ISTORIA TIMPULUI PREZENT

Colecie coordonat de ADRIAN CIOROIANU

Ileana Racheru este absolvent a masterului de Relaii Internaionale, Facultatea de tiine Politice, Universitatea din Bucureti. n prezent, este doctorand a colii Doctorale de tiine Politice a Universitii din Bucureti. Este autoarea unei dizertaii cu titlul Dezbateri de politic extern n relaiile UE i ale Rusiei cu Georgia i Ucraina i a mai multor articole academice despre relaiile Romniei cu statele din Caucazul de Sud. A scris numeroase articole despre evoluiile politice i de securitate din spaiul ex-sovietic n revistele 22 i Foreign Policy Romania, prilej cu care a realizat interviuri cu diplomai, experi, decideni i lideri politici regionali. Stanislav Secrieru este bursier la Colegiul Noua Europ n cadrul programului Black Sea Link Fellowship i cercettor asociat la Centrul de Studii Est-Europene i Asiatice (Bucureti). Este doctor in tiine Politice (SNSPA). A desfurat cercetri la NATO Defense College (Rome) i Institute for European Politics (Berlin). A colaborat n proiecte de cercetare cu European Council on Foreign Relations (Londra), DemosEuropa (Varovia), Europeum (Praga), Heinrich Bll Foundation (Berlin), Finnish Institute for International Affairs (Helsinki). Domenii de interes major: politica intern i extern rus, relaiile UE-Rusia, politica european de vecintate. Angela Grmad este doctorand n tiine Politice, specializarea Relaii Internaionale, coala Naional de Studii Politice i Administrative, Bucureti, i liceniat n Relaii Economice Internaionale, Institutul Relaii Internaionale Perspectiva, Chiinu (2004). Este cercettor la Centrul de Studii Est-Europene i Asiatice, Bucureti. Interesele de cercetare prioritare sunt orientate spre studiul evoluiei raporturilor dintre Federaia Rus, Statele Unite ale Americii i Uniunea European n spaiul ex-sovietic, al proceselor de democratizare din Republica Moldova, Ucraina i Georgia, al politicii europene de vecintate, precum i spre studiul redefinirii geopolitice a spaiului ex-sovietic.

Ileana Racheru, Stanislav Secrieru, Angela Grmad

Caucazul de Sud dup 20 de ani

Regimuri politice, securitate i energie

South Caucasus 20 Years After

Political Regimes, Security, and Energy

BUCURETI, 2012

Ileana Racheru, Stanislav Secrieru, Angela Grmad

Caucazul de Sud dup 20 de ani

Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naionale a Romniei RACHERU, ILEANA Caucazul de Sud dup 20 de ani : regimuri politice, securitate i energie = South Caucasus 20 years After : Political Regimes, Security and Energy / Ileana Racheru, Stanislav Secrieru, Angela Grmad ; pref.: Octavian Manea ; trad.: Mihnea Gafia. - Bucureti : Curtea Veche Publishing, 2012 ISBN 978-606-588-274-4 I. Secrieru, Stanislav II. Grmad, Angela III. Manea, Octavian (pref.) IV . Gafia, Mihnea (trad.) 94(479) 32.01(479) Coperta: S.C. TRI DESIGN S.R.L.

Regimuri politice, securitate i energie

CURTEA VECHE PUBLISHING, 2012 pentru prezenta ediie

ISBN 978-606-588-274-4

Cuprins

Aceast carte a fost realizat n cadrul programului Promovarea valorilor europene n bazinul Mrii Negre al Fundaiei Soros Romnia. mbuntirea dialogului i a cooperrii ntre organizaiile societii civile de pe rmurile estic i vestic ale Mrii Negre reprezint prioritatea acestui program, prin care dorim s contribuim la cunoaterea reciproc a societilor din regiune, precum i la dezvoltarea unei contiine i adeziuni fa de un spaiu european extins, perceput ca un areal comun de valori i principii sociale i politice. Scopul programului este de a ncuraja cunoaterea reciproc i o apropiere ntre societile civile din regiune prin stabilirea unor legturi puternice i schimburi de resurse intelectuale ntre Fundaia Soros Romnia i alte organizaii din Romnia, pe de o parte, i organizaii similare din Armenia, Azerbaijan i Georgia, pe de alt parte. Sergiu Panainte Coordonator Programe

Mulumiri ...................................................................... 11 Introducere .................................................................... 13

Regimuri politice n Caucazul de sud. Democraia care ascunde autoritarisme competitive (Ileana Racheru) .................................... 19
Ce este autoritarismul competitiv? ......................... 22 Georgia Alegerile democratice, marele succes al revoluiei trandafirilor ................................................................ MNU, atotputernic n politica georgian .................. Scena politic georgian ntre revoluie i reform ..... Elite noi, reele clientare de putere noi ........................ Mass-media convieuire imposibil cu regimul politic .......................................................................... Societatea civil, singura voce critic la adresa regimului .................................................................... Democraia care limiteaz presiunile Rusiei ................

23 27 27 29 31 34 37

Armenia ........................................................................ Alegerile care reconfirm acelai ctigtor .................. Un regim legitimat de conflictul din Nagorno-Karabah ....................................................... Drepturi i liberti, doar dup dorina discreionar a regimului politic ...................................................... Mass-media de la putere i presa de opoziie .............. Sprijinul Rusiei este indispensabil, UE este prea departe ............................................................... Azerbaidjan .................................................................. Alegerile care au ntotdeauna rezultatul cunoscut ....... PNA rege pe scena politic de la Baku ................... Corupia care funcioneaz perfect .............................. Drepturi i liberti cu existen precar ..................... Mass-media nu poate fi dect la putere n Azerbaidjan ................................................................ Un petrostat atotputernic .............................................

38 39 43 44 47 49 51 51 52 54 56 59 61

1.4.2. Est ....................................................................... 86 1.4.3. Vest ..................................................................... 87 1.4.4. Sud ...................................................................... 89 II. Dinamica intraregional n Caucazul de Sud ...................................................... 91 2.1. Armenia-Azerbaidjan: pace improbabil, rzboi posibil ................................................................ 91 2.2. Georgia-Armenia: resetarea pragmatismului ......... 100 2.3. Azerbaidjan-Georgia: tot mai aproape ...................... 109 III. Caucazul de Sud: raporturile cu puterile regionale .................................................................. 3.1. Armenia: complementaritatea variabil .................... 3.1.1. Rusia ................................................................. 3.1.2. Iran .................................................................... 3.1.3. SUA ................................................................... 3.1.4. UE ..................................................................... 3.1.5. Turcia ................................................................ 3.2. Azerbaidjan: independen strategic prin multivectorism ...................................................... 3.2.1. Turcia ................................................................ 3.2.2. Rusia ................................................................. 3.2.3. SUA ................................................................... 3.2.4. UE ..................................................................... 3.2.5. Iran .................................................................... 3.3. Georgia: spre Occident ............................................ 3.3.1. SUA ................................................................... 3.3.2. UE ..................................................................... 3.3.3. Turcia ................................................................ 3.3.4. Iran .................................................................... 3.3.5. Rusia .................................................................

Concluzii ....................................................................... 62 Bibliografie .................................................................... 64

116 116 117 121 124 126 129 132 133 136 140 142 145 148 149 152 156 159 161

Geometrie variabil n aciune: politica extern i de securitate n Caucazul de Sud (Stanislav Secrieru) ............. 69
Introducere .................................................................... 71 I. Problema regionalitii Caucazului de Sud ........ 1.1. De la Transcaucazia la Caucazul de Sud ................... 1.2. Este Caucazul de Sud o regiune? ................................ 1.3. Caucazul de Sud un complex subregional de securitate .................................................................. 1.4. Caucazul de Sud n contextul eurasiatic ..................... 1.4.1. Nord ....................................................................
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72 72 73 78 82 84

Concluzii ..................................................................... 166 Bibliografie .................................................................. 167

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Caucazul de Sud ntre economie politic i politic energetic (Angela Grmad) ................ 183
I. Contextul macroeconomic de dezvoltare a regiunii ................................................................... 185 1. Promovarea reformelor economice ntre necesitate i incapacitate ............................................................. 187 2. Importana dezvoltrii mediului de afaceri i factorii care influeneaz evoluia lui ........................................ 206 II. Economia politicilor energetice n Caucazul de Sud .................................................. 211 1. Resurse energetice, economie i politici energetice ........... 213 2. Proiecte energetice i coridoare de transport n Caucazul de Sud ..................................................... 227 Concluzii ..................................................................... 246 Bibliografie .................................................................. 247

Mulumiri

Studiul de fa are peste 200 de pagini, numr care este mult mai mic dect mulimea cuvintelor de Mulumim! / ! / Thank you! pe care autorii trebuie s le adreseze celor care au fcut posibile susinerea financiar, cltoria i documentarea n Caucazul de Sud. Prin interviurile realizate n cele trei capitale caucaziene, am avut prilejul de a intra n contact cu elitele intelectuale georgiene, azere sau armene, specialitii cei mai cunoscui ai zonei, care ne-au mprtit informaii importante i inedite despre actorii statali ai regiunii. Am discutat cu jurnaliti de seam de la cele mai importante publicaii, care ne-au permis s cunoatem lumea presei caucaziene i s nelegem specificul relaiilor dintre mass-media i regimurile politice. Ne-am ntlnit i am discutat cu reprezentanii societii civile, de la care am obinut o descriere a imaginii ONG-urilor care ncearc s cldeasc democraia n regimuri politice ostile. Am intrat n contact cu membri ai parlamentului, minitri sau ali oficiali de rang nalt care ne-au artat cum funcionez elaborarea politicilor, cum gndesc elitele conductoare n Caucazul de Sud. Am discutat cu oficialii europeni din regiune de la care am aflat ce nseamn negocierile diplomatice n Caucazul de Sud i am obinut informaii necunoscute publicului larg despre regimurile politice din Armenia, Georgia i Azerbaidjan.

Am aflat din simple conversaii i plimbri prin Erevan, Baku i Tbilisi cum gndesc, cum triesc i care sunt obiceiurile armenilor, azerilor i georgienilor. Mulumim! / ! / Thank you! tuturor celor care au acceptat s fie intervievai pentru studiu, pentru c ne-au alocat o parte din timpul lor i pentru rbdarea cu care au rspuns ntrebrilor noastre. Mulumim! Soros Romania pentru iniiativa unic i pentru c ne-a selectat pentru a scrie primul studiu romnesc despre evoluiile politice i economice din Caucazul de Sud, bazat pe documentarea direct la Tbilisi, Baku i Erevan. ! / Thank you! Open Society Georgia, Open Society Azerbaijan, Open Society Erevan pentru agendele de interviuri, transport, acomodare. Ileana Racheru Stanislav Secrieru Angela Grmad

Introducere

Discursul public din Romnia abund n referine despre Caucazul de Sud, dar perspectiva asupra regiunii este mereu redus la cteva teme constante: Georgia, rzboiul din august 2008, surs vital pentru asigurarea securitii energetice a Europei. Demersul autorilor reinventeaz discursul despre Caucaz n spaiul romnesc, oferind o radiografie politic, economic i de securitate a regiunii. Destinat instituiilor care articuleaz politica extern a Romniei fa de regiune i experilor din societatea civil, studiul realizat sub egida Fundaiei Soros devine, totodat, un instrument i o lectur obligatorie pentru jurnalitii i studenii care vor s neleag complexitatea unei regiuni eseniale pentru securitatea Europei. Demersul analitic se fundamenteaz pe aplicarea celor mai recente perspective de interpretare din literatura de specialitate asupra evoluiilor politice i economice din Caucazul de Sud. ns cel mai semnificativ aspect este faptul c autorii au mers on the ground, la firul ierbii, materia lor prim fiind regiunea nsi. Au avut posibilitatea s acceseze, prin interviurile fcute la Erevan, Baku i Tbilisi n perioada mai-iunie 2011, experii din ONG-uri, formatorii de opinie, dar i tehnocraii din birocraia guvernamental (uneori pn la cel mai nalt nivel). Prima parte a studiului, redactat de Ileana Racheru, se concentreaz pe radiografia politic a regiunii. Din perspectiva tipologiei regimurilor politice, Caucazul de Sud
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reunete state care consacr autoritarismul competitiv ca formul predilect de guvernare. Este n ADN-ul regimurilor locale s colonizeze i s mobilizeze statul n folosul puterii, nclinnd balana structural n defavoarea opoziiei i ngrdind, totodat, posibilitile opoziiei de a participa la alegeri. Societatea pare ontologic plasat ntr-un raport inegal, de subordonare fa de stat i de regimul aflat la putere. n Georgia, dei formal exist pres independent, totui puterea a gsit imediat mijloacele de a influena coninutul editorial prin crearea unei reele extinse de investitori apropiai regimului care s o controleze. Efectul? Convertirea sa ntr-o portavoce a puterii. n Armenia, mediul alternativ statului, non-guvernamental, este prea slab pentru a coagula n jurul su o mas critic democratic. Activismul civic reunete mai degrab o elit izolat, care nu penetreaz i nu are aderen la populaia obinuit. Imaginea regimului condus de preedintele Aliev, verificat empiric n ministerele de la Baku, pare desprins direct din depeele Wikileaks: este un regim construit pe loialiti personale care au trecut proba timpului. n Azerbaidjan, figura central n arhitectura puterii e preedintele Aliev, care, dup modelul tatlui su, ncearc s pstreze puterea n familie i nelege puterea statului ca pe o afacere de familie. Contient de limitele puterii sale, Aliev este un tactician abil, dar n acelai timp i un foarte iscusit acrobat printre aliane care se exclud. Face o distincie clar ntre ceea ce este personal i ceea ce nseamn business. Preedintele Aliev promoveaz o politic extern echilibrat, combinnd deschiderea ctre NATO i UE cu msuri de conciliere a marilor puteri vecine, Rusia i Iranul. Dimpotriv, pe plan intern este o personalitate impulsiv, care are o ncredere oarb n guvernarea prin for i coerciie. n aceeai logic, orice provocare politic este perceput de Aliev ca o ameninare existenial la adresa dinastiei sale politice. A doua parte, redactat de Stanislav Secrieru, descrie complexitatea raporturilor regionale de la nivelul politicilor
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i al sensibilitilor de securitate. Din perspectiva relaiilor internaionale, Caucazul de Sud reprezint un complex subregional de securitate coagulat n jurul unei relaii de sum zero (Armenia i Azerbaidjan), la care se adaug o serie ntreag de raporturi de cooperare pragmatic sau competiie conjunctural pe diverse compartimente ntre Georgia i Armenia i Georgia i Azerbaidjan. Natura interaciunilor dintre statele complexului subregional formeaz un veritabil puzzle al interdependenei: Georgia este o pies vital pentru funcionarea Armeniei (70-75% din tranzitul comercial al Armeniei acoper teritoriul georgian, iar portul Poti este o verig esenial n asigurarea securitii alimentare; n plus, accesul Armeniei la internet depinde tot de racordarea sa la teritoriul georgian); n acelai timp, Georgia depinde maximal de livrrile de gaz din Azerbaidjan, n timp ce accesul azer spre piaa european se face prin infrastructura care traverseaz teritoriul Georgiei. Interaciunea cu puterile adiacente Caucazului de Sud are, de asemenea, un impact deosebit de semnificativ n interiorul complexului local de securitate. De cele mai multe ori, instinctul statelor din regiune este acela de a-i externaliza securitatea prin curtarea unei mari puteri capabile s le ofere garanii de aprare: dac pentru Georgia conteaz apropierea de structurile de securitate europene (n special NATO i SUA ca offshore balancer), pentru Armenia garania securitii sale rmne Rusia, sub umbrela organizaiei de aprare colectiv OTCS. i Azerbaidjanul, dei mult mai autosuficient, caut sprijin n domeniul securitii, prin tratatul cu Turcia i relaia bilateral militar cu SUA. Studiul arat ns c, dup rzboiul din august 2008, spaiul de manevr macroregional al Georgiei este unul tot mai ngust. Este o realitate consolidat de politicile contradictorii ale unor state europene care au sprijinit vnzarea de heliporturi Mistral Rusiei, dar i de tot mai evidenta ndeprtare a Turciei de Uniunea European. Pentru Tbilisi, inteniile regionale ale Ankarei sunt tot mai neclare, Turcia nemaifiind perceput ca o putere care proiecteaz interesele Occidentului.
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Ultima parte, redactat de Angela Grmad, ofer o prezentare economic a Caucazului de Sud. Studiul evideniaz rolul foarte important pe care l joac n politica i economia regiunii structurile de putere oligarhice i monopoliste. O constant sud-caucazian ar fi aceea c deciziile economice i politice sunt decisiv influenate de interesele unor grupuri private coagulate n monopoluri i oligopoluri. Dei structural se prezint ca o realitate comun, exist desigur o serie de nuane naionale specifice: dac n Georgia i Armenia oligarhia este prezent deopotriv la guvernare i n opoziie, n Azerbaidjan opoziia nu are n spatele su oligarhi care s le sprijine iniiativele. n cele din urm, toi aceti parametri biologici ai mediului economic i politic sud-caucazian vor descuraja investitorii strini s intre pe piee unde concurena neloial e un dat natural. n absena unor legislaii antimonopol care s confere stabilitate i predictibilitate, regulile jocului vor depinde n continuare de bunvoina diverselor structuri clientelare. Atunci cnd vorbim la Bucureti despre Caucazul de Sud, spunem instantaneu energie. Este avantajul comparativ al Azerbaidjanului (ca stat cu resurse de petrol i gaz) i al Georgiei (ca ar cu potenial de tranzit). Din aceast perspectiv, potenialul economic al regiunii depinde de capacitatea sa de a se conecta cu marile piee consumatoare de energie (UE, Rusia i China). ns, deopotriv economic i politic, regiunea rmne dezbinat, fragmentat, la antipodul funcionrii ca un ntreg unitar. Economic, unele dintre state sunt atrase de modelele europene de dezvoltare i cooperare (n special Georgia i Armenia), n timp ce Azerbaidjanul manifest mai degrab o afinitate oriental. Politic, Georgia este interesat de implementarea unor reforme instituionale interne la standarde europene, Armenia de restabilirea relaiilor cu Turcia, n timp ce Azerbaidjanul pare preocupat de o politic extern pur energetic, adeseori n contradicie cu interesele vecinilor si. n esen, studiul pledeaz pentru cutarea unui model economic de succes
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care s asigure fundarea unui sistem regional stabil i care s se concentreze pe cooperarea intraregional. Dar oare sunt capabile statele din Caucazul de Sud s accepte concesiile necesare pentru a-i crea propriul model caucazian de integrare? Studiul Caucazul de Sud dup 20 de ani: Regimuri politice, securitate i energie este realizat n cadrul programului Promovarea valorilor europene n bazinul Mrii Negre al Fundaiei Soros Romnia. Agenda programului urmrete reducerea deficitului de cunoatere despre Caucazul de Sud n rndurile elitelor politice, administrative, academice i jurnalistice romneti, pe de o parte, ncercnd plasarea tematicii pe agenda instituiilor publice de profil Preedinia Romniei, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe i transformarea ei ntr-un subiect de interes public, pe de alt parte. Fiind la grania estic a Uniunii Europene, Romnia poate i trebuie s devin un liant ntre Caucaz i restul Uniunii. Din aceast perspectiv, studiul e destinat inclusiv factorilor de decizie de la nivel european, care pot sprijini i ncuraja candidatura Romniei la rolul de coordonator al politicilor comunitare n regiune.

Octavian Manea, Redactor politic extern Foreign Policy Romnia i Revista 22

Ileana Racheru

Regimuri politice n Caucazul de sud. Democraia care ascunde autoritarisme competitive

Capitolul acesta analizeaz evoluia regimurilor politice din Georgia, Armenia i Azerbaidjan n perioada care a urmat instalrii n funcie a actualilor preedini. Demersul acoper mandatele prezideniale ale lui Mihail Saakavili, Ilham Aliev i Serge Sargsian. Analiza pornete de la premisa c cele trei regimuri sunt autoritarisme competitive i studiaz modul n care autoritile au reuit s creeze i/sau s perpetueze mecanismele de consolidare a puterii. Prima parte explic i descrie ce este autoritarismul competitiv. Demersul analitic se va concentra apoi pe fiecare stat n parte i va urmri evoluia celor trei regimuri politice n raport cu organizarea alegerilor, relaiile puterii cu opoziia/mass-media/societatea civil i influena presiunilor externe asupra deciziilor politice interne. Analiza folosete surse directe (interviuri realizate de autoare n Caucazul de Sud i datele publicate de OSCE i Freedom House) precum i studii de specialitate (teoretice sau analize despre regimurile politice din cele trei state). Comportamentul regimului n relaia cu opoziia, presa i societatea civil va fi urmrit n momente politice cheie: alegeri, legiferare a unor proiecte considerate de importan major pentru democratizare, proteste.
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Prin urmare, capitolul i propune s afle ct de puternic este guvernul/partidul aflat la guvernare i care sunt mijloacele prin care exercit controlul autoritar asupra regimului politic. Ce este autoritarismul competitiv? Autoritarismul competitiv este un regim hibrid rezultat din mbinarea practicilor democraiei cu autoritarismul (Levitsky i Way, 2010, 5). ntr-un regim autoritar competitiv, puterea politic nu respect cel puin una dintre condiiile democraiei: alegeri libere, garantarea libertilor civile, existena unui spaiu al jocului politic unde se pot exprima att puterea ct i opoziia (Levitsky, 2010, 7). Autoritarismul competitiv a fost definit prin diferenierea acestuia de democraie i autoritarism. Autoritarismul este regimul politic care nu permite opoziiei s exprime legal nicio form de contestare (Levistsky, 2010, 7). Autoritarismul competitiv este regimul politic care permite existena constituional a contestrii din partea opoziiei. ntr-un regim autoritar competitiv, alegerile nu sunt ntotdeauna libere i se desfoar ntr-un climat care nu asigur anse egale pentru opoziie, dei legal aceasta se poate nscrie n cursa electoral. Puterea poate manipula listele de alegtori i falsifica rezultatele scrutinului sau ngrdi accesul opoziei n mass-media i la resursele financiare (ibidem, 8). Regimurile autoritare competitive garanteaz formal libertile civile, dar acestea sunt violate frecvent: opoziia i mass media libere sunt inta abuzurilor forelor de ordine/ poliiei/sistemului judiciar. Protestele, dei organizate prin respectarea normelor, sunt adesea reprimate n for. Restrngerea libertilor civile poate avea i forma represiunii legale prin metode mai subtile cum ar fi elaborarea i aplicarea unor prevederi legislative, cu scopul de a da o form legal aciunilor represive.
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Levitsky i Way (2010, 10) au stabilit trei condiii pentru existena unei competiii neloiale: instituiile statului sunt folosite constant pentru scopuri partizane n folosul puterii, puterea e tot timpul avantajat n dauna opoziiei, posibilitile opoziiei de a participa la alegeri sunt serios ngrdite.

Georgia
Alegerile democratice, marele succes al revoluiei trandafirilor Actualul regim politic de la Tbilisi este, n mare, rezultatul revoluiei trandafirilor din 2003, cnd, prin ndelungi proteste panice ale opoziiei politice i ale societii civile, sprijinite de Occident, regimul autoritar al lui Eduard evardnadze1 a fost nlturat. Dup fraudarea alegerilor parlamentare din noiembrie 2003, evardnadze i-a anunat demisia, cednd presiunilor occidentale i micrilor de
lider al PC al RSS Georgia/Gruzia (1972-1985) i ministru de externe al URSS (1985-1991), Eduard evardnadze a condus Georgia din funcia de ef al Parlamentului n perioada 1992-1995 i ca preedinte ales n mod direct ntre 1995 i 2003. n perioada n care s-a aflat la putere, evardnadze a ncheiat cele dou acorduri de pace care au pus capt confruntrilor armate din Abhazia (1994) i Osetia de Sud (1992) cu medierea Rusiei i a ncheiat cu Moscova, n 1995, un acord care prevedea staionarea pe teritoriul Georgiei a patru baze militare ruseti pentru o perioad de 25 ani. Guvernarea evardnadze a coincis cu primele ncercri de construcie a statului georgian: identitatea naional diferit de manifestrile violente din perioada Zviad Gamsahurdia. n 1994, evardnadze, care avea o bun imagine n Occident, a reuit s lanseze cu sprijin financiar vestic un program de reforme economice. n noiembrie 2003, cnd evardnadze a fost nlturat de la putere, reformele economice erau un eec n Georgia, care era considerat unul dintre statele cu cel mai nalt nivel de corupie din lume. Regimul condus de evardnadze a fost considerat de specialiti ca fiind unul autoritar.
1 Fost

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strad, iar Uniunea Cetenilor din Georgia, partidul aflat la putere pn atunci, s-a autodizolvat. Noua configuraie a puterii, cu o componen hibrid, a fost rezultatul coagulrii forelor de opoziie care aveau ca obiectiv comun nlturarea lui evardnadze i ctigarea puterii. Actuala putere de la Tbilisi, instalat dup organizarea de alegeri prezideniale n ianuarie 2004, a fost format din contestatari din interior ai regimului evardnadze (Nino Burjanadze, Mihail Saakavili2 i Zviad Zvania), transformai n critici ai regimului i favorabili adoptrii normelor democratice la nivel intern i apropierii de Occident n politica extern. n urma scrutinului din ianuarie 2004, Saakavili, candidat unic al Micrii Naionale Unite (MNU) i al Democrailor Unii a fost ales preedinte cu 96,2% din sufragii, iar aliaii si Burjanadze i Zvania au ocupat funciile de preedinte/purttor de cuvnt al legislativului i, respectiv, ministru de stat3. Alegerile din ianuarie 2004 au fost primul proces electoral, evaluat de observatorii internaionali ca apropiat de standardele democratice i a marcat nceputul celei de-a doua tranziii n Georgia, dup proclamarea independenei n 1991. Scrutinul legislativ din noiembrie 2003 a fost declarat nul i noi alegeri au fost organizate n martie 2004, hotrre considerat suspect de ctre observatorii internaionali pentru c a fost aplicat doar pentru mandatele parlamentare
Educat n SUA la universitile Columbia (master) i George Washington (doctorat), Mihail Saakavili a fost membru al Parlamentului (1995-1999) i ministru de justiie n regimul evardnadze (2000-2001). n 2001, a demisionat din funcia de ministru al Justiiei, acuznd guvernul de corupie. n acelai an, a creat blocul de opoziie Partidul Micarea Naional, cu care a ctigat alegerile prezideniale n 2004 i 2008 (CRS report, 2011, 1). 3 Potrivit Constituiei din 1995, cea mai important funcie n Georgia era cea de preedinte. Sistemul prezidenial instaurat prin Legea fundamental nu prevedea existena postului de premier, ci a funciei de ministru de stat, care avea sarcina de a superviza corpul de minitri care erau responsabili n faa preedintelui.
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delegate prin scrutin proporional4. n noua curs electoral s-au nscris 16 partide i aliane electorale, care s-au angajat trziu n campania electoral, nu au exprimat oferte electorale sau programe ideologice, limitndu-se la atacuri la adresa contracandidailor. Competiia a consolidat poziia alianei dintre Micarea Naional i Democraii Unii, care a obinut 67% din sufragii (135 locuri) i a adus opoziiei de dreapta (Noua Dreapt i Industria va salva Georgia) 7,6% voturi (15 locuri)5. OSCE a remarcat mbuntirea condiiilor n care s-a desfurat procesul electoral fa de scrutinurile anterioare, dar a menionat i inexistena separaiei ntre administraia de stat i structurile de partid i potenialul partidelor de a folosi n interese electorale resursele administrative (OSCE, 2004, 3). Urmtorul scrutin desfurat n Georgia, cel pentru alegerile locale din 2006, a fost considerat un element-cheie pentru evoluia noului regim politic de la Tbilisi. Scrutinul, dei calificat de ctre observatorii internaionali ca fiind, n termeni generali, n acord cu normele democraiei, a artat o repetare a practicilor n care resursele statului (angajri n funcii publice, mrirea temporar a pensiilor, acordarea unor voucher-e sociale) au fost folosite de partidele aflate la putere pentru a obine voturi. n competiia electoral, ctigat de MNU, s-au nscris 5 partide, o alian i civa candidai independeni. n 27,5% circumscripii majoritare i 8,7% proporionale, candidaii MNU sau listele depuse de aceasta au fost competitori unici (OSCE, 2006, 2). n 2008, georgienii au fost din nou chemai la urne, pentru un scrutin prezidenial anticipat i pentru alegeri legislative. Scrutinul a fost apreciat ca fiind prima curs electoral prezidenial post-independen cu adevrat competitiv.
4 Legea fundamental n vigoare n 2004 n Georgia statua c Parlamentul era compus din 235 alei, din care 150 erau votai prin scrutin proporional pe liste i 85 potrivit sistemului majoritar un mandat pentru un district. 5 n Parlamentul georgian 10 locuri sunt ocupate de reprezentanii persoanelor dislocate din Abhazia i Osetia de Sud.

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Mihail Saakavili a folosit resursele administrative ale statului n campania electoral, iar numrarea voturilor i procedurile de nregistrare au fost deficitare (OSCE a), 2008, 1). Principalul contracandidat al lui Saakavili a fost Levan Gachechiladze, susinut de nou partide de opoziie aliante n Micarea Naional Unit. Saakavili a obinut peste 53% din sufragii din primul tur, Gachechiladze a acumulat 25,69%, iar restul voturilor au fost distribuite ntre ali cinci competitori (fiecare a luat sub 1%). Primii doi clasai au avut agende electorale cu aceleai obiective de politic extern (aderarea Georgiei la NATO) i viziuni diferite cu privire la configurarea regimului politic intern (semiprezidenialism, eliminarea corupiei i a srciei i integrarea Abhaziei i a Osetiei de Sud Saakavili; monarhia parlamentar, ncurajarea mediului de afaceri Gachechiladze). Alegerile parlamentare din 2008 au oferit n mod clar poporului georgian oportunitatea de a-i alege reprezentanii dintr-o palet larg de opiuni, dar ca i la scrutinele anterioare, MNU a folosit resursele administrative ale statului pentru a-i asigura voturi (OSCE b) 2008: 1) Partidul prezidenial a obinut 59,18% din sufragii (119 locuri), Blocul electoral al opoziiei a acumulat 17,73% din voturi (17 locuri), Cretin Democraii 8,66% (6 locuri), Partidul Muncii 7,44% (6 locuri), Partidul Republican din Georgia 3,78% (2 locuri)6. La alegerile locale din 30 martie 2010, partidul aflat la putere a folosit resursele administrative n campania electoral, iar membrii acestuia aflai n funcii publice s-au implicat n campania electoral. Rezultatul scrutinului a indicat ctigtoare MNU cu 73,9% la nivel naional i cu 55,2% (pentru primari) din primul tur i 52,5% (n consiliul municipal) la primria oraului Tbilisi, considerat cel mai important pot n cursa pentru alegerile locale.
6 La 28 martie 2008, Constituia Georgiei a fost amendat, iar numrul de parlamentari a fost redus de la 253 la 150 (75 alei prin scrutin proporional ntr-o singur circumscripie naional i 75 prin vot majoritar n circumscripii inegale ca mrime care se suprapun districtelor administrative).

MNU, atotputernic n politica georgian Partidul prezidenial din Georgia este acum partidul de putere (Max Bader, 2008, 5), care, mpreun cu alte cteva partide de opoziie, construiete imaginea unui regim politic prezidenial cu practici n aceeai msur democratice i autoritare. Dup patru ani de guvernare, MNU a reuit s menin majoritatea parlamentar, chiar dac are o poziie mai slab fa de rezultatul scrutinului din 2004, dar opoziia, care nu a cumulat nici mcar jumtate din sufragiile partidului prezidenial, nu este un adversar redutabil. Rezultatele ultimelor dou scrutine (legislativ din 2008 i local din 2010) arat c MNU a reuit s menin majoritatea i dup ce preedintele Saakavili a pierdut aproape jumtate din voturi la alegerile prezideniale din 2008. Prin alegerile locale, MNU i-a consolidat reeaua de putere i la nivel local, fapt ce i va oferi un avantaj electoral considerabil la urmtoarele scrutine. MNU are n prezent o reea bine consolidat de putere n ntreaga Georgie, controlul electoral al partidului variind ntre 50 i 70%. Scena politic georgian ntre revoluie i reform Scena politic de la Tbilisi pstreaz atmosfera de confruntare extrem din anii 90, nici puterea, nici opoziia nu au experiena negocierilor i a compromisului sau programe ideologice. MNU nu are nicio ideologie i susine c reprezint ntreaga societate georgian (IDEA, 2006, 7), iar celelalte partide, dei i proclam apartenena la stnga sau la drepta sau centrismul, nu caut dect s elimine critica absenei ideologiei. Comportamentul i discursul partidelor de la Tbilisi distinge mai degrab moderaii-reformatori aflai la putere de radicalii-revoluionari din opoziie. Majoritatea partidelor din opoziia7 de la Tbilisi reclam
7 n Georgia exist un singur partid de centru-stnga, Partidul Muncii.

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o ideologie de dreapta, valorile de stnga fiind negate, deoarece sunt asociate direct sau indirect comunismului. Scena politic de la Tbilisi are un grad redus de polarizare (Nodia, 2006, 109), care nu se manifest la nivel ideologic, ci prin refuzul de a participa la dezbateri, acceptarea suportului venit din Rusia (Partidul lui Nino Burjanadze) i modul n care se raporteaz la revoluia trandafirilor8 (ibidem, 115). Crearea de coaliii/aliane i desfacerea acestora este un fenomen frecvent pe scena politic de la Tbilisi care se petrece n orice moment al ciclului electoral sau doar conjunctural n parlament pentru a susine anumite iniiative/proiecte. MNU a venit la putere cu o platform revoluionar, pe care ulterior a reuit s o transforme, cu sprijin occidental, ntr-un program de reforme. MNU a ncercat s ofere un rspuns pozitiv la ntrebarea fundamental pentru georgieni: a fost revoluia din 2003 ultima revoluie din Georgia? Opoziia nu a renunat la obiectivele revoluionare pe care le-a clamat prin proteste de strad i pe parcurs numrul celor care s-au alturat manifestaiilor s-a redus foarte mult. O nou revoluie i demisia preedintelui au fost principalele obiective ale opoziiei, crora guvernul le-a opus reformele i programul electoral Georgia fr srcie. La toate dezbaterile care vizau reforma statului, opoziia a ameninat c se retrage de la discuii i a organizat proteste. n plus, opoziia a acuzat puterea de fraudarea alegerilor, dei observatorii internaionali au remarcat progresele fcute de MNU n organizarea scrutinelor. Agenda politic a ambelor tabere are ca obiectiv prioritar democratizarea asociat cu occidentalizarea i europenizarea, dar cu strategii diferite de realizare. Pentru opoziie mijloacele sunt revoluia, iar pentru putere reforme adeseori radicale, care ncearc s aplice norme occidentale fr a ine
Partidul Republican i Partidul Conservator s-au implicat n revoluia trandafirilor. Noul Partid Conservator, Industriaii i Partidul Muncii nu au susinut evenimentele din 2003.
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cont de specificul local. Anticomunismul sub forma lustraiei radicale este de asemenea prezent pe agenda puterii. Partidul aflat la guvernare n Georgia a creat un spaiu al jocului politic n care opoziia poate participa la alegeri cu anse reale, dar nu a renunat total la practicile administrative neloiale care i-au oferit avantaje electorale. Consolidarea puterii MNU se datoreaz i incapacitii opoziiei de a se autoconstrui n contracandidai importani pentru putere (la alegerile parlamentare din 2004, cei mai muli candidai au refuzat invitaii din partea mass-media i nu au avut aciuni de campanie televizate). MNU este cel mai puternic partid din Georgia, dar ar putea fi contestat de o opoziie puternic, ntruct acesta le las contracandidailor posibiliti largi de exprimare i un climat politic care nu exclude competiia. Dei MNU are majoritatea n parlament, opoziia poate penetra sistemul (de exemplu, n 2005, toate partidele de opoziie s-au coalizat pentru a propune alegerea primarului oraului Tbilisi n mod direct i au respins iniiativa de a fi ales de consiliul municipal). Confruntarea dintre partide n Georgia are loc n cadrul organizat: procese electorale, sau dezbateri parlamentare sau n strad (manifestaii panice sau violene) i bti n parlament. Confruntarea violent nu nseamn doar msuri luate de forele de ordine la adresa opoziiei. Partidele din Georgia pstreaz o tradiie, anterioar revoluiei trandafirilor, a confruntrilor violente fiecare partid are un SonderKommando, grupuri de btui, care le ajut s fac fa unor eventuale provocri ale adversarilor (Nodia, 2006, 117). Elite noi, reele clientare de putere noi Imaginea i practicile elitelor politice de la Tbilisi amestec motenirea sovietic cu adaptarea la tranziie i la obiectivul perpetuu al democratizrii. Motenirea sovietic se reflect n existena unui lider puternic i eliminarea efilor de stat care nu au acest atribut. Mihail Saakavili este liderul puternic de la Tbilisi, poziie construit prin succesul
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revoluiei trandafirilor, ctigarea alegerilor cu 97% sau 53% i reforme. Adaptarea la tranziie a nsemnat crearea unui cadru legislativ care s respecte normele democraiei, dar care s favorizeze puterea. Reformarea legislativ a statului a fost un alt mijloc prin care regimul Saakavili i-a consolidat puterea n Georgia prin modificarea Constituiei i configurarea unui regim prezidenial puternic: preedintele poate demite guvernul i parlamentul (dac acesta nu acord votul de ncredere succesiv pentru trei cabinete). Dei formal a pretins reforma i a oferit un paravan pentru aceasta prin introducerea funciei de premier (care, n aparen, mparte puterea executiv cu preedintele) i confirmarea acestuia de parlament, n practic a fost ntrit puterea preedintului, n jurul persoanei cruia a fost construit noul regim politic. Noua elit creat de Saakavili este n primul rnd diferit de cea sovietic din jurul lui evardnadze sau de radicalii naionaliti din anii 90: toi minitrii au un trecut asemntor preedintelui studii n Occident i susin reforma statului dup model vestic. Baza puterii MNU dincolo de susinerea electoral (explicat n parte prin dorina populaiei de a obine stabilitatea politic) este reprezentat de reelele de patronaj de la nivel nalt, a cror loialitate se bazeaz pe corupie: instituiile publice au fost curate de corupie n funciile de execuie. Acesta este cel mai mare succes al guvernrii Saakavili. Dar la nivel nalt nimeni nu s-a atins de corupi9. n funciile superioare corupia i-a schimbat doar forma. Acum miza este controlul afacerilor i al pieelor10. Regimul mizeaz pe loialitatea mediului de afaceri i a funciilor administrative, nu i a posturilor ministeriale (schimbarea din funcie a minitrilor este o practic constant la Tbilisi). Dar guvernarea Saakavili nu a reuit s obin i susinerea popular ca rezultat al reformelor iniiate, deoarece schimbarea n bine, dei vizibil
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pe strzile din Tbilisi sau Batumi, nu a ajuns la majoritatea populaiei care triete n srcie. Mass-media convieuire imposibil cu regimul politic Relaia puterii de la Tbilisi cu mass-media este una specific regimurilor autoritare i suprapune o legislaie democratic peste practici nedemocratice. n cei aproape 8 ani de cnd se afl la putere, MNU a reuit s aduc sub controlul su aproape ntreaga mass-media. Dei a creat condiiile legale pentru existena unei prese independente, regimul Saakavili a identificat foarte repede modaliti prin care poate influena coninutul editorial: aducerea sub propria influen a presei finanate de stat i crearea unei reele prin care poate controla presa privat (investitori apropiai regimului i chiar membri ai parlamentului), convertind-o din pres independent/critic la adresa regimului n portavocea puterii. Legislaia care reglementeaz audio-vizualul n Georgia a fost calificat de Freedom House ca ntrunind toate normele democratice. Parlamentul de la Tbilisi a completat dup anul 2004 prevederile legislative cu privire la situaia mass-media. Noua legislaie a adus mbuntiri semnificative legii din 1991: prin garantarea libertii de expresie i prin clarificarea constrngerilor legale la care sunt supui jurnalitii, dezincriminarea calomniei (Freedom House Georgia, 2006). Televiziunea reprezint principal surs de informaie pentru georgieni, iar mass-media tiprit are tiraje reduse i acoper, n general, mediile educate i se distribuie mai mult n Tbilisi i n alte orae mai mari. n Georgia, exist mass-media finanat din fonduri publice (un singur post de televiziuneTV1), trei canale tv private (Kanal 1, Rustavi 2, Imedi) i cteva ziare care sunt parial subvenionate de stat. Regimul Saakavili a preluat presa cu finanare public de sub controlul lui evardnadze pentru a o aduce, dup 2004,
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Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

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sub propria influen. Situaia a fost similar cu mass-media din Ajaria, care fost plasat de sub controlul i cenzura autoritilor de la Batumi sub influena puterii de la Tbilisi. Dup venirea la putere a MNU i a lui Mihail Saakavili, postul public de televiziune a devenit principalul vehicul mediatic folosit de regim n toate campaniile electorale. Dei la nivel formal (prin legislaia cu privire la dreptul la liber exprimare i modul de desemnare a conducerii, postul respect normele democratice) postul TV public are toate prghiile necesare pentru a informa ntr-un mod nepartizan, acesta a continuat practicile autocenzurii asociate presei dintr-un regim autoritar. Mass-media privat nu este capabil s se autosusin financiar, din cauza pieei de publicitate extrem de restrnse, situaie care o face vulnerabil n faa presiunilor editoriale adesea cu caracter politic exercitate de finanatori. Investitorii privai din mass-media georgian sunt necunoscui; companii obscure cu sediul n paradisuri fiscale, n spatele crora este speculat prezena unor actori politici de la putere sau din opoziie. Posturile tv private au mari deficite financiare i nimeni nu tie din ce se finaneaz11. Se pare c dup 2004, principalele trei posturi private de televiziune (Rustavi 2, Imedi TV , TV Mze) au fost cumprate de ctre persoane apropiate guvernului sau parlamentari, dup ce propietarii au fost supui unor presiuni. Problemele financiare ale mass-media creeaz dependena acesteia nu doar de investitori privai, ci i de modul n care sunt achitate datoriile fa de autoriti. Regimul s-a folosit de forme legale de presiune asupra mass-media (sub forma controalelor poliiei financiare) sau mesaje informale (critici ale oficialilor la adresa jurnalitilor, interzicerea accesului la evenimente organizate de instituii publice practic a Ministerului Securitii). n 2004, guvernul a reealonat datoriile Rustavi 2, ulterior postul a fost cumprat de un investitor apropiat guvernului, situaie care se pare c
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ar fi temperat poziia critic a postului TV la adresa autoritilor (Freedom House Georgia, 2005). Situaia financiar a presei georgiene influeneaz coninutul editorial al informaiilor transmise publicului. Adesea mass-media privat se autocenzureaz pentru a evita presiunile finanatorului. n presa georgian au aprut mai multe scandaluri n care jurnalitii au acuzat imixtiuni ale investitorilor: retragerea unor documentare despre corupia din poliie sau interzicerea unor emisiuni ai cror moderatori criticau guvernul. Jurnalitii acuz presiuni din partea proprietarilor trustului la care sunt angajai: Este imposibil s scrii i s publici un articol despre un actor politic aflat la putere sau n opoziie, implicat n fapte de corupie, dac eful tu nu este de acord12. Presiunile regimului asupra mass-media s-au manifestat mai ales n momente de tensiune pentru putere (alegeri, proteste ale opoziiei, rzboiul din 2008) i au ajuns la violene fizice sau suspendarea transmisiei televiziunilor. La alegerile parlamentare din 2004, toate cele 16 partide i aliane electorale care au participat la scrutin au fost prezente n mass-media, dar tendina general att a posturilor TV private ct i a celei publice a fost de a favoriza Micarea Naional, aflat la putere. TV 1 finanat din fonduri publice a transmis tiri cu caracter pozitiv n proporie de 80% despre MNU i nu a oferit dezbateri electorale (OSCE, 2004, 2 i 15). Rustavi 2, post privat, a acoperit campania electoral n mod similar. Urmtoarele scrutine au artat o perpetuare a practicilor de la alegerile din 2004. Forele de ordine au agresat fizic jurnaliti, n special pe cei care au transmis informaii de la protestele din 2005 i 2007. Preedintele Saakavili a decretat n noiembrie 2007 starea de urgen, interzicnd transmisiunile TV cu excepia postului public. n aceeai perioad, posturile Imedi i Kavkasia Tv au fost suspendate pe motiv c ar fi incitat protestatarii (Freedom House Georgia, 2008). n timpul
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Interviu cu un jurnalist, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

Interviu cu un jurnalist, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

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rzboiului ruso-georgian din 2008, toate posturile tv din Georgia au difuzat doar informaii favorabile autoritilor de la Tbilisi, iar dup noiembrie 2007, talk-show-urile i analizele au disprut din grila de programe. Regimul de la Tbilisi a reuit s elimine de pe piaa de media georgian mass-media independent, dar nu a suprimat pluralismul, deoarece investitorii nu sunt doar politicieni sau persoane apropiate puterii, ci i membri/susintori ai opoziiei politice: Acum n Georgia exist pres pentru putere i mass-media pentru opoziie 13. n prezent, cel mai important post de televiziune de opoziie este Maestro TV, apropiat de opoziia radical reprezentat de Nino Burjanadze.

Societatea civil, singura voce critic la adresa regimului Regimul de la Tbilisi a oscilat ntre practicile democratice i cele autoritare n relaia cu opoziia i societatea civil. Controlul regimului asupra exercitrii drepturilor i libertilor civile este unul limitat i se rsfrnge mai ales asupra dezbaterilor pe marginea legislaiei care vizeaz reforma statului i a dreptului de a protesta/contesta puterea. A doua tranziie n Georgia a presupus retrasarea cadrului legislativ n care s-au desfurat alegerile i reconfigurarea legal a regimului politic. Imediat dup instalarea la putere, MNU a anunat c va organiza consultri pe marginea proiectului de Cod Electoral Unificat i a amendamentelor aduse Constituiei. Puterea de la Tbilisi a ncercat i a reuit s monopolizeze dezbaterile publice prin dou mecanisme: votul majoritii parlamentare i organizarea unor dezbateri de faad cu opoziia i societatea civil (pentru a arat, cel puin formal, c respect regulile dialogului politic cerute de Occident). Puterea a beneficiat,
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n plus, de polarizarea extrem a mediului politic, de modul extrem n care opoziia a neles s negocieze prin retragerea de la discuii i organizarea de proteste. Observatorii internaionali au criticat frecvent modul n care au fost organizate consultrile cu societatea civil i partidele de opoziie pe marginea modificrii legislaiei electorale i a amendrii constituiei: ntr-un interval de timp limitat14 i cu favorizarea puterii. n 2004, la iniiativa guvernului, parlamentul a modificat legea electoral, prin nclcarea procedurilor de deliberare. Dezbaterile cu privire la modificarea structurii parlamentului (reducerea numrului de membri) au nceput n 2008, cu doar dou luni nainte de alegeri, iar iniiativa a fost calificat de OSCE (2008, 1) ca afectnd egalitatea votului. n plus, msura e favorabil MNU, deoarece acesta obinuse la scrutinele anterioare cele mai multe mandate majoritare. Legea electoral n varianta MNU conine i o prevedere controversat, care le permite oficialilor s se implice n campania electoral. Regimul de la Tbilisi a promovat o dubl abordare a relaiei cu opoziia politic: raporturi panice/conforme normelor democraiei occidentale i msuri violente sau scandaluri/intimidri. Guvernul de la Tbilisi a oferit opoziiei posibilitatea de a participa la alegeri cu anse reale de a acumula voturi (nu a refuzat n mod abuziv niciunui candidat/partid nscrierea n competiiile electorale). Opoziia i-a putut exercita n mod liber dreptul legal de a organiza proteste anti-Saakavili, ns forele de ordine au reprimat prin violen mai multe manifestaii ale contestatarilor. n noiembrie 2007, guvernul a reprimat n for protestele partidelor de opoziie grupate ntr-un Consiliu Naional pentru a solicita decalarea (mai devreme) datei alegerilor parlamentare i demisia preedintelui. Urmtoarele proteste ale opoziiei, organizate
Pe 26 august 2006, preedintele Saakavili a semnat un decret prin care anuna c alegerile locale vor avea loc pe 5 octombrie 2006. Timpul alocat dezbaterilor pentru modificarea legislaiei privind organizarea alegerilor locale a fost de doar dou sptmni.
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Interviu cu un jurnalist, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

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sub forma unor demonstraii masive timp de 2 luni, au fost ntmpinate panic de regim. Poliia a folosit fora, n mai 2011, mpotriva opozanilor grupai n jurul lui Nino Burjanadze, incidente soldate cu moartea a 4 persoane i rnirea altor ctorva zeci. Unul dintre reprezentanii opoziiei a fost ncarcerat. Georgia este singurul stat din Caucazul de Sud n care societatea civil a reuit s transmit prin proteste panice mesajul populaiei ctre guvernarea evardnadze i s ndeplineasc principalele obiective ale manifestaiilor: anularea alegerilor fraudate i organizarea unui nou scrutin, demisia preedintelui. Dup 2004, societatea civil a reuit doar parial s schimbe relaiile cu regimul politic. Guvernul de la Tbilisi are o dubl abordare a relaiei cu mediul ONG: promovarea unei politici de deschidere fa de societatea civil la nivel formal i evitarea dialogului atunci cnd sunt aduse n dezbatere chestiuni de politic intern. Legislaia n vigoare n Georgia nu mpiedic apariia ONG-urilor i regimul de la Tbilisi nu a ncercat s ofere subvenii din partea statului pentru a influena n favoarea sa activitile mediul non-guvernamental. ONG-urile cele mai active primesc finanare din Occident. Au existat, ns, situaii n care diferite organizaii non-guvernamentale au exprimat opiuni partizane (cel mai bun exemplu este cel al Institutului Libertatea, susintor al revoluiei trandafirilor, al crui director s-a implicat n politic n cadrul MNU, dup 2004). Rolul clasic al societii civile de a transmite mesajele cetenilor ctre guvern este limitat, deoarece executivul nu e dispus s participe la dezbaterile organizate de ONG-uri sau s permit influena societii civile asupra deciziei n politicile publice. Spre deosebire de perioada evardnadze, guvernul manifest aparent deschidere fa de proiectele societii civile n special n cazul ONG-urilor ce deruleaz aciuni n parteneriat cu diverse instituii ale UE, pentru a evita astfel eventualele critici venite de la Bruxelles. Dar
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membrii guvernului au refuzat s dea curs unor invitaii din partea ONG-urilor pentru a participa la dezbaterile pe marginea amendrii constituiei. Totui, regimul georgian poate fi penetrat, dei cu greu, de iniiative ale societii civile. n 2004, la propunerea Institutului Libertatea, parlamentul a modificat legea presei, dezincriminnd calomnia i stabilind prevederi cu privire la accesul la informaia public. Peste patru ani, guvernul georgian a cedat n faa presiunilor opiniei publice, a opoziiei i a acceptat reorganizarea mass-mediei subvenionate din fonduri publice (Freedom House Georgia, 2005). Reprezentanii ONG-urilor au acces liber n mass-media, particip adesea la dezbaterile televizate. Niciunul dintre activitii societii civile intervievai pentru acest raport nu a cerut s-i fie declinat identitatea i nu s-a temut s critice regimul politic. Democraia care limiteaz presiunile Rusiei Georgia este un stat mic, poziionat ntr-o regiune cu multe conflicte (Caucazul de Nord, Abhazia, Osetia de Sud i Nagorno-Karabah), situaie care creeaz necesitatea unui aliat puternic. Paleta de opiuni e limitat la dou variante: Rusia i Occidentul. Relaiile privilegiate cu Rusia, dei ar fi favorizat ntrirea controlului i consolidarea puterii MNU i a lui Mihail Saakavili, au fost excluse din programul electoral al acestora nc din 2003: att partidul, ct i candidatul la preedinie au afiat ca obiective majore ale viitoarei guvernri integrarea n UE i aderarea la NATO. Ctigarea tuturor alegerilor ulterioare cu aceeai platform prooccidental i larga susinere popular pentru aliana cu Vestul au fcut ca meninerea la putere a regimului s fie dependent de relaiile cu SUA i UE. Puterea de la Tbilisi a iniiat cu sprijin financiar occidental reformarea instituiilor interne: a mritt de cteva ori salariile funcionarilor publici (aflate n perioada evardnadze sub limita supravieuirii), a modificat structura aparatului birocratic, a asigurat
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training-uri pentru a mbunti performanele angajailor i a eliminat corpuia. Occidentul i-a condiionat, ns, sprijinul pentru adoptarea reformelor democratice, fapt ce a determinat guvernarea de la Tbilisi s-i tempereze tendinele autoritare i s oscileze ntre msuri democratice, cum ar fi organizarea alegerilor dup normele OSCE, i reprimarea prin for a protestelor opoziiei sau brutalizarea jurnalitilor. Regimul de la Tbilisi pstreaz memoria recent a eecului guvernrii evardnadze, care a pierdut sprijinul Occidentului pentru c nu a adoptat reforme, a deteriorat situaia economic i a fost nlturat prin proteste. Presiunea strzii este exercitat i asupra regimului Saakavili, care a reuit s fac fa mai multor proteste care aveau ca obiectiv schimbarea puterii. Relaiile cu Rusia, dup friciunile comerciale (mrirea preului la gaze de ctre Moscova i sistarea importurilor de ap mineral din Georgia) s-au deteriorat total dup rzboiul din august 2008. Rusia este marele inamic al regimului georgian care, potrivit discursului oficial, a ncercat de mai multe ori, dup 2008, s organizeze nlturarea de la putere a lui Saakavili. Presiunile Occidentului pentru democratizarea regimului de la Tbilisi au o dubl coordonat: intern (meninerea la putere prin promovarea unei agende provestice i contracararea ncercrilor Moscovei de a-l nlocui) i extern (necesitatea unui partener puternic care s-i asigure securitatea).

cu rdcini n Nagorno-Karabah16 (Petrosyan, 2010, 8) i al transferului de putere dintre preedintele Kociarian i premierul Serge Sargsian17. Dup preluarea puterii de ctre Sargsian, autoritile armene au construit un regim politic hibrid n care practicile democratice se mbin cu msurile autoritare. Dup venirea la putere a lui Sargsian (ca premier n 2008), autoritile de la Erevan au mbuntit modul de organizare a alegerilor. Renunarea parial la practicile autoritare de organizare a scrutinului este explicat prin inexistena unei opoziii puternice i prin ncercarea de a oferi o imagine mai democratic regimului18. Alegerile care reconfirm acelai ctigtor Scrutinul legislativ din 2007 s-a desfurat n acord cu normele OSCE i alte standarde internaionale cu privire la organizarea de alegeri democratice (OSCE Armenia, 2007, 5).
16 Conflictul are la origine decizia lui Stalin din 1923 de a include Oblastul Nagorno-Karabah, regiune cu o populaie majoritar armean, n RSS Azerbaidjan. n 1988, armenii din Nagorno-Karabah i Erevan au cerut, prin ample demonstaii, ca regiunea s fie inclus n RSS Armenia, situaie care a dus la declanarea conflictului. n 1991, Nagorno-Karabah s-a declarat independent de Azerbaidjan. Acordul de ncetare a focului a fost semnat n 1994. De atunci, reprezentnd 14% din teritoriul Azerbaidjanului, Nagorno-Karabah se afl de facto sub controlul Erevanului i de iure sub administraia de la Baku. 17 Originar din Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabah, Serge Sargsian are o ndelungat carier n PC al RSS Armean i activitate n structurile militare armene ca ef al Comitetului Forelor de Autoaprare a Nagorno-Karabah (1989-1993) i ministru al Aprrii (1993-1995, 2000-2007). Dup 1995, a ocupat posturile de ministru al Securitii, ministru de Interne, diverse funcii n cadrul administraiei prezideniale de la Erevan. n 2007, a devenit premier al Armeniei. A fost considerat omul de ncredere al fostului preedinte armean, Robert Kociarian. 18 Alegerile parlamentare din Armenia, desfurate n 2003, au fost fraudate, situaie care a atras numeroase critici din partea Occidentului i a observatorilor internaionali.

Armenia
Regimul politic din Armenia15 este rezultatul perpeturii, ncepnd din 1998, a puterii unui singur grup politic
15 Armenia i-a declarat independena fa de URSS n august 1990. Levon Ter-Petrosian a devenit, n 1991, primul preedinte al Armeniei postcomuniste. Pn n 1998, Petrosian s-a aflat n fruntea unui regim autoritar criticat frecvent de Occident pentru reprimarea presei, nclcarea drepturilor i libertilor ceteneti i fraudarea alegerilor parlamentare din 1995 i a celor prezideniale din 1998.

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Partidul Republican aflat la putere a ctigat scrutinul cu 41 de mandate proporionale i 22 majoritare19. Celelalte partide care au trecut pragul electoral20 au fost Armenia Prosper (18 mandate proporionale i 7 majoritare), Federaia Revoluionar din Armenia Danacii-FRA (16 mandate proporionale), Ornitas Yerkir-Supremaia Legii (8 proporionale i 2 majoritare), Motenirea (7 proporionale), Partidul Aliana (1 mandat majoritar), Iniiativa civic (non-partizan, 9 mandate majoritare) (OSCE:2007 anexa). Niciunul dintre competitori nu a depus candidaturi n toate circumscripiile i 2/3 dintre partidele i alianele angajate n cursa electoral au depus doar liste pentru scrutinul proporional (n 7 circumscripii s-au nscris candidai unici). Foarte muli candidai (ai puterii i ai opoziiei) s-au retras din cursa electoral dup nscrierea listelor sau depunerea candidaturilor pentru mandatele majoritare. Cu cteva ocazii, Partidul Republican s-a folosit de resursele administrative ale statului pentru a obine susinerea electoratului (OSCE Armenia, 2007, 1) i i-a creat un spaiu de campanie favorabil lui nsui i aliailor informali (Armenia Prosper i parial pentru FRA). Alegerile prezideniale din februarie 2008 au ntrunit, n general, normele OSCE i standardele internaionale cu privire la organizarea de alegeri libere. Rezultatele scrutinului l-au indicat ctigtor pe Serge Sargsian cu 52,8% din sufragii din primul tur. Pe locul doi s-a aflat Levon Ter-Petrosian cu 21,5% voturi. n ansamblu, procesul electoral s-a desfurat cu favorizarea candidatului Partidului Republican: preedintele n exerciiu i oficialii guvernului au fcut campanie n favoarea acestuia, numrarea a 16% din voturi s-a desfurat n condiii proaste sau foarte proaste (OSCE Armenia, 2008, 4).
19 Potrivit Constituiei din 1995, amendat n 2005, Parlamentul Armeniei este o instituie unicameral cu 131 de parlamentari (90 de mandate delegate prin scrutin proporional pe liste, i 41 prin vot majoritar n circumscripii uninominale). 20 n Armenia, pragul electoral este de 5%.

n 2009, locuitorii Erevanului au fost chemai pentru prima dat la urne pentru a-i alege pe membrii Consiliului Municipal. Scrutinul, apreciat ca ntrunind n general normele Consiliului Europei, a fost marcat de aceleai practici nedemocratice: cumprarea voturilor, tiprirea mai multor buletine de vot, intimidarea alegtorilor. Dup numrarea voturilor, Partidul Republican a obinut majoritatea n Consiliul Municipal (35 din cele 65 de locuri) i l-a reconfirmat n funcie pe fostul primar.21 Mediul politic de la Erevan are un grad redus de polarizare, care se reflect doar n coninutul naionalist al agendei politice cu privire la viitorul enclavei Nagorno-Karabah. Cteva partide reclam includerea regiunii n statul armean sau independena acesteia, iar altele organizarea unui referendum n care locuitorii din Nagorno-Karabah s se pronune cu privire la viitorul provinciei. n politica intern, att puterea, ct i opoziia afirm ca obiectiv prioritar democratizarea i reformele, fr ca acestea s aib ca scop final integrarea n UE: Noi nu excludem cooperarea cu UE, dar tim c o eventual integrare este un obiectiv mult prea ndeprtat22. Dup alegerile parlamentare din 2007, Partidul Republican a creat o coaliie de guvernare cu Armenia Prosper, Federaia Revoluionar Armean (FRA) i Ornitas Yerkir, coaliie dominat de republicani. Armenia prosper este controlat de fostul preedinte Kociarian, Ornitas are doar doi membri n guvern (apropiai de Sargsian), despre care se spune c informal fac parte din Partidul Republican (Petrosyan, 2010, 10). Opoziia parlamentar din Armenia include FRA i Motenirea (considerat opoziia real). n 2009, FRA a prsit
21 Pn n 2009, primarul Erevanului era numit de preedintele statului. Dup amendarea Constituiei, n 2005, primarul Erevanului este ales indirect de majoritatea membrilor Consiliului Municipal. 22 Interviu cu un membru al Adunrii Naionale a Armeniei, Erevan, iunie 2011.

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coaliia de guvernare23, dar a continuat s susin informal puterea contra unui pact de neagresiune informal (autoritile nu au luat msuri represive mpotriva membrilor acesteia). Motenirea (Heritage) este considerat singurul partid de opoziie din parlamentul armean i unica voce critic la adresa guvernului att cu privire la politica extern (critic investiiile Rusiei n economia armean pentru c sunt o form de corupie, prezena bazei militare ruseti pe teritoriul armean), ct i la cea intern (modul n care autoritile au gestionat evenimentele din 2008 i urmrile acestora, corupia). Membrii partidului au fost inta criticii guvernului i a violenei forelor de ordine. Opoziia extraparlamentar din Armenia Consiliul Naional Armean este o micare hibrid, compus din 18 partide politice (cu ideologii diverse) i organizaii comunitare (Petrosyan, 2010, 11) creat n jurul lui Levon Ter-Petrosian. CNA critic frecvent guvernul pentru nclcarea drepturilor omului, corupie i nerespectarea ordinii constituionale. Cele dou tabere ale opoziiei din Armenia nu au reuit s creeze o for unic pentru a participa la vreuna dintre cursele electorale. Totui, Heritage a protestat n 2011 alturi de CNA, fr a adera la toate obiectivele acestora. Opoziia politic armean, dei a participat cu anse reale de a concura puterea, la toate scrutinele organizate dup adoptarea Constituiei din 1995, nu a avut suficient influen electoral i nu s-a consolidat prin atragerea de membri. Dup protestele din 2008, opoziia tradiional de la Erevan s-a discreditat n faa populaiei, pentru c a contestat n mod nejustificat un scrutin apreciat ca fiind n acord cu normele democratice occidentale.

n prezent, Partidul Republican are un control electoral de 50%, iar mbuntirea condiiilor de organizare a alegerilor nu i-a afectat controlul asupra puterii. Partidul de putere de la Erevan beneficiaz de avantajul unei opoziii slabe mcinat de dispute i de parteneriate informale cu o alt parte a opoziiei. Un regim legitimat de conflictul din Nagorno-Karabah Actuala elit de la Erevan este rezultatul coaliiei, create n anii 1990, ntre naionaliti i postcomuniti (Gallina, 2010, 24). Gruparea politic aflat la putere n Armenia a aprut prin fuziunea dintre elita militar care a luptat n Nagorno-Karabah n anii 1990 i corpul politic stabilit la Erevan dup independen (ibidem, 25). Puterea de la Erevan nu a cunoscut nicio schimbare n cei douzeci de ani de la proclamarea independenei: alegerile au fost ctigate de preedintele n exerciiu sau de premierul desemnat informal ca succesor al acestuia. Regula succesiunii premierului la funcia de preedinte este confirmat inclusiv de singurul moment n care transferul de putere nu s-a fcut prin alegeri, nlocuirea lui Levon Ter-Petrosian, printr-o lovitur soft de palat n 1998, cu Robert Kociarian. Puterea de la Erevan a beneficiat de victoria mpotriva Azerbaidjanului pentru a ntri controlul autoritar prin construirea unui puternic aparat de coerciie (n armat i poliie), folosit cu succes pentru a reprima amplele proteste ale opoziiei (Way, 2009, 111). Potrivit Constituiei din 2005 (amendat n 2004), Armenia are un regim semiprezidenial, dar informal puterea e concentrat n minile preedintelui. Situaia este explicabil prin motenirea sovietic care a cultivat imaginea unui lider puternic i prin practica politic postcomunist a unui grup de lideri care au trebuit s fac fa unor ameninri de securitate constante i s obin stabilitatea politic. Elita politic aflat la putere este unificat n jurul preedintelui,
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FRA a prsit aliana de guvernare de la Erevan ca de protest fa de semnarea, n octombrie 2009, a protocoalelor de la Zrich pentru normalizarea relaiilor dintre Armenia i Turcia.

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situaie determinat de necesitatea de a avea un lider puternic care s negocieze soluionarea conflictului i de folosirea enclavei Nagorno-Karabah ca pretext pentru consolidarea puterii i mijloc de legitimare (Gallina, 2010, 30). Reelele de putere ale regimului din Armenia sunt motenite din perioada URSS sau construite n postcomunism. Tranziia armean nu a nsemnat schimbarea total a instituiilor motenite din perioada sovietic, ci pstrarea structurii de stat aprope intact i loial pentru a controla formal instituiile i reelele informale (Stefes, 2009, 448). Baza regimului sunt oficialii corupi (actualul prim-ministru a fost implicat n mai multe scandaluri financiare sau n prejudicierea statului prin meninerea unei rate de schimb suspecte pentru drama armean) sau chiar relaiile de rudenie (se pare c oficialul care se bucur de cea mai mare ncredere la Erevan este fratele preedintelui, Alexander Sarsgian). Majoritatea oficialilor au i un trecut criminal. Prezena constant la putere dup 1991 a fost un atu pentru liderii de la Erevan care au reuit s creeze, n toat aceast perioad, dou tipuri de loialiti: n rndul funcionarilor administrativi ai statului i printre oligarhii care au beneficiat de privatizri. Puterea politic din Armenia a construit un mecanism de control al corupiei n care guvernul supravegheaz reelele unei corupii centralizate (ibidem, 447) care are prghii de monitorizare i la nivel local. Consolidarea puterii de la Erevan este explicabil i prin modul n care opoziia a neles s participe la viaa politic: prin stabilirea unor relaii informale cu puterea sau refuzul de a participa la dezbateri (boicotarea parlamentului n perioada 2003-2008) sau protestele de strad. Drepturi i liberti, doar dup dorina discreionar a regimului politic Retorica i legislaia promovate de regimul politic de la Erevan n privina respectrii drepturilor i libertilor omului sunt specifice democraiilor occidentale, dar modul de
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implementare a acestora e caracteristic spaiului post-sovietic. Regimul politic armean a nregistrat pn n prezent progrese importante n adoptarea sau modificarea de legi cu privire la garantarea drepturilor i libertilor. Constituia armean, modificat i democratizat n 2005, creeaz la nivel legal premisele pluralismului i pentru exercitarea supremaiei legii. n 2008, au fost adoptate alte msuri legislative cu scopul de a asigura transparena i independena sistemului juridic. Dar sistemul juridic armean a rmas sub influena regimului politic, dovad fiind msurile luate mpotriva protestatarilor n martie 2008 (arestri suspecte, bti, probe ndoielnice, tergiversarea proceselor Freedom House, 2009, 68). n 2010, n Armenia erau ncarcerai 14 deinui politici. n 2007, codul electoral armean a fost amendat, iar modificrile au adus, potrivit observatorilor internaionali, mbuntiri substaniale fa de situaia de la alegerile din 2003. Puterea de la Erevan a organizat potrivit regulilor proprii discuiile cu opoziia i societatea civil pe marginea amendrii legislaiei electorale. Dei a anunat c e deschis dezbaterilor, regimul de la Erevan a iniiat modificrile n an electoral i cu doar cteva luni nainte de desfurarea scrutinului. Puterea de la Erevan a oscilat ntre nclcarea i respectarea dreptului la libera ntrunire. Legislaia armean ofer opoziiei politice dreptul de a contesta puterea prin manifestaii de strad. Regimul nu a ezitat s foloseasc msuri violente mpotriva opoziiei politice. Dup alegerile prezideniale din 2008, opoziia, coalizat n jurul lui Ter-Petrosian, a protestat acuznd Partidul Republican c ar fi fraudat alegerile n favoarea lui Sargsian. Forele de ordine au reprimat protestele prin violene soldate cu moartea, rnirea sau arestarea unor manifestani, iar instanele de judecat au tergiversat pan n prezent verdictele. Preedintele a decretat starea de urgen pentru 20 de zile i a restricionat manifestaiile (situaie care persist i n prezent). Regimul a adoptat, de asemenea, msuri punitive (bti, arestri sau
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ncarcerarea cu amnarea procesului) mpotriva membrilor familiilor opozanilor (interviu cu membrul unui partid de opoziie). n 2009, Parlamentul a creat o comisie de studiere a evenimentelor din 2008 a crei activitate s-a finalizat cu un raport. Potrivit Adunrii Parlamentare a Consiliului Europei, documentul emis parlamentului armean disculp autoritile i acuz opoziia din jurul lui Ter-Petrosian, situaie care submineaz credibilitatea raportului (2009, 3). Noi proteste ale opoziiei din CNA au avut loc n martie 2011, fr a fi reprimate n for de poliie. n plus, puterea i-a anunat intenia de a ncepe dialogul cu opoziia, a eliberat doi deinui politici (ncarcerai dup violenele din 2008) i a permis manifestaiile n Piaa Libertii (unde opoziiei i fusese interzis accesul din 2008). Legislaia armean i mediul politic de la Erevan au permis crearea i desfurarea de proiecte de ctre organizaiile non-guvernamentale. Regimul manifest totui o atitudine ostil fa de ONG-uri, considerndu-le poteniali competitori politici (Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 2009, 67) i ncearc s evite cooperarea cu acestea. Oficialii statului nu au dat curs invitaiilor la dezbaterile organizate de ONG-uri i nu permit societii civile s influeneze luarea deciziilor cu privire la politicile publice. Pentru a-i ameliora imaginea, regimul a ncercat totui s iniieze un dialog cu societatea civil prin crearea unor comisii de discuii: ne-au chemat doar ca s facem figuraie, pentru c luau deciziile fr a ne consulta Aa c ne-am retras.24 Cele mai multe ONG-uri primesc finanare din Occident i nu au afilieri partizane. Mediul societii civile armene are, ns, i actori conectai partidelor politice care au fcut campanie electoral pentru acestea sau candidaii lor la preedinie (OSCE Armenia, 2007, 11).

Mass-media de la putere i presa de opoziie Regimul de la Erevan exercit un control parial asupra mass-media prin mijloacele de finanare, presiuni administrative (controleaz licenele) i cenzurarea coninutului editorial. Legislaia armean creeaz la nivel formal condiiile existenei unei mass-media independente. n Armenia exist pres finanat din fonduri publice i mass-media privat. Principala surs de informare pentru armeni e televiziunea (doar postul public H1 transmite pe ntreg teritoriul armean), iar presa tiprit nu are un tiraj mai mare de 6.000 de exemplare (pentru o publicaie) i nu se bucur de o larg circulaie numai aproximativ 8% dintre armeni citesc ziarele (OSCE Armenia, 2007, 14). Presa subvenionat din fonduri publice este n proporie de 100% aservit regimului politic. Asupra mass-media private, regimul de la Erevan exercit dou forme de control: investiii ale unor finanatori apropiai puterii i controlul asupra organismului care ofer licenele de transmisie televizate. Principalele surse de finanare pentru mass-media sunt vnzrile de tiraj i publicitatea care aduc venituri foarte reduse, la care se adaug banii oferii de diveri actori politici sau investitori privai: 30% din finanarea acestui cotidian sunt bani negri (interviu cu directorul unui cotidian generalist de la Erevan). Din cauza finanrii precare salariile jurnalitilor din mass-media privat armean sunt la limita supravieuirii: un tnr debutant are un salariu de aproximativ 250$, iar un director de publicaie catig maxim 1000$25. Situaia financiar precar a presei a fost folosit de puterea politic pentru a-i asigura loialiti n rndul jurnalitilor: n presa de stat, jurnalitii pot ctiga i 10.000$, dar cea mai mare parte a veniturilor lor sunt din surse nedeclarate26.Toate cele trei posturi private TV sunt controlate de oligarhi asociai regimului, iar n ultimii ani
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24

Interviu cu directorul unui ONG de la Erevan, Erevan, iunie

2011.

Interviu cu un director de cotidian, Erevan, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un director de cotidian, Erevan, iunie 2011.

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au oferit licene de emisie doar posturilor despre care se tia clar c nu vor crea probleme la nivel politic. n prezent procesul de digitalizare e un alt instrument de presiune asupra televiziunilor folosit de autoriti. Presa tiprit este de opoziie, afiliat puterii sau independent (un singur ziar n spatele cruia este speculat influena guvernului). Accesul la internet nu a fost restricionat de autoritile de la Erevan, iar presa i extinde rapid activitatea n mediul online. n mediul online din Armenia activeaz i autori de bloguri, dar procesul de extindere a blogurilor critice la adresa regimului este atent monitorizat de autoriti27. Opoziia real poate transmite mesaje populaiei doar prin presa tiprit i prin internet. RFA, partid de opoziie apropiat guvernului, apare i la posturile TV controlate de regim. Calitatea produselor de media din Armenia e influenat de pregtirea slab a jurnalitilor, presiunile autoritilor, finanarea. n interviurile realizate pentru acest raport, jurnalitii cu experien de la Erevan au acuzat lipsa de profesionalism a tinerilor jurnaliti. Televiziunea armean este n totalitate monopolizat de puterea politic, iar informaiile oferite de aceasta sunt favorabile regimului: Timp de cinci zile am urmrit doar informaiile transmise de televiziunile armene. Dup ce am avut acces la alte surse de informare mi-am dat seama c n cele cinci zile trisem ntr-o alt realitate, creat artificial de regimul politic.28 Presiunile autoritilor asupra coninutului materialelor de pres sunt evidente mai ales n perioadele electorale: Atunci apar i media-killers, dar acetia nu sunt la fel de agresivi ca cei din Rusia. Articolele de investigaie sunt aproape absente n presa armean: Apare cte un articol pe lun. i doar o singur organizaie Hedk subvenionat
27 28

din Occident produce astfel de materiale, dar nu investigheaz marile cazuri de corupie, se limiteaz la profesori/micii funcionari care primesc mit29. n rest jurnalitii se autocenzureaz pentru a nu avea probleme cu finanatorii sau cu autoritile. La nivel local, situaia mass-media din Armenia este i mai dificil: Trebuie s fac fa presiunilor guvernatorului, autoritilor regionale. Supravieuiete la fel ca ntr-un regim autoritar sau dictatorial.30 Exist un singur post TV local independent, cruia i-a fost refuzat obinerea unei licene pentru a transmite la nivel naional i care a fost obligat s strng cu ajutorul publicului o sum uria pentru a putea plti pretinse datorii ctre stat. Niciunul dintre jurnalitii intervievai la Erevan nu s-a temut s critice regimul politic. Sprijinul Rusiei este indispensabil, UE este prea departe Presiunile externe pentru democratizarea regimului politic din Armenia depind de insecuritatea din Caucazul de sud, dependena de actori externi ca Rusia i Occidentul, competiia ntre statele regiunii, influena actorilor externi asupra societii armene. Armenia este un stat mic, izolat geografic, aflat ntr-o regiune cu o securitate precar. Erevanul are relaii tensionate cu doi dintre vecinii si (Azerbaidjanul i Turcia31), situaie care l face complet dependent de garaniile de securitate oferite de Rusia. Pentru a menine statu quo-ul creat dup rzboiul din Nagorno-Karabah, Erevanul are nevoie
Interviu cu un jurnalist, Erevan, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un jurnalist, Erevan, iunie 2011. 31 n cei 20 de ani de la proclamarea independenei, autoritile armene nu au reuit s ajung la o nelegere cu Turcia cu privire la genocidul turcilor mpotriva populaiei armene din 1915. n plus, Turcia este principalul aliat din regiune al Azerbaidjanului, susinnd integritatea teritorial a acestuia.
30 29

Interviu cu un reprezentant al societii civile, Erevan, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un reprezentant al societii civile, Erevan, iunie 2011.

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permanent de sprijinul Moscovei, care dup 1998/1999 a devenit principalul investitor n economia armean i al crei sprijin nu este condiionat de democratizarea regimului intern. Statul armean este lipsit de resurse, situaie care impune atragerea de ajutoare/fonduri occidentale i care l face vulnerabil la presiunile i sanciunile SUA i UE, care au criticat msurile autoritare luate la nivel intern i au ameninat cu retragerea sprijinului financiar. Meninerea relaiilor cordiale cu Occidentul este esenial i pentru a evita transformarea Moscovei n aliat unic. n acest sens, regimul de la Erevan nu a putut evita adoptarea i implementarea, cel puin la nivel formal, a normelor democratice. Spre deosebire de Georgia i Azerbaidjan, care pot ntreine o relaie de interdependen cu Occidentul, prima pentru tranzitul hidrocarburilor i a doua pentru resursele energetice, Armenia este doar dependent de ajutorul vestic. n plus, dup 2003, Georgia, n pofida sincopelor n procesul de democratizare, a devenit un model de succes pentru Caucazul de sud i partenerul privilegiat al Occidentului. Regimul de la Erevan nu este presat la nivel intern de societate pentru a ntreine relaii privilegiate cu Occidentul: Armenii nu sunt prorui i anti-UE. Dar i dau seama ca aderarea la UE nu este un obietiv realist i privesc cu scepticism ideea de europenizare32. n plus, n cei 20 de ani de independen, puterea de la Erevan, indiferent de culoarea politic, a promovat n mass-media ideea c Rusia este marele nostru aliat. Mediul non-guvernamental, dei are finanare extern, este prea slab pentru a reui n implementarea modelului democratic: organizaii concentrate n Erevan care nu pot desfura aciuni n alte regiuni, activitii sunt mai mult o elit care nu penetreaz i nu are aderen la populaia obinuit.

Azerbaidjan
Actualul regim politic de la Baku este rezultatul transferului de putere ntre Heidar33 i Ilham34 Aliev i al ntririi controlului autoritar de ctre ultimul asupra tuturor prghiilor puterii. Alegerile care au ntotdeauna rezultatul cunoscut Prima msur prin care regimul controlat de Ilham Aliev a ntrit controlul asupra puterii, a fost fraudarea i ctigarea alegerilor. n 2003, alegerile prezideniale din Azerbaidjan s-au desfurat dup modelul introdus n perioada Heidar Aliev. Candidatul Partidului Noul Azerbaidjan Yeni Azerbaycan Partiyas (PNA) a fost favorizat n campania electoral de mass-media, iar autoritile au fraudat alegerile n favoarea lui Ilham Iliev sau au recurs la metode de intimidare a opoziiei. Rezultatele scrutinului l-au indicat ctigtor cu
Heidar Aliev, fost lider al PC al RSS Azerbaidjan i ex-colaborator KGB, a fost ales preedinte al Azerbaidjanului n 1993 i 1998. Cele dou mandate ale lui Heidar Aliev au coincis cu ntrirea controlului preedintelui i a apropiailor si asupra regimului politic de la Baku. Regimul Aliev-senior a fost permanent criticat de Occident pentru msurile autoritare promovate la nivel intern i fraudarea alegerilor. Guvernarea Aliev senior a coincis cu stabilizarea regimului intern i ncheirea unui acord de pace cu Armenia, n 1994, n conflictul din Nagorno-Karabah. Aliev-senior a reuit s lanseze, cu investiii occidentale n industria petrolifer, economia azer. n 2003, Heidar Aliev, n vrst de 80 de ani, candidatul PNA anunat la alegerile prezideniale, a murit i a fost nlocuit de fiul su Ilham Aliev n cursa pentru preedinia Azerbaidjanului. 34 Absolvent al Institutului de Relaii Internaionale din Moscova, Ilham Aliev a fost ef al SOCAR la nceputul anilor 1990 i apoi membru al Parlamentului azer (1995-2000). ntre 1999 i 2003 a ocupat poziia secund n ierarhia PNA (liderul partidului era Heidar Aliev). n 2003 a devenit premier i apoi a fost ales preedinte al Azerbaidjanulu (Jim Nichol, 2010, 8).
33

32

Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

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76,84% din sufragii pe Ilham Aliev, iar urmtorul clasat, Isa Gambar, a obinut 13,94% din voturi. Alegerile prezideniale din 2008 au avut un rezultat previzibil, fiind organizate doar pentru a nu atrage i mai multe critici din partea Occidentului i a-l reconfirma n funcie pe Ilham Aliev. Scrutinul nu a ntrunit standardele pentru alegeri democratice ale OSCE, chiar dac modul de organizare a procesului electoral a cunoscut mbuntiri fa de alegerile parlamentare din 2005. n cursa electoral s-au mai nscris, n afar de preedintele n exerciiu, ase candidai. a ctigat Ilham Aliev cu 88,73% din sufragii. Ceilali competitori nu au reuit s acumuleze mai mult de 2,86% din voturi. n 2005 i 2010, regimul Aliev a organizat n mod similar i alegerile legislative. La scrutinul din 2005, PNA a obinut 61 mandate parlamentare din totalul de 125. n 2010, PNA a obinut din nou majoritatea mandatelor parlamentare 74 de locuri. n parlamentul azer au mai intrat 39 candidai independeni (care n realitate susin PNA), 9 locuri pentru partide minore (care sprijin PNA), 1 loc (Partidul Sperana, care reprezint opoziia real) (OSCE: 2010 32). La ultimul scrutin, puterea a reuit s nlture din parlament, pentru prima dat de la proclamarea independenei Azerbaidjanului, opoziia tradiional Blocul Frontul Popular-Musavat. PNA rege pe scena politic de la Baku n cei 8 ani de cnd se afl la putere, regimul Ilham Aliev a reuit s transforme opoziia dintr-un competitor, care n 2003 avea ansa de a deposeda PNA de putere, ntr-o prezen formal, aproape inexistent pe scena politic. PNA este un partid care controleaz total puterea n Azerbaidjan dup ce a fraudat toate alegerile, a creat o opoziie artificial n parlament i a eliminat prin mijloace neconcureniale opoziia real. Potrivit rezultatelor alegerilor, PNA i Aliev au un control electoral de peste 70% (n realitate controlul este total). Reducerea nsemnat a numrului de
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voturi obinut de opoziie la ultimele alegeri indic consolidarea puterii i tendina progresiv de a scoate opoziia din jocul politic. Rezultatul cunoscut al alegerilor i msurile represive ale autoritilor mpotriva forelor contestatare au transformat populaia ntr-un corp a crui participare la vot a sczut cu fiecare scrutin organizat dup 2003 (la alegerile parlamentare din 2003, 69% dintre azeri s-au prezentat la vot, la scrutinul din 200547%), situaie favorabil regimului, care n condiiile absenteismului trebuie s controleze mai puine sufragii. Analiza partidelor de opoziie din Azerbaidjan are ca prim criteriu existena acestora i nu platformele electorale sau programele ideologice. Cele mai importante partide de opoziie Musavat, Partidul Independent din Azerbaidjan, Partidul Democrat i Frontul Popular sunt aproape invizibile pe scena politic de la Baku din cauza msurilor represive ale puterii. Imaginea acestor partide este construit n jurul liderilor. Discursul opoziiei este unul comun, centrat pe critica la adresa PNA. Un al doilea criteriu, n funcie de care poate fi analizat opoziia de la Baku, este relaia acesteia cu PNA. Opoziia politic din Azerbaidjan este divizat n dou tabere: opoziia parlamentar, apropiat partidului aflat la guvernare i opoziia extraparlamentar (real, critic la adresa regimului Aliev). La ultimele alegeri prezideniale opoziia extraparlamentar nu a depus candidaturi, motivnd c nu dorete s participe la un scrutin fraudat de putere.35 Confruntarea putere-opoziia real a fost ntodeauna violent i se reduce la reprimarea protestelor/manifestaiilor celei din urm de ctre forele de ordine. Relaia PNA cu opoziia exclude negocierile, dialogul sau compromisul. Ultimele negocieri dintre putere i opoziie au avut loc dup
35 Partidul Musavat (Liberal), Partidul Liberal, Partidul Frontul Popular, Forumul Public pentru Binele Azerbaidjanului i Partidul Cetean i Dezvoltare au creat o alian informal Frontul Comun al Forelor Democratice i au cerut cetenilor s nu participe la alegeri (OSCE Azerbaidjan: 2008, 5).

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alegerile din 2005, cnd, prin medierea ambasadorului SUA, puterea a ncercat s negocieze cu opoziia numrul de locuri obinute de ultima n legislativ. Corupia care funcioneaz perfect ntrebarea fundamental care se pune n legtur cu venirea la putere a lui Ilham Aliev: a fost ntr-adevr o schimbare de putere? Puterea de la Baku pstreaz structura de clan motenit din perioada sovietic i epoca lui Heidar Aliev din regiunea Nachicevan. Elementul nou pentru perioada Ilham Aliev este confruntarea invizibil la nivel formal ntre vechii oficiali, motenii din perioada Heidar, noua elit, apropiat de fiu i cu idei occidentale (Ishiyama, 2008, 46) i familia Aliev. Resursele administrative i petrolifere ale statului, precum i afacerile de succes sunt mprite ntre: Ramiz Mehdiev, eful admnistraiei prezideniale i vechea gard din jurul acestuia, oligarhi i familia Aliev. Primul controleaz mpreuna cu ministrul de interne i procuroul ef numirile n funciile publice i organizarea alegerilor. n grupul oligarhilor se disting ministrul transportului i cel al situaiilor de urgen i preedintele SOCAR care controleaz vmile, schimburile comerciale, proiectele de infrastructur i afaceri imobiliare (ICG, 2010, 8-10). n familia Aliev exist dou tabere: una conservatoare, n fruntea creia se afl Bailar Eibov (rud prin alian cu Ilham) i reformatorii familia Paaiev, din care provine Mehriban Aliev, soia preedintelui azer. Eibov controleaz afacerile din vestul Azerbaidjanului, iar Paaievii au activiti n turism, asigurri, bnci (ICG, 2010, 10-11). Regimul lui Ilham Aliev se bazeaz pe dou tipuri de loialiti: din sistemul public sau mediul privat i loialitatea ocazional (obinut cu puin timp nainte de alegeri) a cetenilor. Regimul politic azer este construit pe loialiti personale vechi, privatizri frauduloase, afaceri cu petrol i corupie:
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Aici toi minitrii au afaceri. Nu exist oficial care s nu fie corupt (interviu cu un oficial UE). Figura principal n ansamblul de putere de la Baku este preedintele Aliev, care, dup modelul tatlui su ncearc s pstreze puterea n familie i nelege puterea statului ca o afacere de familie (Guliev, 2005, 241). Probabil c Azerbaidjanul are unii dintre cei mai longevivi minitri din lume: n acel tablou este ministrul nostru cu fostul nostru preedinte, Heidar Aliev. n cellalt tablou, domnul ministru este cu actualul preedinte (discuie cu un funcionar de la Baku). Schimbrile de minitri la Baku sunt evenimente cu totul neobinuite pe scena politic: Eu sunt ministru aici de peste zece ani, nu neleg de ce minitrii se schimb att de des n Georgia (interviu cu un oficial de la Baku). Chiar i funcionarii publici de rnd i sunt loiali preedintelui: n tabloul acela l putei vedea pe Heidar Aliev, primul nostru preedinte. tii, el a fcut foarte multe pentru noi, este liderul naional al Azerbaidjanului.36 n perioadele electorale, regimul de la Baku face cadouri electorale populaiei. Un expert ne-a relatat povestea unei btrane cu 80 manai pensie, care a primit nainte de alegeri o scrisoare de la preedintele rii prin care era anunat c nu mai trebuie s plteasc o datorie de 300 manai pentru electricitate. Prin partidul aflat la putere, Aliev i grupul din jurul su oblig la loialitate. PNA este o structur birocratic piramidal care mbin interesele de afaceri cu apartenena politic: Calitatea de membru n PNA este o cerin obligatorie pentru posturile de rang nalt ale statului i pentru multe slujbe importante din sectorul privat37. Existena financiar a PNA depinde att de spolierea resurselor statului, ct i de contribuiile mediului de afaceri (Goul&Sickner, 2008, 754).

36 37

Discuie cu un funcionar ministerial, Baku, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un oficial european, Baku, iunie 2011.

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Drepturi i liberti cu existen precar Potrivit Constituiei din 1995, Azerbaidjanul este un stat democratic bazat pe supremaia legii i principiul separaiei puterilor. Constituia azer este doar un text care exist formal fr s fi fost vreodat aplicat n absena acordului de la nivel politic. Sistemul juridic din Azerbaidjan este n totalitate subordonat deciziilor politice i aplic adesea normele juridice n interesul regimului. Dup venirea la putere a lui Ilham Aliev, parlamentul de la Baku a confecionat un ambalaj legislativ democratic pentru msurile autoritare. Pentru a da un aspect democratic procesului electoral, regimul politic din Azerbaidjan a modificat de mai multe ori dup 2003 legislaia electoral, fr a organiza ns dezbateri democratice pe marginea modificrilor i fr a respecta n totalitate recomandrile fcute de Comisia de la Veneia. Comisia electoral central a fost ntotdeauna controlat de PNA, iar campania electoral a avut ca protagonist principal partidul aflat la putere sau candidatul acestuia. Cu toate acestea, OSCE a considerat c noile norme pot asigura desfurarea unui proces electoral democratic (2008, 1). Aproape la fiecare scrutin, autoritile azere, n frunte cu preedintele Aliev, adopt msuri de imagine nainte de organizarea alegerilor: retrasarea cadrului legislativ pentru a permite formal organizarea unui scrutin corect sau decizii cu caracter popular. Prima msur vizeaz mbuntirea imaginii regimului n faa observatorilor electorali internaionali, iar a doua n relaiile cu alegtorii. Ilham Aliev nu i-a fcut campanie electoral n mod direct, susinnd c vrea s ofere anse reale opoziiei (OSCE, 2008, 2). Preedintele a decretat msuri legislative sau a refuzat s-i fac o campanie electoral pentru a crea impresia c opoziia are avantaje electorale pe care nu reuete s le foloseasc. n 2005, preedintele a semnat un decret care meniona c ONG-urile i opoziia i pot desfura liber activitatea n campania electoral i c funcionarii statului care nu vor permite organizarea de alegeri libere i democratice vor rspunde n faa legii (Freedom House Azerbaidjan, 2006).
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n realitate, muli candidai ai opoziiei nu au avut resursele necesare pentru a-i face campanie la nivelul ntregii ri, iar n unele regiuni, doar PNA i-a promovat candidatul. Drepturile pe care puterea de la Baku le ofer n mod real opoziiei sunt (aproape) inexistente. Regimul Aliev nu permite existena niciunei surse de finanare pentru opoziia real: Nu tiu din ce triesc liderii Musavat. Regimul i mpiedic s obin un serviciu la fel i pe membrii familiilor lor. Partidul nu ar putea fi finanat de niciun om de afaceri pentru c autoritile i-ar nchide imediat activitatea.38 Legislaia din Azerbaidjan, modificat n 2005 i 2008 dup standardele democraiilor consolidate, permite organizarea de proteste mpotriva aciunilor puterii; autoritile azere au interpretat, ns, prevederile legii n interesul puterii i au refuzat aprobarea manifestaiilor. Puterea de la Baku a folosit i violena fizic pentru a-i ndeprta adversarii din opoziie: mai muli lideri ai partidelor de opoziie au fost atacai pe strad. Dup fiecare scrutin legislativ sau prezidenial, opoziia a protestat mpotriva fraudrii scrutinului, iar autoritile au reprimat manifestaiile prin violen. n martie 2011, autoritile au mobilizat chiar forele armatei la Baku pentru a preveni organizarea unor manifestaii ale opoziiei care srbtoreau o lun de la nlturea de la putere a lui Hosni Mubarak. Puterea de la Baku folosete i o retoric agresiv de propagand antiopoziie: Cetatea azer asediat de servicii secrete din Armenia sau de Occident care ncearc s organizeze o revoluie colorat la Baku, toi inamicii strini acionnd n complicitate cu reprezentani ai opoziiei. Aceleai mesaje agresive au fost transmise n mass-media i despre ONG-urile care au criticat regimul politic. Regimul politic azer a dezvoltat i prghii de control al societii civile: fie prin nfiinarea i finanarea unor ONG-uri fantom (GONGO-uri) sau prin presiuni asupra organizaiilor independente. Regimul a creat chiar o instituie
38

Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.

