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Director Prof. univ. dr. Costic Voicu

Consiliul tiinific : Maurice Petit "Colegiul de Poliie Bruxeles" Prof. univ. dr. Luca Iamandi Acad. prof. univ. dr. Ion Dogaru Prof. univ. dr. Ioan Dasclu Dr. ing. Iulian Medrea Prof. Dr. Ligia Negier Dormont Universit Panton, Paris Chestor de poliie Petre Toba Prof. univ. dr. Vlad Barbu Prof. univ. dr. Alexandru Boroi Prof. univ. dr. Damian Miclea

Comitetul de redacie: Redactori efi: Prof. univ. dr. tefan Prun Dr. Ion Gherghi Redactor ef Adjunct: Conf. univ. dr. Laureniu Giurea Secretar General de Redacie: Lector univ. dr. Marius Pantea

Redactori: Lect. univ. dr. Marian Claudiu upulan Lect. univ. dr. Gheorghe Popescu Asist. univ. dr. Mihail Petric Marcoci Asist. univ. drd. Eduard Cristian tefan Asist. univ. drd. Sergiu Adrian Vasile Machetare i tehnoredactare: Mihai Zofei Revista apare cu sprijinul Catedrei de Investigare a Criminalitii din cadrul Academiei de Poliie A.I.Cuza Publicaie semestrial care apare sub egida IPA Romnia

Adresa: Bucureti, os. Olteniei, 158 160, Sector 4, 041323 Tel: 0213321754, 0213321756

ISSN 1844 7449


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Nr.5/2010

I. STUDII, ANALIZE, SINTEZE ALE FENOMENULUI CRIMINALITII


1. PREZENT I VIITOR N STRATEGIA DE SECURITATE INTERN A UNIUNII EUROPENE.......................................................................................... 13 Prof. univ. dr. COSTIC VOICU 2. UNELE CONSIDERAII PRIVIND AMENINAREA CU ARME BILOGICE I BIOTERORISMUL ....................................................................................................... 24 Chestor principal de poliie dr. CRISTIAN BACI 3. PRINCIPALELE AMENINRI I VULNERABILITI LA ADRESA ROMNIEI............................................................................................. 31 Comisar ef de poliie drd. DAN BUCUR, Chestor de poliie SORIN OPREA 4. CE FACE N REALITATE UN MANAGER ? O ANALIZ A AUTORITII EFILOR........................................................................................................................ 43 Prof. univ. dr. TEFAN PRUN 5. PRINCIPALII FACTORI CARE INFLUENEAZ DEZVOLTAREA CRIMINALITII INFORMATICE, PROVOCRI PENTRU AUTORITILE DE APLICARE A LEGII N COMBATEREA FENOMENULUI ............................... 51 Prof. univ. dr. av. FLORIN SANDU, Lect. univ. dr. av. IONI GHEORGHE-IULIAN 6. NREGISTRAREA DOMENIULUI DE MARC N CADRUL UNIUNII EUROPENE............................................................................ 60 Lect. univ. dr. MARIUS PANTEA, Asist. univ. drd. SERGIU ADRIAN VASILE 7. MSURILE DE PROTECIE I DE ASISTEN APLICABILE MARTORILOR INCLUI N PROGRAMUL DE POTECIE............................................................... 67 Comisar ef de poliie dr. ADRIAN AUGUSTIN BRSCU 8. AVEM CRIMINALITATEA PE CARE NU DORIM S O PREVENIM..................... 74 Comisar ef de poliie dr. EUGEN NEA 9. DISPOZIII ALE NOULUI COD CIVIL CU REFERIRE DIRECT LA DOMENIUL ASIGURRILOR .......................................................................................................... 88 av. DOINA PREOTU, av. CTLIN NARDI PREOTU

II. EVOLUIA I TENDINELE CRIMINALITII


10. ASPECTE ACTUALE LEGISLATIVE I PRACTICE N DOMENIUL COMBATERII FRAUDEI FISCALE............................................................................ 99 Comisar ef de poliie drd. DAN BUCUR, Lect. univ .dr. MARIUS PANTEA 11. CONEXIUNEA DINTRE TRAFICUL DE DROGURI I NOILE TEHNOLOGII Conf. univ. dr. GIUREA LAURENIU, OCTAVIAN VAR ......................................... 106 12. ANALIZA INFRACIUNILOR DIN DOMENIUL JOCURILOR DE NOROC N ROMNIA .................................................................................................................. 111 SORIN CONSTANTINESCU, Inspector de Poliie BOGDAN ALEXANDRU DOMNCA
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13. TRAFICUL INTERNAIONAL CU VEHICULE FURATE, COMPONENT A CRIMINALITII TRANSFRONTALIERE ............................................................. 123 Lect. univ. dr. UPULAN CLAUDIU, Asist. univ. drd. TEFAN CRISTIAN EDUARD 14. TERORISMUL ECONOMIC ..................................................................................... 131 Lect. Univ. dr. GHEORGHE POPESCU, Comisar ef de poliie drd. ADRIAN MARCEL IANCU 15. FORME ALE INCRIMINRII FRAUDEI CORPORAIILOR MULTINAIONALE ................................................................. 139 Asist. univ. dr. MARCOCI PETRIC MIHAIL 16. CORUPEREA RESPONSABILILOR CU APLICAREA LEGII ............................... 151 Lect. univ. dr. PINTILIE LIGIA TEODORA, Lect. univ. dr. TOMA VASILE RUS 17. PRINCIPALELE PROCEDURI, GHIDURI, PRACTICI DEZVOLTATE N DOMENIUL CERCETRII INFRACIUNILOR DIN SFERA CRIMINALITII INFORMATICE .......................................................................................................... 161 Lect. univ. dr. av. IONI GHEORGHE IULIAN, OCTAVIAN VAR 18. FRAUDE INTRACOMITARE LA REGIMUL T.V.A............................................... 172 Comisar de poliie drd. ENACHE VICENIU, ec. ORZA CARLA NICOLETA 19. ORGANIZARE I FUNCIONARE A ARHIVELOR PRIVATE N UNGARIA. UN POSIBIL GHID PENTRU ARHIVELE ROMNETI ....................................... 181 drd. MONICA SACHELARIU 20. CONSIDERAII GENERALE DESPRE CONTRACTUL DE ASIGURARE MARITIM ................................................................................................................. 192 av. DOINA PREOTU, av. CTLIN NARDI PREOTU

III. CERCETAREA I PREVENIREA CRIMINALITII


21. DIMENSIUNI ACTUALE ALE CRIMINALITII CORPORAIILOR MULTINAIONALE ................................................................................................. 201 Asist. univ. dr. MARCOCI PETRIC MIHAIL 22. LUMINA I SPERANA SALVRII DIN TUNELUL TENEBROS AL TRAFICULUI DE PERSOANE .................................................................................. 217 drd. ANGHEL STOICA 23. PREMISELE EMITERII MANDATULUI EUROPEAN DE ARESTARE DE CTRE AUTORITILE ROMNE .................................................................. 227 drd. ANGHELU ADRIAN, STANIMIR EMIL FLORIAN 24. ASPECTE TEORETICE I PRACTICE PRIVIND RPIRILE PARENTALE INTERNAIONALE ................................................................................................... 237 Drd. CRISTIAN EDUARD TEFAN, Drd. ADRIAN ANGHELU 25. PIEELE FINANCIAR - BANCARE A STRUCTURILOR DE CRIM ORGANIZAT I SPLAREA BANILOR............................................................... 249 Lect. univ. dr. PINTILIE LIGIA TEODORA 26. APARIIA I PROLIFERAREA GRUPRILOR CONSTITUITE PE CRITERII MISTICO RELIGIOASE .......................................................................................... 257 Conf. Univ. dr. BARBU NICU-DAMIAN

27. PREVENIREA I SANCIONAREA ILEGALITILOR N DOMENIUL SILVIC ............................................................................................. 272 Inspector de Poliie BOGDAN DOMNICA, av. LILIANA CONSTANTIN 28. PREVENIREA COMPORTAMENTULUI JUVENIL DELINCVENT ..................... 283 Subinspector de poliie VALENTINA IRIMIA, Subinspector de poliie CTLIN IRIMIA 29. MANAGEMENTUL INVESTIGRII FRAUDELOR CARE ADUC ATINGERE INTERESELOR FINANCIARE ALE UE................................................................... 290 Conf. univ. dr. NICOLAE GHINEA 30. FRAUDA PRIN INTERMEDIUL INSTRUMENTELOR DE PLAT..............................298 Chestor de poliie SORIN OPREA 31. METODE I TEHNIC DE PREVENIRE A VIOLENEI DOMESTICE.................. 306 Asist. univ. drd. AMALIA NIU 32. COMBATEREA, LA NIVEL EUROPEAN, A TRAFICULUI ILICIT DE DROGURI PE CALE MARITIM ................................................................................................ 312 Comisar ef de poliie drd. ADRIAN MARCEL IANCU, Comisar ef de poliie dr. VICTOR NICOLESCU 33. UTILIZAREA INFORMAIILOR CONTABILE N PREVENIREA CRIMINALITII ECONOMICO-FINANCIARE, N CONTEXTUL GLOBALIZRII.......................................................................................................... 324 drd. NELU NI 34. CAZUL ERBAU MIHAIL .................................................................................... 333 Comisar ef de poliie VIOREL VASILE

IV. MANAGEMENTUL INVESTIGRII CRIMINALITII


35. MODELUL CONJUNCTURAL DE LUARE A DECIZIEI I EFICIENA ORGANIZAIEI ......................................................................................................... 341 Comisar ef de poliie CRISTINA DOBRIOIU 36. ADMINISTRARE SISTEMULUI E-LEARNING ..................................................... 350 Ioan-Cosmin MIHAI 37. MANAGEMENTUL SCHIMBRII ORGANIZAIONALE N STRUCTURILE POLIIEI DE FRONTIER ROMNE ..................................................................... 359 Lect. univ. dr. COSTEL DUMITRESCU 38. ANALIZA DE RISC, INSTRUMENT PENTRU MANAGEMENTUL ACTIVITILOR LA FRONTIER.......................................................................... 367 expert ADRIAN LZROAIA 39. DE LA MANAGEMENTUL RISCULUI LA MANAGEMENTUL SUCCESULUI DE CE ESTE NECESARA EVALUAREA RISCULUI? ........................................... 373 Comisar ef de poliie drd. MAGDA ARDELEANU 40. IMAGINEA N PROCESUL COMUNICRII ORGANIZAIONALE ................... 378 Prep. Univ. POPESCU OANA ANDREEA 41. MODELELE CLASICE ALE CULTURI ORGANIZAIONALE. DIAGNOSTICAREA CULTURII ............................................................................... 384 Comisar ef de poliie CRISTINA DOBRIOIU
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V. PROBLEMATICA SCHENGEN N DOMENIUL CRIMINALITII


42. UNITATEA DE COOPERARE JUDICIAR A UNIUNII EUROPENE EUROJUST..................................................................... 393 Asist. univ. drd. SERGIU ADRIAN VASILE 43. IMIGRAREA RESORTISANILOR DIN RILE TERE - O NOU PROVOCARE DIN PERSPECTIVA INTEGRRII ROMNIEI N SPAIUL SCHENGEN ................................................................................................................ 401 Conf. univ. dr. CRISTIAN FLORIN POPESCU 44. ROMNIA I REGIMUL MICULUI TRAFIC LA FRONTIERELE COMUNITARE ......................................................................... 408 Asist. univ. drd. GABRIEL PERE 45. REMEDIEREA ADMINISTRRII DEFECTUOASE N INSTITUIILE I ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE PRIN INTERMEDIUL OMBUDSMANULUI EUROPEAN............................................................................ 416 Prep. univ. CRISTIAN PAUL

VI. RECENZII, SEMNALE EDITORIALE


46. COSTIC VOICU ...................................................................................................... 425 47. DAN BUCUR, MARIUS PANTEA............................................................................ 426

No. 5 / 2010

I. ANALYSIS, STUDIES, SYNTHESIS


1. PRESET AND FUTURE IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION STRATEGY ..................................................................................................... 13 professor PhD. COSTIC VOICU 2. SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ........................................................................................... 24 police principal quaestor PhD. CRISTIAN BACI 3. THE MAIN THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES AGAINST ROMANIA............... 31 police chief commissioner PhD student DAN BUCUR, police quaestor SORIN OPREA 4. WHAT REALLY DOES A MANAGER? A REVIEW OF THE AUTHORITY OF HEAD................................................................................ 43 professor PhD. TEFAN PRUN 5. THE MAIN FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CYBERCRIME, THE CHALLENGE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THIS PHENOMENON................................................................................ 51 professor PhD lawyer FLORIN SANDU, lecturer PhD lawyer GEORGE IULIAN IONI 6. DOMAIN MARK REGISTRATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION.................. 60 lecturer PhD MARIUS PANTEA, assist. PhD student SERGIU ADRIAN VASILE 7. MEASURES FOR PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE FOR WITNESSES INCLUDED IN THE PROGRAM OF PROTECTION ................................................. 67 chief commissioner PhD ADRIAN AUGUSTIN BRSCU 8. WE HAVE THE CRIME THAT WE DONT WANT TO PREVENT .......................... 74 chief commissioner PhD EUGEN NEA 9. PROVISIONS OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE REFERRING TO THE INSURANCE.... 88 lawyer DOINA PREOTU, lawyer CTLIN NARDI PREOTU

II. EVOLUTION AND TRENDS OF CRIME


10. CURRENT LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE ISSUES IN COMBATING TAX EVASION ............................................................................................................. 99 police chief commissioner PhD student DAN BUCUR, lecturer. PhD. MARIUS PANTEA 11. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN DRUG TRAFFICKING AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES ....................................................................................................... 106 senior lecturer PhD GIUREA LAURENTIU, OCTAVIAN VAR 12. ANALYSIS OF CRIMES IN THE FIELD OF GAMBLING IN ROMANIA............ 111 SORIN CONSTANTINESCU, police inspector DOMNICA BOGDAN ALEXANDRU 13. INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN STOLEN VEHICLES, PART OF THE CRIME . 123 lecturer PhD UPULAN CLAUDIU, assistant PhD student CRISTIAN TEFAN EDUARD
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14. ECONOMIC TERRORISM ........................................................................................ 131 lecturer PhD GHEORGHE POPESCU, chief commisioner PhD ADRIAN MARCEL IANCU 15. FORMS OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZATION OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ....................................................................................................... 139 assistant PhD MARCOCI PETRIC MIHAIL 16. CORRUPTION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER............................................ 151 lecturer PhD PINTILIE LIGA TEODORA, lecturer. PhD TOMA VASILE RUS 17. THE MAIN PROCEDURES, GUIDES, PRACTICES DEVELOPED IN THE INVESTIGATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES WITHIN THE SPHERE OF CYBERCRIME............................................................................................................ 161 lecturer PhD lawyer GEORGE IULIAN IONI, OCTAVIAN VAR 18. FRAUD SCHEME IN EUROPEAN UNION CONCERNING V.A.T. ...................... 172 police commisioner PhD student VINCENIU ENACHE economist ORZA CARLA NICOLETA 19. THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF PRIVATE ARCHIVES IN HUNGARY. A GUIDE FOR ROMANIAN ARCHIVES ........................................... 181 PhD student MONICA SACHELARIU 20. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON MARITIME INSURANCE CONTRACT ..... 192 lawyer DOINA PREOTU, lawyer CTLIN NARDI PREOTU

III. RESEARCH AND CRIME PREVENTION


21. CURRENT DIMENSIONS IN CRIMINALITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ....................................................................................................... 201 assistant PhD. MARCOCI PETRIC MIHAIL 22. LIGHT AND HOPE OF THE SALVATION FROM TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS... 217 PhD student ANGHEL STOICA 23.PREMISES FOR THE ISSUE OF EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT BY THE ROMANIAN AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... 227 PhD student ADRIAN ANGHELU, police commisioner STANIMIR EMIL FLORIAN 24. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL KIDNAPING .............................................................................. 237 PhD student CRISTIAN TEFAN EDUARD, PhD student ADRIAN ANGHELU 25. FINANCIAL AND BANKING MARKETS OF ORGANIZED CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING .................................................................................. 249 lecturer PhD. PINTILIE LIGA TEODORA 26. THE APPEARANCE AND PROLIFERATION OF GROUPS BASED ON MYSTICAL - RELIGIOUS CRITERIA ............................................................... 257 senior lecturer PhD BARBU NICU DAMIAN 27. PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF ILLEGALITY IN FORESTRY............... 272 police inspector DOMNICA BOGDAN ALEXANDRU, lawyer LILIANA CONSTANTIN 28. PREVENTION OF DELINQUENT JUVENILE BEHAVIOR .................................. 283 police subinspector VALENTINA IRIMIA, police subinspector CTLIN IRIMIA
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29. THE MANAGEMENT OF THE INVESTIGATION FOR FRAUD AFFECTING THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES .............................. 290 senior lecturer PhD NICOLAE GHINEA 30. FRAUD BY PAYMENT INSTRUMENTS ................................................................ 298 policy questor SORIN OPREA 31. METHODS DNA TECHNIQUES PREVENTING FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ... 306 assist PhD. student AMALIA NIU 32. FIGHTING TRAFFICKING OF ILLICIT DRUGS AT EUROPEAN LEVEL, BY SEA............................................................................. 312 police chief commissioner PhD student ADRIAN MARCEL IANCU, police chief commissioner PhD VICTOR NICOLAESCU 33. USE OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION CRIMES PREVENTION IN THE BACKGROUND................. 324 PhD NELU NI 34. MIHAIL ERBAU CASE - ROMANIAS O J. SIMPSON ................................ 333 Chief Commissioner VIOREL VASILE

IV. MANAGEMENT OF CRIME INVESTIGATION


35. THE TERM MODEL OF DECISION MAKING AND ORGANIZATION EFFECTIVENESS ....................................................................................................... 341 police chief commissioner CRISTINA DOBRIOIU 36. E-LEARNING SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION......................................................... 350 PhD student IOAN COSMIN MIHAI 37. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE MANAGEMENT IN THE STRUCTURE OF ROMANIAN BORDER POLICE................................................................................ 359 assist. PhD COSTEL DUMITRESCU 38. RISK ANALYSIS - TOOL FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF ACTIVITIES AT BORDER .................................................................................. 367 expert ADRIAN LZROAIA 39. FROM RISK MANAGEMENT TO THE MANAGEMENT OF SUCCESS. WHY IS RISK ASSESSMENT NECESSARY? ......................................................... 373 chief commissioner of police PhD student MAGDA ARDELEANU 40. IMAGE IN THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION.......... 378 assist. POPESCU OANA ANDREEA 41. CLASSIC MODELS IN ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE. DIAGNOSIS OF CULTURE....................................................................................... 384 police chief commissioner CRISTINA DOBRIOIU

V. SCHENGHEN ISSUES
42. JUDICIAL COOPERATION UNIT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION EUROJUST ... 393 assist. PhD student SERGIU ADRIAN VASILE 43. IMMIGRATION OF NATIONALS FROM THIRD-COUNTRY A NEW CHALLENGE IN VIEW OF ROMANIA'S INTEGRATION INTO SCHENGEN AREA..................................................................................................... 401 senior lecturer PhD CRISTIAN FLORIN POPESCU
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44. ROMANIA AND TREATMENT OF COMMUNITY BORDER SMALL TRAFFIC... 408 assist. PhD student GABRIEL PERE 45. IMPROVEMENT OF INEFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT IN EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES THROUGH OMBUDSMAN.................................. 416 assist. CRISTIAN PAUL MATEI

VI. REVIEWS
46. COSTIC VOICU ...................................................................................................... 425 47. DAN BUCUR, MARIUS PANTEA............................................................................ 426

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PRESENT AND FUTURE IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Prof. PhD COSTIC VOICU EU internal security is based on efficient information exchange mechanisms between national and European actors. To this end, the European Union must have a European model of intelligence based on strategic analysis capacity building and improved collection and intelligence management. In developing of this model must be built a true architecture of information systems capable of interoperable technical solutions to national and European systems nowadays or in the future. Keywords: Treaty of Lisbon, security strategy, economic security, financial security, military security, police cooperation, justice, organized crime The construction, development and consolidation of the European Union were three fundamental stages, which unrolled during 60 years, each time frame being marked by the actions of influent political personalities. On May, 9th, 1950, Robert Schuman, the French ministry of external affairs, launched the project develloped by Jean Monet, ment to realize a union of coal and steel between France and Germany. In April 1951, in Paris, the CECO Treaty is signed (The European Community of Coal and Steel), to which France, Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, the Lower Countries and Italy are part. In March 1957 the six states sign the Rome treaties, which make up the CEE (the European Economic Community) or the common market and EURATOM (the European Atomic Energy Community), treaties that were enforced on the 1st of January, 1958. Therefore, the period 1950 1957 was dominated by the political component of the complex birth process of the European Union, followed by an economic component, essential for the development of basic concepts. In 1968 customs taxes for industrial products were eradicated and they set a common external tarrif, thus uniting the customs of the six founding states.Five
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years later (January 1973) there takes place the first expansion of the Community: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdon adhered, followed by Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986. In November 1989 the bBerlin wall falls, generating the unification of Germany. An important moment for the history of the European Union is the enactment in November 1993 of the Treaty for the European Union, signed at Maastricht, defining the creation projects of the future unique currency, of an external and security politics, as well as of consolidation of the cooperation in the field of justice and internal affairs. The most important role in this vast and complex activity of consolidating the edifice of the European Union was played by two grand political figures of the times: Francois Mitterand the French President and Helmuth Kohl the German Chancellor. The two, characterized by tenacity, sobriety and unlimited trying, did not show the cheap charisma of some who, by populist gestures, proclaim themselves European Liders. The two did not have anything from Sarkozy or Berlusconi; they used to impress by their own grandore, focused on reaching the fundamental objectives of the European Union. This is how the expansion of the European Union was possible in January 1995, by adherring of Austria, Finland and Sweden.

In May 1999 the Amsterdam Treaty is signed, in which there are provided measures ment to reform the communitary institutions, stop the European influence in the world. Two years later, in December 2001, the European Council in Laeken takes over a declaration regarding the future of the European Union, with respect to naming a Convetion that will write the European Constitution. On January 1st , 2002 the European currency (EURO) is issued, adopted by the 12 member states. In February 2003 the Nise Treaty is signed, preparing the European Union for the adherring of 10 new states in the next year. At the same time, the Charta of fundamental rights and liberties of man is adopted. In May 2004 ten other states adherred to the European Union: the Czeck Republic, Ciprus, Estonia, Letonia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary. In October 2004 the chiefs of states and governments of the member states signed the Treaty for a Constitution of the European Union. In the summer of 2005, France and Holland (The Lower Countries) reject, by referendum, the project of the Constitution. The month of January 2007 marks the adherring of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union, the number of the member states reaching 27. On December 1st the Lisbon Treaty is taken up, as well as the new Constitution of the European Union. The juridical European research is preoccupied by the governing model and the institutional architecture of the European Union, as it is configured by the Lisbon Treaty, and deeply influenced, functionally speaking, by the new reality of the European space. We witness a reality in which there are amplified the query, the decision making of some countries, not understanding the economic and social events produced, the action rout of institutions and individuals. Everything seems to be taken over by crisis, whose
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causes are still unknown, though its results are perfectly visible in all member states. On June 1st, 2010, the European Union records a sad record: over 25 million unemployed people, to which we can add almost 5 million European citizens moving from one country to another hoping to find a place to work. Data regarding the demografic structure of the member states of the European Union and their evolution for the next 2 or 3 decades, are depressing: the number of retired people is rasing and there is a dramatic decrease of the active work force, capable of invigorating the revenue necessary fot the survival of peoples. Member states of the European Union are more and more dependant on the energy sources (natural gas and petrol) and mineral resources vital for the high technologies provoked by the fanion states (Germany, France, The United Kingdom, Italy and Holland). The European bank system signals weak signs and lack of inspiration in the face of an American offensive and of states with an emerging economy: China, Brasil, India, Russia, South Africa - whose philosophy is hard to digest by the European conservatorism, in itself hard to define and understand by the elite stuck into over-realistic projects and programs contradicted by the real challenges of the future. There are great differences in the opinions of member states regarding the model of governing that can guarantee stability and progress. The European Union is more like a ReUnion of member states, an orchestra with 27 intruments, where averyone is playing a partiture different than that of the other, because the conductor does not really exist. Of the 27, 16 wear a the badge of the EURO and is trying to tune their instrument how they can better, waiting for a conductor to have the courage of changing the fashion. A first candidature was announced by the French leader Nicolas Szarkozy, on June 1st, 2010. According to Le Monde, the Frech president brings back on first lines

his whish to create a cheaf of states and governments from the EURO area forum, with one secretariat, a real governmet for Europe. The same newspaper reminded that Germany, the most powerful European economy, already rejected similar proposals regarding the creation of a formal entity, ment to coordinate the economic governing of the euro area. The word government leaves us with the impression of a supra-state authority, dictating the economic politics by the unification of the monetary, fiscal and social policies under the form of decisions, mandatory for member states of the Euro Club. If regarding the monetary politics there are decisions already taken at the central level of the Monetary Union, the situation is opposed, almost impossible to solve as far as the fiscal and social systems of the 16 states are concerned, deeply influenced by the political programs of the dominating parties of the nations concerned. There are huge differences amongst the ideologies promovated today within the member states of the European Union: current political left and right have almost nothing in common with the values from 10 or 20 years ago. The coloured politics, where vigourless and inert concepts of the EU are mingled, fade and kneel in front of programs irrespective of our current ideals. The paradox of the current situation is the fact that the government politics are dictated by the many multinational corporations whose objectives are too far away from the whishes of the people. Between the citizen and the government there is the corporate system which, without caring about the interests of people, influences directly the governmental politics. The corporates are those who buy the votes of the electors, they fake the results of the elections and impose the governmental formulas that assure the success of their business. Moreover, in all states there functions the rotative door system; this is a system patented by the USA and taken over by the European states, in which the govern15

ment takes over the most representative corporate characters in the world of business, names ministers, states secretaries, councillors, etc. These persons serve the interests of those who sent them into governments, assuring them successful businesses (public contracts, customs tax exempts and fiscal facilities, uzurping justice and law enforcement authorities). After the contaminated governments have left, the undersigned characters come back to the corporations areal, on well paid positions, assuring by their network of relations the continuation of own business prosperity. Such important examples are in all states: in Italy, Berlusconi came into power from the area of big business through the rotative door. He temporarily left the government and came back in business, for him to come back as Prime minister of an Italy shook by scandals. In France, Nicolas Sarkozy was powered and mantained in the political area by the big barrons of the French corporations (for details: magazine Lumea (The world), no. 8 / 2009, article Sarcozys Secrets, pages 58 to 67). In Romania, the most important political figures (reference years 2008 - 2010) were taken over thorough the rotative door by the business medium (Berceanu, Videanu, Udrea, Vldescu, Pogea, Triceanu, Ionu Popescu, Oprea, Plcint, Ridzi etc), when leaving the functions they had occupied before that. In Germany, the ex-chancellor Gerhard Schorder was taken over from the high political function by the world of business in the giant Gazprom, whom he served impeccably in the period of his ministeriate. In England, the ex-Prime minister Tony Blair, sustained by the big corporate finance for occupying his political dignity, was saved by the rotative door, nowadays being the representative of those companies who unroll impressive international businesses. Robert Skidelsky, member of the Chamber of Lords, an economy professor at

the Warwich University in Great Britain, was recently saying (2010) that the political elite perceives the EU like a pole in a multipolar world. But what is Europe? It is less than a federation, more than a confederation, with no gravity center or strictly limited borders. Without an internal coherence or an external configuration, Europe is a little bit more than a geografic expression. The European political elite is trying to understand if and why do the Chinese capitalism and American socialism exist, but refuses to define what type of society it is buiding today in Europe and what are the real threats to the security of the EU. The European political elite supports the direct aggressive offensive of the Russian mafia to the economic scenery of the most powerful European states, but more likely in its esssential components of economies such as Romana, Bulgaria, the Czeck republic, Hungary, Slovacia, etc. Russia is developing nowadays a partnership with the EU (each year there takes place the Russia EU summit), but the most profitable contacts are the bilaterall ones: with France and Germany. In these circumstances, the Internal Security Strategy of the European Union is a document with a crucial importance, which needs to be analised in the integrating context of cruel realities which need to be understood by every state, but in the context of future threats and challenges, too. In other words, the Strategy needs permanent reconfigurating and reshaping, taking into consideration the conclusions and opinions formulated by prestigious analysis and diagnosis organisms, as well as personalities with a recognized competence in the matter of setting the characteristics of the world we live in. In the book The World in 2010 a schetch of the global future presented by the National Information Council of the USA, (Cartier Publishing House, 2008) the following ideas are presented as new challenges for governing: despite the fact that the nation-state
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will go on being a dominant of the global order, the economic and globalization dissimination of technologies, especially that of information, will generate tesnions grave enough between governments. The capacity to governs will get even more complicated; the institutional system at an international and regional levels is going through a difficult stage, being overwhelmed by the manifestation and effects of global problems: those of organizaed crime, terrorism and mass destruction arms proliferation. We face a system created decades ago (UNO, MIF, World Bank, OSCE, the European Union, the Council of Europe, etc) which risks to become obsolete unless they adapt to the deep changes taking place in the global system; by the year 2020 there is prospect of extiction of the fear of insecurity, generated by the huge economic, cultural and political convulsions. Weak governments, economies left behind, religious extremism and the increase in the number of youngsters will create the perfect conditions for internal conflicts within certain states or regions; as far as international terrorism is concerned, it is possible that by the year 2020, Al-Quaeda be replaced by other Islamic extremist groups, which can merge with local seppratist movements. Terrorists can obtain biologic agents or, less probably, nuclear devices, each of them capable of producing mass dezasters. Bioterrorism can be the instrument at hand to small groups, better informed and well organized. There are taken into consideration the cybernetic terrorist atacks, which can generate the blocking of information networks and grave fizical damages to informatics systems; the economic turmoil can get disseminated and can affect some international relations. In the opinion of some specialists, there can take place some sudden switches of capital movements, and the international financial mechanisms will not be able to anticipate and, obviously, find a remedy for severe crisis and huge social raptures; nations will deal with serious chal-

