Aadar, preocuparea major la Tbilisi o reprezint
asigurarea securitii naionale n contextul epuizrii resetu-
lui ruso-american i perseverenei Kremlinului de a modifica
orientarea politicii externe a Georgiei, inclusiv prin schim-
barea regimului politic.110
SUA sunt un partener economic i donator extern esen-
ial pentru Georgia. SUA sunt al cincilea partener comercial
al Georgiei cu o pondere de 7,2% n 2010 (EU Commission,
2011c). Totodat, SUA sunt principalul investitor n Georgia
cu $135,8 milioane n 2010. Investiiile strine n Georgia
au sczut dramatic de la $2 miliarde n 2007 la $814 mi-
lioane n 2010 (Civil.Ge 2011e). n acelai timp, creterea
economic a Georgiei din ultimii ani s-a bazat pe atragerea
masiv a investitorilor strini. Plasnd Georgia n context
107 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
108 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
109 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
110 Interciu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
151
regional, un expert local explic: Noi nu avem o diaspor
puternic, noi nu dispunem de petrol i gaze naturale, prin
urmare trebuie s atragem investiii111. Aadar, investiiile
americane sunt importante pentru reluarea i meninerea
ritmului pozitiv de cretere economic a Georgiei. Totodat,
SUA sunt un donator major n Georgia. n perioada 2006-
2011, guvernul SUA a finanat prin intermediul Corporaiei
Provocrile Mileniului numeroase proiecte de infrastructur
i dezvoltare n Georgia, cifrate la aproape $400 milioane.
Programul a avut un impact decisiv pentru integrarea i
modernizarea infrastructurii din regiunile populate de mino-
ritatea armean i azer din Georgia. n prezent se discut
posibilitatea finanrii unui nou program pentru Georgia n
cadrul aceleiai iniiative. Dup rzboiul ruso-georgian,
SUA au contribuit cu $1 miliard la eforturile de recon-
strucie a Georgiei, sprijinul PSI i dezvoltarea economic.
Contribuia financiar a SUA la efortul donatorilor externi
a fost crucial pentru depirea cu succes de ctre Georgia
a dublului oc cauzat de rzboi i criza financiar global.
3.3.2. UE
UE, forat de evenimentele din Georgia din 2008, i-a
asumat un rol semnificativ n asigurarea securitii i sta-
bilitii macroeconomice a rii. Rzboiul ruso-georgian a
inversat prioritile conducerii politice georgiene. Aderarea
accelerat la NATO fiind imposibil, Tbilisi a pus mai mult
accent pe integrarea european i cooperarea n domeniul
securitii cu UE. n 2010 Georgia s-a alturat la 28 dintre
cele 44 de declaraii UE n domeniul politicii externe i de
securitate la care a fost invitat s se alinieze (EU Commis-
sion, 2011g). n cadrul platformei multilaterale a Partene-
riatului Estic democraie, guvernare i stabilitate, Georgia
a exprimat interesul pentru cooperarea n domeniul politicii
comune de securitate i aprare a UE.112 n 2010, Georgia
111 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
112 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
152
a deschis negocierile cu privire la Acordul de Asociere, a sem-
nat acordul de facilitare a vizelor i a aderat la piaa euro-
pean comun de aviaie. Ajustarea prioritilor de politic
extern se bucur de sprijinul larg al opiniei publice. Potrivit
sondajelor, 79% dintre georgieni se declar pentru aderarea
Georgiei la UE (Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009b).
Apropierea de UE este ghidat de imperative de securitate
naional i modernizare politic i economic ale Georgiei.
n calitate de parte care a mediat sistarea ostilitilor n
2008, UE e garantul implementrii planului Sarkozy-Med-
vedev. Prin urmare, Tbilisi dorete ca UE s preseze mult
mai intens Rusia pentru ca aceasta s respecte toate pre-
vederile planului de pace din 2008. De multe ori, oficialii
georgieni sunt critici la adresa UE din cauza a ceea ce ei
consider timiditate n relaiile cu Rusia.113 n acelai timp,
autoritile sunt contiente de faptul c UE neutralizeaz
ntr-o anumit msur ameninarea militar a Rusiei114,
iar Georgia trebuie s evite s fie perceput de UE drept
o povar n relaiile sale cu Rusia. n 2008, UE a desfurat
o misiune civil de monitorizare (EUMM), compus din
340 de observatori, care reduce semnificativ ansele eruperii
unui nou conflict. Georgia gsete prezena observatorilor
UE esenial pentru monitorizarea imparial a situaiei pe
frontiera adminstrativ cu Abhazia i Osetia de Sud i con-
tracararea acuzaiilor lipsite de probe ale Rusiei cu privire
la fortificarea prezenei militare georgiene n vecintatea
zonelor de conflict. Autoritile de la Tbilisi au semnat n
2009 un memorandum cu EUMM, valabil pe trei luni, cu
opiunea prelungirii tacite dac una din pri nu i exprim
dezacordul, care impune restricii cu privire la micarea tru-
pelor n vecintatea Abhaziei i Osetiei de Sud. Georgia, de
asemenea, s-a obligat s informeze EUMM despre redislo-
carea trupelor pe teritoriul su. UE este parte a procesului
de la Geneva care reunete Georgia, Rusia, SUA, OSCE,
113 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
114 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
153
ONU, Abhazia i Osetia de Sud. Consultrile au loc n
cadrul a dou grupe de lucru: securitate i refugiai. n 2009
prile au convenit asupra stabilirii firului rou i crerii
mecanismului de prevenire i gestionare a incidentelor,
ceea ce presupune ntlniri sptmnale ntre observatori i
ofieri responsabili de securitate n zona de conflict.
UE a fost i rmne ferm decis n favoarea integritii
teritoriale a Georgiei. Acest fapt a fost confirmat prin des-
curajarea altor state de a recunoate cele dou entiti sepa-
ratiste. Avertizarea subtil adresat autoritilor de la Minsk
n 2009 cu privire la efectele negative ale recunoaterii Ab-
haziei i Osetiei asupra cooperrii cu UE este reprezentativ.
n acelai timp, politica unor state membre UE de comer-
cializare a armamentului a strrnit ngrijorare la Tbilisi cu
privire la securitatea militar naional i regional. n 2011
Frana a semnat contractul de vnzare ctre Rusia a dou
purttoare de elicoptere Mistral. Georgia este ngrijorat c
aceast achiziie va ntri prezena militar rus la Marea
Neagr. n august 2008, Rusia a apelat la nave de rzboi alo-
cate operaiunii maritime de meninere a securitii regio-
nale Black Sea Harmony la care particip rile riverane.115
Dat fiind c invadarea Georgiei n 2008 a avut loc parial
pe cale maritim, iar Rusia se pare c s-a confruntat cu de-
ficitul navelor operaionale, Tbilisi nu exclude posibilitatea
ca achiziiile s urmreasc sporirea capacitii de proiecie
a forei militare ntr-un conflict la Marea Neagr. Aa cum
a explicat un ofier rus de rang nalt, referindu-se la ostilit-
ile din august 2008 ceea ce ne-a luat s facem n 26 de ore,
aceast nav [Mistral] face n 40 de minute (Kommersant,
2009).
n plan economic, UE i statele membre sunt activ impli-
cate n modernizarea multidimensional a Georgiei. UE este
primul partener comercial al Georgiei, cu o pondere de
31,7% n 2010 (EU Commission, 2011c). Olanda i Marea
Britanie s-au plasat pe locul trei i patru printre investitorii
115 Interviu cu un fost oficial de rang nalt, Bucureti, aprilie 2011.
154
Georgiei n 2010, cu $73,4 i, respectiv, $59 milioane
(Civil.Ge, 2011e). UE este o pia atractiv pentru fora de
munc din Georgia. Potrivit barometrului de opinie public,
30% dintre georgieni ar alege UE ca destinaie de munc n
afara rii (Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009b). Statele
membre UE combinate sunt pe locul doi ca surs de remi-
tene n Georgia n prima jumtate a anului 2011. Grecia,
Italia, Spania i Germania s-au plasat pe urmtoarele patru
locuri dup Rusia (Civil.Ge, 2011i). n perioada postconflict
(2008-2011), UE a alocat Georgiei 483,5 milioane, alte
131,27 milioane au fost acordate de state membre UE
(Fean, 2009, 9). Pentru perspectiva bugetar 2011-2013,
UE are prevzute, pentru asistena financiar a Georgiei,
180,3 milioane. Georgia mai poate atrage fonduri supli-
mentare din programe regionale i transfrontaliere (EU Com-
mission, 2011g).
O faz crucial pentru integrarea european a Georgiei o
reprezint instituirea ZCLAC. UE a decis n 2008 crearea
ZCLAC cu Georgia i a expediat la adresa guvernului de la
Tbilisi o serie de precondiii pentru nceperea negocierilor.
Dezbaterea n legtur cu avantajele i dezavantajele, cos-
turile i beneficiile ZCLAC cu UE este extrem de intens n
cercurile guvernamentale i academice. Avocaii ideii afirm
c ZCLAC este singura cale de apropiere real de UE, pre-
luare a standardelor europene i atragere a investitorilor
strini pe termen lung. Chiar dac procesul de implemen-
tare e foarte costisitor, trebuie s-l pltim116, argumenteaz
un experimentat observator local. Oponenii, care majoritar
reprezint aripa ultraliberal a elitei opineaz c ZCLAC,
prin introducerea instituiilor i reglementrilor stufoase n
diferite domenii economice, va stimula fenomenul corupiei
i va ndeprta investitorii de care Georgia are nevoie acum.
n plus se argumenteaz c introducerea rapid a standarde-
lor europene va elimina de pe pia productorii autohtoni,
care nu vor fi capabili s suporte costurile trecerii la standarde
116 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
155
europene.117 Aceast dezbatere aprins a influenat modul n 2005 i 2008, compania turc TAV a obinut dreptul de
n care Georgia a implementat reformele necesare deschi- gestionare a aeroportului din Batumi timp de 20 de ani i
derii negocierilor, fapt reflectat n ultimul raport de evaluare a celui din Tbilisi pe o perioad de 15 ani. ntre Turcia i
al Georgiei realizat de UE (EU Commission, 2011g). n con- Georgia exist curse regulate aeriene i de autocar i se
secin, opinia este divizat la Tbilisi. n timp ce oficialii preconizeaz finalizarea conexiunii pe calea ferat. Turcia i
insist asupra faptului c Georgia s-a conformat cerinelor Georgia sunt conectate prin reelele de transport ale gazelor,
iniiale ale UE i este gata s nceap negocierile118, experii petrolului i electricitii, fapt care contribuie la interdepen-
spun c multe din msurile luate au fost ntrziate i adop- dena economic. n 2011, Georgia a semnat un acord cu
tate selectiv119. Se pare c, cel puin pe termen scurt, Turcia pentru construcia a trei hidrocentrale n Samhe-
Georgia dorete nceperea negocierilor cu privire la ZCLAC Javaheti i a unei linii de transmisie electric Batumi-Arakli
pentru a le trimite un semnal pozitiv investitorilor strini120 (News.Az, 2011m). Georgia a debutat n calitate de expor-
i a inversa tendina descendent din ultimii ani. La rndul tator de energie electric pe piaa european, livrrile fiind
su, UE este preocupat de faptul c momentul nceperii realizate prin Turcia. Astfel, foarte rapid, Turcia s-a transfor-
negocierilor va fi instrumentalizat de Tbilisi pentru a atrage mat ntr-o punte a Georgiei spre Europa.
investiii strine, iar interesul pentru ncheierea acordului ntre cele dou ri are loc o interaciune intens la nivel
propriu-zis va scdea (Waal, 2011, 37). umanitar. Experii estimeaz c aproximativ 100.000 de
georgieni lucreaz n Turcia.121 n 2009, n jur de 350.000
3.3.3. Turcia de turci au vizitat Georgia (Chkhikvadze, 2010). Numrul
turitilor crete de la an an. Doar n primele patru luni din
n ultimii cinci ani relaiile Georgiei cu Turcia au cunos-
cut o dezvoltare calitativ i cantitativ rapid. Au loc vizite 2011 aproape 268.000 de turci au fcut deplasri n Georgia
regulate la nivel de stat i consultri guvernamentale bilate- (News.Am, 2011a). Dinamizarea raporturilor bilaterale a
rale. Relaia dintre preedintele Georgiei i primul-ministru transformat Turcia ntr-unul dintre principalii parteneri
al Turciei este sudat printr-o serie de proiecte comune economici ai Georgiei. Volumul comercial ntre Turcia i
implementate pe parcursul mandatelor succesive. Turcia Georgia a crescut cu 230% n ultimii cinci ani (Fisher Onar,
este singurul vecin cu care Georgia are frontiera delimitat 2009). Prin urmare, Turcia este al doilea partener comercial
i demarcat. n scopul facilitrii comerului i a vizitelor al Georgiei, cu o pondere de 15,6% n 2010 (EU Com-
turistice, prile au semnat acordul cu privire la comerul mission, 2011c). n 2010, Turcia a fost al doilea investitor
liber, au liberalizat regimul de vize (se circul pe baza crii strin n Georgia, cu $91,8 milioane (Civil.Ge, 2011e).
de identitate) i au deschis un modern punct comun de Totodat, Turcia s-a clasat n prima jumtate a anului 2011
frontier n Sarpi (Adjaria), prin care se desfoar 90% pe locul 6 printre rile de origine a remitenelor n Georgia
din traficul rutier bilateral. Prile vor demara n curnd (Civil.Ge, 2011i). Pn la declanarea rzboiului n 2008,
lucrrile la un alt punct de frontier comun Cildir-Aktas. Tbilisi i Ankara au extins cooperarea n domeniul militar
n baza acordului semnat n 1997. Ambiia Georgiei de a
117 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011. deveni stat membru NATO a apropiat forele armate turce
118 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, iunie 2011. i georgiene. Turcia a oferit asisten tehnic i a pregtit
119 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
120 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, iunie 2011. 121 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

156 157
militari georgieni n vederea ajustrii forelor armate ale
Georgiei la standardele NATO i asigurrii interoperabili-
tii acestora n misiunile internaionale. n 2006, asistena
militar a Turciei pentru Georgia s-a cifrat la $1,8 milioane
(Torbakov, 2008, 9). Dei la o scar mai redus, cooperarea
militar ntre cele dou ri a continuat i dup 2008.
Factorul rusesc a contat n calculele politice de la Ankara.
Chestiunea care, ns, afecteaz relaiile bilaterale o repre-
zint rolul Turciei n Abhazia. Turcia gzduiete o diaspor
abhaz numeroas, care ncurajeaz guvernul spre dezvolta-
rea relaiilor mai apropiate cu Abhazia. Pe lng lobby-ul
diasporei, guvernul de la Ankara nsui dorete s sporeasc
interaciunea cu Abhazia. Raionamentul este urmtorul:
dac nu contrabalansm economic i politic Moscova,
Abhazia va fi absorbit integral n timp de Rusia.122 Dei
oficial legtura maritim ntre Abhazia i Turcia este nchis,
ntre cele dou pri au loc schimburi comerciale. Suhumi
declar c Turcia este al doilea partener comercial al Abha-
ziei dup Rusia (Vindimian, 2010, 5). n 2009, un diplomat
turc s-a deplasat la Suhumi pentru consultri cu autoritile
separatiste, iar liderul Abhaziei a efectuat n 2011 o vizit
de patru zile n Turcia n cadrul creia s-a ntlnit cu
reprezentanii diasporei i oameni de afaceri. Tbilisi accept
parial argumentele Turciei, ns nu vrea ca prevenirea
absorbiei Abhaziei de ctre Rusia s fie realizat cu preul
a ceea ce Tbilisi percepe ca un proces gradual de legitimare
internaional a regimului de la Suhumi, care ar putea duce
la recunoaterea independenei Abhaziei. n consecin,
Georgia a reinut, ntre 1999 i 2006, peste 60 de nave care
circulau pe ruta Turcia-Abhazia i a blocat n 2009
deschiderea reprezentanei Benetton din Turcia la Suhumi
(Vindimian, 2010, 5; Civil.Ge, 2009c). n 2009, ntr-un caz
care a tensionat relaiile bilaterale, o instan judectoreasc
de la Tbilisi a condamnat comandantul turc al unei nave
reinute n apele teritoriale ale Georgiei care se ndrepta spre
122 Interviu cu un expert, Berlin, noiembrie 2009.
158
Abhazia la 24 de ani de nchisoare pentru contraband i
activitate economic neautorizat. La presiunile guvernului
turc, sentina a fost comutat, iar ceteanul turc a fost eli-
berat. Prin urmare, guvernul turc nu a dat nici un semn c
ar fi dispus s renune la strategia de angajare a Abhaziei123,
iar Georgia a realizat c nu se poate opune efectiv procesu-
lui. n 2011, Ankara i Tbilisi au purtat negocieri intense cu
privire la modalitile de interaciune cu Abhazia, care s nu
strneasc animozitatea executivului georgian.124
Apropierea Georgiei de Turcia pe multiple planuri a co-
incis cu distanarea Turciei de UE. Cu toate c relaiile cu
Ankara sunt considerate importante pentru realizarea obiec-
tivelor de politic extern, percepia despre rolul i interese-
le Turciei n regiune s-a modificat la Tbilisi. Turcia nu mai
este o putere regional care proiecteaz interesele Occiden-
tului n Caucazul de Sud125, mprtete un oficial per-
spectiva georgian. Turcia rmne un partener important
al Georgiei, dar motivele Ankarei nu sunt ntotdeauna clare
pentru Tbilisi126, l completeaz un expert local. nstri-
narea Turciei de Europa este privit la Tbilisi prin prisma
propriilor eforturi de apropiere de UE i impactul pe care
aceast tendin l poate avea asupra Georgiei. Aa cum
remarc un observator, ameninarea constant de la nord i
Turcia tot mai distant de UE compun un mediu regional nu
tocmai favorabil integrrii europene a Georgiei127.
3.3.4. Iran
Pn n 2006, Georgia nu a demonstrat un interes spe-
cial pentru raporturile bilaterale aprofundate cu Iranul.
Contactele ocazionale la nivel politic i schimburile comer-
ciale nesemnificative pentru balana bilateral caracterizau
123 Interviu cu un expert, Berlin, noiembrie 2009.
124 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
125 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
126 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
127 Interviu cu un expert, iulie 2010.
159
relaiile ntre Tbilisi i Teheran. Politic i economic, Georgia
privea intens dincolo de Marea Neagr. Faptul c rile nu
au o frontier comun a contribuit la detaarea lor. ns, n (Oxford Analytica, 2010), iar Iranul se simea tot mai izolat
2006, n contextul deteriorrii rapide a relaiilor ruso-geor-
giene, Georgia a apelat n regim de urgen la importurile de
gaze din Iran. La finele anului 2006, guvernul de la Tbilisi
preconiza c va reduce cu 80% importurile de gaze din
Rusia. Incertitudinea cu privire la data la care Azerbaidjanul
va putea ncepe din punct de vedere tehnic livrarea gazelor
de pe zcmntul Shah Deniz a determinat Georgia s
prospecteze din nou posibilitatea importurilor de cantiti
mici de gaze din Iran. Dar cursul de politic extern a Geor-
giei nu las foarte mult spaiu pentru dezvoltarea relaiilor
de vecintate apropiate cu Iranul. Georgia a descoperit
foarte rapid limita cooperrii n domeniul energetic cu
Iranul, deoarece guvernul SUA s-a exprimat mpotriva inter-
aciunii pe termen lung n sectorul energetic ntre Georgia i
Iran (Civil.Ge, 2006).
n 2008, rzboiul cu Rusia a impulsionat indirect relaiile
ntre Teheran i Tbilisi. Ameninarea militar constant din
partea Rusiei, depersonalizarea relaiilor cu SUA i criza
economic au contribuit la echilibrarea politicii externe
georgiene. Guvernul a imprimat politicii externe o dimen-
siune regional inclusiv. Tbilisi a realizat c n mediul de
securitate postconflict este vital ca Georgia s dezvolte o
agend pozitiv cu absolut toate puterile regionale. Aadar,
fr a-i schimba radical orientarea strategic, Georgia nu
exclude din start nicio alternativ de cooperare.128 Tehera-
nul a sesizat oportunitatea i a reacionat rapid la demer-
surile Georgiei. Ministrul de externe al Georgiei a vizitat n
2010 Teheranul i a promis c Georgia nu va ntreprinde
nicio aciune mpotriva Iranului indiferent de apartenena
sa la aliane (Civil.Ge, 2010). Astfel, n limbaj diplomatic,
Tbilisi a trimis mesajul c nu va pune la dispoziie terito-
riul su n cazul unei operaiuni militare mpotriva Iranului.
128 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
160
Georgia a profitat de momentul prielnic relansnd relaiile
cu Teheranul atunci cnd relaiile ruso-iraniene s-au rcit
pe plan internaional. Ulterior, o delegaie condus de un
diplomat iranian s-a deplasat la Tbilisi. n cadrul vizitei,
Iranul a propus o serie de iniiative de cooperare n dome-
niul producerii i exportului de energie electric (Lomsadze,
2010). n 2010, Iranul a deschis un consulat la Batumi,
iar n 2011 prile au convenit asupra liberalizrii regimului
de vize i lansrii curselor directe Teheran-Tbilisi i Teheran-
Batumi. Astfel, Georgia a instrumentalizat cooperarea cu
Iranul pentru a stimula industria turistic autohton. Dei
comerul bilateral s-a revitalizat uor, Iranul continu s fie
un partener comercial insignifiant pentru Georgia. Ponderea
schimburilor comerciale cu Iranul n comerul Georgiei a
fost doar de 0,6% n 2010 (EU Commission, 2011c).
Iranul s-a dovedit mult mai entuziast i mai proactiv
dect Georgia, n timp ce executivul georgian a acionat mai
rezervat coordonndu-i aciunile cu SUA.129 Aadar, ceea ce
Tbilisi a conceput drept o cooperare pragmatic, care s nu
pun n pericol relaia cu Occidentul, Iranul a interpretat
drept o ans de a-i proiecta influena n regiune i a atrage
Georgia ntr-o relaie mult mai intensificat. Prin urmare, n
timp ce Teheranul cuta modaliti de a profita la maximum
de aceast deschidere, Georgia ncerca s pstreze o anumit
distan.130
3.3.5. Rusia
Spre deosebire de ali actori regionali, Rusia e perceput
la Tbilisi n calitate de obstacol major n calea realizrii
obiectivelor strategice naionale. n sondajele de opinie,
83% dintre georgieni identific Rusia drept ameninarea
numrul unu la adresa securitii Georgiei (International
Republican Institute, 2011). Exist o serie de factori care
129 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
130 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
161
explic aceast atitudine. Rusia controleaz militar n jur de
20% din teritoriul Georgiei, inclusiv regiunea Ahalgori, aflat
sub jurisdicia autoritilor de la Tbilisi pn n august 2008
(a se vedea harta 7). Forele armate ruse sunt la distana de
50 km de Tbilisi. n eventualitatea unui conflict, Rusia va
putea uor bloca infrastructura de transport care face leg-
tura ntre estul i vestul Georgiei i va putea avansa rapid
spre capitala rii. Rusia a dislocat n cele dou regiuni
separatiste 3.800 de militari i 1.000 de grniceri din cadrul
Serviciului Federal de Securitate. Pe lng investiii masive
n infrastructura militar, Moscova a declanat procesul de
demarcare a frontierei administrative ntre Georgia, pe de o
parte, i Abhazia i Osetia de Sud pe de alt parte. Moscova
subvenioneaz bugetele republicilor separatiste n proporie
de 70-90%. Companiile de stat preiau controlul asupra
infrastructurii strategice, precum cile ferate sau aeroportul Harta 7 Georgia i cele dou regiuni separatiste
Babuera din Abhazia. Kremlinul a depus eforturi diploma- (sursa: Wikipedia)
tice i financiare pentru a extinde lista statelor sau micro-
statelor care au recunoscut independena Abhaziei i Osetiei
de Sud. Astfel, Rusia i propune s decupleze definitiv cele intermediul companiei Itera, care are ncheiate contracte de
dou regiuni de Georgia, pentru a minimaliza ansele unei distribuie cu 103 ntreprinderi locale (Postnikov, 2008, 54).
reintegrri chiar i n viitorul ndeprtat. n acelai timp, ns principalul beneficiar al acestor livrri, probabil la un
diplomaia rus depune eforturi pentru a izola Georgia pe pre preferenial, este uzina chimic Azot din Rustavi, care
plan extern i a preveni livrrile de echipament i tehnic este controlat de Itera.132 Georgia are un acord cu Rusia cu
militar, inclusiv de natur defensiv, forelor armate privire la livrrile reciproce de energie electric, care a rmas
georgiene. Rusia se opune deschis aderrii Georgiei nu doar funcional i dup conflictul din 2008. n Rusia muncesc
la NATO, ci i la UE.131 aproximativ 700.000 de georgieni. Remitenele din Rusia
n ciuda lipsei relaiilor diplomatice, ntre cele dou ri constituie n jur de 63% din totalul transferurilor bneti
se menin multiple legturi economice. Rusia a fost al apte- efectuate de georgienii aflai n strintate (ibidem, 56).
lea partener comercial al Georgiei n 2010, cu o pondere de Dei 72% din georgieni consider c agresiunea Rusiei
4,4% (EU Commission, 2011c). Companiile ruseti (Vm- mpotriva Georgiei continu, n jur de 90% de respondeni
pelkom, Inter RAO, Itera, VTB) sunt prezente n sectorul sprijin dialogul politic i interaciunea n domeniul eco-
telecomunicaiilor, energetic i financiar-bancar al Georgiei. nomic cu Rusia (International Republican Institute, 2011).
Georgia import n continuare aprope 8-10% din necesarul Aadar, lund n considerare legturile economice i opinia
su de gaze din Rusia. Gazele naturale sunt importate prin public, provocarea major pentru guvernul de la Tbilisi

131 Interviu cu un diplomat, Tbilisi, mai 2011. 132 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

162 163
o reprezint identificarea unei modaliti funcionale de
co-existen cu Rusia. n ultimii doi ani, autoritile de la
Tbilisi au avut o serie de iniiative prin care au ncercat
s detensioneze relaiile cu Rusia.133 n 2010, Georgia i-a
asumat n mod unilateral obligaia de a nu utiliza fora
pentru a realiza reintegrarea rii. Cu toate c servete
interesele economice ale Armeniei, redeschiderea punctului
vamal Verhni Lars-Kazbeghi n 2010 a fcut, de asemenea,
parte din eforturile de deescaladare a conflictului ruso-geor-
gian. n octombrie 2008, Georgia a simplificat unilateral
regimul de vize cu Rusia. Cetenii rui obin viza la intrarea
n Georgia fr a mai trece printr-o procedur stufoas de
aplicaie. ncepnd cu 2011, viza se poate obine inclusiv la
punctul de trecere Verhni Lars-Kazbeghi. n 2010 i 2011,
prile au reluat zborurile pe rutele Moscova-Tbilisi, Mos-
cova-Batumi i, respectiv, Moscova-Kutaisi. Georgia consi-
der necesar continuarea discuiilor de la Geneva, n ciuda
rolului deseori neconstructiv al Rusiei. Aa cum explic un
oficial, uneori e nevoie s pori un proces de dragul proce-
sului134. n 2011, la cererea Moscovei au fost reluate nego-
cierile ruso-georgiene pe marginea problemelor care menin
veto-ul Georgiei cu privire la aderarea Rusiei la OMC.
Totodat, au existat contacte i pe linia bisericeasc. Capii
celor dou biserici s-au ntlnit la Kiev n vara lui 2011.
n paralel cu o serie de msuri pozitive, Georgia a con-
tinuat s ating puncte nevralgice pentru Rusia. n 2010,
Georgia a liberalizat unilateral regimul de vize pentru cet-
eni rui cu viza de reedin n apte republici naionale din la Tbilisi este ghidat i de imperative de securitate. Caucazul
Caucazul de Nord. Potrivit autoritilor, zilnic 600 de rezi-
deni din Caucazul de Nord traverseaz frontiera ruso-geor-
gian (Ekho Moskvy, 2011). n 2011, Georgia a lansat de
asemenea un post TV PIK accesibil prin satelit, care
emite n rus i acoper evenimentele din Caucazul de Sud
i Caucazul de Nord. Grupul-int primar al acestui post
133 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
134 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
164
este publicul din Caucazul de Nord. Pagina de internet a
postului are n jur de 7-8.000 de vizitatori unici din Rusia
(Elder, 2011). Parlamentul Georgiei a recunoscut n 2011
genocidul cerkeilor comis de Rusia arist n secolul al
XIX-lea. Evenimentele tragice care au marcat campania de
cucerire a Caucazului au avut loc n 1864 n Krasnaia
Poliana, una dintre localitile care va gzdui Jocurile Olim-
pice de iarn de la Soci n 2014. Autoritile georgiene pla-
nific n 2012 deschiderea unui memorial dedicat victimelor
genocidului cerkeilor, amplasat aproape de Abhazia. Nu
n ultimul rnd, discursul politic georgian recurge la com-
paraii cu Rusia pentru a delegitima i decredibiliza regimul
politic de la Moscova. Reforma poliiei, combaterea corup-
iei, mbuntirea mediului investiional i transformarea
oraului Batumi sunt deseori contrapuse abuzurilor poliiei,
corupiei sistemice, hruirii investitorilor strini i orga-
nizrii deficitare n pregtirea oraului Soci pentru Jocurile
Olimpice.
Dei nu sunt gndite exclusiv pentru a irita Rusia, acest
set de aciuni politice indubitabil i propune s vulnerabi-
lizeze Rusia. Rusia este satisfcut de statu quo, Georgia vrea
ca Rusia s plteasc preul pentru actualul echilibru135,
explic logica din spatele unor msuri un analist local. Pn
acum Rusia nu a pltit un pre pe msur, de aceea Georgia
ncearc s incomodeze Rusia n regiunea unde ea se simte
vulnerabil136, detaliaz expertul motivaia politicilor
georgiene n Caucazul de Nord. n acelai timp, guvernul de
de Nord, cu care Georgia se nvecineaz, va rmne o regiune
turbulent pe termen lung. Tbilisi ncearc s proiecteze
fora de atracie pentru a asigura o atitudine favorabil fa
de Georgia n republicile nord-caucaziene.137 Efectul cumu-
lat al aciunilor de incomodare a Rusiei i de detensionare
135 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
136 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.
137 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
165
a relaiilor bilaterale reprezint o coabitare dificil ntre
Georgia i Rusia.
Concluzii
La 20 de ani de la disoluia Uniunii Sovietice, Caucazul
de Sud este un imens antier n lucru, a crui arhitectur
politic, economic i de securitate final este nc insesi-
zabil. Aa cum arat analiza, o serie de factori contribuie
la incertitudinea cu privire la viitorul regiunii. n primul rnd,
dou din cele trei republici nu i controleaz integral teri-
toriul suveran, iar modificarea violent sau panic a fron-
tierelor nu poate fi exclus. n al doilea rnd, un segment
social important, refugiai i PSI, triesc de aproape dou
decenii n ateptare. Rentoarcerea, la fel ca i nentoarcerea
la casele lor, va influena evoluiile n jurul conflictelor i
politicile statelor gazd. n al treilea rnd, Caucazul de Sud
este o regiune cu multe granie nchise i comunicare trans-
frontalier fragmentat. Prin urmare, deschiderea granielor
va avea un impact multidimensional benefic asupra regiunii.
n acelai timp, meninerea frontierelor nchise va contribui
la dezvoltarea proiectelor care mereu exclud pe cineva n
regiune, alimentnd animozitile i segmentarea regional.
n al patrulea rnd, statele resimt puternic deficitul de secu-
ritate la nivel regional care motiveaz nu numai militari-
zarea excesiv, dar i externalizarea securitii. Agendele
concurente ale actorilor cu pondere regional fac deseori
imposibil conceperea i implementarea soluiilor regionale
inclusive. Manipularea marilor puteri pentru realizarea obiec-
tivelor naionale conflictuale contribuie din plin la situaia
de insecuritate general din zon. n al cincilea rnd, diver-
sitatea orientrilor externe i proiectelor naionale interne
contribuie la geometria variabil la nivel regional. Statele fac
parte sau aspir spre organizaii sau aliane militare alterna-
tive, precum OTSC, NATO, CSI, GUAM, UE, OCEMN
sau Micarea de Nealiniere. n final, Caucazul de Sud se
166
nvecineaz cu (sub)regiuni turbulente (Caucazul de Nord,
Orientul Mijlociu) care export instabilitate i conserv ele-
mente de imprevizibilitate. Cumulate, aceste variabile con-
tribuie la multiple scenarii pe care le-ar putea urma regiunea
n viitor. Normalizarea relaiilor turco-armene n combinaie
cu eventualele progrese n soluionarea conflictului din
Nagorno-Karabah ar putea vindeca statele din Caucazul de
Sud de logica jocului cu suma nul i ar crea premise pentru
cooperare regional trilateral. ns nu poate fi exclus faptul
c ineria regional caracterizat prin dezvoltarea cu mai
multe viteze i evoluiile pluridirecionale regionale vor fi sin-
gurele certitudini pentru Caucazul de Sud n acest deceniu.
Bibliografie
Abbasov, Shahin. 2011. Azerbaijan: Arrest of Islamic Party
Leader Puts Religion in the Political Spotlight, Eurasianet,
12 January (http://www. eurasianet.org/node/62692).
Abbasov, Shahin. 2010. Turkey Steps Up Support for
Strategic Azerbaijani Exclave of Nakhchivan, Eurasianet,
26 July (http://www.eurasianet.org/node/ 61610).
ABC.Az 2011. SOCAR Georgia Gas Has Opened a Large
Distribution Network in Beyler village of Marnueli,
1 April (http://www.abc.az/eng/news/52735. html).
Akyol, Mustafa. 2011. Turkeys Maturing Foreign Policy.
How the Arab Spring Changed the AKP, Foreign Affairs,
7 July (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67974/
mustafa-akyol/turkeys-maturing-foreign-policy?page=
show).
Alieva, Leila. 2009. Azerbaijans Gas Policy: Challenges and
Dilemmas, ISS Opinion, April (http://www.iss.europa.eu/
uploads/media/Azerbaijani_gas_policy.pdf).
Aliyev, Ilham. 2010. Speech at the 46th Munich Security
Conference, 6 February (http://www.securityconference.de/
Aliyev-Ilham.582.0.html?&L=1).
167
Altunisik, Meliha Benli and Ozlem Tur. 2005. Turkey. Chal-
lenges of Continuity and Change, Oxon/New York, Rout-
ledgeCurzon.
Apa News, 2011. Azerbaijani Ambassador to Georgia
Namig Aliyev: For the Armenians Access to the Black
Sea Means the Realization of the Idea of Great Armenia
from Sea to Sea, 23 February (http://www.en.apa.az/
news.php?id=141404).
Armtown.Com, 2011a. Russia to Increase Gas Prices for
Armenia?, 13 July (http://www.armtown.com/news/en/
nws/20110713/67744/).
Armtown.Com, 2011b. Turkish Poll Finds Little Support
for Armenia Border Opening, 5 January (http://www.
armtown.com/news/en/rfe/20110105/22679 36/).
Asbarez Post, 2010. Azerbaijan Offers $500 Million for
Georgia-Armenia Gas Pipeline, August 2010 (http://
www.asbarez.com/84460/azerbaijan-offers-500-million-
for-georgia-armenia-gas-pipeline/).
Asmus, Ronald D. and Bruce P. Jackson, 2004. The Black
Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom, Policy Review, nr. 125
(http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/arti-
cle/6451).
AZE.Az, 2010. Azerbaijan Budet Postavliati Gaz Gruzii
Bespreryvno do 2020 goda, 30 dekabria (http://www.
aze.az/news_azerbayjan_budet_postavl_4862 7.html).
Azernews, 2011. Azeri Government Protests EU Over Crit-
ical Statement, 13 April (http://www.azernews.az/en/
Nation/31623-Azeri_govt_protests_EU_over_critical_
statement).
Aztag. 2011. Azimov: Baku Is Concerned over the Pres-
ence of Russian Servicemen in Armenia, 20 July (http://
www.aztagenglish.com/2011/07/azimov%E2%80%9Cba
ku-is-concerned-over-the-presence-ofrussian-servicemen-
in-armenia%E2%80%9D/).
Bayramov, Vugar, 2009. Ending Dependency: How Is Oil Revenues
Effectively Used in Azerbaijan?, Baku, Centre for Economic
and Social Development.
168
Bedwell, Helena, 2011. Georgian Detained for Cutting
Georgia, Armenia Internet Cable, Bloomberg, 6 April
(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0406/georgian-
d e t a i n e d - f o r- c u t t i n g - g e o rg i a - a r m e n i a - i n t e r n e t -
cable.html).
Buzan, Barry, Ole Weaver i Jaap de Wilde, 1998. Security:
A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder (Colorado), Lynne
Rienner Publishers.
Buzan, Barry i Ole Weaver, 2003. Regions and Power: The
Structure of International Security, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 2010. Caucasus
Barometer 2010, Armenia (http://www.crrc.ge/oda/?data-
set=5&row=91&column=91).
Charap, Samuel i Cory Welt, 2011. A More Proactive US
Approach to the Georgia Conflicts, Center for American
Progress Report, February (http://www.amer ican-
progress.org/issues/2011/02/pdf/georgia-report.pdf).
Chkhikvadze, Ivane, 2010. Black Sea Regional Cooperation
from Georgian Perspective. Black Sea Young Reformers Paper
(http://www.bsyr.org/download/2010/Chkhikvadze-01.
pdf).
CIPDD, GYLA i Safeworld, 2011. Peace, Security and Stabil-
ity in Kvemo Kartli. A Community Informed Strategy (http://
www.cipdd.org/files/40_532_272132_Communityinform
edstrategy-KvemoKartlieng-reduced.pdf).
Civil.Ge, 2011a. Parliament to Be Fully Relocated to Kutaisi,
16 May (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article. php?id=23448).
Civil.Ge, 2011b. Armenia, Georgian FMs Hail Bilateral Ties,
29 June (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php? id=23683).
Civil.Ge, 2011c. Georgian PM: No Plans to Sell Controlling
Stakes in North-South Gas Pipeline, 16 February (http://
www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23150).
Civil.Ge, 2011d. Georgian Church Leader Says Armenian Catho-
licos Clever, but Needs More Experience, 20 June (http://
www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id= 23641).
Civil.Ge, 2011e. Geostat Revises 2010 FDI Figure Upwards,
11 August (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23232).
169
Civil.Ge, 2011f. Georgia Ratifies USD 575m Azerbaijani Loan
for Regional Rail Link, 31 May (http://www.civil.ge/eng/
article.php?id=23841).
Civil.Ge, 2011g. Georgia Mulls Sending More Troops to Afghan-
istan, 3 June (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=
23575).
Civil.Ge, 2011h. U.S. Donates 40 Humvees to Georgian Army,
7 June (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php? id=23588).
Civil.Ge, 2011i. 1H11 Money Transfers from Abroad USD
509.5m, 20 July (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=
23774).
Civil.Ge, 2011j. EU Commissioner on Democratic Reforms in
Georgia, 22 July (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=
23788).
Civil.Ge, 2010. Iranian President Meets Georgian FM, 19 Jan-
uary (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id= 21899).
Civil. Ge, 2009a. Armenian PM Complains on High Transporta-
tion Tariffs in Georgia, 6 June (http://www.civil.ge/eng/arti-
cle.php?id=21061).
Civil.Ge, 2009b. Saakashvili: Tbilisi Ready for Reopening Border
Crossing with Russia, 25 June (http://www.civil.ge/eng/arti-
cle.php?id=21165).
Civil.Ge, 2009c. Georgia Protests Benetton Abkhaz Entry, 25 May
(http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id= 20984).
Civil.Ge, 2006. U.S. Tells Georgia to Avoid Long-Term Gas Deals
with Iran, 27 November (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.
php?id=14189).
Coene, Frederik, 2010. The Caucasus. An Introduction, Londra/
New York, Routledge.
Cornell, Svante E., Niklas L.P. Swanstrom, Anara Tabysha-
lieva i Georgi Tcheishvili, 2005. A Strategic Conflict Analy-
sis of the South Caucasus with a Focus on Georgia, Silk Road
Policy Paper, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (http://www.
silkroadstudies.org/docs/publications/2005/050601Cau-
casus_Total.pdf).
Danielyan, Emil, 2011. Armenian Remittances Soar in 2011,
Radio Free Europe, 6 May (http://www.azatutyun.am/
content/article/24093774.html).
170
Danielyan, Emil, 2010. Russia Boosts Military Alliance
with Armenia, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7 (159) (http://www.
jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_
news%5D=36792).
Deutsch, Karl W., [1954] 2006. Political Community at the
International Level, Salt Lake City, Aardvark Global
Publishing.
De Waal, Thomas, 2011. Georgias Choices. Charting a Future
in Uncertain Times, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Report (http://carnegieendowment.org/files/georgias_
choices.pdf).
De Waal, Thomas, 2003. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbai-
jan Through Peace and War, New York/London, New York
University Press.
EEAS, 2011. European Union-Azerbaijan (http://www.eeas.
europa.eu/azerbaijan/index_en.htm).
Ekho Moskvy, 2011. Interview with President Saakashvili,
8 July (http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/790260
-echo/).
Elder, Miriam, 2011. Georgia Challenges Russias TV Dom-
inance, Global Post, 29 June (http://www.globalpost.com/
dispatch/news/regions/europe/russia/110628/georgia-
russian-language-satellite-television-news).
Emerson, Michael, 2008. The EUs New Black Sea Policy.
What Kind of Regionalism Is This?, CEPS Working Docu-
ment nr. 29 (http://www.ceps.eu/book/eus-new-black-sea-
policy-what-kind-regionalism).
Eteris, Eugene, 2011. In the EUs Financial Assistance to
Armenia the Baltic States Can Have a Share, The Baltic
Course, 21 February (http://www.balticcourse.com/eng/
baltic_states/?doc=37488).
Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009a. Getting Involved!,
Tbilisi.
Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009b. Georgian Public
Opinion. Attitudes towards European Integration, October
(http://www.epfound.ge/files/eusurveyreport_georgia_aug
09.pdf).
171
EU Commission, 2011a. Turkey. EU Bilateral Trade and Trade
with the World (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2006/september/tradoc_113456.pdf).
EU Commission, 2011b. Armenia. EU Bilateral Trade and Trade
with the World (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2006/september/tradoc_113345. pdf).
EU Commission, 2011c. Georgia. EU Bilateral Trade and Trade
with the World (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2006/september/tradoc_113383. pdf).
European Commission, 2011d. Azerbaijan. EU Bilateral Trade
and Trade with the World (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2006/september/tradoc_1 13347.pdf).
European Commission, 2011e. Implementation of the European
Neigbourhood Policy in 2010. Country Report: Armenia,
25 May (http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress
2011/sec_11639_en.pdf).
European Commission, 2011f. Implementation of the European
Neigbourhood Policy in 2010. Country Report: Azerbaijan,
25 May (http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2011/
sec_11_640_en.pdf).
European Commission, 2011g. Implementation of the European
Neigbourhood Policy in 2010. Country Report: Georgia,
25 May (http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2011/
sec_11_649_en.pdf).
European Parliament, 2010. Non-legislative Resolution EU
Strategy for the South Caucasus, 20 May (http://www.euro-
parl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang=en&proc-
num=INI/2009/2216).
Fean, Dominic, 2009. Making Good Use of the EU in
Georgia: The Eastern Partnership and Conflict Policy,
Russia.Nei.Visions no. 44 (http://www.ifri.org/files/Russie/
ifri_fean_EU_and_Georgia_ENG_sep t2009.pdf).
Fitzpatrick, Catherine A., 2011. Turkmenistan: Russia, US
at Odds Over Trans-Caspian Eurasianet, 15 June (http://
www.eurasianet.org/node/63680).
Freedom House, 2011. Nations in Transit 2011. The Authori-
tarian Dead End in the Former Soviet Union (http://www.
freedomhouse.org/uploads/nit/2011/ NIT2011-Full.pdf).
172
Ghazinyan, Aris, 2011. A Dream House: Georgian Presi-
dent Shared His Vision of United Caucasus Again,
ArmeniaNow, 17 February (http://www. armenianow.com/
commentary/analysis/27727/saakashvili_common_cau-
casian_house_armenia_azerbaijan).
GHN News Agency, 2011. U.S. Government Helps Georgia
Build Coast Guard Maintenance Facility, 25 August (http://
www.eng.ghn.ge/news-4296.html).
Grigoryan, Marianna, 2010. Armenia: Azerbaijani Film
Festival Cancellation Doesnt Stop Controversy in Yere-
van, Eurasianet, 15 November (http://www.eurasianet.
org/node/62382).
Grigoryan, Marianna, 2009. Armenia: Saakashvili Visit to
Yerevan Produces Lots of Smiles, Little Action, Eurasia-
net, 25 June (http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/
insightb/articles/eav062609a.shtml).
Grove, Thomas, 2011. Costs Rise for Kremlins N.Caucasus
Funding Policy, Reuters, 24 June (http://www.trust.org/
alertnet/news/analysis-costs-rise-for-kremlins-ncaucasus-
funding-policy).
Hayrumyan, Naira, 2011. Armenian Government Turns to
Russia for Another Loan, Armenia Now, 8 July (http://
www.armenianow.com/economy/30238/armenia_russia_
loan_eurasian_economic_community).
Hayrumyan, Naira, 2010. On Russian Business Rules,
Lragir.am, 11 November (http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/
economy19719.html).
Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2011. Internal
Displacement. Global Overview of Trends and Developments in
2010, March (http://www.internal-displacement.org/pub-
lications/global-overview-2010.pdf).
International Crisis Group, 2011a. Armenia and Azerbaijan:
Preventing War, Europe Briefing 60 (http://www.crisisgroup.
org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/B60%20Armenia%20
and%20Azerbaijan%20%20Preventing%20War.pdf).
International Crisis Group, 2011b. Georgia: The Javakheti
Regions Integration Challenges, Europe Briefing 63 (http://
173
 www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/B63%20Geor
gia%20The%20Javakheti%20Regions%20Integration%2
0Challenges.pdf).
International Crisis Group, 2009. Nagorno-Karabakh: Getting
to a Breakthrough, Europe Briefings 55 (http://www.crisis-
group.org/~/media/Files/europe/b55_nagorno_karabakh_
__getting_to_a_breakthrough.pdf).
International Republican Institute, 2011. Georgian National
Study, April-May (http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/
2011%20June%2028%20Survey%20of%20
Georgian%20Public%20Opinion,%20April%2026-
May%204,%202011.pdf).
International Republican Institute, 2008a. Armenian Nation-
al Study, January (http://www.asa.am/downloads/IRI/
2008%20Janury%20Armenia-poll.pdf).
International Republican Institute, 2008b. Georgian National
Study, September/October (http://www.iri.org/sites/default/
files/2008%20November%2021%20Survey%20of%20G
eorgian%20Public%20Opinion, %20September%2023-
October%201,% 202008.pdf).
Ismailov, Eldar and Vladimer Papava, 2007. Tsentralinyi Kav-
kaz: Istoriia, Politika, Ekonomika. Moscova, Mysli.
Ismailov, Eldar and Vladimer Papava, 2008. A New Concept
for the Caucasus, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,
8 (3), 283-298.
Ismailzade, Fariz, 2009. Russian Arms to Armenia Could
Change Azerbaijans Foreign Policy Orientation, in
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 28 January (http://www.
cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5021).
Kardas, Saban, 2011. Erdogan Responds to Sarksyans
Remarks by Backing Azerbaijan, Eurasia Daily Monitor,
8 (146) (http://www.jamestown. org/single/?no_cache=
1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38247&tx_ttnews[backPid]=
7&cHash=370c70ff1687d62d0d6e 2cdf2aa27f61).
Kazimov, Seymur, 2011. Azerbaijan and Georgia: Disputed
Border, News.Az., 11 March (http://www.news.az/arti-
cles/32193).
174
Kommersant. 2009. Rossia Obiavit Tender na Zakupku
Vertoletonostev Klassa Mistral, 11 Sentiabria (http://
www.kommersant.ru/doc/1236855).
Lesser, Ian O., 2011. Strategy Toward Europes Neighborhood
and the Turkish Role: An American Perspective, GMF Policy
Brief (On Turkey Series), 5 April (http://www.gmfus.org/
galleries/ct_publication_attachments/Lesser_Neighbor-
hood_Apr11.pdf).
Lomsadze, Giorgi, 2010. Tbilisi Woos Iran While Washing-
ton Watches, Eurasianet, 28 May (http://www.eurasianet.
org/node/61179).
Markedonov, Sergei, 2011. Nelineinoe Primirenie. Armya-
no-Turetskaia Normalizatsiya v Proshlom i Budushem,
Rossia v Globalinoi Politike, no. 3 (http://www.globalaffairs.
ru/number/Nelineinoe-primirenie-15229).
Massis Post, 2011. Presence of Armenian Peacekeepers in
Afghanistan to Triple, 11 May (http://massispost.com/
?p=2994).
Mediamax, 2011. Volume of Foreign Investments in Armenia
Reduces by 41%, 3 April (http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/
news/2279-volume-of-foreign-investments-in-armenia-
reduces-by-41.html).
MES Georgia, 2010. Two Rehabilitated Schools Were Opened in
Kvemo Kartli, 23 September (http://www.mes.gov.ge/con-
tent.php?id=1466&lang=eng).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007. National Security Strategy
of Armenia, 26 January (http://www.mfa.am/u_files/file/
doctrine/Doctrineeng.pdf).
Musabekov, Rasim, 2011. Na Styke Polei Pritiajenia, Rossia
v Globalinoi Politike, no. 3 (http://www.globalaffairs.ru/
number/Na-styke-polei-prityazheniya15230).
Nader, Alireza, David E. Thaler i S.R. Bohandy, 2011. The
Next Supreme Leader: Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Santa Monica, RAND Corporation.
Nasardian, Boris, 2011. Armenia: Imagining the Integration
of the Southern Caucasus with the EU, Internationale
Politik und Gesellschaft, nr. 3, 62-73.
175
News.Am, 2011a. Armenian Tourists Prefer to Spend Vacation
in Georgia, 10 June (http://www.news.am/eng/news/62789.
html).
News.Am, 2011b. Number of Iranian Tourists Visiting Armenia
Increased, 15 April (http://www.news.am/eng/news/55577.
html).
News.Am, 2011c. Azerbaijani MFA Offended at Russia and
Iran, 23 July (http://www.news.am/eng/news/68885.html).
News.Az, 2011a. Stockholm Institute Declares Azerbaijans Defense
Costs at $9.2 bn in Past Decade, 14 April (http://www.
news.az/articles/politics/34409).
News.Az, 2011b. Baku Slams Armenian Nuclear Plant, 6 June
(http://www.news.az/articles/politics/37818).
News.Az, 2011c. Azerbaijani Diaspora to Raise Awareness of
Karabakh Conflict, 5 July (http://www.news.az/articles/pol-
itics/39808).
News.Az, 2011d. Turkey to Assist Azerbaijan in Liberation of
Occupied Lands, 9 July (http://www.news.az/articles/poli-
tics/40129).
News.Az, 2011e. Foreign Investments Top $3bn in 2010, 19 Jan-
uary (http://www.news.az/articles/economy/ 30012).
News.Az, 2011f. SOCAR to Invest Some $100m to Petkim in
2011, 21 July (http://www.news.az/articles/economy/
40931).
News.Az, 2011g. Azerbaijan Voices Its Stance on Northern Cyprus,
22 July (http://www.news.az/articles/turkey/ 40992).
News.Az, 2011h. Moscow, Baku Cooperating on Former Enclaves,
17 June (http://www.news.az/articles/politics/38655).
News.Az, 2011i. Partnership Spirit Based on Common Interests
with US Still Persists, 2 July (http://www.news.az/articles/
politics/39663).
News.Az, 2011j. Baku Acknowledges Key Karabakh Points Not
Yet Agreed, 1 August (http://www.news.az/articles/politics/
41604).
News.Az, 2011k. Baku Comments on Latest European Parlia-
ment Resolution on Azerbaijan, 13 May (http://www.news.az/
articles/politics/36332).
176
News.Az, 2011l. Azerbaijani Officer Killed by Iranian Border
Guard?, 5 July (http://www.news.az/articles/iran/ 39780).
News.Az, 2011m. Georgia, Turkey to Construct Three Hydro-
power Plants, 21 February (http://www.news.az/articles/
georgia/31742).
News.Az, 2010. Azerbaijans Economy Makes up 75% of South
Caucasus Aliyev, 25 December (http://www.news.az/
articles/economy/28948).
New Europe, 2011. Armenian Remittances Increase by 20%,
15 May (http://www.neurope.eu/articles/Armenian-
remittances-increase-by-20/106508.php).
Nichol, Jim, 2011. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political
Developments and Implications for US Interests, CRS Report
for Congress, 15 April (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL33453.pdf).
Nilsson, Niklas, 2009. Georgias Rose Revolution: The Break
with the Past, in Svante E. Cornell & Frederick Starr (eds.),
The Guns of August 2008: Russias War in Georgia, Armonk,
M.E. Sharpe, 85-103.
Onar, Nora Fisher, 2009. Neo Ottomanism, Historical Legacies
and Turkish Foreign Policy, EDAM Discussion Paper, nr. 3
(http://www.edam.org.tr/images/PDF/yayinlar/makalel-
er/discussion%20paper%20series_fisher.pdf).
OSCE Yerevan Office, 2010. Final Report. Analysis of Issues
Related to the Free Movement of Persons and Goods through
Border-Crossing Points between the Republic of Armenia and
the Republic of Georgia, Yerevan (http://www.osce.org/yere-
van/71248).
Oxford Analytica, 2011. Azerbaijani-Russian Ties Reflect Inter-
ests, Not Trust, 3 August.
Oxford Analytica, 2010. Georgia-Iran: Tbilisi Is Not Shifting
Policy on Iran, 13 December.
Overland, Indra, The Closure of the Russian Military Base
at Akhalkalaki: Challenges for the Local Energy Elite, the
Informal Economy, and Stability, The Journal of Power
Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, nr. 10 (http://www.
pipss.revues.org/index3717.html).
177
PanArmenian.Net, 2011. Interview with Armenias Minister of
Energy and Natural Resources, 28 March (http://www.panar-
menian.net/eng/interviews/65515/).
Petriashvili, Diana and Rovshan Ismaylov, 2006. Georgia,
Azerbaijan Debate Control of Ancient Monasteries Terri-
tory, Eurasianet, 2 November (http://www.eurasianet.
org/departments/insight/articles/eav110 306b.shtml).
Poghosyan, Anna, 2011. Sadakhlo Neutral Zone for Arme-
nian-Azerbaijani Contacts: Use of Trade as a Tool for
Conflict Transformation, Journal of Conflict Transforma-
tion, 1 April (http://www.caucasusedition.net/analysis/
sadakhlo-neutral-zone-for-armenian-azerbaijani-con-
tacts-use-of-trade-as-a-tool-for-conflict-transformation/).
Popescu, Nicu, 2011. EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Con-
flicts: Stealth Intervention, Londra, Routledge.
Popescu, Nicu, 2009. EU-Armenia: High-Level, But Low-Profile,
EUobserver Blog Neighbourhood, 12 October (http://www.
blogs.euobserver.com/popescu/2009/10/12/euin-arme-
nia-high-level-but-low-profile/).
Postnikov, Sergei, 2008. Rossisko-Gruzinskie Ekonomiceskie
Otnoshenia, Analiticeski Vestnik Soveta Federatsi FSRF, 15
(360), 51-57.
Prezident Rossii, 2008. Deklaratsia Azerbaijanskoi Respubliki,
Respubliki Armenia i Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moskva (http://
www.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/232).
Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010. Azerbaijan in 2006-
2010. Sociological Monitoring (http://www.fes.ge/geo/images/
Fes_Files/ASPublications/2010/az_sur vey_fes.pdf).
Radio Free Europe, 2011a. Armenia, Georgia Agree to Jointly
Control Border, 17 February (http://www.rferl.org/content/
article/2312043.html).
Radio Free Europe. 2011b. Poll Finds Minority of Armenians
Support Rapprochement with Turkey, 29 March (http://www.
rferl.org/content/Poll_Finds_Minority_Of_Armenians_
Support_Rapprochement_With_Turkey/1997110.html).
Radio Free Europe, 2010a. Armenia, Azerbaijani Presidents
Agree on Preamble to Madrid Principles, 26 January (http://
178
www.rferl.org/content/Armenian_Azerbaijani_Presidents
_Agree_On_Preamble_To_Madrid_Principles/1940349.
html).
Radio Free Europe, 2010b. Armenian Government Urged to
Revoke Mining Rights of Russian Gold Firm, 5 November
(http://www.asbarez.com/88124/armenian-government-
urged-to-revoke-mining-rights-of-russian-goldfirm/).
Radio Free Europe, 2010c. Armenia Seeks Chinese Funding for
Rail Link to Iran, 29 June (http://www.rferl.org/content/
Armenia_Seeks_Chinese_Funding_For_Rail_Link_To_Iran
/ 2086137.html).
Radio Free Europe, 2010d. House Panel Backs Continued U.S.
Aid to Karabakh, 2 July (http://www.rferl.org/content/
House_Panel_Backs_Continued_US_Aid_To_Karabakh/
2088881.html).
Radio Free Europe, 2009. Georgias Azeri Minority Treated as
Second-class Citizens, 4 May (http://www.rferl.org/con-
tent/Georgias_Azeri_Minority_Treated_As_SecondClass
_Citizens/1621243.html).
Simao, Lucinia and Maria Raquel Freire, 2008. The EUs
Neighborhood Policy and the South Caucasus: Unfolding
New Patterns of Cooperation, Caucasian Review of Inter-
national Affairs, 2 (4), 225-239.
SIPRI, 2011. Military Expenditure of Armenia and Azerbaijan
(http://www.milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4).
Socor, Vladimir, 2010. Lavrov Hints at Fomenting Ethnic
Tensions Inside Georgia, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7 (132)
(http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttn
ews[tt_news]=36605&tx_ttnews[backPid]=27&cHash
=80826d5244).
Socor, Vladimir, 2009. Russian Naval Mission Creep in
the Black Sea, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 6 (172) (http://www.
jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_ne
ws%5D=35516).
Socor, Vladimir, 2007. Georgian Flag Raised over Akhal-
kalaki, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 4 (128) (http://www.
jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5B
tt_news%5D=32841).
179
The Economist, 2011. Nagorno-Karabakhs Future. Caucasian
Questions, 23 June (http://www.economist.com/node/
18867879?story_id=18867879).
Tocci, Nathalie, 2011. Turkeys Neighborhood Policy: A European
Perspective, GMF Policy Brief (On Turkey Series), 5 April
(http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attach-
ments/Tocci_Neighborhood_Apr11.pdf).
Today.Az, 2011. Governor of Kvemo Kartli Meets with Azerbai-
jani and Armenian Journalists, 15 July (http://www.today.az/
news/society/90440.html).
Today.Az, 2008. Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry: Georgias Actions
Comply with International Law, 8 August (http://www.
today.az/news/politics/46850.html).
Torbakov, Igor, 2010. Russia and Turkish-Armenian Nor-
malization: Competing Interests in the South Caucasus,
Insight Turkey, 12 (2), 31-39.
Torbakov, Igor, 2008. The Georgia Crisis and Russia-Turkish
Relations, Jamestown Foundation Report (http:// www.james-
town.org/uploads/media/GeorgiaCrisis Torbakov.pdf).
Trend, 2011a. Azerbaijani, Georgian Experts Complete Work on
Border Demarcation, 3 March (http://www.en.trend.az/news/
society/1839565.html).
Trend, 2011b. Minister: Number of Azerbaijani Students Studying
in Turkey Increased, 5 May (http://www.en.trend.az/news/
society/1806792.html).
Trend, 2011c. Arzu Rahimov: Azerbaijan Does not Sign Readmis-
sion Agreement with Any Country, 8 April (http://www.en.
trend.az/news/politics/1858108.html).
Trenin, Dmitri, 2009. Russia in the Caucasus: Reversing
the Tide, Brown Journal of World Affairs, 15 (2), 143-155.
Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios, 2009. The Security Paradoxes of the
Black Sea Region, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,
9 (3), 225-241.
United Nations, 2008. Resolution Adopted by the General
Assembly 62/243. The Situation in the Occupied Territories
of Azerbaijan, 25 April (http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/62/243).
180
US Senate, 2011. Resolution with Respect to Ongoing Violations
of the Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty of Georgia and the
Importance of a Peaceful and Just Resolution to the Conflict
within Georgias Internationally Recognized Borders, 27 July
(http://www.civil.ge/files/files/2011/SenateResolution175.
pdf).
Valiyev, Anar, 2011. Neither Friend nor Foe. Azerbaijans Percep-
tions of Russia, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo nr. 147
(http://ada.edu.az/uploads/file/neither%20Friend%20nor
%20Foe.pdf).
Vardanyan, Tamara, 2011. Tbilisskie Armiane: Novyie
Reali, Globus Natsionalinoi Bezopasnosti, nr. 2 (http://www.
armpyatigorsk.org/articles/17).
Vindimian, Marianna, 2010. Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy
towards Georgia, ISPI Policy Brief nr. 196 (http://www.
ispionline.it/it/documents/PB_196_2010. pdf).
World Bank, 2010. Doing Business 2011 (http://www.doing-
business.org/~/media/fpdkm/doing%20business/docu-
ments/annual-reports/english/db11-fullreport.pdf).
Zhahanina, Lizaveta, 2010. Opening the Border at Upper
Larsi-Kazbeghi: A Good Beginning, Investor.Ge, nr. 2
(http://www.investor.ge/issues/2010_2/03.htm).
Ziflioglu, Vercihan, 2010. Armenian Tourists Prefer
Turkeys South, East, Hurriyet, 4 August (http://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=armeniantourists-pre-
fer-turkey8217s-south-2010-08-03).
 Angela Grmad

Caucazul de Sud ntre economie

politic i politic energetic
 I. Contextul macroeconomic de dezvoltare
a regiunii
Tonul politicilor externe i cele ale strategiilor de securi-
tate sunt date n primul rnd de succesul politicilor economi-
ce promovate de un actor statal sau non-statal. Majoritatea
subiecilor de drept internaional public sunt pui n situaia
de a recunoate importana factorilor economici, atunci
cnd elaboreaz noi scheme de guvernare sau de ascensiune
economic. Fr o baz economic bine argumentat i
susinut prin programe eficiente, niciun stat nu va reui s
se menin n topul actorilor care administreaz procesele i
fenomenele care au loc pe scena internaional. Adjudeca-
rea prin investiii financiare sau presiune politic a unor
regiuni precum Caucazul de Sud important datorit
resurselor de petrol, gaze naturale, a conexiunilor de diferite
naturi pe care le poate oferi diferitor pri ale lumii este
una dintre metodele cele mai eficiente, utilizate de ctre
marile puteri pentru a atinge obiective i interese naionale.
Regiunea menionat abund n bogate resurse naturale,
fr a le limita nomenclatorul doar la hidrocarburi, pentru
c aici se mai gsesc resurse de plutoniu, aur i nu numai.