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care se ocup de finanarea organizaiilor neguvernamentale: Consiliul de stat pentru susinerea organizaiilor neguvernamentale, ale crui fonduri au crescut n fiecare an dup boom-ul petrolier (exemplul cel mai elocvent este Fundaia Heidar Aliev, finanat n exclusivitate de la bugetul statului) i organizarea unor competiii pentru granturi sau oferirea pe ci neoficiale a finanrii: M-au rugat s-mi finaneze programele. Dar, cnd am vzut c toate organizaiile care primesc bani de la stat fac doar ce spun autoritile, am refuzat.39 GONGO-urile pot fi, ns, finanate i de organizaii occidentale care ofer granturi pentru dezvoltarea societii civile din Azerbaidjan: Nu considerm c, dac un ONG a primit bani din fondul creat de stat pentru societatea civil, nu este eligibil pentru programele noastre40. Presiunea asupra societii civile a avut i forme legale (de tipul controalelor fiscale ale autoritilor) sau chiar violene, ameninri i intimidri. Pe parcursul interviurilor pentru acest raport, foarte muli activiti ai societii civile s-au temut s critice regimul politic, au rspuns evaziv la ntrebri ori au cerut s nu le fie citate numele. Presiunile regimului asupra societii civile sunt mai mari n perioadele electorale (n 2008 niciun ONG nu a fost lsat de autoriti s monitorizeze campania electoral). n Azerbaidjan elaborarea politicilor publice e un atribut unic al puterii i orice proiect al societii civile este perceput ca fiind politic (Gahramanova, 2008, 787). Informal, reprezentanii societiile civile din Azerbaidjan consider c rolul acesteia este de a implementa programe (indiferent de finalitatea lor), pentru a-i realiza sarcinile de serviciu, avnd certitudinea c mediul ONG nu poate influena n niciun fel decizia politic. Corupia este o alt form de nclcare a drepturilor omului de ctre regimul de la Baku. Dei a adoptat un pachet
39 40

legislativ anticorupie, regimul nu a pus n practic prevederile acestuia: Nu exist funcionar care s nu fie corupt aici. Ar fi imposibil s supravieuiasc, la ct de mici sunt salariile41. Corupia este instrumentul prin care regimul i-a asigurat loialiti n ntrega structur administrativ a statului: Toi minitrii au afaceri n Azerbaidjan, sunt businessmeni ntr-un regim sovietic adaptat la capitalism. Fr corupie regimul ar fi mort.42 n Azerbaidjan, nu exist transparen n nicio instituie public. Puterea politic nu are niciun interes s lupte mpotriva corupiei, iar sistemul juridic care i este subordonat este i el corupt, nu a luat niciodat horrri care s protejeze drepturile i libertile civile i a organizat i pronunat hotrri judectoreti n favoarea regimului. Mass-media nu poate fi dect la putere n Azerbaidjan n perioada care a urmat dup instalarea la putere a lui Ilham Aliev, regimul de la Baku a preluat aproape exclusiv controlul asupra presei. Televiziunea este cea mai important surs de informare din Azerbaidjan, acoperind aproape ntreg teritoriul statului. Toate posturile TV din Azerbaidjan se afl sub controlul regimului politic, care exercit presiuni directe asupra canalului finanat din fonduri publice (AzTV), sau indirecte asupra posturilor private care sunt susinute de investitori apropiai regimului politic. Presa tiprit din Azerbaidjan este parial controlat de regim. La Baku apar i cteva cotidiene de opoziie, a cror circulaie nu acoper ntreg teritoriul azer. Calitatea materialelor de pres din Azerbaidjan este influenat de cenzura regimului, pregtirea jurnalitilor i de finanarea disponibil. Articole de investigaie nu exist
41 42

Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un funcionar ONG, Baku, iunie 2011.

Interviu cu un oficial european, Baku, iunie 2001. Interviu cu un oficial european, Baku, iunie 2001.

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n presa azer i jurnalitii se autocenzureaz pentru a evita presiuni ale finanatorilor sau ale autoritilor. Regimul de la Baku exercit i o presiune legal asupra mass-media strine i a jurnalitilor. n 2008, autoritile au cenzurat mass-media prin adoptarea unei legi ce nu permite transmisiunea pe frecvenele naionale a posturilor strine Radio Europa Liber, BBC i Vocea Americii pe teritoriul azer. Presiunea asupra jurnalitilor se exercit prin intermediul legislaiei care incrimineaz calomnia (pasibil de pedepse penale) / defimarea i prin folosirea violenei de ctre forele de ordine. n 2010, patru jurnaliti azeri se aflau n nchisoare.43 Forele de ordine au recurs la violene mpotriva jurnalitilor n toat perioada de dup instalarea la putere a lui llham Aliev. n ultimii ani presiunile regimului asupra mass-media azere au crescut. Acestea se manifest n general n campaniile electorale. n mass-media azer, controlat de regim, toate campaniile electorale s-au desfurat cu favorizarea PNA sau a lui llham Aliev, despre care sunt difuzate doar informaii cu caracter pozitiv i crora li se acord cea mai mare parte a timpului de transmisie. Pn n 2008, televiziunea public din Azerbaidjan era obligat s asigure tututor candidailor un timp egal de anten. Potrivit modificrilor aduse legii n 2008, TvAZ nu mai poate transmite emisiuni cu caracter electoral. Toate televiziunile au prezentat doar informaii pozitive despre PNA sau Ilham Aliev pe parcursul tuturor campaniilor electorale de dup 2003, iar opoziia a aprut doar sporadic n emisiunile informative.44
Curtea European a Drepturilor Omului a cerut n 2010 autoritilor azere s-l elibereze pe jurnalistul Eiula Fatulaiev (Freedom House Azerbaijan: 2011, 85). Pn n 2011, regimul azer nu a pus n aplicare cererea CEDO, chiar dac judectorii au retras acuzaiile la adresa acestuia. 44 n 2008, TvAZ a furnizat n programele de tiri sau cu caracter politic 92% informaii pozitive despre putere (din care 72% au acoperit doar activitile preedintelui n exerciiu OSCE, 2008, 16).
43

Presa tiprit, finanat de stat, s-a conformat doar prevederilor legale minimale i a acordat dreptul la exprimare opoziiei, n rest a furnizat doar informaii despre candidaii puterii. Doar cotidianul de opoziie Yeni Musavat a publicat informaii detaliate despre campania electoral a opoziiei. Un petrostat atotputernic Influena actorilor externi asupra procesului de democratizare din Azerbaidjan depinde de securitatea regiunii, dependena regimului de relaii cordiale cu Rusia i Occidentul, competiia ntre statele din Caucazul de Sud i influena presiunii actorilor strini asupra societii azere. Rusia e principalul sprijin pe care se poate baza Armenia pentru a menine controlul asupra enclavei Nagorno-Karabah, situaie care face Azerbaidjanul vulnerabil n faa presiunilor Moscovei pentru a obine integritatea teritorial. Dar relaiile cordiale cu Moscova nu nseamn presiune pentru democratizarea regimului politic intern, situaie care se transform ntr-un mare atu pentru msurile autoritare ale puterii de la Baku. Azerbaidjanul este singurul stat cu resurse nsemnate de hidrocarburi din Caucazul de Sud, situaie care i asigur o relaie de interdependen n raport cu Occidentul: Baku are nevoie de piaa vestic pentru a vinde gazul i petrolul i statele UE vor s evite dependena de Rusia ca singur furnizor de energie. Prin urmare, chiar dac la nivel formal condamn msurile autoritare ale regimului Aliev, Occidentul nu se poate lipsi de resursele acestuia i nu poate sista relaiile comerciale ca mijloc de presiune pentru lipsa performanelor democratice. n plus, resursele energetice au fcut ca Azerbaidjanul s nu aib mare nevoie de sprijin financiar occidental (de exemplu, Azerbaidjanul nu a acceptat iniial granturile oferite prin Politica European de Vecintate sau prin Corporaia Provocrile Mileniului). Azerbaidjanul e cel mai mare stat din Caucazul de Sud i, spre deosebire de Georgia i Armenia, e bogat n resurse,
61

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situaie care i asigur din start supremaia regional, i nu este interesat de o competiie care s aib ca miz transformarea ntr-un model de democraie n zon. Revoluia trandafirilor din Georgia a influenat msurile autoritare luate de puterea de la Baku, care s-a temut de un scenariu asemntor n Azerbaidjan. Societatea azer este neutr n raport cu modelul politic occidental din trei motive: azerii sunt contieni c UE i europenizarea sunt un model mult prea ndeprtat, Rusia nu este vzut ca inamic (dei menine ocupaia armean n Nagorno-Karabah), azerii au legturi culturale cu societile orientale i cu Turcia. Societatea civil azer, format din grupuri de elititi, este izolat de populaie, mesajele acesteia penetreaz doar Baku i mprejurimile acestuia. Prin urmare, mesajele de democratizare, chiar dac nu sunt reprimate de regim, nu au larg rspndire printre azeri.

Concluzii O privire general asupra regimurilor politice din Caucazul de Sud arat evoluii i trsturi comune: foste republici sovietice, tranziii repetate care nu au avut ca finalitate democratizarea, conflicte teritoriale i/sau interetnice, relaii complicate cu Rusia i Occidentul. n acelai timp, fiecare regim politic din Caucazul de Sud are propriile particulariti, care sunt influenate de proiectele locale de construcie a statului, de existena sau absena resurselor energetice, de problemele teritoriale. Elita politic georgian se afl la 20 de ani de la proclamarea independenei n faa acelorai ntrebri: autoritarism sau democraie? Pentru liderii de la Baku ntrebarea fundamental este: pn unde pot fi extinse msurile autoritare n Azerbaidjan i cum putem asigura prezena ct mai ndelungat la putere a actualilor lideri? Regimul de la Erevan caut s afle care sunt limitele msurilor democratice n Armenia i cum se poate pstra autoritarismul salvnd aparenele
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democraiei. n Armenia, regimul a oscilat ntre fundamentarea puterii prin legitimitatea dat de procesele electorale organizate dup normele democratice i construirea unui centru de putere bazat pe msuri autoritare. Pentru azeri, conservarea puterii n jurul Alievilor i loialitile politice au fost elementele-cheie ale unui regim care nu i-a pus problema legitimitii. n toate aceste state, democraia electoral a fost ntr-o msur mai mare sau mai mic un mijloc de consolidare a puterii (Shirinian, 2003). Toate cele trei regimuri din Caucazul de Sud folosesc aceleai instrumente pentru acapararea i consolidarea puterii i au avantajul unei opoziii slabe. ntr-un top al performanelor democratice n Caucazul de Sud, Georgia se afl pe primul loc, iar Azerbaidjanul pe ultimul. Pn n prezent regimul de la Tbilisi este unul competitiv-autoritar aflat nc n perioada de tranziie; el va fi condiionat n viitor s adopte i mai multe msuri de democratizare din cauza dependenei de sprijinul Occidentului i a presiunii/influenei pe care o exercit Rusia prin stimularea micrilor de contestare a regimului. Preedintele Aliev este liderul unei structuri de putere centralizate n care politicul guverneaz asupra celorlalte puteri (legislativ i judiciar), care exist doar pentru a crea false aparene democratice. Puterea de la Baku a euat n organizarea alegerilor, crearea unei relaii democratice cu mass-media i nu a garantat drepturile i libertile ceteneti. n ultimii ani, Ilham Aliev i aliaii si au creat un regim competitiv autoritar, care n viitor se va transforma ntr-unul autoritar stabil sau un petro-autoritarism dup modelul rusesc. Puterea de la Erevan a realizat un melanj ntre practici autoritare i msuri democratice. Fiindc a euat n garantarea drepturilor i libertilor ceteneti, regimul Sargsian este n prezent unul competitiv-autoritar, iar pe viitor nu exist anse de transformare a acestuia sau de nlocuire prin alegeri.

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Bibliografie: Aprasizde David, 2009. State-Building and Democratization in Georgia: Have the Limits Been Reached?, n OSCE-Yearbook 2008, IFSH, Hamburg, 63-71. Bader Max, 2008. Fluid Party Politics and the Challenge for Democracy Assistance in Georgia, n Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 2(2), 1-10. Bader Max, 2010. Party politics in Georgia and Ukraine and the Failure of Western Assistance, n Democratization, 17(6), 1085-1107. Chiaberashvili Zurab i Tevzadze Gigi, 2005. Power Elites in Georgia: Old and New, n Fluri H. Cole, Philipp Eden, From Revolution to Reform. Georgias Struggle with Democratic Institution Building and Security Sector Reform, National Defense Academy, Viena, 187-207. Dannreuther Roland (ed.), 2004. European Union Foreign and Security Policy. Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, Routledge, Londra. Fulvio Aitana, Rossi Rossa (ed.), 2004. European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Ecomonic and Social Issue, Jean Monnet Project, Catania. Gould John A. & Carl Sickner, Making Market Democracies? The Contingent Loyalties of Post-privatization Elites in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Serbia, n Review of International Political Economy, 15(5), 740-769. Franke Anja, Gawrich Andrea i Alakbarov Gurban, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States: Resource Incomes and Autocracy as a Double Curse, n PostSoviet Regimes Europe-Asia Studies, 61(1), 109-140. Ishanian Armine, 2008. Democracy Building and Civil Society in Post-Soviet Armenia, Routledge, New York. Ishiyama John, 2008. Political Party Development and Party Gravity in Semi-Authoritarian States. The Cases of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, n Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 4 (1), 33-53.
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Karakhanian, Aghavni, 2003. Political Culture & Democracy Building:The Case of Armenia, n Political Culture Studies, Research & Assessment Branch, Swindon, 3-13. Levistky Steven, Way Luncan, 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Mackinnon Mark, 2007. The New Cold War. Revolutions, Rigged Elections, and Pipeline Politics in the Former Soviet Union, Carroll&Graf Publishers, New York. Nichol Jim, CRS Report Georgia [Republic] Most Recent Developments and US Interests, June 15 2011, http://www. fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-727.pdf, accesat la 18 septembrie 2011. Nichol Jim, CRS Report Georgias January 2008 Presidential Election: Outcome and Implications, January 25, 2008, http://www.opencrs.com/document/RS22794/ accesat la 18 septembrie 2011. Niklas Nilsson, Svante E. Cornell, 2008. Georgias May 2008 Parliamentary Elections Setting Sail in a Storm, http:// www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0805 Georgia.pdf, accesat la 18 septembrie 2011. Nodia Ghia i Pinto Scholtbach lvaro, 2006. The Political Landscape of Georgia, Delft, Eburon. Nodia Ghia (ed.) 2010. Political Forum: 10 Questions on Georgias Political Development, CIPDD, Tbilisi. Nodia Ghia, Dynamics of State Building in Georgia, http:// www.belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2370/dyn amics_of_statebuilding_in_georgia.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fby_type%2Fbook_chapter%3Fpage%3D38, accesat la 18 septembrie 2011. Petrosyan David, 2010. The Political System of Armenia: Form and Content, n Caucasus Analytical Digest, (17), 8-12. Stefes, H. Christoph, Governance, the State and Systemic Corruption: Armenia and Georgia in Comparison, n Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 2(2), 73-83. Timm Christian, 2010. Neopatrimonialism by Default. State Politics and Domination in Georgia after the Rose Revolution,
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German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) http://www.gigahamburg.de/content/fsp1/pdf/neopat/pap er_neopat_workshop_timm.pdf, accesat la 18 septembrie 2011. Svante E. Cornell, 2005. Small Nations and Great Powers. A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Routledge Curzon, New York. Waal de Thomas, 2003. Black Garden Armenia and Azerbaijan Trough Peace and War, New York University Press, New York. Waters Christopher (ed.), 2005. The State of Law in the South Caucasus, Palgrave Macmillan, New York. Commission Staff Working Paper Country Report Georgia, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm, accesat la 5 august 2011. The European Neighbourhood Fishes on Partners, http://www. ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm, accesat la 2 august 2011 Freedom House Country Report Azerbaijan 2006, http://www. freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=390&ye ar=2006, accesat la 12 august 2011. Freedom House Country Report Azerbaijan 2008, http://www. freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=445&ye ar=2008 accesat la 12 august 2011. Freedom House Country Report Azerbaijan 2011, http://www. freedomhouse.org/images/File/nit/2011/NIT-2011Azerbaijan.pdf, accesat la 18 septembrie 2011. Freedom House Country Report Georgia 2005, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=363&year= 2005, accesat la 16 septembrie 2011. Freedom House Country Report Georgia 2006, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&co untry=6967. accesat la 12 august 2011. Freedom House Country Report Georgia 2008, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=452&year= 2008, accesat la 16 septembrie 2011.
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International Crisis Group (ICG), 2010. Azerbaijan Vulnerable Stability. Europe Report 107, 1-32 (http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/azerbaijan/207%20Azerbaijan%20%20Vulnerable%20Stability. ashx, accesat la 18 septembrie 2011). International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Georgia Country Report based on Research and Dialogue with Political Parties. 2006, Stockholm, http:// www.idea.int/parties/upload/Georgia_report.pdf, accesat la 14 septembrie 2011. OSCE, Republic of Armenia Parliamentary Elections 12 May 2007, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/26606, accesat la 12 august 2011. OSCE, Republic of Armenia Presidential Elections 19 February 2008, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/32115, accesat la 12 august 2011. OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan Presidential Elections 15 October 2003, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan/ 13467, accesat la 15 august 2011. OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan Parliamentary Elections 6 November 2005, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan/17946, accesat la 15 august 2011. OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan Parliamentary Elections 7 November 2010, accesat la 15 august 2011. OSCE, Georgia Partial Repeat Parliamentary Elections 28 March 2004, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/34196, accesat la 15 septembrie 2011. OSCE, Georgia Municipal Elections 5 October 2006, http:// www.osce.org/odihr/elections/23510, accesat la 7 august 2011. OSCE a), Georgia Extraordinary Presidential Elections 5 January 2008, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/30959, accesat la 8 august 2011. OSCE b), Georgia Parliamentary Elections 21 May 2008, http:// www.civil.ge/files/files/32898_en.pdf, accesat la 7 august 2011.

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Stanislav Secrieru

Geometrie variabil n aciune: politica extern i de securitate n Caucazul de Sud

Introducere

Acest demers i propune s supun analizei detaliate politica extern i de securitate regional a statelor din Caucazul de Sud la dou decenii de la disoluia Uniunii Sovietice. De la rectigarea independenei au fost propuse mai multe formule tri- sau multilaterale de integrare n Caucazul de Sud, care ns nu s-au materializat. Pe de alt parte, comunitatea academic i politicienii au contestat nsi existena Caucazului de Sud ca regiune. Prin urmare, n prima parte a lucrrii se va realiza radiografia dezbaterii curente asupra regionalitii n Caucazul de Sud. Aceasta va ngloba impactul rzboiului ruso-georgian din 2008 asupra percepiei existenei sau inexistenei Caucazului de Sud ca regiune. Totodat, aceast seciune va descrie mediul macroregional n care evolueaz statele din Caucazul de Sud. Tonul i atmosfera politic n Caucazul de Sud sunt date de dinamica raporturilor intraregionale. A doua parte se va focaliza asupra relaiilor bilaterale dintre cele trei state din Caucazul de Sud. Se va pune accent pe raporturile comerciale, proiectele de infrastructur, conflictele teritoriale nc nesoluionate, percepia public, situaia minoritilor naionale, cooperarea militar, demarcarea frontierelor i alte aspecte care fac parte din agenda bilateral. Prbuirea Uniunii Sovietice a lichidat unipolaritatea n regiune i a multiplicat numrul actorilor capabili s influeneze n mod
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semnificativ evoluiile n Caucazul de Sud. Lund n considerare pluralitatea actorilor cu pondere regional, o parte important a analizei va fi dedicat relaiilor dintre statele din Caucazul de Sud i SUA, UE, Rusia, Turcia i Iran. Prezentul demers analitic va fi ghidat de percepia intraregional. Astfel, n prezentarea dezbaterilor despre regionalitatea Caucazului de Sud, relaiile intraregionale i raporturile cu actorii externi va prima optica celor trei republici, reconstituit preponderent prin intermediul interviurilor realizate cu oficiali i experi din Armenia, Azerbaidjan i Georgia.

I. Problema regionalitii Caucazului de Sud 1.1. De la Transcaucazia la Caucazul de Sud

Transcaucazia, termen precursor al Caucazului de Sud, a fost introdus n limbajul diplomatic al Rusiei ariste la nceputul secolului al XIX-lea. Transcaucazia marca teritoriul controlat de Rusia la sud de Munii Caucazului pn la graniele cu Imperiul Persan i cel Otoman. n cadrul Rusiei ariste, Transcaucazia a fost divizat n 5 gubernii: Tiflis, Baku, Erevan, Kutaisi i Elizavetpol (a se vedea harta 1). Revoluia din 1917 din Rusia arist a declanat procese centrifuge la periferia imperiului. n 1918, Transcaucazia i declar independena i pentru prima dat formeaz o structur politic integrat Republica Democratic Federal Transcaucazian. ns, dup o lun de coexisten, Georgia, Armenia i Azerbaidjan i declar independena. Cele trei state sunt ncorporate militar n Uniunea Sovietic n 1922 sub forma Republicii Sovietice Federale Transcaucaziene. Prin Constituia URSS din 1936, Federaia Transcaucazian este desfiinat i sunt create trei republici unionale, care i pstreaz acest statut pn n 1991 (a se vedea harta 2). Redobndirea independenei de ctre Armenia, Azerbaidjan i Georgia (vezi harta 3) declaneaz dezbaterea cu privire la denumirea i viitorul regiunii. n discursul politic
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i academic sunt vehiculate o serie de formule optimiste de integrare regional: Statele Unite ale Caucazului, Caucazul Casa Comun, Piaa Comun Caucazian. De asemenea, se propun scheme de cooperare 3+1, n care Rusia sau Turcia servesc drept locomotive ale integrrii regionale (Ismailov i Papava, 2007, 13-14). Tot atunci, se fac primii pai pentru a nlocui vechea etichet politico-geografic Transcaucazia. Un oficial i aduce aminte: Ne-a luat patru ani s convingem UE s schimbe limbajul n documentele oficiale din Transcaucazia n Caucazul de Sud1. Treptat, termenul de Caucazul de Sud se afirm n vocabularul diplomatic la nivel internaional i este folosit pe larg de actorii cu interese n regiune, inclusiv Rusia. Declaraia comun a preedinilor Federaiei Ruse, Armeniei i Azerbaidjanului din 2008 face referire explicit la Caucazul de Sud, i nu la Transcaucazia (Prezident Rossii, 2008). Schimbarea terminologic este reflectat la nivelul organizrii birocratice i n politicile promovate de actorii regionali. De exemplu, n 2003 UE a creat un post de Reprezentant special pentru Caucazul de Sud, pstrat dup reorganizrile structurale implementate n baza Tratatului de la Lisabona. n 2005 i 2006 blocarea de ctre Cipru a negocierilor cu privire la planul de aciune UE-Azerbaidjdan a motivat UE s decaleze negocierea planurilor similare cu Georgia i Armenia (Popescu, 2011, 102). n 2008, Turcia a renviat ideea Pactului de stabilitate n Caucazul de Sud lansat n anii 90, de aceast dat sub umbrela Platformei de stabilitate i cooperare n Caucaz n formatul 3+2 (Rusia, Turcia, Armenia, Azerbaidjan i Georgia).

1.2. Este Caucazul de Sud o regiune?

Utilizarea conceptului la nivel internaional a evoluat n paralel cu afirmarea curentului puternic de negare a regionalitii Caucazului de Sud. Un expert explic: Geografic
1

Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.

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Harta 3 Armenia, Azerbaidjan i Georgia n perioada postsovietic (sursa: RFE/RL 2002) Harta 1 Transcaucazia n componena Rusiei ariste (sursa: Andrew Andersen 2003/2007)

noi suntem o regiune, dar asta nu e suficient [] n epoca globalizrii regiunile se construiesc.2 Or, n termeni de cooperare economic, politic sau militar trilateral Caucazul de Sud este paralizat. Proiectele de infrastructur care s includ toate cele trei state lipsesc, iar coordonarea poziiilor pe plan extern n format trilateral este de neconceput. Nu exist nici umbrela integrat de securitate. Statele din regiune apeleaz la diveri actori regionali pentru a-i garanta securitatea militar.3 Aadar, dac comparm Caucazul de Sud cu zona baltic, atunci Caucazul de Sud nu este o regiune4, concluzioneaz un alt expert. Indubitabil, transformarea Caucazului de Sud ntr-o regiune funcional dup modelul european rmne mai mult un deziderat dect o realitate. Tentativele UE de a iniia cooperarea regional nu au produs efectele scontate. Lansat de UE n 2010, programul Management integrat al frontierei n Caucazul de Sud se realizeaz bilateral ntre Georgia i Armenia, pe de o parte,
2 3 4

Harta 2 Caucazul de Sud n componena URSS (sursa: Wikipedia)

Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

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i ntre Georgia i Azerbaidjan, pe de alt parte. La scar redus, se implementeaz proiecte trilaterale n domeniul mediului nconjurtor, finanate de UE. ns n cele mai multe cazuri soluiile unilaterale sau bilaterale prevaleaz. Aa cum a mrturisit un oficial referindu-se la un dosar care implic cele trei state: Noi nu avem timp s ateptm Georgia sau Armenia [...], noi vom soluiona problema de sine stttor.5 Dei au loc contacte la nivelul societilor civile, intensitatea acestora a sczut dup 2007.6 Printre puinele proiecte trilaterale n curs de realizare este programul care faciliteaz comunicarea ntre tinerii din regiune i prin care acetia nva s conceap i s dezvolte proiecte locale i transfrontaliere (Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009a). Contestarea regionalitii Caucazului de Sud i a oricror perspective de viitor regional se face i ntr-o alt dimensiune. Observatorii din regiune au remarcat c statelor din Caucazul de Sud le lipsete o identitate regional, sau n cel mai bun caz, aceasta este subdezvoltat. Viziunea cu privire la Caucazul de Sud nu exist n societatea noastr7, observ un expert din Armenia. Ataamentul fa de regiune n Azerbaidjan este destul de redus [deoarece] identitatea noastr include, pe lng elementele caucaziene, pe cele caspice i orientale8, remarc un formator de opinie din Azerbaidjan. Relativa izolare a Armeniei n regiune i asumarea de ctre Azerbaidjan a rolului de pod ntre Vest i Est dilueaz sensul apartenenei acestor state la Caucazul de Sud. De asemenea, obiectivele de politic extern i imperativele dezvoltrii interne mobilizeaz statele s caute soluii extraregionale. Georgia este de departe cel mai activ stat din regiune la capitolul tentativelor de evadare din regiune. nc din a doua jumtate a anilor 90 Georgia a
5 6 7 8

dezvoltat profilul de stat la Marea Neagr. Dup valuri consecutive de extindere a NATO i UE Georgia a dublat eforturile pentru a se desprinde de Caucazul de Sud perceput ca o regiune cu un handicap de imagine imens (Nilsson, 2009, 100), i a se altura proiectului occidental n construcie zona lrgit a Mrii Negre (Asmus i Jackson, 2004). Noi am ncercat s redefinim identitatea noastr, punnd accent pe plasamentul nostru de la Marea Neagr9, explic un expert. Pentru autoritile de la Tbilisi, migrarea spre zona lrgit a Mrii Negre nseamn prsirea Caucazului i o etap intermediar n apropierea i conectarea instituional la Occident. ns rzboiul ruso-georgian din 2008 a nruit aceste sperane i a determinat schimbarea de optic la Tbilisi. Georgia ncearc s profite de pe urma Parteneriatul Estic pentru a se poziiona ca un stat din Europa de Est. Important de observat este c noul discurs are att o component regional, ct i una individualist. Caucazul de Sud face parte din Europa de Est [...], de ce se face distincie n cadrul Parteneriatului Estic ntre Caucazul de Sud i celelalte state?10, ntreab un oficial guvernamental. n termeni de performan [la integrare european], Georgia este mult mai aproape de Ucraina i Moldova11, adaug reprezentantul guvernului, introducnd n acelai timp n ecuaie elemente de difereniere n raport cu celelalte republici din Caucazul de Sud. Se pare c n urmtoarea perioad Georgia se va inspira pe larg din povestea de evadare din Balcanii de Vest i integrarea (prognozat) Croaiei n UE.12 Concluzionnd, tabra pesimitilor anticipeaz c blocajul la nivelul cooperrii trilaterale i orientrile externe divergente ale statelor vor stimula dispersarea a ceea ce a mai rmas din regiune, astfel nct ntr-o perioad de 15-20
9 10 11 12

Interviu Interviu Interviu Interviu

cu cu cu cu

un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011. experi, Erevan, iunie 2011. un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011. un exepert, Baku, iunie 2011.

Interviu Interviu Interviu Interviu

cu cu cu cu

un un un un

expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011. oficial, Tbilisi, iunie 2011. oficial, Tbilisi, iunie 2011. expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.

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de ani termenul de Caucazul de Sud, o inerie postsovietic, nu va mai avea nici o valoare descriptiv.13

1.3. Caucazul de Sud un complex subregional de securitate

Dei reflect n mod obiectiv realitatea regional, contestatarii regionalitii Caucazului de Sud omit dou aspecte: pluralitatea regionalismelor i impactul rzboiului ruso-georgian din 2008. Aadar, negarea regionalitii Caucazului de Sud pornete de la accepiunea restrns a conceptului de regiune, care face posibil existena unei regiuni, la nivel teoretic i practic, doar sub forma comunitii de securitate caracterizat printr-un grad nalt de integrare i eliminarea violenei ca soluie la problemele din interiorul comunitii (Deutsch, 2006, 41-42). Comunitatea transatlantic este un exemplu clasic n literatura de specialitate. Prin urmare comparaia Caucazului de Sud cu Regiunea Baltic, ultima fiind parte component a comunitii transatlantice, nu este una ntmpltoare. ns comunitatea de securitate este un tip ideal i cu aplicaie geografic destul de limitat. n relaiile internaionale, regionalismul se poate manifesta n diverse forme. Printre formulele mai puin benigne figureaz regionalismul disfuncional i regionalismul geopolitic. n cadrul acestora, statele au euat n a dezvolta o cooperare regional solid, iar regiunea este n centrul unei rivaliti pentru sfere de influen care implic puteri regionale (Emerson, 2008, 2-4). Dac depim concepia idealist cu privire la regiune i acceptm faptul c integrarea nu este singurul criteriu pentru determinarea regionalitii i c interdependena poate fi nu doar pozitiv, ci i una negativ, atunci Caucazul de Sud este o regiune. Conceptul de complex de securitate, elaborat n literatura de specialitate consacrat securitii internaionale, ofer o platform analitic comprehensiv care ncapsuleaz modele cooperative i disfuncionale de
13

regionalism i, prin urmare, poate fi extrem de util n studiul regionalitii n Caucazul de Sud (Buzan i Weaver, 2003, 419-423; Simao i Freire, 2008, 225-226). Prin complex de securitate se nelege existena unui grup de state ale cror percepii i preocupri majore cu privire la securitate sunt interconectate n aa msur, nct problemele lor de securitate naional nu pot fi analizate sau soluionate separat una fa de cealalt (Buzan, Weaver i De Wilde, 1998, 12). Trebuie precizat c autorii acestei construcii analitice ader la interpretarea extensiv a securitii naionale care include, dincolo de tradiionalul sector politico-militar, securitatea ecologic, economic i societal (ibidem, 198-199). Privit prin aceast lentil teoretic, Caucazul de Sud este un complex subregional de securitate. Acesta este definit de o relaie de inamiciie ntre Armenia i Azerbaidjan i o serie de raporturi sectoriale de prietenie pragmatic i/sau competiie situaional ntre Georgia i Armenia i ntre Georgia i Azerbaidjan. De exemplu, securitatea Azerbaidjanului n domeniul gestionrii fluxurilor de ap i calitii acesteia depind de cooperarea cu Georgia i Armenia state riverane in amonte pentru rurile Kura i Aras, care curg spre Azerbaidjan. Securitatea energetic a Georgiei nu poate fi asigurat fr Azerbaidjan, iar un eventual rzboi ntre Armenia i Azerbaidjan va submina semnificativ securitatea economic a Georgiei. La rndul su, sigurana tranzitului terestru prin Georgia este vital pentru economia Armeniei i (ntr-o msur mai mic) cea a Azerbaidjanului. Aceast niruire poate continua. Factori obiectivi care leag aceast regiune cu geometrii variabile (statele fac parte selectiv din CSI, OTSC, OCEMN sau GUAM14; intensitatea relaiilor cu UE i NATO de asemenea variaz) au impact asupra percepiilor i calculelor strategice cu privire la managementul
CSI Comunitatea Statelor Independente; OTCS Organizaia Tratatului de Securitate Colectiv; OCEMN Organizaia Cooperrii Economice a Mrii Negre; GUAM Georgia-Ucraina-Azerbaidjan-Moldova.
14

Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

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securitii naionale. Armenia i Azerbaidjan urmresc foarte atent raporturile pe care fiecare stat le dezvolt cu NATO. Dac astzi se prezint reprezentantul Armeniei i solicit cooperarea ntr-un anumit sector, e foarte probabil ca mine s primim o solicitare similar din partea Azerbaidjanului [...] i vice versa15, mrturisete un oficial. Confirmarea corelrii la nivel regional a deciziilor de cooperare cu NATO o gsim n motivarea deciziei Armeniei de a tripla contingentul forelor de meninere a pcii n Afganistan n 2011. Potrivit ministrului Aprrii, Armenia nu trebuie s fie ultima n Caucazul de Sud la acest [prezena militar n Afganistan] capitol (Massis Post, 2011). ncercarea de a reintegra militar Osetia de Sud n Georgia a fost perceput negativ n Armenia. Vzut de la Erevan, un eventual succes al Georgiei ar ncuraja Azerbaidjanul i ar spori ansele unei soluii militare n Nagorno-Karabah.16 La fel, Georgia, gazda unui numr semnificativ de persoane strmutate intern (PSI) urmrete cu atenie negocierile ntre Azerbaidjan i Armenia, n special soluia la care cele dou pri vor ajunge cu privire la PSI din Nagorno-Karabah. Acestea sunt doar cteva preocupri suprapuse ale statelor din zon care demonstreaz existena unui complex subregional de securitate n Caucazul de Sud. Aadar, n ciuda accentelor divergente n politica extern i de securitate a statelor din regiune, exist un grad sporit de interdependen. Dependena reciproc n Caucazul de Sud nu este mereu una pozitiv, dar acest fapt nu infirm existena regiunii, ci descrie natura legturilor regionale. Probabil comparaia cu Balcanii de Vest este mult mai indicat atunci cnd cutm exemple similare de regionalism pentru Caucazul de Sud. Aceast opinie o mprtesc unii politicieni i analiti din zon. Caucazul de Sud reprezint al doilea focar de probleme dup Balcani17, declar un
15 16 17

oficial de la Baku. Exist o serie de similitudini, precum istoria dominaiei imperiale, memoria rzboiului, ncercrile de a se debarasa de eticheta regional, care fac Caucazul de Sud comparabil cu Balcanii de Vest18, observ un expert de la Tbilisi. n pofida tentativelor de a prsi regiunea, statele au fost forate s revin n Caucazul de Sud dup rzboiul ruso-georgian. Pn n 2008 regiunea era pe cale de dezintegrare, [ns] rzboiul din Georgia a schimbat aceast dinamic, fornd statele s i refocalizeze atenia asupra regiunii19, explic un influent analist local. n consecin, rzboiul a readus contiina i gndirea regional. Georgia a deteriorat atmosfera n regiune20, declar tranant un expert din regiune cu referire la conflictul armat ruso-georgian. Rzboiul din 2008 a schimbat n negativ percepia despre Caucazul de Sud n Europa i n lume21, l completeaz alt observator. Confruntarea armat din 2008 a scos n eviden ameninrile regionale la adresa securitii europene, dei Caucazul de Sud prezint multiple oportuniti pentru Europa. Acest deficit de imagine a afectat toate statele din regiune. n cercurile academice se ncearc depirea handicapului de imagine prin schimbarea etichetelor. De pild, doi autori consacrai ntr-un studiu detaliat dedicat regiunii argumenteaz c cele trei state caucaziene fac parte din Caucazul Central, i nu din Caucazul de Sud (Ismailov i Papava, 2008, 287-289). De observat c logica de argumentare este aproape identic cu cea a statelor din Europa de Est la mijlocul anilor 90, care doreau sa fie ncadrate politic i economic n Europa Central. De asemenea, n 2008, rile din Caucazul de Sud au redescoperit vulnerabilitatea i interconectarea regional. Statele au sporit monitorizarea activitii vecinilor i i-au ajustat strategiile de securitate lund n calcul mediul
18 19 20 21

Interviu cu un oficial NATO. Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.

Interviu Interviu Interviu Interviu

cu cu cu cu

un un un un

expert, expert, expert, expert,

Tbilisi, mai 2011. Erevan, iunie 2011. Baku, iunie 2011. Tbilisi, iunie 2011.

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regional modificat. Integrarea accelerat a Georgiei n NATO a euat, ceea ce a determinat Tbilisi s promoveze o politic extern regional mai echilibrat. Sistarea temporar a tranzitului comercial prin Georgia n august 2008 a grbit negocierile Armeniei cu Turcia n vederea normalizrii relaiilor bilaterale. Rzboiul din Georgia a diminuat interesul Azerbaidjanului fa de NATO i a introdus noi elemente n politica energetic. Totodat, discursul politic a fost adaptat la realitatea post-conflict. Rentoarcerea Georgiei n regiune a fost anunat de preedintele Georgiei: Caucazul trebuie s se uneasc (Grigoryan, 2009). Prin urmare, el a resuscitat ideea Caucazul, Cas Comun. n opinia sa, aceasta ar trebui s ia forma unei uniuni trilaterale care s fie capabil s creioneze o strategie politic i economic regional (Ghazinyan, 2011). Ideea a fost preluat de societatea civil. Noi dorim realizarea conceptului Caucazul Cas Comun sub auspiciile UE22, declar entuziast un reprezentant al mass-media. Au fost introduse nuane economice n discursul politic. Astfel, preedintele Azerbaidjanului a declarat c economia Azerbaidjanului reprezint 75% din economia Caucazului de Sud (News.Az, 2010), iar preedintele Georgiei a descris Tbilisi drept capitala Caucazului (Civil.Ge, 2011a). Fr ndoial, Caucazul, Cas Comun rmne n mare parte doar un exerciiu retoric, iar datele cu privire la volumul economiei Azerbaidjanului fac parte din jocul de intimidare la distan ntre Armenia i Azerbaidjan. ns aspectele regionale ale discursului i mai cu seam ajustarea politicilor statelor din regiune dup 2008 demonstreaz c afirmaiile cu privire la irelevana conceptului de Caucazul de Sud sunt premature.

se dezvolt. Dinamica intraregional n Caucazul de Sud nu face excepie. n virtutea poziionrii geografice a Caucazului de Sud, impactul mediului regional asupra statelor este probabil mai mare dect n cazul altor regiuni (a se vedea harta 4). Fiind la intersecia ctorva complexe regionale de securitate, fiecare stat n parte, dar i Caucazul de Sud ca regiune, resimt din plin ocurile politice, crizele economice sau ascensiunea unor actori regionali n vecintatea imediat. n literatura de specialitate, un complex sub-regional de securitate care se afl la intersecia unor complexe regionale de securitate i procese de securitate paralele la nivel macroregional este catalogat drept izolator (Buzan i Weaver, 2003, 490). Aadar, fiind un punct unde se ntlnesc logici concurente de securitate pe plan regional, preocuprile de securitate ale statelor din Caucazul de Sud nu pot fi nelese izolat de contextul eurasiatic.

1.4. Caucazul de Sud n contextul eurasiatic

Raporturile interstatale nu se desfoar ntr-un vacuum politic, militar i economic. Ineria unor raporturi bilaterale este mereu influenat de contextul regional n care acestea
22

Interviu cu un reprezentant al mass-media, Baku, iunie 2011.

Harta 4 Caucazul de Sud n contextul eurasiatic (sursa: Caspian Studies Program, Harvard University 2006)

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1.4.1. Nord
La nord, Caucazul de Sud se nvecineaz cu districtul federal nord-caucazian i cel sudic al Federaiei Ruse (a se vedea harta 5). Caucazul de Nord este una din cele mai importante provocri la adresa securitii naionale a Rusiei. Republicile din Caucazul de Nord se confrunt cu violene aproape zilnice de intensitate mic i medie, rate mari de omaj (n unele cazuri depesc 50%), corupie sistemic i srcie. Autoritile de la Moscova mizeaz pe stabilitatea situaional asigurat prin alocarea fondurilor federale i militarizarea regiunii. De pild, bugetele Republicii Cecene sau Inguetiei sunt acoperite n proporie de 91% din alocaii federale (Grove, 2011). Infuzia de bani asigur loialitatea elitelor regionale. ns modul netrasparent de distribuire a acestora exacerbeaz fenomenul corupiei. Rusia a dislocat n regiune un contingent de circa 88.000 militari din diverse structuri de for (Nichol, 2011, 13) pentru a face fa insurgenei. Prezena militar terestr este ntrit prin dou baze militare ale flotilei caspice n Kaspiisk i Mahacikala. n 2011, Ministerul de Interne a trimis n Daghestan fore adiionale pentru a contracara campania de primvar a rebelilor. Situaia exploziv din Caucazul de Nord i militarizarea regiunii afecteaz n mod direct securitatea statelor din Caucazul de Sud. Calea ferat i conducta de gaze care leag Daghestanul de Azerbaidjan a fost deseori inta atentatelor teroriste. De asemenea, au fost nregistrate cazuri de traversare a frontierei n direcia Azerbaidjanului de ctre rebeli din Daghestan. Rusia acuz sistematic Georgia de gzduirea i protejarea rebelilor din Caucazul de Nord n defileul Kodori. Trebuie menionat c Kremlinul a continuat s acuze Georgia i dup preluarea controlului asupra defileului Kodori de ctre miliiile abhaze cu ajutorul trupelor regulate ruse. Nu n ultimul rnd, Armata a 58-a, dislocat n Caucazul de Nord, a constituit nucleul forelor armate ruseti care au participat n 2008 la rzboiul ruso-georgian.
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Harta 5 Caucazul de Sud i cel de Nord (sursa: Wikitravel)

Krasnodarskii krai este singura unitate administrativ n componena districtului federal sud care se nvecineaz cu Caucazul de Sud, mai exact cu regiunea separatist din Georgia Abhazia. Krasnodarskii krai gzduiete cel mai important port rusesc de la Marea Neagr Novorossiisk, care anterior nelegerilor ruso-ucrainene de la Harkov din 2010, era considerat o alternativ la baza flotei ruseti de la Sevastopol. Strategia insurgenilor presupune extinderea frontului din Caucazul de Nord n regiunile populate de etnici rui. Astfel, Krasnodarskii krai, vecin direct cu republicile caucaziene, import insecuritate din Caucazul de Nord. n ultimul deceniu, au avut loc o serie de atentate teroriste n aceast regiune. n acelai timp, desemnarea oraului Soci ca gazd a Jocurilor Olimpice de iarn din 2014 sporete pericolul comiterii atentatelor teroriste de proporii n Krasnodarskii krai. Explozia la calea ferat de lng Soci n 2010 confirm cele mai pesimiste predicii. Utilizarea infrastructurii i resurselor naturale ale Abhaziei n vederea pregtirii pentru Jocurile Olimpice din 2014 alimenteaz tensiuni la nivel regional ntre Rusia i Georgia.
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Problemele de securitate n Caucazul de Nord trebuie puse n contextul ambiiilor regionale ale Rusiei. Kremlinul, n mod tradiional, a considerat vital prezena militar n Caucazul de Sud pentru meninerea controlului asupra Caucazului de Nord. Aceast gndire este determinat de istoria cuceririi Caucazului. Din punct de vedere cronologic, Rusia arist mai nti a ocupat Caucazul de Sud n urma confruntrii directe cu alte puteri regionale. Abia dup ce a asigurat controlul asupra teritoriului de la sud de Munii Caucaz, Rusia a declanat campania decisiv pentru cucerirea integral a Caucazului de Nord (regiunile de est i vest), care s-a ncheiat n a doua jumtate a secolului al XIX-lea (Trenin, 2009, 143). Legtura ntre Caucazul de Sud i de Nord n gndirea strategic rus s-a reflectat parial n logica aciunilor din 2008. Pe lng subminarea poziiilor SUA n regiune i prevenirea extinderii NATO n Caucazul de Sud, intervenia militar a trimis un semnal ferm republicilor din Caucazul de Nord (ibidem, 149). Aadar, vulnerabilitatea obiectiv n Caucazul de Nord i ambiia de a avea o sfer de influen n spaiul post-sovietic motiveaz aspiraia Rusiei de a fi principalul gestionar al securitii n Caucaz (ibidem, 154).

1.4.2. Est
Caucazul de Sud este flancat la est de Marea Caspic i la vest de Marea Neagr. Aceast poziie geografic n combinaie cu vastele resurse energetice din regiunea Caspic confer Caucazului de Sud funcia de important nod energetic n Eurasia. Marea Caspic servete drept legtur ntre Caucazul de Sud i Asia Central, n special cu dou republici post-sovietice, Kazahstan i Turkmenistan. Cele dou state sunt guvernate de regimuri autoritare consolidate (Freedom House, 2011), care i asigur supravieuirea nu n ultimul rnd prin intermediul politicii externe multivectoriale. Preedintele Nazarbaev este de 19 ani la crma rii (egalat doar de preedintele Uzbekistanului, Karimov), fiind
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cel mai longeviv lider n spaiul postsovietic. n aprilie 2011, Nazarbaev a fost reales pentru un nou mandat de cinci ani. n Turkmenistan, decesul subit al preedintelui Niazov n 2006 a fcut posibil, tranziia de putere, dup 15 ani de la declararea independenei, care ns nu a schimbat natura autoritar a regimului. Kazahstan i Turkmenistan sunt petro-statele cu cele mai mari rezerve de hidrocarburi n Asia Central. Rusia i China ncearc s monopolizeze importul de gaze naturale i petrol din regiunea caspic: Rusia pentru a le distribui apoi n UE i statele post-sovietice din Europa de Est, China pentru a satisface consumul intern n continu cretere. Pe de alt parte, Iranul, prin poziia rigid cu privire la statutul juridic al Mrii Caspice, sper s blocheze proiectele transcaspice de interes major pentru securitatea energetic a UE. De asemenea, disputa azero-turkmen cu privire la delimitarea sectoarelor naionale n Marea Caspic mpiedic realizarea conductei de gaze transcaspice. n ciuda tuturor acestor obstacole, Kazahstanul (din 2008) i Turkmenistanul (din 2010) au nceput s livreze petrol n Europa prin oleoductul BakuTbilisi-Ceihan (BTC). Kazahstanul mai folosete ruta adiional de export prin portul georgian Batumi. Legtura maritim ntre Azerbaidjan, Turkmenistan i Kazahstan este asigurat prin curse regulate cu feribotul: Baku-Turkmenbai i Baku-Aktau. Arterele de transport care leag Georgia i Azerbaidjan cu Kazahstanul i Turkmenistanul fac parte din reeaua de distribuie nordic care aprovizioneaz forele NATO i SUA n Afganistan. Cu toate acestea, Rusia i Iranul dein n continuare supremaia militar naval la Marea Caspic.

1.4.3. Vest
Marea Neagr este unica legtur direct a Caucazului de Sud cu UE i NATO. Ultimul val de extindere a transformat UE ntr-o putere la Marea Neagr. n acelai timp, extinderea din 2004 a mrit prezena NATO n regiune.
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Noua stare de fapt pe de o parte, i interesele statelor nou venite pe de alt parte, au declanat procesul de formulare a politicilor n regiunea Mrii Negre. n consecin, UE a lansat dou iniiative care acoper aceast arie: Sinergia Mrii Negre (2007) i Parteneriatul Estic (2009). n 2011, Parlamentul European a adoptat strategia UE pentru regiunea Mrii Negre. Dei au existat iniiative de a elabora o strategie similar a NATO i pn atunci, acestea au fost barate n ultim instan de Turcia.23 Romnia i Bulgaria sunt democraii semiconsolidate (Freedom House, 2011) cu interese economice n Caucazul de Sud. Imperativele de securitate energetic au determinat cele dou state s se alture proiectului gazoductului Nabucco i s dezvolte relaii economice i politice apropiate cu Azerbaidjan i Georgia. Primatul intereselor economice explic pasivitatea Bulgariei i Romniei n promovarea agendei democratice n Georgia i Azerbaidjan. Pe lng noii membri ai UE, din regiunea Mrii Negre fac parte dou state cu aspiraii europene, Ucraina i Moldova. Cele dou ri riverane sunt guvernate de regimuri politice hibride (Freedom House 2011) i au cele mai avansate relaii cu UE din grupul rilor Parteneriatului Estic. n scopul accelerrii integrrii europene, ntre Ucraina, Moldova i Georgia are loc un schimb intens de experien la diferite nivele n privina implementrii reformelor i purtrii negocierilor cu UE. Din regiunea Mrii Negre mai fac parte doi actori care n mare msur determin dinamica de securitate n zon Turcia i Rusia. n ultimul deceniu, relaiile politice, militare i economice ntre Moscova i Ankara au cunoscut o traiectorie ascendent. Schimburile comerciale bilaterale au crescut substanial, Rusia devenind al doilea partener comercial al Turciei dup UE (EU Commission, 2011a). Cele dou state au eliminat vizele pentru cltoriile de scurt durat i au creat Consiliul de Cooperare Strategic la Nivel nalt. De asemenea, Turcia
23

este printre puinele state membre NATO care a achiziionat armament de producie ruseasc. Apropierea ruso-turc nu este ns fr precedent n istoria recent. n anii 70, Turcia i URSS au avut o perioad de nclzire a relaiilor politice i economice bilaterale, care s-a datorat, nu n ultimul rnd, tensiunilor ntre cei doi aliai, SUA i Turcia (Altunisik i Tur, 2005, 108). mbuntirea relaiilor ruso-turce n anii 2000 s-a produs pe fondul deteriorrii relaiilor turco-americane, marcate de campania militar a SUA n Irak i planurile Washingtonului de internaionalizare a Mrii Negre. Acest dinamic a grbit formarea n regiunea Mrii Negre a condominiului ruso-turc informal orientat spre meninerea statu quo-ului regional (Socor, 2009; Triantaphyllou, 2009, 232). Drept urmare, Turcia s-a opus extinderii operaiunii NATO Active Endeavour n Marea Neagr i a aprobat o prezen militar limitat a NATO n Marea Neagr pe durata conflictului ruso-georgian din 2008 (Lesser, 2011, 2-3). Acest alian tactic ns nu este lipsit de interese divergente i competiie n Caucazul de Sud, fapt demonstrat de reacia Rusiei la tentativele de normalizare a relaiilor turco-armene (Torbakov, 2010).

1.4.4. Sud
n sud, Caucazul se nvecineaz cu dou puteri din Orientul Mijlociu, Iran i Turcia, ultima fiind i o putere regional european. Iranul este un vecin incomod (nu i pentru Armenia), dar, n acelai timp, un partener necesar pentru statele din Caucazul de Sud. Programul nuclear i instabilitatea politic intern n Iran alimenteaz starea de incertitudine n regiune. Teheranul urmrete cel puin patru obiective n Caucazul de Sud: prevenirea perceputei ncercuiri de ctre Occident, garantarea neutralitii statelor n caz de conflict armat cu SUA, spargerea izolrii internaionale i legitimarea regimului politic, sporirea influenei regionale prin proiectarea puterii blnde i expansiunea economic. Coerena politicii regionale a Iranului e afectat
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Interviu cu un oficial NATO.

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de diviziunile n cadrul regimului de la Teheran i problema succesiunii generate de alegerile prezideniale din 2009 i protestele de mas ce le-au urmat (Nader, Thaler i Bohandy, 2011). De pild, vizita preedintelui Ahmadinejad n Armenia n 2011 a fost anulat nu doar din motive externe invocate oficial de Teheran, dar i de ordin intern. Interdicia de a prsi ara impus n ajunul vizitei unor oficiali de rang nalt din anturajul preedintelui i intenia lui Ahmadinejad de a nu ceda n faa presiunilor ayatollahului Khamenei se pare c au contribuit la decizia de a reprograma vizita la Erevan.24 Turcia a trecut prin transformri interne majore n anii 2000. Ratele de cretere economic ridicate i stagnarea negocierilor de aderare la UE au contribuit la auto-ncredere, o politic extern independent i o strategie activ n vecintatea imediat a rii (Tocci, 2011). Politica turc regional zero probleme cu vecinii a consolidat poziiile politice i economice ale Turciei n Orientul Mijlociu, Balcanii de Vest, Caucazul de Sud i regiunea caspic (Akyol, 2011). Discursul premierului Recep Erdogan dup ctigarea alegerilor n 2011, n timpul cruia el s-a adresat populaiei din Damasc, Sarajevo i Baku, confirm continuitatea politicii regionale ambiioase a Turciei. Caucazul de Sud este important n viziunea Turciei pentru transformarea rii ntr-un major nod energetic eurasiatic. Rzboiul rusogeorgian, care a pus n pericol aceste planuri, a impulsionat implicarea mai activ a Turciei n dosarele de securitate regional. Normalizarea relaiilor cu Armenia era perceput ca un pas care ar putea redesena arhitectura regional i multiplica prghiile de influen ale Turciei n Caucazul de Sud. Dei a nregistrat succese notabile, politica de vecintate a Turciei se confrunt cu dou provocri majore: pstrarea balanei ntre competiia i cooperarea cu Rusia i gestionarea consecinelor politice i economice ale revoluiilor din lumea arab. Nu n ultimul rnd, regimurile politice din
24

Caucazul de Sud au urmrit cu mare preocupare revirimentul democratic din rile arabe. Declanarea campaniei de combatere a corupiei n Azerbaidjan i dialogul ntre putere i opoziie n Armenia au coincis cu valul revoluionar din Orientul Mijlociu, confirmnd expunerea Caucazului de Sud la procesele de democratizare care au loc n vecintate.

II. Dinamica intraregional n Caucazul de Sud

Starea de conflict ntre Armenia i Azerbaidjan transform Georgia ntr-un stat pivot n Caucazul de Sud. Singurele relaii stabile n regiune, pe care le au cele dou pri angajate n conflictul din Nagorno-Karabah sunt cu Georgia. Pe de alt parte, poziia cheie a Georgiei n regiune impune autoritilor de la Tbilisi pstrarea unui echilibru subtil n raporturile cu Armenia i Azerbaidjan.

2.1 Armenia-Azerbaidjan: pace improbabil, rzboi posibil

ntre Armenia i Azerbaidjan nu exist relaii diplomatice, grania este nchis i nu exist comunicare direct terestr sau pe calea aerului. Zborul ntre cele dou capitale se face cu escal la Moscova, Kiev sau Istanbul. Cu toate c unii oficiali afirm c ntre Armenia i Azerbaidjan are loc comerul prin teri25, cel mai probabil prin Georgia, este extrem de dificil de verificat i de cuantificat volumul acestuia. Singurul loc confirmat din Georgia unde avea loc comerul ntre armeni i azeri a fost satul Sadahlo la grania ntre Armenia i Georgia, nu foarte departe de punctul unde frontiera celor trei state din Caucazul de Sud se intersecteaz (Poghosyan, 2011). ns piaa din Sadahlo a fost nchis n 2005. Exist interaciune limitat ntre ONG-urile din cele dou ri, ns nivelul de cooperare a sczut dup 2005.26 ntlnirile au loc, de regul, n Georgia sau n Armenia, deoarece este mai dificil de organizat activiti de
25 26

Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un reprezentant mass-media, Baku, iunie 2011.

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acest gen n Azerbaidjan.27 Participanii armeni la Baku sau azeri la Erevan beneficiaz de protecia personal, iar paapoartele nu sunt tampilate la intrarea i ieirea din ar, astfel nct nu exist dovada c ei au vizitat vreodat Armenia sau Azerbaidjanul.28 Tentativele de a reconecta cele dou societi prin dialog cultural sunt blocate de cele mai multe ori. n 2010, un ONG din Armenia a avut iniiativa de a organiza sptmna filmului azer n Armenia, ns, n ciuda msurilor oganizatorice preliminare, evenimentul nu a avut loc (Grigoryan, 2010). Ctigarea finalei concursului Eurovision 2011 de ctre Azerbaidjan a declanat o dezbatere public ampl n Armenia cu privire la eventuala participare sau neparticipare la ediia Eurovison 2012. Relaiile conflictuale ntre Armenia i Azerbaidjan sunt rezultatul rzboiului purtat ntre cele dou state la nceputul anilor 90 pentru Nagorno-Karabah, care pn la disoluia Uniunii Sovietice a fost n componena Azerbaidjanului. n prezent Armenia controleaz Nagorno-Karabah i alte apte regiuni (dou parial) ale Azerbaidjanului n jurul enclavei (vezi harta 6).29 Prin urmare, Azerbaidjanul nu controleaz n jur de 14% din teritoriul su recunoscut internaional (Waal, 2003, 286). n Armenia, cele apte regiuni ale Azerbaidjanului sunt numite teritorii eliberate i servesc dou obiective strategice: asigur legtura ntre Nagorno-Karabah i Armenia i asigur spaiul necesar pentru aprarea avansat a Nagorno-Karabahului. De asemenea, la Erevan, nu este exclus posibilitatea folosirii regiunilor (cu excepia Lacinului i Kelbajarului, care separ Armenia de Nagorno-Karabah) drept moned de schimb n negocierile asupra viitorului statut al Nagorno-Karabahului i a unor garanii de securitate credibile. Pe lng distrugerea infrastructurii i numeroase victime, rzboiul a generat
Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011. 29 Cele apte regiuni sunt: Kelbajar, Lacin, Kubatli, Jebrail, Zanghelan, Agdam i Fizuli.
28 27

aproximativ 600.000 de PSI n Azerbaidjan. Potrivit organizaiilor non-guvernamentale internaionale, Azerbaidjanul se afl n topul primelor 10 ri din lume cu cea mai mare rat de PSI pe cap de locuitor (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2011).

Harta 6 Nagorno-Karabah i alte apte regiuni ocupate ale Azerbaidjanului (sursa: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Londra, 2011)

De iure, cele dou ri sunt n stare de rzboi. Operaiunile militare au fost sistate n 1994 n urma semnrii armistiiului de la Bikek. Azerbaidjanul s-a opus desfurrii forelor de meninere a pcii ruse pe linia frontului. Astfel, respectarea acordului de ncetare a focului cade n sarcina prilor beligerante. Dei din 1994 n zona de conflict nu au avut loc confruntri militare de proporii, prile sunt angajate sistematic n schimburi de focuri. Violena de mic intensitate numit de unii experi rzboiul lunetitilor30 s-a soldat cu 3000 de victime din 1994 pn n 2009 (International Crisis Group, 2009, 1). n ultimii trei ani, violarea armistiiului a devenit o practic mai frecvent, sporind probabilitatea reizbucnirii conflictului armat (International Crisis Group, 2011a). Aa cum remarc un expert din regiune scopul eforturilor diplomatice la nivel
30

Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

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nalt n acest an [2011] a fost mai degrab prevenirea rzboiului dect identificarea unei soluii pentru conflict.31 Nagorno-Karabah este principala problem de politic extern i de securitate a Azerbaidjanului. Potrivit sondajelor de opinie, conflictul cu Armenia este cea mai important preocupare pentru 51% din cetenii Azerbaidjanului (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). n acelai timp, problema pcii (implicit conflictul cu Azerbaidjanul) ocup doar locul trei cu 9%, dup omaj (46%) i srcie (10%), n topul preocuprilor cetenilor Armeniei (Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 2010). Aceast diferen poate fi explicat prin: Azerbaidjanul este perdantul rzboiului din 1992-1994; petrodolarii distribuii diverselor categorii sociale n mod relativ atenueaz, n percepia public, efectele corupiei i omajului, care urmeaz n lista preocuprilor; guvernul de la Baku controleaz strns spaiul public i, prin urmare, instrumentalizeaz eficient conflictul cu Armenia pentru a preveni n dezbaterea public primordialitatea problemelor de ordin intern asupra celor generate extern. Pe de alt parte, sondajul din Armenia arat c armenii se simt mult mai confortabil cu actualul statu quo pe linia frontului, dar n acelai timp resimt mai puternic efectele conflictului, care, parial, este responsabil pentru situaia economic dificil. Totodat, rezultatele sondajului n Armenia arat c sistemul politic este mai deschis n comparaie cu cel din Azerbaidjan, iar societatea depete lent logica fortreei asediate. n consecin, n prim plan ies problemele care afecteaz viaa de zi cu zi a cetenilor i crete cererea societal pentru soluionarea lor. Pentru a apra sau schimba statu quo-ul n problema Nagorno-Karabahului, Armenia, pe de o parte, i Azerbaidjan, pe de alt parte, aloc resurse financiare i umane importante n rzboiul juridic, diplomatic, istoriografic, economic i militar purtat pe linia frontului, n spaiul informaional
31

sau n cadrul forurilor internaionale. Grania actual dintre Azerbaidjan i Armenia este printre cele mai militarizate din lume. Armenia i Nagorno-Karabah au edificat trei linii de aprare i se pare c a patra este n faza de construcie.32 Armenia sprijin financiar i contribuie cu militari n termen la sistemul de aprare a Nagorno-Karabahului. Potrivit estimrilor, forele armate ale Armeniei i Nagorno-Karabahului totalizeaz 70.000 de militari, n timp ce armata Azerbaidjanului numr circa 95.000 de militari (International Crisis Group, 2011a, 1). Armatele celor dou state organizeaz cu regularitate demonstraii de for prin intermediul exerciiilor militare n apropierea liniei frontului. Armenia i Azerbaidjan sunt angajate n cursa narmrilor reflectat n creterea spectaculoas a bugetelor de aprare i achiziii de tehnic militar. n perioada 2000-2009, bugetul de aprare al Armeniei a crescut de la 3,6% la 4,2% din PIB, iar al Azerbaidjanului de la 2,3% la 3,4 din PIB (SIPRI, 2011). n anii 2000-2010, Azerbaidjanul a alocat pentru aprare $9,2 miliarde, iar Armenia $2,6 miliarde (News.Az 2011a). n 2010, guvernul de la Baku a stabilit bugetul de aprare la nivelul de $2,1 miliarde, ceea ce depete bugetul naional consolidat al Armeniei ($1,8 miliarde). Pe lng dorina de a demonstra schimbarea echilibrului de fore, Baku intete extenuarea economic a Armeniei prin continuarea cursei narmrilor. nchiderea frontierei azero-armene i turco-armene i excluderea Armeniei din proiectele regionale de infrastructur sunt ghidate de aceeai logic. Una din recentele tentative de a pune presiune economic pe Armenia a fost invocarea, dup accidentul de la Fukushima, a pericolului pe care l reprezint pentru ntreaga regiune centrala nuclear Metsamor, de construcie sovietic, care produce aproximativ 40% din energia electric la nivel naional (News. Az, 2011b). Eventuala nchidere a centralei de la Metsamor, fr a identifica surse alternative
32

Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

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de energie sau construcia unei noi centrale, va pune ntr-o situaie dificil ntreaga economie a Armeniei. Baku sper c strategia de hruire permanent n combinaie cu creterea economic proprie, alimentat de exporturile de hidrocarburi, va fora Armenia s negocieze de pe o poziie de inferioritate n ultim instan. Azerbaidjanul nu exclude nici opiunea militar pentru a recupera Nagorno-Karabah. La rndul su, dei efortul financiar pentru aprare este substanial pentru economia Armeniei, pstrarea balanei militare este asigurat, nu n ultimul rnd, cu sprijinul diasporei i prin achiziii de armament din Rusia la preuri sub nivelul pieei mondiale. Armenia ncearc s minimalizeze efectele izolrii economice regionale prin dezvoltarea proiectelor energetice alternative i blocarea iniiativelor promovate de Azerbaidjan. De exemplu, Armenia s-a opus activ alocrii finanrii externe pentru proiectul de cale ferat Baku-Tbilisi-Kars. Dezizolarea vizeaz nu doar Armenia, dar i Nagorno-Karabahul. Astfel, diaspora a contribuit cu $3 milioane la reconstrucia aeroportului din Stepanakert, a crui redeschidere a fost amnat ns n 2011. Erevanul, ca msur de retorsiune pentru nchiderea frontierelor cu Azerbaidjan i Turcia, blocheaz legtura direct a Azerbaidjanului cu enclava sa Nahicevan, care la sud se nvecineaz cu Iranul i pe o fie foarte scurt (11 km) cu Turcia. Ambele state desfoar o campanie internaional activ de informare pe problema Nagorno-Karabahului, care s capteze suportul ct mai larg al comunitii internaionale. Experii nu exclud faptul c decizia din 2011 a Azerbaidjanului de a se altura Micrii de Nealiniere din care fac parte 180 de ri vizeaz parial utilizarea acestei platforme pentru mobilizarea sprijinului pentru Baku n rndul statelor care se confrunt cu probleme teritoriale similare.33 Prile n conflict fac uz de o istoriografie care exclude sau minimalizeaz prezena reciproc n NagornoKarabah pe parcursul istoriei. De asemenea, prile apeleaz
33

fie la dreptul de autodeterminare a populaiei, care a fost victima unei agresiuni a guvernului central, fie la agresiunea teritorial a unui stat mpotriva altui stat i campania de epurri etnice. Pe lng implicarea activ n campanii de informare a corpului diplomatic, administraiile prezideniale din Armenia i Azerbaidjan includ n componena lor departamente specializate care monitorizeaz mesajele concurente i gestioneaz eforturile de neutralizare a acestora n spaiul informaional.34 Diaspora este un emitor important de mesaje n campaniile de lobby ale Armeniei i Azerbaidjanului. Diaspora armean din Frana i SUA este cunoscut pentru buna organizare i impactul pe care l are asupra unor decizii de politic extern. ntr-un efort de recuperare, n ultimii ani, autoritile de la Baku au acordat mai mult atenie organizrii diasporei pentru promovarea cauzei Azerbaidjanului la nivel internaional (News.Az, 2011c). Pe de alt parte, Baku a repurtat o serie de succese diplomatice tactice. n 2008 Adunarea General al ONU a adoptat rezoluia cu privire la situaia pe teritoriul ocupat al Azerbaidjanului n care se solicit retragerea imediat, complet i necondiionat a Armeniei de pe teritoriul Azerbaidjanului (UN, 2008). n 2011, Adunarea Parlamentar a Consiliului Europei a decis restabilirea subcomitetului pentru Nagorno-Karabah, anterior suspendat. Rivalitatea n forurile diplomatice se desfoar n paralel cu negocierile mediate de grupul de la Minsk creat sub egida OSCE i care include Rusia, Frana i SUA n calitate de copreedini. Dup conflictul ruso-georgian activitatea grupului, i n special a Rusiei, n cadrul acestuia a fost revigorat. Rusia a gzduit ntre 2008 i 2011 nou ntlniri ntre preedinii Armeniei i Azerbaidjanului, care s-au soldat cu semnarea unei serii de declaraii comune i schimb de prizoneri sau corpurile militarilor ucii n aciune. Duma de Stat a intermediat n 2010 la Moscova un dialog informal
34 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011; interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.

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ntre membrii Milli Majlis-ului i Adunrii Naionale. n ciuda presiunii din partea SUA, Franei i Rusiei n ajunul ultimului summit de la Kazan n 2011, Baku i Erevan nu au reuit s ajung la un acord cu privire la principiile de soluionare a conflictului, propuse de co-preedini n cadrul conferinei ministeriale OSCE, n 2007, la Madrid. Dup runde succesive de negocieri, principiile de la Madrid n forma nc neacceptat de pri includ: retragerea Armeniei din regiunile din jurul Nagorno-Karabahului cu reglementri speciale pentru Lacin i Kelbajar; un statut provizoriu pentru Nagorno-Karabah garantat internaional; garantarea securitii Nagorno-Karabahului i desfurarea forelor internaionale de meninere a pcii; dreptul refugiailor i PSI de a se ntoarce n zone anterior locuite; redeschiderea comunicaiilor, reluarea comerului i implementarea msurilor de reabilitare post-conflict finanate de donatori externi; determinarea statutului Nagorno-Karabahului n urma unui referendum. Se pare c punctele care ridic probleme sunt graficul retragerii forelor armene din regiunile ocupate n jurul Karabahului, asigurarea coridorului de comunicare ntre Armenia i Karabah i natura statutului interimar al Karabahului (RFE, 2010a). Observatorii sunt sceptici cu privire la soluionarea conflictului n perspectiva apropiat. Chiar dac liderii Armeniei i Azerbaidjanului vor conveni asupra principiilor de la Madrid i foii de parcurs, nu exist precondiii la nivel social pentru implementarea acestora35, remarc un analist. Discursul politic agresiv promovat la Baku i Erevan reduce spaiul de manevr pentru liderii politici i face acceptarea unui eventual consens la nivel nalt inacceptabil pentru ambele societi. Potrivit sondajelor de opinie, 97% din azeri consider c Armenia este cel mai important rival i 91% din armeni percep Azerbaidjanul drept principala ameninare politic i economic (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010; International Republican Institute, 2008a).
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De asemenea, 70% din cei chestionai n Azerbaidjan consider c guvernul nu ar trebui s accepte niciun compromis pentru a soluiona panic conflictul (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2010). Or fr compromis, care se reflect n principiile de la Madrid, nu poate exista o soluie nonviolent a conflictului. Cu toate c 78% din armeni consider c situaia din Nagorno-Karabah poate fi rezolvat pe cale amiabil (International Republican Institute, 2008a), se pare c la Erevan i Stepanakert exist preocupri cu privire la implementarea unei astfel de soluii. Noi dorim o dat previzibil pentru organizarea referendumului prin care se va decide statutul Nagorno-Karabahului36, dezvluie un oficial una din preocupri. Totodat, se pune ntrebarea cu privire la credibilitatea forelor de meninere a pcii i capacitatea lor de a ndeplini misiunea. Cine ne asigur c unele evenimente din Balcani nu se vor repeta n Nagorno-Karabah?37, ntreab un analist cu aluzie la masacrul de la Srebrenia i inaciunea forelor internaionale de meninere a pcii. Se pare c reticena fa de desfurarea pacificatorilor are i rdcini economice. Armata regiunii separatiste este principalul angajator pentru un segment important al populaiei masculine din Nagorno-Karabah. Prin urmare, desfurarea trupelor de meninere a pcii va genera reducerea efectivului forelor armate ale regiunii separatiste, cu impact social i economic sever imediat.38 Aadar, implementarea unui plan de pace n Nagorno-Karabah poate fi comparat cu mersul pe un cmp minat (Economist, 2011). Acesta poate fi traversat cu succes dac negocierile politice vor fi combinate cu msuri care vor pregti societile pentru pacea sustenabil. Dac regimurile politice de la Baku i Erevan au voin i sunt capabile de aa ceva, rmne o ntrebare deschis. Se pare c tot mai muli observatori din regiune consider c, fr o autentic
36 37 38

Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

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democratizare, Armenia i Azerbaidjanul nu vor reui s fac progrese substaniale n problema Nagorno-Karabahului.39 Pn atunci, cel mai plauzibil scenariu mprtit n ambele tabere este statu quo-ul care poate fi sintetizat n formula pacea rapid este imposibil, rzboiul rapid e probabil40. Pe termen scurt, ns, reizbucnirea conflictului este descurajat, se pare, de un factor de natur non-militar. Gzduirea finalei Eurovisionului n mai 2012 reprezint o ans rar de a proiecta internaional o imagine pozitiv despre Azerbaidjan, pe care, fr ndoial, autoritile de la Baku nu vor s o iroseasc prin escaladarea conflictului.41

2.2. Georgia Armenia: resetarea pragmatismului

Relaiile ntre Georgia i Armenia sunt caracterizate de o interdependen preponderent pozitiv, n unele sectoare asimetric, care este gestionat ntr-un mod pragmatic de ambele guverne. Dialogul politic armeano-georgian s-a intensificat calitativ i cantitativ dup rzboiul din Georgia din 2008. Comentatorii observ c chimia personal ntre cei doi preedini contribuie la valene pozitive n relaiile bilaterale.42 Interaciunea pe linia ministerelor de externe aduce un plus de valoare relaiei la nivel nalt. n 2011, efii diplomaiei au convenit s se ntlneasc de cel puin patru ori pe an pentru a avea un dialog continuu pe problematicile bilaterale i regionale. Erevan i Tbilisi recunosc existena problemelor bilaterale, dar nici una dintre acestea nu este considerat insurmontabil (Civil.Ge 2011b). Dei relaiile politice s-au mbuntit considerabil n ultimii doi ani, la nivelul opiniei publice persist animoziti.43
Interviu cu un reprezentant mass-media, Baku, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011. 40 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011. 41 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011. 42 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011. 43 Interviu cu experi, Erevan, iunie 2011.
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Potrivit sondajelor de opinie, 75% din respondeni n Georgia i 62% din cei chestionai n Armenia consider c relaiile bilaterale sunt bune (International Republican Institute, 2011; International Republican Institute, 2008a). La capitolul state prietene i inamici, pentru 8% din georgieni Armenia reprezint cel mai important partener (International Republican Institute, 2011), i pentru 24% din armeni Georgia este principalul partener (International Republican Institute, 2008a). Aceast diferen poate fi explicat prin importana strategic pe care o are Georgia n calitate de ar tranzit pentru fluxurile comerciale ale Armeniei. Volumul schimburilor comerciale bilaterale nu este semnificativ, statisticile pentru 2010 demonstreaz c Georgia este al 8-lea partener comercial al Armeniei (2,2% pondere n comer), n timp ce Armenia este al 12-lea partener comercial al Georgiei cu doar 1,5% pondere n comer (EU Commision, 2011b; EU Commission, 2011c). Cercetrile sociologice arat, pe deasupra, c 31% din respondeni n Armenia privesc Georgia drept principala ameninare politic i economic (International Republican Institute, 2008a). n Georgia, 3% din ceteni percep Armenia n mod similar (International Republican Institute, 2011). Este posibil ca din 2008, cnd s-a fcut ultima cercetare n Armenia, numrul celor care trateaz Georgia drept o ameninare s fi sczut. Totodat, percepia public negativ n Armenia reflect foarte probabil ngrijorarea n privina aspectelor asimetrice n relaiile economice, preocuparea pentru drepturile minoritii armene din SamheJavaheti i participarea statului vecin la proiecte regionale care exclud Armenia. La nivelul opiniei publice din Georgia, Armenia este deseori privit drept aliat militar al Kremlinului n Caucazul de Sud. Dat fiind atitudinea georgienilor fa de politica rus n regiune, are loc un transfer negativ asupra imaginii Armeniei, fapt reflectat n sondajele de opinie. n pofida accentelor diferite n politica extern, la Tbilisi i Erevan exist nelegere c fiecare i face propriul joc n
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regiune, determinat de situaia politic i raiuni de securitate naional.44 De pild, Erevanul a perceput n mod negativ aciunile militare ale Georgiei n Osetia de Sud din 2008, care puteau stabili un precedent periculos pentru Armenia. Conducerea politic de la Erevan s-a abinut de la un discurs critic la adresa Georgiei, care ar fi sprijinit retorica agresiv a Rusiei. n schimb, Armenia a jucat un rol important n evacuarea personalului diplomatic i cetenilor strini din Georgia n timpul conflictului,45 lucru apreciat de autoritile georgiene. n perioada postconflict, Armenia a rezistat presiunilor de la Moscova pentru a recunoate independena Abhaziei i Osetiei de Sud46, iar preedintele Armeniei a fcut o vizit oficial la Tbilisi n septembrie 2008. n 2009 preedintele Georgiei a fost decorat cu cea mai nalt distincie de stat a Armeniei Ordinul de Onoare, fapt care a strnit critici din partea Moscovei. Pe de alt parte, Georgia nu agreeaz prezena militar rus n Armenia, ns autoritile de la Tbilisi realizeaz c nu pot schimba situaia radical i c n mediul de securitate actual este important s pstreze o relaie amiabil cu Armenia.47 Cu toate c a denunat n 2011 acordul de tranzit militar cu Rusia folosit pentru alimentarea bazei ruseti din Gyumri, Georgia aprob n continuare tranzitul cargourilor militare destinate forelor armate armene prin spaiului su aerian.48 Partea georgian a asigurat Erevanul c denunarea acordului cu Rusia, care nu funciona din 2008, este una tehnic (prevenirea prelungirii automate a acordului pe cinci ani) i nu va afecta cooperarea cu Ministerul Aprrii din Armenia. Noi am dorit s primim asigurri c securitatea noastr nu va fi afectat de aceast decizie [], noi le-am primit49, explic un reprezentant
Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011. 45 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011. 46 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011. 47 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011. 48 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011. 49 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.
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guvernamental. Aceste garanii au fost date de ministrul georgian al Aprrii n cadrul vizitei la Erevan, care a precedat votul din parlamentul de la Tbilisi cu privire la acordul de tranzit militar cu Rusia. Tot atunci, partea georgian a oferit posibilitatea pregtirii militarilor armeni la baza montan de antrenament din Sacihere. Aadar, maniera echilibrat de abordare a acestui dosar confirm atitudinea pragmatic la Erevan i Tbilisi. Resetarea pragmatic a relaiilor bilaterale dup 2008 nu este, ns, ntmpltoare. Georgia este un nod vital de transport pentru economia Armeniei. Potrivit estimrilor guvernului de la Erevan, sistarea tranzitului prin Georgia pe durata rzboiului din 2008 a produs o pagub de circa $670 milioane. Prin urmare Armenia era interesat n restabilirea ct mai rapid a comunicaiilor. Ameninarea militar de la nord motiveaz Tbilisi s detensioneze relaiile cu vecinii apropiai. Dup conflictul cu Rusia, problema minoritii armene din Georgia a fost identificat la Tbilisi ca un factor vulnerabil care poate fi speculat de Rusia. Astfel, guvernul georgian a dedicat mai mult atenie relaiilor cu Armenia, n paralel cu proiectele de dezvoltare n Samhe-Javaheti. Suprapunerea celor dou obiective a dat un suflu nou relaiilor bilaterale. Georgia asigur n jur de 70-75% din tranzitul comercial al Armeniei. n prezent, exist legtur feroviar ntre Erevan i portul Batumi, iar prile coopereaz la construcia autostrzii Gyumri-Ahaliihe-Batumi care s faciliteze traficul rutier. Portul Poti joac un rol important pentru securitatea alimentar a Armeniei, deoarece asigur n proporie semnificativ importurile de gru ale rii. Portul Batumi deservete traficul de pasageri: astfel, n 2009 au fost relansate curse de feribot ntre Batumi i Soci. Aceast rut este de interes pentru Armenia, deoarece Soci gzduiete o diaspor armean numeroas stabilit nc din secolul al XIX-lea, iar muli armeni aleg s petreac vacana la Soci. Cu ocazia pregtirilor pentru Jocurile Olimpice de Iarn din 2014, Soci a devenit o destinaie atractiv pentru armeni
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n cutarea oportunitilor de angajare sezonier. Traficul aerian de pasageri ntre Erevan i Tbilisi n ultimii doi ani a fost suspendat din raiuni economice pe timp de iarn i reluat n primavar sau var. n 2010, Georgia i Rusia au czut de acord s redeschid singurul punct vamal ntre cele dou ri Verhni LarsKazbeghi, n urma negocierilor mediate de Elveia. Astfel, dup trei ani de pauz, Armenia beneficiaz din nou de legtur terestr cu Rusia prin Georgia. Aproximativ 70-80% din exporturile din Armenia spre Rusia tranziteaz Georgia. n loc s utilizeze rute maritime ocolitoare Batumi-Varna/ Burgas-Novorossiisk, exportatorii din Armenia au acum acces la Drumul Militar Georgian care face legtur ntre Tbilisi i capitala Osetiei de Nord, Vladikavkaz. Tranzitul terestru spre Rusia prin Verhni Lars-Kazbeghi reduce costurile de transport cu 20-25% (Zhahanina, 2010). Volumul mare al tranzitului comercial aduce profituri importante statului georgian. n 2008-2009, grania armeano-georgian a fost traversat de 4.594 de trenuri marfare i 273.478 de vehicule (OSCE Yerevan Office, 2010, 5). ns guvernul de la Erevan consider c Georgia profit de pe urma interdependenei asimetrice, promovnd o politic de taxare a tranzitului care sporete semnificativ costurile pentru agenii economici din Armenia (Civil.Ge, 2009a). Armenia este conectat la Georgia prin infrastructura energetic i de telecomunicaii. Conexiunea la internet i telefonie internaional n Armenia este asigurat prin cablul de fibr optic care traverseaz Georgia. ntr-un incident din 2011, cuttorii de fier vechi au tiat cablul de internet n apropiere de Tbilisi, lsnd o bun parte din abonaii din Armenia fr internet timp de cteva ore (Bedwell, 2011). Sistemele electrice ntre Armenia i Georgia sunt interconectate prin intermediul a trei linii de transmisie. Gazoductul prin care Gazpromul livreaz gaze naturale Armeniei trece de asemenea prin Georgia. n 2010, n urma alunecrilor de teren, Georgia a suspendat tranzitul de gaze pentru msuri de mentenan necesare relurii livrrilor. Armenia a recurs
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la depozitele de gaze subterane pentru a acoperi consumul intern. n 2010, parlamentul georgian a eliminat conducta de gaze ce face legtur cu Armenia de pe lista obiectivelor care nu pot fi privatizate. Acest lucru a trezit nelinite la Erevan: n cel mai pesimist scenariu, Azerbaidjanul putea s preia controlul asupra magistralei care garanteaz securitatea energetic a Armeniei. Autoritile de la Tbilisi au asigurat Armenia c statul georgian nu va renuna la pachetul majoritar n ntreprinderea care gestioneaz conducta (Civil.Ge, 2011c). n ultimii doi ani, Georgia a devenit o destinaie atractiv pentru investitorii din Armenia. De exemplu, n 2011, compania de dulciuri din Armenia Grand Candy a decis s se extind pe piaa georgian, iar grupul Jermuk a preluat producia Pepsi din Georgia. Potrivit datelor pentru 2010, 103 companii din Armenia au fost nregistrate n Georgia. Experii estimeaz c n total n Georgia opereaz n jur de 4 mii de afaceri mici i mijlocii cu capital armean. Prezena mai activ pe piaa georgian a investitorilor din Armenia a condus la nfiinarea Uniunii Antreprenorilor Armeni (Vardanyan, 2011). O serie de factori determin aceast tendin: pe de o parte, sunt corupia, multiplele obstacole de ordin birocratic pentru oamenii de afaceri i piaa mic a Armeniei; pe de alt parte, sunt condiiile mai favorabile pentru deschiderea i organizarea afacerii, scutirea de taxe pentru afacerile nou nfiinate, nivelul de corupie redus i infrastructura din Georgia.50 Clasamentul Doing Business al Bncii Mondiale confirm diferena dintre Armenia i Georgia la capitolul mediu de afaceri, rile ocupnd n 2011 locurile 48 i, respectiv 12 (World Bank, 2011). Totodat, Georgia i n special litoralul su (Batumi i Kobuleti) sunt o destinaie turistic preferat pentru tot mai muli turiti din Armenia. n 2009, numrul cetenilor armeni care au vizitat Georgia a depit 300.000 (Chkhikvadze, 2010), iar acest numr a atins aproape
50

Interviu cu experti, Erevan, iunie 2011.

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200.000 de turiti doar n perioada ianuarie-aprilie 2011 (News.Am, 2011a). Cooperarea bilateral ns nu s-a focalizat exclusiv asupra domeniului economic i extinderii comunicaiilor de transport. Agenda bilateral conine unele dosare care, dac sunt neglijate, pot complica semnificativ relaiile ntre Georgia i Armenia. n dorina de a elimina de pe agend subiectele litigioase, guvernul de la Tbilisi a abordat problemele minoritii armene: nregistrarea bisericii armeneti (Biserica Apostolic Armean) i demarcarea i gestionarea frontierei. ns nu toate iniiativele guvernului s-au bucurat de sprijinul populaiei. La rndul lor, autoritile de la Erevan au rspuns de o manier cooperant la aceste eforturi. n spaiul public, executivul sau conducerea bisericii armeneti au fost criticate pentru luri de poziii uneori prea flexibile. Frontiera armeano-georgian nu este delimitat i demarcat integral pn n prezent. n lipsa demarcrii clare, n localitile de frontier uneori este dificil de stabilit pn unde se extinde dreptul de proprietate asupra unui lot de pmnt. Prin urmare, au loc incidente legate de accesul ranilor la terenurile agricole. Prile au depus eforturi pentru a grbi procedura de delimitare i demarcare a frontierei. n 2010, Comisia interguvernamental de profil a convenit asupra delimitrii i demarcrii a 160 km (71%) din cei 225 (OSCE Yerevan Office, 2010, 13, 15). Totodat, Armenia i Georgia au ajuns la un acord politic cu privire la gestionarea comun a trei din cele ase puncte de trecere a frontierei (RFE, 2011a). Implementarea acestei iniiative este menit s faciliteze fluxurile de pasageri i cele comerciale ntre cele dou ri. n Georgia, exist comuniti armeneti n Tbilisi (circa 83.000 de persoane n 2002), Batumi (aproximativ 800 n 2002) i regiunea separatist Abhazia (n jur de 45.000 n 2005). ns cea mai numeroas prezen se nregistreaz n Samhe-Javaheti (aproape 125.000 n 2002), regiunea din sudul Georgiei care se nvecineaz cu Armenia i Turcia.
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n perioada sovietic, regiunea a gzduit baza militar din Ahalkalaki care fcea parte din districtul militar transcaucazian. Din acest motiv, regiunea avea un regim semi-nchis i era relativ izolat de restul Georgiei.51 Dup disoluia Uniunii Sovietice, Rusia a preluat controlul asupra bazei militare, care a devenit principalul angajator i surs de venit pentru populaia local (Overland, 2009). n 2007, baza din Ahalkalaki a fost evacuat, ridicnd semne de ntrebare cu privire la perspectivele economice ale regiunii. La Tbilisi, a existat teama c Rusia va ncerca s destabilizeze regiunea, provocnd tensiuni interetnice n SamheJavaheti. ngrijorrile nu au fost lipsite de temei. Aa cum confirm partea armean, Rusia a avut cteva tentative de a mobiliza minoritatea armean mpotriva guvernului de la Tbilisi nainte i dup rzboiul din 2008, fie prin anunarea repatrierii iminente a turcilor meshetini n Samhe-Javaheti (n jur de 100.000 au fost deportai din regiune n Asia Central n 1944), fie relund discursul despre discriminarea armenilor n Georgia.52 Pe lng introducerea msurilor adiionale de securitate53, guvernul de la Tbilisi a implementat o strategie complex pentru integrarea regiunii i populaiei n circuitul economic i educaional al Georgiei. n 2008 i 2010 au fost executate proiecte de renovare sau construcie de autostrad care au legat regiunea cu vestul Georgiei i Tbilisi. Odat cu finalizarea proiectului de cale ferat Baku-Tbilisi-Kars, distana ntre Samhe-Javaheti i Tbilisi va fi parcurs n aproximativ dou ore. Executivul de la Tbilisi a realizat investiii masive n infrastructura local: coli, spitale, sisteme de distribuie a apei i energiei electrice (International Crisis Group, 2011b, 6). O alt component a strategiei a vizat educaia. Necunoaterea limbii georgiene reduce semnificativ ansele tinerilor din regiune de a face studii sau de a beneficia de
51 52 53

Interviu cu un reprezentant mass-media, Tbilisi, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

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oportuniti de angajare. Cu ajutorul donatorilor externi, au fost organizate cursuri gratuite de studiere a limbii. De asemenea, a fost facilitat accesul armenilor din Samhe-Javaheti la studii superioare n instituiile de nvmnt din Georgia.54 Reprezentanii societii civile din Armenia care au vizitat regiunea n 2010-2011 au constatat c populaia este mult mai optimist n privina situaiei economice i sociale, dect cu civa ani n urm. Cererea pentru studierea limbii georgiene a crescut. n loc s mearg la Erevan, tot mai muli armeni din regiune opteaz pentru universitile din Tbilisi.55 Autoritile de la Erevan au adaptat discursul fa de minoritatea armean din Georgia la schimbrile din regiune. Preedintele Armeniei a apreciat eforturile executivului georgian pentru a mbunti situaia socio-economic n Samhe-Javaheti i a anunat disponibilitatea de a asista acest proces (Civil.Ge, 2009b). Un alt factor iritant n relaiile bilaterale o reprezint problema nregistrrii bisericii armeneti n Georgia i cererile reciproce de restituire a lcaelor de cult. Aadar, partea armean pretinde o serie de biserici n Tbilisi i n Samhe-Javaheti. n acelai timp, partea georgian reclam dreptul de proprietate asupra unor biserici medievale din nordul Armeniei de la grania cu Georgia (Civil.Ge, 2011d). Pn de curnd, potrivit legislaiei georgiene, minoritile religioase nu puteau fi nregistrate n calitate de persoane juridice de drept public. Astfel, statul proteja biserica ortodox din Georgia, refuznd calitatea similar altor culte din ar, inclusiv bisericii armeneti. ns, n 2011, Catolicosul tuturor armenilor a efectuat o vizit istoric n Georgia, prima vizit a unei nalte fee bisericeti armene n ara vecin din 1894. n cadrul acesteia, au fost ridicate cele dou probleme. La foarte scurt timp, parlamentul Georgiei a modificat legea n sensul admiterii nregistrrii altor culte ca persoane juridice de drept public. Modificarea legislativ
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scoate de pe ordinea zilei chestiunea nregistrrii bisericii armeneti n Georgia. ns soluionarea problemelor de proprietate asupra lcaelor de cult va necesita mai mult timp i rbdare din partea ambelor pri. Protestele de strad de la Tbilisi, declanate n urma amendrii legislaiei cu privire la minoritile religioase, arat ct de sensibil este acest subiect i ct de ateni trebuie s fie n continuare liderii politici pentru a pstra o dinamic pozitiv n raporturile bilaterale din ultimii ani.

2.3. Azerbaidjan Georgia: tot mai aproape

ntre Azerbaidjan i Georgia s-a dezvoltat n timp o relaie politic i economic foarte strns care se bazeaz, nu n ultimul rnd, pe o experien istoric pozitiv n scurta perioad de independen de dup Primul Rzboi Mondial. n perioada post-sovietic relaiile personale apropiate ntre preedinii evardnadze i Aliev au solidificat raporturile ntre Azerbaidjan i Georgia. De la nceputul anilor 90, cele dou ri se confrunt cu conflicte teritoriale, iar restabilirea integritii teritoriale devine principalul laitmotiv care sudeaz relaia din punct de vedere politic. n 2008, Georgia s-a numrat printre cele 39 de state care au votat n favoarea rezoluiei Adunrii Generale a ONU cu privire la situaia pe teritoriul ocupat al Azerbaidjanului. n august 2008, dup izbucnirea conflictului militar n Osetia de Sud, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe din Azerbaidjan a calificat aciunile Georgiei n vederea restabilirii integritii teritoriale ca fiind n conformitate cu dreptul internaional (Today.Az, 2008). Pentru autoritile de la Baku, rzboiul avea implicaii directe asupra situaiei din Nagorno-Karabah. Fr ndoial, recuperarea Osetiei de Sud de ctre Georgia n 2008 ar fi pus presiune pe regimul de la Baku. Dac Georgia a reuit, noi de ce s nu ncercm? ar fi fost mesajul popular care ar fi mpins guvernul dincolo de retorica belicoas al crei prizonier a devenit. ns nfrngerea Georgiei a redus, n unele cercuri, entuziasmul pentru o soluie militar, care n contextul postconflict are mai puine
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Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, mai 2011. Interviu cu experi, Erevan, iunie 2011.