lenges for the field of suveillance, control and sensitive techgnologies interdiction. Nation-states will not be able to keep control over these technologies which will be able to generate tensions created by the competition for acces to the recent descoveries: research in the field of stem cells, the DNA signature, genetic vaccines, the genes replacement therapy; the change of geostrategic frames will shape the organized crime activity at a global level for the next 15 years. Organized crime will prosper in states rich in resources going through important political and economical transformations, such as China, India, Brasil, Nigeria. Some sindicates of organized crime will make up large alliances, trying to corrupt leaders from the unstable states, fragile from an economical point of view and declining, to force themselves into banks and companies with problems, use the informatics technologies and cooperate with insurgent in order to control important geografic areas. Organized crime prospers in countries where governments are weak, vulnerable to corruption, incapable of applying the law equally; The raltionship between terrorists and organized crime will go on existing especially in the field of business, meaning that terrorist will call upon the criminal groups to obtain fale documents, smuggled arms, or assistence for clandestine travellers. In another book, the Challenges of the future (Polirom Publishing House, 2010) James Canton formulates the following global prognosis: one of the most important business opportunities in the world will be the operation of remaking the national ballance, states and companies investments reaching hundreds of billions of dollars ; numerous organizations (including criminal) will make fortunes out of fields such as waste management, climate control, meteorological, materials and regenerable materials; among the factors that will have an influence over globalization there are the
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energy prices and availability of energetic resources; tendencies of terrorism and organized crime; ethnic conflicts among nations and between nations; respecting law reign and human rights; mass destruction arms proliferation; the degrading of environment; the five wars of globalization will be terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, forgery and powerty; barriers in the way of globalization will be the high unemployment rate, global terrorism, commerce barriers, local stagnating economies, threats to energy and climate, autoritarianism, not respecting the state of right, controlled media, wars, a weak education and health levels, anticonsummers politics; poverty generates and amplifies conflicts, criminality and terrorism. In the analysis of this ecuation, one has to have in mind the following: half of the globe population lives on less than 2 dollars per day; over 1 billion people suffer from malnutrition; in poor countries, Muslim radical organizations offer schooling, food and free medical assistance in the exchange for training future terrorists; organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorist networks exploit the poor war zones in Columbia, Somalia, Ceceny, Bosnia; terrorist networks recruit their members from the poor population of nations such as Malaysia, Irak, Indonezia, Pakistan, Afganistan the seven tendencies of the security of the future are: the risk for bioterrorism is high. Arms are invizible, silent, easy to transport, difficult to detect and capable of being fast spread among civilian population; dirty bombs: nuclear devices used against civil population; ciber terrorist attacks speculating the integrate connections between essential services, commerce, finance, communications, food supplies, transportation, energy and health; organized crime will become more

and more sofisticated, more dangerous, more dependant on high level technology and more profitable; the identity of civil and natural persons will be an extremely valuable merchandise, which will be easily accesible for buying and selling; the future will be dominated by video surveillance, controlled data bases, satellites and biometric systems; the inssurance of personal safety market will evolve. the seven methods used for identity theft: auto piracy. Hackers create the virtual wireless networks that people use to connet to the Internet while driving. Then they use those networks to steal personal information; phising bank systems. Hackers make duplicates of bank systems for accessing banking information of persons and corporations; creating PCDs (digitally constructed personalities), used by the hackers to be taken for account holders, in order to get access to funds in those accounts; donating identity documents. Hackers make digital clones of real persons using stolen identities and manage global business, open accounts, transfer funds, make tranzactions, obtain loans, disappear with the stolen money; destruction of data of persons or corporations and making new data bases in order to create new identities used in criminal activities; using high technlogies by criminals who create secret bank portals, or for stock exchange and networks of currency transactions and use in big fraudulose businesses, without being caught; usign nanobots with nanoantennas in spying anyone for ultrasecret data and information. Identity theft is the most spread crime in the USA (annualy, almost 10 billion victims) and developed European states. The resources that those who steal iden18

tities exploit are: medical charts, vehicle and maritime transport registration numbers, file piracy, credit history, social security numbers, identity documents and domicile documents, personal information, data regarding property transfers, professional diplomas, online hospitalized patients medical charts, registered voting data, online medical receipts, listening phonecalls via Internet with miniature devices, financial information on persons and companies. Another major threat is piracy (it is estimated that more than 15% from the brand products will be forged, at a quality higher than the original one). Piracy fuels the organized crime sindicates, drug traffickers and terrorists. Piracy has become a capital source for the world of organized crime. The Internal Security Strategy is building and rebuilding permanently considering the results of solid research activities on the European legislation of member states, as well as on the institutions and structures invested with attributions in law enforcement, and on procedures and actual actions used for applying strategic objectives. The scientific research can be realized by specialists in the academic environment (jurists, criminologists, sociologists) and in the medium of operative institutions, capable of critically analising the realities of the internal security strategy environment, identifying the causes of existing malfunctions, extending the fields in which new treats to the internal security of the EU and member states move. By points, the scientific research has to take place this way: At a legislative level, studies will be oriented in order to: elaborate the normative documents projects covering the aspects unregulated regarding the incrimination as offences of deeds which imply a social danger level (terrorism, drug trafficking, informatics, trafficking in human beings, money laundering, organized criminality); cutting off from legislation overdue regulations;

coding the specific regulations of the Internal Security Strategy, by including in the Crimial Code the crimes mentioned in special laws with criminal regulations (money laundering, informatics, corruption, etc); harmonizing the legislation in member states with that of the EU; bettering the drafting of normative documents. At the level of specialized institutions and structures, for enforcing the Internal Security Strategy, the reasearch will focus on: revising their internal organization system, by eliminating the useless components, deeply bureaucratic and grand consumers of human resources and material spending. The thorough study of similar isntitutions in other states can offer eficient solutions in the matter; building up new specialized compartments, corresponding to the structures existing in other members states; defining with a maximum precision, precisely, the atributions and competence of institutions and specialized structures in the fields shown in the Strategy; As far as the procedures for enforcing legislation is concerned, the scientific research has to be concerned with: making up propsals for modernising the criminal and adminsitrative procedures, by inserting clear dispositions regarding the probatory system and the procedure of designing the precursor documents for beginning the criminal investigation; bettering the strategic analisys capacity, of gathering and treating the information; revising the cooperation procedures and methods between the components of the law enforcement chain; harmonising the cooperation procedures between the national and European structures; integrating the national procedures within the European juridical frame regarding the electronic evidence; identifying new procedures with respect to common investigation instruments,
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techiques and interrogation in complex cases; identifying new horizons of developing research in the field of criminalistic techniques and investigation methods of IT crimes; defining the victim identification procedures and protection. The fields viewed by the Internal Security Stratgey of the EU are so complex and dinamic that a successful enforcing can only be made without the help of information services, which, traditionally, are not included in the category of law enforcement. In such a situation, the problem refers to the necessity and possibility of articulating the actions of intelligence services in every member state in the national law enforcement structures. The information services in every member state are focused on assuring the national security of each state, and their disponibility to exchange intelligence is reduced. It is hard to believe that we will have an European Intelligence Agency that will dedicate itself to the internal and external security of the European Union. The actual crisis situation that the EU has been facing for two years, lately becoming amplified in Greece, Romania, Spain, Portugal, Italy, proves us clearly that the EU institutions cannot and will not involve in the solving of problems. Every state has to do it for itself, not to ask for help from the EU, nor the MIF. Every state uses its intelligence services to the interest of its own national security, with the interest of knowing the weaknesses of other states and exploit them to their interest; French secret service have gathered intelligence about the sudden brake down of the US dollar. The information was only used by France, financial institutions getting huge profit. The information was not shared to the other member states. In such a situation, the intelligence gathering activity ment to prevent and repress criminality in all fields of the Security Strategy has to be organized and unrolled

by the law enforcement structures. From this point of view, every member state adopted its own model, conformable with its internal legislation. The intelligence component of the law enforcement structures in assimilated to the police structures in all member states (police, border police, customs, financial guard, fiscal authority, the gendarmerie, carabinieri, civil guard, etc). Moreover, in every state there functions the National Intelligence Community, articulated on an own protection strategy of the national security. Richard Aldrich states that the secret service find it hard to exchange intelligence at a transborder level in a rhitm that is comparable to the activities of their foes. This is due to the fact that secret service do not like to share intelligence, other than bilaterrally. There are lots of reasons to the support of this practice, including source protection. Essential to the revising of the conception of cooperation between the information service on the one hand and the structures of law enforcement, on the other, is the true conception according to which information related to many of the problems of globalization are not necessarily secret. The economic-financial criminality, monely laundering, illegal drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, tarfficking in arms, organized crime in the field of IT or payment methods, these are fields that can be discussed more openly, information on these appearing dayly in press. It is said that some journalists are excellent information officers, with an essential luggage of knowledge and aptitudes, capable of infiltrating in apparently inaccessible areas. The paradox is that the intelligence structures do not use this big reservoire of information, one of the explantion being that bureaucracy is suffocating, and the performance of the intelligence officers cannot be counted by the effect, result, of their final operations. It is appropriate to say that intelligence
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services are unidirectional: terrorism, with all its forms, is the fundamental target, the most important threat for these services. The rest of the threats does not matter any more, them being in the category of normal". Only, if organized crime finances terrorist groups, intelligence services are only interested in this kind of activity iff the false money are used in connection to these. The logical question formulated by people who are not part of the academic medium refers to one simple thing: what information did the great power intelligence services have, devastated by the financial crisis, regarding this ravishing phenomenon which continues to prolong its effects years after the declick? What information existed about the clash of America after 2001? What information did the secret service have in all EU member states about the real configuration of the great powers about the fraudulos powers which actually unrolled in all European countries between 2000 and 2010? What is the intelligence potential the great banks have regarding the capital market, in investment funds and speculation funds, potential that will understand the big fraudulose schemes applied to the capitalist economy? In these situations, the problem is not the admittance, but the misunderstanding. A lot of intelligence services receive, collect and receive information they do not understand, due to the simple fact that they do not view the system they exist in and due to the fact that, many times, they receive information vital for a field, that they do not send to those who have the capacity of understading properly. There is adifference of philosophy between the secret service and the investigative-operative-intelligence components of the law enforcement structures. The secret service claim a statute by far superior to the other: they claim to belong to a higher world, that they are suppliers of data, information and analysis exclusive for presidential peaks and government offi-

cials. In other words, they do not step down to the cases of petty crime, which come to the competence of police and dayly routine. Sick with secrecy and compartmentcy, lacking immagination and creativity, the secret service enjoy the command and need of the internal political figures, as well as to one or the other of the masters of the world (the USA, Russia, China). Pumping up such an attitude, often mingled with disregard and shown superiority, was favoured by the favourable access to information coming from technical sources, considered infailible, that they were not able to value with visible results. Our secret service are suffering also from the desease of inherent superiority (obviously false) compared to the other components of national security. The big problem of the system is that of transforming the information into evidence. Then there is the rush for information: hte leader is asking for information, irrespective of where they come from, unimportant if they are credible or not. The leaders of intelligence services invent, on order, targets that they need to have the file of (mere, unimportant papers). We have to admit the fact that the Secret Intelligence Service are too much subordinate to the political, respectively to the chief of state or government (respective of the constitutional regime of states), with a weak disponibility of cooperating with law enforcement authorities. In all, or almost all, Occidental states, a person, a group of persons, a corporation or criminal entity is / are surveilled simultaneously by all (2-3-4) intelligence services of that particular state, without one knowing exactly what the other service is doing. Starting with December 2003, Markus Ederer, deputy director of the Analysis Department of the German Intelligence, BND, was saying openly: the EU member states have identified the main threats to the Security Strategy of the EU: international terrorism, mass destruction arms, destabilized states, regional conflicts and organized
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crime. He adds that this analysis of the threats which assign transborder challenges and asimetric threats, means that the intelligence services modernize and radically change the operating way. Untill this change takes place, there is a long way ahead. The difficulty of modernizing and changing the answer given by authorities in the face of future challenges is due to the insufficient receptivity of authorities faced with the prognosis formulated by specialists and analists. To those mentioned before we add Jacques Attali, already famous as a futurist, who, in his book Short History of Future (Polirom, 2007) sets up some fundamental ideas that the future will be built on: in the next two decades, the EU will not be more than a simple common space including the 27 membre states, some other states from the Ex-Jugoslavia, and, probably, Turkey and Moldavia; the EU will consolidate with great effort its political, social and military integrated institutions, continuing to have serious problems in modernizing the tertiary studies system, revigorate innovation and scientific research, as well as implementing the some integrated politics into the matter of immigration. the EU economy is in decline: the competition is declining, the dinamism is slowing down, the population is growing old. Dominant will be the insurance and entertainment industries. The insurance companies and those covering financial markets risk will set up private security services, whose foremost duty will be that of plant, consumers and employees surveillance. These companies will spend important amounts on modelling the public opinion and on fidelizing clients: they have to respect certain norms, buy surveillance products. The entertainment industries (turism, cinema, TV, music, sport, live shows, games) are and will become the first industries with respect to the time of consuming programs and services they offer.

These two industries (insurance and entertaining) generate an mantain illegal activities: the racketeering is the criminal shape of insurance; the sex commerce and drugs are the criminal forms of entertaining. banks and financial institutions will allot themselves with potential world and European companies that will adopt and impose rules applicable in all states. At present, the Bank for International Regulations in Basel Switzerland has the mission of convoking monthly the presidents of all central banks in the world, to different training courses regarding the application of control rules with respect to the origins of capital, in order to fight more efficiently the pirat economies. In every society there is a criminal organization functioning, of mafiot type , with gangs of mobsters and terrorist groups which are migled within the social layers, and with a sole purpose of influencing and weakening state authority.We will face the existence of ruined states, in which corruption ends up neutralizing the action of law enforcement structures. In the construction and reconstruction of security strategies, both at the level of the EU, and that of every state, we have to notice permanently, deeply, the phenomena that take place in our society. According to Fareed Zakaria (The future of Freedom, Polirom, 2009): what is really new and distinct in the nowadays capitalism, is not the fact that it is global, informational or technological, but the fact that it is democratic. The democratization of capitalism generatde profound changes in the social structure of nations: the economic power, detained for centuries by small groups of business people, moved downwards, to the basis. One of the fundamental characteristics of modern society is the democratization of violence, meaning that the state is no longer the sole user of legitimate force in the society. Governments are the target of terrorists, but state authority is weakened by the powerful positions of capital markets, pri22

vate companies, transnational corporations, local governments, nongovernmental organizations, organized crime structures. The most obvious evidence of states are found in the aggressive forms of drug trafficking, free movement of persons, capitals and arms in the whole world. What we are discussing is the capacity of states and institutions of the EU to conceive and apply substance reforms, granting a real security of them, on every component: economic, financial, societal, military, ecologic. It is worth reflecting on the thouhts written by Andrei Plesu in the article European Union and Rapture, published in the Adevarul newspapaer, on May 26th, 2010: in the May 17th number, Der Spiegel publishes an essay of the Dutch writer Leon de Winter, entitled Plead for the unmaking of the euro currency. Two weaks before, the same magazine had on the first page a terrifying formula: Euroland burning. A continent on its way to bankruftcy. Until some time ago, Europe was living the deaf conflict of the countries not yet members of the Union (marked by the feeling of exclusion) and member states. Now we are dealing with a more and more vocal intra-European conflict: the indulgence of new members vs. the exasperated arrogance of old members. Between the est and the west there was a new scindation: the economic efficiency. But there comes at the horizon the rapture between the north and the south. The ex-Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Mria Aznar, was soon crying for the fact that the countries of the European septentrion are dictating economicalfinancial solutions to the meridionals. Spain and Greece have to conform themselves to some external indications, not necessary in accordance with their real data, and not necessary productive. In his turn, the German tax payer, does not understand why he has to take money out of his pocket to finance the 14 anual salaries of the Greeks, the bonus for punctuality when coming to work, or the early retirement for the thank of a free time bonus at certain convenient

ages. The traditional European nucleus, has least, clearer: it seems that we do not have of course, reasons to be bored of the prob- technocrats, nor philosofers. And if we do, lems created by the more boeme countries, we keep them safe. Just in case. But this but that does not mean that he always holds opportunity never comes." the infailible recepy of reform and progress. In our opinion, the Internal Security Joseph Stiglitz, laureate of the Nobel Strategy of Romania has to be modernized price for economy, thinks that the austerity and adapted to the actual context of our measures anticipated by the EU as a therapy country within the European Union. for the crisis are not only inefficient, but Romania is nowadays a ruined state, a directly dangerous. What is there to be done? stranded state, a captive state (this means a Will we end up, sooner or later, to give up state in which the political clientelle capon the unique currency? (despite the tures all the public funds, makes justice inoptimistic evaluation, though not very opperative and neutralizes the action of law convincing, of the permanent president of enforcement organs.) the EU Council, Mr. Herman Van RomOrgans who were meant to fight orpuy). Will we come back to the more real- ganized criminality (fraud, smuggling, drug istic, more functional regulations of the trafficking, embezzlement, financial fraud, Common Market? Do we have to ask our- theft and aggression of public funds) they selves if the idea of the United Europe hap- all stand in a state of unreal waiting, in a pens to be an utopic one? Or was it - just like state of levitation, in a state of total lack of communism badly put into practice? What intervention. All these organs are politized is certain, is that the danger of unification and corrupt, are kneeled by the political goes a long way of dissolution at present. power and organized crime. They got deThe rational marriage seems to be fol- professionalized and are at the command lowed by a passinal divorce. Under the thin of political and organized criminality. The layer of the common house, threatening police, Financial Guard, the customs, the cracks are foreseen . If we had enough time Finance Agency and some other institutions we should ask again, maturely, about the find out from the TV that smuggling is a fundamentals. What is it that unites us, in crime by which organized crime is manfact? Do we really have common grounds? tained. This TV announcement represents Are we all living by the same stylistic ma- the biggest offence brought to public institrix? Is Europe more than a geografic tutions. Is it now that those who made this unity? The answer to these questions had in announcement learnt that smuggling actions fact to forestand the technicalities of the are crimes? Is it now that government offigrand administrative, economic, and politi- cials find that fraud is a phenomenon visical programme of integration. Unfortu- ble at all pace? nately, experts do not have time to make The solution is a simple one: putting all philosophy, they do not cover themselves law enforcement agencies behind the politiinto romantic-speculative layers. They are cal and making them professional. It is practical people, determined and action- only this way that these institutions can indriven. And if sometimes they say big tegrate in the complex action of national words or sublime frases, it is just for the security, in its essential components: ecosake of discourse seasoning with ornamen- nomic security and financial security. tal sweet talking. In Romania, things are at Bibliography: Fareed Zakaria - the Future of the freedom, Ed. Polirom - 2009. Jacques Attali - Short history of the future, Ed.Polirom - 2007 James Canton - Challenges of the future, Ed.Polirom - 2010 The World in 2010 - A sketch of the global future presented by the National Intelligence Council of the USA Ed. Cartier - 2008
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SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS


Police Principal Quaestor PhD CRISTIAN BACI General Secretary - Ministry of Administration and Interior Bioterrorism means the deliberate release of biological agents or toxins in order to harm humans, animals or plants or to cause death, with the aim of intimidating a government or civilian population or compelling them to meet certain political or social objectives. The risk of terrorist attacks produced by means of biological agents is a major concern, keeping the attention of law enforcement services, governments and health authorities worldwide. Biological agents (such as bacteria, viruses and fungi) are more easily manipulated and transported than nuclear or conventional weapons. Moreover, they are difficult to detect and symptoms of exposure can last from several hours to several days before occuring. A terrorist possessing chemical or radiological weapons could kill hundreds or even thousands of people. With a biological arsenal, on the contrary, he could kill hundreds of thousands of people. Keywords: bioterrorism, biological weapons, weapons of mass destruction Although the civilized world finds it difficult to accept, the phenomenon of terrorism has become a reality with global implications, which is hard to prevent and manage. It is also no longer just a petty criminal act occurred in despair at some stage in the evolution of the social system. Now, it is well known as an action against the rule of law, particularly violent and carried out against international standards. 1 Terrorism has shown a new pole shift in the world order, having ties to organized crime, drugs, arms trade, money laundering etc.. Its not accidental that in recent years Afghanistan has become the world number one producer of heroin, and Osama bin Laden has stolen (using the most intelligent means), so far, more than half of the mutual aid funds sent to Bosnia by Muslim countries. The connection between the organized crime and the terrorist phenomenon has been demonstrated for some time2.
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Current terrorist techniques are represented by suicidal terrorism, bomb use, narcoterrorism, bioterrorism, cyberterorismul and even nuclear terrorism. Some analysts of the current terrorist phenomenon list latent terrorism among the modern terrorist techniques. This new concept aims at replacing the actual use of terrorist means with terrorist threats at using them in order to achieve the goals targeted and aimed. 3 The same category of risk and serious threat to international peace and security and to fundamental human rights includes the proliferation of mass destruction weapons. Associating it with terrorism, meaning the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons in terrorist actions (CBRN terrorism), it aggravates the threat facing humanity. At any time there is the possibility that some terrorist groups use weapons of mass destruction, not only as
no.1/2008, UNAP Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, page.213 3 Cristian Baci Some considerations on terrorism within the framework of globalization process, Crime Investigation Magazine, no.4/2009, page.21

Teodor Frunzeti Globalizing Intelligence, Militry Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, page.114 2 Laureniu-Liviu Dumitru Weaknesses of the terrorist phenomenon, UNAP Bulletin Carol I

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asymmetric responses, but also as extreme ways of implementing or imposing fundamentalist religious precepts, as a reaction to globalization, as a way of "punishing" populations, ethnicities, etc.4. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents probably the biggest threat to EU security5. International treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. However, at present, there is a new and dangerous period that increases the possibility of an arms race with weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the Middle East. Developments in biological sciences may lead to an increased output of biological weapons in the coming years, chemical and radiological attacks are also a serious issue. The spread of missile technology adds a further element of instability and may represent a growing danger for Europe. The risk of terrorist attacks using biological agents represents an issue of growing concern to law enforcement services, governments and health authorities worldwide. Biological agents (such as bacteria, viruses and fungi) are more easily manipulated and transported than nuclear or conventional weapons. Moreover, they are difficult to detect and symptoms of exposure can last from several hours to several days before occurring. For many chiefs in charge of law enforcement services, the recent terrorist pattern shows a very high interest in using weapons of mass destruction and biological weapons. It is relatively easy to purchase biological agents, biological weapons rep4 5

resenting an effective way to produce a generalized sense of fear among people. Many historical events have been characterized by the use or threat of use of toxic substances and pathogens, presenting some evidence which clearly demonstrates that some individuals and terrorist groups have recently conducted research on biological agents or toxins, or tried to obtain these substances6. The attacks in Madrid, London, New York and elsewhere have made clear that terrorism is a threat to all states and peoples. Terrorist groups aim at the security and values of democratic societies and the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. Terrorist groups may use unconventional means such as biological weapons or materials. Some of these materials have the potential to infect thousands of people, contaminate soil, buildings and means of transport, destroy agriculture and infect animal populations and, ultimately, to affect food and feed at any stage of the food chain. From a statistical viewpoint, the risk of a "bioterrorist" attack is low7, but its consequences can be devastating. If there is a deliberate introduction of lethal pathogens or a natural outbreak of a disease in the EU or imported from a third country, they can simultaneously affect several Member States or spread across borders and have a considerable economic and social impact. The use of biological agents and toxins as weapons is mainly characterized by the awareness of the use of the biological agent or toxin advantage over potential enemies, human or animal. This is why in the context of lacking historical sources; we can only make assumptions on the use of weapons or
Ioan Dasclu (coordinator), Cristian-Eduard tefan, Mariana-Daniela Marica, Septimiu-Mihai Marica bioterrorism in modern society, Sitech Publishing House, Craiova, 2009, page 11 7 Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the first 10 confirmed cases of inhalation anthrax caused by intentional spreading of Bacillus anthracis were identified in the U.S.. In this context, Europe has also faced many false anthrax alarms.
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http://www.sri.ro/upload/Brosura%20Bioterorism.pdf The fall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact increased the risk of uncontrolled spread of weapons of mass destruction, as well as their components, chemicals and their production technology. Moreover, technical discoveries in chemistry and biology, enable the production of cheap and relatively simple chemical and biological weapons. The fact that they are produced in small quantities causes difficulties in their discovery especially as traces left in the environment are weak.

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random occurrence of symptoms or diseases in history. It is clear that, once the first biological agent has been physically identified, the history of biological weapons may be clearly ranged into two periods: the empirical one, in which biological agents and toxins were used according to the experience acquired through observation and the scientific period, in which biological agents and toxins have been used according to the scientific information, based on reproducible and predictable phenomena, at which time one may talk about defence and protection against biological weapons8. World Health Organization (WHO) has warned on the potential of biological weapons since 1970. WHO estimated that 50 kg. culture of Bacillus anthracis and Francisella tularensis, spread on a popular center could kill or sicken people on an area of 20 km2. The epidemiological evolution is similar to "mass disease population. Under these conditions, health services (healthcare and public health) would be overcome in providing health care, laboratory testing and supplying materials. Moreover, health care personnel would be in danger. 9 Bioterrorism issues have clearly been identified by the end of the 80s, after the fall of communism and after the Gulf War. Since that time it has been found that the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1972 has not beent strictly observed in the Eastern bloc countries (an accident on the handling of anthrax in a military laboratory in Russia killed 100 people and in 1979, there could be identified silos containing large doses of botulinum toxin and anthrax in Iraq). Under these conditions, three major risks have been identified over 10 years: botulinum toxin, anthrax spores and smallpox virus10.
www.ancex.ro/upload/ISTORIA_ARMELOR_BIO LOGICE.pdf 9 Ludovic Pun Bioterrorism and biological weapons, Amaltea Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003, page.80 10 Ioan Dasclu (coordinator), Cristian-Eduard tefan, Mariana-Daniela Marica, Septimiu-Mihai Marica work cited., page.18
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Bioterrorism, which has already been a latent threat to the public, has proved a full destructive capacity after the dramatic events which took place on the American soil on September 11, 2001 and revealed the use of anthrax as a bacteriological weapon. U.S. have recently officially accused Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Iran, Syria and Sudan that they have got biological weapons, violating the non-proliferation treaty. According to a group of American experts in preventing and controlling diseases, the most dangerous micro-organisms for public health are: anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) 11, botulism12 (botulinum toxin), smallpox (Variola major)13, fever or plague (Yersinia pestis) 14, tularemia 15 (Francisella
11 Anthrax or emfizematos coal is an infectious disease caused by Bacillus anthracis. Anthrax is a zoonosis. Human being may be an accidental host, whose infection occurs through skin injuries, ingestion or inhalation of spores from infected animals or their products. Depending on the type of exposure, there are three clinical forms of anthrax: cutaneous, gastrointestinal and lung, the latter being associated with possible bioterrorism actions. 12 The Explanatory Dictionary of Romanian language defines botulism as: food poisoning caused by Bacillus botulinum toxin, serious food poisoning caused by a bacillus toxin found in meat and preserved fruit, serious poisoning caused by Bacillus botulinum toxin. 13 Smallpox is a disease of viral etiology, with high death rates, considered to be the most contagious infectious human disease. The analysis of cases of smallpox produced before this disease has been eradicated showed a death rate of 30%. It is estimated that smallpox killed between 300 and 540 million people around the world only in the twentieth century. See Sorina-Livia Ciureanu, Beatrice Ioan, Ioanatefania Ciureanu Bioterrorism. A problem of the contemporary society, The Romanian Magazine of Bioethics, vol.5, no.4/2007 14 Yersinia pestis presents the characteristics needed to be used as a biological weapon; it can be grown easily and inexpensively in large quantities, it is spread by aerosol, and it causes many deaths especially as a pulmonary clinical disease, it is indirectly transmitted during the epidemic. For details, see Ludovic Pun cited work Page.184 15 Tularemia is a zoonosis caused by Francisella tularensis. It is primarily a disease of wild animals, living in the environment on ectoparasites and carrier animals. Tularaemia as a potential biological weapon is supported by the existence of biological features of