185
Potenialul de transport al acestor resurse ct i al altor
minereuri dinspre Est spre Vest i dinspre Nord spre Sud a
transformat zona i a atras spre ea diverse interese naionale
i obiective economice. Astfel, profitul pe care l poate oferi
prezena factorului politic n regiune poate avea mai multe
caracteristici, ns latura economic a acesteia e de departe
cea mai important. Regiunea este legat de Federaia Rus,
dar depinde de sprijinul tehnico-financiar al Uniunii Euro-
pene i al Statelor Unite ale Americii.
Potenialul economic i energetic al zonei este propice
pentru crearea mai multor conexiuni cu lumea extern.
Studiile i cercetrile la faa locului scot la iveal inaccesibi-
litatea regiunii pentru potenialii investitori strini. Pe lng
o for de munc ieftin i bine pregtit, care constituie
un avantaj, acetia sunt pui n situaia de a face fa mono-
polurilor sau oligopolurilor, corupiei la nivel nalt, siste-
mului instituional depit, lacunelor legistative, situaiilor
politice incerte i refuzului de a aciona n conformitate cu
noile tendine de modernizare i progres tehnologic, att
n viaa politic, precum i n cea economic, astfel nct s la modele evoluate de dezvoltare economic. Estonia,
poat asigura valoare adugat superioar produselor de
origine sud-caucazian. Cel mai important punct de luat n
considerare, pe care acest studiu dorete s l sublinieze, este
faptul c regiunea Caucazului de Sud trebuie s fie studiat
ca un sistem integrat. Diferena ntre componentele acestuia
o face disponibilitatea de a lua parte la diferite procese de
integrare n circuitul economic mondial, precum i capaci-
tatea de a negocia cel mai bun pre pentru resursele de care
dispune fiecare, desigur innd cont de tipologia i calitatea
acestora. Resursele energetice i infrastructura pentru trans-
portul acestora, disponibile n regiune, ar trebui s fie argu-
mentul forte pentru adoptarea unor strategii de stimulare a
interesului n implementarea reformelor i modernizarea
economiei. Un parcurs ferm spre dezvoltare poate duce n
timp la mrirea capabilitilor de negociere a autoritilor
n procesul de soluionare a conflictelor i diminuarea influ-
enei politice a Federaiei Ruse.
186
I. Promovarea reformelor economice ntre necesitate
i incapacitate
Transformarea calitativ a realitilor sociale ale unui stat
poate fi atins prin implementarea unor reforme economice
profunde. Acestea din urm au drept finalitate realizarea
unor schimbri structurale, ce permit ulterior ameliorarea
nivelului indicatorilor economici i a indicilor sociali. Lipsa
unor experiene anterioare n gestionarea afacerilor interne
ale statului, precum i dependena excesiv de un partener
sau de anumite procese, care au loc la nivel regional, au con-
dus la apariia unor discrepane ntre nivelurile de dezvoltare
economic ale statelor care formeaz regiunea Caucazului
de Sud. Cauzele sunt multiple i pot avea caracter politic
sau economic, dar soluia cea mai bun este urmrirea
obiectivelor i intereselor naionale ca surs unic de argu-
mentare a msurilor i aciunilor care trebuie s fie imple-
mentate pentru dezvoltarea armonioas a societii unui
stat. Cele trei state care formeaz Caucazul de Sud au re-
simit de-a lungul independenei lor tentaia de a face apel
Singapore, Emiratele Arabe Unite acestea sunt doar cte-
va exemple de state ale cror rezultate economice au influ-
enat ntr-o mare msur atitudinea autoritilor caucaziene
fa de metoda de aciune care trebuia adoptat n interior
sau spre ce form de integrare regional s se orienteze n
exterior. Conexiunea accentuat la procesele economice i
politice promovate de Federaia Rus i meninerea unor
trsturi caracteristice regimurilor autoritare au contribuit
la crearea unui mediu politic ostil procesului pentru imple-
mentare a strategiilor i aciunilor capabile s apropie
Caucazul de piaa economic mondial. Dac Georgia i
Armenia sunt membre ale OMC, din anul 2000 i respectiv
din 2003 (World Trade Organization, 2008), acceptnd
normele i principiile acestei forme de integrare internaio-
nal, atunci Azerbaidjanul pare s-i fi creat propriul model
pentru a fi inclus n circuitul mondial, care este susinut de
petrolul i gazele naturale de care dispune, precum i de
187
preul mondial al acestor resurse. Att la Tbilisi, ct i la
Baku au existat la un moment dat preferine pentru imple-
mentarea modelului de susinere a economiei utilizat de
autoritile statului Singapore.1 Renunarea la acest model
are la baz mai multe explicaii: el este greu de adaptat n
Caucazul de Sud din cauza condiiilor cu care se confruntau
cele trei state noi, independente imediat dup prbuirea
Uniunii Sovietice, nu a existat voin politic pentru asu-
marea implementrii elementelor acestuia sau guvernrile
au evoluat, pur i simplu, spre alte modele regionale, mult
mai apropiate ca filosofie. Pentru Georgia, de exemplu,
drept modele de dezvoltare economic au servit pe rnd:
Turcia, Estonia i chiar Emiratele Arabe Unite; pentru Azer-
baidjan Singapore i Emiratele Arabe Unite; Armenia a
fost tentat s preia o parte din experiena statelor baltice.
Prin logica de aciune, concepte i tendine Georgiei i
Armeniei le sunt mult mai apropiate modelele europene de
dezvoltare economic, pe cnd Azerbaidjanul d dovad de
afinitate oriental i asiatic. Adesea apare tentaia ca acest
stat s fie inclus n rndul statelor din Asia Central. Inde-
pendena politic regional poate s fie de scurt durat,
dac un stat se bazeaz exclusiv pe resursele sale naturale.
Existena i comercializarea acestora nu este o condiie
obligatorie pentru creterea nivelului bunstrii sociale
unul din principalii indicatori macroeconomici, care permit
o apreciere mult mai larg a nivelului dezvoltrii economice
a unui stat. Administrarea afacerilor unui stat care dispune
de hidrocarburi poate deveni n timp o problem destul de
nsemnat, care i poate gsi soluionarea doar prin acte de
transparen a actului de guvernare, precum i a cheltuirii
veniturilor provenite din contractele petroliere. Economia
statelor petroliere depinde cel mai mult de nivelul preurilor
la hidrocarburi pe pieele mondiale. n asemenea condiii,
scderea preului la petrol ar putea avea consecine mai mici
asupra Armeniei i Georgiei, care sunt mai puin dependente
1 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, 31 mai, 2011.
188
de vnzrile de resurse energetice. Conform aprecierilor
Fondului Monetar Internaional, Republica Azerbaidjan
poate fi catalogat drept stat dependent de remitenele din
contractele energetice (Ahmedov et al., 2009, 6). Pentru
a putea delimita asemnrile i deosebirile n procesul de
transformare a economiilor statelor din Caucazul de Sud,
este necesar s fie scos n eviden specificul fiecrei ri
n parte. ntr-adevr, faptul c toate cele trei componente ale
regiunii sunt state ex-sovietice ar putea s reprezinte baza
studiului, ns a face abstracie de anumite tendine naio-
nale, existente anterior, dar i n perioada cnd acestea au
fcut parte din Uniunea Sovietic, ar fi incorect. Majorita-
tea problemelor cu care se confrunt autoritile i cetenii
din Georgia, Armenia i Azerbaidjan se pot regsi n tot spa-
iul ex-sovietic, dar nivelul interesului marilor puteri difer
de la o regiune la alta. Iat de ce scoaterea la iveal a trs-
turilor ce fac diferena n caracteristicile de dezvoltare eco-
nomic ale celor trei state sud-caucaziene este o prim
condiie pentru elaborarea unor recomandri pentru guver-
nanii care au sarcina de a atrage investiii strine n zon
prin reducerea nivelului instabilitii politice, prin liberali-
zarea preurilor, prin combaterea corupiei i a monopo-
lurilor, astfel nct i ceilali indicatori economici utilizai n
studierea nivelului de dezvoltare economic a unui stat s
ating nivelul dorit. Tranziia la economia de pia nu tre-
buie s se transforme ntr-un principiu declarativ pe termen
lung. Ea trebuie atins prin adoptarea unor msuri bazate
pe pragmatism, cu efect pe termen lung, astfel nct stabili-
tatea i creterea economic s susin securitatea naional
a fiecrui stat sud-caucazian. n plus, este bine cunoscut
faptul c soluionarea problemelor cu caracter economic,
implementarea reformelor i decizia ferm de a depi o
anumit etap de dezvoltare, adic de a duce la bun sfrit
ceea ce numim astzi perioada de tranziie la economia
de pia, poate conduce la deschiderea partenerilor spre
soluionarea unor probleme mai vechi, regionale, cu caracter
politic.
189
 Armenia, numit adesea paradoxul diasporei2, a re-
simit cel mai mult, dintre cele trei ri care formeaz Cau-
cazul de Sud, efectele crizei economice mondiale. n anul
2009 Produsul Intern Brut al Armeniei a nregistrat o
scdere de 14,4% (Civilitas Foundation, 2010), exprimat n
uniti monetare. Aceast cifr indic o scdere a PIB-ului de
la 12 miliarde dolari SUA n 2008 la 8,7 miliarde dolari SUA
n 2009. Unele ramuri ale economiei naionale au nregistrat
o ncetinire a ritmului de dezvoltare, altele au nregistrat
regrese. Printre cele mai afectate domenii se numr con-
struciile, agricultura, precum i industria metalurgic, din
cauza scderii preurilor la metale pe pieele internaionale.
n perioada Uniunii Sovietice, Armenia era recunoscut pen-
tru dezvoltarea metalurgiei i a infrastructurii de prelucrare,
care avea indicatori mari din cauza forei de munc bine
pregtit, resurse proprii i o pia de desfacere asigurat n
cadrul URSS.
Dac vom lua n calcul faptul c multe trsturi ale
economiilor acestor state au rmas neschimbate nc din
perioada Uniunii Sovietice, infrastructura s-a nvechit, iar
Erevanul a fost n cea mai mare parte a independenei sale
sub influena politic a Federaiei Ruse, cumulat cu izo-
larea economic i energetic n plan regional, este evident
c recesiunea economic global a influenat cel mai mult
acest stat. Abia n 2010, economia armean a nregistrat
primele redresri, Produsul Intern Brut majorndu-se n
aceast perioad cu aproximativ 7,6% fa de anul 2009.
Situaia economic necesit, ns, n continuare investiii
considerabile i aplicarea unor msuri eficiente de reformare
a tuturor ramurilor industriei i agriculturii. Tot ca efect al
perpeturii crizei economice mondiale, are loc scderea
nivelului remunerrii salariale i a creterii nivelului omaju-
lui pn la 6,9%, ceea ce contribuie i mai mult la migraia
forei de munc n afara statului. Pn n anul 2008,
Armenia avea cel mai mare salariu mediu pe economie, fiind
2 Interviu cu un analist politic, Erevan, iunie 2011.
190
urmat de Azerbaidjan i Georgia. Criza a schimbat ierarhia.
Migraia forei de munc are loc n special spre Federaia
Rus, care a iniiat un program de susinere a propriei
demografii, aflat n cdere liber. Acest program prevede
ncurajarea migraiei cetenilor armeni n regiunile non-
europene ale Rusiei, unde acetia primesc terenuri i o sum
de bani. Tot Rusia rmne i statul de unde provin cele mai
multe remitene, chiar dac i aici are loc scderea indicato-
rilor macroeconomici, iar ramurile economice n care sunt
implicai cel mai mult angajai care provin din statele CSI
nregistreaz recesiune. Lipsa investiiilor strine n
Armenia sau migrarea afacerilor mici ctre statul vecin
Georgia, are la baz raionamente politice, mai degrab
dect de ordin economic. Dei reformele economice promo-
vate de autoritile de la Erevan nu au nregistrat rezultate
notorii, lipsa interesului extern de a investi n economia
Armeniei a fost pus de cele mai multe ori pe seama conflic-
tului din Nagorno-Karabah factor de instabilitate regio-
nal. n realitate, recunosc oficialii armeni, conflictul a fost
i este paravanul perfect pentru argumentarea inaciunilor
cu caracter economic i a implementrii reformelor, dar mai
ales pentru a ascunde actele de corupie la nivel nalt. Inves-
titorii strini ar putea condiiona adoptarea unor msuri
principiale de lupt mpotriva corupiei. Acest cerc vicios
poate fi ntrerupt doar prin implicarea ferm a factorului
politic. Mediul de afaceri se dizolv n instituiile statului.
Majoritatea afacerilor sunt susinute de ctre persoane
care ocup funcii-cheie n sistemul instituional de stat.3
Federaia Rus a fost ntotdeauna unul dintre principalii
parteneri economici al Armeniei. Relaiile economice bilate-
rale au avut o dinamic pozitiv pn n anul 2009, atunci
cnd au fost resimite primele efecte negative ale crizei eco-
nomice mondiale. Dac n anul 2008 schimbul de mrfuri
ntre Rusia i Armenia atingea cifra de 900 milioane de
dolari SUA, n anul urmtor aceasta a nregistrat o scdere
3 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.
191
de 19,3%. Abia n anul 2010 au putut fi nregistrate primele
semne pozitive ale schimburilor comerciale bilaterale.4 n
calitate de partener strategic al Armeniei, Federaia Rus
rmne n etapa actual principalul investitor n economia
armean. Investitorii rui au reuit s se impun n mai
multe sectoare ale economiei: sistemul energetic, sistemul
bancar, industria extractiv, tehnologiile informaionale.
Prezena investitorilor rui n Armenia poate fi tratat din
dou perspective. Prima ine de dependena economic a
Armeniei fa de Federaia Rus, care controleaz n ntre-
gime sistemul energetic, deoarece deine majoritatea active-
lor n toate proiectele energetice importante ale rii prin
Gazprom i Inter RAO UES (compania de producere i
distribuie a energiei electrice), a achiziionat toate activele
operatorului naional Armentel, precum i ale SA Banc
VTB, SA Banca de Economii a Armeniei. Cea de-a doua
perspectiv de analiz a relaiei economice ruso-armene ine
de modalitatea n care e prezentat aceasta de ctre oficialii
armeni. Conform acestora, prezena companiilor ruseti
demonstreaz atractivitatea economiei Armeniei pentru
investitorii strini, ignornd aspectul dependenei econo-
miei fa de Federaia Rus. Pe parcursul anului 2009,
Federaia Rus a promis mai multor state ex-sovietice c le
va acorda credite prefereniale sau nerambursabile pentru
a sprijini eforturile guvernrilor acestora de a depi efectele
crizelor economice. Armenia a fost printre puinele bene-
ficiare ale acestui tip de susinere din partea Rusiei. Astfel,
la nceputul lunii iunie 2009, Ministerul Finanelor al Fede-
raiei Ruse a transferat n conturile Guvernului Armeniei
prima tran din creditul total de 500 milioane dolari SUA.
Una dintre ramurile economice ale Armeniei unde exist
potenial de dezvoltare important este aceea a comercia-
lizrii apei potabile n statele arabe, dar i a hidroenergiei.
4 Interaciunea ruso-armean i problemele regionale. Materiale ale
conferinei internaionale din 5 iunie 2010, Erevan, ed. NAAPET, 2011,
pag. 11.
192
Autoritile de la Erevan neleg necesitatea diversificrii
produselor care sunt destinate exportului. n condiiile unei
economii izolate pe plan regional, statele arabe sunt prin-
cipala pia de desfacere pentru agenii economici din
Armenia. Pentru Armenia statul vecin Iranul ar putea
deveni n timp deschiztorul de drumuri pentru interesele
economice ctre pieele regionale i mondiale. n prezent
sunt dezvoltate cteva proiecte energetice comune cu Tehera-
nul. Acestea in de livrarea de hidroenergie ctre ara vecin.
Armenia recunoate c nu este de acord cu modalitatea de
promovare a obiectivelor de politic extern a autoritilor
iraniene, ns cele dou state partenere sunt obligate de
circumstanele regionale s coopereze: Iranul este pentru
Armenia cheia de acces spre pieele economice regionale, iar
Armenia este pentru Iran cheia de acces spre lumea ne-
musulman, deoarece este printre puinele state cretine cu
care a reuit s stabileasc i s menin relaii bilaterale.5
n anul 2006, Armenia a fost invitat s ia parte la cori-
dorul de transport Nord-Sud, pentru a-i diversifica rutele
de transport pentru mrfurile sale. n perspectiv, produse-
le de origine armean aveau s obin o nou posibilitate de
trasport prin intermediul conexiunii feroviare, iar mai apoi
cu ajutorul bacului pn n portul georgian Poti. Situaia
rutelor de transport pentru bunurile i serviciile din i nspre
Amenia are urmtoarea structur:
Georgia 75% din mrfuri;
Iran 25% din mrfuri;
Turcia embargo;
Azerbaidjan conflict.
Armenia depinde excesiv de tranzitul de mrfuri prin
Georgia, ceea ce ngreuneaz dezvoltarea unor proiecte co-
merciale cu alte state, nu doar din regiune. Dei exist anu-
mite demersuri pentru eliminarea taxelor de import-export
5 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.
193
care exist ntre cele dou state, procesul pare s ntmpine investiii n domeniul construciilor, Romnia produse
destule greuti. Spre exemplu, dezinteresul investitorilor petroliere (motorin) i chimice, Germania investiii n
romni este condiionat anume de accesul pieei armene la dezvoltarea unor proiecte pentru construcia de minihidro-
diferite rute de transport regional i interregional. Armenia centrale, Frana telecomunicaii (Orange).
este conectat la coridoarele de transport Nord-Sud, prin Armenia este prin vocaie un stat european. Legturile
Georgia, iar Romnia este interesat mai mult de coridorul sale istorice i comerciale cu Europa au influenat includerea
Est-Vest de transport al mrfurilor. Dei sunt prezente pe vectorului de integrare european n principalele strategii i
piaa georgian, produsele romneti sunt supuse dublei politici ale statului. Armenia este unul dintre cele ase state
impozitri pn n momentul accesrii pieei armene. Acest ex-sovietice incluse n Parteneriatul Estic din cadrul Politicii
aspect, respectiv dubla impozitare, duce la creterea preu- Europene de Vecintate. Planul de Aciuni Comune Arme-
rilor pentru diferite produse, pentru c ea se reflect n cos- niaUniunea European a fost semnat pe 14 noiembrie 2006
tul bunului sau al serviciului. Lipsa unui sistem diversificat la Bruxelles. Acest document prevede integrarea Armeniei n
de conexiuni la principalele rute de transport al mrfurilor, sistemul politic i economic european (Inside Europe, Arme-
precum i cele de transport al produselor energetice, scade nians in Europe, 2006).
din atractivitatea investiional a Armeniei. Din aceste con- Prin coninutul acestui document Armenia se oblig s
siderente, investitorii strini vor ocoli i n continuare opor- implementeze cerinele impuse de instituiile Uniunii
tunitile existente pe piaa acestui stat caucazian i vor Europene, care trebuie s contribuie la accelerarea procesu-
migra spre Georgia sau Azerbaidjan. Riscurile pe care ar tre- lui de implementare a reformelor economice, precum i la
bui s i le asume investitorii sunt prea mari. Susinut de apropierea diferitelor sectoare industriale i ale agriculturii
Kremlin, dar i de cteva instituii financiare internaionale, de standardele europene. n plus, UE cere autoritilor de la
printre care Fondul Monetar Internaional, dup ncetarea Erevan s elaboreze ct mai urgent o strategie de securitate
conflictului militar cu Azerbaidjanul, Armenia a reuit s energetic, astfel nct obiectivele strategice care se bazeaz
reintre n circuitul comercial regional. Federaia Rus nu pe energie nuclear s fie scoase din circuitul economic i s
putea s determine autoritile de la Erevan s stabileasc fie nlocuite cu alt tip de resurse energetice.
conexiuni i puni economice spre sud. O asemenea atitu- Dezvoltarea schimburilor comerciale cu Uniunea Euro-
dine ar fi devenit prea costisitoare, mai ales n condiiile n pean este confirmat i prin cifre. Astfel, n primul semes-
care exist deja foarte multe conflicte la nivel regional pe tru al anului 2010 comerul exterior al Armeniei cu statele
care le susine neoficial sau deschis, sub pretextul protejrii membre ale UE a crescut n medie cu 29,1%, depind n
drepturilor propriilor ceteni. Dac estul i vestul erau zone termeni monetari cifra de 1 miliard de dolari americani.
interzise pentru bunurile i serviciile de origine armean, Creterea acestui indicator economic a avut loc n pofida
nu rmnea dect efectuarea unor demersuri pentru apro- deprecierii monedei euro i la diminuarea valorii n cifre.
fundarea relaiilor cu Iranul i Georgia, pentru c Turcia i Dei a rmas n urma Georgiei n ceea ce privete imple-
Azerbaidjanul erau inaccesibile ca piee de desfacere. mentarea principalelor cerine asumate prin diferite acte i
Federaia Rus rmne i n continuare principalul partener declaraii oficiale n domeniul integrrii europene, Armenia
economic al Armeniei. Aceast relaie bilateral este una cal- i continu demersul spre apropierea de valorile i standar-
culat, bazat pe pragmatism. Printre statele europene care dele europene. Revigorarea economic uoar din ultimii
au reuit s-i fac loc pe piaa armean se numr Italia doi ani sunt semne ale perceperii rolului lurii unor decizii

194 195
ferme de apropiere de forme de integrare economic regio-
nal i internaional. Doar prin promovarea unor aciuni
ferme n direcia schimbrilor sistemice, adic a ntregului
circuit economic, efectuarea de reforme adnci i dure,
mobilizarea spre negocierea propriei independene politice,
energetice i economice regionale, pot fi obinute rezultate
economice credibile.
Azerbaidjanul, numit adesea paradoxul petrolului sau
paradoxul economiei de tip nchis,6 este singurul stat din
lume care a continuat s nregistreze n perioada crizei eco-
nomice globale o cretere economic nsemnat. Conform
estimrilor experilor, economia azer constituie peste 70%
din toat economia Caucazului de Sud, iar volumul total al
hidrocarburilor extrase n anul 2009 a depit cifra de 50
milioane de tone, cel al gazelor naturale a atins nivelul de
23,6 miliarde metri cubi (Nagdalyan, Eduard, 2011: 128).
Att n trecut, ct i n prezent Azerbaidjanul este asociat cu
petrolul i gazele naturale.7 Aceste resurse constituie cartea
6 Interviu cu un analist politic, Erevan, iunie 2011.
7 Transformarea Azerbaidjanului ntr-un stat cu rol energetic
important a nceput acum 400 de ani, cnd pe peninsula Absheron
au fost extrase primele hidrocarburi. n anul 1813, Imperiul arist
a reuit s intre n posesia acestor zcminte i s le administreze o
perioad destul de lung. n 1859, ruii au construit n Baku prima
uzin pentru prelucrarea petrolului. Pn n 1872, Imperiul Rus
a deinut exclusivitate asupra extragerii de resurse energetice din
Azerbaidjan. Abia dup 1872, cnd ruii au anulat sistemul de rs-
cumprare fiscal introdus tot de ei, n aceast ramur i au declarat
liber extragerea de zcminte petroliere, investitorii strini din
Marea Britanie, Frana, Germania i Olanda au primit und verde
pentru a ptrunde pe piaa i n industria petrolier a Azerbaidjanu-
lui. La nceputul secolului XX, mileniul trecut, jumtate din resurse-
le petroliere extrase ale lumii aveau origine azer. Cteva companii
internaionale, printre care i membrii clanului financiar Rothschild,
au reuit s ptrund n regiune i astfel s controleze nu doar can- dotrii tehnologice a acestei industrii a sczut considerabil pe parcurs.
titile de hidrocarburi extrase, dar i preul mondial al petrolului.
Monopolul asupra industriei de extracie petrolier le permitea s
obin venituri maxime cu investiii minime. n rezultat, necesitatea
196
de vizit a Republicii Azerbaidjan, decis acum mai mult ca
niciodat, s-i negocieze locul n cadrul sistemului de relaii
economice internaionale. n prezent, politica promovat de
Baku este de a-i negocia poziia n regiune, contractele
economice, precum i stabilitatea exclusiv prin instrumente
energetice, ceea ce la un moment dat ar putea epuiza re-
zervele interne. Concentrarea pe negocierea unor obiective
actuale, pe consumul veniturilor provenite din industria
petrolier, ignornd de cele mai multe ori investiia n viitor
i n alte ramuri economice este dovada unei strategii de
dezvoltare economic greit. Diversitatea redus a ramuri-
lor economice, lipsa unor condiii ce ar ncuraja investiiile
strine i interne, ncurajarea unor forme de concuren
inadecvate pentru economia de pia, precum sunt mono-
polurile i oligopolurile, corupia la nivel nalt, prejudicierea
dreptului asupra proprietii private i implicarea excesiv
a statului n stabilirea preurilor sunt semne ale unei de-
ficiene majore n administrarea proceselor i fenomenelor
economice ale unui stat. Autoritile se implic n activit-
ile agenilor economici, abuznd de instrumentul stabilirii
preurilor la bunuri i servicii, ca o msur foarte eficient
pentru prentmpinarea diferitor aciuni sociale mpotriva
guvernanilor. La acest capitol, ns, nici Georgia i nici
Armenia nu par s fi nregistrat mai multe succese. Preurile
sunt controlate sau impuse de ctre autoriti. Liberalizarea
preurilor ca trstur a economiei de pia nu funcio-
neaz. Dup douzeci de ani de la proclamarea indepen-
denei Azerbaidjanului, nc mai putem s vorbim aici de
existena unei economii de tip nchis, unde accesul partene-
rilor strini este restricionat, de cele mai multe ori din
cauza intereselor private ale diferiilor lideri politici aflai la
guvernare. Azerbaidjanul este un stat specializat n extracia
i comercializarea pe pieele internaionale a produselor
Regresul tehnologic a fost iminent. n perioada URSS, aproximativ
70% din necesitile industriei sovietice erau acoperite de resursele
petroliere de origine azer.
197
petroliere, preocupat prea puin s creeze condiii optime de
dezvoltare i pentru alte ramuri ale economiei. O balan
comercial pozitiv nu semnific neaprat i existena unor
transformri calitative n domeniul economico-financiar.
Schimbrile au doar un caracter cantitativ la nivel de
susinere financiar a activitilor i iniiativelor actualei
guvernri. Dac vom ine cont de procesele i fenomentele
enumerate mai sus, prin care trece economia azer, atunci
ar trebui s recunoatem c rezultatele nregistrate n acest
domeniu i capacitatea de a menine indicatorii macro-
economici pe un trend pozitiv par s exprime existena unui
paradox economic. Potrivit rezultatelor prezentate de orga-
nizaiile internaionale n rapoartele lor anuale, Azerbai-
djanul a fost singurul stat din lume care a atins n condiii
de criz economic mondial un ritm de cretere economic
de aproximativ 9%. Criza a fost resimit mai puin, fiindc
au fost utilizate resurse financiare din Fondul Petrolier de
Stat pentru a micora intensitatea consecinelor negative
asupra cetenilor. Membrii Grupului Naional pentru Bu-
getul de Stat (National Budget Group, 2007)8 atenioneaz
c, n conformitate cu o clasificare efectuat de ctre Comi-
tetul pentru Transparen al Fondului Monetar Interna-
ional (International Monetary Fund, 2007), dac o ar
are un Produs Intern Brut (PIB) format din peste 25% din
industria extractiv de petrol sau cota parte a exporturilor
totale ale rii depete cifra de 50% din PIB, aceasta intr
n categoria statelor dependente de petrol. Nivelul indicato-
rilor macroeconomici pentru anul 2010 confirm prezena
8 Grupul Naional pentru Bugetul de Stat este o coaliie format
n anul 2006 din nou organizaii non-guvernamentale, susinut
financiar de Fundaia SOROS, Baku. Misiunea coaliiei este de a
crete tansparena utilizrii finanelor publice n interesul cetenilor.
Scopurile activitii coaliiei sunt: mbuntirea legislaiei bugetare, liarde AZN. La capitolul cheltuieli, raportul dintre bugetul
asigurarea transparenei i eficienei efecturii de cheltuieli bugetare,
participarea la dezbaterile publice cu privire la administrarea i repar-
tizarea veniturilor i cheltuielilor bugetare, monitorizarea procesului
de implementare a politicii bugetare.
198
fenomenului n Azerbaidjan pentru ambele situaii. Alte
cifre, care vin s confirme dependena exagerat a econo-
miei azere de domeniul energetic sau orientarea ei ctre dez-
voltarea unei singure ramuri economice reies din Proiectul
de Lege al Bugetului de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan
(Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2011).
Pe 22 octombrie 2010, preedintele azer Ilham Aliev a apro-
bat Legea cu privire la bugetul de stat pentru anul 2011.
Conform prevederilor acesteia, veniturile vor fi de 12,061
miliarde AZN9, iar cheltuielile vor atinge cifra de 12,748
miliarde AZN. Deficitul bugetar a fost aprobat la suma de
687 milioane AZN. Cea mai mare parte a veniturilor n
Bugetul de Stat vor proveni din transferurile din Fondul
Petrolier de Stat i ar atinge cifra de 6,48 miliarde AZN,
adic peste 50% din totalul veniturilor bugetare; celelalte
surse de venit n bugetul statului sunt: taxa pe valoare adu-
gat 2,121 miliarde AZN, impozitul pe venit 1,21 mi-
liarde AZN. La capitolul cheltuieli, cele mai mari resurse
bugetare vor fi alocate programului investiiilor de stat
3,38 miliarde AZN, cheltuieli pentru educaie 1,338 mi-
liarde AZN, armat 1,325 miliarde AZN. n luna iunie
curent, au intrat n vigoare modificrile aduse Legii pentru
Bugetul Statului din Republica Azerbaidjan (ABC.az,
2011a). n conformitate cu noile prevederi, veniturile n
bugetul statului vor atinge cifra de 15,554 miliarde AZN, iar
cheltuielile vor ajunge la 15,941 miliarde. AZN. Trebuie s
menionm aici c Bugetul de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan
este un sistem bugetar supracentralizat, organizat pe dou
niveluri: bugetul central i bugetul local. Bugetul central ar
trebui s ating pn la finele anului 2011 cifra de 15,107
miliarde AZN, iar resursele acumulate n bugetele locale
(84 uniti administrativ-teritoriale, raioane) doar 0,447 mi-
central i bugetul local ar trebui s fie 14,633 miliarde AZN,
9 AZN manatul azer, moneda naional a Republicii Azerbai-
djan.
199
respectiv 1,308 miliarde AZN. Dup rectificrile bugetare,
programul investiiilor de stat a fost suplimentat pn la
cifra de 5,864 miliarde AZN (ABC.az, 2011b). n anul
2010, structura exporturilor prezentat de ctre Comitetul
Statistic de Stat arat c n Republica Azerbaidjan expor-
turile sunt mai mari dect importurile. Volumul comerului
extern a atins cifra de 27,924 miliarde dolari SUA, ceea ce
este cu 31,1% mai mult decat n anul 2009. Exportul de
petrol brut atinge cifra de 86,53%, iar cea a produselor
petroliere prelucrate cota de 5,07% (Foreign Trade. Economic
Rewiev of Azerbaijan, 2011, 13). Tot din structura expor-
turilor pentru anul 2010 aflm c cea mai mare parte a
exporturilor azere au avut ca destinaie statele membre
ale Uniunii Europene, la import au predominat rile din
Comunitatea Statelor Independente. Rata creterii expor-
turilor a fost mai mare dect cea a importurilor. Spre deose-
bire de Georgia i Armenia, Azerbaidjanul nu este membru
al Organizaiei Mondiale a Comerului. Una dintre princi-
palele cauze ale amnrii obinerii calitii de membru cu importante. Liderii Federaiei Ruse insist s rmn printre
drepturi permanente ine de existena acelorai monopoluri
i oligopoluri, controlate de stat. Pentru autoritile de la
Tbilisi calitatea de membru al acestei organizaii inter-
naionale reprezint un instrument important n negocierile
politice cu Rusia, care de aproximativ optsprezece ani poart
tratative cu celelalte state membre pentru a fi acceptat n
calitate de membru cu drepturi depline. Georgia este doar
unul dintre impedimentele cu care se confrunt Kremlinul,
care trebuie s aib acordul tuturor membrilor OMC.
Cellalt impediment ine de filosofia de aciune a liderilor
de la Moscova i a atitudinii fa de cerinele i regulile cu negative asupra consumatorilor finali cetenii azeri. Din
privire la funcionarea pieelor mondiale i pe care aceasta
refuz s le respecte. La Baku, este popular ideea de a
deveni stat membru OMC numai dup ce Federaia Rus
va fi acceptat n aceast form de organizare economic
internaional. Cauza este aceeai ca i n cazul Moscovei:
dependena excesiv a stabilitii economice de vnzrile
de produse petroliere i implicarea n procesul de stabilire a
200
acestora i, probabil, posibila ostilitate a Armeniei, care a
devenit membru al organizaiei pe 5 februarie 2003.10 Co-
merul Azerbaidjanului nc mai este orientat spre Federaia
Rus i ctre iniiativele regionale economice, create special
de ctre Moscova pentru a-i menine influena n spaiul
ex-sovietic. Majoritatea importurilor au origine rus. Fede-
raia Rus se pare c nc rmne a fi unul dintre cei mai
importani parteneri economici pentru Baku. Dincolo de
conexiunile de ordin familial ale actualului preedinte azer
cu Rusia i oamenii de afaceri rui, cifrele vorbesc de la sine
despre potenialul de influen al Kremlinului asupra singu-
rului stat din Caucazul de Sud care i poate asigura parial
independena politic: Rusia este al treilea partener impor-
tant al Azerbaidjanului n ceea ce privete originea mrfu-
rilor importate de ctre azeri i al optulea dup volumul de
mrfuri exportate.11 Rusia nu mai reprezint, ca n trecut,
principalul partener comercial al Azerbaidjanului, dar con-
tinu s dein controlul asupra unor prghii economice
liderii energetici mondiali, care stabilesc regulile de joc pe
pieele internaionale. Rusia achiziioneaz gaz de prove-
nien azer la preuri mai mari dect cele pe care le are
stabilite cu ali parteneri.12 n plus, spun experii, faptul c
Azerbaidjanul a renunat la aderarea la NATO n doctrina sa
militar i a intrat n Organizaia statelor nealiniate (care
nu vor intra n vreun bloc militar) ne demonstreaz faptul
c preedintele azer Ilham Aliev ncearc s echilibreze
balana intereselor politico-economice dintre Rusia i
Occident. Existena monopolurilor n economie are efecte
cauza condiiilor dificile de a ptrunde pe pieile azere i a
cheltuielilor financiare foarte mari pe care le efectueaz n
10 Interviu cu un expert n transparena fondurilor provenite din
vnzrile de petrol, Baku, iunie, 2011.
11 Interviu cu oficiali, Baku, iunie 2011
12 Interviu cu un expert n securitate energetic, Bucureti, august
2011.
201
acest scop, investitorii care reuesc s-i fac loc pe anumite
nie stabilesc la rndul lor preuri superioare celor promo-
vate pe pieele regionale sau mondiale. Azerbaidjanul are un
potenial turistic enorm, neexploatat, dar nc nu a reuit s
devin cunoscut ca destinaie turistic la nivel regional sau
mondial. Turismul ar putea s devin n timp una dintre
ramurile capabile s asigure complementaritate proiectelor
energetice. Investiiile n domeniul turistic pot fi o surs
stabil de fluxuri financiare n bugetul de stat. Domeniul
serviciilor, unde este inclus i turismul n calitate de com-
ponent de baz, necesit sprijin din partea autoritilor,
mai ales n ceea ce privete facilitatea intrrii pe pia a
afacerilor mici i mijlocii n aceast ramur, precum i mo-
dificarea legislaiei n domeniu. Dezvoltarea serviciilor este
obligatorie. Turismul poate deveni n timp o alternativ pen-
tru resursele de petrol. Fr dezvoltarea acestuia, economia
azer ar putea muri n timp, mai ales dac estimrile spe-
cialitilor n domeniul energetic se vor confirma, iar nivelul
maxim al extraciilor de petrol i gaze va fi atins n 2020.
Caracterul epuizabil al resurselor energetice nu trebuie s fie
ignorat, n pofida faptului c se insist din ce n ce mai mult
pe implementarea celor mai noi tehnologii n extracia de
petrol, care permite forri la adncimi ntre 7.000 i 10.000
metri. Turismul rural, agricol constituie una dintre posibilit-
ile de atragere a capitalului intern spre economia naional,
crend condiiile necesare pentru a produce valoare adugat.
Georgia modelul de dezvoltare economic adoptat de
ctre autoritile georgiene se bazeaz pe principiile i ideile
neoliberale. Implementarea acestora presupune adoptarea
unor msuri printre care se numr ncurajarea concurenei
loiale, a liberalizrii pieei, dar i reducerea implicrii auto-
ritilor statului n economie prin funcia sa de corectare a
externalitilor dect n situaii excepionale. Tot n Georgia multor proiecte care vizau Caucazul de Sud n calitate de
a fost adoptat i aa-numitul Act al Libertii Economice,
prin care se micoreaz probabilitatea ca autoritile statului
s mreasc taxele (Georgia Times, 2011) Coninutul acestui
202
document micoreaz posibilitatea de apariie a unor ne-
mulumiri poteniale din partea agenilor economici, actul
asigurnd stabilitate fiscal, consider Ministrul Finanelor
al Georgiei, Dmitri Gvindadze. Ca i Republica Azerbaidjan,
Georgia nu controleaz o parte a teritoriului su. Dup con-
flictul ruso-georgian din luna august 2008, Abhazia i Osetia
de Sud i-au autodeclarat independena fa de Tbilisi, iar
Federaia Rus i nc patru ri, printre care i Venezuela,
le-au recunoscut. Astzi, Abhazia i Osetia de Sud sunt sus-
inute financiar din bugetul Rusiei, care le trateaz practic ca
subiecte ale federaiei.13 Aceast situaie produce tensiune
ntre Georgia i Rusia, oferind teren pentru dispute politice,
care adesea sunt utilizate drept pretext pentru evitarea
reformelor economice reale. Dup anul 2003 cnd a avut
loc revoluia trandafirilor noua guvernare a fost pus n
situaia de a prelua afacerile statului ntr-o stare deplorabil.
Reformele economice nu s-au bucurat de o abordare corec-
t, capabil s promoveze tranziia real la economia de
pia. Modelul de aciune era construit dup acelai tipar,
care a cuprins ntregul spaiu ex-sovietic: privatizarea ilegal
a obiectivelor strategice, ncurajarea corupiei, preocuparea
slab pentru atragerea investiiilor externe. Datoria extern
a Georgiei depise suma de 1,5 miliarde dolari SUA, iar
mai mult de 50% din populaia rii tria sub pragul srciei
(Guseynov, 2008, 295). Aceast stare de lucruri a fost de-
pit n primul rnd datorit susinerii financiare externe
i interesului marilor puteri, Statele Unite ale Americii i
Uniunea European, pentru meninerea stabilitii politice
i economice n regiune. Georgia este element definitoriu
al punii de legtur care conecteaz pieele europene la
resursele energetice din Marea Caspic. n plus, este parte a
coridoarelor de transport al mrfurilor Est-Vest, iar datorit
faptului c Armeniei i s-a refuzat participarea n cadrul mai
regiune, Tbilisi a preluat o parte din rolul acesteia, reuind
13 Interviu cu un oficial georgian, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
203
astfel s multiplice avantajele economice ale orientrii sale
politice ctre Uniunea European i ctre Statele Unite ale
Americii. Dei nu dispune de resurse energetice, precum
Azerbaidjanul, acest stat caucazian este atractiv prin simplul
motiv c a reuit s adere la forme de integrare economic
regionale i internaionale. Este stat membru al Organizaiei
Mondiale a Comerului, conformndu-se normelor, compor-
tamentului i standardelor promovate de OMC. Renunarea
la calitatea de membru al Comunitii Statelor Indepen-
dente dup rzboiul din august 2008 i-a permis s rmn
parte a tratatelor pe care le semnase anterior. Astfel, coni-
nutul acestor documente permite i n continuare Georgiei
s participe la o serie de schimburi economice din cadrul
CSI, avnd posibilitatea s-i promoveze bunurile pe pieele
statelor ex-sovietice. Relaiile dintre Georgia i Uniunea
European au fost oficializate n anul 1996, cnd a fost
semnat Acordul de Parteneriat i Cooperare, care prevedea
asisten tehnic pentru Tbilisi i dezvoltarea unor raporturi
biletarale n mai multe domenii, inclusiv economic. Docu-
mentul a intrat n vigoare n anul 1999. Ulterior, Georgia a
decis s stabileasc drept prioritate a politicii sale integrarea
n Uniunea European. Aciunile urmtoare ale guvernrii
de la Tbilisi au fost ndreptate spre semnarea Planului de
Aciuni Comune Georgia UE (European Commission,
2006), semnat pe 6 octombrie 2006. Ca i celelalte dou
state caucaziene, Georgia este parte a Parteneriatului Estic,
al Politicii Europene de Vecintate. Georgia pare s-i
schimbe atitudinea i fa de Iran, fiind tot mai preocupat
s se transforme ntr-o pia atractiv pentru investitorii
iranieni, dar, spre deosebire de Armenia, autoritile de la
Tbilisi au o reea de parteneriate bilaterale mult mai diver-
sificat, ceea ce mrete cu mult libertatea de aciune n
bazinul Mrii Negre.14 Pentru Georgia, parteneri importani
sunt Turcia i Ucraina. Parteneriatele cu aceste ri permit
accesul produselor georgiene pe piaa european. Ulterior
14 Interviu cu un expert n integrare european, Tbilisi, mai, 2011.
204
conflictului ruso-georgian din august 2008 activitatea portu-
lui Batumi din Georgia a fost suspendat temporar. n urma
acestui conflict, statul vecin, Armenia, a suferit pierderi de
peste 600 milioane dolari SUA o sum enorm pentru
economia rii.15 Dac Georgia a primit suport politic i
economic extrem de important din partea mai multor parte-
neri occidentali, astfel fiind posibil i ieirea din recesiunea
economic, Armenia, din cauza relaiei sale cu Federaia
Rus, nu a primit sprijinul necesar pentru a-i acoperi sau
pentru a recupera o parte din pierderile suportate. Eduard
Nagdalyan confirm teoria conform creia salvarea econo-
mic a Georgiei a fost posibil tocmai datorit rzboiului
ruso-georgian din luna august 2008. Armenia i Azerbaidja-
nul nu s-au bucurat de asemenea resurse (Nagdalyan, 2011,
127): Pe de o parte dinamica Georgiei a avut de suferit n
urma rzboiului, dar, orict ar prea de paradoxal, potrivit
prerilor mprtite de mai muli experi georgieni,
rzboiul a fost cel care a salvat economia Georgiei n timpul
crizei. Aici este avut n vedere sprijinul financiar n valoare
de 4,5 miliarde dolari SUA oferit de donatorii internaionali
Georgiei pentru depirea rezultatelor conflictului cu Rusia.
Din aceast sum, 2 miliarde dolari SUA sunt parte a gran-
tului oferit de ctre Statele Unite. Lipsa propriilor resurse
naturale, precum i relaia tensionat cu Rusia, din cauza
recunoaterii de ctre aceasta a independenei Abhaziei i
Osetiei de Sud, au orientat economia georgian ctre struc-
turi occidentale. Pentru reintegrarea teritoriilor sale, ns,
Georgia trebuie s devin un model de dezvoltare economi-
c real, s promoveze i s implementeze i n continuare
reformele economice. Transformarea trebuie s se produc
la nivel de sistem i nu doar separat pe anumite domenii, iar
faptul c este susinut cel mai mult de comunitatea inter-
naional n demersul su de a se integra n circuitul eco-
nomic mondial, nu doar de jure, ci i de facto, constituie un
avantaj n negocierea intereselor naionale.
15 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie, 2011.
205
 2. Importana dezvoltrii mediului de afaceri i factorii
care influeneaz evoluia lui
Din punct de vedere economic, Caucazul de Sud poate fi
studiat ca un sistem unitar regional, dar i separat, conform
elementelor care l formeaz. Pentru a avea imaginea de
ansamblu asupra regiunii, ns, a fost necesar efectuarea
unei analize retrospective pentru economia naional a fie-
crui stat sud-caucazian, pentru a depista particularitile
i necesitile interne. Nu fiecare stat va avea aceleai nevoi
economice. Din acest punct de vedere, Azerbaidjanul are
independen total, sau va tinde ctre sisteme de integrare
regional diferite, din varii motive: afiniti cultural-istorice,
valori i principii mprtite, independen sau dependen ricoeu, i a celorlalte instituii statale. Tranziia la econo-
politic. Cert este un lucru: regiunea cere o abordare com-
plex, chiar dac exist tendine ale specializrii acesteia pe
anumite tipuri de ramuri economice: industrie metalurgic,
industrie energetic, industrie petrochimic (Kavkazia.net,
2011). Doar aa se pot crea strategii fezabile pentru promo-
varea unor proiecte investiionale n regiune. Orice guver-
nare democratic trebuie s aib drept scop asigurarea pros-
peritii i bunstrii cetenilor si, astfel nct acetia s existen a organizaiei non-guvernamentale Victims of State
nu-i simt ameninate sau lezate n vreun fel interesele.
Asigurarea protejrii i promovrii drepturilor i libertilor
omului, garantate inclusiv prin adeziunea la diferite norme
i principii internaionale, n urma semnrii i ratificrii
documentelor care le includ, este primul pas spre asigurarea
unui dialog reuit ntre stat i cetean. Respectarea drep-
tului la proprietate privat este parte a demersului spre
transformarea economiilor statelor ex-sovietice i tranziia
la economia de pia. Din pcate, n toate cele trei state
sud-caucaziene exist dificulti n asigurarea acestui drept.
Dreptul la proprietate privat este efemer: prin Constituie
acesta este garantat, dar de facto nu se respect. Autoritile
celor trei state par dezinteresate de acest aspect al activitii
lor i de foarte multe ori asistm la nclcarea flagrant a
drepturilor elementare, ceea ce n final conduce la anularea
interesului de a investi n economia unui stat strin sau la
206
luarea deciziei de a exporta surplusul de capital n afar.
Dac un investitor nu va avea deplina siguran cu privire la
securitatea investiiilor sale financiare, el va prsi piaa
unde i desfoar activitatea economic sau nici nu o va
mai accesa. Multe ramuri industriale au nevoie de aceste
injecii financiare din afar, deoarece ele sunt nsoite de
cele mai multe ori i de introducerea n procesul de produc-
ie sau de prestare a serviciilor de implementarea celor mai
noi rezultate ale progresului tehnologic. Amnarea pe ter-
men nelimitat a asigurrii proteciei drepturilor fundamen-
tale i, n special, a celor ce garanteaz proprietatea privat
poate conduce la amnarea modernizrii economiei i, prin
mia de pia necesit susinere pentru iniiative private din
partea autoritilor, implic supravegherea principalelor pro-
cese i oferirea unor garanii de securitate pentru reprezen-
tanii mediului de afaceri care decid s se implice, investind
n sectorul privat. Iat doar dou dintre multiplele exemple:
n Azerbaidjan casele luate pentru a construi un palat de
iarn n zona central Baku16 sau n Armenia simpla
Interests n Erevan, care are drept scop protejarea intereselor
i a drepturilor persoanelor care au devenit victime ale
intereselor de stat.17 O alt condiie pentru a readuce stabi-
litate n sistemul economiilor naionale ale statelor sud-cau-
caziene este adoptarea sau modificarea codurilor anti-
monopol. Foarte muli ageni economici se confrunt cu
aceast problem: nu pot ptrunde pe piee din cauza lipsei
condiiilor pentru o concuren loial. n Azerbaidjan,
proiectul de modificare a codului antimonopol este finanat
de Fundaia SIDA i Fundaia Eurasia. Proiectul de lege este
n curs de adoptare. Se preconizeaz c legea va fi ratificat
n parlamentul azer pn la sfritul lunii octombrie 2011.
Problemele din domeniul legislativ ngreuneaz i progresul
16 Interviu cu un expert n drepturile omului, Baku, iunie 2011.
17 Interviu cu un expert n drepturile omului, Erevan, iunie 2011.
207
n economie. Societatea azer e destul de conservatoare i
accept cu greu noile iniiative sau propuneri de modificare
a legislaiei, chiar dac acest lucru este cerut de instituiile
i organizaiile internaionale unde Azerbaidjanul are cali-
tatea de stat membru. Dac un proiect de lege contravine
intereselor unui anumit grup de interese, atunci adoptarea
i ratificarea acestuia va ntmpina suficiente greuti sau
nu va trece de Milli Majlis.18
Msurile luate de autoritile de la Baku nu pot fi tratate
dect ca fiind populiste. Scderea preurilor la produsele
alimentare de prim necesitate nu anuleaz necesitatea
modificrii strategiei naionale de dezvoltare a economiei.
n plus, asistm la implicarea statului n stabilirea preurilor
pe piee, ceea ce este inadmisibil ntr-un stat cu economie de
pia. n toate cele trei state sud-caucaziene deciziile econo-
mice sunt influenate de monopoluri i oligolopuri. Totui,
exist o diferen major n structura acestora: dac n
Georgia i Armenia oligarhi sunt att la guvernare, ct i n
opoziie, n Azerbaidjan opoziia nu are n spate mono-
politi sau oligarhi care s le susin iniiativele. Un lucru e
cert: deciziile politice i economice sunt dictate de interese-
le unor grupuri private. Dei la nivel guvernamental este
recunoscut importana unei strategii de lupt mpotriva
monopolurilor i oligopolurilor, cele trei state nu dispun de
programe eficiente de lupt mpotriva acestora.
Fenomenul monopolurilor i oligopolurilor poate fi era-
dicat cu ajutorul a dou tipuri de factori:
Interni perceperea necesitii crerii unui mediu
concurenial sntos, ceea ce presupune modificarea legis-
laiei n conformitate cu cerinele impuse de piaa mondial
i organizaiile internaionale cu profil economic;
Externi revoluiille arabe, care se pot extinde i n
statele sud-caucaziene, dac nu vor fi luate decizii ferme de
efectuare a unor reforme sistemice.
18 Denumirea n limba azer a Adunrii Parlamentare a Republicii
Azerbaidjan.
208
Dei investitorii strini se confrunt cu numeroase pro-
bleme atunci cnd iau decizia de a intra pe pieele statelor
din Caucazul de Sud, totui acetia au o prezen importan-
t. Dac se poate face abstracie de nivelul nalt al corupiei,
de lacunele legislative existente, care reglementeaz dome-
niul financiar sau cel cu privire la investiiile strine, este
important s notm c principalul pericol pentru mrirea
volumului iniiativelor private ar trebui s l constituie con-
flictele ngheate existente n regiune. n cei douzeci de ani
de independen, fiecare stat sud-caucazian s-a confruntat
cu conflicte militare deschise. Cu toate acestea, cifra investi-
iilor strine n regiune confirm faptul c niciuna dintre
prile implicate n diferendele din regiune nu se pronun
pentru rezolvarea acestora pe cale armat, chiar dac ele
continu s existe n timp, ntr-o form latent. Dac peri-
colul declanrii unor astfel de aciuni militare ar exista
cu adevrat, atunci majoritatea investitorilor strini s-ar
retrage, pentru a-i proteja investiiile. Fenomenul retragerii
investitorilor strini are o intensitate destul de ridicat,
dar nu este argumentat de raionamentele politice, ci mai
degrab de o politic intern promovat greit, care poate fi
redus la cauzele menionate anterior: corupie, concuren
neloial i o legislaie care nu corespunde realitilor i
cerinelor actuale ale pieei mondiale. ncurajarea ieirii
capitalului financiar n afara rii de origine poate fi un
semn al mbuntirii strii principalilor indici economici ai
unui stat. Una dintre cele mai mari companii din Caucaz,
care a reuit s aib o prezen internaional impresionan-
t prin mrimea proiectelor pe care le desfoar n afara
rii de origine SOCAR19, Compania Petrolier de Stat
19 Compania petrolier de stat din Azerbaidjan (SOCAR) este una
dintre cele mai mari companii petroliere din lume, care acioneaz n
baza unei politici de stat indivizibile cu scopul de a mbunti struc-
tura de administrare a industriei petroliere azere, precum i pentru a
oferi posibilitatea de dezvoltare pentru complexul energetic petrolier
al Azerbaidjanului. SOCAR a fost nfiinat n anul 1992 n urma
fu-ziunii a dou companii petroliere de stat: Azerneft i Azneftkimiya.
209
din Azerbaidjan a iniiat numeroase proiecte energetice
n afara Azerbaidjanului.
Lupta mpotriva corupiei este un alt element indis-
pensabil transformrii calitative a mediului de afaceri al
oricrui stat. n Azerbaidjan, combaterea acestui flagel s-a
intensificat dup declanarea revoluiilor arabe. Autoritile
de la Baku au venit cu iniiativa de a crea un Comitet
Anticorupie, care a atins rezultate mai mult la nivel local.
Lupta mpotriva corupiei la nivel nalt i nivel mic inclusiv
rmne o problem. Cu o situaie similar se confrunt i ncepute acum mai bine de un deceniu, fiindc foarte multe
Georgia, diferena o face contracararea acestui fenomen la
nivel mic. Georgia a avansat foarte mult n lupta mpotriva
actelor de corupie, fiind unul dintre liderii regionali n com-
baterea acestui fenomen negativ, care influeneaz foarte
mult deciziile oamenilor de afaceri atunci cnd acetia anal-
izeaz nivelul de siguran al unor poteniale investiii. n
plus, fenomenul corupiei este unul dintre factorii care vor
frna foarte mult procesul de liberalizare a regimului de vize
cu Uniunea European.20 Cu toate acestea, n cele trei state
sud-caucaziene, fenomenul este un element cotidian. Eradi-
carea lui se face mai mult prin declaraii oficiale dect prin
aplicarea unor aciuni concrete.
Cei douzeci de ani de independen nu au creat condi-
iile necesare pentru construirea unui spaiu economic
comun n regiunea Caucazului de Sud. Aceast trstur
a zonei are la baz existena mai multor divergene politice
ntre actorii statali care o formeaz, precum i interesele
particulare, modalitatea de abordare a problemelor cu care
se confrunt sau relaia cu marile puteri ale lumii cu interese
geostrategice n regiune. Crearea unui asemenea spaiu eco-
nomic comun, dup modelul european, de exemplu, ar con-
duce inevitabil la creterea atractivitii Caucazului de Sud
pentru poteniali investitori occidentali i asiatici. De
asemenea, ar crea precondiii pentru accederea n formate
de integrare economic: europene sau internaionale. Toate
20 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
210
cele trei state sud-caucaziene au semnat Planuri de Aciuni
Comune cu Uniunea European i sunt incluse n Politica
European de Vecintate (PEV), prin intermediul Partene-
riatului Estic, aprut n cadrul PEV la iniiativa Poloniei i
Suediei n anul 2008 i implementat ncepnd cu primvara
anului 2009. Principalul beneficiu al unui asemenea tip de
cooperare intraregional ar fi asigurarea securitii econo-
mice. Pentru a pune bazele unei forme de integrare regional,
statele Caucazului de Sud trebuie s continue reformele
fenomene economice negative, proprii spaiului ex-sovietic,
sunt capabile s ncetineasc i mai mult procesele de tre-
cere la economia de pia, respectiv s diminueze interesul
pentru investiii.
II. Economia politicilor energetice n Caucazul
de Sud
Majoritatea disfunciilor n domeniul economic i n cel
al securitii energetice n statele din Caucazul de Sud au
conexiune cu procesul de destrmare a Uniunii Sovietice.
Recunoaterea internaional a independenei politice nu
a condiionat n manier obligatorie i obinerea indepen-
denei economice sau energetice fa de noua motenitoare
de jure a Uniunii Sovietice, adic fa de Federaia Rus,
care i-a meninut influena n Caucazul de Sud prin diferite
proiecte i iniiative regionale cu caracter economic. n plus,
infrastructura energetic nvechit i lipsa mijloacelor finan-
ciare pentru efectuarea unor modernizri imediate a anulat
aproape n ntregime posibilitatea de a dezvolta acest sector.
Dac mai adugm i privatizarea incorect a reelelor de
distribuire a produselor energetice finale sau rmnerea
acestora n proprietatea statului, prea puin preocupat de
reforme n domeniu, atunci vom asista la creionarea unui
tablou dezolant al unuia dintre cele mai importante sectoare
ale economiei, a crui disfuncie poate contribui, n final,
la apariia unor tulburri sociale, aa cum s-a ntmplat la
211
nceputul ultimului deceniu al secolului trecut n timpul ntre Azerbaidjan i Armenia sau ntre Federaia Rus i
crizei economice din anul 1998. Politicile i strategiile ener- Georgia, ele au atras atenia opiniei publice internaionale
getice ale celor trei state au trecut prin procese de transfor- asupra proceselor i fenomenelor care s-au derulat n
mare dificile, conducnd de multe ori la declanarea unor regiune. Petrolul i gazele naturale sunt cele dou elemente
crize acute, ale cror consecine au fost resimite cel mai care transform Caucazul de Sud, fcndu-l atractiv pentru
mult de ctre ceteni. Infrastructura industrial i energe- investiii politice i financiare; incapacitatea autoritilor de
tic slab, motenit de la URSS, sistemul instituional a gestiona diferendele guvernare/opoziie, precum i lacunele
imperfect, o elit politic nepregtit pentru noile provocri legislative n domeniul investiional, cumulate cu prezena
i nevoi sociale, precum i necesitatea acceptrii i asumrii monopolurilor i a corupiei, diminueaz posibilitile de
noilor statute de state independente au dus la accentuarea implementare a celor mai noi rezultate tehnologice i astfel
crizelor economice n tot spaiul ex-sovietic. Implementarea modernizarea economiei rmne ceva incert. Caucazul de
eficient a unor strategii de securitate energetic presupune Sud dispune de multiple posibiliti de dezvoltare i nimeni
utilizarea unui complex de mecanisme i instrumente, att nu poate contesta aceast trstur a zonei. Pe aici trec
n dimensiunea extern, ct i n cea intern, pentru reali- principalele rute de transport Est-Vest i Nord-Sud pentru
zarea cu succes a obiectivelor strategice din domeniul ener- mrfuri i bunuri de consum, se fac conexiuni ntre Europa
getic (Infosfera, Bucureti, 2011). Dar ele nu au fost capabile i Asia, se creeaz oportuniti pentru a ameliora cile de
s fac fa tuturor provocrilor. Toate acestea, cumulate i acces spre resursele energetice din bazinul Mrii Caspice,
cu distribuia neuniform a resurselor naturale, au stat la att de necesare pentru industriile statelor dezvoltate.
baza diferenierii ritmului de transformare sistemic calita- Promovarea unor politici energetice independente, care au
tiv a acestor state, precum i la apariia unei ierarhizri n drept scop promovarea interesului naional, i nu a celui al
ceea ce privete importana alegerii vectorilor de orientare elitelor aflate la conducere, este o condiie esenial pentru
politic: unele au reuit s se conecteze la forme de coope- modernizarea economic.
rare europene, altele nc oscileaz ntre Est i Vest i ntre
forme de integrare economic regional. Un sistem economic 1. Resurse energetice, economie i politici energetice
devine stabil n momentul n care toate componentele aces- Dup colapsul Uniunii Sovietice i rzboiul armeano-azer,
tuia sunt asigurate cu resurse pentru o bun funcionare. care i-a urmat imediat, pe parcursul cruia Federaia Rus
Politica energetic este componenta de baz a oricrei a susinut cauza Armeniei, cea din urm s-a confruntat cu
economii dezvoltate. Fr promovarea unor iniiative bine mari probleme de ordin economic, dar mai ales cu o criz
argumentate n acest domeniu, nicio formaiune politic nu energetic acut. Azerbaidjanul a sistat livrrile de gaze
va reui s implementeze punctele incluse n programele de naturale ctre Armenia, ceea ce a ntrerupt alimentarea co-
guvernare i, n consecin, va alimenta i mai mult nemul- respunztoare a gazoductului construit pe teritoriul Georgiei
umirea electoratului. Cum menionam anterior, Caucazul i a oprit activitatea trenurilor pe ruta de cale ferat care
de Sud dispune de numeroase resurse energetice de mai trecea prin Abhazia i unea Rusia cu Georgia i Armenia.
multe tipuri, ns distribuia inegal a acestora a fost fac- Dei pe parcursul celor douzeci de ani de independen,
torul determinant al stabilirii coninutului raporturilor mul- autoritile de la Erevan s-au bucurat de susinere din partea
tilaterale i bilaterale ntre componentele regiunii. Cumulate Kremlinului, bunele raporturi diplomatice ntre cei doi actori
cu diferendele de ordin politic, adic cu conflictele existente nu au reuit s compenseze efectele negative ale izolrii

212 213
politico-economice a acestui stat sud-caucazian. Spre deo-
sebire de Azerbaidjan, Armenia nu dispune de resurse de
petrol i gaze naturale, necesarul de hidrocarburi intern
att pentru consumatorii finali, ct i pentru agenii eco-
nomici este asigurat cu resurse din Federaia Rus. n anul
1997 a fost creat o companie cu capital mixt ruso-armean,
numit SA ArmRosGazprom, ce avea drept scop oficial
refacerea infrastructurii energetice a Armeniei, precum i
reluarea livrrilor de gaze naturale prin singura conduct
de gaze naturale funcional, care unea Georgia cu sistemul
energetic rusesc spre nord i cel armean spre sud. Astfel,
Rusia a reuit s restabileasc sistemul energetic al Ereva-
nului. Din pcate pentru economia armean, Rusia a reuit
ulterior s achiziioneze pn la 80% din aciunile Com-
paniei ArmRosGazprom, care, din cauza tipologiei de
constituire societate pe aciuni de tip nchis nu a
putut avea i ali cumprtori. Chiar dac relaia bilateral
Rusia-Armenia continua s par una privilegiat, necesitatea
adoptrii unor msuri suplimentare de asigurare a propriei
securiti energetice era iminent. Exist mai multe posibi-
liti de a diversifica numrul de furnizori de produse ener-
getice, dar toate ar trebui s aib drept scop final obinerea
independenei fa de Rusia: Considerm c este necesar
obinerea unei alternative energetice la cea ruseasc, de
aceea este util s ne apropiem de Romnia i Bulgaria21.
i reprezentanii mediului academic par s confirme ideea
conform creia Federaia Rus este deranjat de iniiativele
energetice ale autoritilor armene. Potrivit opiniei publice
de la Erevan, securitatea energetic a statului nu trebuie s
se bazeze doar pe petrol i gaze. Strategia energetic trebuie
s fie diversificat i s susin i n continuare iniiativele nuat lucrrile. Datele oficiale despre proiect susin c pe
private care doresc multiplicarea potenialului energetic din
surse alternative: solar, eolian i hidroenergie. De aseme-
nea, autoritile de la Erevan vor susine i n continuare
dezvoltarea energiei nucleare. Dezbaterea la nivel inter-
naional a luat amploare dup cutremurul din martie 2011
21 Interviu cu un oficial, iunie 2011, Erevan.
214
din Japonia, n urma cruia a avut mult de suferit centrala
nuclear de la Fukushima. Prerile sunt mprite n funcie
de interesele i resursele pe care le dein statele prezente n
regiune Frana, Marea Britanie, Rusia, Ucraina i
Romnia nu vor renuna la energia nuclear i vor consoli-
da aceast ramur.22 Pe de alt parte, este corect i opinia
conform creia majoritatea proiectelor energetice, mai ales
cele prin care alimentarea conductelor de gaze naturale i
petrol se face din Azerbaidjan, ocolesc Armenia. Nu este
cea mai bun soluie a politicii energetice azere, pentru c
mrete considerabil cheltuielile pentru dezvoltarea pro-
iectelor petroliere regionale. Aceast atitudine, dei nu este
argumentat din punct de vedere economic, are susinere
politic, inclusiv internaional, din cauza conflictului din
Nagorno-Karabah. Soluia nu rmne dect orientarea
spre lumea arab, adic spre acelai Iran cu care Armenia
inteniona s semneze cteva tratate n domeniul energetic,
care distoneaz cu interesele de politic extern ale Federa-
iei Ruse n regiune. Proiectul conductei de tranzit pentru
gaze naturale Iran-Armenia era o alternativ real pentru
produsele energetice de origine rus. Reprezentanii de la
Kremlin au luat decizia de a susine financiar consumurile
de gaze naturale ale cetenilor armeni, transfernd n con-
turile guvernului Armeniei compensaii pariale pentru noile
tarife care urmau s se majoreze n perioada 2009-2011,
dar i s finaneze o parte din lucrrile la conducta Iran-
Armenia, fcnd investiii de aproximativ 550 milioane.
dolari SUA. Este un rspuns energetic care are drept scop
final susinerea propriilor obiective politice. Cele dou state
partenere, implicate n dezvoltarea proiectului, au conti-
aici ar putea fi livrate ctre Armenia 2,3 miliarde metri cubi
de gaze naturale, ceea ce ar putea asigura n ntregime nece-
sitile interne ale agenilor economici armeni.23 Curios la
22 Interviu cu un expert n securitate energetic, Bucureti, 2011.
23 Interaciunea ruso-armean i problemele regionale. Materiale ale con-
ferinei internaionale din 5 iunie 2010, Erevan, NAAPET, 2011, 19.
215
acest proiect este faptul c, n prezent, tot necesarul de gaze
naturale al Armeniei este asigurat de Rusia prin gazoductul
care trece pe teritoriul Georgiei. Dup reluarea relaiilor
economice bilaterale ntre Moscova i Tbilisi, Erevanul a
reuit s-i stabilizeze sistemul energetic. Cu toate acestea,
livrrile prin gazoductul armeano-iranian continu. Resur-
sele energetice ajung pe teritoriul Armeniei, unde sunt
transformate n energie electric n centralele de profil
armene, iar apoi sunt exportate napoi spre Iran.24 Armenia
i dorete s dezvolte politici energetice viabile. Condiiile
interne i natura relaiilor cu statele vecine cer luarea unor
msuri concrete, lucru menionat i mai sus. Dup dezas-
trul de la Fukushima, subiectul utilizrii energiei nucleare
a fost supus dezbaterii publice tot mai intens. Mai multe
state, n frunte cu Germania, i-au artat disponibilitatea
pentru renunarea la acest tip de surse energetice pe termen
mediu, dar nu i Armenia, pe teritoriul creia se gsete
una dintre cele mai periculoase centrale nucleare: cea de la
Metsamor. Centrala are peste 30 de ani i este localizat
ntr-o zon seismic sensibil (World Nuclear Association,
2010), la doar 30 de kilometri de capitala Erevan. n 2007,
autoritile armene au adoptat o nou strategie energetic,
ns coninutul ei confirm faptul c statul nu va renuna
la acest tip de energie, n pofida faptului c Uniunea Euro-
pean i sugereaz Armeniei s renune treptat la energia
nuclear. (European Commission a, 2006, 8). Aceeai
recomandare va fi reluat i prin coninutul rapoartelor
de evaluare a Planului de Aciuni Comune Armenia-UE
(A1plus.am, 2011). Dat fiind situaia energetic a
Armeniei, adic existena unui numr minim de parteneri
energetici, Erevanul nu arat deschidere spre renunarea
la dezvoltarea unor asemenea centrale, mai ales c dispune
de cantiti suficiente de uraniu, care se gsesc pe teritoriul
rii. n anul 2006, guvernul armean i-a fcut publice
24 Interaciunea ruso-armean i problemele regionale. Materiale ale con-
ferinei internaionale din 5 iunie 2010, Erevan, NAAPET, 2011, 19.
216
inteniile de a ncepe lucrrile la un nou proiect energetic:
construcia unei noi centrale nucleare. Primii pai n aceast
direcie au fost fcui n anul 2009, cnd parlamentarii
armeni au votat legea cu privire la creare unei companii
ruso-armene Metsamorenergoatom, care va construi noua
central. Costurile proiectului ating cifra de 5 miliarde
dolari SUA, cu o perioad de uzur de 60 de ani. Aceast
central atomo-electric se preconizeaz a fi dat n exploa-
tare n anul 2016. Ea va asigura o parte din nesesarul intern,
ns acesta este insuficient pentru toat economia armean.
Iat de ce autoritile de la Erevan au decis s sprijine acest
proiect de construcie a centralei atomo-electrice cu capital
rusesc, dei iniial se preconiza ca investiia de capital s
aib origine germano-american. Pentru a obine sprijinul
american i german pentru aceast iniiativ era necesar
includerea Georgiei n proiect, ceea ce ar fi condus i la
mbuntirea vizibilitii politice a Armeniei n regiune.
Colaborarea n domeniul energiei nucleare reprezint o
nou etap a colaborrii ruso-armene. n acest scop a fost
nfiinat n anul 2008 o alt companie mixt, care are drept
domeniu de activitate efectuarea unor cercetri geologice,
precum i extracia de uraniu i alte minerale de pe teritoriul
Armeniei. Aceast companie poart denumirea de Com-
pania ruso-armean pentru extracii miniere, iar n prezent
se lucreaz la conectarea juridic a Erevanului la lucrrile
proiectului Centrului internaional de mbogire a uraniu-
lui de la Angarsk.25
25 Centrul internaional de mbogire a uraniului din Angarsk
prima reuniune a Comisiei pentru nfiinarea Centrului internaional
de mbogire a uraniului a avut loc n anul 2006, fiind organizat de
ctre compania ruseasc Rosatom. n cadrul primei reuniuni au fost
discutate conceptul, forma juridic, precum i viitoarele colaborri ale
Centrului cu Agenia Internaional pentru Energie Atomic (AIEA).
Acest centru face parte dintr-o reea de centre internaionale pentru
studierea procesului de mbogire a uraniului. Centrul din Angarsk
trebuia iniial s trateze doar uraniu produs n Rusia i Kazahstan. El
este situat n apropierea lacului Baikal, n Siberia.
217
 Pe parcursul celor douzeci de ani de independen,
politica energetic a Azerbaidjanului a fost permanent n
vizorul autoritilor. Ea s-a aflat n slujba promovrii intere-
selor de politic extern i a fost un instrument eficient n
meninerea unor relaii stabile cu majoritatea partenerilor.
De fapt, politica energetic a administraiei de la Baku tinde
s diversifice reeaua de clieni pentru resursele energetice
de care dispune. Este o atitudine corect i responsabil,
spun specialitii n transparena utilizrii veniturilor prove-
nite din comercializarea petrolului, tot ei adugnd c politi-
ca energetic agresiv promovat astzi de Azerbaidjan este
cea mai bun strategie de stat, care se implementeaz cu
ajutorul Companiei petroliere de stat din Azerbaidjan
SOCAR. Rezultatele nu au doar caracter economic, ci mai
ales geopolitic, ele devenind deja vizibile la nivel regional.
Agresivitatea energetic este cea mai important compo-
nent a politicii externe azere.26 Ea le ofer independen
autoritilor n procesul de luare a deciziilor politice nu doar
n spaiul Caucazului de Sud, transformnd Azerbaidjanul
ntr-un stat care dispune de resursele necesare pentru sus-
inerea unui anumit tip de negociere. Pentru Romnia,
compania azer SOCAR este foarte important pentru
investiiile n proiecte energetice bilaterale. n viitorul
apropiat, SOCAR intenioneaz s construiasc peste 300
de staii de alimentare pe teritoriul Romniei. Conform de-
claraiilor reprezentanilor companiei SOCAR n Romnia,
ptrunderea companiei azere pe piaa romneasc va con-
tribui la scderea preurilor carburanilor. Exist disponibi-
litate politic, exist potenial economic pentru a dezvolta
aceste proiecte, dar conducerea companiei azere SOCAR
este foarte precaut n ceea ce privete investiiile externe.
Unul dintre argumentele pentru adoptarea unei asemenea
atitudini sunt negocierile dintre rui i azeri pe proiecte
energetice, al cror coninut nu este fcut public, iar strate-
gia adoptat are urmtorul algoritm: investiii n proiecte
26 Interviu cu un expert economic, Baku, iunie 2011.
218
mici i mijlocii, care nu angajeaz financiar excesiv de mult
compania. Aceasta poate explica de ce pn acum SOCAR
a achizionat doar cteva benzinrii n zona Moldovei din
Romnia. SOCAR negociaz, de asemenea, intrarea pe piaa
din Bulgaria, Serbia, Ucraina, precum i Republica Moldova.
n Bulgaria, reprezentanii companiei de stat azere SOCAR
negociaz preluarea activelor singurei rafinrii de petrol
Neftochim, controlat de compania rus Lukoil. Procesul
de negociere al achiziiei activelor companiei Neftochim a
nceput pe fondul disputei dintre autoritile vamale bulgare
cu reprezentanii companiei Lukoil, cnd ruilor le-a fost
retras temporar licena fiindc nu au reuit s contorizeze
procesul de producie n termenul negociat cu autoritile
bulgare. n final, divergenele au condus la sistarea tuturor
activitilor de prelucrare a ieiului la rafinria din Burgas
pentru o perioad de o lun i jumtate (Vedomosti, 2011).
Interesul pentru piaa Republicii Moldova nu este nou i
nici ntmpltor. La finele anului 2003 compania Azpetrol
intra pe piaa Moldovei, intenionnd s preia construcia
terminalului de la Giurgiuleti, iar mai apoi s construiasc
o reea de staii de alimentare n toat ara. Pentru Azpetrol
cucerirea pieei Republicii Moldova nsemna o oportunitate
extraordinar pentru a ptrunde pe pieele europene. Dar
compania i-a ncetat n cel mai scurt timp activitile.
Cauzele acestui fenomen in de evenimente interne care au
avut loc n viaa politic din Azerbaidjan. Compania Azpetrol
se afla sub conducerea Ministerului Dezvoltrii Economiei
a Republicii Azerbaidjan. n luna octombrie 2005 ministrul
Dezvoltrii Economice n exerciiu de la Baku, Farhad
Aliyev (Aze.az, 2007a) era arestat, fiind acuzat de organi-
zarea unei lovituri de stat i depirea atribuiilor de servi-
ciu. Ulterior a fost arestat i fratele acestuia, Rafik Aliyev,
ex-preedintele companiei Azpetrol, fiind acuzat de splare
de bani. Recent, acesta a fost pus n libertate.
n prezent compania Azpetrol are o prezen redus
chiar i pe piaa intern, limitndu-se doar la administrarea
a 66 staii de alimentare cu petrol i cinci care funcioneaz
219
pe baz de gaze naturale (Azpetrol, 2011). SOCAR era unul
dintre potenialii cumprtori, care ducea tratative pentru
a prelua activele companiei Azpetrol.27 Pentru a diminua
efectele negative ale crizei economice mondiale, compania
SOCAR a fost cea care a finanat sectorul non-petrolier din
Azerbaidjan. Astfel, n anul 2010 peste 60% din investiiile
din Republica Azerbaidjan au avut origine intern. Cu toate
acestea, ramurile industriei azere care nu au conexiune direc-
t cu sectorul energetic continu s sufere de o finanare
insuficient.
Probleme apar atunci cnd se face distribuirea incorect
a acestor venituri, iar alte ramuri economice primesc resurse
financiare insuficiente pentru a putea implementa rezul-
tatele modernizrii economice n industria uoar sau agri-
cultur, spre exemplu. Desigur, actuala politic energetic
a Azerbaidjanului permite autoritilor s jongleze printre
obiectivele geostrategice ale marilor actori n regiune, sus-
innd inclusiv propriile demersuri de transformare a aces-
tui stat sud-caucazian n veriga principal a regiunii, care
trebuie s fie consultat atunci cnd se iau decizii cu privire
la vectorii de politic extern a actorilor din Caucazul de Sud.
Disponibilitatea celorlali lideri de a consulta autoritile
de la Baku cu privire la evoluia regiunii este, dup cum am
menionat anterior, unul dintre rezultatele promovrii unei
politici energetice corecte. Nimeni nu poate nega c n acest
domeniu conducerea azer a fcut progrese considerabile,
asigurndu-i astfel un dialog stabil inclusiv cu Moscova.
Interesele cu caracter economic sunt cel puin la fel de
importante ca i cele politice. Este dificil pentru guvernarea
de la Baku s echilibreze interesele energetice, economice,
precum i pe cele politice ale marilor puteri n regiunea
Caucazului de Sud, i cu toate acestea se dezvolt tendine
pozitive n aceast direcie.28 Una dintre problemele cu care
27 Interviu cu un expert economic i un expert n transparena
fondurilor provenite din vnzrile de produse petroliere, Baku, iunie
2011.
28 Interviu cu un analist politic, iunie 2011, Baku.
220
se confrunt astzi Azerbaidjanul se refer la transparena
distribuirii veniturilor care provin din sectorul energetic.
Accesul la informaia public despre modul n care sunt chel-
tuite finanele publice acumulate n urma comercializrii de
produse energetice este limitat, iar administrarea acestora
nu este eficient. Astfel, transparena actului decizional,
care ar trebui s fie proprie unui sistem democratic, este un
principiu declarativ, greu de implementat. Interesele private
domin asupra intereselor naionale. Economia Azerbaidja-
nului este n ntregime dependent de sectorul energetic,
chiar dac autoritile de la Baku insist asupra faptului c
i celelalte sectoare ale economiei se bucur de atenie din
partea guvernrii. ntrebarea care apare aici este urmtoarea:
ce se va ntmpla cu o economie dependent de petrol i
gaze peste douzeci de ani? Specialitii n transparena
veniturilor din sectorul energetic insist asupra faptului c
doar 15% din bugetul de stat al Azerbaidjanului este format
din taxe i impozite, iar restul de 85% este format din pli
provenite din contractele energetice ale statului. Printre
specialitii n economie este tot mai des vehiculat ideea
c petrolul azer se transform ntr-un blestem al Azerbai-
djanului. Explicaia este logic i destul de accesibil: re-
sursele petroliere, precum i gazele naturale sunt epuizabile,
deci limitate n timp, dar autoritile nu percep acest lucru
atunci cnd direcioneaz economia statului spre o singur
ramur industrial. Fondul Petrolier de Stat al Republicii
Azerbaidjanului (State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azer-
baijan, 2011)29 a fost creat n 1999. Prognozele susineau
29 Fondul Petrolier de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan (SOFAZ) a
fost creat prin Decretul Preedintelui Republicii Azerbaidjan Despre
crearea Fondului Petrolier de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan, emis pe
29 decembrie 1999. SOFAZ a fost creat pentru a contribui la asigu-
rarea egalitii ntre generaii n ceea ce privete beneficiile care pot
aprea n urma exploatrii resurselor de petrol ale rii. Demersul
pentru bunstarea economic de astzi trebuie s conduc la asigu-
rarea stabilitii economice pentru generaiile viitoare aceasta este
filosofia Fondului Petrolier de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan.
221
c n anul 2011 n Fondul Petrolier de Stat vor fi acumulate
peste 30 miliarde dolari SUA, cu 10 miliarde dolari SUA
mai mult dect n anul 2009 (ABC.az, 2011c). Cifra prog-
nozat a fost depit n luna iulie curent. Astfel, conform
datelor prezentate de reprezentanii SOFAZ pe 28 iunie
2011, activele Fondului Petrolier de Stat au atins cifra de
30,2 miliarde dolari SUA (ABC.az, 2011d). Mrirea active-
lor Fondului a fost posibil, adaug reprezentanii SOFAZ,
datorit implementrrii cu succes a strategiei petroliere na-
ionale, elaborat de liderul Heydar Alyev (ABC.az, 2011d).
n anul 2050, suma care se va acumula n acest fond al
viitorului se preconizeaz c va atinge cifra de 50 miliarde
dolari SUA. Fondul Petrolier de Stat n care se acumuleaz
fondurile din contractele de vnzare a produselor petroliere
este administrat ineficient, sunt de prere experii n trans-
parena fondurilor de stat, deoarece banii sunt destinai
unor proiecte mult prea ambiioase, pe care autoritile nu
le vor putea implementa. Printre proiectele finanate de
SOFAZ se numr o serie de iniiative destinate reformrii
sistemului educaional al rii i n special pentru atragerea
tinerilor care au studiat n strintate, susinere financiar
pentru proiectul de construire a unei noi rute de cale ferat
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars, proiectul de construire a unei conducte
de transport a apei potabile din regiunea Oguz-Obala, care
va alimenta capitala Baku i care este foarte dificil de imple-
mentat din cauza unei infrastructuri foarte slab dezvoltate,
precum i o serie de iniiative destinate s amelioreze situaia
refugiailor din regiunea Nagorno-Karabah. Din anul 2001
pn n prezent, SOFAZ a alocat peste 765 milioane AZN
pentru mbuntirea condiiilor de trai ale refugiailor
stabilii n diferite regiuni ale Azerbaidjanului, dar n special
n oraul Baku. Utilitatea Fondului Petrolier de Stat al Repu-
blicii Azerbaidjan e pus sub semnul ntrebrii n condiiile
n care doar 5% din totalul de resurse financiare care ajung
acolo sunt destinate pentru proiecte pe termen lung, adic
investiii n viitor, n urmtoarele generaii, susin experii
economici. Celelalte 95% sunt distribuite pentru proiecte
222
actuale, crora, de cele mai multe ori, le lipsesc studiile de
fezabilitate bine argumentate, chiar dac acestea sunt elabo-
rate de parteneri externi. De exemplu, studiul de fezabilitate
pentru conducta de alimentare a oraului Baku cu ap pota-
bil a fost efectuat cu ajutorul companiei CES Consulting
Engineers, Germania i a costat peste 2,1 milioane AZN.
Dar nu toate proiectele susinute financiar prin SOFAZ sunt
gndite pe termen lung. Banii sunt investii, ei formeaz un
circuit economic care ns produce rentabilitate de moment,
pe termen scurt i de care nu se vor putea bucura generaiile
viitoare. Concluzia primar este c guvernul azer nu gn-
dete n termeni de sustenabilitate economic. Diversificarea
surselor energetice este una dintre posibiliti, dar diversifi-
carea producerii de bunuri i servicii i susinerea celor exis-
tente deja, care nu au nicio conexiune cu domeniul energetic,
e singura ans pentru asigurarea securitii economico-sociale
i, nu n ultimul rnd, a stabilitii politice. Concentrarea
agenilor economici n orae, n special n capitala Baku,
diminueaz posibilitatea efecturii unor investiii majore n
provincie. Despre acest lucru vorbesc i taxele colectate n
bugetul statului: 93% din taxele i impozitele colectate au
fost vrsate n bugetul statului de la ageni economici cu
adres juridic n capitala Azerbaidjanului oraul Baku.
Ponderea provinciei este de doar 7%.
Georgia nu e un stat independent din punct de vedere
energetic. De cele mai multe ori, ea este somat de ctre
societatea civil s fac anumite concesii politice tocmai
pentru a-i asigura stabilitatea energetic. Dependena de
resursele energetice ruseti s-a resimit de-a lungul celor
douzeci de ani de independen, ns acest lucru nu a pre-
judiciat interesul pentru promovarea unei politici energetice
de stat bazate pe divesrificarea surselor de aprovizionare cu
necesarul de hidrocarburi sau gaze naturale din alte surse.
De cele mai multe ori, opinia public internaional este
tentat s asocieze acest stat caucazian cu proteste, ncl-
carea drepturilor omului i conflictul ruso-georgian din luna
august 2008, dup consumarea cruia autoritile de la Tbilisi
223
au decis s ias din Comunitatea Statelor Independente,
rmnnd afiliate la aceast form de cooperare regional
doar prin intermediul tratatelor deja semnate. Strategia ener-
getic a Georgiei se bazeaz pe o filosofie de aciune simpl:
diversificarea surselor de aprovizionare a necesarului de pro-
duse energetice att pentru sectorul economic, ct i pentru
consumatorii finali, cu o uoar orientare ctre integrarea
propriului sistem energetic n proiectele susinute de
Uniunea European. Spre deosebire de Republica Moldova
i Ucraina, Georgia nc nu a semnat Tratatul Comunitar
Energetic (Energy Community Treaty), dar a fost acceptat n
calitate de observator al Comunitii Energetice Europene
pe 18 decembrie 2007 (Energy Community, 2007). ntr-
zierea participrii Georgiei la diferitele iniiative europene
cu caracter energetic, explic experii georgieni, are i o
conotaie geografic, nu doar politic. Republica Moldova i
Ucraina au frontiere comune cu Uniunea European i este
mai uor pentru acestea s acceseze diferitele programe des-
tinate statelor incluse n Politica European de Vecintate i
nu numai.30 Conexiunea la proiectele energetice ale Uniunii
Europene pentru Georgia va deveni posibil prin interme-
diul Turciei. Dar, pentru a obine independen energetic
fa de Federaia Rus, autoritile de la Tbilisi trebuie s
armonizeze legislaia ce reglementeaz domeniul energetic
n conformitate cu standardele i normele Uniunii Europene.
Dei UE pare s nu fie tentat s promoveze solidaritate
regional n domeniul energetic, mai ales dup crizele eco-
nomice repetate, care au avut loc mai muli ani consecutiv
din cauza nrutirii raporturilor politice dintre Ucraina i
Federaia Rus, beneficiile pe care le-ar obine Georgia prin
conectarea la iniiative energetice europene ar putea avea
un caracter pe termen lung, pentru c ele vor supune trans-
formrii inclusiv parametrii tehnici ai sistemului energetic
georgian. Experii georgieni n domeniul eficienei energe-
tice trebuie s fie ateni la capitolul care cuprinde rutele de
30 Interviu cu un expert n domeniul energetic, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
224
tranzit din orice proiect energetic deoarece, avnd drept
obiectiv de baz obinerea independenei energetice fa de
Rusia, autoritile sunt tentate s neglijeze capitolul care
cuprinde securitatea mediului, adic ecologia. Dezvoltarea
proiectului AGRI ar putea ntmpina ostilitate din partea
societii civile tocmai din aceste considerente. Important
de notat aic este c oficialii georgieni se pronun n conti-
nuare i pentru dezvoltarea unor iniiative care promoveaz
utilizarea energiei regenerabile, adic 90% din consumul de
energie s fie asigurat de hidroenergie, n condiiile n care
Uniunea European nu impune un consum total mai mare
de 20% de energie regenerabil necesar sectorului econo-
mic.31 ncepnd cu anul 2006 Georgia devine exportator de
energie electric, iar principalii consumatori sunt Federaia
Rus, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, Turcia. i dup august 2008,
Rusia rmne principalul consumator de energie electric
produs de Georgia, care va continua s-i dezvolte cen-
tralele hidroelectrice. Dac la Tbilisi se vehiculeaz ideea
c ar exista posibilitatea ca domeniul hidroelectroenergetic
s constituie elementul de baz al restabilirii dialogului ntre
Abhazia i Georgia, la Suhumi opiniile sunt mprite. Con-
textul politic nu permite acest lucru. Directorul centralei
hidroelectrice de pe rul Inguri, Rezo Zantaria, declara n
noiembrie 2008 c aceast central intr sub jurisdicia
autoritilor abhaze, pe care Tbilisi nu le-a recunoscut dup
proclamarea independenei i recunoaterea acesteia de ctre
autoritile ruse. Din aceste considerente, autoritile geor-
giene nu au dreptul s demareze procedura de privatizare a
centralei hidroelectrice, cu participarea unor investitori din
Azerbaidjan. Geografic, Centrala hidroelectric de la Inguri
se afl la hotarul dintre Abhazia i Georgia, acest lucru este
bine cunoscut prii azere (Kavkaz Uzel, 2008), a adugat
Rezo Zantaria. nc mai persist teama, din partea autori-
tilor georgiene, c, dup rzboiul din august 2008, Rusia
va reui s-i nsueasc obiectivul energetic, dar autoritile
31 Interviu cu un expert n domeniul energetic, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
225
celor dou state aflate n conflict au reuit s ajung la o
nelegere de a administra n mod egal hidrocentrala de la
Inguri.32 Conform nelegerilor dintre cele dou pri, 60%
din totalul de energie produs aici pleac spre Georgia, iar
celelalte 40% acoper o parte a necesitilor consumatorilor
din Abhazia. Lucrrile de reconstrucie la aceast hidrocen-
tral au fost efectuate de ctre compania german Siemens,
ele durnd civa ani. Dei presa georgian i internaional
vehiculeaz anumite subiecte tabu, care nu pot fi supuse
dezbaterii publice la Tbilisi, cele mai accesibile platforme
de discuie pentru societatea civil de aici sunt cele dedicate
sectorului energetic i mediului. Politica energetic a statu-
lui a servit n Georgia drept pretext pentru adncirea diver-
genelor dintre guvernare i opoziie. Astfel, Partidul Laburist
din Georgia a organizat pe 13 ianuarie 2011 o aciune de
protest n faa sediului central al Companiei de Distribuie
a Energiei Electrice Telasi din Tbilisi, cernd autoritilor s
anuleze chitana unic pentru serviciile comunale. Potrivit
acestei chitane, cetenii Georgiei vor fi obligai s fac
plata pentru ap, energie electric, gaze naturale i alte ser-
vicii n conformitate cu dispoziiile unui nou sistem unifi-
cat. n caz de neplat, Telasi are dreptul s-i debraneze pe
consumatori de la reea. Liderul Partidului Laburist din
Georgia, alva Natelavili, a declarat n cadrul unui briefing
de pres c regimul Saakavili pregtete prin actul de luare
a unei asemenea decizii o nou bomb n relaiile dintre
Rusia i Georgia. El a amintit c proprietarul reelei geor-
giene de distribuie a energiei electrice e Compania ruseasc
INTER RAO UES, care nu are niciun drept de a-i pedepsi
pe consumatorii georgieni pentru datorii strine. Conform
lui Natelavili, partidul pe care l reprezint a luat toate
msurile necesare pentru ca aceast aciune s nu aib loc.
Printre acestea se numr i sesizarea Curii Constituionale
ca s-i dea avizul cu privire la legalitatea adoptrii deciziei,
a negociat cu Telasi i compania rus. Laburitii georgieni
32 Interviu cu un expert n domeniul energetic, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
226
amenin cu aciuni de protest care vor avea drept finalitate
schimbarea actualei guvernri. Aciunea nu a avut finalita-
tea presupus de liderii opoziiei. Adesea actuala guvernare
din Georgia este acuzat de limitarea formelor de protest
ale opoziiei, ns protestele care au avut la baz o motivaie
energetic nu s-au bucurat de aceeai atitudine ca cele din
luna mai 2011, spre exemplu. n Caucazul de Sud, promo-
varea unor politici energetice i a unor strategii de dez-
voltare eficient a sectorului energetic, care st la baza unei
bune funcionri a ntregului sistem economic, este o nece-
sitate vital. Dar, fr a-i asigura resursele necesare pentru
dezvoltarea infrastructurii n domeniul supus dezbaterii,
orice politic public devine inutil. Condiia de baz pentru
a nregistra un progres este crearea unor condiii adecvate
pentru apariia voinei politice, iar aceasta se educ pe par-
curs, transformnd erorile n succese.
2. Proiecte energetice i coridoare de transport n Caucazul
de Sud
Caucazul de Sud a reuit s atrag atenia marilor puteri
prin intermediul mai multor elemente, capabile s contribuie
la atingerea unor obiective i interese naionale, cuprinse n
strategii de politic extern sau strategii de securitate ener-
getic ce se pot regsi n aceste regiuni care i arat deschis
interesul pentru a efectua investiii n zon. O alt calitate
a Caucazului de Sud este apropierea sa de Asia Central,
cu care la un moment dat se unete nu doar geografic, ci mai
ales energetic, ceea ce l face i mai atractiv din punct de
vedere geostrategic. Dac Georgia i Armenia, dup cum
am menionat anterior, au o afinitate pentru procese de
integrare politice i economice occidentale, n Azerbaidjan
nu exist o predispoziie general pentru limitarea propriilor
posibiliti de a ptrunde n circuitul mondial. Capacitile
energetice de care dispune i permit s oscileze ntre regiuni.
Adesea Azerbaidjanul este studiat ca parte a Asiei Centrale,
chiar dac n ultima perioad s-a renunat la aceast asociere.
227
Poi s reconstruieti o regiune dup interesele pe care le ai
acolo, iar din acest punct de vedere se poate face afirmaia
c Baku ar fi parte a Asiei Centrale.33 Petrolul, gazele natu-
rale, uraniul, iar mai recent i plutoniul care se gsesc aici
le transform importana n cadrul sistemului mondial de
relaii internaionale. Lupta nu se d att pentru schimbarea
calitativ a sistemelor politice existente n regiune, ct
pentru stabilirea unui grad de subordonare politic, pentru
a obine un control suficient asupra acestor resurse, astfel
nct administrarea lor s produc beneficii economice. Din
pcate acest lucru va fi recunoscut mai puin de ctre actorii
statali i non-statali care au interese de politic extern, de
securitate i energetice. Implicarea i prezena n regiune a
Federaiei Ruse, a Statelor Unite ale Americii i a Uniunii
Europene nu au diminuat interesul altor mari puteri pentru
regiunea Caucazului de Sud. Pe lng actorii enumerai mai
sus, trebuie s menionm ca fiind foarte important i
China marea ctigtoare a crizei economice mondiale
mai ales din cauza resurselor de hidrocarburi. Ce ncearc s
fac autoritile de la Beijing poate prejudicia mai mult sau
mai puin atingerea obiectivelor strategice de ctre Rusia,
UE sau SUA; totul va depinde de capacitatea de a ajunge la
un consens n ceea ce privete modalitatea de construire a
rutelor de transport, precum i a mpririi contractelor
petroliere. Industria Chinei necesit cantiti foarte mari de
resurse petroliere pentru a-i putea fi susinut ritmul de dez-
voltare actual. Aceasta este una dintre explicaiile pentru
care Azerbaidjanul continu s fie atras mai mult spre zona
asiatic, iar proiectele energetice la care acesta este parte
sunt redirecionate cel puin unele dintre ele spre Est.
Filosofia de aciune a acestor mari puteri difer foarte mult.
Dac Rusia se bazeaz pe influena sa politic asupra regiu-
nii i pe susinerea pe care o ofer anumitor actori prin pre-
lungirea artificial a crizelor i conflictelor, Uniunea Euro-
pean ncearc s devin atractiv prin modelul democratic
33 Interviu cu un analist politic, Baku, iunie 2011.
228
i economic, promovnd n primul rnd ideea de schimbare
instituional, prin aplicarea principiilor democratice, orien-
tnd n mod natural subiecii regiunii ctre Vest. China este
obligat, practic, s-i mobilizeze eforturile pentru redirec-
ionarea intereselor economice a tuturor actorilor n regiune
ctre Est, astfel nct s poat prelua o parte din potenialul
acestei prezene. O analiz minuioas cu privire la poten-
ialul energetic al Caucazului de Sud este dificil de efectuat
dac vor fi ignorate principalele coridoare de transport care
unesc Asia de Europa i Nordul de Sud. Produsele energetice
cer n mod obligatoriu i dezvoltarea unor rute de transport,
a unor depozite de stocare, dar i a unor uniti de prelu-
crare a lor. Dezvoltarea sectorului petrolier se face n paralel
cu susinerea investiiilor n sectoare complementare, astfel
nct fezabilitatea proiectelor n curs de derulare, precum
i a celor n curs de pregtire s nu ntmpine dificulti
de implementare n fazele lor finale. Cantitatea de petrol i
gaze naturale care trebuie s alimenteze principalele proiecte
energetice din Caucazul de Sud permite efectuarea unei
ierarhizri a acestora, ns autoritile diferitor state din
regiune ncearc s dea asigurri c nu vor prioritiza un
proiect n defavoarea altuia. Rolul Caucazului de Sud n
economia mondial ar putea fi rezumat la urmtoarele: zon
de acces la petrolul din Marea Caspic prin cele mai scurte
coridoare de transport.
Harta 1 Traseul proiectului energetic Nabucco
Sursa: Nabucco Pipeline,
http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/pipeline/route
229
 Nabucco34 acest proiect energetic a fost gndit ca o
extensie a conductei Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (vezi harta 1),
pentru a asigura securitatea energetic a statelor europene.
Deciziile cu privire la dezvoltarea proiectului au fost adop-
tate n perioada crizei economice mondiale, ns statele care
au lansat iniiativa nu l-au abandonat, tocmai din cauza sta-
bilitii energetice pe care o poate oferi (ACGRC, 2011, 35).
Azerbaidjanul e dispus s ofere gaze naturale proiectului
Nabucco, dar nu va putea asigura tot necesarul pentru buna
desfurare a acestui proiect. Aceasta este una dintre cauzele
pentru care Turkmenistanul a fost invitat s participe la dez-
voltarea Nabucco, n direcia conectrii Mrii Caspice la ini-
iativ. Condiia de baz impus de autoritile de la Baku Potenialul Nabucco va crete abia dup anul 2015, odat
este ca statele care au nevoie de acest proiect s ia o decizie
ferm n ceea ce privete efectuarea de investiii financiare
n construcia conductei. Autoritile azere militeaz pentru
implementarea a ct mai multor proiecte energetice. Acest
lucru atest c politica energetic a Republicii Azerbaidjan
este concentrat pe diversificarea la maximum a rutelor de
transport pentru hidrocarburile sale ctre pieele internaio-
nale. Nabucco este un proiect pretenios i exist numeroase
dificulti pentru ca acesta s devin cu adevrat fezabil pe
termen scurt. Infrastructura de transport de gaze naturale
a Azerbaidjanului e foarte slab dezvoltat. n acest moment
ar trebui s se pun un accent mai mare pe dezvoltarea
34 Nabucco este o conduct lansat n anul 2006, avnd iniial forma pe viitor ntr-o ameninare pentru sigurana energetic
o capacitate de transport al gazelor naturale de 7,2 miliarde metri
cubi pe an, cu o posibilitate de cretere de pn la 20 miliarde metri
cubi, ea fiind gndit ca o extensie a unei alte conducte n care Azer-
baidjanul era implicat, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum. Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
are un traseu aproape identic cu cel al Oleoductului Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan. Conducta va avea o lungime de peste 3.300 km i o capaci-
tate de transport de circa 31 miliarde metri cubi de gaze naturale pe
an. Durata de via a proiectului este de 50 de ani (Nabucco pipeline,
Overwiev). Celelalte surse de aprovizionare a conductei i au origi-
nea n Orientul Mijlociu i Egipt. Este unul dintre cele mai ambiioase
proiecte. Costul estimativ al lucrrii va atinge cifra de 7,9 miliarde
euro (Nabucco pipeline, Facts and Figures), fiind o cifr provizorie.
230
infrastructurii necesare pentru stocarea cantitilor de gaze
naturale pentru care a fost proiectat Nabucco. Autoritile
azere, ns, au o motivaie politic pentru a susine i ncu-
raja partenerii strini interesai s investeasc n continuare
n acest proiect. Jocul pe mai multe proiecte energetice ofer
posibilitate actualilor guvernani de a se menine la condu-
cerea statului, astfel c susinerea pentru Nabucco va fi n
continuare una ferm. SOCAR vine cu garanii c va fi capa-
bil s asigure cantitile necesare de gaze naturale pentru
Nabucco, mai ales dup 2020, cnd vor fi finalizate majo-
ritatea lucrrilor de mbuntire a infrastructurii de trans-
port, care n acest moment se confrunt cu multe probleme.
cu creterea produciei de gaze naturale. n prezent, produc-
ia de gaze naturale se afl n umbra produciei de petrol.35
Dac vorbim despre Nabucco, atunci se cer a fi luate n con-
siderare mai multe variabile politice care pot prejudicia dez-
voltarea proiectului. Independena energetic fa de Rusia
este doar una dintre cele la care putem s facem referin n
acest moment, dar trebuie acordat maxim atenie i unui
alt aspect la fel de important: cea mai mare parte a iniiati-
velor energetice, pe care Uniunea European este interesat
s le dezvolte n baza resurselor de hidrocarburi existente n
Marea Caspic vor trece prin Turcia. Acest stat va deveni
important nu doar din punct de vedere regional, ci va deveni
monopolist energetic pe axa sudic, ceea ce se poate trans-
a Uniunii Europene, care insist tot mai mult pe liberalizarea
pieei energetice, asumndu-i un risc major.36 Autoritile
turce nu vor risca n acest moment relaia economic pe care
o au cu Uniunea European, pentru c nu exist garanii
politice n ceea ce privete evoluia relaiei bilaterale cu
Federaia Rus. Iat de ce Turcia se va limita pe termen scurt
doar la tratarea Rusiei ca pia de desfacere pentru bunurile
35 Interviu cu un expert economic, Baku, iunie, 2011.
36 Interviu cu un expert n domeniul energetic, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
231
i serviciile sale. Interesant e c autoritile azere nu doresc
s vin cu resurse financiare nici pentru Nabucco, nici pen-
tru AGRI (a se vedea mai jos), care ntmpin mai multe
probleme de ordin tehnologic, dar i financiar. De aseme-
nea, agenda de politic extern a Armeniei conine prevederi
despre o posibil aliniere a acestui stat caucazian la proiect.
Autoritile de la Erevan sunt somate de propriile interese
energetice s adere n viitor la aceast iniiativ regional.
n cazul Armeniei acest lucru poate deveni posibil prin
intermediul Planului de Aciuni Comune Armenia-Uniunea
European (European Commission, 2006b), care prevede
cooperare n sectorul energetic ntre cei doi parteneri. Con-
form coninutului acestui document, Uniunea European
va susine proiectele armene pentru dezvoltarea unei strate-
gii energetice pe termen lung, dar condiia de baz este ca
Harta 2 Interconectorul Azerbaidjan Georgia Romnia
Armenia s renune la iniiativele sale de construcie a unei (AGRI, STRATFOR) Sursa: Plano 10 (cu verde AGRI),
noi centrale energetice nucleare. La rndul su, Erevanul http://www.plano10.com/2011/04/proiectul-agri-o-bila-alba-pentru.html
tinde s decline cerinele UE din cauza lipsei unei alterna-
tive, pe care comunitatea european ntrzie s o propun.
n aceste condiii, Nabucco ar putea fi o asemenea alterna- Romnia, Ungaria i alte state europene interesate de diver-
tiv, dar ea depinde n foarte mare msur de relaia cu sificarea surselor de aprovizionare cu resurse energetice, fiind
Azerbaidjanul, care pn acum s-a opus implicrii statului parte a coridorului sudic de transport al gazelor naturale.
cu care se afl n conflict teritorial n mai multe iniiative Compania care se va preocupa de implementarea proiectu-
energetice regionale, insistnd de fiecare dat asupra ocolirii lui poart numele AGRI LNG Project Company. Ea a fost
acestuia. format de participani din patru state: Romgaz (Romnia),
Georgian Oil and Gas Company (Georgia), State Oil Company
Azerbaidjan-Georgia-Romnia-Interconector (AGRI, of Azerbaijan Republic (Azerbaidjan) i MVM (Ungaria).
vezi harta 2)37 este un proiect ambiios, care s-a bucurat Fiecare dintre cele patru state deine o cot-parte egal
de o atenie sporit din partea partenerilor implicai n dez- cu 25% din capitalul social al AGRI LNG Project Company.
voltarea lui. Acest proiect energetic are drept scop trans- Statele implicate n dezvoltarea proiectului AGRI au
portarea de gaze naturale de la zcmntul Shah Deniz spre probleme de ordin politic cu Federaia Rus, ceea ce poate fi
interpretat ca o prejudiciere a intereselor acesteia energetice,
37 Azerbaidjan-Georgia-Romnia-Interconector (AGRI) Memo-
economice i politice n direcia sudic. AGRI este un pro-
randumul de nelegere pentru nceperea lucrrilor la proiectul AGRI
iect mult mai apreciat dect Nabucco, iar interesul parte-
a fost semnat la Bucureti, pe 13 aprilie 2010, iar Declaraia privind
proiectul AGRI a fost semnat la Baku, pe 14 septembrie 2010. nerilor implicai n dezvoltarea sa pare s argumenteze acor-
Studiul de fezabilitate intermediar pentru acest proiect este elaborat darea anumitor prioriti, fiind una dintre cele mai ieftine
de ctre experi din Statele Unite ale Americii. iniiative de acest gen i, n ciuda faptului, c niciunul dintre