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anse de succes.56 Situaia economic dificil din Georgia, dup rzboiul din 2008, a motivat guvenul de la Baku s ofere sprijin statului n a crui existen i supravieuire este direct interesat. Azerbaidjanul i Georgia sunt interdependente n sectorul energetic. Georgia depinde de livrrile de gaze din Azerbaidjan aproape n totalitate. n schimb, principalele rute de export de gaze i petrol dinspre Azerbaidjan spre piaa european traverseaz Georgia. Un eventual rzboi ntre Armenia i Azerbaidjan poate afecta livrrile spre Georgia prin conducta de gaze Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, care trece la o distan nu foarte mare de zona de conflict. Experii avertizeaz c, n cazul reizbucnirii conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah, reelele energetice vor fi inta predilect a forelor armene (International Crisis Group, 2011a, 14). n aceste circumstane, Georgia va fi nevoit s apeleze la Gazprom pentru a-i acoperi consumul de gaze. Similar, conflictul pe teritoriul Georgiei poate duce la distrugerea reelelor energetice de transport afectnd exporturile de hidrocarburi ale Azerbaidjanului. n astfel de condiii, Rusia devine un partener nu foarte dorit, dar necesar pentru Azerbaidjan. n august 2008, Azerbaidjanul a reorientat o parte din exporturile de petrol care tranziteaz Georgia (BakuTbilisi-Ceihan i Baku-Supsa) spre conducta Baku-Novorossisk. Relaia ntre Baku i Tbilisi este cimentat de schimburi economice i dialog politic intensiv. La nivel nalt sau ministerial au loc multiple ntlniri i consultri. Potrivit statisticilor, n 2010 Azerbaidjanul a fost al 4-lea partener comercial al Georgiei cu o pondere de 7,8% (EU Commission, 2011c). De asemenea, n 2010, Azerbaidjan s-a numrat printre principalii investitori strini n Georgia, plasndu-se pe locul cinci cu $58 milioane (Civil.Ge, 2011e). Ponderea Georgiei este semnificativ mai redus n comerul Azerbaidjanului (1,5%), indicnd o asimetrie economic n relaiile
56

Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.

bilaterale (EU Commission, 2011d). La nivelul opiniei publice, 22% din respondenii din Georgia au calificat Azerbaidjanul ca fiind cel mai important partener al Georgiei (International Republican Institute, 2011). n Azerbaidjan, 11,3% consider Georgia un stat prieten (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Aceast diferen reflect importana sporit a Azerbaidjanului, n percepia public, pentru securitatea energetic a Georgiei. Trebuie menionat ns, c n cazul Azerbaidjanului numrul simpatizanilor Georgiei aproape s-a dublat din 2006 (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Aceast dinamic poate fi explicat prin creterea simpatiei la nivel popular pentru cauza reintegrrii Georgiei dup rzboiul din 2008 i rolul Georgiei n tranzitul petrolului i gazelor. Azerbaidjanul a intervenit decisiv pentru a garanta necesarul de gaze pentru Georgia de dou ori n ultimii cinci ani. Prima dat, n 2006, atunci cnd Gazpromul a ntrerupt livrrile spre Georgia, mrind drastic preul la gaze. A doua oar, n 2008, imediat dup rzboi, cnd Baku i Tbilisi au convenit asupra contractului de furnizare a gazelor pe cinci ani, n 2009 gazele fiind livrate la un pre preferenial (Alieva, 2009, 2). Ulterior, prile au ajuns la un acord de a prelungi contractul pn n 2020 fr a modifica preul de baz la gaze naturale (AZE.Az, 2010). Nivelul nalt de ncredere ntre Baku i Tbilisi a facilitat intrarea Azerbaidjanului n sectorul energetic din Georgia. Compania de stat SOCAR controleaz terminalul petrolier de la Kulevi care a devenit operabil din 2008. Totodat, SOCAR a intrat pe piaa distribuiei de gaze din Georgia, avnd o cot de pia de aproape 75%. Compania preconizeaz construcia a 1500 km de conducte care vor aduga la reeaua de gaze deja existent ali 150.000 de consumatori (ABC.Az, 2011). Georgia este o pies important n proiectul AGRI (Azerbaidjan-Georgia-Romnia Interconnector) la care particip SOCAR. Acesta prevede transportul gazelor din Azerbaidjan spre terminalul Kulevi, de unde vor fi transportate n continuare n portul Constana n form lichefiat (LNG).
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ns relaia de ncredere ntre Baku i Tbilisi are limite. Dei s-a vehiculat ideea c Azerbaidjanul a oferit Georgiei $500 milioane pentru a achiziiona conducta prin care se furnizeaz gaze spre Armenia (Asbarez Post, 2010), autoritile de la Tbilisi au exclus posibilitatea cedrii pachetului majoritar. Preluarea acestei conducte de ctre Azerbaidjan ar spori potenialul de conflict ntre Baku i Erevan, lucru pe care Georgia vrea s-l evite din raiuni de securitate energetic naional i regional. Din perspectiva Azerbaidjanului, participarea rii vecine este crucial pentru realizarea legturii feroviare cu Turcia. Iniial se preconiza c proiectul Baku-Tbilisi-Kars va beneficia de finanare internaional, cu ajutorul creia Georgia va putea desfura lucrrile de reabilitare i construcie pe sectorul Marabda-Ahalkalaki-Karahi. ns donatorii externi au refuzat s ofere mprumuturi pentru proiect, pe motiv c acesta nu contribuie la integrarea regional. Dat fiind importana proiectului, Azerbaidjan a aprobat dou mprumuturi n condiii avantajoase pentru Georgia (pe 25 ani cu 1% dobnd pe an) din care s fie finanate lucrrile. n 2007, Baku a oferit $200 milioane, iar n 2011 alte $575 milioane. Condiiile de creditare prevd rambursarea mprumuturilor din veniturile realizate de Georgia de pe urma exploatrii acestui segment de cale ferat, care ar deveni operaional ncepnd cu 2013 (Civil.Ge, 2011f). Prin prisma sectorului turistic georgian, Azerbaidjanul este vzut ca un rezervor important de turiti. Conexiunea direct BakuTbilisi pe calea aerului este suplimentat de numeroase curse de autocar. n ultimii zece ani, numrul vizitatorilor din Azerbaidjan a crescut considerabil, ajungnd n 2009 la aproape 400.000 (Chkhikvadze, 2010). Numrul turitilor se anticipeaz s cresc: doar n perioada ianuarie-aprilie 2011 Georgia a fost vizitat de 244.000 de ceteni azeri (ArmeniaNews, 2011). Cu toate c se dezvolt rapid, relaiile dintre Baku i Tbilisi nu sunt lipsite de probleme care afecteaz atmosfera bilateral sau pot tensiona relaiile. Prile recunosc existena
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dosarelor iritante, dar reitereaz determinarea de a le soluiona ntr-un mod amiabil. Dup douzeci de ani de la redobndirea independenei, cei doi vecini nc nu au finalizat delimitarea i demarcarea frontierei. n 1996, a fost nfiinat comisia interguvernamental pentru delimitarea i demarcarea frontierei. n 2010, Baku i Tbilisi au convenit asupra delimitrii a 300 km (66%) din cei 480 km de frontier (Trend, 2011a). Procesul avanseaz lent, nu n ultimul rnd din cauza disputei n jurul mnstirii David Gareja, care se afl parial n regiunea georgian Kakheti i parial n regiunea Agstafa din Azerbaidjan. Complexul David Gareja gzduiete peste 20 de biserici i numeroase peteri pe o distan de 25 km. Mnstirea are o valoare istoric, cultural i spiritual pentru Georgia, care ar dori s fac un schimb de terenuri pentru a controla integral teritoriul mnstirii. Printre posibilele variante de compensare s-a vehiculat cedarea satului Erismedi, o localitate de frontier disputat ntre cele dou ri. Pentru partea azer ns biserica Bertubani care face parte din mnstire este considerat important din punct de vedere strategic, din cauza altitudinii la care se afl. Prin urmare, Baku respinge orice compensaie teritorial n schimbul renunrii la partea sa din complexul David Gareja. n cadrul negocierilor, Azerbaidjanul a lansat idea transformrii mnstirii ntr-o zon turistic deschis. Biserica ortodox georgian s-a opus categoric acestei propuneri. n 2007, preedinii celor dou ri au discutat posibilitatea cedrii mnstirii n favoarea Georgiei, n condiiile n care Azerbaidjan menine controlul asupra punctelor strategice la altitudini. ns, dincolo de discuii, prile nu au avansat n procesul de identificare a unei soluii pn n prezent (Petriashvili i Ismayilov, 2006; Kazimov, 2011). Minoritatea azer locuiete compact n regiunile Kvemo Kartli, Kaheti i Mheta-Mtianeti de-a lungul graniei cu Azerbaidjan i Armenia. Populaia azer a Georgiei, potrivit ultimului recensmnt, atinge aproximativ 285.000 de locuitori. Situaia minoritii azere din Georgia s-a bucurat
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de mai puin atenie internaional, deoarece nu era considerat o problem cu potenial social i politic exploziv (Cornell et al., 2005, 24). ns minoritatea se confrunt cu numeroase probleme de infrastructur, necunoaterea limbii de stat i accesul limitat la funcii publice locale sau educaie superioar, frontiera nedemarcat armeano-georgian i abuzurile sporadice din partea grnicerilor armeni, precum i subdezvoltare economic. Dei unele probleme de infrastructur au fost abordate de guvernul de la Tbilisi n ultimii ani, sistemul de asigurare a apei potabile, reparaia drumurilor rurale i sectorul agricol au fost neglijate. De asemenea, problema cunoaterii limbii georgiene rmne acut, nu sunt suficieni instructori bilingvi i interesul pentru nvarea limbii rmne sczut. Majoritatea tinerilor din regiune prefer s-i continue studiile n Azerbaidjan (CIPDD, GYLA i Safeworld, 2011). nchiderea n 2005 a pieei din Sadahlo, sat populat de azeri, a lsat 5.000 de oameni fr un venit stabil. Condiiile economice dificile din Kvemo Kartli i foreaz pe etnicii azeri s migreze n rile din vecintate n cutarea oportunitilor de angajare. n 2010, Rusia a acuzat Georgia de violarea drepturilor minoritilor etnice i a chemat Tbilisi s normalizeze relaiile cu minoritile de pe teritoriul su, inclusiv cu azerii (Socor, 2010). Azerbaidjanul a rmas impasibil la tentativa de manipulare a Rusiei. De altfel, Baku a evitat s politizeze problemele minoritii azere din Georgia. Azerbaidjanul s-a comportat n spiritul neimplicrii n ceea ce consider afacerile interne ale Georgiei. n virtutea intereselor economice i politice, fragmentarea Georgiei este mpotriva intereselor Azerbaidjanului. Prin urmare, autoritile de la Baku au ncurajat loialitatea minoritii azere fa de statul georgian. ns guvernul de la Baku recunoate tacit multilplele probleme de ordin economic i social ale minoritii azere. n consecin, Azerbaidjanul, prin intermediul fundaiilor sau companiilor, s-a implicat n proiecte de infrastructur i programe sociale n regiunile populate de azeri (Today.Az, 2011). De exemplu, companiile Akord i Azerinshaat au luat
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parte la reabilitarea poriunii de drum Telet-Samhe-Javaheti. Fondul Heydar Aliev a finanat reabilitarea sau construcia de coli n Kvemo Kartli n 2009-2010 (MES Georgia, 2010). Cu toate c problema minoritii azere nu a fost politizat de Baku, aceasta are potenial destabilizator la nivel social. n 2006, dou ziare ale Asociaiei Naionale a Azerilor din Georgia cu sediul la Baku, care militeaz pentru recunoaterea limbii azere drept a doua limb de stat, au fost suspendate (RFE, 2009). n 2005, comunitatea azer a protestat mpotriva nchiderii pieii din Sadahlo, solicitnd autoritilor centrale s revin asupra deciziei. Nu n ultimul rnd, sustenabilitatea coabitrii preponderent panice a comunitii armene i azere n Kvemo Kartli poate fi testat de reizbucnirea conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah. Pe lng chestiunile cu privire la minoritile naionale i demarcarea frontierei, factorul armean poate genera tensiuni n relaiile bilaterale. Georgia este pus tot mai mult n situaia dificil de a pstra echilibrul ntre sprijin politic pentru integritatea teritorial a Azerbaidjanului i asigurarea tranzitului comercial pentru Armenia. Privind prin prisma integritii teritoriale i cooperrii n sectorul energetic, Baku dorete ca balana s ncline n favoarea sa. Dei la nceputul anilor 90 a ncercat s conving fr succes Georgia s se alture blocadei economice a Armeniei, Baku a tolerat, n general, schimburile comerciale ntre Armenia i Georgia. Evacuarea bazei militare din Ahalkalaki n 2007, ns, a trezit ngrijorare la Baku, deoarece o parte a arsenalului urma s fie transferat n Armenia, n dotarea forelor ruseti de la baza din Gyumri. Dei acordul ruso-georgian stipula obligaia Rusiei de a nu transfera armament forelor armene, nu existau mijloace credibile de a verifica respectarea de ctre Moscova a obligaiilor asumate (Socor, 2007). Desigur, Azerbaidjanul ar prefera ca echipamentul militar s fie transferat integral n Rusia. n 2011, ambasadorul Azerbaidjanului n Georgia a prezentat, n termeni deloc diplomatici, presupusul pericol al cooperarii economice armeano-georgiene i al comunitii armene pentru integritatea
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teritorial a Georgiei. Diplomatul a chemat Georgia i Azerbaidjanul s-i uneasc eforturile pentru a se opune politicii Armeniei n regiune (Apa News, 2011). n timp ce apelul nu va schimba optica guvernului georgian fa de Armenia, discursul rezoneaz cu unele segmente sociale marginale n Georgia aa cum arat rezultatele sondajelor de opinie public. Este puin probabil ca la Baku s existe iluzia c executivul de la Tbilisi i va schimba radical politica fa de Armenia. n acelai timp, acest discurs probabil semnaleaz o stare de iritare la Baku cu privire la efectele resetului pragmatic ale relaiilor armeano-georgiene. n condiiile date, Georgia va avea nevoie de mult ndemnare diplomatic pentru a naviga ntre aspiraiile adeseori contradictorii ale vecinilor si din Caucazul de Sud.

armenilor. Pentru a realiza aceste obiective, politica extern a Armeniei se conduce dup principiul complementaritii. Aceasta presupune ca Armenia s dezvolte relaii apropiate cu principalii actori regionali astfel nct sinergia acestora s contribuie sectorial la promovarea i realizarea obiectivelor de politic extern. n domeniul economic, complementaritatea este expresia dependenei economice a Armeniei de donatorii externi. La nivelul securitii militare, complementaritatea este rspunsul la dependena de Rusia.

3.1.1. Rusia
Din gama parteneriatelor i alianelor dezvoltate de Armenia, cea cu Rusia este de importan vital. Rusia este unul din copreedinii activi ai Grupului de la Minsk i este un actor indispensabil n procesul de negociere n dosarul Nagorno-Karabahului. n plus, aliana este condiionat de dependena economic, energetic i militar a Armeniei de Rusia. Aliana cu Rusia se bucur de sprijinul a 95% din cetenii Armeniei (International Republican Institute 2008a). n plan militar, Armenia face parte din OTSC, fapt care, teoretic, garanteaz securitatea rii prin clauza care presupune intervenia organizaiei n cazul unei agresiuni mpotriva unui membru. Pentru Erevan OTSC este Rusia, iar n caz de agresiune se ateapt la asistena militar a Rusiei, i nu a Belarusului sau a republicilor din Asia Central.57 Pe durata preedeniei OTSC, Armenia a sprijinit activ crearea forelor de reacie rapid n ideea asigurrii unei intervenii nentrziate a organizaiei n caz de necesitate58. n 2010, unul dintre exerciiile forelor de reacie rapid a avut loc n Rostov, n sudul Rusiei. Pe lng clauza de securitate, OTSC ofer posibilitatea procurrii armamentului rusesc la preuri interne sau, n cazuri speciale,
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III. Caucazul de Sud: raporturile cu puterile regionale

Procesele regionale nu sunt doar produsul raporturilor ntre cele trei republici din Caucazul de Sud. Regiunea este un teren pe care actori cu importan regional precum SUA, UE, Rusia, Turcia i Iran concureaz economic, politic, militar i cultural. n acelai timp, republicile caucaziene ncearc s extrag maximum din aceast competiie pentru a-i promova propriile agende de securitate naional pe plan regional.

3.1. Armenia: complementaritatea variabil

Politica extern a Armeniei urmrete o serie de obiective majore: garantarea aprrii n cazul unui atac convenional din partea Azerbaidjanului, pstrarea statu quo-ului sau soluionarea conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah respectnd dreptul la autodeterminare a popoarelor, spargerea blocadei impuse de Azerbaidjan i Turcia, atragerea unor investiii strine i asistenei financiare internaionale pentru dezvoltarea economic, recunoaterea internaional a genocidului
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transferuri gratuite de echipamente. NATO nu ofer aa ceva59, contrapune un expert local avantajele de participare la o alt alian militar. Garantarea securitii militare, ns, nu se reduce la nelegeri multilaterale n cadrul OTSC. Armenia gzduiete dou baze militare ruseti, la Gyumri i Erevan, care numr aproximativ 4.000 de militari. De asemenea, pe teritoriul Armeniei activeaz grniceri rui care asigur protecia frontierei de stat cu Turcia i Iran. n 2010, Armenia a extins prezena militarilor rui pn n 2044. Potrivit autoritilor de la Erevan, n urma acordului, aria de activitate a forelor ruse n Armenia nu mai e limitat la frontiera extern a ex-Uniunii Sovietice (Danielyan 2010). Rusia s-a angajat s protejeze interesele regionale ale Armeniei60, explic semnificaia acordului un oficial. Rusia a promis livrarea de armament i deschiderea unor societi mixte din industria de aprare a Armeniei. Dei se bucur de o dubl asigurare din partea Rusiei, n Armenia exist dubii cu privire la momentul interveniei Moscovei n eventualitatea eruperii conflictului. Clauza de aprare nu a fost testat niciodat [], Rusia nu i va permite s nu intervin, cci i va pierde credibilitatea, [dar] cnd o va face: dup sau naintea unei decizii a Consiliului de Securitate a ONU, dup ce vom pierde o parte din teritoriul Nagorno-Karabahului sau imediat dup izbucnirea conflictului?61, se ntreab un expert. Partea rus a comunicat c va interveni la timpul potrivit. Aceast ambiguitate induce suspiciune i determin Armenia s se asigure c, cel puin n prima faz a conflictului, va fi capabil s poarte singur ostilitile.62 n plan economic, Armenia este prizoniera relaiilor conflictuale dintre Georgia i Rusia, iar rzboiul din 2008 a demonstrat acest lucru ct se poate de bine (Markedonov,
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2011). Un rzboi ntre cele dou state las Armenia cu o singur frontier deschis i rut de tranzit comercial Iran. Dincolo de aceste aspecte, Armenia este interesat de accesul la piaa rus, de importurile de gaze, suportul financiar i investiiile ruse. Rusia este al doilea partener comercial al Armeniei, cu o pondere de aproape 21% n comer (EU Commission, 2011b). Rusia rmne n continuare destinaia preferat pentru muncitorii sezonieri din Armenia, al cror numr se ridic la proximativ 2 milioane. Muncitorii armeni din strintate au transferat acas $1,3 miliarde n 2010, ceea ce reprezint 13% din PIB-ul rii (Danielyan, 2011). Experii estimeaz c 75% din remitene au ca ar de origine Rusia.63 Armenia depinde n proporie de 80% de livrrile de gaze din Rusia i aproximativ 80% din reeaua de distribuie a gazelor este controlat de Gazprom. De asemenea, monopolul rus a preluat controlul asupra poriunii armene a gazoductului Tabriz-Ersah care leag Armenia cu Iranul. n schimb, Armenia pltete cel mai mic pre n CSI pentru gazele naturale din Rusia, $210 pe o mie m/c (Armtown.Com, 2011a). Totodat, Rusia este gata s participe la construcia noilor uniti de la centrala nuclear Metsamor, care s nlocuiasc reactoarele care trebuie s fie scoase din uz pn n 2017. Pentru dezvoltarea economic n condiii de semi-izolare regional, Armenia caut investiii pe termen lung i sprijin finanicar. n anii 2000, Armenia a acceptat intrarea masiv a capitalului rus n sectoare de importan strategic: telecomunicaii, ci ferate, sectorul financiar-bancar, industria grea. Rusia a preluat cile ferate armene pe o durat de 30 de ani, obligndu-se s investeasc n modernizarea lor $570 milioane. Un model de succes la Erevan este considerat investiia de $70 milioane realizat de Rusal n retehnologizarea uzinei locale de aluminiu. Prin urmare, Rusia a rmas principalul investitor al Armeniei n 2010 cu $270 milioane (Mediamax, 2011). Criza economic a afectat
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puternic Armenia. n 2010, guvernul rus a anunat c va acorda Armeniei un mprumut de $500 milioane pentru stabilizarea macroeconomic. n 2011, Moscova i Erevanul au ajuns la un acord de principiu cu privire la acordarea unui credit n valoare de $400 milioane din fondul anticriz al Comunitii Economice Eurasiatice (EurAsEc), organizaie n care Armenia este doar observator (Hayrumyan, 2011). Se preconizeaz c banii vor fi investii n modernizarea uzinei chimice Nairit, care a suferit de pe urma crizei economice globale. Dependena de Rusia restrnge autonomia autoritilor de Erevan n plan extern i are un impact semnificativ pe plan intern. Rusia a pus presiune pe Armenia s nu ia parte la exerciiul NATO din Georgia n 200964 i la sesiunea Adunrii Parlamentare NATO de la Tbilisi n 201165. Se pare c lista instituiilor guvernamentale la care sunt ataai consilieri UE n Armenia a fost influenat de Moscova (Popescu, 2009). La insistena, nu n ultimul rnd a Rusiei, diametrul gazoductului ntre Armenia i Iran a fost redus.66 Erevanul nu a fost pregtit n vara 2011 pentru semnarea unor acorduri n domeniul energetic cu Iranul din cauza opoziiei Moscovei.67 Aliana cu Rusia are efecte adverse pentru Armenia, ceea ce creeaz tensiuni n relaiile bilaterale. Relaiile sunt departe de a fi calde68, confirm un diplomat. Reprezentanii comunitii de afaceri reclam c investitorii rui export modelul corupt de a face afaceri, care amplific fenomenul corupiei n Armenia. Deseori investitorii rui nu i onoreaz obligaiile rezultate din planul de investiii, iar ntreprinderile nu funcioneaz la capacitatea maxim sau activitatea acestora este sistat (Hayrumyan, 2010). Evaluarea curii de conturi cu privire la activitatea companiei ruse GPM Gold care controleaz minele de aur din
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Sodk i Megradzor este semnificativ din acest punct de vedere (RFE, 2010b). Activitatea centrelor ruse de recrutare de pe teritoriul Armeniei care le ofer cetenilor armeni cetenie rus cu condiia stabilirii domiciliului n regiunile preponderent non-europene ale Rusiei a strnit un val de proteste printre reprezentanii societii civile, n mass-media i spaiul virtual. O iniiativ care a provocat iritare a fost propunerea de a introduce limba rus ca mijloc de comunicare interetnic n Armenia, unde aproape 98% din locuitori sunt armeni. De asemenea, propunerea legislativ care a declanat o dezbatere public aprins cu privire la colile cu predare n limb strin a fost vzut de muli ca un act normativ care va autoriza activitatea colilor cu predare n limb rus. tirile despre uciderea muncitorilor armeni n Rusia din motive xenofobe nu au adugat popularitate Rusiei n Armenia.69

3.1.2. Iran
Efectele adverse ale alianei cu Rusia mping Armenia s contrabalanseze dependena de Moscova. Iranul este vecinul imediat al Armeniei spre care privete Erevanul n eforturile sale de a diversifica opiunile economice i a garanta poziia favorabil n conflictul din Nagorno-Karabah. Iranul asigur ntre 25-30% din tranzitul comercial al Armeniei i este o surs important de bunuri de larg consum. Astfel, Iranul este al patrulea partener comercial al Armeniei, cu o pondere de 5,6% (EU Commission 2011b). ns, la fel ca i ruta prin Georgia, tranzitul prin Iran nu este sigur din cauza relaiilor tensionate ntre Teheran i Washington i Teheran i Ierusalim. n ciuda diferenelor religioase, Armenia se simte confortabil cu Iranul i nu l percepe drept o ameninare la adresa securitii sale.70 n ultimele sondaje de opinie, 37% din cei chestionai consider Iranul principalul partener al Armeniei
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i doar 5% l privesc prin prisma inamiciiei (International Republican Institute, 2008a). Starea de siguran deriv, nu n ultimul rnd, din tratamentul favorabil al minoritii armene n Iran, care numr ntre 40 i 80.000 de oameni. Armenii din Iran sunt printre cele mai puternice minoriti religioase, fapt confirmat prin alocarea a dou locuri n parlamentul de la Teheran. Atitudinea pozitiv a armenilor se bazeaz i pe interaciunea intensiv pe linie turistic. Armenia este o destinaie popular n Iran. Mii de turiti iranieni viziteaz Armenia pentru srbtoarea Novruz Bairam i vacana de var. n 2011, 28.000 de iranieni au venit n Armenia cu ocazia Novruz Bairam (News.Am, 2011b). Pentru iranieni, Armenia este Europa, unde ei se pot relaxa aa cum regulile din Iran nu le permit71, explic un analist interesul iranienilor pentru Armenia. ntre cele dou ri, exist curse de avion regulate. Pn n prezent, Armenia i Iran nu sunt conectate prin cale ferat. n perioada sovietic, legtura era realizat prin Azerbaidjan. n 2009, Erevan i Teheran au czut de acord s construiasc o cale ferat direct ntre cele dou ri, care s se extind pn la Golful Persic. Valoarea proiectului se ridic la $1,8 miliarde. n 2010, Armenia a dus o campanie activ pentru identificarea finanatorilor externi pentru acest proiect (RFE, 2010c). Compatibilitatea ntre cele dou ri este sudat de sentimentul de izolare regional (Coene, 2010, 180), pe care Armenia i Iranul ncearc s o depeasc inclusiv cu ajutor reciproc. Dup suspendarea tranzitului militar prin Georgia, Iran a oferit spaiu aerian pentru cargoul militar destinat bazei militare din Gyumri cel puin o dat. Deteriorarea relaiilor ruso-iraniene dup aprobarea de ctre Consiliul de Securitate al ONU a sanciunilor mpotriva Iranului a pus Armenia ntr-o situaie dificil. Experii nu exclud faptul c partea armean ncearc s intermedieze aprobarea tranzitului spre Gyumri de ctre Teheran pentru urmtoarea ncrctur.72 Erevanul apreciaz, de asemenea,
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poziia Iranului n problema Nagorno-Karabahului. Iranul nu ncurajeaz schimbarea statu quo-ului, fiind preocupat de implicaiile asupra securitii sale n cazul retragerii chiar i limitate a Armeniei i desfurrii forelor internaionale de meninere a pcii, care ar putea include SUA i rile membre UE, foarte aproape de frontiera sa.73 Discuiile telefonice ale preedintelui iranian cu omologul din Azerbaidjan i Armenia n ajunul summit-ului de la Kazan confirm preocuparea Teheranului cu privire la efectele regionale ale tratativelor purtate ntre Baku, Erevan i Moscova. Cooperarea n domeniul energetic cu Iranul este important pentru Armenia din trei motive: alimentarea cu gaze n cazul sistrii livrrilor dinspre Georgia, care va acoperi necesarul pe o perioad limitat; diminuarea gradual a dependenei de Rusia; i aprovizionarea forelor armate cu combustibil n cazul relurii ostilitilor n Nagorno-Karabah. Armenia i Iran sunt conectate prin dou linii de transmisie electric. O parte din gazele iraniene importate este folosit pentru a genera i exporta energie electric din Armenia n Iran. n primvara lui 2011, edina interguvernamental la Teheran a pregtit o serie de acorduri n domeniul infrastructurii i energiei: construcia unei linii electrice de transmisie i a hidrocentralei de pe rul Aras (PanArmenian.Net, 2011). De asemenea, a fost reluat ideea construciei unui oleoduct ntre cele dou ri. ns vizita preedintelui iranian n Armenia, n vara 2011, n cadrul creia trebuia s fie definitivate i semnate acordurile nu a avut loc. Teheranul a decalat vizita invocnd probleme la Erevan. Pe lng deja amintita influen a Moscovei i calculele de ordin intern ale preedintelui iranian, care au contribuit la amnarea vizitei, se pare c nici Washingtonul nu agreeaz unele proiecte care permit Teheranului s sparg izolarea internaional.74
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3.1.3. SUA
Dei la o distan geografic apreciabil de Caucazul de Sud, SUA sunt o pies grea n angrenajul politico-diplomatic i economic al Armeniei. SUA sunt unul dintre co-preedinii Grupului de la Minsk, gzduiesc o diaspor armean numeroas i influent i sunt un donator extern important pentru dezvoltarea economic a Armeniei. SUA au fost al aptelea partener comercial al Armeniei n 2010 cu o pondere de 4,1% (EU Commission, 2011b). Mai mult de 8% din totalul remitenelor n Armenia i au originea n SUA (New Europe, 2011). ncepnd cu 2006, Armenia a beneficiat de fonduri nerambursabile n valoare de $235,6 milioane prin intermediul Corporaiei Provocrile Mileniului, ns violenele postelectorale de la Erevan din 2008 au determinat SUA s suspende finanarea proiectelor n cadrul acestui program. Chiar i n aceste condiii Armenia rmne n lista statelor cu cel mai mare ajutor din partea SUA pe cap de locuitor. Asistena SUA acordat Armeniei n perioada 1992-2005 depete $1 miliard (Nichol, 2011, 27). n 2011, Congresul SUA a aprobat pentru Armenia asisten economic n valoare de $44 milioane, asisten militar n valoare $3,5 milioane i $450.000 pentru pregtire militar. De asemenea, SUA aloc anual sume pentru finanarea proiectelor de reconstrucie i dezvoltare n Nagorno-Karabah. Anul 2011 nu este o excepie, SUA alocnd $8 milioane pentru programe de asisten n aceast regiune (RFE, 2010d). n 1998-2008, SUA au acordat ajutor umanitar NagornoKarabahului n valoare de $32 milioane (Nichol, 2011, 27). Diaspora armean din SUA este esenial pentru Erevan n eforturile de a obine asisten financiar n cadrul dezbaterilor bugetare din legislativul american, de a bloca sau a reduce asistena similar pentru Azerbaidjan, de a preveni abrogarea seciunii 907 din Freedom Support Act aplicat Azerbaidjanului, de a bloca unele numiri diplomatice neconvenabile (de pild, procedura de confirmare a actualului ambasador n Azerbaidjan), de recunoatere a genocidului
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armean. Pe lng activitatea de lobby depus la Washington, comunitatea armean contribuie direct la dezvoltarea economic prin finanarea unor proiecte de infrastructur n Armenia. ns interesele diasporei i ale autoritilor de la Erevan nu se suprapun mereu. n 2008 i 2009, conducerea de la Erevan a fost mult mai favorabil presiunilor pe care le puneau SUA asupra Turciei n vederea normalizrii relaiilor cu Armenia. Temerea diasporei armene din SUA a fost c Erevanul va reduce intensitatea campaniei pentru recunoaterea genocidului armenilor odat cu restabilirea relaiilor cu Ankara. De asemenea, unii reprezentani ai diasporei care au dorit s investeasc n Armenia au reclamat nivelul nalt al corupiei i blocajele la nivel administrativ care mpiedic dezvoltarea afacerilor.75 n contextul redefinirii prioritilor de securitate ale SUA dup atentatele teroriste de la 11 septembrie 2001 i desfurrii celor dou campanii militare majore din Afganistan i Irak, Armenia i-a reactivat cooperarea n sectorul militar cu SUA. O linie similar a fost promovat de Erevan fa de NATO. Autoritile de la Erevan au perceput aceste evoluii drept ocazii favorabile de a diversifica opiunile lor de securitate, de a beneficia de asistena tehnic i a acumula experien. Armenia a reuit s instituie un dialog strategic regulat cu SUA i a semnat Planul de Aciuni Individuale ale Parteneriatului cu NATO. Cu sprijinul SUA a fost deschis n Armenia centrul specializat n pregtirea specialitilor n dezamorsarea minelor. n 2010 Armenia a gzduit pentru prima dat pe teritoriul su un exerciiu NATO. n perspectiv sunt preconizate primele exerciii militare armeano-americane. Armenia a trimis 46 de militari n Irak i 45 de militari n Afganistan. n 2011, Armenia i-a mrit substanial prezena n Afganistan, deplasnd n teatrul de operaiuni un contingent de 81 de militari. Toate acestea, n ansamblu, nu intesc decuplarea Armeniei de aliana cu Federaia Rus.
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n condiiile actualului statu quo n regiune, acest lucru ar fi imposibil. n schimb, dorind s-i mreasc spaiul de manevr pe plan extern, autoritile de la Erevan trimit Rusiei semnalul c Armenia are i alte opiuni pentru a-i asigura securitatea militar76. ntrebarea rmne ct de credibile sunt aceste semnale pentru Rusia, care dispune de o gam diversificat de instrumente pentru a preveni schimbarea radical a cursului de politic extern a Armeniei.

3.1.4. UE
Cutnd s amplifice efectul diversificrii, n ultimii ani Armenia i-a ndreptat atenia spre UE. Relaiile economice Armeniei cu UE s-au intensificat rapid ncepnd cu 20052006. Includerea Armeniei n politica de vecintate a UE i semnarea planului de aciune UE-Armenia au impulsionat acest proces. n consecin, Erevanul percepe UE drept o resurs tot mai important pentru stabilitatea macro-financiar i dezvoltarea economic a Armeniei. Mrturisete un observator: Cnd vorbim despre UE, prima ntrebare este dac i ci bani ne vor da?77. Ultimul barometru de opinie public arat c 29% din respondeni consider UE cel mai important partener al Armeniei (International Republican Institute, 2008a). Armenia beneficiaz de asisten financiar semnificativ din partea UE. n perioada 2007-2010, UE a alocat 98,4 milioane, iar pentru perioada 2011-2013 sunt bugetate 157,3 milioane i alte 40 milioane care pot fi atrase de Armenia din alte programe finanate de UE (Navasardian, 2011, 65). n 2011 UE i Armenia au semnat un memorandum cu privire la acordarea sprijinului macrofinanciar Armeniei pentru a depi efectele crizei economice globale n valoare de 100 milioane, din care 65 milioane sub form de mprumut i 35 milioane n calitate de grant (Eteris, 2011). De asemenea, UE finaneaz programe
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pentru mbuntirea securitii nucleare din Armenia. UE a propus s acopere parial costurile nchiderii centralei nucleare Metsamor. n plus, UE este al doilea investitor n Armenia dup Rusia. Statele membre UE, Frana i Olanda, sunt pe locul doi i trei n topul investitorilor n Armenia n 2010, cu $146,7 i respectiv $64,3 milioane (Mediamax, 2011). n plan economic, UE este principalul partener comercial al Armeniei, cu o pondere de 32,1% n 2010 (EU Commission, 2011b). Acest lucru s-a datorat, nu n ultimul rnd, extinderii din 2009 a Sistemului Generalizat de Preferine Plus (SGP+) asupra Armeniei, care a facilitat accesul produselor autohtone pe piaa european. n 2008, UE a comandat un studiu de fezabilitate cu privire la crearea unei Zone de Comer Liber, Aprofundat i Cuprinztor (ZCLAC) cu Armenia. La Erevan, aproape toate forele politice sprijin apropierea de UE. Exist un interes real pentru UE la Erevan78, confirm un diplomat. Interesul este ntrit prin documentele oficiale. Strategia naional de securitate adoptat n 2007 menioneaz integrarea european printre obiectivele Armeniei (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). ns integrarea n UE este conceput la Erevan altfel dect la Kiev, Chiinu sau Tbilisi. ntrebat despre integrarea european, un oficial a explicat: Noi nu vom bate la ua UE precum o fac vecinii. Nu ne vom precipita. Integrarea european este un proces de durat n cadrul cruia, pe msur ce soluionm problemele noastre interne, vom atinge nivelul apropiat de dezvoltare din statele membre UE. Abia atunci vom calcula dac merit s devenim membri cu drepturi depline sau nu.79 Pe de o parte, aceast poziionare fa de integrare demonstreaz o gndire realist cu privire la perspectivele Armeniei de a deveni membru UE n viitorul previzibil. Se pare c Erevanul este relativ mulumit cu ceea ce a fost propus de UE vecinilor din Est i ncearc s extrag maximum din oferta actual.
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Pe de alt parte, aceast abordare arat c Erevanul este interesat de cooperarea tehnic (introducerea standardelor tehnice) i n acelai timp vrea s previn intruziunea excesiv a UE n afacerile politice interne, pstrnd o anumit distan. Aa cum a observat un analist local conducerea politic se ferete s-i asume prea multe obligaii n relaia cu UE; statutul de membru al Consiliului Europei i problematica drepturilor omului genereaz deja prea multe bti de cap pentru guvernani80. Agenda de cooperare a Armeniei cu UE nu se reduce doar la aspecte economice. Drept confirmare, n 2010 Armenia s-a alturat celor 28 din cele 44 declaraii ale UE n domeniul politicii externe i de securitate la care a fost invitat s se alinieze (EU Commission, 2011e). Cooperarea Armeniei cu UE n domeniul politicii externe i de securitate are conexiune direct cu disputa cu Azerbaidjanul i relaia dificil cu Turcia. Pentru noi UE este o uniune a statelor cretine81, declar un oficial. Fr a nominaliza Azerbaidjan i Turcia, Armenia se pare c d de neles c cele dou state nu au ce cuta n UE. Alternativ, acestea trebuie s-i rezolve chestiunile contradictorii cu Armenia ca s poat avansa pe calea integrrii n UE. Confirmnd aceast poziie, autoritile de la Erevan au exprimat dezamgire n legtur cu faptul c soluionarea problemelor istorice i deschiderea frontierei turco-armene nu au fost incluse de UE ca precondiii pentru declanarea negocierilor de aderare a Turciei (Navasardian, 2011, 64). Dei UE nu particip n formatul de negocieri n chestiunea Nagorno-Karabahului, Frana, stat membru al UE, este copreedintele Grupului de la Minsk. Anterior au existat propuneri ca Frana s fie nlocuit n Grupul de la Minsk de ctre un diplomat UE. Armenia bucurndu-se de o legtur privilegiat cu Frana, ara-gazd a unei diaspore armene influente, a blocat aceast iniiativ (Popescu, 2011, 105). Aadar, obiectivele
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diplomaiei armene n interaciunea cu instituiile UE sunt pstrarea statu quo-ului n formatul de negocieri i blocarea unor documente sau a unor iniiative care dezavantajeaz Armenia n raport cu Azerbaidjanul. De regul, UE ncearc s pstreze neutralitatea n raporturile cu cele dou ri. n consecin, documentele UE deseori includ formulri care satisfac i, n acelai timp, provoac nemulumiri la Erevan sau Baku. De exemplu, Armenia a avut o reacie critic la adresa rezoluiei care cheam UE s dezvolte o strategie fa de Caucazul de Sud, care a fost adoptat de Parlamentul European n 2010. Documentul cere n mod explicit retragerea forelor militare armene de pe teritoriul ocupat al Azerbaidjanului (EU Parliament, 2010), reiternd practic mesajul rezoluiei Adunrii Generale ale ONU din 2008. n acelai timp, pasajul n care UE este chemat s ofere ajutor umanitar populaiei din Nagorno-Karabah este n armonie cu eforturile Armeniei de dezizolare a Nagorno-Karabahului.

3.1.5. Turcia
Primul lucru pe care l fac muli din locuitorii Erevanului dimineaa este s priveasc spre Turcia, admirnd magnificul Ararat, muntele cu ncrctur istoric i simbolic pentru armeni. Dei privirile sunt aintite spre Turcia, sunt o serie de lucruri care i separ pe armeni de vecinul imediat din vest. La nceputul anilor 90, Erevanul i Ankara s-au aflat pe diferite pri ale baricadei n conflictul din Nagorno-Karabah. Rzboiul i nchiderea graniei cu Turcia i Azerbaidjan care i-a urmat au resuscitat sentimentul de ameninare turc nrdcinat n memoria istoric colectiv a armenilor. Campania pentru recunoaterea genocidului armean i referirea n Constituia Armeniei la provinciile de est ale Turciei drept Armenia de Vest au adncit i mai mult fractura dintre Erevan i Ankara. ncepnd cu 2008, la nivel politic, Armenia a cutat activ s depeasc animozitile. Rzboiul ruso-georgian a grbit acest proces, care ar fi fost imposibil dac ambele pri nu fceau mici pai spre normalizarea relaiilor. Ankara
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a dat primele semne de apropiere n 2005-2007 prin restaurarea unor biserici armeneti pn atunci neglijate. Printre acestea s-a numrat biserica Akdamar aflat pe una dintre insulele de pe lacul Van. Oficialii din Armenia au participat la ceremonia de deschidere a bisericii, iar ulterior autoritile turce au permis oficierea unei slujbe pe an la biserica Akdamar. Erevanul a sesizat deschiderea unei oportuniti i l-a invitat pe preedintele Turciei n Armenia cu ocazia meciului oficial de fotbal ntre cele dou echipe naionale. n septembrie 2008, preedintele turc a fcut o vizit istoric la Erevan, fiind primul lider al Turciei care a vizitat Armenia. La aproape un an de la acest eveniment, Armenia i Turcia au semnat protocoale care prevd stabilirea relaiilor diplomatice i redeschiderea frontierei turco-armene. ns procesul de normalizare a relaiilor s-a mpotmolit n cursul anului 2010, cnd ambele pri au renunat s mai ratifice protocoalele, acuzndu-se reciproc pentru eec. Trebuie menionat c nici Armenia, nici Turcia nu i-au retras semnturile de pe protocoale. Astfel prile nu au pus capt procesului, ci doar au ngheat procedura de ratificare. Dei au euat n prim faz n 2010, Armenia i Turcia au trecut de o etap psihologic important. Problema nu se mai pune dac, ci cnd vor fi normalizate relaiile?82, remarc un expert local influent. Sub egida politicii zero probleme cu vecinii, Turcia a continuat procesul de restaurare a bisericilor armeneti i a eliminat Armenia din lista statelor care reprezint o ameninare la adresa securitii sale n 2010. Procesul nu este liniar ns. Armenia continu campania internaional pentru recunoaterea genocidului armenilor. Ca rspuns, primul-ministru turc amenin cu expulzarea muncitorilor armeni din ar i cere demolarea monumentului de reconciliere turco-armean din Kars. ns majoritatea analitilor consider c procesul nu poate fi oprit. Aa cum observ un bun cunosctor al regiunii: Astzi nu turcii cu armenii, dar armenii ntre ei i turcii
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ntre ei discut n contradictoriu ce trebuie de fcut pentru mpcare [ntre armeni i turci] (Markedonov, 2011). Din raiuni evidente procesul ntmpin opoziie la nivel politic i social. Un oficial de la Erevan conchide ntr-o not pesimist: Politica zero probleme cu vecinii nseamn pentru Turcia inexistena vecinilor83. i la nivel social exist rezisten la acest proces. Dar cifrele nu sunt att de descurajatoare pe ct ar trebui s fie reieind din percepia majoritar negativ pe care turcii i armenii o au unii fa de alii. n Turcia, potrivit unui sondaj de opinie, 50% din cei chestionai se opun redeschiderii frontierei, 27% rspund afirmativ, iar 22% rmn indecii. ntr-un sondaj de opinie realizat n Armenia, 31% din cei chestionai s-au exprimat pentru multiplicarea contactelor cu Turcia, un procent aproape similar de respondeni se opun, iar 40% s-au declarat indecii (Armtown.Com, 2011b). n Armenia prevaleaz factorii comerciali n problema redeschiderii frontierei. Muli percep acest proces ca pe o imens oportunitate de a explora piaa din regiunea de est a Turciei. Acest gndire se regsete n sondaje. Potrivit unui barometru de opinie public, 41% din respondeni consider c redeschiderea frontierei cu Turcia va avea un impact economic pozitiv imediat asupra rii, iar 36% s-au declarat neutri sau nu sunt siguri de efectele pozitive (RFE, 2011b). n ciuda graniei nchise i a lipsei relaiilor diplomatice, ntre cele dou ri exist schimburi comerciale, umanitare i ocazional politice, care mping zi de zi Erevanul i Ankara spre normalizarea relaiilor. Turcia a fost al aselea partener comercial al Armeniei n 2010, cu o pondere de 4,4% (EU Commission, 2011b). Oamenii de afaceri estimeaz c schimburile comerciale bilaterale s-ar putea dubla dac frontiera va fi redeschis (Markedonov, 2011). ntre Erevan i Istanbul exist comunicare pe calea aerului. n Turcia lucreaz sezonier ntre 40 i 70 de mii de armeni. Armenii nu se feresc s mearg n vacan n Turcia; n jur de 50 de mii de armeni au vizitat Antalia n 2009 (Ziflioglu, 2010).
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Nici turitii turci nu ocolesc Armenia. Au loc i evenimente culturale bilaterale, n 2011 oraul armean Vanadzor gzduind sptmna filmului turcesc pentru a doua oar. Exist numeroase contacte la nivelul societii civile i comunitii de experi care ofer posibilitatea purtrii unui dialog informal ntre formatorii de opinie i oficiali din cele dou ri. La Erevan, unii experi afirm c discuiile bilaterale n privina normalizrii relaiilor nu au fost sistate, dar au fost mutate pe alt palier. Se pare c n cadrul acestora prile au discutat posibilitatea implementrii limitate a protocoalelor fr ratificarea acestora (de exemplu, deschiderea graniei pentru doar cteva zile pe sptmn pentru camioane).84 Mesajul primului-ministru al Turciei dup ctigarea alegerilor parlamenare din 2011 cu privire la continuarea dialogului cu Erevanul (News.Az, 2011d) confirm c procesul nu se va opri n ciuda multiplelor obstacole. Aceste evoluii, dac au succes n timp, vor avea un impact major asupra arhitecturii economice i de securitate n Caucazul de Sud. ns pentru Turcia misiunea promite a fi extrem de dificil, nu n ultimul rnd din cauza opoziiei Azerbaidjanului fa de normalizarea necondiionat a relaiilor i legturilor strnse ntre Ankara i Baku.

Prin urmare, Azerbaidjanul promoveaz o politic extern multivectorial, care se bucur de sprijinul a 41% din ceteni (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Accentele n politica extern se schimb situaional pentru a scpa de sub presiunea unei puteri regionale sau pentru a extrage de la actorii regionali anumite concesii. Cu toate c asigur un grad de independen strategic, acest curs este susceptibil la crize ciclice n relaiile cu partenerii Azerbaidjanului.

3.2.1. Turcia
Probabil cele mai apropiate relaii regionale au fost dezvoltate cu Ankara. Azerbaidjanul i Turcia sunt conectate printr-o reea multilateral de contacte umanitare, economice, sociale, politice i militare care sudeaz aceast relaie. La nivel politic au loc multiple ntlniri i consultri interguvernamentale. Baku se simte confortabil n raporturile cu Ankara, deoarece partea turc evit s critice evoluiile politice interne din Azerbaidjan (Musabekov, 2011). n sectorul energetic, dou magistrale strategice azere de export a gazelor i petrolului i au ca punct final orae din Turcia Erzurum i, respectiv, Ceihan. Calea ferat care va conecta Azerbaidjanul cu Turcia via Georgia este n construcie. Turcia este al doilea partener comercial al Azerbaidjanului, cu o pondere de 8,2% n 2010 (EU Commission, 2011d). Totodat, Turcia este al cincilea investitor n Azerbaidjan, cu 3,9% din totalul investiiilor n 2010 (News.Az, 2011e). n ultimii ani, Azerbaidjanul a demonstrat interes pentru piaa energetic din Turcia, realiznd o serie de investiii de proporii. De exemplu, SOCAR a achiziionat un pachet de 51% n compania turc petrochimic Petkim, intenionnd s investeasc n jur de $100 milioane n dezvoltarea proiectelor energetice (News.Az, 2011f). Volumul cumulat al investiiilor azere n Turcia este de $4 miliarde, Baku planificnd alte investiii n valoare de $6 miliarde (Kardas, 2011). Pentru muli azeri, Turcia este o destinaie de studii sau de lucru atractiv. Din 1992 pn n 2010, mai mult de
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3.2. Azerbaidjan: independen strategic prin multivectorism

Principalul obiectiv al politicii externe a Azerbaidjanului este restabilirea integritii teritoriale. Strategia extern a Azerbaidjanului urmrete, de asemenea, accesul la tehnologii i creterea potenialului de export al hidrocarburilor, inclusiv prin multiplicarea rutelor de livrare a gazelor i petrol pe pieele internaionale. La rndul su, factorul energetic este instrumentalizat intern i extern pentru reintegrarea rii. Independena financiar asigurat de veniturile substaniale generate de sectorul energetic ofer Azerbaidjanului o autonomie larg n raporturile cu puterile regionale.
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5.000 de studeni din Azerbaidjan au studiat n universiti din Turcia prin intermediul burselor oferite de guvernul turc. n plus, unii tineri au ales s plece n Turcia la studii pe cont propriu. Tot mai muli prini i trimit copiii la grdinie, coli primare i licee turce n Baku (Trend, 2011b). Reeaua instituiilor de educaie turceti n Azerbaidjan este depit doar de instituiile similare cu predare n limb rus (Musabekov, 2011). ntr-un sondaj de opinie, Turcia este pe locul trei (7,4%) n preferinele azerilor care ar alege s plece din ar la munc (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Toate acestea se reflect n atitudinea favorabil fa de Turcia la nivelul societii. Astfel, 86,4% din respondeni n 2010 au apreciat c Turcia este un stat-prieten al Azerbaidjanului (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Atitudinea favorabil fa de Turcia se explic inclusiv prin asistena pe care a acordat-o Turcia Azerbaidjanului n timpul i dup suspendarea aciunilor militare n NagornoKarabah. O serie de organizaii nonguvernamentale din Turcia au oferit ajutor umanitar PSI din Nagorno-Karabah, acesta atingnd pn n prezent $6 milioane (News.Az, 2011). Dup sistarea ostilitilor, cooperarea n domeniul militar s-a intensificat, ajutorul total acordat pn n 2010 depind $200 milioane potrivit Ministerului turc al Aprrii (Artsakank News, 2011). Turcia a pregtit ofieri i soldai azeri n instituiile sale de nvtmnt i n facilitile de antrenament militare. Prile coopereaz ntr-o serie de proiecte comune n domeniul industriei de aprare. Pe lng importul de armament din Turcia, Baku i Ankara au nfiinat societi mixte n scopul produciei de muniie i echipamente militare destinate forelor armate azere (News.Az, 2011g). n 2010, Ankara i Baku au solidificat relaia prin semnarea acordului privind parteneriatul strategic i asistena mutual. Prile i-au asumat obligaia de a oferi ajutor reciproc n caz de pericol la adresa securitii naionale. Documentul, ns, nu ofer Azerbaidjanului aceleai garanii de securitate de care se bucur Armenia prin
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tratatul OTSC.85 n caz de rzboi, Azerbaidjanul se ateapt la sprijin politic i ajutor militar indirect din partea Turciei.86 Turcia joac un rol crucial n strategia Azerbaidjanului de dezizolare i asigurare a securitii Nahicevanului. n 2010 a nceput construcia gazoductului din Turcia nspre Nahicevan, iar Azerbaidjanul i Turcia au semnat un contract de livrare a gazelor spre enclava azer, fr ca partea turc s perceap tax de tranzit. Totodat, au fost lansate zboruri directe ntre Istanbul i Nahicevan. Baku i Ankara analizeaz posibilitatea conectrii Nahicevanului la calea ferat Baku-Tbilisi-Kars. Nu n ultimul rnd, prezena militar a Azerbaidjanului n Nahicevan a fost ntrit cu asistena substanial a Turciei (Abbasov, 2010). Date fiind relaiile tensionate ntre Azerbaidjan i Iran, Turcia caut s medieze ntre cele dou state n spiritul noii politici de vecintate. n 2011, Turcia a organizat ntlnirea trilateral a minitrilor de Externe, pentru a da un impuls pozitiv dialogului ntre Baku i Teheran. ns parteneriatul strategic turco-azer nu este lipsit de probleme. Tentativa Turciei de a normaliza necondiionat relaiile cu Armenia a fost perceput extrem de negativ la Baku. Privit din Azerbaidjan, eventuala deschidere a frontierei turco-armene reduce semnificativ ansele de a determina Erevanul s cad la un acord cu Baku. Pe lng schimbarea de discurs la adresa Turciei, Baku a schimbat accentele n politica sa energetic. Aceasta a inclus revizuirea preului gazelor livrate Turciei i implicarea n proiectul AGRI care exclude nu doar Rusia, ci i Turcia. Semnalul dat de Azerbaidjan Turciei a fost fr noi, nu putei fi hub energetic.87 Proiectul Nabucco a alimentat divergenele ntre Baku i Ankara. Azerbaidjanul a respins oferta Turciei de a contracta ntregul volum de gaze pentru ca ulterior s-l exporte pe piaa european. Dei cetenii Azerbaidjanului beneficiaz
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din 2008 de regimul liberalizat de cltorie n Turcia, autoritile de la Baku nu aplic un tratament similar cetenilor turci. Ankara face presiuni ca Baku s liberalizeze regimul de cltorie pentru cetenii si. Azerbaidjanul rezist invocnd motive de securitate (traficul de droguri i migraia). Iranul, la rndul su, pune presiune pe Baku s elimine vizele pentru cetenii si. Experii aduc de asemenea n discuie motive de ordin intern. Regimul este preocupat de creterea influenei politice i economice a Turciei n Azerbaidjan88, detaliaz un analist preocuprile pe care oficialii le trec sub tcere. Cu toate c n 2010 Turcia a reuit s repare relaiile cu Azerbaidjan, gustul amar al tentativei de a normaliza necondiionat relaia cu Armenia a rmas. La Baku se ateapt ca Turcia s continue dialogul cu Armenia dup alegeri.89 n aceste circumstane, este foarte posibil ca Azerbaidjanul s foloseasc aici cooperarea sectorial cu Rusia, pentru a deturna acest proces.

3.2.2. Rusia
n timpul rzboiului ruso-georgian din 2008, conducerea Azerbaidjanului a avut o reacie moderat. Baku a evitat s critice n mod deschis Rusia. Conformitatea aciunilor Georgiei cu dreptul internaional a fost anunat de purttorul de cuvnt al Ministerului de Externe, i nu de un oficial de rang nalt. Protestele din faa ambasadei ruse la Baku au fost de scurt durat, fiind dispersate de forele de ordine. n acelai timp, conflictul armat din 2008 i negocierile ntre Turcia i Armenia au creat premisele pentru apropierea ntre Moscova i Baku. Rolul pe care l joac Rusia n Grupul de la Minsk i reactivarea dup 2008 a negocierilor de ctre Moscova au determinat Azerbaidjanul, care se opune actualului statu quo n Nagorno-Karabah, s admit punctual interesele Rusiei, fr ns a trece limita pe care o impune o politic extern multivectorial.
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Interviu cu un un expert, Baku, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.

Compatibilitatea modelelor politice (democraia suveran) i economice (petro-state), precum i multiplele legturi personale cu Rusia ale preedintelui (care i-a fcut studiile la Moscova) au facilitat acest proces. Interesele economice i fluxurile migraionale au contribuit la apropierea dintre Moscova i Baku. Rusia este al treilea partener comercial al Azerbaidjanului, cu o pondere de 7,4% n 2010 (EU Commission, 2011d). Rusia, de asemenea, este a doua n lista destinaiilor preferate de azerii care ar fi dispui s plece din ar la munc (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Potrivit estimrilor, n Rusia se afl ntre 1,3 i 1,8 milioane azeri care anual trimit n ar $1,8 $2,4 miliarde (Valiyev, 2011). Limitarea accesului migranilor azeri n Rusia ar avea un impact social negativ imens, care ar pune ntr-o situaie dificil guvernul de la Baku. Creterea importanei vectorului rusesc a contribuit la eliminarea unor probleme de pe agenda bilateral. n 2010, Azerbaidjanul i Rusia au semnat tratatul cu privire la frontiera terestr de stat completnd acordul semnat n 2002 cu privire la delimitarea frontierei ntre cele dou state n Marea Caspic. Cu aceast ocazie, Rusia a anunat c problema a dou sate din nordul Azerbaidjanului Urianoba i Hrahoba , care se considerau temporar teritoriul Rusiei (Republica Daghestan) a fost soluionat definitiv, cele dou localiti revenind sub jurisdicia autoritilor de la Baku (News.Az, 2011h). Tranarea problemei celor dou localiti era important pentru guvernul azer preocupat de revendicrile ocazionale ale minoritii lezghine din nordul rii, care adeseori a folosit Moscova ca platform pentru a lansa mesaje politice. Azerbaidjanul gzduiete o staie radar n Gabala, pe care Rusia o nchiriaz pentru $7 milioane anual. Aproximativ 1.000 de militari rui deservesc staia. Acordul expir n anul 2012, dar prile au purtat deja o rund de negocieri preliminare pe marginea prelungirii acordului. Rusia s-a oferit s investeasc n modernizarea radarului. Este foarte probabil ca Azerbaidjanul s extind termenul
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de edere a militarilor rui cu nc cinci sau zece ani.90 Nu este exclus ca un eventual acord s fie plata politic pentru armamentul rusesc modern livrat Azerbaidjanului n 2010. Unii experi consider c aderarea Azerbaidjanului la Micarea de Nealiniere are legtur direct cu dinamica regional post-2008. Se pare c prin aceast micare Baku a dorit s comunice n principal Moscovei c nu caut aderarea la aliane militare, nici la NATO, dar nici la OTSC.91 Acomodarea intereselor Rusiei a avut loc de asemenea n domeniul energetic, economic i umanitar. O serie de companii au fost admise pe piaa din Azerbaidjan. Banca VTB a intrat pe piaa financiar n 2008. Alte dou companii ruse, Rostelekom i Sistema, i-au declarat interesul s participe la procesul de privatizare a Azertelekom i Baki Telefon Rabitasi. Aproximativ 500 de companii ruse activeaz n Azerbaidjan (Oxford Analytica, 2011). Rusia i Azerbaidjan au ncheiat acordul cu privire la construcia unei noi linii de transmisie electric, Iama-Derbent, care va spori capacitatea de export a energiei electrice din Rusia. n 2008, Rusia a evitat s bombardeze terminalul Kulevi, proprietatea SOCAR-ului, i conducta Baku-Supsa. n 2010, Azerbaidjanul a nceput exporturile de gaze spre Rusia. n 2011, volumul exporturilor a fost majorat pn la 2 miliarde m/c. n 2008, n Azerbaidjan, gazda celei mai numeroase diaspore ruseti n Caucazul de Sud (160-170.000), a fost deschis filiala Universitii de Stat de la Moscova. Aceast instituie s-a adugat listei care include peste 200 de coli i faculti din Azerbaidjan cu predare n limba rus (Musabekov, 2011). Azerbaidjanul e vizitat anual de 700.000 de ceteni rui (Oxford Analytica). Toate acestea pstreaz n percepia unei pri a populaiei o imagine pozitiv despre Rusia. Un barometru de opinie public din 2010 arat c aproximativ 23% dintre azeri consider Rusia un stat-prieten. Rusia este depit la acest capitol doar de Turcia (Puls-R/Friedrich
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Ebert Stiftung, 2010), ns societatea azer este polarizat n privina Rusiei. n acelai sondaj, aproape 17% dintre cei chestionai au identificat Rusia drept stat duman (Puls-R/ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Fr ndoial, pe lng sprijinul acordat Armeniei n Nagorno-Karabah, imaginea Rusiei a avut de suferit dup rzboiul din Georgia, simpatia populaiei fiind preponderent de partea georgienilor.92 Un indicator util n acest sens poate fi nivelul de sprijin pentru procesele integraioniste n cadrul CSI, al cror motor este Rusia. Din 2006 pn n 2010, sprijinul n Azerbaidjan pentru integrarea n cadrul CSI a sczut de la aproximativ 24% la 15% (ibidem). Cursul pragmatic al Azerbaidjanului fa de Rusia a fost testat de o serie de situaii conflictuale. n 2009 informaia circulat n mass-media despre transferul de armament n valoare de $800 milioane din Rusia ctre Armenia a provocat indignare n Azerbaidjan. Guvernul de la Baku a fost dezamgit, deoarece Kremlinul, dup apropierea din 2008, a promis s ofere extrasprijin Azerbaidjanului (Ismailzade, 2009). Ori, n timp ce intermedia negocieri ntre Erevan i Baku, Kremlinul contribuia la echilibrarea balanei militare ntre pri contrar obiectivelor Azerbaidjanului. Prelungirea prezenei militare ruse n Armenia n 2010 de asemenea nu a fost recepionat cu entuziasm la Baku. Comentnd politica militar rus n Caucazul de Sud, un oficial azer de rang nalt a observat c a venit timpul de a nlocui tancurile de lupt cu tancuri petroliere, [altfel spus] de a substitui prezena militar cu cea economic (Aztag, 2011). Pe parcursul anului 2008 au avut loc o serie de atacuri violente xenofobe mpotriva cetenilor azeri n regiunea Moscovei. Mass-media local a informat pe larg despre aceste crime, strnind o reacie public negativ n Azerbaidjan. Sub presiunea opiniei publice, guvernul de la Baku a ridicat problema securitii cetenilor azeri aflai n Rusia n cadrul discuiilor bilaterale cu colegii de la Moscova. Pe poziii
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diametral opuse s-au plasat prile n dezbaterea cu privire la construcia conductei transcaspice. Dac ambasadorul rus la Baku a invocat daune ce pot fi cauzate mediului nconjurtor prin executarea acestui proiect i necesitatea acordului Rusiei i Iranului ca aceast iniiativa s progreseze, reprezentantul SOCAR a replicat c negocierile cu privire la conducta transcaspic vor avea loc fr Rusia (Fitzpatrick, 2011).

3.2.3. SUA
Sprijinul politic i economic al SUA a fost decisiv pentru finalizarea la mijlocul deceniului 2001-2010 a rutelor energetice care ocolesc Rusia i ofer autonomia internaional de care se bucur Azerbaidjanul acum. Rolul SUA este n continuare crucial pentru deblocarea dosarelor bilaterale turkmeno-azere, care ar pune bazele transformrii Azerbaidjanului n ar de tranzit a gazelor naturale dinspre Marea Caspic. Totodat, ntre Azerbaidjan i SUA s-au dezvoltat n timp relaii economice strnse. SUA sunt al doilea investitor (9% din totalul investiiilor) i al patrulea partener comercial al Azerbaidjanului n 2010, cu o pondere de 7% (News.Az, 2011e; EU Commission, 2011d). Unele dintre cele mai mari companii petroliere din SUA (Exxon Mobil, Conoco Philips sau Chevron) sunt implicate n proiecte energetice de proporii n Azerbaidjan. Adeseori, Azerbaidjanul a apelat la lobby-ul companiilor petroliere americane pentru a promova agenda sa naional la Washington. Cooperarea bilateral n domeniul securitii a sporit considerabil dup atentatele de la 11 septembrie 2001. Azerbaidjanul a deschis spaiul su aerian pentru forele armate ale SUA i a pus la dispoziie infrastructura terestr pentru realimentarea avioanelor cu destinaia Afganistan. Baku a desfurat un contingent de pacificatori n Afganistan, care numr 80 de militari. Azerbaidjanul a oferit suport SUA n cadrul operaiunii militare din Irak, contribuind la fora de stabilizare cu 150 de militari. De asemenea,
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Azerbaidjanul reprezint un nod important, care asigur funcionarea facil a reelei nordice de distribuie spre Afganistan. ncepnd cu 2002, preedintele SUA a suspendat anual aplicarea seciunii 907 din Freedom Support Act, care bloca asistena financiar acordat Azerbaidjanului. n 2010, SUA au acordat Azerbaidjanului asisten financiar n valoare de $22 milioane. n 2003, Departamentul Aprrii american a nceput derularea programului de pregtire i dotare cu echipament a grzii navale azere n Marea Caspic. Anual forele armate ale SUA i Azerbaidjanului au organizat exerciii militare comune. ns n 2008 acest parteneriat a scos n eviden primele fisuri, care s-au adncit n 2009 i 2010. n ciuda eforturilor din partea ambelor pri de a menine aparena normalitii la suprafa, relaiile nu mai sunt la fel de apropiate cum au fost n primii ani 2000, n opinia unui oficial azer din administraia prezidenial (News.Az, 2011i). Acest lucru se reflect n sondajele de opinie, n care numai 6,5% din respondeni au declarat c SUA sunt un stat prieten, cu 2% mai puin comparativ cu Iranul (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Din perspectiva azer, o serie de factori au contribuit la rcirea relaiilor azero-americane. n general, la nivelul elitei politice este mprtit pe larg sentimentul c Azerbaidjanul a oferit mai mult dect a primit n schimb. n percepia conducerii de la Baku, relaia cu SUA nu este bazat pe valori, ci pe interese. Azerbaidjanul a sperat c cooperarea n domeniul securitii i al sectorului energetic va genera un sprijin masiv din partea SUA pentru soluionarea conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah. Astfel, interpretnd parteneriatul ca pe o relaie pur contractual, Baku simte c nu a beneficiat suficient de pe urma sprijinului din partea Washingtonului.93 O serie de aciuni de politic extern ale SUA au provocat iritare la Baku: n primul rnd, rolul activ jucat de SUA n semnarea protocoalelor de normalizare a relaiilor dintre Armenia i Turcia; n al doilea rnd,
93

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meninerea seciunii 907 din Freedom Support Act;94 i n al treilea rnd, promovarea agendei democratice n Azerbaidjan95. Administraia prezidenial a devenit extrasensibil la presiunile de democratizare din partea SUA dup valul de revolte populare din lumea arab.96 Votul SUA mpotriva rezoluiei Adunrii Generale a ONU n 2008 cu privire la situaia pe teritoriul ocupat al Azerbaidjanului, postul vacant de ambasador al SUA la Baku timp de un an i neinvitarea preedintelui Azerbaidjanului la summit-ul privind Securitatea Nuclear de la Washington, n 2010, la care au participat efi de stat din Armenia i Georgia, sunt cteva episoade n plus care au contribuit la distanarea Azerbaidjanului de SUA. n consecin, Baku a suspendat exerciiile militare comune cu SUA n 2009, 2010 i 2011 i a virat situaional n plan extern spre Rusia. Administraia prezidenial l-a detaat pe ministrul Aprrii al SUA la Baku pentru a relansa relaia bilateral. A urmat vizita Secretarului de Stat la Baku n 2010 i a ministrului de Externe azer la Washington n 2011. Cu toate c dialogul la nivel guvernamental s-a intensificat n 2010 i 2011, poziia prilor n ceea ce privete dosarele care i divizeaz a rmas aproape neschimbat. Un nou apel lansat la Istanbul n 2011 de Secretarul de Stat al SUA, de a fi redeschis grania turco-armean, a provocat o reacie previzibil la Baku (News.Az, 2011), care menine prile ntr-un cerc vicios.

3.2.4. UE
ncepnd cu a doua jumtate a deceniului 2001-2010, comerul Azerbaidjanului cu UE cunoate o traiectorie ascendent. Astfel, n 2010, UE este de departe principalul partener comercial al Azerbaidjanului cu o pondere de 46,9% n 2010 (EU Commission, 2011d). Trebuie observat
94 95 96

c Azerbaidjanul este singurul stat din Parteneriatul Estic care se bucur de o balan comercial pozitiv solid cu UE. Principalul export al Azerbaidjanului sunt hidrocarburile. Statele membre UE se numr printre cei mai mari investitori n Azerbaidjan, cu Marea Britanie situndu-se detaat pe primul loc n 2010 (52% din totalul investiiilor realizate), urmat de Republica Ceh i Frana (News.Az, 2011e). Pentru perioada 2007-2010 UE a alocat 92 milioane, iar pentru perspectiva financiar 2011-2013 au fost repartizate 122,5 milioane (EEAS 2011). UE i integrarea european sunt relativ populare la nivelul societii. Ultimul barometru de opinie arat c 32,2% se pronun pentru integrarea european, n cretere de la 27,7% n 2006. Totodat, statele membre UE combinat reprezint prima opiune n preferinele azerilor (11%) care ar fi dispui s plece la munc n alt ar (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). n ciuda dinamicii comerciale pozitive, preponderent n sectorul energetic, relaiile politice ale Azerbaidjanului cu UE nu au un succes similar. Azerbaidjanul este un actor financiar independent. Experii au estimat c n 2009 veniturile zilnice ale Azerbaidjanului din vnzrile de petrol au oscilat ntre $40 i $60 milioane (Bayramov, 2009, 7). Azerbaidjanul nsui dezvolt un profil de stat donator, oferind n 2011 $1 milion Japoniei lovite de un cutremur devastator.97 n aceste condiii, un milion n plus sau un milion n minus din partea UE nu mai conteaz98, remarc un analist local. Noi nu avem aceeai motivaie de a ne reforma precum Georgia sau Moldova99, explic alt expert. Sigurana oferit de veniturile uriae i-a transformat pe liderii azeri n interlocuitori extrem de dificili pentru UE.100 Reducerea asimetriei n relaiile bilaterale este confirmat la Baku. Cooperarea noastr a trecut prin transformri majore, de la accentul iniial pus pe ajutor spre cooperarea
97

Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un reprezentant al mass media, Baku, iunie 2011.

Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011. 99 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011. 100 Interviu cu un diplomat.
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mutual avantajoas, remarc ministrul azer de Externe (News.Az, 2011j). Prin urmare, Azerbaidjanul promoveaz activ egalitatea n relaiile sale cu UE. Eschivarea de la condiionalitatea UE face parte din acest efort. De pild, Azerbaidjanul respinge ceea ce consider o abordare unidimensional a problematicii drepturilor omului promovat de UE. Drepturile omului, dincolo de libertile politice i civile, includ aspecte economice i sociale, domenii n care Baku anun progrese.101 n acelai timp, Baku dezvolt parteneriate bilaterale privilegiate cu statele membre UE pentru a dilua critica instituiilor comunitare la adresa sa. Atunci cnd aceasta nu poate fi evitat, precum n cazul reprimrii protestelor opoziiei n primvara anului 2011, autoritile i exprim nemulumirea fa de poziia luat de UE (Azernews, 2011). Alternativ, Baku invoc abordarea selectiv a UE fa de respectarea drepturilor omului, referindu-se mai ales la dezinteresul instituiilor europene pentru drepturile PSI din Nagorno-Karabah (News.Az, 2011k). Azerbaidjanul demonstreaz un comportament obstrucionist n domeniile de interes pentru cetenii si, cum ar fi regimul facilitat de vize cu UE. Autoritile afirm c problema este n curtea UE, Comisia neavnd mandatul de a ncepe negocierile.102 Experii ns deplng lipsa voinei politice la Baku. Executivul se opune semnrii acordurilor de readmisie necesare ncheierii unui acord de facilitare a vizelor cu UE (Trend, 2011c). n schimb, n 2010, Azerbaidjanul a nsprit regimul de vize pentru cetenii strini, inclusiv UE. n esen, aceste exemple reflect poziia guvernului de la Baku cu privire la formula de integrare european preferat, care se reduce la cooperarea economic. Se pare c, la capitolul cooperare economic cu UE, Azerbaidjanul pune accent pe sectorul energetic, din moment ce perspectiva ZCLAC rmne irealizabil fr aderarea la Organizaia Mondial
101 102

a Comerului (OMC). n 2006, UE a semnat cu Azerbaidjan un memorandum cu privire la parteneriatul n sectorul energetic, iar n 2011 preedintele Comisiei Europene i preedintele Azerbaidjanului au semnat o declaraie comun cu privire la coridorul sudic al gazului, a crui parte component l reprezint proiectul Nabucco. Accesul pe pieele europene trebuie s sporeasc veniturile i importana Azerbaidjanului pentru securitatea energetic a UE (Aliyev, 2010). Totodat, Azerbaidjanul aspir s converteasc interaciunea cu UE n domeniul energiei n sprijin pentru reintegrarea rii. Acest efort este suplimentat prin aderarea ocazional la declaraiile UE n domeniul politicii externe i de securitate la care a fost invitat s se alinieze i Azerbaidjanul. n 2010, guvernul de la Baku s-a alturat la 18 din 44 de declaraii (EU Commission, 2011f). Azerbaidjanul nu percepe UE ca putere major n regiune, deoarece i lipsete componenta militar. Rzboiul ruso-georgian a fost exemplificativ pentru Baku.103 Prin urmare, conducerea politic nu ateapt ca UE s joace un rol important n negocierile pe marginea conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah pe termen mediu i scurt. n acelai timp, diplomaia azer cultiv relaii apropiate cu statele membre UE, printre care actuali sau poteniali importatori de gaze din Azerbaidjan, pentru a-i susine n interiorul UE poziia n conflictul din Nagorno-Karabah.

3.2.5. Iran
Iranul, pe teritoriul cruia triesc circa 16 milioane de etnici azeri, rmne un vecin incomod pentru Azerbaidjan. Dei ntre cele dou ri exist puternice legturi istorice, culturale i religioase, la nivelul percepiei publice din Azerbaidjan exist nencredere i suspiciune fa de Iran. ntr-un sondaj de opinie public, 10% din respondenii din Azerbaidjan consider Iranul un stat inamic, i doar 8,8% au apreciat c Iranul este un stat prieten (Puls-R/Friedrich
103

Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.

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Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Schimburile comerciale bilaterale sunt de o intensitate sczut. Iranul este al 17-lea partener comercial al Azerbaidjanului, cu o pondere de 0,7 n 2010 (EU Commission, 2011d). La nivel politic are loc un dialog insuficient instituionalizat, care alterneaz ntre elemente de conflict i cooperare. Vizita preedintelui parlamentului iranian la Baku n iunie 2011 are puine anse de a schimba radical natura raporturilor ntre cele dou state. Printre puinele proiecte bilaterale de cooperare existente n prezent se numr schimburile sezoniere de energie electric. Potrivit acordurilor bilaterale, Azerbaidjanul export energie electric vara, iar Iranul export o cantitate similar toamna i iarna. De asemenea, Iranul i Azerbaidjanul realizeaz exporturi reciproce de gaze. Astfel, Iranul joac un rol important n asigurarea securitii energetice a Nahicevanului. Iranul livreaz anual enclavei izolate de Armenia volumul de gaze necesar. n schimb, Azerbaidjanul export gaze n regiunile de nord ale Iranului. n 2009 i 2011 Azerbaidjanul a mrit livrrile de gaze spre Iran (Nichol, 2011, 16). Aparent, prin aceast majorare, Baku dorete s neutralizeze potenialul efect negativ al relaiilor politice disfuncionale asupra Nahicevanului. Relaiile bilaterale sunt mpovrate de un numr de dosare bilaterale problematice, care afecteaz substanial interaciunea ntre vecini. Iranul ocup ceea ce Azerbaidjanul consider o poziie proarmean. Proiectele n domeniul energetic sunt percepute negativ deoarece slbesc presiunea exercitat de Azerbaidjan i Turcia asupra Armeniei prin nchiderea granielor i excluderea Armeniei din proiectele regionale de infrastructur. Baku a semnalat dezaprobarea cooperrii armeano-iraniene n dialogul direct cu Teheranul (News.Am 2011c). Aparent Iranul a intensificat cooperarea cu Armenia, atunci cnd Azerbaidjanul s-a apropiat prea mult, pentru Teheran, de Occident. De asemenea, chestiunea frontierei e un alt dosar iritant n raporturile bilaterale. Azerbaidjanul i Iranul nu au ajuns la un consens cu privire la delimitarea graniei n Marea Caspic. Dezavantajat de
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mprirea pe linia median n sectoare naionale, Teheranul insist ca Marea Caspic s fie divizat n pri egale ntre statele riverane. Prin urmare, n zona disputat de cele dou state, Azerbaidjanul nu poate efectua lucrri de prospeciune i exploatare. ntr-un incident din 2001, garda iranian a forat un vas de cercetare al BP s se retrag din zona disputat. n 2005, au existat informaii cu privire la violarea spaiului aerian de ctre forele iraniene. Un alt incident grav pe frontiera terestr a avut loc n iulie 2011. Un schimb de focuri ntre grnicerii iranieni i cei azeri, n care un militar azer a fost ucis, red ct se poate de bine atmosfera ncrcat n relaiile bilaterale (News.Az, 2011l). Autoritile de la Baku sunt preocupate de activitatea desfurat de Iran pe teritoriul Azerbaidjanului. n 2007, la Baku, 15 ceteni azeri au fost reinui i gsii vinovai de o instan judectoreasc azer de trdare n favoarea Iranului. La Baku, tentativele Iranului de a exporta o versiune mai conservatoare a Islamului dect cea practicat n Azerbaidjan trezesc nelinite.104 n 2011, a fost arestat liderul Partidului Islamic din Azerbaidjan, pentru implicarea sa n organizarea protestelor n faa Ministerului Educaiei mpotriva interzicerii purtrii hijab-ului n colile din Azerbaidjan (Abbasov, 2011). Partidul considerat pro-iranian i suspectat c este finanat de Teheran a fost scos n afara legii n Azerbaidjan. Arestarea liderului acestuia a fost precedat de declaraiile critice ale clericilor i politicienilor din Iran cu privire la decizia guvernului azer de a interzice purtarea hijab-ului n coli. Oficiali de rang nalt de la Teheran au avertizat autoritile de la Baku cu privire la iminena unei revolte populare dac dreptul la libertate religioas va fi ngrdit n Azerbaidjan. Conducerea Azerbaidjanului este ngrijorat de tentativele de a proiecta puterea blnd a Iranului n Azerbaidjan, ameninnd astfel bazele actualului regim politic. ncepnd din februarie 2010, Iranul a liberalizat unilateral regimul de vize pentru azeri, cu excepia unei
104

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singure categorii, jurnalitii. De atunci, Teheranul insist ca Baku s adopte msuri similare fa de cetenii iranieni. Teheranul finaneaz postul iranian TV Sahar, care emite n azer i acoper partea de sud a Azerbaidjanului, n care triete compact minoritatea tal, cultural i lingvistic apropiat de Iran. Activitatea postului este echivalat la Baku cu subminarea monopolului guvernului n spaiul informaional. Pe lng acuzaii la adresa autoritilor centrale pentru cooperarea cu SUA i Israelul, postul invit cu regularitate reprezentani ai societii civile pentru a discuta despre derapajele democratice din Azerbaidjan.105 Astfel de dezbateri au devenit mai frecvente odat cu declanarea valului revoluionar n Orientul Mijlociu. Toate acestea au ntrit la Baku percepia de ameninare din partea Iranului, motivnd o distanare pronunat a Azerbaidjanului de vecinul din sud. n acelai timp, amplificarea conflictului la vrful conducerii n Iran este vzut ca un potenial factor destabilizator n regiune, ceea ce ntreine starea de anxietate la Baku.

cursului de politic extern a fost adaptat la noua realitate macroregional.

3.3.1. SUA
Dei relaiile bilaterale au fost depersonalizate n mandatul preedintelui Obama, SUA joac n continuare un rol important n strategia de politic extern a Georgiei. Tnra elit politic de la Tbilisi, educat n Occident, se inspir pe larg n aciunile i politicile publice din modelul american. Cooperarea intensificat cu SUA se bucur de sprijinul popular. n sondajele de opinie din 2011, 58% din ceteni consider SUA cel mai important partener politic i economic al Georgiei, n scdere uoar (de la 63%) n 2008 (International Republican Institute, 2008b, 2011). Protestele organizate de unii reprezentani ai opoziiei n faa ambasadei de la Tbilisi n 2011 nu s-au bucurat de o prezen masiv i au fost denunate de cealalt parte a opoziiei georgiene. Conducerea Georgiei a folosit relaia cu SUA dup rzboiul din 2008 pentru a neutraliza strategia de marginalizare a regimului politic de la Tbilisi promovat de Rusia pe plan internaional. Astfel, n 2009 Georgia a semnat un document cu privire la parteneriatul strategic cu SUA. Cu toate c documentul nu ofer garanii de securitate similare celor din tratatul de securitate nipono-american, acesta a reconfirmat sprijinul politic al SUA. Acest sprijin politic s-a reflectat ulterior n rezoluia Senatului cu privire la violarea integritii teritoriale i suveranitii Georgiei de ctre Rusia (US Senate, 2011). n 2009 i 2010, vicepreedintele Statelor Unite i respectiv Secretarul de Stat au vizitat Tbilisi. n 2010 a fost reluat dialogul direct ntre cei doi efi de stat. Pe lng dezizolarea pe plan extern, Tbilisi a apelat la influena SUA pentru a descuraja recunoaterea Abhaziei i a Osetiei de Sud de ctre comunitatea internaional.106 Posibilele efecte economice sau politice negative asupra relaiilor
106

3.3. Georgia: spre Occident

Cu toate c rmne un obiectiv imposibil de realizat ntr-un viitor previzibil, reintegrarea rii rmne preocuparea major a autoritilor de la Tbilisi. Pe termen scurt i mediu ns, Georgia i propune s ating pe plan extern urmtoarele: descurajarea recunoaterii independenei Abhaziei i Osetiei de Sud de ctre comunitatea internaional, asigurarea securitii de-a lungul frontierei administrative de nord, atragerea investiiilor strine i asistenei financiare din partea donatorilor externi necesare dezvoltrii interne intensive, dezvoltarea relaiilor ct de posibil apropiate cu NATO i UE, care ar facilita ntr-un context favorabil integrarea deplin n aceste instituii. Aadar, politica extern a Georgiei este puternic orientat spre Occident. Dup rzboiul din 2008, caracterul pronunat prooccidental al
105

Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.

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bilaterale cu Washingtonul n cazul recunoaterii celor dou regiuni separatiste au fost un motiv puternic pentru multe state din emisfera vestic de a refuza oferta Moscovei. Resimind acut deficitul de securitate, Georgia a depus eforturi pentru a adnci cooperarea n domeniul militar cu SUA i NATO. n 2008, a fost creat Comisia NATO-Georgia pentru a intensifica consultrile politice i cooperarea practic. ncepnd cu 2009, Georgia implementeaz programul anual naional care intete reforme n sectorul de securitate. Modelul programelor anuale este, de regul, aplicat statelor care au primit Planul de aciune n vederea obinerii calitii de membru al NATO (MAP), Georgia reprezentnd astfel o excepie. Georgia este parte a reelei de distibuie nord spre Afganistan, a crei importan a crescut n contextul vulnerabilitii tot mai mari a tranzitului prin Pakistan i al creterii numrului trupelor americane n Afganistan. Portul Poti servete ca punct de legtur cu Azerbaidjanul, de unde cargourile continu tranzitul peste Marea Caspic. Guvernul de la Tbilisi a mrit substanial prezena militar n Afganistan. Cu 937 de militari desfurai n 2010, Georgia se numr printre cei mai mari contribuitori dintre statele care nu fac parte din NATO la misiunile de stabilizare n Afganistan. Autoritile de la Tbilisi pregtesc ntrirea contingentului din Afganistan cu ali 600 de militari (Civil.Ge, 2011g). n schimb, Tbilisi a ncercat s obin contracte de achiziii de armament i echipamente, care s restabileasc capacitatea de aprare serios afectat de rzboiul din 2008. Administraia american a evitat s dea curs acestor solicitri i a oferit n schimb mai multe programe de pregtire militar i exerciii comune (Charap i Welt, 2011, 56-57). Guvernul american a fcut donaii ocazionale de natur militar sau a investit n modernizarea echipamentelor aflate n dotarea forelor armate georgiene. n 2011, au fost donate 40 de autovehicule uor blindate Humvee contingentului militar georgian care se deplasa n teatrul de operaiuni din Afganistan (Civil.Ge, 2011h). De asemenea, guvernul american a finanat lucrrile de
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modernizare la trei vase de patrulare ale grzii de coast georgiene i construcia unui atelier pentru reparaii navale (GHN News Agency, 2011). Dei guvernul SUA s-a ferit s livreze armament, politica de resetare a relaiilor cu Rusia a produs efecte pozitive asupra securitii naionale a Georgiei. Detensionarea relaiilor ruso-americane garanteaz ntr-o oarecare msur securitatea militar a Georgiei, n sensul diminurii anselor unui atac convenional masiv din partea Rusiei.107 SUA au descurajat activ Rusia s iniieze aciuni agresive deschise mpotriva Georgiei. Discuiile de la Moscova, din 2009, ntre preedinii Rusiei i SUA n condiiile escaladrii uoare a situaiei n zonele de conflict sunt exemplificative.108 Georgia percepe resetul ruso-american ca o evoluie conjuctural, iar conflictul cu Rusia o constant a politicii externe pentru un viitor previzibil. Ct de mult va dura resetul ruso-american?, ntreab un analist de la Tbilisi, evalund alternativele de a garanta securitatea militar a Georgiei. Rzboiul rece nu s-a ncheiat pentru Georgia109, l completeaz un oficial. Aadar, preocuparea major la Tbilisi o reprezint asigurarea securitii naionale n contextul epuizrii resetului ruso-american i perseverenei Kremlinului de a modifica orientarea politicii externe a Georgiei, inclusiv prin schimbarea regimului politic.110 SUA sunt un partener economic i donator extern esenial pentru Georgia. SUA sunt al cincilea partener comercial al Georgiei cu o pondere de 7,2% n 2010 (EU Commission, 2011c). Totodat, SUA sunt principalul investitor n Georgia cu $135,8 milioane n 2010. Investiiile strine n Georgia au sczut dramatic de la $2 miliarde n 2007 la $814 milioane n 2010 (Civil.Ge 2011e). n acelai timp, creterea economic a Georgiei din ultimii ani s-a bazat pe atragerea masiv a investitorilor strini. Plasnd Georgia n context
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Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, mai 2011. Interciu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.

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regional, un expert local explic: Noi nu avem o diaspor puternic, noi nu dispunem de petrol i gaze naturale, prin urmare trebuie s atragem investiii111. Aadar, investiiile americane sunt importante pentru reluarea i meninerea ritmului pozitiv de cretere economic a Georgiei. Totodat, SUA sunt un donator major n Georgia. n perioada 20062011, guvernul SUA a finanat prin intermediul Corporaiei Provocrile Mileniului numeroase proiecte de infrastructur i dezvoltare n Georgia, cifrate la aproape $400 milioane. Programul a avut un impact decisiv pentru integrarea i modernizarea infrastructurii din regiunile populate de minoritatea armean i azer din Georgia. n prezent se discut posibilitatea finanrii unui nou program pentru Georgia n cadrul aceleiai iniiative. Dup rzboiul ruso-georgian, SUA au contribuit cu $1 miliard la eforturile de reconstrucie a Georgiei, sprijinul PSI i dezvoltarea economic. Contribuia financiar a SUA la efortul donatorilor externi a fost crucial pentru depirea cu succes de ctre Georgia a dublului oc cauzat de rzboi i criza financiar global.

3.3.2. UE
UE, forat de evenimentele din Georgia din 2008, i-a asumat un rol semnificativ n asigurarea securitii i stabilitii macroeconomice a rii. Rzboiul ruso-georgian a inversat prioritile conducerii politice georgiene. Aderarea accelerat la NATO fiind imposibil, Tbilisi a pus mai mult accent pe integrarea european i cooperarea n domeniul securitii cu UE. n 2010 Georgia s-a alturat la 28 dintre cele 44 de declaraii UE n domeniul politicii externe i de securitate la care a fost invitat s se alinieze (EU Commission, 2011g). n cadrul platformei multilaterale a Parteneriatului Estic democraie, guvernare i stabilitate, Georgia a exprimat interesul pentru cooperarea n domeniul politicii comune de securitate i aprare a UE.112 n 2010, Georgia
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a deschis negocierile cu privire la Acordul de Asociere, a semnat acordul de facilitare a vizelor i a aderat la piaa european comun de aviaie. Ajustarea prioritilor de politic extern se bucur de sprijinul larg al opiniei publice. Potrivit sondajelor, 79% dintre georgieni se declar pentru aderarea Georgiei la UE (Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009b). Apropierea de UE este ghidat de imperative de securitate naional i modernizare politic i economic ale Georgiei. n calitate de parte care a mediat sistarea ostilitilor n 2008, UE e garantul implementrii planului Sarkozy-Medvedev. Prin urmare, Tbilisi dorete ca UE s preseze mult mai intens Rusia pentru ca aceasta s respecte toate prevederile planului de pace din 2008. De multe ori, oficialii georgieni sunt critici la adresa UE din cauza a ceea ce ei consider timiditate n relaiile cu Rusia.113 n acelai timp, autoritile sunt contiente de faptul c UE neutralizeaz ntr-o anumit msur ameninarea militar a Rusiei114, iar Georgia trebuie s evite s fie perceput de UE drept o povar n relaiile sale cu Rusia. n 2008, UE a desfurat o misiune civil de monitorizare (EUMM), compus din 340 de observatori, care reduce semnificativ ansele eruperii unui nou conflict. Georgia gsete prezena observatorilor UE esenial pentru monitorizarea imparial a situaiei pe frontiera adminstrativ cu Abhazia i Osetia de Sud i contracararea acuzaiilor lipsite de probe ale Rusiei cu privire la fortificarea prezenei militare georgiene n vecintatea zonelor de conflict. Autoritile de la Tbilisi au semnat n 2009 un memorandum cu EUMM, valabil pe trei luni, cu opiunea prelungirii tacite dac una din pri nu i exprim dezacordul, care impune restricii cu privire la micarea trupelor n vecintatea Abhaziei i Osetiei de Sud. Georgia, de asemenea, s-a obligat s informeze EUMM despre redislocarea trupelor pe teritoriul su. UE este parte a procesului de la Geneva care reunete Georgia, Rusia, SUA, OSCE,
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ONU, Abhazia i Osetia de Sud. Consultrile au loc n cadrul a dou grupe de lucru: securitate i refugiai. n 2009 prile au convenit asupra stabilirii firului rou i crerii mecanismului de prevenire i gestionare a incidentelor, ceea ce presupune ntlniri sptmnale ntre observatori i ofieri responsabili de securitate n zona de conflict. UE a fost i rmne ferm decis n favoarea integritii teritoriale a Georgiei. Acest fapt a fost confirmat prin descurajarea altor state de a recunoate cele dou entiti separatiste. Avertizarea subtil adresat autoritilor de la Minsk n 2009 cu privire la efectele negative ale recunoaterii Abhaziei i Osetiei asupra cooperrii cu UE este reprezentativ. n acelai timp, politica unor state membre UE de comercializare a armamentului a strrnit ngrijorare la Tbilisi cu privire la securitatea militar naional i regional. n 2011 Frana a semnat contractul de vnzare ctre Rusia a dou purttoare de elicoptere Mistral. Georgia este ngrijorat c aceast achiziie va ntri prezena militar rus la Marea Neagr. n august 2008, Rusia a apelat la nave de rzboi alocate operaiunii maritime de meninere a securitii regionale Black Sea Harmony la care particip rile riverane.115 Dat fiind c invadarea Georgiei n 2008 a avut loc parial pe cale maritim, iar Rusia se pare c s-a confruntat cu deficitul navelor operaionale, Tbilisi nu exclude posibilitatea ca achiziiile s urmreasc sporirea capacitii de proiecie a forei militare ntr-un conflict la Marea Neagr. Aa cum a explicat un ofier rus de rang nalt, referindu-se la ostilitile din august 2008 ceea ce ne-a luat s facem n 26 de ore, aceast nav [Mistral] face n 40 de minute (Kommersant, 2009). n plan economic, UE i statele membre sunt activ implicate n modernizarea multidimensional a Georgiei. UE este primul partener comercial al Georgiei, cu o pondere de 31,7% n 2010 (EU Commission, 2011c). Olanda i Marea Britanie s-au plasat pe locul trei i patru printre investitorii
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Georgiei n 2010, cu $73,4 i, respectiv, $59 milioane (Civil.Ge, 2011e). UE este o pia atractiv pentru fora de munc din Georgia. Potrivit barometrului de opinie public, 30% dintre georgieni ar alege UE ca destinaie de munc n afara rii (Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009b). Statele membre UE combinate sunt pe locul doi ca surs de remitene n Georgia n prima jumtate a anului 2011. Grecia, Italia, Spania i Germania s-au plasat pe urmtoarele patru locuri dup Rusia (Civil.Ge, 2011i). n perioada postconflict (2008-2011), UE a alocat Georgiei 483,5 milioane, alte 131,27 milioane au fost acordate de state membre UE (Fean, 2009, 9). Pentru perspectiva bugetar 2011-2013, UE are prevzute, pentru asistena financiar a Georgiei, 180,3 milioane. Georgia mai poate atrage fonduri suplimentare din programe regionale i transfrontaliere (EU Commission, 2011g). O faz crucial pentru integrarea european a Georgiei o reprezint instituirea ZCLAC. UE a decis n 2008 crearea ZCLAC cu Georgia i a expediat la adresa guvernului de la Tbilisi o serie de precondiii pentru nceperea negocierilor. Dezbaterea n legtur cu avantajele i dezavantajele, costurile i beneficiile ZCLAC cu UE este extrem de intens n cercurile guvernamentale i academice. Avocaii ideii afirm c ZCLAC este singura cale de apropiere real de UE, preluare a standardelor europene i atragere a investitorilor strini pe termen lung. Chiar dac procesul de implementare e foarte costisitor, trebuie s-l pltim116, argumenteaz un experimentat observator local. Oponenii, care majoritar reprezint aripa ultraliberal a elitei opineaz c ZCLAC, prin introducerea instituiilor i reglementrilor stufoase n diferite domenii economice, va stimula fenomenul corupiei i va ndeprta investitorii de care Georgia are nevoie acum. n plus se argumenteaz c introducerea rapid a standardelor europene va elimina de pe pia productorii autohtoni, care nu vor fi capabili s suporte costurile trecerii la standarde
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europene.117 Aceast dezbatere aprins a influenat modul n care Georgia a implementat reformele necesare deschiderii negocierilor, fapt reflectat n ultimul raport de evaluare al Georgiei realizat de UE (EU Commission, 2011g). n consecin, opinia este divizat la Tbilisi. n timp ce oficialii insist asupra faptului c Georgia s-a conformat cerinelor iniiale ale UE i este gata s nceap negocierile118, experii spun c multe din msurile luate au fost ntrziate i adoptate selectiv119. Se pare c, cel puin pe termen scurt, Georgia dorete nceperea negocierilor cu privire la ZCLAC pentru a le trimite un semnal pozitiv investitorilor strini120 i a inversa tendina descendent din ultimii ani. La rndul su, UE este preocupat de faptul c momentul nceperii negocierilor va fi instrumentalizat de Tbilisi pentru a atrage investiii strine, iar interesul pentru ncheierea acordului propriu-zis va scdea (Waal, 2011, 37).