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tularensis) and hemorrhagic fevers (filoviruses / arenaviruses) 16. The characteristics of these types of agents(specific for weapons of mass destruction) are17: simple production technique, it may be produced by any nation in the pharmaceutical industry; the industrial production methods are to be found in making yoghurt, beer, even antibiotics or vaccines; most equipment used in their production is "dual use" and is sold on the open market; the existence of previous pathogens crops, kept in certain specific facilities/ warehouses; the ease of reaching the target, using even the weather; increased efficiency: small quantities, with maximum effect; large scale of contamination. Biological agents are micro-organisms, including genetically modified micro-organisms, cell cultures and human endoparasites, which are likely to cause infection, allergy or poisoning. The biological weapon, called the nuclear bomb of the poor or the dirty bomb, is an invisible weapon. It can be transported without being detected, even across borders, either in "culture" - to obtain the desired amount - either in quantities sufficient to commit a disaster. Microorganisms can be released without noise and without causing immediate effects. The disease can not be defined until the symptoms of the inthe etiologic agent. Francisella tularensis: an extended natural reservoir, multiple ways of transmission of the infection, very low minimum infective dose, lethal evolution in human beings and vaccination with poor results when tularaemia is spread by aerosol. See Ludovic Pun cited work, page 204 16 Viral haemorrhagic fevers are characterized by fever, vomiting, abdominal pain, bleeding and hemorrhagic shock. Infectious agents leading to their emergence: Filoviruses (Ebola and Marburg), Arenaviruses (Lassa fever virus), viruses of Bunyaviridae family. 17 Costel Guterian CBRN risks in theater of operation: the biological threat (www.rft.forter.ro)

fection and the causative agent are known. If this one may easily spread from one person to another, such as smallpox, the number of victims can easily reach tens of thousands of cases18. According to their intentions, the terrorists will choose a biological agent, according to several characteristics19: easy acquisition/production; easy use as a weapon; easy transmission; resistance to environmental factors; terrorists intention to kill or to cause a temporary disability; the contagiousness of the agent; the potential risk to the terrorists themselves. The acquisition of biological agents is possible in the following ways: by a governments support, by the diversion of substances during their transport, from natural sources, theft from universities, microbiology laboratories, veterinary laboratories and industrial companies. According to the Report of the Office for Technology Projects (OTA) of the US Congress, the microorganisms culture and toxins production for terrorist purposes are not operations which are difficult to achieve from a technical point of view. According to existing sources, a second-year or a third-year student in medicine or microbiology should have enough laboratory experience to be able to produce a biological agent, without exposing himself/herself to too many dangers. Despite the large number and the variety of potential agents, most authors have identified a relatively small number of agents that can be used. Berkowitz20, for
Mihai Graur, Adrian Iordache The up-to-date threats, CBRN-risks and threats, industrial, biological toxins (www.rft.forter.ro) 19 Guide de preparation et de reponse un attentat bioterroriste, OIPC-Interpol, 2007, pag.11 20 Berkowitz, B.J. et al. Superviolence: The Civil Threat of Mass Destruction Weapons. Santa Barbara, CA: ADCON (Advanced Concepts Research) Corporation, Report A72-034-10, 29 September 1972
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example, noted the following substances: anthrax, brucellosis, Coccidioidomycosis, criptococosis, lung fever, psitacosis, mountain puerperal fever and tularemia. He explains that some diseases likely to serve as biological weapons such as glanders (distemper), melioidosis, bacillary dysentery, Q fever and various encephalitis encephalomyelitis are not on the list for a number of reasons related to the background of the terrorist group: limited access, the difficulty of cultivation, low resistance to aggressive treatments needed for spreading, issues raised on handlers protection, the similarity of the effects of the diseases. He admits however, that these diseases could be chosen as biological weapons in case of illegal operations. The eight selected diseases can be classified into three groups according to the importance attached to a double criterion of effectiveness in causing losses and epidemiology: fever and the parrots disease are potential epidemic agents, anthrax, plague and fever are fatal diseases and the other diseases are incapacitating and non-epidemic. As mentioned in the doctrine21, bioterrorism agents can be used in different ways: a) aerosols spread either through conditioners or by an airplane or helicopter, or by a bomb scattering. Anthrax, tularemia, Q fever, typhus, smallpox and plague are likely to be spread by the respiratory route. Also, sarin gas and botulinum toxin could be spread in the same way. b) water22 and food23 - it contains toxIoan Dasclu (coordinator), Cristian-Eduard tefan, Mariana-Daniela Marica, Septimiu-Mihai Marica cited work, page.21 22 Donald Louria, Chairman of the Department of Preventive Medicine and Community Health New Jersey Medical School, presents a realistic scenario for 1990: "the discharge of a container containing billions of bacteria genetically produced into waters of an average important city, would prove an increased contamination leading to the deaths of millions of people. - Furthermore, it shows that such a weapon is a terrorist's dream, stating that the development of antidotes, vaccines and new antibiotics may require several years of work. Moreover, if it comes to producing a vaccine,
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ins, particularly ricin toxin and botulinum toxin, which mixed in large containers for beverage supplies could produce catastrophic consequences. It is also the case of a large number of food bacteria: Escherichia coli and all food poisoning agents. c) dermal route may be the source of infection for anthrax, tularaemia and smallpox. Specialized publications refer to more than 20 cases of terrorist threats or attacks put into practice by the use of biological agents: the case of threats, apparently without consequences, whose authors said they could use such agents, but without providing evidence that they have indeed purchased them. Publications also mention cases when serious steps have been taken to purchase biological agents. They also draw attention to cases in which certain quantities of agents have been found on terrorists or persons suspected of having committed terrorist attacks. Finally, in a few cases, reference is made to the use of biological agents. Opinions differ on the exact circumstances of events, especially on the dates when they have occurred and even on the definition of terrorism, compared with criminal activity. They indicate a high number of threats (even actual attacks) on food contamination, but in most cases the reason was only financial and not political and the authors were not considered terrorists. Using ricin substance in several assassinations or assassination attempts is a worrying example of biological terrorism, because these attacks were attributed to intelligence services in some countries24.
terrorists could use another body to produce new toxins. See the site http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/ thr/cbtrrrsm02-fra.asp 23 Food contamination is one of the ways to which terrorists are willing to resort in order to administer a biological agent. For example, terrorists could enter the agent in the production channel of plants or plants in which food is prepared and packaged in containers, even if we talk of an attempt of forgery. For details, see Kupperman, Robert H., Jeff Kamen Final Warning: Averting Disaster in the New Age of Terrorism. New York: Doubleday, 1989, pag.107 24 http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/thr/cbtrrrsm02fra.asp

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In the 1990s, the Japanese Aum Sect members have twice tried to use a biological weapon. First in 1992, they vainly tried to obtain the Ebola virus which originated a more serious epidemic in Zaire. In 1993, after the Crown Princes marriage, they failed in their attempt to spread anthrax from a building, because they have chosen an inappropriate strain and were unable to disseminate the cultures. In 1995, the sect has turned attention to a chemical weapon, more reliable and easier to handle, namely the sarin gas, which they used after the subway attack in Tokyo. The sarin gas attack of the Aum Sect has marked the official onset of terrorism involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. On March 20, 1995, members of Aum Sect, intending to kill tens of thousands of civilians in order to cause panic and disaster, planned the placement of 11 packages containing sarin gas (finally six of them were used) in trains running on three major underground lines, used daily by over 5 million passengers. The train sets concerned were to arrive in the central Kasumigaseki station in the morning, at the rush hour, between 8:00 and 8:10. The attack resulted in 12 deaths and injured over 5,000 people. It also succeeded in creating panic and chaos not only at the subway station, but also across the city25. If a larger amount of lethal sarin gas had been used or if the spreading procedure had been slightly improved, the attack could have killed thousands of people and not only some, the way it happened26. Aum cult founder, Shoko Asahara, whose real name is Chizuo Matsumoto, was sentenced to death in February 2004, following a trial that lasted almost eight years. Asahara, aged 48, was found guilty of having committed 13 terrorist acts, including two sarin gas attacks, resulting in 27 deaths and thousands wounded people. Asahara has refused to testify in court and
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the lawyers who defended him during the trial argued that he was no longer the sect's leader in March 1995 at the time of the sarin gas attack at Tokyo subway27. Bioterrorism raises many issues to law enforcement authorities. Terrorists have the ability to choose performers who can be manipulated and sent at the scene in order to threat a person or thousands of people. This form of terror may have effects involving several jurisdictions or countries and it requires international cooperation at the level of sharing information and investigation. Among population, many people may consider that they themselves or their families have been exposed to danger and claim health care and taking medication, which will require police to ensure order in hospitals, clinics and drug stores. At the same time the police will ensure the safe quarantine system28. In the last 10-15 years, the threat that a terrorist group may acquire chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials (CBRN) led governments and international organizations to adopt regulations and programs with significant impact, in order to protect populations against risks associated with this threat. Fears that these programs seek to eliminate were triggered by wellknown examples of certain terrorist groups interest in acquiring such materials. Although fortunately the number of incidents that made use of such materials has been reduced, according to the general opinion, risks involved are so high that taking coordinated action in preventing, detecting and combating it, is a necessity. Although most experts share the opinion that in order to "succeed" in producing such materials and in using them in their attacks, terrorists have to overcome considerable difficulties and therefore, the probability that such attacks occur is quite small, it is clear that no public authority can afford to
27 http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/Liderul-secteiAUM-condamnat-moarte_0_70194531.html 28 Guide de preparation et de reponse a un attentat bioterroriste, OIPC-Interpol, 2007, page.7

http://www.sri.ro/upload/Brosura%20Bioterorism.pdf http://www.antitero.ro/share/Document8.pdf

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ignore this threat, given the potential huge consequences on human life so as the economic effects of this threat. Also, there is a general consensus among experts on the need to consider very carefully the possi-

bility of an attack on a smaller scale, as long as the psychological, medical and economic effects of the attack using such materials on the population would be significant.

Bibliography: Berkowitz, B.J. et al. Super violence: The Civil Threat of Mass Destruction Weapons. Santa Barbara, CA: ADCON (Advanced Concepts Research) Corporation, Report A72-034-10, 29 September 1972 Guide de preparation et de reponse a un attentat bioterroriste, OIPC-Interpol, 2007 Ioan Dasclu (coordinator), Cristian-Eduard tefan, Mariana-Daniela Marica, Septimiu-Mihai Marica bioterrorism in modern society, Sitech Publishing House, Craiova, 2009 Mihai Graur, Adrian Iordache The up-to-date threats, CBRN-risks and threats, industrial, biological toxins

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THE MAIN THREATS TO AND VULNERABILITIES OF ROMANIA


Chief commissioner PhD student DAN BUCUR Director of The Fraud Investigation Directorate within The General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police Police quaestor SORIN OPREA Chief Inspector of The Police Inspectorate of Prahova County within The General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police The article hereby presents the main threats to and the vulnerabilities of the Romanian state, all specific to a communitary state which is also a NATO member. We consider that in the current conditions of globalization, the evaluation (if possible) of risks, threats, challenges, contempt and tensions is absolutely necessary. We must also take into account the global crisis we are now facing and all possible dangers aiming public order and national safety. Keywords: Vulnerability, Danger, Threats, Risk, Global Challenges, dangers, threats and, in connection, specific risks- either assumed, episodic or imposed- are strictly dependant on the evolution and features of human society, as well as on its every component and action. There will always exist a competition, there will even exist a fight between challenges, dangers, threats and implicit risks (assumed, episodic or imposed) and practical forms and actions of security and safe-keeping of sistems and processes. Danger is a harmful disfunction of a system or process. The degradation of systems or processes often becomes dangerous. But, in order to develop itself as a threat, danger needs a vector , meaning it needs to be transported. The network is bigger than a vector, it is a support for every form of transportation and for any type of vector in compliance with the requisitions of the network flow. Threats have a destination, aim for something, they are oriented. Most of the times, a threat means oriented danger, danger with a destination. But a threat is not always dangerous, even if it is and needs to be strictly tied to danger, if it is a threat. Of course, it can also consist in a simple warning. Warning is not truly a threat, but
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it could be a kind of conditioned threat. Risk is an attitude to danger or threat. It is assumed, imposed, associated consciously, responsibly or, on the contrary, arbitrary, collateral or mistimed. There are no rules for risk appreciation, as there arent any for choosing the right solution: risk appreciation is a matter of intelligence, but also of knowledge and experience.29 This is why identifying dangers30, threats31 and risks32, as well as challenges33, conwww.stratisc.org Francois Caron, L'APPRECIATION DU RISQUE MILITAIRE. 30 Danger means jeopardy, a situation that could lead to the degradation of a system or a process, to the destruction of an entity. Danger itself is the degradation of a system or process or one of their effects. 31 Threat means a hostile action, with the intent of intimidating. It can be exercised directly by the one threatening or it can be perceived like one by the threatened one. This is why, in relations between states, the problem of threatening and its perception are very sensible. 32 The term risk refers to a peril whose value can be appreciated to a certain point, eventuality, that can be less or more predictable. (DICTIONAIRE DE LA LANGUE FRANCAISE. Encyclopedie, noms communns, noms propres, 1995). 33 Challenge refers to a set of gestures, realities or actions against someone with the intent of producing a reaction. Here, we can find an important sensibility between challenge itself and its understanding. This is
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tempt34 and tensions35 remains a matter of a high subjectivity, this process being situated somewhere between the objective and subjective, as a dynamic and flexible construction between these two very important knowledge poles. In the conditions of the current globalization, evaluating risks, threats, challenges, contempt and tensions, if they are to be identified36, is absolutely necessary. There are some categories of challenges, dangers, threats and, in consequence, of associated, assumed, imposed or episodic risks. Within the theme of this paper, we suggest the following classification: A) Challenges, tensions, dangers and threats concerning the entire world (the humanity in general); B) Challenges, tensions, dangers and threats centered on different regions; C) Cross-border challenges, tensions, dangers and threats; D) Internal challenges, tensions, dangers and threats (aiming the states); E) Challenges, tensions, dangers and threats to property safety; F) Challenges, tensions, dangers and threats to law order; G) Challenges, tensions, dangers and threats to people.
how we can explain, in many ways, how challenges are not just actions of provoking, but also understanding it (consideration, analisys, qualification) as a challenge. 34 Contempt is, on the contrary, challenge by ignore, meaning an ignoration that provokes, but also attitude that ignores. Contempt is an oriented ignoration, sometimes threatening. 35 Tensions, in the sense of the present study, mean a state of intension that induces fear, unsafety and distrust and determines, in most of the cases, reactions. 36 Identifying challenges, contempt, dangers, threats and associated risks goes to specialized structures such as, for example, intelligence services, analysis and evaluation compartments from each system or process, but also to each institution and person, especially those dealing with national safety and public order. We live in a world of interdependences. This is why not only processes and actions leading to progress inter-condition one another, it is also those leading to the degradation and destruction of systems and processes, quality of life, international relations, peace and security.

The A) category is formed especially by: the proliferation of mass- destruction weapons, of arms systems, of cosmic and geophysical weapons; global warming, drought, weather, cosmic and geophysical phenomena; poverty and hunger; the lack of drinkable water; the reduction of resources; the proliferation of destructive diseases (cancer, AIDS, eating disorders, etc.); terrorism; trafficking in drugs, weapons and human beings; cross-border criminality. The B) category may contain dangers and threats specific to different regions such as: nuclear or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear programs (CBRN); the lack of drinkable water; transforming wide territories into desert; natural catastrophes; ethnic conflicts; terrorism; serious border problems; poverty and hunger; dictatorial regimes; civil wars; guerilla. The C) category refers especially to those challenges, tensions, dangers and even threats that do not depend on state organisms, they follow the strategic corridors of traffickers, mafia networks, money laundering, organized crime, etc. Among these, the most important could be: clandestine emigration, violent mafia or organized crime or money laundering networks, etc.; cross-border terrorism, especially the suicidal type; local traffickers networks; local cross-border networks of drug distribution; prostitution cross-border networks; cross-border networks of the underground economy and of economical and financial criminality. In accordance with the global, regional or cross-border challenges, tensions, dangers and threats, the internal ones provided by the D) category also appear. For now, no state in the world has managed to solve this problem that proliferates with the new philosophy and physiognomy of the network. The most important of the challenges, tensions, dangers and threats affecting the states are, in our opinion, the following: destructing national economic units; ethnic conflicts; corruption; unemployment; prostitution networks; organized crime; money laundering.
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There is a series of challenges, tensions, dangers and threats, those belonging to the E) category, that affect property safety. Some of the most important, at this stage, could be as follows: the lack of legal consistency in the field of property or legal contradictions; the difficult come-back from state property to private property; the corruption amongst state functionaries and other people; unsolved problems related to vesting of possession and granting property titles; natural calamities and disasters; the high degree of criminality related to property. From the F) category, the most frequent challenges, tensions, dangers and threats to law order are: disorienting national economy and increasing the degree of social insecurity; the massive migration of working forces toward countries in the Western Europe with all its consequences; the considerable fluctuation of goods, persons and services; the proliferation of underground economy; the high economical and financial criminality; social insecurity. All mentioned above affect also the citizen. The most frequent challenges, tensions, dangers and threats to people from the G) category involve: rising the level of people alienation; the acute lack of means of subsistence; the employment insecurity; the street insecurity; the massive and omnipresent corruption; the high criminality; migration; pressures from different institutions, firms and mechanisms; ethnic conflicts; terrorism; calamities. The nature and area of challenges, dangers, threats and, obviously, risks, assumed or imposed, in this period of new beginnings of globalization, in the sixth step of globalization, that affects national and international security, could also be identified based on activity domains; community and religious entities, but also other types; geographical position; time (period); volume; importance (interest, gravity); probability. Depending on activity domains, challenges, dangers and threats could be: 1. Economical a. Internal The reduction of the enterprises number under the crisis threshold;
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The degradation, inefficiency, drastic fall of production; The undermining of some branches in the national economy; Proliferating the underground economy; Affecting sectors of high strategic importance (the industry of defense); Property insecurity; The alienation, with or without intent, of national belongings; Creating mechanisms of national values spoliation; The depreciation of national currency; The decline of banking system; Rising the public debt over the critical threshold; Unrealistic economical policies; Economical and financial attitudes, are irresponsible or inadequate to circumstances; The migration of labor forces ; b. External a. Blocking external credits; blocking access to sources of raw materials, adverse to national economies; b. Blocking access to modern technology; c. Economical globalization based on a national fund incapable of adaptation; d. Tendentious regionalization; e. The failure of integrating economically in the European Union starting from January the 1st 2007 (integration without having an economy properly prepared for such efforts); f. Smuggling, illegal goods trafficking. The main sources for these challenges, dangers, threats and risks of economic nature are in the impossibility of harmonizing all the components in the field, in the difficulty of relationships between entities, internal and international factors, in the complex realities with sudden developments and this is why chaotic, in the different interests, but also in the complexity of dimensioning and re- dimensioning some of the

realistic economical and social policies, practical and effective on long term. Equally, the lack of a coherent economical strategy, adequate on long, medium or short term, able to apply a well constructed decision of economical politics, conjugated with political and social instabilities and with numerous unfavorable economic circumstances, both internal and external, with numerous arbitrary factors, as well as the incapacity of the banking system to adapt quickly to the economical demands, especially market demands, all of them represent challenges, dangers and even threats to economic security and others. These circumstances can be and are used by certain economic forces that adapt rapidly to confusing situations, taking advantage of them in order to eliminate competition and gain new markets. They are frequently used also by those aiming to destabilize some of the countries or some areas and to accomplish goals bigger than the plain economic profit. Such dangers and threats affect seriously the economic security of every country, including ours, and influence equally other sources of dangers, threats and risks from the political, social, cultural, informational and military domain. Sources of challenges, dangers and threats in the economical and financial domain are hard to be noticed, as mixed and implicit as they are. Their display is hidden and seldom perverted, because a part of them are not cognoscible, easy to understand. And even if their identification wouldnt cause serious problems, their display consists in series of actions, both direct and of late effect. For example, privatization needs to have positive effects on activating the economy and preventing major economic risks. In reality, the way its been done and it still is in our country, instead of having economic growth, it led and it still leads to confusing situations, frauds and destructions that affected and still affect seriously the economic status of all involved countries, of entire areas and even of the entire world.
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Great differences between groups of political and strategic interests persist, causing confusion and global problems. From this perspective, the most frequent and probable challenges, dangers and threats to national security, but also to coalitions and alliances, that could develop into crisis and even armed conflicts, could be: 2. Global The proliferation of mass- destruction weapons and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear means (CBRN), with effects in all fields and great risks; Building-up economic, technologic and informational breakdowns, accentuating poverty and strategic downthrows between the rich and the poor, between Middle East and West, between different categories of interests, that always cause competition, the fight over resources and markets, crisis and conflicts; The proliferation of interethnic, interracial and interreligious conflicts that cause confessional, racial and social conflicts, both internal (between basic religions and different sects, between races) and between different interests that develop themselves as religious, racial and social related. This type of conflict leads to religious fundamentalism, similar to the Islamic one, but not only, taking into consideration that almost each religion has a side that exacerbates doctrine (fundamentalism, as well as Islamism, is of political origin), to serious racial and social conflicts. Developing terrorist groupings and networks and their possible access to CRBN means and to perfected armed systems, and to other categories of means, including the psychological and media ones; Developing other types of challenges, dangers and threats, dissymmetric (disproportioned) and asymmetric (exploiting mutual vulnerabilities) that maintain and proliferate up to the level of saturation (general anxiety), a state of tensions, fear and individual, social, economic and even political insecurity. The main sources of challenges, dan-

gers, threats and associated risks (assumed, episodic or imposed) are numerous. They firstly consist in world disorder, humungous technological offsets, confrontations between interests- meaning politics, views on world order, access to resources, relations between communities, community and human rights. 3. Political a. Internal The instability or confusion and political promiscuity; The proliferation of extremism or of fights over power and influence; The authority crisis of state institutions; The lack, insufficiency or incorrect enforcement of democratic legal provisions; Hidden or perverted politics of territorial succession; The unclear definition of national interest; The proliferation of group interests. b. External Revisionist tendencies, territorial claims from forces (governs, political groups, interest groups, etc.) from our zone of strategic interest; External pressure concerning the minorities issue; Reinstalling influence spheres; Altering Romanias image; Geopolitical regroupings, other than those imposed by the European integration; The main sources of these risks are dominantly in the contradictory interests, subjectivism, fight over power and in the lack of morality in the political life. Such sources are not specific only to Romania, but our country is one of the countries seriously affected by confusion and political promiscuity. Such realities are encountered all over the world and at similar parameters. The complex situation of moving from a centralized economy towards a market economy, from an authoritarian political regime to a democratic one, but also other types of developments and changes that create
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chaos37, form a factor favorable to proliferating these sources. They display themselves through all kind of complicated, hidden, cunning actions. No matter how open and acute the political battle is, it does not succeed in revealing the secrets of the confrontation. Ambitions, threats and political methods have always implied extreme actions, meaning a great political risk, materialized in political battles without limits or morality. They destroyed antique Rome, brought into bankruptcy the Greek democracy, led to the fall of great empires; they also caused the territorial faction of Romania near the second World War and, nowadays, slowed down by many years the national recovery. Informational - both internal and external The lack of information; Altering information; The informational intoxication; The informational manipulation; The incondite management of communication systems. Dangers and threats specific to the transitory period from industrial societies to the informational ones: - Reducing the states economic unity in favor of world economic networks; - Diminishing production and rising the economic dependence and interdependence, this generating the chaos of manufacturing, at the same time with creating and recreating centers of economic powers or superpowers; - The proliferation of perturbations and even of aggressions from informational systems; - Building powerful international centers of economic and informational influence; - Intoxicating, altering information and individualism;
Chaos is here seen as a disorganization in the purpose of a new organization, state in which all processes are accelerated, intersected, mixed, confused, hard to be identified, analyzed, understood and supported.
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- Losing national control over information. Sources of these challenges, dangers and threats are in the informational explosions and in the strategic downthrows created between network structures- that tend to weigh more and more in the act of communication- and the sectarian interest, in the fight over power, resources, markets and informational supremacy of some of the human communities, institutions, economic and political groups. In this context, a great role is played by groups from the interlope world, the world of traffickers and organized crime. 4. Social a. Internal Degrading the socio-professional condition of citizens and placing Romania outside the first high-tech and IT line ; Unemployment; Intelligence exodus; Internal migration; Demographical perturbations (population ageing, decreasing the birth rate and increasing the death rate, decreasing the active population rate, etc.) Poverty (the chaotic increase of the percentage for citizens living in poverty); Social insecurity. b. External The emigration to the U.S.A., countries from the Western Europe and from EU; Demographic destabilization of the fault region, including the Balkan area; The globalization of poverty (the multiplication and diversification of poverty poles); The continue destabilization of the space for the old disturbing38 shelter and especially of the Middle East; Using the national territory as refuge by some bigger or smaller groups illegally coming from conflict zones;
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The old disturbing shelter was situated between the North of the Caspic Sea and Manchuria and invading European and Asian territories by nomad populations in the area was specific to it. (n.a.)

The causes and sources of these challenges, dangers and threats- in fact, of the situation that generates such extremely dangerous phenomena- are in realities created by forced evolution, without discernment, towards globalization and fragmentation, in the collective memory that deposits humiliations, injustices and phantoms of history. Western Balkans, for example, are not causing tensions and conflicts, they deposit the destroying effects of some strategic downthrows between great empires. Their annihilation and tempering the zone will take, maybe, hundreds of years, most probably a period of time similar to the existence of the empires, and even more, based on a long human experience according to which it takes double time to correct a mistake, a wrong consuetude, a reflex, a prejudgment or an evil doing. 5. Cultural a. Internal The decline of the national education system; The depreciation of national values; The endearment of culture acts; An aggressive and hasting multiculturalism ; Anti- culture; Ethnocentrism; Xenophobia. b. External Cultural pressures (movies, books, songs, etc.); Replacing values by cultural market products and non-values; Globalizing cultural market products and damaging authentic culture ; The proliferation of subculture, nonculture and anti- culture; Irredentism; An aggressive multiculturalism, interestedly cultivated; Sources of these realities are found in the chaos period comprising the human society. We are dealing not with a cultural crisis, but with an offensive of non-culture, damaging authentic culture. In chaos periods there is a battle over markets, resources, survival and
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especially over a better status in the future reconfiguration of power structure. In these conditions, the one who sells more becomes the strongest. It is normal in these eras to promote multiculturalism, not the authentic multiculturalism that is created in centuries of cultural cohabitation, through value assimilation unified in an important edifice which lifts the planets civilization on a superior step, but the mixture of cultural products which cannot enter a dialogue, only a stressful and belligerent vicinity, meaning a confrontation. The confrontation between cultural market products does not mean conflict between cultures, nor war of civilizations, it means just a battle between vendors of this type of products, valueless, with the purpose of earning more and more money. Gaining money has nothing to do with culture, but it can generate a terrible competition and conflict, because this is where it is possible to gain so much. The United States of America, for example, earn from exporting this kind of cultural products (violent films, TV shows, cassettes, CDs, music, etc.) more than from exporting weapons. 6. Ecological a. Internal The constant deterioration of environment quality; Calamities designed or induced by negligence; Ecological accidents; b. External Depositing toxic waste on Romanian territory; Calamities designed or induced by intervening in modifying the environment; Reducing the ozone layer; Destroying the ionosphere; Ecological accidents c. Natural (objective) Earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, avalanches and other natural calamities; Global warming, the rising of ocean level, natural disequilibria; Geophysical phenomena affecting negatively the life of people and communities;
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Cosmic phenomena affecting live environment; Causes of these dangers and threats are outside the social and human environment. They are encountered also in the fact that Earth is an active planet, in continuous transformation. Life itself is a product of this planets activity, conjugated with the solar and cosmic activity. These causes only need to be known, identified. Such danger can be only reduced, meaning that humanity shouldnt stand against it, it should understand and respect natural phenomena. Many thousand of years from now on there will exist thunder, lightning, floods and water overflows, hurricanes, landfalls, volcanic eruptions, sudden weather changes, etc. This is the environment we are living in and it needs to be known, understood and respected, because it is not only destructive, but also producer of movement, change and life. 7. Technological a. Internal The ageing of technological patrimony; The incapacity of producing modern technology; The incapacity of importing modern technology; b. External Blocking (limiting) access to modern technology; Increasing the prices of modern technology; The incapacity or impossibility of participating in the creation of high technologies (in cooperation with developed states). Sources of these dangers and threats are to be found in an inadequate political attitude, in the primitive architecture, not adapted to the practical conditions of the political class, of legislation, of international relations. Access to high technology and informational technology is not a right, it is a construction based on a great effort of applying careful, intelligent and realistic politics.

This type of danger and threat is implicit. They dont lead to crisis and wars and they dont attack anyone. But they do create considerable gaps, polarize information, knowledge, material goods, civilization and even culture. Modern society produces not only a traditional culture, based on hundreds of years of cohabitation, it also produces a technological culture, absolutely necessary for progress. Technological and informational values are absolutely necessary in the architecture of every society, in creating social balance and welfare. In fact, one of the fundamental causes for gaps, and consequently for polarizing richness and poverty, is given by technological downthrows. Its because of these downthrows that some communities are in the Internet Age and cosmic flight, while other communities remain in Stone Age. 8. Military a. Internal The unprecedented development of weapons and battle devices, especially of mass-destruction weapons, very precise vectors and arms systems, also of 12 SR and C4 networks; Creating an image of inutility for national armies and inducing the idea of no need for the existence of such an institution, only for professional armies; The proliferation of terrorist and diversionists threats; The possible appearance of secessionist tendencies through violence; Sabotaging military objectives of strategic importance; The deterioration of the defense industry; The minuses in preparing the territory, the economy and the population for defense; The lack (insufficiency) of a modern and clear legislation in the domain of national and international security; The failure of reform in the military and civil-military systems. b. External Nuclear danger;
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CRBN danger; The potential danger of indirect military attacks; The existence of open, latent or frozen conflicts near the national territory or in the European and Euro-Atlantic zone; The proliferation of unconventional weaponry; The danger of using other mass-destruction weapons; The proliferation of arms systems and strategies of a non-contact war, disproportioned war, preventive war and asymmetric war; The proliferation of cosmic weaponry and of cosmic military structures; Accentuating the decays of military potential; Blocking the access to modern technologies; Creating potential conflicts between NATO countries and countries outside the alliance; The appearance of possible strategic alliances opposed to NATO. Sources of these dangers are in the socio-military dynamic, in the conflict of interests and implicitly of politics and strategies of enforcement. There are still numerous points which can become divergent nucleus between countries or groups of countries. They depend on the interest dynamic, especially that of economical and political interest, in terms of power and influence. The strategic partnerships aim these parameters: power and influence. Partnership strategies, alliances and coalition strategies are imposed, on one hand by universalizing great nuclear, terrorist dangers and threats, by geopolitical and geostrategic downthrows which can be reactivated any time and, on the other hand by the need of reconfiguration and re- dimensioning international relations in terms of access to resources, financing and the biggest markets. These determinations impose cooperation and collaboration, avoiding armed conflicts and destroying wars. But they also ac-

centuate decays, increase downthrows and generate conflicts in the whole symmetrical, dissymmetrical and asymmetrical specter. 9. Ethnical a. Internal The recrudescence of identity pressures of some of the ethnic groups; Actions for obtaining autonomy of different zones on ethnic criteria; Creating an economic, cultural, informational and international support for an eventual escalade of disputes; Creating some organizations (legal or illegal) to cultivate dissensions between ethnic groups or to create pressures generating tensions and conflicts; b. External Pressures exercised by some groups, in the name of organisms and communities, for the fragmentation (federalization) of some countries or for granting ethnic territorial autonomy; Pressures exercised by some countries for protecting ethnic groups from other countries; Supporting some terrorist claims; Supporting terrorist acts (such as AlQaeda) by some ethnical groups; Causes of such dangers and threats reside, on one hand in unhappy historical legacies, in history injustice, in downthrows left by empires and still uncovered today and, on the other hand in very important economic decays, in the border process frozen through treaties and conventions, but, in reality, unfinished or unaccepted (in its actual form) by some of the countries which consider themselves frustrated or aggrieved by peace treaties and other international documents. Even if, in these conditions, when most of the European countries are preoccupied with consolidating the unity of the continent, with the success of the European integration, border problems seem to be obsolete, if every determination and implication of this complex and permanent process is not taken into account (the border process never ends), they could come back spectacularly and dramatically as tensions and conflicts hard to solve.
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10. Religious a. Internal The great majority of populations on the European continent are stable from the religious point of view. Even if religion, in the past, created crusades and the inquisition, things have radically changed nowadays. Religion is a part of modern civilization of the European continent and of the American continent and it cultivates harmony, trust, tolerance, cooperation and peace. Even so, in this age of very hard efforts for the planet, when over 45 million people die annually of starving and malnutrition39, religions are affected, too. Especially those from zones in profound downthrows are effects of fundamentalism and other dangers, threats generating tensions and conflicts, both in interior and in the social, political and economical sphere. The conflict between Shiites and Sunni, the Islamic fundamentalism, the sect phenomenon and religious terrorism are just a few of the realities which amplify a lot the conflict of the age we live in. At the same time, there are some actions against church representatives, probably with the purpose of diminishing the populations trust in church and to deepen more the chaotic state in which a part of the planet is, especially Middle East and Near East. Their faith is stable and cannot be influenced by image strategies. Dangers and threats of religious origin or religious related: Actions of Islamic fundamentalism and of other extremist religious organizations for all sort of claims, most of them being political; Discussions and even conflicts between churches (catholic, Greek-catholic, orthodox, etc.) on patrimony themes; Extremist actions of some religious sects;
39 http://www.iss-eu.org. L'Institut cT'Etudes de Securite" de P'Union Europeenne, Une Europe sure dans un monde meilleur. Strategie europeenne de Securite, 2005, p. 6.