232 233
cele patru state implicate n derularea acestuia nu deine n
acest moment posibiliti tehnice i financiare de implemen-
tare. n aceeai msur, nici Azerbaidjanul, cum aminteam
mai sus, nu pare s agreeze finanarea proiectului din resurse
proprii. Terminalul de lichefiere al gazelor naturale trebuie
s fie construit pe teritoriul Georgiei, care nu dispune de
tehnologia necesar pentru demararea lucrrilor. n plus,
experii n securitatea energetic susin c exist i probleme
de securizare a transporturilor pe Marea Neagr, deoarece
nu exist nave (tancuri) speciale pentru transportul gazului
lichefiat pe Marea Neagr, ele fiind construite pentru a par-
curge distane mult mai mari i avnd o capacitate de trans-
port foarte mare.38 Aceiai experi n securitate energetic
sunt de prere c AGRI este mai degrab un joc politic al
Azerbaidjanului pentru a-i promova interesele i pentru a
se poziiona n calitate de negociator n dialogul energetic al
Uniunii Europene i Federaiei Ruse, astfel nct s obin
beneficii politice. Nici resursele de gaze disponibile i ne-
contractate nu sunt certe. Faptul c niciun alt stat membru
al Uniunii Europene, n afar de Romnia i Ungaria, nu au
aderat la proiect spune multe. 39 Finanarea privat pentru
AGRI e cea mai plauzibil variant. Primele estimri ale
costurilor proiectului indic o cifr cuprins ntre 2 i 5 mi-
liarde euro, pentru o capacitate de transport de 8 miliarde
de metri cubi de gaze pe an, cu potenial de cretere ulte-
rior.40 Exist trei variante pentru capacitatea de transportare
a gazelor naturale din Azerbaidjan spre Europa prin inter-
mediul proiectului AGRI: 2 miliarde metri cubi, 4,5 miliarde
metri cubi i 8 miliarde metri cubi. Dac prioritatea va fi
dat celei de-a treia variante, atunci Romnia ar putea nego-
cia o cot parte din totalul de gaze tranzitate egal cu 2 mi-
liarde metri cubi.
38 Interviu cu un expert n securitate energetic, Bucureti, august
2011.
39 Interviu cu un expert n securitate energetic, Bucureti, august
2011.
40 Interviu cu oficiali, Baku, iunie 2011.
234
Autoritile de la Baku nu acord prioritate unui anumit
proiect energetic regional. Nabucco sau AGRI ambele
sunt la fel de importante, iar Azerbaidjanul ar dori ca aces-
te dou proiecte s devin complementare. Primul proiect
are o susinere mare din partea Uniunii Europene i va lega
Europa de zcmintele de petrol din Marea Caspic i din
Orientul Mijlociu. Att Nabucco, ct i AGRI se bucur de
aceeai atenie din partea autoritilor, doar c primul este
mai dificil de implementat, pentru c au fost invitate s
participe la dezvoltarea proiectului state precum Iranul i
Turkmenistanul, care sunt tratate ca actori statali capabili
s produc instabilitate regional, dar i pentru c tarifele
pentru hidrocarburile care vor fi tranzitate prin Nabucco
sunt mai mari. n plus, n anul 2010, Uniunea European
a renunat la implicarea Teheranului n proiect, ca sanciune
pentru continuarea programului nuclear al Iranului. n con-
secin, autoritile iraniene au artat disponibilitate pentru
dezvoltarea unui alt proiect, care ar putea rivaliza cu Na-
bucco i care ar putea aproviziona Europa cu gaze naturale
pe sub Marea Mediteran.
Disponibilitate pentru a investi n proiectul AGRI au
artat mai muli ageni economici. Printre acetia se numr
investitori din Japonia, Germania, Coreea de Sud, Frana,
care i-au oferit sprijinul pentru realizarea unor studii de
fezabilitate a proiectului. Conform unui comunicat de pres
emis pe 14 februarie 2011 de ctre Ministerul Economiei,
Comerului i Mediului de Afaceri al Romniei (Ministerul
Economiei, Comerului i Mediului de Afaceri al Romniei,
2011) studiul de fezabilitate al Proiectului AGRI, trebuie
s fie ncheiat pn cel mai trziu la data de 1 aprilie 2012,
cu scopul de a accelera finalizarea proiectului
Spre deosebire de statele care i-au propus serviciile pen-
tru efectuarea studiilor de fezabilitate, Japonia are un avans
minim, propunnd s finaneze o parte din costurile proiec-
tului i s furnizeze tehnologie de transport pentru a primi
la schimb gaze naturale din Azerbaidjan. De asemenea,
Federaia Rus, Bulgaria i Ucraina nu-i ascund interesul de
a adera la acest proiect dovad c interesele economice
235
prevaleaz adesea n faa obiectivelor politice. Nici Turcia
nu pare s fie prea ncntat de entuziasmul manifestat de
anumii juctori regionali pentru dezvoltarea AGRI, pentru
c diminueaz rolul su cheie n cadrul coridorului sudic
de transport al resurselor energetice nspre Europa. Poziia
Uniunii Europene fa de acest proiect nu este una ostil.
Dimpotriv, Bruxelles-ul ncurajeaz demararea lucrrilor
pentru AGRI, deoarece acesta ar contribui n mod esenial
la diversificarea rutelor de tranzit i pentru alte state membre
ale UE. n plus, AGRI pare s fie un proiect care dispune
n primul rnd de o argumentare economic foarte bun.41
De asemenea, disponibilitate pentru a adera la proiect au
manifestat i autoritile srbe care, dup cum se tie, se
numr printre partenerii stabili ai Federaiei Ruse n Bal-
canii de Vest. Pentru partea georgian, care este unul dintre
cei patru deintori ai capitalului social din cadrul AGRI
LNG Project Company, acest proiect pare s aib unele difi-
culti de ordin ecologic. Conducta de tranzitare a gazelor
naturale va trece prin zone sensibile i anume locul de unde
i au originea renumitele ape Borjomi un important
produs georgian, recunoscut att n ar, ct i peste hotare
pentru proprietile sale curative. n cazul unui dezastru
ecologic, care nu este exclus, dar care este prea puin luat n
consideraie n proiectarea conductei, vor avea de suferit n
primul rnd fabricile de ap mineral Borjomi destinat
exporturilor, iar mai apoi i economia georgian.42
este un proiect internaional, aprut la iniiativa Turciei,
Georgiei i Azerbaidjanului n 1994 cu scopul de a consoli-
da independena economic a rilor din regiune (Haciyev
Iqbal, 2010, 227-242). Proiectul este alimentat cu petrol
extras din zona sectorului azer al Mrii Caspice i ptrunde
prin intermediul acestuia pe pieele internaioale, fiind con-
ceput astfel nct s poat prelua i o parte din producia
petrolier kazah (ibidem, 227-242). Lungimea oleoductului
este de 1.767 km, dintre care 443 pe teritoriul Azerbaidja-
nului, 248 pe teritoriul Georgiei i 1.076 pe cel al Turciei.
Conducta a fost proiectat cu o durat de via de 40 de ani.
Capacitatea maxim de transport pe an este de 50 milioane
tone pe an. Participarea Azerbaidjanului la proiect a fost
asigurat de una din filialele SOCAR i anume AzBTC Co.
Ponderea investiiilor acesteia n cadrul BTC Co. este de
25% din totalul de 3 miliarde euro necesari pentru reali-
zarea ntregului proiect. (vezi ceilali investitori n figura 1).
Importana acestuia este complex. n afar de faptul c
asigur o parte din necesitile interne ale industriilor statelor

Oleoductul Heydar Aliyev: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan

(State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan b, 2011)43

41 Interviu cu un expert n domeniul energetic,Tbilisi, mai 2011.

42 Interviu cu un expert n domeniul ecologic, Tbilisi, mai 2011.
43 Oleoductul Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) contractul petrolier al

secolului XX pentru statele care i-au pus bazele a fost semnat pe

20 septembrie 1994. n anul 1999 a fost semnat la Istanbul Acordul
de transportare a petrolului neprelucrat prin oleoductul BTC de ctre Figura 1 Cotele-pri ale investiiilor n dezvoltarea
preedinii Azerbaidjanului, Georgiei i Turciei. Oficial, oleoductul a oleoductului Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
fost dat n exploatare pe 13 iulie 2006. Lucrrile la oleoduct au fost Sursa: State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan,
efectuate de ctre BTC Co., fondat la Londra n luna august 2002. http://www.oilfund.az/en/content/10/95

236 237
participante la dezvoltarea proiectului, are i nsemntate
politic. Miza geopolitic a proiectului presupune reducerea
dependenei energetice fa de Federaia Rus. Cea de-a
doua funcie a acestui oleoduct este de a oferi Statelor Unite
ale Americii, precum i altor state occidentale posibilitatea
de a nu mai fi dependente n prea mare msur de petrolul
din zona Golfului Persic, ocolind teritoriul Rusiei i rutele
aglomerate din strmtorile Bosfor i Dardanele.
Dei conexiunea economic a Azerbaidjanului la Fede-
raia Rus este nc destul de nsemnat, strategia de dez- atunci, Heidar Aliev. n luna februarie 2007 au fost alocate
voltare energetic este orientat, dup cum am menionat
anterior, spre promovarea unor proiecte de dezvoltare alter-
native la colaborarea prea strns cu Rusia. Aceast atitu-
dine le ofer autoritilor de la Baku o perspectiv supli-
mentar n negocierea intereselor i obiectivelor politice
naionale, dar pune n valoare foarte mult aspectul economic
al relaiei bilaterale Baku-Moscova. Strategia de diversifi-
care a ofertanilor de produse petroliere, precum i a rutelor
de transport pentru hidrocarburile de alt provenien dect
ruseasc va modifica rolul Federaiei Ruse pe scena mon-
dial, oblignd-o s fie mai deschis, mai orientat spre
adoptarea unui alt tip de negocieri. Totodat, conducerea
rus va deveni mai receptiv la mecanismele i normele
internaionale promovate de instituiile de profil cu care
poart negocieri pentru a obine statutul de membru cu
drepturi depline. Scopul acestui demers cel de deschidere
a Rusiei ctre pieele mondiale n condiiile unei concurene
loiale este de a asigura stabilitate energetic pe teritoriul
Europei.
BTC Co. este un consoriu de companii petroliere i
financiare, care au un aport total n cadrul proiectului de
3 miliarde euro, dintre care 30% din investiii au fost efec-
tuate de ctre filiala SOCAR AzBTC nfiinat special de Sangachal. Exportul gazelor naturale extrase la Shah Deniz a
pentru dezvoltarea prii azere a oleoductului. Celelalte
70% constituie contribuiile celorlali parteneri, membri ai
consoriului: instituii financiare internaionale, agenii de
creditare, bnci comerciale. Ministerul Dezvoltrii Economice
238
al Republicii Azerbaidjan a obinut reprezentarea oficial
a intereselor guvernului azer, printr-o participare de 80% n
cadrul AzBTC. Astfel, veniturile ce rezult n urma implic-
rii i susinerii oferite de Ministerul Dezvoltrii Economice
vor fi acumulate n conturile Fondului Petrolier de Stat al
Republicii Azerbaidjan. SOFAZ a finanat construcia prii
de pe teritoriul azer a oleoductului Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, n
conformitate cu prevederile Decretului Prezidenial nr. 739
din 30 iulie 2002, semnat de preedintele n exerciiu de
298 milioane AZN pentru finanarea cotei pri a Azerbai-
djanului n cadrul BTC. Seciunea azer a conductei Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) destinat exportului de petrol a fost
inaugurat pe 25 mai 2005 de ctre preedinii Azerbai-
djanului, Georgiei i Turciei n cadrul unei ceremonii ofi-
ciale, care a avut loc la Terminalul Sangachal de lng Baku.
BTC este unul dintre cele mai scumpe proiecte energetice
dezvoltate pn n anul 2005, la care au luat parte 11 state
partenere. El modific situaia geopolitic din Caucaz, crend
tensiuni ntre Federaia Rus i Statele Unite ale Americii.
Platforma Shah Deniz44 consoriul Shah Deniz,
constituit de ctre mai multe companii cu profil energetic,
printre care British Petroleum, Stateoil, SOCAR, Lukoil,
NICO, Total i TPAO, ateapt propuneri pn la data de
1 octombrie 2011 pentru construirea unor rute de transport
adiacente, n afara celor care vor alimenta proiectul AGRI,
44 Proiectul Shah Deniz prima faz a proiectului a fost finaliza-
t n anul 2003. Aceasta a presupus instalarea unor noi platforme de
exploatare a zcmintelor de gaze naturale i a dou conducte sub-
acvatice, capabile s asigure transportul acestora la rm, n apropiere
nceput n 2004. Primul contract de export al gazelor naturale a fost
semnat de autoritile azere n anul 2001. El presupunea furnizarea
acestui tip de resurse Turciei. Livrrile au nceput n 2006. Volumul
gazelor exportate anual, consemnate prin acest contract, a atins cifra
de 222 miliarde metri cubi de gaz la finele anului 2009.
239
pentru tranzitarea de gaze naturale extrase din cmpul Shah
Deniz. Pn n prezent au fost lansate trei propuneri, care
sunt studiate de autoritile de la Baku. Toate sunt orientate
spre Europa:
ITGI interconectorul Turcia-Grecia-Italia
TAP Conducta Transadriatic;
Nabucco.
Primele extracii de gaze din cmpul Shah Deniz pentru
cel mai ambiios proiect energetic european, Nabucco, au
fost preconizate pentru anul 2017 (News.az a, 2011), dat
confirmat de oficialitile azere, care adaug c, din punct
de vedere al viabilitii de transportare economic i logis-
tic, Nabucco va contribui cel mai mult la dezvoltarea cori-
dorului energetic sudic. Dei SOCAR deine doar 10% din
cota parte a consoriului Shah Deniz, care a fost creat pen-
tru a exploata acest zcmnt, reprezentanii companiei de
stat azere vin s confirme faptul c pn n 2017 capaci-
tatea de extracie va atinge cifra de 25 miliarde metri cubi
pe an. Nabucco a fost proiectat pentru a transporta 31 mi-
liarde metri cubi de gaze naturale pe an, cu un potenial de
extindere de pn la 35 miliarde metri cubi pe an. Oficialii
azeri au garantat o producie de 10 miliarde metri cubi pe
an pentru Nabucco. n ceea ce privete AGRI, dup cum am
menionat anterior, cantitatea de resurse care va alimenta
conducta nc nu a fost decis. Pn n 2006, Azerbaidja- energetice a statelor europene n condiiile unei dependene
nul, dei deinea cantiti importante de gaze naturale, a
fost un stat importator de acest tip de resurse (EIA, 2011).
Consumul intern depea cantitile extrase. Principalul
furnizor era compania rus Gazprom. (Haciyev, Iqbal,
2010, 242) Exploatarea rezervelor de la Shah Deniz le-a
permis autoritilor azere s reduc n timp dependena fa din Germania. Capacitatea de transport a produselor ener-
de gazele naturale de provenien rus. Cele mai mari impe-
dimente n dezvoltarea rapid a proiectului sunt, pe rnd,
lipsa infrastructurii de depozitare, apoi a celei de prelucrare
a resurselor extrase la Shah Deniz. Acest aspect, ns, nu a
mpiedicat conducerea azer s poarte negocieri cu cea turc
pentru semnarea unor acorduri de tranzitare pentru gazele
240
naturale din cmpul Shah Deniz spre consumatorii euro-
peni prin Turcia. Declaraiile oficialilor azeri confirm acest
lucru (News.az b, 2011), ei menionnd c, la etapa n care
se afl, deja a fost convenit volumul resurselor de gaze natu-
rale care vor fi livrate ctre Europa.
Interconexiunea Turcia-Grecia-Italia (ITGI, 2011) este
un proiect care are drept scop crearea unei puni de legtur
ntre Europa i resursele de gaze naturale din Marea Caspic.
Importurile spre statele membre ale Uniunii Europene se
vor efectua prin Turcia, ceea ce duce la creterea rolului aces-
tui stat n cadrul coridorului energetic de sud. Ca i celelalte
coridoare energetice, are rolul de a diversifica sursele de
aprovizionare cu gaze naturale ale agenilor economici de pe
continentul european. Cumulat cu celelalte proiecte, ITGI
va contribui la transformarea Republicii Azerbaidjan n unul
dintre cei mai mari furnizori de gaze naturale pentru
Europa. ITGI intenioneaz s conecteze sistemele energe-
tice ale Greciei i Bulgariei la cel italian prin intermediul off-
shore-ului ce se ocup de administrarea conductei Poseidon.45
Conducta Transadriatic (TAP) e un alt proiect ener-
getic care face parte din sistemul conductelor care trec prin
coridorul sudic, menit s contribuie la asigurarea securitii
mrite fa de importurile de gaze naturale din Federaia
Rus. Principalii acionari ai companiei de tip joint venture
ai Conductei Transadriatice, care vor administra conducta
ce va uni Europa de Marea Caspic prin Marea Adriatic,
sunt EGL din Elveia, Statoil din Norvegia i E.ON Ruhrgas
getice prin conducta TAP este de 10 miliarde metri cubi pe
an, cu posibilitatea de mrire a acesteia pn la 20 miliarde
metri cubi (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, 2011). Compania TAP
45 Compania care se ocup de dezvoltarea conductei Poseidon se
numete IGI Poseidon SA.
241
va contribui la dezvoltarea infrastructurii de stocare a gaze-
lor naturale pe teritoriul Albaniei, care a fost invitat alturi
de Grecia s participe la dezvoltarea proiectului. Depozitele
de stocare pentru gazele naturale au rolul de a asigura nece-
sarul de produse energetice pentru statele europene n cazul
unor poteniale crize energetice. n iulie 2011, reprezentanii
TAP au semnat cu guvernul Albaniei un Memorandum de
cooperare (Penn Energy, 2011), n urma cruia intenio-
neaz s studieze posibilitile de conectare a gazoductului
Ionian Adriatic Pipeline la Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, astfel
nct sistemul de conducte care formeaz coridorul de sud
s fie ct mai interconectat, pentru a facilita funcionarea
acestuia. Livrrile de gaze naturale ctre TAP vor ncepe din
zcmntul Shah Deniz II n 2017. n prezent, experii Europa-Caucaz-Asia (Kusch, Prause & Hunke, 2011, 25).
studiaz impactul construirii conductei asupra mediului.
Proiectul Viking este o cale de transport pentru mrfuri,
care opereaz pe ruta Odessa-Klaipeda (Railway Pro, 2011)
i utilizeaz seciunea de linie Jonava-Siauliai (parte a liniei
Rail Baltica). Acest proiect a aprut n anul 2003 la iniiati-
va a trei state: Lituania, Belarus i Ucraina. Este o iniiativ
important din punct de vedere economic, pentru c ofer
o perspectiv de unificare a rutelor de transport dintre
Europa de Nord i Europa Central cu statele membre ale
Comunitii Statelor Independente i alte state asiatice,
printre care i China. Fezabilitatea proiectului este sporit
de efectele crizei economice mondiale, care a impus adop-
tarea unor msuri de contracarare a consecinelor acesteia
de ctre statele participante la fluxurile internaionale de
mrfuri pe coridorul de transport Est-Vest. Transportul fero-
viar al mrfurilor scade preul de achiziie al acestora, fiind
unul dintre cele mai ieftine mijloace de transport internaio-
nal. Dac e completat i de alte mijloace de transport de-a
lungul unei rute, atunci eficiena utilizrii acestuia crete.
Georgia i Republica Moldova au primit invitaia de a adera
la acest proiect. Ele pot contribui la dezvoltarea transportu-
lui de marf din bazinul Mrii Negre. n mai 2011, aceste
242
dou ri i-au manifestat oficial interesul pentru proiectul
Viking, adernd la lucrrile acestuia. Lungimea iniial a
rutei a fost de 1.753 km. Ulterior la acest proiect a fost invi-
tat s participe i Azerbaidjanul (Web-portal of Ukrainian
Government, 2011). Primul-ministru ucrainean Mykola
Azarov a declarat, n cadrul unei conferine de pres, c
Azerbaidjanul va participa la proiect pentru extinderea rutei
spre Kazahstan, Turkmenistan i alte ri din Asia Central.
Astfel proiectul ar putea obine i o alt semnificaie: unirea
Mrii Caspice cu Marea Baltic, prin punctul Odessa.
Pentru transportul de mrfuri Europa-Asia acest proiect este
foarte important, pentru c va face conexiune cu un alt cori-
dor de transport, TRACECA Coridorul de Transport
Pe alocuri, transportul feroviar ar putea fi dublat de cel cu
feribotul, ceea ce ar facilita i mai mult conexiunile locale.
Exist dou posibiliti de extindere a coridorului de
transport Est-Vest spre Asia Central:
1. Regiunea de Sud a Mrii Baltice-Lituania-Belarus-
Federaia Rus-Kazahstan-China;
2. Regiunea de Sud a Mrii Baltice-Lituania-Belarus-
Ucraina-Georgia-Azerbaidjan-Kazahstan-China, adic folo-
sirea potenial a unor elemente componente ale TRACECA.
Costurile transportrii pe cale feroviar a mrfurilor sunt
mai mici dect cele cu alte mijloace. Problema o poate con-
stitui ecartamentul diferit, care va trebui adaptat la stan-
dardele internaionale. Proiectul Viking este destinat crerii
unui sistem de transport containerizat al mrfurilor Marea
Neagr-Marea Baltic i este parte a unui proiect inter-
modal de transport internaional, lansat nc n anul 2003.
Capacitatea redus a mai multor coridoare de transport con-
stituie o ameninare pentru o eventual cretere economic,
dar i pentru integrarea european. n viitorul apropiat va
crete volumul mrfurilor produse, ceea ce va conduce i la
necesitatea de a dezvolta proiectele de transport deja existente
sau de a iniia altele noi. Proiectul Viking este gndit s fac
fa unei asemenea creteri cantitative.
243

Harta 3 Coridorul de transport Est-Vest
Sursa: Thomas Kusch, Gunnar Prause, Kristina Hunke,
The East-West Transport Corridor and the Shuttle Train VIKING,
Hochschule Wismar, Fakultt fr Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 2011,
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48566/1/66468520X.pdf
Harta 4 Extensia rutei de transport Viking
Sursa: Thomas Kusch, Gunnar Prause, Kristina Hunke,
The East-West Transport Corridor and the Shuttle Train VIKING,
Hochschule Wismar, Fakultt fr Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 2011,
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48566/1/66468520X.pdf
244
TRACECA46 este un proiect lansat n anul 1993, care
asigur accesul mrfurilor europene i asiatice pe piaa inter-
naional la transportul rutier, feroviar i cel de navigaie
comercial. El a stat la baza crerii unei rute alternative de
transport din Europa spre Asia Central, din Bazinul Mrii
Negre, trecnd prin Caucaz spre Mongolia i China. Aceast
rut alternativ a fost creat pentru a micora cheltuielile de
transport pentru schimbul de mrfuri europene i asiatice,
dar i pentru a oferi o rut ocolitoare pentru aceleai pro-
duse europene i asiatice la ruta transiberian. n acelai
timp, TRACECA are i o misiune cu caracter politic, pentru
c va conduce la apariia unor prghii eficiente prin inter-
mediul crora ar putea fi asigurat parial independena
comercial a statelor din Caucazul de Sud i Asia Central
fa de rutele de transport create la iniiativa Federaiei
Ruse. Putem s vorbim aici despre ncercarea de a minimiza
rolul proiectelor economice propuse de Moscova, minimiza-
rea influenei i rolului Comunitii Statelor Independente
avnd de aceast dat origine european. Aadar, TRACECA
este una dintre punile create de ctre Bruxelles ctre Asia,
care prejudiciaz parial interesele geostrategice ale
Kremlinului n regiune. Aderarea la aceast rut alternativ
de transport presupunea i adoptarea unor msuri legislative
i de armonizare a politicilor de transport. Cei care se ar-
tau dispui s adere la TRACECA, dar i la Proiectul Viking
trebuia s treac printr-un proces de armonizare i adaptare
a propriilor politici publice i a cadrului legislativ, n acest
caz cele n domeniul transportului, la cele europene.
46 Documentul prin care au fost puse bazele Proiectului TRACECA
a fost semnat pe 3 mai 1993 la Bruxelles, de minitrii Transporturilor
i Comerului din opt state din Asia Central, respecti Caucazul de
Sud: Kazahstan, Krgzstan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Armenia, Azerbaidjan i Georgia. Proiectul a fost finanat de Uniunea
European cu scopul de a dezvolta coridorul de transport pe direcia
Vest-Est din Europa cu traversarea Mrii Negre prin Caucaz i Mrii
Caspice cu ieire la Asia Central. Din 1996, la TRACECA au aderat:
Ucraina, Mongolia, Republica Moldova, Bulgaria, Romnia i Turcia.
245
 Concluzii bun pe termen scurt. Regiunea poate deveni vulnerabil
n faa noilor provocri, dac liderii celor trei state care o
Dezvoltarea potenialului economic al Caucazului de formeaz vor nega importana ei ca un ntreg. Caucazul de
Sud este condiionat n cea mai mare msur de interesul Sud nu e doar o punte de acces la hidrocarburile din Marea
pe care l manifest marile puteri pentru regiune, n calitatea Caspic pentru marile economii ale lumii, ci i o zon de
sa de furnizor de resurse energetice, precum i de spaiul pe transfer a unor pericole i ameninri la adresa securitii
care l ofer acesta pentru transportul de mrfuri i servicii regionale. A recunoate importana conexiunilor economice
dinspre Est spre Vest i dinspre Nord spre Sud. Acest terito- i a schimburilor intraregionale este una dintre multiplele
riu a devenit o punte de intersecie a intereselor i obiecti- soluii pe care le au la dispoziie cele trei state, iar utilizarea
velor politice, economice i geostrategice pe care le dezvolt lor este o necesitate vital pentru accelerarea dezvoltrii
diferii actori statali i non-statali. n acest context, cnd calitative a societilor celor trei state caucaziene.
rolul regiunii crete din ce n ce mai mult, ea fiind capabil
s produc stabilitate i instabilitate deopotriv, vor aprea
mereu iniiative i proiecte regionale, ce vor cuprinde mpre-
un sau separat cele trei state sud-caucaziene, dar ele nu vor
avea drept scop ntrirea unitii regionale, ci le vor atrage Bibliografie
separat spre diferite forme de cooperare regional, ceea ce va
ABC.az a, -
conduce i mai mult la slbirea conexiunilor ntre subiectele
regiunii. Armenia, Azerbaidjan i Georgia trebuie s continue 2011 , 26 noiembrie 2010 (http://www.
procesul de reformare a sistemului economic, prin asumarea abc.az/rus/news/49702.html).
unor aciuni cu caracter dur, la care populaia va fi tentat ABC.az b, -
s se opun. Este deopotriv un exerciiu politic i demo- 2011 , 9 iunie
cratic, dar consecinele benefice asupra economiei ar putea 2011 (http://www.abc.az/rus/news/54895.html).
fi valorificate de ctre generaiile viitoare. De asemenea, cei ABC.az c, -
trei actori statali din Caucazul de Sud trebuie s gseasc , 2011
soluiile necesare pentru a depi conflictele i divergenele $30 ., 23 mai 2011 (http://www.
cu caracter politic care exist fie i n stare latent ntre ele. abc.az/rus/news/54411.html).
Dac soluia nu poate fi gsit n zona factorilor politici, ABC.az d,
atunci ar trebuie s fie ales un model economic de succes, $30 ., 06 iulie 2011 (http://www.
care s stea la baza crerii unui sistem regional stabil. Trans- abc.az/rus/news/55687.html).
formarea factorului economic n soluie pentru rezolvarea Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Coopera-
problemelor politice nu este ntotdeauna posibil. Procesul tion, Agenda for Armenian Foreign Policy 2011, Edit Print,
poate fi argumentat din perspectiva intereselor naionale pe Erevan, 2010.
care le poate acoperi. Deciziile politice trebuie s fie mode- Aze.az, : -
late pragmatic, astfel nct s asigure obinerea a ct mai , 11 iulie 2007 (http://www.aze.az/news.
multor beneficii economice. Spargerea Caucazului de Sud, php?id=9071).
n dependen de obiectivele separate ale unor mari con- Azpetrol, , 2011 (http://azpetrol.az/ru/
sumatori de resurse energetice i politice, este o strategie content/8/).

246 247
Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan Oil Pipeline (BTC) (http://www.oil-
fund.az/en/content/10/95).
Baratashvili, Evghenii i Baidoshvili, David, Georgias Economic
Integration in South Caucasus, Kavkaz Online, 31 ianua-
rie 2011 (http://www.kavkasia.net/Georgia/article/12965
32063.php).
Civilitas Foundation, Armenia in 2010. A Year of Uncertainty,
Yerevan, 2010. Economic Review of Azerbaijan in 2010, n
Informational and Analytical Bulletin, Baku, aprilie 2011.
EIA, Imports of Dry Natural Gas in Azerbaijan, 2011 (http://
www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=3&p
id=26&aid=3&cid=AJ,&syid=2006&eyid=2010&
unit=BCF).
Energy Community, Decision no. 2007 107 IMG-EnC of
18 December 2002, on the acceptance of Georgia as an
Observer, decembrie 2007 (http://www.energy-communi-
ty.org/pls/portal/docs/296188.PDF).
Estate.am, ENP Country Progress Report 2010 Armenia,
27 mai 2011 (http://www.a1plus.am/en/politics/2011/05/
27/report).
European Commission a, Armenia-EU Action Plan, Bruxelles,
noiembrie 2006 (http://www.ec.europa.eu/environment/
enlarg/pdf/enp_action_plan_armenia.pdf).
European Commission b, Georgia-EU Action Plan, Bruxelles,
septembrie 2006 (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/
pdf/enp_action_plan_georgia.pdf).
Georgia Times, Georgia needs an act of economic freedom,
interviu cu Dmitri Gvindadze, ministrul georgian al
Finanelor, 13 iulie 2011 (http://www.georgiatimes.info/
en/news/60772.html).
Guseynov, Vagif, 2008. : - Nagdalyan, Eduard. The New Orbits of the South-Caucasian
(1992-2008 ), Moscova, - States: A Comparative Economic Dynamics, n Caucasus Insti-
. tute Yearbook, Yerevan, 2011.
Haciyev, Iqbal, Relaiile Republicii Azerbaidjan cu statele din
Asia Central: Geopolitica spaiului caspic i central-asiatic,
Bucureti, Top Form, 2010.
248
IGI Poseidon, ICGB AD, a Subsidiary of Bulgarian Energy
Holding and IGI-POSEIDON, Announces a TSO Market
Study Tender, 13 iulie 2011 (http://www.igi-poseidon.com/
english/index.asp).
Lene, Leonela. Energy Diplomacy, n Infosfera, III, nr. 2,
2011.
Inside Europe, Armenias EU Action Plan adopted in Brussels,
25 noiembrie 2006 (http://www.insideeurope.org/news/
armenias-eu-action-plan-adopted-in-brussels).
International Monetary Fund, Guide on Resource Revenue
Transparency / Fiscal Affairs Dept., Washington, D.C., 2007
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=
18349.0).
Kusch, Thomas, Gunnar Prause, Kristina Hunke, 2011. The
East-West Transport Corridor and the Shuttle Train VIKING,
Hochschule Wismar, Fakultt fr Wirtschaftswissenschaf-
ten (http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48566/1/
66468520X.pdf).
Ministerul Economiei, Comerului i Mediului de Afaceri
(comunicat de pres), Bucureti, 14 februarie 2011 (http://
www.minind.ro/presa_2011/februarie/14_feb_comuni-
cat_semnare_AGRI.pdf).
Ministry of Finances of the Republic of Azerbaijan, The Law
of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the State Budget of the Republic
of Azerbaijan for 2011, 23 octombrie 2010 (http://www.
maliyye.gov.az/index_en.jsp?mod=2&id=12&lang=en).
Nabucco Pipeline Overview (http://www.nabuccopipeline.com/
portal/page/portal/en/pipeline/overview).
Nabucco Pipeline Facts and Figures, 2011 (http://www.nabucco-
pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/press/Facts%20_Figur
es).
National Budget Group, Baku, 2011 (http://www.nbg.az/index.
php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blo
g&id=71&Itemid=116&lang=en).
249
National Budget Group, . Vedomosti, Counters have betrayed, 28 iulie 2011 (http://
, www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/264675/schetchi-
Center for the Monitoring of the Public Finances, Baku- ki_podveli).
Alma-Ata, 2009 (http://www.nbg.az/attachments/122_ Web-portal of the Ukrainian Government, The Prime Minister
dogovor_doroje_deneq.pdf). Invited Azerbaijan to Take Part in the Viking Project, 23 fe-
News.az a, Nabucco Director Confident Gas Will Flow in 2017, bruarie 2011 (http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/pub-
9 august 2011 (http://www.news.az/articles/economy/ lish/article?art_id=244090116&cat_id=244 314975).
42159). World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Armenia, 21 au-
News.az b, Azerbaijan Close to Signing Gas Transit Deal with gust 2010 (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf113.html).
Turkish Minister, 16 septembrie 2011 (http://www.news. World Trade Organization, Members and Observers (http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm).
az/articles/economy/44614).
Zantaria, Rezo. The Hydro-electric powerplant in Inguri
Penn Energy, Trans Adriatic Pipeline Links MOUC with Albania
belongs to Abkhazia and cannot be privatized, n Kavkaz
to Support SSE Security of Supply, 21 iulie 2011 (http://
Uzel, 26 noiembrie 2008 (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/arti-
www.pennenergy.com/index/petroleum/display/2537964136/
cles/144596/).
articles/pennenergy/petroleum/pipelines/2011/07/trans-
adriatic_pipeline.html).
Project AGRI, a winning card for the Bsescu regime. Even if it
means upsetting Russia and Turkey, 19 aprilie 2011 (http://
www.plano10.com/2011/04/proiectul-agri-obila-alba-
pentru.html).
Railway Pro, 2011a, Rail Baltica: From Isolation to Integration
in the Macroregion (http://www.railwaypro.com/wp/ro/?p=
6192).
Russo-Armenian Interaction and Regional Problems. Papers of the
International Conference of June 5th, 2010 (The), Yerevan,
NAAPET, 2011.
State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2011a. History
and Philosophy (http://www.oilfund.az/en/ content/2).
State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2011b.
Heydar Aliyev Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Export Pipeline
(http://www.oilfund.az/en/content/10/95).
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline Concept, 2011 (http://www.trans-adriat-
ic-pipeline.com/tap-project/concept/).
-
, Lenta.ru, 20 octombrie 2005 (http://www.
lenta.ru/news/2005/10/20/ministr/).

250
Ileana Racheru, Stanislav Secrieru, Angela Grmad

South Caucasus
20 Years After
Political Regimes, Security, and Energy

English version by Mihnea Gafia

Ileana Racheru is a graduate of the Master of International Contents
Relations of the University of Bucharest Department of
Political Sciences. She is currently a PhD candidate of the Acknowledgements 261
University of Bucharest Doctoral School of Political Sciences. Introduction 263
She is also the author of a dissertation entitled Foreign Policy
Debates in the Relations of the EU and Russia with Georgia
and the Ukraine and of several academic articles concerning The Political Regimes in South Caucasus. The Democracy
the relationships between Romania and the South-Caucasian That Hides Competitive Authoritarianisms (Ileana Racheru)
states. She has published many articles on the political and
security-related evolutions in the ex-Soviet countries in such What Is Competitive Authoritarianism? 272
periodicals as 22 and Foreign Policy Romania, for which she has Georgia 273
interviewed regional diplomats, experts, decision-makers, and
Democratic Elections, the Great Success of the
political leaders.
Rose Revolution 273
Stanislav Secrieru is a scholar of the New Europe College The UNM, All-Powerful in Georgian Politics 277
within the Black Sea Link Fellowship program and an asso- The Georgian Political Scene between Revolution
ciate-researcher with the Bucharest Center for East-European and Reform 277
and Asian Studies. He is a PhD in Political Sciences (SNSPA).
New Elites, New Cliental Networks in Power 280
He has conducted researches at the NATO Defense College
(Rome) and the Institute for European Politics (Berlin). He The Mass-Media and Its Impossible Co-existence
has been involved in research projects at the European Council with the Political Regime 281
on Foreign Relations (London), the DemosEuropa (Warsaw), Civil Society, the Only Voice That Criticizes
the Europeum (Prague), the Heinrich Bll Foundation (Berlin), the Regime 285
and the Finnish Institute for International Affairs (Helsinki). The Democracy That Limits the Russian Pressure 288
His major fields of interest are: the Russian domestic and for-
eign policies, the EU-Russia relationships, and the European Armenia 291
neighborhood policy. The Elections That Reconfirm the Same Winner 291
A Regime Legitimized by the Nagorno-Karabakh
Angela Grmad is a PhD candidate in Political Sciences of Conflict 294
the National School of Political and Administrative Studies in
Bucharest and a bachelor in International Economic Relations Rights and Liberties Only According to the
of the Perspectiva Institute of International Relations in Discretionary Will of the Political Regime 296
Chiinu (2004). She is a researcher with the Bucharest The Mass-Media of Power and the Press of the
Center for East-European and Asian Studies. Her major fields Opposition 298
of interest are: the evolution of the relationships between the Russias Support Is Indispensable, the EU Is too Far 301
Russian Federation, the US, and the EU within the ex-Soviet
space; the democratization processes in the Republic of Mol- Azerbaijan 303
dova, the Ukraine, and Georgia; the European neighborhood Elections with an Outcome Always Known
policy; and the geopolitical redefinition of the ex-Soviet space. in Advance 303

257
 The NAP, a King on the Baku Political Scene 304 III.1.4. The EU / 379
The Perfectly Functioning Corruption 306 III.1.5. Turkey / 383

Rights and Liberties with an Insecure Existence 308 III.2. Azerbaijan: Strategic independence through
multi-vectorism 386
The Mass-Media Can Only Be in Power
III.2.1. Turkey / 387
in Azerbaijan 312
III.2.2. Russia / 390
A Powerful Petrostate 313 III.2.3. The US / 394
Conclusions 315 III.2.4. The EU / 396
III.2.5. Iran / 399
Bibliography 316
III.3. Georgia due West 402
III.3.1. The US / 403
Variable Geometry in Action: Foreign and Security
III.3.2. The EU / 406
Policies in South Caucasus (Stanislav Secrieru)
III.3.3. Turkey / 410
III.3.4. Iran / 414
Introduction 323
III.3.5. Russia / 415
I. The Question of the Regionness of South Caucasus 324
Conclusions 420
I.1. From Transcaucasia to South Caucasus 324 Bibliography 421
I.2. Is South Caucasus a region? 327
I.3. South Caucasus a sub-regional security complex 330
South Caucasus between Political Economy
I.4. South Caucasus in its Eurasian context 335 and Energy-Based Politics (Angela Grmad)
I.4.1. North / 336
I.4.2. East / 338 I. The Macro-Economic Context of Regional Development 439
I.4.3. West / 340
I.4.4. South / 344 1. The implementation of economic reforms between
necessity and incapacity 440
II. The Intra-Regional Dynamics in South Caucasus 343
2. The importance of developing the business environment
II.1. Armenia and Azerbaijan: an improbable peace, and the factors that influence its evolution 459
a possible war 344
II. The Economy of Energy-Related Policies in
II.2. Georgia and Armenia: "Resetting" pragmatism 353 South Caucasus 464
II.3. Azerbaijan and Georgia: Getting closer 362 1. Energy resources, economy, and energy policies 467
III. South Caucasus: Relationships with the Regional 2. Energy-related projects and transport corridors
Powers 369 in South Caucasus 480
III.1. Armenia: Variable complementarity 370 Conclusions 499
III.1.1. Russia / 370 Bibliography 500
III.1.2. Iran / 374
III.1.3. The US / 377

258 259

This book is published within the framework of the
European Values Across the Black Sea program of the
Soros Foundation Romania. The priority of this program is
to improve the dialogue and cooperation among civil society
organizations on the Eastern and Western shores of the
Black Sea, thus increasing mutual societal knowledge, as
well as common awareness of, and adherence to, the wider
European space understood as a common sphere of social
and political principles and values.
The goal of the program is to foster mutual knowledge
and a rapprochement of civil societies by establishing solid
contacts and exchanges of intellectual resources between
Soros Foundation Romania and other Romanian organi-
zations, on the one hand, and organizations in Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia, on the other hand.
Sergiu Panainte
Program Coordinator
Acknowledgements
The present study has about two hundred pages and
comprises a much lesser number of words than the thanks
Mulumim! / ! / Thank you! the authors have to
address to those who have made our journey and documen-
tation in South Caucasus financially possible.
Through the interviews1 we have taken in the three
South-Caucasian capitals, we have had the opportunity to
contact the Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Armenian intellec-
tual elites, some of the best-known experts in the region who
have shared with us major and fresh information about the
state-level actors in the area. We have talked to outstanding
journalists from the most important media, who have
allowed us to know the world of the South-Caucasian press
and to grasp the specificities of the relationships between
the mass-media and the political regimes. We have met with,
and talked to, representatives of the civil society in the three
states, who have offered us an overview of the NGOs trying
to build up democracy in relatively hostile political regimes.
We have contacted members of the parliaments, minis-
ters, and other high-ranking officials who have shown us
1For reasons that have to do with their own security or at the spe-
cific request of some of the interviewed, the authors of the study
have chosen not to mention their names.
261
how the policies are being conceived, how the leading elites
of South Caucasus think.
We have talked to European officials in the region, who
have shown us how negotiations are being carried out in the
South-Caucasian states, and have been offered information
concealed from the public about the political regimes in
Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.
We have found out from simple talks and strolls through
Yerevan, Baku, and Tbilisi how the Armenians, the Azerbai-
janis, and the Georgians think, how they live, and what
their customs are.
Mulumim! / ! / Thank you! once again to all those In the public discourse in Romania, there are plenty of
who have agreed to be interviewed for this study, for giving
us a little of their time and for their patience in answering
our questions.
Mulumim!, Soros Foundation Romania, for this unique
initiative and for choosing us to write this first Romanian
study about the political and economic evolutions in South
Caucasus, based on direct documentation in Tbilisi, Baku,
and Yerevan.
! / Thank you!, Open Society Georgia, Open Socie- with regard to this part of the world and for the experts in
ty Azerbaijan, Open Society Yerevan, for the interviewing
agendas, for the transportation, for the accomodation.
Ileana Racheru
Stanislav Secrieru
Angela Grmad
Introduction
references to the South Caucasus, but the discussions are
always being reduced to a couple of persistent themes:
Georgia, the August 2008 war, and the vital sources of ener-
gy that ensure Europes energetic security. The authors rein-
vent the discourse on the Caucasus for the Romanian pub-
lic; they offer a radiograph of the area from a political, an
economic, and a security-related point of view. Meant for
the institutions that articulate Romanias foreign policy
the civil society, this study completed by the Soros
Foundation Romania is also an instrument and a compelling
reading for the journalists and students who wish to grasp
the complexity of an essential region when it comes to the
security of Europe. The analytic undertaking is based on the
implementation of the most recent interpreting perspectives
in the literature specialized on the political and economic
evolutions in South Caucasus. The most significant aspect
of the work, however, is that the authors have gone on the
ground, so to speak; they have drawn their subject-matter
from the area itself, in that they had access, through the
interviews that were taken in Yerevan, Baku, or Tbilisi, to
experts from the NGOs in those cities, to opinion makers,
and technocrats in the governmental bureaucracies (at the
highest levels, at times).
263
 The first part of the study, authored by Ileana Racheru,
focuses on the political radiograph of the area. If we are
talking about the typology of their political regimes, the
states in South Caucasus practice competitive authoritari-
anism as a dominant form of government. It is in the DNA
of the local regimes to colonize and mobilize the state to
benefit the power, tilting the structural balance against the
opposition and restraining its possibilities of participation
in the elections. Society seems ontologically shackled in an
unequal relationship, one of subordination to the state and
to the regime in power. In Georgia, although an independ-
ent press formally exists, the power has rapidly found the
means to influence its contents by creating an extended net-
work of investors closely related to the regime who manage
to control it, with the effect that the press has become a her-
ald of those in power. In Armenia, the political forces that
could create an alternative to the state are too weak to coag-
ulate a democratic critical mass. Civic activism manages to
unite a rather isolated elite, that does not reach or attract
the populace. The image of the regime led by president
Aliyev, empirically checked out in the Baku ministries,
seems to step right out of the WikiLeaks telegrams: it is a
regime built on personal allegiances that have withstood the
test of time. In Azerbaijan, the central figure in the architec-
ture of power is president Ilham Aliyev who, following his
father Heydar Aliyevs model, tries to keep power in the
family and understands the power of the state as a family
business. Aware of the limits of his power, Aliyev is a skil-
ful tactician, but also a very clever acrobat, walking a tight
rope between mutually exclusive alliances. He makes a clear-
cut distinction between what is personal and what is actual-
ly a business. President Aliyev encourages a balanced for-
eign policy, combining the openness towards NATO and the
European Union with measures seeking to win over his great
neighbor powers Russia and Iran. Domestically, however,
he proves to be an impulsive personality, with a blind confi-
dence in ruling by force and coercion. In consequence, any
264
political challenge is perceived by Aliyev as an existential
threat against his political dynasty.
The second part, authored by Stanislav Secrieru,
describes the complexity of the regional relationships as
determined by security policies and sensitive issues. From
the point of view of international relationships, South
Caucasus represents a sub-regional security complex that
has coalesced around a zero-sum rapport (Armenia and
Azerbaijan), plus a wide variety of relationships of pragmat-
ic cooperation or circumstantial competition in different
respects between Georgia and Armenia and between
Georgia and Azerbaijan. The nature of the interaction
between the states of this sub-regional complex builds up a
genuine puzzle of interdependence: Georgia is vital for the
functioning of Armenia (70 to 75% of Armenias trade
crosses the Georgian territory and the port of Poti is an
essential link in guaranteeing the countrys food security;
moreover, Armenias access to the Internet depends on the
wiring that crosses the same Georgian territory). At the
same time, Georgia depends in the highest degree on the gas
supply from Azerbaijan and the Azeri gas for the European
market is being supplied through the infrastructure that
crosses Georgia. Interacting with the powers around South
Caucasus also has a major impact inside the local security
complex. Most of the times, the states in the region instinc-
tively take the management of security outside their own
space, by courting one of the great powers able to offer them
security guarantees: while to Georgia it is its nearness to the
European security structures that counts (especially NATO
and the USA as an offshore balancer), Armenia seeks its
security guarantees in Russia, under the umbrella of the col-
lective defense organization CSTO. Even Azerbaijan, which
is much more self-sufficient, seeks support in the field of
security, through its treaty with Turkey and its bilateral mil-
itary relationship with the US. The study shows that after
the August 2008 war, however, Georgias space of maneuver
at a macro-regional level tends to narrow down. This is a
265
reality created by the contradictory policies of certain
European states that have supported the sale of Mistral hel-
iports to Russia, but also by the increasing alienation of
Turkey from the European Union. In Tbilisi, Ankaras
regional intentions are all the more confusing, as Turkey is
no longer perceived as a power projecting the interests of
the West.
The last part, authored by Angela Grmad, offers a pic-
ture of the economy of South Caucasus. The study points
out the very important role that the oligarchic and monop-
olist power structures play in the politics and the economy
of the region. It would be a South-Caucasian constant that
the economic and political decisions are being decisively
influenced by the interests of certain private groups coalesc-
ing in monopolies and oligopolies. Although structurally
they make up a common reality, there are, of course, many
specific national nuances: while in Georgia and Armenia the
oligarchy is present both in power and in the opposition, in
Azerbaijan the opposition does not have its initiatives sup-
ported by oligarchs. Ultimately, all these biological parame-
ters of the South-Caucasian economic and political environ-
ment tend to discourage the foreign investors to enter a
market where unfair competition is a natural datum. In the
absence of antimonopoly legislations that should bring
about stability and predictability, the rules of the game keep
depending on the goodwill of the various cliental structures.
Of course, when talking in Bucharest about South
Caucasus, we instantly think energy. It is the relative
advantage of Azerbaijan (as a state with oil and gas
resources) and of Georgia (as a state with a transit poten-
tial). From this point of view, the economic potential of the
region depends on its capacity to connect to the great ener-
gy-consuming markets: the EU, Russia, and China. But, eco-
nomically as well as politically, it remains divided, fragment-
ed, poles apart from functioning as a unitary whole. Some
of these states are economically attracted by the European
patterns of development and cooperation (mostly Georgia
266
and Armenia), while Azerbaijan tends to show Oriental
affinities. Politically, Georgia is interested in the domestic
implementation of institutional reforms at European stan-
dards, Armenia by re-establishing its relationships with
Turkey, while Azerbaijan seems preoccupied by a foreign
policy strictly based on energy, often in contradiction with
its neighbors interests. Essentially, the study advocates the
search of a successful economic pattern that could be laid at
the foundation of a stable regional system and concentrate
on inter-regional cooperation. But are the South-Caucasian
states able to make the concessions they should in order to
create their own, Caucasian pattern of integration?
The present study, 20 Years After: Political Regimes, Security,
and Energy Policies in South Caucasus, has been completed as
part of the program Promoting European values in the
Black Sea basin of Soros Foundation Romania. This pro-
gram seeks to increase knowledge regarding South Caucasus
among the political, administrative, academic, and journal-
istic elites in Romania, on the one hand, trying to bring this
topic onto the agendas of the public institutions interested
the Presidency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and, on the other hand, to turn it into a matter of public
interest. Given its position at the Eastern border of the
European Union, Romania could and should become a
connecting factor between the Caucasus and the rest of the
Union. From this point of view, the study is also meant for
the deciding factors in Europe, that can support and encour-
age Romania to become a coordinator of the Unions policies
in the region.
Octavian Manea
Foreign policy editor
Foreign Policy Romania and Revista 22
 Ileana Racheru

The Political Regimes in South Caucasus.