3.3.3. Turcia
n ultimii cinci ani relaiile Georgiei cu Turcia au cunoscut o dezvoltare calitativ i cantitativ rapid. Au loc vizite regulate la nivel de stat i consultri guvernamentale bilaterale. Relaia dintre preedintele Georgiei i primul-ministru al Turciei este sudat printr-o serie de proiecte comune implementate pe parcursul mandatelor succesive. Turcia este singurul vecin cu care Georgia are frontiera delimitat i demarcat. n scopul facilitrii comerului i a vizitelor turistice, prile au semnat acordul cu privire la comerul liber, au liberalizat regimul de vize (se circul pe baza crii de identitate) i au deschis un modern punct comun de frontier n Sarpi (Adjaria), prin care se desfoar 90% din traficul rutier bilateral. Prile vor demara n curnd lucrrile la un alt punct de frontier comun Cildir-Aktas.
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n 2005 i 2008, compania turc TAV a obinut dreptul de gestionare a aeroportului din Batumi timp de 20 de ani i a celui din Tbilisi pe o perioad de 15 ani. ntre Turcia i Georgia exist curse regulate aeriene i de autocar i se preconizeaz finalizarea conexiunii pe calea ferat. Turcia i Georgia sunt conectate prin reelele de transport ale gazelor, petrolului i electricitii, fapt care contribuie la interdependena economic. n 2011, Georgia a semnat un acord cu Turcia pentru construcia a trei hidrocentrale n SamheJavaheti i a unei linii de transmisie electric Batumi-Arakli (News.Az, 2011m). Georgia a debutat n calitate de exportator de energie electric pe piaa european, livrrile fiind realizate prin Turcia. Astfel, foarte rapid, Turcia s-a transformat ntr-o punte a Georgiei spre Europa. ntre cele dou ri are loc o interaciune intens la nivel umanitar. Experii estimeaz c aproximativ 100.000 de georgieni lucreaz n Turcia.121 n 2009, n jur de 350.000 de turci au vizitat Georgia (Chkhikvadze, 2010). Numrul turitilor crete de la an an. Doar n primele patru luni din 2011 aproape 268.000 de turci au fcut deplasri n Georgia (News.Am, 2011a). Dinamizarea raporturilor bilaterale a transformat Turcia ntr-unul dintre principalii parteneri economici ai Georgiei. Volumul comercial ntre Turcia i Georgia a crescut cu 230% n ultimii cinci ani (Fisher Onar, 2009). Prin urmare, Turcia este al doilea partener comercial al Georgiei, cu o pondere de 15,6% n 2010 (EU Commission, 2011c). n 2010, Turcia a fost al doilea investitor strin n Georgia, cu $91,8 milioane (Civil.Ge, 2011e). Totodat, Turcia s-a clasat n prima jumtate a anului 2011 pe locul 6 printre rile de origine a remitenelor n Georgia (Civil.Ge, 2011i). Pn la declanarea rzboiului n 2008, Tbilisi i Ankara au extins cooperarea n domeniul militar n baza acordului semnat n 1997. Ambiia Georgiei de a deveni stat membru NATO a apropiat forele armate turce i georgiene. Turcia a oferit asisten tehnic i a pregtit
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militari georgieni n vederea ajustrii forelor armate ale Georgiei la standardele NATO i asigurrii interoperabilitii acestora n misiunile internaionale. n 2006, asistena militar a Turciei pentru Georgia s-a cifrat la $1,8 milioane (Torbakov, 2008, 9). Dei la o scar mai redus, cooperarea militar ntre cele dou ri a continuat i dup 2008. Factorul rusesc a contat n calculele politice de la Ankara. Chestiunea care, ns, afecteaz relaiile bilaterale o reprezint rolul Turciei n Abhazia. Turcia gzduiete o diaspor abhaz numeroas, care ncurajeaz guvernul spre dezvoltarea relaiilor mai apropiate cu Abhazia. Pe lng lobby-ul diasporei, guvernul de la Ankara nsui dorete s sporeasc interaciunea cu Abhazia. Raionamentul este urmtorul: dac nu contrabalansm economic i politic Moscova, Abhazia va fi absorbit integral n timp de Rusia.122 Dei oficial legtura maritim ntre Abhazia i Turcia este nchis, ntre cele dou pri au loc schimburi comerciale. Suhumi declar c Turcia este al doilea partener comercial al Abhaziei dup Rusia (Vindimian, 2010, 5). n 2009, un diplomat turc s-a deplasat la Suhumi pentru consultri cu autoritile separatiste, iar liderul Abhaziei a efectuat n 2011 o vizit de patru zile n Turcia n cadrul creia s-a ntlnit cu reprezentanii diasporei i oameni de afaceri. Tbilisi accept parial argumentele Turciei, ns nu vrea ca prevenirea absorbiei Abhaziei de ctre Rusia s fie realizat cu preul a ceea ce Tbilisi percepe ca un proces gradual de legitimare internaional a regimului de la Suhumi, care ar putea duce la recunoaterea independenei Abhaziei. n consecin, Georgia a reinut, ntre 1999 i 2006, peste 60 de nave care circulau pe ruta Turcia-Abhazia i a blocat n 2009 deschiderea reprezentanei Benetton din Turcia la Suhumi (Vindimian, 2010, 5; Civil.Ge, 2009c). n 2009, ntr-un caz care a tensionat relaiile bilaterale, o instan judectoreasc de la Tbilisi a condamnat comandantul turc al unei nave reinute n apele teritoriale ale Georgiei care se ndrepta spre
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Abhazia la 24 de ani de nchisoare pentru contraband i activitate economic neautorizat. La presiunile guvernului turc, sentina a fost comutat, iar ceteanul turc a fost eliberat. Prin urmare, guvernul turc nu a dat nici un semn c ar fi dispus s renune la strategia de angajare a Abhaziei123, iar Georgia a realizat c nu se poate opune efectiv procesului. n 2011, Ankara i Tbilisi au purtat negocieri intense cu privire la modalitile de interaciune cu Abhazia, care s nu strneasc animozitatea executivului georgian.124 Apropierea Georgiei de Turcia pe multiple planuri a coincis cu distanarea Turciei de UE. Cu toate c relaiile cu Ankara sunt considerate importante pentru realizarea obiectivelor de politic extern, percepia despre rolul i interesele Turciei n regiune s-a modificat la Tbilisi. Turcia nu mai este o putere regional care proiecteaz interesele Occidentului n Caucazul de Sud125, mprtete un oficial perspectiva georgian. Turcia rmne un partener important al Georgiei, dar motivele Ankarei nu sunt ntotdeauna clare pentru Tbilisi126, l completeaz un expert local. nstrinarea Turciei de Europa este privit la Tbilisi prin prisma propriilor eforturi de apropiere de UE i impactul pe care aceast tendin l poate avea asupra Georgiei. Aa cum remarc un observator, ameninarea constant de la nord i Turcia tot mai distant de UE compun un mediu regional nu tocmai favorabil integrrii europene a Georgiei127.

3.3.4. Iran
Pn n 2006, Georgia nu a demonstrat un interes special pentru raporturile bilaterale aprofundate cu Iranul. Contactele ocazionale la nivel politic i schimburile comerciale nesemnificative pentru balana bilateral caracterizau
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relaiile ntre Tbilisi i Teheran. Politic i economic, Georgia privea intens dincolo de Marea Neagr. Faptul c rile nu au o frontier comun a contribuit la detaarea lor. ns, n 2006, n contextul deteriorrii rapide a relaiilor ruso-georgiene, Georgia a apelat n regim de urgen la importurile de gaze din Iran. La finele anului 2006, guvernul de la Tbilisi preconiza c va reduce cu 80% importurile de gaze din Rusia. Incertitudinea cu privire la data la care Azerbaidjanul va putea ncepe din punct de vedere tehnic livrarea gazelor de pe zcmntul Shah Deniz a determinat Georgia s prospecteze din nou posibilitatea importurilor de cantiti mici de gaze din Iran. Dar cursul de politic extern a Georgiei nu las foarte mult spaiu pentru dezvoltarea relaiilor de vecintate apropiate cu Iranul. Georgia a descoperit foarte rapid limita cooperrii n domeniul energetic cu Iranul, deoarece guvernul SUA s-a exprimat mpotriva interaciunii pe termen lung n sectorul energetic ntre Georgia i Iran (Civil.Ge, 2006). n 2008, rzboiul cu Rusia a impulsionat indirect relaiile ntre Teheran i Tbilisi. Ameninarea militar constant din partea Rusiei, depersonalizarea relaiilor cu SUA i criza economic au contribuit la echilibrarea politicii externe georgiene. Guvernul a imprimat politicii externe o dimensiune regional inclusiv. Tbilisi a realizat c n mediul de securitate postconflict este vital ca Georgia s dezvolte o agend pozitiv cu absolut toate puterile regionale. Aadar, fr a-i schimba radical orientarea strategic, Georgia nu exclude din start nicio alternativ de cooperare.128 Teheranul a sesizat oportunitatea i a reacionat rapid la demersurile Georgiei. Ministrul de externe al Georgiei a vizitat n 2010 Teheranul i a promis c Georgia nu va ntreprinde nicio aciune mpotriva Iranului indiferent de apartenena sa la aliane (Civil.Ge, 2010). Astfel, n limbaj diplomatic, Tbilisi a trimis mesajul c nu va pune la dispoziie teritoriul su n cazul unei operaiuni militare mpotriva Iranului.
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Georgia a profitat de momentul prielnic relansnd relaiile cu Teheranul atunci cnd relaiile ruso-iraniene s-au rcit (Oxford Analytica, 2010), iar Iranul se simea tot mai izolat pe plan internaional. Ulterior, o delegaie condus de un diplomat iranian s-a deplasat la Tbilisi. n cadrul vizitei, Iranul a propus o serie de iniiative de cooperare n domeniul producerii i exportului de energie electric (Lomsadze, 2010). n 2010, Iranul a deschis un consulat la Batumi, iar n 2011 prile au convenit asupra liberalizrii regimului de vize i lansrii curselor directe Teheran-Tbilisi i TeheranBatumi. Astfel, Georgia a instrumentalizat cooperarea cu Iranul pentru a stimula industria turistic autohton. Dei comerul bilateral s-a revitalizat uor, Iranul continu s fie un partener comercial insignifiant pentru Georgia. Ponderea schimburilor comerciale cu Iranul n comerul Georgiei a fost doar de 0,6% n 2010 (EU Commission, 2011c). Iranul s-a dovedit mult mai entuziast i mai proactiv dect Georgia, n timp ce executivul georgian a acionat mai rezervat coordonndu-i aciunile cu SUA.129 Aadar, ceea ce Tbilisi a conceput drept o cooperare pragmatic, care s nu pun n pericol relaia cu Occidentul, Iranul a interpretat drept o ans de a-i proiecta influena n regiune i a atrage Georgia ntr-o relaie mult mai intensificat. Prin urmare, n timp ce Teheranul cuta modaliti de a profita la maximum de aceast deschidere, Georgia ncerca s pstreze o anumit distan.130

3.3.5. Rusia
Spre deosebire de ali actori regionali, Rusia e perceput la Tbilisi n calitate de obstacol major n calea realizrii obiectivelor strategice naionale. n sondajele de opinie, 83% dintre georgieni identific Rusia drept ameninarea numrul unu la adresa securitii Georgiei (International Republican Institute, 2011). Exist o serie de factori care
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explic aceast atitudine. Rusia controleaz militar n jur de 20% din teritoriul Georgiei, inclusiv regiunea Ahalgori, aflat sub jurisdicia autoritilor de la Tbilisi pn n august 2008 (a se vedea harta 7). Forele armate ruse sunt la distana de 50 km de Tbilisi. n eventualitatea unui conflict, Rusia va putea uor bloca infrastructura de transport care face legtura ntre estul i vestul Georgiei i va putea avansa rapid spre capitala rii. Rusia a dislocat n cele dou regiuni separatiste 3.800 de militari i 1.000 de grniceri din cadrul Serviciului Federal de Securitate. Pe lng investiii masive n infrastructura militar, Moscova a declanat procesul de demarcare a frontierei administrative ntre Georgia, pe de o parte, i Abhazia i Osetia de Sud pe de alt parte. Moscova subvenioneaz bugetele republicilor separatiste n proporie de 70-90%. Companiile de stat preiau controlul asupra infrastructurii strategice, precum cile ferate sau aeroportul Babuera din Abhazia. Kremlinul a depus eforturi diplomatice i financiare pentru a extinde lista statelor sau microstatelor care au recunoscut independena Abhaziei i Osetiei de Sud. Astfel, Rusia i propune s decupleze definitiv cele dou regiuni de Georgia, pentru a minimaliza ansele unei reintegrri chiar i n viitorul ndeprtat. n acelai timp, diplomaia rus depune eforturi pentru a izola Georgia pe plan extern i a preveni livrrile de echipament i tehnic militar, inclusiv de natur defensiv, forelor armate georgiene. Rusia se opune deschis aderrii Georgiei nu doar la NATO, ci i la UE.131 n ciuda lipsei relaiilor diplomatice, ntre cele dou ri se menin multiple legturi economice. Rusia a fost al aptelea partener comercial al Georgiei n 2010, cu o pondere de 4,4% (EU Commission, 2011c). Companiile ruseti (Vmpelkom, Inter RAO, Itera, VTB) sunt prezente n sectorul telecomunicaiilor, energetic i financiar-bancar al Georgiei. Georgia import n continuare aprope 8-10% din necesarul su de gaze din Rusia. Gazele naturale sunt importate prin
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Harta 7 Georgia i cele dou regiuni separatiste (sursa: Wikipedia)

intermediul companiei Itera, care are ncheiate contracte de distribuie cu 103 ntreprinderi locale (Postnikov, 2008, 54). ns principalul beneficiar al acestor livrri, probabil la un pre preferenial, este uzina chimic Azot din Rustavi, care este controlat de Itera.132 Georgia are un acord cu Rusia cu privire la livrrile reciproce de energie electric, care a rmas funcional i dup conflictul din 2008. n Rusia muncesc aproximativ 700.000 de georgieni. Remitenele din Rusia constituie n jur de 63% din totalul transferurilor bneti efectuate de georgienii aflai n strintate (ibidem, 56). Dei 72% din georgieni consider c agresiunea Rusiei mpotriva Georgiei continu, n jur de 90% de respondeni sprijin dialogul politic i interaciunea n domeniul economic cu Rusia (International Republican Institute, 2011). Aadar, lund n considerare legturile economice i opinia public, provocarea major pentru guvernul de la Tbilisi
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o reprezint identificarea unei modaliti funcionale de co-existen cu Rusia. n ultimii doi ani, autoritile de la Tbilisi au avut o serie de iniiative prin care au ncercat s detensioneze relaiile cu Rusia.133 n 2010, Georgia i-a asumat n mod unilateral obligaia de a nu utiliza fora pentru a realiza reintegrarea rii. Cu toate c servete interesele economice ale Armeniei, redeschiderea punctului vamal Verhni Lars-Kazbeghi n 2010 a fcut, de asemenea, parte din eforturile de deescaladare a conflictului ruso-georgian. n octombrie 2008, Georgia a simplificat unilateral regimul de vize cu Rusia. Cetenii rui obin viza la intrarea n Georgia fr a mai trece printr-o procedur stufoas de aplicaie. ncepnd cu 2011, viza se poate obine inclusiv la punctul de trecere Verhni Lars-Kazbeghi. n 2010 i 2011, prile au reluat zborurile pe rutele Moscova-Tbilisi, Moscova-Batumi i, respectiv, Moscova-Kutaisi. Georgia consider necesar continuarea discuiilor de la Geneva, n ciuda rolului deseori neconstructiv al Rusiei. Aa cum explic un oficial, uneori e nevoie s pori un proces de dragul procesului134. n 2011, la cererea Moscovei au fost reluate negocierile ruso-georgiene pe marginea problemelor care menin veto-ul Georgiei cu privire la aderarea Rusiei la OMC. Totodat, au existat contacte i pe linia bisericeasc. Capii celor dou biserici s-au ntlnit la Kiev n vara lui 2011. n paralel cu o serie de msuri pozitive, Georgia a continuat s ating puncte nevralgice pentru Rusia. n 2010, Georgia a liberalizat unilateral regimul de vize pentru ceteni rui cu viza de reedin n apte republici naionale din Caucazul de Nord. Potrivit autoritilor, zilnic 600 de rezideni din Caucazul de Nord traverseaz frontiera ruso-georgian (Ekho Moskvy, 2011). n 2011, Georgia a lansat de asemenea un post TV PIK accesibil prin satelit, care emite n rus i acoper evenimentele din Caucazul de Sud i Caucazul de Nord. Grupul-int primar al acestui post
133 134

este publicul din Caucazul de Nord. Pagina de internet a postului are n jur de 7-8.000 de vizitatori unici din Rusia (Elder, 2011). Parlamentul Georgiei a recunoscut n 2011 genocidul cerkeilor comis de Rusia arist n secolul al XIX-lea. Evenimentele tragice care au marcat campania de cucerire a Caucazului au avut loc n 1864 n Krasnaia Poliana, una dintre localitile care va gzdui Jocurile Olimpice de iarn de la Soci n 2014. Autoritile georgiene planific n 2012 deschiderea unui memorial dedicat victimelor genocidului cerkeilor, amplasat aproape de Abhazia. Nu n ultimul rnd, discursul politic georgian recurge la comparaii cu Rusia pentru a delegitima i decredibiliza regimul politic de la Moscova. Reforma poliiei, combaterea corupiei, mbuntirea mediului investiional i transformarea oraului Batumi sunt deseori contrapuse abuzurilor poliiei, corupiei sistemice, hruirii investitorilor strini i organizrii deficitare n pregtirea oraului Soci pentru Jocurile Olimpice. Dei nu sunt gndite exclusiv pentru a irita Rusia, acest set de aciuni politice indubitabil i propune s vulnerabilizeze Rusia. Rusia este satisfcut de statu quo, Georgia vrea ca Rusia s plteasc preul pentru actualul echilibru135, explic logica din spatele unor msuri un analist local. Pn acum Rusia nu a pltit un pre pe msur, de aceea Georgia ncearc s incomodeze Rusia n regiunea unde ea se simte vulnerabil136, detaliaz expertul motivaia politicilor georgiene n Caucazul de Nord. n acelai timp, guvernul de la Tbilisi este ghidat i de imperative de securitate. Caucazul de Nord, cu care Georgia se nvecineaz, va rmne o regiune turbulent pe termen lung. Tbilisi ncearc s proiecteze fora de atracie pentru a asigura o atitudine favorabil fa de Georgia n republicile nord-caucaziene.137 Efectul cumulat al aciunilor de incomodare a Rusiei i de detensionare
135 136 137

Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011. Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

164

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a relaiilor bilaterale reprezint o coabitare dificil ntre Georgia i Rusia.

Concluzii
La 20 de ani de la disoluia Uniunii Sovietice, Caucazul de Sud este un imens antier n lucru, a crui arhitectur politic, economic i de securitate final este nc insesizabil. Aa cum arat analiza, o serie de factori contribuie la incertitudinea cu privire la viitorul regiunii. n primul rnd, dou din cele trei republici nu i controleaz integral teritoriul suveran, iar modificarea violent sau panic a frontierelor nu poate fi exclus. n al doilea rnd, un segment social important, refugiai i PSI, triesc de aproape dou decenii n ateptare. Rentoarcerea, la fel ca i nentoarcerea la casele lor, va influena evoluiile n jurul conflictelor i politicile statelor gazd. n al treilea rnd, Caucazul de Sud este o regiune cu multe granie nchise i comunicare transfrontalier fragmentat. Prin urmare, deschiderea granielor va avea un impact multidimensional benefic asupra regiunii. n acelai timp, meninerea frontierelor nchise va contribui la dezvoltarea proiectelor care mereu exclud pe cineva n regiune, alimentnd animozitile i segmentarea regional. n al patrulea rnd, statele resimt puternic deficitul de securitate la nivel regional care motiveaz nu numai militarizarea excesiv, dar i externalizarea securitii. Agendele concurente ale actorilor cu pondere regional fac deseori imposibil conceperea i implementarea soluiilor regionale inclusive. Manipularea marilor puteri pentru realizarea obiectivelor naionale conflictuale contribuie din plin la situaia de insecuritate general din zon. n al cincilea rnd, diversitatea orientrilor externe i proiectelor naionale interne contribuie la geometria variabil la nivel regional. Statele fac parte sau aspir spre organizaii sau aliane militare alternative, precum OTSC, NATO, CSI, GUAM, UE, OCEMN sau Micarea de Nealiniere. n final, Caucazul de Sud se
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nvecineaz cu (sub)regiuni turbulente (Caucazul de Nord, Orientul Mijlociu) care export instabilitate i conserv elemente de imprevizibilitate. Cumulate, aceste variabile contribuie la multiple scenarii pe care le-ar putea urma regiunea n viitor. Normalizarea relaiilor turco-armene n combinaie cu eventualele progrese n soluionarea conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah ar putea vindeca statele din Caucazul de Sud de logica jocului cu suma nul i ar crea premise pentru cooperare regional trilateral. ns nu poate fi exclus faptul c ineria regional caracterizat prin dezvoltarea cu mai multe viteze i evoluiile pluridirecionale regionale vor fi singurele certitudini pentru Caucazul de Sud n acest deceniu.

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PanArmenian.Net, 2011. Interview with Armenias Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, 28 March (http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/interviews/65515/). Petriashvili, Diana and Rovshan Ismaylov, 2006. Georgia, Azerbaijan Debate Control of Ancient Monasteries Territory, Eurasianet, 2 November (http://www.eurasianet. org/departments/insight/articles/eav110 306b.shtml). Poghosyan, Anna, 2011. Sadakhlo Neutral Zone for Armenian-Azerbaijani Contacts: Use of Trade as a Tool for Conflict Transformation, Journal of Conflict Transformation, 1 April (http://www.caucasusedition.net/analysis/ sadakhlo-neutral-zone-for-armenian-azerbaijani-contacts-use-of-trade-as-a-tool-for-conflict-transformation/). Popescu, Nicu, 2011. EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts: Stealth Intervention, Londra, Routledge. Popescu, Nicu, 2009. EU-Armenia: High-Level, But Low-Profile, EUobserver Blog Neighbourhood, 12 October (http://www. blogs.euobserver.com/popescu/2009/10/12/euin-armenia-high-level-but-low-profile/). Postnikov, Sergei, 2008. Rossisko-Gruzinskie Ekonomiceskie Otnoshenia, Analiticeski Vestnik Soveta Federatsi FSRF, 15 (360), 51-57. Prezident Rossii, 2008. Deklaratsia Azerbaijanskoi Respubliki, Respubliki Armenia i Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moskva (http:// www.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/232). Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010. Azerbaijan in 20062010. Sociological Monitoring (http://www.fes.ge/geo/images/ Fes_Files/ASPublications/2010/az_sur vey_fes.pdf). Radio Free Europe, 2011a. Armenia, Georgia Agree to Jointly Control Border, 17 February (http://www.rferl.org/content/ article/2312043.html). Radio Free Europe. 2011b. Poll Finds Minority of Armenians Support Rapprochement with Turkey, 29 March (http://www. rferl.org/content/Poll_Finds_Minority_Of_Armenians_ Support_Rapprochement_With_Turkey/1997110.html). Radio Free Europe, 2010a. Armenia, Azerbaijani Presidents Agree on Preamble to Madrid Principles, 26 January (http://
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www.rferl.org/content/Armenian_Azerbaijani_Presidents _Agree_On_Preamble_To_Madrid_Principles/1940349. html). Radio Free Europe, 2010b. Armenian Government Urged to Revoke Mining Rights of Russian Gold Firm, 5 November (http://www.asbarez.com/88124/armenian-governmenturged-to-revoke-mining-rights-of-russian-goldfirm/). Radio Free Europe, 2010c. Armenia Seeks Chinese Funding for Rail Link to Iran, 29 June (http://www.rferl.org/content/ Armenia_Seeks_Chinese_Funding_For_Rail_Link_To_Iran / 2086137.html). Radio Free Europe, 2010d. House Panel Backs Continued U.S. Aid to Karabakh, 2 July (http://www.rferl.org/content/ House_Panel_Backs_Continued_US_Aid_To_Karabakh/ 2088881.html). Radio Free Europe, 2009. Georgias Azeri Minority Treated as Second-class Citizens, 4 May (http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgias_Azeri_Minority_Treated_As_SecondClass _Citizens/1621243.html). Simao, Lucinia and Maria Raquel Freire, 2008. The EUs Neighborhood Policy and the South Caucasus: Unfolding New Patterns of Cooperation, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 2 (4), 225-239. SIPRI, 2011. Military Expenditure of Armenia and Azerbaijan (http://www.milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4). Socor, Vladimir, 2010. Lavrov Hints at Fomenting Ethnic Tensions Inside Georgia, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7 (132) (http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttn ews[tt_news]=36605&tx_ttnews[backPid]=27&cHash =80826d5244). Socor, Vladimir, 2009. Russian Naval Mission Creep in the Black Sea, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 6 (172) (http://www. jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_ne ws%5D=35516). Socor, Vladimir, 2007. Georgian Flag Raised over Akhalkalaki, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 4 (128) (http://www. jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5B tt_news%5D=32841).
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The Economist, 2011. Nagorno-Karabakhs Future. Caucasian Questions, 23 June (http://www.economist.com/node/ 18867879?story_id=18867879). Tocci, Nathalie, 2011. Turkeys Neighborhood Policy: A European Perspective, GMF Policy Brief (On Turkey Series), 5 April (http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/Tocci_Neighborhood_Apr11.pdf). Today.Az, 2011. Governor of Kvemo Kartli Meets with Azerbaijani and Armenian Journalists, 15 July (http://www.today.az/ news/society/90440.html). Today.Az, 2008. Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry: Georgias Actions Comply with International Law, 8 August (http://www. today.az/news/politics/46850.html). Torbakov, Igor, 2010. Russia and Turkish-Armenian Normalization: Competing Interests in the South Caucasus, Insight Turkey, 12 (2), 31-39. Torbakov, Igor, 2008. The Georgia Crisis and Russia-Turkish Relations, Jamestown Foundation Report (http:// www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/GeorgiaCrisis Torbakov.pdf). Trend, 2011a. Azerbaijani, Georgian Experts Complete Work on Border Demarcation, 3 March (http://www.en.trend.az/news/ society/1839565.html). Trend, 2011b. Minister: Number of Azerbaijani Students Studying in Turkey Increased, 5 May (http://www.en.trend.az/news/ society/1806792.html). Trend, 2011c. Arzu Rahimov: Azerbaijan Does not Sign Readmission Agreement with Any Country, 8 April (http://www.en. trend.az/news/politics/1858108.html). Trenin, Dmitri, 2009. Russia in the Caucasus: Reversing the Tide, Brown Journal of World Affairs, 15 (2), 143-155. Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios, 2009. The Security Paradoxes of the Black Sea Region, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 9 (3), 225-241. United Nations, 2008. Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly 62/243. The Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan, 25 April (http://www.un.org/ga/search/ view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/62/243).
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US Senate, 2011. Resolution with Respect to Ongoing Violations of the Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty of Georgia and the Importance of a Peaceful and Just Resolution to the Conflict within Georgias Internationally Recognized Borders, 27 July (http://www.civil.ge/files/files/2011/SenateResolution175. pdf). Valiyev, Anar, 2011. Neither Friend nor Foe. Azerbaijans Perceptions of Russia, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo nr. 147 (http://ada.edu.az/uploads/file/neither%20Friend%20nor %20Foe.pdf). Vardanyan, Tamara, 2011. Tbilisskie Armiane: Novyie Reali, Globus Natsionalinoi Bezopasnosti, nr. 2 (http://www. armpyatigorsk.org/articles/17). Vindimian, Marianna, 2010. Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Georgia, ISPI Policy Brief nr. 196 (http://www. ispionline.it/it/documents/PB_196_2010. pdf). World Bank, 2010. Doing Business 2011 (http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/annual-reports/english/db11-fullreport.pdf). Zhahanina, Lizaveta, 2010. Opening the Border at Upper Larsi-Kazbeghi: A Good Beginning, Investor.Ge, nr. 2 (http://www.investor.ge/issues/2010_2/03.htm). Ziflioglu, Vercihan, 2010. Armenian Tourists Prefer Turkeys South, East, Hurriyet, 4 August (http://www. hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=armeniantourists-prefer-turkey8217s-south-2010-08-03).

Angela Grmad

Caucazul de Sud ntre economie politic i politic energetic

I. Contextul macroeconomic de dezvoltare a regiunii

Tonul politicilor externe i cele ale strategiilor de securitate sunt date n primul rnd de succesul politicilor economice promovate de un actor statal sau non-statal. Majoritatea subiecilor de drept internaional public sunt pui n situaia de a recunoate importana factorilor economici, atunci cnd elaboreaz noi scheme de guvernare sau de ascensiune economic. Fr o baz economic bine argumentat i susinut prin programe eficiente, niciun stat nu va reui s se menin n topul actorilor care administreaz procesele i fenomenele care au loc pe scena internaional. Adjudecarea prin investiii financiare sau presiune politic a unor regiuni precum Caucazul de Sud important datorit resurselor de petrol, gaze naturale, a conexiunilor de diferite naturi pe care le poate oferi diferitor pri ale lumii este una dintre metodele cele mai eficiente, utilizate de ctre marile puteri pentru a atinge obiective i interese naionale. Regiunea menionat abund n bogate resurse naturale, fr a le limita nomenclatorul doar la hidrocarburi, pentru c aici se mai gsesc resurse de plutoniu, aur i nu numai.
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Potenialul de transport al acestor resurse ct i al altor minereuri dinspre Est spre Vest i dinspre Nord spre Sud a transformat zona i a atras spre ea diverse interese naionale i obiective economice. Astfel, profitul pe care l poate oferi prezena factorului politic n regiune poate avea mai multe caracteristici, ns latura economic a acesteia e de departe cea mai important. Regiunea este legat de Federaia Rus, dar depinde de sprijinul tehnico-financiar al Uniunii Europene i al Statelor Unite ale Americii. Potenialul economic i energetic al zonei este propice pentru crearea mai multor conexiuni cu lumea extern. Studiile i cercetrile la faa locului scot la iveal inaccesibilitatea regiunii pentru potenialii investitori strini. Pe lng o for de munc ieftin i bine pregtit, care constituie un avantaj, acetia sunt pui n situaia de a face fa monopolurilor sau oligopolurilor, corupiei la nivel nalt, sistemului instituional depit, lacunelor legistative, situaiilor politice incerte i refuzului de a aciona n conformitate cu noile tendine de modernizare i progres tehnologic, att n viaa politic, precum i n cea economic, astfel nct s poat asigura valoare adugat superioar produselor de origine sud-caucazian. Cel mai important punct de luat n considerare, pe care acest studiu dorete s l sublinieze, este faptul c regiunea Caucazului de Sud trebuie s fie studiat ca un sistem integrat. Diferena ntre componentele acestuia o face disponibilitatea de a lua parte la diferite procese de integrare n circuitul economic mondial, precum i capacitatea de a negocia cel mai bun pre pentru resursele de care dispune fiecare, desigur innd cont de tipologia i calitatea acestora. Resursele energetice i infrastructura pentru transportul acestora, disponibile n regiune, ar trebui s fie argumentul forte pentru adoptarea unor strategii de stimulare a interesului n implementarea reformelor i modernizarea economiei. Un parcurs ferm spre dezvoltare poate duce n timp la mrirea capabilitilor de negociere a autoritilor n procesul de soluionare a conflictelor i diminuarea influenei politice a Federaiei Ruse.
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I. Promovarea reformelor economice ntre necesitate i incapacitate

Transformarea calitativ a realitilor sociale ale unui stat poate fi atins prin implementarea unor reforme economice profunde. Acestea din urm au drept finalitate realizarea unor schimbri structurale, ce permit ulterior ameliorarea nivelului indicatorilor economici i a indicilor sociali. Lipsa unor experiene anterioare n gestionarea afacerilor interne ale statului, precum i dependena excesiv de un partener sau de anumite procese, care au loc la nivel regional, au condus la apariia unor discrepane ntre nivelurile de dezvoltare economic ale statelor care formeaz regiunea Caucazului de Sud. Cauzele sunt multiple i pot avea caracter politic sau economic, dar soluia cea mai bun este urmrirea obiectivelor i intereselor naionale ca surs unic de argumentare a msurilor i aciunilor care trebuie s fie implementate pentru dezvoltarea armonioas a societii unui stat. Cele trei state care formeaz Caucazul de Sud au resimit de-a lungul independenei lor tentaia de a face apel la modele evoluate de dezvoltare economic. Estonia, Singapore, Emiratele Arabe Unite acestea sunt doar cteva exemple de state ale cror rezultate economice au influenat ntr-o mare msur atitudinea autoritilor caucaziene fa de metoda de aciune care trebuia adoptat n interior sau spre ce form de integrare regional s se orienteze n exterior. Conexiunea accentuat la procesele economice i politice promovate de Federaia Rus i meninerea unor trsturi caracteristice regimurilor autoritare au contribuit la crearea unui mediu politic ostil procesului pentru implementare a strategiilor i aciunilor capabile s apropie Caucazul de piaa economic mondial. Dac Georgia i Armenia sunt membre ale OMC, din anul 2000 i respectiv din 2003 (World Trade Organization, 2008), acceptnd normele i principiile acestei forme de integrare internaional, atunci Azerbaidjanul pare s-i fi creat propriul model pentru a fi inclus n circuitul mondial, care este susinut de petrolul i gazele naturale de care dispune, precum i de
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preul mondial al acestor resurse. Att la Tbilisi, ct i la Baku au existat la un moment dat preferine pentru implementarea modelului de susinere a economiei utilizat de autoritile statului Singapore.1 Renunarea la acest model are la baz mai multe explicaii: el este greu de adaptat n Caucazul de Sud din cauza condiiilor cu care se confruntau cele trei state noi, independente imediat dup prbuirea Uniunii Sovietice, nu a existat voin politic pentru asumarea implementrii elementelor acestuia sau guvernrile au evoluat, pur i simplu, spre alte modele regionale, mult mai apropiate ca filosofie. Pentru Georgia, de exemplu, drept modele de dezvoltare economic au servit pe rnd: Turcia, Estonia i chiar Emiratele Arabe Unite; pentru Azerbaidjan Singapore i Emiratele Arabe Unite; Armenia a fost tentat s preia o parte din experiena statelor baltice. Prin logica de aciune, concepte i tendine Georgiei i Armeniei le sunt mult mai apropiate modelele europene de dezvoltare economic, pe cnd Azerbaidjanul d dovad de afinitate oriental i asiatic. Adesea apare tentaia ca acest stat s fie inclus n rndul statelor din Asia Central. Independena politic regional poate s fie de scurt durat, dac un stat se bazeaz exclusiv pe resursele sale naturale. Existena i comercializarea acestora nu este o condiie obligatorie pentru creterea nivelului bunstrii sociale unul din principalii indicatori macroeconomici, care permit o apreciere mult mai larg a nivelului dezvoltrii economice a unui stat. Administrarea afacerilor unui stat care dispune de hidrocarburi poate deveni n timp o problem destul de nsemnat, care i poate gsi soluionarea doar prin acte de transparen a actului de guvernare, precum i a cheltuirii veniturilor provenite din contractele petroliere. Economia statelor petroliere depinde cel mai mult de nivelul preurilor la hidrocarburi pe pieele mondiale. n asemenea condiii, scderea preului la petrol ar putea avea consecine mai mici asupra Armeniei i Georgiei, care sunt mai puin dependente
1

Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, 31 mai, 2011.

de vnzrile de resurse energetice. Conform aprecierilor Fondului Monetar Internaional, Republica Azerbaidjan poate fi catalogat drept stat dependent de remitenele din contractele energetice (Ahmedov et al., 2009, 6). Pentru a putea delimita asemnrile i deosebirile n procesul de transformare a economiilor statelor din Caucazul de Sud, este necesar s fie scos n eviden specificul fiecrei ri n parte. ntr-adevr, faptul c toate cele trei componente ale regiunii sunt state ex-sovietice ar putea s reprezinte baza studiului, ns a face abstracie de anumite tendine naionale, existente anterior, dar i n perioada cnd acestea au fcut parte din Uniunea Sovietic, ar fi incorect. Majoritatea problemelor cu care se confrunt autoritile i cetenii din Georgia, Armenia i Azerbaidjan se pot regsi n tot spaiul ex-sovietic, dar nivelul interesului marilor puteri difer de la o regiune la alta. Iat de ce scoaterea la iveal a trsturilor ce fac diferena n caracteristicile de dezvoltare economic ale celor trei state sud-caucaziene este o prim condiie pentru elaborarea unor recomandri pentru guvernanii care au sarcina de a atrage investiii strine n zon prin reducerea nivelului instabilitii politice, prin liberalizarea preurilor, prin combaterea corupiei i a monopolurilor, astfel nct i ceilali indicatori economici utilizai n studierea nivelului de dezvoltare economic a unui stat s ating nivelul dorit. Tranziia la economia de pia nu trebuie s se transforme ntr-un principiu declarativ pe termen lung. Ea trebuie atins prin adoptarea unor msuri bazate pe pragmatism, cu efect pe termen lung, astfel nct stabilitatea i creterea economic s susin securitatea naional a fiecrui stat sud-caucazian. n plus, este bine cunoscut faptul c soluionarea problemelor cu caracter economic, implementarea reformelor i decizia ferm de a depi o anumit etap de dezvoltare, adic de a duce la bun sfrit ceea ce numim astzi perioada de tranziie la economia de pia, poate conduce la deschiderea partenerilor spre soluionarea unor probleme mai vechi, regionale, cu caracter politic.
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Armenia, numit adesea paradoxul diasporei2, a resimit cel mai mult, dintre cele trei ri care formeaz Caucazul de Sud, efectele crizei economice mondiale. n anul 2009 Produsul Intern Brut al Armeniei a nregistrat o scdere de 14,4% (Civilitas Foundation, 2010), exprimat n uniti monetare. Aceast cifr indic o scdere a PIB-ului de la 12 miliarde dolari SUA n 2008 la 8,7 miliarde dolari SUA n 2009. Unele ramuri ale economiei naionale au nregistrat o ncetinire a ritmului de dezvoltare, altele au nregistrat regrese. Printre cele mai afectate domenii se numr construciile, agricultura, precum i industria metalurgic, din cauza scderii preurilor la metale pe pieele internaionale. n perioada Uniunii Sovietice, Armenia era recunoscut pentru dezvoltarea metalurgiei i a infrastructurii de prelucrare, care avea indicatori mari din cauza forei de munc bine pregtit, resurse proprii i o pia de desfacere asigurat n cadrul URSS. Dac vom lua n calcul faptul c multe trsturi ale economiilor acestor state au rmas neschimbate nc din perioada Uniunii Sovietice, infrastructura s-a nvechit, iar Erevanul a fost n cea mai mare parte a independenei sale sub influena politic a Federaiei Ruse, cumulat cu izolarea economic i energetic n plan regional, este evident c recesiunea economic global a influenat cel mai mult acest stat. Abia n 2010, economia armean a nregistrat primele redresri, Produsul Intern Brut majorndu-se n aceast perioad cu aproximativ 7,6% fa de anul 2009. Situaia economic necesit, ns, n continuare investiii considerabile i aplicarea unor msuri eficiente de reformare a tuturor ramurilor industriei i agriculturii. Tot ca efect al perpeturii crizei economice mondiale, are loc scderea nivelului remunerrii salariale i a creterii nivelului omajului pn la 6,9%, ceea ce contribuie i mai mult la migraia forei de munc n afara statului. Pn n anul 2008, Armenia avea cel mai mare salariu mediu pe economie, fiind
2

urmat de Azerbaidjan i Georgia. Criza a schimbat ierarhia. Migraia forei de munc are loc n special spre Federaia Rus, care a iniiat un program de susinere a propriei demografii, aflat n cdere liber. Acest program prevede ncurajarea migraiei cetenilor armeni n regiunile noneuropene ale Rusiei, unde acetia primesc terenuri i o sum de bani. Tot Rusia rmne i statul de unde provin cele mai multe remitene, chiar dac i aici are loc scderea indicatorilor macroeconomici, iar ramurile economice n care sunt implicai cel mai mult angajai care provin din statele CSI nregistreaz recesiune. Lipsa investiiilor strine n Armenia sau migrarea afacerilor mici ctre statul vecin Georgia, are la baz raionamente politice, mai degrab dect de ordin economic. Dei reformele economice promovate de autoritile de la Erevan nu au nregistrat rezultate notorii, lipsa interesului extern de a investi n economia Armeniei a fost pus de cele mai multe ori pe seama conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah factor de instabilitate regional. n realitate, recunosc oficialii armeni, conflictul a fost i este paravanul perfect pentru argumentarea inaciunilor cu caracter economic i a implementrii reformelor, dar mai ales pentru a ascunde actele de corupie la nivel nalt. Investitorii strini ar putea condiiona adoptarea unor msuri principiale de lupt mpotriva corupiei. Acest cerc vicios poate fi ntrerupt doar prin implicarea ferm a factorului politic. Mediul de afaceri se dizolv n instituiile statului. Majoritatea afacerilor sunt susinute de ctre persoane care ocup funcii-cheie n sistemul instituional de stat.3 Federaia Rus a fost ntotdeauna unul dintre principalii parteneri economici al Armeniei. Relaiile economice bilaterale au avut o dinamic pozitiv pn n anul 2009, atunci cnd au fost resimite primele efecte negative ale crizei economice mondiale. Dac n anul 2008 schimbul de mrfuri ntre Rusia i Armenia atingea cifra de 900 milioane de dolari SUA, n anul urmtor aceasta a nregistrat o scdere
3

Interviu cu un analist politic, Erevan, iunie 2011.

Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

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de 19,3%. Abia n anul 2010 au putut fi nregistrate primele semne pozitive ale schimburilor comerciale bilaterale.4 n calitate de partener strategic al Armeniei, Federaia Rus rmne n etapa actual principalul investitor n economia armean. Investitorii rui au reuit s se impun n mai multe sectoare ale economiei: sistemul energetic, sistemul bancar, industria extractiv, tehnologiile informaionale. Prezena investitorilor rui n Armenia poate fi tratat din dou perspective. Prima ine de dependena economic a Armeniei fa de Federaia Rus, care controleaz n ntregime sistemul energetic, deoarece deine majoritatea activelor n toate proiectele energetice importante ale rii prin Gazprom i Inter RAO UES (compania de producere i distribuie a energiei electrice), a achiziionat toate activele operatorului naional Armentel, precum i ale SA Banc VTB, SA Banca de Economii a Armeniei. Cea de-a doua perspectiv de analiz a relaiei economice ruso-armene ine de modalitatea n care e prezentat aceasta de ctre oficialii armeni. Conform acestora, prezena companiilor ruseti demonstreaz atractivitatea economiei Armeniei pentru investitorii strini, ignornd aspectul dependenei economiei fa de Federaia Rus. Pe parcursul anului 2009, Federaia Rus a promis mai multor state ex-sovietice c le va acorda credite prefereniale sau nerambursabile pentru a sprijini eforturile guvernrilor acestora de a depi efectele crizelor economice. Armenia a fost printre puinele beneficiare ale acestui tip de susinere din partea Rusiei. Astfel, la nceputul lunii iunie 2009, Ministerul Finanelor al Federaiei Ruse a transferat n conturile Guvernului Armeniei prima tran din creditul total de 500 milioane dolari SUA. Una dintre ramurile economice ale Armeniei unde exist potenial de dezvoltare important este aceea a comercializrii apei potabile n statele arabe, dar i a hidroenergiei.
Interaciunea ruso-armean i problemele regionale. Materiale ale conferinei internaionale din 5 iunie 2010, Erevan, ed. NAAPET, 2011, pag. 11.
4

Autoritile de la Erevan neleg necesitatea diversificrii produselor care sunt destinate exportului. n condiiile unei economii izolate pe plan regional, statele arabe sunt principala pia de desfacere pentru agenii economici din Armenia. Pentru Armenia statul vecin Iranul ar putea deveni n timp deschiztorul de drumuri pentru interesele economice ctre pieele regionale i mondiale. n prezent sunt dezvoltate cteva proiecte energetice comune cu Teheranul. Acestea in de livrarea de hidroenergie ctre ara vecin. Armenia recunoate c nu este de acord cu modalitatea de promovare a obiectivelor de politic extern a autoritilor iraniene, ns cele dou state partenere sunt obligate de circumstanele regionale s coopereze: Iranul este pentru Armenia cheia de acces spre pieele economice regionale, iar Armenia este pentru Iran cheia de acces spre lumea nemusulman, deoarece este printre puinele state cretine cu care a reuit s stabileasc i s menin relaii bilaterale.5 n anul 2006, Armenia a fost invitat s ia parte la coridorul de transport Nord-Sud, pentru a-i diversifica rutele de transport pentru mrfurile sale. n perspectiv, produsele de origine armean aveau s obin o nou posibilitate de trasport prin intermediul conexiunii feroviare, iar mai apoi cu ajutorul bacului pn n portul georgian Poti. Situaia rutelor de transport pentru bunurile i serviciile din i nspre Amenia are urmtoarea structur: Georgia 75% din mrfuri; Iran 25% din mrfuri; Turcia embargo; Azerbaidjan conflict.

Armenia depinde excesiv de tranzitul de mrfuri prin Georgia, ceea ce ngreuneaz dezvoltarea unor proiecte comerciale cu alte state, nu doar din regiune. Dei exist anumite demersuri pentru eliminarea taxelor de import-export
5

Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.

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care exist ntre cele dou state, procesul pare s ntmpine destule greuti. Spre exemplu, dezinteresul investitorilor romni este condiionat anume de accesul pieei armene la diferite rute de transport regional i interregional. Armenia este conectat la coridoarele de transport Nord-Sud, prin Georgia, iar Romnia este interesat mai mult de coridorul Est-Vest de transport al mrfurilor. Dei sunt prezente pe piaa georgian, produsele romneti sunt supuse dublei impozitri pn n momentul accesrii pieei armene. Acest aspect, respectiv dubla impozitare, duce la creterea preurilor pentru diferite produse, pentru c ea se reflect n costul bunului sau al serviciului. Lipsa unui sistem diversificat de conexiuni la principalele rute de transport al mrfurilor, precum i cele de transport al produselor energetice, scade din atractivitatea investiional a Armeniei. Din aceste considerente, investitorii strini vor ocoli i n continuare oportunitile existente pe piaa acestui stat caucazian i vor migra spre Georgia sau Azerbaidjan. Riscurile pe care ar trebui s i le asume investitorii sunt prea mari. Susinut de Kremlin, dar i de cteva instituii financiare internaionale, printre care Fondul Monetar Internaional, dup ncetarea conflictului militar cu Azerbaidjanul, Armenia a reuit s reintre n circuitul comercial regional. Federaia Rus nu putea s determine autoritile de la Erevan s stabileasc conexiuni i puni economice spre sud. O asemenea atitudine ar fi devenit prea costisitoare, mai ales n condiiile n care exist deja foarte multe conflicte la nivel regional pe care le susine neoficial sau deschis, sub pretextul protejrii drepturilor propriilor ceteni. Dac estul i vestul erau zone interzise pentru bunurile i serviciile de origine armean, nu rmnea dect efectuarea unor demersuri pentru aprofundarea relaiilor cu Iranul i Georgia, pentru c Turcia i Azerbaidjanul erau inaccesibile ca piee de desfacere. Federaia Rus rmne i n continuare principalul partener economic al Armeniei. Aceast relaie bilateral este una calculat, bazat pe pragmatism. Printre statele europene care au reuit s-i fac loc pe piaa armean se numr Italia
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investiii n domeniul construciilor, Romnia produse petroliere (motorin) i chimice, Germania investiii n dezvoltarea unor proiecte pentru construcia de minihidrocentrale, Frana telecomunicaii (Orange). Armenia este prin vocaie un stat european. Legturile sale istorice i comerciale cu Europa au influenat includerea vectorului de integrare european n principalele strategii i politici ale statului. Armenia este unul dintre cele ase state ex-sovietice incluse n Parteneriatul Estic din cadrul Politicii Europene de Vecintate. Planul de Aciuni Comune ArmeniaUniunea European a fost semnat pe 14 noiembrie 2006 la Bruxelles. Acest document prevede integrarea Armeniei n sistemul politic i economic european (Inside Europe, Armenians in Europe, 2006). Prin coninutul acestui document Armenia se oblig s implementeze cerinele impuse de instituiile Uniunii Europene, care trebuie s contribuie la accelerarea procesului de implementare a reformelor economice, precum i la apropierea diferitelor sectoare industriale i ale agriculturii de standardele europene. n plus, UE cere autoritilor de la Erevan s elaboreze ct mai urgent o strategie de securitate energetic, astfel nct obiectivele strategice care se bazeaz pe energie nuclear s fie scoase din circuitul economic i s fie nlocuite cu alt tip de resurse energetice. Dezvoltarea schimburilor comerciale cu Uniunea European este confirmat i prin cifre. Astfel, n primul semestru al anului 2010 comerul exterior al Armeniei cu statele membre ale UE a crescut n medie cu 29,1%, depind n termeni monetari cifra de 1 miliard de dolari americani. Creterea acestui indicator economic a avut loc n pofida deprecierii monedei euro i la diminuarea valorii n cifre. Dei a rmas n urma Georgiei n ceea ce privete implementarea principalelor cerine asumate prin diferite acte i declaraii oficiale n domeniul integrrii europene, Armenia i continu demersul spre apropierea de valorile i standardele europene. Revigorarea economic uoar din ultimii doi ani sunt semne ale perceperii rolului lurii unor decizii
195

ferme de apropiere de forme de integrare economic regional i internaional. Doar prin promovarea unor aciuni ferme n direcia schimbrilor sistemice, adic a ntregului circuit economic, efectuarea de reforme adnci i dure, mobilizarea spre negocierea propriei independene politice, energetice i economice regionale, pot fi obinute rezultate economice credibile. Azerbaidjanul, numit adesea paradoxul petrolului sau paradoxul economiei de tip nchis,6 este singurul stat din lume care a continuat s nregistreze n perioada crizei economice globale o cretere economic nsemnat. Conform estimrilor experilor, economia azer constituie peste 70% din toat economia Caucazului de Sud, iar volumul total al hidrocarburilor extrase n anul 2009 a depit cifra de 50 milioane de tone, cel al gazelor naturale a atins nivelul de 23,6 miliarde metri cubi (Nagdalyan, Eduard, 2011: 128). Att n trecut, ct i n prezent Azerbaidjanul este asociat cu petrolul i gazele naturale.7 Aceste resurse constituie cartea
Interviu cu un analist politic, Erevan, iunie 2011. Transformarea Azerbaidjanului ntr-un stat cu rol energetic important a nceput acum 400 de ani, cnd pe peninsula Absheron au fost extrase primele hidrocarburi. n anul 1813, Imperiul arist a reuit s intre n posesia acestor zcminte i s le administreze o perioad destul de lung. n 1859, ruii au construit n Baku prima uzin pentru prelucrarea petrolului. Pn n 1872, Imperiul Rus a deinut exclusivitate asupra extragerii de resurse energetice din Azerbaidjan. Abia dup 1872, cnd ruii au anulat sistemul de rscumprare fiscal introdus tot de ei, n aceast ramur i au declarat liber extragerea de zcminte petroliere, investitorii strini din Marea Britanie, Frana, Germania i Olanda au primit und verde pentru a ptrunde pe piaa i n industria petrolier a Azerbaidjanului. La nceputul secolului XX, mileniul trecut, jumtate din resursele petroliere extrase ale lumii aveau origine azer. Cteva companii internaionale, printre care i membrii clanului financiar Rothschild, au reuit s ptrund n regiune i astfel s controleze nu doar cantitile de hidrocarburi extrase, dar i preul mondial al petrolului. Monopolul asupra industriei de extracie petrolier le permitea s obin venituri maxime cu investiii minime. n rezultat, necesitatea
7 6

de vizit a Republicii Azerbaidjan, decis acum mai mult ca niciodat, s-i negocieze locul n cadrul sistemului de relaii economice internaionale. n prezent, politica promovat de Baku este de a-i negocia poziia n regiune, contractele economice, precum i stabilitatea exclusiv prin instrumente energetice, ceea ce la un moment dat ar putea epuiza rezervele interne. Concentrarea pe negocierea unor obiective actuale, pe consumul veniturilor provenite din industria petrolier, ignornd de cele mai multe ori investiia n viitor i n alte ramuri economice este dovada unei strategii de dezvoltare economic greit. Diversitatea redus a ramurilor economice, lipsa unor condiii ce ar ncuraja investiiile strine i interne, ncurajarea unor forme de concuren inadecvate pentru economia de pia, precum sunt monopolurile i oligopolurile, corupia la nivel nalt, prejudicierea dreptului asupra proprietii private i implicarea excesiv a statului n stabilirea preurilor sunt semne ale unei deficiene majore n administrarea proceselor i fenomenelor economice ale unui stat. Autoritile se implic n activitile agenilor economici, abuznd de instrumentul stabilirii preurilor la bunuri i servicii, ca o msur foarte eficient pentru prentmpinarea diferitor aciuni sociale mpotriva guvernanilor. La acest capitol, ns, nici Georgia i nici Armenia nu par s fi nregistrat mai multe succese. Preurile sunt controlate sau impuse de ctre autoriti. Liberalizarea preurilor ca trstur a economiei de pia nu funcioneaz. Dup douzeci de ani de la proclamarea independenei Azerbaidjanului, nc mai putem s vorbim aici de existena unei economii de tip nchis, unde accesul partenerilor strini este restricionat, de cele mai multe ori din cauza intereselor private ale diferiilor lideri politici aflai la guvernare. Azerbaidjanul este un stat specializat n extracia i comercializarea pe pieele internaionale a produselor
dotrii tehnologice a acestei industrii a sczut considerabil pe parcurs. Regresul tehnologic a fost iminent. n perioada URSS, aproximativ 70% din necesitile industriei sovietice erau acoperite de resursele petroliere de origine azer.

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petroliere, preocupat prea puin s creeze condiii optime de dezvoltare i pentru alte ramuri ale economiei. O balan comercial pozitiv nu semnific neaprat i existena unor transformri calitative n domeniul economico-financiar. Schimbrile au doar un caracter cantitativ la nivel de susinere financiar a activitilor i iniiativelor actualei guvernri. Dac vom ine cont de procesele i fenomentele enumerate mai sus, prin care trece economia azer, atunci ar trebui s recunoatem c rezultatele nregistrate n acest domeniu i capacitatea de a menine indicatorii macroeconomici pe un trend pozitiv par s exprime existena unui paradox economic. Potrivit rezultatelor prezentate de organizaiile internaionale n rapoartele lor anuale, Azerbaidjanul a fost singurul stat din lume care a atins n condiii de criz economic mondial un ritm de cretere economic de aproximativ 9%. Criza a fost resimit mai puin, fiindc au fost utilizate resurse financiare din Fondul Petrolier de Stat pentru a micora intensitatea consecinelor negative asupra cetenilor. Membrii Grupului Naional pentru Bugetul de Stat (National Budget Group, 2007)8 atenioneaz c, n conformitate cu o clasificare efectuat de ctre Comitetul pentru Transparen al Fondului Monetar Internaional (International Monetary Fund, 2007), dac o ar are un Produs Intern Brut (PIB) format din peste 25% din industria extractiv de petrol sau cota parte a exporturilor totale ale rii depete cifra de 50% din PIB, aceasta intr n categoria statelor dependente de petrol. Nivelul indicatorilor macroeconomici pentru anul 2010 confirm prezena
8 Grupul Naional pentru Bugetul de Stat este o coaliie format n anul 2006 din nou organizaii non-guvernamentale, susinut financiar de Fundaia SOROS, Baku. Misiunea coaliiei este de a crete tansparena utilizrii finanelor publice n interesul cetenilor. Scopurile activitii coaliiei sunt: mbuntirea legislaiei bugetare, asigurarea transparenei i eficienei efecturii de cheltuieli bugetare, participarea la dezbaterile publice cu privire la administrarea i repartizarea veniturilor i cheltuielilor bugetare, monitorizarea procesului de implementare a politicii bugetare.

fenomenului n Azerbaidjan pentru ambele situaii. Alte cifre, care vin s confirme dependena exagerat a economiei azere de domeniul energetic sau orientarea ei ctre dezvoltarea unei singure ramuri economice reies din Proiectul de Lege al Bugetului de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan (Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2011). Pe 22 octombrie 2010, preedintele azer Ilham Aliev a aprobat Legea cu privire la bugetul de stat pentru anul 2011. Conform prevederilor acesteia, veniturile vor fi de 12,061 miliarde AZN9, iar cheltuielile vor atinge cifra de 12,748 miliarde AZN. Deficitul bugetar a fost aprobat la suma de 687 milioane AZN. Cea mai mare parte a veniturilor n Bugetul de Stat vor proveni din transferurile din Fondul Petrolier de Stat i ar atinge cifra de 6,48 miliarde AZN, adic peste 50% din totalul veniturilor bugetare; celelalte surse de venit n bugetul statului sunt: taxa pe valoare adugat 2,121 miliarde AZN, impozitul pe venit 1,21 miliarde AZN. La capitolul cheltuieli, cele mai mari resurse bugetare vor fi alocate programului investiiilor de stat 3,38 miliarde AZN, cheltuieli pentru educaie 1,338 miliarde AZN, armat 1,325 miliarde AZN. n luna iunie curent, au intrat n vigoare modificrile aduse Legii pentru Bugetul Statului din Republica Azerbaidjan (ABC.az, 2011a). n conformitate cu noile prevederi, veniturile n bugetul statului vor atinge cifra de 15,554 miliarde AZN, iar cheltuielile vor ajunge la 15,941 miliarde. AZN. Trebuie s menionm aici c Bugetul de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan este un sistem bugetar supracentralizat, organizat pe dou niveluri: bugetul central i bugetul local. Bugetul central ar trebui s ating pn la finele anului 2011 cifra de 15,107 miliarde AZN, iar resursele acumulate n bugetele locale (84 uniti administrativ-teritoriale, raioane) doar 0,447 miliarde AZN. La capitolul cheltuieli, raportul dintre bugetul central i bugetul local ar trebui s fie 14,633 miliarde AZN,
9

AZN manatul azer, moneda naional a Republicii Azerbai-

djan.

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respectiv 1,308 miliarde AZN. Dup rectificrile bugetare, programul investiiilor de stat a fost suplimentat pn la cifra de 5,864 miliarde AZN (ABC.az, 2011b). n anul 2010, structura exporturilor prezentat de ctre Comitetul Statistic de Stat arat c n Republica Azerbaidjan exporturile sunt mai mari dect importurile. Volumul comerului extern a atins cifra de 27,924 miliarde dolari SUA, ceea ce este cu 31,1% mai mult decat n anul 2009. Exportul de petrol brut atinge cifra de 86,53%, iar cea a produselor petroliere prelucrate cota de 5,07% (Foreign Trade. Economic Rewiev of Azerbaijan, 2011, 13). Tot din structura exporturilor pentru anul 2010 aflm c cea mai mare parte a exporturilor azere au avut ca destinaie statele membre ale Uniunii Europene, la import au predominat rile din Comunitatea Statelor Independente. Rata creterii exporturilor a fost mai mare dect cea a importurilor. Spre deosebire de Georgia i Armenia, Azerbaidjanul nu este membru al Organizaiei Mondiale a Comerului. Una dintre principalele cauze ale amnrii obinerii calitii de membru cu drepturi permanente ine de existena acelorai monopoluri i oligopoluri, controlate de stat. Pentru autoritile de la Tbilisi calitatea de membru al acestei organizaii internaionale reprezint un instrument important n negocierile politice cu Rusia, care de aproximativ optsprezece ani poart tratative cu celelalte state membre pentru a fi acceptat n calitate de membru cu drepturi depline. Georgia este doar unul dintre impedimentele cu care se confrunt Kremlinul, care trebuie s aib acordul tuturor membrilor OMC. Cellalt impediment ine de filosofia de aciune a liderilor de la Moscova i a atitudinii fa de cerinele i regulile cu privire la funcionarea pieelor mondiale i pe care aceasta refuz s le respecte. La Baku, este popular ideea de a deveni stat membru OMC numai dup ce Federaia Rus va fi acceptat n aceast form de organizare economic internaional. Cauza este aceeai ca i n cazul Moscovei: dependena excesiv a stabilitii economice de vnzrile de produse petroliere i implicarea n procesul de stabilire a
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acestora i, probabil, posibila ostilitate a Armeniei, care a devenit membru al organizaiei pe 5 februarie 2003.10 Comerul Azerbaidjanului nc mai este orientat spre Federaia Rus i ctre iniiativele regionale economice, create special de ctre Moscova pentru a-i menine influena n spaiul ex-sovietic. Majoritatea importurilor au origine rus. Federaia Rus se pare c nc rmne a fi unul dintre cei mai importani parteneri economici pentru Baku. Dincolo de conexiunile de ordin familial ale actualului preedinte azer cu Rusia i oamenii de afaceri rui, cifrele vorbesc de la sine despre potenialul de influen al Kremlinului asupra singurului stat din Caucazul de Sud care i poate asigura parial independena politic: Rusia este al treilea partener important al Azerbaidjanului n ceea ce privete originea mrfurilor importate de ctre azeri i al optulea dup volumul de mrfuri exportate.11 Rusia nu mai reprezint, ca n trecut, principalul partener comercial al Azerbaidjanului, dar continu s dein controlul asupra unor prghii economice importante. Liderii Federaiei Ruse insist s rmn printre liderii energetici mondiali, care stabilesc regulile de joc pe pieele internaionale. Rusia achiziioneaz gaz de provenien azer la preuri mai mari dect cele pe care le are stabilite cu ali parteneri.12 n plus, spun experii, faptul c Azerbaidjanul a renunat la aderarea la NATO n doctrina sa militar i a intrat n Organizaia statelor nealiniate (care nu vor intra n vreun bloc militar) ne demonstreaz faptul c preedintele azer Ilham Aliev ncearc s echilibreze balana intereselor politico-economice dintre Rusia i Occident. Existena monopolurilor n economie are efecte negative asupra consumatorilor finali cetenii azeri. Din cauza condiiilor dificile de a ptrunde pe pieile azere i a cheltuielilor financiare foarte mari pe care le efectueaz n
10 Interviu cu un expert n transparena fondurilor provenite din vnzrile de petrol, Baku, iunie, 2011. 11 Interviu cu oficiali, Baku, iunie 2011 12 Interviu cu un expert n securitate energetic, Bucureti, august 2011.

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acest scop, investitorii care reuesc s-i fac loc pe anumite nie stabilesc la rndul lor preuri superioare celor promovate pe pieele regionale sau mondiale. Azerbaidjanul are un potenial turistic enorm, neexploatat, dar nc nu a reuit s devin cunoscut ca destinaie turistic la nivel regional sau mondial. Turismul ar putea s devin n timp una dintre ramurile capabile s asigure complementaritate proiectelor energetice. Investiiile n domeniul turistic pot fi o surs stabil de fluxuri financiare n bugetul de stat. Domeniul serviciilor, unde este inclus i turismul n calitate de component de baz, necesit sprijin din partea autoritilor, mai ales n ceea ce privete facilitatea intrrii pe pia a afacerilor mici i mijlocii n aceast ramur, precum i modificarea legislaiei n domeniu. Dezvoltarea serviciilor este obligatorie. Turismul poate deveni n timp o alternativ pentru resursele de petrol. Fr dezvoltarea acestuia, economia azer ar putea muri n timp, mai ales dac estimrile specialitilor n domeniul energetic se vor confirma, iar nivelul maxim al extraciilor de petrol i gaze va fi atins n 2020. Caracterul epuizabil al resurselor energetice nu trebuie s fie ignorat, n pofida faptului c se insist din ce n ce mai mult pe implementarea celor mai noi tehnologii n extracia de petrol, care permite forri la adncimi ntre 7.000 i 10.000 metri. Turismul rural, agricol constituie una dintre posibilitile de atragere a capitalului intern spre economia naional, crend condiiile necesare pentru a produce valoare adugat. Georgia modelul de dezvoltare economic adoptat de ctre autoritile georgiene se bazeaz pe principiile i ideile neoliberale. Implementarea acestora presupune adoptarea unor msuri printre care se numr ncurajarea concurenei loiale, a liberalizrii pieei, dar i reducerea implicrii autoritilor statului n economie prin funcia sa de corectare a externalitilor dect n situaii excepionale. Tot n Georgia a fost adoptat i aa-numitul Act al Libertii Economice, prin care se micoreaz probabilitatea ca autoritile statului s mreasc taxele (Georgia Times, 2011) Coninutul acestui
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document micoreaz posibilitatea de apariie a unor nemulumiri poteniale din partea agenilor economici, actul asigurnd stabilitate fiscal, consider Ministrul Finanelor al Georgiei, Dmitri Gvindadze. Ca i Republica Azerbaidjan, Georgia nu controleaz o parte a teritoriului su. Dup conflictul ruso-georgian din luna august 2008, Abhazia i Osetia de Sud i-au autodeclarat independena fa de Tbilisi, iar Federaia Rus i nc patru ri, printre care i Venezuela, le-au recunoscut. Astzi, Abhazia i Osetia de Sud sunt susinute financiar din bugetul Rusiei, care le trateaz practic ca subiecte ale federaiei.13 Aceast situaie produce tensiune ntre Georgia i Rusia, oferind teren pentru dispute politice, care adesea sunt utilizate drept pretext pentru evitarea reformelor economice reale. Dup anul 2003 cnd a avut loc revoluia trandafirilor noua guvernare a fost pus n situaia de a prelua afacerile statului ntr-o stare deplorabil. Reformele economice nu s-au bucurat de o abordare corect, capabil s promoveze tranziia real la economia de pia. Modelul de aciune era construit dup acelai tipar, care a cuprins ntregul spaiu ex-sovietic: privatizarea ilegal a obiectivelor strategice, ncurajarea corupiei, preocuparea slab pentru atragerea investiiilor externe. Datoria extern a Georgiei depise suma de 1,5 miliarde dolari SUA, iar mai mult de 50% din populaia rii tria sub pragul srciei (Guseynov, 2008, 295). Aceast stare de lucruri a fost depit n primul rnd datorit susinerii financiare externe i interesului marilor puteri, Statele Unite ale Americii i Uniunea European, pentru meninerea stabilitii politice i economice n regiune. Georgia este element definitoriu al punii de legtur care conecteaz pieele europene la resursele energetice din Marea Caspic. n plus, este parte a coridoarelor de transport al mrfurilor Est-Vest, iar datorit faptului c Armeniei i s-a refuzat participarea n cadrul mai multor proiecte care vizau Caucazul de Sud n calitate de regiune, Tbilisi a preluat o parte din rolul acesteia, reuind
13

Interviu cu un oficial georgian, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

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astfel s multiplice avantajele economice ale orientrii sale politice ctre Uniunea European i ctre Statele Unite ale Americii. Dei nu dispune de resurse energetice, precum Azerbaidjanul, acest stat caucazian este atractiv prin simplul motiv c a reuit s adere la forme de integrare economic regionale i internaionale. Este stat membru al Organizaiei Mondiale a Comerului, conformndu-se normelor, comportamentului i standardelor promovate de OMC. Renunarea la calitatea de membru al Comunitii Statelor Independente dup rzboiul din august 2008 i-a permis s rmn parte a tratatelor pe care le semnase anterior. Astfel, coninutul acestor documente permite i n continuare Georgiei s participe la o serie de schimburi economice din cadrul CSI, avnd posibilitatea s-i promoveze bunurile pe pieele statelor ex-sovietice. Relaiile dintre Georgia i Uniunea European au fost oficializate n anul 1996, cnd a fost semnat Acordul de Parteneriat i Cooperare, care prevedea asisten tehnic pentru Tbilisi i dezvoltarea unor raporturi biletarale n mai multe domenii, inclusiv economic. Documentul a intrat n vigoare n anul 1999. Ulterior, Georgia a decis s stabileasc drept prioritate a politicii sale integrarea n Uniunea European. Aciunile urmtoare ale guvernrii de la Tbilisi au fost ndreptate spre semnarea Planului de Aciuni Comune Georgia UE (European Commission, 2006), semnat pe 6 octombrie 2006. Ca i celelalte dou state caucaziene, Georgia este parte a Parteneriatului Estic, al Politicii Europene de Vecintate. Georgia pare s-i schimbe atitudinea i fa de Iran, fiind tot mai preocupat s se transforme ntr-o pia atractiv pentru investitorii iranieni, dar, spre deosebire de Armenia, autoritile de la Tbilisi au o reea de parteneriate bilaterale mult mai diversificat, ceea ce mrete cu mult libertatea de aciune n bazinul Mrii Negre.14 Pentru Georgia, parteneri importani sunt Turcia i Ucraina. Parteneriatele cu aceste ri permit accesul produselor georgiene pe piaa european. Ulterior
14

conflictului ruso-georgian din august 2008 activitatea portului Batumi din Georgia a fost suspendat temporar. n urma acestui conflict, statul vecin, Armenia, a suferit pierderi de peste 600 milioane dolari SUA o sum enorm pentru economia rii.15 Dac Georgia a primit suport politic i economic extrem de important din partea mai multor parteneri occidentali, astfel fiind posibil i ieirea din recesiunea economic, Armenia, din cauza relaiei sale cu Federaia Rus, nu a primit sprijinul necesar pentru a-i acoperi sau pentru a recupera o parte din pierderile suportate. Eduard Nagdalyan confirm teoria conform creia salvarea economic a Georgiei a fost posibil tocmai datorit rzboiului ruso-georgian din luna august 2008. Armenia i Azerbaidjanul nu s-au bucurat de asemenea resurse (Nagdalyan, 2011, 127): Pe de o parte dinamica Georgiei a avut de suferit n urma rzboiului, dar, orict ar prea de paradoxal, potrivit prerilor mprtite de mai muli experi georgieni, rzboiul a fost cel care a salvat economia Georgiei n timpul crizei. Aici este avut n vedere sprijinul financiar n valoare de 4,5 miliarde dolari SUA oferit de donatorii internaionali Georgiei pentru depirea rezultatelor conflictului cu Rusia. Din aceast sum, 2 miliarde dolari SUA sunt parte a grantului oferit de ctre Statele Unite. Lipsa propriilor resurse naturale, precum i relaia tensionat cu Rusia, din cauza recunoaterii de ctre aceasta a independenei Abhaziei i Osetiei de Sud, au orientat economia georgian ctre structuri occidentale. Pentru reintegrarea teritoriilor sale, ns, Georgia trebuie s devin un model de dezvoltare economic real, s promoveze i s implementeze i n continuare reformele economice. Transformarea trebuie s se produc la nivel de sistem i nu doar separat pe anumite domenii, iar faptul c este susinut cel mai mult de comunitatea internaional n demersul su de a se integra n circuitul economic mondial, nu doar de jure, ci i de facto, constituie un avantaj n negocierea intereselor naionale.
15

Interviu cu un expert n integrare european, Tbilisi, mai, 2011.

Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie, 2011.

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2. Importana dezvoltrii mediului de afaceri i factorii care influeneaz evoluia lui

Din punct de vedere economic, Caucazul de Sud poate fi studiat ca un sistem unitar regional, dar i separat, conform elementelor care l formeaz. Pentru a avea imaginea de ansamblu asupra regiunii, ns, a fost necesar efectuarea unei analize retrospective pentru economia naional a fiecrui stat sud-caucazian, pentru a depista particularitile i necesitile interne. Nu fiecare stat va avea aceleai nevoi economice. Din acest punct de vedere, Azerbaidjanul are independen total, sau va tinde ctre sisteme de integrare regional diferite, din varii motive: afiniti cultural-istorice, valori i principii mprtite, independen sau dependen politic. Cert este un lucru: regiunea cere o abordare complex, chiar dac exist tendine ale specializrii acesteia pe anumite tipuri de ramuri economice: industrie metalurgic, industrie energetic, industrie petrochimic (Kavkazia.net, 2011). Doar aa se pot crea strategii fezabile pentru promovarea unor proiecte investiionale n regiune. Orice guvernare democratic trebuie s aib drept scop asigurarea prosperitii i bunstrii cetenilor si, astfel nct acetia s nu-i simt ameninate sau lezate n vreun fel interesele. Asigurarea protejrii i promovrii drepturilor i libertilor omului, garantate inclusiv prin adeziunea la diferite norme i principii internaionale, n urma semnrii i ratificrii documentelor care le includ, este primul pas spre asigurarea unui dialog reuit ntre stat i cetean. Respectarea dreptului la proprietate privat este parte a demersului spre transformarea economiilor statelor ex-sovietice i tranziia la economia de pia. Din pcate, n toate cele trei state sud-caucaziene exist dificulti n asigurarea acestui drept. Dreptul la proprietate privat este efemer: prin Constituie acesta este garantat, dar de facto nu se respect. Autoritile celor trei state par dezinteresate de acest aspect al activitii lor i de foarte multe ori asistm la nclcarea flagrant a drepturilor elementare, ceea ce n final conduce la anularea interesului de a investi n economia unui stat strin sau la
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luarea deciziei de a exporta surplusul de capital n afar. Dac un investitor nu va avea deplina siguran cu privire la securitatea investiiilor sale financiare, el va prsi piaa unde i desfoar activitatea economic sau nici nu o va mai accesa. Multe ramuri industriale au nevoie de aceste injecii financiare din afar, deoarece ele sunt nsoite de cele mai multe ori i de introducerea n procesul de producie sau de prestare a serviciilor de implementarea celor mai noi rezultate ale progresului tehnologic. Amnarea pe termen nelimitat a asigurrii proteciei drepturilor fundamentale i, n special, a celor ce garanteaz proprietatea privat poate conduce la amnarea modernizrii economiei i, prin ricoeu, i a celorlalte instituii statale. Tranziia la economia de pia necesit susinere pentru iniiative private din partea autoritilor, implic supravegherea principalelor procese i oferirea unor garanii de securitate pentru reprezentanii mediului de afaceri care decid s se implice, investind n sectorul privat. Iat doar dou dintre multiplele exemple: n Azerbaidjan casele luate pentru a construi un palat de iarn n zona central Baku16 sau n Armenia simpla existen a organizaiei non-guvernamentale Victims of State Interests n Erevan, care are drept scop protejarea intereselor i a drepturilor persoanelor care au devenit victime ale intereselor de stat.17 O alt condiie pentru a readuce stabilitate n sistemul economiilor naionale ale statelor sud-caucaziene este adoptarea sau modificarea codurilor antimonopol. Foarte muli ageni economici se confrunt cu aceast problem: nu pot ptrunde pe piee din cauza lipsei condiiilor pentru o concuren loial. n Azerbaidjan, proiectul de modificare a codului antimonopol este finanat de Fundaia SIDA i Fundaia Eurasia. Proiectul de lege este n curs de adoptare. Se preconizeaz c legea va fi ratificat n parlamentul azer pn la sfritul lunii octombrie 2011. Problemele din domeniul legislativ ngreuneaz i progresul
16 17

Interviu cu un expert n drepturile omului, Baku, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un expert n drepturile omului, Erevan, iunie 2011.

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n economie. Societatea azer e destul de conservatoare i accept cu greu noile iniiative sau propuneri de modificare a legislaiei, chiar dac acest lucru este cerut de instituiile i organizaiile internaionale unde Azerbaidjanul are calitatea de stat membru. Dac un proiect de lege contravine intereselor unui anumit grup de interese, atunci adoptarea i ratificarea acestuia va ntmpina suficiente greuti sau nu va trece de Milli Majlis.18 Msurile luate de autoritile de la Baku nu pot fi tratate dect ca fiind populiste. Scderea preurilor la produsele alimentare de prim necesitate nu anuleaz necesitatea modificrii strategiei naionale de dezvoltare a economiei. n plus, asistm la implicarea statului n stabilirea preurilor pe piee, ceea ce este inadmisibil ntr-un stat cu economie de pia. n toate cele trei state sud-caucaziene deciziile economice sunt influenate de monopoluri i oligolopuri. Totui, exist o diferen major n structura acestora: dac n Georgia i Armenia oligarhi sunt att la guvernare, ct i n opoziie, n Azerbaidjan opoziia nu are n spate monopoliti sau oligarhi care s le susin iniiativele. Un lucru e cert: deciziile politice i economice sunt dictate de interesele unor grupuri private. Dei la nivel guvernamental este recunoscut importana unei strategii de lupt mpotriva monopolurilor i oligopolurilor, cele trei state nu dispun de programe eficiente de lupt mpotriva acestora. Fenomenul monopolurilor i oligopolurilor poate fi eradicat cu ajutorul a dou tipuri de factori: Interni perceperea necesitii crerii unui mediu concurenial sntos, ceea ce presupune modificarea legislaiei n conformitate cu cerinele impuse de piaa mondial i organizaiile internaionale cu profil economic; Externi revoluiille arabe, care se pot extinde i n statele sud-caucaziene, dac nu vor fi luate decizii ferme de efectuare a unor reforme sistemice.
18 Denumirea n limba azer a Adunrii Parlamentare a Republicii Azerbaidjan.

Dei investitorii strini se confrunt cu numeroase probleme atunci cnd iau decizia de a intra pe pieele statelor din Caucazul de Sud, totui acetia au o prezen important. Dac se poate face abstracie de nivelul nalt al corupiei, de lacunele legislative existente, care reglementeaz domeniul financiar sau cel cu privire la investiiile strine, este important s notm c principalul pericol pentru mrirea volumului iniiativelor private ar trebui s l constituie conflictele ngheate existente n regiune. n cei douzeci de ani de independen, fiecare stat sud-caucazian s-a confruntat cu conflicte militare deschise. Cu toate acestea, cifra investiiilor strine n regiune confirm faptul c niciuna dintre prile implicate n diferendele din regiune nu se pronun pentru rezolvarea acestora pe cale armat, chiar dac ele continu s existe n timp, ntr-o form latent. Dac pericolul declanrii unor astfel de aciuni militare ar exista cu adevrat, atunci majoritatea investitorilor strini s-ar retrage, pentru a-i proteja investiiile. Fenomenul retragerii investitorilor strini are o intensitate destul de ridicat, dar nu este argumentat de raionamentele politice, ci mai degrab de o politic intern promovat greit, care poate fi redus la cauzele menionate anterior: corupie, concuren neloial i o legislaie care nu corespunde realitilor i cerinelor actuale ale pieei mondiale. ncurajarea ieirii capitalului financiar n afara rii de origine poate fi un semn al mbuntirii strii principalilor indici economici ai unui stat. Una dintre cele mai mari companii din Caucaz, care a reuit s aib o prezen internaional impresionant prin mrimea proiectelor pe care le desfoar n afara rii de origine SOCAR19, Compania Petrolier de Stat
Compania petrolier de stat din Azerbaidjan (SOCAR) este una dintre cele mai mari companii petroliere din lume, care acioneaz n baza unei politici de stat indivizibile cu scopul de a mbunti structura de administrare a industriei petroliere azere, precum i pentru a oferi posibilitatea de dezvoltare pentru complexul energetic petrolier al Azerbaidjanului. SOCAR a fost nfiinat n anul 1992 n urma fu-ziunii a dou companii petroliere de stat: Azerneft i Azneftkimiya.
19

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din Azerbaidjan a iniiat numeroase proiecte energetice n afara Azerbaidjanului. Lupta mpotriva corupiei este un alt element indispensabil transformrii calitative a mediului de afaceri al oricrui stat. n Azerbaidjan, combaterea acestui flagel s-a intensificat dup declanarea revoluiilor arabe. Autoritile de la Baku au venit cu iniiativa de a crea un Comitet Anticorupie, care a atins rezultate mai mult la nivel local. Lupta mpotriva corupiei la nivel nalt i nivel mic inclusiv rmne o problem. Cu o situaie similar se confrunt i Georgia, diferena o face contracararea acestui fenomen la nivel mic. Georgia a avansat foarte mult n lupta mpotriva actelor de corupie, fiind unul dintre liderii regionali n combaterea acestui fenomen negativ, care influeneaz foarte mult deciziile oamenilor de afaceri atunci cnd acetia analizeaz nivelul de siguran al unor poteniale investiii. n plus, fenomenul corupiei este unul dintre factorii care vor frna foarte mult procesul de liberalizare a regimului de vize cu Uniunea European.20 Cu toate acestea, n cele trei state sud-caucaziene, fenomenul este un element cotidian. Eradicarea lui se face mai mult prin declaraii oficiale dect prin aplicarea unor aciuni concrete. Cei douzeci de ani de independen nu au creat condiiile necesare pentru construirea unui spaiu economic comun n regiunea Caucazului de Sud. Aceast trstur a zonei are la baz existena mai multor divergene politice ntre actorii statali care o formeaz, precum i interesele particulare, modalitatea de abordare a problemelor cu care se confrunt sau relaia cu marile puteri ale lumii cu interese geostrategice n regiune. Crearea unui asemenea spaiu economic comun, dup modelul european, de exemplu, ar conduce inevitabil la creterea atractivitii Caucazului de Sud pentru poteniali investitori occidentali i asiatici. De asemenea, ar crea precondiii pentru accederea n formate de integrare economic: europene sau internaionale. Toate
20

cele trei state sud-caucaziene au semnat Planuri de Aciuni Comune cu Uniunea European i sunt incluse n Politica European de Vecintate (PEV), prin intermediul Parteneriatului Estic, aprut n cadrul PEV la iniiativa Poloniei i Suediei n anul 2008 i implementat ncepnd cu primvara anului 2009. Principalul beneficiu al unui asemenea tip de cooperare intraregional ar fi asigurarea securitii economice. Pentru a pune bazele unei forme de integrare regional, statele Caucazului de Sud trebuie s continue reformele ncepute acum mai bine de un deceniu, fiindc foarte multe fenomene economice negative, proprii spaiului ex-sovietic, sunt capabile s ncetineasc i mai mult procesele de trecere la economia de pia, respectiv s diminueze interesul pentru investiii.

II. Economia politicilor energetice n Caucazul de Sud

Majoritatea disfunciilor n domeniul economic i n cel al securitii energetice n statele din Caucazul de Sud au conexiune cu procesul de destrmare a Uniunii Sovietice. Recunoaterea internaional a independenei politice nu a condiionat n manier obligatorie i obinerea independenei economice sau energetice fa de noua motenitoare de jure a Uniunii Sovietice, adic fa de Federaia Rus, care i-a meninut influena n Caucazul de Sud prin diferite proiecte i iniiative regionale cu caracter economic. n plus, infrastructura energetic nvechit i lipsa mijloacelor financiare pentru efectuarea unor modernizri imediate a anulat aproape n ntregime posibilitatea de a dezvolta acest sector. Dac mai adugm i privatizarea incorect a reelelor de distribuire a produselor energetice finale sau rmnerea acestora n proprietatea statului, prea puin preocupat de reforme n domeniu, atunci vom asista la creionarea unui tablou dezolant al unuia dintre cele mai importante sectoare ale economiei, a crui disfuncie poate contribui, n final, la apariia unor tulburri sociale, aa cum s-a ntmplat la
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Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

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nceputul ultimului deceniu al secolului trecut n timpul crizei economice din anul 1998. Politicile i strategiile energetice ale celor trei state au trecut prin procese de transformare dificile, conducnd de multe ori la declanarea unor crize acute, ale cror consecine au fost resimite cel mai mult de ctre ceteni. Infrastructura industrial i energetic slab, motenit de la URSS, sistemul instituional imperfect, o elit politic nepregtit pentru noile provocri i nevoi sociale, precum i necesitatea acceptrii i asumrii noilor statute de state independente au dus la accentuarea crizelor economice n tot spaiul ex-sovietic. Implementarea eficient a unor strategii de securitate energetic presupune utilizarea unui complex de mecanisme i instrumente, att n dimensiunea extern, ct i n cea intern, pentru realizarea cu succes a obiectivelor strategice din domeniul energetic (Infosfera, Bucureti, 2011). Dar ele nu au fost capabile s fac fa tuturor provocrilor. Toate acestea, cumulate i cu distribuia neuniform a resurselor naturale, au stat la baza diferenierii ritmului de transformare sistemic calitativ a acestor state, precum i la apariia unei ierarhizri n ceea ce privete importana alegerii vectorilor de orientare politic: unele au reuit s se conecteze la forme de cooperare europene, altele nc oscileaz ntre Est i Vest i ntre forme de integrare economic regional. Un sistem economic devine stabil n momentul n care toate componentele acestuia sunt asigurate cu resurse pentru o bun funcionare. Politica energetic este componenta de baz a oricrei economii dezvoltate. Fr promovarea unor iniiative bine argumentate n acest domeniu, nicio formaiune politic nu va reui s implementeze punctele incluse n programele de guvernare i, n consecin, va alimenta i mai mult nemulumirea electoratului. Cum menionam anterior, Caucazul de Sud dispune de numeroase resurse energetice de mai multe tipuri, ns distribuia inegal a acestora a fost factorul determinant al stabilirii coninutului raporturilor multilaterale i bilaterale ntre componentele regiunii. Cumulate cu diferendele de ordin politic, adic cu conflictele existente
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ntre Azerbaidjan i Armenia sau ntre Federaia Rus i Georgia, ele au atras atenia opiniei publice internaionale asupra proceselor i fenomenelor care s-au derulat n regiune. Petrolul i gazele naturale sunt cele dou elemente care transform Caucazul de Sud, fcndu-l atractiv pentru investiii politice i financiare; incapacitatea autoritilor de a gestiona diferendele guvernare/opoziie, precum i lacunele legislative n domeniul investiional, cumulate cu prezena monopolurilor i a corupiei, diminueaz posibilitile de implementare a celor mai noi rezultate tehnologice i astfel modernizarea economiei rmne ceva incert. Caucazul de Sud dispune de multiple posibiliti de dezvoltare i nimeni nu poate contesta aceast trstur a zonei. Pe aici trec principalele rute de transport Est-Vest i Nord-Sud pentru mrfuri i bunuri de consum, se fac conexiuni ntre Europa i Asia, se creeaz oportuniti pentru a ameliora cile de acces spre resursele energetice din bazinul Mrii Caspice, att de necesare pentru industriile statelor dezvoltate. Promovarea unor politici energetice independente, care au drept scop promovarea interesului naional, i nu a celui al elitelor aflate la conducere, este o condiie esenial pentru modernizarea economic.

1. Resurse energetice, economie i politici energetice

Dup colapsul Uniunii Sovietice i rzboiul armeano-azer, care i-a urmat imediat, pe parcursul cruia Federaia Rus a susinut cauza Armeniei, cea din urm s-a confruntat cu mari probleme de ordin economic, dar mai ales cu o criz energetic acut. Azerbaidjanul a sistat livrrile de gaze naturale ctre Armenia, ceea ce a ntrerupt alimentarea corespunztoare a gazoductului construit pe teritoriul Georgiei i a oprit activitatea trenurilor pe ruta de cale ferat care trecea prin Abhazia i unea Rusia cu Georgia i Armenia. Dei pe parcursul celor douzeci de ani de independen, autoritile de la Erevan s-au bucurat de susinere din partea Kremlinului, bunele raporturi diplomatice ntre cei doi actori nu au reuit s compenseze efectele negative ale izolrii
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politico-economice a acestui stat sud-caucazian. Spre deosebire de Azerbaidjan, Armenia nu dispune de resurse de petrol i gaze naturale, necesarul de hidrocarburi intern att pentru consumatorii finali, ct i pentru agenii economici este asigurat cu resurse din Federaia Rus. n anul 1997 a fost creat o companie cu capital mixt ruso-armean, numit SA ArmRosGazprom, ce avea drept scop oficial refacerea infrastructurii energetice a Armeniei, precum i reluarea livrrilor de gaze naturale prin singura conduct de gaze naturale funcional, care unea Georgia cu sistemul energetic rusesc spre nord i cel armean spre sud. Astfel, Rusia a reuit s restabileasc sistemul energetic al Erevanului. Din pcate pentru economia armean, Rusia a reuit ulterior s achiziioneze pn la 80% din aciunile Companiei ArmRosGazprom, care, din cauza tipologiei de constituire societate pe aciuni de tip nchis nu a putut avea i ali cumprtori. Chiar dac relaia bilateral Rusia-Armenia continua s par una privilegiat, necesitatea adoptrii unor msuri suplimentare de asigurare a propriei securiti energetice era iminent. Exist mai multe posibiliti de a diversifica numrul de furnizori de produse energetice, dar toate ar trebui s aib drept scop final obinerea independenei fa de Rusia: Considerm c este necesar obinerea unei alternative energetice la cea ruseasc, de aceea este util s ne apropiem de Romnia i Bulgaria21. i reprezentanii mediului academic par s confirme ideea conform creia Federaia Rus este deranjat de iniiativele energetice ale autoritilor armene. Potrivit opiniei publice de la Erevan, securitatea energetic a statului nu trebuie s se bazeze doar pe petrol i gaze. Strategia energetic trebuie s fie diversificat i s susin i n continuare iniiativele private care doresc multiplicarea potenialului energetic din surse alternative: solar, eolian i hidroenergie. De asemenea, autoritile de la Erevan vor susine i n continuare dezvoltarea energiei nucleare. Dezbaterea la nivel internaional a luat amploare dup cutremurul din martie 2011
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din Japonia, n urma cruia a avut mult de suferit centrala nuclear de la Fukushima. Prerile sunt mprite n funcie de interesele i resursele pe care le dein statele prezente n regiune Frana, Marea Britanie, Rusia, Ucraina i Romnia nu vor renuna la energia nuclear i vor consolida aceast ramur.22 Pe de alt parte, este corect i opinia conform creia majoritatea proiectelor energetice, mai ales cele prin care alimentarea conductelor de gaze naturale i petrol se face din Azerbaidjan, ocolesc Armenia. Nu este cea mai bun soluie a politicii energetice azere, pentru c mrete considerabil cheltuielile pentru dezvoltarea proiectelor petroliere regionale. Aceast atitudine, dei nu este argumentat din punct de vedere economic, are susinere politic, inclusiv internaional, din cauza conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah. Soluia nu rmne dect orientarea spre lumea arab, adic spre acelai Iran cu care Armenia inteniona s semneze cteva tratate n domeniul energetic, care distoneaz cu interesele de politic extern ale Federaiei Ruse n regiune. Proiectul conductei de tranzit pentru gaze naturale Iran-Armenia era o alternativ real pentru produsele energetice de origine rus. Reprezentanii de la Kremlin au luat decizia de a susine financiar consumurile de gaze naturale ale cetenilor armeni, transfernd n conturile guvernului Armeniei compensaii pariale pentru noile tarife care urmau s se majoreze n perioada 2009-2011, dar i s finaneze o parte din lucrrile la conducta IranArmenia, fcnd investiii de aproximativ 550 milioane. dolari SUA. Este un rspuns energetic care are drept scop final susinerea propriilor obiective politice. Cele dou state partenere, implicate n dezvoltarea proiectului, au continuat lucrrile. Datele oficiale despre proiect susin c pe aici ar putea fi livrate ctre Armenia 2,3 miliarde metri cubi de gaze naturale, ceea ce ar putea asigura n ntregime necesitile interne ale agenilor economici armeni.23 Curios la
Interviu cu un expert n securitate energetic, Bucureti, 2011. Interaciunea ruso-armean i problemele regionale. Materiale ale conferinei internaionale din 5 iunie 2010, Erevan, NAAPET, 2011, 19.
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Interviu cu un oficial, iunie 2011, Erevan.

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acest proiect este faptul c, n prezent, tot necesarul de gaze naturale al Armeniei este asigurat de Rusia prin gazoductul care trece pe teritoriul Georgiei. Dup reluarea relaiilor economice bilaterale ntre Moscova i Tbilisi, Erevanul a reuit s-i stabilizeze sistemul energetic. Cu toate acestea, livrrile prin gazoductul armeano-iranian continu. Resursele energetice ajung pe teritoriul Armeniei, unde sunt transformate n energie electric n centralele de profil armene, iar apoi sunt exportate napoi spre Iran.24 Armenia i dorete s dezvolte politici energetice viabile. Condiiile interne i natura relaiilor cu statele vecine cer luarea unor msuri concrete, lucru menionat i mai sus. Dup dezastrul de la Fukushima, subiectul utilizrii energiei nucleare a fost supus dezbaterii publice tot mai intens. Mai multe state, n frunte cu Germania, i-au artat disponibilitatea pentru renunarea la acest tip de surse energetice pe termen mediu, dar nu i Armenia, pe teritoriul creia se gsete una dintre cele mai periculoase centrale nucleare: cea de la Metsamor. Centrala are peste 30 de ani i este localizat ntr-o zon seismic sensibil (World Nuclear Association, 2010), la doar 30 de kilometri de capitala Erevan. n 2007, autoritile armene au adoptat o nou strategie energetic, ns coninutul ei confirm faptul c statul nu va renuna la acest tip de energie, n pofida faptului c Uniunea European i sugereaz Armeniei s renune treptat la energia nuclear. (European Commission a, 2006, 8). Aceeai recomandare va fi reluat i prin coninutul rapoartelor de evaluare a Planului de Aciuni Comune Armenia-UE (A1plus.am, 2011). Dat fiind situaia energetic a Armeniei, adic existena unui numr minim de parteneri energetici, Erevanul nu arat deschidere spre renunarea la dezvoltarea unor asemenea centrale, mai ales c dispune de cantiti suficiente de uraniu, care se gsesc pe teritoriul rii. n anul 2006, guvernul armean i-a fcut publice
24 Interaciunea ruso-armean i problemele regionale. Materiale ale conferinei internaionale din 5 iunie 2010, Erevan, NAAPET, 2011, 19.

inteniile de a ncepe lucrrile la un nou proiect energetic: construcia unei noi centrale nucleare. Primii pai n aceast direcie au fost fcui n anul 2009, cnd parlamentarii armeni au votat legea cu privire la creare unei companii ruso-armene Metsamorenergoatom, care va construi noua central. Costurile proiectului ating cifra de 5 miliarde dolari SUA, cu o perioad de uzur de 60 de ani. Aceast central atomo-electric se preconizeaz a fi dat n exploatare n anul 2016. Ea va asigura o parte din nesesarul intern, ns acesta este insuficient pentru toat economia armean. Iat de ce autoritile de la Erevan au decis s sprijine acest proiect de construcie a centralei atomo-electrice cu capital rusesc, dei iniial se preconiza ca investiia de capital s aib origine germano-american. Pentru a obine sprijinul american i german pentru aceast iniiativ era necesar includerea Georgiei n proiect, ceea ce ar fi condus i la mbuntirea vizibilitii politice a Armeniei n regiune. Colaborarea n domeniul energiei nucleare reprezint o nou etap a colaborrii ruso-armene. n acest scop a fost nfiinat n anul 2008 o alt companie mixt, care are drept domeniu de activitate efectuarea unor cercetri geologice, precum i extracia de uraniu i alte minerale de pe teritoriul Armeniei. Aceast companie poart denumirea de Compania ruso-armean pentru extracii miniere, iar n prezent se lucreaz la conectarea juridic a Erevanului la lucrrile proiectului Centrului internaional de mbogire a uraniului de la Angarsk.25
25 Centrul internaional de mbogire a uraniului din Angarsk prima reuniune a Comisiei pentru nfiinarea Centrului internaional de mbogire a uraniului a avut loc n anul 2006, fiind organizat de ctre compania ruseasc Rosatom. n cadrul primei reuniuni au fost discutate conceptul, forma juridic, precum i viitoarele colaborri ale Centrului cu Agenia Internaional pentru Energie Atomic (AIEA). Acest centru face parte dintr-o reea de centre internaionale pentru studierea procesului de mbogire a uraniului. Centrul din Angarsk trebuia iniial s trateze doar uraniu produs n Rusia i Kazahstan. El este situat n apropierea lacului Baikal, n Siberia.