The most dangerous of current threats is considered to be the terrorist threat. This affirmation looks circumstantial because, as it is well known, its not terrorism that produces most of the victims, it is poverty and malnutrition. Though, terrorism deserves its qualification of important threat, in the immediate vicinity of nuclear weapons, mass-destruction weapons, taking in account some extremely important features: Unpredictability and surprise; Violence; Cruelty; Mosaic action; Complex character. Even if it is not admitted and it is attacked from all sides and by all means, terrorism still has important resources40, it communicates through electronic networks and takes more and more violent actions. More than that, it extends itself to all media and comprises almost all human activities, as this phenomenon is anti-value and aims the destruction of the effective character of every progressive activity. Contemporary terrorism already has a global feature. It is based especially on the violent religious extremism, on the political extremism and on the effects of alienation41. It has complex causes and it cannot be fought against just through antiterrorist actions. Terrorist threats are not new. They exist since the beginning, as the first human brought the first terrorist act. Terrorism belongs to people, it is a creation of the social person, of one that has something to share with another. The Roman legions, in order to overpower population in the subdued territories, used to practice state terrorism. Totalitarian regimes practice fre40 http://www.iss-eu.org. Strategie europeenne de securite, L'institut d'Etudes de l'Union Europe"enne, decembre, 2003, p.7. 41 Brigade general (r) dr. Gheorghe Vduva, Contemporary terrorism- a risk factor for national security and defense, in conditions of RomaniaNATO member, The National Defense University Carol I Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, p. 11.

quently state terrorism. But also some of the public institution, in transition steps, terrorize population through all kind of actions similar to criminal ones: standing in lines for tax payment, the proliferation of all kind of notices and threats, the sequestration of houses and goods due to late payments of bills impossible to be paid because of low incomes of a great part of the population, etc. This type of terrorism is generally accepted by authorities and its not considered by law-makers, it creates serious problems for the population and life quality. It represents one of the stress factors, of protest and even of social anomy. But, unfortunately, such terrorism is not even taken into account. The main sources for generating the terrorist phenomenon are in the forever changing and unsecure configuration of the current society, in the state of chaos that mankind lives in. Terrorist attacks aim the United States and alias of America, Russia, China, India, Western Europe and even against some Islamic countries, considered as traitors, such as, for example, Turkey which, in one way or another, supports the fight against this type of terrorism. Among the main sources that generate contemporary terrorism, there are the following42: The chaotic state which erupted after breaking bipolarity; The globalizations effect on comm.unities and some zones in which identity and consolidation processes still continue; Deepening the strategic downthrows between the Euro- Atlantic space and other, especially the Muslim world; The presence of a great mass of young Muslims in western countries and dogmatizing their thoughts and attitude towards liberal society; Rigidity and inflexibility promoted
42

Brigade general (r) dr. Gheorghe Vduva, Contemporary terrorism- a risk factor for national security and defense, in conditions of Romania- NATO member, The National Defense University Carol I Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, p. 15-16.

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in the name of culture, opposing the great openness, pragmatism and efficiency of the new technological culture; The immediate effects of market culture; The recrudescence of identity spirit especially of the extremist, intolerant and aggressive one; The recrudescence of fundamentalism; Poverty, hunger, malnutrition, the difficulty and even lack of access to primary food resources and drinkable water (45.000.000 millions of people die each year of hunger and malnutrition43); Global conflicts (after 1990, almost four million people, 90% of them civilians, died in wars and over 18 million of people needed refuge44). Instability has numerous sources, they give it a fluid evolution, hard to be comprised, analyzed, understood and managed. Plus, the more the evolution of post-industrial and informational societies becomes spectacular, the more all downthrows between technological countries and informational ones are increased and deepened, generating and regenerating the terrorist phenomenon. Terrorism is not a product of one civilization or another, as it is sometimes understood, but a product of degrading human condition, of the evil spreading more and more worldwide. Instability zones are numerous. Even if they are situated, in general, on great strategic downthrows (Muslim, African, Central Asia, Caucasian, Western Balkans, Arabian, Israeli) the reality shows that this type of zones may appear right in the center of usually stable countries of great economic, political and social potential. Romania is situated near such instability areas (Transdnestr, Balkans, Caucasus, Near East) and could support, in unfavorable conditions, the effect of terrorist actions
43 http://www.iss-eu.org. Strategie europeenne de securite, L'institut d'Etudes de l'Union Europe"enne, decembre, 2003, p.6. 44 http://www.iss-eu.org. Ibidem, p. 5.

from these spaces. The territory of our country could be targeted, initially, as a refuge or even as a shelter for some terrorist groups or as a network knot, a space used for creating financial resources and after that as a starting point for possible attacks against countries from the Islamic, Caucasian, west-Balkan or Arabian-Israeli downthrows. The world is extremely dynamic. It evolves rapidly, without losing its structure of resistance, cultural, economic or even political. From the political point of view, the world is made out of states, international organizations and institutions, institutions belonging to international communities which together and individually (but in an important, liberal, though restrictive cooperation) pile important directions of evolutions, development and fix the main marks and alignments to accomplish. The world today, the world tomorrow is, in general, a world with high technological front guards and rear guards left in Stone Age, and the split between them becomes bigger and bigger and harder to be managed, due to different speeds of movement- from snail to rocket- and intensive multiplications of entities and patterns situated in this continuously accelerating march. The first speed- the main speed of world evolution- is given by technology and especially by informational technology. The second one is determined on one hand by the impossibility of keeping the rhythm with the avant-garde45 (due to the lack of technology and resources) and, on the other hand, by the remaining of geopolitical transfixing and even the remaining of history phantoms. Evolving towards complex informational systems solves many problems from manufacturing quality to its speed (in fact, no enterprise in the world, no matter what it produces, can be competitive if it does not
Countries benefiting from high technologies, informational technology (IT) and dominating markets and resources.
45

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resort to modern technology and especially to informational technology). But once passing the informational threshold, it takes all eventual risks. As a consequence, the part of society which globalizes itself (economy and information) meets a series of vulnerabilities (some newer, other older) that proliferate especially cross-border networks. Among the most obvious, there are the following: New global structures vulnerability of to the cross-border underground economy; Financial vulnerability; Communication systems and informational systems vulnerability to hackers and pirated networks attack (informational piracy); Vulnerability to new identity actions that become more and more numerous, starting with the ethnic and religious ones and ending with those based on interest; Vulnerability to mass-destruction weapons and to CBRN means;

Vulnerability to terrorism. Symmetrical to these vulnerabilities, the following threats are developed: The proliferation of cross-border underground economy; Illicit financial transactions, money laundering, attacks over banking systems, especially over those sustaining national economies; Developing illegal informational networks and informational piracy, cyberpiracy*; Developing cyber-terrorism**; New identity actions (political, ethnical, religious and even economic, cultural and informational) characterized by intolerance, inflexibility and violence. Proliferating, in one form or another, mass-destruction weapons and of CRBN means; Politic terrorism; Economic terrorism; Financial terrorism; Religious terrorism.
*

Cyber-pyracy is not just an infromational pyracy, it is a reproducing one which feeds from a feed-back relation, specific to informational systems. Cyberpiracy is a type of informational mistletoe that develops in the rythms of informational systems. ** Just like cyber-piracy, cyber-terrorism develops on information systems and aims for their spectacular destruction, based on them though, taking its resources and consistency from them (this is one of the paradoxes of cyber-terrorism which destroys its source.)

Selective bibliography General Ph.D. Mircea Murean, brigade general (r) Gheorghe Vduva, War of the future, future of the war, second edition, The National Defense University Carol I Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006 Herve Coutau-Begarie, Strategy treaty, 1st volume, The National Defense University Carol I Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006 Gerard Chaliand, Global anthology of strategies on nuclear origins, Edition Robert Laffont, S.A., Paris, 1990, p. XI Brigade general (r) dr. Gheorghe Vduva, Contemporary terrorism- a risk factor for national security and defense, in conditions of Romania- NATO member, The National Defense University Carol I Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005 Brigade general (r) dr. Gheorghe Vduva, Network-based war in the context of new military conflicts, The National Defense University Carol I Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005. Dr. Gheorghe Vduva, Mihai Dinu, The European strategy of integration, The National Defense University Carol I Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005
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WHAT DOES REALLY DO A MANAGER? AN ANALYSIS OF MANAGERS AUTHORITY


University Professor PhD tefan Prun Alexandru Ioan Cuza Police Academy The present article analyzes the perspectives used for appreciating the practical work carried out by a manager. The actual work of a manager has been the subject of a very vivid dispute in the speciality literature, caused by the complexity of the problem and by the subjectivity of the research instruments. The author performs an analysis starting with the roles played by a manager and with the authority he/she has in relation to his/ her subordinates. Keywords: actual work, managerial role, formal authority, informal authority, knowledge. A Managers Actual Work, Roles and Competencies. The cooperation among people, as a modality of solving certain issues that go beyond their individual possibilities, has led to a difficulty that seems rather administrative. Who has a general view on the entire activity, who establishes responsibilities and who makes sure that work is done properly? Solving this difficulty splits people into two categories: on one hand, there are the ones who do have a general view of the whole picture, establish tasks and make sure that the efforts go towards the right direction and, on the other hand, there are those ones who listen to what the first category says and do as they are told to. The first ones are the managers, the leaders, the chiefs, the directors, the commanders, and the other ones are the subordinates, the employees, the executive level. This psychological and social reality is important because the individual can hardly accept the idea of being told by someone else what to do or of being sanctioned. The problems of power or authority, being manifestations of this reality, are specific both to the organizational world and to daily life. If self-organization and reciprocity are the solution at the level of the daily
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life, the organizational level uses the hierarchy, the norms, the institutional regulations as solutions. The management system is the one that sets the rules within organizations. Therefore, one may say that power and authority is managed depending on the managers interests. These characters are not chosen at random. They must have certain features in order to be assigned as managers. An identikit, a portrait for such an individual would include: determination, ability to tolerate ambiguity and lack of safety, the pleasure of having the power, decision, perseverance, the capacity of walking in someone elses shoes, the strength of dealing with stressful situations. And the list may go on. The research on managerial activity shows that in most cases the manager is the main element within an organization. He/ she definitely puts his/ her fingerprint on: providing a positive psychological and moral climate of collaboration and relaxation within the organization; taking the most of the decisions; motivating people; solving issues etc. Starting from this point, theoreticians wanted to answer the question: what kind of a person is a manager? What kind of personality he/she should have in order to be successful in what he/she does? Is there a

standard portrait, an identikit of the efficient manager? What roles do managers play? What knowledge is necessary to be a manager? How can a managers key competencies be structured? A managers capacity can be defined by his/ her success in influencing his/ her collaborators in order to get a maximum of efficiency and a maximum of personal and professional satisfaction. We shall start our intercession with a classic definition for the notion of manager: the manager must make the others do things (T. Herseni, 1969)46. In other words, the managers efficiency consists in his/ her capacity to make the others, the subordinates, to do a certain thing. How can he/ she convince them to do that? The tools are diverse. In order to understand the managers way of determination, we should debate a bit: his/ her personality, his/ her power and authority, the roles he/ she plays, his/ her skills and qualities. All these are convergent with the answer to the question: what does actually do a manager during a day of work? The problem of the actual wok became important when the managers competencies were to be re-arranged within modern organizations. The manager became a power center capable to pull the organization up or to break it down. Fayols old outlook that says that the manager plans, organizes, leads, coordinates and controls, even if it is still valid, it is also oldfashined, because of the complexity of the activities. Back then, at the end of the 19th century, it was an important discovery. Now it must be completed. Reconsidering this problem, Henry Mintzberg47 tried to analyze, by means of direct observation, several managers of various professions. The results led to the identification of three major categories of roles all managers play. For Mintzberg, a
Herseni, T, Psihologia organizrii ntreprinderilor industriale, Ed. Academiei Romne, Bucureti, 1969 47 Mintzberg, Henry, Mintzberg on Management, Free Press, New York, 1989
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role is an organized set of behaviors that can be identified at a management level. Since the management can be met at all levels of an organization, these roles manifest themselves the same way. Practical activity makes it difficult if not impossible to clearly split these roles since their balance is given by many variable aspects, from the level of authority to the size of the organization, from the organizational culture to the human quality of the subordinates. Nevertheless, the concept of role described the managers actual work better. Therefore, it is an efficient and flexible working tool today. A modern managers roles and competencies are analyzed depending on the knowledge he/ she must have. If we put the vivid debates on this subject apart, the most common knowledge necessary for the actual work is48: Managerial education is the most important pack of knowledge, being based on conceptual competencies. A manager must have strong knowledge about management as a science, about the management techniques and methods, about various ways of planning, organizing, deciding, controlling. This knowledge allow him/ her to make connections with other departments within the organization, to understand the role his/ her department plays within the organization. Modern organizations offer their managers many opportunities to enhance their managerial knowledge: conferences, round tables, master courses, PhD courses. This theoretical basis can enlarge the managers horizon of understanding by providing useful working tools. Managerial experience even though it is an important factor, it is also generalized many times. Managerial experience starts with professional experience for working within a modern organization offers many opportunities to the subordinates so that they can understand the relationship with the managers and what their work ac48

tefan Prun, Management Poliienesc, Ed. Sitech, Craiova, 2008

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tually means. These are important elements for process of becoming a manager. Another important element of the managerial experience is the stability on a certain position. This concept, along with the one of employee rotation, are not communist inventions, they belong to the market economy. The fact that one needs a certain period of time on a certain managerial position in order to put theory into practice, to learn something new and to use your own expertise is not a wrong observation. There are many countries where the organizations calculate the stability of a position for certain jobs, trying to valorize the previously accumulated knowledge in the process of concretely exerting a managerial position. The psychological and pedagogical knowledge, since the manager does not achieve directly the objectives of the organization, but by using human means. Therefore, he/ she needs human knowledge and abilities in order to make the subordinated do what he/ she wants them to do. The area of acting in this respect is very large, from forcing to influencing. Many specialists in management, especially those ones who are closer to human relations, consider that, after the managerial pack of knowledge, this is most important. The difficulty regarding this type of knowledge consists in the fact that each of us has a certain philosophy regarding the relationships with the others around. Since this philosophy is inefficient, not so many have the courage to admit or to make efforts to make it efficient. Taking into account the specificity of police work, we consider that human abilities and competencies are the most important pack of knowledge a police manager must have. General culture knowledge, translated into the level of culture and of general knowledge. Professing management within a modern organization requires a high level of language, a very well developed vocabulary, an obvious understanding of the usage of theories and concepts. Scientific research work cannot be separated from this
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activity. The intellectual level associated with the profession leads to the existence of a rich vocabulary, allowing the dialogue with people who have a simpler way of understanding the organization and its role in the society. Many research studies show that one of the managers qualities required by the subordinates is to talk clearly so that we can understand what they want from us. This also requires a level of intelligence above the rate. Technical knowledge or concrete aspects of the work they perform. Since they usually come from the working level, this condition is met. There are organizations promoting people for management position based only on their technical knowledge, which can often be deceiving. If, at the level of the operational management, technical knowledge is important, the higher we go on the management hierarchy, the more inoperable it becomes. What kind of knowledge must a general director have? Knowledge of production? Of sales? Of human resources? Logistics? Financial and banking? You can offer the answer yourselves. When a manager deals with several lines of work, the importance of his/ her technical knowledge drops. The understanding of tendencies within modern organizations. The big changes they witness require the managers to have an open understanding. The accession to the European Union, the larger use of computers in the society, globalization, all these modify a managers daily activities. Seeing from above is very important and it makes the manager understand the importance of change and become its promoter, it makes him/ her able to explain these things to people and to understand their doubt and reticence. Since the society is more and more interested in the managerial ethics and responsibility, the managers must understand this aspect, as well. Obviously, this picture is not complete but, doubtlessly, a manager really needs these things in his/ her actual work. A managers knowledge is doubled by his/ her

aptitudes. The aptitudes, being features a manager is born with or the result of an education, are a condition for the simplicity and efficiency of the managerial process. Depending on their nature, they can be grouped in three major categories: conceptual, technical and human (human relations and communication). Conceptualization aptitudes reflect the managers ability of perceiving and understanding the organization as a whole, the relation of dependence among its parts and functions, of diagnose and assess various types of managerial problems. They require the process of systemic thinking. Technical aptitudes they are very concrete. They are developed and pointed out in the training process. They allow the circulation of certain methods, procedures and specific techniques in the field they coordinate. Aptitudes of initiation, development and finalization of certain human relations necessary for the relation manifestations with the vital resource of the organization: people. They allow the manager to motivate people, to manipulate conflicts and to coordinate team work. Communication aptitudes synthesize the managers capacity of receiving and transmitting information, thoughts, feelings and attitudes (they are important for all managerial levels). A managers roles and his/ her actual work. The concept of role is very important for Mintzberg in order to analyze a mangers actual wok. As a result of his observations, the author identifies three major categories of roles that can describe a managers daily work. Informational roles are about the usage and the distribution of information. The daily work allows the managers to access a lot of information both from within the organization and also from the outside. Setting up and developing an information and data base is a constant preoccupation of the management system. The efficiency of the information is more important than ever.
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The IT made that the rapidity, the complexity and the volume of information be out of control. How to rationalize information today is to establish the necessary quantity of information for a good functioning of a system. The law of information balance stipulates that a manager, on one hand, must gather all the information he/ she needs and, on the other hand, he/ she should not get overloaded with unnecessary information. The ability of gathering sufficient information is doubled by the ability of not gathering more information than necessary. Being an efficient manager nowadays requires probably more to be able to eliminate the unnecessary information than to look for necessary information. A modern organization can be paralyzed from an informational point of view if it deals with a larger quantity of information than necessary. The information management is generally performed by using three different ways: gathering information by asking questions or being acknowledged through formal channels meetings, informing notes, reports, briefings, or through informal channels such as wireless phone, gossip, rumour, friendly chatting; transmitting information, first of all, to the direct subordinates, regarding their daily tasks, as well as about the requirement they have from them; taking part in the discussions, on behalf of the unit, department, collectivity, with other managers or people from outside the organization. Rule: the quantity of necessary information for a good functioning of the system (organization, unit, subunit) remains constant for a while. Any sudden reduction of it by using formal channels will determine an increase on informal channels and it will be difficult to keep it under control or to influence it. The main activities a manager should carry out in order to play the informational roles are: monitoring, information dissemination and the activity of a spokesperson.

Inter-personal roles are about the aspects related to the interpersonal relations, to the ways a manager interacts with his/ her subordinates, colleagues, superiors and people from outside the organization. The interpersonal relation is considered nowadays to be the most efficient way of obtaining efficiency. In the working process, the most important interpersonal relation is the one between chief and subordinate, which is considered to be the key of the managers efficiency. This affirmation can only be true if we think about how much a manager talks to his/ her direct subordinate. Making the subordinate to do what the manager wants him/ her to do is done by this role. The importance of the interpersonal roles consists in: creating a working climate that requires rules, a behavior code, compatibilities; identifying the subordinates personal needs necessities, interests, career; enhancing the performance by assuring and efficient feed back; building informal interpersonal relations that could work along with the formal ones and become complementary; setting up an organizational culture to encourage working and respecting the others and to make the management system come closer to the executive level. The interpersonal roles, being so strong and having such an impact on the individuals psychology, is the most difficult part of a managers work. Many studies and research activities consolidate the idea that a manager who can make these roles efficient can also solve many daily problems. The important aspects of these roles are: the representation, the quality of a leader and the relationship or the connection. Decisional roles are about the activities performed by a manager in order to properly deal with the decisional process and to take a decision. Probably, the most important preoccupation of a modern manager, the decision, is still the fundamental right of the management system. Decentralizing the
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decisional act, the occurrence of certain collective models of taking a decision will never be able to replace a manager and his/ her task of deciding. Taking a decision makes a manager feel very close to his/ her actual work. The organizational life is based on an amount of choices that redirect constantly the organizational daily activity. The highest authority in taking a decision belongs to the manager, and his/her liberty in terms of decision taking is almost total. Decisional roles manifest themselves: when new ideas and methods occur, being able to improve social and professional activity (decisions of change that are required or claimed by the organization dynamics); when malfunctions, unpleasant surprises, conflicts occur (decisions of mending the situation); when resources are distributed to the members of the collectivity, rewards or punishments (decisions of allocation). Decisional roles are important because: some decisions may touch the subordinates personal interests; they contribute to the creation of an image/ prestige of the subunit; they provide a positive working climate; they are exclusively the competence of the managers/ chiefs/ commanders. The managers main activities for assuming the decisional roles are: the initiative quality, solving tensions and distributing resources. The roles described by Mintzberg several tens of years ago must also be completed. We have not met, for instance, roles of counseling integration, socializing, career which are very important nowadays. The managers authority and his/ her actual work. Authority is the right to exert power. By using the authority, we make the capacity of influencing legit. Authority is: a relationship within which a person or a group accepts as being legit the fact that his/ her actions and decisions are to be

guided by an external factor (in our case, the manager) dictionary of Sociology; from an organizational point of view it is about a leaders right to take decisions and to ask the subordinates to observe them in order to reach certain goals (M. Vlasceanu. 1996)49. A leaders authority is about his/ her right to: take decisions in his/ her field of activity and competence; assign tasks to the subordinates; ask for the achievement of satisfactory performance by the subordinates. Where does this right of exerting power come from? In other words, how can authority be legit? It is now the moment to explain this notion, as well legitimacy. It is the process within which a person accepts to be led by another person or to be influenced in terms of behavior by the decisions other people take. An authority is legit when a person admits someone elses authority on him/ her. By having legitimacy, the authority is accepted by the subordinates as being necessary. Through authority, power is seen as someones right (the leaders) of influencing people and of imposing his/ her will. The authority plays an important role within an organization for it has three functions: it asserts social interests in relation with the personal ones; it simplifies and makes the decisional process possible; it offers an unique frame for a groups organized activity. As for the last two functions, A. Simon50, by his theory of limited rationalization, said that authority is an essential component of the social decision making process. Each person, within an organization, receives/ accepts from the supe49 Vlsceanu, Mihaela, Psihociologia organizaiilor i conducerii, Ed. Paideia, Bucureti, 1996 50 A. Simon, Comportamentul Administrativ, Ed. tiina, Chiinu, 2004

rior hierarchical levels the general frame of decisions and of the activities he/she is about to carry out. Even though it is different from the coercive imposing, the voluntary acceptance of authority is always doubled, more or less, by coercion, by using a sanction system that encourages and consolidates its usage. This paradox is maintained only within organizations. Authority is seen as a necessary evil because the individual cannot easily accept to be influenced or dominated by someone else. He/ she accepts authority in order to be able to be part of the group. As for the organizations, we may meet two types of authorities: the formal authority and the informal one. A leaders authority of deciding and setting in order is considered to be formal because it is conferred to him/ her because of the function/ position he/ she occupies in the hierarchical structure of the organization. Formal authority is associated with the position a person has within the hierarchy and not with the person as such. Thats why this type of authority does not imply a certain degree of accord or acceptance from the subordinates. Practically, the manager does not make any effort to legitimate his/ her authority. It is enough for him to occupy a certain position in order to be invested with this type of authority. Any individual who goes in and integrates him/herself within an organization will accept and observe, to a certain extent, the authoritarian structure of it. As March and Simon were saying in 195851, by joining the organization, the subordinate accepts a relationship of authority, agrees to accept the orders and instructions given by the organization as a premise of his/ her behavior, within certain limits (defined both explicitly and implicitly by the terms of his/her hiring contract). Retainable elements! formal authority is given by the posi51 March, J.G., Simon, H.A., Organizations, John Wiley, New York, 1958

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tion a leader occupies within an organization; the leader does not make any efforts in order to make this authority recognized by the others (it is enough for him/ her to occupy a managerial position); the leading activity is carried out by using tools such as: the system of rewards / punishments, order, subordination etc; the subordinates accept this authority as a necessary evil and they react against it whenever they have a chance; the subordinates actually observe the authority of the position/ function but not the persons authority who occupies that position; the interpersonal relations coming with this type of authority are formal. They are more about the ways of subordination, the official status, the observance of regulations (A. Neculau, 1977). Formal relations are very important in order to make power legit, as well as the obligations for each member and for the members soaical integration, according to certain norms. Formal relations are those relations required by the organization from its members, a certain behavior, an apparel, a certain performance, loyalty, correctness, team work. The individual automatically accepts these requirements when joining the organizations. He/ she will also accept the formal authority of the leaders of the organization; formal authority stops at the level of professional activities; formal authority and a leaders power must be equally balanced. A leader who has the authority of taking decisions and giving orders to his/ her subordinates but does not have the power to impose them will be as inefficient as the one who has the power or capacity to impose his/ her will on the others but has no authority to do so; formal authority is stronger within military systems; formal authority does not go beyond the borders of the organization. The authority, as a right of exerting
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power, may be perceived as legit depending on the leaders human and moral value. This type of authority is informal and it refers to those aspects of the relations among people that are beyond professional activities. We have already shown that formal relations do not offer satisfaction to the members of an organization because they do not meet their personal interests. Informal relations are based on feelings, they are about affinity and antipathy towards a person. This type of relations started to be studied in the 30s. Mayo52 conducted a series of research studies regarding informal relations within working groups. His results can be synthesized as follows: spontaneous development of the relations base on affinity and solidarity; the development of the behavioral norms admissible in terms of efficiency and mutual assistance (psychological compatibility); consolidating these norms by the existence of a leader, chosen by the members of the collectivity, also called an informal leader. This leader does not play a formal role, does not have responsibilities of such kind in this line of work. He/ she is chosen by the group as a token of appreciation and trust the group offers him/her. In a similar manner, informal authority occurs because of these needs. The subordinates accept the leaders authority because of his/ her personality and human qualities. It is what military regulations call acquired authority. The leaders informally legitimate their authority by the concern and respect they show towards their subordinates. They consider their men to be the best, they take care of them, help them, give them advice etc. They go down from their ivory tower conferred by the position to the peoples soul and heart. It is very difficult to answer the question: how can informal authority be acquired? Some leaders work for months and they cannot get this
52 Mayo, E., The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization, Harvard University Press, 1945

type of authority be accepted. Some other times, it takes only a gesture to get it. We say that management is both science and art. Acquiring informal authority is the art of management. Its basis is not the position, as it is in the case of formal authority, but the unconditioned affinity for a leader. Investing a leader with informal authority is not stipulated by any military regulation. It is part of the unwritten laws of social cohabitation in a group of people. It is certain that a leaders informal authority towards his/ her subordinates denotes loyalty and unconditioned respect. This informal authority meets the subordinates need to be understood, respected, accepted, loved etc. A subordinate may identify him/herself in his inner corners with the leading philosophy proposed by his/ her chief and accepts his/her power and authority not as a necessary evil but as a natural need of being led. The results of an informal authority are huge. Even though a person joins professional groups in order to obtain performance, efficiency, material resources, he/ she will never give up his/ her emotional needs. Even though he/ she is aware of the importance of the strict rules and regulations he/ she accepted, the individual will hate them and consider them inhuman each time when they limit his/ her actions or freedom. It is a paradox why Man revolts against the rules he/ she accepted voluntarily. The majority of theoreticians agree with the fact that Man does not revolt against the rules he/ she once accepted but against the way these rules are put into practice. The emotional needs, the need of being recognized and appreciated is induced to the subordinate by the leader who knows how to get beyond the traps of power and the selfishness of leading. There are few leaders who

can manage that. Thats why there are so few leaders whose informal authority is recognized by their subordinates. Retainable elements! informal authority is about the leaders personality and character and not about his/ her position; the subordinates respect the persons authority and not the authority of the position the person occupies; informal authority is not seen a s a necessary evil but as a natural need of recognizing a leaders right to lead; informal authority is given to those leaders who are least interested in formal authority, managing themselves to get beyond formal barriers and to establish normal human relations; acquiring informal authority is not stipulated by any regulation; informal authority within organizations is not only about professional relationships. The leaders who have informal authority are consulted and listened to by their subordinated in cases of personal problems as well. Their subordinates are not afraid to ask for advice or to get help from a leader who has informal authority. The two ways of legitimate authority, the formal one and the informal one, do not exist independently. There is a certain relation of completion at the level of an organization a manager should be aware of. Moreover, the informal way of managing authority has priority comparing to the formal one. It means that the most efficient thing ever existing for a manager is to learn how to have informal authority towards his/ her subordinates. The way of rationalize the right of using power within an organization if the philosophers stone in management and a way of understanding a leaders daily work.