The Democracy That Hides
Competitive Authoritarianisms
 This chapter tackles the evolution of the political
regimes in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan following the
advent to power of the current presidents of the respective
countries. It covers the administrations of Mikhail
Saakashvili, Ilham Aliyev, and Serzh Sargsyan. The analysis
assumes that the three regimes are forms of competitive
authoritarianism and studies the way in which the authori-
ties have managed to create and/or to perpetuate the mech-
anisms which consolidate their power. It first explains and
describes what competitive authoritarianism is. The analy-
sis then focuses on every state in turn and follows the evo-
lution of the political regime regarding the organization of
elections, the relationship between power, on the one hand,
and opposition, media, and civil society, on the other hand.
Finally, the study discusses the influence of external pressure
upon the internal political decision-making. The analysis is
based on primary sources (interviews taken by the author in
South Caucasus and data published by OSCE and Freedom
House) and on expert theoretical studies or observations of
the political regimes in the three states. The behavior of the
regime in its relationship with the opposition, the press, and
the civil society is being surveyed in key political moments:
elections, protests, and the passing of legislation considered
to be of major importance for democratization. Consequently,

271
this chapter aims at finding out how strong the government
or the party in power is and the means it employs in order
to exercise its authoritarian control over the political regime.
What Is Competitive Authoritarianism?
Competitive authoritarianism is a hybrid regime resulting
from the combination of democratic practices with authori-
tarianism (Levitsky & Way [2010], p. 5). In a competitive
authoritarian regime, the political power fails to observe at
least one of the conditions of democracy: free elections, the
guaranteeing of civil rights, the existence of a space of polit-
ical game where both power and opposition can express
themselves (Levitsky [2010], p. 7).
Competitive authoritarianism has been defined by differ-
entiating it from democracy and authoritarianism.
Authoritarianism is a political regime that does not allow
the opposition to express any form of contestation (Levits-
ky [2010], p. 7). Competitive authoritarianism is a political
regime that allows the constitutional existence of contestation
by the opposition. In a competitive authoritarian regime,
elections are not always free or they take place in an envi-
ronment that does not guarantee equal opportunities for the
opposition, although the latter can legally participate in the
election campaign. The power can manipulate the lists of
voters, it can tamper with the results of the voting, or it can
restrict the access of the opposition to the media or the
financial resources (ibidem, p. 8).
The competitive authoritarian regimes formally guaran-
tee the civil liberties, but they are frequently violated: the
opposition and the free mass-media are the targets of the
abusing law-and-order forces, of the police, of the judicial
system. Protests, even when they observe the regulations,
are often repressed forcibly. Restraining the civil liberties
can also take the shape of legal repression, through more
subtle methods like the implementation of certain stipu-
lations of the law, in order to give legal form to repressive
272
actions. Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 10) have established
three conditions for the occurring of an unfair competition:
the state institutions are constantly being used for purposes
favorable to those in power, the power is always being
privileged in the oppositions detriment, and the possibilities
of the opposition to take part in the elections are seriously
being restrained.
Georgia:
Democratic Elections,
the Great Success of the Rose Revolution
The current political regime in Tbilisi resulted broadly
from the Rose Revolution of 2003, when the long-lasting
peaceful protests of the Georgian political opposition and
West-supported civil society overthrew the authoritarian
regime of Eduard Shevardnadze1. After having fraudulently
won the parliamentary elections of November 2003, Eduard
1A former leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Socialist
Republic of Georgia (1972-1985) and Foreign Minister of the Soviet
Union (1985-1991), Eduard Shevardnadze (b. 1928) led Georgia
first as head of Parliament (1992-1995), then as President elected
by direct vote (1995-2003). While in power, Shevardnadze con-
cluded the two Russia-mediated peace treaties that put an end to
the violent confrontations in South Ossetia (1992) and Abkhazia
(1994). In 1995, he also concluded an Agreement with Moscow, for
a 25-year functioning of four Russian military bases on Georgian
territory. Shevardnadzes rule saw the earliest attempts at creating a
Georgian state based on a national identity and avoided the violent
manifestations characteristic of that of his predecessor, Zviad Gam-
sakhurdia (1939-1993). In 1994, due to his positive image in the
West, where he was still seen as having been instrumental in the
reunification of Germany, Eduard Shevardnadze managed to launch
a Western-supported program of economic reforms. However, when
he was overthrown from power, in 2003, said economic reforms had
failed and Georgia had come to be regarded as one of the countries
in the world with the highest level of corruption. The Shevardnadze
regime is considered by experts to have been an authoritarian one.
273
Shevardnadze gave up before the Western pressure and the
street unrest and announced his resignation. The Georgian
Citizens Union the party in power at the time disin-
tegrated.
The new, hybrid configuration of power was the result
of the concentration of all forces of opposition around a
common goal: overthrowing Shevardnadze and winning the
political battle. Todays power in Tbilisi, that took over after
the presidential elections of January 2004, is made up of
contesters from inside the Shevardnadze regime Nino
Burjanadze (b. 1964), Mikhail Saakashvili2 (b. 1967), and
Zurab Zhvania (1963-2005), turned into critics who
favored the introduction of democratic norms internally
and a West-oriented foreign policy. Following the January
2004 vote, Saakashvili, who was the unique candidate of
the United National Movement (UNM) and of the United
Democrats, was elected president by 96.2% of the votes and
his allies Burjanadze and Zhvania became Chairman and
Spokesman of Parliament and State Minister, respectively.3
The January 2004 elections were the first described by
international observers described as being close to the dem-
ocratic standards and marked the beginning of the second
Georgian transition, after the 1991 proclamation of inde-
pendence.
2 With his masters degree at Columbia University and his Ph.D.
at the George Washington University, Mikhail Saakashvili was a
member of Parliament (1995-1999) and a Minister of Justice
(2000-2001) during the rule of Eduard Shevardnadze. In 2001,
he resigned from the Ministry of Justice and accused his own
government of corruption. That same year, he founded the United
National Movement as an opposition entity with which he won the
presidential elections of 2004 and 2008 (CRS Report, 2011, p. 1).
3 According to the 1995 Constitution, the president of Georgia
held the most important position in the country. The presidential
system instituted by the fundamental law did not make provisions
for the existence of the position of prime-minister, but of a State
Minister who supervised the body of ministers accountable only
before the president.
274
The November 2003 parliamentary elections were
declared null and void and new elections were organized in
March 2004, a decision that was deemed suspicious by the
international observers, since it was applied exclusively to
the parliamentary seats that had been delegated through
proportional representation.4 16 parties and alliances ran in
the new elections, but they began campaigning rather late
and did not come up with any offers or ideological programs,
limiting themselves to attacks against their opponents. The
voting competition strengthened the position of the alliance
between the UNM and the United Democrats, that won
67% of the ballot (135 seats), and brought the right-wing
opposition (The New Right and Industry to Save Georgia)
7.6% of it (15 seats).5 The OSCE noticed that the voting
conditions had improved if compared to the previous cam-
paigns, but it also mentioned the continuing lack of a clear
separation between State administration and political party
structures, and the ongoing potential for misuse of State
administrative resources (OSCE, 2004, p. 3).
The following elections that took place in Georgia, the
2006 local elections, were considered a key-moment for the
evolution of the new political regime in Tbilisi. Although
evaluated by international observers as being, generally, in
accordance with the norms of democracy, the use of state
resources (hires in public positions, a temporary increase of
pensions, a granting of social vouchers) by the parties in
power in order to win votes was still practiced. Five parties,
an alliance, and several independent candidates ran in this
elections, which were won by the UNM. In 27.5% of the
majoritarian races and in 8.7% of the proportional races,
4 The Constitution that was effective in Georgia in 2004 stipu-
lated that the parliament was made up of 235 seats; for 150 of these,
the vote was proportionate, according to lists, while for the remaining
85 it was a simple-majority vote - one mandate, one district.
5 In the Georgian parliament, ten seats are reserved for the repre-
sentatives of the population displaced from the provinces Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.
275
only one candidate or party list runs in all but one case,
that of the governing UNM (OSCE, 2006, p. 2).
In 2008, the Georgians were called again to vote for the
anticipated presidential elections and for parliamentary
ones. The elections were qualified as the first really com-
petitive post-independence presidential race. Mikhail
Saakashvili used the states administrative resources in his
campaign and the vote counting and registration procedures
were inadequate (OSCE, 2008a, p. 2). Saakashvilis main
adversary was Levan Gachechiladze, supported by nine
opposition parties grouped together in the UNM. Saakashvili
won over 53% of the ballot from the first round, Gachechi-
ladze gathered 25.69% and the rest of the votes went to five
other competitors (each got under 1%). The first two candi-
dates had similar objectives of foreign policy on their agen-
das (Georgias joining NATO) and different views as to the
configuration of the domestic political regime (a semi-pres-
idential system, eliminating corruption and poverty, and the
integration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for Saakashvili;
parliamentary monarchy and encouraging the business envi-
ronment for Gachechiladze).
The 2008 parliamentary elections clearly offered the
Georgian people the opportunity to choose its representa-
tives from a wide variety of options, but, as in the previous
elections, the UNM made use of the states administrative
resources to win votes (OSCE, 2008b, p. 1). The presidential
party won 59.18% of the ballot (119 seats), the nine-party
opposition alliance obtained 17.73% of the votes (17 seats),
the Christian-Democrats 8.66% (6 seats), the Labor Party
7.44% (6 seats), and the Georgian Republican Party 3.78%
(2 seats).6
6 The Georgian Constitution was amended on March 28th, 2008,
so the number of members of parliament was reduced from 253 to
150 (75 chosen proportionately, in a single national constituency,
and 75 chosen through a majority vote in unequal constituencies
overlapping with the administrative districts).
276
In the local elections of March 30th, 2010, the party in
power used the administrative resources in its campaign once
again and its members that occupied public offices went
campaigning. The UNM won the elections by 73.9% of the
ballot nationwide and by 55.2% (for the mayors) from the
first round and 52.5% (for the Municipal Council) in the
Tbilisi city hall, thought to be the jackpot of local elections.
The UNM, All-Powerful in Georgian Politics
The presidential party in Georgia is now in power (Max
Bader, 2008, p. 5); together with several opposition parties,
it is building the image of a presidential political system
with practices both democratic, and authoritarian.
After four years of government, the UNM has managed
to preserve the parliamentary majority, even though it has a
weaker position now than after the 2004 elections; but the
opposition did not gather half of the votes that the presi-
dential party won, so it is no formidable adversary. The
results of the last two elections (the parliamentary ones in
2008 and the local ones in 2010) showed that the UNM
has managed to preserve the majority even after president
Saakashvili lost almost half of the ballot in the 2008 presi-
dential elections. Through the local elections, the UNM has
strengthened its power network also locally, which is going
to give it a significant advantage in the following elections.
The UNM has now a well-consolidated power network all
over Georgia, the partys control varying between 50 and
70% of the electorate.
The Georgian Political Scene between
Revolution and Reform
The political scene in Tbilisi preserves the atmosphere of
extreme confrontation of the 1990s, since neither the
power, nor the opposition is experienced in negotiations and
compromise and neither has any ideological programs. The
277
UNM has no ideology and claims it represents the entire
Georgian society (IDEA, 2006, p. 7), while the other par-
ties, although claiming to belong to either left, or right or
proclaim their centrism, do so only to avoid the criticism of
lacking any ideology. The behavior and discourse of the
parties in Tbilisi mostly distinguish between the moderate
reformers in power and the radical revolutionaries in the
opposition. Most opposition parties in Tbilisi7 place them-
selves to the right of the ideological spectrum leftist values
being rejected as directly or indirectly associated with com-
munism.
The political scene in Tbilisi has a low degree of polar-
ization (Nodia, 2006, p. 19), that does not manifest itself
ideologically, but through the refuse to take part in debates,
the acceptance of the Russian support (Nino Burjanadzes
party), and the way in which everyone relates to the Rose
Revolution8 (ibidem, p. 119). The creation of coalitions and
alliances and their dissolution is a phenomenon frequently
occurring on the political scene in Tbilisi, at any moment of
the electoral cycle or just conjecturally, in parliament, in
order to sustain certain initiatives or projects.
The UNM came to power with a revolutionary program
that subsequently, with Western help , it managed to turn
into a reform program. It has tried to come up with a positive
answer to a question that is fundamental to the Georgians:
Was the 2003 revolution the last one in Georgia? The oppo-
sition has not given up the revolutionary objectives it pro-
claimed through street protests, although, in time, the num-
ber of those who joined the manifestations decreased very
much. A new revolution and the presidents resignation were
the main objectives of the opposition, against which the
government came up with reforms and with the electoral
7 There is only one center-left political structure in Georgia, the
Labor Party.
8 The Republican Party and the Conservative Party were involved
in the Rose Revolution. The New Conservative party, the Indus-
trialists, and the Labor Party did not support the 2003 events.
278
program Georgia without poverty. The opposition threat-
ened to withdraw from all debates referring to government
reforms and organized more protests. Moreover, it accused
the power of perpetrating fraud in the elections, although
the international observers noticed the UNMs progress in
organizing them.
The political agendas of both camps claim that their pri-
ority objective is to achieve democratization combined with
Westernization and Europeanization, with various achieve-
ment strategies. For the opposition, revolution is the means;
for the power, the often radical reforms that attempt at
applying Western norms without taking into account the
local specificities. Anti-communism in the form of a radical
lustration is also present on the powers agenda.
The party in power in Georgia has created a space for the
political game in which the opposition may take part in the
elections with real chances to win, but it has not given up
altogether the disloyal administrative practices that put it in
an advantageous position. The increasing power of the
UNM is also due to the oppositions incapacity of bringing
forth important adversaries who might challenge the power
(in the 2004 parliamentary elections, most candidates
refused the medias offers and did not have any TV cam-
paigns). The UNM is the strongest party in Georgia, but it
might be challenged by a powerful opposition, since it
leaves its adversaries a great many possibilities to express
themselves and allows for a political climate that does not
rule out competition. Although the UNM holds the major-
ity in parliament, the opposition could penetrate the system
(in 2005, for instance, all the opposition parties formed an
alliance in order to propose that the mayor of Tbilisi be
elected by direct voting and they rejected the initiatives that
held that he or she be chosen by the Municipal Council).
The confrontation between the Georgian parties takes place
in an organized fashion, through elections or parliamentary
debates, in the street (peaceful or violent manifestations), or
through fights in parliament. Violent confrontations do not
279
mean just measures taken by law enforcement against the
opposition. The Georgian parties preserve a tradition prior
to the Rose Revolution, that of violent confrontations among
themselves: each party has a SonderKommando, a group of
thugs that help it face the potential provocations of their
adversaries (Nodia, 2006, p. 117).
New Elites, New Cliental Networks in Power
The image and practices of the political elites in Tbilisi
combine the Soviet heritage with adaptation to the transi-
tion and to the ever-present objective of democratization.
The Soviet heritage is reflected in the existence of a strong
leader and the elimination of all heads of state that do not
show this attribute. Mikhail Saakashvili is the strong leader
in Tbilisi, a position he has built for himself through the
successful Rose Revolution, the winning of the elections by
97% and 53%, respectively, and through reforms. Adaptation
to transition has meant the creation of a legislative frame-
work that observes the norms of democracy, while favoring
the power.
The legislative reformation of government (by modifying
the constitution and building up a strong presidential sys-
tem) has been another way of consolidating the Saakashvili
regimes power in Georgia. Thus, the president may dismiss
the cabinet and the parliament (if the latter does not give
a vote of confidence to three successive cabinets). Although
the system has formally been reformed by the introduction
of the office of prime-minister (who functions as a screen
inasmuch as he/she apparently shares the executive power
with the president), as well as his/her confirmation by par-
liament, the presidents power has actually strengthened,
because he is the one around whom the entire political
regime is built.
The new elite created by Mikhail Saakashvili is different,
first and foremost, from the Soviet one around Eduard
Shevardnadze or from the nationalist radicals of the 1990s:
280
all ministers resemble their president they have studied
in the West and support the reformation of the state after
Western patterns. The power of the UNM may be account-
ed for, aside from its success in the elections (that can also
be explained, at least partially, by the peoples wish to attain
a certain political stability), through the high-level cliental
networks whose loyalty is based on corruption: The public
institutions have been ridden of corruption at the lower
levels. This is the greatest achievement of the Saakashvili
administration. But nobody has touched the corrupt ele-
ments at the high levels.9 In the upper positions, corrup-
tion has just changed form. The stakes are now to control
business and the market.10 The regime relies on the loyal-
ty of the business environment and of the administrative
employees, not on the ministers (the replacement of minis-
ters is a constant practice in Tbilisi). But, as a result of the
reforms it has initiated, the Saakashvili administration has
not managed to obtain popular support as well, because the
positive changes, although visible in the streets of Tbilisi or
Batumi, have not yet reached the lower strata of the impov-
erished population.
The Mass-Media and Its Impossible Co-existence
with the Political Regime
The relationship between the mass-media and the power
in Tbilisi is typical for the authoritarian regimes in that a
democratic legislation overlaps with undemocratic practices.
In the almost eight years since it came to power, the UNM
has managed to assume control of almost all mass-media.
Although it has created the legal conditions for the existence
of an independent press, the Saakashvili regime has also
identified, in a very short time, the means by which it may
influence the content of the news: to bring the state-financed
9 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
10 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
281
press under its own influence and to create a network of pri-
vate investors close to the regime (even of parliament mem-
bers) who are capable of controlling the private media and
turn them from an independent press that often criticized
the regime into a mouthpiece of those in power.
The legislation regulating the Georgian audio-visual
environment has been evaluated by Freedom House as one
that meets all democratic requirements. After 2004, the
parliament in Tbilisi completed the legislative provisions
regarding the mass-media. The new legal framework also
came up with significant amendments to the 1991 law:
it guarantees the freedom of expression, it clarifies the legal
constraints that the media people may be subjected to, and
it des-incriminates slander (Freedom House Georgia, 2006).
Television represents the Georgians main source of infor-
mation, while the printed mass-media have a reduced circu-
lation and usually cover the educated milieus, being distrib-
uted mainly in Tbilisi and other larger cities. There is a TV
station in Georgia, that is being financed from public funds
(TV1), three private TV channels (Kanal 1, Rustavi 2, and
Imedi), and several newspapers partially state-financed. The
Saakashvili regime took the publicly-financed press from
under the influence of Shevardnadze and brought it under
its own after 2004. The same happened with the mass-media
in Ajaria, that was put under the control and censorship of
the Batumi authorities, heavily influenced by the power in
Tbilisi. After the advent to power of the UNM and of
Mikhail Saakashvili, the public TV station became the main
media vehicle the regime resorted to in all electoral cam-
paigns. Although formally through the legislation guaran-
teeing the right to free expression and the means by which
its leadership is being appointed that observe all democratic
norms this station has at its disposal all the necessary
elements for disseminating non-partisan information, it has
not abandoned the self-censorship practices associated with
the press from an authoritarian regime.
282
The private mass-media are incapable of financially sus-
taining themselves, because of the extremely meager publicity
market, which makes them vulnerable before the editorial
pressure often politically inspired, that the financers exert.
The private investors in the Georgian mass-media remain
unknown, they are obscure companies located in fiscal par-
adises and it is speculated that they are only screens meant
to conceal the presence of political actors connected to the
circles of either power, or opposition. The private TV sta-
tions fight serious financial deficits and nobody knows
where they are getting their money from11. It seems that
after 2004, the three main private TV stations (Rustavi-2,
Imedi-TV, TV Mze) were purchased by individuals with
government ties or by parliament members, after their own-
ers were submitted to legal pressure.
The financial problems of the mass-media make them
dependent not only on the private investors, but also on
how the debts towards the state are being paid. The regime
resorted to legal forms of pressure (fiscal police controls)
or informal messages (criticisms of the journalists by the
officials and restricting their access to events organized by
public institutions a practice of the Ministry of State
Security). In 2004, the government rescheduled payments
due by Rustavi-2 and the TV station was later purchased by
an investor close to the government circles, which seems to
have diluted its critical stance with reference to the author-
ities (Freedom House Georgia, 2005).
The financial situation of the Georgian press has an
impact on the editorial content of the information made
public. The private mass-media often practice self-censor-
ship in order to avoid pressure from the financer. There have
been several scandals in the Georgian press, in which jour-
nalists accused their investors of interference causing docu-
mentaries about corruption in the police ranks or shows
whose hosts criticized the government to be pulled off the air.
11 Interview with a journalist, Tbilisi, May 2011.
283
They also accused their own employers of pressure: It is
impossible to write and publish an article about a corrupt
political figure either in power, or in the opposition, unless
your own boss agrees12.
The regimes pressure on the mass-media has been mani-
fest especially in the tensed moments of the struggle for
power (elections, opposition protests, the 2008 war) and
has gone all the way to physical violence or the suspension
of TV broadcasting. At the 2004 parliamentary elections, all
the sixteen parties and alliances that competed for the votes
were present in the media, but the general tendency of both
the private TV stations and of the public one, was to favor
the party in power, the UNM. TV1, which is publicly
financed, broadcast 80% positive news about the UNM and
did not host any electoral debates (OSCE, 2004, pp. 2, 15).
Rustavi-2, a private-owned station, covered the campaign in
a similar fashion. The following elections showed that the
practices of the 2004 voting were still in use.
The forces of order have physically aggressed the journal-
ists, especially those who broadcast information about the
2005 and 2007 protests. President Saakashvili proclaimed a
state of emergency in November 2007 and forbade all TV
broadcasting, except from the public station. At that same
moment, the Imedi and Kavkasia TV stations were suspend-
ed, allegedly for having stirred up the protesters (Freedom
House Georgia, 2008). During the 2008 Russo-Georgian
war, all TV stations in Georgia broadcast only information
that was favorable to the Tbilisi authorities and, as a conse-
quence of the November 2007 incidents, all talk-shows and
analyses vanished from all programs.
The Tbilisi regime has managed to rid the Georgian mar-
ket of the independent mass-media, but it has not sup-
pressed pluralism, since the investors are not only politicians
and people having close connections with the power circles,
but also members or supporters of the political opposition:
12 Interview with a journalist, Tbilisi, May 2011.
284
There are now in Georgia one press for the power and one
for the opposition13. At present, the most important TV
station of the opposition is Maestro TV, which supports the
radical opposition represented by Nino Burjanadze.
Civil Society, the Only Voice That Criticizes the
Regime
The Tbilisi regime has hesitated between the democratic
and the authoritarian practices in its relationship with the
opposition and the civil society. Its control over the exercis-
ing of civil rights and liberties is a limited one and mostly
impacts the debates on the legislation regarding the reforma-
tion of the state and the right to protest against or contest
the power.
The second transition in Georgia implied the reorganiza-
tion of the legislative framework in which the elections took
place and the legal reconfiguration of the political regime.
As soon as it came to power, the UNM announced that it
was going to have consultations regarding the project for a
Unified Electoral Code and the amendments to be brought
to the Constitution. The power in Tbilisi tried and succeeded
to monopolize the public debate by two means: the parlia-
mentary majority vote and some faade debates with the
opposition and the civil society (to show, at least formally,
that it observed the rules of political dialogue required by
the West). Moreover, the power took advantage of the
extreme polarization of the political milieu and of the radi-
cal manner in which the opposition approached those con-
sultations, by withdrawing from the discussions and putting
up street protests.
International observers have frequently criticized the
manner in which consultations with the civil society and the
opposition parties were organized in view of the modifica-
tion of the electoral legislation and the amendment of the
13 Interview with a journalist, Tbilisi, May 2011.
285
constitution: they were held over a very limited time-span14
and favored the parties in power. In 2004, following a gov-
ernment initiative, the parliament modified the electoral law,
while violating the deliberation procedures. The debates
regarding the modification of the parliamentary structure
(reduction of the number of seats) began in 2008, only two
months before the elections, and the OSCE (2008, p. 1)
considered that the initiative was violating the equality of
the vote. Moreover, the changes were in favor of the UNM
that had obtained most of the simple-majority mandates in
the previous elections. The UNM version of the electoral
law also contains a controversial stipulation that allows
the candidates already holding public offices to take part in
the campaign.
The regime in Tbilisi has also promoted a dual approach
in its relations with the political opposition: peaceful ones,
according to the norms of Western democracy, but also vio-
lent reactions or scandals and intimidations.
The Tbilisi government has offered the opposition the
possibility to take part in the elections with real chances of
gaining votes (no candidate or party was abusively denied
participation in the elections organized so far). The opposi-
tion has been able to exercise freely its legal right of organ-
izing anti-Saakashvili protests, yet several manifestations of
the contesters were suppressed violently. In November 2007,
the government forcibly suppressed the protests of the
opposition parties grouped together in a National Council,
which demanded that the parliamentary elections be organ-
ized earlier and called for the presidents resignation. The
following protests of the opposition, which took the form of
massive demonstrations lasting almost two months were,
however, received peacefully by the regime in power. The
14 On August 26th, 2006, president Saakashvili issued a decree
that announced that local elections were to be held on October 6th,
the same year. The time allotted to the debates on the modification
of the local elections legislations was just two weeks.
286
police used force in May 2011 against one part of the oppo-
sition led by Nino Burjanadze, which resulted in four deaths
and tens of people being injured. One of the opposition
leaders was put under arrest.
Georgia is the only South-Caucasian state in which the
civil society has managed to send the message of the popu-
lation through peaceful protests to the Shevardnadze
administration and to achieve the main objectives of the
manifestations: the annulment of the fraudulent elections,
the organizing of new ones, and the presidents resignation.
After 2004, the civil society has only partially managed to
alter its relationships with the political milieu. The govern-
ment in Tbilisi has a dual approach in its relationships with
the NGOs: it presents itself with a formal policy of openness
to the civil society, yet avoids the dialogue when matters of
domestic policy are brought into debate.
The legislation in effect in Georgia does not obstruct the
creation of NGOs and the Tbilisi regime has not tried to
offer those already existing any state financing in order to
influence the activities of the non-governmental environment
to its advantage. The most active NGOs are being financed
from the West. There have been, however, situations in which
various NGOs expressed very biased options (a good exam-
ple is the Liberty Institute, a supporter of the Rose Revolu-
tion, whose director took up politics, after 2004, under the
umbrella of the UNM).
The classic role of civil society of communicating the
citizens messages to the government is limited in Georgia,
since the administration is unwilling to take part in debates
organized by NGOs or to allow the civil society any influence
on the decision-making process in the case of public policies.
Unlike under Shevardnadze, the government is now appar-
ently open to the civil society projects, especially in the case
of the NGOs working in partnership with various EU insti-
tutions, so as to avoid any possible criticism coming from
Brussels. But members of the government turned down
several invitations by the NGOs to take part in the debates
regarding the modification of the constitution.
287
 However, the Georgian regime is not altogether immune
to all initiatives of the civil society. In 2004, following the
suggestion of the Liberty Institute, the parliament modified
the law of the press, by des-incriminating slander and pro-
viding for access to public information. Four years later, the
Georgian government gave up to the pressure exerted by the
public opinion and the opposition and accepted reorganizing
the publicly funded mass-media (Freedom House Georgia,
2005).
The representatives of the NGOs have free access to the
media and they often take part in TV-broadcast debates.
None of the civil society activists that were interviewed for
this paper demanded that his of her identity be concealed
and did not fear to criticize the political circles.
The Democracy That Limits the Russian
Pressure
Georgia is a small state in a region of many conflicts
(North Caucasus, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Kara-
bakh), a situation that creates the necessity of having a
strong ally. There are only two options for it: Russia and the
West. The privileged relationships with Russia have been
ruled out of the political program of both the UNM, and
Mikhail Saakashvili since 2003, although they might have
helped them both to assume a firmer control and consoli-
date their positions. However, the party and its presidential
candidate alike proclaimed EU integration and joining
NATO as being the major objectives of their future adminis-
tration. Winning all the subsequent elections with the same
pro-Western program and the peoples wide support for an
alliance with the West has caused the survival in power of
the regime to depend on its relationships with the US and
the EU. The power in Tbilisi has initiated the reform of the
countrys institutions with the financial support of the West:
it has substantially augmented the public servants wages
288
(in Eduard Shevardnadzes administration, these were under
the subsistence limit), modified the structure of the bureau-
cratic apparatus, put up training sessions for the improvement
of the employees performance, and eliminated corruption.
The West demanded, however, that democratic reforms
be implemented in exchange for its support, so the govern-
ment in Tbilisi had to temper its authoritarian tendencies
and began hesitating between the organization of elections
according to the OSCE norms and the suppression by force
of the oppositions protests or the brutalizing of media
members. The regime there has not yet forgotten the recent
failure of the Shevardnadze administration, which was
deprived of help from the West because it refused to imple-
ment any reforms, it let the economic situation deteriorate
and was overthrown through public protests. The street puts
pressure on the Saakashvili regime as well, although this
regime has withstood a number of manifestations meant to
bring about a change of power.
After some commercial frictions (an increase of the price
of gas by Moscow and the discontinuation of mineral water
imports from Georgia), the relations between Georgia and
Russia have utterly deteriorated in the wake of the August
2008 war. Russia has become the great enemy of the Georgian
regime and has tried several times to have Saakashvili
removed from power, if the official version is to be taken
seriously.
The Western pressure for the democratization of the
regime in Tbilisi has double coordinates: an internal one (to
keep it in power by encouraging a pro-Western agenda and
by counteracting Moscows attempts at replacing it) and an
external one (the necessity of having a powerful partner
there and guaranteeing its security).
289
 Armenia
The current political regime in Armenia15 has resulted
from the remaining in power, since 1998, of a single political
group rooted in Nagorno-Karabakh16 (Ter-Petrosyan, 2010,
p. 8) and from the transfer of power from President Robert
Kocharyan to prime-minister Serzh Sargsyan17. After the
taking over of power by Sargsyan, the Armenian authorities
built up a hybrid political regime in which democratic prac-
tices co-exist with authoritarian measures. After Serzh Sarg-
syans appointment as prime-minister in 2008, the Yerevan
authorities improved the electoral system. The regime could
afford renouncing some of the authoritarian practices and
15 Armenia declared its independence from the USSR in August
1990. Levon Ter-Petrosyan (b. 1945) became the first president of
post-communist Armenia in 1991. Until 1998, Ter-Petrosyan headed
an authoritarian regime frequently criticized in the West for suppres-
sing the press, violating the citizens rights and liberties, and having
fraudulently won the 1995 parliamentary elections and the 1998
presidential ones.
16 In 1923, Stalin decided to include the Oblast Nagorno-Kara-
bakh, with a mostly Armenian population, in the Azerbaijan Soviet
Socialist Republic. In 1988, the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh
and Yerevan demanded, in vast street demonstrations, that the
region be included in the Armenian SSR, which led to the outbreak
of the conflict. In 1991, Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independ-
ence from Azerbaijan. The cease-fire agreement was signed in 1994.
This roughly 14% of the territory of Azerbaijan has been de facto
under the control of Yerevan and de iure under the Baku administra-
tion ever since.
17 Born in Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh, Sargsyan had a long
career in the Communist Party of the Armenian SSR, then served
in the Armenian military structures as head of the Nagorno-Kara-
bakh Self-Defense Committee (1989-1993) and Minister of Defense
(1993-1995 and 2000-2007). After 1995, he was Minister of State
Security, Minister of Internal Affairs, and held other various posi-
tions in the Yerevan presidential administration. In 2007, he was
appointed prime-minister of Armenia, being seen as the right hand
of the Armenian President Robert Kocharyan.
290
offering a more democratic image to the world, due to the
lack of a real opposition that could have threatened it.18
The Elections That Reconfirm the Same Winner
The 2007 parliamentary elections were conducted
largely in accordance with OSCE commitments and other
international standards for democratic elections (OSCE
Armenia, 2007, p. 1). The Republican Party, which was in
power, won 41 proportional mandates and 22 simple-major-
ity ones.19 The other parties that made the 5% election
threshold were Prosperous Armenia (18 proportional and
7 simple-majority mandates), the Dashnaktsutyun the
Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF; 16 proportional
mandates), Orinac Yerkir the Country of Laws (8 propor-
tional and 2 simple-majority mandates), the Heritage
Movement (7 proportional mandates), the Alliance Party
(1 simple-majority mandate), the non-party Civic Initiative
(9 simple-majority mandates) (OSCE Armenia, 2007, Annex).
None of the competitors had candidates in all electoral dis-
tricts and two thirds of the parties and alliances running in
the elections only had lists for the proportional voting (in
seven districts only single candidates were registered). Many
candidates (of both power, and opposition) withdrew from
the race after the lists were registered or the candidacies for
the single-majority mandates were validates). On several
occasions, the Republican Party used the state administrative
resources to gain the support of the voters (OSCE Armenia,
2007, p. 1) and to create a campaign environment favorable
18 The parliamentary elections held in Armenia in 2003 were
stolen, which brought about a lot of criticism from the West and the
international observers.
19 According to the 1995 Constitution, that was amended in
2005, the Parliament of Armenia is a one-chamber institution with
131 deputies (90 mandates delegated through a proportional vote
on lists and 41 mandates through a simple majority in single-winner
constituencies).
291
to itself and its informal allies (Prosperous Armenia and,
partially, the ARF).
The February 2008 presidential elections mostly met
OSCE commitments and international standards regarding
the organization of a free voting. The results indicated that
Serzh Sargsyan won in the first run by 52.8% of the ballot.
Levon Ter-Petrosyan came out second, with 21.5% of the
votes. All in all, the voting process developed in such a way
as to favor the candidate of the Republican Party: the acting
president and the Government officials campaigned for him
and the counting of votes in some 16% of the polling sta-
tions observed was assessed as bad or very bad (OSCE ARF and the Heritage (considered to be the only genuine
Armenia, 2008, p. 2).
In 2009, for the first time, the inhabitants of Yerevan
were called upon to elect the members of their Municipal
Council. This voting, that was assessed as generally meeting
the norms of the European Council, was, however, marked
by the same non-democratic practices: votes were bought,
ballot papers were printed in excess, and voters were intimi-
dated. After counting, the Republican Party gained the
majority in the Municipal Council (35 of the total 65 seats)
and reconfirmed the former mayor.20
The political scene in Yerevan shows a low degree of
polarization, only reflected in the nationalist content of the
political agenda regarding the future of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Several parties claim that the region should either be includ-
ed in the Armenian state, or remain independent, while
others advocate the organization of a referendum in which
the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh themselves should
state their opinion as to the future of the area. Domestically,
both power, and opposition claim that democratization and
reforms are their main priorities, but the final purpose of
those are not the integration in the European Union: We do
20 Until 2009, the mayor of Yerevan was appointed by the presi-
dent. Since the 2005 revision of the Constitution, the mayor of
Yerevan is being chosen indirectly by the majority of the Municipal
Council members.
292
not reject cooperation with the EU, but we are aware that
a possible integration is a much too distant objective21.
After the 2007 parliamentary elections, the Republican
Party formed a majority together with Prosperous Armenia,
the ARF, and the Orinac Yerkir, a coalition dominated by the
Republicans. Prosperous Armenia is being controlled by for-
mer president Kocharyan, while Orinac Yerkir has only two
members in the governing team, who are said to be close to
Sargsyan and, unofficially, members of the Republican Party
(Petrosyan, 2010, p. 10).
The Armenian parliamentary opposition includes the
opposition). In 2009, the ARF left the governing coalition22,
but went on sustaining the power informally, in exchange
for an equally informal non-aggression pact (the authori-
ties took no measures against its members).
Heritage is seen as the only opposition party in the
Armenian parliament and the only one that criticizes both
the governments foreign policy (for the Russian investments
in the Armenian economy, as being a form of corruption,
and for the presence of a Russian military base on the
Armenian territory), and for its domestic one (for corruption
and for the way the authorities handled the 2008 events).
Heritage members, on the other hand, have constantly been
targets of government criticism and of law enforcement
brutality.
The Armenian opposition outside the parliament, the
so-called Armenian National Council, is a hybrid movement
made up of eighteen political parties of different ideologies
and civic organizations grouped around Levon Ter-Petrosyan
(Petrosyan, 2010, p. 11). The ANC frequently criticizes
21 Interview with a member of the Armenian National Assembly,
June 2011.
22 As a protest against the signing, in October 2009, of the Zurich
protocols of the normalization of the relationship between Armenia
and Turkey.
293
the government for violation of human rights, corruption,
and the infringement of the constitutional order. The two
camps of the Armenian opposition have not managed to
coalesce into a unique force able to take part in elections.
In 2011, Heritage protested alongside the ANC, without
supporting all of the latters objectives, however.
Although it has taken part in all the elections that have
been organized since the 1995 adoption of the Constitution
and has had real chances to challenge the power, the
Armenian political opposition has never had enough influ-
ence on the voters and has not strengthened itself by
attracting new supporters. After the 2008 protests, the tra-
ditional opposition in Yerevan compromised itself before
the population by unduly contesting the results of a voting
that had been assessed as being one in accordance with the
Western democratic standards.
At present, the Republican Party holds a majority of over
50% of the electorate and the improvement of the condi-
tions in which elections are being organized has not affected
its control over the political power. The party in power in
Yerevan enjoys the advantages of an opposition that is weak
and divided by internal disputes and of informal partner-
ships with part of the opposition.
A Regime Legitimized by the Nagorno-Karabakh
Conflict
The current elite in Yerevan is the result of the coalition
between nationalists and post-communists, set up in the
1990s (Gallina, 2010, p. 24). The political force holding
power in Armenia was created when the military elite that
had fought in Nagorno-Karabakh in the 1990s blended with
the political body that had settled in Yerevan after the gain-
ing of independence (ibidem, p. 25). The power in Yerevan
has met no change in the twenty years since the proclama-
tion of independence: elections have been won by the acting
president or by the prime-minister unofficially designated
294
to succeed him. The rule that the prime-minister takes over
the presidents position was confirmed even the single time
when the transfer of power was not made as a result of elec-
tions in 1998, when Levon Ter-Petrosyan was replaced by
Robert Kocharyan following a soft coup. The power in
Yerevan took advantage of the victory against Azerbaijan
and strengthened its authoritarian control by building up a
powerful coercive force in the Army and the Police, which
was afterwards efficiently used to suppress the oppositions
vast protests (Way, 2009, p. 111).
According to the 2005 constitution (it was amended in
2004), Armenia has a semi-presidential regime, but unoffi-
cially the power is concentrated in the presidents hands.
This situation is accountable for by the Soviet heritage that
cultivated the image of a powerful leader and by the post-
communist political practice of a group of leaders who had
to face a series of constant threats in order to gain political
stability. The political elite in power is grouped around the
president, due to the necessity of having a strong leader able
to negotiate the outcome of the conflict and to use the pre-
text of Nagorno-Karabakh for consolidating his own power
and obtaining legitimacy (Gallina, 2010, p. 30).
The power networks of the Armenian regime are inherited
from the Soviet period or constructed in the post-commu-
nist one. The Armenian transition has not meant the total
change of the institutions inherited from the Soviet period,
but the preservation of the state structure almost intact and
loyal, so the institutions and the informal networks may be
controlled in a formal way (Stefes, 2009, p. 448). The regime
is based on corrupt officials (the current prime-minister has
been involved in several financial scandals or in defrauding
the state by maintaining a suspect exchange rate for the
Armenian dram) or even on family relationships (it seems
that the most trustworthy official in Yerevan is the presi-
dents brother, Alexander Sargsyan). Most officials also have
a felonious past. Their uninterrupted presence in power after
1991 has been an advantage for the Yerevan leaders who
295
have managed to build up, during these two decades, two
types of loyalties: within the states administration and
among the oligarchs who have benefited from privatizations.
The political power in Armenia has conceived a mechanism
for the control of corruption, in which the government
monitors the central networks of corruption (ibidem, p. 447)
which, in their turn, monitor the local ones.
The consolidation of the power in Yerevan can be also
accounted for by the way in which the opposition has cho-
sen to take part in the political life: by establishing informal
relationships with the power, by its refuse to engage in
debates (see the parliament boycotting from 2003 to 2008),
or by street protests.
Rights and Liberties Only According to the
Discretionary Will of the Political Regime
The rhetoric and legislation encouraged by the political
regime in Yerevan in order to observe human rights and
liberties are characteristic of the Western democracies, but
their implementation is typical for the post-Soviet space.
The Armenian political regime has made significant progress
so far in the adoption or modification of laws that refer to
the guaranteeing of rights and liberties.
The Armenian constitution, modified and improved in
2005, creates the legal premises of pluralism and of the
supremacy of law. In 2008, other legislative measures were
taken in order to ensure the judicial systems transparency
and independence. But the Armenian judicial system has
not ridden itself of the influence of the political regime, as
proven by the measures taken against the March 2008 pro-
testers (suspect arrests, beatings, collection of doubtful evi-
dence, protracted court actions Freedom House, 2009,
p. 68). In 2010, fourteen political detainees were imprisoned
in Armenia.
In 2007, the Armenian electoral code was amended and,
according to the international observers, the modifications
296
brought substantial improvements in comparison with the
situation of the 2003 elections. The power in Yerevan
imposed its own rules when setting up talks with the oppo-
sition and the civil society with regard to the electoral legis-
lation. Although it claimed to be open to debate, the Yerevan
regime initiated the modification of the law during the elec-
tion year, just a few months before the voting itself.
The power in Yerevan also hesitated between violating
and observing the right of free assembling. The Armenian
legislation grants the political opposition the right to contest
the power through street manifestations. However, the regime
happened to apply a violent treatment to its opposition.
After the 2008 presidential elections, the opposition that
gathered around Ter-Petrosyan protested by accusing the
Republican Party of having fraudulently skewed the election
results in favor of Sargsyan. The police suppressed the
protests by resorting to violence, which resulted in the killing,
injuring, or detaining of several protesters; the courts of law
have not yet come with any verdict. The president decreed
a 20-day state of emergency and imposed limits for the
manifestations, a situation that has been prolonged to this
day. The regime also took punitive measures (beatings,
arrests, imprisonments with postponed trials) against the
protesters family members.23 In 2009, the parliament set
up a commission for the studying of the 2008 events, which
completed its activity by drawing up a report. According
to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
the document presented before the Armenian parliament
exculpated the authorities and blamed the opposition
gathered around Ter-Petrosyan, a situation that undermines
the credibility of the report (2009, p. 3). Further protests
of the opposition took place in March 2011, but they were
not forcibly suppressed by the police. Moreover, the power
declared itself ready to begin a dialogue with the opposition,
freed two political detainees (imprisoned after the 2008
23 Interview with a member of an opposition party.
297
violent events) and allowed for the manifestations in Liberty
Square (where the opposition was denied access in 2008).
The Armenian legislation and the political circles in Yere-
van allowed for the conceiving and developing of projects by
the NGOs. The regime, however, shows certain hostility to
the NGOs, in which it sees potential political rivals (Free-
dom House, Nations in Transit, 2009, p. 67), and tries to
avoid cooperating with them. The state officials have turned
down the NGOs invitations to debates and do not let the
civil society influence the taking of decisions with regard to
public policies. To improve its image, the regime has tried,
nevertheless, to initiate a dialogue with the civil society by
creating thematic commissions: They have called us just to
play extras, because decisions are taken without anyone
consulting us So, we have retreated.24
Most NGOs are financed from the West and do not have
biased affiliations. There are, however, on the Armenian
civil society scene, actors connected to the political parties,
who have been campaigning for these or for their presiden-
tial candidates (OSCE Armenia, 2007, p. 11).
The Mass-Media of Power and the Press of the
Opposition
The Yerevan regime partially controls the mass-media by
financing means, administrative pressure (it conditions the
issuing of licenses), and the censoring of the editorial content.
The Armenian legislation formally provides conditions for
the existence of independent mass-media. There is a press
financed from public funds and there are private media. The
Armenians main source of information is television (only
the public station H1 broadcasts all over Armenia) and the
printed press has issues of no more than 6,000 copies for
any publication and has no significant circulation: only about
8% of the Armenians read the papers (OSCE Armenia, 2007,
p. 14).
24 Interview with the director of anNGO, Yerevan, June 2011.
298
The publicly financed press is 100 percent in the service
of the political regime. The Yerevan regime exercises two
forms of control of the privately financed media: invest-
ments by financers who are close to the circles of power and
control over the organism that issues licenses for television
broadcasting. The main financing sources for the mass-media
are the sales and the publicity, which bring only a very
reduced income, plus the money offered by various political
actors or private investors: 30% of the financing of this
daily is black money, says the manager of a Yerevan daily
newspaper of general interest. Because of the precarious
financing, the wages of the journalists from the Armenian
private media are barely enough to survive: A young begin-
ner earns about $250 and a manager $1,000 at the most25.
This precarious financial situation of the press has been
used by the political power to make sure the journalists were
loyal to it: In the state-owned press, journalists can earn
even $10,000, but most of their income is from undisclosed
sources26. All three private TV stations are being controlled
by oligarchs associated to the regime; These past years,
they have given broadcasting licenses only to the stations
that were most assuredly not going to create any political
problems. At present, the process of digitalization is anoth-
er instrument used by the authorities to put pressure on the
TV stations.
The printed press is of the opposition, affiliated to the
power, or independent (one single newspaper about which
there are speculations that it is in fact influenced by the
government).
Access to the Internet has not been restricted by the
authorities in Yerevan and the press is rapidly extending its
activities online. In the Armenian online environment, there
25 Interview with the manager of a daily newspaper, Yerevan,
June 2011.
26 Interview with the manager of a daily newspaper, Yerevan,
June 2011.
299
are also bloggers who are active, but the spreading blogs that
are critical about the regime is attentively being monitored
by the authorities.27
The actual opposition may communicate with the popu-
lation only through the written press and the Internet. The
Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), an opposition
party close to the government, also appears at the TV stations
controlled by the regime.
The quality of the Armenian media products is deter-
mined by the journalists poor training, the authorities
pressure, and by financing. In the interviews taken for this
paper, experienced journalists in Yerevan complained about
the lack of professionalism of their younger colleagues.
The Armenian television is completely monopolized by
the political circles in power, so the information it provides
is favorable to the regime: For five days, all I saw was the
information broadcast by the Armenian TV stations. After
I had access to other sources of information, I realized that
during those five days I had been living in a different reality,
one created artificially by the political regime there.28
The pressure the authorities exert on the content of the
press releases is obvious especially during elections: Then
there are also media-killers, but they are not as aggressive as
those in Russia. The investigation articles are almost absent:
Maybe you get an article a month. And even then, a single
organization, Hedk, that is financed from the West, pro-
duces such material, but they do not investigate the great
instances of corruption, they keep to teachers or low-level
civil servants who take bribes29. For the rest, the journalists
practice self-censorship, so they wont get in trouble with
the financers or the authorities.
27 Interview with a representative of the civil society, Yerevan,
June 2011.
28 Interview with a representative of the civil society, Yerevan,
June 2011.
29 Interview with a journalist, Yerevan, June 2011.
300
At local level, the situation of the Armenian mass-media
is even more difficult: They have to deal with the pressure
put on them by the governor and by the regional authorities.
They survive as if it were an authoritarian or a dictatorial
regime.30 There is only one independent local TV station,
that was denied a license for broadcasting nationwide and
had to collect a huge sum with the help of the public, so it
may pay some alleged duties to the state.
None of the journalists interviewed in Yerevan was afraid
to criticize the political regime.
Russias Support Is Indispensable,
the EU Is too Far.
The foreign pressure for the democratization of the polit-
ical regime in Armenia depends on the feeling of insecurity
in South Caucasus, on the dependence on foreign actors like
Russia and the West, on the competition between the states
in the region, and on the influence of the foreign factors
upon the Armenian society.
Armenia is a small, geographically isolated state, in a
region with a frail security. Yerevan has tense relationships
with two of its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Turkey31, a situa-
tion that makes it completely dependent on the security
guarantees offered by Russia. In order to maintain the status
quo that resulted after the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Yerevan
is in permanent need of Moscows support, all the more so
as Russia has become, since 1998-1999, the main investor
in the Armenian economy and does not condition its help
on the democratization of the countrys regime.
30 Interview with a journalist, Yerevan, June 2011.
31 In the twenty years since the proclamation of indepedence,
the Armenian authorities have not managed to reach an agreement
with Turkey regarding the 1915 Turkish genocide against the
Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Turkey is
Azerbaijans main ally in the region and a supporter of its territorial
integrity.
301
 Armenia is a state devoid of resources a situation
which makes the attraction of Western aid and financing
compulsory and, hence, vulnerable to the pressure and
criticism of the US and the EU, that have disapproved of
the authoritarian measures adopted internally and have
threatened to discontinue their financial support. Maintaining
cordial relationships with the West is also essential in order
to avoid having Moscow as Armenias unique ally. In this
sense, the regime in Yerevan could not help introduce and
implement, at least formally, the democratic norms. Unlike
Georgia and Azerbaijan, that are able to maintain relation-
ships of interdependence with the West, the former for its
transiting of oil and gas, the latter for its energy resources,
Armenia depends entirely on the Western help. Moreover,
since 2003, in spite of all its hesitations in the process of
democratization, Georgia has become a successful model for
South Caucasus and a privileged partner of the West among
its republics.
The regime in Yerevan is not pressured internally to
develop privileged relationships with the West: Armenians
are not pro-Russian and anti-EU, but they are aware of the
fact that joining the EU is not a realistic objective for them,
so they are skeptical about the idea of Europeanization32.
Moreover, during the two decades of independence, the
power in Yerevan, irrespective of its political orientation, has
actively circulated in the mass-media the idea that Russia
is our great ally. The non-governmental milieu, although
financed from abroad, is too weak to succeed in implement-
ing the democratic pattern: the organizations concentrated
in Yerevan cannot activate in other regions, while their
activists are more of an elite that does not penetrate and has
no impact on the average Armenians.
32 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
302
Azerbaijan
The current political regime in Baku is the result of the
shift of power between Heydar33 and Ilham34 Aliyev and of
the strengthening of the latters authoritarian control at all
levers of power
Elections with an Outcome Always Known
in Advance
The first thing Ilham Aliyevs regime did to strengthen
its control over power in Azerbaijan was to fraudulently win
the elections.
In 2003, the presidential elections in Azerbaijan were
held after the pattern introduced under Heydar Aliyev. The
candidate of the New Azerbaijani Party (NAP) was favored
by the mass-media during the campaign and the authorities
33 Heydar Aliyev, former leader of the Communist Party of the
Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic and ex-KGB collaborator, was
elected president of Azerbaijan in 1993 and 1998. Aliyevs two
successive terms of office coincided with the strengthening of the
presidents and his closest advisors control over the political regime
in Baku. The Heydar Aliyev administration was constantly criti-
cized by the West for its authoritarian methods and for stealing the
elections. It also brought about the stabilization of the domestic af-
fairs and the conclusion of a peace agreement with Armenia in 1994,
following the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Heydar Aliyev managed
to give a fresh start to the Azerbaijani economy, by attracting
Western investments in the countrys oil industry. In 2003, Heydar
Aliyev, aged 80, died while running for a new presidential election
as the sole candidate of the New Azerbaijani Party. He was replaced
by his son Ilham in the presidential race, that the latter won.
34 A graduate of the Moscow State Institute of International
Relations, Ilham Aliyev was a head of SOCAR in the early 1990s,
then a member of the Azerbaijani parliament (1995-2000). From
1999 to 2003, he was second in command of his fathers New
Azerbaijani Party. In 2003, he was appointed prime-minister, then
elected president of Azerbaijan (Jim Nichol, 2010, p. 8).
303
committed an electoral fraud to Ilham Aliyevs advantage
or else resorted to methods of intimidation against the
opposition. The counting of the votes showed that Ilham
Aliyev had won 76.84% of the ballot, while the second com-
petitor, Isa Gambar, had got only 13.94% of the votes. The
results of the 2008 presidential elections were predictable,
since they were organized just to reconfirm Ilham Aliyevs
position and to avoid too much criticism from the West.
The voting was not in accordance with the OSCE standards
for democratic elections, even if the organization of the
electoral process itself had been somewhat improved if com-
pared to the 2005 parliamentary elections. Besides the sit-
ting president, six other candidates ran for the office. Ilham
Aliyev won again by 88.73% of the ballot. The other com-
petitors put together did not manage to accumulate more
than 2.86% of the votes.
In 2005 and 2010, the Aliyev regime organized parlia-
mentary elections in a similar way. At the 2005 voting, the
NAP won 61 parliamentary seats of the total 125. In 2010,
it won the majority in parliament 74 seats. 39 independ-
ent candidates (who vote, in fact, for the NAP) also became
members of the Azerbaijani parliament, while 9 seats were
reserved for minor parties (supporting the NAP, too) and
one seat for the Party of Hope, representing the actual op-
position (OSCE, 2010, p. 32). At the most recent elections,
for the first time since the independence of Azerbaijan was
proclaimed, the power managed to keep out of parliament
the traditional opposition represented by the Popular Front
Party Musavat.
The NAP, a King on the Baku Political Scene
In its eight years of power, the Ilham Aliyev regime has
managed to turn the opposition from a real competitor, that
in 2003 was a step away from depriving the NAP of power,
into a formal, almost non-existent actor on the political
scene. The NAP is currently a party with an overall control
304
over the power in Azerbaijan, after it has stolen every elec-
tion, has created an artificial opposition in parliament,
and has all but eliminated the real opposition through
unfair means. According to the voting results, the NAP and
Ilham Aliyev have control over 70% of the electoral body
(in fact, they have control over the whole of it). The signif-
icant reduction in the number of votes the opposition won
in the most recent elections shows that the Aliyev regime
has an all-reaching power and the progressive tendency to
eliminate the opposition from the political game altogether.
The results of the elections that are known beforehand and
the repressive measures that the authorities resort to against
their contesters have made the population more and more
indifferent to the elections: its participation has diminished
with every voting organized after 2003: while 69% of the
Azerbaijanis took part in the parliamentary elections of
2003, only 47% of them voted in the 2005 ones (a situation
in favor of the regime, since fewer votes have to be tampered
with).
The analysis of the Azerbaijani opposition parties has to
do, in the first place, with their proper existence, not with
their electoral or ideological programs. The most important
opposition parties Musavat, the Independent Party in
Azerbaijan, the Democratic Party, and the Popular Front
are almost invisible on the Baku political scene because of
the powers repressive measures. The image of such parties
is built around their leaders. The oppositions discourse is a
common one, focused on everyones criticism of the NAP.
The second aspect one could analyze regarding the
opposition in Baku is its relationship with the NAP. The
Azerbaijani political opposition is divided into two camps:
the parliamentary opposition, which is close to the party in
power, and the real, extra-parliamentary opposition, which
is critical about the Ilham Aliyev regime. At the last presi-
dential elections, this latter opposition did not come up
with its own candidate, claiming that it did not want to be
305
part of a voting process the power was anyway going to
steal.35
The confrontation between the power and its real oppo-
sition has always been a violent one and manifested itself in
the form of the latters protests and manifestations being
forcefully suppressed by the forces of order. The NAPs rela-
tionship with the opposition rules out the negotiations, the
dialogue, or the compromise. The last negotiations between
power and opposition took place after the 2005 elections,
when the US ambassador in Baku tried to mediate the num-
ber of seats each side had won in the legislative voting.
The Perfectly Functioning Corruption
The basic question about Ilham Aliyevs coming to
power is this: Was it really a change of power? The power in
Baku preserves the clan structure it inherited from the Soviet
period and from Heydar Aliyevs Nakhichevan administra-
tion of the 1990s. The new element in Ilham Aliyevs
administration is the invisible confrontation between the
older officials left over from Heydar Aliyevs regime, the
new elite, which is close to Aliyev the son, and which flirts
with Western ideas (Ishiyama, 2008, p. 46), and the Aliyev
family itself.
The states administrative and oil resources, as well as
the lucrative businesses are divided between Ramiz Mehdiev,
chief of the presidential administration and the old guard
around him, the oligarchs, and the Aliyev family. Mehdiev,
together with the Minister of the Interior and the Chief
Prosecutor, has control over the appointments in public
offices and the organization of elections.
35 The Musavat (Liberal) Party, the Liberal Party, the Popular
Front, the Public Forum For Azerbaijan and the Citizens Develop-
ment Corps created an informal alliance called the Common Front
of the Democratic Forces that called upon the citizens not to take
part in the elections (OSCE Azerbaijan, 2008, p. 5).
306
The most famous among the oligarchs are the Minister
of Transportation, the one of Emergency Situations, and the
president of SOCAR who have control over the customs,
the trade exchanges, the infrastructure projects, and the real
estate business (ICG, 2010, pp. 8-10).
There are two camps in the Aliyev extended family: a
conservative one grouped around Bailar Eibov (an in-law of
Ilham Aliyevs) and a reform-oriented one, the Pashayevs,
from which Mehriban Aliyev, the wife of the Azerbaijani
president, comes. Eibov controls the businesses in Western
Azerbaijan, while the Pashayevs activate in tourism, banking,
insurances etc. (ICG, 2010, pp. 10-11).
Ilham Aliyevs regime is based on two types of loyalties:
from the public system or the private sector and the occa-
sional loyalty of the citizens, usually obtained just before
the elections. The Azerbaijani political regime rests on old
personal loyalties, fraudulent privatizations, oil trafficking,
and corruption: All the ministers here have their business-
es. There is no uncorrupt official, says an EU official. The
main figure in the grand power design in Baku is president
Aliyev who follows his fathers example and tries to keep
power in the family and sees the power of the state as a
family business (Guliev, 2005, p. 241). Azerbaijan has
probably some of the longest-lasting ministers in the world:
In that picture over there, you can see our minister with
the former president, Heydar Aliyev. And there, you have
the same minister with the new president, said a Baku offi-
cial during an interview. A change of minister in Baku is
quite an unusual event on the political scene: Ive been a
minister here for over ten years, I dont see why ministers
change so often in Georgia, said another Baku official.
Even the low-level public servants are loyal to the presi-
dent: In that picture over there, you can see Heydar Aliyev,
our first president. He did a lot for us, you know, he is the
national leader of Azerbaijan.36
36 Interview with a ministerial official, Baku, June 2011.
307
 When elections take place, the Baku regime makes elec-
toral gifts to the population. An expert told us the story of
an elderly woman with an 80-manat pension who received
a letter from the president himself, just before the elections,
whereby she was informed that her 300-manat debt for elec-
tricity was forgiven.
Through the party in power, Ilham Aliyev and his team
make loyalty an obligation. The NAP is a pyramidal bureau-
cratic structure that combines business interests with polit-
ical affiliation: Being an NAP member is a requirement in
order to be appointed in a high-ranking state official position,
as well as in many important jobs from the private sector37.
The NAPs financial existence depends on both state
resources and the contributions of the business environment
(Goul & Sickner, 2008, p. 754).
Rights and Liberties with an Insecure Existence
According to the 1995 constitution, the Republic of Azer-
baijan is a democratic state based on the supremacy of law
and the principle of the separation of powers. Yet the Azer-
baijani constitution is just a text with a formal existence,
that has never actually been applied in practice, because
there is no agreement at the political level. The judicial sys-
tem in Azerbaijan is totally subordinated to political deci-
sions and often interprets the judicial norms in the regimes
interest. After Ilham Aliyevs coming to power in 2003,
Azerbaijan has modified the electoral legislation several
times, without calling for a democratic debate on the modi-
fications and without observing all the recommendations of
the Venice Commission. The central electoral commission
has always been under NAP control and the election cam-
paigns have always been focused on the party in power or
its candidate as the main actors. However, the OSCE (2008,
p. 1) thinks that the new norms may guarantee a democratic
37 Interview with a European official, Baku, June 2011.
308
development of the voting process. At almost every voting,
the Azerbaijani authorities, including president Ilham Aliyev,
take measures meant to improve their image just before the
elections: they either adapt the legislative framework so as
to formally allow for a correct voting, or come up with
populist decisions. The former method is meant to improve
the regimes image before the international observers of the
elections, while the latter addresses its image before the
voters. Ilham Aliyev did not properly go on campaign, argu-
ing that he wanted to offer the opposition some real chances
(ibidem, p. 2). The president decreed some legislative meas-
ures or gave up campaigning in order to leave the impression
that the opposition had some electoral advantages but it
was unable to make use of them. In 2005, Aliyev ruled that
the NGOs and the opposition could activate freely during
the campaign and that the state officials who obstructed the
organization of free and democratic elections would answer
to the law (Freedom House Azerbaijan, 2008). In fact,
many opposition candidates did not possess the necessary
resources to campaign all over the country, so there were
regions in which only the NAP could promote its candidate.
The rights actually granted by the power in Baku to the
opposition are (quasi) non-existent. The Ilham Aliyev regime
does not allow for the existence of any source of financing
for the real opposition: I dont know what the Musavat
leaders live of. The regime prevents them from getting
jobs and their family members, too. The party could not
be financed by any businessman, because the authorities
would shut down his business in no time.38
The legislation in Azerbaijan, which was modified in
2005 and 2008 according to the standards of established
democracies, allows for the organization of protests against
the powers actions, but the Azerbaijani authorities have
interpreted the legal stipulations in the interest of the power
and refused to approve of the manifestations.
38 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
309
 The power in Baku also used physical violence to intim-
idate its adversaries in the opposition: several leaders of the
opposition parties were attacked in the streets. After each
parliamentary or presidential voting, the opposition protest-
ed that the elections had been stolen and the authorities
suppressed the manifestations violently. In March 2011,
they even mobilized the army in Baku to prevent the cele-
bration by the opposition of one month since Hosni Mubarak
was overthrown from power.
The power in Baku also uses an aggressively rhetorical
anti-opposition propaganda: The Azerbaijani fortress
besieged by the Armenian or Western secret services trying
to put up some colored revolution in Baku, all foreign
enemies being accomplices of the members of the opposi-
tion. The same aggressive messages pervade the mass-media
with reference to the NGOs which have ever criticized the
political power.
The Azerbaijani political regime has also developed
means by which to control the civil society: by setting up
and financing so-called GONGOs (Government-Organized
Non-Governmental Organizations) or by putting pressure
on the independent organizations. It has even created an
institution responsible for the financing of NGOs: the State
Council for the supporting of non-governmental organiza-
tions, with funds that have grown year after year since the
oil boom (the most eloquent example being the Heydar
Aliyev Foundation, financed from the state budget alone);
there are also contests for grants or financing may be offered
unofficially: They asked me to let them finance my pro-
grams. But I saw that every organization that got money
from the state did only what the authorities told them to
do, so I turned down the offer.39
But GONGOs may be financed also by Western organi-
zations that offer grants for the development of the civil
society in Azerbaijan: We do not think that an NGO that
39 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
310
has got money from the special civil society state-created
fund is not eligible for our own programs40.
The pressure exerted on the civil society can take legal
forms (i.e., the authorities fiscal controls), but can also be
of a violent, threatening, or intimidating nature. While the
interviews for this paper were taken, many activists of the
civil society were afraid to criticize the political regime,
answered the questions evasively or demanded that their
names remain secret. There is more pressure on the civil
society during the elections (in 2008, no NGO was allowed
by the authorities to monitor the electoral campaign).
In Azerbaijan, to elaborate public policies is a unique
attribute of the power, so any civil society project is per-
ceived as being a political one (Gahramanova, 2008, p. 787).
Privatly, the members of the Azerbaijani civil society believe
that all they can do is to go through the motions of imple-
menting various programs (irrespective of their purpose),
since they are convinced that no NGO can influence the
political decision in any way.
Corruption is yet another form of the Baku regimes vio-
lation of human rights. Although it has introduced an anti-
corruption legislative package, the regime has not put it into
practice: There is no clerk here that is not corrupt. Nobody
could survive with a salary that small.41 Corruption is the
instrument by which the regime has secured the loyalty of
the entire state administration: All the ministers have their
own businesses in Azerbaijan, they are businessmen in a
Soviet regime adapted to capitalism. Without corruption,
the whole system would be dead.42 There is no transparen-
cy in any Azerbaijani public institution. The political power
has no interest in fighting corruption and the judicial sys-
tem subordinated to it is also corrupt: it has never taken
decisions that protect civil rights and liberties, and has pro-
duced legal sentences always in favor of the regime.
40 Interview with an NGO employee, Baku, June 2011.
41 Interview with a European official, Baku, June 2011.
42 Interview with a European official, Baku, June 2011.
311
 The Mass-Media Can Only Be in Power
in Azerbaijan
After Ilham Aliyevs coming to power, the Baku regime
took over the control of the press almost entirely.
Television is the most important source of information in
Azerbaijan, covering almost its entire territory. All Azer-
baijani TV stations are controlled by the political regime
that puts pressure directly on the publicly-financed channel
(AzTV) or indirectly on the private stations financially sup-
ported by investors close to it.
The printed Azerbaijani press is partially controlled by
the regime. There are a number of opposition daily newspa-
pers published in Baku, but their circulation does not cover
the entire territory of the country.
The quality of the media products in Azerbaijan is influ-
enced by the regimes censorship, the journalists training,
and the available financing. There are no investigation
articles in the Azerbaijani press and the journalists practice
self-censorship in order to avoid pressure from the financers
or the authorities.
The Baku regime also puts legal pressure on the foreign
mass-media and the journalists. In 2008, it censored Radio
Free Europe, the BBC and the Voice of America by passing
a law that forbade the foreign stations to broadcast on the
same frequencies as the national Azerbaijani ones. Pressure
is being exerted on journalists through legislation that
incriminates slander (penal punishments are stipulated for
it) or defamation and through the use of violence by the
forces of order. Four Azerbaijani journalists were in jail in
2010.43 Police resorted to violence against the media people
during the whole period after Ilham Aliyevs taking office.
43 The European Court of Human Rights asked the Azerbaijani
authorities in 2010 to free journalist Eiula Fatulaiev (Freedom House
Azerbaijan, 2011, p. 85). In 2011, the regime in Baku had not yet
complied with the ECtHR request, even though the judges had
given up the charges against him.
312
Over the last few years, there has been a growing pressure
of the Azerbaijani regime on the mass-media. This mostly
occurs during the voting campaigns. In the Azerbaijani media
controlled by the regime, all campaigns to date have favored
the NAP or Ilham Aliyev, by transmitting only positive
information about them and allowing them most of the
broadcasting time. Until 2008, the public television in Azer-
baijan was under the obligation to give all candidates equal
time. After the modifications to the law made in 2008,
TvAZ cannot broadcast any more programs related to the
elections. Ever since 2003, all TV stations have given only
positive information regarding the NAP or Ilham Aliyev
during all the election campaigns, while the opposition was
only mentioned occasionally in the news programs.44 The
state-financed printed press minimally met the legal provi-
sions for equal time and granted the opposition the right to
express itself, but otherwise offered information only about
the candidates of the parties in power. Yeni Musavat, the
daily newspaper of the opposition, was the only one to
publish detailed information on the oppositions campaign.
A Powerful Petrostate
The foreign actors influence on the process of democra-
tization in Azerbaijan depends on the level of security in the
region, on the regimes cordial relationships with both Russia,
and the West, on the competition between the South-Cau-
casian states, and on the pressure of the very foreign actors
on the Azerbaijani society.
Russia is Armenias main support in maintaining control
on Nagorno-Karabakh, which makes Azerbaijan vulnerable
before Moscows pressure to obtain territorial integrity. Yet,
44In 2008, TvAZ broadcast news or political programs in which
92% of the material was positive information on the power (of
which 72% covered only the activities of the president in office
OSCE, 2008, p. 16).
313
having cordial relations with Moscow, does not mean pressure
for the democratization of the domestic political regime,
which turns into a great advantage for the power in Baku
and its authoritarian attitude.
Azerbaijan is the only South-Caucasian state with signif-
icant oil and gas resources, which guarantees its relationship
of interdependence with the West: Baku needs the Western
market to sell its oil and gas and the EU states want to avoid
depending on Russia alone as a supplier of energy. Conse-
quently, even if it formally condemns the authoritarian
measures of the Aliyev regime, the West cannot do without
the Azerbaijani resources and cannot suspend commercial
relations as a means of pressure for the lack of democratic
transformations. Moreover, due to its energy resources,
Azerbaijan is in no great need of Western financial support
(for instance, it initially rejected the grants offered to it
through the European Neighborhood Policy or the Millen-
nium Challenge Corporation).
Azerbaijan is the largest South-Caucasian state and, unlike
Armenia and Georgia, a rich one, too, which guarantees its
regional supremacy from the start, so it is not interested in
a competition meant to turn it into a model democracy of
South Caucasus. The Rose Revolution in Georgia, however,
had an impact on the authoritarian measures of the Baku
power that feared a similar scenario occurring in Azerbaijan.
The Azerbaijani society is neutral with regard to the
Western political model for three reasons: the Azerbaijanis
are aware that the EU and Europeanization are patterns too
far away for them to even consider, they do not see Russia
as an enemy (although the Russians support the Armenian
occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh), and they have cultural
ties with the other societies in the East and with Turkey. The
Azerbaijani civil society consists of small groups of elitists
isolated from the population, its messages going no further
than Baku and its surroundings. It follows that the democra-
tization initiatives, even if they are not suppressed by the
regime, have only a small echo among the Azerbaijanis.
314
Conclusions
A general analysis of the political regimes in South Cau-
casus shows common features and evolutions: they were all
Soviet republics, they all had repeated transitions which did
not lead to democratic societies, territorial and/or inter-eth-
nic conflicts, and complicated relationships with Russia and
the West. At the same time, each political regime in South
Caucasus has its own particularities, that are influenced by
the local projects of state construction, by the existence or
absence of energy resources, and by territorial problems.
The Georgian political elite are now, twenty years after
the proclamation of independence, before the same questions:
Authoritarianism or democracy? For the regime in Baku, the
basic question is: How far can it go with authoritarian meas-
ures in Azerbaijan and how can the current leaders remain
in power as long as possible? The Yerevan leadership tries to
find out: What are the limits of the democratic measures in
Armenia and how can authoritarianism be preserved, while
keeping up the appearance of democracy?
In Armenia, the regime has oscillated between basing its
power on the legitimacy of voting processes organized
according to democratic norms or setting up a power center
based on authoritarian measures. For the Azerbaijanis, the
preservation of power by the Aliyevs and political loyalty
towards them have been the key levers of a regime that has
never been preoccupied by legitimacy.
In all three states, the election-based democracy has more
or less been a means of consolidating the power (Shirinian,
2003). All three regimes in South Caucasus use the same
instruments to seize or strengthen their power and are
favored by the weakness of their respective oppositions. In
a top of the democratic achievements in South Caucasus,
Georgia ranks first and Azerbaijan last.
So far, the Tbilisi regime has been a competitive-author-
itarian one still in process of transition, that will be made
to accept more and more democratization measures in the
315
future due to its dependence on the Western support and to
the pressure and influence Russia exerts on it by stimulating
the contesting movements.
President Ilham Aliyev leads a centralized administration
in which the political power clearly dominates the other two
(legislative and judicial) existing only to create the false
impression of democracy. The power in Baku has failed to
organize free elections, to create democratic relationships
with the mass-media and to guarantee the citizens rights
and liberties. Over the past few years, Ilham Aliyev and his
allies have put up a competitive-authoritarian regime that is
bound to turn into either a stable authoritarian one, or in
a petro-authoritarian one, after the Russian pattern, in the
future.
The Armenian regime has managed to achieve a mixture
of authoritarian and democratic practices. For having failed
in guaranteeing the Armenian citizens rights and liberties,
the Sargsyan regime is currently a competitive-authoritarian
one and there are few chances to see it transformed or
replaced through elections in the near future.
Bibliography
Aprasizde, David, 2009. State-Building and Democratization in
Georgia: Have the Limits Been Reached?, in OSCE Yearbook
2008, IFSH: Hamburg, pp. 63-71.
Bader, Max, 2008. Fluid Party Politics and the Challenge
for Democracy Assistance in Georgia, in Caucasian Review
of International Affairs, 2(2), pp. 1-10.
Bader, Max, 2010. Party politics in Georgia and Ukraine
and the failure of Western assistance, in Democratization,
17(6), pp. 1085-1107.
Chiaberashvili, Zurab and Tevzadze, Gigi, 2005. Power Elites
in Georgia: Old and New, in Fluri H. Cole, Philip Eden
(eds.), From Revolution to Reform. Georgias Struggle with
316
Democratic Institution Building and Security Sector Reform,
National Defense Academy, Vienna, pp. 187-207.
Cornell, Svante E., 2005. Small Nations and Great Powers.
A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Routledge
Curzon, New York.
Dannreuther, Roland (ed.), 2004. European Union Foreign and
Security Policy. Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, Routledge,
London.
Fulvio, Aitana and Rossi Rossa (eds.), 2004. European Neigh-
bourhood Policy: Political, Economic, and Social Issue, Jean
Monnet Project, Catania.
Gould, John A. and Carl Sickner, Making market democra-
cies? The contingent loyalties of post-privatization elites
in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Serbia, in Review of Interna-
tional Political Economy, 15(5), pp. 740-769.
Franke, Anja, Gawrich, Andrea, and Alakbarov, Gurban, Ka-
zakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States: Resource
Incomes and Autocracy as a Double Curse, in Post-Soviet
Regimes Europe-Asia Studies, 61(1), pp. 109-140.
Ishanian, Armine, 2008. Democracy Building and Civil Society
in Post-Soviet Armenia, Routledge, New York.
Ishiyama, John, 2008. Political Party Development and
Party Gravity in Semi-Authoritarian States. The Cases
of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, in Taiwan
Journal of Democracy, 4 (1), pp. 33-53.
Karakhanian, Aghavni, 2003. Political Culture & Democracy
Building:The Case of Armenia in Political Culture Studies,
Research & Assessment Branch, Swindon, pp. 3-13.
Levistky, Steven and Way, Luncan, 2010. Competitive Author-
itarianism. Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Mackinnon, Mark, 2007. The New Cold War. Revolutions,
Rigged Elections and Pipeline Politics in the Former Soviet Union,
Carroll & Graf Publishers, New York.
Nichol, Jim, CRS Report Georgia [Republic] Most Recent Devel-
opments and US Interests, June 15, 2011 (available at:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-727.pdf, accessed on
18 September 2011).
317
Nichol, Jim, CRS Report Georgias January 2008 Presidential
Election: Outcome and Implications, January 25th, 2008
(available at: http://opencrs.com/document/RS22794/,
accessed on 18 September 2011).
Niklas, Nilsson and Cornell, Svante E., 2008. Georgias May
2008 Parliamentary Elections Setting Sail in a Storm (avail-
able at: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroad
papers/0805Georgia.pdf, accessed on 18 September 2011).
Nodia, Ghia and Pinto Scholtbach, lvaro, 2006. The Polit-
ical Landscape of Georgia, Delft, Eburon.
Nodia, Ghia (ed.) 2010. Political Forum: 10 Questions on
Georgias Political Development, CIPDD, Tbilisi.
Nodia, Ghia, Dynamics of State Building in Georgia (available
at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publiction/2370/
dynamics_of_statebuilding_in_georgia.html?bread-
crumb=%2Fpublication%2Fby_type%2Fbook_chap-
ter%3Fpage%3D38, accessed on 18 September 2011).
Petrosyan, David, 2010. The Political System of Armenia:
Form and Content, in Caucasus Analytical Digest (17),
pp. 8-12.
Stefes, H. Christopf. Governance, the State, and Systemic
Corruption: Armenia and Georgia in Comparison, in
Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 2(2), pp. 73-83.
Timm, Christian, 2010. Neopatrimonialism by Default. State
Politics and Domination in Georgia after the Rose Revolution,
German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA
available at: http://www.gigahamburg.de/content/fsp1/
pdf/neopat/paper_neopat_workshop_timm.pdf, accessed
on 18 September 2011).
Waal, Thomas de, 2003. Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan
Through Peace and War, New York University Press, New
York.
Waters, Christopher (ed.), 2005. The State of Law in the South
Caucasus, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
Commission Staff Working Paper Country Report Georgia (avail-
able at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm,
accessed on 5 August 2011).
318
The European Neighbourhood Fishes on Partners (available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm,
accessed on 2 August 2011).
Freedom House Country Report Azerbaijan 2006 (available at:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&n
it=390&year=2006, accessed on 12 August 2011).
Freedom House Country Report Azerbaijan 2008 (available at:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&n
it=445&year=2008, accessed on 12 August 2011).
Freedom House Country Report Azerbaijan 2011 (available at:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/nit/2011/
NIT-2011-Azerbaijan.pdf, accessed on 18 September 2011).
Freedom House Country Report Georgia 2005 (available at:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&n
it=363&year=2005, accessed on 16 September 2011).
Freedom House Country Report Georgia 2006 (available at:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&y
ear=2006&country=6967, accessed on 12 August 2011).
Freedom House Country Report Georgia 2008 (available at:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&n
it=452&year=2008, accessed on 16 September 2011).
International Crisis Group (ICG), 2010. Azerbaijan Vulnerable
Stability, Europe Report 107, pp. 1-32 (available at: http://
www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/azer-
baijan/207%20Azerbaijan%20%20Vulnerable%20Stabil
ity.ashx, accessed on 18 September 2011).
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assis-
tance (IDEA), Georgia Country Report based on Research and
Dialogue with Political Parties, 2006. Stockholm (available
at: http://www.idea.int/parties/upload/Georgia_report.
pdf, accessed on 14 September 2011).
OSCE, Republic of Armenia Parliamentary Elections, 12 May
2007 (available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/
armenia/26606, accessed on 12 August 2011).
OSCE, Republic of Armenia Presidential Elections, 19 February
2008 (available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/
armenia/32115, accessed on 12 August 2011).
319
OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan Presidential Elections, 15 October
2003 (available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/
azerbaijan/13467, accessed on 15 August 2011).
OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan Parliamentary Elections, 6 Nov-
ember 2005 (available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elec- Stanislav Secrieru
tions/azerbaijan/17946, accessed on 15 August 2011).
OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan Parliamentary Elections, 7 Nov-
ember 2010 (available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elec-
tions/azerbaijan/75073, accesed on 15 August 2011).
OSCE, Georgia Partial Repeat Parliamentary Elections, 28 March
2004 (available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/
georgia/34196, accessed on 15 September 2011).
OSCE, Georgia Municipal Elections, 5 October 2006 (available
at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/23510, accessed
on 7 August 2011). Variable Geometry in Action:
OSCE, a) Georgia Extraordinary Presidential Elections, 5 January Foreign and Security Policies
2008 (available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/
georgia/30959, accesed on 8 August 2011). in South Caucasus
OSCE, b) Georgia Parliamentary Elections, 21 May 2008
(available at: http://www.civil.ge/files/files/32898_en.pdf,
accessed on 7 August 2011).
 Introduction