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Pe parcursul celor douzeci de ani de independen, politica energetic a Azerbaidjanului a fost permanent n vizorul autoritilor. Ea s-a aflat n slujba promovrii intereselor de politic extern i a fost un instrument eficient n meninerea unor relaii stabile cu majoritatea partenerilor. De fapt, politica energetic a administraiei de la Baku tinde s diversifice reeaua de clieni pentru resursele energetice de care dispune. Este o atitudine corect i responsabil, spun specialitii n transparena utilizrii veniturilor provenite din comercializarea petrolului, tot ei adugnd c politica energetic agresiv promovat astzi de Azerbaidjan este cea mai bun strategie de stat, care se implementeaz cu ajutorul Companiei petroliere de stat din Azerbaidjan SOCAR. Rezultatele nu au doar caracter economic, ci mai ales geopolitic, ele devenind deja vizibile la nivel regional. Agresivitatea energetic este cea mai important component a politicii externe azere.26 Ea le ofer independen autoritilor n procesul de luare a deciziilor politice nu doar n spaiul Caucazului de Sud, transformnd Azerbaidjanul ntr-un stat care dispune de resursele necesare pentru susinerea unui anumit tip de negociere. Pentru Romnia, compania azer SOCAR este foarte important pentru investiiile n proiecte energetice bilaterale. n viitorul apropiat, SOCAR intenioneaz s construiasc peste 300 de staii de alimentare pe teritoriul Romniei. Conform declaraiilor reprezentanilor companiei SOCAR n Romnia, ptrunderea companiei azere pe piaa romneasc va contribui la scderea preurilor carburanilor. Exist disponibilitate politic, exist potenial economic pentru a dezvolta aceste proiecte, dar conducerea companiei azere SOCAR este foarte precaut n ceea ce privete investiiile externe. Unul dintre argumentele pentru adoptarea unei asemenea atitudini sunt negocierile dintre rui i azeri pe proiecte energetice, al cror coninut nu este fcut public, iar strategia adoptat are urmtorul algoritm: investiii n proiecte
26

Interviu cu un expert economic, Baku, iunie 2011.

mici i mijlocii, care nu angajeaz financiar excesiv de mult compania. Aceasta poate explica de ce pn acum SOCAR a achizionat doar cteva benzinrii n zona Moldovei din Romnia. SOCAR negociaz, de asemenea, intrarea pe piaa din Bulgaria, Serbia, Ucraina, precum i Republica Moldova. n Bulgaria, reprezentanii companiei de stat azere SOCAR negociaz preluarea activelor singurei rafinrii de petrol Neftochim, controlat de compania rus Lukoil. Procesul de negociere al achiziiei activelor companiei Neftochim a nceput pe fondul disputei dintre autoritile vamale bulgare cu reprezentanii companiei Lukoil, cnd ruilor le-a fost retras temporar licena fiindc nu au reuit s contorizeze procesul de producie n termenul negociat cu autoritile bulgare. n final, divergenele au condus la sistarea tuturor activitilor de prelucrare a ieiului la rafinria din Burgas pentru o perioad de o lun i jumtate (Vedomosti, 2011). Interesul pentru piaa Republicii Moldova nu este nou i nici ntmpltor. La finele anului 2003 compania Azpetrol intra pe piaa Moldovei, intenionnd s preia construcia terminalului de la Giurgiuleti, iar mai apoi s construiasc o reea de staii de alimentare n toat ara. Pentru Azpetrol cucerirea pieei Republicii Moldova nsemna o oportunitate extraordinar pentru a ptrunde pe pieele europene. Dar compania i-a ncetat n cel mai scurt timp activitile. Cauzele acestui fenomen in de evenimente interne care au avut loc n viaa politic din Azerbaidjan. Compania Azpetrol se afla sub conducerea Ministerului Dezvoltrii Economiei a Republicii Azerbaidjan. n luna octombrie 2005 ministrul Dezvoltrii Economice n exerciiu de la Baku, Farhad Aliyev (Aze.az, 2007a) era arestat, fiind acuzat de organizarea unei lovituri de stat i depirea atribuiilor de serviciu. Ulterior a fost arestat i fratele acestuia, Rafik Aliyev, ex-preedintele companiei Azpetrol, fiind acuzat de splare de bani. Recent, acesta a fost pus n libertate. n prezent compania Azpetrol are o prezen redus chiar i pe piaa intern, limitndu-se doar la administrarea a 66 staii de alimentare cu petrol i cinci care funcioneaz
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pe baz de gaze naturale (Azpetrol, 2011). SOCAR era unul dintre potenialii cumprtori, care ducea tratative pentru a prelua activele companiei Azpetrol.27 Pentru a diminua efectele negative ale crizei economice mondiale, compania SOCAR a fost cea care a finanat sectorul non-petrolier din Azerbaidjan. Astfel, n anul 2010 peste 60% din investiiile din Republica Azerbaidjan au avut origine intern. Cu toate acestea, ramurile industriei azere care nu au conexiune direct cu sectorul energetic continu s sufere de o finanare insuficient. Probleme apar atunci cnd se face distribuirea incorect a acestor venituri, iar alte ramuri economice primesc resurse financiare insuficiente pentru a putea implementa rezultatele modernizrii economice n industria uoar sau agricultur, spre exemplu. Desigur, actuala politic energetic a Azerbaidjanului permite autoritilor s jongleze printre obiectivele geostrategice ale marilor actori n regiune, susinnd inclusiv propriile demersuri de transformare a acestui stat sud-caucazian n veriga principal a regiunii, care trebuie s fie consultat atunci cnd se iau decizii cu privire la vectorii de politic extern a actorilor din Caucazul de Sud. Disponibilitatea celorlali lideri de a consulta autoritile de la Baku cu privire la evoluia regiunii este, dup cum am menionat anterior, unul dintre rezultatele promovrii unei politici energetice corecte. Nimeni nu poate nega c n acest domeniu conducerea azer a fcut progrese considerabile, asigurndu-i astfel un dialog stabil inclusiv cu Moscova. Interesele cu caracter economic sunt cel puin la fel de importante ca i cele politice. Este dificil pentru guvernarea de la Baku s echilibreze interesele energetice, economice, precum i pe cele politice ale marilor puteri n regiunea Caucazului de Sud, i cu toate acestea se dezvolt tendine pozitive n aceast direcie.28 Una dintre problemele cu care
Interviu cu un expert economic i un expert n transparena fondurilor provenite din vnzrile de produse petroliere, Baku, iunie 2011. 28 Interviu cu un analist politic, iunie 2011, Baku.
27

se confrunt astzi Azerbaidjanul se refer la transparena distribuirii veniturilor care provin din sectorul energetic. Accesul la informaia public despre modul n care sunt cheltuite finanele publice acumulate n urma comercializrii de produse energetice este limitat, iar administrarea acestora nu este eficient. Astfel, transparena actului decizional, care ar trebui s fie proprie unui sistem democratic, este un principiu declarativ, greu de implementat. Interesele private domin asupra intereselor naionale. Economia Azerbaidjanului este n ntregime dependent de sectorul energetic, chiar dac autoritile de la Baku insist asupra faptului c i celelalte sectoare ale economiei se bucur de atenie din partea guvernrii. ntrebarea care apare aici este urmtoarea: ce se va ntmpla cu o economie dependent de petrol i gaze peste douzeci de ani? Specialitii n transparena veniturilor din sectorul energetic insist asupra faptului c doar 15% din bugetul de stat al Azerbaidjanului este format din taxe i impozite, iar restul de 85% este format din pli provenite din contractele energetice ale statului. Printre specialitii n economie este tot mai des vehiculat ideea c petrolul azer se transform ntr-un blestem al Azerbaidjanului. Explicaia este logic i destul de accesibil: resursele petroliere, precum i gazele naturale sunt epuizabile, deci limitate n timp, dar autoritile nu percep acest lucru atunci cnd direcioneaz economia statului spre o singur ramur industrial. Fondul Petrolier de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjanului (State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2011)29 a fost creat n 1999. Prognozele susineau
29 Fondul Petrolier de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan (SOFAZ) a fost creat prin Decretul Preedintelui Republicii Azerbaidjan Despre crearea Fondului Petrolier de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan, emis pe 29 decembrie 1999. SOFAZ a fost creat pentru a contribui la asigurarea egalitii ntre generaii n ceea ce privete beneficiile care pot aprea n urma exploatrii resurselor de petrol ale rii. Demersul pentru bunstarea economic de astzi trebuie s conduc la asigurarea stabilitii economice pentru generaiile viitoare aceasta este filosofia Fondului Petrolier de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan.

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c n anul 2011 n Fondul Petrolier de Stat vor fi acumulate peste 30 miliarde dolari SUA, cu 10 miliarde dolari SUA mai mult dect n anul 2009 (ABC.az, 2011c). Cifra prognozat a fost depit n luna iulie curent. Astfel, conform datelor prezentate de reprezentanii SOFAZ pe 28 iunie 2011, activele Fondului Petrolier de Stat au atins cifra de 30,2 miliarde dolari SUA (ABC.az, 2011d). Mrirea activelor Fondului a fost posibil, adaug reprezentanii SOFAZ, datorit implementrrii cu succes a strategiei petroliere naionale, elaborat de liderul Heydar Alyev (ABC.az, 2011d). n anul 2050, suma care se va acumula n acest fond al viitorului se preconizeaz c va atinge cifra de 50 miliarde dolari SUA. Fondul Petrolier de Stat n care se acumuleaz fondurile din contractele de vnzare a produselor petroliere este administrat ineficient, sunt de prere experii n transparena fondurilor de stat, deoarece banii sunt destinai unor proiecte mult prea ambiioase, pe care autoritile nu le vor putea implementa. Printre proiectele finanate de SOFAZ se numr o serie de iniiative destinate reformrii sistemului educaional al rii i n special pentru atragerea tinerilor care au studiat n strintate, susinere financiar pentru proiectul de construire a unei noi rute de cale ferat Baku-Tbilisi-Kars, proiectul de construire a unei conducte de transport a apei potabile din regiunea Oguz-Obala, care va alimenta capitala Baku i care este foarte dificil de implementat din cauza unei infrastructuri foarte slab dezvoltate, precum i o serie de iniiative destinate s amelioreze situaia refugiailor din regiunea Nagorno-Karabah. Din anul 2001 pn n prezent, SOFAZ a alocat peste 765 milioane AZN pentru mbuntirea condiiilor de trai ale refugiailor stabilii n diferite regiuni ale Azerbaidjanului, dar n special n oraul Baku. Utilitatea Fondului Petrolier de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan e pus sub semnul ntrebrii n condiiile n care doar 5% din totalul de resurse financiare care ajung acolo sunt destinate pentru proiecte pe termen lung, adic investiii n viitor, n urmtoarele generaii, susin experii economici. Celelalte 95% sunt distribuite pentru proiecte
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actuale, crora, de cele mai multe ori, le lipsesc studiile de fezabilitate bine argumentate, chiar dac acestea sunt elaborate de parteneri externi. De exemplu, studiul de fezabilitate pentru conducta de alimentare a oraului Baku cu ap potabil a fost efectuat cu ajutorul companiei CES Consulting Engineers, Germania i a costat peste 2,1 milioane AZN. Dar nu toate proiectele susinute financiar prin SOFAZ sunt gndite pe termen lung. Banii sunt investii, ei formeaz un circuit economic care ns produce rentabilitate de moment, pe termen scurt i de care nu se vor putea bucura generaiile viitoare. Concluzia primar este c guvernul azer nu gndete n termeni de sustenabilitate economic. Diversificarea surselor energetice este una dintre posibiliti, dar diversificarea producerii de bunuri i servicii i susinerea celor existente deja, care nu au nicio conexiune cu domeniul energetic, e singura ans pentru asigurarea securitii economico-sociale i, nu n ultimul rnd, a stabilitii politice. Concentrarea agenilor economici n orae, n special n capitala Baku, diminueaz posibilitatea efecturii unor investiii majore n provincie. Despre acest lucru vorbesc i taxele colectate n bugetul statului: 93% din taxele i impozitele colectate au fost vrsate n bugetul statului de la ageni economici cu adres juridic n capitala Azerbaidjanului oraul Baku. Ponderea provinciei este de doar 7%. Georgia nu e un stat independent din punct de vedere energetic. De cele mai multe ori, ea este somat de ctre societatea civil s fac anumite concesii politice tocmai pentru a-i asigura stabilitatea energetic. Dependena de resursele energetice ruseti s-a resimit de-a lungul celor douzeci de ani de independen, ns acest lucru nu a prejudiciat interesul pentru promovarea unei politici energetice de stat bazate pe divesrificarea surselor de aprovizionare cu necesarul de hidrocarburi sau gaze naturale din alte surse. De cele mai multe ori, opinia public internaional este tentat s asocieze acest stat caucazian cu proteste, nclcarea drepturilor omului i conflictul ruso-georgian din luna august 2008, dup consumarea cruia autoritile de la Tbilisi
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au decis s ias din Comunitatea Statelor Independente, rmnnd afiliate la aceast form de cooperare regional doar prin intermediul tratatelor deja semnate. Strategia energetic a Georgiei se bazeaz pe o filosofie de aciune simpl: diversificarea surselor de aprovizionare a necesarului de produse energetice att pentru sectorul economic, ct i pentru consumatorii finali, cu o uoar orientare ctre integrarea propriului sistem energetic n proiectele susinute de Uniunea European. Spre deosebire de Republica Moldova i Ucraina, Georgia nc nu a semnat Tratatul Comunitar Energetic (Energy Community Treaty), dar a fost acceptat n calitate de observator al Comunitii Energetice Europene pe 18 decembrie 2007 (Energy Community, 2007). ntrzierea participrii Georgiei la diferitele iniiative europene cu caracter energetic, explic experii georgieni, are i o conotaie geografic, nu doar politic. Republica Moldova i Ucraina au frontiere comune cu Uniunea European i este mai uor pentru acestea s acceseze diferitele programe destinate statelor incluse n Politica European de Vecintate i nu numai.30 Conexiunea la proiectele energetice ale Uniunii Europene pentru Georgia va deveni posibil prin intermediul Turciei. Dar, pentru a obine independen energetic fa de Federaia Rus, autoritile de la Tbilisi trebuie s armonizeze legislaia ce reglementeaz domeniul energetic n conformitate cu standardele i normele Uniunii Europene. Dei UE pare s nu fie tentat s promoveze solidaritate regional n domeniul energetic, mai ales dup crizele economice repetate, care au avut loc mai muli ani consecutiv din cauza nrutirii raporturilor politice dintre Ucraina i Federaia Rus, beneficiile pe care le-ar obine Georgia prin conectarea la iniiative energetice europene ar putea avea un caracter pe termen lung, pentru c ele vor supune transformrii inclusiv parametrii tehnici ai sistemului energetic georgian. Experii georgieni n domeniul eficienei energetice trebuie s fie ateni la capitolul care cuprinde rutele de
30

tranzit din orice proiect energetic deoarece, avnd drept obiectiv de baz obinerea independenei energetice fa de Rusia, autoritile sunt tentate s neglijeze capitolul care cuprinde securitatea mediului, adic ecologia. Dezvoltarea proiectului AGRI ar putea ntmpina ostilitate din partea societii civile tocmai din aceste considerente. Important de notat aic este c oficialii georgieni se pronun n continuare i pentru dezvoltarea unor iniiative care promoveaz utilizarea energiei regenerabile, adic 90% din consumul de energie s fie asigurat de hidroenergie, n condiiile n care Uniunea European nu impune un consum total mai mare de 20% de energie regenerabil necesar sectorului economic.31 ncepnd cu anul 2006 Georgia devine exportator de energie electric, iar principalii consumatori sunt Federaia Rus, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, Turcia. i dup august 2008, Rusia rmne principalul consumator de energie electric produs de Georgia, care va continua s-i dezvolte centralele hidroelectrice. Dac la Tbilisi se vehiculeaz ideea c ar exista posibilitatea ca domeniul hidroelectroenergetic s constituie elementul de baz al restabilirii dialogului ntre Abhazia i Georgia, la Suhumi opiniile sunt mprite. Contextul politic nu permite acest lucru. Directorul centralei hidroelectrice de pe rul Inguri, Rezo Zantaria, declara n noiembrie 2008 c aceast central intr sub jurisdicia autoritilor abhaze, pe care Tbilisi nu le-a recunoscut dup proclamarea independenei i recunoaterea acesteia de ctre autoritile ruse. Din aceste considerente, autoritile georgiene nu au dreptul s demareze procedura de privatizare a centralei hidroelectrice, cu participarea unor investitori din Azerbaidjan. Geografic, Centrala hidroelectric de la Inguri se afl la hotarul dintre Abhazia i Georgia, acest lucru este bine cunoscut prii azere (Kavkaz Uzel, 2008), a adugat Rezo Zantaria. nc mai persist teama, din partea autoritilor georgiene, c, dup rzboiul din august 2008, Rusia va reui s-i nsueasc obiectivul energetic, dar autoritile
31

Interviu cu un expert n domeniul energetic, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

Interviu cu un expert n domeniul energetic, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

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celor dou state aflate n conflict au reuit s ajung la o nelegere de a administra n mod egal hidrocentrala de la Inguri.32 Conform nelegerilor dintre cele dou pri, 60% din totalul de energie produs aici pleac spre Georgia, iar celelalte 40% acoper o parte a necesitilor consumatorilor din Abhazia. Lucrrile de reconstrucie la aceast hidrocentral au fost efectuate de ctre compania german Siemens, ele durnd civa ani. Dei presa georgian i internaional vehiculeaz anumite subiecte tabu, care nu pot fi supuse dezbaterii publice la Tbilisi, cele mai accesibile platforme de discuie pentru societatea civil de aici sunt cele dedicate sectorului energetic i mediului. Politica energetic a statului a servit n Georgia drept pretext pentru adncirea divergenelor dintre guvernare i opoziie. Astfel, Partidul Laburist din Georgia a organizat pe 13 ianuarie 2011 o aciune de protest n faa sediului central al Companiei de Distribuie a Energiei Electrice Telasi din Tbilisi, cernd autoritilor s anuleze chitana unic pentru serviciile comunale. Potrivit acestei chitane, cetenii Georgiei vor fi obligai s fac plata pentru ap, energie electric, gaze naturale i alte servicii n conformitate cu dispoziiile unui nou sistem unificat. n caz de neplat, Telasi are dreptul s-i debraneze pe consumatori de la reea. Liderul Partidului Laburist din Georgia, alva Natelavili, a declarat n cadrul unui briefing de pres c regimul Saakavili pregtete prin actul de luare a unei asemenea decizii o nou bomb n relaiile dintre Rusia i Georgia. El a amintit c proprietarul reelei georgiene de distribuie a energiei electrice e Compania ruseasc INTER RAO UES, care nu are niciun drept de a-i pedepsi pe consumatorii georgieni pentru datorii strine. Conform lui Natelavili, partidul pe care l reprezint a luat toate msurile necesare pentru ca aceast aciune s nu aib loc. Printre acestea se numr i sesizarea Curii Constituionale ca s-i dea avizul cu privire la legalitatea adoptrii deciziei, a negociat cu Telasi i compania rus. Laburitii georgieni
32

amenin cu aciuni de protest care vor avea drept finalitate schimbarea actualei guvernri. Aciunea nu a avut finalitatea presupus de liderii opoziiei. Adesea actuala guvernare din Georgia este acuzat de limitarea formelor de protest ale opoziiei, ns protestele care au avut la baz o motivaie energetic nu s-au bucurat de aceeai atitudine ca cele din luna mai 2011, spre exemplu. n Caucazul de Sud, promovarea unor politici energetice i a unor strategii de dezvoltare eficient a sectorului energetic, care st la baza unei bune funcionri a ntregului sistem economic, este o necesitate vital. Dar, fr a-i asigura resursele necesare pentru dezvoltarea infrastructurii n domeniul supus dezbaterii, orice politic public devine inutil. Condiia de baz pentru a nregistra un progres este crearea unor condiii adecvate pentru apariia voinei politice, iar aceasta se educ pe parcurs, transformnd erorile n succese.

2. Proiecte energetice i coridoare de transport n Caucazul de Sud

Caucazul de Sud a reuit s atrag atenia marilor puteri prin intermediul mai multor elemente, capabile s contribuie la atingerea unor obiective i interese naionale, cuprinse n strategii de politic extern sau strategii de securitate energetic ce se pot regsi n aceste regiuni care i arat deschis interesul pentru a efectua investiii n zon. O alt calitate a Caucazului de Sud este apropierea sa de Asia Central, cu care la un moment dat se unete nu doar geografic, ci mai ales energetic, ceea ce l face i mai atractiv din punct de vedere geostrategic. Dac Georgia i Armenia, dup cum am menionat anterior, au o afinitate pentru procese de integrare politice i economice occidentale, n Azerbaidjan nu exist o predispoziie general pentru limitarea propriilor posibiliti de a ptrunde n circuitul mondial. Capacitile energetice de care dispune i permit s oscileze ntre regiuni. Adesea Azerbaidjanul este studiat ca parte a Asiei Centrale, chiar dac n ultima perioad s-a renunat la aceast asociere.
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Interviu cu un expert n domeniul energetic, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

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Poi s reconstruieti o regiune dup interesele pe care le ai acolo, iar din acest punct de vedere se poate face afirmaia c Baku ar fi parte a Asiei Centrale.33 Petrolul, gazele naturale, uraniul, iar mai recent i plutoniul care se gsesc aici le transform importana n cadrul sistemului mondial de relaii internaionale. Lupta nu se d att pentru schimbarea calitativ a sistemelor politice existente n regiune, ct pentru stabilirea unui grad de subordonare politic, pentru a obine un control suficient asupra acestor resurse, astfel nct administrarea lor s produc beneficii economice. Din pcate acest lucru va fi recunoscut mai puin de ctre actorii statali i non-statali care au interese de politic extern, de securitate i energetice. Implicarea i prezena n regiune a Federaiei Ruse, a Statelor Unite ale Americii i a Uniunii Europene nu au diminuat interesul altor mari puteri pentru regiunea Caucazului de Sud. Pe lng actorii enumerai mai sus, trebuie s menionm ca fiind foarte important i China marea ctigtoare a crizei economice mondiale mai ales din cauza resurselor de hidrocarburi. Ce ncearc s fac autoritile de la Beijing poate prejudicia mai mult sau mai puin atingerea obiectivelor strategice de ctre Rusia, UE sau SUA; totul va depinde de capacitatea de a ajunge la un consens n ceea ce privete modalitatea de construire a rutelor de transport, precum i a mpririi contractelor petroliere. Industria Chinei necesit cantiti foarte mari de resurse petroliere pentru a-i putea fi susinut ritmul de dezvoltare actual. Aceasta este una dintre explicaiile pentru care Azerbaidjanul continu s fie atras mai mult spre zona asiatic, iar proiectele energetice la care acesta este parte sunt redirecionate cel puin unele dintre ele spre Est. Filosofia de aciune a acestor mari puteri difer foarte mult. Dac Rusia se bazeaz pe influena sa politic asupra regiunii i pe susinerea pe care o ofer anumitor actori prin prelungirea artificial a crizelor i conflictelor, Uniunea European ncearc s devin atractiv prin modelul democratic
33

i economic, promovnd n primul rnd ideea de schimbare instituional, prin aplicarea principiilor democratice, orientnd n mod natural subiecii regiunii ctre Vest. China este obligat, practic, s-i mobilizeze eforturile pentru redirecionarea intereselor economice a tuturor actorilor n regiune ctre Est, astfel nct s poat prelua o parte din potenialul acestei prezene. O analiz minuioas cu privire la potenialul energetic al Caucazului de Sud este dificil de efectuat dac vor fi ignorate principalele coridoare de transport care unesc Asia de Europa i Nordul de Sud. Produsele energetice cer n mod obligatoriu i dezvoltarea unor rute de transport, a unor depozite de stocare, dar i a unor uniti de prelucrare a lor. Dezvoltarea sectorului petrolier se face n paralel cu susinerea investiiilor n sectoare complementare, astfel nct fezabilitatea proiectelor n curs de derulare, precum i a celor n curs de pregtire s nu ntmpine dificulti de implementare n fazele lor finale. Cantitatea de petrol i gaze naturale care trebuie s alimenteze principalele proiecte energetice din Caucazul de Sud permite efectuarea unei ierarhizri a acestora, ns autoritile diferitor state din regiune ncearc s dea asigurri c nu vor prioritiza un proiect n defavoarea altuia. Rolul Caucazului de Sud n economia mondial ar putea fi rezumat la urmtoarele: zon de acces la petrolul din Marea Caspic prin cele mai scurte coridoare de transport.

Interviu cu un analist politic, Baku, iunie 2011.

Harta 1 Traseul proiectului energetic Nabucco Sursa: Nabucco Pipeline, http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/pipeline/route

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Nabucco34 acest proiect energetic a fost gndit ca o extensie a conductei Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (vezi harta 1), pentru a asigura securitatea energetic a statelor europene. Deciziile cu privire la dezvoltarea proiectului au fost adoptate n perioada crizei economice mondiale, ns statele care au lansat iniiativa nu l-au abandonat, tocmai din cauza stabilitii energetice pe care o poate oferi (ACGRC, 2011, 35). Azerbaidjanul e dispus s ofere gaze naturale proiectului Nabucco, dar nu va putea asigura tot necesarul pentru buna desfurare a acestui proiect. Aceasta este una dintre cauzele pentru care Turkmenistanul a fost invitat s participe la dezvoltarea Nabucco, n direcia conectrii Mrii Caspice la iniiativ. Condiia de baz impus de autoritile de la Baku este ca statele care au nevoie de acest proiect s ia o decizie ferm n ceea ce privete efectuarea de investiii financiare n construcia conductei. Autoritile azere militeaz pentru implementarea a ct mai multor proiecte energetice. Acest lucru atest c politica energetic a Republicii Azerbaidjan este concentrat pe diversificarea la maximum a rutelor de transport pentru hidrocarburile sale ctre pieele internaionale. Nabucco este un proiect pretenios i exist numeroase dificulti pentru ca acesta s devin cu adevrat fezabil pe termen scurt. Infrastructura de transport de gaze naturale a Azerbaidjanului e foarte slab dezvoltat. n acest moment ar trebui s se pun un accent mai mare pe dezvoltarea
Nabucco este o conduct lansat n anul 2006, avnd iniial o capacitate de transport al gazelor naturale de 7,2 miliarde metri cubi pe an, cu o posibilitate de cretere de pn la 20 miliarde metri cubi, ea fiind gndit ca o extensie a unei alte conducte n care Azerbaidjanul era implicat, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum. Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum are un traseu aproape identic cu cel al Oleoductului Baku-TbilisiCeyhan. Conducta va avea o lungime de peste 3.300 km i o capacitate de transport de circa 31 miliarde metri cubi de gaze naturale pe an. Durata de via a proiectului este de 50 de ani (Nabucco pipeline, Overwiev). Celelalte surse de aprovizionare a conductei i au originea n Orientul Mijlociu i Egipt. Este unul dintre cele mai ambiioase proiecte. Costul estimativ al lucrrii va atinge cifra de 7,9 miliarde euro (Nabucco pipeline, Facts and Figures), fiind o cifr provizorie.
34

infrastructurii necesare pentru stocarea cantitilor de gaze naturale pentru care a fost proiectat Nabucco. Autoritile azere, ns, au o motivaie politic pentru a susine i ncuraja partenerii strini interesai s investeasc n continuare n acest proiect. Jocul pe mai multe proiecte energetice ofer posibilitate actualilor guvernani de a se menine la conducerea statului, astfel c susinerea pentru Nabucco va fi n continuare una ferm. SOCAR vine cu garanii c va fi capabil s asigure cantitile necesare de gaze naturale pentru Nabucco, mai ales dup 2020, cnd vor fi finalizate majoritatea lucrrilor de mbuntire a infrastructurii de transport, care n acest moment se confrunt cu multe probleme. Potenialul Nabucco va crete abia dup anul 2015, odat cu creterea produciei de gaze naturale. n prezent, producia de gaze naturale se afl n umbra produciei de petrol.35 Dac vorbim despre Nabucco, atunci se cer a fi luate n considerare mai multe variabile politice care pot prejudicia dezvoltarea proiectului. Independena energetic fa de Rusia este doar una dintre cele la care putem s facem referin n acest moment, dar trebuie acordat maxim atenie i unui alt aspect la fel de important: cea mai mare parte a iniiativelor energetice, pe care Uniunea European este interesat s le dezvolte n baza resurselor de hidrocarburi existente n Marea Caspic vor trece prin Turcia. Acest stat va deveni important nu doar din punct de vedere regional, ci va deveni monopolist energetic pe axa sudic, ceea ce se poate transforma pe viitor ntr-o ameninare pentru sigurana energetic a Uniunii Europene, care insist tot mai mult pe liberalizarea pieei energetice, asumndu-i un risc major.36 Autoritile turce nu vor risca n acest moment relaia economic pe care o au cu Uniunea European, pentru c nu exist garanii politice n ceea ce privete evoluia relaiei bilaterale cu Federaia Rus. Iat de ce Turcia se va limita pe termen scurt doar la tratarea Rusiei ca pia de desfacere pentru bunurile
35 36

Interviu cu un expert economic, Baku, iunie, 2011. Interviu cu un expert n domeniul energetic, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

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i serviciile sale. Interesant e c autoritile azere nu doresc s vin cu resurse financiare nici pentru Nabucco, nici pentru AGRI (a se vedea mai jos), care ntmpin mai multe probleme de ordin tehnologic, dar i financiar. De asemenea, agenda de politic extern a Armeniei conine prevederi despre o posibil aliniere a acestui stat caucazian la proiect. Autoritile de la Erevan sunt somate de propriile interese energetice s adere n viitor la aceast iniiativ regional. n cazul Armeniei acest lucru poate deveni posibil prin intermediul Planului de Aciuni Comune Armenia-Uniunea European (European Commission, 2006b), care prevede cooperare n sectorul energetic ntre cei doi parteneri. Conform coninutului acestui document, Uniunea European va susine proiectele armene pentru dezvoltarea unei strategii energetice pe termen lung, dar condiia de baz este ca Armenia s renune la iniiativele sale de construcie a unei noi centrale energetice nucleare. La rndul su, Erevanul tinde s decline cerinele UE din cauza lipsei unei alternative, pe care comunitatea european ntrzie s o propun. n aceste condiii, Nabucco ar putea fi o asemenea alternativ, dar ea depinde n foarte mare msur de relaia cu Azerbaidjanul, care pn acum s-a opus implicrii statului cu care se afl n conflict teritorial n mai multe iniiative energetice regionale, insistnd de fiecare dat asupra ocolirii acestuia. Azerbaidjan-Georgia-Romnia-Interconector (AGRI, vezi harta 2)37 este un proiect ambiios, care s-a bucurat de o atenie sporit din partea partenerilor implicai n dezvoltarea lui. Acest proiect energetic are drept scop transportarea de gaze naturale de la zcmntul Shah Deniz spre
37 Azerbaidjan-Georgia-Romnia-Interconector (AGRI) Memorandumul de nelegere pentru nceperea lucrrilor la proiectul AGRI a fost semnat la Bucureti, pe 13 aprilie 2010, iar Declaraia privind proiectul AGRI a fost semnat la Baku, pe 14 septembrie 2010. Studiul de fezabilitate intermediar pentru acest proiect este elaborat de ctre experi din Statele Unite ale Americii.

Harta 2 Interconectorul Azerbaidjan Georgia Romnia (AGRI, STRATFOR) Sursa: Plano 10 (cu verde AGRI), http://www.plano10.com/2011/04/proiectul-agri-o-bila-alba-pentru.html

Romnia, Ungaria i alte state europene interesate de diversificarea surselor de aprovizionare cu resurse energetice, fiind parte a coridorului sudic de transport al gazelor naturale. Compania care se va preocupa de implementarea proiectului poart numele AGRI LNG Project Company. Ea a fost format de participani din patru state: Romgaz (Romnia), Georgian Oil and Gas Company (Georgia), State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (Azerbaidjan) i MVM (Ungaria). Fiecare dintre cele patru state deine o cot-parte egal cu 25% din capitalul social al AGRI LNG Project Company. Statele implicate n dezvoltarea proiectului AGRI au probleme de ordin politic cu Federaia Rus, ceea ce poate fi interpretat ca o prejudiciere a intereselor acesteia energetice, economice i politice n direcia sudic. AGRI este un proiect mult mai apreciat dect Nabucco, iar interesul partenerilor implicai n dezvoltarea sa pare s argumenteze acordarea anumitor prioriti, fiind una dintre cele mai ieftine iniiative de acest gen i, n ciuda faptului, c niciunul dintre
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cele patru state implicate n derularea acestuia nu deine n acest moment posibiliti tehnice i financiare de implementare. n aceeai msur, nici Azerbaidjanul, cum aminteam mai sus, nu pare s agreeze finanarea proiectului din resurse proprii. Terminalul de lichefiere al gazelor naturale trebuie s fie construit pe teritoriul Georgiei, care nu dispune de tehnologia necesar pentru demararea lucrrilor. n plus, experii n securitatea energetic susin c exist i probleme de securizare a transporturilor pe Marea Neagr, deoarece nu exist nave (tancuri) speciale pentru transportul gazului lichefiat pe Marea Neagr, ele fiind construite pentru a parcurge distane mult mai mari i avnd o capacitate de transport foarte mare.38 Aceiai experi n securitate energetic sunt de prere c AGRI este mai degrab un joc politic al Azerbaidjanului pentru a-i promova interesele i pentru a se poziiona n calitate de negociator n dialogul energetic al Uniunii Europene i Federaiei Ruse, astfel nct s obin beneficii politice. Nici resursele de gaze disponibile i necontractate nu sunt certe. Faptul c niciun alt stat membru al Uniunii Europene, n afar de Romnia i Ungaria, nu au aderat la proiect spune multe. 39 Finanarea privat pentru AGRI e cea mai plauzibil variant. Primele estimri ale costurilor proiectului indic o cifr cuprins ntre 2 i 5 miliarde euro, pentru o capacitate de transport de 8 miliarde de metri cubi de gaze pe an, cu potenial de cretere ulterior.40 Exist trei variante pentru capacitatea de transportare a gazelor naturale din Azerbaidjan spre Europa prin intermediul proiectului AGRI: 2 miliarde metri cubi, 4,5 miliarde metri cubi i 8 miliarde metri cubi. Dac prioritatea va fi dat celei de-a treia variante, atunci Romnia ar putea negocia o cot parte din totalul de gaze tranzitate egal cu 2 miliarde metri cubi.
38 Interviu cu un expert n securitate energetic, Bucureti, august 2011. 39 Interviu cu un expert n securitate energetic, Bucureti, august 2011. 40 Interviu cu oficiali, Baku, iunie 2011.

Autoritile de la Baku nu acord prioritate unui anumit proiect energetic regional. Nabucco sau AGRI ambele sunt la fel de importante, iar Azerbaidjanul ar dori ca aceste dou proiecte s devin complementare. Primul proiect are o susinere mare din partea Uniunii Europene i va lega Europa de zcmintele de petrol din Marea Caspic i din Orientul Mijlociu. Att Nabucco, ct i AGRI se bucur de aceeai atenie din partea autoritilor, doar c primul este mai dificil de implementat, pentru c au fost invitate s participe la dezvoltarea proiectului state precum Iranul i Turkmenistanul, care sunt tratate ca actori statali capabili s produc instabilitate regional, dar i pentru c tarifele pentru hidrocarburile care vor fi tranzitate prin Nabucco sunt mai mari. n plus, n anul 2010, Uniunea European a renunat la implicarea Teheranului n proiect, ca sanciune pentru continuarea programului nuclear al Iranului. n consecin, autoritile iraniene au artat disponibilitate pentru dezvoltarea unui alt proiect, care ar putea rivaliza cu Nabucco i care ar putea aproviziona Europa cu gaze naturale pe sub Marea Mediteran. Disponibilitate pentru a investi n proiectul AGRI au artat mai muli ageni economici. Printre acetia se numr investitori din Japonia, Germania, Coreea de Sud, Frana, care i-au oferit sprijinul pentru realizarea unor studii de fezabilitate a proiectului. Conform unui comunicat de pres emis pe 14 februarie 2011 de ctre Ministerul Economiei, Comerului i Mediului de Afaceri al Romniei (Ministerul Economiei, Comerului i Mediului de Afaceri al Romniei, 2011) studiul de fezabilitate al Proiectului AGRI, trebuie s fie ncheiat pn cel mai trziu la data de 1 aprilie 2012, cu scopul de a accelera finalizarea proiectului Spre deosebire de statele care i-au propus serviciile pentru efectuarea studiilor de fezabilitate, Japonia are un avans minim, propunnd s finaneze o parte din costurile proiectului i s furnizeze tehnologie de transport pentru a primi la schimb gaze naturale din Azerbaidjan. De asemenea, Federaia Rus, Bulgaria i Ucraina nu-i ascund interesul de a adera la acest proiect dovad c interesele economice
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prevaleaz adesea n faa obiectivelor politice. Nici Turcia nu pare s fie prea ncntat de entuziasmul manifestat de anumii juctori regionali pentru dezvoltarea AGRI, pentru c diminueaz rolul su cheie n cadrul coridorului sudic de transport al resurselor energetice nspre Europa. Poziia Uniunii Europene fa de acest proiect nu este una ostil. Dimpotriv, Bruxelles-ul ncurajeaz demararea lucrrilor pentru AGRI, deoarece acesta ar contribui n mod esenial la diversificarea rutelor de tranzit i pentru alte state membre ale UE. n plus, AGRI pare s fie un proiect care dispune n primul rnd de o argumentare economic foarte bun.41 De asemenea, disponibilitate pentru a adera la proiect au manifestat i autoritile srbe care, dup cum se tie, se numr printre partenerii stabili ai Federaiei Ruse n Balcanii de Vest. Pentru partea georgian, care este unul dintre cei patru deintori ai capitalului social din cadrul AGRI LNG Project Company, acest proiect pare s aib unele dificulti de ordin ecologic. Conducta de tranzitare a gazelor naturale va trece prin zone sensibile i anume locul de unde i au originea renumitele ape Borjomi un important produs georgian, recunoscut att n ar, ct i peste hotare pentru proprietile sale curative. n cazul unui dezastru ecologic, care nu este exclus, dar care este prea puin luat n consideraie n proiectarea conductei, vor avea de suferit n primul rnd fabricile de ap mineral Borjomi destinat exporturilor, iar mai apoi i economia georgian.42 Oleoductul Heydar Aliyev: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan b, 2011)43
Interviu cu un expert n domeniul energetic,Tbilisi, mai 2011. Interviu cu un expert n domeniul ecologic, Tbilisi, mai 2011. 43 Oleoductul Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) contractul petrolier al secolului XX pentru statele care i-au pus bazele a fost semnat pe 20 septembrie 1994. n anul 1999 a fost semnat la Istanbul Acordul de transportare a petrolului neprelucrat prin oleoductul BTC de ctre preedinii Azerbaidjanului, Georgiei i Turciei. Oficial, oleoductul a fost dat n exploatare pe 13 iulie 2006. Lucrrile la oleoduct au fost efectuate de ctre BTC Co., fondat la Londra n luna august 2002.
42 41

este un proiect internaional, aprut la iniiativa Turciei, Georgiei i Azerbaidjanului n 1994 cu scopul de a consolida independena economic a rilor din regiune (Haciyev Iqbal, 2010, 227-242). Proiectul este alimentat cu petrol extras din zona sectorului azer al Mrii Caspice i ptrunde prin intermediul acestuia pe pieele internaioale, fiind conceput astfel nct s poat prelua i o parte din producia petrolier kazah (ibidem, 227-242). Lungimea oleoductului este de 1.767 km, dintre care 443 pe teritoriul Azerbaidjanului, 248 pe teritoriul Georgiei i 1.076 pe cel al Turciei. Conducta a fost proiectat cu o durat de via de 40 de ani. Capacitatea maxim de transport pe an este de 50 milioane tone pe an. Participarea Azerbaidjanului la proiect a fost asigurat de una din filialele SOCAR i anume AzBTC Co. Ponderea investiiilor acesteia n cadrul BTC Co. este de 25% din totalul de 3 miliarde euro necesari pentru realizarea ntregului proiect. (vezi ceilali investitori n figura 1). Importana acestuia este complex. n afar de faptul c asigur o parte din necesitile interne ale industriilor statelor

Figura 1 Cotele-pri ale investiiilor n dezvoltarea oleoductului Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Sursa: State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan, http://www.oilfund.az/en/content/10/95

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participante la dezvoltarea proiectului, are i nsemntate politic. Miza geopolitic a proiectului presupune reducerea dependenei energetice fa de Federaia Rus. Cea de-a doua funcie a acestui oleoduct este de a oferi Statelor Unite ale Americii, precum i altor state occidentale posibilitatea de a nu mai fi dependente n prea mare msur de petrolul din zona Golfului Persic, ocolind teritoriul Rusiei i rutele aglomerate din strmtorile Bosfor i Dardanele. Dei conexiunea economic a Azerbaidjanului la Federaia Rus este nc destul de nsemnat, strategia de dezvoltare energetic este orientat, dup cum am menionat anterior, spre promovarea unor proiecte de dezvoltare alternative la colaborarea prea strns cu Rusia. Aceast atitudine le ofer autoritilor de la Baku o perspectiv suplimentar n negocierea intereselor i obiectivelor politice naionale, dar pune n valoare foarte mult aspectul economic al relaiei bilaterale Baku-Moscova. Strategia de diversificare a ofertanilor de produse petroliere, precum i a rutelor de transport pentru hidrocarburile de alt provenien dect ruseasc va modifica rolul Federaiei Ruse pe scena mondial, oblignd-o s fie mai deschis, mai orientat spre adoptarea unui alt tip de negocieri. Totodat, conducerea rus va deveni mai receptiv la mecanismele i normele internaionale promovate de instituiile de profil cu care poart negocieri pentru a obine statutul de membru cu drepturi depline. Scopul acestui demers cel de deschidere a Rusiei ctre pieele mondiale n condiiile unei concurene loiale este de a asigura stabilitate energetic pe teritoriul Europei. BTC Co. este un consoriu de companii petroliere i financiare, care au un aport total n cadrul proiectului de 3 miliarde euro, dintre care 30% din investiii au fost efectuate de ctre filiala SOCAR AzBTC nfiinat special pentru dezvoltarea prii azere a oleoductului. Celelalte 70% constituie contribuiile celorlali parteneri, membri ai consoriului: instituii financiare internaionale, agenii de creditare, bnci comerciale. Ministerul Dezvoltrii Economice
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al Republicii Azerbaidjan a obinut reprezentarea oficial a intereselor guvernului azer, printr-o participare de 80% n cadrul AzBTC. Astfel, veniturile ce rezult n urma implicrii i susinerii oferite de Ministerul Dezvoltrii Economice vor fi acumulate n conturile Fondului Petrolier de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan. SOFAZ a finanat construcia prii de pe teritoriul azer a oleoductului Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, n conformitate cu prevederile Decretului Prezidenial nr. 739 din 30 iulie 2002, semnat de preedintele n exerciiu de atunci, Heidar Aliev. n luna februarie 2007 au fost alocate 298 milioane AZN pentru finanarea cotei pri a Azerbaidjanului n cadrul BTC. Seciunea azer a conductei BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) destinat exportului de petrol a fost inaugurat pe 25 mai 2005 de ctre preedinii Azerbaidjanului, Georgiei i Turciei n cadrul unei ceremonii oficiale, care a avut loc la Terminalul Sangachal de lng Baku. BTC este unul dintre cele mai scumpe proiecte energetice dezvoltate pn n anul 2005, la care au luat parte 11 state partenere. El modific situaia geopolitic din Caucaz, crend tensiuni ntre Federaia Rus i Statele Unite ale Americii. Platforma Shah Deniz44 consoriul Shah Deniz, constituit de ctre mai multe companii cu profil energetic, printre care British Petroleum, Stateoil, SOCAR, Lukoil, NICO, Total i TPAO, ateapt propuneri pn la data de 1 octombrie 2011 pentru construirea unor rute de transport adiacente, n afara celor care vor alimenta proiectul AGRI,
44 Proiectul Shah Deniz prima faz a proiectului a fost finalizat n anul 2003. Aceasta a presupus instalarea unor noi platforme de exploatare a zcmintelor de gaze naturale i a dou conducte subacvatice, capabile s asigure transportul acestora la rm, n apropiere de Sangachal. Exportul gazelor naturale extrase la Shah Deniz a nceput n 2004. Primul contract de export al gazelor naturale a fost semnat de autoritile azere n anul 2001. El presupunea furnizarea acestui tip de resurse Turciei. Livrrile au nceput n 2006. Volumul gazelor exportate anual, consemnate prin acest contract, a atins cifra de 222 miliarde metri cubi de gaz la finele anului 2009.

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pentru tranzitarea de gaze naturale extrase din cmpul Shah Deniz. Pn n prezent au fost lansate trei propuneri, care sunt studiate de autoritile de la Baku. Toate sunt orientate spre Europa: ITGI interconectorul Turcia-Grecia-Italia TAP Conducta Transadriatic; Nabucco. Primele extracii de gaze din cmpul Shah Deniz pentru cel mai ambiios proiect energetic european, Nabucco, au fost preconizate pentru anul 2017 (News.az a, 2011), dat confirmat de oficialitile azere, care adaug c, din punct de vedere al viabilitii de transportare economic i logistic, Nabucco va contribui cel mai mult la dezvoltarea coridorului energetic sudic. Dei SOCAR deine doar 10% din cota parte a consoriului Shah Deniz, care a fost creat pentru a exploata acest zcmnt, reprezentanii companiei de stat azere vin s confirme faptul c pn n 2017 capacitatea de extracie va atinge cifra de 25 miliarde metri cubi pe an. Nabucco a fost proiectat pentru a transporta 31 miliarde metri cubi de gaze naturale pe an, cu un potenial de extindere de pn la 35 miliarde metri cubi pe an. Oficialii azeri au garantat o producie de 10 miliarde metri cubi pe an pentru Nabucco. n ceea ce privete AGRI, dup cum am menionat anterior, cantitatea de resurse care va alimenta conducta nc nu a fost decis. Pn n 2006, Azerbaidjanul, dei deinea cantiti importante de gaze naturale, a fost un stat importator de acest tip de resurse (EIA, 2011). Consumul intern depea cantitile extrase. Principalul furnizor era compania rus Gazprom. (Haciyev, Iqbal, 2010, 242) Exploatarea rezervelor de la Shah Deniz le-a permis autoritilor azere s reduc n timp dependena fa de gazele naturale de provenien rus. Cele mai mari impedimente n dezvoltarea rapid a proiectului sunt, pe rnd, lipsa infrastructurii de depozitare, apoi a celei de prelucrare a resurselor extrase la Shah Deniz. Acest aspect, ns, nu a mpiedicat conducerea azer s poarte negocieri cu cea turc pentru semnarea unor acorduri de tranzitare pentru gazele
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naturale din cmpul Shah Deniz spre consumatorii europeni prin Turcia. Declaraiile oficialilor azeri confirm acest lucru (News.az b, 2011), ei menionnd c, la etapa n care se afl, deja a fost convenit volumul resurselor de gaze naturale care vor fi livrate ctre Europa. Interconexiunea Turcia-Grecia-Italia (ITGI, 2011) este un proiect care are drept scop crearea unei puni de legtur ntre Europa i resursele de gaze naturale din Marea Caspic. Importurile spre statele membre ale Uniunii Europene se vor efectua prin Turcia, ceea ce duce la creterea rolului acestui stat n cadrul coridorului energetic de sud. Ca i celelalte coridoare energetice, are rolul de a diversifica sursele de aprovizionare cu gaze naturale ale agenilor economici de pe continentul european. Cumulat cu celelalte proiecte, ITGI va contribui la transformarea Republicii Azerbaidjan n unul dintre cei mai mari furnizori de gaze naturale pentru Europa. ITGI intenioneaz s conecteze sistemele energetice ale Greciei i Bulgariei la cel italian prin intermediul offshore-ului ce se ocup de administrarea conductei Poseidon.45 Conducta Transadriatic (TAP) e un alt proiect energetic care face parte din sistemul conductelor care trec prin coridorul sudic, menit s contribuie la asigurarea securitii energetice a statelor europene n condiiile unei dependene mrite fa de importurile de gaze naturale din Federaia Rus. Principalii acionari ai companiei de tip joint venture ai Conductei Transadriatice, care vor administra conducta ce va uni Europa de Marea Caspic prin Marea Adriatic, sunt EGL din Elveia, Statoil din Norvegia i E.ON Ruhrgas din Germania. Capacitatea de transport a produselor energetice prin conducta TAP este de 10 miliarde metri cubi pe an, cu posibilitatea de mrire a acesteia pn la 20 miliarde metri cubi (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, 2011). Compania TAP
45 Compania care se ocup de dezvoltarea conductei Poseidon se numete IGI Poseidon SA.

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va contribui la dezvoltarea infrastructurii de stocare a gazelor naturale pe teritoriul Albaniei, care a fost invitat alturi de Grecia s participe la dezvoltarea proiectului. Depozitele de stocare pentru gazele naturale au rolul de a asigura necesarul de produse energetice pentru statele europene n cazul unor poteniale crize energetice. n iulie 2011, reprezentanii TAP au semnat cu guvernul Albaniei un Memorandum de cooperare (Penn Energy, 2011), n urma cruia intenioneaz s studieze posibilitile de conectare a gazoductului Ionian Adriatic Pipeline la Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, astfel nct sistemul de conducte care formeaz coridorul de sud s fie ct mai interconectat, pentru a facilita funcionarea acestuia. Livrrile de gaze naturale ctre TAP vor ncepe din zcmntul Shah Deniz II n 2017. n prezent, experii studiaz impactul construirii conductei asupra mediului. Proiectul Viking este o cale de transport pentru mrfuri, care opereaz pe ruta Odessa-Klaipeda (Railway Pro, 2011) i utilizeaz seciunea de linie Jonava-Siauliai (parte a liniei Rail Baltica). Acest proiect a aprut n anul 2003 la iniiativa a trei state: Lituania, Belarus i Ucraina. Este o iniiativ important din punct de vedere economic, pentru c ofer o perspectiv de unificare a rutelor de transport dintre Europa de Nord i Europa Central cu statele membre ale Comunitii Statelor Independente i alte state asiatice, printre care i China. Fezabilitatea proiectului este sporit de efectele crizei economice mondiale, care a impus adoptarea unor msuri de contracarare a consecinelor acesteia de ctre statele participante la fluxurile internaionale de mrfuri pe coridorul de transport Est-Vest. Transportul feroviar al mrfurilor scade preul de achiziie al acestora, fiind unul dintre cele mai ieftine mijloace de transport internaional. Dac e completat i de alte mijloace de transport de-a lungul unei rute, atunci eficiena utilizrii acestuia crete. Georgia i Republica Moldova au primit invitaia de a adera la acest proiect. Ele pot contribui la dezvoltarea transportului de marf din bazinul Mrii Negre. n mai 2011, aceste
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dou ri i-au manifestat oficial interesul pentru proiectul Viking, adernd la lucrrile acestuia. Lungimea iniial a rutei a fost de 1.753 km. Ulterior la acest proiect a fost invitat s participe i Azerbaidjanul (Web-portal of Ukrainian Government, 2011). Primul-ministru ucrainean Mykola Azarov a declarat, n cadrul unei conferine de pres, c Azerbaidjanul va participa la proiect pentru extinderea rutei spre Kazahstan, Turkmenistan i alte ri din Asia Central. Astfel proiectul ar putea obine i o alt semnificaie: unirea Mrii Caspice cu Marea Baltic, prin punctul Odessa. Pentru transportul de mrfuri Europa-Asia acest proiect este foarte important, pentru c va face conexiune cu un alt coridor de transport, TRACECA Coridorul de Transport Europa-Caucaz-Asia (Kusch, Prause & Hunke, 2011, 25). Pe alocuri, transportul feroviar ar putea fi dublat de cel cu feribotul, ceea ce ar facilita i mai mult conexiunile locale. Exist dou posibiliti de extindere a coridorului de transport Est-Vest spre Asia Central: 1. Regiunea de Sud a Mrii Baltice-Lituania-BelarusFederaia Rus-Kazahstan-China; 2. Regiunea de Sud a Mrii Baltice-Lituania-BelarusUcraina-Georgia-Azerbaidjan-Kazahstan-China, adic folosirea potenial a unor elemente componente ale TRACECA. Costurile transportrii pe cale feroviar a mrfurilor sunt mai mici dect cele cu alte mijloace. Problema o poate constitui ecartamentul diferit, care va trebui adaptat la standardele internaionale. Proiectul Viking este destinat crerii unui sistem de transport containerizat al mrfurilor Marea Neagr-Marea Baltic i este parte a unui proiect intermodal de transport internaional, lansat nc n anul 2003. Capacitatea redus a mai multor coridoare de transport constituie o ameninare pentru o eventual cretere economic, dar i pentru integrarea european. n viitorul apropiat va crete volumul mrfurilor produse, ceea ce va conduce i la necesitatea de a dezvolta proiectele de transport deja existente sau de a iniia altele noi. Proiectul Viking este gndit s fac fa unei asemenea creteri cantitative.
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Harta 3 Coridorul de transport Est-Vest Sursa: Thomas Kusch, Gunnar Prause, Kristina Hunke, The East-West Transport Corridor and the Shuttle Train VIKING, Hochschule Wismar, Fakultt fr Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 2011, http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48566/1/66468520X.pdf

TRACECA46 este un proiect lansat n anul 1993, care asigur accesul mrfurilor europene i asiatice pe piaa internaional la transportul rutier, feroviar i cel de navigaie comercial. El a stat la baza crerii unei rute alternative de transport din Europa spre Asia Central, din Bazinul Mrii Negre, trecnd prin Caucaz spre Mongolia i China. Aceast rut alternativ a fost creat pentru a micora cheltuielile de transport pentru schimbul de mrfuri europene i asiatice, dar i pentru a oferi o rut ocolitoare pentru aceleai produse europene i asiatice la ruta transiberian. n acelai timp, TRACECA are i o misiune cu caracter politic, pentru c va conduce la apariia unor prghii eficiente prin intermediul crora ar putea fi asigurat parial independena comercial a statelor din Caucazul de Sud i Asia Central fa de rutele de transport create la iniiativa Federaiei Ruse. Putem s vorbim aici despre ncercarea de a minimiza rolul proiectelor economice propuse de Moscova, minimizarea influenei i rolului Comunitii Statelor Independente avnd de aceast dat origine european. Aadar, TRACECA este una dintre punile create de ctre Bruxelles ctre Asia, care prejudiciaz parial interesele geostrategice ale Kremlinului n regiune. Aderarea la aceast rut alternativ de transport presupunea i adoptarea unor msuri legislative i de armonizare a politicilor de transport. Cei care se artau dispui s adere la TRACECA, dar i la Proiectul Viking trebuia s treac printr-un proces de armonizare i adaptare a propriilor politici publice i a cadrului legislativ, n acest caz cele n domeniul transportului, la cele europene.
46 Documentul prin care au fost puse bazele Proiectului TRACECA a fost semnat pe 3 mai 1993 la Bruxelles, de minitrii Transporturilor i Comerului din opt state din Asia Central, respecti Caucazul de Sud: Kazahstan, Krgzstan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaidjan i Georgia. Proiectul a fost finanat de Uniunea European cu scopul de a dezvolta coridorul de transport pe direcia Vest-Est din Europa cu traversarea Mrii Negre prin Caucaz i Mrii Caspice cu ieire la Asia Central. Din 1996, la TRACECA au aderat: Ucraina, Mongolia, Republica Moldova, Bulgaria, Romnia i Turcia.

Harta 4 Extensia rutei de transport Viking Sursa: Thomas Kusch, Gunnar Prause, Kristina Hunke, The East-West Transport Corridor and the Shuttle Train VIKING, Hochschule Wismar, Fakultt fr Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 2011, http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48566/1/66468520X.pdf

244

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Concluzii
Dezvoltarea potenialului economic al Caucazului de Sud este condiionat n cea mai mare msur de interesul pe care l manifest marile puteri pentru regiune, n calitatea sa de furnizor de resurse energetice, precum i de spaiul pe care l ofer acesta pentru transportul de mrfuri i servicii dinspre Est spre Vest i dinspre Nord spre Sud. Acest teritoriu a devenit o punte de intersecie a intereselor i obiectivelor politice, economice i geostrategice pe care le dezvolt diferii actori statali i non-statali. n acest context, cnd rolul regiunii crete din ce n ce mai mult, ea fiind capabil s produc stabilitate i instabilitate deopotriv, vor aprea mereu iniiative i proiecte regionale, ce vor cuprinde mpreun sau separat cele trei state sud-caucaziene, dar ele nu vor avea drept scop ntrirea unitii regionale, ci le vor atrage separat spre diferite forme de cooperare regional, ceea ce va conduce i mai mult la slbirea conexiunilor ntre subiectele regiunii. Armenia, Azerbaidjan i Georgia trebuie s continue procesul de reformare a sistemului economic, prin asumarea unor aciuni cu caracter dur, la care populaia va fi tentat s se opun. Este deopotriv un exerciiu politic i democratic, dar consecinele benefice asupra economiei ar putea fi valorificate de ctre generaiile viitoare. De asemenea, cei trei actori statali din Caucazul de Sud trebuie s gseasc soluiile necesare pentru a depi conflictele i divergenele cu caracter politic care exist fie i n stare latent ntre ele. Dac soluia nu poate fi gsit n zona factorilor politici, atunci ar trebuie s fie ales un model economic de succes, care s stea la baza crerii unui sistem regional stabil. Transformarea factorului economic n soluie pentru rezolvarea problemelor politice nu este ntotdeauna posibil. Procesul poate fi argumentat din perspectiva intereselor naionale pe care le poate acoperi. Deciziile politice trebuie s fie modelate pragmatic, astfel nct s asigure obinerea a ct mai multor beneficii economice. Spargerea Caucazului de Sud, n dependen de obiectivele separate ale unor mari consumatori de resurse energetice i politice, este o strategie
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bun pe termen scurt. Regiunea poate deveni vulnerabil n faa noilor provocri, dac liderii celor trei state care o formeaz vor nega importana ei ca un ntreg. Caucazul de Sud nu e doar o punte de acces la hidrocarburile din Marea Caspic pentru marile economii ale lumii, ci i o zon de transfer a unor pericole i ameninri la adresa securitii regionale. A recunoate importana conexiunilor economice i a schimburilor intraregionale este una dintre multiplele soluii pe care le au la dispoziie cele trei state, iar utilizarea lor este o necesitate vital pentru accelerarea dezvoltrii calitative a societilor celor trei state caucaziene.

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Ileana Racheru, Stanislav Secrieru, Angela Grmad

South Caucasus 20 Years After

Political Regimes, Security, and Energy

English version by Mihnea Gafia

Ileana Racheru is a graduate of the Master of International Relations of the University of Bucharest Department of Political Sciences. She is currently a PhD candidate of the University of Bucharest Doctoral School of Political Sciences. She is also the author of a dissertation entitled Foreign Policy Debates in the Relations of the EU and Russia with Georgia and the Ukraine and of several academic articles concerning the relationships between Romania and the South-Caucasian states. She has published many articles on the political and security-related evolutions in the ex-Soviet countries in such periodicals as 22 and Foreign Policy Romania, for which she has interviewed regional diplomats, experts, decision-makers, and political leaders. Stanislav Secrieru is a scholar of the New Europe College within the Black Sea Link Fellowship program and an associate-researcher with the Bucharest Center for East-European and Asian Studies. He is a PhD in Political Sciences (SNSPA). He has conducted researches at the NATO Defense College (Rome) and the Institute for European Politics (Berlin). He has been involved in research projects at the European Council on Foreign Relations (London), the DemosEuropa (Warsaw), the Europeum (Prague), the Heinrich Bll Foundation (Berlin), and the Finnish Institute for International Affairs (Helsinki). His major fields of interest are: the Russian domestic and foreign policies, the EU-Russia relationships, and the European neighborhood policy. Angela Grmad is a PhD candidate in Political Sciences of the National School of Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest and a bachelor in International Economic Relations of the Perspectiva Institute of International Relations in Chiinu (2004). She is a researcher with the Bucharest Center for East-European and Asian Studies. Her major fields of interest are: the evolution of the relationships between the Russian Federation, the US, and the EU within the ex-Soviet space; the democratization processes in the Republic of Moldova, the Ukraine, and Georgia; the European neighborhood policy; and the geopolitical redefinition of the ex-Soviet space.

Contents
Acknowledgements 261 Introduction 263 The Political Regimes in South Caucasus. The Democracy That Hides Competitive Authoritarianisms (Ileana Racheru) What Is Competitive Authoritarianism? Georgia

272 273

Democratic Elections, the Great Success of the Rose Revolution 273 The UNM, All-Powerful in Georgian Politics

277

The Georgian Political Scene between Revolution and Reform 277 New Elites, New Cliental Networks in Power

280

The Mass-Media and Its Impossible Co-existence with the Political Regime 281 Civil Society, the Only Voice That Criticizes the Regime 285 The Democracy That Limits the Russian Pressure 288 Armenia

291

The Elections That Reconfirm the Same Winner 291 A Regime Legitimized by the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict 294 Rights and Liberties Only According to the Discretionary Will of the Political Regime 296 The Mass-Media of Power and the Press of the Opposition 298 Russias Support Is Indispensable, the EU Is too Far 301 Azerbaijan

303

Elections with an Outcome Always Known in Advance 303 257

The NAP, a King on the Baku Political Scene 304 The Perfectly Functioning Corruption

306

III.1.4. The EU / 379 III.1.5. Turkey / 383 III.2. Azerbaijan: Strategic independence through multi-vectorism 386 III.2.1. Turkey / 387 III.2.2. Russia / 390 III.2.3. The US / 394 III.2.4. The EU / 396 III.2.5. Iran / 399 III.3. Georgia due West 402 III.3.1. The US / 403 III.3.2. The EU / 406 III.3.3. Turkey / 410 III.3.4. Iran / 414 III.3.5. Russia / 415 Conclusions 420 Bibliography 421 South Caucasus between Political Economy and Energy-Based Politics (Angela Grmad) I. The Macro-Economic Context of Regional Development 439 1. The implementation of economic reforms between necessity and incapacity 440 2. The importance of developing the business environment and the factors that influence its evolution 459 II. The Economy of Energy-Related Policies in South Caucasus 464 1. Energy resources, economy, and energy policies 467 2. Energy-related projects and transport corridors in South Caucasus 480 Conclusions 499 Bibliography 500

Rights and Liberties with an Insecure Existence 308 The Mass-Media Can Only Be in Power in Azerbaijan 312 A Powerful Petrostate

313

Conclusions 315 Bibliography 316 Variable Geometry in Action: Foreign and Security Policies in South Caucasus (Stanislav Secrieru) Introduction 323 I. The Question of the Regionness of South Caucasus 324 I.1. From Transcaucasia to South Caucasus 324 I.2. Is South Caucasus a region? 327 I.3. South Caucasus a sub-regional security complex 330 I.4. South Caucasus in its Eurasian context 335 I.4.1. North / 336 I.4.2. East / 338 I.4.3. West / 340 I.4.4. South / 344 II. The Intra-Regional Dynamics in South Caucasus

343

II.1. Armenia and Azerbaijan: an improbable peace, a possible war 344 II.2. Georgia and Armenia: "Resetting" pragmatism 353 II.3. Azerbaijan and Georgia: Getting closer

362

III. South Caucasus: Relationships with the Regional Powers 369 III.1. Armenia: Variable complementarity 370 III.1.1. Russia / 370 III.1.2. Iran / 374 III.1.3. The US / 377 258

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Acknowledgements

This book is published within the framework of the European Values Across the Black Sea program of the Soros Foundation Romania. The priority of this program is to improve the dialogue and cooperation among civil society organizations on the Eastern and Western shores of the Black Sea, thus increasing mutual societal knowledge, as well as common awareness of, and adherence to, the wider European space understood as a common sphere of social and political principles and values. The goal of the program is to foster mutual knowledge and a rapprochement of civil societies by establishing solid contacts and exchanges of intellectual resources between Soros Foundation Romania and other Romanian organizations, on the one hand, and organizations in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, on the other hand. Sergiu Panainte Program Coordinator

The present study has about two hundred pages and comprises a much lesser number of words than the thanks Mulumim! / ! / Thank you! the authors have to address to those who have made our journey and documentation in South Caucasus financially possible. Through the interviews1 we have taken in the three South-Caucasian capitals, we have had the opportunity to contact the Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Armenian intellectual elites, some of the best-known experts in the region who have shared with us major and fresh information about the state-level actors in the area. We have talked to outstanding journalists from the most important media, who have allowed us to know the world of the South-Caucasian press and to grasp the specificities of the relationships between the mass-media and the political regimes. We have met with, and talked to, representatives of the civil society in the three states, who have offered us an overview of the NGOs trying to build up democracy in relatively hostile political regimes. We have contacted members of the parliaments, ministers, and other high-ranking officials who have shown us
reasons that have to do with their own security or at the specific request of some of the interviewed, the authors of the study have chosen not to mention their names.
1For

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how the policies are being conceived, how the leading elites of South Caucasus think. We have talked to European officials in the region, who have shown us how negotiations are being carried out in the South-Caucasian states, and have been offered information concealed from the public about the political regimes in Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. We have found out from simple talks and strolls through Yerevan, Baku, and Tbilisi how the Armenians, the Azerbaijanis, and the Georgians think, how they live, and what their customs are. Mulumim! / ! / Thank you! once again to all those who have agreed to be interviewed for this study, for giving us a little of their time and for their patience in answering our questions. Mulumim!, Soros Foundation Romania, for this unique initiative and for choosing us to write this first Romanian study about the political and economic evolutions in South Caucasus, based on direct documentation in Tbilisi, Baku, and Yerevan. ! / Thank you!, Open Society Georgia, Open Society Azerbaijan, Open Society Yerevan, for the interviewing agendas, for the transportation, for the accomodation.

Introduction

Ileana Racheru Stanislav Secrieru Angela Grmad

In the public discourse in Romania, there are plenty of references to the South Caucasus, but the discussions are always being reduced to a couple of persistent themes: Georgia, the August 2008 war, and the vital sources of energy that ensure Europes energetic security. The authors reinvent the discourse on the Caucasus for the Romanian public; they offer a radiograph of the area from a political, an economic, and a security-related point of view. Meant for the institutions that articulate Romanias foreign policy with regard to this part of the world and for the experts in the civil society, this study completed by the Soros Foundation Romania is also an instrument and a compelling reading for the journalists and students who wish to grasp the complexity of an essential region when it comes to the security of Europe. The analytic undertaking is based on the implementation of the most recent interpreting perspectives in the literature specialized on the political and economic evolutions in South Caucasus. The most significant aspect of the work, however, is that the authors have gone on the ground, so to speak; they have drawn their subject-matter from the area itself, in that they had access, through the interviews that were taken in Yerevan, Baku, or Tbilisi, to experts from the NGOs in those cities, to opinion makers, and technocrats in the governmental bureaucracies (at the highest levels, at times).
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The first part of the study, authored by Ileana Racheru, focuses on the political radiograph of the area. If we are talking about the typology of their political regimes, the states in South Caucasus practice competitive authoritarianism as a dominant form of government. It is in the DNA of the local regimes to colonize and mobilize the state to benefit the power, tilting the structural balance against the opposition and restraining its possibilities of participation in the elections. Society seems ontologically shackled in an unequal relationship, one of subordination to the state and to the regime in power. In Georgia, although an independent press formally exists, the power has rapidly found the means to influence its contents by creating an extended network of investors closely related to the regime who manage to control it, with the effect that the press has become a herald of those in power. In Armenia, the political forces that could create an alternative to the state are too weak to coagulate a democratic critical mass. Civic activism manages to unite a rather isolated elite, that does not reach or attract the populace. The image of the regime led by president Aliyev, empirically checked out in the Baku ministries, seems to step right out of the WikiLeaks telegrams: it is a regime built on personal allegiances that have withstood the test of time. In Azerbaijan, the central figure in the architecture of power is president Ilham Aliyev who, following his father Heydar Aliyevs model, tries to keep power in the family and understands the power of the state as a family business. Aware of the limits of his power, Aliyev is a skilful tactician, but also a very clever acrobat, walking a tight rope between mutually exclusive alliances. He makes a clearcut distinction between what is personal and what is actually a business. President Aliyev encourages a balanced foreign policy, combining the openness towards NATO and the European Union with measures seeking to win over his great neighbor powers Russia and Iran. Domestically, however, he proves to be an impulsive personality, with a blind confidence in ruling by force and coercion. In consequence, any
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political challenge is perceived by Aliyev as an existential threat against his political dynasty. The second part, authored by Stanislav Secrieru, describes the complexity of the regional relationships as determined by security policies and sensitive issues. From the point of view of international relationships, South Caucasus represents a sub-regional security complex that has coalesced around a zero-sum rapport (Armenia and Azerbaijan), plus a wide variety of relationships of pragmatic cooperation or circumstantial competition in different respects between Georgia and Armenia and between Georgia and Azerbaijan. The nature of the interaction between the states of this sub-regional complex builds up a genuine puzzle of interdependence: Georgia is vital for the functioning of Armenia (70 to 75% of Armenias trade crosses the Georgian territory and the port of Poti is an essential link in guaranteeing the countrys food security; moreover, Armenias access to the Internet depends on the wiring that crosses the same Georgian territory). At the same time, Georgia depends in the highest degree on the gas supply from Azerbaijan and the Azeri gas for the European market is being supplied through the infrastructure that crosses Georgia. Interacting with the powers around South Caucasus also has a major impact inside the local security complex. Most of the times, the states in the region instinctively take the management of security outside their own space, by courting one of the great powers able to offer them security guarantees: while to Georgia it is its nearness to the European security structures that counts (especially NATO and the USA as an offshore balancer), Armenia seeks its security guarantees in Russia, under the umbrella of the collective defense organization CSTO. Even Azerbaijan, which is much more self-sufficient, seeks support in the field of security, through its treaty with Turkey and its bilateral military relationship with the US. The study shows that after the August 2008 war, however, Georgias space of maneuver at a macro-regional level tends to narrow down. This is a
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reality created by the contradictory policies of certain European states that have supported the sale of Mistral heliports to Russia, but also by the increasing alienation of Turkey from the European Union. In Tbilisi, Ankaras regional intentions are all the more confusing, as Turkey is no longer perceived as a power projecting the interests of the West. The last part, authored by Angela Grmad, offers a picture of the economy of South Caucasus. The study points out the very important role that the oligarchic and monopolist power structures play in the politics and the economy of the region. It would be a South-Caucasian constant that the economic and political decisions are being decisively influenced by the interests of certain private groups coalescing in monopolies and oligopolies. Although structurally they make up a common reality, there are, of course, many specific national nuances: while in Georgia and Armenia the oligarchy is present both in power and in the opposition, in Azerbaijan the opposition does not have its initiatives supported by oligarchs. Ultimately, all these biological parameters of the South-Caucasian economic and political environment tend to discourage the foreign investors to enter a market where unfair competition is a natural datum. In the absence of antimonopoly legislations that should bring about stability and predictability, the rules of the game keep depending on the goodwill of the various cliental structures. Of course, when talking in Bucharest about South Caucasus, we instantly think energy. It is the relative advantage of Azerbaijan (as a state with oil and gas resources) and of Georgia (as a state with a transit potential). From this point of view, the economic potential of the region depends on its capacity to connect to the great energy-consuming markets: the EU, Russia, and China. But, economically as well as politically, it remains divided, fragmented, poles apart from functioning as a unitary whole. Some of these states are economically attracted by the European patterns of development and cooperation (mostly Georgia
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and Armenia), while Azerbaijan tends to show Oriental affinities. Politically, Georgia is interested in the domestic implementation of institutional reforms at European standards, Armenia by re-establishing its relationships with Turkey, while Azerbaijan seems preoccupied by a foreign policy strictly based on energy, often in contradiction with its neighbors interests. Essentially, the study advocates the search of a successful economic pattern that could be laid at the foundation of a stable regional system and concentrate on inter-regional cooperation. But are the South-Caucasian states able to make the concessions they should in order to create their own, Caucasian pattern of integration? The present study, 20 Years After: Political Regimes, Security, and Energy Policies in South Caucasus, has been completed as part of the program Promoting European values in the Black Sea basin of Soros Foundation Romania. This program seeks to increase knowledge regarding South Caucasus among the political, administrative, academic, and journalistic elites in Romania, on the one hand, trying to bring this topic onto the agendas of the public institutions interested the Presidency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, on the other hand, to turn it into a matter of public interest. Given its position at the Eastern border of the European Union, Romania could and should become a connecting factor between the Caucasus and the rest of the Union. From this point of view, the study is also meant for the deciding factors in Europe, that can support and encourage Romania to become a coordinator of the Unions policies in the region.

Octavian Manea Foreign policy editor Foreign Policy Romania and Revista 22

Ileana Racheru

The Political Regimes in South Caucasus. The Democracy That Hides Competitive Authoritarianisms

This chapter tackles the evolution of the political regimes in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan following the advent to power of the current presidents of the respective countries. It covers the administrations of Mikhail Saakashvili, Ilham Aliyev, and Serzh Sargsyan. The analysis assumes that the three regimes are forms of competitive authoritarianism and studies the way in which the authorities have managed to create and/or to perpetuate the mechanisms which consolidate their power. It first explains and describes what competitive authoritarianism is. The analysis then focuses on every state in turn and follows the evolution of the political regime regarding the organization of elections, the relationship between power, on the one hand, and opposition, media, and civil society, on the other hand. Finally, the study discusses the influence of external pressure upon the internal political decision-making. The analysis is based on primary sources (interviews taken by the author in South Caucasus and data published by OSCE and Freedom House) and on expert theoretical studies or observations of the political regimes in the three states. The behavior of the regime in its relationship with the opposition, the press, and the civil society is being surveyed in key political moments: elections, protests, and the passing of legislation considered to be of major importance for democratization. Consequently,
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this chapter aims at finding out how strong the government or the party in power is and the means it employs in order to exercise its authoritarian control over the political regime. What Is Competitive Authoritarianism? Competitive authoritarianism is a hybrid regime resulting from the combination of democratic practices with authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way [2010], p. 5). In a competitive authoritarian regime, the political power fails to observe at least one of the conditions of democracy: free elections, the guaranteeing of civil rights, the existence of a space of political game where both power and opposition can express themselves (Levitsky [2010], p. 7). Competitive authoritarianism has been defined by differentiating it from democracy and authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is a political regime that does not allow the opposition to express any form of contestation (Levitsky [2010], p. 7). Competitive authoritarianism is a political regime that allows the constitutional existence of contestation by the opposition. In a competitive authoritarian regime, elections are not always free or they take place in an environment that does not guarantee equal opportunities for the opposition, although the latter can legally participate in the election campaign. The power can manipulate the lists of voters, it can tamper with the results of the voting, or it can restrict the access of the opposition to the media or the financial resources (ibidem, p. 8). The competitive authoritarian regimes formally guarantee the civil liberties, but they are frequently violated: the opposition and the free mass-media are the targets of the abusing law-and-order forces, of the police, of the judicial system. Protests, even when they observe the regulations, are often repressed forcibly. Restraining the civil liberties can also take the shape of legal repression, through more subtle methods like the implementation of certain stipulations of the law, in order to give legal form to repressive
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actions. Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 10) have established three conditions for the occurring of an unfair competition: the state institutions are constantly being used for purposes favorable to those in power, the power is always being privileged in the oppositions detriment, and the possibilities of the opposition to take part in the elections are seriously being restrained.

Georgia:
Democratic Elections, the Great Success of the Rose Revolution The current political regime in Tbilisi resulted broadly from the Rose Revolution of 2003, when the long-lasting peaceful protests of the Georgian political opposition and West-supported civil society overthrew the authoritarian regime of Eduard Shevardnadze1. After having fraudulently won the parliamentary elections of November 2003, Eduard
former leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia (1972-1985) and Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union (1985-1991), Eduard Shevardnadze (b. 1928) led Georgia first as head of Parliament (1992-1995), then as President elected by direct vote (1995-2003). While in power, Shevardnadze concluded the two Russia-mediated peace treaties that put an end to the violent confrontations in South Ossetia (1992) and Abkhazia (1994). In 1995, he also concluded an Agreement with Moscow, for a 25-year functioning of four Russian military bases on Georgian territory. Shevardnadzes rule saw the earliest attempts at creating a Georgian state based on a national identity and avoided the violent manifestations characteristic of that of his predecessor, Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1939-1993). In 1994, due to his positive image in the West, where he was still seen as having been instrumental in the reunification of Germany, Eduard Shevardnadze managed to launch a Western-supported program of economic reforms. However, when he was overthrown from power, in 2003, said economic reforms had failed and Georgia had come to be regarded as one of the countries in the world with the highest level of corruption. The Shevardnadze regime is considered by experts to have been an authoritarian one.
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Shevardnadze gave up before the Western pressure and the street unrest and announced his resignation. The Georgian Citizens Union the party in power at the time disintegrated. The new, hybrid configuration of power was the result of the concentration of all forces of opposition around a common goal: overthrowing Shevardnadze and winning the political battle. Todays power in Tbilisi, that took over after the presidential elections of January 2004, is made up of contesters from inside the Shevardnadze regime Nino Burjanadze (b. 1964), Mikhail Saakashvili2 (b. 1967), and Zurab Zhvania (1963-2005), turned into critics who favored the introduction of democratic norms internally and a West-oriented foreign policy. Following the January 2004 vote, Saakashvili, who was the unique candidate of the United National Movement (UNM) and of the United Democrats, was elected president by 96.2% of the votes and his allies Burjanadze and Zhvania became Chairman and Spokesman of Parliament and State Minister, respectively.3 The January 2004 elections were the first described by international observers described as being close to the democratic standards and marked the beginning of the second Georgian transition, after the 1991 proclamation of independence.
2 With his masters degree at Columbia University and his Ph.D. at the George Washington University, Mikhail Saakashvili was a member of Parliament (1995-1999) and a Minister of Justice (2000-2001) during the rule of Eduard Shevardnadze. In 2001, he resigned from the Ministry of Justice and accused his own government of corruption. That same year, he founded the United National Movement as an opposition entity with which he won the presidential elections of 2004 and 2008 (CRS Report, 2011, p. 1). 3 According to the 1995 Constitution, the president of Georgia held the most important position in the country. The presidential system instituted by the fundamental law did not make provisions for the existence of the position of prime-minister, but of a State Minister who supervised the body of ministers accountable only before the president.

The November 2003 parliamentary elections were declared null and void and new elections were organized in March 2004, a decision that was deemed suspicious by the international observers, since it was applied exclusively to the parliamentary seats that had been delegated through proportional representation.4 16 parties and alliances ran in the new elections, but they began campaigning rather late and did not come up with any offers or ideological programs, limiting themselves to attacks against their opponents. The voting competition strengthened the position of the alliance between the UNM and the United Democrats, that won 67% of the ballot (135 seats), and brought the right-wing opposition (The New Right and Industry to Save Georgia) 7.6% of it (15 seats).5 The OSCE noticed that the voting conditions had improved if compared to the previous campaigns, but it also mentioned the continuing lack of a clear separation between State administration and political party structures, and the ongoing potential for misuse of State administrative resources (OSCE, 2004, p. 3). The following elections that took place in Georgia, the 2006 local elections, were considered a key-moment for the evolution of the new political regime in Tbilisi. Although evaluated by international observers as being, generally, in accordance with the norms of democracy, the use of state resources (hires in public positions, a temporary increase of pensions, a granting of social vouchers) by the parties in power in order to win votes was still practiced. Five parties, an alliance, and several independent candidates ran in this elections, which were won by the UNM. In 27.5% of the majoritarian races and in 8.7% of the proportional races,
The Constitution that was effective in Georgia in 2004 stipulated that the parliament was made up of 235 seats; for 150 of these, the vote was proportionate, according to lists, while for the remaining 85 it was a simple-majority vote - one mandate, one district. 5 In the Georgian parliament, ten seats are reserved for the representatives of the population displaced from the provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
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only one candidate or party list runs in all but one case, that of the governing UNM (OSCE, 2006, p. 2). In 2008, the Georgians were called again to vote for the anticipated presidential elections and for parliamentary ones. The elections were qualified as the first really competitive post-independence presidential race. Mikhail Saakashvili used the states administrative resources in his campaign and the vote counting and registration procedures were inadequate (OSCE, 2008a, p. 2). Saakashvilis main adversary was Levan Gachechiladze, supported by nine opposition parties grouped together in the UNM. Saakashvili won over 53% of the ballot from the first round, Gachechiladze gathered 25.69% and the rest of the votes went to five other competitors (each got under 1%). The first two candidates had similar objectives of foreign policy on their agendas (Georgias joining NATO) and different views as to the configuration of the domestic political regime (a semi-presidential system, eliminating corruption and poverty, and the integration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for Saakashvili; parliamentary monarchy and encouraging the business environment for Gachechiladze). The 2008 parliamentary elections clearly offered the Georgian people the opportunity to choose its representatives from a wide variety of options, but, as in the previous elections, the UNM made use of the states administrative resources to win votes (OSCE, 2008b, p. 1). The presidential party won 59.18% of the ballot (119 seats), the nine-party opposition alliance obtained 17.73% of the votes (17 seats), the Christian-Democrats 8.66% (6 seats), the Labor Party 7.44% (6 seats), and the Georgian Republican Party 3.78% (2 seats).6
6 The Georgian Constitution was amended on March 28th, 2008, so the number of members of parliament was reduced from 253 to 150 (75 chosen proportionately, in a single national constituency, and 75 chosen through a majority vote in unequal constituencies overlapping with the administrative districts).

In the local elections of March 30th, 2010, the party in power used the administrative resources in its campaign once again and its members that occupied public offices went campaigning. The UNM won the elections by 73.9% of the ballot nationwide and by 55.2% (for the mayors) from the first round and 52.5% (for the Municipal Council) in the Tbilisi city hall, thought to be the jackpot of local elections.

The UNM, All-Powerful in Georgian Politics

The presidential party in Georgia is now in power (Max Bader, 2008, p. 5); together with several opposition parties, it is building the image of a presidential political system with practices both democratic, and authoritarian. After four years of government, the UNM has managed to preserve the parliamentary majority, even though it has a weaker position now than after the 2004 elections; but the opposition did not gather half of the votes that the presidential party won, so it is no formidable adversary. The results of the last two elections (the parliamentary ones in 2008 and the local ones in 2010) showed that the UNM has managed to preserve the majority even after president Saakashvili lost almost half of the ballot in the 2008 presidential elections. Through the local elections, the UNM has strengthened its power network also locally, which is going to give it a significant advantage in the following elections. The UNM has now a well-consolidated power network all over Georgia, the partys control varying between 50 and 70% of the electorate.

The Georgian Political Scene between Revolution and Reform

The political scene in Tbilisi preserves the atmosphere of extreme confrontation of the 1990s, since neither the power, nor the opposition is experienced in negotiations and compromise and neither has any ideological programs. The
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UNM has no ideology and claims it represents the entire Georgian society (IDEA, 2006, p. 7), while the other parties, although claiming to belong to either left, or right or proclaim their centrism, do so only to avoid the criticism of lacking any ideology. The behavior and discourse of the parties in Tbilisi mostly distinguish between the moderate reformers in power and the radical revolutionaries in the opposition. Most opposition parties in Tbilisi7 place themselves to the right of the ideological spectrum leftist values being rejected as directly or indirectly associated with communism. The political scene in Tbilisi has a low degree of polarization (Nodia, 2006, p. 19), that does not manifest itself ideologically, but through the refuse to take part in debates, the acceptance of the Russian support (Nino Burjanadzes party), and the way in which everyone relates to the Rose Revolution8 (ibidem, p. 119). The creation of coalitions and alliances and their dissolution is a phenomenon frequently occurring on the political scene in Tbilisi, at any moment of the electoral cycle or just conjecturally, in parliament, in order to sustain certain initiatives or projects. The UNM came to power with a revolutionary program that subsequently, with Western help , it managed to turn into a reform program. It has tried to come up with a positive answer to a question that is fundamental to the Georgians: Was the 2003 revolution the last one in Georgia? The opposition has not given up the revolutionary objectives it proclaimed through street protests, although, in time, the number of those who joined the manifestations decreased very much. A new revolution and the presidents resignation were the main objectives of the opposition, against which the government came up with reforms and with the electoral
7 There is only one center-left political structure in Georgia, the Labor Party. 8 The Republican Party and the Conservative Party were involved in the Rose Revolution. The New Conservative party, the Industrialists, and the Labor Party did not support the 2003 events.

program Georgia without poverty. The opposition threatened to withdraw from all debates referring to government reforms and organized more protests. Moreover, it accused the power of perpetrating fraud in the elections, although the international observers noticed the UNMs progress in organizing them. The political agendas of both camps claim that their priority objective is to achieve democratization combined with Westernization and Europeanization, with various achievement strategies. For the opposition, revolution is the means; for the power, the often radical reforms that attempt at applying Western norms without taking into account the local specificities. Anti-communism in the form of a radical lustration is also present on the powers agenda. The party in power in Georgia has created a space for the political game in which the opposition may take part in the elections with real chances to win, but it has not given up altogether the disloyal administrative practices that put it in an advantageous position. The increasing power of the UNM is also due to the oppositions incapacity of bringing forth important adversaries who might challenge the power (in the 2004 parliamentary elections, most candidates refused the medias offers and did not have any TV campaigns). The UNM is the strongest party in Georgia, but it might be challenged by a powerful opposition, since it leaves its adversaries a great many possibilities to express themselves and allows for a political climate that does not rule out competition. Although the UNM holds the majority in parliament, the opposition could penetrate the system (in 2005, for instance, all the opposition parties formed an alliance in order to propose that the mayor of Tbilisi be elected by direct voting and they rejected the initiatives that held that he or she be chosen by the Municipal Council). The confrontation between the Georgian parties takes place in an organized fashion, through elections or parliamentary debates, in the street (peaceful or violent manifestations), or through fights in parliament. Violent confrontations do not
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mean just measures taken by law enforcement against the opposition. The Georgian parties preserve a tradition prior to the Rose Revolution, that of violent confrontations among themselves: each party has a SonderKommando, a group of thugs that help it face the potential provocations of their adversaries (Nodia, 2006, p. 117).

New Elites, New Cliental Networks in Power

The image and practices of the political elites in Tbilisi combine the Soviet heritage with adaptation to the transition and to the ever-present objective of democratization. The Soviet heritage is reflected in the existence of a strong leader and the elimination of all heads of state that do not show this attribute. Mikhail Saakashvili is the strong leader in Tbilisi, a position he has built for himself through the successful Rose Revolution, the winning of the elections by 97% and 53%, respectively, and through reforms. Adaptation to transition has meant the creation of a legislative framework that observes the norms of democracy, while favoring the power. The legislative reformation of government (by modifying the constitution and building up a strong presidential system) has been another way of consolidating the Saakashvili regimes power in Georgia. Thus, the president may dismiss the cabinet and the parliament (if the latter does not give a vote of confidence to three successive cabinets). Although the system has formally been reformed by the introduction of the office of prime-minister (who functions as a screen inasmuch as he/she apparently shares the executive power with the president), as well as his/her confirmation by parliament, the presidents power has actually strengthened, because he is the one around whom the entire political regime is built. The new elite created by Mikhail Saakashvili is different, first and foremost, from the Soviet one around Eduard Shevardnadze or from the nationalist radicals of the 1990s:
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all ministers resemble their president they have studied in the West and support the reformation of the state after Western patterns. The power of the UNM may be accounted for, aside from its success in the elections (that can also be explained, at least partially, by the peoples wish to attain a certain political stability), through the high-level cliental networks whose loyalty is based on corruption: The public institutions have been ridden of corruption at the lower levels. This is the greatest achievement of the Saakashvili administration. But nobody has touched the corrupt elements at the high levels.9 In the upper positions, corruption has just changed form. The stakes are now to control business and the market.10 The regime relies on the loyalty of the business environment and of the administrative employees, not on the ministers (the replacement of ministers is a constant practice in Tbilisi). But, as a result of the reforms it has initiated, the Saakashvili administration has not managed to obtain popular support as well, because the positive changes, although visible in the streets of Tbilisi or Batumi, have not yet reached the lower strata of the impoverished population.

The Mass-Media and Its Impossible Co-existence with the Political Regime
The relationship between the mass-media and the power in Tbilisi is typical for the authoritarian regimes in that a democratic legislation overlaps with undemocratic practices. In the almost eight years since it came to power, the UNM has managed to assume control of almost all mass-media. Although it has created the legal conditions for the existence of an independent press, the Saakashvili regime has also identified, in a very short time, the means by which it may influence the content of the news: to bring the state-financed
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Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011. Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

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press under its own influence and to create a network of private investors close to the regime (even of parliament members) who are capable of controlling the private media and turn them from an independent press that often criticized the regime into a mouthpiece of those in power. The legislation regulating the Georgian audio-visual environment has been evaluated by Freedom House as one that meets all democratic requirements. After 2004, the parliament in Tbilisi completed the legislative provisions regarding the mass-media. The new legal framework also came up with significant amendments to the 1991 law: it guarantees the freedom of expression, it clarifies the legal constraints that the media people may be subjected to, and it des-incriminates slander (Freedom House Georgia, 2006). Television represents the Georgians main source of information, while the printed mass-media have a reduced circulation and usually cover the educated milieus, being distributed mainly in Tbilisi and other larger cities. There is a TV station in Georgia, that is being financed from public funds (TV1), three private TV channels (Kanal 1, Rustavi 2, and Imedi), and several newspapers partially state-financed. The Saakashvili regime took the publicly-financed press from under the influence of Shevardnadze and brought it under its own after 2004. The same happened with the mass-media in Ajaria, that was put under the control and censorship of the Batumi authorities, heavily influenced by the power in Tbilisi. After the advent to power of the UNM and of Mikhail Saakashvili, the public TV station became the main media vehicle the regime resorted to in all electoral campaigns. Although formally through the legislation guaranteeing the right to free expression and the means by which its leadership is being appointed that observe all democratic norms this station has at its disposal all the necessary elements for disseminating non-partisan information, it has not abandoned the self-censorship practices associated with the press from an authoritarian regime.
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The private mass-media are incapable of financially sustaining themselves, because of the extremely meager publicity market, which makes them vulnerable before the editorial pressure often politically inspired, that the financers exert. The private investors in the Georgian mass-media remain unknown, they are obscure companies located in fiscal paradises and it is speculated that they are only screens meant to conceal the presence of political actors connected to the circles of either power, or opposition. The private TV stations fight serious financial deficits and nobody knows where they are getting their money from11. It seems that after 2004, the three main private TV stations (Rustavi-2, Imedi-TV, TV Mze) were purchased by individuals with government ties or by parliament members, after their owners were submitted to legal pressure. The financial problems of the mass-media make them dependent not only on the private investors, but also on how the debts towards the state are being paid. The regime resorted to legal forms of pressure (fiscal police controls) or informal messages (criticisms of the journalists by the officials and restricting their access to events organized by public institutions a practice of the Ministry of State Security). In 2004, the government rescheduled payments due by Rustavi-2 and the TV station was later purchased by an investor close to the government circles, which seems to have diluted its critical stance with reference to the authorities (Freedom House Georgia, 2005). The financial situation of the Georgian press has an impact on the editorial content of the information made public. The private mass-media often practice self-censorship in order to avoid pressure from the financer. There have been several scandals in the Georgian press, in which journalists accused their investors of interference causing documentaries about corruption in the police ranks or shows whose hosts criticized the government to be pulled off the air.
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Interview with a journalist, Tbilisi, May 2011.

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They also accused their own employers of pressure: It is impossible to write and publish an article about a corrupt political figure either in power, or in the opposition, unless your own boss agrees12. The regimes pressure on the mass-media has been manifest especially in the tensed moments of the struggle for power (elections, opposition protests, the 2008 war) and has gone all the way to physical violence or the suspension of TV broadcasting. At the 2004 parliamentary elections, all the sixteen parties and alliances that competed for the votes were present in the media, but the general tendency of both the private TV stations and of the public one, was to favor the party in power, the UNM. TV1, which is publicly financed, broadcast 80% positive news about the UNM and did not host any electoral debates (OSCE, 2004, pp. 2, 15). Rustavi-2, a private-owned station, covered the campaign in a similar fashion. The following elections showed that the practices of the 2004 voting were still in use. The forces of order have physically aggressed the journalists, especially those who broadcast information about the 2005 and 2007 protests. President Saakashvili proclaimed a state of emergency in November 2007 and forbade all TV broadcasting, except from the public station. At that same moment, the Imedi and Kavkasia TV stations were suspended, allegedly for having stirred up the protesters (Freedom House Georgia, 2008). During the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, all TV stations in Georgia broadcast only information that was favorable to the Tbilisi authorities and, as a consequence of the November 2007 incidents, all talk-shows and analyses vanished from all programs. The Tbilisi regime has managed to rid the Georgian market of the independent mass-media, but it has not suppressed pluralism, since the investors are not only politicians and people having close connections with the power circles, but also members or supporters of the political opposition:
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There are now in Georgia one press for the power and one for the opposition13. At present, the most important TV station of the opposition is Maestro TV, which supports the radical opposition represented by Nino Burjanadze.