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PRINCIPALII FACTORI CARE INFLUENEAZ DEZVOLTAREA CRIMINALITII INFORMATICE. PROVOCRI PENTRU AUTORITILE DE APLICARE A LEGII N COMBATEREA FENOMENULUI
Prof. univ. dr. av. SANDU FLORIN Lect. univ. dr. av. IONI GHEORGHE-IULIAN Universitatea Romno-American, Baroul Bucureti The emergence and development of computers has represented a true revolution in the human society. The computer has become an indispensable part of our daily work and the communication technology and Internet opportunities have caused changes throughout the entire society. The new computer civilization is based on the availability and accessibility of information, but useful innovations are proved to be usefull both to the consumers and often to the offenders. In this context factors that influencing the development of cybercrime are taking shape, factors wich present a challenge for law enforcement authorities in combating the fenomenon. Cuvinte cheie: infraciuni, criminalitate informatic, dezvoltare, factori Introducere Apariia i dezvoltarea calculatoarelor electronice a reprezentat o adevrat revoluie n societatea uman. Calculatorul a devenit o component indispensabil a activitii noastre zilnice iar tehnologia comunicaiilor i posibilitile oferite de Internet au produs transformri n ntreaga societate. Noua civilizaie informatic se bazeaz pe disponibilitatea i accesibilitatea informaiei, dar inovaiile utile consumatorilor se dovedesc (deseori) a fi utile i infractorilor. Utilizarea calculatoarelor n toate sectoarele vieii sociale a condus la dezvoltarea societii, n ansamblu, dar aceast dezvoltare a fost nsoit de dezvoltarea i specializarea activitilor criminale53. n acest context se contureaz factorii care influeneaz dezvoltarea criminalitii informatice, factori care constituie provocri pentru autoritile de aplicare a legii n combaterea fenomenului.
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Principalele caracteristici ale criminalitii informatice Analiza cazuisticii criminalitii informatice, contureaz urmtoarele caracteristici54 ale fenomenului: A. Transfrontalitate: aceast caracteristic este dat de faptul c utilizarea (legitim sau nelegitim) unui calculator, activitile desfurate prin intermediul Internetului, depesc frontierele convenionale ale statelor. B. Anonimitate: aceast caracteristic se concretizeaz printr-un avantaj al fptuitorului, acela de a rmne necunoscut fa de victimele sale i fa de autoriti, cel puin n momentul comiterii infraciunii, datorit faptului c autorul nu trebuie s fie prezent la locul faptei, iar victima nu poate identifica fizic autorul, aa cum se ntmpl n majoritatea infraciunilor. C. Credibilitate: aceast caracteristic sa desprins datorit faptului c, n prezent,
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Sandu F., Ioni G.I.,Criminologie teoretic i aplicat, Ed. Universul Juridic, Bucureti, 2005, p. 271

A se vedea i Alecu G., Barbneagr A., Reglementarea penal i investigarea criminalistic din domeniul informatic, Ed. Pinguin Book, Bucureti, 2006, p. 13-25.

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aproape orice companie, din orice domeniu, are un site pe Internet. Uneori ns, nu toate site-urile care prezint i comercializeaz produse sau servicii ofer protecie i garanii cumprtorului. Mai nou, au aprut i site-uri fantom ale unor instituii publice care prezint i mai mult credibilitate pentru utilizator. Astfel, utilizatorul, bazndu-se pe ncrederea n autoriti i pe faptul c site-ul este un loc public, poate fi uor nelat. D. Simplitate: aceast caracteristic este conturat de faptul c, spre deosebire de svrirea altor infraciuni, comiterea infraciunilor din sfera criminalitii informatice nu presupune acte pregtitoare costisitoare sau mijloace complicate de finalizare a activitii infracionale. Practic, pentru comiterea multor astfel de infraciuni, este nevoie doar de un sistem informatic conectat la Internet i de minime cunotine informatice. E. Rapiditate: aceast caraceristic este conferit de transmiterea aproape instantanee a datelor prin sistemele informatice, singura condiie impus este ca sistemele s fie legate ntr-o reea. Astel c, indiferent de distana dintre calculatoare, datele se transmit rapid i n orice cantitate, ceea ce poate fi esenial pentru realizarea unor anumite infraciuni. F. Costuri foarte reduse: aceast caracteristic a aprut ca urmare a faptului c tehnologia informaiilor a devenit din ce n ce mai accesibil i din punct de vedere al costurilor. Astfel, pentru orice persoan de condiie medie, costurile achiziionrii unor sisteme informatice sunt rezonabile, iar obinerea accesului la Internet presupune cheltuieli din ce n ce mai reduse. Principalii factori care influeneaz fenomenul criminalitii informatice Dependena de tehnologia informaiei i comunicaiilor Depindem din ce n ce mai mult de tehnologia informaiei i comunicaiilor. Astfel, comunicaiile zilnice, controlul i de gestionarea funcionalitilor n cldiri, transportul (aerian, feroviar, naval, etc.),
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furnizarea de energie, ap, etc. depind de tehnologia informaiei i comunicaiilor iar integrarea continu a tehnologiei informaiei i comunicaiilor n viaa de zi cu zi este posibil s continue i s dobndeasc valene noi55. Creterea bazat pe tehnologia informaiei i comunicaiilor face sistemele i serviciile mai vulnerabile la atacurile mpotriva infrastructurilor critice. Astfel, chiar i scurte ntreruperi a serviciilor, ca i atacurile informatice, provoac pagube financiare imense pentru afacerile bazate pe comerul electronic. Infrastructura tehnic existent, prezint o serie de puncte slabe, printre care i omogenitatea sistemelor de operare. Datorit faptului c majoritatea utilizatorilor folosesc sisteme de operare Microsoft, infractorii pot concepe atacuri eficiente prin concentrarea pe aceast singur int. Dependena societilor de tehnologia informaiei i comunicaiilor nu se limiteaz la rile occidentale; de asemenea, rile n curs de dezvoltare se confrunt cu provocri n prevenirea atacurilor mpotriva infrastructurii i utilizatorilor. Trebuie s fie dezvoltate strategii pentru a preveni astfel de atacuri dar i contramsuri inclusiv dezvoltarea i promovarea unor mijloace tehnice de protecie, precum i legi adecvate i suficiente care s permit aplicarea legii pentru a lupta mpotriva criminalitii informatice n mod eficient. Numrul de utilizatori Popularitatea Internetului i a serviciilor sale, este n continu ascensiune, depind 1,5 miliarde de utilizatori (n prezent)56. Dar, odat cu creterea numrului de persoane conectate la Internet, a crescut i nu55 A se vedea i alte specte n Bohn J., Coroam V., Langheinrich M., Mattern F., Rohs M., Living in a World of Smart Everyday Objects Social, Economic, and Ethical Implications, Journal of Human and Ecological Risck Assesment, vol. 10, nr. 5, p. 736786, (oct.) 2004, disponibil i la http://www.vs. inf.ethz.ch /res/papers/hera.pdf 56 Conform Internet World Stats, Usage and Population Statistic, disponibil la http://www.internet worldstats.com/stats.htm

mrul de poteniale inte i infractori. Este dificil de estimat ct de muli oameni folosesc Internetul pentru activiti ilegale. Chiar dac numai 0.1 la sut din utilizatori ar comite infraciuni, numrul total al infractorilor ar depi 1,5 milioane. Creterea a numrului utilizatorilor de Internet provoac dificulti pentru organele de aplicare a legii, pentru c este relativ dificil automatizarea proceselor de investigaie. Dac, spre exemplu, cutarea pe baza unui cuvnt cheie pentru coninut ilegal (imagini pornografice cu minori) poate fi efectuat destul de uor, identificarea imaginilor ilegale este mai problematic deoarece chiar i abordrile bazate pe valoarea Hash au succes numai n cazul n care imaginile au fost evaluate n prealabil, valoarea hash a fost stocat ntr-o baz de date i imaginile care au fost analizate nu au fost modificate. Disponibilitatea dispozitivelor si accesului Comiterea infraciunilor din sfera criminalitii informatice este destul de uoar, fiind necesare echipamente (hardware), programe (software) i acces la Internet. n ceea ce privete echipamentele (hardware), puterea calculatoarelor crete continuu, infractorii putnd comite infraciuni grave doar cu tehnologie informatic foarte ieftin sau second-hand. n prezent, cunotinele deinute conteaz mult mai mult dect echipamentele folosite. Comiterea infraciunilor informatice se poate face mai uor prin instrumente (software) de specialitate care sunt disponibile. Astfel, infractorii pot descrca instrumente (software) proiectate pentru a localiza porturile deschise, pentru a sparge parole de protecie, etc. i, datorit tehnicilor mirroring i de schimb peer-to-peer, este dificil s se limiteze disponibilitatea i rspndirea pe scar larg a unor astfel de dispozitive. Ultimul element vital este de accesul la Internet. Dei costul de accesului la Internet este mai mare n cele mai multe ri n curs de dezvoltare dect n rile industrializate, numrul utilizatorilor de Internet n rile n
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curs de dezvoltare crete rapid. Oricum, infractorii (n general) nu se vor abona la un serviciu Internet, pentru a limita ansele de a fi identificai, ci vor prefera serviciile pe care le pot utiliza fr nregistrare (verificare) cum ar fi terminale publice de Internet, reele fr fir, reele sparte i servicii pre-pltite fr cerine de nregistrare. Organele de aplicare a legii iau msuri pentru a restriciona accesul necontrolat la serviciile de Internet, pentru a evita abuzul infracional al acestor servicii. Spre exemplu, n Italia i n China, utilizarea de terminale Internet publice necesit identificarea utilizatorilor. Cu toate c restriciile de acces ar putea preveni infraciunile i facilita investigaiile organelor de aplicare a legii, o astfel de legislaie ar putea mpiedica dezvoltarea societii informaionale i dezvoltarea comerului electronic i chiar ar putea nclca drepturile omului. Disponibilitatea informaiilor Internetul conine, n prezent, aproape 240 milioane de pagini web57 de informaii, la zi. Un infractor care plnuiete un atac poate gsi informaii detaliate pe Internet, de la cum s construiasc o bomb folosind substane i produse comercializate liber, pn la planurile unei cldiri sau ale unei reele de utiliti. Dei astfel informaii erau disponibile chiar nainte de dezvoltarea Internetului, accesul la aceste informaii era oricum, mult mai greu de obinut. Succesul Internetului depinde, de asemenea, de puterea motoarelor de cutare, care permit utilizatorilor s caute milioane de pagini de Web n cteva secunde. Aceasta tehnologie poate fi utilizat n ambele scopuri, legitime i infracionale. Motoare de cutare complexe pot fi folosite pentru a filtra multe rezultatele de cutare de informaii cu privire la problemele de securitate informatic. De exemplu, infractorii ar putea cuta sisteme de protecie cu parol nesigure sau ar putea analiza intele.
Conform Netcraft, June 2009 Web Server Survey, disponibil la http://news.netcraft.com/archives/web_ server_survey.html
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Pierderea mecanismelor de control Toate reelele de comunicare n mas de la reelele de telefonie utilizate pentru apeluri de voce la Internet au nevoie de administraie central i standarde tehnice pentru a asigura operabilitatea. Internetul trebuie de asemenea, s fie guvernat de legi i legiuitori iar organele de aplicare a legii, au nceput s se dezvolte standarde legale care necesit un anumit grad de control central. Iniial, Internetul a fost conceput ca o reea militar58, bazat pe o arhitectur de reea descentralizat care a ncercat s pstreze funcionalitile principale intacte i n funciune, chiar i atunci cnd componente de reea au fost atacate. Ca urmare, infrastructura de reea a Internetului este rezistent la ncercrile de control extern. Cu toate acestea, nu a fost proiectat (iniial) pentru a facilita anchete penale sau pentru a preveni atacurile din interiorul reelei. Un exemplu de probleme ridicate de lipsa unor instrumente de control este abilitatea utilizatorilor de a eluda tehnologia de filtrare, folosind servicii de comunicaii anonime criptate. Astfel, dac furnizorii de acces blocheaz anumite site-uri web cu coninut ilegal (cum ar fi pornografia infantil), clienii sunt, n general, n imposibilitatea de a accesa aceste site-uri web. Dar blocarea coninutului ilegal poate fi evitat, n cazul clienilor care folosesc un server de comunicaii anonim, criptnd comunicaiile ntre ei i server-ul central. n acest caz, furnizorii pot fi n imposibilitatea de a bloca cererile, deoarece cererile trimise ca mesaje criptate nu pot fi deschise de ctre furnizorii de acces. Dimensiuni internaionale Multe procese de transfer de date pot dobndi caracter transnaional datorit faptului c protocoalele utilizate pentru transferurile de date pe Internet se bazeaz pe o
Pentru o istorie a Internetului, a se vedea Leiner B. M., Cerf V.G., Clark D.D., Kahn R.E., Kleinrock L., Lynch D.C., Postel J., Roberts L.G., Wolff S., A Brief History of the Internet, disponibil http://www.isoc. org/internet/history/brief.shtml
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dirijare optim dac legturile directe sunt temporar blocate. Chiar i n cazul n care procesul de transfer intern n cadrul rii sursele sunt limitate, datele pot prsi ara, se transmit prin rutere din afara teritoriului i sunt redirecionate napoi n ar la destinaia lor final. n plus, multe servicii Internet se bazeaz pe serviciile din strintate; de exemplu, furnizorii gazd pot oferi spaiu web de nchiriat ntr-o ar bazat pe echipamentele (hardware) dintr-o alt ar. Dac infractorii i intele sunt situate n ri diferite, investigaiile necesit o cooperare a organelor de aplicare a legii, n toate rile afectate deoarece suveranitatea naional nu permite investigaiile pe teritoriul altor ri fr permisiunea autoritilor locale59. Solicitrile formale i timpul necesar pentru a colabora cu organele de aplicare a legii strine, mpiedic adesea investigaiile i, de toate aceste ntrzieri beneficiaz infractorii, care aleg deliberat inte din afara propriei ri i acioneaz din ri cu legislaie inadecvat a criminalitii informatice. Independena locaiei i prezenei la locul infraciunii Pentru comiterea infraciunilor, infractorii nu trebuie s fie prezeni n aceeai locaie cu inta. Accesul la Internet le permite comiterea infraciunilor de aproape oriunde n lume. Aspectele pe care potenialii infractori le iau n considerare atunci cnd comit infraciunea sunt: statutul legislaiei criminalitii informatice, eficacitatea organelor de aplicare a legii, precum i disponibilitatea de acces anonim la Internet. Prevenirea paradisurilor sigure este una din provocrile cheie n lupta mpotriva criminalitii informatice deoarece, atta timp ct exist aceste paradisuri sigure, infractorii le vor utiliza pentru a mpiedica investigaiile. rile n curs de dezvoltare care nu au pus nc n aplicare reglementrile interna59

Goodman S.E., Sofaer A.D., The Transnational Dimension of Cyber Crime and Terrorism, Hoover Press, Standford, CA, 2001, p. 1 i urm., disponibil i la http://media.hoover.org/documents/0817999825_1.pdf

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ionale n domeniul criminalitii informatice pot deveni vulnerabile, ntruct pot fi folosite, pentru a evita urmrirea penal. n acest context, infraciuni grave care afecteaz victime din ntreaga lume ar putea fi dificil de oprit, datorit legislaiei insuficiente din rile n care sunt stabilii infractorii. Un exemplu n acest sens este l Nigeria, care a ajuns sub presiunea de a lua msuri mpotriva neltoriilor financiare distribuite prin pota electronic. Automatizarea Una dintre cele mai mari avantaje ale tehnologiei informaiei i comunicaiilor este abilitatea de a automatiza anumite procese, automatizare care are mai multe consecine majore: mrete viteza proceselor, crete amploarea i impactul proceselor, limiteaz implicarea oamenilor. Infractorii pot folosi automatizarea pentru a crete nivelul activitilor lor. Astfel, multe milioane de mesaje nesolicitate pot fi trimise n grup prin automatizare60. De asemenea, atacurile hacking sunt acum adesea automatizate, ajungnd la mai multe milioane n fiecare zi61 datorit utilizrii unor instrumente (software) care le permite atacarea a mii de sisteme informatice n cteva ore. Prin automatizarea proceselor infractorii pot obine profit mare proiectnd escrocherii care se bazeaz pe un numr mare de infraciuni cu o pierdere relativ sczut pentru fiecare victim deoarece, cu ct este mai mic fiecare pierdere, cu att este mai mare ansa ca victima s nu raporteze infraciunea. Resursele Nu doar o creterea puterii calculatoarelor folosite de un singur utilizator este singura caracteristic care ridic probleme pentru investigaii; n aceiai msur, cre60 A se vedea i Berg T., The Changing Face of Cybercrime: New Internet Threats Create Challenge to Law Enforcement, n Computer Law, Michigan Bar Journal, (iun) 2007, p. 21, disponibil i la http://www. michbar.org/journal/pdf/pdf4article1163.pdf 61 A se vedea Hacker Watch, Anti-Hacker Community, Event Tracking, disponibil la http://www.hacker watch.org

terea capacitilor reelei poate ridica probleme majore. Un exemplu l reprezint atacurile mpotriva website-urilor guvernamentale din Estonia. Analiza atacurilor sugereaz c acestea au fost comise de mii de computere ntr-o reea (ro)bot Botnet62, un grup de calculatoare compromise rulnd programe sub control extern n ultimii ani, reelele (ro)bot au devenit un risc serios pentru securitatea informatic. Mrimea unui Botnet poate varia, de la cteva calculatoare la mai mult de un milion de calculatoare. Ele pot fi utilizate pentru diverse activiti infracionale, incluznd: atacuri tip refuzul serviciului (DoS), trimiterea de mesaje tip spam, atacuri tip hacking i reele de partajare fiiere tipP2P. Reelele (ro)bot ofer o serie de avantaje pentru infractori. Acestea cresc deopotriv capacitatea computerului i a reelei folosite. Utiliznd mii de calculatoare, infractorii pot ataca sisteme informatice, pe care nu le-ar putea atinge cu doar cteva calculatoare. n acelai timp, aceste reele fac, mult mai dificil urmrirea originii infraciunii, deoarece urmele iniiale conduc doar la un membru al reelei. ntruct infractorii controleaz sisteme informatice i reele tot mai puternice, diferenele dintre capacitile de investigare ale autoritilor i cele aflate sub controlul infractorilor devin din ce n ce mai mari. Viteza proceselor de schimb de date Trimiterea unui mesaj de pot electronic oriunde n lume dureaz doar cteva secunde. Acest transfer rapid las foarte puin timp organelor de aplicare a legii pentru a cerceta infraciunea sau pentru a colecta probele. Un timp de rspuns foarte scurt este vital pentru o investigaie de succes ori, fr o legislaie corespunztoare i instrumente
A se vedea i Toth B., Estonia under cyber attack, disponibil la http://www.cert.hu/dmdocuments/Estonia _attack2.pdf
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care s permit anchetatorilor s acioneze imediat i s previn tergerea datelor, o lupt eficient mpotriva criminalitii informatice nu poate fi posibil. n acest sens, procedurile de conservare imediat a datelor i Reeaua de puncte de contact 24/7 sunt exemple de instrumente care pot accelera anchetele. Viteza de dezvoltare Internetul este n continu dezvoltare. nceputul extinderii sale dramatice a fost marcat de crearea unei interfee de utilizator grafice (www), prietenoas i uor accesibil. Crearea acestei interfee (www) a permis dezvoltarea de noi aplicaii, dar i de noi infraciuni. Evoluia ulterioar a continuat, n special cu: jocurile online i transmisia de date audio prin intermediul unei reele ce are la baz IP (VoIP). Jocurile online sunt din ce n ce mai populare, dar nu este nc foarte clar dac organele de aplicare a legii pot investiga i urmri cu succes infraciunile comise n aceast lume virtual. Trecerea de la apelurile vocale tradiionale la transmisia de date audio prin Internet (VoIP) prezint, de asemenea, noi provocri pentru organele de aplicare a legii. Tehnicile i procedurile dezvoltate de organele de aplicare a legii pentru interceptarea convorbirilor telefonice clasice nu se aplic (n general) i comunicaiilor tip VoIP. Astfel, interceptarea apelurilor vocale tradiionale este efectuat (de obicei) prin intermediul furnizorilor de telecomunicaii; aplicnd acelai principiu pentru comunicaiile tip VoIP, organele de aplicare a legii ar trebui s opereze prin furnizorii de servicii Internet i furnizori de servicii tip VoIP. Cu toate acestea, n cazul n care serviciul este bazat pe tehnologia P2P (puncla-punct), prestatorii de servicii pot fi pui n imposibilitatea de a intercepta comunicaiile deoarece datele relevante sunt transferate direct ntre partenerii de comunicare. n aceiai ordine de idei, noile dispozitive (hardware) cu tehnologie de reea sunt, de asemenea, n curs de dezvoltare rapid.
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Cele mai noi sisteme de petrecere a timpului liber acas transform televizoarele n puncte de acces Internet; cele mai recente telefoane mobile stocheaz date i se conecteaz la Internet prin reele fr fir iar dispozitive de memorie USB (Universal Serial Bus) cu o capacitate mare au fost integrate n ceasuri, pixuri, etc. Organele de aplicare a legii trebuie s in seama de aceste evoluii, n munca lor fiind esenial pregtirea continu a celor implicai n investigaiile acestor infraciuni, astfel nct acetia s fie la curent cu cele mai noi tehnologii i s poat identifica echipamentele relevante, precum i dispozitivele care trebuie s fie confiscate. Comunicaiile anonime Anumite servicii Internet fac dificil identificarea infractorilor63. Posibilitatea comunicaiilor anonime este un produs/serviciu oferit cu intenia de a evita dezavantajele de utilizator; exemple de astfel de servicii: terminale publice de Internet (la aeroporturi, cafenele Internet), reele fr fir, servicii de telefonie mobil prepltite care nu necesit nregistrare, capacitile de stocare oferite de pagini web fr nregistrare, sisteme tip server de comunicaii anonime, retransmitori anonimi. Utilizarea reelelor fr fir deschise, face aproape imposibil identificarea infractorilor. Prin folosirea serviciilor de comunicaii anonime i servicii de e-mail care nu verifica informaii privind nregistrarea, infractorul poate reduce ansele de reuit n a fi identificat. Infractorii i pot ascunde identitatea destul de simplu, ca de exemplu, prin utilizarea de adrese de pot electronic false. Datorit faptului c muli furnizori ofer gratuit adrese de pot electronic neavnd posibilitatea s verifice informaiile personale introduse, utilizatorii pot nregistra
63 A se vedea i Sobel D.L., The Process That John Doe is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge to Internet Anonymity, n Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, nr. 3, 2000, disponibil la http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/symposium/v5i1a3-Sobel .html

adrese de pot electronic fr s dezvluie identitatea lor. Aceste adrese anonime pot fi utile, ca de exemplu, n situaia n care utilizatorii doresc s adere la grupuri de discuii. Comunicaiile anonime pot duce la un comportament anti-social, dar pot, n aceiai msur, s permit utilizatorilor s acioneze mai liber. Unele ri abordeaz provocrile comunicaiilor anonime prin punerea n aplicare a unor restricii juridice; spre exemplu Italia, impune furnizorilor de acces public la Internet s identifice utilizatorii nainte ca acetia s nceap s utilizeze serviciul cu scopul de a ajuta organele de aplicare a legii n identificarea suspecilor. Cu toate acestea, msurile pot fi uor evitate datorit faptului c infractorii pot utiliza reele private fr fir neprotejate sau carduri din ri care nu necesit nregistrare. Tehnologia de criptare Un alt factor care poate complica investigarea criminalitii informatice, dar care constituie soluia tehnic cheie n lupta mpotriva criminalitii informatice, este tehnologia de criptare. Folosind criptarea, se reuete protejarea informaiilor mpotriva accesului persoanelor neautorizate. Ca i anonimatul, criptarea nu este o noutate, dar (ca i n alte cazuri) tehnologia a transformat domeniul. Acum criptarea datelor din calculator este destul de facil, cu un simplu clic al mausului fiind disponibile diverse produse software care s permit utilizatorilor protejarea fiierelor mpotriva accesului neautorizat , ceea ce ngreuneaz posibilitatea organelor de aplicare a legii de a descifra criptarea i de a accesa datele. Este posibil decifrarea criptrii, dar (de multe ori) este un proces dificil i anevoios, ce poate fi realizat dac anchetatorii au acces la programul (software) folosit pentru a cripta fiierele. n funcie de tehnica de criptare i dimensiunea cheii, ar putea lua decenii pentru a sparge o criptare. Utilitarele (software) de criptare actuale,
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merg mult mai departe dect criptarea singular a fiierelor; spre exemplu, versiunile recente ale sistemelor de operare dezvoltate de Microsoft permit criptarea unui ntregului disc dur al unitii centrale. Sunt, de asemenea, disponibile instrumente pentru criptarea comunicaiilor iar infractorii folosesc deja aceast tehnologie pentru a-i proteja conversaiile de interceptare. Tehnicile pot fi combinate. Folosind utilitare (software) de steganografie, infractorii pot cripta mesajele i s fac schimb de mesaje n imagini, pentru anchetatori fiind dificil s disting ntre schimbul inofensiv de poze de vacan i schimbul de imagini cu mesaje criptate ascunse. Dei sunt unii experi care consider c aceast tehnologie nu este o ameninare, totui, disponibilitatea pe scar larg a acesteia, pentru orice utilizator, poate avea ca rezultat o mai mare utilizare a criptrii. Diferitele abordri legale pentru rezolvarea problemei sunt nc n discuie; au fost formulate propuneri de genul: formularea unor poteniale obligaii pentru dezvoltatorii de programe (software) de a lsa o u deschis pentru organele de aplicare a legii, limitri privind cheile de criptare, instituirea (n cazul unei anchete penale) obligaiei de divulgare a cheilor folosite, etc. Msuri specifice de prevenire a criminalitii informatice Ca o condiie esenial de eficien, trebuie avut n vedere faptul c aciunea de prevenire trebuie s vizeze fenomenul, n ansamblul su i nu izolat, pe domenii sau genuri de infraciuni. n funcie de msurile prin care se realizeaz prevenirea criminalitii putem vorbi de mai multe moduri de prevenire a acesteia; n prezent, asistm la o intensificare a msurilor de ordin social i (ndeosebi) a msurilor tehnologice care nlocuiesc msurile eminent represive menite s reduc svrirea faptelor antisociale64.
64 Sandu F., Ioni G.I., Criminologie , op. cit., p. 158-161

Principalele msuri care trebuie ntreprinse pentru prevenirea criminalitii informatice sunt stipulate n capitolul II al titlului III al Legii nr. 161/2003; astfel: autoritile i instituiile publice cu competene n domeniu, furnizorii de servicii, organizaiile neguvernamentale i ali reprezentani ai societii civile ar trebui s desfoare activiti comune i programe de prevenire a criminalitii informatice pentru asigurarea securitii sistemelor informatice i a proteciei datelor personale65. autoritile i instituiile publice cu competene n domeniu, n cooperare cu furnizorii de servicii, organizaiile neguvernamentale i ali reprezentani ai societii civile ar trebui s promoveze politici, practici, msuri, proceduri i standarde minime de securitate a sistemelor informatice66. autoritile i instituiile publice cu competene n domeniu, n cooperare cu furnizorii de servicii, organizaiile neguvernamentale i ali reprezentani ai societii civile ar trebui s organizeze campanii de informare privind criminalitatea informatic i riscurile la care sunt expui utilizatorii de sisteme informatice67. Ministerul Justiiei, Ministerul de Interne, Ministerul Comunicaiilor i Tehnologiei Informaiei, Serviciul Romn de Informaii i Serviciul de Informaii Externe ar trebui s constituie i s actualizeze continuu baze de date privind criminalitatea informatic iar Institutul Naional de Criminologie din subordinea Ministerului Justiiei ar trebui s efectueze studii periodice n scopul identificrii cauzelor care determin i a condiiilor ce favorizeaz criminalitatea informatic68. Ministerul Justiiei, Ministerul de Interne, Ministerul Comunicaiilor i Tehnologiei Informaiei, Serviciul Romn de Informaii i Serviciul de Informaii Ex65 66

terne ar trebui s desfoare programe speciale de pregtire i perfecionare a personalului cu atribuii n prevenirea i combaterea criminalitii informatice69. proprietarii sau administratorii de sisteme informatice la care accesul este interzis sau restricionat pentru anumite categorii de utilizatori ar trebui s avertizeze utilizatorii cu privire la condiiile legale de acces i utilizare, precum i cu privire la consecinele juridice ale accesului fr drept la aceste sisteme informatice; avertizarea trebuind s fie accesibil oricrui utilizator70. Din nefericire, ca i n alte situaii, multe dintre msuri rmn doar scriptic menionate, fr a fi i puse n aplicare. Astfel, nu exist o conlucrare efectiv, pe de o parte, ntre organele de aplicare a legii i furnizorii de servicii i, pe de alt parte, ntre organele de aplicare a legii i societatea civil; nu au fost organizate campanii de informare privind criminalitatea informatic i riscurile la care sunt expui utilizatorii de sisteme informatice, nici de ctre Ministerul Comunicaiilor (i Tehnologiei Informaiilor/Societii Informaionale) i nici de Ministerul Administraiei i Internelor (Ministerul Internelor i Reformei Administrative) prin serviciile/instituiile subordonate nu au fost efectuate studii de ctre Institutul Naional de Criminologie din subordinea Ministerului Justiiei (sau de o alt instituie abilitat) n scopul identificrii cauzelor care determin i a condiiilor ce favorizeaz criminalitatea informatic portalul eFrauda creat pentru a permite fiecrui cetean s sesizeze on line aciunile cu caracter aparent nelegal de care a luat cunotin sau fraudele electronice crora le-a czut victim, care trebuia s asigure informarea prin mijloace electronice cu privire la legislaia i reglementrile n
69 70

art. 36. art. 37. 67 art. 38. 68 art. 39.

art. 40. art. 41.