This chapter attempts at making a detailed analysis of

the foreign and regional security policies of the South-Cau-
casian states two decades after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. Since their regaining of independence, several tri- or
multilateral integration formulas in South Caucasus have
been proposed, but these have failed to materialize. At the
same time, the academic community and the political circles
challenged the very existence of South Caucasus as a region.
Consequently, the first part of this chapter reviews the
current debate on the regionness of South Caucasus. It
encompasses the impact of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war
on the perception of the regionness of South Caucasus.
Moreover, this section describes the macro-regional envi-
ronment in which the South-Caucasian states evolve. The
trends and political atmosphere in South Caucasus result
from the dynamics of the intra-regional relationships. The
second part focuses on the bilateral relationships between
the three South-Caucasian states, emphasizing their com-
mercial relationships, infrastructure projects, unsolved terri-
torial conflicts, public perception, the status of national
minorities, military cooperation, demarcation of borders,
and other aspects of the bilateral agendas. The fall of the
Soviet Union has liquidated unipolarity in the region and
has multiplied the number of actors capable to influence

323
developments in the South-Caucasus in a significant way.
Given the multitude of influential actors in the region, a
major part of the analysis will be devoted to the relation-
ships between the South-Caucasian states and the US, the
EU, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. All in all, this analytical
undertaking will be guided by an intra-regional perception.
Thus, in presenting the debates on the regionness of
South Caucasus, on the intra-regional relationships, and the
interaction with external actors, the views of the three
republics, which are mainly compiled from interviews with
officials and experts in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia,
will prevail.
I. The Question of the Regionness of South
Caucasus
I.1. From Transcaucasia to South Caucasus
Transcaucasia, a term used before South Caucasus, was
introduced into the diplomatic vocabulary of Tsarist Russia
in the early 19th century. It referred to the territory under
Russian control south of the Caucasian Mountains, all the
way to the borders of the Persian and the Ottoman Empires.
In Tsarist Russia, Transcaucasia was divided into five
guberniyas: Tiflis, Baku, Yerevan, Kutaisi, and Elizavetpol
(see Map 1). The 1917 Revolution triggered centrifugal
movements on the periphery of the Tsarist Empire. In 1918,
Transcaucasia declared its independence and for the first
time formed an integrated political structure the
Transcaucasian Federal Democratic Republic. However,
after a month of co-existence, Georgia, Armenia, and Azer-
baijan declared their independence. The three states were
included by military force in the Soviet Union in 1922,
under the banner of the Transcaucasian Federal Soviet
Republic. The 1936 Constitution of the USSR put an end
324
to the Transcaucasian Federation and created three
republics of the union that kept their status until 1991 (see
Map 2).
The regaining of their independence by Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia (see Map 3) triggered the debate
on the proper name to use and the future of the region.
The political and academic discourses make use of several
optimistic labels that allude to regional integration: The
United States of Caucasus, The Caucasian Common
House, and The Caucasian Common Market. Also, there
are proposals for cooperation projects of the type 3 + 1,
in which Russia or Turkey serve as engines of regional inte-
gration (Ismailov & Papava, 2007, pp. 13-14). At the same
time, the first attempts are made to replace the old political
and geographic label of Transcaucasia. An official remem-
bers: It took us four years to persuade the EU to replace
Transcaucasia, in its official documents, with South Cau-
casus1. Gradually, the term South Caucasus came to promi-
nence in the international diplomatic vocabulary and is now
largely being used by the actors interested in the region,
including Russia. The 2008 joint statement of the presi-
dents of the Russian Federation, Armenia, and Azerbaijan
refers explicitly to South Caucasus, and not Transcaucasia
(Prezident Rossii, 2008). The terminological change is mir-
rored at the level of bureaucratic organization and in the
policies led by the regional actors. For instance, in 2003, the
EU created a position of special Representative for South
Caucasus, that was maintained after the structural reorgani-
zation triggered by the Lisbon Treaty. In 2005 and 2006,
the obstruction by Cyprus of the negotiations for an EU
Azerbaijan action plan determined the European Union to
postpone negotiation of similar plans with Georgia and
Armenia (Popescu, 2011, p. 102). In 2008, Turkey revived
the idea of a stability pact in South Caucasus initially
launched in the 1990s, this time under the umbrella of a
1 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011.
325
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, of the type
3 + 2 (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia + Russia and Turkey).
Map 1 Transcaucasia within Tsarist Russia
(Source: Andrew Andersen, 2003/2007)
Map 2 South Caucasus within the USSR
(Source: Wikipedia)
326
Map 3 Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in the post-Soviet era
(Source: RFE/RL, 2002)
I.2. Is South Caucasus a region?
The international use of the concept evolved alongside
a strong trend which denies the regionness of South
Caucasus. An expert explains: We are a region, geographi-
cally speaking, but this is not enough [] In the era of glob-
alization, regions are being built.2 And yet, in terms of a
trilateral economic, political, or military cooperation, South
Caucasus is actually paralyzed. There are no infrastructure
projects that include all the three states and coordinating
their foreign policy positions in a trilateral format is uncon-
ceivable. Nor is there an integrated security umbrella: the
states in the region turn to the various regional actors to
guarantee their military security.3 So, if we compare South
Caucasus to the Baltic area, then South Caucasus is not a
region4, concludes another expert. Undoubtedly, turning
South Caucasus into a functional region, following a European
pattern, is more of a wish than a reality. The EU attempts
2 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
3 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.
4 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
327
at launching regional cooperation have not produced the
expected results. Initiated by the EU in 2010, the South
Caucasus Integrated Border Management program is being
implemented bilaterally between Georgia and Armenia, on
the one hand, and between Georgia and Azerbaijan, on the
other hand. Trilateral environmental programs financed by
the EU are being implemented on a rather small scale, but,
in most cases, unilateral or bilateral solutions prevail: We
have no time to wait for Georgia or Armenia [] We will
solve this matter by ourselves5, an official confessed, refer-
ring to an issue involving all three states. Although there are
contacts at the level of the civil societies, even those have
dropped in intensity after 2007.6 One of the few ongoing
trilateral projects is the program that facilitates communica-
tion between the young people in the region and teaches
them to conceive and develop local and trans-boundary
projects (Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009a).
The contestation of the regionness of South Caucasus
and of any prospect of regional cohesion is also being argued
from an alternative perspective. Observers have noticed that
the South-Caucasian states regional identity is either mis-
sing or, at best, under-developed: There is no vision regard-
ing South Caucasus in our society7, an Armenian expert
said; The attachment to the idea of a region is rather weak
in Azerbaijan [because] our identity includes not only
Caucasian elements, but also Caspian and Oriental ones8,
an Azerbaijani opinion maker stated. Armenias relative iso-
lation in the area and the fact that Azerbaijan assumes the
role of a bridge between East and West dilute these states
sense of belonging to South Caucasus. Moreover, foreign
policy objectives and imperatives of domestic development
push the states towards seeking extra-regional solutions.
5 Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011.
6 Interview with experts, Yerevan, June 2011.
7 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
8 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
328
Georgia is by far the most active state in the region when it
comes to attempts to escape the region. Ever since the lat-
ter half of the 1990s, Georgia has developed a Black Sea
state profile. After the consecutive expansions of NATO and
of the EU, Georgia doubled its efforts to detach itself from
South Caucasus, which was perceived as a region with a
huge image burden (Nilsson, 2009, p. 100) and to join the
developing Western project in making: the wider Black Sea
region (Asmus and Jackson, 2004): We have tried to rede-
fine our identity, by emphasizing our geographical position
in the Black Sea9, an expert said. For the authorities in
Tbilisi, migrating towards the wider Black Sea region
means leaving the Caucasus and gradually getting closer and
connecting to the institutions of the West. But the 2008
Russo-Georgian war dashed these hopes and determined a
change of perspective in Tbilisi. Georgia seeks to take
advantage of the Eastern Partnership so as to assume the
position of an Eastern European state. It is important to
notice that the new discourse has both a regional compo-
nent, and an individualist one: South Caucasus is part of
Eastern Europe [] why is there this distinction, within the
Eastern Partnership, between South Caucasus and the other
states?10, a government official asks; Speaking of reforms
[for the European integration], Georgia is much closer to
the Ukraine and Moldova11, a government representative
adds, while adding to the equation elements that differentiate
Georgia from the other South-Caucasian republics. It seems
that in the years to come, Georgia will find a rich source of
inspiration in Croatias escape from the Western Balkans
and its (predictable) integration in the EU.12
In conclusion, it is anticipated in the pessimists camp
that the blockages at the level of trilateral cooperation and
9 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.
10 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.
11 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011.
12 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011.
329
the diverging external orientations of the three states will
stimulate the dispersal of what is left from the region, so
that, in fifteen to twenty years time, the phrase South Cau-
casus, a post-Soviet inertia, will be stripped of any descrip-
tive value13.
I.3. South Caucasus a sub-regional security complex
Although they reflect objectively the regional reality,
the deniers of the South Caucasus regionness overlook
two aspects: the plurality of regionalism typologies and the
impact of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Hence, the rejec-
tion of the South Caucasus regionness is built on the nar-
row meaning of the concept of region, that theoretically and
practically imagines region only in the form of a security
community defined by a high degree of integration and by
the elimination of violence as a solution to problems inside
the community (Deutsch, 2006, pp. 41-42). A classic
example in the IR literature is the trans-Atlantic communi-
ty. Therefore, the parallel between South Caucasus and the
Baltic region as part of the trans-Atlantic community is not
an accidental one. The security community, however, is
an ideal type, reproduced in a rather limited geographical
area. In international relationships, regionalism may mani-
fest itself in various forms. Dysfunctional regionalism and
geo-political regionalism are among the less benign formu-
las of regionalism. These apply to cases in which the states
have failed to develop a sound regional cooperation and the
region is the object of a rivalry for spheres of influence
involving regional powers (Emerson, 2008, pp. 2-4).
If we put aside the idealist notion of region and admit
that integration is not the only criterion of determining
regionness and that interdependence may be not only
positive, but negative as well, then South Caucasus is a
region. The concept of security complex, developed in the
13 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
330
literature devoted to international security studies, offers
a comprehensive analytical platform that captures coopera-
tive as well as dysfunctional patterns of regionalism and can,
hence, prove extremely useful in the study of the region-
ness of South Caucasus (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, pp. 419-
423; Simao & Freire, 2008, pp. 225-226). The concept of
security complex refers to a set of states whose major
security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked, that
their national security problems cannot reasonably be ana-
lyzed or resolved apart from one another (Buzan, Weaver
& De Wilde, 1998, p. 12). It must be pointed out that the
authors of this analytical approach share the extensive inter-
pretation of national security which includes, apart from the
traditional political and military dimension, the ecological,
economic, and societal security (ibidem, pp. 198-199).
Seen through such a theoretical lens, South Caucasus is
a sub-regional security complex, which is defined by enmity
between Armenia and Azerbaijan and by a variety of secto-
rial relationships of pragmatic friendship and/or situational
competition between Georgia and Armenia and between
Georgia and Azerbaijan. For instance, Azerbaijans security,
when it comes to the management of the courses of water
and its quality, depends on the cooperation with Georgia
and Armenia, which are situated upstream on the rivers
Kura and Aras flowing towards Azerbaijan. Georgias energy
security cannot be ensured without Azerbaijan, and a pos-
sible war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is bound to sig-
nificantly undermine Georgias economic security. In turn,
the security of the terrestrial transit through Georgia is vital
for Armenias economy and (to a lesser extent) for that of
Azerbaijan. The list could go on. Objective factors binding
this region of variable geometries (the three states are part,
in various combinations, of the CIS, CSTO, BSEC, GUAM14;
14 Community of Independent States; Collective Security Treaty
Organization; (Organization of the) Black Sea Economic Coopera-
tion; Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova.
331
the intensity of their relationships with the EU and NATO
also varies) have an impact on the strategic perceptions and
calculations regarding the management of the national secu-
rity of each state. Armenia and Azerbaijan follow very close-
ly the relationships that each of them develops with NATO:
If the representative of Armenia comes today and requests
cooperation in this or that sector, it is most likely that
tomorrow we will receive a similar request from Azerbaijan
[] and vice versa15, an official admits. Confirmation of the
correlation at regional level of each countrys decision to
cooperate with NATO is to be found in the motivation for
Armenias decision to triple its peace-keeping forces in
Afghanistan in 2011. According to the Minister of Defense,
Armenia must not be last in South Caucasus in this respect
[the military presence in Afghanistan] (Massis Post 2011).
The attempt at military reintegration of South Ossetia in
Georgia was negatively perceived in Armenia. As Yerevan
sees things, any success on the part of Georgia would
encourage Azerbaijan and increase the chances of a military
solution in Nagorno-Karabakh.16 Similarly, in Georgia, where
a significant number of internally displaced persons (IDPs)
live, the negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia are
closely followed, especially the solution the two countries
will reach regarding the IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh.
These are some of the overlapping concerns of the states in
the region, confirming the existence of a sub-regional secu-
rity complex in South Caucasus.
Therefore, in spite of the divergent foreign and security
policies orientations of the states in the region, there is a
rather high degree of interdependence. The South-Caucasian
states mutual dependencies are not always of a positive
nature, but this does not negate the existence of the region,
it merely describes the nature of the regional interconnec-
tions. The comparison with the Western Balkans is probably
15 Interview with a NATO official.
16 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
332
much more appropriate when we seek examples of region-
alism similar to those in South Caucasus. It is an opinion
shared by some politicians and analysts in the area: South
Caucasus represents the next source of problems after the
Balkans17, a Baku official stated; There are a series of sim-
ilarities the history of imperial domination, the memory
of the war, the attempts at getting rid of the regional label
that make South Caucasus comparable to the Western
Balkans18, a Tbilisi expert pointed out.
In spite of their attempts at escaping the region, the
three states were forced to return to South Caucasus after
the Russo-Georgian war: Before August 2008, the region
was about to disintegrate [but] the war in Georgia altered
these dynamics and forced the states to refocus their atten-
tion on the region19, an influential local analyst explains.
Consequently, the war brought back the regional conscious-
ness and thinking: Georgia has deteriorated the atmosphere
in the region20, a local expert incisively declared, referring
to the Russo-Georgian military conflict; The 2008 war
altered the perception about South Caucasus in Europe and
in the world in a negative way21, another observer added.
The 2008 military conflict brought to light the regional
threats affecting European security, although South Cau-
casus offers to Europe a multitude of opportunities. The
altered image has impacted all the states in the region. The
academic circles are attempting to overcome the image
deficit by changing labels. For instance, two authors of a
detailed study dedicated to the region argue that the three
Caucasian states belong to Central, not to South Caucasus
(Ismailov & Papava, 2008, pp. 287-289). The logic of their
argument is almost identical to that of the East-European
17 Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011.
18 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
19 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
20 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
21 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.
333
states in the mid-1990s, that wished to be included politi- of the discourse and, especially, the adjustments brought to
cally and economically in Central Europe. the policies of the three states after 2008 prove that it is pre-
Moreover, in 2008, the South-Caucasian states redis- mature to speak of the notion of South Caucasus as being
covered the regional vulnerability and interconnectedness. irrelevant.
They increased the monitoring of their neighbors activities
and adjusted their security strategies by taking into account I.4. South Caucasus in its Eurasian context
the modified regional environment. Georgias accelerated
The relationships between states do not evolve in a
NATO integration failed, which determined the authorities
political, military, or economic void. The inertia of bilateral
in Tbilisi to practice a more balanced regional foreign poli-
relationships is always influenced by the regional context in
cy. The temporary suspension of the commercial transit
which they develop. The intra-regional dynamics of South
through Georgia, in August 2008, sped up Armenias nego-
Caucasus makes no exception. By virtue of the geographic
tiations with Turkey for the normalization of the bilateral positioning of the region, the impact of the regional envi-
relationship. The war in Georgia diminished Azerbaijans ronment on the three states is probably stronger than in
interest for NATO and introduced new elements into the case of other regions (see Map 4). Since they are placed at
energy policy. The political discourse was also adapted to the intersection of several regional security complexes, every
the post-war reality. Georgias homecoming back to the South-Caucasian state by itself, but also South Caucasus as
region was announced by the Georgian president: The
Caucasus must unite (Grigoryan, 2009). Hence, he resus-
citated the idea of The Caucasian Common House. In his
opinion, that should take the shape of a trilateral union able
to sketch a regional political and economic strategy (Gha-
zinyan, 2011). The idea was taken up by the civil society:
We wish for the materialization of the concept of a
Caucasian Common House under the auspices of the
European Union22, a member of the mass-media enthusias-
tically states. Economic undertones were introduced into
the political discourse. For instance, the president of
Azerbaijan said that the economy of Azerbaijan represents
75% of the economy of South Caucasus (News.Az, 2010),
while the president of Georgia described Tbilisi as the
capital of the Caucasus (Civil.Ge, 2011a). Undoubtedly,
the Caucasian Common House remains mostly a rhetori-
cal exercise and the data referring to the volume of Azer-
baijans economy belongs to the intimidation game going on
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But the regional aspects
Map 4 South Caucasus in its Euro-Asian context
22 Interview with a mass-media person, Baku, June 2011. (Source: Caspian Study Program, Harvard University, 2006)

334 335
a region feels the impact of the political upheavals, the eco-
nomic crises, and the ascent of other regional actors in their
immediate vicinity. The literature defines a sub-regional
security complex situated at the intersection of other region-
al security complexes and parallel security processes at a
macro-regional level as being insulators (Buzan & Weaver,
2003, p. 490). Therefore, since they are at a meeting-point
of concurrent regional security logics, the security concerns
of the South-Caucasian states cannot be understood sepa-
rately from the Eurasian context.
I.4.1. North
To the North, South Caucasus neighbors the North-Cau-
casian Federal District and the Southern Federal Districts of
the Russian Federation (see Map 5). North-Caucasus is one
of the most important challenges to Russias national secu-
rity. The republics of North Caucasus are confronted with
almost daily acts of low or medium intensity violence,
large-scale unemployment (over 50% in some cases), sys-
temic corruption, and poverty. Moscow ensures situational
Map 5 South Caucasus and North Caucasus (Source: Wikitravel)
336
stability in the area through allocation of federal funds and
militarization of the region. For instance, the budgets of
republics such as Chechnya and Ingushetia are being covered
at a rate of 91% from federal allocations (Grove, 2011). The
infusion of money secures the regional elites loyalty, but the
non-transparent way in which the funds are distributed
exacerbates corruption. To contain the insurgency, Russia
has deployed a contingent of approximately 88,000 troops
in the region, from various branches of the armed forces
(Nichol, 2011, p. 13). The military presence on land is
being reinforced by two military bases of the Caspian fleet,
in Kaspiysk and Makhacikala. In 2011, the Ministry of the
Interior dispatched additional forces to Dagestan, to coun-
teract the rebels spring campaign. The explosive situation
in North Caucasus and the militarization of the region
directly impact the security of the South-Caucasian states.
The railroad and the gas pipeline that connect Dagestan to
Azerbaijan have often been the targets of terrorist acts.
Moreover, rebels from Dagestan have often crossed the
border into Azerbaijan. Russia regularly blames Georgia for
harboring and protecting North-Caucasian rebels in the
Kodori Gorge. It is worthwhile to mention that the Kremlin
has kept accusing Georgia even after the Abkhazian militia
gained control over the Kodori Gorge, with large support of
Russian troops. Last, but not least, the 58th Army deployed
in North Caucasus was at the backbone of the Russian forces
that took part in the Russo-Georgian war of 2008.
Krasnodarsky Kray is the only administrative unit of the
Southern Federal District that neighbors South Caucasus
or, more precisely, the Georgian separatist region, Abkhazia.
It hosts the most important Russian port at the Black Sea,
Novorossiysk, which was considered, prior to the 2010
Russo-Ukrainian agreements in Kharkov, to be an alterna-
tive to the Russian fleet basis in Sevastopol. The insurgents
strategy is to extend the North-Caucasian front towards the
areas populated by Russian ethnics. Hence, Krasnodarsky
Kray, as an immediate neighbor of the Caucasian republics,
337
imports insecurity from North Caucasus. During the last
decade, there have been several terrorist acts in the region.
Moreover, the designation of the city of Sochi as host of the
2014 Winter Olympic Games increases the danger for
large-scale terrorist attacks in Krasnodarsky Kray. The 2010
railroad explosion outside Sochi confirms the worst predic-
tions. The use of the Abkhazian infrastructure and natural
resources to prepare the 2014 Winter Olympiad fuels the
regional tensions between Russia and Georgia.
The security problems in North Caucasus should be seen
in the context of Russias regional ambitions. The Kremlin
traditionally considered its military presence in South Cau-
casus to be vital for keeping control over North Caucasus.
This outlook is based on the history of the conquest of the
Caucasus. Chronologically speaking, Tsarist Russia first
occupied South Caucasus, following a direct confrontation
with other regional powers. Only after consolidating control
over the territory South of the Caucasian Mountains did
Russia launch its decisive campaign for the all-out conquer-
ing of North Caucasus as well (the East and West regions),
that was accomplished in the latter half of the 19th century
(Trenin, 2009, p. 143). The connection between South and
North Caucasus in the Russian strategic thinking was par-
tially reflected by the logic of the 2008 actions. Besides
undermining the US positions in the region and preventing
the extension of NATO in South Caucasus, the military
intervention sent a powerful signal to the North-Caucasian
republics (ibidem, p. 149). Therefore, the objective vulnera-
bility in North Caucasus and the ambition to establish a
sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space motivate
Russias ambition to be the major security manager in the (since 2010) have started supplying Europe with oil through
Caucasus (ibidem, p. 154).
I.4.2. East
South Caucasus is bordered by the Caspian Sea to the East
and by the Black Sea to the West. Due to this geographic
338
position, combined with the vast energy resources in the
Caspian region, South Caucasus plays the role of an impor-
tant energy hub in Eurasia. The Caspian Sea links South
Caucasus to Central Asia, especially to the post-Soviet
republics Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The two states are
being governed by consolidated authoritarian regimes
(Freedom House, 2011), that ensure their survival also
through a multi-vectorial foreign policy. President Nursultan
Nazarbayev has been in office for 19 years (matched only
by president Karimov of Uzbekistan), the longest in power
among the leaders in the post-Soviet space. In April 2011,
Nazarbayev was reelected for another five-year term. In
Turkmenistan, president Niazovs sudden death in 2006
made possible a power transition after fifteen years since
the declaration of independence, but the authoritarian
nature of the regime remained unchanged. Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan are petrostates; they possess the largest
reserves of oil and/or gas in Central Asia. Russia and China
seek to monopolize the imports of natural gas and crude oil
from the Caspian region: Russia in order to re-sell these
resources to the EU and to the other post-Soviet states in
Eastern Europe, China in order to meet the demands of its
ever-growing domestic consumption. On the other hand, by
adopting a rigid position on the judicial status of the
Caspian Sea, Iran aims to hamper the trans-Caspian projects
important for the EUs energy security. Also, the dispute
between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan regarding the delim-
itation of the national sectors in the Caspian Sea hinders
the trans-Caspian gas pipeline project. In spite of such
obstacles, Kazakhstan (since 2008) and Turkmenistan
the Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan pipeline (BTC). Kazakhstan
also uses additional export route through the Georgian port
of Batumi. The maritime connection between Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan is provided by the regular
ferry-boat connections from Baku to Turkmenbashi and
to Aktau, respectively. The transport routes linking Georgia
339
and Azerbaijan to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are part of
the northern distribution network whereby the NATO and
US forces in Afghanistan are being supplied. Nevertheless,
Russia and Iran still hold the naval military supremacy at
the Caspian Sea.
I.4.3. West
The Black Sea is the only direct link between South
Caucasus and the EU and NATO. Its latest enlargement has
turned the EU into a Black Sea power. At the same time, the
2004 enlargement has extended NATOs presence in the
region. The new regional configuration, on the one hand,
and the interests of the new member states, on the other
hand, have triggered a process of reformulation of policies
towards the Black Sea region. Consequently, the EU
launched two initiatives covering this area: the Black Sea
Sinergy (2007) and the Eastern Partnership (2009). In
2011, the European Parliament adopted the EU strategy for
the Black Sea region. Although there had been initiatives for
a similar strategy of NATO before, those were ultimately
blocked by Turkey.23 Romania and Bulgaria are semi-consol-
idated democracies (Freedom House, 2011) with economic
interests in South Caucasus. The imperatives of energy
security have encouraged the two states to join the Nabucco
gas pipeline project and to develop close economic and
political relationships with Azerbaijan and Georgia. The pri-
macy of economic interests explains Bulgarias and Romanias
weak support for democracy promotion in Georgia and
Azerbaijan.
Besides the new EU members, two states with European
aspirations are part of the Black Sea region: the Ukraine and
Moldova. These Black Sea countries are being governed by
hybrid political regimes (Freedom House, 2011) and have
the most advanced relations, among the Eastern Partnership
23 Interview with a NATO official.
340
states, with the EU. In order to accelerate their European
integration, tke Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia share
experience at various levels regarding the implementation of
reforms and the negotiations with the EU. Another two
actors in the Black Sea region determine to a great extent
the security dynamics in the area: Turkey and Russia.
During the last decade, the political, military, and economic
relations between Moscow and Ankara have had an ascend-
ing trajectory. The bilateral trade exchanges have substan-
tially grown, with Russia becoming Turkeys second trade
partner after the EU (EU Commission, 2011a). The two
states have lifted the visas for short-term trips and have cre-
ated a High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council. Moreover,
Turkey is among the few NATO member-states to have pur-
chased Russian weapons. The Russo-Turkish rapprochement
is not, however, without precedent in recent history. In the
1970s, Turkey and Russia went through a period of warm
political and economic bilateral relations ultimately due to
the tensions between the Turkey and its ally, the United
States (Altunisik & Tur, 2005, p. 108). The improvement of
the Russo-Turkish relations in the early 2000s occurred
alongside the deterioration of the Turkish-American ones,
that was caused by the US military campaign in Iraq and
Washingtons plans to internationalize the Black Sea. This
dynamics accelerated the formation of the Russo-Turkish
condominium in the Black Sea region, meant to maintain
the regional status quo (Socor, 2009; Triantaphyllou, 1009,
p. 232). Consequently, Turkey opposed the extension of the
NATO Active Endeavor operation in the Black Sea and
approved a limited NATO military presence in the Black
Sea during the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict (Lesser, 2011,
pp. 2-3). This tactical alliance, however, is not without
divergent or competitive interests in South Caucasus, which
has been proven plainly by Russias reaction to the attempts
at normalization of the Turkish-Armenian relations (Torba-
kov, 2010).
341
 I.4.4. South
In the South, the Caucasus neighbors two Middle-Eastern
powers, Iran and Turkey, the latter a regional European
power as well. Iran is a difficult neighbor (though not to
Armenia), but a necessary partner, at the same time, for the
South-Caucasian states. Irans nuclear program and domes-
tic political instability fuel uncertainty in the region. Tehran
pursues at least four objectives in South Caucasus: to pre-
vent what it perceives as encirclement by the West; to
ensure the neutrality of the three South-Caucasian states in
case of an armed conflict with the US; to break out of inter-
national isolation and to legitimate its political regime; to
increase its regional and economic influence by projecting
soft power and through economic expansion. The coher-
ence of Irans regional policy is undermined by the splits
within the Tehran regime and by the problem of succession
following the disputed presidential elections of 2009 and
the mass protests they triggered (Nader, Thaler & Bohandy,
2011). For instance, president Mahmoud Ahmadinejads
visit to Armenia was canceled in 2011 not only for the
external reasons Tehran officially invoked, but also for some
domestic ones. The interdiction to leave the country, that
was imposed on the eve of the visit to some high-ranking
officials from the presidents entourage, and Ahmadinejads
intention to resist Ayatollah Khameneis pressure seem to
have contributed decisively to the postponement of his visit
to Yerevan.24
Turkey has undergone major internal transformations in
the early 2000s. The high rates of economic growth and the
stagnation of accession talks with the EU have contributed
to self-confidence, an independent foreign policy, and an
active strategy in the countrys vicinity (Tocci, 2011).
Turkeys regional policy of zero problems with neighbors
has strengthened its political and economic positions in the
24 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
342
Middle East, the Western Balkans, South Caucasus, and the
Caspian region (Akyol, 2011). Prime-Minister Erdogans
speech after winning the 2011 elections, in which he
addressed the inhabitants of Damascus, Sarajevo, and Baku,
confirmed the continuity of Turkeys ambitious regional
policy. South Caucasus is important in Turkeys strategy to
turn itself into a major Eurasian energy node. The war
between Russia and Georgia, while jeopardizing such plans,
gave an impulse to Turkeys more active involvement in the
regional security matters. The normalization of the relations
with Armenia was seen as a step towards the redesigning of
the regional architecture and the boosting of Turkeys levers
in South Caucasus. Although is has been successful to a
certain extent, Turkeys neighborhood policy is facing two
major challenges: keeping the balance between competition
and cooperation with Russia and managing the political and
economic consequences of the revolutions in the Arab world.
Last, but not least, the political regimes in South Caucasus
have followed with deep concern the democratic revival in
the Arab countries. The launch of the anti-corruption cam-
paign in Azerbaijan and the dialogue between power and
opposition in Armenia coincided with the revolutionary
sweep in the Middle East, thus confirming the exposure of
South Caucasus to the democratization processes underway
in the vicinity.
II. The Intra-Regional Dynamics in South
Caucasus
The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan makes
Georgia a pivotal state in South Caucasus. The only stable
relations the two camps in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
have in the region are those with Georgia. On the other
hand, Georgias key-position in the region forces the author-
ities in Tbilisi to keep a subtle balance in their relations with
both Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
343
 II.1. Armenia and Azerbaijan: an improbable peace,
a possible war
Between Armenia and Azerbaijan there are no diplomatic
relations, the border is closed, and there is no direct com-
munication by land or by air. Flights between the two capi-
tals have stopovers in Moscow, Kiev, or Istanbul. Although,
according to certain officials, there is a trade going on
between Armenia and Azerbaijan through third parties25,
most likely through Georgia, the extent of such a trade is
very difficult to measure. The only confirmed place in
Georgia where some trade between the Armenians and the
Azerbaijani was going on was the village Sadakhlo, at the
border between Armenia and Georgia, not very far from
the point of intersection of the borders between the three
South-Caucasian states (Poghosyan, 2011). However, the
Sadakhlo market was closed down in 2005. There exists a
limited interaction between the NGOs in the two countries,
but even the level of cooperation between those has
dropped after 2005.26 The encounters usually take place
in Georgia or in Armenia, because it is rather difficult to
organize this type of activities in Azerbaijan.27 The Armenian
participants in Baku or the Azerbaijani ones in Yerevan are
provided with personal protection and their passports are
not being stamped when they go in and out of the respec-
tive countries, so there is no actual proof that they have ever
visited Armenia or Azerbaijan.28 The attempts at reconnect-
ing the two societies through a cultural dialogue are often
blocked. In 2010, an Armenian NGO planned a week of the
Azerbaijani film in Armenia, but, in spite of all preliminary
organizational measures, the event no longer took place
(Gregoryan, 2010). The Azerbaijani singers winning of the
2011 finals of the Eurovision Song Contest triggered a vast
25 Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011.
26 Interview with a mass-media person, Baku, June 2011.
27 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
28 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
344
public debate in Armenia on whether the country should
participate in the 2012 edition or boycott it.
The state of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is
the result of the war waged between the two states in the
early 1990s for Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave that used to
belong to Azerbaijan prior to the Soviet Union dissolution.
Currently, Armenia controls Nagorno-Karabakh and other
seven regions (two of them partially) around it (see Map 6).29
Therefore, Azerbaijan has no control over roughly 14% of
its internationally recognized territory (Waal, 2003, p. 286).
In Armenia, the seven Azerbaijani regions are called liber-
ated territories and serve two strategic objectives: to secure
a land connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia
and provide the necessary space for an advanced defense of
the enclave. Moreover, one does not rule out, in Yerevan,
that those regions might be used (except Lacin and Kelbajar,
which separate Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh) as a bar-
gaining chip in the future negotiations for the status of
Nagorno-Karabakh and for reliable security guarantees.
Aside from the destruction of infrastructure and the numer-
ous victims, the war produced around 600,000 internally
Map 6 Nagorno-Karabakh and other seven occupied Azerbaijani
regions (Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
London 2011)
29 The seven regions are: Kelbajar, Lacin, Kubatli, Jebrail, Agdam,
Zanghelan, and Fizuli.
345
displaced persons (IDPs) in Azerbaijan. According to the
international NGOs, Azerbaijan is in the top ten among
countries with the highest per capita IDP population in the
world (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2011).
De iure, the two countries are in a state of war. The mili-
tary operations were suspended in 1994, following the con-
clusion of an armistice in Bishkek. Azerbaijan opposed the
deployment of Russian peace-keeping forces along the front
line. Thus, it is the sole responsibility of the belligerents to
observe the cease-fire agreement. Although there have been
no considerable military confrontations in the conflict zone
since 1994, the two sides regularly engage in skirmishes.
This low-intensity violence, that some experts call the
snipers war30, produced 3,000 casualties between 1994
and 2009 (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 1). Over the
last three years, the violation of the armistice has become
a more frequent practice, which increases the likelihood of
a new outbreak of the armed conflict (idem, 2011a). The
purpose of the high-level diplomatic efforts this year [2011]
has been the prevention of war, rather than finding a solu-
tion to the conflict31, an expert in the region stated.
Nagorno-Karabakh is Azerbaijans main foreign policy
and security problem. According to the surveys, the conflict
with Armenia is the utmost concern of 51% of the Azer-
baijani citizens (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). At
the same time, the problem of peace (including the conflict
with Azerbaijan) comes only third, with 9%, after unemploy-
ment (46%) and poverty (10%) in the top concerns of the
Armenian citizens (Caucasus Research Resource Centers,
2010). This difference could be due to the following:
Azerbaijan lost the 1992-1994 war; its petrodollars, that are
distributed among various social categories, tend to miti-
gate, in the public perception, the effects of corruption and
unemployment coming next on the list of concerns; the Baku
30 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
31 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
346
government keeps a tight control over the public space,
so it is able to instrumentalize efficiently the conflict with
Armenia to prevent in the public debates the primacy of the
domestic problems over those generated externally. On the
other hand, the opinion poll undertaken on the Armenian
side shows that the Armenians feel much more comfortable
with the present-day status quo on the front line, but feel
stronger the effects of the conflict, since it is partially
responsible for their difficult economic situation. At the
same time, the results of the Armenian survey show that the
political system in that country is more open than the one
in Azerbaijan and the population gradually leaves behind
the logic of the besieged fortress. Consequently, the prob-
lems affecting the citizens daily life come first and there is
an ever-growing social demand that they be solved.
To defend or to change the status quo in Nagorno-Kara-
bakh, Armenia, on the one hand, and Azerbaijan, on the
other hand, invest significant financial and human resources
into the judicial, diplomatic, historiographic, economic, and
military conflict waged along the front line, in the infor-
mational space, or within the international organizations.
The current border between Azerbaijan and Armenia is one
of the most militarized ones in the world. Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh have already erected three lines of
defense and the fourth appears to be under construction.32
Armenia supports Nagorno-Karabakh financially and con-
tributes with troops to its defense system. According to esti-
mates, the armed forces of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh
add up to 70,000 troops, while the Azerbaijani army counts
about 95,000 troops (International Crisis Group, 2011a,
p. 1). The armies of the two states regularly display military
might by organizing military exercises in the proximity of
the front line. Both Armenia, and Azerbaijan are engaged
in an arms race, as reflected by the spectacular increase
of defense budgets and acquisitions of military equipment.
32 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
347
Between 2000 and 2009, Armenias defense budget rose
from 3.6% to 4.2% of the GDP and Azerbaijans from 2.3%
to 3.4% of the GDP (SIPRI, 2011). From 2000 to 2010,
Azerbaijan allocated $9.2 billion for its defense and Armenia
$2.6 billion (News.Az, 2011a). In 2010, the Baku government
adopted a $2.1 billion defense budget, more than Armenias
national consolidated budget ($1.8 billion).
Besides its wish to demonstrate a change in the military
balance, Bakus aim is to exhaust Armenia economically,
through a sustained arms race. The shutting down of the
Azerbaijani-Armenian border and of the Turkish-Armenian
one and the exclusion of Armenia from the regional infra-
structure projects are guided by the same agenda. One of
the recent attempts at exerting economic pressure on
Armenia was to invoke, after the Fukushima nuclear inci-
dent, the threat for the entire region represented by the
Soviet-era nuclear plant in Metsamor, that produces rough-
ly 40% of the countrys electric power (News.Az, 2011b).
Shutting down the Metsamor plant without a prior identi-
fication of alternative energy sources or the building of a
new plant, would put in jeopardy Armenias entire economy.
Baku hopes that its strategy of continuous harassment,
combined with Azerbaijans own steady economic growth
based on oil and gas exports, will ultimately force Armenia
into negotiating from a position of weakness. Azerbaijan
does not rule out completely a military solution for recover-
ing control over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Although the defense budget is a heavy burden for
Armenias economy, keeping up the military balance is a
major objective achieved in great part with the help of the
Armenian Diaspora and through purchasing military equip-
ment from Russia at prices below those on the world mar-
ket. Armenia tries to minimize the effects of its regional eco-
nomic isolation by developing alternative energy projects
and obstructing the initiatives supported by Azerbaijan. For
instance, Armenia has actively opposed any external financing
for the Baku Tbilisi Kars railroad project. The de-isolation
348
strategy aims not only Armenia, but Nagorno-Karabakh as
well. Thus, the Diaspora has contributed $3 million for the
reconstruction of the Stepanakert airport, but its reopening
was postponed in 2011. At the same time, in retaliation for
the closing of its borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey,
Armenia is blocking Azerbaijans access to the Nakhichevan
enclave, whose southern neighbors are Iran and, for a very
short length (11 km), Turkey.
Both states promote an active worldwide information
campaign on Nagorno-Karabakh, in order to gain as much
support from the international community as possible.
Experts do not rule out the possibility that Azerbaijans
2011 decision to join the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),
with a membership of 180 countries, is partly aimed
towards using that platform in order to gain support for the
Baku cause among states that are confronted with similar
territorial problems.33 The two conflicting parts make use of
a historiography that either denies or minimizes their mutu-
al presence in Nagorno-Karabakh in the course of history.
Furthermore, they invoke either the right to self-determina-
tion of a population that has been the victim of an aggression
by the central administration, or the territorial aggression of
one state against the other and ethnic cleansing campaigns.
Besides their active implication in information campaigns
aimed at the diplomatic corps, the presidential administra-
tions in both Armenia, and Azerbaijan include specialized
departments that monitor the rivals messages and coordinate
the efforts to neutralize them in the informational sphere.34
The Diaspora is an important conveyor of messages in both
Armenias, and Azerbaijans lobbying campaigns. The
Armenian Diasporas in France and in the US are well-known
for their thorough organization and their impact on certain
foreign policy decisions. In a catch-up effort, the authorities
33 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
34 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011; interview with an
expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
349
in Baku have recently paid more attention to organizing
their own Diaspora in order to promote the Azerbaijani
cause in the world (News.Az, 2011c). On the other hand,
Baku has registered a series of diplomatic tactical victories.
In 2008, the United Nations General Assembly passed a
resolution regarding the situation in the occupied territo-
ries of Azerbaijan, in which the immediate, complete, and
unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian forces from all
the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan was
demanded (UN, 2008). In 2011, the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe decided to reinstate the
previously suspended sub-committee on Nagorno-Karabakh.
The rivalry in the international organizations takes place
alongside with the negotiations mediated by the Minsk
Group, which has been created under the umbrella of the
OSCE and is co-presided by Russia, France, and the US.
After the Russo-Georgian conflict, the groups activity, and
especially Russias inside the group, was re-energized. From
2008 to 2011, Russia hosted nine meetings between the
presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, which resulted in a
number of joint statements and several exchanges of prison-
ers and bodies of soldiers killed in action. The Russian State
Duma mediated in Moscow, in 2010, an informal dialogue
between representatives of the Azerbaijani Milli Majlis and
of the Armenian National Assembly. In spite of the pressure
exerted by the US, France, and Russia on the eve of the
latest 2011 summit in Kazan, Baku and Yerevan failed to
reach an agreement regarding the principles of the conflict
resolution that had been proposed by the Minsk Group co-
chairing countries at the OSCE ministerial conference held
in Madrid in 2007. After successive rounds of negotiations,
the Madrid principles, though not yet accepted by the con-
flicting parts, include: Armenias withdrawal from the regions
surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, with special stipulations
for Lacin and Kelbajar; a provisional, internationally guar-
anteed status for Nagorno-Karabakh; security guarantees
for Nagorno-Karabakh and the deployment of international
350
peace-keeping forces; the right of the refugees and IDPs to
return to their homes of origin; reopening of the routes of
communication, restoring of trade, and implementation of
post-conflict rehabilitation measures financed by foreign
donors; determination of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh
through referendum. It seems that the disputed points are
the schedule of the Armenian forces withdrawal from the
occupied regions around Nagorno-Karabakh, the mainte-
nance of a communication corridor between Armenia and
Karabakh and the nature of the provisional status of the
enclave (RFE, 2010a).
Observers are skeptical about a solution to the conflict
any time soon: Even if the leaders of Armenia and Azer-
baijan agree on the Madrid principles and the road map,
there are no social conditions in place conducive towards
implementation of the accord35, an analyst commented.
The aggressive political discourses promoted by Baku and
Yerevan narrow the political leaders space for maneuver
and make very unlikely the acceptance by either society of
any future high-level deals. According to the opinion polls,
97% of the Azerbaijani think that Armenia is their most sig-
nificant rival and 91% of the Armenians perceive Azerbaijan
as the main political and economic threat (Puls-R/Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung, 2010; International Republican Institute,
2008a). Additionally, 70% of those poled in Azerbaijan
oppose any compromise on the part of their government in
order to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict. How-
ever, there can be no non-violent solution to the conflict
without a compromise as reflected in the Madrid principles.
Although 78% of the Armenians believe the situation in
Nagorno-Karabakh can be solved peacefully (International
Republican Institute, 2008a), it seems that there are con-
cerns in Yerevan and Stepanakert regarding the implemen-
tation of such a solution: What we want is a certain date
for organizing the referendum that will decide the future
35 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
351
status of Nagorno-Karabakh36, an official unveils his pre- with the military: the organization of the 2012 Eurovision
occupation. Another question is the peace-keeping forces Song Contest finals offers Azerbaijan a rare chance to proj-
credibility and their capacity to carry out the mission: ect internationally a positive image, a chance the Baku
Who can guarantee that certain events in the Balkans will authorities certainly do not want to waste by escalating the
not occur in Nagorno-Karabakh as well?37, an analyst asks, conflict.41
alluding to the Srebrenica massacre and to the inaction of
the international peace-keepers forces. It seems that the II.2. Georgia and Armenia: Resetting pragmatism
reservations regarding the pacifiers deployment is also eco-
The relationship between Georgia and Armenia is char-
nomically motivated. The separatist regions army is the main
acterized by a preeminently positive interdependence,
employer of a significant number of Nagorno-Karabakh
asymmetrical in certain sectors, which is managed pragmat-
men; so, the deployment of peace-keeping troops would
ically by both governments. The political dialogue between
most likely generate a reduction of the armed forces of the
Armenians and Georgians has intensified both quantitative-
separatist region, with an immediate and severe social and
ly, and qualitatively after the 2008 war in Georgia. Observers
economic impact.38
remark that the personal chemistry between the two pres-
The implementation of a peace plan in Nagorno-Karabakh
idents contributes positively to the bilateral relations.42 The
may therefore be compared to the crossing of a mine field
interaction between Foreign Affairs ministries solidifies the
(Economist, 2011). The field could be crossed successfully
relationship on the high level. In 2011, the two heads of
if the political negotiations will be combined with measures
diplomacy agreed to meet at least four times a year in order
meant to prepare the two societies for a long-lasting peace.
to have a continuous dialogue on all bilateral and regional
Whether the political regimes in Baku and Yerevan have the
problems. Both Yerevan, and Tbilisi admit that there are
will and capacity to do it, is still an open question. It seems
unsolved bilateral problems, but none of those is considered
that more and more observers in the region believe that,
unsolvable (Civil.Ge, 2011b). Although the political rela-
without a genuine democratization of both countries, Arme-
tionship has improved considerably in the past two years,
nia and Azerbaijan will not achieve any substantial progress
there still are animosities reflected in the public opinion.43
regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.39 Until then,
According to surveys, 75% of the respondents in Georgia
the most likely scenario shared in both camps is the contin-
and 62% of the ones in Armenia believe the bilateral rela-
uation of the status quo, described as: Rapid peace is impos-
tionship is good (International Republican Institute, 2011;
sible, rapid war is probable40. On a short term, however,
idem, 2008a). Speaking of friend and foe states, for 8% of
the outbreak of violence around Nagorno-Karabakh seems
the Georgians Armenia is the most important partner
to be discouraged by a development that has nothing to do
(International Republican Institute, 2011), while for 24%
36
of the Armenians Georgia is the main partner (International
Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.
37 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
Republican Institute, 2008a). This difference could be
38 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011. explained by Georgias strategic importance as a transit state
39 Interview with a mass-media person, Baku, June 2011; inter-

view with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011. 41 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
40 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011; interview with an 42 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
official, Yerevan, June 2011. 43 Interview with experts, Yerevan, June 2011.