Civil Society, the Only Voice That Criticizes the Regime

The Tbilisi regime has hesitated between the democratic and the authoritarian practices in its relationship with the opposition and the civil society. Its control over the exercising of civil rights and liberties is a limited one and mostly impacts the debates on the legislation regarding the reformation of the state and the right to protest against or contest the power. The second transition in Georgia implied the reorganization of the legislative framework in which the elections took place and the legal reconfiguration of the political regime. As soon as it came to power, the UNM announced that it was going to have consultations regarding the project for a Unified Electoral Code and the amendments to be brought to the Constitution. The power in Tbilisi tried and succeeded to monopolize the public debate by two means: the parliamentary majority vote and some faade debates with the opposition and the civil society (to show, at least formally, that it observed the rules of political dialogue required by the West). Moreover, the power took advantage of the extreme polarization of the political milieu and of the radical manner in which the opposition approached those consultations, by withdrawing from the discussions and putting up street protests. International observers have frequently criticized the manner in which consultations with the civil society and the opposition parties were organized in view of the modification of the electoral legislation and the amendment of the
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Interview with a journalist, Tbilisi, May 2011.

Interview with a journalist, Tbilisi, May 2011.

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constitution: they were held over a very limited time-span14 and favored the parties in power. In 2004, following a government initiative, the parliament modified the electoral law, while violating the deliberation procedures. The debates regarding the modification of the parliamentary structure (reduction of the number of seats) began in 2008, only two months before the elections, and the OSCE (2008, p. 1) considered that the initiative was violating the equality of the vote. Moreover, the changes were in favor of the UNM that had obtained most of the simple-majority mandates in the previous elections. The UNM version of the electoral law also contains a controversial stipulation that allows the candidates already holding public offices to take part in the campaign. The regime in Tbilisi has also promoted a dual approach in its relations with the political opposition: peaceful ones, according to the norms of Western democracy, but also violent reactions or scandals and intimidations. The Tbilisi government has offered the opposition the possibility to take part in the elections with real chances of gaining votes (no candidate or party was abusively denied participation in the elections organized so far). The opposition has been able to exercise freely its legal right of organizing anti-Saakashvili protests, yet several manifestations of the contesters were suppressed violently. In November 2007, the government forcibly suppressed the protests of the opposition parties grouped together in a National Council, which demanded that the parliamentary elections be organized earlier and called for the presidents resignation. The following protests of the opposition, which took the form of massive demonstrations lasting almost two months were, however, received peacefully by the regime in power. The
On August 26th, 2006, president Saakashvili issued a decree that announced that local elections were to be held on October 6th, the same year. The time allotted to the debates on the modification of the local elections legislations was just two weeks.
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police used force in May 2011 against one part of the opposition led by Nino Burjanadze, which resulted in four deaths and tens of people being injured. One of the opposition leaders was put under arrest. Georgia is the only South-Caucasian state in which the civil society has managed to send the message of the population through peaceful protests to the Shevardnadze administration and to achieve the main objectives of the manifestations: the annulment of the fraudulent elections, the organizing of new ones, and the presidents resignation. After 2004, the civil society has only partially managed to alter its relationships with the political milieu. The government in Tbilisi has a dual approach in its relationships with the NGOs: it presents itself with a formal policy of openness to the civil society, yet avoids the dialogue when matters of domestic policy are brought into debate. The legislation in effect in Georgia does not obstruct the creation of NGOs and the Tbilisi regime has not tried to offer those already existing any state financing in order to influence the activities of the non-governmental environment to its advantage. The most active NGOs are being financed from the West. There have been, however, situations in which various NGOs expressed very biased options (a good example is the Liberty Institute, a supporter of the Rose Revolution, whose director took up politics, after 2004, under the umbrella of the UNM). The classic role of civil society of communicating the citizens messages to the government is limited in Georgia, since the administration is unwilling to take part in debates organized by NGOs or to allow the civil society any influence on the decision-making process in the case of public policies. Unlike under Shevardnadze, the government is now apparently open to the civil society projects, especially in the case of the NGOs working in partnership with various EU institutions, so as to avoid any possible criticism coming from Brussels. But members of the government turned down several invitations by the NGOs to take part in the debates regarding the modification of the constitution.
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However, the Georgian regime is not altogether immune to all initiatives of the civil society. In 2004, following the suggestion of the Liberty Institute, the parliament modified the law of the press, by des-incriminating slander and providing for access to public information. Four years later, the Georgian government gave up to the pressure exerted by the public opinion and the opposition and accepted reorganizing the publicly funded mass-media (Freedom House Georgia, 2005). The representatives of the NGOs have free access to the media and they often take part in TV-broadcast debates. None of the civil society activists that were interviewed for this paper demanded that his of her identity be concealed and did not fear to criticize the political circles.

The Democracy That Limits the Russian Pressure

Georgia is a small state in a region of many conflicts (North Caucasus, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh), a situation that creates the necessity of having a strong ally. There are only two options for it: Russia and the West. The privileged relationships with Russia have been ruled out of the political program of both the UNM, and Mikhail Saakashvili since 2003, although they might have helped them both to assume a firmer control and consolidate their positions. However, the party and its presidential candidate alike proclaimed EU integration and joining NATO as being the major objectives of their future administration. Winning all the subsequent elections with the same pro-Western program and the peoples wide support for an alliance with the West has caused the survival in power of the regime to depend on its relationships with the US and the EU. The power in Tbilisi has initiated the reform of the countrys institutions with the financial support of the West: it has substantially augmented the public servants wages
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(in Eduard Shevardnadzes administration, these were under the subsistence limit), modified the structure of the bureaucratic apparatus, put up training sessions for the improvement of the employees performance, and eliminated corruption. The West demanded, however, that democratic reforms be implemented in exchange for its support, so the government in Tbilisi had to temper its authoritarian tendencies and began hesitating between the organization of elections according to the OSCE norms and the suppression by force of the oppositions protests or the brutalizing of media members. The regime there has not yet forgotten the recent failure of the Shevardnadze administration, which was deprived of help from the West because it refused to implement any reforms, it let the economic situation deteriorate and was overthrown through public protests. The street puts pressure on the Saakashvili regime as well, although this regime has withstood a number of manifestations meant to bring about a change of power. After some commercial frictions (an increase of the price of gas by Moscow and the discontinuation of mineral water imports from Georgia), the relations between Georgia and Russia have utterly deteriorated in the wake of the August 2008 war. Russia has become the great enemy of the Georgian regime and has tried several times to have Saakashvili removed from power, if the official version is to be taken seriously. The Western pressure for the democratization of the regime in Tbilisi has double coordinates: an internal one (to keep it in power by encouraging a pro-Western agenda and by counteracting Moscows attempts at replacing it) and an external one (the necessity of having a powerful partner there and guaranteeing its security).

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Armenia
The current political regime in Armenia15 has resulted from the remaining in power, since 1998, of a single political group rooted in Nagorno-Karabakh16 (Ter-Petrosyan, 2010, p. 8) and from the transfer of power from President Robert Kocharyan to prime-minister Serzh Sargsyan17. After the taking over of power by Sargsyan, the Armenian authorities built up a hybrid political regime in which democratic practices co-exist with authoritarian measures. After Serzh Sargsyans appointment as prime-minister in 2008, the Yerevan authorities improved the electoral system. The regime could afford renouncing some of the authoritarian practices and
15 Armenia declared its independence from the USSR in August 1990. Levon Ter-Petrosyan (b. 1945) became the first president of post-communist Armenia in 1991. Until 1998, Ter-Petrosyan headed an authoritarian regime frequently criticized in the West for suppressing the press, violating the citizens rights and liberties, and having fraudulently won the 1995 parliamentary elections and the 1998 presidential ones. 16 In 1923, Stalin decided to include the Oblast Nagorno-Karabakh, with a mostly Armenian population, in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1988, the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and Yerevan demanded, in vast street demonstrations, that the region be included in the Armenian SSR, which led to the outbreak of the conflict. In 1991, Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence from Azerbaijan. The cease-fire agreement was signed in 1994. This roughly 14% of the territory of Azerbaijan has been de facto under the control of Yerevan and de iure under the Baku administration ever since. 17 Born in Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh, Sargsyan had a long career in the Communist Party of the Armenian SSR, then served in the Armenian military structures as head of the Nagorno-Karabakh Self-Defense Committee (1989-1993) and Minister of Defense (1993-1995 and 2000-2007). After 1995, he was Minister of State Security, Minister of Internal Affairs, and held other various positions in the Yerevan presidential administration. In 2007, he was appointed prime-minister of Armenia, being seen as the right hand of the Armenian President Robert Kocharyan.

offering a more democratic image to the world, due to the lack of a real opposition that could have threatened it.18

The Elections That Reconfirm the Same Winner

The 2007 parliamentary elections were conducted largely in accordance with OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections (OSCE Armenia, 2007, p. 1). The Republican Party, which was in power, won 41 proportional mandates and 22 simple-majority ones.19 The other parties that made the 5% election threshold were Prosperous Armenia (18 proportional and 7 simple-majority mandates), the Dashnaktsutyun the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF; 16 proportional mandates), Orinac Yerkir the Country of Laws (8 proportional and 2 simple-majority mandates), the Heritage Movement (7 proportional mandates), the Alliance Party (1 simple-majority mandate), the non-party Civic Initiative (9 simple-majority mandates) (OSCE Armenia, 2007, Annex). None of the competitors had candidates in all electoral districts and two thirds of the parties and alliances running in the elections only had lists for the proportional voting (in seven districts only single candidates were registered). Many candidates (of both power, and opposition) withdrew from the race after the lists were registered or the candidacies for the single-majority mandates were validates). On several occasions, the Republican Party used the state administrative resources to gain the support of the voters (OSCE Armenia, 2007, p. 1) and to create a campaign environment favorable
The parliamentary elections held in Armenia in 2003 were stolen, which brought about a lot of criticism from the West and the international observers. 19 According to the 1995 Constitution, that was amended in 2005, the Parliament of Armenia is a one-chamber institution with 131 deputies (90 mandates delegated through a proportional vote on lists and 41 mandates through a simple majority in single-winner constituencies).
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to itself and its informal allies (Prosperous Armenia and, partially, the ARF). The February 2008 presidential elections mostly met OSCE commitments and international standards regarding the organization of a free voting. The results indicated that Serzh Sargsyan won in the first run by 52.8% of the ballot. Levon Ter-Petrosyan came out second, with 21.5% of the votes. All in all, the voting process developed in such a way as to favor the candidate of the Republican Party: the acting president and the Government officials campaigned for him and the counting of votes in some 16% of the polling stations observed was assessed as bad or very bad (OSCE Armenia, 2008, p. 2). In 2009, for the first time, the inhabitants of Yerevan were called upon to elect the members of their Municipal Council. This voting, that was assessed as generally meeting the norms of the European Council, was, however, marked by the same non-democratic practices: votes were bought, ballot papers were printed in excess, and voters were intimidated. After counting, the Republican Party gained the majority in the Municipal Council (35 of the total 65 seats) and reconfirmed the former mayor.20 The political scene in Yerevan shows a low degree of polarization, only reflected in the nationalist content of the political agenda regarding the future of Nagorno-Karabakh. Several parties claim that the region should either be included in the Armenian state, or remain independent, while others advocate the organization of a referendum in which the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh themselves should state their opinion as to the future of the area. Domestically, both power, and opposition claim that democratization and reforms are their main priorities, but the final purpose of those are not the integration in the European Union: We do
2009, the mayor of Yerevan was appointed by the president. Since the 2005 revision of the Constitution, the mayor of Yerevan is being chosen indirectly by the majority of the Municipal Council members.
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not reject cooperation with the EU, but we are aware that a possible integration is a much too distant objective21. After the 2007 parliamentary elections, the Republican Party formed a majority together with Prosperous Armenia, the ARF, and the Orinac Yerkir, a coalition dominated by the Republicans. Prosperous Armenia is being controlled by former president Kocharyan, while Orinac Yerkir has only two members in the governing team, who are said to be close to Sargsyan and, unofficially, members of the Republican Party (Petrosyan, 2010, p. 10). The Armenian parliamentary opposition includes the ARF and the Heritage (considered to be the only genuine opposition). In 2009, the ARF left the governing coalition22, but went on sustaining the power informally, in exchange for an equally informal non-aggression pact (the authorities took no measures against its members). Heritage is seen as the only opposition party in the Armenian parliament and the only one that criticizes both the governments foreign policy (for the Russian investments in the Armenian economy, as being a form of corruption, and for the presence of a Russian military base on the Armenian territory), and for its domestic one (for corruption and for the way the authorities handled the 2008 events). Heritage members, on the other hand, have constantly been targets of government criticism and of law enforcement brutality. The Armenian opposition outside the parliament, the so-called Armenian National Council, is a hybrid movement made up of eighteen political parties of different ideologies and civic organizations grouped around Levon Ter-Petrosyan (Petrosyan, 2010, p. 11). The ANC frequently criticizes
21 Interview with a member of the Armenian National Assembly, June 2011. 22 As a protest against the signing, in October 2009, of the Zurich protocols of the normalization of the relationship between Armenia and Turkey.

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the government for violation of human rights, corruption, and the infringement of the constitutional order. The two camps of the Armenian opposition have not managed to coalesce into a unique force able to take part in elections. In 2011, Heritage protested alongside the ANC, without supporting all of the latters objectives, however. Although it has taken part in all the elections that have been organized since the 1995 adoption of the Constitution and has had real chances to challenge the power, the Armenian political opposition has never had enough influence on the voters and has not strengthened itself by attracting new supporters. After the 2008 protests, the traditional opposition in Yerevan compromised itself before the population by unduly contesting the results of a voting that had been assessed as being one in accordance with the Western democratic standards. At present, the Republican Party holds a majority of over 50% of the electorate and the improvement of the conditions in which elections are being organized has not affected its control over the political power. The party in power in Yerevan enjoys the advantages of an opposition that is weak and divided by internal disputes and of informal partnerships with part of the opposition.

A Regime Legitimized by the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

The current elite in Yerevan is the result of the coalition between nationalists and post-communists, set up in the 1990s (Gallina, 2010, p. 24). The political force holding power in Armenia was created when the military elite that had fought in Nagorno-Karabakh in the 1990s blended with the political body that had settled in Yerevan after the gaining of independence (ibidem, p. 25). The power in Yerevan has met no change in the twenty years since the proclamation of independence: elections have been won by the acting president or by the prime-minister unofficially designated
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to succeed him. The rule that the prime-minister takes over the presidents position was confirmed even the single time when the transfer of power was not made as a result of elections in 1998, when Levon Ter-Petrosyan was replaced by Robert Kocharyan following a soft coup. The power in Yerevan took advantage of the victory against Azerbaijan and strengthened its authoritarian control by building up a powerful coercive force in the Army and the Police, which was afterwards efficiently used to suppress the oppositions vast protests (Way, 2009, p. 111). According to the 2005 constitution (it was amended in 2004), Armenia has a semi-presidential regime, but unofficially the power is concentrated in the presidents hands. This situation is accountable for by the Soviet heritage that cultivated the image of a powerful leader and by the postcommunist political practice of a group of leaders who had to face a series of constant threats in order to gain political stability. The political elite in power is grouped around the president, due to the necessity of having a strong leader able to negotiate the outcome of the conflict and to use the pretext of Nagorno-Karabakh for consolidating his own power and obtaining legitimacy (Gallina, 2010, p. 30). The power networks of the Armenian regime are inherited from the Soviet period or constructed in the post-communist one. The Armenian transition has not meant the total change of the institutions inherited from the Soviet period, but the preservation of the state structure almost intact and loyal, so the institutions and the informal networks may be controlled in a formal way (Stefes, 2009, p. 448). The regime is based on corrupt officials (the current prime-minister has been involved in several financial scandals or in defrauding the state by maintaining a suspect exchange rate for the Armenian dram) or even on family relationships (it seems that the most trustworthy official in Yerevan is the presidents brother, Alexander Sargsyan). Most officials also have a felonious past. Their uninterrupted presence in power after 1991 has been an advantage for the Yerevan leaders who
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have managed to build up, during these two decades, two types of loyalties: within the states administration and among the oligarchs who have benefited from privatizations. The political power in Armenia has conceived a mechanism for the control of corruption, in which the government monitors the central networks of corruption (ibidem, p. 447) which, in their turn, monitor the local ones. The consolidation of the power in Yerevan can be also accounted for by the way in which the opposition has chosen to take part in the political life: by establishing informal relationships with the power, by its refuse to engage in debates (see the parliament boycotting from 2003 to 2008), or by street protests.

Rights and Liberties Only According to the Discretionary Will of the Political Regime
The rhetoric and legislation encouraged by the political regime in Yerevan in order to observe human rights and liberties are characteristic of the Western democracies, but their implementation is typical for the post-Soviet space. The Armenian political regime has made significant progress so far in the adoption or modification of laws that refer to the guaranteeing of rights and liberties. The Armenian constitution, modified and improved in 2005, creates the legal premises of pluralism and of the supremacy of law. In 2008, other legislative measures were taken in order to ensure the judicial systems transparency and independence. But the Armenian judicial system has not ridden itself of the influence of the political regime, as proven by the measures taken against the March 2008 protesters (suspect arrests, beatings, collection of doubtful evidence, protracted court actions Freedom House, 2009, p. 68). In 2010, fourteen political detainees were imprisoned in Armenia. In 2007, the Armenian electoral code was amended and, according to the international observers, the modifications
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brought substantial improvements in comparison with the situation of the 2003 elections. The power in Yerevan imposed its own rules when setting up talks with the opposition and the civil society with regard to the electoral legislation. Although it claimed to be open to debate, the Yerevan regime initiated the modification of the law during the election year, just a few months before the voting itself. The power in Yerevan also hesitated between violating and observing the right of free assembling. The Armenian legislation grants the political opposition the right to contest the power through street manifestations. However, the regime happened to apply a violent treatment to its opposition. After the 2008 presidential elections, the opposition that gathered around Ter-Petrosyan protested by accusing the Republican Party of having fraudulently skewed the election results in favor of Sargsyan. The police suppressed the protests by resorting to violence, which resulted in the killing, injuring, or detaining of several protesters; the courts of law have not yet come with any verdict. The president decreed a 20-day state of emergency and imposed limits for the manifestations, a situation that has been prolonged to this day. The regime also took punitive measures (beatings, arrests, imprisonments with postponed trials) against the protesters family members.23 In 2009, the parliament set up a commission for the studying of the 2008 events, which completed its activity by drawing up a report. According to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the document presented before the Armenian parliament exculpated the authorities and blamed the opposition gathered around Ter-Petrosyan, a situation that undermines the credibility of the report (2009, p. 3). Further protests of the opposition took place in March 2011, but they were not forcibly suppressed by the police. Moreover, the power declared itself ready to begin a dialogue with the opposition, freed two political detainees (imprisoned after the 2008
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Interview with a member of an opposition party.

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violent events) and allowed for the manifestations in Liberty Square (where the opposition was denied access in 2008). The Armenian legislation and the political circles in Yerevan allowed for the conceiving and developing of projects by the NGOs. The regime, however, shows certain hostility to the NGOs, in which it sees potential political rivals (Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 2009, p. 67), and tries to avoid cooperating with them. The state officials have turned down the NGOs invitations to debates and do not let the civil society influence the taking of decisions with regard to public policies. To improve its image, the regime has tried, nevertheless, to initiate a dialogue with the civil society by creating thematic commissions: They have called us just to play extras, because decisions are taken without anyone consulting us So, we have retreated.24 Most NGOs are financed from the West and do not have biased affiliations. There are, however, on the Armenian civil society scene, actors connected to the political parties, who have been campaigning for these or for their presidential candidates (OSCE Armenia, 2007, p. 11).

The Mass-Media of Power and the Press of the Opposition

The Yerevan regime partially controls the mass-media by financing means, administrative pressure (it conditions the issuing of licenses), and the censoring of the editorial content. The Armenian legislation formally provides conditions for the existence of independent mass-media. There is a press financed from public funds and there are private media. The Armenians main source of information is television (only the public station H1 broadcasts all over Armenia) and the printed press has issues of no more than 6,000 copies for any publication and has no significant circulation: only about 8% of the Armenians read the papers (OSCE Armenia, 2007, p. 14).
24

The publicly financed press is 100 percent in the service of the political regime. The Yerevan regime exercises two forms of control of the privately financed media: investments by financers who are close to the circles of power and control over the organism that issues licenses for television broadcasting. The main financing sources for the mass-media are the sales and the publicity, which bring only a very reduced income, plus the money offered by various political actors or private investors: 30% of the financing of this daily is black money, says the manager of a Yerevan daily newspaper of general interest. Because of the precarious financing, the wages of the journalists from the Armenian private media are barely enough to survive: A young beginner earns about $250 and a manager $1,000 at the most25. This precarious financial situation of the press has been used by the political power to make sure the journalists were loyal to it: In the state-owned press, journalists can earn even $10,000, but most of their income is from undisclosed sources26. All three private TV stations are being controlled by oligarchs associated to the regime; These past years, they have given broadcasting licenses only to the stations that were most assuredly not going to create any political problems. At present, the process of digitalization is another instrument used by the authorities to put pressure on the TV stations. The printed press is of the opposition, affiliated to the power, or independent (one single newspaper about which there are speculations that it is in fact influenced by the government). Access to the Internet has not been restricted by the authorities in Yerevan and the press is rapidly extending its activities online. In the Armenian online environment, there
Interview with the manager of a daily newspaper, Yerevan, June 2011. 26 Interview with the manager of a daily newspaper, Yerevan, June 2011.
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Interview with the director of anNGO, Yerevan, June 2011.

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are also bloggers who are active, but the spreading blogs that are critical about the regime is attentively being monitored by the authorities.27 The actual opposition may communicate with the population only through the written press and the Internet. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), an opposition party close to the government, also appears at the TV stations controlled by the regime. The quality of the Armenian media products is determined by the journalists poor training, the authorities pressure, and by financing. In the interviews taken for this paper, experienced journalists in Yerevan complained about the lack of professionalism of their younger colleagues. The Armenian television is completely monopolized by the political circles in power, so the information it provides is favorable to the regime: For five days, all I saw was the information broadcast by the Armenian TV stations. After I had access to other sources of information, I realized that during those five days I had been living in a different reality, one created artificially by the political regime there.28 The pressure the authorities exert on the content of the press releases is obvious especially during elections: Then there are also media-killers, but they are not as aggressive as those in Russia. The investigation articles are almost absent: Maybe you get an article a month. And even then, a single organization, Hedk, that is financed from the West, produces such material, but they do not investigate the great instances of corruption, they keep to teachers or low-level civil servants who take bribes29. For the rest, the journalists practice self-censorship, so they wont get in trouble with the financers or the authorities.
27 Interview with a representative of the civil society, Yerevan, June 2011. 28 Interview with a representative of the civil society, Yerevan, June 2011. 29 Interview with a journalist, Yerevan, June 2011.

At local level, the situation of the Armenian mass-media is even more difficult: They have to deal with the pressure put on them by the governor and by the regional authorities. They survive as if it were an authoritarian or a dictatorial regime.30 There is only one independent local TV station, that was denied a license for broadcasting nationwide and had to collect a huge sum with the help of the public, so it may pay some alleged duties to the state. None of the journalists interviewed in Yerevan was afraid to criticize the political regime.

Russias Support Is Indispensable, the EU Is too Far.

The foreign pressure for the democratization of the political regime in Armenia depends on the feeling of insecurity in South Caucasus, on the dependence on foreign actors like Russia and the West, on the competition between the states in the region, and on the influence of the foreign factors upon the Armenian society. Armenia is a small, geographically isolated state, in a region with a frail security. Yerevan has tense relationships with two of its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Turkey31, a situation that makes it completely dependent on the security guarantees offered by Russia. In order to maintain the status quo that resulted after the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Yerevan is in permanent need of Moscows support, all the more so as Russia has become, since 1998-1999, the main investor in the Armenian economy and does not condition its help on the democratization of the countrys regime.
Interview with a journalist, Yerevan, June 2011. In the twenty years since the proclamation of indepedence, the Armenian authorities have not managed to reach an agreement with Turkey regarding the 1915 Turkish genocide against the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Turkey is Azerbaijans main ally in the region and a supporter of its territorial integrity.
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Armenia is a state devoid of resources a situation which makes the attraction of Western aid and financing compulsory and, hence, vulnerable to the pressure and criticism of the US and the EU, that have disapproved of the authoritarian measures adopted internally and have threatened to discontinue their financial support. Maintaining cordial relationships with the West is also essential in order to avoid having Moscow as Armenias unique ally. In this sense, the regime in Yerevan could not help introduce and implement, at least formally, the democratic norms. Unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, that are able to maintain relationships of interdependence with the West, the former for its transiting of oil and gas, the latter for its energy resources, Armenia depends entirely on the Western help. Moreover, since 2003, in spite of all its hesitations in the process of democratization, Georgia has become a successful model for South Caucasus and a privileged partner of the West among its republics. The regime in Yerevan is not pressured internally to develop privileged relationships with the West: Armenians are not pro-Russian and anti-EU, but they are aware of the fact that joining the EU is not a realistic objective for them, so they are skeptical about the idea of Europeanization32. Moreover, during the two decades of independence, the power in Yerevan, irrespective of its political orientation, has actively circulated in the mass-media the idea that Russia is our great ally. The non-governmental milieu, although financed from abroad, is too weak to succeed in implementing the democratic pattern: the organizations concentrated in Yerevan cannot activate in other regions, while their activists are more of an elite that does not penetrate and has no impact on the average Armenians.

Azerbaijan
The current political regime in Baku is the result of the shift of power between Heydar33 and Ilham34 Aliyev and of the strengthening of the latters authoritarian control at all levers of power

Elections with an Outcome Always Known in Advance

The first thing Ilham Aliyevs regime did to strengthen its control over power in Azerbaijan was to fraudulently win the elections. In 2003, the presidential elections in Azerbaijan were held after the pattern introduced under Heydar Aliyev. The candidate of the New Azerbaijani Party (NAP) was favored by the mass-media during the campaign and the authorities
33 Heydar Aliyev, former leader of the Communist Party of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic and ex-KGB collaborator, was elected president of Azerbaijan in 1993 and 1998. Aliyevs two successive terms of office coincided with the strengthening of the presidents and his closest advisors control over the political regime in Baku. The Heydar Aliyev administration was constantly criticized by the West for its authoritarian methods and for stealing the elections. It also brought about the stabilization of the domestic affairs and the conclusion of a peace agreement with Armenia in 1994, following the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Heydar Aliyev managed to give a fresh start to the Azerbaijani economy, by attracting Western investments in the countrys oil industry. In 2003, Heydar Aliyev, aged 80, died while running for a new presidential election as the sole candidate of the New Azerbaijani Party. He was replaced by his son Ilham in the presidential race, that the latter won. 34 A graduate of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Ilham Aliyev was a head of SOCAR in the early 1990s, then a member of the Azerbaijani parliament (1995-2000). From 1999 to 2003, he was second in command of his fathers New Azerbaijani Party. In 2003, he was appointed prime-minister, then elected president of Azerbaijan (Jim Nichol, 2010, p. 8).

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Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

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committed an electoral fraud to Ilham Aliyevs advantage or else resorted to methods of intimidation against the opposition. The counting of the votes showed that Ilham Aliyev had won 76.84% of the ballot, while the second competitor, Isa Gambar, had got only 13.94% of the votes. The results of the 2008 presidential elections were predictable, since they were organized just to reconfirm Ilham Aliyevs position and to avoid too much criticism from the West. The voting was not in accordance with the OSCE standards for democratic elections, even if the organization of the electoral process itself had been somewhat improved if compared to the 2005 parliamentary elections. Besides the sitting president, six other candidates ran for the office. Ilham Aliyev won again by 88.73% of the ballot. The other competitors put together did not manage to accumulate more than 2.86% of the votes. In 2005 and 2010, the Aliyev regime organized parliamentary elections in a similar way. At the 2005 voting, the NAP won 61 parliamentary seats of the total 125. In 2010, it won the majority in parliament 74 seats. 39 independent candidates (who vote, in fact, for the NAP) also became members of the Azerbaijani parliament, while 9 seats were reserved for minor parties (supporting the NAP, too) and one seat for the Party of Hope, representing the actual opposition (OSCE, 2010, p. 32). At the most recent elections, for the first time since the independence of Azerbaijan was proclaimed, the power managed to keep out of parliament the traditional opposition represented by the Popular Front Party Musavat.

The NAP, a King on the Baku Political Scene

In its eight years of power, the Ilham Aliyev regime has managed to turn the opposition from a real competitor, that in 2003 was a step away from depriving the NAP of power, into a formal, almost non-existent actor on the political scene. The NAP is currently a party with an overall control
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over the power in Azerbaijan, after it has stolen every election, has created an artificial opposition in parliament, and has all but eliminated the real opposition through unfair means. According to the voting results, the NAP and Ilham Aliyev have control over 70% of the electoral body (in fact, they have control over the whole of it). The significant reduction in the number of votes the opposition won in the most recent elections shows that the Aliyev regime has an all-reaching power and the progressive tendency to eliminate the opposition from the political game altogether. The results of the elections that are known beforehand and the repressive measures that the authorities resort to against their contesters have made the population more and more indifferent to the elections: its participation has diminished with every voting organized after 2003: while 69% of the Azerbaijanis took part in the parliamentary elections of 2003, only 47% of them voted in the 2005 ones (a situation in favor of the regime, since fewer votes have to be tampered with). The analysis of the Azerbaijani opposition parties has to do, in the first place, with their proper existence, not with their electoral or ideological programs. The most important opposition parties Musavat, the Independent Party in Azerbaijan, the Democratic Party, and the Popular Front are almost invisible on the Baku political scene because of the powers repressive measures. The image of such parties is built around their leaders. The oppositions discourse is a common one, focused on everyones criticism of the NAP. The second aspect one could analyze regarding the opposition in Baku is its relationship with the NAP. The Azerbaijani political opposition is divided into two camps: the parliamentary opposition, which is close to the party in power, and the real, extra-parliamentary opposition, which is critical about the Ilham Aliyev regime. At the last presidential elections, this latter opposition did not come up with its own candidate, claiming that it did not want to be
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part of a voting process the power was anyway going to steal.35 The confrontation between the power and its real opposition has always been a violent one and manifested itself in the form of the latters protests and manifestations being forcefully suppressed by the forces of order. The NAPs relationship with the opposition rules out the negotiations, the dialogue, or the compromise. The last negotiations between power and opposition took place after the 2005 elections, when the US ambassador in Baku tried to mediate the number of seats each side had won in the legislative voting.

The Perfectly Functioning Corruption

The basic question about Ilham Aliyevs coming to power is this: Was it really a change of power? The power in Baku preserves the clan structure it inherited from the Soviet period and from Heydar Aliyevs Nakhichevan administration of the 1990s. The new element in Ilham Aliyevs administration is the invisible confrontation between the older officials left over from Heydar Aliyevs regime, the new elite, which is close to Aliyev the son, and which flirts with Western ideas (Ishiyama, 2008, p. 46), and the Aliyev family itself. The states administrative and oil resources, as well as the lucrative businesses are divided between Ramiz Mehdiev, chief of the presidential administration and the old guard around him, the oligarchs, and the Aliyev family. Mehdiev, together with the Minister of the Interior and the Chief Prosecutor, has control over the appointments in public offices and the organization of elections.
35 The Musavat (Liberal) Party, the Liberal Party, the Popular Front, the Public Forum For Azerbaijan and the Citizens Development Corps created an informal alliance called the Common Front of the Democratic Forces that called upon the citizens not to take part in the elections (OSCE Azerbaijan, 2008, p. 5).

The most famous among the oligarchs are the Minister of Transportation, the one of Emergency Situations, and the president of SOCAR who have control over the customs, the trade exchanges, the infrastructure projects, and the real estate business (ICG, 2010, pp. 8-10). There are two camps in the Aliyev extended family: a conservative one grouped around Bailar Eibov (an in-law of Ilham Aliyevs) and a reform-oriented one, the Pashayevs, from which Mehriban Aliyev, the wife of the Azerbaijani president, comes. Eibov controls the businesses in Western Azerbaijan, while the Pashayevs activate in tourism, banking, insurances etc. (ICG, 2010, pp. 10-11). Ilham Aliyevs regime is based on two types of loyalties: from the public system or the private sector and the occasional loyalty of the citizens, usually obtained just before the elections. The Azerbaijani political regime rests on old personal loyalties, fraudulent privatizations, oil trafficking, and corruption: All the ministers here have their businesses. There is no uncorrupt official, says an EU official. The main figure in the grand power design in Baku is president Aliyev who follows his fathers example and tries to keep power in the family and sees the power of the state as a family business (Guliev, 2005, p. 241). Azerbaijan has probably some of the longest-lasting ministers in the world: In that picture over there, you can see our minister with the former president, Heydar Aliyev. And there, you have the same minister with the new president, said a Baku official during an interview. A change of minister in Baku is quite an unusual event on the political scene: Ive been a minister here for over ten years, I dont see why ministers change so often in Georgia, said another Baku official. Even the low-level public servants are loyal to the president: In that picture over there, you can see Heydar Aliyev, our first president. He did a lot for us, you know, he is the national leader of Azerbaijan.36
36

Interview with a ministerial official, Baku, June 2011.

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When elections take place, the Baku regime makes electoral gifts to the population. An expert told us the story of an elderly woman with an 80-manat pension who received a letter from the president himself, just before the elections, whereby she was informed that her 300-manat debt for electricity was forgiven. Through the party in power, Ilham Aliyev and his team make loyalty an obligation. The NAP is a pyramidal bureaucratic structure that combines business interests with political affiliation: Being an NAP member is a requirement in order to be appointed in a high-ranking state official position, as well as in many important jobs from the private sector37. The NAPs financial existence depends on both state resources and the contributions of the business environment (Goul & Sickner, 2008, p. 754).

Rights and Liberties with an Insecure Existence

According to the 1995 constitution, the Republic of Azerbaijan is a democratic state based on the supremacy of law and the principle of the separation of powers. Yet the Azerbaijani constitution is just a text with a formal existence, that has never actually been applied in practice, because there is no agreement at the political level. The judicial system in Azerbaijan is totally subordinated to political decisions and often interprets the judicial norms in the regimes interest. After Ilham Aliyevs coming to power in 2003, Azerbaijan has modified the electoral legislation several times, without calling for a democratic debate on the modifications and without observing all the recommendations of the Venice Commission. The central electoral commission has always been under NAP control and the election campaigns have always been focused on the party in power or its candidate as the main actors. However, the OSCE (2008, p. 1) thinks that the new norms may guarantee a democratic
37

development of the voting process. At almost every voting, the Azerbaijani authorities, including president Ilham Aliyev, take measures meant to improve their image just before the elections: they either adapt the legislative framework so as to formally allow for a correct voting, or come up with populist decisions. The former method is meant to improve the regimes image before the international observers of the elections, while the latter addresses its image before the voters. Ilham Aliyev did not properly go on campaign, arguing that he wanted to offer the opposition some real chances (ibidem, p. 2). The president decreed some legislative measures or gave up campaigning in order to leave the impression that the opposition had some electoral advantages but it was unable to make use of them. In 2005, Aliyev ruled that the NGOs and the opposition could activate freely during the campaign and that the state officials who obstructed the organization of free and democratic elections would answer to the law (Freedom House Azerbaijan, 2008). In fact, many opposition candidates did not possess the necessary resources to campaign all over the country, so there were regions in which only the NAP could promote its candidate. The rights actually granted by the power in Baku to the opposition are (quasi) non-existent. The Ilham Aliyev regime does not allow for the existence of any source of financing for the real opposition: I dont know what the Musavat leaders live of. The regime prevents them from getting jobs and their family members, too. The party could not be financed by any businessman, because the authorities would shut down his business in no time.38 The legislation in Azerbaijan, which was modified in 2005 and 2008 according to the standards of established democracies, allows for the organization of protests against the powers actions, but the Azerbaijani authorities have interpreted the legal stipulations in the interest of the power and refused to approve of the manifestations.
38

Interview with a European official, Baku, June 2011.

Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

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The power in Baku also used physical violence to intimidate its adversaries in the opposition: several leaders of the opposition parties were attacked in the streets. After each parliamentary or presidential voting, the opposition protested that the elections had been stolen and the authorities suppressed the manifestations violently. In March 2011, they even mobilized the army in Baku to prevent the celebration by the opposition of one month since Hosni Mubarak was overthrown from power. The power in Baku also uses an aggressively rhetorical anti-opposition propaganda: The Azerbaijani fortress besieged by the Armenian or Western secret services trying to put up some colored revolution in Baku, all foreign enemies being accomplices of the members of the opposition. The same aggressive messages pervade the mass-media with reference to the NGOs which have ever criticized the political power. The Azerbaijani political regime has also developed means by which to control the civil society: by setting up and financing so-called GONGOs (Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations) or by putting pressure on the independent organizations. It has even created an institution responsible for the financing of NGOs: the State Council for the supporting of non-governmental organizations, with funds that have grown year after year since the oil boom (the most eloquent example being the Heydar Aliyev Foundation, financed from the state budget alone); there are also contests for grants or financing may be offered unofficially: They asked me to let them finance my programs. But I saw that every organization that got money from the state did only what the authorities told them to do, so I turned down the offer.39 But GONGOs may be financed also by Western organizations that offer grants for the development of the civil society in Azerbaijan: We do not think that an NGO that
39

has got money from the special civil society state-created fund is not eligible for our own programs40. The pressure exerted on the civil society can take legal forms (i.e., the authorities fiscal controls), but can also be of a violent, threatening, or intimidating nature. While the interviews for this paper were taken, many activists of the civil society were afraid to criticize the political regime, answered the questions evasively or demanded that their names remain secret. There is more pressure on the civil society during the elections (in 2008, no NGO was allowed by the authorities to monitor the electoral campaign). In Azerbaijan, to elaborate public policies is a unique attribute of the power, so any civil society project is perceived as being a political one (Gahramanova, 2008, p. 787). Privatly, the members of the Azerbaijani civil society believe that all they can do is to go through the motions of implementing various programs (irrespective of their purpose), since they are convinced that no NGO can influence the political decision in any way. Corruption is yet another form of the Baku regimes violation of human rights. Although it has introduced an anticorruption legislative package, the regime has not put it into practice: There is no clerk here that is not corrupt. Nobody could survive with a salary that small.41 Corruption is the instrument by which the regime has secured the loyalty of the entire state administration: All the ministers have their own businesses in Azerbaijan, they are businessmen in a Soviet regime adapted to capitalism. Without corruption, the whole system would be dead.42 There is no transparency in any Azerbaijani public institution. The political power has no interest in fighting corruption and the judicial system subordinated to it is also corrupt: it has never taken decisions that protect civil rights and liberties, and has produced legal sentences always in favor of the regime.
40 41

Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

Interview with an NGO employee, Baku, June 2011. Interview with a European official, Baku, June 2011. 42 Interview with a European official, Baku, June 2011.

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The Mass-Media Can Only Be in Power in Azerbaijan

After Ilham Aliyevs coming to power, the Baku regime took over the control of the press almost entirely. Television is the most important source of information in Azerbaijan, covering almost its entire territory. All Azerbaijani TV stations are controlled by the political regime that puts pressure directly on the publicly-financed channel (AzTV) or indirectly on the private stations financially supported by investors close to it. The printed Azerbaijani press is partially controlled by the regime. There are a number of opposition daily newspapers published in Baku, but their circulation does not cover the entire territory of the country. The quality of the media products in Azerbaijan is influenced by the regimes censorship, the journalists training, and the available financing. There are no investigation articles in the Azerbaijani press and the journalists practice self-censorship in order to avoid pressure from the financers or the authorities. The Baku regime also puts legal pressure on the foreign mass-media and the journalists. In 2008, it censored Radio Free Europe, the BBC and the Voice of America by passing a law that forbade the foreign stations to broadcast on the same frequencies as the national Azerbaijani ones. Pressure is being exerted on journalists through legislation that incriminates slander (penal punishments are stipulated for it) or defamation and through the use of violence by the forces of order. Four Azerbaijani journalists were in jail in 2010.43 Police resorted to violence against the media people during the whole period after Ilham Aliyevs taking office.
43 The European Court of Human Rights asked the Azerbaijani authorities in 2010 to free journalist Eiula Fatulaiev (Freedom House Azerbaijan, 2011, p. 85). In 2011, the regime in Baku had not yet complied with the ECtHR request, even though the judges had given up the charges against him.

Over the last few years, there has been a growing pressure of the Azerbaijani regime on the mass-media. This mostly occurs during the voting campaigns. In the Azerbaijani media controlled by the regime, all campaigns to date have favored the NAP or Ilham Aliyev, by transmitting only positive information about them and allowing them most of the broadcasting time. Until 2008, the public television in Azerbaijan was under the obligation to give all candidates equal time. After the modifications to the law made in 2008, TvAZ cannot broadcast any more programs related to the elections. Ever since 2003, all TV stations have given only positive information regarding the NAP or Ilham Aliyev during all the election campaigns, while the opposition was only mentioned occasionally in the news programs.44 The state-financed printed press minimally met the legal provisions for equal time and granted the opposition the right to express itself, but otherwise offered information only about the candidates of the parties in power. Yeni Musavat, the daily newspaper of the opposition, was the only one to publish detailed information on the oppositions campaign.

A Powerful Petrostate
The foreign actors influence on the process of democratization in Azerbaijan depends on the level of security in the region, on the regimes cordial relationships with both Russia, and the West, on the competition between the South-Caucasian states, and on the pressure of the very foreign actors on the Azerbaijani society. Russia is Armenias main support in maintaining control on Nagorno-Karabakh, which makes Azerbaijan vulnerable before Moscows pressure to obtain territorial integrity. Yet,
In 2008, TvAZ broadcast news or political programs in which 92% of the material was positive information on the power (of which 72% covered only the activities of the president in office OSCE, 2008, p. 16).
44

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having cordial relations with Moscow, does not mean pressure for the democratization of the domestic political regime, which turns into a great advantage for the power in Baku and its authoritarian attitude. Azerbaijan is the only South-Caucasian state with significant oil and gas resources, which guarantees its relationship of interdependence with the West: Baku needs the Western market to sell its oil and gas and the EU states want to avoid depending on Russia alone as a supplier of energy. Consequently, even if it formally condemns the authoritarian measures of the Aliyev regime, the West cannot do without the Azerbaijani resources and cannot suspend commercial relations as a means of pressure for the lack of democratic transformations. Moreover, due to its energy resources, Azerbaijan is in no great need of Western financial support (for instance, it initially rejected the grants offered to it through the European Neighborhood Policy or the Millennium Challenge Corporation). Azerbaijan is the largest South-Caucasian state and, unlike Armenia and Georgia, a rich one, too, which guarantees its regional supremacy from the start, so it is not interested in a competition meant to turn it into a model democracy of South Caucasus. The Rose Revolution in Georgia, however, had an impact on the authoritarian measures of the Baku power that feared a similar scenario occurring in Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani society is neutral with regard to the Western political model for three reasons: the Azerbaijanis are aware that the EU and Europeanization are patterns too far away for them to even consider, they do not see Russia as an enemy (although the Russians support the Armenian occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh), and they have cultural ties with the other societies in the East and with Turkey. The Azerbaijani civil society consists of small groups of elitists isolated from the population, its messages going no further than Baku and its surroundings. It follows that the democratization initiatives, even if they are not suppressed by the regime, have only a small echo among the Azerbaijanis.
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Conclusions
A general analysis of the political regimes in South Caucasus shows common features and evolutions: they were all Soviet republics, they all had repeated transitions which did not lead to democratic societies, territorial and/or inter-ethnic conflicts, and complicated relationships with Russia and the West. At the same time, each political regime in South Caucasus has its own particularities, that are influenced by the local projects of state construction, by the existence or absence of energy resources, and by territorial problems. The Georgian political elite are now, twenty years after the proclamation of independence, before the same questions: Authoritarianism or democracy? For the regime in Baku, the basic question is: How far can it go with authoritarian measures in Azerbaijan and how can the current leaders remain in power as long as possible? The Yerevan leadership tries to find out: What are the limits of the democratic measures in Armenia and how can authoritarianism be preserved, while keeping up the appearance of democracy? In Armenia, the regime has oscillated between basing its power on the legitimacy of voting processes organized according to democratic norms or setting up a power center based on authoritarian measures. For the Azerbaijanis, the preservation of power by the Aliyevs and political loyalty towards them have been the key levers of a regime that has never been preoccupied by legitimacy. In all three states, the election-based democracy has more or less been a means of consolidating the power (Shirinian, 2003). All three regimes in South Caucasus use the same instruments to seize or strengthen their power and are favored by the weakness of their respective oppositions. In a top of the democratic achievements in South Caucasus, Georgia ranks first and Azerbaijan last. So far, the Tbilisi regime has been a competitive-authoritarian one still in process of transition, that will be made to accept more and more democratization measures in the
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future due to its dependence on the Western support and to the pressure and influence Russia exerts on it by stimulating the contesting movements. President Ilham Aliyev leads a centralized administration in which the political power clearly dominates the other two (legislative and judicial) existing only to create the false impression of democracy. The power in Baku has failed to organize free elections, to create democratic relationships with the mass-media and to guarantee the citizens rights and liberties. Over the past few years, Ilham Aliyev and his allies have put up a competitive-authoritarian regime that is bound to turn into either a stable authoritarian one, or in a petro-authoritarian one, after the Russian pattern, in the future. The Armenian regime has managed to achieve a mixture of authoritarian and democratic practices. For having failed in guaranteeing the Armenian citizens rights and liberties, the Sargsyan regime is currently a competitive-authoritarian one and there are few chances to see it transformed or replaced through elections in the near future.

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Stanislav Secrieru

Variable Geometry in Action: Foreign and Security Policies in South Caucasus

Introduction

This chapter attempts at making a detailed analysis of the foreign and regional security policies of the South-Caucasian states two decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since their regaining of independence, several tri- or multilateral integration formulas in South Caucasus have been proposed, but these have failed to materialize. At the same time, the academic community and the political circles challenged the very existence of South Caucasus as a region. Consequently, the first part of this chapter reviews the current debate on the regionness of South Caucasus. It encompasses the impact of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war on the perception of the regionness of South Caucasus. Moreover, this section describes the macro-regional environment in which the South-Caucasian states evolve. The trends and political atmosphere in South Caucasus result from the dynamics of the intra-regional relationships. The second part focuses on the bilateral relationships between the three South-Caucasian states, emphasizing their commercial relationships, infrastructure projects, unsolved territorial conflicts, public perception, the status of national minorities, military cooperation, demarcation of borders, and other aspects of the bilateral agendas. The fall of the Soviet Union has liquidated unipolarity in the region and has multiplied the number of actors capable to influence
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developments in the South-Caucasus in a significant way. Given the multitude of influential actors in the region, a major part of the analysis will be devoted to the relationships between the South-Caucasian states and the US, the EU, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. All in all, this analytical undertaking will be guided by an intra-regional perception. Thus, in presenting the debates on the regionness of South Caucasus, on the intra-regional relationships, and the interaction with external actors, the views of the three republics, which are mainly compiled from interviews with officials and experts in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, will prevail.

I. The Question of the Regionness of South Caucasus I.1. From Transcaucasia to South Caucasus
Transcaucasia, a term used before South Caucasus, was introduced into the diplomatic vocabulary of Tsarist Russia in the early 19th century. It referred to the territory under Russian control south of the Caucasian Mountains, all the way to the borders of the Persian and the Ottoman Empires. In Tsarist Russia, Transcaucasia was divided into five guberniyas: Tiflis, Baku, Yerevan, Kutaisi, and Elizavetpol (see Map 1). The 1917 Revolution triggered centrifugal movements on the periphery of the Tsarist Empire. In 1918, Transcaucasia declared its independence and for the first time formed an integrated political structure the Transcaucasian Federal Democratic Republic. However, after a month of co-existence, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan declared their independence. The three states were included by military force in the Soviet Union in 1922, under the banner of the Transcaucasian Federal Soviet Republic. The 1936 Constitution of the USSR put an end
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to the Transcaucasian Federation and created three republics of the union that kept their status until 1991 (see Map 2). The regaining of their independence by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (see Map 3) triggered the debate on the proper name to use and the future of the region. The political and academic discourses make use of several optimistic labels that allude to regional integration: The United States of Caucasus, The Caucasian Common House, and The Caucasian Common Market. Also, there are proposals for cooperation projects of the type 3 + 1, in which Russia or Turkey serve as engines of regional integration (Ismailov & Papava, 2007, pp. 13-14). At the same time, the first attempts are made to replace the old political and geographic label of Transcaucasia. An official remembers: It took us four years to persuade the EU to replace Transcaucasia, in its official documents, with South Caucasus1. Gradually, the term South Caucasus came to prominence in the international diplomatic vocabulary and is now largely being used by the actors interested in the region, including Russia. The 2008 joint statement of the presidents of the Russian Federation, Armenia, and Azerbaijan refers explicitly to South Caucasus, and not Transcaucasia (Prezident Rossii, 2008). The terminological change is mirrored at the level of bureaucratic organization and in the policies led by the regional actors. For instance, in 2003, the EU created a position of special Representative for South Caucasus, that was maintained after the structural reorganization triggered by the Lisbon Treaty. In 2005 and 2006, the obstruction by Cyprus of the negotiations for an EU Azerbaijan action plan determined the European Union to postpone negotiation of similar plans with Georgia and Armenia (Popescu, 2011, p. 102). In 2008, Turkey revived the idea of a stability pact in South Caucasus initially launched in the 1990s, this time under the umbrella of a
1

Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011.

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Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, of the type 3 + 2 (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia + Russia and Turkey).

Map 3 Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in the post-Soviet era (Source: RFE/RL, 2002)

I.2. Is South Caucasus a region?

The international use of the concept evolved alongside a strong trend which denies the regionness of South Caucasus. An expert explains: We are a region, geographically speaking, but this is not enough [] In the era of globalization, regions are being built.2 And yet, in terms of a trilateral economic, political, or military cooperation, South Caucasus is actually paralyzed. There are no infrastructure projects that include all the three states and coordinating their foreign policy positions in a trilateral format is unconceivable. Nor is there an integrated security umbrella: the states in the region turn to the various regional actors to guarantee their military security.3 So, if we compare South Caucasus to the Baltic area, then South Caucasus is not a region4, concludes another expert. Undoubtedly, turning South Caucasus into a functional region, following a European pattern, is more of a wish than a reality. The EU attempts
2

Map 1 Transcaucasia within Tsarist Russia (Source: Andrew Andersen, 2003/2007)

Map 2 South Caucasus within the USSR (Source: Wikipedia)

Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011. Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011. 4 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
3

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at launching regional cooperation have not produced the expected results. Initiated by the EU in 2010, the South Caucasus Integrated Border Management program is being implemented bilaterally between Georgia and Armenia, on the one hand, and between Georgia and Azerbaijan, on the other hand. Trilateral environmental programs financed by the EU are being implemented on a rather small scale, but, in most cases, unilateral or bilateral solutions prevail: We have no time to wait for Georgia or Armenia [] We will solve this matter by ourselves5, an official confessed, referring to an issue involving all three states. Although there are contacts at the level of the civil societies, even those have dropped in intensity after 2007.6 One of the few ongoing trilateral projects is the program that facilitates communication between the young people in the region and teaches them to conceive and develop local and trans-boundary projects (Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009a). The contestation of the regionness of South Caucasus and of any prospect of regional cohesion is also being argued from an alternative perspective. Observers have noticed that the South-Caucasian states regional identity is either missing or, at best, under-developed: There is no vision regarding South Caucasus in our society7, an Armenian expert said; The attachment to the idea of a region is rather weak in Azerbaijan [because] our identity includes not only Caucasian elements, but also Caspian and Oriental ones8, an Azerbaijani opinion maker stated. Armenias relative isolation in the area and the fact that Azerbaijan assumes the role of a bridge between East and West dilute these states sense of belonging to South Caucasus. Moreover, foreign policy objectives and imperatives of domestic development push the states towards seeking extra-regional solutions.
5 6

Georgia is by far the most active state in the region when it comes to attempts to escape the region. Ever since the latter half of the 1990s, Georgia has developed a Black Sea state profile. After the consecutive expansions of NATO and of the EU, Georgia doubled its efforts to detach itself from South Caucasus, which was perceived as a region with a huge image burden (Nilsson, 2009, p. 100) and to join the developing Western project in making: the wider Black Sea region (Asmus and Jackson, 2004): We have tried to redefine our identity, by emphasizing our geographical position in the Black Sea9, an expert said. For the authorities in Tbilisi, migrating towards the wider Black Sea region means leaving the Caucasus and gradually getting closer and connecting to the institutions of the West. But the 2008 Russo-Georgian war dashed these hopes and determined a change of perspective in Tbilisi. Georgia seeks to take advantage of the Eastern Partnership so as to assume the position of an Eastern European state. It is important to notice that the new discourse has both a regional component, and an individualist one: South Caucasus is part of Eastern Europe [] why is there this distinction, within the Eastern Partnership, between South Caucasus and the other states?10, a government official asks; Speaking of reforms [for the European integration], Georgia is much closer to the Ukraine and Moldova11, a government representative adds, while adding to the equation elements that differentiate Georgia from the other South-Caucasian republics. It seems that in the years to come, Georgia will find a rich source of inspiration in Croatias escape from the Western Balkans and its (predictable) integration in the EU.12 In conclusion, it is anticipated in the pessimists camp that the blockages at the level of trilateral cooperation and
Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011. Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011. 11 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011. 12 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011.
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an official, Baku, June 2011. experts, Yerevan, June 2011. an expert, Yerevan, June 2011. an expert, Baku, June 2011.

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the diverging external orientations of the three states will stimulate the dispersal of what is left from the region, so that, in fifteen to twenty years time, the phrase South Caucasus, a post-Soviet inertia, will be stripped of any descriptive value13.

I.3. South Caucasus a sub-regional security complex

Although they reflect objectively the regional reality, the deniers of the South Caucasus regionness overlook two aspects: the plurality of regionalism typologies and the impact of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Hence, the rejection of the South Caucasus regionness is built on the narrow meaning of the concept of region, that theoretically and practically imagines region only in the form of a security community defined by a high degree of integration and by the elimination of violence as a solution to problems inside the community (Deutsch, 2006, pp. 41-42). A classic example in the IR literature is the trans-Atlantic community. Therefore, the parallel between South Caucasus and the Baltic region as part of the trans-Atlantic community is not an accidental one. The security community, however, is an ideal type, reproduced in a rather limited geographical area. In international relationships, regionalism may manifest itself in various forms. Dysfunctional regionalism and geo-political regionalism are among the less benign formulas of regionalism. These apply to cases in which the states have failed to develop a sound regional cooperation and the region is the object of a rivalry for spheres of influence involving regional powers (Emerson, 2008, pp. 2-4). If we put aside the idealist notion of region and admit that integration is not the only criterion of determining regionness and that interdependence may be not only positive, but negative as well, then South Caucasus is a region. The concept of security complex, developed in the
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literature devoted to international security studies, offers a comprehensive analytical platform that captures cooperative as well as dysfunctional patterns of regionalism and can, hence, prove extremely useful in the study of the regionness of South Caucasus (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, pp. 419423; Simao & Freire, 2008, pp. 225-226). The concept of security complex refers to a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked, that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another (Buzan, Weaver & De Wilde, 1998, p. 12). It must be pointed out that the authors of this analytical approach share the extensive interpretation of national security which includes, apart from the traditional political and military dimension, the ecological, economic, and societal security (ibidem, pp. 198-199). Seen through such a theoretical lens, South Caucasus is a sub-regional security complex, which is defined by enmity between Armenia and Azerbaijan and by a variety of sectorial relationships of pragmatic friendship and/or situational competition between Georgia and Armenia and between Georgia and Azerbaijan. For instance, Azerbaijans security, when it comes to the management of the courses of water and its quality, depends on the cooperation with Georgia and Armenia, which are situated upstream on the rivers Kura and Aras flowing towards Azerbaijan. Georgias energy security cannot be ensured without Azerbaijan, and a possible war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is bound to significantly undermine Georgias economic security. In turn, the security of the terrestrial transit through Georgia is vital for Armenias economy and (to a lesser extent) for that of Azerbaijan. The list could go on. Objective factors binding this region of variable geometries (the three states are part, in various combinations, of the CIS, CSTO, BSEC, GUAM14;
of Independent States; Collective Security Treaty Organization; (Organization of the) Black Sea Economic Cooperation; Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova.
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Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

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the intensity of their relationships with the EU and NATO also varies) have an impact on the strategic perceptions and calculations regarding the management of the national security of each state. Armenia and Azerbaijan follow very closely the relationships that each of them develops with NATO: If the representative of Armenia comes today and requests cooperation in this or that sector, it is most likely that tomorrow we will receive a similar request from Azerbaijan [] and vice versa15, an official admits. Confirmation of the correlation at regional level of each countrys decision to cooperate with NATO is to be found in the motivation for Armenias decision to triple its peace-keeping forces in Afghanistan in 2011. According to the Minister of Defense, Armenia must not be last in South Caucasus in this respect [the military presence in Afghanistan] (Massis Post 2011). The attempt at military reintegration of South Ossetia in Georgia was negatively perceived in Armenia. As Yerevan sees things, any success on the part of Georgia would encourage Azerbaijan and increase the chances of a military solution in Nagorno-Karabakh.16 Similarly, in Georgia, where a significant number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) live, the negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia are closely followed, especially the solution the two countries will reach regarding the IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh. These are some of the overlapping concerns of the states in the region, confirming the existence of a sub-regional security complex in South Caucasus. Therefore, in spite of the divergent foreign and security policies orientations of the states in the region, there is a rather high degree of interdependence. The South-Caucasian states mutual dependencies are not always of a positive nature, but this does not negate the existence of the region, it merely describes the nature of the regional interconnections. The comparison with the Western Balkans is probably
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much more appropriate when we seek examples of regionalism similar to those in South Caucasus. It is an opinion shared by some politicians and analysts in the area: South Caucasus represents the next source of problems after the Balkans17, a Baku official stated; There are a series of similarities the history of imperial domination, the memory of the war, the attempts at getting rid of the regional label that make South Caucasus comparable to the Western Balkans18, a Tbilisi expert pointed out. In spite of their attempts at escaping the region, the three states were forced to return to South Caucasus after the Russo-Georgian war: Before August 2008, the region was about to disintegrate [but] the war in Georgia altered these dynamics and forced the states to refocus their attention on the region19, an influential local analyst explains. Consequently, the war brought back the regional consciousness and thinking: Georgia has deteriorated the atmosphere in the region20, a local expert incisively declared, referring to the Russo-Georgian military conflict; The 2008 war altered the perception about South Caucasus in Europe and in the world in a negative way21, another observer added. The 2008 military conflict brought to light the regional threats affecting European security, although South Caucasus offers to Europe a multitude of opportunities. The altered image has impacted all the states in the region. The academic circles are attempting to overcome the image deficit by changing labels. For instance, two authors of a detailed study dedicated to the region argue that the three Caucasian states belong to Central, not to South Caucasus (Ismailov & Papava, 2008, pp. 287-289). The logic of their argument is almost identical to that of the East-European
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Interview with a NATO official. Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

Interview Interview 19 Interview 20 Interview 21 Interview

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official, Baku, June 2011. expert, Tbilisi, May 2011. expert, Yerevan, June 2011. expert, Baku, June 2011. expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.

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states in the mid-1990s, that wished to be included politically and economically in Central Europe. Moreover, in 2008, the South-Caucasian states rediscovered the regional vulnerability and interconnectedness. They increased the monitoring of their neighbors activities and adjusted their security strategies by taking into account the modified regional environment. Georgias accelerated NATO integration failed, which determined the authorities in Tbilisi to practice a more balanced regional foreign policy. The temporary suspension of the commercial transit through Georgia, in August 2008, sped up Armenias negotiations with Turkey for the normalization of the bilateral relationship. The war in Georgia diminished Azerbaijans interest for NATO and introduced new elements into the energy policy. The political discourse was also adapted to the post-war reality. Georgias homecoming back to the region was announced by the Georgian president: The Caucasus must unite (Grigoryan, 2009). Hence, he resuscitated the idea of The Caucasian Common House. In his opinion, that should take the shape of a trilateral union able to sketch a regional political and economic strategy (Ghazinyan, 2011). The idea was taken up by the civil society: We wish for the materialization of the concept of a Caucasian Common House under the auspices of the European Union22, a member of the mass-media enthusiastically states. Economic undertones were introduced into the political discourse. For instance, the president of Azerbaijan said that the economy of Azerbaijan represents 75% of the economy of South Caucasus (News.Az, 2010), while the president of Georgia described Tbilisi as the capital of the Caucasus (Civil.Ge, 2011a). Undoubtedly, the Caucasian Common House remains mostly a rhetorical exercise and the data referring to the volume of Azerbaijans economy belongs to the intimidation game going on between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But the regional aspects
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of the discourse and, especially, the adjustments brought to the policies of the three states after 2008 prove that it is premature to speak of the notion of South Caucasus as being irrelevant.

I.4. South Caucasus in its Eurasian context

The relationships between states do not evolve in a political, military, or economic void. The inertia of bilateral relationships is always influenced by the regional context in which they develop. The intra-regional dynamics of South Caucasus makes no exception. By virtue of the geographic positioning of the region, the impact of the regional environment on the three states is probably stronger than in case of other regions (see Map 4). Since they are placed at the intersection of several regional security complexes, every South-Caucasian state by itself, but also South Caucasus as

Interview with a mass-media person, Baku, June 2011.

Map 4 South Caucasus in its Euro-Asian context (Source: Caspian Study Program, Harvard University, 2006)

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a region feels the impact of the political upheavals, the economic crises, and the ascent of other regional actors in their immediate vicinity. The literature defines a sub-regional security complex situated at the intersection of other regional security complexes and parallel security processes at a macro-regional level as being insulators (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 490). Therefore, since they are at a meeting-point of concurrent regional security logics, the security concerns of the South-Caucasian states cannot be understood separately from the Eurasian context.

I.4.1. North
To the North, South Caucasus neighbors the North-Caucasian Federal District and the Southern Federal Districts of the Russian Federation (see Map 5). North-Caucasus is one of the most important challenges to Russias national security. The republics of North Caucasus are confronted with almost daily acts of low or medium intensity violence, large-scale unemployment (over 50% in some cases), systemic corruption, and poverty. Moscow ensures situational

Map 5 South Caucasus and North Caucasus (Source: Wikitravel)

stability in the area through allocation of federal funds and militarization of the region. For instance, the budgets of republics such as Chechnya and Ingushetia are being covered at a rate of 91% from federal allocations (Grove, 2011). The infusion of money secures the regional elites loyalty, but the non-transparent way in which the funds are distributed exacerbates corruption. To contain the insurgency, Russia has deployed a contingent of approximately 88,000 troops in the region, from various branches of the armed forces (Nichol, 2011, p. 13). The military presence on land is being reinforced by two military bases of the Caspian fleet, in Kaspiysk and Makhacikala. In 2011, the Ministry of the Interior dispatched additional forces to Dagestan, to counteract the rebels spring campaign. The explosive situation in North Caucasus and the militarization of the region directly impact the security of the South-Caucasian states. The railroad and the gas pipeline that connect Dagestan to Azerbaijan have often been the targets of terrorist acts. Moreover, rebels from Dagestan have often crossed the border into Azerbaijan. Russia regularly blames Georgia for harboring and protecting North-Caucasian rebels in the Kodori Gorge. It is worthwhile to mention that the Kremlin has kept accusing Georgia even after the Abkhazian militia gained control over the Kodori Gorge, with large support of Russian troops. Last, but not least, the 58th Army deployed in North Caucasus was at the backbone of the Russian forces that took part in the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. Krasnodarsky Kray is the only administrative unit of the Southern Federal District that neighbors South Caucasus or, more precisely, the Georgian separatist region, Abkhazia. It hosts the most important Russian port at the Black Sea, Novorossiysk, which was considered, prior to the 2010 Russo-Ukrainian agreements in Kharkov, to be an alternative to the Russian fleet basis in Sevastopol. The insurgents strategy is to extend the North-Caucasian front towards the areas populated by Russian ethnics. Hence, Krasnodarsky Kray, as an immediate neighbor of the Caucasian republics,
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imports insecurity from North Caucasus. During the last decade, there have been several terrorist acts in the region. Moreover, the designation of the city of Sochi as host of the 2014 Winter Olympic Games increases the danger for large-scale terrorist attacks in Krasnodarsky Kray. The 2010 railroad explosion outside Sochi confirms the worst predictions. The use of the Abkhazian infrastructure and natural resources to prepare the 2014 Winter Olympiad fuels the regional tensions between Russia and Georgia. The security problems in North Caucasus should be seen in the context of Russias regional ambitions. The Kremlin traditionally considered its military presence in South Caucasus to be vital for keeping control over North Caucasus. This outlook is based on the history of the conquest of the Caucasus. Chronologically speaking, Tsarist Russia first occupied South Caucasus, following a direct confrontation with other regional powers. Only after consolidating control over the territory South of the Caucasian Mountains did Russia launch its decisive campaign for the all-out conquering of North Caucasus as well (the East and West regions), that was accomplished in the latter half of the 19th century (Trenin, 2009, p. 143). The connection between South and North Caucasus in the Russian strategic thinking was partially reflected by the logic of the 2008 actions. Besides undermining the US positions in the region and preventing the extension of NATO in South Caucasus, the military intervention sent a powerful signal to the North-Caucasian republics (ibidem, p. 149). Therefore, the objective vulnerability in North Caucasus and the ambition to establish a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space motivate Russias ambition to be the major security manager in the Caucasus (ibidem, p. 154).

I.4.2. East
South Caucasus is bordered by the Caspian Sea to the East and by the Black Sea to the West. Due to this geographic
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position, combined with the vast energy resources in the Caspian region, South Caucasus plays the role of an important energy hub in Eurasia. The Caspian Sea links South Caucasus to Central Asia, especially to the post-Soviet republics Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The two states are being governed by consolidated authoritarian regimes (Freedom House, 2011), that ensure their survival also through a multi-vectorial foreign policy. President Nursultan Nazarbayev has been in office for 19 years (matched only by president Karimov of Uzbekistan), the longest in power among the leaders in the post-Soviet space. In April 2011, Nazarbayev was reelected for another five-year term. In Turkmenistan, president Niazovs sudden death in 2006 made possible a power transition after fifteen years since the declaration of independence, but the authoritarian nature of the regime remained unchanged. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are petrostates; they possess the largest reserves of oil and/or gas in Central Asia. Russia and China seek to monopolize the imports of natural gas and crude oil from the Caspian region: Russia in order to re-sell these resources to the EU and to the other post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe, China in order to meet the demands of its ever-growing domestic consumption. On the other hand, by adopting a rigid position on the judicial status of the Caspian Sea, Iran aims to hamper the trans-Caspian projects important for the EUs energy security. Also, the dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan regarding the delimitation of the national sectors in the Caspian Sea hinders the trans-Caspian gas pipeline project. In spite of such obstacles, Kazakhstan (since 2008) and Turkmenistan (since 2010) have started supplying Europe with oil through the Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan pipeline (BTC). Kazakhstan also uses additional export route through the Georgian port of Batumi. The maritime connection between Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan is provided by the regular ferry-boat connections from Baku to Turkmenbashi and to Aktau, respectively. The transport routes linking Georgia
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and Azerbaijan to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are part of the northern distribution network whereby the NATO and US forces in Afghanistan are being supplied. Nevertheless, Russia and Iran still hold the naval military supremacy at the Caspian Sea.

I.4.3. West
The Black Sea is the only direct link between South Caucasus and the EU and NATO. Its latest enlargement has turned the EU into a Black Sea power. At the same time, the 2004 enlargement has extended NATOs presence in the region. The new regional configuration, on the one hand, and the interests of the new member states, on the other hand, have triggered a process of reformulation of policies towards the Black Sea region. Consequently, the EU launched two initiatives covering this area: the Black Sea Sinergy (2007) and the Eastern Partnership (2009). In 2011, the European Parliament adopted the EU strategy for the Black Sea region. Although there had been initiatives for a similar strategy of NATO before, those were ultimately blocked by Turkey.23 Romania and Bulgaria are semi-consolidated democracies (Freedom House, 2011) with economic interests in South Caucasus. The imperatives of energy security have encouraged the two states to join the Nabucco gas pipeline project and to develop close economic and political relationships with Azerbaijan and Georgia. The primacy of economic interests explains Bulgarias and Romanias weak support for democracy promotion in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Besides the new EU members, two states with European aspirations are part of the Black Sea region: the Ukraine and Moldova. These Black Sea countries are being governed by hybrid political regimes (Freedom House, 2011) and have the most advanced relations, among the Eastern Partnership
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Interview with a NATO official.

states, with the EU. In order to accelerate their European integration, tke Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia share experience at various levels regarding the implementation of reforms and the negotiations with the EU. Another two actors in the Black Sea region determine to a great extent the security dynamics in the area: Turkey and Russia. During the last decade, the political, military, and economic relations between Moscow and Ankara have had an ascending trajectory. The bilateral trade exchanges have substantially grown, with Russia becoming Turkeys second trade partner after the EU (EU Commission, 2011a). The two states have lifted the visas for short-term trips and have created a High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council. Moreover, Turkey is among the few NATO member-states to have purchased Russian weapons. The Russo-Turkish rapprochement is not, however, without precedent in recent history. In the 1970s, Turkey and Russia went through a period of warm political and economic bilateral relations ultimately due to the tensions between the Turkey and its ally, the United States (Altunisik & Tur, 2005, p. 108). The improvement of the Russo-Turkish relations in the early 2000s occurred alongside the deterioration of the Turkish-American ones, that was caused by the US military campaign in Iraq and Washingtons plans to internationalize the Black Sea. This dynamics accelerated the formation of the Russo-Turkish condominium in the Black Sea region, meant to maintain the regional status quo (Socor, 2009; Triantaphyllou, 1009, p. 232). Consequently, Turkey opposed the extension of the NATO Active Endeavor operation in the Black Sea and approved a limited NATO military presence in the Black Sea during the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict (Lesser, 2011, pp. 2-3). This tactical alliance, however, is not without divergent or competitive interests in South Caucasus, which has been proven plainly by Russias reaction to the attempts at normalization of the Turkish-Armenian relations (Torbakov, 2010).
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I.4.4. South
In the South, the Caucasus neighbors two Middle-Eastern powers, Iran and Turkey, the latter a regional European power as well. Iran is a difficult neighbor (though not to Armenia), but a necessary partner, at the same time, for the South-Caucasian states. Irans nuclear program and domestic political instability fuel uncertainty in the region. Tehran pursues at least four objectives in South Caucasus: to prevent what it perceives as encirclement by the West; to ensure the neutrality of the three South-Caucasian states in case of an armed conflict with the US; to break out of international isolation and to legitimate its political regime; to increase its regional and economic influence by projecting soft power and through economic expansion. The coherence of Irans regional policy is undermined by the splits within the Tehran regime and by the problem of succession following the disputed presidential elections of 2009 and the mass protests they triggered (Nader, Thaler & Bohandy, 2011). For instance, president Mahmoud Ahmadinejads visit to Armenia was canceled in 2011 not only for the external reasons Tehran officially invoked, but also for some domestic ones. The interdiction to leave the country, that was imposed on the eve of the visit to some high-ranking officials from the presidents entourage, and Ahmadinejads intention to resist Ayatollah Khameneis pressure seem to have contributed decisively to the postponement of his visit to Yerevan.24 Turkey has undergone major internal transformations in the early 2000s. The high rates of economic growth and the stagnation of accession talks with the EU have contributed to self-confidence, an independent foreign policy, and an active strategy in the countrys vicinity (Tocci, 2011). Turkeys regional policy of zero problems with neighbors has strengthened its political and economic positions in the
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Middle East, the Western Balkans, South Caucasus, and the Caspian region (Akyol, 2011). Prime-Minister Erdogans speech after winning the 2011 elections, in which he addressed the inhabitants of Damascus, Sarajevo, and Baku, confirmed the continuity of Turkeys ambitious regional policy. South Caucasus is important in Turkeys strategy to turn itself into a major Eurasian energy node. The war between Russia and Georgia, while jeopardizing such plans, gave an impulse to Turkeys more active involvement in the regional security matters. The normalization of the relations with Armenia was seen as a step towards the redesigning of the regional architecture and the boosting of Turkeys levers in South Caucasus. Although is has been successful to a certain extent, Turkeys neighborhood policy is facing two major challenges: keeping the balance between competition and cooperation with Russia and managing the political and economic consequences of the revolutions in the Arab world. Last, but not least, the political regimes in South Caucasus have followed with deep concern the democratic revival in the Arab countries. The launch of the anti-corruption campaign in Azerbaijan and the dialogue between power and opposition in Armenia coincided with the revolutionary sweep in the Middle East, thus confirming the exposure of South Caucasus to the democratization processes underway in the vicinity.

II. The Intra-Regional Dynamics in South Caucasus

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan makes Georgia a pivotal state in South Caucasus. The only stable relations the two camps in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have in the region are those with Georgia. On the other hand, Georgias key-position in the region forces the authorities in Tbilisi to keep a subtle balance in their relations with both Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
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II.1. Armenia and Azerbaijan: an improbable peace, a possible war

Between Armenia and Azerbaijan there are no diplomatic relations, the border is closed, and there is no direct communication by land or by air. Flights between the two capitals have stopovers in Moscow, Kiev, or Istanbul. Although, according to certain officials, there is a trade going on between Armenia and Azerbaijan through third parties25, most likely through Georgia, the extent of such a trade is very difficult to measure. The only confirmed place in Georgia where some trade between the Armenians and the Azerbaijani was going on was the village Sadakhlo, at the border between Armenia and Georgia, not very far from the point of intersection of the borders between the three South-Caucasian states (Poghosyan, 2011). However, the Sadakhlo market was closed down in 2005. There exists a limited interaction between the NGOs in the two countries, but even the level of cooperation between those has dropped after 2005.26 The encounters usually take place in Georgia or in Armenia, because it is rather difficult to organize this type of activities in Azerbaijan.27 The Armenian participants in Baku or the Azerbaijani ones in Yerevan are provided with personal protection and their passports are not being stamped when they go in and out of the respective countries, so there is no actual proof that they have ever visited Armenia or Azerbaijan.28 The attempts at reconnecting the two societies through a cultural dialogue are often blocked. In 2010, an Armenian NGO planned a week of the Azerbaijani film in Armenia, but, in spite of all preliminary organizational measures, the event no longer took place (Gregoryan, 2010). The Azerbaijani singers winning of the 2011 finals of the Eurovision Song Contest triggered a vast
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public debate in Armenia on whether the country should participate in the 2012 edition or boycott it. The state of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the result of the war waged between the two states in the early 1990s for Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave that used to belong to Azerbaijan prior to the Soviet Union dissolution. Currently, Armenia controls Nagorno-Karabakh and other seven regions (two of them partially) around it (see Map 6).29 Therefore, Azerbaijan has no control over roughly 14% of its internationally recognized territory (Waal, 2003, p. 286). In Armenia, the seven Azerbaijani regions are called liberated territories and serve two strategic objectives: to secure a land connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia and provide the necessary space for an advanced defense of the enclave. Moreover, one does not rule out, in Yerevan, that those regions might be used (except Lacin and Kelbajar, which separate Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh) as a bargaining chip in the future negotiations for the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and for reliable security guarantees. Aside from the destruction of infrastructure and the numerous victims, the war produced around 600,000 internally

Interview Interview 27 Interview 28 Interview

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Map 6 Nagorno-Karabakh and other seven occupied Azerbaijani regions (Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 2011)
29 The seven regions are: Kelbajar, Lacin, Kubatli, Jebrail, Agdam, Zanghelan, and Fizuli.

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displaced persons (IDPs) in Azerbaijan. According to the international NGOs, Azerbaijan is in the top ten among countries with the highest per capita IDP population in the world (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2011). De iure, the two countries are in a state of war. The military operations were suspended in 1994, following the conclusion of an armistice in Bishkek. Azerbaijan opposed the deployment of Russian peace-keeping forces along the front line. Thus, it is the sole responsibility of the belligerents to observe the cease-fire agreement. Although there have been no considerable military confrontations in the conflict zone since 1994, the two sides regularly engage in skirmishes. This low-intensity violence, that some experts call the snipers war30, produced 3,000 casualties between 1994 and 2009 (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 1). Over the last three years, the violation of the armistice has become a more frequent practice, which increases the likelihood of a new outbreak of the armed conflict (idem, 2011a). The purpose of the high-level diplomatic efforts this year [2011] has been the prevention of war, rather than finding a solution to the conflict31, an expert in the region stated. Nagorno-Karabakh is Azerbaijans main foreign policy and security problem. According to the surveys, the conflict with Armenia is the utmost concern of 51% of the Azerbaijani citizens (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). At the same time, the problem of peace (including the conflict with Azerbaijan) comes only third, with 9%, after unemployment (46%) and poverty (10%) in the top concerns of the Armenian citizens (Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 2010). This difference could be due to the following: Azerbaijan lost the 1992-1994 war; its petrodollars, that are distributed among various social categories, tend to mitigate, in the public perception, the effects of corruption and unemployment coming next on the list of concerns; the Baku
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government keeps a tight control over the public space, so it is able to instrumentalize efficiently the conflict with Armenia to prevent in the public debates the primacy of the domestic problems over those generated externally. On the other hand, the opinion poll undertaken on the Armenian side shows that the Armenians feel much more comfortable with the present-day status quo on the front line, but feel stronger the effects of the conflict, since it is partially responsible for their difficult economic situation. At the same time, the results of the Armenian survey show that the political system in that country is more open than the one in Azerbaijan and the population gradually leaves behind the logic of the besieged fortress. Consequently, the problems affecting the citizens daily life come first and there is an ever-growing social demand that they be solved. To defend or to change the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, on the one hand, and Azerbaijan, on the other hand, invest significant financial and human resources into the judicial, diplomatic, historiographic, economic, and military conflict waged along the front line, in the informational space, or within the international organizations. The current border between Azerbaijan and Armenia is one of the most militarized ones in the world. Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh have already erected three lines of defense and the fourth appears to be under construction.32 Armenia supports Nagorno-Karabakh financially and contributes with troops to its defense system. According to estimates, the armed forces of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh add up to 70,000 troops, while the Azerbaijani army counts about 95,000 troops (International Crisis Group, 2011a, p. 1). The armies of the two states regularly display military might by organizing military exercises in the proximity of the front line. Both Armenia, and Azerbaijan are engaged in an arms race, as reflected by the spectacular increase of defense budgets and acquisitions of military equipment.
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Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

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Between 2000 and 2009, Armenias defense budget rose from 3.6% to 4.2% of the GDP and Azerbaijans from 2.3% to 3.4% of the GDP (SIPRI, 2011). From 2000 to 2010, Azerbaijan allocated $9.2 billion for its defense and Armenia $2.6 billion (News.Az, 2011a). In 2010, the Baku government adopted a $2.1 billion defense budget, more than Armenias national consolidated budget ($1.8 billion). Besides its wish to demonstrate a change in the military balance, Bakus aim is to exhaust Armenia economically, through a sustained arms race. The shutting down of the Azerbaijani-Armenian border and of the Turkish-Armenian one and the exclusion of Armenia from the regional infrastructure projects are guided by the same agenda. One of the recent attempts at exerting economic pressure on Armenia was to invoke, after the Fukushima nuclear incident, the threat for the entire region represented by the Soviet-era nuclear plant in Metsamor, that produces roughly 40% of the countrys electric power (News.Az, 2011b). Shutting down the Metsamor plant without a prior identification of alternative energy sources or the building of a new plant, would put in jeopardy Armenias entire economy. Baku hopes that its strategy of continuous harassment, combined with Azerbaijans own steady economic growth based on oil and gas exports, will ultimately force Armenia into negotiating from a position of weakness. Azerbaijan does not rule out completely a military solution for recovering control over Nagorno-Karabakh. Although the defense budget is a heavy burden for Armenias economy, keeping up the military balance is a major objective achieved in great part with the help of the Armenian Diaspora and through purchasing military equipment from Russia at prices below those on the world market. Armenia tries to minimize the effects of its regional economic isolation by developing alternative energy projects and obstructing the initiatives supported by Azerbaijan. For instance, Armenia has actively opposed any external financing for the Baku Tbilisi Kars railroad project. The de-isolation
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strategy aims not only Armenia, but Nagorno-Karabakh as well. Thus, the Diaspora has contributed $3 million for the reconstruction of the Stepanakert airport, but its reopening was postponed in 2011. At the same time, in retaliation for the closing of its borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia is blocking Azerbaijans access to the Nakhichevan enclave, whose southern neighbors are Iran and, for a very short length (11 km), Turkey. Both states promote an active worldwide information campaign on Nagorno-Karabakh, in order to gain as much support from the international community as possible. Experts do not rule out the possibility that Azerbaijans 2011 decision to join the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), with a membership of 180 countries, is partly aimed towards using that platform in order to gain support for the Baku cause among states that are confronted with similar territorial problems.33 The two conflicting parts make use of a historiography that either denies or minimizes their mutual presence in Nagorno-Karabakh in the course of history. Furthermore, they invoke either the right to self-determination of a population that has been the victim of an aggression by the central administration, or the territorial aggression of one state against the other and ethnic cleansing campaigns. Besides their active implication in information campaigns aimed at the diplomatic corps, the presidential administrations in both Armenia, and Azerbaijan include specialized departments that monitor the rivals messages and coordinate the efforts to neutralize them in the informational sphere.34 The Diaspora is an important conveyor of messages in both Armenias, and Azerbaijans lobbying campaigns. The Armenian Diasporas in France and in the US are well-known for their thorough organization and their impact on certain foreign policy decisions. In a catch-up effort, the authorities
Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011. Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011; interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
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in Baku have recently paid more attention to organizing their own Diaspora in order to promote the Azerbaijani cause in the world (News.Az, 2011c). On the other hand, Baku has registered a series of diplomatic tactical victories. In 2008, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution regarding the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, in which the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian forces from all the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan was demanded (UN, 2008). In 2011, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe decided to reinstate the previously suspended sub-committee on Nagorno-Karabakh. The rivalry in the international organizations takes place alongside with the negotiations mediated by the Minsk Group, which has been created under the umbrella of the OSCE and is co-presided by Russia, France, and the US. After the Russo-Georgian conflict, the groups activity, and especially Russias inside the group, was re-energized. From 2008 to 2011, Russia hosted nine meetings between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, which resulted in a number of joint statements and several exchanges of prisoners and bodies of soldiers killed in action. The Russian State Duma mediated in Moscow, in 2010, an informal dialogue between representatives of the Azerbaijani Milli Majlis and of the Armenian National Assembly. In spite of the pressure exerted by the US, France, and Russia on the eve of the latest 2011 summit in Kazan, Baku and Yerevan failed to reach an agreement regarding the principles of the conflict resolution that had been proposed by the Minsk Group cochairing countries at the OSCE ministerial conference held in Madrid in 2007. After successive rounds of negotiations, the Madrid principles, though not yet accepted by the conflicting parts, include: Armenias withdrawal from the regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, with special stipulations for Lacin and Kelbajar; a provisional, internationally guaranteed status for Nagorno-Karabakh; security guarantees for Nagorno-Karabakh and the deployment of international
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peace-keeping forces; the right of the refugees and IDPs to return to their homes of origin; reopening of the routes of communication, restoring of trade, and implementation of post-conflict rehabilitation measures financed by foreign donors; determination of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh through referendum. It seems that the disputed points are the schedule of the Armenian forces withdrawal from the occupied regions around Nagorno-Karabakh, the maintenance of a communication corridor between Armenia and Karabakh and the nature of the provisional status of the enclave (RFE, 2010a). Observers are skeptical about a solution to the conflict any time soon: Even if the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan agree on the Madrid principles and the road map, there are no social conditions in place conducive towards implementation of the accord35, an analyst commented. The aggressive political discourses promoted by Baku and Yerevan narrow the political leaders space for maneuver and make very unlikely the acceptance by either society of any future high-level deals. According to the opinion polls, 97% of the Azerbaijani think that Armenia is their most significant rival and 91% of the Armenians perceive Azerbaijan as the main political and economic threat (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010; International Republican Institute, 2008a). Additionally, 70% of those poled in Azerbaijan oppose any compromise on the part of their government in order to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict. However, there can be no non-violent solution to the conflict without a compromise as reflected in the Madrid principles. Although 78% of the Armenians believe the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh can be solved peacefully (International Republican Institute, 2008a), it seems that there are concerns in Yerevan and Stepanakert regarding the implementation of such a solution: What we want is a certain date for organizing the referendum that will decide the future
35

Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

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status of Nagorno-Karabakh36, an official unveils his preoccupation. Another question is the peace-keeping forces credibility and their capacity to carry out the mission: Who can guarantee that certain events in the Balkans will not occur in Nagorno-Karabakh as well?37, an analyst asks, alluding to the Srebrenica massacre and to the inaction of the international peace-keepers forces. It seems that the reservations regarding the pacifiers deployment is also economically motivated. The separatist regions army is the main employer of a significant number of Nagorno-Karabakh men; so, the deployment of peace-keeping troops would most likely generate a reduction of the armed forces of the separatist region, with an immediate and severe social and economic impact.38 The implementation of a peace plan in Nagorno-Karabakh may therefore be compared to the crossing of a mine field (Economist, 2011). The field could be crossed successfully if the political negotiations will be combined with measures meant to prepare the two societies for a long-lasting peace. Whether the political regimes in Baku and Yerevan have the will and capacity to do it, is still an open question. It seems that more and more observers in the region believe that, without a genuine democratization of both countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan will not achieve any substantial progress regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.39 Until then, the most likely scenario shared in both camps is the continuation of the status quo, described as: Rapid peace is impossible, rapid war is probable40. On a short term, however, the outbreak of violence around Nagorno-Karabakh seems to be discouraged by a development that has nothing to do
Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011. Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011. 38 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011. 39 Interview with a mass-media person, Baku, June 2011; interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011. 40 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011; interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.
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with the military: the organization of the 2012 Eurovision Song Contest finals offers Azerbaijan a rare chance to project internationally a positive image, a chance the Baku authorities certainly do not want to waste by escalating the conflict.41

II.2. Georgia and Armenia: Resetting pragmatism

The relationship between Georgia and Armenia is characterized by a preeminently positive interdependence, asymmetrical in certain sectors, which is managed pragmatically by both governments. The political dialogue between Armenians and Georgians has intensified both quantitatively, and qualitatively after the 2008 war in Georgia. Observers remark that the personal chemistry between the two presidents contributes positively to the bilateral relations.42 The interaction between Foreign Affairs ministries solidifies the relationship on the high level. In 2011, the two heads of diplomacy agreed to meet at least four times a year in order to have a continuous dialogue on all bilateral and regional problems. Both Yerevan, and Tbilisi admit that there are unsolved bilateral problems, but none of those is considered unsolvable (Civil.Ge, 2011b). Although the political relationship has improved considerably in the past two years, there still are animosities reflected in the public opinion.43 According to surveys, 75% of the respondents in Georgia and 62% of the ones in Armenia believe the bilateral relationship is good (International Republican Institute, 2011; idem, 2008a). Speaking of friend and foe states, for 8% of the Georgians Armenia is the most important partner (International Republican Institute, 2011), while for 24% of the Armenians Georgia is the main partner (International Republican Institute, 2008a). This difference could be explained by Georgias strategic importance as a transit state
41 42

Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011. Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011. 43 Interview with experts, Yerevan, June 2011.

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for the Armenian trade. The volume of bilateral trade is not significant, the 2010 statistic results showing that Georgia is Armenias eighth commercial partner (2.2% of the trade volume), while Armenia is Georgias 12th commercial partner, with a mere 1.5% of the trade volume (EU Commission, 2011b; EU Commission, 2011c). The opinion poll shows, in addition, that 31% of the Armenian respondents believe Georgia represents the main political and economic threat (International Republican Institute, 2008a). In Georgia, 3% of the citizens perceive Armenia similarly (International Republican Institute, 2011). It may very well be that, since 2008, when the last survey was conducted in Armenia, the number of those who consider Georgia to be a threat has diminished. At the same time, the negative public perception in Armenia might reflect the peoples concern regarding the asymmetries in the economic relations, the preoccupation for the rights of the Armenian minority in Samtskhe-Javakheti and the participation in the regional projects that exclude Armenia. In Georgian public opinion, Armenia is often seen as a military ally of the Kremlin in South Caucasus. Given the Georgians attitude towards the Russian policy in the region, a negative transfer occurs upon the image of Armenia, which is reflected in the surveys. In spite of different foreign policy priorities, Tbilisi and Yerevan are increasingly aware that each one plays its own game in the region based on the political situation and national security rationales.44 For instance, Yerevan perceived in a negative way Georgias 2008 military actions in South Ossetia, which could have set a dangerous precedent for Armenia. The political leadership in Yerevan refrained from a critical discourse aimed at Georgia, which might have supported Russias aggressive rhetoric. On the other hand, Armenia played an important role in the evacuation of the diplomatic personnel and the foreign citizens from Georgia
44 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011; interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

during the conflict45, that was appreciated by the Georgian authorities. After the conflict, Armenia resisted Moscows pressure to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia46 and the president of Armenia paid an official visit to Tbilisi in September 2008. In 2009, the president of Georgia was decorated with the highest Armenian state distinction the Order of Honor , which was met with criticism in Moscow. On the other hand, Georgia dislikes the Russian military presence in Armenia, yet the Tbilisi authorities are aware that they cannot change things radically and that it is important that, in the current security environment, they maintain a friendly relationship with Armenia.47 Although it cancelled in 2011 the agreement on military transit with Russia meant to support the Russian base in Gyumri, Georgia still consents to military cargo transit for the Armenian armed forces through its air space.48 Georgia assured Yerevan that the termination of the agreement with Russia, inoperable since 2008, is a strictly technical one (meant to prevent its automatic five-year extension) and will not affect its cooperation with the Armenian Ministry of Defense: We wanted to receive guarantees that our security will not be affected by this decision [] Those we have received49, a government representative explains. Such guarantees were offered by the Georgian Minister of Defense during his visit in Yerevan that preceded the vote in the Tbilisi parliament regarding the termination of the agreement for military transit with Russia. On the same occasion, the Georgians offered the possibility of training Armenian troops at mountain training base in Sachere. The balanced approach to these issues confirms the pragmatic attitude in both Yerevan, and Tbilisi.
45 46

Interview Interview 47 Interview 48 Interview 49 Interview

with with with with with

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official, Yerevan, June 2011. expert, Yerevan, June 2011. expert, Tbilisi, June 2011. official, Yerevan, June 2011. official, Yerevan, June 2011.