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domeniul serviciilor societii informaionale i prezentarea, de ctre autoriti, a unor situaii sau exemple ntlnite n practic, a cazurilor instrumentate i a msurilor luate , pe lng faptul c nu furniza prea multe informaii, a fost suspendat sau desfiinat; nu exist o politic de securitate IT

sau cel puin nite principii coordonatoare la nivel naional. nu sunt aplicate, n cazul infraciunilor din sfera criminalitii informatice, msurile cu caracter general de prevenire a criminalitii (menionate) mai sus.

Bibliografie: Berg T., The Changing Face of Cybercrime: New Internet Threats Create Challenge to Law Enforcement, n Computer Law, Michigan Bar Journal, (iun) 2007, p. 21, disponibil i la http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/pdf4article1163.pdf Bohn J., Coroama V., Langheinrich M., Mattern F., Rohs M., Living in a World of Smart Everyday Objects Social, Economic, and Ethical Implications, Journal of Human and Ecological Risck Assesment, vol. 10, nr. 5, p. 736-786, (oct.) 2004, disponibil i la http://www.vs.inf.ethz.ch/res/papers/hera.pdf Goodman S.E., Sofaer A.D., The Transnational Dimension of Cyber Crime and Terrorism, Hoover Press, Standford, CA, 2001, p. 1 i urm., disponibil i la http://media. hoover.org/documents/0817999825_1.pdf Hacker Watch, Anti-Hacker Community, Event Tracking, disponibil la http://www.hackerwatch.org Internet World Stats, Usage and Population Statistic, disponibil la http://www.internet worldstats.com/stats.htm Leiner B. M., Cerf V.G., Clark D.D., Kahn R.E., Kleinrock L., Lynch D.C., Postel J., Roberts L.G., Wolff S., A Brief History of the Internet, disponibil http://www.isoc.org/ internet/history/brief.shtml Netcraft, June 2009 Web Server Survey, disponibil la http://news.netcraft.com/ archives/web_server_survey.html Sandu F., Ioni G.I.,Criminologie teoretic i aplicat, Ed. Universul Juridic, Bucureti, 2005. Sobel D.L., The Process That John Doe is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge to Internet Anonymity, n Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, nr. 3, 2000, disponibil la http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/symposium/v5i1a3-Sobel.html Toth B., Estonia under cyber attack, disponibil la http://www.cert.hu/dmdocuments /Estonia_attack2.pdf

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MARK REGISTRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION


Lecturer PhD MARIUS PANTEA Assist. PhD student SERGIU ADRIAN VASILE Ministry of Administration and Interior Alexandru Ioan Cuza Police Academy The adoption of a public policy addressing speculative and abusive registration of domain names should provide that holders of prior rights recognized or established by national and Community law and public bodies will benefit from a specific period of time during which the registration of their domain names is exclusively reserved to such holders of prior rights recognized or established by national and Community law and public bodies. Domain names should not be revoked arbitrarily. A revocation may, however, be obtained in particular should a domain name be manifestly contrary to public order. The revocation policy should nevertheless provide for a timely and efficient mechanism. Rules should be adopted on the question of bona vacantia to address the status of domain names the registration of which is not renewed or which. Keywords: mark; domain; Internet; European Union; Escrow; sunrise The new technology makes possible a fast, wide and easy spreading of information, from which science men and not only benefit. A new challenge for the leading forums of the European Union was the regulation of the Internet domains71. They were also aware that it was necessary to clear some judicial aspects concerning electronic trade72 and the precise defining of the networks and the electronic communication within the European Union73. Back in 10 November 1999, the Committee delivered to the European ParliaIn 2002 the Regulations of the European Parliament nr. 733/2002 and of the Council was approved in 22.04.2002 concerning the introduction of the name of Internet domain in the U.E., and later the4 Regulation (CE) no 874/2004 of the Commission in 28.04.2004 which settled the rules of public politics concerning the usage of this new element in the upper levels and the registrations basis 72 Directive 2000/31/CE of the European Parliament and Council , 8.06.2000 concerning particular judicial aspects of the informational society, especially the electronic trade, on the intern market 73 Directive 2002/21/CE of the European Parliament and Council, 7.03.2002 concerning the common regulation frame for the networks and the electronic communications services
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ment, Council, Social and Economical Committee and Regions Committee a message entitled To a new frame concerning the electronic communication infrastructure and related services the revision of communications of 1999. In this message, the Committee changed the legal frame concerning communications at that time74. The Committee also delivered a series of ideas concerning a new frame for the communications infrastructure and the related services for a public debate. The European Committee from Lisbon 23 and 24 March 2000 underlined the potential of growth, competitivity, and the possibility of offering more jobs represented by the new step to a new technology, a new era based on knowledge. In particular the importance of the access to a cheaper, global infrastructure and a wide range of services both for companies and European citizens.
74 Art. 8 of the Directive 90/387/CEE of the Council, 28 of June 1990 concerning the building of the common communications market by using opened networks, JO L 192, 24.7.1990, p. 1., Directive modified by the Directive 97/51/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council (JO L 295, 29.10.1997, p. 23).

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The definition of International Social Service75 referred to a series of activities which take place on-line. The wide majority of these activities do not obey any regulations as they do not represent main procedures of signal transmission relying on the usage of electronic communications. In order to fully understand al the aspects which regulate the Internet domains within the European Union is necessary to list particular terms. The word Internet is made up of two English words: interconnected and network and has many meanings: - The proper name Internet (with capital) refers to the unique world wide network of computers interconnected thru communications regulations named Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol, TCP / IP. - The common noun internet, for the great majority, stands for the same network but seen as a mean of communication, including the information and the services offer to the users - Technically, the term can also stand for a network that interconnects two or more private networks placed in distinctive areas. Examples of wide networks, for which the usage of this term is justified, are SIPRNet and FidoNet. But there are also some terms related to the Internet: - intranet a private network with the same properties as the Internet, on which you add the restricted access for example the networks used by private corporations - extranet an intranet of some company to which can have access particular foreigners such as providers or customers A TLD76 or a Top Level Domain is the
Art. 1 from the Directive 98/34/CE of the European Parliament and Committee, 22nd of June 1998 concerning the usage of particular procedure in providing information in standards and technical domain, JO L 204 , 21.07.1998, p.37, Directive modified by Directive 98/38/CE (JO L217, 5.8.2998, p.18 ). 76 English Abr. TLD - Top-Level Domain
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last part-component of a Internet domain name. For example, in case of the domain academiadepolitie.ro, the T.D.L. is .ro, the T.L.D.s are a part of the internet infrastructure. They are an essential element of the global connections of the World Wide Web. The connection and the presence allowed by the providing of domain names and related addresses allow the users to find the exact location of the computers and the sites on Web. Also, the T.L.D.s are found in any Internet address or E-mail. The Top Level Domains are controlled by IANA 77 . There are three types: National domains, ccTLD78: used by countries or dependent territories, have the length of two letters, as .ro for Romania Generic domains, gTLD79: used by certain organizations, for example, .com for commercial enterprises, having three or more letters; nearly all the gTLDs are possible no matter the country, except for gov and mil used only by the Government and Army. Infrastructure domains: arpa is, for now, the first of his kind. The development of the .eu domain is included as one of the means to accelerate the electronic trade, as e-Europe was approved by the European Committee, Lisbon 23rd and 24th of March 2000. While using the .eu TLD the intern market of the European Union managed to gain a greater visibility on the virtual market based on the Internet. The 1st level domain .eu provides a link which can be easily identified within the Community, regulations and on the European market also. This enables enterprises, organizations and free-lancers in the Community to register in a certain domain. The Commission demanded, in the name of the Community, a code of the European Union, the target was to create a ceTLD on the Internet. On 25th of SepEnglish Abr. IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 78 English Abr. ccTLD - country code Top-Level Domain 79 English Abr. gTLD - generic Top-Level Domain
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tember 2000 ICAN80 elaborated a resolution concerning: the two letter alphanumeric codes to be commissioned as ccTLD only for the cases in which the maintaining Agency of ISO 3166, in its list of reservations, created a reservation of the code which covers any ISO 3166-1 application, a short code of the country, territory or area being necessary. These terms are fulfilled by the European Unions code which is this way eligible by the Community. At the moment, ICANN is responsible for the commission coordination of the Registers containing the codes TLDs. The endorsement of a public politic concerning the abusive registration of the domain names, must guarantee that the holders of the rights previously recognized or regulated by the intern laws, European and the public organizations will benefit for a certain period sunrise period while their domain names registration is exclusively reserved to these previous right-holders. The .eu domain was in forced for the residents and for the organizations from the European Union in April 2006.There was an introductive period of four months, called Sunrise, which took place between 7th of December2005 and the 6th of April 2006. During the Sunrise period registration of the .eu domain names was possible to freelancers and organizations only, such as the holders of reiterated trademarks, who could prove that they had previously rights over a name and, consequently, the were entitled to the proper .eu domain. Within this period the applications have been approved regarding the terms known as Sunrise Regulations. On the whole, during this period there were more than 245 000 .eu domain names. EURID holds a data base with all the applications from the Sunrise period to ensure the transparency of the .eu registration process81.
English Abr. ICANN - Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 81 After searching a .eu domain name you will de redirected to a page that contains information concerning the WHOIS politics and a special code.
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The domain names can not be cancelled arbitrarily. Even so, it can be done when the domain is endangering the public order. In this case is needed a certain policy to ensure a proper and efficient mechanism. Concerning the terms of the public order in .eus registration is recommended that different options be considered, such as the first who comes is the first who gets. The Community keeps all the rights concerning the .eu TLD including, especially, the intellectual property rights and other rights on the data bases of the register needed for the present Regulation development and also for the possibility of assigning another identity as Register. The members can ask for their official names and nicknames to be directly registered under the .eu only by their national Governments82. Some members sent a message to the Commission and the other members, a list of world wide known names concerning the geographical concepts83 and geopolitical that affects their political and territorial order84. These lists contain names that could not be registered or were registered to a secondary level due to the public policy. For these names the first that comes is not the first that gets it. The Register offers a wide range of solutions, regarding the international order, especially the OMPI85 regulations to avoid as much as possible abusive registration. The registrations demands include the following elements, any material error becoming an abuse to the registration terms:
To access these extra information about the historic of the Sunrise process of a domain name you will have to introduce the code as displayed 82 Regulation (CE) no 733/2002 of the European Parliament and Committee, 22.04.2002 concerning the U.E.s internet domain nickname 83 Geographical Pointing is the name that serves to the identification of the country, region or area of a product , in case they have particular qualities 84 Art.5 (2) Regulations (CE) no 733/2002 of the European Parliament and Committee, 22.04.2002 concerning the U.E.s internet domain nickname 85 Abr. OMPI

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the name and address of the applicant electronic confirmation of the applicant, who states that he meets the requirements concerning eligibility86 the applicants statement that he does not mean to disobey the law concerning internet domains and the registration is made with good faith an electronic sent commitment by the applicant, in which he agrees to the terms and conditions of the registration, including the extrajudicial solving of the conflicts The holders of the previously recognized rights or added by the intern or European regulations can apply for domain names that involve a step by step registration, which is followed by the general registration of the .eu domain. Previous rights include inter alia national and European registered trademarks, geographical coordinates of the name origin while they are protected by the inter regulations of the countries that holds them: marks that are not registered, commercial names, enterprises identifiers, names of commercial companies, family names and distinct titles of some protected artistic masterpieces. Public organisms include: European institutions and organisms, national Governments and local authorities, governmental organisms, authorities, organizations and organisms of public right and international and intergovernmental organizations. Registration due to a previous right refers to the registration of a full name for which there is such a right, as written in the regulations that state that particular right. For a public organism the name either complete or an acronym frequently used. Public organisms responsible for the administration of a certain territory can register with the full name of the territory, as well with the name the territory is known. It is important to know, the moment
Art.4 (2,b) of the European parliament and Committee no733/2002 concerning the U.E.s internet domain nicknames.
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Romania joins the European Union an examination to all that appears new shall be made in comparison with the E.U.s marks87 extended in Romania. Unfortunately, the Romanian marks will not immediately extend in the European Union, this way the producers and service providers from Romania are disadvantaged. So we see how the conflicts between the national brands and the European ones escalade, however the last ones manage to get on top. There have been created special judicial Courts, which shall solve, by following certain special procedures, the future conflicts. For the registration of full names, in this case the names that contain a space among the textual elements or the words that compose them, it is considered, in the case of their writing as demanded domain names, that those particular names to be written in one word or with the equivalent of their full names. The Law nr.381/2005 that adjusts and completes the Governments Ruling nr.41/1998 concerning taxes in industrial property protection and the means of their usage, in force with 7th of January 2006, the registration costs of the national brands were modified. In case of a name for which is claimed for previous rights contains special sign, spaces or punctuation marks, these are entirely eliminated from the domain, being replaced with dashes/hyphens and when possible with a new version of the name. Special signs and punctuation marks previously mentioned include: ! $ % ^ & * ( ) +{ }[] : ; # ? If a name for which there is a previous right contains letters with additional elements, which cannot be reproduced in
87 The mark is a piece of graphic art that helps to the recognition of particular companies. There can be names, drawings, colour mixtures, sign, threedimensional shapes, letters, numbers, special shapes of certain products, etc. Distinctive - the capacity of marks to indicate certain products origin

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ASCII code, such as , or , the letters can be reproduced without these elements (with a, e or n) or are replaced with other letters such as ae. In any other way the domain name is identical with the textual elements or words of the name that benefits from a previous right. The registration application of a domain name on which there is a previous right contains a sending to the European or intern regulation on which basis the right to name was given, and some other significant information, such as the registration number of the mark, information concerning the display in a official paper or governmental publication, information concerning the registration at professional or business agencies or Commercial Bureau. The Register signs, on his own cases, an escrow agreement88 with repute mandatory or another escrow agent settled within the Community territory, which appoints the commission as beneficiary of the escrow agreement. The register provides daily to the escrow agent an electronic copy of the current content of the .eu database. In many cases, the free circulation of informational societies services can be a specific reflection, in the European regulation, of a more general idea, and that is freedom of speech89. For this reason, the directives that regulate the informational social services activity must guarantee that this activity can be freely developed obeying the article above mentioned, and restricted by the terms of the 2nd alin. Of the same article and by the article 46(1) of the Treaty. The Agreement specifies the fact that the information is held by the escrow agent, who regards the following terms and conditions: the data are received and kept in escrow and except for the checking regarding
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its correctitude, format and consistency cant suffer other procedures, until sent to the Commission ; in case the escrow agreement is no longer possible, the Commission has the exclusive and irrevocable right to appoint again the Register; if the contract is cancelled, the Commission shall take all the needed measures to transfer the operational and administrative responsibility for the .eu TLD and any spare funds to a appointed part of the Commission. The WHOIS database contains information concerning the owner of a domain name, which are relevant but not excessive with the purpose of the database. If the information is not strictly required for the purpose of the database and the owner is a natural person, for the information that are about to be made public there must be a solid consent of the owner of the domain name. The deliberate display of inexact information is a reason to think that the domain name registration was made disregarding the terms. The purpose of the WHOIS database is to provide accurate and upgraded information regarded the administrative and technical centers of contact that manage the domain name under the .eu TLD. The following names are reserved for the development of the Register: eurid.eu, registry.eu, nic.eu, dns.eu, internic.eu, whois.eu, das.eu, coc.eu, eurethix.eu, eurethics.eu, euthics.eu For a domain name that it has been considered by a Court of a member as being scandalmonger, racist or a treat to the public order, the name is froze by the register until the final decision of the Court ; if it proves to be true the name is revoked. The register will ban the future registrations in case of the names for which the Court gave a verdict. A registration domain name is revoked, using an extrajudicial procedure or a proper judicial one, in case of the name which due to its shape or elements can generate confu64

Escrow a guarantee between the creditor and the debtor, and used in case one of them does not respect the terms of the deal. In the Romanian regulation it is not defined, being a term of the Anglo-Saxon banking activity. 89 Defined in the 10th art.(1) of the Convention for the defence of the human rights and fundamental liberties signed by all the members.

sion with a name which is rightly recognized by the intern and European regulations, such as the rights mentioned in art.10(1) and which: Was registered by someone who did not have rights or legitimate interest for the name Was registered or used with dishonesty Legitimate interest90 can be proved in the following situations: before an S.A.L. alternative solving procedure , the owner used the domain name to provide products or services regarding the regulations the owner of a domain name, being an enterprise, organization or a natural person, is usually known due to the name of the domain, even without a recognized right by the intern or European regulations the owner of the domain name uses it legitimately, for non-commercial purposes correctly, without the intention of lying the customers or harm the reputation of a name for which there is a recognized right by the intern and European regulation Dishonesty91 can be proved in the following situations: the domain name was registered for selling, renting or transferring purposes of a name for which there is a recognized right by the intern or international regulation or a public authority the domain name was registered as not to allow the owner of a name which obeys the regulations, to reflect the name into a proper domain name, on the condition that: such a behavior can be proved, the domain name was not used significantly for two years from registration or in the moment of the SAL procedure, the owner of such a domain name states he shall use it significantly, but does not respect his word for six months after the Start of the SAL procedure.
90 Alin.( 1 ) ( a ) Regulation (CE) no74/2004 of the Committee 28.04.2004 which settled the rules of public politics concerning the usage of this new element in the upper levels and the registrations basis 91 Alin.( 1 ) ( b ) Regulation (CE) no874/2004 of the Committee 28.04.2004 which settled the rules of public politics concerning the usage of this new element in the upper levels and the registrations basis

the domain name was registered with the main purpose of harming the professional activity of an opponent the domain name was use for commercial purposes, to attract internet users to a web site, using of the name to advertise the web site actually -the domain name registered is a personal name for which there is no link between the owner of the name an the registered domain name On the 1st of January 2007 Romania and Bulgaria joined the European Union. Consequently, Bulgaria and Romania should have the responsibility to registrant the domain name they reserved for them92. In order to ensure the judicial transparency according to which these two states benefit from such a possibility, the annex in the Regulation nr.874/2004 of the Commission was modified: Consequently, as the regulations in force mention, here is the list of registration names for Romania: 1. romnia 2. romania 3. roumanie 4. rumnien 5. rumanien 6. rumana 7. rumnien 8. romnia 9. romnia 10. romenia 11. rumunia 12. rumunsko 13. romunija 14. rumnija 15. rumunija 16. rumeenia 17. 18. romnia 19. rumanija 20. roemeni For a link among the telecommunication sectors, media and informational technology, all the networks and transmission services must be regulated the same way. This frame includes four individual directives: Directive 2002/19/CE of the European Parliament and Committee 7th of march 2002 regarding the electronic communications networks and the related infrastructure and their interconnection
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Art.8 alin.(1) Regulation (CE) no874/2004 of the Committee 28.04.2004 which settled the rules of public politics concerning the usage of this new element in the upper levels and the registrations basis.

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Directive 2002/20/CE of the European Parliament and Committee 7th of march 2002 regarding the authorization of the networks and electronic communication services Directive 2002/22/CE of the European Parliament and Committee 7th of march 2002 regarding the universal service and the rights of the users related to the networks and electronic communications services Directive 97/66/CE of the European Parliament an Committee 15th of December 1997 regarding the work with the private data and the protection of intimate life in telecommunications sector/area. The development of the informational social services in the E.U. is restricted by a series of judicial impediments, whish make less attractive the freedom of settlement and labor market. These obstacles interfere due to the differences of inter and European regulations and the judicial uncertainty of the national governments in this sector. Due to the lack of coordination and regulations adjustments in certain areas, obstacles can be justified considering the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Community. There are also some uncertainty concerning the extent to which the members of the U.E. can fully control the services provided by another state.

Definitions: Electronic communications network system of transmission, equipments of commuting or rutting and other resources that allow the signal transmission thru cable, radio waves, optical means or other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, mobile networks, system that use the electric network as long as they serve at signal transmission, networks used by the radio, television, no matter the kind of information sent Electronic communication services Service provided , payment is usually required , involving mainly signal transmission thru electronic communication networks, including the telecommunication systems; does not include informational social services as they are defined in the 98/34/CE Directive, which do not entirely or mainly transmit signals thru the electronic communications networks Public communications network a electronic communications network used, mainly or entirely, to provide electronic communications services to the public User Any natural person or judicial person that uses or requires an electronic communications service allowed to the public.

Bibliography: Directive 2000/31/CE of the European Parliament and Council, 8.06.2000 concerning particular judicial aspects of the informational society, especially the electronic trade, on the intern market. Directive 2002/21/CE of the European Parliament and Council, 7.03.2002 concerning the common regulation frame for the networks and the electronic communications services. Directive 90/387/CEE of the Council, 28 of June 1990 concerning the building of the common communications market by using opened networks, JO L 192, 24.7.1990, p. 1. Directive 97/51/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council (JO L 295, 29.10.1997, p. 23). Directive 98/34/CE of the European Parliament and Committee, 22nd of June 1998 concerning the usage of particular procedure in providing information in standards and technical domain. Regulation (CE) no 874/2004 of the Committee 28.04.2004 which settled the rules of public politics concerning the usage of this new element in the upper levels and the registrations basis. Regulations (CE) no 1255/2007 of the Committee 25th of October 2007. Regulations (CE) no 733/2002 of the European Parliament and Committee 22.04.2002 concerning the U.E. internet domain nickname. The Convention defending the human rights and fundamental liberties.
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MSURILE DE PROTECIE I DE ASISTEN APLICABILE MARTORILOR INCLUI N PROGRAMUL DE POTECIE


Comisar ef dr. ADRIAN-AUGUSTIN BRSCU Director O.N.P.M The ability of a witness to give testimony in a judicial setting or to cooperate with law enforcement investigations without fear of intimidation or reprisal is essential to maintaining the rule of law. Increasingly, countries are enacting legislation or adopting policies to protect witnesses whose cooperation with law enforcement authorities or testimony in a court of law would endanger their lives or those of their families. Protection may be as simple as providing a police escort to the courtroom, offering temporary residence in a safe house or using modern communications technology (such as videoconferencing) for testimony. There are other cases, though, where cooperation by a witness is critical to successful prosecution but the reach and strength of the threatening criminal group is so powerful that extraordinary measures are required to ensure the witnesss safety. In such cases, resettlement of the witness under a new identity in a new, undisclosed place of residence in the same country or even abroad may be the only viable alternative. Cuvinte cheie: martori, protecia martorilor, program de protecie, procedur Uniunea European recomand ca atunci cnd se proiecteaz un cadru de msuri destinat combaterii infraciunilor grave incluzndu-le pe cele referitoare la crim organizat i terorism i a violrilor legislaiei internaionale n domeniul drepturilor omului, trebuie adoptate msuri adecvate pentru protecia martorilor i colaboratorilor justiiei mpotriva intimidrii. De asemenea, trebuie s se asigure proporia ntre natura msurilor de protecie i seriozitatea intimidrii la care sunt supui martorii i colaboratorii justiiei.93 n funcie de particularitile fiecrui caz, Oficiul Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor ntocmete, pentru fiecare martor protejat, o schem de sprijin care cuprinde msurile concrete de protecie i asisten, conform celor stabilite de procuror, respectiv instan. Adoptarea msurilor sau programelor de protecie trebuie s ia n calcul necesitatea
93 Consiliul Europei Recomandarea Rec ( 2005)9 a Comitetului de Minitrii din Statele Membre privind protecia martorilor i a colaboratorilor justiiei, adoptat de Comitetul de Minitrii n 20.aprilie.2005, cu prilejul celei de a 924-a ntruniri a reprezentanilor minitrilor.

stabilirii unui echilibru adecvat cu principiul salvgardrii drepturilor i ateptrilor victimelor94. Dac pentru martorul aflat n stare de pericol au fost adoptate msuri urgente, acestea pot continua prin includerea lor n schema de sprijin. Pentru aplicarea msurii de schimbare a domiciliului, Oficiului Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor, cu sprijinul autoritilor publice centrale i locale, desfoar activiti de identificare a unor spaii de locuit corespunztoare95. Protejarea deplasrilor martorului la i de la organele judiciare se realizeaz de Oficiul Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor prin personalul propriu sau n colaborare cu alte fore n funcie de pericolul evaluat al aplicrii acestei msuri.
Consiliul Europei Recomandarea Rec ( 2005)9 a Comitetului de Minitrii din Statele Membre privind protecia martorilor i a colaboratorilor justiiei, adoptat de Comitetul de Minitrii n 20.aprilie.2005, cu prilejul celei de a 924-a ntruniri a reprezentanilor minitrilor. 95 Art. 22, alin 1 Hotrrea nr. 760 din 14 mai 2004 pentru aprobarea Regulamentului de aplicare a Legii nr. 682/2002 privind protecia martorilor.
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n situaia n care Oficiul Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor nu dispune de mijloace suficiente, protejarea deplasrilor martorilor la i de la organele judiciare se realizeaz n colaborare cu structurile specializate centrale sau locale ale Poliiei Romne. Msurile de protecie care presupun supravegherea sau paza domiciliului ori a reedinei martorului protejat se dispun, la propunerea motivat a Oficiului Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor, de conducerea Inspectoratului General al Poliiei Romne. Aceste msurile se execut, de regul, de ctre personalul specializat din cadrul inspectoratului judeean de poliie sau al Direciei Generale de Poliie a Municipiului Bucureti96. Oficiul Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor reevalueaz, periodic i ori de cte ori situaia concret o impune, riscurile la care este expus martorul pe tot parcursul procesului penal, astfel nct s se poat revizui schema de sprijin, cu acordul martorului, urmrindu-se permanent asigurarea unui raport optim ntre necesitile reale de protecie i asisten i resursele avute la dispoziie. De asemenea, reanalizeaz n mod obligatoriu schema de sprijin n momentul ncetrii procesului penal, n vederea adaptrii acesteia la noua situaie. Procedurile de schimbare a domiciliului i a identitii, precum i procedurile de emitere a noilor documente de identitate, respectiv a altor documente ale persoanei care a devenit martor protejat, se stabilesc prin ordin al ministrului administraiei i internelor sau, dup caz, prin ordin comun al minitrilor de resort. Msurile de asisten prevzute n schema de sprijin sunt detaliate pentru fiecare caz, specificndu-se, dup caz, unul sau mai multe dintre urmtoarele elemente: locul i mediul n care se poate efectua reinseria social, precum i msurile concrete ce urmeaz a fi luate; domeniul recalificrii profesionale, locul, forma, cursurile sau programele la care martorul protejat urmeaz a participa, cuantumul costurilor acestora i valoarea ce poate fi asigurat prin Program;
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msurile ce urmeaz a fi ntreprinse de Oficiul Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor pentru identificarea i obinerea de ctre martorul protejat a unui loc de munc, domeniile n care poate fi identificat noul loc de munc, pe ct posibil similare celui sau celor n care martorul protejat i-a desfurat activitatea, precum i condiiile n care martorul poate refuza locul de munc identificat de Oficiului Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor; suma care se poate asigura martorului protejat de ctre Oficiul Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor ca venit lunar pn la gsirea unui loc de munc i modalitile de transmitere a acestei sume. Oficiul Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor urmrete ca msurile de asisten s fie permanent corelate cu msurile de protecie i poate adopta unele msuri de asisten psihologic n vederea adaptrii martorului protejat n cadrul Programului. Asistena psihologic reprezint un ansamblu de msuri specifice, menite s susin persoana inclus n Program n vederea adecvrii comportamentului su la situaia actual. Msurile vizeaz, pe de o parte, asigurarea i sprijinirea martorului, iar pe de alt parte, au n vedere formarea unor mecanisme de autocontrol al comportamentului propriu. Intervenia imediat i ajutorul de specialitate restabilesc un sentiment fundamental de siguran, punndu-l pe individ n situaia de a utiliza n modul cel mai eficient resursele sale proprii pentru depirea situaiei problematice actuale. n cazul unui incident critic, comportamentul unei persoane poate fi foarte dificil de prevzut, o persoan foarte puternic i stabil ntr-un eveniment considerat minor ar putea s aib o reacie dramatic, n timp ce, cineva fragil emoional ar putea s nu aib nicio reacie n faa unui eveniment pe care lumea l-ar considera traumatic.97 Odat cu includerea n programul de protecie, o persoan poate tri o serie de
A. Mihalcea, D. Bratu, Evaluarea psihologic, cerin necesar n procesul de acordare a calitii de martor protejat, Buletinul de Informare si Documentare al M.A.I. nr. 6 (71) 2005.
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Art. 24, alin. 1 i 2 din Hotrrea nr. 760 din 2004.