352 353
for the Armenian trade. The volume of bilateral trade is not
significant, the 2010 statistic results showing that Georgia
is Armenias eighth commercial partner (2.2% of the trade
volume), while Armenia is Georgias 12th commercial part-
ner, with a mere 1.5% of the trade volume (EU Commission,
2011b; EU Commission, 2011c). The opinion poll shows,
in addition, that 31% of the Armenian respondents believe
Georgia represents the main political and economic threat
(International Republican Institute, 2008a). In Georgia, 3%
of the citizens perceive Armenia similarly (International
Republican Institute, 2011). It may very well be that, since
2008, when the last survey was conducted in Armenia, the
number of those who consider Georgia to be a threat has
diminished. At the same time, the negative public perception
in Armenia might reflect the peoples concern regarding the
asymmetries in the economic relations, the preoccupation for
the rights of the Armenian minority in Samtskhe-Javakheti
and the participation in the regional projects that exclude
Armenia. In Georgian public opinion, Armenia is often seen
as a military ally of the Kremlin in South Caucasus. Given
the Georgians attitude towards the Russian policy in the
region, a negative transfer occurs upon the image of Armenia,
which is reflected in the surveys.
In spite of different foreign policy priorities, Tbilisi and
Yerevan are increasingly aware that each one plays its own
game in the region based on the political situation and
national security rationales.44 For instance, Yerevan perceived
in a negative way Georgias 2008 military actions in South
Ossetia, which could have set a dangerous precedent for
Armenia. The political leadership in Yerevan refrained from
a critical discourse aimed at Georgia, which might have sup-
ported Russias aggressive rhetoric. On the other hand,
Armenia played an important role in the evacuation of the
diplomatic personnel and the foreign citizens from Georgia
44 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011; interview with an
expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
354
during the conflict45, that was appreciated by the Georgian
authorities. After the conflict, Armenia resisted Moscows
pressure to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia46 and the president of Armenia paid an offi-
cial visit to Tbilisi in September 2008. In 2009, the presi-
dent of Georgia was decorated with the highest Armenian
state distinction the Order of Honor , which was met
with criticism in Moscow. On the other hand, Georgia
dislikes the Russian military presence in Armenia, yet the
Tbilisi authorities are aware that they cannot change things
radically and that it is important that, in the current securi-
ty environment, they maintain a friendly relationship with
Armenia.47 Although it cancelled in 2011 the agreement on
military transit with Russia meant to support the Russian
base in Gyumri, Georgia still consents to military cargo
transit for the Armenian armed forces through its air space.48
Georgia assured Yerevan that the termination of the agree-
ment with Russia, inoperable since 2008, is a strictly tech-
nical one (meant to prevent its automatic five-year exten-
sion) and will not affect its cooperation with the Armenian
Ministry of Defense: We wanted to receive guarantees that
our security will not be affected by this decision [] Those
we have received49, a government representative explains.
Such guarantees were offered by the Georgian Minister of
Defense during his visit in Yerevan that preceded the vote in
the Tbilisi parliament regarding the termination of the
agreement for military transit with Russia. On the same
occasion, the Georgians offered the possibility of training
Armenian troops at mountain training base in Sachere. The
balanced approach to these issues confirms the pragmatic
attitude in both Yerevan, and Tbilisi.
45 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.
46 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
47 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.
48 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.
49 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.
355
 The pragmatic reset of the bilateral relationships after
2008 is not unexpected, however. Georgia is a vital transit
corridor for the Armenian economy. According to the
Yerevan governmental estimates, the suspension of transit
through Georgia during the 2008 war produced losses of
approximately $670 million. Consequently, Armenia was
interested in the restoring of communications as soon as
possible. The military threat coming from the North moti-
vates the Tbilisi authorities to ease up the tensions with
immediate neighbors. In the aftermath of the conflict with
Russia, the problem of the Armenian minority in Georgia
was identified by Tbilisi as a vulnerable point that Russia
could exploit. Hence, the Georgian government paid more
attention to the relationship with Armenia and to the infra-
structural projects in Samtskhe-Javakheti. The two objec-
tives overlap provided impulse to the bilateral relations.
Georgia facilitates about 70-75% of Armenias commer-
cial transit. Currently, there is a railroad connection between
Yerevan and the port of Batumi and the two countries coop-
erate in the construction of the Gyumri Akhaltsikhe
Batumi highway, which will facilitate the road traffic. The
port of Poti plays an important role for Armenias food secu-
rity, because it is a significant gate of the countrys grain
imports. The port of Batumi serves the passenger traffic: in
2009, the ferry transports between Batumi and Sochi were
resumed. This route is important for Armenia, since there is
a significant Armenian Diaspora settled in Sochi ever since
the 19th century; moreover, many Armenians choose to
spend their holidays in Sochi. Given the preparations for
the 2014 Winter Olympic Games, Sochi has become an
attractive destination for the Armenians seeking opportuni-
ties for temporary work. Over the past two years, air traffic
for passengers between Yerevan and Tbilisi has been sus-
pended in winter time, for economic reasons, but resumed
in spring or summer.
In 2010, Georgia and Russia agreed to reopen the only
border crossing between the two countries, the one between
356
Verhni Lars and Kazbeghi, following negotiations mediated
by Switzerland. Thus, after a three-years interruption,
Armenia benefits again from a land connection with Russia
through Georgia. About 70 or 80% of the Armenian exports
to Russia transit through Georgia. Instead of using long and
indirect maritime routes like Batumi Varna/Burgas Novo-
rossiysk, the Armenian exporters have now access to the
Georgian Military Highway connecting Tbilisi and Vladi-
kavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia. The land transit to
Russia through Verhni Lars Kazbeghi reduces transporta-
tion costs by 20-25% (Zhahanina, 2010). The significant
volume of commercial transit generates substantial profits
for the Georgian state. In 2008-2009, the border between
Armenia and Georgia was crossed by 4,594 freight trains
and 273,478 vehicles (OSCE Yerevan Office, 2010, p. 5). At
the same time, the government in Yerevan believes Georgia
profits from the asymmetrical interdependence by applying
a policy of transit taxation that significantly increases costs
for Armenias economic agents (Civil.Ge, 2009a).
Armenia is linked to Georgia through its energy and
telecommunications infrastructure. The Internet and inter-
national telephone connections in Armenia are being pro-
vided through the optic fiber cable crossing Georgia. There
was an incident in 2011, in which scrap iron collectors cut
the Internet cable just outside Tbilisi and left a great num-
ber of Armenian users without an Internet connection for
several hours (Bedwell, 2011). The electric systems that link
Armenia and Georgia are interconnected through three
transmission lines. The gas pipeline used by Gazprom to
supply natural gas to Armenia also crosses Georgia. In 2010,
following landslides, Georgia suspended the transit of gas in
order to make the necessary pipeline repairs. Armenia had
to tap its underground gas deposits to cover the domestic
consumption. In 2010, the Georgian parliament removed
the gas pipeline supplying Armenia from the list of strategic
enterprises that can not be privatized. This caused concern
in Yerevan: the worst scenario was that Azerbaijan could
357
assume control of the pipeline that guarantees Armenias
main source of energy security. However, the authorities in
Tbilisi assured Armenia that the Georgian state would not
give up the controlling stake in the pipeline-managing com-
pany (Civil.Ge, 2011c).
In the last two years, Georgia has become an attractive
terrain for the Armenian investors. For instance, in 2011,
the Armenian candy maker Grand Candy decided to
expand on the Georgian market, while the Jermuk group
took over the Georgian production of Pepsi-Cola. According
to the statistic data for 2010, 103 Armenian companies
were registered in Georgia. Experts estimate that there are
about 4,000 small and medium-size Armenian businesses
operating in Georgia. The increased presence of Armenian
investors on the Georgian market has led to the establish-
ment of a Union of Armenian Entrepreneurs (Vardanyan,
2011). Several factors are behind this trend: on the one
hand, there is the corruption and the multitude of bureau-
cratic obstacles hindering small businesses, and the limited
market in Armenia; on the other hand, there are the friend-
lier conditions for opening and managing a business, the tax
exemptions for newly launched businesses, less corruption,
and the better infrastructure in Georgia.50 The World Banks
Doing Business classification confirms the difference
between Armenia and Georgia regarding business environ-
ments: the two countries were placed in positions 48 and
12, respectively, in 2011 (World Bank, 2011). Additionally,
Georgia and its seaside (Batumi and Kobuleti) are among
favorite tourist destinations for an ever-growing number of
Armenian tourists: in 2009, the number of Armenian citi-
zens visiting Georgia went over 300,000 (Chkhikvadze,
2010) and topped 200,000 between January and April
2011 alone (News.Am, 2011a).
The bilateral cooperation, however, has not focused only
on the economic issued and the expansion of transportation
50 Interview with experts, Yerevan, June 2011.
358
routes. There are issues on the bilateral agenda that, if over-
looked, could generate significant complications in the rela-
tions between Georgia and Armenia. Aiming to eliminate
from the agenda the contentious items, the Tbilisi govern-
ment has addressed the questions of the Armenian minority,
the registration of the Armenian Church (as the Armenian
Apostolic Church), and the demarcation and management
of the border. Not all the governments initiatives, however,
won the popular support. In their turn, the Yerevan author-
ities reacted constructively to such overtures. The central
administration or the leaders of the Armenian Church were
criticized publicly for sometimes too flexible positions.
To this day, the border between Armenia and Georgia has
not been entirely delimited and demarcated. For lack of a
clear demarcation, it is often difficult in the borderline com-
munities to settle the ownership of land. This provokes inci-
dents related to the peasants access to the farming land.
The two sides joined efforts meant to accelerate the delin-
eation and demarcation of the border. In 2010, the inter-
governmental commission appointed to that end agreed on
the delineation and demarcation of 160 kilometers (71%)
of the total of 225 km (OSCE Yerevan Office, 2010, pp. 13,
15). Moreover, Armenia and Georgia have reached a politi-
cal agreement as to the joint management of three of the six
border checkpoints (RFE, 2011a). The implementation of
this initiative is meant to facilitate the passenger and com-
mercial traffic between the two countries.
In Georgia, there are Armenian communities in Tbilisi
(about 83,000 people in 2002), in Batumi (about 8,000
people in 2002), and in the separatist region of Abkhazia
(about 45,000 people in 2005). But the most numerous
Armenian presence (almost 125,000 people) was registered
in 2002 in Samtskhe-Javakheti, the southern region of
Georgia neighboring Armenia and Turkey. In Soviet times,
this was the place of the military base in Akhalkalaki, which
belonged to the Transcaucasian military district. For this
reason, the whole region was under a quasi-closed regime
359
and relatively isolated from the rest of Georgia.51 After the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia took control of the
military base, which became the main employer and income
source for the local population (Overland, 2009). In 2007,
the Akhalkalaki base was evacuated, which raised questions
as to the economic future of the whole region. There were
fears in Tbilisi that Russia would try to destabilize the area,
by generating inter-ethnic tensions in Samtskhe-Javakheti.
Such concerns were not entirely groundless. The Armenian
side confirms that Russia did attempt to mobilize the
Armenian minority against the Tbilisi authorities before
and after the 2008 war, either by announcing the imminent
repatriation of the Meshetian Turks in Samtskhe-Javakheti
(about 100,000 of them have been deported to Central Asia
in 1944), or by re-ignating the discourse on discrimination
against Armenians in Georgia.52
Apart from introducing additional security53 measures,
the Tbilisi government implemented a complex strategy for
the integration of the region and its population in the
Georgian economic and educational circuit. In 2008 and
2010, projects of highway renovation or construction were
carried out, in order to link the region to Western Georgia
and Tbilisi. Once the Baku Tbilisi Kars railroad project
is completed, the distance between Samtskhe-Javakheti and
Tbilisi will be covered in approximately two hours. The
Georgian administration has made substantial investments
in the local infrastructure: schools, hospitals, water and elec-
tric power distribution systems (International Crisis Group,
2011b, p. 6).
Another aspect of the strategy was education. Lack of
proficiency in the Georgian language significantly diminishes
the chances of young people in the region to study and take
advantage of hiring opportunities. With the help of foreign
51 Interview with a mass-media person, Tbilisi, June, 2011.
52 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
53 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011.
360
donors, free language courses have been introduced. Also,
the Armenians in Samtskhe-Javakheti have been granted
facilitated access to high education in the Georgian univer-
sities.54 Representatives of the Armenian civil society who
visited the region in 2010-2011 found that the population
was much more optimistic about their economic and social
situation, than several years ago. The demand for studying
the Georgian language has grown. Instead of going to
Yerevan, more and more Armenians in the region choose to
study at the Tbilisi universities.55 The authorities in Yerevan
have adapted their discourse on the Armenian minority in
Georgia to the local changes. The Armenian president appre-
ciated the efforts of the Georgian administration to improve
the socio-economic situation in Samtskhe-Javakheti and
announced his willingness to assist in the process (Civil.Ge,
2009b).
Another irritating factor in the bilateral relationship is
the problem of registering the Armenian Church in Georgia
and the mutual demands of restitution of churches. The
Armenian side claims a number of churches in Tbilisi and
Samtskhe-Javakheti. At the same time, the Georgian side
claims the right of property over several medieval churches
in Northern Armenia, close to the border (Civil.Ge, 2011d).
Until recently, according to the Georgian legislation, reli-
gious minorities could not be registered as non-profit legal
persons. Hence, the state protected the Georgian Orthodox
Church and denied similar rights to other cults in the coun-
try, including the Armenian Church. In 2011, however, the
Catholicos of All Armenians paid a historic visit to Georgia,
the first of a high-level Armenian cleric to the neighboring
country since 1894. The two problems were discussed dur-
ing the visit. Soon after, the Georgian parliament modified
the law in the sense that other cults could be registered as
non-profit legal entities. The legal modification took off the
54 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011.
55 Interview with experts, Yerevan, June 2011.
361
agenda the question of the Armenian Church registration in
Georgia. The second problem however, that of the right of
property over places of worship, will require much more
time and patience from both sides. The street protests that
took place in Tbilisi after the legal changes regarding reli-
gious minorities show how delicate the topic is and how
cautious the political leaders need to be from now on in
order to maintain the positive dynamics of the bilateral rela-
tions established in recent years.
II.3. Azerbaijan and Georgia: Getting closer
A very close political and economic relationship has
developed in time between Azerbaijan and Georgia, based
primarily on a positive experience during their brief inde-
pendence following World War I. In the post-Soviet era, the
close relations between presidents Heydar Aliyev and
Eduard Shevardnadze have consolidated the relationship
between Azerbaijan and Georgia. Since the early 1990s, the
two countries have been faced with territorial conflicts,
so the restoring of their territorial integrity has become the
dominant theme that reinforces the relationship from a
political point of view. In 2008, Georgia was among the
39 states that voted in favor of the UN General Assemblys
resolution about the situation in the occupied territories of
Azerbaijan. In August 2008, after the outbreak of the mil-
itary hostilities in South Ossetia, the Azerbaijani Ministry
of Foreign Affairs qualified the Georgian actions meant to
reestablish the territorial integrity as being in accordance
with international law (Today.Az, 2008). For the authorities
in Baku, the war had direct implications on the situation in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Undoubtedly, the recovery of South
Ossetia by Georgia in 2008 would have put pressure on the
Baku regime. If Georgia has succeeded, why shouldnt we
try as well? would have been the popular message push-
ing the government beyond the bellicose rhetoric it has
become a prisoner of. In certain circles, however, Georgias
362
defeat lessened the enthusiasm for a military solution that
is much less likely to succeed in the post-conflict context.56
The difficult economic situation in Georgia after the 2008
war impelled the Baku government to provide support to
the state in whose existence and survival it is directly inter-
ested.
Azerbaijan and Georgia are interdependent as far as the
energy sector is concerned. Georgia depends on the Azer-
baijani gas supplies almost entirely. In exchange, the main
oil and gas export routes linking Azerbaijan to the European
market cross Georgia. If a war broke out between Armenia
and Azerbaijan, it could impact the supplies of Georgia
through the gas pipeline Baku Tbilisi Erzurum, which is
rather close to the conflict zone. Experts warn that, in case
of the reopening of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the
energy-transporting facilities would be the favorite targets
of the Armenian forces (International Crisis Group, 2011a,
p. 14). Georgia would then be forced to resort to Gazprom
satisfy the demand for gas. Similarly, a war waged on
Georgian territory would lead to the destruction of the
energy transportation network impacting the Azerbaijani
exports of oil and gas. In such conditions, Russia becomes
an undesirable, but necessary partner for Azerbaijan. In
August 2008, Azerbaijan redirected part of its oil exports
that transit Georgia (Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan and Baku
Supsa) towards the Baku Novorossiysk pipeline.
The relationship between Baku and Tbilisi is cemented
by economic exchanges and an intensive political dialogue.
There are many direct meetings and consultations at high or
ministerial level. According to statistics, Azerbaijan was
Georgias fourth trade partner in 2010, with 7.8% of the
total exchanges (EU Commission, 2011c). In 2010 as well,
Azerbaijan was among the main foreign investors in Georgia,
ranging fifth, with $58 million (Civil.Ge, 2011e). Georgias
place in the Azerbaijani trade is considerably lower (1.5%),
56 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
363
which points to an economic asymmetry in the bilateral
relations (EU Commission, 2011d). As far as public opinion
goes, 22% of the respondents in Georgia estimated that
Azerbaijan is their countrys most important partner
(International Republican Institute, 2011). 11.3% of the
Azerbaijani believe that Georgia is a friendly state (Puls-R/
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). This difference mirrors
Azerbaijans increased significance, in the public eye, for
Georgias energy security. It should be pointed out, howev-
er, that the number of Azerbaijani supporters of Georgia has
almost doubled since 2006 (ibidem). This dynamics can be
accounted for by the increase in popular support for the
cause of Georgias reintegration after the 2008 war and by
its role in the oil and gas transportation.
Azerbaijan has twice taken decisive action over the last
five years to guarantee the security of gas supply for Georgia.
The first time was in 2006, when Gazprom cut gas delivery
to Georgia, simultaneously pushing high the gas price. The
second time was in 2008, right after the war, when Baku
and Tbilisi reached an agreement regarding the five-year
contract for gas delivery, in 2009 the gas being supplied at
a preferential price (Alieva, 2009, p. 2). Later on, the two
sides agreed to extend the contract until 2020, without
modifying the basic price of natural gas (AZE.Az, 2010).
The high level of mutual trust between Baku and Tbilisi
facilitated Azerbaijans access to Georgias energy sector.
The SOCAR state company has control over the oil termi-
nal at Kulevi, which became operable in 2008. Moreover,
SOCAR entered the Georgian gas distribution market, with
a market quota of almost 75%. The company intends to
build an additional 1,500 kilometers of pipelines that will
supply gas to another 150,000 users (ABC.Az, 2011).
Georgia is an important component in the Azerbaijan
Georgia Romania Interconnector (AGRI) project in which
SOCAR is a partner. This project envisions the transport of
gas from Azerbaijan to the Kulevi terminal, from which
point it is further sent to the port of Constana in a liquefied
364
form (LNG). There are limits, however, to the trust between
Baku and Tbilisi. Although it has been said that Azerbaijan
offered Georgia $500 million for purchasing the pipeline
through which gas is being supplied to Armenia (Asbarez
Post, 2010), the authorities in Tbilisi ruled out the possibil-
ity of giving up the controlling shares package. Azerbaijans
takeover of this pipeline would potentially fuel the conflict
between Baku and Yerevan, an evolution that Georgia is keen
to avoid for reasons of national and regional energy security.
From the Azerbaijani point of view, the neighbor coun-
trys participation is crucial for the completion of the rail-
road connection with Turkey. It was initially planned that
the Baku Tbilisi Kars project would be internationally
financed, such that Georgia would be able to launch works
of repair and construction on the Marabda Akhalhalaki
Kartsakhi. The international donors, however, refused to
support the project financially, claiming that it would not
serve the purpose of regional integration. Given the impor-
tance of the project, Azerbaijan offered Georgia two prefer-
ential loans (for 25 years, at 1% yearly interest) for the
financing of the works: Baku provided $200 million in 2007
and another $575 million in 2011. Loan payments are to be
made from the profit made by Georgia from the exploitation
of that segment of railroad, which will become operational
starting in 2013 (Civil.Ge, 2011f). For Georgian tourism,
Azerbaijan is an important reservoir of customers. In addi-
tion to the direct Baku Tbilisi connection by air, there are
also numerous coach routs. Over the last ten years, the num-
ber of Azerbaijani visitors has considerably grown, reaching
almost 400,000 in 2009 (Chkhikvadze, 2010). The number
of tourists is expected to grow: from January to April 2011
alone, Georgia was visited by 244,000 citizens of Azerbaijan
(ArmeniaNews, 2011).
Although rapidly improving, the relations between Baku
and Tbilisi are not free of difficulties that impact negatively
on the atmosphere or could produce in the bilateral relations.
The two sides admit that there are still contentious issues,
365
but insist on their determination to solve them amiably.
Twenty years after the regaining of their independence, the
two neighboring countries have not yet accomplished the
delineation and demarcation of the common border. In 1996,
an inter-governmental commission for the delineation and
demarcation of the border was instituted. In 2010, Baku
and Tbilisi agreed on the delineation of 300 km (66% out
of the 480 km) of the border (Trend, 2011a). The process
advances slowly, among other things, because of the dispute
around the David Gareja monastery, which is situated half
in the Georgian region of Kakheti and half in the Azerbai-
jani region of Agstafa. The David Gareja complex consists of
more than twenty churches and a number of caves, over a
distance of 25 kilometers. The monastery has an important
historical, cultural, and spiritual value for Georgia, which
would like a land exchange so as to gain full control over the
monastery. Among the possible means of compensation
under consideration is the village of Erismedi, a border
locality also in dispute between the two countries. For the
Azerbaijani side, however, the position of the Bertubani
church, which is part of the monastery, is considered to be
strategically important, due to its altitude. Consequently,
the authorities in Baku reject any territorial compensation
in exchange for the Azerbaijani half of the David Gareja
complex. In the course of negotiations, Azerbaijan suggest-
ed turning the monastery into an open tourist zone. The
Georgian Orthodox Church explicitly opposed such a pro-
posal. In 2007, the presidents of the two countries discussed
the possibility of leaving the entire monastery to Georgia,
while Azerbaijan keeps control over the high-altitude strate-
gic positions. But, other than talking it over, the two sides
have not taken any step further in the process of identifying
a solution (Petriashvili & Ismayilov, 2006; Kazimov, 2011).
The Azerbaijani minority lives in compact numbers in the
regions of Kvemo Kartli, Kaheti, and Mtskheta-Mtianeti
along the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The
Azerbaijani population of Georgia counts approximately
366
285,000 people, according to the latest census. The situa-
tion of the Azerbaijani minority in Georgia has been under
lesser international scrutiny, not being considered socially
and politically explosive (Cornell et al., 2005, p. 24). This
minority, however, faces numerous problems having to do
with the infrastructure, lack of proficiency in the Georgian
language, limited access to local public positions or to high-
er education, undemarcated border between Armenia and
Georgia and occasional abuses by the Armenian border guards,
as well as the economic under-development. Although cer-
tain infrastructure problems have been addressed by the
authorities in Tbilisi in recent years, those of the drinking
water supply, the repair of rural roads, and the agricultural
sector have been neglected. Moreover, lack of proficiency in
Georgian remains an issue for the Azerbaijani minority,
since bilingual instructors are scarce and there is a low inter-
est for learning the language. Most young people in the region
prefer to continue their studies in Azerbaijan (CIPDD,
GYLA, and Safeworld, 2011). The closing down, in 2005,
of the market in Sadakhlo, a village with Azerbaijani popu-
lation, left 5,000 people without a regular profit. The hard
economic conditions in Kvemo Kartli push the Azerbaijani
ethnics to migrate to neighboring countries in search of
work opportunities.
In 2010, Russia accused Georgia of violating the rights of
the ethnic minorities and demanded that Tbilisi normalize
its relationships with the minorities living in that country,
including the Azerbaijanis (Socor, 2010). Azerbaijan, how-
ever, ignored Russias attempt at manipulation. Thus, Baku
avoided making a political issue out of the problems of the
Azerbaijani minority in Georgia and behaved in such a way
as not to get involved in what it considers to be Georgias
internal affairs. Given the economic and political condi-
tions, any fragmentation of Georgia is against the interests
of Azerbaijan. Consequently, the authorities in Baku have
encouraged the Azerbaijani minority to be loyal to the
Georgian state. But the government in Baku tacitly admits
367
that there are many economic and social problems of the
Azerbaijani minority in Georgia, so it participates, through
companies or foundations, in infrastructure projects and
social programs implemented in the areas inhabited by the
Azerbaijani ethnics (Today.Az, 2011). For instance, the
Akord and Azerinshaat companies helped in the repairs to
the Telet Samtskhe Javaheti road. The Heydar Aliyev
fund financed the repair or building of schools in Kvemo
Kartli in 2009-2010 (MES Georgia, 2010). Although the
problem of the Azerbaijani minority has not been exploited
politically in Baku, it has a destabilizing potential on a social
level. In 2006, two papers of the Baku-located National
Association of the Azerbaijani in Georgia, which fights for
the recognition of the Azerbaijani language as the second
official language, were suspended from publication (RFE,
2009). In 2005, the Azerbaijani community protested
against the closing of the Sadakhlo market and demanded
that the central authorities reconsider the decision. Finally,
the sustainability of the preeminently peaceful cohabitation
of the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in Kvemo
Kartli could be put to a serious test by any future outburst
of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Apart from the problems regarding the national minori-
ties and the border demarcation, the Armenian factor may
generate tensions in the bilateral relationships. Georgia faces
the increasingly difficult task of maintaining the balance
between its political support for the territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan and facilitation of Armenias commercial transit.
Given the joint cause for territorial integrity and coopera-
tion in the energy field, Baku would like the balance tilted
in its favor. Although, in the early 1990s, tried unsuccess-
fully to persuade Georgia to join the economic blockade
against Armenia, the authorities in Baku have generally tol-
erated the trade exchanges between Armenia and Georgia.
The 2007 evacuation of the military base in Akhalkalaki
gave rise to worries in Baku, since a part of the arsenal was
to be transferred to Armenia, in order to supply the Russian
368
forces at the Gyumri base. Although the Russo-Georgian
agreement stipulated that Russia would not transfer weapon-
ry to the Armenian forces, there were no trustworthy means
to verify that Moscow abided by the obligations it had
undertaken (Socor, 2007). No doubt, Azerbaijan would
rather have the whole military equipment transferred back
to Russia. In 2011, the Azerbaijani ambassador to Georgia
spoke about the presumed danger of the economic coopera-
tion between Armenia and Georgia and of the Armenian
community for the territorial integrity of Georgia. The
ambassador called upon Georgia and Azerbaijan to join
efforts in opposing the Armenian policy in the region (Apa
News, 2011). While the appeal is not bound to change the
position of the Georgian government regarding Armenia,
the discourse echoes the stances of some marginal social seg-
ments in Georgia, as the public opinion surveys show. It is
unlikely that anyone in Baku believes the Tbilisi government
will radically change its policy towards Armenia. Yet this
discourse probably signals an irritation in Baku with the effect
of the pragmatic resetting in the relationship between
Armenia and Georgia. Given these circumstances, Georgia
needs great diplomatic skill to navigate among the often
conflicting aspirations of its neighbors in South Caucasus.
III. South Caucasus: Relationships with the
Regional Powers
The regional processes do not result only from the rela-
tionships between the three South-Caucasian republics. It is
an area where significant regional actors such as the US, the
EU, Russia, Turkey, and Iran engage in an economic, politi-
cal, military, and cultural competition. At the same time, the
Caucasian republics do their best to take advantage as much
as possible of this competition, in order to promote their
own national security agendas at the regional level.
369
 III.1. Armenia: Variable complementarity
Armenias foreign policy pursues several major objec-
tives: guarantee defense in case of an Azerbaijani conven-
tional military attack; keeping the status quo or solving the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by observing the nations right
to self-determination; breaking the blockade imposed by
Azerbaijan and Turkey; attracting foreign investments and
international financial aid for economic development, and,
last but not least, international recognition of the Armenian
genocide. To carry out these objectives, Armenias foreign
policy follows the principle of complementarity, which
requires that Armenia develop close relationships with the
main regional actors, such that their synergy contributes to
the sectoral promotion of its foreign policy objectives. Eco-
nomically, complementarity expresses Armenias economic
dependence on foreign donors. Regarding military security,
complementarity is the answer to its dependence on Russia.
III.1.1. Russia
Among the partnerships and alliances developed by
Armenia, that with Russia is vitally important. Russia is one
of the active co-presidents of the Minsk Group and an indis-
pensable actor in the negotiation process concerning
Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, the alliance is conditioned
by Armenias economic, military, and energy dependence on
Russia. The alliance with Russia is supported by 95% of the
Armenian citizens (International Republican Institute, 2008a).
Militarily, Armenia is part of the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO), which theoretically guarantees
the countrys security, since the organization is supposed to
intervene if a member-country is subject to aggression. To
Yerevan, CSTO is Russia. In case of aggression, it is Russias
military assistance that we expect, not that of Belarus or of
the Central Asian republics.57 During its presidency of the
57 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
370
CSTO, Armenia actively supported the creation of a Rapid
Reaction Force, so as to guarantee the organizations swift
intervention in case of need.58 One of the exercises of the
Rapid Reaction Force took place in Rostov, Southern Russia,
in 2010. Aside from its security guarantee, the CSTO offers
the possibility of purchasing Russian equipment at domes-
tic-market prices or, in some cases, of having the equip-
ments transferred free of charge. NATO does not offer any-
thing similar59, a local expert points out the advantages of
being part of a different military alliance. Guaranteeing the
military security is not limited, however, to the multilateral
alliances within the CSTO. Armenia hosts two Russian
military bases at Gyumri and Yerevan, totaling about 4,000
troops. There are also Russian border guards in Armenia,
who protect the border with Turkey and Iran. In 2010,
Armenia extended the presence of the Russian troops on its
territory through 2044. According to the Yerevan authori-
ties, following the agreement, the Russian forces in Armenia
will extend their activities beyond the mere protection of the
former Soviet Unions border (Danielyan, 2010): Russia
has undertaken to protect Armenias regional interests60,
an official explains the meaning of the agreement. Russia
has promised to supply weapons and to cooperate with the
Armenian companies in the defense industry.
Although their country enjoys a double assurance from
Russia, Armenians have doubts as to the timing of Moscows
intervention in the eventuality of the outbreak of hostilities:
The defense clause has never been put to the test [].
Russia cannot afford not to intervene, because it would lose
its credibility, [but] when is it going to intervene: before
or after a UN Security Council decision, after we have lost
part of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh or immediately
after the outbreak of the conflict?61, an expert wonders.
58 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.
59 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
60 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.
61 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
371
The Russian side pointed out that it would intervene at the
right moment. This ambiguity generates suspicion and deter-
mines Armenia to make sure that, at least in the first stages
of a possible conflict it will be able to fight on its own.62
Economically, Armenia is a prisoner of the conflictual
relations between Georgia and Russia and the 2008 war
between the two countries proved it perfectly well (Marke-
donov, 2011). Such a war leaves Armenia with only one
open frontier and one commercial transit route through
Iran. Beyond these aspects, Armenia is interested in having
access to the Russian market, gas import, financial support,
and investments. Russia is Armenias second largest trade
partner, with roughly 21% of the exchanges (EU Commis-
sion, 2011b). It remains the favorite destination for the
approximately two million Armenian seasonal workers.
Armenians working abroad sent home $1.3 billion in 2010,
wich makes 13% of the countrys GDP (Danielyan, 2011).
Experts estimate that 75% of the remittances originate in
Russia.63 Armenia heavily relies (80% of the gas consump-
tion) on the Russian gas deliveries. Gazprom owns 80% of
Armenias gas distribution network. Moreover, the Russian
state monopoly has taken control of the Armenian segment
of the gas pipeline Tabriz Ersakh, which connects Armenia
with Iran. In exchange, Armenia pays the lowest price in the
CIS for the Russian natural gas it imports, namely $210 for
a thousand cubic meters (Armtown.Com, 2011a). Russia is
also ready to take part in the construction of the new reac-
tors at the Metsamor nuclear power plant, which are meant
to replace the old ones scheduled to be shut down by 2017.
Aiming for economic development in conditions of
regional semi-isolation, Armenia is looking for long-term
investments and financial support. Since the early 2000s, it
has accepted a massive penetration of Russian capital in sec-
tors of strategic importance: telecommunications, railroads,
finances and banking, heavy industry. Russia has taken over
62 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
63 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
372
the Armenian railroads for thirty years, with a commitment
to invest $570 million in their modernization. In Yerevan,
Rusals $70 million investment in the technological upgrade
of the local aluminum plant is considered to be a model of
success. Consequently, Russia has remained Armenias main
investor in 2010, at the level of $270 million (Mediamax,
2011). The economic crisis has hit Armenia hard. In 2010,
the Russian government announced that it would grant
Armenia a $500 million loan for macro-economic stabiliza-
tion. In 2011, Moscow and Yerevan reached an agreement
for a $400 million loan from the anti-crisis fund of the
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc), an organization
in which Armenia is an observer (Hayrumyan, 2011). It is
intended that the money will be invested in the moderniza-
tion of the Nairit chemical plant, which has struggled to
overcome the effects of the global economic turmoil.
The dependence on Russia diminishes the autonomy of
the Yerevan authorities externally and has a significant impact
domestically. Russia has put pressure on Armenia to cancel
its participation in the 2009 NATO exercise in Georgia64
and in the 2011 session of the NATO Parliamentary As-
sembly in Tbilisi65. It seems also that the list of government
institutions in Armenia, to which EU advisors have been
assigned, was overseen by Moscow (Popescu, 2009). It was
at Moscows request, as well, that the diameter of the gas
pipeline between Armenia and Iran was reduced.66 Yerevan
was unprepared in the summer of 2011 to sign several
agreements on energy with Iran, because Moscow opposed
it.67 The alliance with Russia has also side effects for Armenia,
which creates tensions in the bilateral relations. The rela-
tions are far from being warm68, a diplomat confirms. The
representatives of the business community complain that
64 Interview with a NATO official.
65 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
66 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
67 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
68 Interview with a diplomat.
373
the Russian businessmen export corruption, which adds to
the already high level of corruption in Armenia. They often
do not stick to the obligations stipulated in the investment
plans, so the companies do not function at full capacity, or
their activity is suspended (Hayrumyan, 2010). The Court
of Accounts evaluation regarding the activity of the Russian
company GPM Gold, which controls the gold mines in Sodk
and Megradzor is illustrative in this respect (RFE, 2010b).
The activity of the Russian recruiting centers in Armenia,
that offer Russian citizenship, provided the beneficiaries
settle permanently in the non-European sections of Russia,
has generated numerous protests among the representatives
of the civil society, in the mass- and social media. Another
initiative that caused irritation was the suggestion to intro-
duce Russian as a language of inter-ethnic communication
in Armenia, where almost 98% of the population is Armenian.
Also, the bill on schools with teaching in a foreign language,
that generated a heated public debate, was seen by many as
a means to authorize schools where teaching is done in
Russian. Also, the news about Armenian workers killed in
Russia on xenophobic grounds did by no means improve the
image of Russia in Armenia.69
III.1.2. Iran
The adverse effects of its alliance with Russia push
Armenia towards finding a counter-balance to its depend-
ence on Moscow. Iran is Armenias closest neighbor that
Yerevan looks to in its efforts to diversify the economic
options and to guarantee a favorable position in the Nagor-
no-Karabakh conflict. Iran provides 25 to 30% of Armenias
commercial transit and is a major source of consumer goods.
Thus, Iran is Armenias fourth trade partner, accounting
for 5.6% of the total commercial exchanges (EU Commission,
2011b). However, like the transit through Georgia, the one
69 Interview with experts, Yerevan, 2011.
374
through Iran is not safe either, because of the tensioned rela-
tionships between Tehran, on the one hand, and Washington
and Jerusalem, on the other hand.
In spite of religious differences, Armenia cooperates well
with Iran and does not perceive it as a threat for its nation-
al security.70 In the most recent surveys, 37% of the people
questioned see Iran as Armenias main partner and only 5%
perceive it as an enemy (International Republican Institute,
2008a). This feeling of safety derives, among other things,
from the favorable treatment of the Armenian minority in
Iran, that counts between 40,000 and 80,000 people. The
Armenians in Iran are one of the most powerful religious
minorities, which is confirmed by two seats allocated to
them in the Iranian parliament. The Armenians positive
attitude is also based on the intensive tourist exchanges:
Armenia is a popular destination for Iranians. Thousands of
Iranian tourists visit Armenia for the Novruz Bairam holi-
day and during the summer vacations. In 2011, 28,000
Iranians came to Armenia for the religious festival of Novruz
Bairam (News.Am, 2011b): For the Iranians, Armenia is
Europe; they can celebrate here in ways the rules in Iran do
not permit71, an analyst explains the Iranians interest for
Armenia. There are regular flights between the two coun-
tries. As yet, however, they are not connected by railroad. In
Soviet times, the connection was made through Azerbaijan.
In 2009, Yerevan and Tehran agreed to build a railroad that
would connect them directly and go all the way to the
Persian Gulf. The costs of the project are estimated at $1.8
billion. In 2010, Armenia launched an active campaign of
identifying foreign investors for this project (RFE, 2010c).
The compatibility between the two countries is being
strengthened by the feeling of regional isolation (Coene,
2010, p. 180) that Armenia and Iran are trying to overcome,
also through mutual help. After the suspension of military
70 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.
71 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
375
transit through Georgia, Iran offered, at least once, free pas-
sage through its air space for the military cargo that was
meant to reach the base at Gyumri. The deterioration of the
Russo-Iranian relations after the approval by the UN
Security Council of the sanctions against Iran put Armenia
in a difficult position. Experts do not exclude the possibili-
ty that the Armenian side tries to mediate the approval by
Tehran of the next cargo for the Gyumri base.72 Yerevan also
appreciates Irans position regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.
Iran does not favor the change of the status quo, being con-
cerned about the implications on its security in case Armenia
withdraws even partially and international peace-keeping
forces, which might include soldiers from the US or from
EU-member states, are deployed in the proximity of its bor-
ders.73 The telephone talks between the president of Iran
and his counterparts from Azerbaijan and Armenia on the
eve of the Kazan summit confirm Tehrans concerns regard-
ing the regional effects of the negotiations carried out
between Baku, Yerevan, and Moscow.
The cooperation with Iran in the field of energy is impor-
tant to Armenia for three reasons: the supply of gas that
would cover demand for a short period in case the deliver-
ies from Georgia are cut off; the gradual reduction of the
countrys dependence on Russia; and providing fuel for the
armed forces in case hostilities are resumed in Nagorno-Kara-
bakh. Armenia and Iran are connected through two electric
power transmission lines. Part of the imported Iranian gas is
being used to generate and transport electric power from
Armenia to Iran. In the spring of 2011, during the inter-gov-
ernmental meeting in Tehran, a series of agreements in the
fields of infrastructure and energy were prepared: the con-
struction of an electric power transmission line and the con-
struction of the hydroelectric power station on the river Aras
72Interview with experts, Yerevan, June 2011.
73Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011; interview with
an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
376
(PanArmenian.Net, 2011). Also, the idea of the construction
of an oil pipeline between the two countries was revived.
However, the visit of the Iranian president to Armenia, dur-
ing which these agreements were to be finalized and signed,
did not take place in the summer of 2011. Tehran postponed
it invoking problems in Yerevan. Besides Moscows already
mentioned influence and the domestic calculations of the
Iranian president that contributed to the delaying of the
visit, it seems that Washington does not sympathize either
with certain projects that would allow Tehran to break its
international isolation.74
III.1.3. The US
Although placed far enough from South Caucasus, the
US is a heavy piece in the political, diplomatic, and eco-
nomic strategy of Armenia. The US is home of a large and
influential Armenian Diaspora, it is one of the chairs of the
Minsk Group, and it is an important foreign donor for the
economic development for Armenia. In 2010, the US was
the seventh trade partner of Armenia, accounting for 4.1%
of the total commercial exchanges (EU Commission, 2011b).
Over 8% of the remittances coming to Armenia originate in
the US. Since 2006, Armenia received a total of $235.6 mil-
lion in assistance funds through the Millennium Challenge
Corporation, but the 2008 post-election violence in Yerevan
determined the US to suspend financing for the covered
projects. Even in those circumstances, Armenia is still one of
the states receiving the highest financial US aid per capita.
The American assistance granted to Armenia between 1992
and 2005 exceeds $1 billion (Nichol, 2011, p. 27). In 2011,
the US Congress voted for Armenia: $44 million in economic
assistance, $3.5 million in military assistance, and $450,000
in military training. The US also allocates annually money
for the financing of the reconstruction and development
74 Interview with a diplomat.
377
projects in Nagorno-Karabakh. 2011 was no exception: the
US provided $8 million in assistance programs for the region
(RFE, 2010d). Between 1998 and 2008, the US granted
Nagorno-Karabakh humanitarian aid worth a total of $32
million (Nichol, 2011, p. 27).
The Armenian Diaspora in the US is instrumental to
Yerevans efforts to obtain financial assistance during the
budget debates in the American legislative, to block or
reduce a similar assistance for Azerbaijan, to prevent the
repel of section 907 of the Freedom Support Act applied to
the latter, to block certain inconvenient diplomatic assign-
ments (e.g., the confirmation procedure of the current US
ambassador in Azerbaijan), to obtain the recognition of the
Armenian Genocide. Besides lobbying in Washington, the
Armenian community contributes directly to the economic
development by financing infrastructure projects in
Armenia. However, the interests of the Diaspora and those
of the authorities in Yerevan do not always overlap. In 2008
and 2009, the leadership in Yerevan was much more favor-
able to the pressure exerted by the US upon Turkey for the
normalization of relations with Armenia. The Armenian
Diaspora in the US suspected that Yerevan might slow down
its campaign for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide
once it has reestablished relations with Ankara. Moreover,
representatives of the Diaspora who wished to invest in
Armenia complained about the high level of corruption and
the administrative obstacles that hinder the development of
businesses.75
In the context of changing US security priorities after the
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and the two major
military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, Armenia reac-
tivated its military cooperation with the US. A similar atti-
tude was adopted by Yerevan towards NATO. The Armenian
authorities perceived these developments as an opportunity
for diversifying their security options, receiving technical
75 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
378
assistance, and gaining experience. Armenia managed to
establish a regular strategic dialogue with the US and signed
the Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO. With
American assistance, the Center for Humanitarian Demining
for the training of experts in land mine disarming was
opened in Armenia. In 2010, for the first time, Armenia
hosted a NATO exercise on its territory. The first US-Arme-
nian military exercises are also planned in the near future.
Armenia sent 46 troops in Iraq and 45 in Afghanistan.
In 2011, it increased its military presence in Afghanistan
substantially, by sending a contingent of 81 troops to the
theater of operations. All these do not aim to break
Armenias alliance with Russia. Given the current status quo
in the region, a break is inconceivable. However, wishing to
expand the maneuvering space in their foreign policy, the
authorities in Yerevan are signaling to Russia that Armenia
has other options as well, by which to guarantee its military
security76. Yet the question remains: how serious are such
signals for Russia, which has at its disposal a variety of means
to obstruct a radical change in the course of Armenias foreign
policy?
III.1.4. The EU
In an attempt to galvanize its diversification strategy,
Armenia has lately turned its attention towards the EU.
The economic relations between Armenia and the EU have
rapidly grown since 2005-2006. Armenias inclusion in the
European Neighborhood Policy and the signing of the
EU-Armenia action plan have accelerated this process.
Consequently, Yerevan sees the EU as increasingly impor-
tant for macro-financial stability and the economic develop-
ment of Armenia. As an observer acknowledges: When we
speak of the EU, the first question that comes to mind is if
and how much money theyll give us77. The latest public
76 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
77 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
379
opinion barometer shows that 29% of the respondents view
the EU as Armenias number one partner (International
Republican Institute, 2008a).
Armenia receives significant financial assistance from the
EU. Between 2007 and 2010, the EU allocated 98.4 million
euros; for the years 2011-2013, a budget of 157.3 million
euros is approved, plus another 40 million euros that can be
drawn by Armenia from other EU-financed programs (Nava-
sardian, 2011, p. 65). In 2011, the EU and Armenia signed
a memorandum for the granting of a macro-financial aid of
100 million euros aimed to overcome the effects of the
global economic crisis 65 million as a loan and 35 million
as a grant (Eteris, 2011). The EU also finances programs for
the improvement of the nuclear security in Armenia: it has
offered to partially cover the costs of closing down the
nuclear power plant in Metsamor. Moreover, the EU is the
second largest investor in Armenia after Russia. EU-member
states, France and the Netherlands, are second and third top
investors in Armenia in 2010, with $146.7 million and
$64.3 million, respectively (Mediamax, 2011). Economical-
ly, the EU is Armenias main trade partner accounting for
32.1% of the total commercial exchanges in 2010 (EU
Commission, 2011b). This was due, in part, to the 2009
extension of the Generalized System of Preferences Plus
(GSP+) to Armenia, which facilitated the access of the
countrys products on the European market. In 2008, the
EU commissioned a feasibility study concerning the creation
of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)
with Armenia.
In Yerevan, almost all political forces support closer
relations with the EU: There is a genuine interest for the
EU in Yerevan78, a diplomat confirms. This interest is con-
firmed by official documents. The national security strategy
adopted in 2007 mentions the European integration among
Armenias objectives (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007).
78 Interview with a diplomat.
380
European integration, however, is seen differently in Yerevan
than in Kiev, Chiinu, or Tbilisi. Asked about the countrys
European integration, an official explained: We do not
knock at the EUs door, as our neighbors do. We do not rush
into it. European integration is a lengthy process during
which, as we solve our domestic problems, we will gradually
reach a level of development close to that of the EU-mem-
ber states. Only then will we determine whether it is worth
becoming a full member or not.79 On the one hand, such a
positioning with regard to integration confirms a realistic
assessment of Armenias chances to become an EU member
in the foreseeable future. It seems that Yerevan is relatively
satisfied with the EUs offer to Eastern neighbors and tries
to extract as much as possible from what is on the table. On
the other hand, such an approach shows that Yerevan is
interested in technical cooperation (the introduction of
technical standards and regulations), but also in preventing
an excessive EU intrusion in its domestic affairs by keeping
a certain distance. As a local analyst remarked, the politi-
cal leadership avoids assuming too many obligations in its
relationship with the EU; the membership in the Council of
Europe and the problems related to human rights already
give our leaders enough headaches80.
Armenias cooperation with the EU is not confined, how-
ever, to economic aspects only. As a confirmation, in 2010
Armenia aligned with 28 out of the 44 EU foreign and secu-
rity policy statements, opened for third countries support
(EU Commission, 2011e). Armenias cooperation with the
EU in the field of foreign and security policies is directly
connected to its dispute with Azerbaijan and difficult rela-
tions with Turkey. For us, the EU is a union of Christian
states81, an official declared. Without mentioning Turkey
and Azerbaijan, Armenia seems to suggest that those two
79 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.
80 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
81 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.
381
states have no place in the EU. Alternatively, both have to
solve their conflicts with Armenia first, in order to take fur-
ther steps towards integration in the EU. Confirming this
position, Yerevan expressed a certain disappointment with
the the fact that overcoming certain historic problems and
the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border were not laid
down by the EU as preconditions for accession talks with
Turkey (Navasardian, 2011, p. 64). Although the EU does
not formally take part in the negotiations regarding Nagor-
no-Karabakh, France, an EU-member state, co-presides the
Minsk Group. There have been suggestions that France be
replaced in the Minsk Group by an EU diplomat. Armenia,
having a privileged relationship with France, which is home
to an influential Armenian Diaspora, opposed this proposal
(Popescu, 2011, p. 105). To conclude, the Armenian diplo-
macy objectives in its interaction with the EU institutions
are to preserve the status quo in the negotiations and to block
certain documents or initiatives that would put Armenia in
an unfavorable position with regard to Azerbaijan. Usually,
the EU tries to keep its neutrality with regard to both coun-
tries, so the EU documents often contain statements that
satisfy Yerevan and irritate Baku or the other way around.
For instance, Armenia had a critical reaction to the resolution
calling upon the EU to develop a strategy regarding South
Caucasus, which was passed by the European Parliament in
2010. The document demands explicitly that the Armenian
military forces be withdrawn from the occupied territories
of Azerbaijan (EU Parliament, 2010), actually reiterating
the message of the 2008 resolution of the UN General
Assembly. At the same time, the passage in which the EU is
called upon to offer humanitarian aid to the population of
Nagorno-Karabakh is in accordance with Armenias efforts
to de-isolate the region.
382
III.1.5. Turkey
The first thing many ordinary people in Yerevan do when
they get up in the morning is to look towards Turkey and
admire the magnificent Ararat, the mountain that bears
deep historical and symbolical significance to all Armenians.
Although their eyes are drawn to Turkey, there are many
things that separate Armenians from their closest Western
neighbor. In the early 1990s, Yerevan and Ankara found
themselves on the opposite sides of the barricade in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The war and the subsequent
closing of the borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan revived
the fear of the Turkish threat deeply rooted in the collective
memory of the Armenians. The campaign for the recognition
of the Armenian Genocide and references in the Armenian
Constitution to the Eastern provinces of Turkey as Western
Armenia have farther broadened the split between Yerevan
and Ankara.
Starting in 2008, Armenia has actively sought to overcome
the political animosities. The Russo-Georgian war accelerat-
ed this process that would have been impossible if both
states had not made small steps towards the normalization
of their relations. Ankara gave the first signs of rapproche-
ment in 2005-2007 by restoring several Armenian churches
previously in poor condition. Among those, was the Akdamar
church, situated on one of the Lake Van islands. Armenian
officials took part in the opening ceremony and the Turkish
authorities subsequently allowed only one liturgy per year.
Yerevan seized the opportunity and invited the Turkish
president to Armenia for the official soccer game between
the two national teams. In September 2008, the president
of Turkey paid a historic visit to Yerevan, being the first
Turkish head of state to have ever visited Armenia. Almost
a year later, Armenia and Turkey signed protocols on estab-
lishing diplomatic relations and reopening the border between
the two countries. However, the process of normalization
got stuck in 2010, when both parts gave up ratifying the
383
protocols and blamed the failure on each other. It should be
noticed that neither Armenia, nor Turkey withdrew signa-
tures on the protocols. Therefore they did not put an end to
the process but only froze the ratification procedure.
Although they failed in the first attempt in 2010, Arme-
nia and Turkey overcame an important psychological stage.
The problem is no longer if, but when the relationships are
going to be normalized82, an influent local expert remarked.
In the spirit of its policy of zero problems with the neigh-
bors, Turkey went on with the restoration of the Armenian
churches and, in 2010, removed Armenia from the list of
countries that pose a national security threat. The process is
not a linear one, however. Armenia goes on with its interna-
tional campaign for recognition of the Armenian Genocide.
In response, the Turkish prime-minister threatens to expel
the Armenian workers from the country and demands that
the monument of the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation in
Kars be pulled down. But most analysts believe the process
cannot be stopped. A keen observer of the region remarks:
Today, it is not the Turks and the Armenians, but the
Armenians among themselves and the Turks among them-
selves who argue as to what is to be done for the reconcilia-
tion [between Turks and Armenians] (Markedonov, 2011).
For obvious reasons, the process meets with opposition
at both political and social levels. An official in Yerevan con-
cludes rather pessimistically: The policy of zero problems
with the neighbors means for Turkey zero neighbors83.
Socially as well, there is resistance to the normalization
process. But the figures are not as discouraging as they should
be, given the mostly negative mutual perception both Turks
and Armenians have. In Turkey, according to an opinion
survey, 50% of the people questioned are against the
reopening of the border, 27% give affirmative answers, while
82 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
83 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.
384
22% remain undecided. In another opinion survey, this time
in Armenia, 31% of the people questioned were in favor of
increased contacts with Turkey, almost as many were against
it, while 40% were undecided (Armtown.Com, 2011b). In
Armenia, the trade arguments prevail when it comes to the
reopening of the border. Many see it as a huge opportunity
to explore the market in Eastern Turkey. This line of reason-
ing is mirrored in the surveys. According to a public opinion
barometer, 41% of the respondents believe the reopening of
the countrys border with Turkey will have an immediate
positive economic impact on Armenia, while 36% state they
are neutral or unsure of the positive effects (RFE, 2011b).
In spite of the closed border and the lack of diplomatic
relations, there are commercial, humanitarian, and occasion-
ally political exchanges that push Yerevan and Ankara day
by day towards the normalization of their relationship.
Turkey was Armenias sixth trade partner in 2010, account-
ing for 4.4% of the total commercial exchanges (EU Com-
mission, 2011b). Businessmen estimate that the bilateral
trade exchanges might double if the border is reopened
(Markedonov, 2011). There is air communication between
Yerevan and Istanbul. Between 40,000 and 70,000 Armenians
work in Turkey. Armenians have no problems with going on
vacation to Turkey: about 50,000 of them visited Antalya in
2009 (Ziflioglu, 2010). Neither do Turkish tourists avoid
Armenia. There are also bilateral cultural events: in 2011,
a Turkish film week was organized for the second time in
the Armenian city of Vanadzor. There are also many con-
tacts between civil society and the experts community that
provides the chance to have an informal dialogue between
officials and opinion makers from the two countries. In
Yerevan, some experts affirmed that the bilateral talks about
the normalization of relations have not been suspended;
they have just been moved to a different level. It seems that
during such talks the two sides discussed the possibility of
partially implementing the protocols, without their being
385
ratified (e.g., opening the border for trucks alone, several days
a week).84 The message of the Turkish premier, after winning
the 2011 parliamentary elections, about the continuation of
the dialogue with Yerevan (News.Ad, 2011d) confirmed
that, in spite of the many obstacles, the process will not
stop. These developments, if ultimately successful, will have
a major impact on the economic and security architecture of
South Caucasus. For Turkey, however, the mission seems
extremely difficult, not least because of Azerbaijans opposi-
tion to the unconditional normalization of relations between
Turkey and Armenia and of the close connections existing
between Ankara and Baku.
III.2. Azerbaijan: Strategic independence through
multi-vectorism
The prime objective of Azerbaijans foreign policy is to
reestablish its territorial integrity. The countrys external
strategy also seeks access to technologies and aims to boost
oil and gas exports, by multiplying the delivery routes
towards the international market. The energy factor is thus
instrumentalized domestically and externally to achieve the
countrys reintegration. The financial independence guaran-
teed by the substantial income that the energy sector gener-
ates offers Azerbaijan a wide autonomy in its relationships
with the regional powers. Consequently, Azerbaijan pursues
a multi-vectorial foreign policy that 41% of its citizens sup-
port (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). The foreign
policy orientations often oscillate in order to loosen the
pressure of a regional power or to extract concessions from
the regional actors. Although it guarantees a certain degree
of strategic independence, such a course is susceptible to
cyclical crises in Azerbaijans relations with its partners.
84 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
386
III.2.1. Turkey
Probably the closest regional relations Azerbaijan has are
developed with Turkey. Azerbaijan and Turkey are connect-
ed through a multilateral web of humanitarian, economic,
social, and political contacts that strengthen the relation-
ship. On a political level, there are many inter-governmental
meetings and consultations between the two sides. Baku
feels comfortable in its relationships with Ankara, because
the Turkish side avoids any criticism regarding the domestic
political developments in Azerbaijan (Musabekov, 2011).
In the energy sector, two Azerbaijani oil and gas export
pipelines have two Turkish cities Erzurum and Ceyhan,
respectively as their final destinations. The railroad that
will connect Azerbaijan and Turkey via Georgia is under
construction. Turkey is Azerbaijans second biggest trade
partner, with 8.2% of the total trade volume in 2010 (EU
Commission, 2011d). Moreover, Turkey is the fifth greatest
investor in Azerbaijan, at 3.9% of the total investments in
2010 (News.Az, 2011e). Over the last few years, Azerbaijan
has shown interest in the Turkish energy market and has
made several significant investments. For instance, SOCAR
has purchased 51% of the Turkish petrochemical plant
Petkim shares and intends to invest about $100 million in
the development of energy projects (News.Az, 2011f). The
total volume of Azerbaijani investments in Turkey reaches
$4 billion and Baku plans further investments of about $6
billion (Kardas, 2011). To many Azerbaijanis who want to
study or work, Turkey is an attractive destination. From
1992 to 2010, more than 5,000 Azerbaijani citizens studied
in Turkish universities thanks to the scholarships provided
by the Turkish government. Some also chose to study in
Turkey at their own expense. More and more parents send
their children to Turkish kindergartens and primary and
high schools in Baku (Trend, 2011b). The network of
Turkish educational units in Azerbaijan is only surpassed by
the similar institutions where teaching is done in Russian
(Musabekov, 2011). In an opinion survey, Turkey ranks third
387
(7.4%) in the top preferences of the Azerbaijanis who would
go to work abroad (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010).
All this is reflected in the societys favorable attitude towards
Turkey. Thus, 86.4% of the 2010 respondents declared that
Turkey is a friendly state for Azerbaijan (ibidem).
The favorable attitude towards Turkey can be accounted
for also by the assistance this country offered Azerbaijan
during and in the aftermath of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh
and after its adjournment. Several NGOs in Turkey provided
humanitarian aid to the IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh, the
amount up to now reaching $6 million (News.Az, 2011).
After the war, the military cooperation intensified, with a
total help granted until 2010 of over $200 million, accord-
ing to the Turkish Ministry of Defense (Artsakank News,
2011). Turkey trained Azerbaijani officers and soldiers in its
educational institutions and military training facilities. The
two sides cooperate in several common projects in the
defense industry. Besides importing weaponry from Turkey,
Baku and Ankara have set up joint ventures for the produc-
tion of ammunition and military equipment for the Azer-
baijani armed forces (News.Az, 2011g). In 2010, Ankara
and Baku strengthen their relationship by concluding an
agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support.
They committed to offer each other support in case their
national security is threatened. The document, however,
does not offer Azerbaijan the same kind of security guaran-
tees that Armenia enjoys through CSTO.85 In case of war,
Azerbaijan expects to receive indirect political support and
military assistance from Turkey.86
Turkey plays a crucial role in Azerbaijans strategy of
de-isolation and guaranteeing security for Nakhichevan.
The construction of a gas pipeline from Turkey to Nakhi-
chevan began in 2010; plus, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed
a contract for the gas supplies to the Azerbaijani enclave
85 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
86 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
388
without the Turkish side collecting any transit fees. Direct
flights from Istanbul to Nakhichevan have been opened.
Baku and Ankara discuss the possibility of connecting Nakhi-
chevan to the Baku Tbilisi Kars railroad. Moreover,
Azerbaijans military presence in Nakhichevan has been
strengthened with Turkeys substantial assistance (Abbasov,
2010). Given the tensioned relationships between Azerbai-
jan and Iran, Turkey tries to mediate between the two states
in the spirit of its new policy towards its neighbors. In 2011,
it housed the trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers in
order to revamp the dialogue between Baku and Tehran.
Yet the strategic Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership is not
without difficulties. Turkeys attempt at normalizing rela-
tions with Armenia was perceived in a very negative way in
Baku. Seen from Azerbaijan, the eventual re-opening of the
Turkish-Armenian border undermines drastically the chances
to force Yerevan to an agreement with Baku. Besides chang-
ing its discourse on Turkey, Azerbaijan has slightly changed
direction in its energy policy as well. This meant the revisit-
ed gas prices for Turkey and involvement in the AGRI
project that excludes not only Russia, but Turkey as well.
Azerbaijans message to Turkey was, essentially: Without us,
you can not be an energy hub87. The Nabucco project only
fueled the differences between Baku and Ankara. Azerbaijan
rejected Turkeys offer to buy an entire volume of gas with
the aim to re-sell it on the European market. Although the
Azerbaijani citizens enjoy, since 2008, a visa-free regime
with Turkey, a similar treatment is not being applied to the
Turkish citizens visiting Azerbaijan. Ankara exerts pressure
so that Azerbaijan liberalize its visa regime with Turkey.
Azerbaijan, however, invokes security concerns (drug traf-
ficking, migration etc.) and a similar pressure coming from
Iran to lift visas for Iranian citizens. Experts invoke domes-
tic motives as well: The regime is concerned by Turkeys
87 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
389
growing political and economic influence in Azerbaijan88,
an analyst unveils the concerns otherwise concealed by the
officials. Although Turkey managed to repair its relationship
with Azerbaijan in 2010, the bitter taste left by the formers
attempt at unconditionally normalizing relations with
Armenia remained. It is expected in Baku that Turkey will
go on with its dialogue with Armenia after the elections.89
In such circumstances, it may very well be that Azerbaijan
will make use of sectorial cooperation with Russia to divert
this process.
III.2.2. Russia
During the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the Azerbaijani
leadership reacted with moderation. Baku refrained from
criticizing Russia openly. That Georgias actions were in
conformity with the international law was announced by
the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Baku,
not by some high-ranking official. The protests in front of
the Russian embassy in Baku were brief, because of the law-
and-order forces intervention. At the same time, the 2008
military conflict and the negotiations between Turkey and
Armenia created the necessary conditions for a rapproche-
ment between Moscow and Baku. Russias role in the Minsk
Group and the reactivation of the negotiations by Moscow
determined Azerbaijan, which is opposed to the current sta-
tus quo in Nagorno-Karabakh, to accomodate Russias
interests, without, however, crossing the line imposed by a
multi-vectorial foreign policy.
The compatibility between the political models (sovereign
democracies) and the specific of the economies (petro-states),
as well as the Azerbaijani presidents multiple personal ties
with Russia (he studied in Moscow) facilitated this process.
The economic interests and migratory flows contributed to
88 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
89 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
390
the rapprochement between Moscow and Baku. Russia is
Azerbaijans third trade partner, accounting for 7.4% of the
total commercial exchanges in 2010 (EU Commission,
2011d). It is also second on the list of preferred working
destinations for the Azerbaijanis willing to work abroad
(Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). According to esti-
mates, there are between 1.3 and 1.8 million Azerbaijanis in
Russia, who send home annually from $1.8 to $2.4 billion
(Valiyev, 2011). A limitation on the access of Azerbaijani
migrants to the Russian labor market would have a huge
negative social impact, putting the Baku government into
a difficult situation.
The growing importance of the Russian vector in Azerbai-
jans foreign policy contributed to the removing of certain
problems from the bilateral agenda. In 2010, Azerbaijan
and Russia signed a terrestrial border delimitation agree-
ment, in addition to the 2002 one on the delimitation of
the border between the two states in the Caspian Sea. On
that occasion, Russia announced that the issue of two villages
in Northern Azerbaijan Uryanoba and Khrakhoba ,
considered to be temporary Russian territory (Republic of
Dagestan), had been solved: the two communities had
returned under the jurisdiction of the Baku authorities
(News.Az, 2011h). Solving the problem of the two villages
was important for the Baku government, since it is concerned
by the occasional revendications of the Lezgin minority in
Northern Azerbaijan, which often uses Moscow as a platform
to launch political messages. Azerbaijan hosts a radar station
in Gabala and leases it to Russia in exchange for $7 million
annually. About 1,000 Russian troops serve at the station.
The agreement expires in 2012, but the two sides have
already begun a preliminary round of negotiations to extend
it. Russia has offered to invest in the modernization of the
radar. It is very likely that Azerbaijan will extend the term
of leasing by another five or ten years.90 It may very well be
90 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
391
that this prolongation of the agreement will be the political
payback for the modern Russian weaponry supplied to
Azerbaijan in 2010. Some experts think that Azerbaijans
joining the Non-Aligned Movement is in direct connection
with the regional post-2008 dynamics. It seems that Baku
wanted to signal in this way, especially to Moscow, that it
does not seek membership of military alliances, neither of
NATO, nor of the CSTO.91
Accommodation of the Russian interests also occurred
in the energy, economic, and humanitarian fields. A number
of companies were admitted to the Azerbaijani market. The
VTB Bank entered the financial market in 2008. Another
two Russian companies, Rostelekom and Sistema, have stat-
ed their interest to take part in the privatization process of
Azertelekom and Baki Telefon Rabitasi. Approximately 500
Russian companies have businesses in Azerbaijan (Oxford
Analytica, 2011). Russia and Azerbaijan have signed an
agreement regarding the construction of a new electric
power transmission line from Iashma to Derbent, that will
boost Russias electricity exports capacity. In 2008, Russia
avoided to bomb the Kulevi terminal, which is the property
of SOCAR, and the Baku Supsa pipeline. In 2010, Azer-
baijan began exporting gas to Russia. In 2011, the export
volume was increased to 2 billion cubic meters. In 2008,
in Azerbaijan, where the largest Russian Diaspora in South
Caucasus lives (160,000-170,000 people), a branch of the
Moscow State University was opened. This institution joins
the list of the already existing over 200 schools and colleges
in Azerbaijan, where teaching is done in Russian (Musabekov,
2011). Annually, Azerbaijan is visited by 700,000 Russian
citizens (Oxford Analytica, 2011). All together, these factors
preserve a positive image of Russia among several segments
of the Azerbaijani society. A 2010 public opinion barometer
indicated that 23% of the Azerbaijanis think of Russia as a
friendly state. It is surpassed, in this sense, only by Turkey
91 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
392
(Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). But the Azerbaijani
society is polarized when it comes to Russia. In the same
opinion poll, almost 17% of the respondents identified Russia
as an enemy state (ibidem). Undoubtedly and given the
Russian support for Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh con-
flict , Russias image in Azerbaijan has further deteriorat-
ed after the Georgian war, the population, being preponder-
ently sympathetic with the Georgians.92 A useful indicator
is the level of popular support for the Russian-sponsored
integration processes inside CIS. From 2006 to 2010, the
Azerbaijanis support for integration in the CIS dropped
from about 24% to 15% (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
2010).
Azerbaijans pragmatic attitude towards Russia was put
to the test in several conflicting situations. In 2009, the
information in the media about the $800 million worth of
military equipment transferred from Russia to Armenia
caused indignation in Azerbaijan. The Baku government
was disappointed, since the Kremlin, as a result of the 2008
rapprochement, had promised to provide extra-support to
Azerbaijan (Ismailzade, 2009). Yet, while mediating the talks
between Yerevan and Baku, the Kremlin was busy to preserve
the military balance, against the interests of Azerbaijan.
The extension, in 2010, of the Russian military presence in
Armenia was also received without enthusiasm in Baku.
Commenting on the Russian military policy in South Cau-
casus, an Azerbaijani high-ranking official pointed out that
the time has come to replace the battle tanks with oil tanks,
in other words to substitute the military presence with the
economic one (Aztag, 2011). During 2008, there were sev-
eral xenophobic violent attacks against Azerbaijani citizens
in the suburbs of Moscow. The local media widely reported
on these crimes, causing public outcry in Azerbaijan. Under
the public opinion pressure, the Baku officials brought up
the question of the security of the Azerbaijani citizens in
92 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
393
Russia during the bilateral talks with their counterparts in
Moscow. The two sides found themselves on radically differ-
ent positions also on the issue of the trans-Caspian pipeline:
the Russian ambassador in Baku suggested that such a proj-
ect could cause damages to the environment and that Russia
and Iran had to give consent for the project to be imple-
mented. In turn, the SOCAR representative replied that
talks of the trans-Caspian pipeline will take place without
Russia (Fitzpatrick, 2011).
III.2.3. The US
The US political and economic support was decisive for
the construction, in the first decade of this century, of the
energy routes that bypass Russia, providing Azerbaijan with
the wide international autonomy it currently enjoys. The
US role continues to be crucial for lifting the bilateral block-
ages between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which could
turn Azerbaijan into a transit country of the Caspian gas.
Moreover, close economic relations have developed in time
between Azerbaijan and the US. The US is Azerbaijans sec-
ond biggest investor (9% of the total investments) and
fourth trade partner in 2010, accounting for 7% of the total
commercial exchanges (News.Az, 2011e; EU Commission,
2011d). Some of the largest US oil companies (Exxon Mobil,
Conoco Philips, or Chevron) are involved in large-scale
energy projects in Azerbaijan. Baku has often resorted to the
US oil companies lobby to support its national agenda in
Washington.
The bilateral cooperation in the field of security increased
considerably after September 11th, 2001. Azerbaijan opened
its air space and made its terrestrial infrastructure available
for refueling the US planes heading towards Afghanistan.
Baku deployed a contingent of 80 peace-keepers in Afghan-
istan and offered the US support in its military operation in
Iraq, contributing 150 troops to the stabilization force.
Azerbaijan offers also an important way of transportation
394
towards Afghanistan from the North. Every year starting
with 2002, the President of the United States has suspend-
ed the application of section 907 of the Freedom Support
Act, which blocks the financial assistance to Azerbaijan.
In 2010, the US granted Azerbaijan financial assistance of
$22 million. In 2003, the US Defense Department began to
develop a training and equipment program of the Azerbaijani
naval guard in the Caspian Sea. Each year, the US and
Azerbaijani armed forces organize joint military exercises.
In 2008, however, the first cracks in this partnership
became visible, and kept growing in 2009 and 2010. In
spite of efforts on both sides to maintain a faade of nor-
mality, the relationship is no longer as close as it used to be
in the early 2000s, as an Azerbaijani official from the presi-
dential administration stated (News.Az, 2011i). This reflects
in opinion surveys, in which only 6.5% of the respondents
declared that the US was a friendly state, 2% fewer than in
the case of Iran (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010).
From the Azerbaijani point of view, several factors con-
tributed to the chilling down of the Azerbaijani-American
relations. Among the political elite, there is a general feeling
that Azerbaijan has contributed more than it has received in
exchange. In the Baku leaderships perception, the relation-
ship with the US is based not on values, but on interests.
Azerbaijan hoped that its cooperation in the field of security
and in the energy sector would generate a massive support
from the US for solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Thus, interpreting the partnership as a purely contractual
relation, Baku feels that it has not profited enough from
Washingtons support.93 A series of US foreign policy actions
caused irritation in Baku: first, the US active role behind the
normalization of the relations between Armenia and Turkey;
second, the preservation of section 907 of the Freedom
Support Act94; and third, the promotion of a democratic
93 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
94 Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011.
395
agenda in Azerbaijan95. The Azerbaijani presidency became
very sensitive to the US pressure for democratization after
the wave of popular revolts in the Arab world.96 The US
vote against the 2008 resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly regarding the situation in the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan, the fact that there was no US
ambassador appointed in Baku for more than a year, and
that the president of Azerbaijan was not invited at the 2010
Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, attended instead
by the Armenian and Georgian heads of state, were a few
more episodes that further contributed to the alienation of
Azerbaijan from the US.
Consequently, Baku suspended its common military
exercises with the US in 2009, 2010, and 2011 and veered
towards Russia in its foreign policy. The US Administration
sent the Secretary of Defense to Baku to shore up the divi-
sion. This episode was followed by the 2010 visit of the
Secretary of State in Baku and by that of the Azerbaijani
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Washington in 2011. Although
the dialogue intensified at governmental level in 2010 and
2011, the positions of the two sides remained almost
unchanged regarding the issues dividing them. A new appeal
for the reopening of the Turkish-Armenian border, which
the US Secretary of State launched in Istanbul in 2011,
caused a predictable reaction in Baku (News.Az, 2011) and
maintained the vicious circle the two sides are caught in.
III.2.4. The EU
At the middle of the first decade of this century,
Azerbaijans trade with the EU began growing, so that in
2010 the EU was by far its largest trade partner, accounting
for 46.9% of the total commercial exchanges (EU Commis-
sion, 2011d). It must be pointed out that Azerbaijan is the
95 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
96 Interview with a mass-media person, Baku, June 2011.
396
only Eastern Partnership state that enjoys a solid positive
trade balance with the EU. Its main export products are oil
and gas. The EU-member states count among the largest
investors in Azerbaijan: Great Britain comes first, with 52%
of the total investments in 2010, and is followed by the
Czech Republic and France (News.Az, 2011e). From 2007
to 2010, the EU invested 92 million euros in Azerbaijan; for
the years 2011-2013, the budget goes up to 122.5 million
euros (EEAS, 2011). The EU and European integration are
relatively popular topics in the Azerbaijani society. The lat-
est public opinion barometer indicates that 32.2% of the
population is in favor of European integration, a rise from a
27.7% in 2006. Moreover, the combined EU-member states
combined represent the first and foremost choice (11%) of
the Azerbaijanis willing to work abroad (Puls-R/Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung, 2010).
In spite of the positive commercial dynamics, mostly in
the energy sector, the political relationships between Azer-
baijan and the European Union trail behind. Azerbaijan is
an independent financial actor. Experts estimate that
Azerbaijans daily income from the oil trade varied in 2009
between $40 and $60 million (Bayramov, 2009, p. 7).
Azerbaijan also develops a donor state profile: in 2011,
it offered $1 million in aid to Japan after the devastating
earthquake.97 Under these circumstances, one million more
or less from the EU does not make a difference98, a local
analyst comments. We do not have the same motivation
for reforms as Georgia or Moldova does99, another explains.
The self-confidence fueled by the oil-driven economy turned
the Azerbaijani leaders into extremely difficult dialogue
partners.100 The diminishing asymmetry in the bilateral
relationships is confirmed in Baku: Our cooperation has
97 Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011.
98 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
99 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
100 Interview with a diplomat.
397
undergone a serious transformation from the initial emphasis
on aid [from the EU] to mutually beneficial cooperation,
the Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs underscored
(News.Az, 2011j). Consequently, Azerbaijan seeks equality
in its relations with the EU. Eschewing the EUs condition-
ality is part of this effort. For instance, Azerbaijan rejects
what it considers to be the EUs one-dimensional approach
to human rights. Besides political and civil liberties, human
rights also cover economic and social rights concerning
which Baku states it has made significant progress.101 At the
same time, Baku develops privileged bilateral partnerships
with the EU-member states, in order to mitigate the
European institutions criticism. When criticism cannot be
muted, as it happened in the spring of 2011, when protests
of the opposition were suppressed, the Azerbaijani authori-
ties express their discontent with the EUs position (Azernews,
2011). At the same time, Baku criticizes the EUs selective
approach towards human rights, for instance with reference
to the European institutions lack of interest for the rights
of the IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh (News.Az, 2011k).
Azerbaijan behaves in an obstructionist way in questions of
interest for its citizens, for instance regarding the visa facil-
itation agreement with the EU. The authorities state that
the problem is now with the EU, since the Commission has
no mandate to begin negotiations.102 Experts, however,
blame the lack of political will in Baku. The Azerbaijani
government is reluctant to conclude the readmission agree-
ments that are necessary for a visa facilitation deal with the
EU (Trend, 2011c). In turn, Azerbaijan has toughened visa
requirementss for all foreign citizens, including EU ones.
Generally speaking, these examples reflect the position
of the Baku government on the preferred model of European
integration, i.e. economic cooperation. It seems that eco-
nomic cooperation with the EU is focused mainly on the
101 Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011.
102 Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011.
398
energy sector; the prospects of a DCFTA are bleak, since
Azerbaijan is not a member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). In 2006, the EU and Azerbaijan signed a memo-
randum on partnership in the field of energy; in 2011, the
president of the European Commission and the president of
Azerbaijan signed a joint statement on the southern gas cor-
ridor, of which project Nabucco is a part. Access to the
European markets is supposed to increase the profits and
importance of Azerbaijan for the EUs energy security
(Aliyev, 2010). Moreover, Azerbaijan aspires to convert its
interaction with the EU in the field of energy into support
for the countrys reintegration. This effort is backed by the
occasional support given to the EUs foreign policy and
security statements that Azerbaijan is invited to join. In
2010, the Baku government aligned with 18 of the 44 state-
ments (EU Commission, 2011f). Azerbaijan does not see
the EU as a major power in the region, since it lacks hard
power. The Russo-Georgian war was a good example in this
sense for Baku.103 Consequently, the political leadership
does not expect the EU to play, in short and medium term,
an important role in the negotiations on the Nagorno-Kara-
bakh conflict. At the same time, the Azerbaijani diplomacy
cultivates close ties with the EU-member states, actual or
prospective importers of gas from Azerbaijan, to defend
inside the EU its stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
III.2.5. Iran
The Islamic Republic of Iran, where about 16 million
Azerbaijani ethnics live, remains an inconvenient neighbor
for Azerbaijan. Although strong historical, cultural, and reli-
gious aspects link together the two countries, there is dis-
trust regarding Iran in the public opinion. Surveys show
that 10% of the Azerbaijani respondents think that Iran
is an enemy state, while 8.8% view it as a friendly one
(Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). The bilateral trade
103 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
399
exchanges are rather modest: Iran is Azerbaijans 17th trade
partner, with only 0.7% of the total commercial exchanges
in 2010 (EU Commission, 2011d). Politically, there is an
insufficiently institutionalized dialogue which alternates
between conflict and cooperation. The June 2011 visit in
Baku of the president of the Iranian parliament can hardly
change in a significant way the nature of the relations
between the two states. Among the few existing bilateral
cooperation projects, there are the seasonal exchanges of
electric power. According to the agreements, Azerbaijan
exports electricity in summer, while Iran exports a similar
quantity in autumn and winter. There are also gas exports in
both directions: thus, Iran plays an important role in Nakhi-
chevans energy security, by supplying the annual volume of
gas necessary to the Armenia-isolated enclave. In exchange,
Azerbaijan exports gas to Irans northern regions. Between
2009 and 2011, Azerbaijan increased the gas deliveries to
Iran (Nichol, 2011, p. 16). Through such an increase, Baku
apparently wishes to protect Nakhichevan from the side ef-
fects of the dysfunctional political relationship with Tehran.
The bilateral relationship is burdened by several prob-
lematic dossiers that substantially affect the interaction
between the two neighbors. Iran holds what Azerbaijan con-
siders to be a pro-Armenian position. Projects in the field of
energy are perceived in a negative way because they weaken
the pressure exerted by Azerbaijan and Turkey on Armenia
via closed borders and exclusion from regional infrastructure
projects. Baku has let Tehran know that it disapproves of the
cooperation between Armenia and Iran (News.Am, 2011c).
Apparently, Iran intensified its cooperation with Armenia
when Azerbaijan got too close, in Tehrans opinion, to the
West. The problem of the border is yet another irritating
subject in the bilateral relationship. Azerbaijan and Iran
have not reached a consensus on the delineation of their
border in the Caspian Sea. Since it feels disadvantaged by
the national sectors division along the median line, Tehran
insists that the Caspian Sea should be divided into equal
400
sectors between the Caspian states. Consequently, in the
dispute area between the two states, Azerbaijan cannot con-
duct drilling and exploitation activities. In a 2001 incident,
the Iranian coast guard forced a BP research vessel to with-
draw from the disputed area. In 2005, there were reports
about the violation of the Azerbaijani air space by the
Iranian forces. Another serious incident on the land border
took place in 2011: there was a fire exchange among the
Iranian border guards and the Azerbaijani ones, in the
course of which an Azerbaijani soldier was killed. This per-
fectly mirrors the tense atmosphere in the bilateral relation-
ship (News.Az, 2011l).
The authorities in Baku are concerned by Irans activities
on the Azerbaijani territory. In 2007, fifteen Azerbaijani
citizens were put under arrest in Baku, and then found, by
an Azerbaijani tribunal, guilty of treason for the benefit of
Iran. Also in Baku, Irans attempts to export a more conser-
vative version of Islam than the one practiced in Azerbaijan
breed suspicion.104 In 2011, the leader of the Azerbaijani
Islamic Party was also arrested for involvement in the
protests held in front of the Ministry of Education against
the prohibition of wearing hijabs in the Azerbaijani schools
(Abbasov, 2011). The party, which is considered pro-Iranian
and suspected of receiving financial support from Tehran,
was outlawed in Azerbaijan. The arrest of its leader was pre-
ceded by critical statements of the clerics and politicians in
Iran regarding the decision of the Azerbaijani government
to ban wearing hijabs in schools. High-ranking officials in
Tehran warned the authorities in Baku about the immi-
nence of a popular revolt if the right to religious freedom is
restricted in Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani leadership is con-
cerned by the attempts at projecting Irans soft power in
Azerbaijan, which threatens the very bases of the current
political regime. Since February 2010, Iran has liberalized
unilaterally the visa regime with Azerbaijanis, with the
104 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
401
exception of a single category, the journalists. Since then,
Tehran demands reciprocity for the Iranian citizens. Tehran
finances the Iranian TV station Sahar, which broadcasts in
Azerbaijani and covers the southern parts of Azerbaijan,
where a compact Talysh minority, culturally and linguistical-
ly close to Iran, lives. The activity of the TV station is con-
sidered in Baku as aimed to undermine the governments
monopoly in the informational space. Besides accusations
brought to the central Azerbaijani authorities for their coop-
eration with the US and Israel, the TV station regularly
invites representatives of the civil society to discuss the
democratic backslide in Azerbaijan.105 Such TV debates
have intensified ever since the outbreak of revolutionary
movements in the Middle East. All these have strengthened
in Baku the feeling that Iran represents a threat, which has
created a widening gap between Azerbaijan and its southern
neighbor. Moreover, the growing conflict within the Iranian
top leadership is perceived as a potentially destabilizing fac-
tor in the region, which only amplifies the state of anxiety
in Baku.
III.3. Georgia due West
Although it remains a goal that can hardly be reached in
the foreseeable future, the countrys reintegration is the
major preoccupation of the Tbilisi authorities. In the short
and mid run, however, Georgia aims to achieve the follow-
ing objectives: to impede the international recognition of
the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to ensure
security along its administrative northern border, to attract
investments and financial assistance from foreign donors for
an intensive domestic development, to set up the closest
possible relationships with NATO and the EU, which, in a
favorable context, would facilitate full integration in these
organizations. Hence, Georgias foreign policy is strongly
oriented towards the West. After the 2008 war, the openly
105 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.
402
pro-Western course of the Georgian foreign policy has been
adapted to the new macro-regional reality.
III.3.1. The US
Although the bilateral relationship has been de-person-
alized during President Obamas Administration, the US
plays an important role in Georgias foreign policy strategy.
The young political elite in Tbilisi, educated in the West,
is largely inspired, in its public policies, from the American
model. The intensified cooperation with the US enjoys
overwhelming popular support. In the 2011 public opinion
surveys, 58% of the citizens think that the US is Georgias
most important political and economic partner, with a slight
drop from the 63% in 2008 (International Republican
Institute, 2008b, 2011). The protests organized in 2011 in
front of the American embassy in Tbilisi by some activists
did not attract a significant support and were denounced by
the rest of the Georgian opposition.
The Georgian leaders used their relation with the US,
after the 2008 war, to neutralize the international isolation
strategy, that Russia promoted worldwide vis--vis Tbilisi.
Thus, in 2009, Georgia signed the Charter on Strategic
Partnership with the US. Although it did not provide simi-
lar security guarantees as the one concluded between Japan
and the US, this document reconfirmed the American polit-
ical support. This was mirrored later in the US Senate reso-
lution regarding the violation of Georgias territorial integrity
and sovereignty by Russia (US Senate, 2011). The Vice-
President of the United States and the US Secretary of State
visited Tbilisi in 2009 and 2010, respectively. In 2010, the
dialogue between the two heads of state was resumed. In
addition to de-isolation efforts, Tbilisi resorted to US influ-
ence to discourage the recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia by the international community.106 The potentially
negative economic or political consequences on the bilateral
106 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
403
relations with Washington in case of recognition of the two
separatist regions were a strong reason for many states in
the Western hemisphere to turn down Moscows offer.
To address the acute security deficit, Georgia made
efforts to increase its military cooperation with the US and
NATO. In 2008, a NATO-Georgia commission was created,
in order to intensify the political consultations and practical
cooperation. From 2009 on, Georgia has begun implement-
ing the national annual program targeting security sector
reforms. This pattern of annual programs is usually applied
to the states that have received their Membership Action
Plan (MAP) therefore, Georgia represents an exception.
Georgia is part of the northern distribution network leading
to Afghanistan, which has grown in importance due to the
increased vulnerability of transit through Pakistan and US
troops surge in Afghanistan. The port of Poti serves as a
point of liaison with Azerbaijan, wherefrom cargoes continue
their transit across the Caspian Sea. The Tbilisi government
has considerably increased its military presence in Afghan-
istan. Having 937 troops deployed in 2010, Georgia counts
among the largest contributors, among the non-NATO
states, to the stabilization missions in Afghanistan. Tbilisi is
also ready to reinforce its contingent in Afghanistan with
another 600 troops (Civil.Ge, 2011g). In exchange, Georgia
sought to acquire weaponry and equipment that would re-
establish its defense capabilities seriously affected by the
2008 war. The US administration has declined such
requests and offered, in exchange, more programs of mili-
tary training and common exercises (Charap and Welt,
2011, pp. 56-57). The US Government occasionally made
military donations or invested in the modernization of the
equipment that the Georgian armed forces already pos-
sessed. Forty light-armored Humvee vehicles were donated
in 2011 to the Georgian military contingent dispatched to
the theater of operations in Afghanistan (Civil.Ge, 2011h).
Moreover, the US financed the modernization works for
three patrol ships of the Georgian coast guard and the con-
struction of a ship maintenance facility.
404
Although the US authorities have refrained from supply-
ing weaponry, the policy of resetting the relations with
Russia has been beneficial for Georgias national security.
The de-tensioning of the Russo-American relations guaran-
tees Georgias military security to a certain extent, in the
sense that there are less chances of a Russian massive con-
ventional attack against it.107 The US actively discouraged
Russia from initiating open aggressive actions against
Georgia. The 2009 Moscow talks between the presidents of
Russia and the US are illustrative in the context of the slight
escalation of the situation in the conflict zones.108 Georgia
perceives the Russo-American resetting as a circumstantial
evolution and the conflict with Russia as a constant factor
in its foreign policy in a foreseeable future: How long will
the Russo-American resetting last?, a Georgian analyst in
Tbilisi wonders, while evaluating the alternatives before
Georgia for its military security. The Cold War has not
ended for Georgia109, an official adds. Hence, the major
concern in Tbilisi is to guarantee the countrys national
security in case the Russo-American reset dies out and the
Kremlin persists in its endeavor to redirect the Georgian
foreign policy, ultimately by the political regime change.110
The US is an essential economic partner and foreign donor
for Georgia. It is Georgias fifth trade partner, accounting
for 7.2% of the total commercial exchanges in 2010 (EU
Commission, 2011c). Moreover, the US is the main foreign
investor in Georgia with $135.8 million in 2010. Foreign
investments in Georgia dropped dramatically from $2 bil-
lion in 2007 to $814 million in 2010 (Civil.Ge, 2011e). At
the same time, Georgias economic growth was based, over
the past few years, on the massive attraction of foreign
investors. Presenting the country in the regional context, a
local expert explains: We do not have a powerful Diaspora,
107 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.
108 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.
109 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011.
110 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.
405
we do not have oil and natural gas, so we must attract
investments111. Hence, US investments are essential for
the resuming and maintaining of Georgias positive econom-
ic growth. The US is also a major foreign donor in Georgia.
From 2006 to 2011, through the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC), the US Government financed numer-
ous infrastructure and development projects in Georgia,
worth almost $400 million. The program has had a decisive
impact on the integration and modernization of the infra-
structure in the regions inhabited by the Armenian and
Azerbaijani minorities in Georgia. The possibility to extend
the program for another term is currently under discussion.
After the Russo-Georgian war, the US contributed $1 billion
to the efforts of reconstruction, supporting the IDPs and
economic development in Georgia. The US financial contri-
bution to the effort of the foreign donors was crucial for
Georgias successful overcoming of the double shock caused
by the war and the global financial crisis.
III.3.2. The EU
Forced by the 2008 events in Georgia, the EU has assumed
a significant role in guaranteeing the countrys security and
macro-economic stability. The Russo-Georgian war reversed
the priorities of the Georgian political leaders. Since the
accelerated accession to NATO is unfeasible, Tbilisi put
more emphasis on the European integration and coopera-
tion with the EU in the field of security. In 2010, Georgia
aligned with 28 of the 44 EU foreign and security policy
statements open for support (EU Commission, 2011g).
Within the framework of the Eastern Partnership multi-
lateral platform democracy, good governance, and stability,
Georgia expressed interest for cooperation with the EU in
the field of the common security policy.112 In 2010, Georgia
opened the negotiations on Association Agreement, signed
111 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.
112 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011.
406
a visa facilitation agreement, and joined the European com-
mon aviation area. The adjustments of the foreign policy
priorities have met support in Georgian public opinion. Ac-
cording to the surveys, 79% of the Georgians declare them-
selves in favor of Georgias joining the EU (Eurasia Partner-
ship Foundation, 2009b). The countrys closer relation with
the EU is motivated by national security imperatives and
the drive for political and economic modernization.
As a mediator for the cease-fire in 2008, the EU is guar-
antor of the Sarkozy-Medvedev plan implementation. Con-
sequently, Tbilisi wishes that the EU puts more pressure on
Russia to determine it to observe all the provisions of the
2008 peace deal. The Georgian officials are often critical of
the EU, blaming it for being too soft in relation to Russia.113
At the same time, they are fully aware that the EU neutral-
izes Russias military threat to a certain extent114, and that
Georgia must avoid being perceived by the EU as a burden
in its relations with Russia. In 2008, the EU deployed a
civilian monitoring mission (EUMM) of 340 observers,
that significantly reduces the chances of another conflict.
The presence of the EU observers is essential for the impar-
tial monitoring of the situation on Georgias administrative
border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to override
Russias allegations regarding Georgias military buildup in
the vicinity of the conflict zones. The authorities in Tbilisi
signed a three-month memorandum with the EUMM in
2009, meant to be prolonged tacitly unless any of the sign-
ing parts pulls out, which imposes restrictions as to the
movement of troops in the vicinity of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Georgia has also taken upon itself to inform EUMM
about the redeployment of troops on its territory. The EU
is part of the Geneva talks in which Georgia, Russia, the US,
the OSCE, the UN, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia are
involved. The consultations take place in two working groups:
113 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011.
114 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.
407
security and refugees. In 2009, the parties involved con-
vened to establish a hot line and to create an incident pre-
vention mechanism, that envisions weekly meetings between
the observers and the officers responsible with security in
the conflict zone.
The EU has been and remains decisive for the preservation
of the territorial integrity of Georgia. This was confirmed by
its discouraging of other states to recognize the two sepa-
ratist entities. The subtle warning addressed to the Minsk
authorities in 2009 regarding the negative effects of the
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the coopera-
tion between Belarus and the EU is a good example in this
sense. At the same time, the policy of certain EU-member
states on arms trade caused concerns in Tbilisi as to the
impact on national and regional military security. In 2011,
France signed a contract for selling two Mistral helicopter
carriers to Russia. Georgia is concerned that such an acqui-
sition is bound to reinforce the Russian military presence in
the Black Sea. In august 2008, Russia resorted to war ships
allocated to the Black Sea Harmony operation for main-
taining regional security, that reunites the litoral states.115
Given that the 2008 invasion of Georgia was partially
launched from the sea and Russia seems to have been con-
fronted with a deficit of operational ships, Tbilisi does not
rule out the possibility that such acquisitions are meant to
increase the projection capacity of the Russian military
forces in a potential Black Sea conflict. As a high-ranking
Russian officer explained, referring to the August 2008 hos-
tilities, what it took us twenty-six hours to do, this [Mistral]
ship does in forty minutes (Kommersant, 2009).
Economically, the EU and its member-states are actively
involved in Georgias multi-dimensional modernization. The
EU is Georgias number one trade partner, with a 31.7% of
the total volume of exchanges in 2010 (EU Commission,
115 Interview with a former high-ranking official, Bucharest,
April 2011.
408
2011c). The Netherlands and Great Britain range second
and third among the top investors in Georgia in 2010, with
$73.4 million and $59 million, respectively (Civil.Ge, 2011e).
The EU is an attractive labor market for the Georgians.
According to the public opinion barometer, 30% of the
Georgians would choose the EU as a destination for work-
ing abroad (Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009b). The
EU member-states combined came second as a source of
remittances to Georgia in the first half of 2011: Greece,
Italy, Spain, and Germany ranged second to fifth in this top,
after Russia (Civil.Ge, 2011i). In the post-conflict years
(2008-2011), the EU has allocated 483.5 million euros for
Georgia, while 131.27 million euros came form individual
EU member-states (Fean, 2009, p. 9). In its 2011-2013 pro-
jected budget, the EU has envisioned 180.3 million euros as
financial assistance for Georgia, that may attract additional
funding from the regional and trans-boundary programs
(EU Commission, 2011g).
A crucial phase of Georgias European integration is the
creation of a DCFTA. The EU decided in 2008 to create
a DCFTA in Georgia and sent to the Georgian government
a set of preconditions for the beginning of negotiations.
The debates as to the advantages and disadvantages, the
costs and benefits of an EU-Georgia DCFTA are extremely
intense in government and academic circles. The advocates
of the idea argue that a DCFTA is their countrys only way
of getting closer to the EU, of adopting the European stan-
dards, and attracting long-term foreign investments. Even
if the implementation process is very costly, we have to pay
the price116, says an experienced local observer. The oppo-
nents, most of whom represent the ultra-liberal orientation
of the Georgian elite, argue that a DCFTA, by introducing
new bureaucratic institutions and complicated regulations
in the various economic sectors, will encourage corruption
and to keep away the investors that Georgia needs right now.
116 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
409
Moreover, they argue that the swift introduction of
European standards would drive the Georgia producers off
the market, since they would be unable to meet the costs of
adopting those standards.117 These heated debates have had
an impact on the way Georgia has implemented the reforms
needed for the beginning of talks, which is reflected in the
latest EU evaluation report for Georgia (EU Commission,
2011g). Thus, the opinions are divided in Tbilisi. While
officials insist that Georgia has met the EUs initial require-
ments and is ready to start negotiations118, experts say that
many measures were taken too late and only selectively119.
It seems that in the short term, at least, Georgia wishes to
begin the DCFTA-related negotiations in order to send a
positive signal to the foreign investors120 and to reverse the
last years downward trend. In its turn, the EU is concerned
that, the moment negotiations are started, Tbilisi would
take advantage of it to attract foreign investments, so the
interest to conclude the agreement would drop (Waal, 2011,
p. 37).
III.3.3. Turkey
Over the last five years, the relationship between Georgia
and Turkey has known a rapid quantitative and qualitative
development. There are regular bilateral state visits and
government consultations. The relationship between the
Georgian president and the Turkish prime-minister is
strengthened by several joint projects implemented during
their successive mandates. Turkey is the only neighboring
country with whom Georgia has a delineated and demar-
cated border. To facilitate trade and tourist visits, the two
countries have concluded a free trade agreement, have liber-
alized the visa regime (one may travel using just a regular
117 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.
118 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011.
119 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.
120 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011.
410
identity card), and have opened a modern joint border
checkpoint in Sarpi (Adjaria), that manages 90% of the
bilateral terrestrial traffic. They are soon to begin working
on yet another border checkpoint, Cildir Aktas. In 2005
and 2008, the Turkish company TAV obtained the contract
for the management of the Batumi airport over a period of
twenty years and of the Tbilisi one for a period of fifteen
years. There is regular air and bus transportation between
Turkey and Georgia and the construction of a direct railroad
connection is under way. The two countries are intercon-
nected through oil, gas, and electricity transport networks,
that only solidifies their economic interdependence. In 2011,
Georgia signed an agreement with Turkey for the construc-
tion of three hydro-electric plants in Samtskhe-Javakheti
and of an electrical power transmission line from Batumi to
Arakli (News.Az, 2011m). Georgia has only begun elec-
tricity exports to the European market and its deliveries are
made across Turkey. Hence, Turkey has rapidly turned into
a bridge connecting Georgia to Europe.
There is also an intensive human transit between the two
countries. Experts estimate that about 100,000 Georgians
work in Turkey.121 In 2009, about 350,000 Turks visited
Georgia (Chkhikvadze, 2010). The number of tourists grows
every year. In the first four months of 2011 alone, almost
268,000 Turks traveled to Georgia (News.Am, 2011a). The
intensification of the bilateral relations has transformed
Turkey into one of Georgias main economic partners. The
Turkish-Georgian trade exchanges have increased by 230%
over the last five years (Fisher Onar, 2009). Consequently,
Turkey is Georgias second trade partner, with a 15.6% of
the total volume of exchanges in 2010 (EU Commission,
2011c). In 2010, Turkey was the second biggest foreign
investor in Georgia, with $91.8 million (Civil.Ge, 2011e). It
also ranged sixth, in the first half of 2011, among the states
wherefrom remittances come to Georgia (Civil.Ge, 2011i).
121 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
411
Until the outbreak of the 2008 war, Tbilisi and Ankara had
an extended military cooperation on the basis of an agree-
ment signed in 1997. Georgias aspiration to become a
NATO member-state has brought the Turkish and Georgian
armies very close together. Turkey has provided technical
assistance and trained Georgian troops in order to help its
neighbor country adjust to NATO standards and to ensure
their inter-operability in the international missions. In 2006,
Turkeys military assistance for Georgia totaled $1.8 million
(Torbakov, 2008, p. 9). The military cooperation between
the two countries went on after 2008 as well, though on a
lower scale, since the Russian factor weighed heavily enough
in Ankaras political calculations.
However, the question affecting the bilateral relationship
is Turkeys role in Abkhazia. There is a numerous Abkhazian
Diaspora in Turkey, that pushes the government towards
closer relations with the separatist province. Besides the
Diasporas lobby, the Ankara authorities themselves wish to
deepen their interaction with Abkhazia, based on the fol-
lowing reasoning: unless we counter-balance Moscow eco-
nomically and politically, Abkhazia will eventually be
absorbed by Russia.122 Although the Turkish-Abkhazian sea
connection is closed, trade exchanges between the two sides
take place. Sukhumi states that Turkey is Abkhazias second
largest trade partner after Russia (Vindimian, 2010, p. 5).
In 2009, a Turkish diplomat went to Sukhumi for consulta-
tions with the separatist authorities and the Abkhazian
leader went on a four-day visit to Turkey in 2011, during
which he met with representatives of the Diaspora and busi-
nessmen. Tbilisi partially accepts Ankaras arguments, but
does not wish that attempts to prevent the absorption of
Abkhazia by Russia turn into an international legitimation
of the regime in Sukhumi, that could lead, eventually, to the
recognition of Abkhazias independence. Consequently, from
1999 to 2006, Georgia stopped over sixty ships going from
122 Interview with an expert, Berlin, November 2009.
412
Turkey to Abkhazia and obstructed in 2009 the opening of
the Turkish Benetton branch in Sukhumi (ibidem; Civil.Ge,
2009c). In 2009, in a case that produced tension in the
bilateral relations, a Tbilisi tribunal sentenced the Turkish
commander of a ship that was heading towards Abkhazia
and was retained in the Georgian waters, to twenty-four
years in prison for smuggling and unauthorized economic
activities. Following pressures from the Turkish government,
the sentence was commuted and the Turkish citizen released.
Hence, the Turkish authorities gave no sign of intention to
give up on the engagement strategy with Abkhazia123, while
Georgia realized that it cannot effectively oppose such a
process. In 2011, Ankara and Tbilisi conducted intense
negotiations on the interaction with Abkhazia, that would
not raise concerns within the Georgian government.124
The multi-level rapprochement between Georgia and
Turkey coincided with Turkeys growing alienation from the
EU. Although the relationship with Ankara is considered
important for the achievement of its foreign policy objectives,
Tbilisis perception about Turkeys role and interests in the
region has altered: Turkey is no longer a regional power
that projects the Western interests in South Caucasus125,
an official shares the Georgian perspective; Turkey remains
an important partner for Georgia, but Ankaras motives are
not always clear in Tbilisi126, a local expert adds. Turkeys
estrangement from Europe is being seen in Tbilisi through
the lens of its own efforts to come closer to the EU and of
the impact such a trend may have on Georgia. As an observer
remarks, the constant threat from the North and Turkeys
estrangement from the EU make up a regional environment
not exactly favorable to Georgias European integration127.
123 Interview with an expert, Berlin, November 2009.
124 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011.
125 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011.
126 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
127 Interview with an expert, July 2010.
413
 III.3.4. Iran alliances it is a part of (Civil.Ge, 2010). Thus, in diplomatic
jargon, Tbilisi sent a message that Georgia would not pro-
Before 2006, Georgia showed no particular interest for
vide its territory to launch military operations against Iran.
deep bilateral relations with Iran. Infrequent political con-
Georgia took advantage of the favorable moment and re-
tacts and an insignificant volume of trade exchanges charac-
launched its relations with Tehran at the very moment when
terized the relations between Tbilisi and Tehran. Politically
the Russo-Iranian ones grew colder (Oxford Analytica, 2010)
and economically, Georgia looked intensely beyond the
and Iran felt more and more isolated in the world. Sub-
Black Sea. The fact that the two countries do not share a
sequently, a delegation led by an Iranian diplomat visited
common border contributed to their relative enstragement.
Tbilisi and brought there a series of Iranian proposals for
In 2006, however, when the Russo-Georgian relations dete-
cooperation in the field of producing and exporting electric-
riorated, Georgia turned, as an emergency solution, to the
ity (Lomsadze, 2010). In 2010, Iran opened a consulate in
gas imports from Iran. At the end of 2006, the Tbilisi gov-
Batumi and in 2011 the two sides agreed on the liberaliza-
ernment intended to cut gas imports from Russia by 80%.
tion of the visa regime and on the establishing of direct
The uncertainty as to the date when Azerbaijan could tech-
flights from Tehran to Tbilisi and to Batumi. Thus, Georgia
nically begin to supply Georgia with gas from the Shakh
instrumentalized its cooperation with Iran, so as to stimu-
Deniz gas field forced Georgia to consider the possibility of
late its tourist industry. Although the bilateral trade was
importing small quantities of gas from Iran. But Georgias
slightly revitalized, Iran is still an insignificant trade partner
foreign policy course left little room for the development of
for Georgia. Only 0.6% of the total trade volume was repre-
close neighborly relations with Iran. Georgia discovered very
sented by the countrys exchanges with Iran in 2010 (EU
soon the limits of its cooperation in the field of energy with
Commission, 2011c).
Iran, since the US took position against a long-term energy
Iran proved to be much more enthusiastic and pro-active
cooperation between the two countries (Civil.Ge, 2006).
than Georgia, while the Georgian authorities showed more
In 2008, the war with Russia indirectly changed the
reservation and coordinated their actions with the US.129
momentum in the relations between Tbilisi and Tehran. The
Hence, what Tbilisi conceived as pragmatic cooperation
Russian constant military threat, the de-personalization of
that would not jeopardize its relationships with the West,
relations with the US, and the economic crisis contributed
Tehran interpreted as a chance to project its own influence
to a more balanced Georgian foreign policy. The government
in the region and draw Georgia into a much more intense
adopted a more inclusive regional outlook in its foreign pol-
bilateral cooperation. Therefore, while Tehran is looking for
icy. Tbilisi realized that, in the post-conflict security setting,
ways of taking maximum advantage from new opportuni-
it was vital that Georgia develop a positive agenda with all
ties, Tbilisi is trying to keep a certain distance.130
regional powers. Hence, without radically altering its strate-
gic orientation, Georgia no longer rules out, in principle,
any cooperation alternative.128 Tehran seized the opportuni- III.3.5. Russia
ty and reacted rapidly to Georgias overtures. The Georgian Unlike other regional actors, Russia is being perceived
Foreign Minister visited Tehran in 2010 and promised that in Tbilisi as a major obstacle for the achievement of the
Georgia would not act against Tehran, irrespective of the
129 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
128 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011. 130 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