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The pragmatic reset of the bilateral relationships after 2008 is not unexpected, however. Georgia is a vital transit corridor for the Armenian economy. According to the Yerevan governmental estimates, the suspension of transit through Georgia during the 2008 war produced losses of approximately $670 million. Consequently, Armenia was interested in the restoring of communications as soon as possible. The military threat coming from the North motivates the Tbilisi authorities to ease up the tensions with immediate neighbors. In the aftermath of the conflict with Russia, the problem of the Armenian minority in Georgia was identified by Tbilisi as a vulnerable point that Russia could exploit. Hence, the Georgian government paid more attention to the relationship with Armenia and to the infrastructural projects in Samtskhe-Javakheti. The two objectives overlap provided impulse to the bilateral relations. Georgia facilitates about 70-75% of Armenias commercial transit. Currently, there is a railroad connection between Yerevan and the port of Batumi and the two countries cooperate in the construction of the Gyumri Akhaltsikhe Batumi highway, which will facilitate the road traffic. The port of Poti plays an important role for Armenias food security, because it is a significant gate of the countrys grain imports. The port of Batumi serves the passenger traffic: in 2009, the ferry transports between Batumi and Sochi were resumed. This route is important for Armenia, since there is a significant Armenian Diaspora settled in Sochi ever since the 19th century; moreover, many Armenians choose to spend their holidays in Sochi. Given the preparations for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games, Sochi has become an attractive destination for the Armenians seeking opportunities for temporary work. Over the past two years, air traffic for passengers between Yerevan and Tbilisi has been suspended in winter time, for economic reasons, but resumed in spring or summer. In 2010, Georgia and Russia agreed to reopen the only border crossing between the two countries, the one between
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Verhni Lars and Kazbeghi, following negotiations mediated by Switzerland. Thus, after a three-years interruption, Armenia benefits again from a land connection with Russia through Georgia. About 70 or 80% of the Armenian exports to Russia transit through Georgia. Instead of using long and indirect maritime routes like Batumi Varna/Burgas Novorossiysk, the Armenian exporters have now access to the Georgian Military Highway connecting Tbilisi and Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia. The land transit to Russia through Verhni Lars Kazbeghi reduces transportation costs by 20-25% (Zhahanina, 2010). The significant volume of commercial transit generates substantial profits for the Georgian state. In 2008-2009, the border between Armenia and Georgia was crossed by 4,594 freight trains and 273,478 vehicles (OSCE Yerevan Office, 2010, p. 5). At the same time, the government in Yerevan believes Georgia profits from the asymmetrical interdependence by applying a policy of transit taxation that significantly increases costs for Armenias economic agents (Civil.Ge, 2009a). Armenia is linked to Georgia through its energy and telecommunications infrastructure. The Internet and international telephone connections in Armenia are being provided through the optic fiber cable crossing Georgia. There was an incident in 2011, in which scrap iron collectors cut the Internet cable just outside Tbilisi and left a great number of Armenian users without an Internet connection for several hours (Bedwell, 2011). The electric systems that link Armenia and Georgia are interconnected through three transmission lines. The gas pipeline used by Gazprom to supply natural gas to Armenia also crosses Georgia. In 2010, following landslides, Georgia suspended the transit of gas in order to make the necessary pipeline repairs. Armenia had to tap its underground gas deposits to cover the domestic consumption. In 2010, the Georgian parliament removed the gas pipeline supplying Armenia from the list of strategic enterprises that can not be privatized. This caused concern in Yerevan: the worst scenario was that Azerbaijan could
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assume control of the pipeline that guarantees Armenias main source of energy security. However, the authorities in Tbilisi assured Armenia that the Georgian state would not give up the controlling stake in the pipeline-managing company (Civil.Ge, 2011c). In the last two years, Georgia has become an attractive terrain for the Armenian investors. For instance, in 2011, the Armenian candy maker Grand Candy decided to expand on the Georgian market, while the Jermuk group took over the Georgian production of Pepsi-Cola. According to the statistic data for 2010, 103 Armenian companies were registered in Georgia. Experts estimate that there are about 4,000 small and medium-size Armenian businesses operating in Georgia. The increased presence of Armenian investors on the Georgian market has led to the establishment of a Union of Armenian Entrepreneurs (Vardanyan, 2011). Several factors are behind this trend: on the one hand, there is the corruption and the multitude of bureaucratic obstacles hindering small businesses, and the limited market in Armenia; on the other hand, there are the friendlier conditions for opening and managing a business, the tax exemptions for newly launched businesses, less corruption, and the better infrastructure in Georgia.50 The World Banks Doing Business classification confirms the difference between Armenia and Georgia regarding business environments: the two countries were placed in positions 48 and 12, respectively, in 2011 (World Bank, 2011). Additionally, Georgia and its seaside (Batumi and Kobuleti) are among favorite tourist destinations for an ever-growing number of Armenian tourists: in 2009, the number of Armenian citizens visiting Georgia went over 300,000 (Chkhikvadze, 2010) and topped 200,000 between January and April 2011 alone (News.Am, 2011a). The bilateral cooperation, however, has not focused only on the economic issued and the expansion of transportation
50

Interview with experts, Yerevan, June 2011.

routes. There are issues on the bilateral agenda that, if overlooked, could generate significant complications in the relations between Georgia and Armenia. Aiming to eliminate from the agenda the contentious items, the Tbilisi government has addressed the questions of the Armenian minority, the registration of the Armenian Church (as the Armenian Apostolic Church), and the demarcation and management of the border. Not all the governments initiatives, however, won the popular support. In their turn, the Yerevan authorities reacted constructively to such overtures. The central administration or the leaders of the Armenian Church were criticized publicly for sometimes too flexible positions. To this day, the border between Armenia and Georgia has not been entirely delimited and demarcated. For lack of a clear demarcation, it is often difficult in the borderline communities to settle the ownership of land. This provokes incidents related to the peasants access to the farming land. The two sides joined efforts meant to accelerate the delineation and demarcation of the border. In 2010, the intergovernmental commission appointed to that end agreed on the delineation and demarcation of 160 kilometers (71%) of the total of 225 km (OSCE Yerevan Office, 2010, pp. 13, 15). Moreover, Armenia and Georgia have reached a political agreement as to the joint management of three of the six border checkpoints (RFE, 2011a). The implementation of this initiative is meant to facilitate the passenger and commercial traffic between the two countries. In Georgia, there are Armenian communities in Tbilisi (about 83,000 people in 2002), in Batumi (about 8,000 people in 2002), and in the separatist region of Abkhazia (about 45,000 people in 2005). But the most numerous Armenian presence (almost 125,000 people) was registered in 2002 in Samtskhe-Javakheti, the southern region of Georgia neighboring Armenia and Turkey. In Soviet times, this was the place of the military base in Akhalkalaki, which belonged to the Transcaucasian military district. For this reason, the whole region was under a quasi-closed regime
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and relatively isolated from the rest of Georgia.51 After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia took control of the military base, which became the main employer and income source for the local population (Overland, 2009). In 2007, the Akhalkalaki base was evacuated, which raised questions as to the economic future of the whole region. There were fears in Tbilisi that Russia would try to destabilize the area, by generating inter-ethnic tensions in Samtskhe-Javakheti. Such concerns were not entirely groundless. The Armenian side confirms that Russia did attempt to mobilize the Armenian minority against the Tbilisi authorities before and after the 2008 war, either by announcing the imminent repatriation of the Meshetian Turks in Samtskhe-Javakheti (about 100,000 of them have been deported to Central Asia in 1944), or by re-ignating the discourse on discrimination against Armenians in Georgia.52 Apart from introducing additional security53 measures, the Tbilisi government implemented a complex strategy for the integration of the region and its population in the Georgian economic and educational circuit. In 2008 and 2010, projects of highway renovation or construction were carried out, in order to link the region to Western Georgia and Tbilisi. Once the Baku Tbilisi Kars railroad project is completed, the distance between Samtskhe-Javakheti and Tbilisi will be covered in approximately two hours. The Georgian administration has made substantial investments in the local infrastructure: schools, hospitals, water and electric power distribution systems (International Crisis Group, 2011b, p. 6). Another aspect of the strategy was education. Lack of proficiency in the Georgian language significantly diminishes the chances of young people in the region to study and take advantage of hiring opportunities. With the help of foreign
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donors, free language courses have been introduced. Also, the Armenians in Samtskhe-Javakheti have been granted facilitated access to high education in the Georgian universities.54 Representatives of the Armenian civil society who visited the region in 2010-2011 found that the population was much more optimistic about their economic and social situation, than several years ago. The demand for studying the Georgian language has grown. Instead of going to Yerevan, more and more Armenians in the region choose to study at the Tbilisi universities.55 The authorities in Yerevan have adapted their discourse on the Armenian minority in Georgia to the local changes. The Armenian president appreciated the efforts of the Georgian administration to improve the socio-economic situation in Samtskhe-Javakheti and announced his willingness to assist in the process (Civil.Ge, 2009b). Another irritating factor in the bilateral relationship is the problem of registering the Armenian Church in Georgia and the mutual demands of restitution of churches. The Armenian side claims a number of churches in Tbilisi and Samtskhe-Javakheti. At the same time, the Georgian side claims the right of property over several medieval churches in Northern Armenia, close to the border (Civil.Ge, 2011d). Until recently, according to the Georgian legislation, religious minorities could not be registered as non-profit legal persons. Hence, the state protected the Georgian Orthodox Church and denied similar rights to other cults in the country, including the Armenian Church. In 2011, however, the Catholicos of All Armenians paid a historic visit to Georgia, the first of a high-level Armenian cleric to the neighboring country since 1894. The two problems were discussed during the visit. Soon after, the Georgian parliament modified the law in the sense that other cults could be registered as non-profit legal entities. The legal modification took off the
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Interview with a mass-media person, Tbilisi, June, 2011. Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011. 53 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011.

Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011. Interview with experts, Yerevan, June 2011.

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agenda the question of the Armenian Church registration in Georgia. The second problem however, that of the right of property over places of worship, will require much more time and patience from both sides. The street protests that took place in Tbilisi after the legal changes regarding religious minorities show how delicate the topic is and how cautious the political leaders need to be from now on in order to maintain the positive dynamics of the bilateral relations established in recent years.

II.3. Azerbaijan and Georgia: Getting closer

A very close political and economic relationship has developed in time between Azerbaijan and Georgia, based primarily on a positive experience during their brief independence following World War I. In the post-Soviet era, the close relations between presidents Heydar Aliyev and Eduard Shevardnadze have consolidated the relationship between Azerbaijan and Georgia. Since the early 1990s, the two countries have been faced with territorial conflicts, so the restoring of their territorial integrity has become the dominant theme that reinforces the relationship from a political point of view. In 2008, Georgia was among the 39 states that voted in favor of the UN General Assemblys resolution about the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. In August 2008, after the outbreak of the military hostilities in South Ossetia, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs qualified the Georgian actions meant to reestablish the territorial integrity as being in accordance with international law (Today.Az, 2008). For the authorities in Baku, the war had direct implications on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Undoubtedly, the recovery of South Ossetia by Georgia in 2008 would have put pressure on the Baku regime. If Georgia has succeeded, why shouldnt we try as well? would have been the popular message pushing the government beyond the bellicose rhetoric it has become a prisoner of. In certain circles, however, Georgias
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defeat lessened the enthusiasm for a military solution that is much less likely to succeed in the post-conflict context.56 The difficult economic situation in Georgia after the 2008 war impelled the Baku government to provide support to the state in whose existence and survival it is directly interested. Azerbaijan and Georgia are interdependent as far as the energy sector is concerned. Georgia depends on the Azerbaijani gas supplies almost entirely. In exchange, the main oil and gas export routes linking Azerbaijan to the European market cross Georgia. If a war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it could impact the supplies of Georgia through the gas pipeline Baku Tbilisi Erzurum, which is rather close to the conflict zone. Experts warn that, in case of the reopening of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the energy-transporting facilities would be the favorite targets of the Armenian forces (International Crisis Group, 2011a, p. 14). Georgia would then be forced to resort to Gazprom satisfy the demand for gas. Similarly, a war waged on Georgian territory would lead to the destruction of the energy transportation network impacting the Azerbaijani exports of oil and gas. In such conditions, Russia becomes an undesirable, but necessary partner for Azerbaijan. In August 2008, Azerbaijan redirected part of its oil exports that transit Georgia (Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan and Baku Supsa) towards the Baku Novorossiysk pipeline. The relationship between Baku and Tbilisi is cemented by economic exchanges and an intensive political dialogue. There are many direct meetings and consultations at high or ministerial level. According to statistics, Azerbaijan was Georgias fourth trade partner in 2010, with 7.8% of the total exchanges (EU Commission, 2011c). In 2010 as well, Azerbaijan was among the main foreign investors in Georgia, ranging fifth, with $58 million (Civil.Ge, 2011e). Georgias place in the Azerbaijani trade is considerably lower (1.5%),
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Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

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which points to an economic asymmetry in the bilateral relations (EU Commission, 2011d). As far as public opinion goes, 22% of the respondents in Georgia estimated that Azerbaijan is their countrys most important partner (International Republican Institute, 2011). 11.3% of the Azerbaijani believe that Georgia is a friendly state (Puls-R/ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). This difference mirrors Azerbaijans increased significance, in the public eye, for Georgias energy security. It should be pointed out, however, that the number of Azerbaijani supporters of Georgia has almost doubled since 2006 (ibidem). This dynamics can be accounted for by the increase in popular support for the cause of Georgias reintegration after the 2008 war and by its role in the oil and gas transportation. Azerbaijan has twice taken decisive action over the last five years to guarantee the security of gas supply for Georgia. The first time was in 2006, when Gazprom cut gas delivery to Georgia, simultaneously pushing high the gas price. The second time was in 2008, right after the war, when Baku and Tbilisi reached an agreement regarding the five-year contract for gas delivery, in 2009 the gas being supplied at a preferential price (Alieva, 2009, p. 2). Later on, the two sides agreed to extend the contract until 2020, without modifying the basic price of natural gas (AZE.Az, 2010). The high level of mutual trust between Baku and Tbilisi facilitated Azerbaijans access to Georgias energy sector. The SOCAR state company has control over the oil terminal at Kulevi, which became operable in 2008. Moreover, SOCAR entered the Georgian gas distribution market, with a market quota of almost 75%. The company intends to build an additional 1,500 kilometers of pipelines that will supply gas to another 150,000 users (ABC.Az, 2011). Georgia is an important component in the Azerbaijan Georgia Romania Interconnector (AGRI) project in which SOCAR is a partner. This project envisions the transport of gas from Azerbaijan to the Kulevi terminal, from which point it is further sent to the port of Constana in a liquefied
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form (LNG). There are limits, however, to the trust between Baku and Tbilisi. Although it has been said that Azerbaijan offered Georgia $500 million for purchasing the pipeline through which gas is being supplied to Armenia (Asbarez Post, 2010), the authorities in Tbilisi ruled out the possibility of giving up the controlling shares package. Azerbaijans takeover of this pipeline would potentially fuel the conflict between Baku and Yerevan, an evolution that Georgia is keen to avoid for reasons of national and regional energy security. From the Azerbaijani point of view, the neighbor countrys participation is crucial for the completion of the railroad connection with Turkey. It was initially planned that the Baku Tbilisi Kars project would be internationally financed, such that Georgia would be able to launch works of repair and construction on the Marabda Akhalhalaki Kartsakhi. The international donors, however, refused to support the project financially, claiming that it would not serve the purpose of regional integration. Given the importance of the project, Azerbaijan offered Georgia two preferential loans (for 25 years, at 1% yearly interest) for the financing of the works: Baku provided $200 million in 2007 and another $575 million in 2011. Loan payments are to be made from the profit made by Georgia from the exploitation of that segment of railroad, which will become operational starting in 2013 (Civil.Ge, 2011f). For Georgian tourism, Azerbaijan is an important reservoir of customers. In addition to the direct Baku Tbilisi connection by air, there are also numerous coach routs. Over the last ten years, the number of Azerbaijani visitors has considerably grown, reaching almost 400,000 in 2009 (Chkhikvadze, 2010). The number of tourists is expected to grow: from January to April 2011 alone, Georgia was visited by 244,000 citizens of Azerbaijan (ArmeniaNews, 2011). Although rapidly improving, the relations between Baku and Tbilisi are not free of difficulties that impact negatively on the atmosphere or could produce in the bilateral relations. The two sides admit that there are still contentious issues,
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but insist on their determination to solve them amiably. Twenty years after the regaining of their independence, the two neighboring countries have not yet accomplished the delineation and demarcation of the common border. In 1996, an inter-governmental commission for the delineation and demarcation of the border was instituted. In 2010, Baku and Tbilisi agreed on the delineation of 300 km (66% out of the 480 km) of the border (Trend, 2011a). The process advances slowly, among other things, because of the dispute around the David Gareja monastery, which is situated half in the Georgian region of Kakheti and half in the Azerbaijani region of Agstafa. The David Gareja complex consists of more than twenty churches and a number of caves, over a distance of 25 kilometers. The monastery has an important historical, cultural, and spiritual value for Georgia, which would like a land exchange so as to gain full control over the monastery. Among the possible means of compensation under consideration is the village of Erismedi, a border locality also in dispute between the two countries. For the Azerbaijani side, however, the position of the Bertubani church, which is part of the monastery, is considered to be strategically important, due to its altitude. Consequently, the authorities in Baku reject any territorial compensation in exchange for the Azerbaijani half of the David Gareja complex. In the course of negotiations, Azerbaijan suggested turning the monastery into an open tourist zone. The Georgian Orthodox Church explicitly opposed such a proposal. In 2007, the presidents of the two countries discussed the possibility of leaving the entire monastery to Georgia, while Azerbaijan keeps control over the high-altitude strategic positions. But, other than talking it over, the two sides have not taken any step further in the process of identifying a solution (Petriashvili & Ismayilov, 2006; Kazimov, 2011). The Azerbaijani minority lives in compact numbers in the regions of Kvemo Kartli, Kaheti, and Mtskheta-Mtianeti along the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Azerbaijani population of Georgia counts approximately
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285,000 people, according to the latest census. The situation of the Azerbaijani minority in Georgia has been under lesser international scrutiny, not being considered socially and politically explosive (Cornell et al., 2005, p. 24). This minority, however, faces numerous problems having to do with the infrastructure, lack of proficiency in the Georgian language, limited access to local public positions or to higher education, undemarcated border between Armenia and Georgia and occasional abuses by the Armenian border guards, as well as the economic under-development. Although certain infrastructure problems have been addressed by the authorities in Tbilisi in recent years, those of the drinking water supply, the repair of rural roads, and the agricultural sector have been neglected. Moreover, lack of proficiency in Georgian remains an issue for the Azerbaijani minority, since bilingual instructors are scarce and there is a low interest for learning the language. Most young people in the region prefer to continue their studies in Azerbaijan (CIPDD, GYLA, and Safeworld, 2011). The closing down, in 2005, of the market in Sadakhlo, a village with Azerbaijani population, left 5,000 people without a regular profit. The hard economic conditions in Kvemo Kartli push the Azerbaijani ethnics to migrate to neighboring countries in search of work opportunities. In 2010, Russia accused Georgia of violating the rights of the ethnic minorities and demanded that Tbilisi normalize its relationships with the minorities living in that country, including the Azerbaijanis (Socor, 2010). Azerbaijan, however, ignored Russias attempt at manipulation. Thus, Baku avoided making a political issue out of the problems of the Azerbaijani minority in Georgia and behaved in such a way as not to get involved in what it considers to be Georgias internal affairs. Given the economic and political conditions, any fragmentation of Georgia is against the interests of Azerbaijan. Consequently, the authorities in Baku have encouraged the Azerbaijani minority to be loyal to the Georgian state. But the government in Baku tacitly admits
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that there are many economic and social problems of the Azerbaijani minority in Georgia, so it participates, through companies or foundations, in infrastructure projects and social programs implemented in the areas inhabited by the Azerbaijani ethnics (Today.Az, 2011). For instance, the Akord and Azerinshaat companies helped in the repairs to the Telet Samtskhe Javaheti road. The Heydar Aliyev fund financed the repair or building of schools in Kvemo Kartli in 2009-2010 (MES Georgia, 2010). Although the problem of the Azerbaijani minority has not been exploited politically in Baku, it has a destabilizing potential on a social level. In 2006, two papers of the Baku-located National Association of the Azerbaijani in Georgia, which fights for the recognition of the Azerbaijani language as the second official language, were suspended from publication (RFE, 2009). In 2005, the Azerbaijani community protested against the closing of the Sadakhlo market and demanded that the central authorities reconsider the decision. Finally, the sustainability of the preeminently peaceful cohabitation of the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in Kvemo Kartli could be put to a serious test by any future outburst of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Apart from the problems regarding the national minorities and the border demarcation, the Armenian factor may generate tensions in the bilateral relationships. Georgia faces the increasingly difficult task of maintaining the balance between its political support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and facilitation of Armenias commercial transit. Given the joint cause for territorial integrity and cooperation in the energy field, Baku would like the balance tilted in its favor. Although, in the early 1990s, tried unsuccessfully to persuade Georgia to join the economic blockade against Armenia, the authorities in Baku have generally tolerated the trade exchanges between Armenia and Georgia. The 2007 evacuation of the military base in Akhalkalaki gave rise to worries in Baku, since a part of the arsenal was to be transferred to Armenia, in order to supply the Russian
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forces at the Gyumri base. Although the Russo-Georgian agreement stipulated that Russia would not transfer weaponry to the Armenian forces, there were no trustworthy means to verify that Moscow abided by the obligations it had undertaken (Socor, 2007). No doubt, Azerbaijan would rather have the whole military equipment transferred back to Russia. In 2011, the Azerbaijani ambassador to Georgia spoke about the presumed danger of the economic cooperation between Armenia and Georgia and of the Armenian community for the territorial integrity of Georgia. The ambassador called upon Georgia and Azerbaijan to join efforts in opposing the Armenian policy in the region (Apa News, 2011). While the appeal is not bound to change the position of the Georgian government regarding Armenia, the discourse echoes the stances of some marginal social segments in Georgia, as the public opinion surveys show. It is unlikely that anyone in Baku believes the Tbilisi government will radically change its policy towards Armenia. Yet this discourse probably signals an irritation in Baku with the effect of the pragmatic resetting in the relationship between Armenia and Georgia. Given these circumstances, Georgia needs great diplomatic skill to navigate among the often conflicting aspirations of its neighbors in South Caucasus.

III. South Caucasus: Relationships with the Regional Powers

The regional processes do not result only from the relationships between the three South-Caucasian republics. It is an area where significant regional actors such as the US, the EU, Russia, Turkey, and Iran engage in an economic, political, military, and cultural competition. At the same time, the Caucasian republics do their best to take advantage as much as possible of this competition, in order to promote their own national security agendas at the regional level.
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III.1. Armenia: Variable complementarity

Armenias foreign policy pursues several major objectives: guarantee defense in case of an Azerbaijani conventional military attack; keeping the status quo or solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by observing the nations right to self-determination; breaking the blockade imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey; attracting foreign investments and international financial aid for economic development, and, last but not least, international recognition of the Armenian genocide. To carry out these objectives, Armenias foreign policy follows the principle of complementarity, which requires that Armenia develop close relationships with the main regional actors, such that their synergy contributes to the sectoral promotion of its foreign policy objectives. Economically, complementarity expresses Armenias economic dependence on foreign donors. Regarding military security, complementarity is the answer to its dependence on Russia.

III.1.1. Russia
Among the partnerships and alliances developed by Armenia, that with Russia is vitally important. Russia is one of the active co-presidents of the Minsk Group and an indispensable actor in the negotiation process concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, the alliance is conditioned by Armenias economic, military, and energy dependence on Russia. The alliance with Russia is supported by 95% of the Armenian citizens (International Republican Institute, 2008a). Militarily, Armenia is part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which theoretically guarantees the countrys security, since the organization is supposed to intervene if a member-country is subject to aggression. To Yerevan, CSTO is Russia. In case of aggression, it is Russias military assistance that we expect, not that of Belarus or of the Central Asian republics.57 During its presidency of the
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CSTO, Armenia actively supported the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force, so as to guarantee the organizations swift intervention in case of need.58 One of the exercises of the Rapid Reaction Force took place in Rostov, Southern Russia, in 2010. Aside from its security guarantee, the CSTO offers the possibility of purchasing Russian equipment at domestic-market prices or, in some cases, of having the equipments transferred free of charge. NATO does not offer anything similar59, a local expert points out the advantages of being part of a different military alliance. Guaranteeing the military security is not limited, however, to the multilateral alliances within the CSTO. Armenia hosts two Russian military bases at Gyumri and Yerevan, totaling about 4,000 troops. There are also Russian border guards in Armenia, who protect the border with Turkey and Iran. In 2010, Armenia extended the presence of the Russian troops on its territory through 2044. According to the Yerevan authorities, following the agreement, the Russian forces in Armenia will extend their activities beyond the mere protection of the former Soviet Unions border (Danielyan, 2010): Russia has undertaken to protect Armenias regional interests60, an official explains the meaning of the agreement. Russia has promised to supply weapons and to cooperate with the Armenian companies in the defense industry. Although their country enjoys a double assurance from Russia, Armenians have doubts as to the timing of Moscows intervention in the eventuality of the outbreak of hostilities: The defense clause has never been put to the test []. Russia cannot afford not to intervene, because it would lose its credibility, [but] when is it going to intervene: before or after a UN Security Council decision, after we have lost part of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh or immediately after the outbreak of the conflict?61, an expert wonders.
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The Russian side pointed out that it would intervene at the right moment. This ambiguity generates suspicion and determines Armenia to make sure that, at least in the first stages of a possible conflict it will be able to fight on its own.62 Economically, Armenia is a prisoner of the conflictual relations between Georgia and Russia and the 2008 war between the two countries proved it perfectly well (Markedonov, 2011). Such a war leaves Armenia with only one open frontier and one commercial transit route through Iran. Beyond these aspects, Armenia is interested in having access to the Russian market, gas import, financial support, and investments. Russia is Armenias second largest trade partner, with roughly 21% of the exchanges (EU Commission, 2011b). It remains the favorite destination for the approximately two million Armenian seasonal workers. Armenians working abroad sent home $1.3 billion in 2010, wich makes 13% of the countrys GDP (Danielyan, 2011). Experts estimate that 75% of the remittances originate in Russia.63 Armenia heavily relies (80% of the gas consumption) on the Russian gas deliveries. Gazprom owns 80% of Armenias gas distribution network. Moreover, the Russian state monopoly has taken control of the Armenian segment of the gas pipeline Tabriz Ersakh, which connects Armenia with Iran. In exchange, Armenia pays the lowest price in the CIS for the Russian natural gas it imports, namely $210 for a thousand cubic meters (Armtown.Com, 2011a). Russia is also ready to take part in the construction of the new reactors at the Metsamor nuclear power plant, which are meant to replace the old ones scheduled to be shut down by 2017. Aiming for economic development in conditions of regional semi-isolation, Armenia is looking for long-term investments and financial support. Since the early 2000s, it has accepted a massive penetration of Russian capital in sectors of strategic importance: telecommunications, railroads, finances and banking, heavy industry. Russia has taken over
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the Armenian railroads for thirty years, with a commitment to invest $570 million in their modernization. In Yerevan, Rusals $70 million investment in the technological upgrade of the local aluminum plant is considered to be a model of success. Consequently, Russia has remained Armenias main investor in 2010, at the level of $270 million (Mediamax, 2011). The economic crisis has hit Armenia hard. In 2010, the Russian government announced that it would grant Armenia a $500 million loan for macro-economic stabilization. In 2011, Moscow and Yerevan reached an agreement for a $400 million loan from the anti-crisis fund of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc), an organization in which Armenia is an observer (Hayrumyan, 2011). It is intended that the money will be invested in the modernization of the Nairit chemical plant, which has struggled to overcome the effects of the global economic turmoil. The dependence on Russia diminishes the autonomy of the Yerevan authorities externally and has a significant impact domestically. Russia has put pressure on Armenia to cancel its participation in the 2009 NATO exercise in Georgia64 and in the 2011 session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Tbilisi65. It seems also that the list of government institutions in Armenia, to which EU advisors have been assigned, was overseen by Moscow (Popescu, 2009). It was at Moscows request, as well, that the diameter of the gas pipeline between Armenia and Iran was reduced.66 Yerevan was unprepared in the summer of 2011 to sign several agreements on energy with Iran, because Moscow opposed it.67 The alliance with Russia has also side effects for Armenia, which creates tensions in the bilateral relations. The relations are far from being warm68, a diplomat confirms. The representatives of the business community complain that
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the Russian businessmen export corruption, which adds to the already high level of corruption in Armenia. They often do not stick to the obligations stipulated in the investment plans, so the companies do not function at full capacity, or their activity is suspended (Hayrumyan, 2010). The Court of Accounts evaluation regarding the activity of the Russian company GPM Gold, which controls the gold mines in Sodk and Megradzor is illustrative in this respect (RFE, 2010b). The activity of the Russian recruiting centers in Armenia, that offer Russian citizenship, provided the beneficiaries settle permanently in the non-European sections of Russia, has generated numerous protests among the representatives of the civil society, in the mass- and social media. Another initiative that caused irritation was the suggestion to introduce Russian as a language of inter-ethnic communication in Armenia, where almost 98% of the population is Armenian. Also, the bill on schools with teaching in a foreign language, that generated a heated public debate, was seen by many as a means to authorize schools where teaching is done in Russian. Also, the news about Armenian workers killed in Russia on xenophobic grounds did by no means improve the image of Russia in Armenia.69

III.1.2. Iran
The adverse effects of its alliance with Russia push Armenia towards finding a counter-balance to its dependence on Moscow. Iran is Armenias closest neighbor that Yerevan looks to in its efforts to diversify the economic options and to guarantee a favorable position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Iran provides 25 to 30% of Armenias commercial transit and is a major source of consumer goods. Thus, Iran is Armenias fourth trade partner, accounting for 5.6% of the total commercial exchanges (EU Commission, 2011b). However, like the transit through Georgia, the one
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through Iran is not safe either, because of the tensioned relationships between Tehran, on the one hand, and Washington and Jerusalem, on the other hand. In spite of religious differences, Armenia cooperates well with Iran and does not perceive it as a threat for its national security.70 In the most recent surveys, 37% of the people questioned see Iran as Armenias main partner and only 5% perceive it as an enemy (International Republican Institute, 2008a). This feeling of safety derives, among other things, from the favorable treatment of the Armenian minority in Iran, that counts between 40,000 and 80,000 people. The Armenians in Iran are one of the most powerful religious minorities, which is confirmed by two seats allocated to them in the Iranian parliament. The Armenians positive attitude is also based on the intensive tourist exchanges: Armenia is a popular destination for Iranians. Thousands of Iranian tourists visit Armenia for the Novruz Bairam holiday and during the summer vacations. In 2011, 28,000 Iranians came to Armenia for the religious festival of Novruz Bairam (News.Am, 2011b): For the Iranians, Armenia is Europe; they can celebrate here in ways the rules in Iran do not permit71, an analyst explains the Iranians interest for Armenia. There are regular flights between the two countries. As yet, however, they are not connected by railroad. In Soviet times, the connection was made through Azerbaijan. In 2009, Yerevan and Tehran agreed to build a railroad that would connect them directly and go all the way to the Persian Gulf. The costs of the project are estimated at $1.8 billion. In 2010, Armenia launched an active campaign of identifying foreign investors for this project (RFE, 2010c). The compatibility between the two countries is being strengthened by the feeling of regional isolation (Coene, 2010, p. 180) that Armenia and Iran are trying to overcome, also through mutual help. After the suspension of military
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transit through Georgia, Iran offered, at least once, free passage through its air space for the military cargo that was meant to reach the base at Gyumri. The deterioration of the Russo-Iranian relations after the approval by the UN Security Council of the sanctions against Iran put Armenia in a difficult position. Experts do not exclude the possibility that the Armenian side tries to mediate the approval by Tehran of the next cargo for the Gyumri base.72 Yerevan also appreciates Irans position regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. Iran does not favor the change of the status quo, being concerned about the implications on its security in case Armenia withdraws even partially and international peace-keeping forces, which might include soldiers from the US or from EU-member states, are deployed in the proximity of its borders.73 The telephone talks between the president of Iran and his counterparts from Azerbaijan and Armenia on the eve of the Kazan summit confirm Tehrans concerns regarding the regional effects of the negotiations carried out between Baku, Yerevan, and Moscow. The cooperation with Iran in the field of energy is important to Armenia for three reasons: the supply of gas that would cover demand for a short period in case the deliveries from Georgia are cut off; the gradual reduction of the countrys dependence on Russia; and providing fuel for the armed forces in case hostilities are resumed in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia and Iran are connected through two electric power transmission lines. Part of the imported Iranian gas is being used to generate and transport electric power from Armenia to Iran. In the spring of 2011, during the inter-governmental meeting in Tehran, a series of agreements in the fields of infrastructure and energy were prepared: the construction of an electric power transmission line and the construction of the hydroelectric power station on the river Aras
Interview with experts, Yerevan, June 2011. Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011; interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.
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(PanArmenian.Net, 2011). Also, the idea of the construction of an oil pipeline between the two countries was revived. However, the visit of the Iranian president to Armenia, during which these agreements were to be finalized and signed, did not take place in the summer of 2011. Tehran postponed it invoking problems in Yerevan. Besides Moscows already mentioned influence and the domestic calculations of the Iranian president that contributed to the delaying of the visit, it seems that Washington does not sympathize either with certain projects that would allow Tehran to break its international isolation.74

III.1.3. The US
Although placed far enough from South Caucasus, the US is a heavy piece in the political, diplomatic, and economic strategy of Armenia. The US is home of a large and influential Armenian Diaspora, it is one of the chairs of the Minsk Group, and it is an important foreign donor for the economic development for Armenia. In 2010, the US was the seventh trade partner of Armenia, accounting for 4.1% of the total commercial exchanges (EU Commission, 2011b). Over 8% of the remittances coming to Armenia originate in the US. Since 2006, Armenia received a total of $235.6 million in assistance funds through the Millennium Challenge Corporation, but the 2008 post-election violence in Yerevan determined the US to suspend financing for the covered projects. Even in those circumstances, Armenia is still one of the states receiving the highest financial US aid per capita. The American assistance granted to Armenia between 1992 and 2005 exceeds $1 billion (Nichol, 2011, p. 27). In 2011, the US Congress voted for Armenia: $44 million in economic assistance, $3.5 million in military assistance, and $450,000 in military training. The US also allocates annually money for the financing of the reconstruction and development
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projects in Nagorno-Karabakh. 2011 was no exception: the US provided $8 million in assistance programs for the region (RFE, 2010d). Between 1998 and 2008, the US granted Nagorno-Karabakh humanitarian aid worth a total of $32 million (Nichol, 2011, p. 27). The Armenian Diaspora in the US is instrumental to Yerevans efforts to obtain financial assistance during the budget debates in the American legislative, to block or reduce a similar assistance for Azerbaijan, to prevent the repel of section 907 of the Freedom Support Act applied to the latter, to block certain inconvenient diplomatic assignments (e.g., the confirmation procedure of the current US ambassador in Azerbaijan), to obtain the recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Besides lobbying in Washington, the Armenian community contributes directly to the economic development by financing infrastructure projects in Armenia. However, the interests of the Diaspora and those of the authorities in Yerevan do not always overlap. In 2008 and 2009, the leadership in Yerevan was much more favorable to the pressure exerted by the US upon Turkey for the normalization of relations with Armenia. The Armenian Diaspora in the US suspected that Yerevan might slow down its campaign for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide once it has reestablished relations with Ankara. Moreover, representatives of the Diaspora who wished to invest in Armenia complained about the high level of corruption and the administrative obstacles that hinder the development of businesses.75 In the context of changing US security priorities after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and the two major military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, Armenia reactivated its military cooperation with the US. A similar attitude was adopted by Yerevan towards NATO. The Armenian authorities perceived these developments as an opportunity for diversifying their security options, receiving technical
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assistance, and gaining experience. Armenia managed to establish a regular strategic dialogue with the US and signed the Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO. With American assistance, the Center for Humanitarian Demining for the training of experts in land mine disarming was opened in Armenia. In 2010, for the first time, Armenia hosted a NATO exercise on its territory. The first US-Armenian military exercises are also planned in the near future. Armenia sent 46 troops in Iraq and 45 in Afghanistan. In 2011, it increased its military presence in Afghanistan substantially, by sending a contingent of 81 troops to the theater of operations. All these do not aim to break Armenias alliance with Russia. Given the current status quo in the region, a break is inconceivable. However, wishing to expand the maneuvering space in their foreign policy, the authorities in Yerevan are signaling to Russia that Armenia has other options as well, by which to guarantee its military security76. Yet the question remains: how serious are such signals for Russia, which has at its disposal a variety of means to obstruct a radical change in the course of Armenias foreign policy?

III.1.4. The EU
In an attempt to galvanize its diversification strategy, Armenia has lately turned its attention towards the EU. The economic relations between Armenia and the EU have rapidly grown since 2005-2006. Armenias inclusion in the European Neighborhood Policy and the signing of the EU-Armenia action plan have accelerated this process. Consequently, Yerevan sees the EU as increasingly important for macro-financial stability and the economic development of Armenia. As an observer acknowledges: When we speak of the EU, the first question that comes to mind is if and how much money theyll give us77. The latest public
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opinion barometer shows that 29% of the respondents view the EU as Armenias number one partner (International Republican Institute, 2008a). Armenia receives significant financial assistance from the EU. Between 2007 and 2010, the EU allocated 98.4 million euros; for the years 2011-2013, a budget of 157.3 million euros is approved, plus another 40 million euros that can be drawn by Armenia from other EU-financed programs (Navasardian, 2011, p. 65). In 2011, the EU and Armenia signed a memorandum for the granting of a macro-financial aid of 100 million euros aimed to overcome the effects of the global economic crisis 65 million as a loan and 35 million as a grant (Eteris, 2011). The EU also finances programs for the improvement of the nuclear security in Armenia: it has offered to partially cover the costs of closing down the nuclear power plant in Metsamor. Moreover, the EU is the second largest investor in Armenia after Russia. EU-member states, France and the Netherlands, are second and third top investors in Armenia in 2010, with $146.7 million and $64.3 million, respectively (Mediamax, 2011). Economically, the EU is Armenias main trade partner accounting for 32.1% of the total commercial exchanges in 2010 (EU Commission, 2011b). This was due, in part, to the 2009 extension of the Generalized System of Preferences Plus (GSP+) to Armenia, which facilitated the access of the countrys products on the European market. In 2008, the EU commissioned a feasibility study concerning the creation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with Armenia. In Yerevan, almost all political forces support closer relations with the EU: There is a genuine interest for the EU in Yerevan78, a diplomat confirms. This interest is confirmed by official documents. The national security strategy adopted in 2007 mentions the European integration among Armenias objectives (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007).
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European integration, however, is seen differently in Yerevan than in Kiev, Chiinu, or Tbilisi. Asked about the countrys European integration, an official explained: We do not knock at the EUs door, as our neighbors do. We do not rush into it. European integration is a lengthy process during which, as we solve our domestic problems, we will gradually reach a level of development close to that of the EU-member states. Only then will we determine whether it is worth becoming a full member or not.79 On the one hand, such a positioning with regard to integration confirms a realistic assessment of Armenias chances to become an EU member in the foreseeable future. It seems that Yerevan is relatively satisfied with the EUs offer to Eastern neighbors and tries to extract as much as possible from what is on the table. On the other hand, such an approach shows that Yerevan is interested in technical cooperation (the introduction of technical standards and regulations), but also in preventing an excessive EU intrusion in its domestic affairs by keeping a certain distance. As a local analyst remarked, the political leadership avoids assuming too many obligations in its relationship with the EU; the membership in the Council of Europe and the problems related to human rights already give our leaders enough headaches80. Armenias cooperation with the EU is not confined, however, to economic aspects only. As a confirmation, in 2010 Armenia aligned with 28 out of the 44 EU foreign and security policy statements, opened for third countries support (EU Commission, 2011e). Armenias cooperation with the EU in the field of foreign and security policies is directly connected to its dispute with Azerbaijan and difficult relations with Turkey. For us, the EU is a union of Christian states81, an official declared. Without mentioning Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia seems to suggest that those two
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states have no place in the EU. Alternatively, both have to solve their conflicts with Armenia first, in order to take further steps towards integration in the EU. Confirming this position, Yerevan expressed a certain disappointment with the the fact that overcoming certain historic problems and the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border were not laid down by the EU as preconditions for accession talks with Turkey (Navasardian, 2011, p. 64). Although the EU does not formally take part in the negotiations regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, France, an EU-member state, co-presides the Minsk Group. There have been suggestions that France be replaced in the Minsk Group by an EU diplomat. Armenia, having a privileged relationship with France, which is home to an influential Armenian Diaspora, opposed this proposal (Popescu, 2011, p. 105). To conclude, the Armenian diplomacy objectives in its interaction with the EU institutions are to preserve the status quo in the negotiations and to block certain documents or initiatives that would put Armenia in an unfavorable position with regard to Azerbaijan. Usually, the EU tries to keep its neutrality with regard to both countries, so the EU documents often contain statements that satisfy Yerevan and irritate Baku or the other way around. For instance, Armenia had a critical reaction to the resolution calling upon the EU to develop a strategy regarding South Caucasus, which was passed by the European Parliament in 2010. The document demands explicitly that the Armenian military forces be withdrawn from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (EU Parliament, 2010), actually reiterating the message of the 2008 resolution of the UN General Assembly. At the same time, the passage in which the EU is called upon to offer humanitarian aid to the population of Nagorno-Karabakh is in accordance with Armenias efforts to de-isolate the region.

III.1.5. Turkey
The first thing many ordinary people in Yerevan do when they get up in the morning is to look towards Turkey and admire the magnificent Ararat, the mountain that bears deep historical and symbolical significance to all Armenians. Although their eyes are drawn to Turkey, there are many things that separate Armenians from their closest Western neighbor. In the early 1990s, Yerevan and Ankara found themselves on the opposite sides of the barricade in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The war and the subsequent closing of the borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan revived the fear of the Turkish threat deeply rooted in the collective memory of the Armenians. The campaign for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide and references in the Armenian Constitution to the Eastern provinces of Turkey as Western Armenia have farther broadened the split between Yerevan and Ankara. Starting in 2008, Armenia has actively sought to overcome the political animosities. The Russo-Georgian war accelerated this process that would have been impossible if both states had not made small steps towards the normalization of their relations. Ankara gave the first signs of rapprochement in 2005-2007 by restoring several Armenian churches previously in poor condition. Among those, was the Akdamar church, situated on one of the Lake Van islands. Armenian officials took part in the opening ceremony and the Turkish authorities subsequently allowed only one liturgy per year. Yerevan seized the opportunity and invited the Turkish president to Armenia for the official soccer game between the two national teams. In September 2008, the president of Turkey paid a historic visit to Yerevan, being the first Turkish head of state to have ever visited Armenia. Almost a year later, Armenia and Turkey signed protocols on establishing diplomatic relations and reopening the border between the two countries. However, the process of normalization got stuck in 2010, when both parts gave up ratifying the
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protocols and blamed the failure on each other. It should be noticed that neither Armenia, nor Turkey withdrew signatures on the protocols. Therefore they did not put an end to the process but only froze the ratification procedure. Although they failed in the first attempt in 2010, Armenia and Turkey overcame an important psychological stage. The problem is no longer if, but when the relationships are going to be normalized82, an influent local expert remarked. In the spirit of its policy of zero problems with the neighbors, Turkey went on with the restoration of the Armenian churches and, in 2010, removed Armenia from the list of countries that pose a national security threat. The process is not a linear one, however. Armenia goes on with its international campaign for recognition of the Armenian Genocide. In response, the Turkish prime-minister threatens to expel the Armenian workers from the country and demands that the monument of the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation in Kars be pulled down. But most analysts believe the process cannot be stopped. A keen observer of the region remarks: Today, it is not the Turks and the Armenians, but the Armenians among themselves and the Turks among themselves who argue as to what is to be done for the reconciliation [between Turks and Armenians] (Markedonov, 2011). For obvious reasons, the process meets with opposition at both political and social levels. An official in Yerevan concludes rather pessimistically: The policy of zero problems with the neighbors means for Turkey zero neighbors83. Socially as well, there is resistance to the normalization process. But the figures are not as discouraging as they should be, given the mostly negative mutual perception both Turks and Armenians have. In Turkey, according to an opinion survey, 50% of the people questioned are against the reopening of the border, 27% give affirmative answers, while
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Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011. Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.

22% remain undecided. In another opinion survey, this time in Armenia, 31% of the people questioned were in favor of increased contacts with Turkey, almost as many were against it, while 40% were undecided (Armtown.Com, 2011b). In Armenia, the trade arguments prevail when it comes to the reopening of the border. Many see it as a huge opportunity to explore the market in Eastern Turkey. This line of reasoning is mirrored in the surveys. According to a public opinion barometer, 41% of the respondents believe the reopening of the countrys border with Turkey will have an immediate positive economic impact on Armenia, while 36% state they are neutral or unsure of the positive effects (RFE, 2011b). In spite of the closed border and the lack of diplomatic relations, there are commercial, humanitarian, and occasionally political exchanges that push Yerevan and Ankara day by day towards the normalization of their relationship. Turkey was Armenias sixth trade partner in 2010, accounting for 4.4% of the total commercial exchanges (EU Commission, 2011b). Businessmen estimate that the bilateral trade exchanges might double if the border is reopened (Markedonov, 2011). There is air communication between Yerevan and Istanbul. Between 40,000 and 70,000 Armenians work in Turkey. Armenians have no problems with going on vacation to Turkey: about 50,000 of them visited Antalya in 2009 (Ziflioglu, 2010). Neither do Turkish tourists avoid Armenia. There are also bilateral cultural events: in 2011, a Turkish film week was organized for the second time in the Armenian city of Vanadzor. There are also many contacts between civil society and the experts community that provides the chance to have an informal dialogue between officials and opinion makers from the two countries. In Yerevan, some experts affirmed that the bilateral talks about the normalization of relations have not been suspended; they have just been moved to a different level. It seems that during such talks the two sides discussed the possibility of partially implementing the protocols, without their being
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ratified (e.g., opening the border for trucks alone, several days a week).84 The message of the Turkish premier, after winning the 2011 parliamentary elections, about the continuation of the dialogue with Yerevan (News.Ad, 2011d) confirmed that, in spite of the many obstacles, the process will not stop. These developments, if ultimately successful, will have a major impact on the economic and security architecture of South Caucasus. For Turkey, however, the mission seems extremely difficult, not least because of Azerbaijans opposition to the unconditional normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia and of the close connections existing between Ankara and Baku.

III.2.1. Turkey
Probably the closest regional relations Azerbaijan has are developed with Turkey. Azerbaijan and Turkey are connected through a multilateral web of humanitarian, economic, social, and political contacts that strengthen the relationship. On a political level, there are many inter-governmental meetings and consultations between the two sides. Baku feels comfortable in its relationships with Ankara, because the Turkish side avoids any criticism regarding the domestic political developments in Azerbaijan (Musabekov, 2011). In the energy sector, two Azerbaijani oil and gas export pipelines have two Turkish cities Erzurum and Ceyhan, respectively as their final destinations. The railroad that will connect Azerbaijan and Turkey via Georgia is under construction. Turkey is Azerbaijans second biggest trade partner, with 8.2% of the total trade volume in 2010 (EU Commission, 2011d). Moreover, Turkey is the fifth greatest investor in Azerbaijan, at 3.9% of the total investments in 2010 (News.Az, 2011e). Over the last few years, Azerbaijan has shown interest in the Turkish energy market and has made several significant investments. For instance, SOCAR has purchased 51% of the Turkish petrochemical plant Petkim shares and intends to invest about $100 million in the development of energy projects (News.Az, 2011f). The total volume of Azerbaijani investments in Turkey reaches $4 billion and Baku plans further investments of about $6 billion (Kardas, 2011). To many Azerbaijanis who want to study or work, Turkey is an attractive destination. From 1992 to 2010, more than 5,000 Azerbaijani citizens studied in Turkish universities thanks to the scholarships provided by the Turkish government. Some also chose to study in Turkey at their own expense. More and more parents send their children to Turkish kindergartens and primary and high schools in Baku (Trend, 2011b). The network of Turkish educational units in Azerbaijan is only surpassed by the similar institutions where teaching is done in Russian (Musabekov, 2011). In an opinion survey, Turkey ranks third
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III.2. Azerbaijan: Strategic independence through multi-vectorism

The prime objective of Azerbaijans foreign policy is to reestablish its territorial integrity. The countrys external strategy also seeks access to technologies and aims to boost oil and gas exports, by multiplying the delivery routes towards the international market. The energy factor is thus instrumentalized domestically and externally to achieve the countrys reintegration. The financial independence guaranteed by the substantial income that the energy sector generates offers Azerbaijan a wide autonomy in its relationships with the regional powers. Consequently, Azerbaijan pursues a multi-vectorial foreign policy that 41% of its citizens support (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). The foreign policy orientations often oscillate in order to loosen the pressure of a regional power or to extract concessions from the regional actors. Although it guarantees a certain degree of strategic independence, such a course is susceptible to cyclical crises in Azerbaijans relations with its partners.
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(7.4%) in the top preferences of the Azerbaijanis who would go to work abroad (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). All this is reflected in the societys favorable attitude towards Turkey. Thus, 86.4% of the 2010 respondents declared that Turkey is a friendly state for Azerbaijan (ibidem). The favorable attitude towards Turkey can be accounted for also by the assistance this country offered Azerbaijan during and in the aftermath of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and after its adjournment. Several NGOs in Turkey provided humanitarian aid to the IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh, the amount up to now reaching $6 million (News.Az, 2011). After the war, the military cooperation intensified, with a total help granted until 2010 of over $200 million, according to the Turkish Ministry of Defense (Artsakank News, 2011). Turkey trained Azerbaijani officers and soldiers in its educational institutions and military training facilities. The two sides cooperate in several common projects in the defense industry. Besides importing weaponry from Turkey, Baku and Ankara have set up joint ventures for the production of ammunition and military equipment for the Azerbaijani armed forces (News.Az, 2011g). In 2010, Ankara and Baku strengthen their relationship by concluding an agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support. They committed to offer each other support in case their national security is threatened. The document, however, does not offer Azerbaijan the same kind of security guarantees that Armenia enjoys through CSTO.85 In case of war, Azerbaijan expects to receive indirect political support and military assistance from Turkey.86 Turkey plays a crucial role in Azerbaijans strategy of de-isolation and guaranteeing security for Nakhichevan. The construction of a gas pipeline from Turkey to Nakhichevan began in 2010; plus, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a contract for the gas supplies to the Azerbaijani enclave
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without the Turkish side collecting any transit fees. Direct flights from Istanbul to Nakhichevan have been opened. Baku and Ankara discuss the possibility of connecting Nakhichevan to the Baku Tbilisi Kars railroad. Moreover, Azerbaijans military presence in Nakhichevan has been strengthened with Turkeys substantial assistance (Abbasov, 2010). Given the tensioned relationships between Azerbaijan and Iran, Turkey tries to mediate between the two states in the spirit of its new policy towards its neighbors. In 2011, it housed the trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers in order to revamp the dialogue between Baku and Tehran. Yet the strategic Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership is not without difficulties. Turkeys attempt at normalizing relations with Armenia was perceived in a very negative way in Baku. Seen from Azerbaijan, the eventual re-opening of the Turkish-Armenian border undermines drastically the chances to force Yerevan to an agreement with Baku. Besides changing its discourse on Turkey, Azerbaijan has slightly changed direction in its energy policy as well. This meant the revisited gas prices for Turkey and involvement in the AGRI project that excludes not only Russia, but Turkey as well. Azerbaijans message to Turkey was, essentially: Without us, you can not be an energy hub87. The Nabucco project only fueled the differences between Baku and Ankara. Azerbaijan rejected Turkeys offer to buy an entire volume of gas with the aim to re-sell it on the European market. Although the Azerbaijani citizens enjoy, since 2008, a visa-free regime with Turkey, a similar treatment is not being applied to the Turkish citizens visiting Azerbaijan. Ankara exerts pressure so that Azerbaijan liberalize its visa regime with Turkey. Azerbaijan, however, invokes security concerns (drug trafficking, migration etc.) and a similar pressure coming from Iran to lift visas for Iranian citizens. Experts invoke domestic motives as well: The regime is concerned by Turkeys
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Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011. Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

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growing political and economic influence in Azerbaijan88, an analyst unveils the concerns otherwise concealed by the officials. Although Turkey managed to repair its relationship with Azerbaijan in 2010, the bitter taste left by the formers attempt at unconditionally normalizing relations with Armenia remained. It is expected in Baku that Turkey will go on with its dialogue with Armenia after the elections.89 In such circumstances, it may very well be that Azerbaijan will make use of sectorial cooperation with Russia to divert this process.

III.2.2. Russia
During the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the Azerbaijani leadership reacted with moderation. Baku refrained from criticizing Russia openly. That Georgias actions were in conformity with the international law was announced by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Baku, not by some high-ranking official. The protests in front of the Russian embassy in Baku were brief, because of the lawand-order forces intervention. At the same time, the 2008 military conflict and the negotiations between Turkey and Armenia created the necessary conditions for a rapprochement between Moscow and Baku. Russias role in the Minsk Group and the reactivation of the negotiations by Moscow determined Azerbaijan, which is opposed to the current status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh, to accomodate Russias interests, without, however, crossing the line imposed by a multi-vectorial foreign policy. The compatibility between the political models (sovereign democracies) and the specific of the economies (petro-states), as well as the Azerbaijani presidents multiple personal ties with Russia (he studied in Moscow) facilitated this process. The economic interests and migratory flows contributed to
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the rapprochement between Moscow and Baku. Russia is Azerbaijans third trade partner, accounting for 7.4% of the total commercial exchanges in 2010 (EU Commission, 2011d). It is also second on the list of preferred working destinations for the Azerbaijanis willing to work abroad (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). According to estimates, there are between 1.3 and 1.8 million Azerbaijanis in Russia, who send home annually from $1.8 to $2.4 billion (Valiyev, 2011). A limitation on the access of Azerbaijani migrants to the Russian labor market would have a huge negative social impact, putting the Baku government into a difficult situation. The growing importance of the Russian vector in Azerbaijans foreign policy contributed to the removing of certain problems from the bilateral agenda. In 2010, Azerbaijan and Russia signed a terrestrial border delimitation agreement, in addition to the 2002 one on the delimitation of the border between the two states in the Caspian Sea. On that occasion, Russia announced that the issue of two villages in Northern Azerbaijan Uryanoba and Khrakhoba , considered to be temporary Russian territory (Republic of Dagestan), had been solved: the two communities had returned under the jurisdiction of the Baku authorities (News.Az, 2011h). Solving the problem of the two villages was important for the Baku government, since it is concerned by the occasional revendications of the Lezgin minority in Northern Azerbaijan, which often uses Moscow as a platform to launch political messages. Azerbaijan hosts a radar station in Gabala and leases it to Russia in exchange for $7 million annually. About 1,000 Russian troops serve at the station. The agreement expires in 2012, but the two sides have already begun a preliminary round of negotiations to extend it. Russia has offered to invest in the modernization of the radar. It is very likely that Azerbaijan will extend the term of leasing by another five or ten years.90 It may very well be
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Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011. Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

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that this prolongation of the agreement will be the political payback for the modern Russian weaponry supplied to Azerbaijan in 2010. Some experts think that Azerbaijans joining the Non-Aligned Movement is in direct connection with the regional post-2008 dynamics. It seems that Baku wanted to signal in this way, especially to Moscow, that it does not seek membership of military alliances, neither of NATO, nor of the CSTO.91 Accommodation of the Russian interests also occurred in the energy, economic, and humanitarian fields. A number of companies were admitted to the Azerbaijani market. The VTB Bank entered the financial market in 2008. Another two Russian companies, Rostelekom and Sistema, have stated their interest to take part in the privatization process of Azertelekom and Baki Telefon Rabitasi. Approximately 500 Russian companies have businesses in Azerbaijan (Oxford Analytica, 2011). Russia and Azerbaijan have signed an agreement regarding the construction of a new electric power transmission line from Iashma to Derbent, that will boost Russias electricity exports capacity. In 2008, Russia avoided to bomb the Kulevi terminal, which is the property of SOCAR, and the Baku Supsa pipeline. In 2010, Azerbaijan began exporting gas to Russia. In 2011, the export volume was increased to 2 billion cubic meters. In 2008, in Azerbaijan, where the largest Russian Diaspora in South Caucasus lives (160,000-170,000 people), a branch of the Moscow State University was opened. This institution joins the list of the already existing over 200 schools and colleges in Azerbaijan, where teaching is done in Russian (Musabekov, 2011). Annually, Azerbaijan is visited by 700,000 Russian citizens (Oxford Analytica, 2011). All together, these factors preserve a positive image of Russia among several segments of the Azerbaijani society. A 2010 public opinion barometer indicated that 23% of the Azerbaijanis think of Russia as a friendly state. It is surpassed, in this sense, only by Turkey
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(Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). But the Azerbaijani society is polarized when it comes to Russia. In the same opinion poll, almost 17% of the respondents identified Russia as an enemy state (ibidem). Undoubtedly and given the Russian support for Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict , Russias image in Azerbaijan has further deteriorated after the Georgian war, the population, being preponderently sympathetic with the Georgians.92 A useful indicator is the level of popular support for the Russian-sponsored integration processes inside CIS. From 2006 to 2010, the Azerbaijanis support for integration in the CIS dropped from about 24% to 15% (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Azerbaijans pragmatic attitude towards Russia was put to the test in several conflicting situations. In 2009, the information in the media about the $800 million worth of military equipment transferred from Russia to Armenia caused indignation in Azerbaijan. The Baku government was disappointed, since the Kremlin, as a result of the 2008 rapprochement, had promised to provide extra-support to Azerbaijan (Ismailzade, 2009). Yet, while mediating the talks between Yerevan and Baku, the Kremlin was busy to preserve the military balance, against the interests of Azerbaijan. The extension, in 2010, of the Russian military presence in Armenia was also received without enthusiasm in Baku. Commenting on the Russian military policy in South Caucasus, an Azerbaijani high-ranking official pointed out that the time has come to replace the battle tanks with oil tanks, in other words to substitute the military presence with the economic one (Aztag, 2011). During 2008, there were several xenophobic violent attacks against Azerbaijani citizens in the suburbs of Moscow. The local media widely reported on these crimes, causing public outcry in Azerbaijan. Under the public opinion pressure, the Baku officials brought up the question of the security of the Azerbaijani citizens in
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Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

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Russia during the bilateral talks with their counterparts in Moscow. The two sides found themselves on radically different positions also on the issue of the trans-Caspian pipeline: the Russian ambassador in Baku suggested that such a project could cause damages to the environment and that Russia and Iran had to give consent for the project to be implemented. In turn, the SOCAR representative replied that talks of the trans-Caspian pipeline will take place without Russia (Fitzpatrick, 2011).

III.2.3. The US
The US political and economic support was decisive for the construction, in the first decade of this century, of the energy routes that bypass Russia, providing Azerbaijan with the wide international autonomy it currently enjoys. The US role continues to be crucial for lifting the bilateral blockages between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which could turn Azerbaijan into a transit country of the Caspian gas. Moreover, close economic relations have developed in time between Azerbaijan and the US. The US is Azerbaijans second biggest investor (9% of the total investments) and fourth trade partner in 2010, accounting for 7% of the total commercial exchanges (News.Az, 2011e; EU Commission, 2011d). Some of the largest US oil companies (Exxon Mobil, Conoco Philips, or Chevron) are involved in large-scale energy projects in Azerbaijan. Baku has often resorted to the US oil companies lobby to support its national agenda in Washington. The bilateral cooperation in the field of security increased considerably after September 11th, 2001. Azerbaijan opened its air space and made its terrestrial infrastructure available for refueling the US planes heading towards Afghanistan. Baku deployed a contingent of 80 peace-keepers in Afghanistan and offered the US support in its military operation in Iraq, contributing 150 troops to the stabilization force. Azerbaijan offers also an important way of transportation
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towards Afghanistan from the North. Every year starting with 2002, the President of the United States has suspended the application of section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which blocks the financial assistance to Azerbaijan. In 2010, the US granted Azerbaijan financial assistance of $22 million. In 2003, the US Defense Department began to develop a training and equipment program of the Azerbaijani naval guard in the Caspian Sea. Each year, the US and Azerbaijani armed forces organize joint military exercises. In 2008, however, the first cracks in this partnership became visible, and kept growing in 2009 and 2010. In spite of efforts on both sides to maintain a faade of normality, the relationship is no longer as close as it used to be in the early 2000s, as an Azerbaijani official from the presidential administration stated (News.Az, 2011i). This reflects in opinion surveys, in which only 6.5% of the respondents declared that the US was a friendly state, 2% fewer than in the case of Iran (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). From the Azerbaijani point of view, several factors contributed to the chilling down of the Azerbaijani-American relations. Among the political elite, there is a general feeling that Azerbaijan has contributed more than it has received in exchange. In the Baku leaderships perception, the relationship with the US is based not on values, but on interests. Azerbaijan hoped that its cooperation in the field of security and in the energy sector would generate a massive support from the US for solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Thus, interpreting the partnership as a purely contractual relation, Baku feels that it has not profited enough from Washingtons support.93 A series of US foreign policy actions caused irritation in Baku: first, the US active role behind the normalization of the relations between Armenia and Turkey; second, the preservation of section 907 of the Freedom Support Act94; and third, the promotion of a democratic
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Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011. Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011.

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agenda in Azerbaijan95. The Azerbaijani presidency became very sensitive to the US pressure for democratization after the wave of popular revolts in the Arab world.96 The US vote against the 2008 resolution of the United Nations General Assembly regarding the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, the fact that there was no US ambassador appointed in Baku for more than a year, and that the president of Azerbaijan was not invited at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, attended instead by the Armenian and Georgian heads of state, were a few more episodes that further contributed to the alienation of Azerbaijan from the US. Consequently, Baku suspended its common military exercises with the US in 2009, 2010, and 2011 and veered towards Russia in its foreign policy. The US Administration sent the Secretary of Defense to Baku to shore up the division. This episode was followed by the 2010 visit of the Secretary of State in Baku and by that of the Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs in Washington in 2011. Although the dialogue intensified at governmental level in 2010 and 2011, the positions of the two sides remained almost unchanged regarding the issues dividing them. A new appeal for the reopening of the Turkish-Armenian border, which the US Secretary of State launched in Istanbul in 2011, caused a predictable reaction in Baku (News.Az, 2011) and maintained the vicious circle the two sides are caught in.

III.2.4. The EU
At the middle of the first decade of this century, Azerbaijans trade with the EU began growing, so that in 2010 the EU was by far its largest trade partner, accounting for 46.9% of the total commercial exchanges (EU Commission, 2011d). It must be pointed out that Azerbaijan is the
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only Eastern Partnership state that enjoys a solid positive trade balance with the EU. Its main export products are oil and gas. The EU-member states count among the largest investors in Azerbaijan: Great Britain comes first, with 52% of the total investments in 2010, and is followed by the Czech Republic and France (News.Az, 2011e). From 2007 to 2010, the EU invested 92 million euros in Azerbaijan; for the years 2011-2013, the budget goes up to 122.5 million euros (EEAS, 2011). The EU and European integration are relatively popular topics in the Azerbaijani society. The latest public opinion barometer indicates that 32.2% of the population is in favor of European integration, a rise from a 27.7% in 2006. Moreover, the combined EU-member states combined represent the first and foremost choice (11%) of the Azerbaijanis willing to work abroad (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). In spite of the positive commercial dynamics, mostly in the energy sector, the political relationships between Azerbaijan and the European Union trail behind. Azerbaijan is an independent financial actor. Experts estimate that Azerbaijans daily income from the oil trade varied in 2009 between $40 and $60 million (Bayramov, 2009, p. 7). Azerbaijan also develops a donor state profile: in 2011, it offered $1 million in aid to Japan after the devastating earthquake.97 Under these circumstances, one million more or less from the EU does not make a difference98, a local analyst comments. We do not have the same motivation for reforms as Georgia or Moldova does99, another explains. The self-confidence fueled by the oil-driven economy turned the Azerbaijani leaders into extremely difficult dialogue partners.100 The diminishing asymmetry in the bilateral relationships is confirmed in Baku: Our cooperation has
Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011. Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011. 99 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011. 100 Interview with a diplomat.
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Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011. Interview with a mass-media person, Baku, June 2011.

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undergone a serious transformation from the initial emphasis on aid [from the EU] to mutually beneficial cooperation, the Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs underscored (News.Az, 2011j). Consequently, Azerbaijan seeks equality in its relations with the EU. Eschewing the EUs conditionality is part of this effort. For instance, Azerbaijan rejects what it considers to be the EUs one-dimensional approach to human rights. Besides political and civil liberties, human rights also cover economic and social rights concerning which Baku states it has made significant progress.101 At the same time, Baku develops privileged bilateral partnerships with the EU-member states, in order to mitigate the European institutions criticism. When criticism cannot be muted, as it happened in the spring of 2011, when protests of the opposition were suppressed, the Azerbaijani authorities express their discontent with the EUs position (Azernews, 2011). At the same time, Baku criticizes the EUs selective approach towards human rights, for instance with reference to the European institutions lack of interest for the rights of the IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh (News.Az, 2011k). Azerbaijan behaves in an obstructionist way in questions of interest for its citizens, for instance regarding the visa facilitation agreement with the EU. The authorities state that the problem is now with the EU, since the Commission has no mandate to begin negotiations.102 Experts, however, blame the lack of political will in Baku. The Azerbaijani government is reluctant to conclude the readmission agreements that are necessary for a visa facilitation deal with the EU (Trend, 2011c). In turn, Azerbaijan has toughened visa requirementss for all foreign citizens, including EU ones. Generally speaking, these examples reflect the position of the Baku government on the preferred model of European integration, i.e. economic cooperation. It seems that economic cooperation with the EU is focused mainly on the
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energy sector; the prospects of a DCFTA are bleak, since Azerbaijan is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 2006, the EU and Azerbaijan signed a memorandum on partnership in the field of energy; in 2011, the president of the European Commission and the president of Azerbaijan signed a joint statement on the southern gas corridor, of which project Nabucco is a part. Access to the European markets is supposed to increase the profits and importance of Azerbaijan for the EUs energy security (Aliyev, 2010). Moreover, Azerbaijan aspires to convert its interaction with the EU in the field of energy into support for the countrys reintegration. This effort is backed by the occasional support given to the EUs foreign policy and security statements that Azerbaijan is invited to join. In 2010, the Baku government aligned with 18 of the 44 statements (EU Commission, 2011f). Azerbaijan does not see the EU as a major power in the region, since it lacks hard power. The Russo-Georgian war was a good example in this sense for Baku.103 Consequently, the political leadership does not expect the EU to play, in short and medium term, an important role in the negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. At the same time, the Azerbaijani diplomacy cultivates close ties with the EU-member states, actual or prospective importers of gas from Azerbaijan, to defend inside the EU its stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

III.2.5. Iran
The Islamic Republic of Iran, where about 16 million Azerbaijani ethnics live, remains an inconvenient neighbor for Azerbaijan. Although strong historical, cultural, and religious aspects link together the two countries, there is distrust regarding Iran in the public opinion. Surveys show that 10% of the Azerbaijani respondents think that Iran is an enemy state, while 8.8% view it as a friendly one (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). The bilateral trade
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Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011. Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011.

Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

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exchanges are rather modest: Iran is Azerbaijans 17th trade partner, with only 0.7% of the total commercial exchanges in 2010 (EU Commission, 2011d). Politically, there is an insufficiently institutionalized dialogue which alternates between conflict and cooperation. The June 2011 visit in Baku of the president of the Iranian parliament can hardly change in a significant way the nature of the relations between the two states. Among the few existing bilateral cooperation projects, there are the seasonal exchanges of electric power. According to the agreements, Azerbaijan exports electricity in summer, while Iran exports a similar quantity in autumn and winter. There are also gas exports in both directions: thus, Iran plays an important role in Nakhichevans energy security, by supplying the annual volume of gas necessary to the Armenia-isolated enclave. In exchange, Azerbaijan exports gas to Irans northern regions. Between 2009 and 2011, Azerbaijan increased the gas deliveries to Iran (Nichol, 2011, p. 16). Through such an increase, Baku apparently wishes to protect Nakhichevan from the side effects of the dysfunctional political relationship with Tehran. The bilateral relationship is burdened by several problematic dossiers that substantially affect the interaction between the two neighbors. Iran holds what Azerbaijan considers to be a pro-Armenian position. Projects in the field of energy are perceived in a negative way because they weaken the pressure exerted by Azerbaijan and Turkey on Armenia via closed borders and exclusion from regional infrastructure projects. Baku has let Tehran know that it disapproves of the cooperation between Armenia and Iran (News.Am, 2011c). Apparently, Iran intensified its cooperation with Armenia when Azerbaijan got too close, in Tehrans opinion, to the West. The problem of the border is yet another irritating subject in the bilateral relationship. Azerbaijan and Iran have not reached a consensus on the delineation of their border in the Caspian Sea. Since it feels disadvantaged by the national sectors division along the median line, Tehran insists that the Caspian Sea should be divided into equal
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sectors between the Caspian states. Consequently, in the dispute area between the two states, Azerbaijan cannot conduct drilling and exploitation activities. In a 2001 incident, the Iranian coast guard forced a BP research vessel to withdraw from the disputed area. In 2005, there were reports about the violation of the Azerbaijani air space by the Iranian forces. Another serious incident on the land border took place in 2011: there was a fire exchange among the Iranian border guards and the Azerbaijani ones, in the course of which an Azerbaijani soldier was killed. This perfectly mirrors the tense atmosphere in the bilateral relationship (News.Az, 2011l). The authorities in Baku are concerned by Irans activities on the Azerbaijani territory. In 2007, fifteen Azerbaijani citizens were put under arrest in Baku, and then found, by an Azerbaijani tribunal, guilty of treason for the benefit of Iran. Also in Baku, Irans attempts to export a more conservative version of Islam than the one practiced in Azerbaijan breed suspicion.104 In 2011, the leader of the Azerbaijani Islamic Party was also arrested for involvement in the protests held in front of the Ministry of Education against the prohibition of wearing hijabs in the Azerbaijani schools (Abbasov, 2011). The party, which is considered pro-Iranian and suspected of receiving financial support from Tehran, was outlawed in Azerbaijan. The arrest of its leader was preceded by critical statements of the clerics and politicians in Iran regarding the decision of the Azerbaijani government to ban wearing hijabs in schools. High-ranking officials in Tehran warned the authorities in Baku about the imminence of a popular revolt if the right to religious freedom is restricted in Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani leadership is concerned by the attempts at projecting Irans soft power in Azerbaijan, which threatens the very bases of the current political regime. Since February 2010, Iran has liberalized unilaterally the visa regime with Azerbaijanis, with the
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exception of a single category, the journalists. Since then, Tehran demands reciprocity for the Iranian citizens. Tehran finances the Iranian TV station Sahar, which broadcasts in Azerbaijani and covers the southern parts of Azerbaijan, where a compact Talysh minority, culturally and linguistically close to Iran, lives. The activity of the TV station is considered in Baku as aimed to undermine the governments monopoly in the informational space. Besides accusations brought to the central Azerbaijani authorities for their cooperation with the US and Israel, the TV station regularly invites representatives of the civil society to discuss the democratic backslide in Azerbaijan.105 Such TV debates have intensified ever since the outbreak of revolutionary movements in the Middle East. All these have strengthened in Baku the feeling that Iran represents a threat, which has created a widening gap between Azerbaijan and its southern neighbor. Moreover, the growing conflict within the Iranian top leadership is perceived as a potentially destabilizing factor in the region, which only amplifies the state of anxiety in Baku.

pro-Western course of the Georgian foreign policy has been adapted to the new macro-regional reality.

III.3.1. The US
Although the bilateral relationship has been de-personalized during President Obamas Administration, the US plays an important role in Georgias foreign policy strategy. The young political elite in Tbilisi, educated in the West, is largely inspired, in its public policies, from the American model. The intensified cooperation with the US enjoys overwhelming popular support. In the 2011 public opinion surveys, 58% of the citizens think that the US is Georgias most important political and economic partner, with a slight drop from the 63% in 2008 (International Republican Institute, 2008b, 2011). The protests organized in 2011 in front of the American embassy in Tbilisi by some activists did not attract a significant support and were denounced by the rest of the Georgian opposition. The Georgian leaders used their relation with the US, after the 2008 war, to neutralize the international isolation strategy, that Russia promoted worldwide vis--vis Tbilisi. Thus, in 2009, Georgia signed the Charter on Strategic Partnership with the US. Although it did not provide similar security guarantees as the one concluded between Japan and the US, this document reconfirmed the American political support. This was mirrored later in the US Senate resolution regarding the violation of Georgias territorial integrity and sovereignty by Russia (US Senate, 2011). The VicePresident of the United States and the US Secretary of State visited Tbilisi in 2009 and 2010, respectively. In 2010, the dialogue between the two heads of state was resumed. In addition to de-isolation efforts, Tbilisi resorted to US influence to discourage the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the international community.106 The potentially negative economic or political consequences on the bilateral
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III.3. Georgia due West

Although it remains a goal that can hardly be reached in the foreseeable future, the countrys reintegration is the major preoccupation of the Tbilisi authorities. In the short and mid run, however, Georgia aims to achieve the following objectives: to impede the international recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to ensure security along its administrative northern border, to attract investments and financial assistance from foreign donors for an intensive domestic development, to set up the closest possible relationships with NATO and the EU, which, in a favorable context, would facilitate full integration in these organizations. Hence, Georgias foreign policy is strongly oriented towards the West. After the 2008 war, the openly
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Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

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relations with Washington in case of recognition of the two separatist regions were a strong reason for many states in the Western hemisphere to turn down Moscows offer. To address the acute security deficit, Georgia made efforts to increase its military cooperation with the US and NATO. In 2008, a NATO-Georgia commission was created, in order to intensify the political consultations and practical cooperation. From 2009 on, Georgia has begun implementing the national annual program targeting security sector reforms. This pattern of annual programs is usually applied to the states that have received their Membership Action Plan (MAP) therefore, Georgia represents an exception. Georgia is part of the northern distribution network leading to Afghanistan, which has grown in importance due to the increased vulnerability of transit through Pakistan and US troops surge in Afghanistan. The port of Poti serves as a point of liaison with Azerbaijan, wherefrom cargoes continue their transit across the Caspian Sea. The Tbilisi government has considerably increased its military presence in Afghanistan. Having 937 troops deployed in 2010, Georgia counts among the largest contributors, among the non-NATO states, to the stabilization missions in Afghanistan. Tbilisi is also ready to reinforce its contingent in Afghanistan with another 600 troops (Civil.Ge, 2011g). In exchange, Georgia sought to acquire weaponry and equipment that would reestablish its defense capabilities seriously affected by the 2008 war. The US administration has declined such requests and offered, in exchange, more programs of military training and common exercises (Charap and Welt, 2011, pp. 56-57). The US Government occasionally made military donations or invested in the modernization of the equipment that the Georgian armed forces already possessed. Forty light-armored Humvee vehicles were donated in 2011 to the Georgian military contingent dispatched to the theater of operations in Afghanistan (Civil.Ge, 2011h). Moreover, the US financed the modernization works for three patrol ships of the Georgian coast guard and the construction of a ship maintenance facility.
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Although the US authorities have refrained from supplying weaponry, the policy of resetting the relations with Russia has been beneficial for Georgias national security. The de-tensioning of the Russo-American relations guarantees Georgias military security to a certain extent, in the sense that there are less chances of a Russian massive conventional attack against it.107 The US actively discouraged Russia from initiating open aggressive actions against Georgia. The 2009 Moscow talks between the presidents of Russia and the US are illustrative in the context of the slight escalation of the situation in the conflict zones.108 Georgia perceives the Russo-American resetting as a circumstantial evolution and the conflict with Russia as a constant factor in its foreign policy in a foreseeable future: How long will the Russo-American resetting last?, a Georgian analyst in Tbilisi wonders, while evaluating the alternatives before Georgia for its military security. The Cold War has not ended for Georgia109, an official adds. Hence, the major concern in Tbilisi is to guarantee the countrys national security in case the Russo-American reset dies out and the Kremlin persists in its endeavor to redirect the Georgian foreign policy, ultimately by the political regime change.110 The US is an essential economic partner and foreign donor for Georgia. It is Georgias fifth trade partner, accounting for 7.2% of the total commercial exchanges in 2010 (EU Commission, 2011c). Moreover, the US is the main foreign investor in Georgia with $135.8 million in 2010. Foreign investments in Georgia dropped dramatically from $2 billion in 2007 to $814 million in 2010 (Civil.Ge, 2011e). At the same time, Georgias economic growth was based, over the past few years, on the massive attraction of foreign investors. Presenting the country in the regional context, a local expert explains: We do not have a powerful Diaspora,
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we do not have oil and natural gas, so we must attract investments111. Hence, US investments are essential for the resuming and maintaining of Georgias positive economic growth. The US is also a major foreign donor in Georgia. From 2006 to 2011, through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the US Government financed numerous infrastructure and development projects in Georgia, worth almost $400 million. The program has had a decisive impact on the integration and modernization of the infrastructure in the regions inhabited by the Armenian and Azerbaijani minorities in Georgia. The possibility to extend the program for another term is currently under discussion. After the Russo-Georgian war, the US contributed $1 billion to the efforts of reconstruction, supporting the IDPs and economic development in Georgia. The US financial contribution to the effort of the foreign donors was crucial for Georgias successful overcoming of the double shock caused by the war and the global financial crisis.

III.3.2. The EU
Forced by the 2008 events in Georgia, the EU has assumed a significant role in guaranteeing the countrys security and macro-economic stability. The Russo-Georgian war reversed the priorities of the Georgian political leaders. Since the accelerated accession to NATO is unfeasible, Tbilisi put more emphasis on the European integration and cooperation with the EU in the field of security. In 2010, Georgia aligned with 28 of the 44 EU foreign and security policy statements open for support (EU Commission, 2011g). Within the framework of the Eastern Partnership multilateral platform democracy, good governance, and stability, Georgia expressed interest for cooperation with the EU in the field of the common security policy.112 In 2010, Georgia opened the negotiations on Association Agreement, signed
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a visa facilitation agreement, and joined the European common aviation area. The adjustments of the foreign policy priorities have met support in Georgian public opinion. According to the surveys, 79% of the Georgians declare themselves in favor of Georgias joining the EU (Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009b). The countrys closer relation with the EU is motivated by national security imperatives and the drive for political and economic modernization. As a mediator for the cease-fire in 2008, the EU is guarantor of the Sarkozy-Medvedev plan implementation. Consequently, Tbilisi wishes that the EU puts more pressure on Russia to determine it to observe all the provisions of the 2008 peace deal. The Georgian officials are often critical of the EU, blaming it for being too soft in relation to Russia.113 At the same time, they are fully aware that the EU neutralizes Russias military threat to a certain extent114, and that Georgia must avoid being perceived by the EU as a burden in its relations with Russia. In 2008, the EU deployed a civilian monitoring mission (EUMM) of 340 observers, that significantly reduces the chances of another conflict. The presence of the EU observers is essential for the impartial monitoring of the situation on Georgias administrative border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to override Russias allegations regarding Georgias military buildup in the vicinity of the conflict zones. The authorities in Tbilisi signed a three-month memorandum with the EUMM in 2009, meant to be prolonged tacitly unless any of the signing parts pulls out, which imposes restrictions as to the movement of troops in the vicinity of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia has also taken upon itself to inform EUMM about the redeployment of troops on its territory. The EU is part of the Geneva talks in which Georgia, Russia, the US, the OSCE, the UN, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia are involved. The consultations take place in two working groups:
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Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011. Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011.

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security and refugees. In 2009, the parties involved convened to establish a hot line and to create an incident prevention mechanism, that envisions weekly meetings between the observers and the officers responsible with security in the conflict zone. The EU has been and remains decisive for the preservation of the territorial integrity of Georgia. This was confirmed by its discouraging of other states to recognize the two separatist entities. The subtle warning addressed to the Minsk authorities in 2009 regarding the negative effects of the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the cooperation between Belarus and the EU is a good example in this sense. At the same time, the policy of certain EU-member states on arms trade caused concerns in Tbilisi as to the impact on national and regional military security. In 2011, France signed a contract for selling two Mistral helicopter carriers to Russia. Georgia is concerned that such an acquisition is bound to reinforce the Russian military presence in the Black Sea. In august 2008, Russia resorted to war ships allocated to the Black Sea Harmony operation for maintaining regional security, that reunites the litoral states.115 Given that the 2008 invasion of Georgia was partially launched from the sea and Russia seems to have been confronted with a deficit of operational ships, Tbilisi does not rule out the possibility that such acquisitions are meant to increase the projection capacity of the Russian military forces in a potential Black Sea conflict. As a high-ranking Russian officer explained, referring to the August 2008 hostilities, what it took us twenty-six hours to do, this [Mistral] ship does in forty minutes (Kommersant, 2009). Economically, the EU and its member-states are actively involved in Georgias multi-dimensional modernization. The EU is Georgias number one trade partner, with a 31.7% of the total volume of exchanges in 2010 (EU Commission,
115 Interview with a former high-ranking official, Bucharest, April 2011.

2011c). The Netherlands and Great Britain range second and third among the top investors in Georgia in 2010, with $73.4 million and $59 million, respectively (Civil.Ge, 2011e). The EU is an attractive labor market for the Georgians. According to the public opinion barometer, 30% of the Georgians would choose the EU as a destination for working abroad (Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009b). The EU member-states combined came second as a source of remittances to Georgia in the first half of 2011: Greece, Italy, Spain, and Germany ranged second to fifth in this top, after Russia (Civil.Ge, 2011i). In the post-conflict years (2008-2011), the EU has allocated 483.5 million euros for Georgia, while 131.27 million euros came form individual EU member-states (Fean, 2009, p. 9). In its 2011-2013 projected budget, the EU has envisioned 180.3 million euros as financial assistance for Georgia, that may attract additional funding from the regional and trans-boundary programs (EU Commission, 2011g). A crucial phase of Georgias European integration is the creation of a DCFTA. The EU decided in 2008 to create a DCFTA in Georgia and sent to the Georgian government a set of preconditions for the beginning of negotiations. The debates as to the advantages and disadvantages, the costs and benefits of an EU-Georgia DCFTA are extremely intense in government and academic circles. The advocates of the idea argue that a DCFTA is their countrys only way of getting closer to the EU, of adopting the European standards, and attracting long-term foreign investments. Even if the implementation process is very costly, we have to pay the price116, says an experienced local observer. The opponents, most of whom represent the ultra-liberal orientation of the Georgian elite, argue that a DCFTA, by introducing new bureaucratic institutions and complicated regulations in the various economic sectors, will encourage corruption and to keep away the investors that Georgia needs right now.
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Moreover, they argue that the swift introduction of European standards would drive the Georgia producers off the market, since they would be unable to meet the costs of adopting those standards.117 These heated debates have had an impact on the way Georgia has implemented the reforms needed for the beginning of talks, which is reflected in the latest EU evaluation report for Georgia (EU Commission, 2011g). Thus, the opinions are divided in Tbilisi. While officials insist that Georgia has met the EUs initial requirements and is ready to start negotiations118, experts say that many measures were taken too late and only selectively119. It seems that in the short term, at least, Georgia wishes to begin the DCFTA-related negotiations in order to send a positive signal to the foreign investors120 and to reverse the last years downward trend. In its turn, the EU is concerned that, the moment negotiations are started, Tbilisi would take advantage of it to attract foreign investments, so the interest to conclude the agreement would drop (Waal, 2011, p. 37).

III.3.3. Turkey
Over the last five years, the relationship between Georgia and Turkey has known a rapid quantitative and qualitative development. There are regular bilateral state visits and government consultations. The relationship between the Georgian president and the Turkish prime-minister is strengthened by several joint projects implemented during their successive mandates. Turkey is the only neighboring country with whom Georgia has a delineated and demarcated border. To facilitate trade and tourist visits, the two countries have concluded a free trade agreement, have liberalized the visa regime (one may travel using just a regular
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identity card), and have opened a modern joint border checkpoint in Sarpi (Adjaria), that manages 90% of the bilateral terrestrial traffic. They are soon to begin working on yet another border checkpoint, Cildir Aktas. In 2005 and 2008, the Turkish company TAV obtained the contract for the management of the Batumi airport over a period of twenty years and of the Tbilisi one for a period of fifteen years. There is regular air and bus transportation between Turkey and Georgia and the construction of a direct railroad connection is under way. The two countries are interconnected through oil, gas, and electricity transport networks, that only solidifies their economic interdependence. In 2011, Georgia signed an agreement with Turkey for the construction of three hydro-electric plants in Samtskhe-Javakheti and of an electrical power transmission line from Batumi to Arakli (News.Az, 2011m). Georgia has only begun electricity exports to the European market and its deliveries are made across Turkey. Hence, Turkey has rapidly turned into a bridge connecting Georgia to Europe. There is also an intensive human transit between the two countries. Experts estimate that about 100,000 Georgians work in Turkey.121 In 2009, about 350,000 Turks visited Georgia (Chkhikvadze, 2010). The number of tourists grows every year. In the first four months of 2011 alone, almost 268,000 Turks traveled to Georgia (News.Am, 2011a). The intensification of the bilateral relations has transformed Turkey into one of Georgias main economic partners. The Turkish-Georgian trade exchanges have increased by 230% over the last five years (Fisher Onar, 2009). Consequently, Turkey is Georgias second trade partner, with a 15.6% of the total volume of exchanges in 2010 (EU Commission, 2011c). In 2010, Turkey was the second biggest foreign investor in Georgia, with $91.8 million (Civil.Ge, 2011e). It also ranged sixth, in the first half of 2011, among the states wherefrom remittances come to Georgia (Civil.Ge, 2011i).
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Until the outbreak of the 2008 war, Tbilisi and Ankara had an extended military cooperation on the basis of an agreement signed in 1997. Georgias aspiration to become a NATO member-state has brought the Turkish and Georgian armies very close together. Turkey has provided technical assistance and trained Georgian troops in order to help its neighbor country adjust to NATO standards and to ensure their inter-operability in the international missions. In 2006, Turkeys military assistance for Georgia totaled $1.8 million (Torbakov, 2008, p. 9). The military cooperation between the two countries went on after 2008 as well, though on a lower scale, since the Russian factor weighed heavily enough in Ankaras political calculations. However, the question affecting the bilateral relationship is Turkeys role in Abkhazia. There is a numerous Abkhazian Diaspora in Turkey, that pushes the government towards closer relations with the separatist province. Besides the Diasporas lobby, the Ankara authorities themselves wish to deepen their interaction with Abkhazia, based on the following reasoning: unless we counter-balance Moscow economically and politically, Abkhazia will eventually be absorbed by Russia.122 Although the Turkish-Abkhazian sea connection is closed, trade exchanges between the two sides take place. Sukhumi states that Turkey is Abkhazias second largest trade partner after Russia (Vindimian, 2010, p. 5). In 2009, a Turkish diplomat went to Sukhumi for consultations with the separatist authorities and the Abkhazian leader went on a four-day visit to Turkey in 2011, during which he met with representatives of the Diaspora and businessmen. Tbilisi partially accepts Ankaras arguments, but does not wish that attempts to prevent the absorption of Abkhazia by Russia turn into an international legitimation of the regime in Sukhumi, that could lead, eventually, to the recognition of Abkhazias independence. Consequently, from 1999 to 2006, Georgia stopped over sixty ships going from
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Turkey to Abkhazia and obstructed in 2009 the opening of the Turkish Benetton branch in Sukhumi (ibidem; Civil.Ge, 2009c). In 2009, in a case that produced tension in the bilateral relations, a Tbilisi tribunal sentenced the Turkish commander of a ship that was heading towards Abkhazia and was retained in the Georgian waters, to twenty-four years in prison for smuggling and unauthorized economic activities. Following pressures from the Turkish government, the sentence was commuted and the Turkish citizen released. Hence, the Turkish authorities gave no sign of intention to give up on the engagement strategy with Abkhazia123, while Georgia realized that it cannot effectively oppose such a process. In 2011, Ankara and Tbilisi conducted intense negotiations on the interaction with Abkhazia, that would not raise concerns within the Georgian government.124 The multi-level rapprochement between Georgia and Turkey coincided with Turkeys growing alienation from the EU. Although the relationship with Ankara is considered important for the achievement of its foreign policy objectives, Tbilisis perception about Turkeys role and interests in the region has altered: Turkey is no longer a regional power that projects the Western interests in South Caucasus125, an official shares the Georgian perspective; Turkey remains an important partner for Georgia, but Ankaras motives are not always clear in Tbilisi126, a local expert adds. Turkeys estrangement from Europe is being seen in Tbilisi through the lens of its own efforts to come closer to the EU and of the impact such a trend may have on Georgia. As an observer remarks, the constant threat from the North and Turkeys estrangement from the EU make up a regional environment not exactly favorable to Georgias European integration127.
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III.3.4. Iran
Before 2006, Georgia showed no particular interest for deep bilateral relations with Iran. Infrequent political contacts and an insignificant volume of trade exchanges characterized the relations between Tbilisi and Tehran. Politically and economically, Georgia looked intensely beyond the Black Sea. The fact that the two countries do not share a common border contributed to their relative enstragement. In 2006, however, when the Russo-Georgian relations deteriorated, Georgia turned, as an emergency solution, to the gas imports from Iran. At the end of 2006, the Tbilisi government intended to cut gas imports from Russia by 80%. The uncertainty as to the date when Azerbaijan could technically begin to supply Georgia with gas from the Shakh Deniz gas field forced Georgia to consider the possibility of importing small quantities of gas from Iran. But Georgias foreign policy course left little room for the development of close neighborly relations with Iran. Georgia discovered very soon the limits of its cooperation in the field of energy with Iran, since the US took position against a long-term energy cooperation between the two countries (Civil.Ge, 2006). In 2008, the war with Russia indirectly changed the momentum in the relations between Tbilisi and Tehran. The Russian constant military threat, the de-personalization of relations with the US, and the economic crisis contributed to a more balanced Georgian foreign policy. The government adopted a more inclusive regional outlook in its foreign policy. Tbilisi realized that, in the post-conflict security setting, it was vital that Georgia develop a positive agenda with all regional powers. Hence, without radically altering its strategic orientation, Georgia no longer rules out, in principle, any cooperation alternative.128 Tehran seized the opportunity and reacted rapidly to Georgias overtures. The Georgian Foreign Minister visited Tehran in 2010 and promised that Georgia would not act against Tehran, irrespective of the
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alliances it is a part of (Civil.Ge, 2010). Thus, in diplomatic jargon, Tbilisi sent a message that Georgia would not provide its territory to launch military operations against Iran. Georgia took advantage of the favorable moment and relaunched its relations with Tehran at the very moment when the Russo-Iranian ones grew colder (Oxford Analytica, 2010) and Iran felt more and more isolated in the world. Subsequently, a delegation led by an Iranian diplomat visited Tbilisi and brought there a series of Iranian proposals for cooperation in the field of producing and exporting electricity (Lomsadze, 2010). In 2010, Iran opened a consulate in Batumi and in 2011 the two sides agreed on the liberalization of the visa regime and on the establishing of direct flights from Tehran to Tbilisi and to Batumi. Thus, Georgia instrumentalized its cooperation with Iran, so as to stimulate its tourist industry. Although the bilateral trade was slightly revitalized, Iran is still an insignificant trade partner for Georgia. Only 0.6% of the total trade volume was represented by the countrys exchanges with Iran in 2010 (EU Commission, 2011c). Iran proved to be much more enthusiastic and pro-active than Georgia, while the Georgian authorities showed more reservation and coordinated their actions with the US.129 Hence, what Tbilisi conceived as pragmatic cooperation that would not jeopardize its relationships with the West, Tehran interpreted as a chance to project its own influence in the region and draw Georgia into a much more intense bilateral cooperation. Therefore, while Tehran is looking for ways of taking maximum advantage from new opportunities, Tbilisi is trying to keep a certain distance.130

III.3.5. Russia
Unlike other regional actors, Russia is being perceived in Tbilisi as a major obstacle for the achievement of the
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Georgian strategic national objectives. In the opinion surveys, 83% of the Georgians identify Russia as the main threat for Georgias security (International Republican Institute, 2011). Several factors explain such an attitude. Russia has military control over about 20% of the Georgian territory, including the Akhalgori region, which was under the jurisdiction of the Tbilisi authorities until August 2008 (see Map 7, opposite page). The Russian troops are stationed 50 kilometers from Tbilisi. In case of a conflict, Russia would find it easy to block the transport infrastructure that connects Eastern and Western Georgia and to rapidly reach the countrys capital. Russia has deployed 3,800 troops and 1,000 border guards from the Federal Security Service in the two Georgian separatist regions. Besides investing massively in the military infrastructure, Moscow has also initiated the process of demarcation of the administrative border between Georgia, on the one hand, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the other hand. It supports financially 70 to 90% of the two separatist republics budgets. Russian state companies are gradually taking over control of the strategic infrastructure, such as the railroads or the Babushera airport in Abkhazia. The Kremlin has made diplomatic and financial efforts to expand the list of states or micro-states that have recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Thus, Russia intends to permanently separate the two regions from Georgia, so as to minimize the chances of their reintegration, even in a distant future. The Russian diplomacy makes considerable efforts to isolate Georgia externally and to prevent arms supplies, even defensive ones, to the Georgian armed forces. Russia is explicitly against Georgias joining not only NATO, but the EU as well.131 Despite the lack of diplomatic relations, multiple economic connections have survived between the two countries. Russia was Georgias seventh trade partner in 2010, with a 4.4% of the total trade volume (EU Commission, 2011c).
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Map 7 Georgia and the two separatist regions (Source: Wikipedia)

Russian companies (Vympelkom, Inter RAO, Itera, VTB) are present in Georgias telecommunications, energy, finances, and banking sectors. Georgia still imports almost 8 to 10% of gas from Russia. Natural gas is being imported through the company Itera, which has distribution contracts with 103 local companies (Postnikov, 2008, p. 54). But the main beneficiary of these supplies, presumably at a preferential price, is the Itera-owned Azot chemical plant in Rustavi.132 There is an agreement with Russia regarding the mutual supplies of electricity, which has remained in force after the 2008 conflict. About 700,000 Georgians work in Russia. The money transferred back home represents about 63% of the overall remittances incoming to Georgia (ibidem, p. 56). Although 72% of the Georgians believe that the Russian aggression against Georgia is going on, about 90% of the respondents support the political dialogue and economic interaction with Russia (International Republican Institute,
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2011). Hence, considering the economic relations and the public opinions stance, the major challenge for the Tbilisi government is to identify a functional way of co-existing with Russia. Over the past two years, the authorities in Tbilisi have had several initiatives aimed to relieve the tension in relations with Moscow.133 In 2010, Georgia unilaterally committed itself not to use force in order to reintegrate the country. Although it serves Armenias economic interests, the reopening of the Verhni Lars Kazbeghi custom point in 2010 was also part of the Georgian efforts to de-escalate the conflict with Russia. In October 2008, Georgia unilaterally simplified its visa regime for Russian citizens. They may obtain Georgian visas at the checkpoint, without having to go through a lengthy application procedure. Starting with 2011, visas may also be obtained at the entry point Verhni Lars Kazbeghi. In 2010 and 2011, the Moscow Tbilisi, Moscow Batumi, and, respectively, Moscow Kutaisi flights were resumed. Georgia finds it necessary to continue the Geneva talks, in spite of Russias often obstructive attitude. As an official explains, It is sometimes necessary to keep a process going for the sake of the process itself 134. In 2011, at Moscows request, the Russo-Georgian negotiations on removing Georgias veto on Russias membership in the WTO were resumed. Moreover, there have been high-level contacts between the two heads of church. The patriarchs met in Kiev in the summer of 2011. Alongside a number of positive measures, Georgia has kept pushing several initiatives that caused irritation in Russia. In 2010, Georgia unilaterally liberalized the visa regime for the Russian citizens residing in seven national republics in North Caucasus. According to the authorities, 600 residents from the region cross the Russo-Georgian border daily (Ekho Moskvy, 2011). In 2011, Georgia also
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launched the PIK TV station accessible by satellite, which broadcasts in Russian and covers the events in South and North Caucasus. The primary target-group of this TV station is the public in North Caucasus. The stations webpage has about 7 or 8 thousands single visitors from Russia (Elder, 2011). In 2011, the Georgian parliament recognized the 19th-century Circassian genocide committed by Tsarist Russia. The tragic events that accompanied the campaign of conquering the Caucasus took place in 1864 in Krasnaya Polyana, one of the localities which will host the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. The Georgian authorities plan to inaugurate a memorial dedicated to the victims of the Circassian genocide in 2012, not far from the Abkhazian border. Last, but not least, the Georgian political discourse appeals to comparisons with Russia in order to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the Russian political regime. Police reform, fight against corruption, improvement of the business environment, and renovation of Batumi are often used to compare with developments in Russia, such as the police abuses, the systemic corruption, the foreign investors harassment, and the deficient preparation of Sochi for the Olympic Games. Although not meant exclusively to annoy Russia, such political actions undoubtedly aim at making it more vulnerable: Russia is satisfied with the status quo, while Georgia wants Russia to pay the price for the current situation135, a local analyst explains the logic behind certain measures; Russia has not paid an adequate price so far, so Georgia tries to make it feel uncomfortable in the very region where it feels vulnerable136, the expert details the motivation of Georgias policies in North Caucasus. At the same time, the Tbilisi government also has in mind security requirements. North Caucasus, that neighbors Georgia, will remain in the long run a turbulent area. Tbilisi tries to project its soft
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power to ensure a favorable attitude towards Georgia in the North-Caucasian republics.137 The cumulated effects of the actions meant to make Russia feel uncomfortable and of those meant to dissipate tension in bilateral relations produce a difficult cohabitation between Georgia and Russia.