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dificulti: disconfort psihic (trirea subiectiv a unor stri afective negative), lipsa autocontrolului (trirea subiectiv i experiena obiectiv a pierderii controlului asupra evenimentelor), precum i dezorganizare psihic ce presupune incapacitatea individului de a face fa, de a depi situaia stresant. De aceea se impune acordarea suportului psihologic martorului protejat n cursul derulrii programului de protecie. Suportul i ajutorul acordat prin asisten psihologic individual vizeaz creterea rezistenei psihice a persoanei n cauz pentru adaptarea sa la situaii noi, stresante sau neobinuite aprute n viaa sa personal avndu-se n vedere n principal, facilitarea procesului de adaptare la situaia anxiogen i implicit ameliorarea relaiilor cu persoanele implicate n procesul penal, ameliorarea emoiilor negative i a consecinelor determinate de diferite traume, crearea condiiei psihologice de accesibilitate pentru diversele aciuni juridice desfurate la nivel general precum i sprijinirea martorului din punct de vedere psihologic pe parcursul desfurrii procesului penal n care este implicat. n scopul prevenirii apariiei unor probleme i meninerea strii de sntate mental, se urmrete inerea sub observaie a anumitor trsturi de personalitate dominante, puse n eviden prin evaluare psihologic ce se realizeaz la includerea n Program, care n situaii tensionate pot deveni trsturi psihopatologice cu caracter dezadaptativ. Oficiul Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor acord asisten martorului protejat n privina interviurilor pentru angajare sau a concursurilor la care acesta se prezint n vederea ncadrrii n munc, prin furnizarea documentelor necesare. Venitul lunar care se asigur prin Program trebuie s asigure nevoile de existen ale martorului protejat i ale membrilor si de familie. Cuantumul venitului lunar care urmeaz a fi asigurat prin Program i perioada n care martorul protejat beneficiaz de aceast msur de asisten se stabilesc, pentru fiecare caz, n Protocolul de protecie, cu ncadrarea n bugetul aprobat Oficiului. n afara msurilor procedurale de protecie, n cadrul Protocolului de protecie
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ncheiat ntre martorul protejat pe de o parte i Oficiul Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor pe de alt parte, sunt stipulate i o serie de msuri menite s asigure o eficien sporit a siguranei martorului. Aceste msuri de protecie i asisten98, de natur extraprocedural, sunt msuri prevzute de legea cadru i se refer la: protecia martorului aflat n stare de reinere, arestare preventiv sau n executarea unei pedepse privative de libertate, n colaborare cu organele care administreaz locurile de deinere msuri sporite de siguran la domiciliu, precum i de protejare a deplasrii martorului la i de la organele judiciare; schimbarea domiciliului; schimbarea identitii; schimbarea nfirii; reinseria n alt mediu social; recalificarea profesional; schimbarea sau asigurarea locului de munc; asigurarea unui venit pn la gsirea unui loc de munc. Acestora se adaug msura de protecie privind dotarea martorului cu arme de paz i aprare. Msurile de protecie i de asisten pot fi prevzute singure sau cumulat n cadrul schemei de sprijin aceste, msuri cptnd o caracteristic dinamic n funcie de evoluia anumitor parametri dictai de starea de pericol sau anumite cerine aprute n viaa martorului protejat. Aceast form de protecie cunoscut i sub denumirea de ,,protecie poliieneasc sau ,,preventiv i care presupune, n general, utilizarea de mijloace mai puin economicoase, este ntlnit n toate sistemele juridice care cunosc programe extraprocedurale, dar uneori i n celelalte sisteme n care n care nu exist dect dispoziii procedurale, fiind impus de Ministerul Public n toate procesele i n toate cazurile.99

Legea 682 din 2002 privind protecia martorilor, articolul 12, punctul 2, literele d-h i punctul 3, literele a-d. 99 Gheorghi Mateu - Protecia martorilor Utilizarea martorilor anonimi n faa organelor

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Infractorii deseori recurg la intimidri, ameninri sau violen asupra martorilor sau familiilor acestora pentru a-i mpiedica s depun mrturie. Msurile de protecie extraprocedurale care au ca scop protejarea securitii fizice sunt de importan deosebit, ele putnd fi puse n practic de unitile de poliie care instrumenteaz cauza pn la preluarea martorului de ctre Oficiul Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor. Msurile de protecie trebuie potrivite mprejurrilor individuale ale victimeimartor. Transpunerea acestor msuri trebuie s fie bazat pe o evaluare a riscurilor, care trebuie efectuat deja la o etap timpurie i revizuit pe tot parcursul procesului penal. Starea de pericol privind viaa, integritatea corporal sau libertatea martorului poate aprea de la nceputul desfurrii investigaiilor ntr-o cauz, pe parcursul anchetei penale, n faza de judecat i se poate extinde pe o perioad mai ntins sau mai scurt de timp dup terminarea procesului. Obligaia de protecie din partea organelor judiciare exist prin urmare, ncepnd cu momentul identificrii martorului i pn la perioada ulterioar procesului penal100. De asemenea, obligaia de protecie se poate extinde de la caz la caz i asupra membrilor de familie sau a unor persoane de care martorul este legat afectiv. n vreme ce se respect dreptul la aprare, msurile de protecie a martorilor, coprocesului penal, Editura Lumina Lex, Bucureti, 2003 pag 238. 100 Convenia Consiliului Europei privind lupta mpotriva traficului cu fiine umane, Varovia, 16 mai 2005, n ART.28- Protecia victimelor, martorilor i persoanelor care colaboreaz cu autoritile judiciareprevede c: Fiecare parte va adopta msurile legislative i alte msuri necesare pentru asigurarea unei protecii efective i adecvate fa de posibilele represalii sau intimidri, mai ales pe durata investigaiilor i a urmririlor mpotriva autorilor i dup finalizarea acestora: a)pentru victime; b)atunci cnd este necesar, pentru persoanele care furnizeaz informaii privind infraciunile stabilite n baza art 18 di Convenie sau care colaboreaz ntr-un alt mod cu autoritile nsrcinate cu investigarea i urmrirea; c)pentru martorii care depun mrturie privind infraciunile stabilite n baza art.18 din Convenie; d) i dac este necesar pentru membrii familiei persoanelor vizate la alineatele (a) i (c).

laboratorilor justiiei i apropiailor acestora trebuie organizate, cnd este necesar, nainte, n timpul i dup proces.101 Msurile de protecie procedurale pot fi luate de procuror n faza urmririi penale sau de judector n faza de judecat (darea declaraiilor sub alt identitate sau prin modaliti speciale de distorsionare a vocii si imaginii, protecia datelor de identitate sau a declaraiei), iar o parte din cele neprocedurale pot fi luate de poliie (Oficiul Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor sau alte uniti de poliie - exemplu: msuri sporite de siguran la domiciliu, protejarea deplasrii la i de la organele judiciare). Msurile de protecie extrajudiciare pot fi aplicate de la o etap timpurie, cnd cazul nu a fost adus n instan, dar i pe durata procesului i dup terminarea lui. Ele pot completa, ns nu pot ine locul msurilor de protecie judiciar care sunt de baz n asigurarea unei protecii de lung durat i care presupun un alt gen de complexitate i eficien. Msurile de protecie extraprocedurale sunt msuri clasice de protecie, specifice activitii poliienesi. Din acest considerent majoritatea unitilor de protecie a martorilor din Europa i desfoar activitatea n cadrul ministerului de interne. Un aspect important l reprezint evaluarea riscului pentru determinarea msurilor de protecie extrajudiciare, att n ceea ce privete demararea, ct i n privia ncetrii aplicrii lor i la selectarea msurilor de protecie corespunztoare i individual determinate. Evaluarea eficient a riscurilor n cadrul programelor de protecie a martorilor trebuie efectuat de la bun nceput, cnd este naintat solicitarea de aplicare a msurilor de protecie a martorului i ulterior repetat n mod regulat. Pentru a asigura alegerea msurilor adecvate de protecie i aplicarea
Consiliul Europei Recomandarea Rec ( 2005)9 a Comitetului de Minitrii din Statele Membre privind protecia martorilor i a colaboratorilor justiiei, adoptat de Comitetul de Minitrii n 20.aprilie.2005, cu prilejul celei de a 924-a ntruniri a reprezentanilor minitrilor.
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lor martorilor, evaluarea trebuie s ia n considerare natura i gravitatea pericolului, precum i situaia individual a martorului. De asemenea, trebuie stabilit clar cine este responsabil de efectuarea evalurii riscului. Din practica european se desprinde concluzia utilitii sistemului n care o alt unitate de poliie, diferit de unitatea care efectueaz investigaia cazului, este desemnat s execute aceast evaluare a riscurilor. Aceast experien european a fost mbriat si de sistemul romnesc de protecie a martorilor, evaluarea strii de pericol i msurile ce se impun funcie de aceast evaluare se face de ctre Oficiul Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor, msurile de protecie extraprocedurale stabilite fiind aplicate n practic de ctre Oficiu mpreun cu alte uniti ale Ministerului Internelor i Reformei Administrative, dar n mod deosebit cu unitatea de poliie implicat n soluionarea cauzei. Consiliul Europei recomand statelor membre s aplice msuri de protecie extraprocedurale asigurate de poliie, inclusiv schimbarea identitii, a locului de domiciliu, asisten i gsirea unui loc de munc i protecie fizic. 102 Nu mai puin important este eficiena msurilor de protecie a martorilor, care depind de resursele i capacitile celor responsabili de acordarea proteciei. Aici se nscriu msurile extraprocedurale de asigurare a unui venit pn la gsirea unui loc de munc, recalificarea profesional, schimbarea domiciliului sau a identitii, montarea unui sistem de alarm sau G.P.S., relocarea temporar sau relocarea internaional103. Acest gen de

Recomandarea Consiliului Europei. R(97)13, art.14 i art.15. Convenia Consiliului Europei privind lupta mpotriva traficului cu fiine umane, Varovia, 16 mai 2005, n ART.28- Protecia victimelor, martorilor i persoanelor care colaboreaz cu autoritile judiciareparagraful 4,se arat c: Fiecare Parte va adopta msurile legislative i alte msuri necesare pentru a asigura i oferi diverse tipuri de protecie ( victimelor, martorilor, colaboratorilor i membrilor de familie). Asemenea msuri pot include protecia fizic,
103

102

msuri de protecie extrajudiciare presupun anumite costuri destul de ridicate i personal specializat care ar fi destul de greu de aplicat n afara structurii specializate n protecia martorilor, respectiv Oficiul Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor. Oficiul dispune n primul rnd de fonduri financiare, alocate de la bugetul de stat, special pentru protecia martorilor i de personal specializat n implementarea acestor msuri de asisten realiznd n acelai timp i msuri de conspirativitate deosebite, absolut necesare unei protecii eficiente. Unele msuri de protecie extraprocedurale necesit o justificare special, pentru c sunt foarte costisitoare i pot avea un impact puternic asupra vieii cotidiene a martorului sau familiei acestuia (schimbarea domiciliului, a identitii, sau schimbarea nfirii). Pentru justificarea unor asemenea msuri de protecie i pentru ca un martor s fie eligibil vis-a-vis de aplicarea acestor msuri, trebuie ca viaa sau securitatea fizic a acestuia s fie grav ameninat. Protecia martorului aflat n stare de reinere, arestare preventiv sau executarea unei pedepse privative de libertate, n colaborare cu organele care administreaz locul de deinere. Aceast msur de protecie extraprocedural, nu trebuie confundat cu protecia martorului realizat prin msuri procesuale: reinerea, obligarea de a nu prsi localitatea sau arestarea preventiv. Aceste msuri au caracter de constrngere, prin care nvinuitul sau inculpatul este mpiedicat s ntreprind anumite activiti mpotriva martorului. Consiliul Europei recomand fa de aceast categorie de persoane ca: ,,dat fiind rolul esenial al colaboratorilor justiiei mpotriva infraciunilor grave, o atenie deosebit trebuie acordat acestui aspect. Cnd este necesar, programele de protecie aplicate colaboratorilor justiiei ce execut o sentin pot include de asemenea aranjamente specifice regimului penitenciar.104
atribuirea unui loc de reedin, schimbarea identitii i sprijinul pentru obinerea unui loc de munc. 104 Consiliul Europei Recomandarea Rec ( 2005)9 a Comitetului de Minitrii din Statele Membre privind

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Protecia martorului aflat n stare de reinere, arestare preventiv sau executarea unei pedepse privative de libertate, n colaborare cu organele care administreaz locul de deinere, ca msur extraprocedural vizeaz acea categorie de martori care se ncadreaz n prevederile articolului 2, litera a, punctul 3, din Legea privind protecia martorilor, i anume: ,,se afl n cursul executrii unei pedepse privative de libertate i prin informaiile i datele cu caracter determinant pe care le furnizeaz, contribuie la aflarea adevrului n cauze privind infraciuni grave sau la prevenirea producerii ori la recuperarea unor prejudicii deosebite ce ar putea fi cauzate prin svrirea unor astfel de infraciuni. De asemenea, aceast msur de protecie se refer i la persoana care are calitate de inculpat ntr-o alt cauz i se afl n arest preventiv ca urmare a msurii reinerii sau a msurii arestrii preventive. Msurile de protecie fa de aceast categorie de persoane presupun o bun colaborare ntre Oficiul Naional pentru Protecia Martorilor, administratorul locului de deinere i, dup caz, procuror sau judector. Dac n trecutul nu foarte ndeprtat, discuiile despre anumite modaliti de protecie a martorilor, cum ar fi schimbarea identitii, relocarea la o alt locuin, schimbarea fizionomiei reprezenta apanajul unei strategii greu de imaginat, iat c astzi acestea sunt aplicabile martorilor, pentru a-i proteja de agresiuni sau intimidri.105 Aceste schimbri de strategie n politicile penale, vis-a-vis de instituia martorilor, au fost determinate de expansiunea fenomenului de crim organizat, de dezvoltarea rapid a marii criminaliti i de necesitatea statelor de a reaciona la provocrile generate de infracionalitate.
protecia martorilor i a colaboratorilor justiiei, adoptat de Comitetul de Minitrii n 20.aprilie.2005, cu prilejul celei de a 924-a ntruniri a reprezentanilor minitrilor. 105 Adrian-Augustin Brscu, Tez de doctorat Legea privind protecia martorilor necesitate n combaterea marii criminaliti, pag.223.

Protecia acestora s-a impus totui destul de trziu, abia atunci cnd statele moderne au contientizat c fr aportul necondiionat al martorilor i colaboratorilor justiiei nu pot fi adui n faa justiiei i trai la rspundere autorii unor infraciuni grave care ameninau valorile de baz ale democraiei, drepturile fundamentale ale omului, stabilitatea economic i chiar politic a statului de drept. Martorii, ca exponeni eseniali n probaiunea judiciar, au fost i rmn piese de greutate n cadrul procesului penal pentru aflarea adevrului, n probarea unor infraciuni i nu n ultimul rnd pentru tragerea la rspundere a celor care svresc infraciuni. Pentru a armoniza cele dou interese, i anume cel al aflrii adevrului, descoperirii autorilor de infraciuni sau a infraciunilor grave i reprimrii lor i cel al eliminrii sau limitrii riscurilor la care se supun martorii sau cei implicai s-a creat instituia juridic a proteciei i asistenei martorilor. Romnia deine n prezent legislaia n domeniul proteciei martorilor i a persoanelor care coopereaz cu organele judiciare, are dezvoltat capacitatea instituional necesar punerii n aplicare a prevederilor legale pentru protejarea martorilor. Avantajul c de protecia martorului se ocup o instituie specializat n acest domeniu, ofer celor implicai n activitatea de cercetare sau urmrire penal posibilitatea de a se concentra pe prioritile activitilor ce decurg din cauzele n lucru, fiind degrevai de o sarcin important i anume protecia persoanei dispuse s colaboreze. La aceasta se adaug faptul c nu s-ar putea asigura o protecie real i calificat, pliat pe necesitile martorului dect printr-un program de protecie. Programul de protecie a martorilor trebuie s se impun n activitatea curent a celor implicai n combaterea marii criminaliti ca un instrument facil de rezolvare a unor cauze complexe i cu un grad ridicat de gravitate, care nu se pot rezolva fr utilizarea unor declaraii sau informaii provenind de la persoane care refuz colaborarea judiciar datorit ameninrilor sau intimi72

drilor la care sunt supui ei, sau alte persoane apropiate, din partea unor persoane interesate n blocarea nfptuirii justiiei. Protecia colaboratorilor justiiei i apropiailor acestora trebuie organizate, cnd este necesar, nainte, n timpul i dup proces.* Acest aspect distinge importana msurilor prevzute ntr-un Program de protecie fa de genurile msurilor prevzute n Codul de procedur penal. Msurile de protecie extrajudiciare pot fi aplicate de la o etap timpurie, cnd cazul nu a fost adus n instan, dar i pe durata procesului i dup terminarea lui. Ele pot completa, ns nu pot ine locul msurilor de protecie judiciare care sunt de baz n asigurarea unei protecii de lung durat i care presupun un alt gen de complexitate i eficien. Unele msuri de protecie extraprocedurale necesit o justificare special, pentru c sunt foarte costisitoare i pot avea un impact puternic asupra vieii cotidiene ale martorului sau familiei acestuia (schimbarea domiciliului, a identitii, sau schimbarea nfirii). Pentru justificarea unor asemenea msuri de protecie i pentru ca un martor s fie eligibil vis-a-vis de aplicarea acestor

msuri, trebuie ca viaa sau securitatea fizic a acestuia s fie grav ameninat. Scopul principal pentru care o persoan este prelut ntr-un Program de protecie a martorilor este acela c viaa, integritatea personal a sa sau a unor persoane apropiate afectiv acesteia, sunt puse n pericol ca urmare a hotrrii de a colabora cu organele judiciare. Prin coresponden, dac martorul se expune unor pericole datorit implicrii sale n actul de nfptuire a justiiei, statului i revine obligaia de a asigura o stare de securitate sporit pentru martor. Obligaia persoanelor de a da declaraii n faa organelor judiciare abilitate, iar n cazul unui refuz acestea fiind supuse unor sanciuni, incumb obligaia statelor de a acorda protecie martorilor, dnd natere la ceea ce se numete n literatura de specialitate dreptul la protecie din partea statelor fa de persoanele dispuse s participe prin mrturiile depuse la nfptuirea justiiei, punndu-i n pericol viaa sa sau a celor apropiai.
* Consiliul Europei Recomandarea Rec ( 2005)9 a Comitetului de Minitrii din Statele Membre privind protecia martorilor i a colaboratorilor justiiei, adoptat de Comitetul de Minitrii n 20.aprilie.2005, cu prilejul celei de a 924-a ntruniri a reprezentanilor minitrilor.

Bibliografie: A. Mihalcea, D. Bratu, Evaluarea psihologic, cerin necesar n procesul de acordare a calittii de martor protejat, Buletinul de Informare si Documentare al M.A.I. nr. 6 (71) 2005. Adrian-Augustin Brascu, Cooperarea internaional n realizarea proteciei martorilor, curs universitar, Editura Etna, 2008 Adrian-Augustin Brascu, George ical, Managementul proteciei martorilor, curs universitar, Editura Etna, 2007. Adrian-Augustin Brscu, Tez de doctorat - Legea privind protecia martorilor necesitate n combaterea marii criminaliti. Codul de procedur penal al Romniei Decizia cadru a Consiliului Europei cu privire la protecia martorilor n cadrul combaterii criminalitii internaionale din 23.11.2005 Gheorghi Mateu - Protecia martorilor - Utilizarea martorilor anonimi n faa organelor procesului penal, Ed. Lumina Lex, Bucureti, 2003 H.G. 760 din 2004, pentru aprobarea Regulamentului de aplicare a Legii 682 din 2002 privind protecia martorilor Legea 682 din 2002, privind protecia martorilor Recomandarea Consiliul. Europei. R(97)13, privind protecia martorilor i colaboratorilor justiiei
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AVEM CRIMINALITATEA PE CARE NU DORIM S O PREVENIM


Comisar ef de poliie dr. EUGEN NEA Adjunctul efului Inspectoratului de Poliie Judeean Vlcea Crime in recent years is affecting social life at global, national and local level and citizens' sense of security is important for confidence in the criminal justice system. Therefore the main state institutions should pay high attention to preventive work so that persons and their property protection should be ensured by preventive measures, repression being the last resort for combating crime. Cuvinte cheie: criminalitate, prevenire, securitatea comunitii, infraciune Lumea nu va fi distrus de cei care fac ru, ci de aceia care i privesc i refuz s intervin. Albert Einstein Fenomenul infracional din ultimii ani influeneaz viaa social la nivel global, naional i local, sentimentul de securitate al cetenilor fiind important pentru ncrederea n sistemul de justiie penal. Ultimii ani au amplificat cererea de securitate la nivelul tuturor comunitilor umane, fapt cauzat de o criminalitate din ce n ce mai diversificat i de incapacitatea instituiilor specializate ale statului de a asigura protecia tuturor persoanelor i a bunurilor acestora. Mai adugm interesul acordat de mass-media crimelor grave, corupiei i abuzurilor de tot felul n faa crora par s nu existe soluii imediate. Cnd peste acestea se suprapune ineficiena instituiilor statului i criza economic, un sentiment de prsire cuprinde oamenii de toate categoriile. In acest context, cei mai muli se deschid spre cooperare, ascult experii n domeniu i fac cheltuieli pentru echipamente de protecie, urmeaz cursuri i angajeaz specialiti n domeniul pazei i proteciei sau ncearc s-i fac dreptate singuri, tot mai adesea recurgnd la acte de violen. Deseori, securitatea cetenilor obinuii pare o preocupare conjunctural a guvernanilor sau a aleilor locali, mai ales n preajma alegerilor sau pentru a evita o eli74

berare din funcie dup o crim sau un accident de circulaie cu urmri mai deosebite. Atunci se vorbete de dreptul fundamental al oamenilor de a tri ntr-un mediu linitit i curat, de importana crerii locurilor de munc pentru a-i integra pe cei marginalizai sau fr domiciliu stabil. Romnia pare s fi pierdut pasul cu celelalte ri ale Uniunii Europene care, mpotriva criminalitii duc o lupt prin msuri concertate deopotriv de prevenire i de combatere prin constrngerea cu aplicarea de sanciuni penale. Statele europene, cu muli ani n urm, au trecut la strategii de prevenire a criminalitii, elabornd programe temeinic fundamentate. structuri Totodat, au nfiinat organizaionale menite s asigure prevenirea mai eficient a criminalitii. Dinamica fenomenului infracional din ultimii ani i eforturile instituiilor mondiale, europene i naionale de a-i face fa ntr-o manier coerent i eficace arat c, din punct de vedere juridic, este posibil, existnd o baz teoretic bogat, consacrat acestui domeniu. Amintim aici unele dintre actele normative, programele i recomandrile Consiliului Europei i ale Organizaiei Naiunilor Unite, ce reglementeaz aceast activitate:

1. Tratatul privind Uniunea European, Titlul I, Dispoziii comune, art. 2, alin. (4), care prevede Uniunea ii propune ca obiectiv:106 s menin i s dezvolte Uniunea ca spaiu de libertate, securitate i justiie, n interiorul creia este asigurat libera circulaie a persoanelor, n corelare cu msuri adecvate privind controlul frontierelor externe, dreptul de azil, imigrarea, precum i prevenirea criminalitii i combaterea acestui fenomen. Acelai tratat a consacrat un ntreg Titlu (Titlul VI) unor dispoziii privind cooperarea poliieneasc i juridic n materia penal.107 Astfel, acesta fixeaz obiectivul Uniunii ca fiind acela de a oferi cetenilor un nivel ridicat de protecie, ntrun spaiu de libertate, securitate i justiie, prin elaborarea unor aciuni comune a statelor membre, n domeniul cooperrii poliieneti i judiciare n materie penal, prin prevenirea rasismului i xenofobiei i prin combaterea acestor fenomene. Acest obiectiv se realizeaz prin prevenirea criminalitii organizate sau de alt tip i prin combaterea acestui fenomen, n special a terorismului, a traficului de fiine umane i a infraciunilor mpotriva copiilor, a traficului de droguri, de arme, a corupiei i fraudei.108 2. Tratatul de instituire a Comunitii Europene, partea a treia, Politicile comunitii, Titlul VI, Norme comune privind concurena, Capitolul 3, Apropierea legislaiilor109 i Titlul X, Cooperarea vamal.110 3. Tratatul privind aderarea Republicii Bulgaria i a Romniei la Uniunea European, care prevede c dispoziiile privind drepturile i obligaiile statelor membre precum i atribuiile i competena instituiilor Uniunii, astfel cum sunt stabilite n
106 107

A se vedea Tratatul privind Uniunea European, art. 2 Tratatul privind Uniunea European, Titlul VI, art. 29-42 108 Tratatul privind Uniunea European, Titlul VI, art. 29, alin. (1) si (2) 109 Tratatul de instituire a Comunitii Europene, partea a treia, Politicile Comunitii, Titlul VI, Capitolul 3, art. 94-97 110 Tratatul de instituire a Comunitii Europene, partea a treia, Politicile Comunitii, Titlul X, art. 135

tratatele la care Republica Bulagria i Romnia devin pri, se aplic cu privire la prezentul tratat.111 4. Actul privind condiiile de aderare a Republicii Bulgaria i a Romniei i adaptrile tratatelor pe care se ntemeiaz Uniunea European. Un alt instrument internaional care se refer la activitatea de prevenire a criminalitii este Recomandarea R 19/1987 a Comitetului Minitrilor Statelor Membre ale Consiliului Europei112, care lund n considerare preocuparea crescnd a publicului fa de creterea numrului infraciunilor, efectul limitat al msurilor represive penale i ncrctura deosebit care rezult din acestea pentru sistemele de justiie penal, recomand statelor membre s includ prevenirea ca misiune permanent n programele guvernamentale de lupt mpotriva criminalitii, s ncurajeze i s susin pe plan naional, regional i local organismele de prevenire a criminalitii. Acest document recomand guvernelor statelor membre s ia msuri pentru obinerea sprijinului organismelor interesate n activitile de prevenire i asigurarea colaborrii strnse a acestor organisme, ncurajnd relaiile pozitive ntre poliie i societile de supraveghere i securitate, astfel nct, n limitele competenelor lor, acestea din urm s ajute poliia n prevenirea criminalitii. Toate aceste tratate au fost ratificate de Romnia, n conformitate cu normele constituionale, devenind astfel, obligatorii. Integrarea Romniei n Uniunea European a impus adoptarea unor msuri care s permit armonizarea regimului de control la frontiere i a msurilor complementare pentru asigurarea securitii i mpiedicarea migraiei ilegale a cetenilor statelor ce nu sunt membre ale Uniunii Europene, reglementate de Acordul de la Schengen i Convenia de aplicare a acestuia. Prin Conven111 Tratatul privind aderarea Republicii Bulgaria i a Romniei la Uniunea European, art. 3 112 Recomandarea R 19/1987 a Comitetului Minitrilor Statelor Membre ale Consiliului Europei

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ia de aplicare a Acordului de la Schengen113 se pun noi baze ale cooperrii n vederea prevenirii i combaterii criminalitii n rile semnatare, n scopul crerii unui climat de ordine public i securitate naional. Pentru cetenii Uniunii Europene i ai altor state, rezideni n Uniunea European, acordul de la Schengen a reprezentat o substanial cretere a liberei circulaie i o sporire a siguranei n statele Schengen i la frontierele externe. n Romnia a fost aprobat, prin H.G. nr. 2356 din 21 decembrie 2004, Planul de aciune Schengen revizuit n 2004114, care a prevzut sarcini i termene pentru transpunere n totalitate a legislaiei Schengen n dreptul intern, stabilind obligaii n activitatea de prevenire i asigurare a colaborrii strnse cu statele membre pentru realizarea securitii comune a statelor membre ale Uniunii Europene n acest domeniu. Necesitatea elaborrii unor strategii i crerii unor organisme specializate pe prevenirea criminalitii a fcut ca i Romnia s opteze pentru iniierea unor astfel de activiti ce pot opri evoluia fenomenului infracional, recunoscnd prevenirea ca pe o activitate nsemnat, dar din pcate, acestei activiti i se acord valoarea real doar n prevederile legale. Practica dovedete c strategia naional este axat pe msuri reactive, prevenirea fiind o prioritate doar la modul declarativ. Lipsa unei strategii axate pe prevenire, cu obiective, aciuni i evaluri ce iau n calcul aspectul preventiv, precum i legislaia stufoas i neclar pe linia ordinii i siguranei publice, dar i lipsa resurselor, face ca la nivel naional, prevenia s fie o activitate efectuat doar declarativ de cei cu responsabiliti n domeniu, atunci cnd vor s-i ascund nereuitele profesionale. Astfel, prevenirea criminalitii, pentru structurile operative, nu poate constitui un atribut esenial, aa cum Legea nr. 218
Convenia din 19 iunie 1990 de aplicare a acordului Schengen din 14 iunie 1985 privind eliminarea gradual a controalelor la frontierele comune Schengen 114 Monitorul Oficial al Romniei, partea I, nr. 129 si 129 bis, din 10 februarie 2005
113

din 23 aprilie 2002 privind organizarea i funcionarea Poliiei Romne o cere. Chiar cei ce conduc i elaboreaz strategia de prevenire a criminalitii la nivel naional fac ca aceast atribuie s nu fie realizat ntr-o manier coerent i eficace. Tocmai pentru a complica i mai mult aceast activitate, peste 60 de acte normative, strategii, proiecte i protocoale reglementeaz activitatea n domeniul ordinii i siguranei publice, la nivel naional. n ce privete Poliia Romn, Prevenirea criminalitii constituie pentru structurile operative un atribut esenial, conform Legii nr. 218/2002 privind organizarea i funcionarea Poliiei Romne115. Aceasta prevede c: ART. 1 Poliia Romn face parte din Ministerul de Interne i este instituia specializat a statului, care exercit atribuii privind aprarea drepturilor i libertilor fundamentale ale persoanei, a proprietii private i publice, prevenirea i descoperirea infraciunilor, respectarea ordinii i linitii publice, n condiiile legii. ART. 26 (1) Poliia Romn are urmtoarele atribuii principale: 2. aplic msuri de meninere a ordinii i linitii publice, a siguranei ceteanului, de prevenire i combatere a fenomenului infracional i de identificare i contracarare a aciunilor elementelor care atenteaz la viaa, libertatea, sntatea i integritatea persoanelor, a proprietii private, publice i a altor interese legitime ale comunitii; 6. culege informaii n vederea cunoaterii, prevenirii i combaterii infraciunilor, precum i a altor fapte ilicite; 7. realizeaz activiti de prevenire i combatere a corupiei, a criminalitii economico-financiare, a celei transfrontaliere, a infraciunii n domeniul informaticii i a crimei organizate; 14. desfoar activiti de prevenire i combatere a migraiei ilegale;

115

Legea nr. 218 din 23 aprilie 2002 privind organizarea i funcionarea Poliiei Romne