414 415
Georgian strategic national objectives. In the opinion sur-
veys, 83% of the Georgians identify Russia as the main
threat for Georgias security (International Republican Insti-
tute, 2011). Several factors explain such an attitude. Russia
has military control over about 20% of the Georgian terri-
tory, including the Akhalgori region, which was under the
jurisdiction of the Tbilisi authorities until August 2008 (see
Map 7, opposite page). The Russian troops are stationed
50 kilometers from Tbilisi. In case of a conflict, Russia
would find it easy to block the transport infrastructure that
connects Eastern and Western Georgia and to rapidly reach
the countrys capital. Russia has deployed 3,800 troops and
1,000 border guards from the Federal Security Service in the
two Georgian separatist regions. Besides investing massive-
ly in the military infrastructure, Moscow has also initiated
the process of demarcation of the administrative border Map 7 Georgia and the two separatist regions (Source: Wikipedia)
between Georgia, on the one hand, and Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, on the other hand. It supports financially 70 to
90% of the two separatist republics budgets. Russian state Russian companies (Vympelkom, Inter RAO, Itera, VTB)
companies are gradually taking over control of the strategic are present in Georgias telecommunications, energy, finances,
infrastructure, such as the railroads or the Babushera airport and banking sectors. Georgia still imports almost 8 to 10%
in Abkhazia. The Kremlin has made diplomatic and finan- of gas from Russia. Natural gas is being imported through
cial efforts to expand the list of states or micro-states that the company Itera, which has distribution contracts with
have recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South 103 local companies (Postnikov, 2008, p. 54). But the main
Ossetia. Thus, Russia intends to permanently separate the beneficiary of these supplies, presumably at a preferential
two regions from Georgia, so as to minimize the chances of price, is the Itera-owned Azot chemical plant in Rustavi.132
their reintegration, even in a distant future. The Russian There is an agreement with Russia regarding the mutual
diplomacy makes considerable efforts to isolate Georgia supplies of electricity, which has remained in force after the
externally and to prevent arms supplies, even defensive ones, 2008 conflict. About 700,000 Georgians work in Russia.
to the Georgian armed forces. Russia is explicitly against The money transferred back home represents about 63% of
Georgias joining not only NATO, but the EU as well.131 the overall remittances incoming to Georgia (ibidem, p. 56).
Despite the lack of diplomatic relations, multiple eco- Although 72% of the Georgians believe that the Russian
nomic connections have survived between the two countries. aggression against Georgia is going on, about 90% of the
Russia was Georgias seventh trade partner in 2010, with respondents support the political dialogue and economic
a 4.4% of the total trade volume (EU Commission, 2011c). interaction with Russia (International Republican Institute,

131 Interview with a diplomat, Tbilisi, May 2011. 132 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

416 417
2011). Hence, considering the economic relations and the
public opinions stance, the major challenge for the Tbilisi
government is to identify a functional way of co-existing
with Russia. Over the past two years, the authorities in
Tbilisi have had several initiatives aimed to relieve the ten-
sion in relations with Moscow.133 In 2010, Georgia unilat-
erally committed itself not to use force in order to reinte-
grate the country. Although it serves Armenias economic
interests, the reopening of the Verhni Lars Kazbeghi cus-
tom point in 2010 was also part of the Georgian efforts
to de-escalate the conflict with Russia. In October 2008,
Georgia unilaterally simplified its visa regime for Russian
citizens. They may obtain Georgian visas at the checkpoint,
without having to go through a lengthy application proce-
dure. Starting with 2011, visas may also be obtained at the
entry point Verhni Lars Kazbeghi. In 2010 and 2011, the
Moscow Tbilisi, Moscow Batumi, and, respectively,
Moscow Kutaisi flights were resumed. Georgia finds it nec-
essary to continue the Geneva talks, in spite of Russias
often obstructive attitude. As an official explains, It is
sometimes necessary to keep a process going for the sake of
the process itself 134. In 2011, at Moscows request, the
Russo-Georgian negotiations on removing Georgias veto on
Russias membership in the WTO were resumed. Moreover,
there have been high-level contacts between the two heads
of church. The patriarchs met in Kiev in the summer of
2011.
Alongside a number of positive measures, Georgia has
kept pushing several initiatives that caused irritation in
Russia. In 2010, Georgia unilaterally liberalized the visa
regime for the Russian citizens residing in seven national
republics in North Caucasus. According to the authorities,
600 residents from the region cross the Russo-Georgian
border daily (Ekho Moskvy, 2011). In 2011, Georgia also
133 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
134 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011.
418
launched the PIK TV station accessible by satellite, which
broadcasts in Russian and covers the events in South and
North Caucasus. The primary target-group of this TV sta-
tion is the public in North Caucasus. The stations webpage
has about 7 or 8 thousands single visitors from Russia
(Elder, 2011). In 2011, the Georgian parliament recognized
the 19th-century Circassian genocide committed by
Tsarist Russia. The tragic events that accompanied the cam-
paign of conquering the Caucasus took place in 1864 in
Krasnaya Polyana, one of the localities which will host the
2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. The Georgian
authorities plan to inaugurate a memorial dedicated to the
victims of the Circassian genocide in 2012, not far from
the Abkhazian border. Last, but not least, the Georgian
political discourse appeals to comparisons with Russia in
order to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the
Russian political regime. Police reform, fight against corrup-
tion, improvement of the business environment, and reno-
vation of Batumi are often used to compare with develop-
ments in Russia, such as the police abuses, the systemic cor-
ruption, the foreign investors harassment, and the deficient
preparation of Sochi for the Olympic Games.
Although not meant exclusively to annoy Russia, such
political actions undoubtedly aim at making it more vulner-
able: Russia is satisfied with the status quo, while Georgia
wants Russia to pay the price for the current situation135,
a local analyst explains the logic behind certain measures;
Russia has not paid an adequate price so far, so Georgia
tries to make it feel uncomfortable in the very region where
it feels vulnerable136, the expert details the motivation of
Georgias policies in North Caucasus. At the same time, the
Tbilisi government also has in mind security requirements.
North Caucasus, that neighbors Georgia, will remain in the
long run a turbulent area. Tbilisi tries to project its soft
135 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.
136 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.
419
power to ensure a favorable attitude towards Georgia in
the North-Caucasian republics.137 The cumulated effects of
the actions meant to make Russia feel uncomfortable and of
those meant to dissipate tension in bilateral relations pro-
duce a difficult cohabitation between Georgia and Russia.
Conclusions
Two decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
South Caucasus is an immense site under construction,
whose final political, economic, and security-related archi-
tecture is still hard to envision. As the analysis shows, a
number of factors contribute to the uncertainty concerning
the regions future. First, two of the three republics do not
have full control over their entire sovereign territory and the
violent or peaceful changes of borders cannot be ruled out.
Second, an important social segment of refugees and IDPs
have been living in expectation for almost twenty years.
Whether they return to their homes or not will impact the
evolutions in the conflicts areas and the policies of their
host-states. Third, South Caucasus is a region with many
closed borders and fragmented trans-boundary communi-
cation. Consequently, the opening of the borders will have
a multi-dimensional benefic impact on the entire region. At
the same time, if the borders are kept closed, the regional
projects will always keep someone out, thus fueling the ani-
mosities and regional fragmentation. Fourth, the states har-
bor a sense of security deficit at regional level, which moti-
vates not only the excessive militarization, but also the drive
for security externalization. The competing agendas of the
influential regional actors often hinder rather than nurture
inclusive regional solutions. Playing great powers off one
another to achieve conflicting national objectives fully con-
tributes to the general feeling of insecurity in the area. Fifth,
137 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
420
the various external orientations and domestic national
projects contribute to the variable geometry of the region.
The states join or aspire to join alternative organizations or
military alliances like CSTO, NATO, CIS, GUAM, BSEC,
the EU, or the Non-Aligned Movement. Finally, South Cau-
casus neighbors turbulent (sub)regions like North Caucasus
or the Middle East, wherefrom instability and elements of
unpredictability are being exported. Cumulated, all these
variables contribute to a multitude of scenarios that the
region might develop along in the future. The normalization
of the Turkish-Armenian relationship combined with the
potential progress in the solving of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict could vindicate the region from the logic of the
zero-sum game and lay down preconditions for the trilater-
al regional cooperation. But one cannot rule out, however,
the fact that the regional inertia, which is characterized by
multi-speed developments and multi-directional evolutions
could be the only certainty for South Caucasus during this
decade.
Bibliography
Abbasov, Shahin. 2011. Azerbaijan: Arrest of Islamic Party
Leader Puts Religion in the Political Spotlight, in
Eurasianet, 12 January (available at: http://www.
eurasianet.org/node/62692).
Abbasov, Shahin. 2010. Turkey Steps Up Support for
Strategic Azerbaijani Exclave of Nakhchivan, in Eurasia-
net, 26 July (available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/
61610).
ABC.Az 2011. SOCAR Georgia Gas Has Opened a Large
Distribution Network in Beyler village of Marnueli,
1 April (available at: http://www.abc.az/eng/news/52735.
html).
Akyol, Mustafa. 2011. Turkeys Maturing Foreign Policy.
How the Arab Spring Changed the AKP, in Foreign Affairs,
421
 7 July (available at: http://www.foreignaffairs. com/arti-
cles/67974/mustafa-akyol/turkeys-maturing-foreign-poli-
cy?page=show).
Alieva, Leila. 2009. Azerbaijans Gas Policy: Challenges and
Dilemmas, in ISS Opinion, April (available at: http://
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Azerbaijani_gas_poli-
cy.pdf).
Aliyev, Ilham. 2010. Speech at the 46th Munich Security
Conference, 6 February (available at: http://www.securi-
tyconference.de/Aliyev-Ilham.582.0.html?&L=1).
Altunisik, Meliha Benli and Ozlem Tur. 2005. Turkey. Chal-
lenges of Continuity and Change, Oxon/New York, Rout-
ledgeCurzon.
Apa News, 2011. Azerbaijani Ambassador to Georgia
Namig Aliyev: For the Armenians Access to the Black
Sea Means the Realization of the Idea of Great Armenia
from Sea to Sea, 23 February (available at: http://www.
en.apa.az/ news.php?id=141404).
Armtown.Com, 2011a. Russia to Increase Gas Prices for
Armenia?, 13 July (available at: http://www.armtown.
com/news/en/nws/20110713/67744/).
Armtown.Com, 2011b. Turkish Poll Finds Little Support
for Armenia Border Opening, 5 January (available at:
http://www.armtown.com/news/en/rfe/20110105/22679
36/).
Asbarez Post, 2010. Azerbaijan Offers $500 Million for
Georgia-Armenia Gas Pipeline, August 2010 (available
at: http://asbarez.com/84460/azerbaijan-offers-500-mil-
lion-for-georgia-armenia-gas-pipeline/).
Asmus, Ronald D. and Bruce P. Jackson, 2004. The Black
Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom, in Policy Review, no.
125 (available at: http://www.hoover.org/publications/
policy-review/article/6451).
AZE.Az, 2010. Azerbaijan Budet Postavliati Gaz Gruzii
Bespreryvno do 2020 goda, 30 dekabria (available at:
http://www.aze.az/news_azerbayjan_budet_postavl_4862
7.html).
422
Azernews, 2011. Azeri Government Protests EU Over
Critical Statement, 13 April (available at: http://www.
azernews.az/en/Nation/31623-Azeri_govt_protests_EU_
over_critical_statement).
Aztag. 2011. Azimov: Baku Is Concerned over the Pres-
ence of Russian Servicemen in Armenia, 20 July (avail-
able at: http://www.aztagenglish.com/2011/07/azimov-
%E2%80%9Cbaku-is-concerned-over-the-presence-of-
russian-servicemen-in-armenia%E2%80%9D/).
Bayramov, Vugar, 2009. Ending Dependency: How Is Oil
Revenues Effectively Used in Azerbaijan?, Baku, Centre for
Economic and Social Development.
Bedwell, Helena, 2011. Georgian Detained for Cutting
Georgia, Armenia Internet Cable, in Bloomberg, 6 April
(available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-
06/georgian-detained-for-cutting-georgia-armenia-inter-
net-cable.html).
Buzan, Barry, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, 1998. Securi-
ty: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder (Colorado),
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Buzan, Barry and Ole Weaver, 2003. Regions and Power: The
Structure of International Security, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 2010. Caucasus
Barometer 2010, Armenia (available at: http://www.crrc.
ge/oda/?dataset=5&row=91&column=91).
Charap, Samuel and Cory Welt, 2011. A More Proactive US
Approach to the Georgia Conflicts, Center for American
Progress Report, February (available at: http://www.amer
icanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/pdf/georgia-report.pdf).
Chkhikvadze, Ivane, 2010. Black Sea Regional Cooperation
from Georgian Perspective. Black Sea Young Reformers Paper
(available at: http://www.bsyr.org/download/2010/Chk
hikvadze-01.pdf).
CIPDD, GYLA, and Safeworld, 2011. Peace, Security and
Stability in Kvemo Kartli. A Community Informed Strategy
(available at: http://www.cipdd.org/files/40_532_272132_
423
 Communityinformedstrategy-KvemoKartlieng-
reduced.pdf).
Civil.Ge, 2011a. Parliament to Be Fully Relocated to Kutaisi,
16 May (available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.
php?id=23448).
Civil.Ge, 2011b. Armenia, Georgian FMs Hail Bilateral Ties,
29 June (available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?
id=23683).
Civil.Ge, 2011c. Georgian PM: No Plans to Sell Controlling
Stakes in North-South Gas Pipeline, 16 February (available
at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23150).
Civil.Ge, 2011d. Georgian Church Leader Says Armenian
Catholicos Clever, but Needs More Experience, 20 June
(available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=
23641).
Civil.Ge, 2011e. Geostat Revises 2010 FDI Figure Upwards,
11 August (available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.
php?id=23232).
Civil.Ge, 2011f. Georgia Ratifies USD 575m Azerbaijani Loan
for Regional Rail Link, 31 May (available at: http://www.
civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23841).
Civil.Ge, 2011g. Georgia Mulls Sending More Troops to Afghan-
istan, 3 June (available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.
php?id=23575).
Civil.Ge, 2011h. U.S. Donates 40 Humvees to Georgian Army,
7 June (available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?
id=23588).
Civil.Ge, 2011i. 1H11 Money Transfers from Abroad
USD509.5m, 20 July (available at: http://www.civil.ge/
eng/article.php?id=23774).
Civil.Ge, 2011j. EU Commissioner on Democratic Reforms in
Georgia, 22 July (available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/arti-
cle.php?id=23788).
Civil.Ge, 2010. Iranian President Meets Georgian FM, 19 Jan-
uary (available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=
21899).
424
Civil. Ge, 2009a. Armenian PM Complains on High Transporta-
tion Tariffs in Georgia, 6 June (available at: http://www.
civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21061).
Civil.Ge, 2009b. Saakashvili: Tbilisi Ready for Reopening Border
Crossing with Russia, 25 June (available at: http://www.
civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21165).
Civil.Ge, 2009c. Georgia Protests Benetton Abkhaz Entry, 25 May
(available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=
20984).
Civil.Ge, 2006. U.S. Tells Georgia to Avoid Long-Term Gas Deals
with Iran, 27 November (available at: http://www.civil.ge/
eng/article.php?id=14189).
Coene, Frederik, 2010. The Caucasus. An Introduction, London/
New York, Routledge.
Cornell, Svante E., Niklas L.P. Swanstrom, Anara Tabysha-
lieva, and Georgi Tcheishvili, 2005. A Strategic Conflict
Analysis of the South Caucasus with a Focus on Georgia, Silk
Road Policy Paper, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (avail-
able at: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/docs/publications/
2005/050601Caucasus_Total.pdf).
Danielyan, Emil, 2011. Armenian Remittances Soar in 2011,
Radio Free Europe, 6 May (available at: http://www.azatu
tyun.am/content/article/24093774.html).
Danielyan, Emil, 2010. Russia Boosts Military Alliance
with Armenia, in Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7 (159) (available
at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_
ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36792).
Deutsch, Karl W., [1954] 2006. Political Community at the
International Level, Salt Lake City, Aardvark Global
Publishing.
De Waal, Thomas, 2011. Georgias Choices. Charting a Future
in Uncertain Times, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace Report (available at: http://carnegieendowment.
org/files/georgias_choices.pdf).
De Waal, Thomas, 2003. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbai-
jan Through Peace and War, New York/London, New York
University Press.
425
EEAS, 2011. European Union-Azerbaijan (available at: http://
www.eeas.europa.eu/azerbaijan/index_en.htm).
Ekho Moskvy, 2011. Interview with President Saakashvili,
8 July (available at: http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/
beseda/790260-echo/).
Elder, Miriam, 2011. Georgia Challenges Russias TV Dom-
inance, in Global Post, 29 June (available at: http://
www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/rus-
sia/110628/georgia-russian-language-satellite-television-
news).
Emerson, Michael, 2008. The EUs New Black Sea Policy.
What Kind of Regionalism Is This?, CEPS Working Docu-
ment no. 29 (available at: http://www.ceps.eu/book/eus-
new-black-sea-policy-what-kind-regionalism).
Eteris, Eugene, 2011. In the EUs Financial Assistance to
Armenia the Baltic States Can Have a Share, in The
Baltic Course, 21 February (available at: http://www.baltic-
course.com/eng/baltic_states/?doc=37488).
Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009a. Getting Involved!,
Tbilisi.
Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009b. Georgian Public
Opinion. Attitudes towards European Integration, October
(available at: http://www.epfound.ge/files/eusurveyre
port_georgia_aug09.pdf).
EU Commission, 2011a. Turkey. EU Bilateral Trade and Trade
with the World (available at: http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113456.pdf).
EU Commission, 2011b. Armenia. EU Bilateral Trade and Trade
with the World (available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113345. pdf).
EU Commission, 2011c. Georgia. EU Bilateral Trade and Trade
with the World (available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113383. pdf).
European Commission, 2011d. Azerbaijan. EU Bilateral Trade
and Trade with the World (available at: http://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_1
13347.pdf).
426
European Commission, 2011e. Implementation of the European
Neigbourhood Policy in 2010. Country Report: Armenia,
25 May (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
progress2011/sec_11639_en.pdf).
European Commission, 2011f. Implementation of the European
Neigbourhood Policy in 2010. Country Report: Azerbaijan,
25 May (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
progress2011/sec_11_640_en.pdf).
European Commission, 2011g. Implementation of the European
Neigbourhood Policy in 2010. Country Report: Georgia,
25 May (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
progress2011/sec_11_649_en.pdf).
European Parliament, 2010. Non-legislative Resolution
EU Strategy for the South Caucasus, 20 May (available at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.
do?lang=en&procnum=INI/2009/2216).
Fean, Dominic, 2009. Making Good Use of the EU in
Georgia: The Eastern Partnership and Conflict Policy,
in Russia.Nei.Visions no. 44 (available at: http://www.
ifri.org/files/Russie/ifri_fean_EU_and_Georgia_ENG_sep
t2009.pdf).
Fitzpatrick, Catherine A., 2011. Turkmenistan: Russia, US
at Odds Over Trans-Caspian, in Eurasianet, 15 June
(available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63680).
Freedom House, 2011. Nations in Transit 2011. The Authori-
tarian Dead End in the Former Soviet Union (available at:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/nit/2011/
NIT2011-Full.pdf).
Ghazinyan, Aris, 2011. A Dream House: Georgian Presi-
dent Shared His Vision of United Caucasus Again, in
ArmeniaNow, 17 February (available at: http://www.
armenianow.com/commentary/analysis/27727/saakashvil
i_common_caucasian_house_armenia_azerbaijan).
GHN News Agency, 2011. U.S. Government Helps Georgia
Build Coast Guard Maintenance Facility, 25 August (avail-
able at: http://eng.ghn.ge/news-4296.html).
427
Grigoryan, Marianna, 2010. Armenia: Azerbaijani Film
Festival Cancellation Doesnt Stop Controversy in Yere-
van, in Eurasianet, 15 November (available at: http://
www.eurasianet.org/node/62382).
Grigoryan, Marianna, 2009. Armenia: Saakashvili Visit
to Yerevan Produces Lots of Smiles, Little Action, in
Eurasianet, 25 June (available at: http://www.eurasianet.
org/departments/insightb/articles/eav062609a.shtml).
Grove, Thomas, 2011. Costs Rise for Kremlins N.Caucasus
Funding Policy, Reuters, 24 June (available at: http://
www.trust.org/alertnet/news/analysis-costs-rise-for-krem-
lins-ncaucasus-funding-policy).
Hayrumyan, Naira, 2011. Armenian Government Turns to
Russia for Another Loan, in Armenia Now, 8 July (avail-
able at: http://www.armenianow.com/economy/30238/
armenia_russia_loan_eurasian_economic_community).
Hayrumyan, Naira, 2010. On Russian Business Rules, in
Lragir.am, 11 November (available at: http://www.lragir.
am/engsrc/economy19719.html).
Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2011. Internal
Displacement. Global Overview of Trends and Developments in
2010, March (available at: http://www.internal-displace
ment.org/publications/global-overview-2010.pdf).
International Crisis Group, 2011a. Armenia and Azerbaijan:
Preventing War, Europe Briefing 60 (available at: http://
www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/B60
%20Armenia%20and%20Azerbaijan%20
%20Preventing%20War.pdf).
International Crisis Group, 2011b. Georgia: The Javakheti
Regions Integration Challenges, Europe Briefing 63 (available
at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/
B63%20Georgia%20The%20Javakheti%20Regions%20I
ntegration%20Challenges.pdf).
International Crisis Group, 2009. Nagorno-Karabakh: Getting
to a Breakthrough, Europe Briefings 55 (available at: http://
www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/b55_na
gorno_karabakh___getting_to_a_breakthrough.pdf).
428
International Republican Institute, 2011. Georgian National
Study, April-May (available at: http://www.iri.org/sites/
default/files/2011%20June%2028%20Survey%20of%20
Georgian%20Public%20Opinion,%20April%2026-
May%204,%202011.pdf).
International Republican Institute, 2008a. Armenian Nation-
al Study, January (available at: http://www.asa.am/down-
loads/IRI/2008%20Janury%20Armenia-poll.pdf).
International Republican Institute, 2008b. Georgian National
Study, September/October (available at: http://www.
iri.org/sites/default/files/2008%20November%2021
%20Survey%20of%20Georgian%20Public%20Opinion,
%20September%2023-October%201,% 202008.pdf).
Ismailov, Eldar and Vladimer Papava, 2007. Tsentralinyi
Kavkaz: Istoriia, Politika, Ekonomika. Moskva, Mysli.
Ismailov, Eldar and Vladimer Papava, 2008. A New Concept
for the Caucasus, in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,
8 (3), pp. 283-298.
Ismailzade, Fariz, 2009. Russian Arms to Armenia Could
Change Azerbaijans Foreign Policy Orientation, in
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 28 January (available at:
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5021).
Kardas, Saban, 2011. Erdogan Responds to Sarksyans
Remarks by Backing Azerbaijan, in Eurasia Daily Monitor,
8 (146) (available at: http://www.jamestown. org/single/
?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38247&tx_ttnews
[ b a c k Pi d ] = 7 & c H a s h = 3 7 0 c 7 0 f f 1 6 8 7 d 6 2 d 0 d 6 e
2cdf2aa27f61).
Kazimov, Seymur, 2011. Azerbaijan and Georgia: Disputed
Border, News.Az., 11 March (available at: http://www.
news.az/articles/32193).
Kommersant. 2009. Rossia Obiavit Tender na Zakupku
Vertoletonostev Klassa Mistral, 11 Sentiabria (available
at: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1236855).
Lesser, Ian O., 2011. Strategy Toward Europes Neighborhood
and the Turkish Role: An American Perspective, GMF Policy
Brief (On Turkey Series), 5 April (available at: http://
429
 www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/Les
ser_Neighborhood_Apr11.pdf).
Lomsadze, Giorgi, 2010. Tbilisi Woos Iran While Washing-
ton Watches, in Eurasianet, 28 May (available at: http://
www.eurasianet.org/node/61179).
Markedonov, Sergei, 2011. Nelineinoe Primirenie. Armya-
no-Turetskaia Normalizatsiya v Proshlom i Budushem,
in Rossia v Globalinoi Politike, no. 3 (available at: http://www.
globalaffairs.ru/number/Nelineinoe-primirenie-15229).
Massis Post, 2011. Presence of Armenian Peacekeepers in
Afghanistan to Triple, 11 May (available at: http://mas-
sispost.com/?p=2994).
Mediamax, 2011. Volume of Foreign Investments in Armenia
Reduces by 41%, 3 April (available at: http://www.arme-
niadiaspora.com/news/2279-volume-of-foreign-invest-
ments-in-armenia-reduces-by-41.html).
MES Georgia, 2010. Two Rehabilitated Schools Were Opened in
Kvemo Kartli, 23 September (available at: http://www.
mes.gov.ge/content.php?id=1466&lang=eng).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007. National Security Strategy
of Armenia, 26 January (available at: http://www.mfa.
am/u_files/file/doctrine/Doctrineeng.pdf).
Musabekov, Rasim, 2011. Na Styke Polei Pritiajenia, in
Rossia v Globalinoi Politike, no. 3 (available at: http://www.
globalaffairs.ru/number/Na-styke-polei-prityazheniya-
15230).
Nader, Alireza, David E. Thaler, and S.R. Bohandy, 2011.
The Next Supreme Leader: Succession in the Islamic Republic
of Iran, Santa Monica, RAND Corporation.
Nasardian, Boris, 2011. Armenia: Imagining the Integration
of the Southern Caucasus with the EU, in Internationale
Politik und Gesellschaft, no. 3, pp. 62-73.
News.Am, 2011a. Armenian Tourists Prefer to Spend Vacation
in Georgia, 10 June (available at: http://news.am/eng/news/
62789.html).
News.Am, 2011b. Number of Iranian Tourists Visiting Armenia
Increased, 15 April (available at: http://news.am/eng/news/
55577.html).
430
News.Am, 2011c. Azerbaijani MFA Offended at Russia and
Iran, 23 July (available at: http://news.am/eng/news/
68885.html).
News.Az, 2011a. Stockholm Institute Declares Azerbaijans Defense
Costs at $9.2 bn in Past Decade, 14 April (available at:
http://www.news.az/articles/politics/34409).
News.Az, 2011b. Baku Slams Armenian Nuclear Plant, 6 June
(available at: http://news.az/articles/politics/37818).
News.Az, 2011c. Azerbaijani Diaspora to Raise Awareness of
Karabakh Conflict, 5 July (available at: http://news.az/arti-
cles/politics/39808).
News.Az, 2011d. Turkey to Assist Azerbaijan in Liberation of
Occupied Lands, 9 July (available at: http://news.az/arti-
cles/politics/40129).
News.Az, 2011e. Foreign Investments Top $3bn in 2010, 19 Jan-
uary (available at: http://www.news.az/articles/economy/
30012).
News.Az, 2011f. SOCAR to Invest Some $100m to Petkim in
2011, 21 July (available at: http://www.news.az/articles/
economy/40931).
News.Az, 2011g. Azerbaijan Voices Its Stance on Northern Cyprus,
22 July (available at: http://news.az/articles/turkey/
40992).
News.Az, 2011h. Moscow, Baku Cooperating on Former Enclaves,
17 June (available at: http://www.news.az/articles/poli-
tics/38655).
News.Az, 2011i. Partnership Spirit Based on Common Interests
with US Still Persists, 2 July (available at: http://news.az/
articles/politics/39663).
News.Az, 2011j. Baku Acknowledges Key Karabakh Points Not
Yet Agreed, 1 August (available at: http://news.az/articles/
politics/41604).
News.Az, 2011k. Baku Comments on Latest European Parlia-
ment Resolution on Azerbaijan, 13 May (available at: http://
www.news.az/articles/politics/36332).
News.Az, 2011l. Azerbaijani Officer Killed by Iranian Border
Guard?, 5 July (available at: http://news.az/articles/iran/
39780).
431
News.Az, 2011m. Georgia, Turkey to Construct Three Hydro-
power Plants, 21 February (available at: http://www.news.
az/articles/georgia/31742).
News.Az, 2010. Azerbaijans Economy Makes up 75% of South
Caucasus Aliyev, 25 December (available at: http://
www.news.az/articles/economy/28948).
New Europe, 2011. Armenian Remittances Increase by 20%,
15 May (available at: http://www.neurope.eu/articles/
Armenian-remittances-increase-by-20/106508.php).
Nichol, Jim, 2011. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political
Developments and Implications for US Interests, CRS Report
for Congress, 15 April (available at: http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/row/RL33453.pdf).
Nilsson, Niklas, 2009. Georgias Rose Revolution: The Break
with the Past, in Svante E. Cornell & Frederick Starr (eds.),
The Guns of August 2008: Russias War in Georgia, Armonk,
M.E. Sharpe, pp. 85-103.
Onar, Nora Fisher, 2009. Neo Ottomanism, Historical Legacies
and Turkish Foreign Policy, EDAM Discussion Paper, no. 3
(available at: http://www.edam.org.tr/images/PDF/yayin
lar/makaleler/discussion%20paper%20series_fisher.pdf).
OSCE Yerevan Office, 2010. Final Report. Analysis of Issues
Related to the Free Movement of Persons and Goods through
Border-Crossing Points between the Republic of Armenia and
the Republic of Georgia, Yerevan (available at: http://www.
osce.org/yerevan/71248).
Oxford Analytica, 2011. Azerbaijani-Russian Ties Reflect Inter-
ests, Not Trust, 3 August.
Oxford Analytica, 2010. Georgia-Iran: Tbilisi Is Not Shifting
Policy on Iran, 13 December.
Overland, Indra, The Closure of the Russian Military Base
at Akhalkalaki: Challenges for the Local Energy Elite, the
Informal Economy, and Stability, in The Journal of Power
Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, no. 10 (available at:
http://pipss.revues.org/index3717.html).
PanArmenian.Net, 2011. Interview with Armenias Minister of
Energy and Natural Resources, 28 March (available at: http://
www.panarmenian.net/eng/interviews/65515/).
432
Petriashvili, Diana and Rovshan Ismaylov, 2006. Georgia,
Azerbaijan Debate Control of Ancient Monasteries Terri-
tory, in Eurasianet, 2 November (available at: http://
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav110
306b.shtml).
Poghosyan, Anna, 2011. Sadakhlo Neutral Zone for Arme-
nian-Azerbaijani Contacts: Use of Trade as a Tool for
Conflict Transformation, in Journal of Conflict Transforma-
tion, 1 April (available at: http://caucasusedition.net/analy-
sis/sadakhlo-neutral-zone-for-armenian-azerbaijani-con-
tacts-use-of-trade-as-a-tool-for-conflict-transformation/).
Popescu, Nicu, 2011. EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Con-
flicts: Stealth Intervention, London, Routledge.
Popescu, Nicu, 2009. EU-Armenia: High-Level, But Low-Profile,
EUobserver Blog Neighbourhood, 12 October (available at:
http://blogs.euobserver.com/popescu/2009/10/12/euin-
armenia-high-level-but-low-profile/).
Postnikov, Sergei, 2008. Rossisko-Gruzinskie Ekonomiceskie
Otnoshenia, in Analiticeski Vestnik Soveta Federatsi FSRF,
15 (360), pp. 51-57.
Prezident Rossii, 2008. Deklaratsia Azerbaijanskoi Respubliki,
Respubliki Armenia i Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moskva (available
at: http://www.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/232).
Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010. Azerbaijan in 2006-
2010. Sociological Monitoring (available at: http://www.
fes.ge/geo/images/Fes_Files/ASPublications/2010/az_sur
vey_fes.pdf).
Radio Free Europe, 2011a. Armenia, Georgia Agree to Jointly
Control Border, 17 February (available at: http://www.
rferl.org/content/article/2312043.html).
Radio Free Europe. 2011b. Poll Finds Minority of Armenians
Support Rapprochement with Turkey, 29 March (available at:
http://www.rferl.org/content/Poll_Finds_Minority_Of_
Armenians_Support_Rapprochement_With_Turkey/
1997110.html).
Radio Free Europe, 2010a. Armenia, Azerbaijani Presidents
Agree on Preamble to Madrid Principles, 26 January (avail-
433
 able at: http://www.rferl.org/content/Armenian_Azerbai-
jani_Presidents_Agree_On_Preamble_To_Madrid
_Principles/1940349.html).
Radio Free Europe, 2010b. Armenian Government Urged to
Revoke Mining Rights of Russian Gold Firm, 5 November
(available at: http://asbarez.com/88124/armenian-gov
ernment-urged-to-revoke-mining-rights-of-russian-gold-
firm/).
Radio Free Europe, 2010c. Armenia Seeks Chinese Funding for
Rail Link to Iran, 29 June (available at: http://www.rferl.
org/content/Armenia_Seeks_Chinese_Funding_For_Rail_
Link_To_Iran/2086137.html).
Radio Free Europe, 2010d. House Panel Backs Continued U.S.
Aid to Karabakh, 2 July (available at: http://www.rferl.
org/content/House_Panel_Backs_Continued_US_Aid_To
_Karabakh/2088881.html).
Radio Free Europe, 2009. Georgias Azeri Minority Treated as
Second-class Citizens, 4 May (available at: http://www.
rferl.org/content/Georgias_Azeri_Minority_Treated_As_S
econdClass_Citizens/1621243.html).
Simao, Lucinia and Maria Raquel Freire, 2008. The EUs
Neighborhood Policy and the South Caucasus: Unfolding
New Patterns of Cooperation, in Caucasian Review of
International Affairs, 2 (4), pp. 225-239.
SIPRI, 2011. Military Expenditure of Armenia and Azerbaijan
(available at: http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4).
Socor, Vladimir, 2010. Lavrov Hints at Fomenting Ethnic
Tensions Inside Georgia, in Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7 (132)
(available at: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/
single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36605&tx_ttnews[backPid]
=27&cHash=80826d5244).
Socor, Vladimir, 2009. Russian Naval Mission Creep in
the Black Sea, in Eurasia Daily Monitor, 6 (172) (available
at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_
ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35516).
Socor, Vladimir, 2007. Georgian Flag Raised over Akhalka-
laki, in Eurasia Daily Monitor, 4 (128) (available at: http://
434
www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5B
tt_news%5D=32841).
The Economist, 2011. Nagorno-Karabakhs Future. Caucasian
Questions, 23 June (available at: http://www.econo-
mist.com/node/18867879?story_id=18867879).
Tocci, Nathalie, 2011. Turkeys Neighborhood Policy: A European
Perspective, GMF Policy Brief (On Turkey Series), 5 April
(available at: http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publica-
tion_attachments/Tocci_Neighborhood_Apr11.pdf).
Today.Az, 2011. Governor of Kvemo Kartli Meets with Azerbai-
jani and Armenian Journalists, 15 July (available at: http://
www.today.az/news/society/90440.html).
Today.Az, 2008. Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry: Georgias Actions
Comply with International Law, 8 August (available at:
http://today.az/news/politics/46850.html).
Torbakov, Igor, 2010. Russia and Turkish-Armenian Nor-
malization: Competing Interests in the South Caucasus,
in Insight Turkey, 12 (2), pp. 31-39.
Torbakov, Igor, 2008. The Georgia Crisis and Russia-Turkish
Relations, Jamestown Foundation Report (available at: http://
www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/GeorgiaCrisis
Torbakov.pdf).
Trend, 2011a. Azerbaijani, Georgian Experts Complete Work on
Border Demarcation, 3 March (availableat: http://en.trend.
az/news/society/1839565.html).
Trend, 2011b. Minister: Number of Azerbaijani Students Studying
in Turkey Increased, 5 May (available at: http://www.en.
trend.az/news/society/1806792.html).
Trend, 2011c. Arzu Rahimov: Azerbaijan Does not Sign Readmis-
sion Agreement with Any Country, 8 April (available at:
http://www.en.trend.az/news/politics/1858108.html).
Trenin, Dmitri, 2009. Russia in the Caucasus: Reversing the
Tide, in Brown Journal of World Affairs, 15 (2), pp. 143-155.
Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios, 2009. The Security Paradoxes of
the Black Sea Region, in Southeast European and Black Sea
Studies, 9 (3), pp. 225-241.
435
United Nations, 2008. Resolution Adopted by the General
Assembly 62/243. The Situation in the Occupied Territories
of Azerbaijan, 25 April (available at: http://www.un.org/
ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/62/243).
US Senate, 2011. Resolution with Respect to Ongoing Violations Angela Grmad
of the Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty of Georgia and the
Importance of a Peaceful and Just Resolution to the Conflict
within Georgias Internationally Recognized Borders, 27 July
(available at: http://www.civil.ge/files/files/2011/Senate
Resolution175.pdf).
Valiyev, Anar, 2011. Neither Friend nor Foe. Azerbaijans Percep-
tions of Russia, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo no. 147
(available at: http://ada.edu.az/uploads/file/neither
%20Friend%20nor%20Foe.pdf).
Vardanyan, Tamara, 2011. Tbilisskie Armiane: Novyie Reali, South Caucasus between Political
in Globus Natsionalinoi Bezopasnosti, no. 2 (available at: Economy and Energy-Based Politics
http://www.armpyatigorsk.org/articles/17).
Vindimian, Marianna, 2010. Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy
towards Georgia, ISPI Policy Brief no. 196 (available at:
http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/PB_196_2010.
pdf).
World Bank, 2010. Doing Business 2011 (available at: http://
www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/fpdkm/doing%20 busi-
ness/documents/annual-reports/english/db11-fullre-
port.pdf).
Zhahanina, Lizaveta, 2010. Opening the Border at Upper
Larsi-Kazbeghi: A Good Beginning, in Investor.Ge, no. 2
(available at: http://www.investor.ge/issues/2010_2/03.htm).
Ziflioglu, Vercihan, 2010. Armenian Tourists Prefer
Turkeys South, East, in Hurriyet, 4 August (available at:
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=armenian-
tourists-prefer-turkey8217s-south-2010-08-03).
 I. The Macro-Economic Context of Regional
Development
The orientation of foreign policies and security strategies
depends, first and foremost, on the success of the economic
policies a state or any other major actor practices. Most
subjects of public international law have to admit the
importance of economic factors when they conceive of new
schemes for government action or economic growth.
Without a well-documented economic basis doubled by effi-
cient programs, no state will ever manage to keep up with
the top actors that administrate the processes and phenom-
ena going on at international level.
Making use of financial investments or political pressure
to subordinate regions like South Caucasus which is
important for its oil and natural gas resources and its various
connections to all parts of the world is one of the most
efficient methods the great powers resort to in order to
accomplish their national objectives and goals. This region
is rich in natural resources of the most various kind, not
only oil and gas, but many more, like plutonium and gold.
Its capacity of transporting such resources from East to West
and from North to South has transformed the area and has
attracted many national interests and economic objectives.
Thus, the profit resulting from the presence of the political