Conclusions
Two decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, South Caucasus is an immense site under construction, whose final political, economic, and security-related architecture is still hard to envision. As the analysis shows, a number of factors contribute to the uncertainty concerning the regions future. First, two of the three republics do not have full control over their entire sovereign territory and the violent or peaceful changes of borders cannot be ruled out. Second, an important social segment of refugees and IDPs have been living in expectation for almost twenty years. Whether they return to their homes or not will impact the evolutions in the conflicts areas and the policies of their host-states. Third, South Caucasus is a region with many closed borders and fragmented trans-boundary communication. Consequently, the opening of the borders will have a multi-dimensional benefic impact on the entire region. At the same time, if the borders are kept closed, the regional projects will always keep someone out, thus fueling the animosities and regional fragmentation. Fourth, the states harbor a sense of security deficit at regional level, which motivates not only the excessive militarization, but also the drive for security externalization. The competing agendas of the influential regional actors often hinder rather than nurture inclusive regional solutions. Playing great powers off one another to achieve conflicting national objectives fully contributes to the general feeling of insecurity in the area. Fifth,
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the various external orientations and domestic national projects contribute to the variable geometry of the region. The states join or aspire to join alternative organizations or military alliances like CSTO, NATO, CIS, GUAM, BSEC, the EU, or the Non-Aligned Movement. Finally, South Caucasus neighbors turbulent (sub)regions like North Caucasus or the Middle East, wherefrom instability and elements of unpredictability are being exported. Cumulated, all these variables contribute to a multitude of scenarios that the region might develop along in the future. The normalization of the Turkish-Armenian relationship combined with the potential progress in the solving of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could vindicate the region from the logic of the zero-sum game and lay down preconditions for the trilateral regional cooperation. But one cannot rule out, however, the fact that the regional inertia, which is characterized by multi-speed developments and multi-directional evolutions could be the only certainty for South Caucasus during this decade.

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United Nations, 2008. Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly 62/243. The Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan, 25 April (available at: http://www.un.org/ ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/62/243). US Senate, 2011. Resolution with Respect to Ongoing Violations of the Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty of Georgia and the Importance of a Peaceful and Just Resolution to the Conflict within Georgias Internationally Recognized Borders, 27 July (available at: http://www.civil.ge/files/files/2011/Senate Resolution175.pdf). Valiyev, Anar, 2011. Neither Friend nor Foe. Azerbaijans Perceptions of Russia, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo no. 147 (available at: http://ada.edu.az/uploads/file/neither %20Friend%20nor%20Foe.pdf). Vardanyan, Tamara, 2011. Tbilisskie Armiane: Novyie Reali, in Globus Natsionalinoi Bezopasnosti, no. 2 (available at: http://www.armpyatigorsk.org/articles/17). Vindimian, Marianna, 2010. Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Georgia, ISPI Policy Brief no. 196 (available at: http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/PB_196_2010. pdf). World Bank, 2010. Doing Business 2011 (available at: http:// www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/fpdkm/doing%20 business/documents/annual-reports/english/db11-fullreport.pdf). Zhahanina, Lizaveta, 2010. Opening the Border at Upper Larsi-Kazbeghi: A Good Beginning, in Investor.Ge, no. 2 (available at: http://www.investor.ge/issues/2010_2/03.htm). Ziflioglu, Vercihan, 2010. Armenian Tourists Prefer Turkeys South, East, in Hurriyet, 4 August (available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=armeniantourists-prefer-turkey8217s-south-2010-08-03).

Angela Grmad

South Caucasus between Political Economy and Energy-Based Politics

I. The Macro-Economic Context of Regional Development

The orientation of foreign policies and security strategies depends, first and foremost, on the success of the economic policies a state or any other major actor practices. Most subjects of public international law have to admit the importance of economic factors when they conceive of new schemes for government action or economic growth. Without a well-documented economic basis doubled by efficient programs, no state will ever manage to keep up with the top actors that administrate the processes and phenomena going on at international level. Making use of financial investments or political pressure to subordinate regions like South Caucasus which is important for its oil and natural gas resources and its various connections to all parts of the world is one of the most efficient methods the great powers resort to in order to accomplish their national objectives and goals. This region is rich in natural resources of the most various kind, not only oil and gas, but many more, like plutonium and gold. Its capacity of transporting such resources from East to West and from North to South has transformed the area and has attracted many national interests and economic objectives. Thus, the profit resulting from the presence of the political
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factor in the area may present a lot of characteristics, but its economic side is by far the most important. The region is connected to the Russian Federation, but also depends on the technical and financial support of both the European Union, and the United States of America. The economic and energy potential of South Caucasus is favorable for the creation of several connections with the outside world. On-site studies reveal the regions inaccessibility by the potential foreign investors. There is, indeed, a cheap and well-trained labor force, which represents an advantage, but then any investor has to deal with monopolies or oligopolies, with corruption at the highest level, with the outdated institutional system, with legislative gaps, with uncertain political circumstances, and with the refusal to act according to the new trends of modernization and technological advance both in the political, and in the economic spheres, so that the South-Caucasian products may guarantee a superior added value. The most important point to be considered, that this paper wishes to emphasize, is that South Caucasus must be studied as a whole. What makes the difference between its component states is the availability to take part in various processes of integration in the worldwide economic circuit, plus the capacity of negotiating the best price for the resources each possesses, keeping in mind their typology and quality. The available energy resources and the infrastructure needed for their transportation should be the number one argument for stimulating the interest in the implementation of reforms and the modernization of the economies. A steady course towards development could lead in time to the increase of the authorities capacity of negotiating in the process of conflict-solving and to the decrease of the Russian Federations political influence.

1. The implementation of economic reforms between necessity and incapacity The improvement of a states social realities may be accomplished through the implementation of deep-reaching
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economic reforms. These are meant to achieve certain structural changes that later allow for growth of the economic indicators and social progress. The lack of previous experience in the management of the states domestic affairs, as well as the excessive dependence on a partner or on certain regional processes have led to the appearance of discrepancies between the levels of economic development of the states that make up the region of South Caucasus. There are multiple political or economic causes for this, but the best solution is to follow the national objectives or interests as a unique source of inspiration for the measures and actions that must be implemented in order to have a harmonious development of a society. The three states that make up South Caucasus have all felt, since they declared their independence, the temptation to resort to advanced models of economic development. Estonia, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates are some examples of states whose economic results have greatly influenced the attitude of the South-Caucasian authorities as to the method to be applied inside or the form of regional integration to be sought outside. Their intricate connections to the economic processes and the policies promoted by the Russian Federation and the maintaining of certain features typical for the authoritarian regimes have contributed to the creation of a political milieu that is hostile to the implementation of the strategies and actions that are capable to bring South Caucasus closer to the world economic market. While Georgia and Armenia have been members of the World Trade Organization since 2000 and 2003, respectively (WTO, 2008) and accept the norms and principles of this form of international integration, Azerbaijan seems to have created its own pattern of penetrating the world circuit, which is being supported by the oil and natural gases it possesses and by the prices of these resources on the world markets. In both Tbilisi, and Baku, the pattern used by the authorities in Singapore to sustain the economy had its supporters at one time or another.1 The renouncing
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Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

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of this model had several explanations: it was difficult to adapt to South Caucasus because of the conditions the three new independent states had to face immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, no one was politically willing to assume the implementation of that model, or the governments simply turned towards other regional models, much closer to them philosophically. Georgia, for instance, took its models of economic development, in turn, from Turkey, Estonia, and even the United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan from Singapore and the EAU, while Armenia was tempted to get inspiration, al least partially, from the Baltic states experience. Through their logic in action, their concepts and tendencies, the European models of economic development are much more familiar to Georgia and Armenia, while Azerbaijan makes proof of its Oriental and Asian affinities. This last state is often included among the Central Asian nations. If a state relies exclusively on its natural resources, its regional political independence may be short-lived. The existence and trading of these is not a compulsory condition for the growth of social welfare, one of the main macro-economic indicators, that allows for a broader appreciation of a states level of economic development. Managing the affairs of a state that possesses oil and gas may become quite a problem in time, one that can only be solved by the transparency of governing itself and of how the income from the oil business is being used. The economies of petro-states depend mostly on the prices of crude and processed oil on the world markets. In such conditions, a decrease of the price of oil would have lesser consequences in Armenia and Georgia, which are less dependent on the selling of energy resources. According to the International Monetary Fund estimates, the Republic of Azerbaijan may be classified as a state dependent on the income from oil-selling contracts (Ahmedov et al., 2009, p. 6). To determine the similarities and differences existing in the process of transformation of the South-Caucasian states economies, it is necessary to outline the specificities of each
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country in turn. Indeed, the fact that the three component states of the region are all ex-Soviet republics could be the starting-point of the study, but it would be unfair to ignore certain national tendencies, existing both previously, and at the time they were part of the Soviet Union. Most problems that the authorities and citizens in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan have to face may be found in all the ex-Soviet states, yet the great powers level of interest differs from one region to another. This is why outlining the features that make the difference when it comes to the specific economic development of the three South-Caucasian states is a primary condition for contriving recommendations that the decision-makers may use to attract foreign investments in the area by reducing the level of political instability, by liberalizing the prices, by fighting corruption and the monopolies, so that the other economic indicators involved in the studying of a states level of economic development reach the desired level. Transition to the market economy should not turn into a long-term declarative principle. It should be reached by implementing measures based on pragmatism, effective on a longer term, so that stability and economic growth may sustain the national security of every South-Caucasian state. Moreover, it is well-known that the solving of economic problems, the implementation of reforms, and the steady determination to go beyond a certain stage of development, i.e., successfully finalizing what is called today the period of transition to market economy may result in the partners openness towards the solving of older, regional problems of a political nature. Armenia, often called the Diaspora paradox2, has felt the effects of the worldwide economic crisis more than the other two South-Caucasian states. In 2009, Armenias Gross Domestic Product (GDP) experienced a 14.4% drop (Civilitas Foundation, 2010) expressed in monetary units,
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Interview with a political analyst, Yerevan, June 2011.

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i.e. from $12 billion in 2008 to $8.7 billion in 2009. Certain branches of the national economy registered either a slowing down of the development rate, or even a regress. Constructions, agriculture, or the metallurgical industry were among the worst affected, the last because of the drop in prices on the international metal markets. In the Soviet period, Armenia was well-known for the development of its metallurgical industry and processing infrastructure, with high indicators due to the well-trained labor force, the rich resources and a secure market within the USSR. Considering the fact that many features of these countries economies have remained virtually unchanged since the Soviet period, that their infrastructure has become outdated, and that Yerevan has been under the influence of the Russian Federation most of its independent life, cumulated with the regional economic and energy isolation, it is obvious that the worldwide economic recession has had the deepest impact on this particular state. No sooner than in 2010 did the Armenian economy experience its first steps forward, the GDP going up by about 7.6% compared to 2009. However, the economic situation requires massive investments and the implementation of efficient measures for the reformation of all branches of industry and agriculture. Also, as effects of the prolonged worldwide economic crisis, wages went down, while unemployment went up to 6.9%, which contributed even more to the migration of the labor force outside the country. Until 2008, Armenia had the highest average salary in South Caucasus and outmatched Azerbaijan and Georgia. The crisis modified this hierarchy. The labor force migrates mainly towards the Russian Federation, which has initiated a program for sustaining its own free-falling demographic evolution. This program encourages the migration of Armenian citizens to the non-European areas of Russia, where they receive land and money. Russia is also the state where most of the money transferred back home comes from, even if the macro-economic indicators are dropping there as well and the economic domains in which
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most employees come from the CIS states are in recession. The lack of foreign investments in Armenia and the migration of small businesses to neighboring Georgia have political rather than economic reasons. Although the economic reforms introduced by the authorities in Yerevan have not led to notorious results, the lack of a foreign interest for investing in the Armenian economy has been justified, most of the times, by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a factor of regional instability. In fact, as the Armenian officials admit, the conflict was and is the perfect motivation for justifying inaction regarding the implementation of economic reforms, but mainly to conceal acts of high-level corruption. Foreign investors might require that systemic measures of fighting corruption be adopted. Such a vicious circle can only be broken by the political factors firm involvement. The business milieu merges with the states institutions. Most businesses belong to people holding key-offices in the state institutional system.3 The Russian Federation has always been one of Armenias main economic partners. The bilateral economic relationship had a positive trend until 2009, when the first negative effects of the worldwide economic crisis made themselves felt. If in 2008 the trade exchange between Russia and Armenia reached $900 million, the following year it dropped by 19.3%. Only in 2010 were the first positive signs of recovery in the bilateral commercial exchanges registered.4 As a strategic partner of Armenia, the Russian Federation also remains, at this stage, the main investor in the Armenian economy. Russian investors have managed to come into prominence in several sectors: the energy system, the banking system, the extractive industry, and the technologies of information. The presence of Russian investors in Armenia can be analyzed from two perspectives. The first
Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011. Russo-Armenian Interaction and Regional Problems. Papers of the International Conference of June 5th, 2010, Yerevan, NAAPET, 2011, p. 11.
4 The 3

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has to do with Armenias economic dependence on the Russian Federation; the Russians fully control the countrys energy system, because they are majority stockholders in all of the countrys major energy projects, through Gazprom and Inter RAO UES (the company that produces and distributes electricity), they have purchased the entire active stock of the national phone operator Armentel, as well as of Banc VTB and of the Armenian Savings Bank. The second perspective from which the economic Russo-Armenian relationship may be analyzed has to do with the way in which it is being presented by the Armenian officials. They choose to ignore the dependence of the Armenian economy on the Russian Federation and claim that the presence of Russian companies proves how attractive the Armenian economy is to foreign investors. During 2009, Russia promised several ex-Soviet states to grant them preferential or non-refundable credits in order to help those governments overcome the effects of the economic crises. Armenia was one of the few beneficiaries of such a financial support from Russia. So, in early June 2009, the Russian Federation Ministry of Finances transferred to the Armenian government the first installment of the total credit of $500 million. One of the economic activities in Armenia where there is a major potential for development is the selling of drinking water to the Arab countries. So is hydro-energy. The authorities in Yerevan grasp the necessity to diversify the products meant to be exported. In the circumstances of a regionally isolated economy, the Arab states are the main market for the sales of Armenian producers. For Armenias interests, neighboring Iran could become, in time, a road opener towards the regional and international markets. There are currently several ongoing common energy projects with Tehran. These have to do with the supply of hydro-energy to the neighboring country. Armenia admits that it does not agree to the way the Iranian authorities further their foreign policy objectives, but the two partner states are forced by the regional circumstances to cooperate: Iran is Armenias access
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key towards the regional economic markets, while Armenia is Irans access key towards the non-Muslim world, since it is one of the very few Christian states with which it has managed to establish and maintain a bilateral relationship.5 In 2006, Armenia was invited to join the North-South transportation corridor, in order to diversify the transit routes for its goods. In perspective, the Armenian products were to benefit from new transportation opportunities through railroad connections, then by ferry to the Georgian port of Poti. The situation of the transit routes for the goods and services from and to Armenia is this: Georgia 75% of the goods Iran 25% of the goods Turkey embargo Azerbaijan conflict Armenia is excessively dependent on the transiting of its goods through Georgia, which impedes the development of commercial projects with other countries, and not only with those in the region. Although there are proposals for canceling custom fees between the two countries, the process seems to meet with a lot of difficulties. For instance, the Romanian investors disinterest is particularly conditioned by the Armenian markets lack of access to various routes of regional and inter-regional transit. Armenia is connected to the North-South corridor through Georgia, but Romania is interested rather in the East-West corridor. Although present on the Georgian market, Romanian products are being submitted to double taxation until they reach the Armenian market. This aspect, of the double taxation, leads to the increase of prices for various products, because it is reflected in the costs of the respective goods or services. The lack of a diversified system of connections to the main transportation routes of the goods, as well as of those for the transportation of energy products lowers the attractiveness of Armenia as far as investments are concerned. It is for these
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Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.

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reasons that the foreign investors will go on passing up the opportunities existing otherwise on this Caucasian states market and will migrate to Georgia or Azerbaijan. The risks that foreign investors would have to take are too high. Supported by the Kremlin, but also by some international financial institutions for instance, by the IMF after the ceasing of its military conflict with Azerbaijan, Armenia has managed to reenter the regional commercial circuit. The Russian Federation could not forbid the authorities in Yerevan to establish economic connections and bridges to the South. Such an attitude would have become too costly, all the more so as there are already a great many regional conflicts that Russia encourages openly or unofficially, under the pretense of protecting its own citizens rights. If East and West had been off-limits areas for the goods and services of Armenian origin, all that would have been left to do was to encourage relationships with Iran and Georgia, since Turkey and Azerbaijan were inaccessible markets. The Russian Federation will remain Armenias main economic partner in the near future. This bilateral relationship is a calculated one, based on pragmatism. Several European states that have managed to find their way to the Armenian market are Italy (investments in the field of constructions), Romania (oil and chemical products, e.g. diesel), Germany (investments in the development of projects for the construction of mini-hydro-power plants), and France (telecommunications, e.g. Orange). Armenia is by vocation a European state. Its historical and commercial connections with Europe have determined the inclusion of the European integration vector among the South-Caucasian states main strategies and policies. Armenia counts among the six ex-Soviet states included in the Eastern Partnership within the European Neighborhood Policy. The Joint Action Plan Armenia EU was signed on November 14th, 2006, in Brussels. This document refers to Armenias integration in the European political and economic system (Inside Europe, Armenians in Europe, 2006).
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Through its provisions, Armenia agrees to contribute to the acceleration of economic reforms implementation and to the harmonization of its industrial sectors and agriculture with the European standards. Moreover, the EU requires that the authorities in Yerevan come up with a strategy of energy security as soon as possible, so the strategic objectives based on nuclear energy be taken out of the economic circuit and replaced with other types of energy resources. The development of commercial exchanges with the EU is confirmed by the figures, too. In the first semester of 2010, Armenias foreign trade with the EU-member states increased by an average 29.1%, exceeding $1 billion. The growth of this economic indicator took place in spite of the depreciation of the euro. Although it was left behind by Georgia with regard to the implementation of the main requirements agreed upon in various official acts and statements having to do with European integration, Armenia has not given up its endeavor to draw nearer the European values and standards. Its light economic recovery of the past two years signals that Armenians have grasped the role of taking certain firm decisions regarding the regional and international integration. Only by implementing some decisive action towards systemic changes, i.e. of the entire economic circuit, by applying deep and severe reforms, by mobilizing everybody for the negotiation of their countrys political, economic, and energy regional independence, some credible results may be obtained. Azerbaijan, often called the oil paradox or the closed economy paradox6 it the only state in the world that registered a significant economic growth during the worldwide crisis. According to the experts estimates, the Azerbaijani industry represents over 70% of the total South-Caucasian economy and the overall volume of oil extracted in 2009 exceeded 50 million tons, while that of the natural gas went
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Interview with a political analyst, Yerevan, June 2011.

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up to 23.6 billion cubic meters (Nagdalyan, 2009, p. 128). Azerbaijan was and still is associated with oil and natural gas.7 These resources characterize the Republic of Azerbaijan, which is now more than ever determined to negotiate its place within the system of international economic relationships. At present, the official policy in Baku is to negotiate the countrys position in the region, its economic contracts and stability through energy-related instruments, which could lead, at some time in the future, to the exhaustion of the Azerbaijani domestic resources. Concentration on the negotiation of current objectives, on spending the income of the oil industry, more often than not ignoring any investment in the future of this and other industries is the proof of a mistaken economic development strategy. The reduced diversity of economic sectors, the lack of conditions that may attract both foreign, and domestic investments,
The turning of Azerbaijan into a country with an important role in the field of energy started four hundred years ago, when oil was first extracted from the Absheron peninsula. In 1813, the Tsarist Empire took possession of those oil fields and managed them for some time. In 1859, the Russians built the first oil processing plant in Baku. Until 1872, the Russian Empire was the exclussive extractor of energy resources from Azerbaijan. It was only after that year, when the Russian annulled the system of fiscal buyback in this domain, that they had introduced themselves, and declared free the extraction of oil resources, that foreign investors from Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands were allowed to enter the market and the oil industry of Azerbaijan. In the early 20th century, half of the oil resources extracted in the world were of Azerbaijani origin. Several international companies, including the Rothschild financial clan, managed to penetrate the region and, hence, get control not only of the quantities of oil that were extracted, but also of the world price of crude oil. The monopoly on the oil extraction industry allowed them to obtain maximum results with minimum investments. As a consequence, the necessity of keeping the industry up-to-date with the technological advances dropped significantly. The technological setback was imminent. In the Soviet years, about 70% of the necessities of the Soviet industry were covered by oil resources of an Azerbaijani origin.
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the encouraging of forms of competition that are inadequate for the market economy, plus the monopolies and oligopolies, high-level corruption, the violation of the right of private property, and the excessive involvement of the state in establishing prices all these signal major deficiencies in the management of a states economic processes and evolutions. The authorities intervene in the companies activities and make an excessive use of price control for goods and services, as a most efficient measure for preventing any social action against the government. In this respect, neither Georgia, nor Armenia seems to have made much progress. Prices and tariffs are being controlled or imposed by the authorities. The liberalization of prices as a market economy feature does not work here. Twenty years after the independence of Azerbaijan was proclaimed, one can still speak of a closed economy, where the access of foreign partners is restricted, most of the times because of the private interests of various political leaders in close connection with the government. Azerbaijan is a state specialized in the extraction and selling of oil products on the international markets, barely concerned to create efficient development conditions for other sectors of the economy. A positive trade balance does not necessarily mean the existence of quality economic and financial transformations. Changes occur only in quantity, inasmuch as the activities and initiatives of the current government receive their necessary financial support. If one is to take into account the above-mentioned processes and phenomena that affect the Azerbaijani economy, then one has to admit that the results obtained and the success in maintaining the macro-economic indicators growth trend seem to signal an economic paradox. According to the results presented by the international organizations in their annual reports, Azerbaijan was the only state in the world to have registered a rate of economic growth of about 9% during the worldwide economic crisis. The crisis was felt less, because the financial resources from the State Oil Fund were used to diminish the impact of the negative consequences on the
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Azerbaijani population. Members of the National Budget Group8 (2007) warn that according to a classification made by the Transparency Commission of the IMF (2007), if a country has a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in which the oil extraction industry holds more than 25% or the sales of oil products represents more than 50% of the countrys exports, then we are dealing with an oil-dependent country. The levels of the macro-economic indicators for 2010 confirm the existence of both conditions in Azerbaijan. Other figures that confirm the exaggerated dependence of the Azerbaijani economy on the energy sector or its orientation towards one single economic sector result from the project of law for the State Budget of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Ministry of Finances, 2011). On October 22nd, 2010, the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev promulgated the law regarding the state budget for 2011, according to which the total income was meant to reach 12.061 billion AZN9, while the expenditure 12.478 billion AZN. The approved budgetary deficit was 687 million AZN. Over 50% of the state budget income 6.48 billion AZN was going to come from the State Oil Fund, other budgetary sources being: the value-added tax 2.121 billion AZN and the income tax 1.21 billion AZN. As far as the expenditure was concerned, the largest budgetary resources were going to be allotted to the state investment program 3.38 billion AZN; to education 1.338 billion AZN; the army 1.325 billion AZN.
The National Budget Group is a coalition created in 2006 by nine non-governmental organizations that are financially supported by the Soros Foundation in Baku. The mission of this group is to increase transparency regarding the use of public financing in the interest of the citizens. Its goals are: to improve the budgetary legislation, to guarantee the transparency and efficiency of budgetary expenditure, to participate in public debates regarding the administration and distribution of the budgetary ins and outs, to monitor the process of implementation of the budgetary policy. 9 AZN, or the Azerbaijani manat, the national currency of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
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In June 2011, the modifications to the law of the State Budget of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ABC.az, 2011a) came into effect. According to the new provisions, the state budget income was going to reach 15.554 billion AZN, and the expenditure 15.941 billion AZN. It should be mentioned here that the Azerbaijani state budget is an over-centralized two-level budgetary system: the central budget and the local budget. The central budget was expected to reach the sum total of 15.107 billion AZN by the end of 2011 and the cumulated resources of the local budgets (84 administrative-territorial units) only 0.447 billion AZN. As far as expenditure is concerned, the central budget / local budget proportion was supposed to be 14.633 billion AZN to 1.308 billion AZN. After the budgetary adjustments, the budget of the programs of state investments was supplemented to 5.864 billion AZN (ABC.az, 2011b). In 2010, the evolution of the exports, as presented by the State Committee for Statistics, showed that exports exceeded imports in Azerbaijan. The volume of foreign trade has reached the sum total of $27.294 billion, i.e. 31.1% more than in 2009. The exports of crude oil represented 86.53%, while those of processed oil products only 5.07% (Foreign Trade, Economic Review of Azerbaijan, 2011, p. 13). Also from the evolution of exports in 2010, one notices that most of the Azerbaijani exports reached EU member-states, while most imports came from members of the Community of Independent States. The growth rate of exports was higher than that of imports. Unlike Georgia and Armenia, Azerbaijan is not a member of the World Trade Organization. One of the main reasons for which its joining the WTO with full rights has been postponed has to do with the existence of the same state-controlled monopolies and oligopolies. For the authorities in Tbilisi, the membership of this international organization is an important instrument in their political negotiations with Moscow, which has been talking for about eighteen years with the other member-states in order to be accepted as a full-rights member, too. Georgia is but one of the obstacles
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the Kremlin stumbles upon, since it must have the agreement of all WTO members. Another obstacle has to do with the Moscow leaders philosophy of action and with the requirements and rules regarding the world markets, that they do not observe. In Baku, at least, there is this general idea that Azerbaijan will become a member of the WTO only after Russia has been accepted as a full member of this international economic structure. The reason is the same as in the case of Moscow: the excessive dependence of economic stability on the sales of oil products and the states involvement in price control, plus, presumably, the hostility of Armenia, that joined the organization on February 5th, 2003.10 The Azerbaijani trade is still oriented towards the Russian Federation and the regional economic initiatives, especially created by Moscow to maintain its influence in the ex-Soviet countries. Most Azerbaijani imports come from Russia. The Russian Federation seems to hold the position as one of Azerbaijans most important economic partners. Besides the family connections of the current Azerbaijani president with Russia and Russian businessmen, there are figures that speak for themselves about the Kremlins potential influence on the only South-Caucasian state able to partially guarantee for its political independence: Russia is Azerbaijans third major partner as far as the imported goods are concerned and the eighth in the total volume of exported goods.11 It is no longer Azerbaijans main trade partner, as it used to be, but still has control over certain major economic sectors. The Russian Federation leaders insist on remaining among the world energy dealers who make the rules of the game on the international markets. Russia purchases Azerbaijani gas at prices higher than the ones it uses with other trade partners.12 Moreover, experts say, the fact that Azerbaijan has
10 Interview with an expert in the transparent use of the funds coming from oil sales, Baku, June 2011. 11 Interview with officials, Baku, June 2011. 12 Interview with an expert in energy security, Bucharest, August 2011.

taken out of its military doctrine the project of joining NATO and has joined, instead, the Non-Aligned Movement (made up of states that are not going to join any military block) shows that the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev tries to find a proper balance between the political interests of Russia and those of the West. The existence of monopolies has a negative impact on the final consumers, the Azerbaijani citizens. Because of the difficult conditions in which they may reach the Azerbaijani market and of the high expenses they incur in the process, the investors who manage to find themselves a place in some local economic niche also establish prices higher than the ones practiced on the regional or world markets. Azerbaijan has a huge, yet unexploited tourist potential, but has not managed so far to become known as a tourist attraction either regionally, or worldwide. Tourism could become, in time, one of the sectors capable to offer complementariness to the energy projects. Investments in tourism could be a stable source of financial income for the national budget. The sector of services, of which tourism is a basic component, requires support from the authorities, especially with regard to the facilities provided to small and medium businesses for access to this market, plus the modification of the related legislation. The development of services is mandatory. Tourism may become, in time, an alternative to the use of oil resources. Without its development, the Azerbaijani economy could suffocate in time, especially if the estimates of experts in the field of energy are confirmed and the climax of oil and gas extraction is actually reached in 2020. The exhaustibility of the energy resources should not be overlooked, even if there is an ever-growing pressure for the implementation of the newest technologies of oil extraction, that allow for diggings down to 7,000 to 10,000 meters. Rural, agricultural tourism is but one of the possibilities of attracting the domestic capital towards the countrys economy, by supplying it the necessary conditions to produce added value.
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Georgia: The Georgian authorities pattern of economic development is based on neo-liberal principles and ideas. Their implementation presupposes the adoption of certain measures among which encouraging the loyal competition, liberalizing the market, but also limiting the involvement of the state in economy only to exceptional circumstances. The so-called Economic Freedom Act was also adopted in Georgia, which lowers the likelihood of the state authority increasing taxes (Georgia Times, 2011). The contents of that document, says the Georgian Minister of Finances Dmitri Gvindadze, make it less likely that the economic factors become discontent, thus guaranteeing a fiscal stability. Like the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia does not control its entire territory. After the August 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, Abkhazia and South Ossetia proclaimed their independence from Tbilisi and the Russian Federation plus four other states, including Venezuela, have recognized them as such. Today, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are being supported financially from the Russian budget and treated as if they were actually parts of the Federation.13 This situation is likely to produce tension between Georgia and Russia and to offer a good subject of political disputes, which are often invoked as pretexts for avoiding real economic reforms. After 2003, when the Rose Revolution took place, the new government had to take over the government affairs, which were in a deplorable state. Economic reforms were not adequately applied, so as to encourage a real transition to a market economy. The same pattern was followed as in the entire ex-Soviet space: an illegal privatization of the strategic objectives, tolerance for corruption, a meager concern for attracting foreign investments. Georgias foreign debt had exceeded $1.5 billion and over 50% of the countrys population were living under the limit of poverty (Guseynov, 2008, p. 295). This state of affairs was overcome due to the external financial support and the interest shown by the
13

Interview with a Georgian official, Tbilisi, May 2011.

great powers the US and the EU primarily in order to maintain political and economic stability in the region. Georgia is a defining element of the bridge connecting the European markets to the energy resources of the Caspian Sea area. Moreover, it is part of the East-West transport corridors for goods and, since Armenia was denied participation in several projects related to South Caucasus as a region, Tbilisi took over part of Armenians role, thus managing to multiply the economic advantages of its political orientation towards the EU and the United States. Although it does not possess energy resources, like Azerbaijan does, this Caucasian state is attractive simply because it has managed to join some forms of regional and international integration. Georgia is a member of the World Trade Organization and conforms to the norms, behavior, and standards the organization upholds. The fact that it has renounced its membership in the CIS after the August 2008 war has allowed Georgia to remain a signing part of the treaties it had adhered to before that. Thus, the documents in question allow Georgia to keep participating in certain economic exchanges within the CIS and promoting its goods on the markets of the ex-Soviet states. The relationship between Georgia and the EU was made official in 1996, when the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed; it stipulated that Tbilisi would receive technical assistance and help to develop bilateral relations in several sectors, including the economic one. The document came into effect in 1999. Later, Georgia decided to establish that integration in the EU was a priority of its foreign policy. The following actions of the Tbilisi government were directed towards the signing of the Joint Action Plan Georgia EU (European Commission, 2006), which occurred on October 6th, 2006. As the other two South-Caucasian states, Georgia is part of the Eastern Partnership, within the European Neighborhood Policy. The country seems to have changed its attitude towards Iran too, since it is more and more intent on turning into an attractive market for the Iranian investors; however, unlike
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the Armenian ones, the authorities in Tbilisi have a much more diversified network of bilateral partnerships, which greatly expands their freedom of action in the Black Sea area.14 Turkey and the Ukraine are important partners of Georgias. The partnerships with these two countries allow for the access of Georgian products on the European market. After the August 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, the activity of the Georgian port of Batumi was temporarily suspended. Following that conflict, neighboring Armenia suffered losses of over $600 million, a huge sum for this South-Caucasian countrys economy.15 While Georgia received an extremely important political and financial support from several Western partners, which made it possible for the country to overcome the economic recession, Armenia did not receive any similar support, given its relationships with the Russian Federation, so it could not cover or recover at least some of the losses it had experienced. Eduard Nagdalyan (2011, p. 127) confirms the theory that Georgias economic salvation became possible because of the Russo-Georgian war, while Armenia and Azerbaijan did not enjoy the same external support: On the one hand, the dynamics of the Georgian economy was damaged by the war, but, however paradoxical it may seem, in accordance with the opinions shared by several Georgian experts, it was the war itself that saved the Georgian crisis-stricken economy. One has to consider the $4.5 billion worth of financial support offered to Georgia by international donors, so it may face the outcome of the war with Russia. Of this money, $2 billion came from the US grant. The lack of natural resources of its own, as well as the tensioned relationship with Russia because of the latters recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have oriented Georgias economy towards Western structures. For the reintegration of its territories, however,
with an expert in European integration, Tbilisi, May 2011. 15 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.
14 Interview

Georgia has to become a model of actual economic development, to keep on encouraging and implementing economic reforms. Transformation has to be a systemic one; the fact that Georgia is being firmly sustained by the international community in its endeavor to integrate in the worldwide economic circuit represents not only de iure, but also de facto an advantage in negotiating the countrys national interests.

2. The importance of developing the business environment and the factors that influence its evolution
From an economic point of view, South Caucasus can be studied as a regional unitary system, but also separately, each of its elements in turn. To have an overview of the region, however, it was necessary to make a retrospective analysis of the national economy of each South-Caucasian state, in order to grasp its internal particularities and necessities. Each state does not have the same economic needs. From this point of view, Azerbaijan is totally independent or tends towards a different regional integration system, for various reasons: cultural and historical affinities, shared values and principles, political dependence or independence. One thing is for sure: this region requires a complex approach, even if there are attempts at having specialized approaches according to the economic sectors: metallurgical industry, energy industry, or petro-chemical industry (Kavkazia.net, 2011). It is the only way to come up with feasible strategies for the promotion of certain investment projects in the region. Any democratic government should establish as its purpose to guarantee the prosperity and well-being of its citizens, so they do not feel threatened or having their interests affected in any way. Guaranteeing the protection and promotion of human rights and liberties, including through the adoption of various international norms and principles contained in the documents signed and ratified, is the first step towards a successful dialogue between state and citizen.
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Observing the right to private property is part of the endeavor towards the transformation of the ex-Soviet states economies and transition to the market economy. Unfortunately, there are difficulties in all three South-Caucasian states regarding the guaranteeing of this right. The right to private property is transitory: it is guaranteed in the constitutions, but in reality it is not fully protected. The authorities in the three states do not seem interested in this aspect of their activity, so that elementary rights are often being flagrantly violated, which ultimately makes the investors lose their interest to invest in the economy of this state or postpone the decision to export their capital surplus abroad. If an investor is not completely sure that his financial investments are secure, he leaves the market where he activates or avoids it. Many industrial sectors need such foreign financial injections of capital that are accompanied, most of the time, by the implementation of the latest achievements of technological progress in the production processes or in the services offered on the market. The indefinite postponing of the necessary steps in order to guarantee private property protection may trigger a similar postponing of the modernization of the economy and, by way of consequence, of the other governmental institutions. Transition to the market economy requires the authorities support for private initiatives, it implies monitoring the main processes and offering security guarantees for the representatives of the business environment who choose to involve themselves by investing in the private sector. Here are just two of many possible examples: in Azerbaijan, the houses taken in order to built a winter palace in the central area of Baku16 or, in Armenia, the mere existence in Yerevan of the NGO Victims of State Interests, whose purpose it is to protect the interests and rights of the people who have become victims of the state17.
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A further condition for restoring the stability of the South-Caucasian states national economies is the adoption or modification of the anti-monopoly codes. A lot of businesses are confronted with the same problem: they cannot penetrate the markets because there are no adequate conditions for a loyal competition. In Azerbaijan, the project of modification of the anti-monopoly code is being financed by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) Foundation and the Eurasia Foundation. The law project is under discussion. It was estimated that the law would be ratified by the Azerbaijani parliament by the end of October 2011. The problems with legislation hinder the economic progress, too. The Azerbaijani society is conservative enough and finds it difficult to accept new initiatives or proposals for the modification of legislation, even if is required by the international institutions and organizations of which Azerbaijan is a member. If a law project opposes the interests of a certain business group, then its adoption and ratification is significantly hindered or else it is rejected by the Milli Majlis18. The measures taken by the authorities in Baku can only be qualified as populist. The reducing of prices for the basic food products can not compensate for the necessity of modifying the national strategy for economic development. Moreover, the state is omnipresent in the establishing of market prices, which is inadmissible in a country with an alleged market economy. In all three South-Caucasian states, economic decisions are being influenced by the monopolies and oligopolies. However, there is a major structural difference: while in Georgia and Armenia, the oligarchs are both in power, and in the opposition, in Azerbaijan, the opposition is not backed by any monopolists or oligarchs who might support its initiatives. The only certain thing is that political and economic decisions are being dictated by the interests of some private groups. Although the government
18 The Azerbaijani name of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Interview with a human rights expert, Baku, June 2011. Interview with a human rights expert, Yerevan, June 2011..

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circles admit that it is important to have a strategy by which to fight the monopolies and oligopolies, the three states do not have any efficient programs to this purpose. The existence of monopolies and oligopolies may be eradicated with the help of two types of factors: Internal ones, by perceiving the need to create a healthy competitive environment, which implies the modification of the legislation according to the requirements of the world market and of the economically-oriented international organizations; External ones, like the Arab revolutions, which may reach the South-Caucasian states as well if firm decisions to introduce some systemic reforms are not adopted. Although foreign investors are confronted with numerous problems when they decide to penetrate the markets of the South-Caucasian states, their presence is important. If the high level of corruption can be ignored and with the existing legislative gaps that affect the financial sector and the foreign investments, it is worthy mentioning here that the main threat for the growth in volume of the private initiatives is due to the frozen conflicts in the region. Over the past twenty years since their independence was proclaimed, all three South-Caucasian states were confronted with open military conflicts. However, the amount of foreign investments in the area confirms that none of the sides involved in those regional conflicts advocates the idea of solving them through military force, even though the conflicts continue to exist in a latent form. If there were a real danger that such military actions break out again, then most of the foreign investors would withdraw to protect their investments. There is a high enough rate of withdrawal of the foreign investors, but this phenomenon is not actually based on political arguments, but rather on a domestic policy applied in a wrong way, which may be reduced to the causes mentioned earlier: corruption, disloyal competition and a legislation that does not correspond to the current realities and requirements of the worldwide market.
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Encouraging the capital to go outside its country of origin may be a sign of improvement in a states main economic indicators. One of the largest companies in the Caucasus that has managed to acquire an international presence impressive by the size of the projects it develops outside its country of origin is the Azerbaijani state oil company SOCAR19, whose management has initiated a lot of energy projects outside Azerbaijan. Fighting corruption is yet another element of the qualitative transformation of any states business environment. In Azerbaijan, fighting against this scourge has intensified since the outbreak of the Arab revolutions. The authorities in Baku came up with the idea of creating an Anti-Corruption Committee that has had results mostly locally. Fighting corruption at high level or even at a medium level remains a problem. Georgia is confronted with a similar phenomenon; the fight against corruption has yielded results only at low administrative levels Georgia has made significant progress in fighting corruption, being a regional leader by now in repelling this negative phenomenon with a strong impact on the investors decisions when they analyze the level of safety of a potential investment. Moreover, the phenomenon of corruption is likely to hinder the process of liberalization of the EU visa regime for a long time.20 However, it is an everyday reality in the three South-Caucasian states. Its eradication is attempted in official statements more than by applying concrete measures. The two decades of independence have not created the necessary conditions for building up a common economic space in the South-Caucasian region. This characteristic of
SOCAR is one of the worlds largest oil companies, acting on the basis of an indivisible state policy, in order to improve the administrative structure of the Azerbaijani oil industry, as well as to offer the possibility of developing the oil-based energy complex of Azerbaijan. SOCAR was founded in 1992, following the fusion of two state-owned oil companies: Azerneft and Azneftkimiya. 20 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.
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the region is based on the existence of several political divergences between the three states, on private interests, on the way each state approaches the problems it is confronted with or its relationships with the great world powers having geo-strategic interests in the area. The creation of a common economic space, after the European pattern, for instance, would inevitably lead to the growth of the South-Caucasian attractiveness for the potential Western and Asian investors. Moreover, it would create the preconditions for the accessing of economic integration formats, whether European or international. All three South-Caucasian states have signed Joined Action Plans with the European Union and have been included in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) through the Eastern Partnership that was initiated within the ENP in 2008, at the initiative of Poland and Sweden, and has been implemented from the spring of 2009 on. The main benefit of such an intra-regional cooperation is the guaranteeing of economic security. To lay the foundations of a form of regional integration, the South-Caucasian states should continue the reforms initiated more than a decade ago, because a lot of negative economic phenomena typical for the ex-Soviet countries are capable of slowing down even more the processes of transition to the market economy and, by way of consequence, of lowering down the interest for investments.

II. The Economy of Energy-Related Policies in South Caucasus

Most of the disfunctionality in the economic sector and in that of energy security in the South-Caucasian states has to do with the process of dissolution of the Soviet Union. The international recognition of the political independence has not necessarily brought about the economic or energyrelated independence from the rightful heir of the Soviet Union, i.e. from the Russian Federation, which has maintained
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its influence in South Caucasus through various regional projects and initiatives of an economic nature. Moreover, the outdated energy infrastructure and the lack of financial means necessary to achieve immediate modernizations have all but annihilated the possibility of developing this sector. Adding to this the incorrect privatization of the networks of distribution of the final energy products or their preservation under state ownership, that is hardly concerned with achieving reforms in this respect, a desolating picture results of one of the most important areas of the economy, whose malfunctioning may ultimately contribute to the aggravation of social troubles, the way it happened during the economic crisis of the last decade of the previous century. The energy-related policies and strategies of the three states have undergone difficult processes of transformation that more than once led to the outbreak of acute crises, the consequences of which were mostly felt by the citizens. The weak industrial and energy infrastructure inherited from the USSR, the imperfect institutional system, political elite unprepared for the new challenges and social needs, plus the necessity of accepting and assuming the new statuses of independent states led to the deepening of the economic crises in the entire ex-Soviet space. The efficient implementation of certain strategies of energy security of the various states implies the using of a complex system of mechanisms and instruments, both externally, and domestically, in order to successfully reach the energy-related strategic objectives (Infosfera, Bucharest, 2011). But they have been unable to deal with all the challenges. All this, cumulated with the non-uniform distribution of natural resources, explains the different rates of qualitative systemic transformation of the three states, as well as the establishing of a hierarchy with respect to the importance of choosing each states direction of political orientation: some have managed to connect to European forms of cooperation, others keep hesitating between East and West and between several forms of regional integration.
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An economic system becomes stable when all its components have their resources assured for a satisfactory functioning. The energy policy is the basic component of any developed economy. Without encouraging well-justified initiatives in this field, no political party will succeed to implement its governing programs and will hence, fuel up even more the electorates discontent. As mentioned earlier, South Caucasus has many energy sources of several types, but their unequal distribution has been determining in the establishment of the multilateral and bilateral relationships between the regions constituent states. Cumulated with the political controversies, i.e., with the conflicts existing between Azerbaijan and Armenia or between the Russian Federation and Georgia, they have drawn the attention of the international public opinion on the processes and phenomena occurring in the region. Oil and natural gas are the two elements that transform South Caucasus, making it attractive for political and financial investments. The authorities incapacity to alleviate the controversies between government and opposition, as well as the legislative gaps in the domain of investments, plus the presence of monopolies and corruption significantly reduce the possibilities of implementing the latest technological results, so the modernization of economy remains uncertain. South Caucasus also has multiple development possibilities and nobody can contest it. This is where the main East-West and North-South routes of transport for goods and commodities intersect, where connections between Europe and Asia are made, where opportunities are created for the improvement of the routes of access towards the energy resources of the Caspian Sea basin, that are necessary to the economies of the developed states. The implementation of independent energy-related policies meant to further the interests of nations, not of the governing elites, is an essential condition for economic modernization.

1. Energy resources, economy, and energy policies

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan immediately following it, during which the Russian Federation upheld the cause of Armenia, the latter was confronted with heavy problems of an economic nature, but most of all with an acute energy crisis. Azerbaijan stopped supplying Armenia with natural gas, which interrupted the adequate charging of the gas pipeline built on the territory of Georgia and put on hold the railroad traffic that crossed Abkhazia and connected Russia to Georgia and Armenia. Although the authorities in Yerevan have been supported by the Kremlin during their two decades of independence, the good diplomatic relations between the two sides have not managed to compensate the negative effects of the political and economic isolation of the South-Caucasian state. Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia does not have oil and natural gas resources, its necessary energy both for consume, and the economy being imported from the Russian Federation. In 1997, a company with a mixed, Russo-Armenian capital, called ArmRosGazprom was created, whose officially declared purpose was to rebuild Armenias energy infrastructure and to resume the supplying of natural gas through the only functional gas pipeline that connected Georgia to the Russian energy system to the North with the Armenian one to the South. Thus, Russia managed to reestablish Yerevans energy supplying system. Unfortunately for the Armenian economy, Russia later also managed to purchase up to 80% of the ArmRosGazprom stock, which could not have had any other buyers, due to its having been structured as society with a closed-type stock. Even if the bilateral relations between Russia and Armenia seemed to be privileged ones, the necessity of taking supplementary measures for Armenias guaranteeing its own energy security was imminent. There were several possibilities to diversify the number of energy suppliers, but all should aim, ultimately, at obtaining independence from Russia:
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We think it is necessary to obtain an alternative to the Russian solution for energy needs; therefore, it is useful to get closer to Romania and Bulgaria21. The representatives of the academic environment also seem to confirm the idea that the Russian Federation is upset by the energy-related initiatives of the Armenian authorities. According to the public opinion in Yerevan, the states energy security should not rely on oil and gas alone. The energy strategy should be diversified and the private initiatives meant to multiply the energy-related potential from alternative sources: solar energy, wind energy, and hydro-energy, should be supported. The authorities in Yerevan will also sustain the development of nuclear energy. The international debate gained momentum after the March 2011 earthquake in Japan that brought considerable damage to the Fukushima nuclear plant. There are, though, divided opinions that depend on the interests and resources of the states active in the region: France, Great Britain, Russia, the Ukraine, and Romania will not renounce nuclear energy, but consolidate this sector.22 On the other hand, there is an equally sound opinion that most energy-related projects, especially those in which the oil and natural gas pipelines are being charged from Azerbaijan, avoid Armenia. This is not the best solution for the Azerbaijani energy policy, because it increases considerably the expenses necessary for the development of regional oil-related projects. This attitude, although not justified economically, enjoys a political support, even at international level, due to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. There is only one solution left, and that is to look towards the Arab world, i.e. towards the same Iran Armenia intended to sign several energy-related treaties with, which conflicts with the Russian Federations foreign policy interests in the region. The project of a natural gas transit pipeline from Iran to
Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011. 22 Interview with an expert in energy security, Bucharest, August 2011.
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Armenia was a real alternative solution for the transportation of the energy products of Russian origin. The Kremlin officials decided to subsidize the Armenian citizens consumption of natural gas, by transferring to the Armenian governments accounts partial compensations for the new tariffs meant to grow between 2009 and 2011, which were being imposed on the final consumers, but also to partially finance the works of the Iran Armenia pipeline, by investing about $550 million. This is an energy-related response, but its final purpose is to sustain Russias own political objectives. The two partner states involved in the development of the project went on working on it. The official data about the project claim that 2.3 billion cubic meters of gas could be supplied to Armenia through this pipeline, which would cover fully the needs of the Armenian economy.23 The peculiarity of the project is this: at this moment, all the necessary natural gas for Armenia is being ensured by Russia through the gas pipeline crossing the territory of Georgia. After the bilateral economic relationship between Moscow and Tbilisi was resumed, Yerevan managed to stabilize its energy system. However, gas is still being supplied through the Iran Armenia pipeline. The energy resources reach Armenia, where they are transformed into electric power in the Armenian power plants, then exported back to Iran.24 Armenia wishes to develop viable energy-related policies. The domestic conditions and the nature of the countrys relationships with its neighbor countries require that concrete measures be taken, as mentioned above. After the Fukushima disaster, the subject of using nuclear energy has been debated publicly more and more. Several states Germany especially have declared themselves willing to
The Russo-Armenian Interaction and Regional Problems. Papers of the International Conference of June 5th, 2010, Yerevan, NAAPET, 2011, p. 19. 24 Ibidem.
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renounce this type of energy sources on a medium term, but not Armenia, on whose territory one of the most dangerous nuclear plants still exists, that of Metsamor. It is over thirty years old and situated in a delicate seismic area (World Nuclear Association, 2010), only thirty kilometers away from the Armenian capital, Yerevan. In 2007, the Armenian authorities adopted a new energy strategy that confirmed that the state is not going to renounce nuclear energy, even though the EU suggested that Armenia should gradually give it up (European Commission, 2006a, p. 8). The same recommendation was reiterated in the evaluation reports of the Joint Action Plan Armenia EU (A1plus.am, 2011). Given Armenias energy situation, i.e., the existence of a minimum number of energy partners, Yerevan does not show any desire to stop developing such plants, especially since it has sufficient quantities of uranium on its territory. In 2006, the Armenian government made public its intentions to begin working on a new energy project: the construction of yet another nuclear plant. The first steps in this direction were made in 2009, when the Armenian parliament voted in favor of the law regarding the creation of a Russo-Armenian company called Metsamorenergoatom, meant to build the new plant. The project costs reach up to $5 billion, with a usability of 60 years. It is estimated that this nuclear electric plant will become operational in 2016. It will supply electricity for domestic consumption, but not for the entire Armenian economy. This is why the authorities in Yerevan have decided to support the project of building the nuclear plant with Russian capital, although it was initially estimated that the investment would be a German and American one. To obtain the German and American support for the initiative, Georgia had to be associated to the project, since the latter would have received foreign support for the project development, which would have led to the improvement of Armenias own political position in the region. Cooperation in the field of nuclear energy represents a new stage of the Russo-Armenian economic relationships.
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To serve this purpose, another mixed capital company was created in 2008, which was meant to conduct geological research, as well as to extract uranium and other minerals from the Armenian territory. This company is called the The Russo-Armenian company for mining extractions; at present, Yerevan is being connected judicially to the Angarsk International Center for the enrichment of uranium.25 During its twenty years of independence, Azerbaijans energy policy has constantly been in focus by the authorities. It has always served the promotion of the countrys foreign policy interests and has been an efficient instrument for maintaining stable relationships with most of Azerbaijans partners. In fact, the energy policy of the Baku administration tries to create a more diverse network of clients for the energy resources it possesses. It is a correct and responsible attitude, according to the specialists in the transparent use of the income resulting from the trading of oil, who argue that the aggressive energy policy that Azerbaijan practices today is the best strategy available; it is implemented through SOCAR, the Azerbaijani state oil company. The results are not only economic in nature, but mainly geopolitical, since they become visible at regional level. The most important component of the Azerbaijani foreign policy is energy-related aggressiveness.26 It offers the Baku authorities a political independence in the process of decision-making not only in the South-Caucasian space, turning Azerbaijan
The first meeting of the commission for the creation of an international center for the enrichment of uranium took place in 2006, under the auspices of the Russian company Rosatom. At that first meeting the concept, the judicial form, and the future forms of cooperation between the center and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were discussed. The center is part of a network of international centers for the studying of the process of uranium enrichment. The Angarsk center was initially meant to treat only uranium produced in Russia and Kazakhstan. It is situated near Lake Baikal, in Siberia. 26 Interview with an expert in economy, Baku, June 2011.
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into a necessary state, one that possesses the resources it needs in order to sustain a certain type of negotiation. The Azerbaijani company SOCAR is most important to Romania in the bilateral projects of energy investments. In the near future, SOCAR intends to open over 300 gas stations in Romania. According to SOCAR representatives in Romania, the Azerbaijani companys penetration on the Romanian market will contribute to the lowering of fuel prices. There is political will and economic potential for the development of such projects, but the SOCAR management is very cautious when it comes to foreign investments. One of the arguments for such an attitude is the type of negotiations between the Russians and the Azerbaijanis on energy-related projects, the details of which are never made public; the companys strategy is to discuss small- and medium-sized projects in which it does not commit itself excessively from a financial point of view. This may explain why SOCAR has only acquired a couple of fuel stations in the Moldavian part of Romania so far. SOCAR also negotiates its penetration on the markets in Bulgaria, Serbia, the Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova. In Bulgaria, the SOCAR representatives negotiate the taking over of the single oil refining installation, Neftochim, which is controlled by the Russian company Lukoil. The negotiating process for the acquisition of the Neftochim stock began in the context of the dispute between the Bulgarian custom authorities and the management of Lukoil, when the Russians license was temporarily withdrawn for not having monitored the production process within the time-limit they had negotiated with the Bulgarian authorities. Ultimately, the disagreement led to the cease of all oil-refining activities at the Burgas refinery during a month and a half (Vedomosti, 2011). The interest for the Moldovan market is neither new, nor fortuitous. At the end of 2003, the Azpetrol Company entered the Moldovan market with the intention of taking over the construction of the Giurgiuleti oil terminal and later of building up a nationwide network of gas stations.
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For Azpetrol, conquering the Moldovan market represented an outstanding opportunity to penetrate the European markets. Yet the company ceased all its activities soon after. This withdrawal had to do with events that took place in the Azerbaijani political life. Azpetrol was controlled by the Ministry of Economic Development of the Republic of Azerbaijan. In October 2005, the acting Minister of Economic Development in Baku, Farhad Aliyev (Aze.az, 2007a) was arrested, being charged with an attempted coup dtat and with exceeding his attributions. His brother, Rafik Aliyev, former president of Azpetrol, was later also put under arrest for money laundering. The latter has recently been released from prison, however. At present, Azpetrol has a reduced presence even on the Azerbaijani domestic market: it only administrates 66 oil refueling stations and five natural gas-based ones (Azpetrol, 2011). SOCAR was one of the potential buyers that negotiated the takeover of the Azpetrol stock.27 To reduce the negative effects of the worldwide economic crisis, SOCAR was the company that financed the Azerbaijani non-oil-related sector. Thus, in 2010, over 60% of the investments in the Republic of Azerbaijan were of domestic origin. Even so, the sectors of the Azerbaijani industry that are not directly connected to energy still suffer from insufficient financing. Problems occur when the distribution of income is done unfairly and other sectors of the economy receive insufficient funding for the implementation of economic modernization, in the light industry or in agriculture, for instance. Surely, their current energy allows the Azerbaijani authorities more than any other to dribble among the geo-strategic objectives of the regional great actors, sustaining also their own endeavor to make this South-Caucasian state into the main link in the region, that must be consulted when decisions are being made regarding the foreign policy vectors of
27 Interview with an economic expert and an expert in the transparent use of the income of processed oil sales, Baku, June 2011.

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the South-Caucasian actors. The other leaders willingness to consult with the Baku authorities regarding the evolution of the region turns out to be, as mentioned earlier, one of the outcomes of practicing the right energy-related policy. No one can deny that the Azerbaijani leadership has made considerable progress in this field, guaranteeing itself also a stable dialogue with Moscow. The interests of an economic nature are at least as important as the political ones. It is very difficult for the Baku government to keep a balance between the great powers energy, economic, and political interests in the region of South Caucasus, yet there exists a positive trend in this direction.28 One of the problems that Azerbaijan is confronted with nowadays has to do with the transparent distribution of the income obtained from the energy sector. There is limited access to public information about the way in which the funds accumulated after the trading of energy products are being spent and their administration is not efficient. Thus, the transparency of decision-making, which should be a characteristic of a democratic state, remains just a desideration, and proves hard to implement. Private interests prevail over the national ones. The Azerbaijani economy is fully dependent on its energy sector, even if the Baku authorities insist that the other economic sectors are given the same attention by the government. The following question should be asked: What will happen in twenty years time to an economy dependent on oil and gas? Experts in the transparent use of the income of the energy sector state that only 15% of the Azerbaijani state budget consists of taxes and impositions, the remaining 85% coming from payments for the states energy-related contracts. An idea circulating among the economic experts is that the Azerbaijani oil is turning into a curse of Azerbaijan. The explanation for this is only logical and accessible enough: the oil and gas resources are exhaustible, hence limited in time, but the authorities do
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not seem to grasp this reality when they orientate the states economy towards one single industrial sector. The State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan (2011) was created in 1999.29 The most recent estimates said that in 2011 SOFAZ would have accumulated over $30 billion, i.e. $10 billion more than in 2009 (ABC.az, 2011c). This estimated figure was surpassed in July of last year. Thus, according to the data presented by SOFAZ representatives on June 28th, 2011, the State Oil Funds reserves had reached the sum total of $30.2 billion (ABC.az, 2011d). The growth of the Funds reserves had been made possible, the same SOFAZ representatives added, thanks to the successful implementation of the national oil strategy conceived by the leader of the nation, Ilham Aliyev (ibidem). The amount reached by this reserve fund for the future is projected to reach $50 billion in 2050. This State Oil Fund that gathers up the money resulting from the sales of oil products is being administered inefficiently, say the experts in the transparent use of state funds, because the money is destined to projects that are much too ambitious for the authorities to be able to execute. Among the SOFAZ-financed projects, there are several initiatives meant to reform the countrys educational system, especially to attract back home the young people who study abroad, there is financial support for the project of building a new railroad connection Baku Tbilisi Kars or for the construction of a pipeline for transporting drinking water from the Oguz-Obala area to the capital city Baku (but this is very difficult to put into practice, because of a very poorly developed infrastructure), as there are other initiatives
the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, was created by Decree of the President of Azerbaijan, issued on December 29th, 1999. The purpose of SOFAZ was to guarantee the equality between generations with regard to the advantages to be obtained by the exploitation of the countrys oil resources. The endeavor for todays economic welfare must lead to the guaranteeing of economic stability for the future generations this is the philosophy behind the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
29 SOFAZ,

Interview with a political analyst, Baku, June 2011.

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meant to improve the situation of the refugees from the Nagorno-Karabakh area. Since 2001, SOFAZ has been paying over 765 million AZN to improve the living conditions of the refugees having settled in various parts of Azerbaijan, but mainly in Baku. The usefulness of the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan is being questioned by the economic experts who argue that only 5% of the total financial resources going there are destined for long-term projects, i.e. for investments in the future, in the next generations. The remaining 95% are being distributed for present-day projects that more often than not lack well-documented feasibility studies, even if they are conceived by foreign partners. For instance, the feasibility study for the pipeline meant to supply drinking-water to Baku was made with the help of a German company, CES Consulting Engineers, and cost over 2.1 million AZN. But not all projects meant to be supported financially by SOFAZ are long-term ones. The money is invested, it produces an economic circuit, but its profitability is only short-term and has nothing to do with future generations. The conclusion at hand is that the Azerbaijani government does not have economic sustainability in mind. Diversifying the sources of energy is one possibility, but diversifying the production of goods and services and supporting the existing ones, with no connection to the energy sector, is the only chance for guaranteeing the countrys economic, social, and even political security. The concentration of companies in the cities, especially in the capital city of Baku, reduces the possibility of making any major investments in the countryside. To illustrate, it is worth mentioning that 93% of the taxes and impositions collected by the state budget come from companies having their official address in the capital city of Azerbaijan. The rest of the country contributes only 7%. Georgia is not an independent state from the point of view of energy. Most of the time, the Georgian civil society calls upon the administration to make some political concessions for the purpose of gaining its energy independence.
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Georgias dependence on the Russian energy resources has been felt during its two decades of political independence, but, nevertheless, this has not affected the countrys interest in applying an energy policy based on diversifying the sources of oil and natural gas. The international public opinion often tends to associate this South-Caucasian state with protests, with violations of human rights, and with the August 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, in the aftermath of which the authorities in Tbilisi decided to leave the Community of Independent States and only remain affiliated to this form of regional cooperation through treaties already signed, that are still in effect. Georgias energy strategy is based on a simple philosophy of action: diversifying the sources from which the necessary oil and natural gas are being supplied, both for the economic sector, and for the end-users, with a slight orientation towards integrating the countrys own energy sector in the EU-supported projects. Unlike the Republic of Moldova and the Ukraine, Georgia has not yet signed the Energy Community Treaty, but has been accepted as an observer of the European Energy Community on December 18th, 2007 (EEC, 2007). The delay in Georgias participation in the various European initiatives related to energy is also geographically explained, Georgian experts say. The Republic of Moldova and the Ukraine have common borders with the European Union, so it is easier for them to access the various programs destined to the states included in the European Neighborhood Policy and in other forms of cooperation.30 Georgias connection to the European Union energy programs will only be possible through Turkey. But, to obtain their energy independence from the Russian Federation, the authorities in Tbilisi have to accommodate the legislation that regulates the Georgian energy sector to EU standards and norms. Although the EU does not seem interested to encourage a regional solidarity with regard to energy, mainly
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Interview with an energy expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

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after the recurring economic crises that have been registered several years running because of the deterioration of the political relationship between the Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the benefits that Georgia might obtain by joining the European energy-related initiatives could be long-term ones, since they would require that the technical parameters of the Georgian energy system itself be modified. What the Georgian experts in energy efficiency must pay attention to, first and foremost, is the part, in any energy project, referring to the transit routes, because, since their objective is to become independent from Russia as far as energy is concerned, the Georgian authorities are tempted to ignore the part referring to environment security, i.e. to ecology. Therefore, the development of the AGRI project could be met with hostility by the civil society. It is worth mentioning here that the Georgian officials keep stating that they are in favor of the development of such energy projects as to encourage the use of regenerative energy, i.e. 90% of the energy consumption should be ensured by hydro-energy, although the European Union does not require that more than 20% of the necessary energy for the economic sector should be from regenerative sources.31 Ever since 2006, Georgia has become an exporter of electric power, its main consumers being the Russian Federation, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. Even after August 2008, Russia is still the main consumer of electric power produced in Georgia, which will continue to develop hydro-electric power plants. While in Tbilisi there is talk about the possibility that hydro-electricity become the basic element for the restoring of dialogue between Abkhazia and Georgia, in Sukhumi the opinion is divided. The political context does not allow it. Rezo Zantaria, director of the hydro-electric power plant on the Inguri river, stated in November 2008 that his installation was under the jurisdiction of the Abkhazian authorities, which were not recognized by the ones in Tbilisi after the
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proclamation of independence of the separatist region and its recognition by the Russian Federation. That is why the Georgian authorities have no right to initiate the procedure of privatization of the hydro-electric power plant, with the participation of Azerbaijani investors: Geographically, the Inguri hydro-electric power plant is at the border between Abkhazia and Georgia, this is well-known to the Azerbaijani side (Kavkaz Uzel, 2008), Zantaria added. There is still fear, among the Georgian authorities, that Russia will somehow manage, after the August 2008 war, to appropriate this energy objective, but officials of the two conflicting states have reached an agreement for the equally shared administration of the Inguri power plant.32 According to this agreement, 60% of the total electricity produced there goes to Georgia, while the remaining 40% partially cover the necessities of the Abkhazian consumers. The reconstruction works for this power plant lasted several years and were carried out by the German company Siemens. Although both the Georgian and the international press tackle some taboo subjects that cannot be publicly debated in Tbilisi, the most accessible discussion platforms for the Georgian civil society are those regarding the energy and the environment sectors. The states energy-related policy has been used in Georgia as a pretext for the aggravation of the divergences between government and opposition. Thus, the Georgian Labor Party put up a protest, on January 13th, 2011, before the central headquarters of the Telasi Electric Power Distribution Company in Tbilisi, demanding that the authorities cancel the unique receipt for communal services. The Georgian citizens were obliged to pay for water, electricity, natural gas, and other services according to the dispositions of a new, unified system. In case they did not pay, Telasi was entitled to disconnect them from the grid. Georgian Labor Party leader Shalva Natelashvili stated in a press briefing that the Saakashvili regime set up a new bomb
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Interview with an energy expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

Interview with an energy expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

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in the relationships between Russia and Georgia by taking such a decision. He reminded that the owner of the Georgian distribution network for electricity was the Russian company INTER RAO UES, that had no right to punish the Georgian consumers for some foreign debts. According to Natelashvili, the party he spoke for had taken all the necessary measures for that action to be cancelled, for instance it had called upon the Constitutional Court to advise about the lawfulness of such a decision, and it had negotiated with Telasi and the Russian company. The GLP threatened to launch other protests intended to overthrow the current government. The action, however, did not have the results the opposition leaders wished to obtain. The current government in Georgia is often accused of limiting the oppositions possibilities to protest, but the energy-related protests did not enjoy the same support as the May 2011 ones, for instance. In South Caucasus, it is a vital necessity to apply energy-related policies and strategies for the efficient development of the energy sector, which is the basis of the good functioning of the entire economic system. But, without guaranteeing the necessary resources for the development of the infrastructure in this field, any public policy becomes futile. The basic requirement for making any progress is to create adequate conditions for the existence of a political willingness that can only be educated while staying the course and turning mistakes into achievements.

2. Energy-related projects and transport corridors in South Caucasus

South Caucasus has managed to draw the great powers attention through several elements that may contribute to the reaching of certain national objectives and interests included in foreign policy or energy security strategies to be found in this region or showing openly their intent to make investments in the area. Another quality of South Caucasus is its proximity to Central Asia not only geographically, but
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especially from the point of view of energy, which makes it even more attractive geo-strategically. While Georgia and Armenia, as mentioned earlier, show affinities for the Western processes of political and economic integration, in Azerbaijan there is no general inclination towards limiting the countrys own possibilities of penetrating the world circuit. Its energy resources allow it to play several regional cards simultaneously. Azerbaijan is often studied as belonging to Central Asia, even if this approach has been given up recently. One can reshape a region according to the interests one has there, hence the statement that Azerbaijan was part of Central Asia.33 The oil, natural gas, uranium and, more recently, the plutonium to be found here give those interests a different weight within the worldwide system of international relationships. There is a struggle going on, not so much for the qualitative change of the political systems existing in the region, as for establishing a certain degree of political subordination, in order to get sufficient control of those resources as to obtain economic profit from their administration. Unfortunately, this is seldom admitted by the state and private actors who have foreign policy, security, and energy interests in South Caucasus. The presence and involvement in the region of the Russian Federation, the US, and the EU has not discouraged the other great powers interest in the region of South Caucasus. Besides the actors listed above, one should mention China as a very important such power, the great winner of the worldwide economic crisis, as being interested in those oil and gas resources. What the authorities in Beijing try to do may obstruct more or less the reaching of strategic objectives by Russia, the EU, or the US everything depends on the ability of reaching a consensus as to how the transport routes are going to be built and the oil-related contracts shared. Chinas industry requires large quantities of oil products to sustain its current rate of growth. This is one of the explanations for the fact
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Interview with a political analyst, Baku, June 2011.

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that Azerbaijan is constantly being attracted by Asia and the energy projects in which it is involved are being redirected some, at least towards the East. The philosophies of these great powers differ considerably. While Russia is based on its political influence on the region and the support it grants certain actors on the scene by artificially sustaining crises and conflicts, the European Union is trying to become attractive through its democratic and economic model, advocating above all the idea of an institutional change by applying democratic principles and helping the subjects in the region turn their faces naturally towards the West. China, in exchange, is literally obliged to concentrate all its efforts to the redirecting of the economic interests of all the actors in the region towards the East, so it may take over, at least partially, the potential of their presence there. A detailed analysis of the energy potential of South Caucasus is difficult to make if one ignores the main transport corridors that link Asia to Europe and North to South. The selling of energy products makes it compulsory to develop transport routes, storage facilities, but also processing units. The development of the oil sector is paralleled by the sustaining of investments in the complementary sectors, so that the ongoing projects or the ones still in preparation

may be implemented without difficulties, especially in their final stages. The quantities of oil and natural gas that should feed the main energy projects in South Caucasus allow for their prioritization, but the authorities in the various states of the region try to give assurances that they are not going to prioritize a project and overlook another. The role of South Caucasus in the world economy could be summarized as such: an access zone to the Caspian Sea oil by the shortest transport corridors. The energy project Nabucco34 was conceived as an extension to the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and meant to guarantee the energy security of the European states (see Map 1, previous page). The decisions regarding the development of the projects were taken during the worldwide economic crisis, but the states that have launched this initiative have not given it up, because of the energy stability it may offer (ACGRC, 2011, p. 35). Azerbaijan is willing to provide natural gas to the Nabucco project, but it cannot supply the entire quantity required for its good functioning. This is one of the reasons for which Turkmenistan was also invited to take part in the development of Nabucco, so as to connect the Caspian Sea to it. The basic condition of the Baku authorities was that the states who need the project declare firmly that they are ready to make financial investments in the construction of
34 Nabucco is a natural gas pipeline launched in 2006, with the initial transportation capacity of 7.2 billion cubic meters per year, which could be increased to 20 billion cubic meters. It was conceived as an extension of another gas pipeline in which Azerbaijan was involved as well: the Baku Tbilisi Erzurum corridor. The latter has an almost identical track as the oil pipeline Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan. Nabucco will finally be 3,300 kilometers long and have a transportation capacity of about 31 billion cubic meters per year. The duration of the project is fifty years (Nabucco Pipeline Overview). The other sources of supply for this pipeline have their origins in the Middle East and Egypt. It is one of the most ambitious projects. The estimated costs of the works will reach 7.9 billion euros (Nabucco Pipeline Facts and Figures), but this figure is provisional.

Map 1 The track of the Nabucco project (Source: Nabucco Pipeline http://www.nabuccopipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/pipeline/route)

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the pipeline. The Azerbaijani authorities favor the implementation of as many energy projects as possible. This is to say, once again, that the energy-related policy of Azerbaijan is focused on diversifying aa much as possible the transportation routes for its oil and gas towards the international markets. Nabucco is an ambitious project and there are too many difficulties to overcome for it to be actually feasible on short term. The Azerbaijani infrastructure for natural gas transportation is very poorly developed. At present, the focus should be on the development of the necessary infrastructure for storing the quantities of natural gas for which Nabucco has been designed. The authorities in Baku, however, are politically motivated to sustain and encourage their foreign partners who are interested in the Azerbaijani energy resources to go on investing in this project. Playing the cards of several energy projects, the current government has the possibility to remain in power for a longer time, so their support for Nabucco will remain a firm one. SOCAR guarantees it will be able to provide the quantities of natural gas that are necessary for Nabucco, but only after 2020, when most of the works of improvement of transportation capabilities, that are now faced with a lot of difficulties, are completed. Nabuccos potential will only grow after 2015, when the natural gas production also grows. At present, the production of natural gas is still behind that of oil.35 When speaking of Nabucco, there are many political variables we need to consider, which may hinder the evolution of the project. Energy independence from Russia is but one to be mentioned at this point, but attention must be drawn to another, equally important aspect: most energy projects that the European Union is interested to develop with regard to the Caspian Sea oil and gas resources cross Turkey. The latter will not only gain importance in the region, it will also hold an energy monopoly on the southern axis, which may very well turn into a future threat for the energy security of
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the European Union, in spite of its insistence that the energy market should be liberalized hence, there is a major risk.36 The Turkish authorities are not going to risk right now their economic relationship with the European Union, because there are no political guarantees regarding the evolution of Turkeys bilateral relationship with the Russian Federation. This is why it will be content, on a short term, to treat Russia as a market for its own goods and services. It is interesting that the Azerbaijani authorities do not want to contribute financial resources either for Nabucco, or for AGRI (see below), which is faced with several difficulties of a technological, but also of a financial nature. Moreover, Armenias foreign policy agenda does not rule out its joining the project. The Yerevan authorities are being pressed by their own energy interests to join this regional initiative at some time in the future. In the case of Armenia, this could become feasible through the Joint Action Plan Armenia EU (European Commission, 2006b), that prefigures cooperation in the energy sector between the two partners. According to the document, the EU is to sustain Armenias actions for the development of a long-term energy strategy, but the basic condition is that Armenia should renounce its intentions to build a new nuclear plant. In its turn, Yerevan is tempted to decline the EUs requirements because of the lack of an alternative solution, which the European community is yet to suggest. Under these circumstances, Nabucco may very well be such an alternative solution, but it greatly depends on the Armenian relationship with Azerbaijan, which has so far opposed the involvement of the state it is in a territorial conflict with in several regional energy-related initiatives, insisting every time on keeping out. The Azerbaijan Georgia Romania Interconnector (AGRI, see Map 2, following page) is an ambitious project that has enjoyed much attention from the partners involved
36

Interview with an economic expert, Baku, June 2011.

Interview with an economic expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

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Map 2 The Azerbaijan Georgia Romania Interconnector (AGRI, Stratfor) (Source: Plano 10 [AGRI in green]) http://www.plano10.com/2011/04/proiectul-agri-o-bila-alba-pentru.html

in its implementation. The purpose of this energy project is to transport natural gas from the Shakh Deniz deposit towards Romania, Hungary, and other European states interested in diversifying their sources of energy supplies; it is part of the southern corridor of natural gas transit. The company that will attend to the implementation of the project, called AGRI LNG Project Company, has been created by participants belonging to four states: Romgaz (Romania), the Georgian Oil and Gas Company, the State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and MVM (Hungary). Each of the four states holds an equal share of 25% of the AGRI LNG Project Company social capital.37 The states involved in the development of the AGRI project have problems of a political nature with the Russian
37 The Memorandum of Agreement for the beginning of the AGRI program was signed in Bucharest on April 13th, 2010, and the Declaration regarding the AGRI project was signed in Baku on September 14th, 2010. The intermediary feasibility study for this project is being drawn by experts from the USA.

Federation, which can be interpreted as harmful for the Russian energetic, economic, and political interests towards the South. But AGRI is a much more appreciated project than Nabucco and the interest of the partners involved in its implementation seems to argue in favor of granting certain special priorities to it, since it is one of the cheapest initiatives of its kind in spite of the fact that none of its four initiator states possesses the technical or financial means to implement it at this time. Likewise, as mentioned above, neither does Azerbaijan seem to agree to finance the project out of its own resources. The natural gas liquefying terminal must be built on the territory of Georgia, which does not possess the necessary technology to begin working on it. Moreover, experts in energy security argue that guaranteeing the security of the transports across the Black Sea is problematic, since there are no available special tankers for carrying the liquefied gas across the Black Sea (those are usually built with a huge transportation capacity and made to travel far greater distances).38 The same energy security experts think that AGRI is rather the result of a political game that Azerbaijan plays in order to promote its interests and to occupy a better negotiating position in the dialogue on energy between the European Union and the Russian Federation, so as to obtain political advantages. Neither are the available and not yet contracted gas resources certain. The fact that no other EU-member state except Romania and Hungary has joined this project says a lot.39 Private financing for AGRI is the likeliest solution. The earliest estimates of the project costs indicate a figure ranging between 2 and 5 billion euros for a transportation capacity of 8 billion cubic meters per year, with a potential increase later.40
38 Interview with an expert in energy security, Bucharest, August 2011. 39 Interview with an expert in energy security, Bucharest, August 2011. 40 Interview with officials, Baku, June, 2011.

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There are three possibilities regarding the future capacity of the project AGRI to transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe: 2, 4.5, and 8 billion cubic meters. If the third figure is going to be the preferred one, then Romania will be able to negotiate a share of 2 billion cubic meters of the total quantity of gas transiting its territory. The authorities in Baku do not give priority to any regional energy-related project. Nabucco or AGRI both are equally important and Azerbaijan wishes that the two complement each other. The former project is strongly supported by the EU and will connect Europe to the oil deposits from the Caspian Sea and the Middle East. Both Nabucco, and AGRI are given the same attention by the Azerbaijani authorities; the difference is that the former is more difficult to implement, because, first, states like Iran and Turkmenistan have been invited to participate in its development, that are perceived as regional actors capable of producing regional instability and, second, there are higher tariffs to be paid for the gas that will transit through Nabucco. Moreover, in 2010 the EU has renounced the involvement of Iran in this project as a sanction for that countrys continuation of its nuclear program. Consequently, the Iranian authorities have declared their availability for the development of yet another project that could rival with Nabucco and would supply natural gas to Europe beneath the bottom of the Mediterranean. Several companies have also shown their willingness to invest in AGRI. Among those are investors from Japan, Germany, South Korea, and France that have offered to help with the drawing of some feasibility studies for the project. According to a press statement issued by the Romanian Ministry of Economy, Commerce, and Business Environment on February 14th, 2011, the feasibility study for Project AGRI must be completed by April 1st, 2012, in order to accelerate the completion of the project. Unlike the states that have just offered to draw feasibility studies, Japan has gone a bit further and suggested it may
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partially finance the project costs and supply transport technology in exchange for Azerbaijani natural gas. Neither do the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, and the Ukraine hide their interest to be parts of this project proving that the economic interests often prevail over the political ones. Turkey, in exchange, does not seem too happy about the enthusiasm shown by certain regional actors for the development of AGRI, since any such involvement would diminish its key role in the southern corridor by which energy resources are being transported to Europe. The EUs position as to this project is not a hostile one. On the contrary, Brussels encourages the starting of AGRI works, since that would contribute in an essential manner to the diversifying of the transit routes for other EU-member states as well. Moreover, AGRI seems to be a project with an excellent economic justification in the first place.41 The Serbian authorities, that are well-known for being stable partners of the Russian Federation in the West Balkans, have also shown their interest in joining the project. For the Georgian side, i.e. for one of the four states that have contributed the social capital of the AGRI LNG Project Company, there seem to be certain delicate points of an ecologic nature attached to this project. The natural gas transit pipeline is designed to cross some sensitive areas, for instance the area of origin of the famous Borjomi waters, an important Georgian product recognized both domestically and abroad for its curative properties. In case of an ecologic disaster, that cannot be ruled out, but is barely taken into consideration in the designing of the gas pipeline, the first to suffer will be the bottling facilities for the Borjomi water, which is primarily meant for export, but then also the Georgian economy in its entirety.42

41 42

Interview with an energy expert, Tbilisi, May 2011. Interview with an ecology expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

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The Heydar Aliyev Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan oil pipeline43 (State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2011b) is an international project that took shape in 1994, at the initiative of Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, in order to strengthen the economic independence of the countries in the region (Haciyev, Iqbal, 2010, pp. 227-242). The pipeline is being supplied with oil extracted from the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea and takes it to the international markets, being designed in such a way as to take over a part of the Kazakh oil production, too (ibidem). The length of the pipeline is 1,767 kilometers, of which 443 on the territory of Azerbaijan, 248 in Georgia, and 1,076 in Turkey. It was designed to last forty years. The maximum transport capacity is 50 million tons per year. The Azerbaijani participation in the project was accomplished through AzBTC Co., one of SOCARs subsidiaries. The percentage of the latters investment in BTC Co. is 25% of the sum total of 3 billion euros overall cost (see the other investors in Figure 1, opposite page). The importance of the BTC oil pipeline is a complex one. Besides guaranteeing a part of the domestic necessities of the states involved in the development of the project, it also has a political significance. Its geopolitical significance comes from the fact that it reduces dependence on the Russian Federation energy. The second function of this oil pipeline is to offer the US and other Western states the possibility of no longer depending so much on the Persian Gulf oil, by avoiding the Russian territory and the crowded routes from the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits.
The BTC oil pipeline was the oil-related contract of the 20th century for the states that contributed to the realization of the project. It was signed on September 20th, 1994. In 1999, the Agreement for the transportation of crude oil through the BTC pipeline was signed in Istanbul by the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Officially, the pipeline became operative on July 13th, 2006. Its construction was carried out by the BTC Co., created in London in August 2002.
43

Figure 1 The investment percentages in the development of the BTC oil pipeline (Source: State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan, http://www.oilfund.az/en/content/10/95)

Although Azerbaijans economic ties with the Russian Federation are still significant, its strategy of energy-related development is orientated, as earlier mentioned, towards promoting projects that offer alternative sources to the Russian ones. This attitude offers the authorities in Baku an additional perspective in the negotiation of their national interests and political objectives, but strongly outlines the economic aspect of the bilateral relationship between Baku and Moscow. The strategy of diversifying the suppliers of oil products and of the transportation routes for oil and gas of other than Russian origin will alter the Russian Federations position on the world stage, forcing it to be more friendly, more oriented towards carrying out another type of negotiations. At the same time, the Russian leaders are bound to become more receptive to the international mechanisms and norms specific to the specialized institutions with which they negotiate in order to obtain full membership. The purpose of this endeavor to have Russia open itself to the world markets in conditions of loyal competition is to ensure energy stability on European soil.
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BTC Co. is a consortium of oil companies and financers with a total contribution to the project of 3 billion euros, 30% of which has been invested by AzBTC, a SOCAR subsidiary especially created for the development of the Azerbaijani side of the project. The remaining 70% is made up of contributions from the other members of the consortium: international financial institutions, credit agencies, and commercial banks. The Ministry of Economic Development of the Republic of Azerbaijan has obtained the official representation of the interests of the Azerbaijani government, by securing itself an 80% participation in AzBTC. Thus, the income resulting from the involvement and support of the Ministry of Economic Development is accumulated in SOFAZ, the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan. SOFAZ has financed the construction of the portion of the BTC oil pipeline crossing the territory of Azerbaijan, in conformity with the provisions of the Presidential Decree no. 739 of July 30th, 2002, signed by then-president Heydar Aliyev. In February 2007, 298 million AZN were allocated to the financing of the Azerbaijani share in the BTC project. The Azerbaijani section of the BTC pipeline was inaugurated on May 25th, 2005, by the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, on the occasion of an official ceremony held at the Sangachal terminal near Baku. BTC is one of the most expensive energy projects implemented before 2005 and brought together eleven partner states. It modifies the geopolitical situation in the Caucasus, creating tensions between the Russian Federation and the US. The Shakh Deniz Platform44 the Shakh Deniz consortium, made up of several energy-specialized companies,
44 The first stage of the Shakh Deniz project was completed in 2003. It required that new platforms for the exploitation of the natural gas deposits and two underwater pipelines be installed, that would transport the gas to shore, near Sangachal. Exporting the natural gas extracted at Shakh Deniz began in 2004. The first contract for natural gas exportation was signed by the Azerbaijani authorities

among which British Petroleum, Stateoil, SOCAR, Lukoil, NICO, Total, and TPAO, was accepting proposals until October 1st, 2011, for the construction of adjacent transportation routes, besides the ones that would supply the AGRI project, for the natural gas extracted from the Shakh Deniz field. Up to now, three proposals have been received, which are being studied by the authorities in Baku. All three are Europe-oriented: ITGI, the Interconnector Turkey Greece Italy; TAP, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline; Nabucco. The first gas extractions from the Shakh Deniz field for the most ambitious European energy project, Nabucco, are estimated to take place in 2017 (News.az, 2011a), a date the Azerbaijani officials confirm, adding that, from the point of view of the viability of an economic and logistic transportation, Nabucco will be the one to contribute mostly to the development of the southern energy corridor. Although SOCAR holds only 10% of the stock of the Shakh Deniz consortium that was created especially to exploit that deposit, the representatives of the Azerbaijani state owned company confirm that by 2017, the extraction capacity will reach the volume of 25 billion cubic meters per year. Nabucco was designed to transport 31 billion cubic meters per year with a potential growth to 35 billion cubic meters per year. The Azerbaijani officials have guaranteed a production of 10 billion cubic meters per year for Nabucco. As far as AGRI is concerned, as mention earlier, the quantity of resources that will pass through the pipeline has not yet been determined. Until 2006, although it possesses large quantities of natural gas, Azerbaijan was an importer state (EIA, 2011). Domestic consumption exceeded the extracted
in 2001. It referred to the supplying of such resources to Turkey. The earliest deliveries were made in 2006. The total volume of gas exported annually, according to that contract, reached up to 222 billion cubic meters at the end of 2009.

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volume of gas. Its main supplier was the Russian company Gazprom (Haciyev, Iqbal, 2010, p. 242). The exploitation of the Shakh Deniz reserves allowed the Azerbaijani authorities to lower the countrys dependence on the natural gas of Russian origin. The greatest impediments in the swift development of the project are the lack of a storage infrastructure and of a processing one for the gas extracted from Shakh Deniz. This has not impeded, however, the Azerbaijani authorities to negotiate with the Turkish ones for signing of agreements for the transiting of the Shakh Deniz gas, through Turkey, towards the European consumers. This is confirmed by the statements of the Azerbaijani officials (News.az, 2011b) who declare that, irrespective of the stage the works have reached, the volume of natural gas to be delivered in Europe has already been established. The Interconnector Turkey Greece Italy (ITGI, 2011) is a project whose purpose it is to create a linking bridge between Europe and the natural gas resources of the Caspian Sea area. The EU-member states imports are to be made through Turkey, which will result in the growth of this states role in the southern energy corridor. Like the other energy corridors, ITGI aims at diversifying the sources from which natural gas is being supplied to the European companies. Cumulated with the other projects, it will contribute to the transformation of the Republic of Azerbaijan into one of the largest suppliers of natural gas for Europe. The intention is that ITGI will interconnect the energy-supplying systems of Greece and Bulgaria to the Italian one through the offshore company that manages the Poseidon45 pipeline. The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) is yet another energy project belonging to the system of pipelines that make up the southern corridor, meant to guarantee the energy security
45 The company that manages the development of the Poseidon pipeline is called IGI Poseidon SA.

of the European states and to offset the growing dependence on the imports of natural gas from the Russian Federation. The main share-holders of the joint venture company that will manage the TAP connecting Europe to the Caspian Sea through the Adriatic are EGL from Switzerland, Statoil from Norway, and E.ON Ruhrgas from Germany. The transport capacity of the TAP will be 10 billion cubic meters per year, with the possibility to be doubled (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, 2011). The TAP company will contribute to the development of the gas storing infrastructure on the territory of Albania, which was invited, alongside Greece, to participate in the development of the project. These storage installations for natural gas are meant to ensure the necessary energy products for the European states in case of an energy crisis. Last July, TAP representatives signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Albanian government (Penn Energy, 2011), according to which they will study the possibility of connecting the Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline for gas to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, so that the network of pipelines of the southern corridor will be better interconnected and its functioning will be improved. The deliveries of natural gas to TAP from the Shakh Deniz deposit are estimated to begin in 2017. Experts are currently studying the impact of the future pipeline on the environment. The Viking Project is a merchandise transport route operating from Odessa to Klaipeda (Railway Pro, 2011) on the Jonava Siauliai railroad, part of the Rail Baltica. This project came up in 2003, as an initiative of three states: Lithuania, Belarus, and the Ukraine. Economically, it is an important initiative, since it offers a possibility of unifying the transport routes between Northern and Central Europe with those of the CIS and other Asian states, including China. The project feasibility has been enhanced by the effects of the worldwide economic crisis that has made it a necessity, for the states involved in the international trading on the East-West transport corridor, to take measures of
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counteracting its consequences. Railroad transportation of goods lowers their acquisition prices, since it is one of the cheapest means of international transfer. If supported by other means of transportation along the route, its efficiency grows even more. Georgia and the Republic of Moldova have been invited to join this project. They may contribute to the development of merchandise transportation in the Black Sea area. In May 2011, the two countries officially showed interest for the Viking Project and took over some of its works. The initial length of the route was 1,753 kilometers. Then, Azerbaijan was also invited to join the project (Web-portal of the Ukrainian Government, 2011). Ukrainian premier Mykola Azarov stated in a press conference that Azerbaijan would take part in the project in order to have the route extended towards Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and other Central Asian countries. Thus, the project could gain further significance: joining the Caspian to the Baltic Sea through Odessa. It is a very important project for the transportation of goods between Europe and Asia because it will connect to yet another transport corridor, TRACECA (The Europe Caucasus Asia Transport Corridor; see Kusch, Prause, and Hunke, 2011, p. 25). In places, the railroad transport could be doubled by the ferry one, which would facilitate the local connections even more. There are two possibilities for extending the East-West transport corridor to Central Asia: (1) the southern region of the Baltic Sea Lithuania Belarus the Russian Federation Kazakhstan China and (2) the southern region of the Baltic Sea Lithuania Belarus the Ukraine Georgia Azerbaijan Kazakhstan China, i.e. by potentially using certain components of the TRACECA route. The costs of transporting goods by railroad are lower than by using other means of transportation. There may be a problem, however, with the different gauges that have to be adapted to international standards in order to unify infrastructures of different types. The Viking project is meant to create a system
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of container transportation of goods between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea and is a component of an inter-modal project of international transportation launched in 2003. The reduced capacity of several transport corridors is a threat for the future economic growth and for European integration. In the near future, the production of goods will increase in volume, which will lead to the necessity of developing transport projects that already exist or to initiate new ones. Project Viking is designed to deal with such a quantitative growth. TRACECA46 is a project launched in 1993 to ensure the access of the European and Asian goods to the international markets through road, railroad, and maritime transportation means. It has been the basis of an alternative route from Europe to Central Asia, from the Black Sea basin, crossing the Caucasus, towards Mongolia and China. This alternative route has been created in order to lower the transportation costs for the Euro-Asian trade exchanges and to provide a route other than the trans-Siberian one for the same European and Asian goods. Moreover, TRACECA plays a political role as well, since it will lead, in time, to the creation of some efficient levers by which to ensure, at least in part, the commercial independence of the South-Caucasian and Central Asian states from the transport routes created at the initiative of the Russian Federation. What is attempted here is to minimize the importance of the economic projects
46 The document on which Project TRACECA relies was signed on May 3rd, 1993, in Brussels by the ministries of Transportation and Commerce from eight Central Asian and South-Caucasian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, plus Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The project was financed by the European Union in order to develop the East-West transport corridor that starts in Europe, crosses the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea and reaches Central Asia. After 1996, the Ukraine, Mongolia, the Republic of Moldova, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey also joined TRACECA.

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proposed by Moscow as well as the influence and role of the Community of Independent States, through a project of European origin. Thus, TRACECA is one of the linking bridges with Asia created by Brussels that partially brings prejudice to the Kremlins geo-strategic interests in the region. Joining this alternative transport route also implied the introduction of such legislative measures as to unify the transportation policies. The states wishing to join TRACECA, but also the Viking Project, had to undergo a process of harmonization and adaptation of their public policies and legislative transportation-related framework to the European ones.
Map 3 The East-West transport corridor (Source: Thomas Kusch, Gunnar Prause, Kristina Hunke, The East-West Transport Corridor and the Shuttle Train "VIKING", Hochschule Wismar, Fakultt fr Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 2011, p. 11, http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48566/1/66468520X.pdf)

Conclusions
The development of the South-Caucasian economic potential is mostly conditioned by the interest of the great powers in this region, inasmuch as it is a supplier of energy resources, but also by the opportunities it offers for the transportation of goods and services from East to West and from North to South. This territory has become a crossing point for the interests and the political, economic, and geostrategic objectives of various state and private actors. In this context, while the importance of the region steadily grows, since it is capable of producing both stability, and instability, regional initiatives and projects are bound to appear, that will be of interest for the three South-Caucasian states either separately, or together, but those will not be aimed at the consolidation of the regional unity, but will attract the states separately towards various forms of regional cooperation, which will determine even more the weakening of the interconnections between them. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia must keep up the process of reformation of their economic systems, by adopting tough measures that the population will be inclined to oppose. It is an exercise of both politics, and democracy, but its benefic impact on the economies could work for the benefit of future generations.
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Map 4 The extension of the Viking route (Source: Thomas Kusch, Gunnar Prause, Kristina Hunke, The East-West Transport Corridor and the Shuttle Train "VIKING", Hochschule Wismar, Fakultt fr Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 2011, p. 24, http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48566/1/66468520X.pdf)

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The three South-Caucasian states must also find the necessary solutions to overcome the conflicts and divergences of a political nature existing even in a latent form between them. If such solutions cannot be found in the political area, then a successful economic model should be chosen, that would help create a stable regional system. It is not always possible to turn the economic factor into a solution for solving the political issues. But the process can be justified by the national interests it may serve. Political decisions must be shaped pragmatically, so as to ensure as many economic benefits as possible. Breaking South Caucasus in accordance with the separate objectives of the great consumers of energy and political resources is a good short-term strategy. The region may become vulnerable to new challenges if the leaders of its three states deny its importance as a whole. South Caucasus is not just a bridge for the great economies of the world to be able to access the Caspian Sea oil and gas, it is also an area where dangers and threats for the regional security still lurk. Acknowledging the importance of economic connections and intra-regional trade exchanges is one of the multiple solutions the three South-Caucasian states have at their disposal and resorting to those is a vital necessity to accelerate the qualitative development of their respective societies.

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