439
factor in the area may present a lot of characteristics, but its
economic side is by far the most important. The region is
connected to the Russian Federation, but also depends on
the technical and financial support of both the European
Union, and the United States of America.
The economic and energy potential of South Caucasus is
favorable for the creation of several connections with the
outside world. On-site studies reveal the regions inacces-
sibility by the potential foreign investors. There is, indeed,
a cheap and well-trained labor force, which represents an
advantage, but then any investor has to deal with monopo-
lies or oligopolies, with corruption at the highest level, with
the outdated institutional system, with legislative gaps, with
uncertain political circumstances, and with the refusal to act
according to the new trends of modernization and techno-
logical advance both in the political, and in the economic
spheres, so that the South-Caucasian products may guaran-
tee a superior added value. The most important point to be
considered, that this paper wishes to emphasize, is that
South Caucasus must be studied as a whole. What makes
the difference between its component states is the avail-
ability to take part in various processes of integration in the
worldwide economic circuit, plus the capacity of negotiating
the best price for the resources each possesses, keeping in
mind their typology and quality. The available energy
resources and the infrastructure needed for their transporta-
tion should be the number one argument for stimulating the
interest in the implementation of reforms and the modern-
ization of the economies. A steady course towards develop-
ment could lead in time to the increase of the authorities
capacity of negotiating in the process of conflict-solving and
to the decrease of the Russian Federations political influence.
1. The implementation of economic reforms between
necessity and incapacity
The improvement of a states social realities may be
accomplished through the implementation of deep-reaching
440
economic reforms. These are meant to achieve certain struc-
tural changes that later allow for growth of the economic
indicators and social progress. The lack of previous experi-
ence in the management of the states domestic affairs, as
well as the excessive dependence on a partner or on certain
regional processes have led to the appearance of discrepan-
cies between the levels of economic development of the
states that make up the region of South Caucasus. There are
multiple political or economic causes for this, but the best
solution is to follow the national objectives or interests as a
unique source of inspiration for the measures and actions
that must be implemented in order to have a harmonious
development of a society. The three states that make up
South Caucasus have all felt, since they declared their inde-
pendence, the temptation to resort to advanced models of
economic development. Estonia, Singapore, the United Arab
Emirates are some examples of states whose economic results
have greatly influenced the attitude of the South-Caucasian
authorities as to the method to be applied inside or the form
of regional integration to be sought outside. Their intricate
connections to the economic processes and the policies pro-
moted by the Russian Federation and the maintaining of
certain features typical for the authoritarian regimes have
contributed to the creation of a political milieu that is hos-
tile to the implementation of the strategies and actions that
are capable to bring South Caucasus closer to the world eco-
nomic market. While Georgia and Armenia have been mem-
bers of the World Trade Organization since 2000 and 2003,
respectively (WTO, 2008) and accept the norms and prin-
ciples of this form of international integration, Azerbaijan
seems to have created its own pattern of penetrating the
world circuit, which is being supported by the oil and natu-
ral gases it possesses and by the prices of these resources on
the world markets. In both Tbilisi, and Baku, the pattern
used by the authorities in Singapore to sustain the economy
had its supporters at one time or another.1 The renouncing
1 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
441
of this model had several explanations: it was difficult to
adapt to South Caucasus because of the conditions the
three new independent states had to face immediately after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, no one was politically
willing to assume the implementation of that model, or the
governments simply turned towards other regional models,
much closer to them philosophically. Georgia, for instance,
took its models of economic development, in turn, from
Turkey, Estonia, and even the United Arab Emirates, Azer-
baijan from Singapore and the EAU, while Armenia was
tempted to get inspiration, al least partially, from the Baltic
states experience.
Through their logic in action, their concepts and tenden-
cies, the European models of economic development are
much more familiar to Georgia and Armenia, while Azer-
baijan makes proof of its Oriental and Asian affinities. This
last state is often included among the Central Asian nations.
If a state relies exclusively on its natural resources, its region-
al political independence may be short-lived. The existence
and trading of these is not a compulsory condition for the
growth of social welfare, one of the main macro-economic
indicators, that allows for a broader appreciation of a states
level of economic development. Managing the affairs of a
state that possesses oil and gas may become quite a problem
in time, one that can only be solved by the transparency of
governing itself and of how the income from the oil business
is being used. The economies of petro-states depend mostly
on the prices of crude and processed oil on the world mar-
kets. In such conditions, a decrease of the price of oil would
have lesser consequences in Armenia and Georgia, which are
less dependent on the selling of energy resources. According
to the International Monetary Fund estimates, the Republic
of Azerbaijan may be classified as a state dependent on the
income from oil-selling contracts (Ahmedov et al., 2009, p. 6).
To determine the similarities and differences existing in
the process of transformation of the South-Caucasian states
economies, it is necessary to outline the specificities of each
442
country in turn. Indeed, the fact that the three component
states of the region are all ex-Soviet republics could be the
starting-point of the study, but it would be unfair to ignore
certain national tendencies, existing both previously, and at
the time they were part of the Soviet Union. Most problems
that the authorities and citizens in Georgia, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan have to face may be found in all the ex-Soviet
states, yet the great powers level of interest differs from one
region to another. This is why outlining the features that
make the difference when it comes to the specific economic
development of the three South-Caucasian states is a pri-
mary condition for contriving recommendations that the
decision-makers may use to attract foreign investments in
the area by reducing the level of political instability, by
liberalizing the prices, by fighting corruption and the
monopolies, so that the other economic indicators involved
in the studying of a states level of economic development
reach the desired level. Transition to the market economy
should not turn into a long-term declarative principle. It
should be reached by implementing measures based on
pragmatism, effective on a longer term, so that stability and
economic growth may sustain the national security of every
South-Caucasian state. Moreover, it is well-known that the
solving of economic problems, the implementation of reforms,
and the steady determination to go beyond a certain stage
of development, i.e., successfully finalizing what is called
today the period of transition to market economy may
result in the partners openness towards the solving of older,
regional problems of a political nature.
Armenia, often called the Diaspora paradox2, has felt
the effects of the worldwide economic crisis more than the
other two South-Caucasian states. In 2009, Armenias
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) experienced a 14.4% drop
(Civilitas Foundation, 2010) expressed in monetary units,
2 Interview with a political analyst, Yerevan, June 2011.
443
i.e. from $12 billion in 2008 to $8.7 billion in 2009. Certain
branches of the national economy registered either a slow-
ing down of the development rate, or even a regress.
Constructions, agriculture, or the metallurgical industry
were among the worst affected, the last because of the drop
in prices on the international metal markets. In the Soviet
period, Armenia was well-known for the development of its
metallurgical industry and processing infrastructure, with
high indicators due to the well-trained labor force, the rich
resources and a secure market within the USSR.
Considering the fact that many features of these coun-
tries economies have remained virtually unchanged since
the Soviet period, that their infrastructure has become out-
dated, and that Yerevan has been under the influence of the
Russian Federation most of its independent life, cumulated
with the regional economic and energy isolation, it is obvious
that the worldwide economic recession has had the deepest
impact on this particular state. No sooner than in 2010 did
the Armenian economy experience its first steps forward, the
GDP going up by about 7.6% compared to 2009. However,
the economic situation requires massive investments and the
implementation of efficient measures for the reformation of
all branches of industry and agriculture.
Also, as effects of the prolonged worldwide economic
crisis, wages went down, while unemployment went up to
6.9%, which contributed even more to the migration of the
labor force outside the country. Until 2008, Armenia had
the highest average salary in South Caucasus and outmatched
Azerbaijan and Georgia. The crisis modified this hierarchy.
The labor force migrates mainly towards the Russian Feder-
ation, which has initiated a program for sustaining its own
free-falling demographic evolution. This program encourages
the migration of Armenian citizens to the non-European
areas of Russia, where they receive land and money. Russia
is also the state where most of the money transferred back
home comes from, even if the macro-economic indicators are
dropping there as well and the economic domains in which
444
most employees come from the CIS states are in recession.
The lack of foreign investments in Armenia and the migra-
tion of small businesses to neighboring Georgia have politi-
cal rather than economic reasons. Although the economic
reforms introduced by the authorities in Yerevan have not
led to notorious results, the lack of a foreign interest for
investing in the Armenian economy has been justified, most
of the times, by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a factor of
regional instability. In fact, as the Armenian officials admit,
the conflict was and is the perfect motivation for justifying
inaction regarding the implementation of economic reforms,
but mainly to conceal acts of high-level corruption. Foreign
investors might require that systemic measures of fighting
corruption be adopted. Such a vicious circle can only be
broken by the political factors firm involvement. The busi-
ness milieu merges with the states institutions. Most busi-
nesses belong to people holding key-offices in the state insti-
tutional system.3 The Russian Federation has always been
one of Armenias main economic partners. The bilateral
economic relationship had a positive trend until 2009, when
the first negative effects of the worldwide economic crisis
made themselves felt. If in 2008 the trade exchange between
Russia and Armenia reached $900 million, the following
year it dropped by 19.3%. Only in 2010 were the first posi-
tive signs of recovery in the bilateral commercial exchanges
registered.4 As a strategic partner of Armenia, the Russian
Federation also remains, at this stage, the main investor in
the Armenian economy. Russian investors have managed to
come into prominence in several sectors: the energy system,
the banking system, the extractive industry, and the tech-
nologies of information. The presence of Russian investors
in Armenia can be analyzed from two perspectives. The first
3 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
4 The Russo-Armenian Interaction and Regional Problems. Papers of the
International Conference of June 5th, 2010, Yerevan, NAAPET, 2011,
p. 11.
445
has to do with Armenias economic dependence on the
Russian Federation; the Russians fully control the countrys
energy system, because they are majority stockholders in all
of the countrys major energy projects, through Gazprom
and Inter RAO UES (the company that produces and dis-
tributes electricity), they have purchased the entire active
stock of the national phone operator Armentel, as well as of
Banc VTB and of the Armenian Savings Bank. The second
perspective from which the economic Russo-Armenian rela-
tionship may be analyzed has to do with the way in which
it is being presented by the Armenian officials. They choose
to ignore the dependence of the Armenian economy on the
Russian Federation and claim that the presence of Russian
companies proves how attractive the Armenian economy is
to foreign investors. During 2009, Russia promised several
ex-Soviet states to grant them preferential or non-refundable
credits in order to help those governments overcome the
effects of the economic crises. Armenia was one of the few
beneficiaries of such a financial support from Russia. So, in
early June 2009, the Russian Federation Ministry of Finances
transferred to the Armenian government the first installment
of the total credit of $500 million.
One of the economic activities in Armenia where there is
a major potential for development is the selling of drinking
water to the Arab countries. So is hydro-energy. The author-
ities in Yerevan grasp the necessity to diversify the products
meant to be exported. In the circumstances of a regionally
isolated economy, the Arab states are the main market for
the sales of Armenian producers. For Armenias interests,
neighboring Iran could become, in time, a road opener
towards the regional and international markets. There are
currently several ongoing common energy projects with
Tehran. These have to do with the supply of hydro-energy
to the neighboring country. Armenia admits that it does not
agree to the way the Iranian authorities further their foreign
policy objectives, but the two partner states are forced by the
regional circumstances to cooperate: Iran is Armenias access
446
key towards the regional economic markets, while Armenia
is Irans access key towards the non-Muslim world, since it is
one of the very few Christian states with which it has man-
aged to establish and maintain a bilateral relationship.5
In 2006, Armenia was invited to join the North-South
transportation corridor, in order to diversify the transit
routes for its goods. In perspective, the Armenian products
were to benefit from new transportation opportunities
through railroad connections, then by ferry to the Georgian
port of Poti. The situation of the transit routes for the goods
and services from and to Armenia is this:
Georgia 75% of the goods
Iran 25% of the goods
Turkey embargo
Azerbaijan conflict
Armenia is excessively dependent on the transiting of its
goods through Georgia, which impedes the development of
commercial projects with other countries, and not only with
those in the region. Although there are proposals for can-
celing custom fees between the two countries, the process
seems to meet with a lot of difficulties. For instance, the
Romanian investors disinterest is particularly conditioned
by the Armenian markets lack of access to various routes of
regional and inter-regional transit. Armenia is connected to
the North-South corridor through Georgia, but Romania is
interested rather in the East-West corridor. Although pres-
ent on the Georgian market, Romanian products are being
submitted to double taxation until they reach the Armenian
market. This aspect, of the double taxation, leads to the
increase of prices for various products, because it is reflected
in the costs of the respective goods or services. The lack of
a diversified system of connections to the main transporta-
tion routes of the goods, as well as of those for the trans-
portation of energy products lowers the attractiveness of
Armenia as far as investments are concerned. It is for these
5 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.
447
reasons that the foreign investors will go on passing up the
opportunities existing otherwise on this Caucasian states
market and will migrate to Georgia or Azerbaijan. The risks
that foreign investors would have to take are too high.
Supported by the Kremlin, but also by some international
financial institutions for instance, by the IMF after
the ceasing of its military conflict with Azerbaijan, Armenia
has managed to reenter the regional commercial circuit.
The Russian Federation could not forbid the authorities in
Yerevan to establish economic connections and bridges to
the South. Such an attitude would have become too costly,
all the more so as there are already a great many regional
conflicts that Russia encourages openly or unofficially,
under the pretense of protecting its own citizens rights. If
East and West had been off-limits areas for the goods and
services of Armenian origin, all that would have been left to
do was to encourage relationships with Iran and Georgia,
since Turkey and Azerbaijan were inaccessible markets. The
Russian Federation will remain Armenias main economic
partner in the near future. This bilateral relationship is a
calculated one, based on pragmatism. Several European
states that have managed to find their way to the Armenian
market are Italy (investments in the field of constructions),
Romania (oil and chemical products, e.g. diesel), Germany
(investments in the development of projects for the con-
struction of mini-hydro-power plants), and France (telecom-
munications, e.g. Orange).
Armenia is by vocation a European state. Its historical
and commercial connections with Europe have determined
the inclusion of the European integration vector among
the South-Caucasian states main strategies and policies.
Armenia counts among the six ex-Soviet states included in
the Eastern Partnership within the European Neighborhood
Policy. The Joint Action Plan Armenia EU was signed on
November 14th, 2006, in Brussels. This document refers to
Armenias integration in the European political and eco-
nomic system (Inside Europe, Armenians in Europe, 2006).
448
Through its provisions, Armenia agrees to contribute to the
acceleration of economic reforms implementation and to
the harmonization of its industrial sectors and agriculture
with the European standards. Moreover, the EU requires that
the authorities in Yerevan come up with a strategy of ener-
gy security as soon as possible, so the strategic objectives
based on nuclear energy be taken out of the economic cir-
cuit and replaced with other types of energy resources.
The development of commercial exchanges with the EU
is confirmed by the figures, too. In the first semester of
2010, Armenias foreign trade with the EU-member states
increased by an average 29.1%, exceeding $1 billion. The
growth of this economic indicator took place in spite of the
depreciation of the euro. Although it was left behind by
Georgia with regard to the implementation of the main
requirements agreed upon in various official acts and state-
ments having to do with European integration, Armenia
has not given up its endeavor to draw nearer the European
values and standards. Its light economic recovery of the past
two years signals that Armenians have grasped the role of
taking certain firm decisions regarding the regional and
international integration. Only by implementing some
decisive action towards systemic changes, i.e. of the entire
economic circuit, by applying deep and severe reforms, by
mobilizing everybody for the negotiation of their countrys
political, economic, and energy regional independence,
some credible results may be obtained.
Azerbaijan, often called the oil paradox or the closed
economy paradox6 it the only state in the world that regis-
tered a significant economic growth during the worldwide
crisis. According to the experts estimates, the Azerbaijani
industry represents over 70% of the total South-Caucasian
economy and the overall volume of oil extracted in 2009
exceeded 50 million tons, while that of the natural gas went
6 Interview with a political analyst, Yerevan, June 2011.
449
up to 23.6 billion cubic meters (Nagdalyan, 2009, p. 128).
Azerbaijan was and still is associated with oil and natural
gas.7 These resources characterize the Republic of Azerbai-
jan, which is now more than ever determined to negotiate
its place within the system of international economic rela-
tionships. At present, the official policy in Baku is to nego-
tiate the countrys position in the region, its economic con-
tracts and stability through energy-related instruments,
which could lead, at some time in the future, to the exhaus-
tion of the Azerbaijani domestic resources. Concentration
on the negotiation of current objectives, on spending the
income of the oil industry, more often than not ignoring any
investment in the future of this and other industries is the
proof of a mistaken economic development strategy. The
reduced diversity of economic sectors, the lack of conditions
that may attract both foreign, and domestic investments,
7 The turning of Azerbaijan into a country with an important
role in the field of energy started four hundred years ago, when oil
was first extracted from the Absheron peninsula. In 1813, the
Tsarist Empire took possession of those oil fields and managed them
for some time. In 1859, the Russians built the first oil processing
plant in Baku. Until 1872, the Russian Empire was the exclussive
extractor of energy resources from Azerbaijan. It was only after that
year, when the Russian annulled the system of fiscal buyback in this
domain, that they had introduced themselves, and declared free the
extraction of oil resources, that foreign investors from Great Britain,
France, Germany, and the Netherlands were allowed to enter the
market and the oil industry of Azerbaijan. In the early 20th century,
half of the oil resources extracted in the world were of Azerbaijani
origin. Several international companies, including the Rothschild
financial clan, managed to penetrate the region and, hence, get con-
trol not only of the quantities of oil that were extracted, but also of
the world price of crude oil. The monopoly on the oil extraction
industry allowed them to obtain maximum results with minimum
investments. As a consequence, the necessity of keeping the industry
up-to-date with the technological advances dropped significantly.
The technological setback was imminent. In the Soviet years, about
70% of the necessities of the Soviet industry were covered by oil
resources of an Azerbaijani origin.
450
the encouraging of forms of competition that are inadequate
for the market economy, plus the monopolies and oligo-
polies, high-level corruption, the violation of the right of
private property, and the excessive involvement of the state
in establishing prices all these signal major deficiencies in
the management of a states economic processes and evolu-
tions. The authorities intervene in the companies activities
and make an excessive use of price control for goods and
services, as a most efficient measure for preventing any
social action against the government. In this respect, neither
Georgia, nor Armenia seems to have made much progress.
Prices and tariffs are being controlled or imposed by the
authorities. The liberalization of prices as a market econo-
my feature does not work here. Twenty years after the inde-
pendence of Azerbaijan was proclaimed, one can still speak
of a closed economy, where the access of foreign partners is
restricted, most of the times because of the private interests
of various political leaders in close connection with the gov-
ernment. Azerbaijan is a state specialized in the extraction
and selling of oil products on the international markets,
barely concerned to create efficient development conditions
for other sectors of the economy. A positive trade balance
does not necessarily mean the existence of quality economic
and financial transformations. Changes occur only in quan-
tity, inasmuch as the activities and initiatives of the current
government receive their necessary financial support. If one
is to take into account the above-mentioned processes and
phenomena that affect the Azerbaijani economy, then one
has to admit that the results obtained and the success in
maintaining the macro-economic indicators growth trend
seem to signal an economic paradox. According to the results
presented by the international organizations in their annual
reports, Azerbaijan was the only state in the world to have
registered a rate of economic growth of about 9% during the
worldwide economic crisis. The crisis was felt less, because
the financial resources from the State Oil Fund were used to
diminish the impact of the negative consequences on the
451
Azerbaijani population. Members of the National Budget
Group8 (2007) warn that according to a classification made
by the Transparency Commission of the IMF (2007), if a
country has a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in which the
oil extraction industry holds more than 25% or the sales of
oil products represents more than 50% of the countrys
exports, then we are dealing with an oil-dependent country.
The levels of the macro-economic indicators for 2010 con-
firm the existence of both conditions in Azerbaijan. Other
figures that confirm the exaggerated dependence of the
Azerbaijani economy on the energy sector or its orientation
towards one single economic sector result from the project
of law for the State Budget of the Republic of Azerbaijan
(Ministry of Finances, 2011). On October 22nd, 2010, the
Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev promulgated the law
regarding the state budget for 2011, according to which the
total income was meant to reach 12.061 billion AZN9, while
the expenditure 12.478 billion AZN. The approved budget-
ary deficit was 687 million AZN. Over 50% of the state
budget income 6.48 billion AZN was going to come
from the State Oil Fund, other budgetary sources being: the
value-added tax 2.121 billion AZN and the income tax
1.21 billion AZN. As far as the expenditure was concerned,
the largest budgetary resources were going to be allotted to
the state investment program 3.38 billion AZN; to edu-
cation 1.338 billion AZN; the army 1.325 billion AZN.
8 The National Budget Group is a coalition created in 2006 by
nine non-governmental organizations that are financially supported
by the Soros Foundation in Baku. The mission of this group is to
increase transparency regarding the use of public financing in the
interest of the citizens. Its goals are: to improve the budgetary leg-
islation, to guarantee the transparency and efficiency of budgetary
expenditure, to participate in public debates regarding the adminis-
tration and distribution of the budgetary ins and outs, to monitor
the process of implementation of the budgetary policy.
9 AZN, or the Azerbaijani manat, the national currency of the
Republic of Azerbaijan.
452
In June 2011, the modifications to the law of the State
Budget of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ABC.az, 2011a) came
into effect. According to the new provisions, the state budg-
et income was going to reach 15.554 billion AZN, and the
expenditure 15.941 billion AZN. It should be mentioned
here that the Azerbaijani state budget is an over-centralized
two-level budgetary system: the central budget and the local
budget. The central budget was expected to reach the sum
total of 15.107 billion AZN by the end of 2011 and the
cumulated resources of the local budgets (84 administra-
tive-territorial units) only 0.447 billion AZN. As far as
expenditure is concerned, the central budget / local budget
proportion was supposed to be 14.633 billion AZN to 1.308
billion AZN. After the budgetary adjustments, the budget
of the programs of state investments was supplemented to
5.864 billion AZN (ABC.az, 2011b). In 2010, the evolution
of the exports, as presented by the State Committee for
Statistics, showed that exports exceeded imports in Azerbai-
jan. The volume of foreign trade has reached the sum total
of $27.294 billion, i.e. 31.1% more than in 2009. The exports
of crude oil represented 86.53%, while those of processed
oil products only 5.07% (Foreign Trade, Economic Review
of Azerbaijan, 2011, p. 13). Also from the evolution of
exports in 2010, one notices that most of the Azerbaijani
exports reached EU member-states, while most imports came
from members of the Community of Independent States.
The growth rate of exports was higher than that of imports.
Unlike Georgia and Armenia, Azerbaijan is not a member of
the World Trade Organization. One of the main reasons for
which its joining the WTO with full rights has been post-
poned has to do with the existence of the same state-con-
trolled monopolies and oligopolies. For the authorities in
Tbilisi, the membership of this international organization is
an important instrument in their political negotiations with
Moscow, which has been talking for about eighteen years
with the other member-states in order to be accepted as a
full-rights member, too. Georgia is but one of the obstacles
453
the Kremlin stumbles upon, since it must have the agreement
of all WTO members. Another obstacle has to do with the
Moscow leaders philosophy of action and with the require-
ments and rules regarding the world markets, that they do
not observe. In Baku, at least, there is this general idea that
Azerbaijan will become a member of the WTO only after
Russia has been accepted as a full member of this interna-
tional economic structure. The reason is the same as in the
case of Moscow: the excessive dependence of economic sta-
bility on the sales of oil products and the states involvement
in price control, plus, presumably, the hostility of Armenia,
that joined the organization on February 5th, 2003.10
The Azerbaijani trade is still oriented towards the Russian
Federation and the regional economic initiatives, especially
created by Moscow to maintain its influence in the ex-Soviet
countries. Most Azerbaijani imports come from Russia. The
Russian Federation seems to hold the position as one of
Azerbaijans most important economic partners. Besides the
family connections of the current Azerbaijani president with
Russia and Russian businessmen, there are figures that speak
for themselves about the Kremlins potential influence on
the only South-Caucasian state able to partially guarantee
for its political independence: Russia is Azerbaijans third
major partner as far as the imported goods are concerned
and the eighth in the total volume of exported goods.11 It is
no longer Azerbaijans main trade partner, as it used to be,
but still has control over certain major economic sectors.
The Russian Federation leaders insist on remaining among
the world energy dealers who make the rules of the game on
the international markets. Russia purchases Azerbaijani gas
at prices higher than the ones it uses with other trade part-
ners.12 Moreover, experts say, the fact that Azerbaijan has
10 Interview with an expert in the transparent use of the funds
coming from oil sales, Baku, June 2011.
11 Interview with officials, Baku, June 2011.
12 Interview with an expert in energy security, Bucharest, August
2011.
454
taken out of its military doctrine the project of joining
NATO and has joined, instead, the Non-Aligned Movement
(made up of states that are not going to join any military
block) shows that the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev
tries to find a proper balance between the political interests
of Russia and those of the West. The existence of monopo-
lies has a negative impact on the final consumers, the
Azerbaijani citizens. Because of the difficult conditions in
which they may reach the Azerbaijani market and of the
high expenses they incur in the process, the investors who
manage to find themselves a place in some local economic
niche also establish prices higher than the ones practiced
on the regional or world markets. Azerbaijan has a huge,
yet unexploited tourist potential, but has not managed so far
to become known as a tourist attraction either regionally,
or worldwide. Tourism could become, in time, one of the
sectors capable to offer complementariness to the energy
projects. Investments in tourism could be a stable source of
financial income for the national budget. The sector of serv-
ices, of which tourism is a basic component, requires support
from the authorities, especially with regard to the facilities
provided to small and medium businesses for access to this
market, plus the modification of the related legislation. The
development of services is mandatory. Tourism may become,
in time, an alternative to the use of oil resources. Without
its development, the Azerbaijani economy could suffocate
in time, especially if the estimates of experts in the field of
energy are confirmed and the climax of oil and gas extrac-
tion is actually reached in 2020. The exhaustibility of the
energy resources should not be overlooked, even if there is
an ever-growing pressure for the implementation of the
newest technologies of oil extraction, that allow for diggings
down to 7,000 to 10,000 meters. Rural, agricultural tourism
is but one of the possibilities of attracting the domestic
capital towards the countrys economy, by supplying it the
necessary conditions to produce added value.
455
 Georgia: The Georgian authorities pattern of economic
development is based on neo-liberal principles and ideas.
Their implementation presupposes the adoption of certain
measures among which encouraging the loyal competition,
liberalizing the market, but also limiting the involvement of
the state in economy only to exceptional circumstances.
The so-called Economic Freedom Act was also adopted in
Georgia, which lowers the likelihood of the state authority
increasing taxes (Georgia Times, 2011). The contents of that
document, says the Georgian Minister of Finances Dmitri
Gvindadze, make it less likely that the economic factors
become discontent, thus guaranteeing a fiscal stability. Like
the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia does not control its
entire territory. After the August 2008 Russo-Georgian
conflict, Abkhazia and South Ossetia proclaimed their inde-
pendence from Tbilisi and the Russian Federation plus four
other states, including Venezuela, have recognized them as
such. Today, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are being sup-
ported financially from the Russian budget and treated as if
they were actually parts of the Federation.13 This situation
is likely to produce tension between Georgia and Russia and
to offer a good subject of political disputes, which are often
invoked as pretexts for avoiding real economic reforms.
After 2003, when the Rose Revolution took place, the new
government had to take over the government affairs, which
were in a deplorable state. Economic reforms were not ade-
quately applied, so as to encourage a real transition to a
market economy. The same pattern was followed as in the
entire ex-Soviet space: an illegal privatization of the strategic
objectives, tolerance for corruption, a meager concern for
attracting foreign investments. Georgias foreign debt had
exceeded $1.5 billion and over 50% of the countrys popu-
lation were living under the limit of poverty (Guseynov,
2008, p. 295). This state of affairs was overcome due to the
external financial support and the interest shown by the
13 Interview with a Georgian official, Tbilisi, May 2011.
456
great powers the US and the EU primarily in order
to maintain political and economic stability in the region.
Georgia is a defining element of the bridge connecting the
European markets to the energy resources of the Caspian Sea
area. Moreover, it is part of the East-West transport corri-
dors for goods and, since Armenia was denied participation
in several projects related to South Caucasus as a region,
Tbilisi took over part of Armenians role, thus managing to
multiply the economic advantages of its political orienta-
tion towards the EU and the United States. Although it
does not possess energy resources, like Azerbaijan does, this
Caucasian state is attractive simply because it has managed
to join some forms of regional and international integration.
Georgia is a member of the World Trade Organization and
conforms to the norms, behavior, and standards the organi-
zation upholds. The fact that it has renounced its member-
ship in the CIS after the August 2008 war has allowed
Georgia to remain a signing part of the treaties it had adhered
to before that. Thus, the documents in question allow
Georgia to keep participating in certain economic exchanges
within the CIS and promoting its goods on the markets of
the ex-Soviet states. The relationship between Georgia and
the EU was made official in 1996, when the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement was signed; it stipulated that Tbilisi
would receive technical assistance and help to develop bilat-
eral relations in several sectors, including the economic one.
The document came into effect in 1999. Later, Georgia
decided to establish that integration in the EU was a prior-
ity of its foreign policy. The following actions of the Tbilisi
government were directed towards the signing of the Joint
Action Plan Georgia EU (European Commission, 2006),
which occurred on October 6th, 2006. As the other two
South-Caucasian states, Georgia is part of the Eastern
Partnership, within the European Neighborhood Policy. The
country seems to have changed its attitude towards Iran
too, since it is more and more intent on turning into an
attractive market for the Iranian investors; however, unlike
457
the Armenian ones, the authorities in Tbilisi have a much
more diversified network of bilateral partnerships, which
greatly expands their freedom of action in the Black Sea
area.14 Turkey and the Ukraine are important partners of
Georgias. The partnerships with these two countries allow
for the access of Georgian products on the European market.
After the August 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, the activity
of the Georgian port of Batumi was temporarily suspended.
Following that conflict, neighboring Armenia suffered losses
of over $600 million, a huge sum for this South-Caucasian
countrys economy.15 While Georgia received an extremely
important political and financial support from several
Western partners, which made it possible for the country to
overcome the economic recession, Armenia did not receive
any similar support, given its relationships with the Russian
Federation, so it could not cover or recover at least some of
the losses it had experienced. Eduard Nagdalyan (2011, p.
127) confirms the theory that Georgias economic salvation
became possible because of the Russo-Georgian war, while
Armenia and Azerbaijan did not enjoy the same external
support: On the one hand, the dynamics of the Georgian
economy was damaged by the war, but, however paradoxi-
cal it may seem, in accordance with the opinions shared by
several Georgian experts, it was the war itself that saved the
Georgian crisis-stricken economy. One has to consider the
$4.5 billion worth of financial support offered to Georgia by
international donors, so it may face the outcome of the war
with Russia. Of this money, $2 billion came from the US
grant. The lack of natural resources of its own, as well as
the tensioned relationship with Russia because of the latters
recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia have oriented Georgias economy towards Western
structures. For the reintegration of its territories, however,
14 Interview with an expert in European integration, Tbilisi, May
2011.
15 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.
458
Georgia has to become a model of actual economic develop-
ment, to keep on encouraging and implementing economic
reforms. Transformation has to be a systemic one; the fact
that Georgia is being firmly sustained by the international
community in its endeavor to integrate in the worldwide
economic circuit represents not only de iure, but also de facto
an advantage in negotiating the countrys national interests.
2. The importance of developing the business environment
and the factors that influence its evolution
From an economic point of view, South Caucasus can be
studied as a regional unitary system, but also separately,
each of its elements in turn. To have an overview of the
region, however, it was necessary to make a retrospective
analysis of the national economy of each South-Caucasian
state, in order to grasp its internal particularities and neces-
sities. Each state does not have the same economic needs.
From this point of view, Azerbaijan is totally independent
or tends towards a different regional integration system,
for various reasons: cultural and historical affinities, shared
values and principles, political dependence or independ-
ence. One thing is for sure: this region requires a complex
approach, even if there are attempts at having specialized
approaches according to the economic sectors: metallurgical
industry, energy industry, or petro-chemical industry (Kav-
kazia.net, 2011). It is the only way to come up with feasible
strategies for the promotion of certain investment projects
in the region. Any democratic government should establish
as its purpose to guarantee the prosperity and well-being of
its citizens, so they do not feel threatened or having their
interests affected in any way. Guaranteeing the protection
and promotion of human rights and liberties, including
through the adoption of various international norms and
principles contained in the documents signed and ratified,
is the first step towards a successful dialogue between state
and citizen.
459
 Observing the right to private property is part of the
endeavor towards the transformation of the ex-Soviet states
economies and transition to the market economy. Unfortu-
nately, there are difficulties in all three South-Caucasian
states regarding the guaranteeing of this right. The right to
private property is transitory: it is guaranteed in the consti-
tutions, but in reality it is not fully protected. The authori-
ties in the three states do not seem interested in this aspect
of their activity, so that elementary rights are often being
flagrantly violated, which ultimately makes the investors
lose their interest to invest in the economy of this state or
postpone the decision to export their capital surplus abroad.
If an investor is not completely sure that his financial
investments are secure, he leaves the market where he acti-
vates or avoids it. Many industrial sectors need such foreign
financial injections of capital that are accompanied, most of
the time, by the implementation of the latest achievements
of technological progress in the production processes or in
the services offered on the market. The indefinite post-
poning of the necessary steps in order to guarantee private
property protection may trigger a similar postponing of the
modernization of the economy and, by way of consequence,
of the other governmental institutions. Transition to the
market economy requires the authorities support for private
initiatives, it implies monitoring the main processes and
offering security guarantees for the representatives of the
business environment who choose to involve themselves by
investing in the private sector. Here are just two of many
possible examples: in Azerbaijan, the houses taken in order
to built a winter palace in the central area of Baku16 or, in
Armenia, the mere existence in Yerevan of the NGO Victims
of State Interests, whose purpose it is to protect the interests
and rights of the people who have become victims of the
state17.
16 Interview with a human rights expert, Baku, June 2011.
17 Interview with a human rights expert, Yerevan, June 2011..
460
A further condition for restoring the stability of the
South-Caucasian states national economies is the adop-
tion or modification of the anti-monopoly codes. A lot
of businesses are confronted with the same problem: they
cannot penetrate the markets because there are no adequate
conditions for a loyal competition. In Azerbaijan, the project
of modification of the anti-monopoly code is being financed
by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)
Foundation and the Eurasia Foundation. The law project is
under discussion. It was estimated that the law would be
ratified by the Azerbaijani parliament by the end of October
2011. The problems with legislation hinder the economic
progress, too. The Azerbaijani society is conservative enough
and finds it difficult to accept new initiatives or proposals
for the modification of legislation, even if is required by the
international institutions and organizations of which
Azerbaijan is a member. If a law project opposes the inter-
ests of a certain business group, then its adoption and rati-
fication is significantly hindered or else it is rejected by the
Milli Majlis18.
The measures taken by the authorities in Baku can only
be qualified as populist. The reducing of prices for the basic
food products can not compensate for the necessity of
modifying the national strategy for economic development.
Moreover, the state is omnipresent in the establishing of
market prices, which is inadmissible in a country with an
alleged market economy. In all three South-Caucasian states,
economic decisions are being influenced by the monopolies
and oligopolies. However, there is a major structural differ-
ence: while in Georgia and Armenia, the oligarchs are both
in power, and in the opposition, in Azerbaijan, the opposi-
tion is not backed by any monopolists or oligarchs who
might support its initiatives. The only certain thing is that
political and economic decisions are being dictated by the
interests of some private groups. Although the government
18 The Azerbaijani name of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Republic of Azerbaijan.
461
circles admit that it is important to have a strategy by which
to fight the monopolies and oligopolies, the three states do
not have any efficient programs to this purpose.
The existence of monopolies and oligopolies may be
eradicated with the help of two types of factors:
Internal ones, by perceiving the need to create a healthy
competitive environment, which implies the modification of
the legislation according to the requirements of the world
market and of the economically-oriented international
organizations;
External ones, like the Arab revolutions, which may
reach the South-Caucasian states as well if firm decisions to
introduce some systemic reforms are not adopted.
Although foreign investors are confronted with numer-
ous problems when they decide to penetrate the markets of
the South-Caucasian states, their presence is important. If
the high level of corruption can be ignored and with the
existing legislative gaps that affect the financial sector and
the foreign investments, it is worthy mentioning here that
the main threat for the growth in volume of the private ini-
tiatives is due to the frozen conflicts in the region. Over the
past twenty years since their independence was proclaimed,
all three South-Caucasian states were confronted with open
military conflicts. However, the amount of foreign invest-
ments in the area confirms that none of the sides involved
in those regional conflicts advocates the idea of solving them
through military force, even though the conflicts continue
to exist in a latent form. If there were a real danger that such
military actions break out again, then most of the foreign
investors would withdraw to protect their investments. There
is a high enough rate of withdrawal of the foreign investors,
but this phenomenon is not actually based on political argu-
ments, but rather on a domestic policy applied in a wrong
way, which may be reduced to the causes mentioned earlier:
corruption, disloyal competition and a legislation that does
not correspond to the current realities and requirements of
the worldwide market.
462
Encouraging the capital to go outside its country of
origin may be a sign of improvement in a states main eco-
nomic indicators. One of the largest companies in the Cau-
casus that has managed to acquire an international presence
impressive by the size of the projects it develops outside its
country of origin is the Azerbaijani state oil company
SOCAR19, whose management has initiated a lot of energy
projects outside Azerbaijan.
Fighting corruption is yet another element of the qual-
itative transformation of any states business environment.
In Azerbaijan, fighting against this scourge has intensified
since the outbreak of the Arab revolutions. The authorities
in Baku came up with the idea of creating an Anti-Corruption
Committee that has had results mostly locally. Fighting cor-
ruption at high level or even at a medium level remains a
problem. Georgia is confronted with a similar phenomenon;
the fight against corruption has yielded results only at low
administrative levels Georgia has made significant progress
in fighting corruption, being a regional leader by now in
repelling this negative phenomenon with a strong impact on
the investors decisions when they analyze the level of safety
of a potential investment. Moreover, the phenomenon of
corruption is likely to hinder the process of liberalization of
the EU visa regime for a long time.20 However, it is an every-
day reality in the three South-Caucasian states. Its eradication
is attempted in official statements more than by applying
concrete measures.
The two decades of independence have not created the
necessary conditions for building up a common economic
space in the South-Caucasian region. This characteristic of
19 SOCAR is one of the worlds largest oil companies, acting on
the basis of an indivisible state policy, in order to improve the
administrative structure of the Azerbaijani oil industry, as well as to
offer the possibility of developing the oil-based energy complex of
Azerbaijan. SOCAR was founded in 1992, following the fusion of
two state-owned oil companies: Azerneft and Azneftkimiya.
20 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
463
the region is based on the existence of several political diver-
gences between the three states, on private interests, on the
way each state approaches the problems it is confronted
with or its relationships with the great world powers having
geo-strategic interests in the area. The creation of a common
economic space, after the European pattern, for instance,
would inevitably lead to the growth of the South-Caucasian
attractiveness for the potential Western and Asian investors.
Moreover, it would create the preconditions for the acces-
sing of economic integration formats, whether European or
international. All three South-Caucasian states have signed
Joined Action Plans with the European Union and have
been included in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)
through the Eastern Partnership that was initiated within
the ENP in 2008, at the initiative of Poland and Sweden,
and has been implemented from the spring of 2009 on. The
main benefit of such an intra-regional cooperation is the
guaranteeing of economic security. To lay the foundations of
a form of regional integration, the South-Caucasian states
should continue the reforms initiated more than a decade
ago, because a lot of negative economic phenomena typical
for the ex-Soviet countries are capable of slowing down even
more the processes of transition to the market economy
and, by way of consequence, of lowering down the interest
for investments.
II. The Economy of Energy-Related Policies in
South Caucasus
Most of the disfunctionality in the economic sector and
in that of energy security in the South-Caucasian states has
to do with the process of dissolution of the Soviet Union.
The international recognition of the political independence
has not necessarily brought about the economic or energy-
related independence from the rightful heir of the Soviet
Union, i.e. from the Russian Federation, which has maintained
464
its influence in South Caucasus through various regional
projects and initiatives of an economic nature. Moreover,
the outdated energy infrastructure and the lack of financial
means necessary to achieve immediate modernizations have
all but annihilated the possibility of developing this sector.
Adding to this the incorrect privatization of the networks of
distribution of the final energy products or their preserva-
tion under state ownership, that is hardly concerned with
achieving reforms in this respect, a desolating picture results
of one of the most important areas of the economy, whose
malfunctioning may ultimately contribute to the aggrava-
tion of social troubles, the way it happened during the eco-
nomic crisis of the last decade of the previous century. The
energy-related policies and strategies of the three states have
undergone difficult processes of transformation that more
than once led to the outbreak of acute crises, the conse-
quences of which were mostly felt by the citizens. The weak
industrial and energy infrastructure inherited from the USSR,
the imperfect institutional system, political elite unprepared
for the new challenges and social needs, plus the necessity
of accepting and assuming the new statuses of independent
states led to the deepening of the economic crises in the
entire ex-Soviet space. The efficient implementation of cer-
tain strategies of energy security of the various states implies
the using of a complex system of mechanisms and instru-
ments, both externally, and domestically, in order to success-
fully reach the energy-related strategic objectives (Infosfera,
Bucharest, 2011). But they have been unable to deal with
all the challenges. All this, cumulated with the non-uniform
distribution of natural resources, explains the different rates
of qualitative systemic transformation of the three states, as
well as the establishing of a hierarchy with respect to the
importance of choosing each states direction of political
orientation: some have managed to connect to European
forms of cooperation, others keep hesitating between East
and West and between several forms of regional integration.
465
An economic system becomes stable when all its components
have their resources assured for a satisfactory functioning.
The energy policy is the basic component of any developed
economy. Without encouraging well-justified initiatives in
this field, no political party will succeed to implement its
governing programs and will hence, fuel up even more the
electorates discontent. As mentioned earlier, South Cau-
casus has many energy sources of several types, but their
unequal distribution has been determining in the establish-
ment of the multilateral and bilateral relationships between
the regions constituent states. Cumulated with the political
controversies, i.e., with the conflicts existing between
Azerbaijan and Armenia or between the Russian Federation
and Georgia, they have drawn the attention of the interna-
tional public opinion on the processes and phenomena
occurring in the region. Oil and natural gas are the two ele-
ments that transform South Caucasus, making it attractive
for political and financial investments. The authorities
incapacity to alleviate the controversies between govern-
ment and opposition, as well as the legislative gaps in the
domain of investments, plus the presence of monopolies and
corruption significantly reduce the possibilities of implement-
ing the latest technological results, so the modernization of
economy remains uncertain.
South Caucasus also has multiple development possi-
bilities and nobody can contest it. This is where the main
East-West and North-South routes of transport for goods
and commodities intersect, where connections between
Europe and Asia are made, where opportunities are created
for the improvement of the routes of access towards the
energy resources of the Caspian Sea basin, that are neces-
sary to the economies of the developed states. The imple-
mentation of independent energy-related policies meant to
further the interests of nations, not of the governing elites,
is an essential condition for economic modernization.
466
1. Energy resources, economy, and energy policies
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the war
between Armenia and Azerbaijan immediately following it,
during which the Russian Federation upheld the cause of
Armenia, the latter was confronted with heavy problems of
an economic nature, but most of all with an acute energy
crisis. Azerbaijan stopped supplying Armenia with natural
gas, which interrupted the adequate charging of the gas
pipeline built on the territory of Georgia and put on hold
the railroad traffic that crossed Abkhazia and connected
Russia to Georgia and Armenia. Although the authorities in
Yerevan have been supported by the Kremlin during their
two decades of independence, the good diplomatic relations
between the two sides have not managed to compensate the
negative effects of the political and economic isolation of
the South-Caucasian state. Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia does
not have oil and natural gas resources, its necessary energy
both for consume, and the economy being imported from
the Russian Federation. In 1997, a company with a mixed,
Russo-Armenian capital, called ArmRosGazprom was
created, whose officially declared purpose was to rebuild
Armenias energy infrastructure and to resume the supply-
ing of natural gas through the only functional gas pipeline
that connected Georgia to the Russian energy system to the
North with the Armenian one to the South. Thus, Russia
managed to reestablish Yerevans energy supplying system.
Unfortunately for the Armenian economy, Russia later also
managed to purchase up to 80% of the ArmRosGazprom
stock, which could not have had any other buyers, due to its
having been structured as society with a closed-type stock.
Even if the bilateral relations between Russia and Armenia
seemed to be privileged ones, the necessity of taking supple-
mentary measures for Armenias guaranteeing its own ener-
gy security was imminent. There were several possibilities
to diversify the number of energy suppliers, but all should
aim, ultimately, at obtaining independence from Russia:
467
We think it is necessary to obtain an alternative to the
Russian solution for energy needs; therefore, it is useful to
get closer to Romania and Bulgaria21. The representatives
of the academic environment also seem to confirm the idea
that the Russian Federation is upset by the energy-related
initiatives of the Armenian authorities. According to the
public opinion in Yerevan, the states energy security should
not rely on oil and gas alone. The energy strategy should be
diversified and the private initiatives meant to multiply the
energy-related potential from alternative sources: solar ener-
gy, wind energy, and hydro-energy, should be supported. The
authorities in Yerevan will also sustain the development of
nuclear energy. The international debate gained momentum
after the March 2011 earthquake in Japan that brought con-
siderable damage to the Fukushima nuclear plant. There
are, though, divided opinions that depend on the interests
and resources of the states active in the region: France,
Great Britain, Russia, the Ukraine, and Romania will not
renounce nuclear energy, but consolidate this sector.22 On
the other hand, there is an equally sound opinion that most
energy-related projects, especially those in which the oil and
natural gas pipelines are being charged from Azerbaijan,
avoid Armenia. This is not the best solution for the Azer-
baijani energy policy, because it increases considerably the
expenses necessary for the development of regional oil-relat-
ed projects. This attitude, although not justified economi-
cally, enjoys a political support, even at international level,
due to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. There is only one
solution left, and that is to look towards the Arab world, i.e.
towards the same Iran Armenia intended to sign several
energy-related treaties with, which conflicts with the
Russian Federations foreign policy interests in the region.
The project of a natural gas transit pipeline from Iran to
21 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.
22 Interview with an expert in energy security, Bucharest, August
2011.
468
Armenia was a real alternative solution for the transporta-
tion of the energy products of Russian origin. The Kremlin
officials decided to subsidize the Armenian citizens con-
sumption of natural gas, by transferring to the Armenian
governments accounts partial compensations for the new
tariffs meant to grow between 2009 and 2011, which were
being imposed on the final consumers, but also to partially
finance the works of the Iran Armenia pipeline, by invest-
ing about $550 million. This is an energy-related response,
but its final purpose is to sustain Russias own political
objectives. The two partner states involved in the develop-
ment of the project went on working on it. The official data
about the project claim that 2.3 billion cubic meters of gas
could be supplied to Armenia through this pipeline, which
would cover fully the needs of the Armenian economy.23
The peculiarity of the project is this: at this moment, all the
necessary natural gas for Armenia is being ensured by
Russia through the gas pipeline crossing the territory of
Georgia. After the bilateral economic relationship between
Moscow and Tbilisi was resumed, Yerevan managed to sta-
bilize its energy system. However, gas is still being supplied
through the Iran Armenia pipeline. The energy resources
reach Armenia, where they are transformed into electric
power in the Armenian power plants, then exported back to
Iran.24
Armenia wishes to develop viable energy-related policies.
The domestic conditions and the nature of the countrys
relationships with its neighbor countries require that con-
crete measures be taken, as mentioned above. After the
Fukushima disaster, the subject of using nuclear energy has
been debated publicly more and more. Several states
Germany especially have declared themselves willing to
23 The Russo-Armenian Interaction and Regional Problems. Papers of
the International Conference of June 5th, 2010, Yerevan, NAAPET, 2011,
p. 19.
24 Ibidem.
469
renounce this type of energy sources on a medium term, but
not Armenia, on whose territory one of the most dangerous
nuclear plants still exists, that of Metsamor. It is over thirty
years old and situated in a delicate seismic area (World
Nuclear Association, 2010), only thirty kilometers away
from the Armenian capital, Yerevan. In 2007, the Armenian
authorities adopted a new energy strategy that confirmed
that the state is not going to renounce nuclear energy, even
though the EU suggested that Armenia should gradually give
it up (European Commission, 2006a, p. 8). The same recom-
mendation was reiterated in the evaluation reports of the
Joint Action Plan Armenia EU (A1plus.am, 2011). Given
Armenias energy situation, i.e., the existence of a minimum
number of energy partners, Yerevan does not show any
desire to stop developing such plants, especially since it has
sufficient quantities of uranium on its territory. In 2006,
the Armenian government made public its intentions to
begin working on a new energy project: the construction of
yet another nuclear plant. The first steps in this direction
were made in 2009, when the Armenian parliament voted
in favor of the law regarding the creation of a Russo-Armenian
company called Metsamorenergoatom, meant to build the
new plant. The project costs reach up to $5 billion, with a
usability of 60 years. It is estimated that this nuclear elec-
tric plant will become operational in 2016. It will supply
electricity for domestic consumption, but not for the entire
Armenian economy. This is why the authorities in Yerevan
have decided to support the project of building the nuclear
plant with Russian capital, although it was initially estimat-
ed that the investment would be a German and American
one. To obtain the German and American support for the
initiative, Georgia had to be associated to the project, since
the latter would have received foreign support for the project
development, which would have led to the improvement of
Armenias own political position in the region.
Cooperation in the field of nuclear energy represents a
new stage of the Russo-Armenian economic relationships.
470
To serve this purpose, another mixed capital company was
created in 2008, which was meant to conduct geological
research, as well as to extract uranium and other minerals
from the Armenian territory. This company is called the
The Russo-Armenian company for mining extractions; at
present, Yerevan is being connected judicially to the Angarsk
International Center for the enrichment of uranium.25
During its twenty years of independence, Azerbaijans
energy policy has constantly been in focus by the authori-
ties. It has always served the promotion of the countrys for-
eign policy interests and has been an efficient instrument
for maintaining stable relationships with most of Azerbai-
jans partners. In fact, the energy policy of the Baku admin-
istration tries to create a more diverse network of clients for
the energy resources it possesses. It is a correct and respon-
sible attitude, according to the specialists in the transparent
use of the income resulting from the trading of oil, who
argue that the aggressive energy policy that Azerbaijan prac-
tices today is the best strategy available; it is implemented
through SOCAR, the Azerbaijani state oil company. The
results are not only economic in nature, but mainly geo-
political, since they become visible at regional level. The most
important component of the Azerbaijani foreign policy is
energy-related aggressiveness.26 It offers the Baku authorities
a political independence in the process of decision-making
not only in the South-Caucasian space, turning Azerbaijan
25 The first meeting of the commission for the creation of an
international center for the enrichment of uranium took place in
2006, under the auspices of the Russian company Rosatom. At that
first meeting the concept, the judicial form, and the future forms of
cooperation between the center and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) were discussed. The center is part of a network of
international centers for the studying of the process of uranium
enrichment. The Angarsk center was initially meant to treat only
uranium produced in Russia and Kazakhstan. It is situated near
Lake Baikal, in Siberia.
26 Interview with an expert in economy, Baku, June 2011.
471
into a necessary state, one that possesses the resources it
needs in order to sustain a certain type of negotiation. The
Azerbaijani company SOCAR is most important to Romania
in the bilateral projects of energy investments. In the near
future, SOCAR intends to open over 300 gas stations in
Romania. According to SOCAR representatives in Romania,
the Azerbaijani companys penetration on the Romanian
market will contribute to the lowering of fuel prices. There
is political will and economic potential for the development
of such projects, but the SOCAR management is very cau-
tious when it comes to foreign investments. One of the argu-
ments for such an attitude is the type of negotiations
between the Russians and the Azerbaijanis on energy-relat-
ed projects, the details of which are never made public; the
companys strategy is to discuss small- and medium-sized
projects in which it does not commit itself excessively from
a financial point of view. This may explain why SOCAR has
only acquired a couple of fuel stations in the Moldavian
part of Romania so far. SOCAR also negotiates its penetra-
tion on the markets in Bulgaria, Serbia, the Ukraine, and
the Republic of Moldova. In Bulgaria, the SOCAR represen-
tatives negotiate the taking over of the single oil refining
installation, Neftochim, which is controlled by the Russian
company Lukoil. The negotiating process for the acquisition
of the Neftochim stock began in the context of the dispute
between the Bulgarian custom authorities and the manage-
ment of Lukoil, when the Russians license was temporarily
withdrawn for not having monitored the production process
within the time-limit they had negotiated with the Bulgarian
authorities. Ultimately, the disagreement led to the cease of
all oil-refining activities at the Burgas refinery during a
month and a half (Vedomosti, 2011).
The interest for the Moldovan market is neither new, nor
fortuitous. At the end of 2003, the Azpetrol Company
entered the Moldovan market with the intention of taking
over the construction of the Giurgiuleti oil terminal and
later of building up a nationwide network of gas stations.
472
For Azpetrol, conquering the Moldovan market represented
an outstanding opportunity to penetrate the European
markets. Yet the company ceased all its activities soon after.
This withdrawal had to do with events that took place in
the Azerbaijani political life. Azpetrol was controlled by the
Ministry of Economic Development of the Republic of Azer-
baijan. In October 2005, the acting Minister of Economic
Development in Baku, Farhad Aliyev (Aze.az, 2007a) was
arrested, being charged with an attempted coup dtat and
with exceeding his attributions. His brother, Rafik Aliyev,
former president of Azpetrol, was later also put under arrest
for money laundering. The latter has recently been released
from prison, however.
At present, Azpetrol has a reduced presence even on the
Azerbaijani domestic market: it only administrates 66 oil
refueling stations and five natural gas-based ones (Azpetrol,
2011). SOCAR was one of the potential buyers that negoti-
ated the takeover of the Azpetrol stock.27 To reduce the neg-
ative effects of the worldwide economic crisis, SOCAR was
the company that financed the Azerbaijani non-oil-related
sector. Thus, in 2010, over 60% of the investments in the
Republic of Azerbaijan were of domestic origin. Even so, the
sectors of the Azerbaijani industry that are not directly con-
nected to energy still suffer from insufficient financing.
Problems occur when the distribution of income is done
unfairly and other sectors of the economy receive insuffi-
cient funding for the implementation of economic modern-
ization, in the light industry or in agriculture, for instance.
Surely, their current energy allows the Azerbaijani authori-
ties more than any other to dribble among the geo-strategic
objectives of the regional great actors, sustaining also their
own endeavor to make this South-Caucasian state into the
main link in the region, that must be consulted when deci-
sions are being made regarding the foreign policy vectors of
27 Interview with an economic expert and an expert in the trans-
parent use of the income of processed oil sales, Baku, June 2011.
473
the South-Caucasian actors. The other leaders willingness
to consult with the Baku authorities regarding the evolution
of the region turns out to be, as mentioned earlier, one of
the outcomes of practicing the right energy-related policy.
No one can deny that the Azerbaijani leadership has made
considerable progress in this field, guaranteeing itself also a
stable dialogue with Moscow. The interests of an economic
nature are at least as important as the political ones. It is
very difficult for the Baku government to keep a balance
between the great powers energy, economic, and political
interests in the region of South Caucasus, yet there exists a
positive trend in this direction.28
One of the problems that Azerbaijan is confronted with
nowadays has to do with the transparent distribution of the
income obtained from the energy sector. There is limited
access to public information about the way in which the
funds accumulated after the trading of energy products are
being spent and their administration is not efficient. Thus,
the transparency of decision-making, which should be a
characteristic of a democratic state, remains just a desidera-
tion, and proves hard to implement. Private interests prevail
over the national ones. The Azerbaijani economy is fully
dependent on its energy sector, even if the Baku authorities
insist that the other economic sectors are given the same
attention by the government. The following question should
be asked: What will happen in twenty years time to an
economy dependent on oil and gas? Experts in the transpar-
ent use of the income of the energy sector state that only
15% of the Azerbaijani state budget consists of taxes and
impositions, the remaining 85% coming from payments for
the states energy-related contracts. An idea circulating among
the economic experts is that the Azerbaijani oil is turning
into a curse of Azerbaijan. The explanation for this is only
logical and accessible enough: the oil and gas resources are
exhaustible, hence limited in time, but the authorities do
28 Interview with a political analyst, Baku, June 2011.
474
not seem to grasp this reality when they orientate the states
economy towards one single industrial sector. The State Oil
Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan (2011) was created in
1999.29 The most recent estimates said that in 2011
SOFAZ would have accumulated over $30 billion, i.e. $10
billion more than in 2009 (ABC.az, 2011c). This estimated
figure was surpassed in July of last year. Thus, according to
the data presented by SOFAZ representatives on June 28th,
2011, the State Oil Funds reserves had reached the sum
total of $30.2 billion (ABC.az, 2011d). The growth of the
Funds reserves had been made possible, the same SOFAZ
representatives added, thanks to the successful implementa-
tion of the national oil strategy conceived by the leader of
the nation, Ilham Aliyev (ibidem). The amount reached by
this reserve fund for the future is projected to reach $50 bil-
lion in 2050. This State Oil Fund that gathers up the money
resulting from the sales of oil products is being administered
inefficiently, say the experts in the transparent use of state
funds, because the money is destined to projects that are
much too ambitious for the authorities to be able to execute.
Among the SOFAZ-financed projects, there are several ini-
tiatives meant to reform the countrys educational system,
especially to attract back home the young people who study
abroad, there is financial support for the project of building
a new railroad connection Baku Tbilisi Kars or for the
construction of a pipeline for transporting drinking water
from the Oguz-Obala area to the capital city Baku (but this
is very difficult to put into practice, because of a very poor-
ly developed infrastructure), as there are other initiatives
29 SOFAZ,
the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, was
created by Decree of the President of Azerbaijan, issued on
December 29th, 1999. The purpose of SOFAZ was to guarantee the
equality between generations with regard to the advantages to be
obtained by the exploitation of the countrys oil resources. The
endeavor for todays economic welfare must lead to the guarantee-
ing of economic stability for the future generations this is the
philosophy behind the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
475
meant to improve the situation of the refugees from the
Nagorno-Karabakh area. Since 2001, SOFAZ has been pay-
ing over 765 million AZN to improve the living conditions
of the refugees having settled in various parts of Azerbaijan,
but mainly in Baku.
The usefulness of the State Oil Fund of the Republic of
Azerbaijan is being questioned by the economic experts who
argue that only 5% of the total financial resources going
there are destined for long-term projects, i.e. for investments
in the future, in the next generations. The remaining 95%
are being distributed for present-day projects that more
often than not lack well-documented feasibility studies,
even if they are conceived by foreign partners. For instance,
the feasibility study for the pipeline meant to supply drink-
ing-water to Baku was made with the help of a German
company, CES Consulting Engineers, and cost over 2.1 mil-
lion AZN. But not all projects meant to be supported finan-
cially by SOFAZ are long-term ones. The money is invested,
it produces an economic circuit, but its profitability is only
short-term and has nothing to do with future generations.
The conclusion at hand is that the Azerbaijani government
does not have economic sustainability in mind. Diversifying
the sources of energy is one possibility, but diversifying the
production of goods and services and supporting the existing
ones, with no connection to the energy sector, is the only
chance for guaranteeing the countrys economic, social, and
even political security. The concentration of companies in
the cities, especially in the capital city of Baku, reduces the
possibility of making any major investments in the country-
side. To illustrate, it is worth mentioning that 93% of the
taxes and impositions collected by the state budget come from
companies having their official address in the capital city of
Azerbaijan. The rest of the country contributes only 7%.
Georgia is not an independent state from the point of
view of energy. Most of the time, the Georgian civil society
calls upon the administration to make some political con-
cessions for the purpose of gaining its energy independence.
476
Georgias dependence on the Russian energy resources has
been felt during its two decades of political independence,
but, nevertheless, this has not affected the countrys interest
in applying an energy policy based on diversifying the
sources of oil and natural gas. The international public
opinion often tends to associate this South-Caucasian state
with protests, with violations of human rights, and with the
August 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, in the aftermath of
which the authorities in Tbilisi decided to leave the Com-
munity of Independent States and only remain affiliated to
this form of regional cooperation through treaties already
signed, that are still in effect.
Georgias energy strategy is based on a simple philosophy
of action: diversifying the sources from which the necessary
oil and natural gas are being supplied, both for the economic
sector, and for the end-users, with a slight orientation
towards integrating the countrys own energy sector in the
EU-supported projects. Unlike the Republic of Moldova
and the Ukraine, Georgia has not yet signed the Energy
Community Treaty, but has been accepted as an observer of
the European Energy Community on December 18th, 2007
(EEC, 2007). The delay in Georgias participation in the
various European initiatives related to energy is also geo-
graphically explained, Georgian experts say. The Republic of
Moldova and the Ukraine have common borders with the
European Union, so it is easier for them to access the various
programs destined to the states included in the European
Neighborhood Policy and in other forms of cooperation.30
Georgias connection to the European Union energy pro-
grams will only be possible through Turkey. But, to obtain
their energy independence from the Russian Federation, the
authorities in Tbilisi have to accommodate the legislation
that regulates the Georgian energy sector to EU standards
and norms. Although the EU does not seem interested to
encourage a regional solidarity with regard to energy, mainly
30 Interview with an energy expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
477
after the recurring economic crises that have been registered
several years running because of the deterioration of the
political relationship between the Ukraine and the Russian
Federation, the benefits that Georgia might obtain by joining
the European energy-related initiatives could be long-term
ones, since they would require that the technical parameters
of the Georgian energy system itself be modified. What the
Georgian experts in energy efficiency must pay attention to,
first and foremost, is the part, in any energy project, refer-
ring to the transit routes, because, since their objective is to
become independent from Russia as far as energy is con-
cerned, the Georgian authorities are tempted to ignore the
part referring to environment security, i.e. to ecology.
Therefore, the development of the AGRI project could be
met with hostility by the civil society. It is worth mention-
ing here that the Georgian officials keep stating that they
are in favor of the development of such energy projects as to
encourage the use of regenerative energy, i.e. 90% of the
energy consumption should be ensured by hydro-energy,
although the European Union does not require that more
than 20% of the necessary energy for the economic sector
should be from regenerative sources.31 Ever since 2006,
Georgia has become an exporter of electric power, its main
consumers being the Russian Federation, Armenia, Azer-
baijan, and Turkey. Even after August 2008, Russia is still
the main consumer of electric power produced in Georgia,
which will continue to develop hydro-electric power plants.
While in Tbilisi there is talk about the possibility that
hydro-electricity become the basic element for the restoring
of dialogue between Abkhazia and Georgia, in Sukhumi the
opinion is divided. The political context does not allow it.
Rezo Zantaria, director of the hydro-electric power plant on
the Inguri river, stated in November 2008 that his installa-
tion was under the jurisdiction of the Abkhazian authorities,
which were not recognized by the ones in Tbilisi after the
31 Interview with an energy expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
478
proclamation of independence of the separatist region and
its recognition by the Russian Federation. That is why the
Georgian authorities have no right to initiate the procedure
of privatization of the hydro-electric power plant, with the
participation of Azerbaijani investors: Geographically, the
Inguri hydro-electric power plant is at the border between
Abkhazia and Georgia, this is well-known to the Azerbaijani
side (Kavkaz Uzel, 2008), Zantaria added. There is still
fear, among the Georgian authorities, that Russia will some-
how manage, after the August 2008 war, to appropriate this
energy objective, but officials of the two conflicting states
have reached an agreement for the equally shared adminis-
tration of the Inguri power plant.32 According to this agree-
ment, 60% of the total electricity produced there goes to
Georgia, while the remaining 40% partially cover the neces-
sities of the Abkhazian consumers. The reconstruction works
for this power plant lasted several years and were carried out
by the German company Siemens.
Although both the Georgian and the international press
tackle some taboo subjects that cannot be publicly debated
in Tbilisi, the most accessible discussion platforms for the
Georgian civil society are those regarding the energy and the
environment sectors. The states energy-related policy has
been used in Georgia as a pretext for the aggravation of the
divergences between government and opposition. Thus, the
Georgian Labor Party put up a protest, on January 13th,
2011, before the central headquarters of the Telasi Electric
Power Distribution Company in Tbilisi, demanding that the
authorities cancel the unique receipt for communal services.
The Georgian citizens were obliged to pay for water, elec-
tricity, natural gas, and other services according to the dis-
positions of a new, unified system. In case they did not pay,
Telasi was entitled to disconnect them from the grid.
Georgian Labor Party leader Shalva Natelashvili stated in a
press briefing that the Saakashvili regime set up a new bomb
32 Interview with an energy expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
479
in the relationships between Russia and Georgia by taking
such a decision. He reminded that the owner of the Georgian
distribution network for electricity was the Russian compa-
ny INTER RAO UES, that had no right to punish the
Georgian consumers for some foreign debts. According to
Natelashvili, the party he spoke for had taken all the neces-
sary measures for that action to be cancelled, for instance it
had called upon the Constitutional Court to advise about
the lawfulness of such a decision, and it had negotiated with
Telasi and the Russian company. The GLP threatened to
launch other protests intended to overthrow the current
government. The action, however, did not have the results
the opposition leaders wished to obtain. The current gov-
ernment in Georgia is often accused of limiting the opposi-
tions possibilities to protest, but the energy-related protests
did not enjoy the same support as the May 2011 ones, for
instance. In South Caucasus, it is a vital necessity to apply
energy-related policies and strategies for the efficient devel-
opment of the energy sector, which is the basis of the good
functioning of the entire economic system. But, without
guaranteeing the necessary resources for the development of
the infrastructure in this field, any public policy becomes
futile. The basic requirement for making any progress is to
create adequate conditions for the existence of a political
willingness that can only be educated while staying the
course and turning mistakes into achievements.
2. Energy-related projects and transport corridors in South
Caucasus
South Caucasus has managed to draw the great powers
attention through several elements that may contribute to
the reaching of certain national objectives and interests
included in foreign policy or energy security strategies to be
found in this region or showing openly their intent to make
investments in the area. Another quality of South Caucasus
is its proximity to Central Asia not only geographically, but
480
especially from the point of view of energy, which makes it
even more attractive geo-strategically. While Georgia and
Armenia, as mentioned earlier, show affinities for the
Western processes of political and economic integration, in
Azerbaijan there is no general inclination towards limiting
the countrys own possibilities of penetrating the world cir-
cuit. Its energy resources allow it to play several regional
cards simultaneously. Azerbaijan is often studied as belong-
ing to Central Asia, even if this approach has been given up
recently. One can reshape a region according to the interests
one has there, hence the statement that Azerbaijan was part
of Central Asia.33 The oil, natural gas, uranium and, more
recently, the plutonium to be found here give those interests
a different weight within the worldwide system of interna-
tional relationships. There is a struggle going on, not so much
for the qualitative change of the political systems existing in
the region, as for establishing a certain degree of political
subordination, in order to get sufficient control of those
resources as to obtain economic profit from their adminis-
tration. Unfortunately, this is seldom admitted by the state
and private actors who have foreign policy, security, and ener-
gy interests in South Caucasus. The presence and involve-
ment in the region of the Russian Federation, the US, and
the EU has not discouraged the other great powers interest
in the region of South Caucasus. Besides the actors listed
above, one should mention China as a very important such
power, the great winner of the worldwide economic crisis, as
being interested in those oil and gas resources. What the
authorities in Beijing try to do may obstruct more or less
the reaching of strategic objectives by Russia, the EU, or the
US everything depends on the ability of reaching a con-
sensus as to how the transport routes are going to be built
and the oil-related contracts shared. Chinas industry
requires large quantities of oil products to sustain its current
rate of growth. This is one of the explanations for the fact
33 Interview with a political analyst, Baku, June 2011.
481
that Azerbaijan is constantly being attracted by Asia and
the energy projects in which it is involved are being redirect-
ed some, at least towards the East. The philosophies
of these great powers differ considerably. While Russia is
based on its political influence on the region and the sup-
port it grants certain actors on the scene by artificially sus-
taining crises and conflicts, the European Union is trying to
become attractive through its democratic and economic
model, advocating above all the idea of an institutional
change by applying democratic principles and helping the
subjects in the region turn their faces naturally towards the
West. China, in exchange, is literally obliged to concentrate
all its efforts to the redirecting of the economic interests of
all the actors in the region towards the East, so it may take
over, at least partially, the potential of their presence there.
A detailed analysis of the energy potential of South Caucasus
is difficult to make if one ignores the main transport cor-
ridors that link Asia to Europe and North to South. The
selling of energy products makes it compulsory to develop
transport routes, storage facilities, but also processing units.
The development of the oil sector is paralleled by the sus-
taining of investments in the complementary sectors, so
that the ongoing projects or the ones still in preparation
Map 1 The track of the Nabucco project
(Source: Nabucco Pipeline http://www.nabucco-
pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/pipeline/route)
482
may be implemented without difficulties, especially in their
final stages. The quantities of oil and natural gas that
should feed the main energy projects in South Caucasus
allow for their prioritization, but the authorities in the
various states of the region try to give assurances that they
are not going to prioritize a project and overlook another.
The role of South Caucasus in the world economy could be
summarized as such: an access zone to the Caspian Sea oil
by the shortest transport corridors.
The energy project Nabucco34 was conceived as an exten-
sion to the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and meant to
guarantee the energy security of the European states (see
Map 1, previous page). The decisions regarding the develop-
ment of the projects were taken during the worldwide eco-
nomic crisis, but the states that have launched this initiative
have not given it up, because of the energy stability it may
offer (ACGRC, 2011, p. 35).
Azerbaijan is willing to provide natural gas to the
Nabucco project, but it cannot supply the entire quantity
required for its good functioning. This is one of the reasons
for which Turkmenistan was also invited to take part in the
development of Nabucco, so as to connect the Caspian Sea
to it. The basic condition of the Baku authorities was that
the states who need the project declare firmly that they are
ready to make financial investments in the construction of
34 Nabucco is a natural gas pipeline launched in 2006, with the
initial transportation capacity of 7.2 billion cubic meters per year,
which could be increased to 20 billion cubic meters. It was con-
ceived as an extension of another gas pipeline in which Azerbaijan
was involved as well: the Baku Tbilisi Erzurum corridor. The lat-
ter has an almost identical track as the oil pipeline Baku Tbilisi
Ceyhan. Nabucco will finally be 3,300 kilometers long and have a
transportation capacity of about 31 billion cubic meters per year.
The duration of the project is fifty years (Nabucco Pipeline Over-
view). The other sources of supply for this pipeline have their ori-
gins in the Middle East and Egypt. It is one of the most ambitious
projects. The estimated costs of the works will reach 7.9 billion euros
(Nabucco Pipeline Facts and Figures), but this figure is provisional.
483
the pipeline. The Azerbaijani authorities favor the imple-
mentation of as many energy projects as possible. This is to
say, once again, that the energy-related policy of Azerbaijan
is focused on diversifying aa much as possible the trans-
portation routes for its oil and gas towards the internation-
al markets. Nabucco is an ambitious project and there are
too many difficulties to overcome for it to be actually feasi-
ble on short term. The Azerbaijani infrastructure for natu-
ral gas transportation is very poorly developed. At present,
the focus should be on the development of the necessary
infrastructure for storing the quantities of natural gas for
which Nabucco has been designed. The authorities in Baku,
however, are politically motivated to sustain and encourage
their foreign partners who are interested in the Azerbaijani
energy resources to go on investing in this project. Playing
the cards of several energy projects, the current government
has the possibility to remain in power for a longer time, so
their support for Nabucco will remain a firm one. SOCAR
guarantees it will be able to provide the quantities of natu-
ral gas that are necessary for Nabucco, but only after 2020,
when most of the works of improvement of transportation
capabilities, that are now faced with a lot of difficulties, are
completed. Nabuccos potential will only grow after 2015,
when the natural gas production also grows. At present, the
production of natural gas is still behind that of oil.35 When
speaking of Nabucco, there are many political variables we
need to consider, which may hinder the evolution of the
project. Energy independence from Russia is but one to be
mentioned at this point, but attention must be drawn to
another, equally important aspect: most energy projects that
the European Union is interested to develop with regard to
the Caspian Sea oil and gas resources cross Turkey. The lat-
ter will not only gain importance in the region, it will also
hold an energy monopoly on the southern axis, which may
very well turn into a future threat for the energy security of
35 Interview with an economic expert, Baku, June 2011.
484
the European Union, in spite of its insistence that the ener-
gy market should be liberalized hence, there is a major
risk.36 The Turkish authorities are not going to risk right
now their economic relationship with the European Union,
because there are no political guarantees regarding the evo-
lution of Turkeys bilateral relationship with the Russian
Federation. This is why it will be content, on a short term,
to treat Russia as a market for its own goods and services.
It is interesting that the Azerbaijani authorities do not want
to contribute financial resources either for Nabucco, or for
AGRI (see below), which is faced with several difficulties
of a technological, but also of a financial nature. Moreover,
Armenias foreign policy agenda does not rule out its join-
ing the project. The Yerevan authorities are being pressed by
their own energy interests to join this regional initiative at
some time in the future. In the case of Armenia, this could
become feasible through the Joint Action Plan Armenia EU
(European Commission, 2006b), that prefigures cooperation
in the energy sector between the two partners. According
to the document, the EU is to sustain Armenias actions
for the development of a long-term energy strategy, but the
basic condition is that Armenia should renounce its inten-
tions to build a new nuclear plant. In its turn, Yerevan is
tempted to decline the EUs requirements because of the
lack of an alternative solution, which the European commu-
nity is yet to suggest. Under these circumstances, Nabucco
may very well be such an alternative solution, but it greatly
depends on the Armenian relationship with Azerbaijan,
which has so far opposed the involvement of the state it is in
a territorial conflict with in several regional energy-related
initiatives, insisting every time on keeping out.
The Azerbaijan Georgia Romania Interconnector
(AGRI, see Map 2, following page) is an ambitious project
that has enjoyed much attention from the partners involved
36 Interview with an economic expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
485

Map 2 The Azerbaijan Georgia Romania Interconnector
(AGRI, Stratfor) (Source: Plano 10 [AGRI in green])
http://www.plano10.com/2011/04/proiectul-agri-o-bila-alba-pentru.html
in its implementation. The purpose of this energy project is
to transport natural gas from the Shakh Deniz deposit
towards Romania, Hungary, and other European states
interested in diversifying their sources of energy supplies;
it is part of the southern corridor of natural gas transit. The
company that will attend to the implementation of the proj-
ect, called AGRI LNG Project Company, has been created
by participants belonging to four states: Romgaz (Romania),
the Georgian Oil and Gas Company, the State Oil Company
of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and MVM (Hungary). Each
of the four states holds an equal share of 25% of the AGRI
LNG Project Company social capital.37
The states involved in the development of the AGRI
project have problems of a political nature with the Russian
37 The Memorandum of Agreement for the beginning of the
AGRI program was signed in Bucharest on April 13th, 2010, and the
Declaration regarding the AGRI project was signed in Baku on
September 14th, 2010. The intermediary feasibility study for this
project is being drawn by experts from the USA.
486
Federation, which can be interpreted as harmful for the
Russian energetic, economic, and political interests towards
the South. But AGRI is a much more appreciated project
than Nabucco and the interest of the partners involved in
its implementation seems to argue in favor of granting
certain special priorities to it, since it is one of the cheapest
initiatives of its kind in spite of the fact that none of its four
initiator states possesses the technical or financial means
to implement it at this time. Likewise, as mentioned above,
neither does Azerbaijan seem to agree to finance the project
out of its own resources. The natural gas liquefying terminal
must be built on the territory of Georgia, which does not
possess the necessary technology to begin working on it.
Moreover, experts in energy security argue that guarantee-
ing the security of the transports across the Black Sea is
problematic, since there are no available special tankers for
carrying the liquefied gas across the Black Sea (those are
usually built with a huge transportation capacity and made
to travel far greater distances).38 The same energy security
experts think that AGRI is rather the result of a political
game that Azerbaijan plays in order to promote its interests
and to occupy a better negotiating position in the dialogue
on energy between the European Union and the Russian
Federation, so as to obtain political advantages. Neither are
the available and not yet contracted gas resources certain.
The fact that no other EU-member state except Romania
and Hungary has joined this project says a lot.39 Private
financing for AGRI is the likeliest solution. The earliest esti-
mates of the project costs indicate a figure ranging between
2 and 5 billion euros for a transportation capacity of 8 bil-
lion cubic meters per year, with a potential increase later.40
38 Interview with an expert in energy security, Bucharest, August
2011.
39 Interview with an expert in energy security, Bucharest, August
2011.
40 Interview with officials, Baku, June, 2011.
487
There are three possibilities regarding the future capacity of
the project AGRI to transport natural gas from Azerbaijan
to Europe: 2, 4.5, and 8 billion cubic meters. If the third
figure is going to be the preferred one, then Romania will be
able to negotiate a share of 2 billion cubic meters of the
total quantity of gas transiting its territory.
The authorities in Baku do not give priority to any
regional energy-related project. Nabucco or AGRI both
are equally important and Azerbaijan wishes that the two
complement each other. The former project is strongly sup-
ported by the EU and will connect Europe to the oil
deposits from the Caspian Sea and the Middle East. Both
Nabucco, and AGRI are given the same attention by the
Azerbaijani authorities; the difference is that the former is
more difficult to implement, because, first, states like Iran
and Turkmenistan have been invited to participate in its
development, that are perceived as regional actors capable
of producing regional instability and, second, there are
higher tariffs to be paid for the gas that will transit through
Nabucco. Moreover, in 2010 the EU has renounced the
involvement of Iran in this project as a sanction for that
countrys continuation of its nuclear program. Consequent-
ly, the Iranian authorities have declared their availability for
the development of yet another project that could rival with
Nabucco and would supply natural gas to Europe beneath
the bottom of the Mediterranean.
Several companies have also shown their willingness to
invest in AGRI. Among those are investors from Japan,
Germany, South Korea, and France that have offered to help
with the drawing of some feasibility studies for the project.
According to a press statement issued by the Romanian
Ministry of Economy, Commerce, and Business Environment
on February 14th, 2011, the feasibility study for Project AGRI
must be completed by April 1st, 2012, in order to accelerate
the completion of the project.
Unlike the states that have just offered to draw feasibility
studies, Japan has gone a bit further and suggested it may
488
partially finance the project costs and supply transport tech-
nology in exchange for Azerbaijani natural gas. Neither do
the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, and the Ukraine hide their
interest to be parts of this project proving that the eco-
nomic interests often prevail over the political ones. Turkey,
in exchange, does not seem too happy about the enthusiasm
shown by certain regional actors for the development of
AGRI, since any such involvement would diminish its key
role in the southern corridor by which energy resources are
being transported to Europe. The EUs position as to this
project is not a hostile one. On the contrary, Brussels
encourages the starting of AGRI works, since that would
contribute in an essential manner to the diversifying of the
transit routes for other EU-member states as well. More-
over, AGRI seems to be a project with an excellent econom-
ic justification in the first place.41 The Serbian authorities,
that are well-known for being stable partners of the Russian
Federation in the West Balkans, have also shown their inter-
est in joining the project. For the Georgian side, i.e. for one
of the four states that have contributed the social capital of
the AGRI LNG Project Company, there seem to be certain
delicate points of an ecologic nature attached to this proj-
ect. The natural gas transit pipeline is designed to cross
some sensitive areas, for instance the area of origin of the
famous Borjomi waters, an important Georgian product rec-
ognized both domestically and abroad for its curative prop-
erties. In case of an ecologic disaster, that cannot be ruled
out, but is barely taken into consideration in the designing
of the gas pipeline, the first to suffer will be the bottling
facilities for the Borjomi water, which is primarily meant for
export, but then also the Georgian economy in its entirety.42
41 Interview with an energy expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
42 Interview with an ecology expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
489
 The Heydar Aliyev Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan oil pipe-
line43 (State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2011b)
is an international project that took shape in 1994, at the
initiative of Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, in order to
strengthen the economic independence of the countries in
the region (Haciyev, Iqbal, 2010, pp. 227-242). The pipeline
is being supplied with oil extracted from the Azerbaijani sec-
tor of the Caspian Sea and takes it to the international mar-
kets, being designed in such a way as to take over a part of
the Kazakh oil production, too (ibidem). The length of the
pipeline is 1,767 kilometers, of which 443 on the territory
of Azerbaijan, 248 in Georgia, and 1,076 in Turkey. It was
designed to last forty years. The maximum transport capac-
ity is 50 million tons per year. The Azerbaijani participation Figure 1 The investment percentages in the development
of the BTC oil pipeline (Source: State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan,
in the project was accomplished through AzBTC Co., one of
http://www.oilfund.az/en/content/10/95)
SOCARs subsidiaries. The percentage of the latters invest-
ment in BTC Co. is 25% of the sum total of 3 billion euros
overall cost (see the other investors in Figure 1, opposite Although Azerbaijans economic ties with the Russian
page). Federation are still significant, its strategy of energy-related
The importance of the BTC oil pipeline is a complex one. development is orientated, as earlier mentioned, towards
Besides guaranteeing a part of the domestic necessities of promoting projects that offer alternative sources to the
the states involved in the development of the project, it also Russian ones. This attitude offers the authorities in Baku an
has a political significance. Its geopolitical significance comes additional perspective in the negotiation of their national
from the fact that it reduces dependence on the Russian interests and political objectives, but strongly outlines the
Federation energy. The second function of this oil pipeline economic aspect of the bilateral relationship between Baku
is to offer the US and other Western states the possibility of and Moscow. The strategy of diversifying the suppliers of oil
no longer depending so much on the Persian Gulf oil, by products and of the transportation routes for oil and gas of
avoiding the Russian territory and the crowded routes from other than Russian origin will alter the Russian Federations
the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. position on the world stage, forcing it to be more friendly,
more oriented towards carrying out another type of nego-
43 The BTC oil pipeline was the oil-related contract of the 20th tiations. At the same time, the Russian leaders are bound to
century for the states that contributed to the realization of the proj- become more receptive to the international mechanisms
ect. It was signed on September 20th, 1994. In 1999, the Agreement and norms specific to the specialized institutions with
for the transportation of crude oil through the BTC pipeline was
which they negotiate in order to obtain full membership.
signed in Istanbul by the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Turkey. Officially, the pipeline became operative on July 13th, 2006. The purpose of this endeavor to have Russia open itself
Its construction was carried out by the BTC Co., created in London to the world markets in conditions of loyal competition
in August 2002. is to ensure energy stability on European soil.

490 491
 BTC Co. is a consortium of oil companies and financers
with a total contribution to the project of 3 billion euros,
30% of which has been invested by AzBTC, a SOCAR
subsidiary especially created for the development of the
Azerbaijani side of the project. The remaining 70% is made
up of contributions from the other members of the consor-
tium: international financial institutions, credit agencies,
and commercial banks. The Ministry of Economic Develop-
ment of the Republic of Azerbaijan has obtained the official
representation of the interests of the Azerbaijani govern-
ment, by securing itself an 80% participation in AzBTC.
Thus, the income resulting from the involvement and support
of the Ministry of Economic Development is accumulated
in SOFAZ, the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
SOFAZ has financed the construction of the portion of the
BTC oil pipeline crossing the territory of Azerbaijan, in con-
formity with the provisions of the Presidential Decree no.
739 of July 30th, 2002, signed by then-president Heydar
Aliyev. In February 2007, 298 million AZN were allocated
to the financing of the Azerbaijani share in the BTC project.
The Azerbaijani section of the BTC pipeline was inaugu-
rated on May 25th, 2005, by the presidents of Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Turkey, on the occasion of an official ceremo-
ny held at the Sangachal terminal near Baku. BTC is one of
the most expensive energy projects implemented before
2005 and brought together eleven partner states. It modifies
the geopolitical situation in the Caucasus, creating tensions
between the Russian Federation and the US.
The Shakh Deniz Platform44 the Shakh Deniz con-
sortium, made up of several energy-specialized companies,
44 The first stage of the Shakh Deniz project was completed in
2003. It required that new platforms for the exploitation of the
natural gas deposits and two underwater pipelines be installed, that
would transport the gas to shore, near Sangachal. Exporting the nat-
ural gas extracted at Shakh Deniz began in 2004. The first contract
for natural gas exportation was signed by the Azerbaijani authorities
492
among which British Petroleum, Stateoil, SOCAR, Lukoil,
NICO, Total, and TPAO, was accepting proposals until
October 1st, 2011, for the construction of adjacent trans-
portation routes, besides the ones that would supply the
AGRI project, for the natural gas extracted from the Shakh
Deniz field. Up to now, three proposals have been received,
which are being studied by the authorities in Baku. All three
are Europe-oriented:
ITGI, the Interconnector Turkey Greece Italy;
TAP, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline;
Nabucco.
The first gas extractions from the Shakh Deniz field for
the most ambitious European energy project, Nabucco, are
estimated to take place in 2017 (News.az, 2011a), a date
the Azerbaijani officials confirm, adding that, from the
point of view of the viability of an economic and logistic
transportation, Nabucco will be the one to contribute most-
ly to the development of the southern energy corridor.
Although SOCAR holds only 10% of the stock of the Shakh
Deniz consortium that was created especially to exploit that
deposit, the representatives of the Azerbaijani state owned
company confirm that by 2017, the extraction capacity
will reach the volume of 25 billion cubic meters per year.
Nabucco was designed to transport 31 billion cubic meters
per year with a potential growth to 35 billion cubic meters
per year. The Azerbaijani officials have guaranteed a pro-
duction of 10 billion cubic meters per year for Nabucco.
As far as AGRI is concerned, as mention earlier, the quantity
of resources that will pass through the pipeline has not yet
been determined. Until 2006, although it possesses large
quantities of natural gas, Azerbaijan was an importer state
(EIA, 2011). Domestic consumption exceeded the extracted
in 2001. It referred to the supplying of such resources to Turkey.
The earliest deliveries were made in 2006. The total volume of gas
exported annually, according to that contract, reached up to 222 bil-
lion cubic meters at the end of 2009.
493
volume of gas. Its main supplier was the Russian company
Gazprom (Haciyev, Iqbal, 2010, p. 242). The exploitation
of the Shakh Deniz reserves allowed the Azerbaijani author-
ities to lower the countrys dependence on the natural gas
of Russian origin. The greatest impediments in the swift
development of the project are the lack of a storage infra-
structure and of a processing one for the gas extracted from
Shakh Deniz. This has not impeded, however, the Azer-
baijani authorities to negotiate with the Turkish ones for
signing of agreements for the transiting of the Shakh Deniz
gas, through Turkey, towards the European consumers. This
is confirmed by the statements of the Azerbaijani officials
(News.az, 2011b) who declare that, irrespective of the stage
the works have reached, the volume of natural gas to be
delivered in Europe has already been established.
The Interconnector Turkey Greece Italy (ITGI,
2011) is a project whose purpose it is to create a linking
bridge between Europe and the natural gas resources of the
Caspian Sea area. The EU-member states imports are to be
made through Turkey, which will result in the growth of this
states role in the southern energy corridor. Like the other
energy corridors, ITGI aims at diversifying the sources from
which natural gas is being supplied to the European compa-
nies. Cumulated with the other projects, it will contribute to
the transformation of the Republic of Azerbaijan into one of
the largest suppliers of natural gas for Europe. The intention
is that ITGI will interconnect the energy-supplying systems
of Greece and Bulgaria to the Italian one through the offshore
company that manages the Poseidon45 pipeline.
The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) is yet another ener-
gy project belonging to the system of pipelines that make up
the southern corridor, meant to guarantee the energy security
45 The company that manages the development of the Poseidon
pipeline is called IGI Poseidon SA.
494
of the European states and to offset the growing dependence
on the imports of natural gas from the Russian Federation.
The main share-holders of the joint venture company that
will manage the TAP connecting Europe to the Caspian Sea
through the Adriatic are EGL from Switzerland, Statoil
from Norway, and E.ON Ruhrgas from Germany. The trans-
port capacity of the TAP will be 10 billion cubic meters per
year, with the possibility to be doubled (Trans-Adriatic Pipe-
line, 2011). The TAP company will contribute to the devel-
opment of the gas storing infrastructure on the territory of
Albania, which was invited, alongside Greece, to participate
in the development of the project. These storage installations
for natural gas are meant to ensure the necessary energy
products for the European states in case of an energy crisis.
Last July, TAP representatives signed a memorandum of
cooperation with the Albanian government (Penn Energy,
2011), according to which they will study the possibility
of connecting the Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline for gas to the
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, so that the network of pipelines of
the southern corridor will be better interconnected and its
functioning will be improved. The deliveries of natural gas
to TAP from the Shakh Deniz deposit are estimated to
begin in 2017. Experts are currently studying the impact of
the future pipeline on the environment.
The Viking Project is a merchandise transport route
operating from Odessa to Klaipeda (Railway Pro, 2011) on
the Jonava Siauliai railroad, part of the Rail Baltica. This
project came up in 2003, as an initiative of three states:
Lithuania, Belarus, and the Ukraine. Economically, it is an
important initiative, since it offers a possibility of unifying
the transport routes between Northern and Central Europe
with those of the CIS and other Asian states, including
China. The project feasibility has been enhanced by the
effects of the worldwide economic crisis that has made it a
necessity, for the states involved in the international trading
on the East-West transport corridor, to take measures of
495
counteracting its consequences. Railroad transportation of
goods lowers their acquisition prices, since it is one of the
cheapest means of international transfer. If supported by
other means of transportation along the route, its efficiency
grows even more.
Georgia and the Republic of Moldova have been invited
to join this project. They may contribute to the develop-
ment of merchandise transportation in the Black Sea area.
In May 2011, the two countries officially showed interest
for the Viking Project and took over some of its works. The
initial length of the route was 1,753 kilometers. Then,
Azerbaijan was also invited to join the project (Web-portal
of the Ukrainian Government, 2011). Ukrainian premier
Mykola Azarov stated in a press conference that Azerbaijan
would take part in the project in order to have the route
extended towards Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and other
Central Asian countries. Thus, the project could gain further
significance: joining the Caspian to the Baltic Sea through
Odessa. It is a very important project for the transportation
of goods between Europe and Asia because it will connect to
yet another transport corridor, TRACECA (The Europe
Caucasus Asia Transport Corridor; see Kusch, Prause, and
Hunke, 2011, p. 25). In places, the railroad transport could
be doubled by the ferry one, which would facilitate the local
connections even more.
There are two possibilities for extending the East-West
transport corridor to Central Asia: (1) the southern region
of the Baltic Sea Lithuania Belarus the Russian Feder-
ation Kazakhstan China and (2) the southern region of
the Baltic Sea Lithuania Belarus the Ukraine Georgia on May 3rd, 1993, in Brussels by the ministries of Transportation
Azerbaijan Kazakhstan China, i.e. by potentially using and Commerce from eight Central Asian and South-Caucasian states:
certain components of the TRACECA route. The costs of
transporting goods by railroad are lower than by using other
means of transportation. There may be a problem, however,
with the different gauges that have to be adapted to inter-
national standards in order to unify infrastructures of dif-
ferent types. The Viking project is meant to create a system
496
of container transportation of goods between the Black Sea
and the Baltic Sea and is a component of an inter-modal
project of international transportation launched in 2003.
The reduced capacity of several transport corridors is a
threat for the future economic growth and for European
integration. In the near future, the production of goods will
increase in volume, which will lead to the necessity of devel-
oping transport projects that already exist or to initiate new
ones. Project Viking is designed to deal with such a quanti-
tative growth.
TRACECA46 is a project launched in 1993 to ensure the
access of the European and Asian goods to the international
markets through road, railroad, and maritime transportation
means. It has been the basis of an alternative route from
Europe to Central Asia, from the Black Sea basin, crossing
the Caucasus, towards Mongolia and China. This alterna-
tive route has been created in order to lower the transporta-
tion costs for the Euro-Asian trade exchanges and to provide
a route other than the trans-Siberian one for the same
European and Asian goods. Moreover, TRACECA plays a
political role as well, since it will lead, in time, to the cre-
ation of some efficient levers by which to ensure, at least in
part, the commercial independence of the South-Caucasian
and Central Asian states from the transport routes created at
the initiative of the Russian Federation. What is attempted
here is to minimize the importance of the economic projects
46 The document on which Project TRACECA relies was signed
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, plus
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The project was financed by the
European Union in order to develop the East-West transport corri-
dor that starts in Europe, crosses the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and
the Caspian Sea and reaches Central Asia. After 1996, the Ukraine,
Mongolia, the Republic of Moldova, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey
also joined TRACECA.
497

Map 3 The East-West transport corridor (Source: Thomas Kusch,
Gunnar Prause, Kristina Hunke, The East-West Transport Corridor
and the Shuttle Train "VIKING", Hochschule Wismar, Fakultt fr
Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 2011, p. 11,
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48566/1/66468520X.pdf)
Map 4 The extension of the Viking route (Source: Thomas
Kusch, Gunnar Prause, Kristina Hunke, The East-West Transport
Corridor and the Shuttle Train "VIKING", Hochschule Wismar,
Fakultt fr Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 2011, p. 24,
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48566/1/66468520X.pdf)
498
proposed by Moscow as well as the influence and role of the
Community of Independent States, through a project of
European origin. Thus, TRACECA is one of the linking
bridges with Asia created by Brussels that partially brings
prejudice to the Kremlins geo-strategic interests in the region.
Joining this alternative transport route also implied the
introduction of such legislative measures as to unify the
transportation policies. The states wishing to join TRACE-
CA, but also the Viking Project, had to undergo a process
of harmonization and adaptation of their public policies
and legislative transportation-related framework to the
European ones.
Conclusions
The development of the South-Caucasian economic
potential is mostly conditioned by the interest of the great
powers in this region, inasmuch as it is a supplier of energy
resources, but also by the opportunities it offers for the
transportation of goods and services from East to West and
from North to South. This territory has become a crossing
point for the interests and the political, economic, and geo-
strategic objectives of various state and private actors.
In this context, while the importance of the region
steadily grows, since it is capable of producing both stability,
and instability, regional initiatives and projects are bound to
appear, that will be of interest for the three South-Cau-
casian states either separately, or together, but those will not
be aimed at the consolidation of the regional unity, but will
attract the states separately towards various forms of regional
cooperation, which will determine even more the weakening
of the interconnections between them. Armenia, Azerbaijan,
and Georgia must keep up the process of reformation of
their economic systems, by adopting tough measures that
the population will be inclined to oppose. It is an exercise of
both politics, and democracy, but its benefic impact on the
economies could work for the benefit of future generations.
499
The three South-Caucasian states must also find the neces- $30 ., 23 May 2011 (available at:
sary solutions to overcome the conflicts and divergences of http://abc.az/rus/news/54411.html).
a political nature existing even in a latent form between ABC.az d,
them. If such solutions cannot be found in the political area, $30 ., 06 July 2011 (available at:
then a successful economic model should be chosen, that http://abc.az/rus/news/55687.html).
would help create a stable regional system. It is not always Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Coopera-
possible to turn the economic factor into a solution for solv- tion, Agenda for Armenian Foreign Policy 2011, Edit Print,
ing the political issues. But the process can be justified by Yerevan, 2010.
the national interests it may serve. Political decisions must Aze.az, : -
be shaped pragmatically, so as to ensure as many economic , 11 July 2007 (available at: http://www.
benefits as possible. Breaking South Caucasus in accor- aze.az/news.php?id=9071).
dance with the separate objectives of the great consumers of Azpetrol, , 2011 (available at: http://
energy and political resources is a good short-term strategy. azpetrol.az/ru/content/8/).
The region may become vulnerable to new challenges if the Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan Oil Pipeline (BTC) (available at:
leaders of its three states deny its importance as a whole. http://www.oilfund.az/en/content/10/95).
South Caucasus is not just a bridge for the great economies Baratashvili, Evghenii and Baidoshvili, David, Georgias
of the world to be able to access the Caspian Sea oil and gas,
Economic Integration in South Caucasus, Kavkaz Online,
it is also an area where dangers and threats for the regional
31 January 2011 (available at: http://kavkasia.net/
security still lurk.
Georgia/article/1296532063.php).
Acknowledging the importance of economic connections
Civilitas Foundation, Armenia in 2010. A Year of Uncertainty,
and intra-regional trade exchanges is one of the multiple
Yerevan, 2010. Economic Review of Azerbaijan in 2010,
solutions the three South-Caucasian states have at their dis-
in Informational and Analytical Bulletin, Baku, April 2011.
posal and resorting to those is a vital necessity to accelerate
the qualitative development of their respective societies. EIA, Imports of Dry Natural Gas in Azerbaijan, 2011 (available
at: http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?
tid=3&pid=26&aid=3&cid=AJ,&syid=2006&eyid=2
010&unit=BCF).
Energy Community, Decision no. 2007 107 IMG-EnC of
Bibliography 18 December 2002, on the acceptance of Georgia as an
ABC.az a, - Observer, December 2007 (available at: http://www.ener-
2011 , 26 November 2010 (available at: gy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/296188.PDF).
http://abc.az/rus/news/49702.html). Estate.am, ENP Country Progress Report 2010 Armenia,
ABC.az b, - 27 May 2011 (available at: http://www.a1plus.am/en/pol-
2011 , 09 June itics/2011/05/27/report).
2011 (available at: http://abc.az/rus/news/54895.html). European Commission a, Armenia-EU Action Plan, Brussels,
ABC.az c, - November 2006 (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/envi-
, 2011 ronment/enlarg/pdf/enp_action_plan_armenia.pdf).

500 501
European Commission b, Georgia-EU Action Plan, Brussels,
September 2006 (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/envi-
ronment/enlarg/pdf/enp_action_plan_georgia.pdf).
Georgia Times, Georgia needs an act of economic freedom,
interview with Dmitri Gvindadze, Georgian Minister of
Finances, 13 July 2011 (available at: http://www.georgia-
times.info/en/news/60772.html).
Guseynov, Vagif, 2008. : - Nabucco Pipeline Facts and Figures, 2011 (available at: http://
(1992-2008 ), Moscow, - www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/
. press/Facts%20_Figures).
Haciyev, Iqbal, Relaiile Republicii Azerbaidjan cu statele din
Asia Central: Geopolitica spaiului caspic i central-asiatic,
Bucharest, Top Form, 2010.
IGI Poseidon, ICGB AD, a Subsidiary of Bulgarian Energy
Holding and IGI-POSEIDON, Announces a TSO Market
Study Tender, 13 July 2011 (available at: http://www.igi-
poseidon.com/english/index.asp).
Lene, Leonela. Energy Diplomacy, in Infosfera, III, no. 2,
2011.
Inside Europe, Armenias EU Action Plan adopted in Brussels,
25 November 2006 (available at: http://www.insideeu-
rope.org/news/armenias-eu-action-plan-adopted-in-brus-
sels).
International Monetary Fund, Guide on Resource Revenue
Transparency / Fiscal Affairs Dept., Washington, D.C., 2007
(available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/lon-
gres.cfm?sk=18349.0).
Kusch, Thomas, Gunnar Prause, Kristina Hunke, 2011. The
East-West Transport Corridor and the Shuttle Train VIKING,
Hochschule Wismar, Fakultt fr Wirtschaftswissenschaf-
ten (available at: http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/
10419/48566/1/66468520X.pdf).
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Business Environment
(press release), Bucharest, 14 February 2011 (available at:
http://www.minind.ro/presa_2011/februarie/14_feb_
comunicat_semnare_AGRI.pdf).
502
Ministry of Finances of the Republic of Azerbaijan, The Law
of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the State Budget of the Republic
of Azerbaijan for 2011, 23 October 2010 (available at:
http://maliyye.gov.az/index_en.jsp?mod=2&id=
12&lang=en).
Nabucco Pipeline Overview (available at: http://www.nabucco-
pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/pipeline/overview).
Nagdalyan, Eduard. The New Orbits of the South-Caucasian
States: A Comparative Economic Dynamics, in Caucasus
Institute Yearbook, Yerevan, 2011.
National Budget Group, Baku, 2011 (available at: http://
www.nbg.az/index.php?option=com_content&view=cat
egory&layout=blog&id=71&Itemid=116&lang=en).
National Budget Group, .
,
Center for the Monitoring of the Public Finances, Baku-
Alma-Ata, 2009 (available at: http://www.nbg.az/attach-
ments/122_dogovor_doroje_deneq.pdf).
News.az a, Nabucco Director Confident Gas Will Flow in 2017,
09 August 2011 (available at: http://news.az/articles/
economy/42159).
News.az b, Azerbaijan Close to Signing Gas Transit Deal with
Turkish Minister, 16 September 2011 (available at: http://
www.news.az/articles/economy/44614).
Penn Energy, Trans Adriatic Pipeline Links MOUC with Albania
to Support SSE Security of Supply, 21 July 2011 (available
at: http://www.pennenergy.com/index/petroleum/display/
2537964136/articles/pennenergy/petroleum/pipelines/
2011/07/trans-adriatic_pipeline.html).
Project AGRI, a winning card for the Bsescu regime. Even if it
means upsetting Russia and Turkey, 19 April 2011 (available
at: http://www.plano10.com/2011/04/proiectul-agri-o-
bila-alba-pentru.html).
503
Railway Pro, 2011a, Rail Baltica: From Isolation to Integration
in the Macroregion (available at: http://www.railwaypro.com/
wp/ro/?p=6192).
Russo-Armenian Interaction and Regional Problems. Papers of the
International Conference of June 5th, 2010 (The), Yerevan,
NAAPET, 2011.
State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2011a. History
and Philosophy (available at: http://www.oilfund.az/en/
content/2
State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2011b.
Heydar Aliyev Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Export Pipeline
(available at: http://www.oilfund.az/en/content/10/95).
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline Concept, 2011 (available at: http:// www.
trans-adriatic-pipeline.com/tap-project/concept/).
-
, Lenta.ru, 20 October 2005 (available at:
http://www.lenta.ru/news/2005/10/20/ministr/).
Vedomosti, Counters have betrayed, 28 July 2011 (available
at: http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/264675/
schetchiki_podveli).
Web-portal of the Ukrainian Government, The Prime Minister
Invited Azerbaijan to Take Part in the Viking Project, 23
February 2011 (available at: http://www.kmu.gov.ua/con-
trol/en/publish/article?art_id=244090116&cat_id=244
314975).
World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Armenia, 21
August 2010 (available at: http://www.world-nuclear.org/
info/inf113.html).
World Trade Organization, Members and Observers (available
at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
org6_e.htm).
Zantaria, Rezo. The Hydro-electric powerplant in Inguri
belongs to Abkhazia and cannot be privatized, in Kavkaz
Uzel, 26 November 2008 (available at: http://www.
kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/144596/).
 Editor: GRIGORE ARSENE
Redactor: VLAD CONSTANTIN
Tehnoredactor: CRISTIAN BALINT
CURTEA VECHE PUBLISHING
str. Aurel Vlaicu nr. 35, Bucureti
c.p. 020091
tel.: (021)260 22 87, (021)222 57 26
redacie: 0744 55 47 63
fax: (021)223 16 88
distribuie: (021)222 25 36
redactie@curteaveche.ro
www.curteaveche.ro