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26. colaboreaz cu instituiile de nvmnt i cu organizaiile neguvernamentale pentru pregtirea antiinfracional a populaiei; 27. conlucreaz cu structuri de profil din alte state i de la nivelul unor instituii internaionale pentru prevenirea i combaterea criminalitii transfrontaliere. Este suficient ns existena unei stufoase baze legale de aciune i prevenire a criminalitii pentru a fi eficient o prevenire real a infracionalitii ? Un rol important n activitatea de prevenire a criminalitii l poate avea i mass-media. In relaia poliie-comunitate, media reprezint o important surs de informaii pentru ceteni n ce privete att pregtirea antiinfracional a populaiei, ct i popularizarea unor rezultate importante realizate de poliie ori alte organe cu atribuii n prevenirea i combaterea criminalitii. Se pune ns ntrebarea: mass-media previne sau produce criminalitatea ? Rspunsul este dat de modul prezentrii informaiilor i modul de expunere a funciilor mass-media. Funciile mass-media sunt: 1. Funcia de informare cea mai important funcie. Mass-media vehiculeaz informaii care pot fi structurate divers, n funcie de utilitatea imediat, de gradul de rspndire sau chiar de semnificaiile ce le pot avea n societatea contemporan. Toate aceste informaii, ntr-o economie de pia fiind practic o marf, sunt prezentate n funcie de cerere. Din pcate, cererea consumatorului de pres, dar i oferta vnztorului este tot mai mult nclinat spre violen, scandal, ireconciliere. Alturi de informaiile cu utilitate imediat, funcia de informare mai cuprinde: - informaii generale, ele sunt generate n funcie de dorina emitentului, de interesul acestuia. Adesea, emitentul (mass-media) utilizeaz funcia de informare n mod distorsionat, consumatorul prelund informaia fr a reflecta asupra ei, fr a face o analiz critic ori o verificare a acesteia. - informaii de prevenire, ele pot fi date cu privire la starea vremii, prognoze eco77

nomico-financiare, informaii viznd prevenirea unor accidente, boli sau victimizarea unor persoane. n realitate, numai un segment extrem de redus de informaii de acest tip sunt furnizate. 2. Funcia de interpretare rezid din necesitatea de a prezenta realitile nconjurtoare ntr-un anumit gen publicistic (editorialul, comentariul, pamfletul), iar n media electronic (documentare i dezbateri de idei). 3. Funcia de legtur aceasta se refer la oportunitatea creat prin intermediul canalelor media, ca mulimi de oameni s fie conectate n acelai timp la un eveniment, facnd un dialog posibil. Rolul, preventiv sau nu, al acestei funcii este dat adesea de interesul emitorului. 4. Funcia de culturalizare este privit cu mult reinere. Cnd se vorbete de culturalizare, este evident c un segment relativ restrns de populaie este consumatorul acestei funcii. Altfel spus, cu toate c televiziunea, radioul, presa sunt posibile instrumente de cultur pentru o ampl categorie uman, informaia cultural, fiind o marf mai puin vndut astzi, particip prea puin la cultivarea populaiei. Funciile educative existente n mass-media, sunt lipsite cel mai adesea de suportul pedagogic, transformndu-se astfel ntr-un teren de disput. n ultima vreme, mass-media tinde a se plia pe inducerea unor fenomene negative, agresive. 5. Funcia de divertisment tinde a ocupa prim-planul multora dintre ofertele mass-media. Din pcate i aceasta este adesea contaminat cu elemente negative. Toate aceste funcii, cu o implicare mai activ a instituiilor cu atribuii pe linia prevenirii criminalitii i printr-o mai atent furnizare a informaiei de ctre emitor, pot avea un caracter educativ important n prevenirea criminalitii. Totui, mass-media are i multiple implicaii negative. Unul dintre riscurile consumatorului de informaii este manipularea exercitat de mijloacele de informare n mas, ajungnd n final s se comporte aa cum i

este indus. nc din Grecia Antic, oratoria era o art, cunoscndu-se c felul cum prezini un anumit lucru schimb efectul recepionrii acestuia. n epoca modern, mijloacele de comunicare n mas sunt adesea un mijloc de influenare a opiniei publice, din pcate mai mult n sensul ru. Uneori se ajunge la exagerarea unor evenimente minore, n detrimentul celor de interes, crendu-se o fals scar a valorilor, o fals imagine a realitii (vezi precizrile privind activitatea preventiv declarativ). Aadar, avem dreptul la informare, la informarea servit de furnizorul de informaii, creia adesea ceteanul i devine victim. Un al factor de risc pentru consumatorul de media este violena promovat de mijloacele de comunicare n mas. Influena modelelor vizuale este recunoscut de toat lumea. In Romnia, capacul cutiei Pandorei este din sticl ! Nenorocirile, abuzurile, agresivitatea, violena sunt promovate mult prea des, parc cu scopul de a ne adapta cu toii la o asemenea societate. Faptele bune sunt prezentate rarisim. Violena este generatoare a deviaiilor comportamentale, comportamentele modificndu-se sub influena modelelor vizuale sugerate. Repetarea unor imagini ocante, reprezentnd acte de violen, infraciuni i infractori, pot avea consecine dintre cele mai grave. i cnd ne gndim c fiecare dintre noi (tnr, btrn, brbat, femeie, copil) avem o cutie a Pandorei individual ! Funciile de informare transform presa ntr-un veritabil instrument de control al realitii. Acesta este motivul pentru care mass-media poate avea un rol important n prevenirea criminalitii, n crearea unei societi cu mai puin criminalitate. Din pcate, prezentarea cu preponderen a unor tiri ocante, promovarea anormalitii, a degenerrii morale i sociale, a violenei i crimei nu ne ajut prea mult, dimpotriv, creaz imaginea unei Romnii unde violena, prostituia, ceretoria i neltoria sunt ca la ele acas. O analiz efectuat n anul 2009 de principalele institute de sondaj din Romnia (IMAS, INSOMAR, MMT),
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la cererea Ageniei pentru Strategii Guvernamentale, a relevat faptul c la creterea sentimentului de team, contribuie i mediatizarea pe care mass-media o face fenomenului infracional. Astfel, n opinia majoritii cetenilor, mass-media induce un sentiment de nesiguran n rndul populaiei i exagereaz gravitatea n mod nejustificat. Credem c instituiile cu atribuii pe linia prevenirii criminalitii trebuie s-i ndrepte eforturile spre o mai bun cooperare cu mass-media, n vederea unei mediatizri axate pe pregtirea cetenilor pentru a nu deveni victime ale infraciunilor, adresnd periodic recomandri, cu scopul de a diminua riscurile de victimizare. Dup aceast succint analiz, rmne tot mai actual ntrebarea: cnd mass-media promoveaz informaii care prind la un public numeros, previne sau produce criminalitate? Din pcate, pentru realizarea unei preveniri reale i eficiente a criminalitii nu ne ajut prea mult nici sectorul politic. i n acest sector abund indivizi care ocolesc adevrul, dispreuiesc legile, pierzndu-i total credibilitatea n faa celor muli, care au nevoie tot mai acut de idoli! Mai grav este c i cei ndrituii prin lege i funcie s coordoneze ntreaga activitate pe linie de siguran public la nivel naional, adesea sunt oameni nepregtii, inadaptai pentru a realiza activitile ce le revin potrivit fiei postului i ocup acele funcii motivai de cu totul alte aspiraii dect cele legate de profesionalism (dorina de putere, vanitate, orgolii, interese oculte). Pe fondul lipsei pariale sau totale a cunotinelor manageriale i de specialitate, iubind lucrul dup ureche, se nconjoar de specialiti din aceeai categorie. Instituiile cu atribuii privind prevenirea i combaterea criminalitii, conduse de asemenea specialiti, atente s previn i s combat criminalitatea, urmeaz, n cel mai bun caz, agenda subire ori dezastruoas lansat de manager! Manager ales de acei politicieni care sunt tot mai des implicai n activitatea instituiei Poliia Romn!

Uneori, se elaboreaz diagnoze greite, se formuleaz explicaii simpliste ale unor pseudoexperi n problemele criminalitii, risipind astfel, fr rost, puinele resurse financiare i materiale avute la dispoziie, cauznd astfel mai mult ru. Cu privire la astfel de pseudoexperi, Cesare Beccaria spunea: Dac ignorana oarb este mai puin fatal dect o cunoatere mediocr i confuz (cci aceasta din urm adaug la relele ignoranei, relele greeli inevitabile ale cuiva ce are o vedere limitat, fr a atinge grania adevrului), omul luminat este darul cel mai de pre pe care l poate face un suveran naiunii i siei, transformndu-l n depozitar i custode al sfintelor legi.116 Alteori, se ncearc depolitizarea problematicii legate de siguran public, canaliznd atenia spre responsabilitatea individual n faa valului de infraciuni ori spre lipsa de cooperare a populaiei cu poliitii, stabilind vinovaii n sarcina altora, pentru salvarea adevrailor vinovai. Principalii vinovai, persoane cu funcii de decizie i comand pe linia ordinii i siguranei publice, nepregtite pentru atribuiile acordate i numite pe alte criterii dect cele legate de profesionalism, pentru a-i acoperi incompetena, caut vinovai n rndul unor funcionari mruni. Mai adaug la acestea, promisiunile entuziaste privind tratamentul rapid al cauzelor delicvenei prin mobilizri temporare de fore n zonele sensibile, doar n scopul de a creea o imagine pozitiv, fr a urmri obinerea de rezultate. Imaginea devine n fapt obiectivul structurilor cu atribuii n domeniu, n detrimentul unui real succes n prevenirea i combaterea criminalitii. Sunt ocolite sistematic adevratele soluii pe termen lung: reconstrucia urban, integrarea tinerilor n munc, un nvmnt de calitate, amenajri adecvate pentru timpul liber i sport, un transport n comun coerent, msuri de igien public eficace, solidarizarea oamenilor la progra116 Cesare Beccaria, Despre infraciuni i pedepse, cap. XLII Despre tiine

mele de prevenire a pericolelor de orice fel, dar i repartizarea resurselor (umane, materiale i financiare) n funcie de aceast prioritate european i naional prevenirea criminalitii. Ca urmare, prevenirea criminalitii devine un imperativ pentru Romnia. Astfel, obiectivele principale ar trebui s fie: axarea ntregii activiti a instituiilor cu atribuii n acest domeniu, pe prevenirea criminalitii i evaluarea lor n funcie de aceti indicatori; concentrarea efectivelor de ordine i siguran public din cadrul Ministerului Administraiei i Internelor (poliie, jandarmerie) n cadrul unei singure structuri (Inspectoratul General al Poliiei Romne) pentru eficientizarea activitilor preventive i de combatere a criminalitii; ordinea social; consolidarea mecanismelor de respectare i aplicare a legilor; formarea i solidarizarea publicului la aciunile preventive; supravegherea i evaluarea riscurilor n timp i spaiu; organizarea cooperrii ntre instituiile cu atribuii n acest domeniu; mbuntirea colaborrii cu societatea civil i organizaii non-guvernamentale ce desfoar activiti n domeniul siguranei publice. Alturi de aceste obiective principale, credem c este necesar a fi revizuite i modificate anumite acte normative prin care s fie mai bine conturat i evaluat oportunitatea cercetrii penale. Astfel, printr-o legislaie ce are n vedere oportunitatea efecturii unor acte de cercetare se va reui degrevarea organelor de siguran public, dar i a celor de cercetare, de acele cauze care nu sunt de natur s afecteze relaiile sociale ce fac obiect de ocrotire penal, dnd astfel prioritate n rezolvarea cu celeritate a acelor probleme, cauze care au ca efect nesigurana individual sau colectiv. Literatura consacrat acestui domeniu se gsete, din pcate, mai ales n strintate. La noi s-a studiat i s-a scris foarte puin, iar n practic a fost pus doar sporadic, fapt care ntreine ideea c represiunea e singura modalitate de a lupta contra criminalitii, c interveniile n for sunt suficiente pentru a menine ordinea social. Ignorana ce o
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acord instituiile statului activitii preventive este evident atunci cnd parcurgem materialele de evaluare. Unicul criteriu al evalurii muncii desfurate de structurile de ordine i siguran public este constatarea, deci activitatea reactiv. Abordrile retorice nu lipsesc ns din discursul unor nali funcionari ai poliiei, jandarmeriei sau ai administraiilor locale: totul se nruie cnd i ntrebi dac tiu ce este un program de prevenire, ce au fcut concret i, mai ales, cum au evaluat rezultatele. Sunt de-a dreptul ridicole explicaiile date i msurile luate. La acest management se alatur cu spor lipsa aproape total a resurselor materiale alocate acestui gen de activitate. Exist ns resurse suficiente pentru autoturisme Dacia Logan de 70.000 ! Iluzia c poate exista o societate fr criminalitate s-a risipit de mult. Noul model social trebuie s includ criminalitatea ca o constant, cu tot ce decurge de aici: personal specializat, penitenciare suficiente, un institut de criminologie, studii i cercetri, programe difereniate de prevenire, informarea i educarea publicului, fonduri pe msura eforturilor, o instituie calificat pentru prevenire, legislaie adecvat, instituii puternice, cooperare internaional. O ar fr un institut de criminologie117 e mai puin credibil i mult mai puin eficient atunci cnd se angajeaz s apere cetenii i bunurile lor, graniele i ordinea de drept, s menin un climat social linitit, s impun legea n situaii de o mare diversitate. i asta pentru c autoritile au nevoie s neleag mai nti fenomenele pentru a putea gestiona probleme att de complexe precum criminalitatea. Este necesar s cunoatem cauzele pentru a nelege i combate efectele. Astzi, pe cine mai intereseaz oare cauzele ? Traversm o perioad n care, la marile flageluri sociale cunoscute - corupia, srcia, omajul, drogurile, alcoolismul, se adaug terorismul, crima organizat, degradarea
117

Institutul de criminologie a fost desfiinat la propunerea ministrului Justiiei pe 31 ianuarie 2007.

mediului urban, precum i ali factori ca abuzurile, discriminrile, absena controlului, violena i promovarea ei prin mass-media. Grupurile care sufer cel mai mult din cauza criminalitii (grupurile de risc) rmn mereu aceleai: tinerii, vrstnicii, femeile, persoanele singure, cei care triesc n cartiere marginalizate. Dei riscurile imediate par urgente, ameliorrile de durat apar doar cnd sunt abordai factorii indirecti: incultura, srcia, lipsa perspectivei de via. Prevenirea criminalitii este o urgen a acestei perioade pentru Romnia, o adevrat problem de bun guvernare pentru a evita mersul spre o societate terorizat i care nu poate neglija obiective precum ordinea social, aplicarea corect a legilor, supravegherea i evaluarea activ a riscurilor de orice natur pe ntreg teritoriul rii. Pentru toate acestea este nevoie de o strategie de prevenire centrat pe dezvoltarea social, n care puterile publice s aib rolul principal n coordonarea programelor la nivel naional, judeean i local. Totodat, Ministerul Administraiei i Internelor (Poliia Romn, Jandarmeria i alte fore de ordine) trebuie s acioneze n sistem integrat i s utilizeze resursele canalizndu-le n principal spre activiti preventive. n prezent, resursele umane i materiale sunt canalizate spre activiti preventive doar la modul declarativ. n cadrul Poliiei Romne s-au creat mai multe formaiuni de birou, neoperative, ndreptate spre desfurarea unor activiti utile efului i nu respectnd criteriile date de necesitatea prevenirii i reducerii criminalitii. Numrul mare al structurilor centrale i neoperative nu face dect s ngreuneze i mai mult activitatea celor care desfoar activiti n sectorul operativ, prin multitudinea dispoziiilor, raportrilor solicitate i msurilor dispuse din birou, fr o cunoatere real a cauzelor mpotriva crora trebuie acionat i a situaiei operative din teritoriu. Strada rmne un loc interzis, un loc unde desfoar activiti preventive doar poliitii structurilor de ordine i siguran public i cele de poliie rutiera. Celelalte
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structuri ale poliiei dar i alte instituii cu atribuii pe linie de siguran public au fost transformate n contabilizatori ai activitii desfurate de acetia. Specialitii, profesionistii, instituiile depozitare de inteligen n domeniu (profesori din domeniul penal, siguran public, criminologie, sociologie, psihologie) sunt adesea, sau chiar totdeauna, marginalizai, uneori eliminai din sistem. Sunt un pericol, nu ?! Bineneles, nu pentru siguran public, dar sigur sunt un pericol pentru cei ce ocup vremelnic funcii de decizie n conducerea instituiilor cu atribuii de ordine i siguran public. n ultimii ani, dou modaliti de prevenire a delicvenei sunt cele mai utilizate n lume: - prima este prevenirea social, care apeleaz la educaie, iar prin intermediul instituiilor i specialitilor, mpiedic evoluia indivizilor spre inadaptare i antisocialitate. Prevenirea social dezvolt programe de ameliorare precoce a competenelor de via, ale minorilor, de eliminare a carenelor parentale, de creare a condiiilor pentru o bun evoluie intelectual i moral a familei, de mbogire a mediului educativ n care triesc copiii. A te purta civilizat, a respecta regulile, a-i controla agresivitatea, a-i impune s fii bun cu cei din jur, a fi cooperant, a-i preui pe cei apropiai nu sunt achiziii att de facile pe ct par la prima vedere. Cu ct vulnerabilitatea social a copiilor i prinilor este mai mare, cu att riscul apariiei i meninerii conduitelor antisociale este mai ampl. Cnd eti convins c nu ai valoare i nici viitor, conduita moral e considerat un lux inutil. Din pcate acest lux inutil este tot mai vizibil n prezent. - a doua este prevenirea situaional, care urmrete protejarea persoanelor i bunurilor cu ajutorul poliitilor, jandarmilor i experilor n domeniul siguranei publice, care stabilesc msuri eficiente n teren, instruiesc ceteni, instaleaz dispozitive adecvate, desfoara activiti preventive directe.
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Pe termen lung, aciunile preventive au o dubl orientare: pe de o parte, spre factori care anticipeaz o dezvoltare inadecvat a persoanei ori a familiei sale, pe de alt parte, spre comunitatea n care triesc acetia. O strategie ampl de prevenire trebuie s clarifice foarte repede o serie de probleme fundamentale: tendinele i cauzele criminalitii n ar i n lume, sursele vulnerabilitii sociale i individuale, izvoarele tradiionale ale ordinii sociale, modalitile crerii unei culturi adecvate ideii de prevenire, domeniile i principiile care fundamenteaz programele de prevenire, necesitatea aciunilor proactive, calitatea legislaiei actuale, limitele sistemului penitenciar, elaborarea reglementrilor naionale corespunztoare. Un pas important a fost fcut odat cu promulgarea noului Cod Penal118. Activitatea de prevenire desfurat de organele de poliie se realizeaz pe trei coordonate de aciune: reactiv (rspund la solicitrile cetenilor); proactiv (prin folosirea mijloacelor specifice); interactiv (consultarea comunitii i aciuni comune). Un rol pozitiv n prevenirea criminalitii l reprezint i noua concepie privind organizarea activitilor de meninere a ordinii i siguranei publice n sistem integrat. n doctrina de specialitate exist mai multe clasificri ale aciunilor preventive, mai des fiind ntlnite urmtoarele: prevenirea primar; prevenirea secundar; prevenirea teriar. 1. Prevenirea primar are ca principal scop mpiedicarea comiterii infraciunilor i const n reducerea premiselor care favorizeaz n mod direct i indirect criminalitatea. Aceasta face mai dificil i mai riscant svrirea de infraciuni i descurajeaz infractorii s comit fapte penale. Ea face parte din demersul general de reducere a incidenei criminalitii nainte de a avea loc. Prevenirea primar implic: msuri adecvate de scdere a numrului potenialelor victime i a oportunitilor de comitere a faptelor; prezena unor poliiti care s
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O.U.G. nr. 198 din 4 decembrie 2008

asigure o prevenire real i eficient a criminalitii. Modaliti de realizare: introducerea i promovarea unor cerine minime de securitate pentru sediile rezideniale i spaiile comerciale; repartizarea resurselor umane spre activitatea de prevenire, desfurat acolo unde este necesar n strad; mbuntirea sistemului de iluminare public; dispunerea poliitilor n sectorul de siguran public n funcie de situaia operativ; amplificarea activitilor de intervenie a organelor de ordine; utilizarea mijloacelor video de supraveghere n spaiile cu risc criminogen ridicat; supravegherea zonelor cu o not sporit a criminalitii; implicarea tuturor instituiilor cu atribuii n domeniul ordinii publice i desfurarea de activiti n sistem integrat. 2. Prevenirea secundar are ca scop acionarea cu prioritate asupra potenialilor infractori i a potenialelor victime, urmarindu-se schimbarea comportamentului social al persoanelor cu tendine deviante i protejarea persoanelor sau grupurilor de risc. Aceast form de prevenire este inclus n activitatea instituiilor cu atribuii pe prevenirea i combaterea criminalitii i are ca obiectiv identificarea persoanelor care se afl n situaii de risc sau a identificrii factorilor de risc n producerea criminalitii. Pentru obinerea de rezultate n ce privete acest gen de activitate este necesar a fi responsabilizate i Ministerul Educaiei, Cercetrii, Tineretului i Sportului, Ministerul Sntii, Ministerul Muncii, Familiei i Proteciei Sociale. Modaliti de realizare: derularea de programe de asisten pentru prini; derularea de programe de asisten a minorilor cu probleme; derularea de programe de asisten i supraveghere a minorilor cu prini plecai la munc n strintate; derularea de programe care s ncurajeze victimele repetate ale infraciunilor s-i consolideze msurile de protecie a vieii personale i proprietii; includerea n cadrul orelor de consiliere a elementelor de studiu necesare prevenirii criminalitii; suprave82

gherea i contientizarea asupra riscului la care se expun persoanele predispuse la comiterea de infraciuni; popularizarea legislaiei i mediatizarea unor cazuri; soluionarea cu celeritate a dosarelor n care sunt cercetate persoane ce au svrit infraciuni. 3. Prevenirea teriar are ca scop acionarea cu prioritate asupra persoanelor care au comis fapte penale, urmrindu-se descurajarea svririi de infraciuni n mod repetat. Aceasta form de prevenire vizeaz diminuarea condiiilor de producere a criminalitii, fiind ndreptat mai mult spre intervenie. Aceasta presupune responsabilizarea i a altor ministere (Ministerul Justiiei, Ministerul Muncii, Familiei i Proteciei Sociale, Ministerul Sntii). Modaliti de realizare: implementarea unor programe adecvate de reabilitare a persoanelor condamnate; derularea unor programe integrate de reinserie socio-economic a fotilor infractori; campanii de contientizare a cetenilor, menite s asigure reinseria social a condamnailor; derularea unor programe de educaie n mediul penitenciar. Un capitol aparte va fi consacrat instituiilor i organizaiilor implicate direct n prevenirea criminalitii: ministere, instituii publice, societi comerciale, organizaii non-guvernamentale, chiar i mass-media. Unele prioriti sunt vizibile de pe acum: un nou Cod Penal, o lege a prevenirii, sondaje de victimizare, cartografierea delicvenei, formarea specialitilor. Nu este suficient ns, s creezi i s efectuezi statistici i sondaje, este absolut necesar s foloseti aceti specialiti, s identifici i s aplici msuri performante (stabilite n urma unor analize aprofundate), s distribui i s foloseti resursele prioritar spre acest gen de activitate. Analizele trebuie s includ cheltuielile privind funcionarea poliiei, jandarmeriei, parchetelor, tribunalelor i penitenciarelor, valoarea ngrijirilor medicale i psihologice acordate victimelor, pierderile determinate de corupie, de furturile de bunuri aparinnd cetenilor sau firmelor, de fraudele economice i fiscale,

de fraudele vamale, de cheltuielile prilejuite de tulburrile ordinii publice, de pagubele generate de comerul clandestin i de profiturile din lumea interlop, de cheltuielile firmelor particulare i de stat pentru a se proteja. La acestea se mai adaug acele aspecte greu de cuantificat, dar generatoare de mari suferine: pierderile de viei omeneti, vieile distruse ale rudelor victimelor criminalitii, reaciile de rzbunare, nencrederea ce survine n relaiile sociale, frica permanent de o nou agresiune, schimbarea obiceiurilor oamenilor, determinate de teama de noi infraciuni, pierderile turistice i culturale, imaginea defavorabil a rii n ochii strinilor, dar i o imagine proast a romnilor n general. Costurile criminalitii sunt enorme n orice ar i nelegerea structurii acestora va impune o dat n plus urgena gsirii unor masuri eficace de prevenire i control a acesteia. n descrierea care urmeaz m voi sprijini pe o lucrare clasic n domeniu, cea a lui Ph. Robert i T. Godefroy n 1978.119 n general, evaluarea costurilor criminalitii implic att de multe elemente, nct o estimare precis este aproape imposibil. Astfel, un prim element al acesteia l constituie costurile angajate de stat pentru funcionarea instituiilor direct implicate n represiunea criminalitii: poliia, jandarmeria, parchetele, tribunalele, penitenciarele. n al doilea rnd figureaz cheltuielile determinate de instituiile implicate permanent n prevenirea criminalitii poliia comunitar, protecia victimelor, protecia martorilor, probaiunea, centrele de asisten a copiilor n dificultate, anumite structuri specializate din poliie i jandarmerie. La toate acestea se adaug asigurarea securitii n cele mai diferite situaii: firmele pentru paz i transportul valorilor, serviciile de paz din marile magazine, asigurrile contra furturilor de automobile,
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Philippe Robert, Thierry Godefroy: Le cout du crime. Ou I'economie poursuivant le crime, Collection Deviance el societe, Masson, Medecine et Hygiene m+h, Geneva 1978

sistemele de alarm, casele de bani, blindajele (din instituii, magazine etc.), costul avocailor n materie penal. Ultimul mare capitol al pierderilor generate de criminalitate i care sunt pltite, ntrun fel sau altul, de stat, de o parte a cetenilor, de victime sau de familiile acestora, are o componen de mare diversitate: costurile legate de moartea unor ceteni victime ale agresiunilor criminale120; costurile ngrijirilor medicale n cazul unor vtmri corporale inclusiv cele determinate de accidentele rutiere; costul furturilor din automobile, magazine etc.; costul incendiilor provocate; costul fraudelor economice i fiscale; costul fraudelor vamale (eludarea taxelor, exportul ilicit, pierderile de substan pentru economie); costul revoltelor i cel al tulburrii ordinii publice; costul expertizelor de orice natur pltit de cetenii sau instituiile implicate n procesele penale. Criminalitatea afecteaz semnificativ bunstarea unei populaii, iar soluiile nu sunt uor de gsit. Cnd abordm subiectul legat de costurile criminalitii se impune a fi fcute i alte comentarii. Exist costuri a cror contribuie la prevenirea sau nlturarea consecinelor actelor infracionale este evident i care variaz de la un an la altul dup amploarea fenomenului: avem n vedere pentru exemplificare iluminatul public, serviciile medicale de urgen, instituiile care se ocup cu verificarea calitii produselor alimentare, a mediului sau cu calitatea construciilor de locuine. De asemenea, exist un comer clandestin i servicii aductoare de mari profituri pentru lumea interlop, care sunt greu de cuantificat n termenii prejudiciilor sociale: ne referim la proxenetism, la traficul de persoane sau stupefiante. ntotdeauna rmn necunoscute adevratele dimensiuni ale criminalitii: cifra infraciunilor consemnate de poliie va fi mereu mai mic dect cea a infraciunilor trite efectiv de ceteni. Costurile, desigur aproximative, fcute publice de cteva ri n 1996, stau mrturie
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Nu se va putea stabili niciodat ct cost cu adevrat viaa unui om

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n acest sens: Statele Unite - 425 de miliarde de dolari (doar costurile sociale), Anglia - 51 de miliarde de lire sterline, Canada - 46 de miliarde de dolari canadieni. Sumele alocate de rile Uniunii Europene au crescut considerabil n ultimii ani. Astfel, nu departe de noi, n Bulgaria n ultimii 10 ani bugetul Ministerului de Interne a crescut de 4 ori. n Uniunea European ocup primul loc dup criteriul procent din P.I.B. alocat ordinii publice i justiiei (a crescut de 10 ori). Ca numr de poliiti la 100.000 de locuitori, Bulgaria este pe locul doi, ns cu toate acestea, procentul de nencredere n forele de ordine i justiie este cel mai mare din Uniunea European (76%). Strategia naional de prevenire a criminalitii implic conlucrarea interinstituional la toate nivelurile, coordonarea politicilor administrative i judiciare, sincronizarea relaiei justiiei penale (colaborare ntre parchet, poliie i alte organe de investigare), consultare permanent i implementarea msurilor preventive mpreun cu partenerii din societatea civil, dar i transparena msurilor i a modului de implementare. ntregul efort de prevenire are n centrul su o diversitate de programe pentru copii i familie, pentru coli i comuniti, pentru victime, pentru deinui, pentru minoriti i imigrani etc., dar i programe nalt specializate n domeniul toxicomaniei, corupiei, crimei organizate i mediului natural (unele exista deja, dar nu se bucur de o coordonare general adecvat, derularea lor fiind fcut doar n scopul crerii unei imagini pozitive, fr a urmri producerea unor efecte reale). Activitatea de prevenire nu poate fi eficient n orice condiii: este nevoie de statistici uniforme, de o legislaie incisiv i aplicat unitar cu celelalte, de o reflectare obiectiv n mass-media, de evaluarea corect a nevoilor locale, de implicarea cetenilor i a sectorului privat, de cunoaterea exact a factorilor de risc i factorilor favorizani, dar mai ales de implicarea profesionitilor i impunerea acestora n lupta cu oportunitii ce tot mai des sunt promovai n instituiile cu atribuii pe linia
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ordinii i siguranei publice. De asemenea, folosirea eficient a resurselor umane i materiale, ca i aciunea n sistem integrat este esenial n obinerea de performane pe linia prevenirii criminalitii. Prevenirea se realizeaz cu participarea unor ample categorii de oameni, nebnuite la prima vedere: corpul profesoral din toate categoriile de coli, arhitecii care trebuie s proiecteze spaii de locuit uor de supravegheat i care s ncurajeze viaa n comun, persoanele care pot deveni victime, martorii ntmpltori care asist la scene conflictuale, familiile tinere care au dificulti, poliitii, jandarmii, poliitii comunitari, personalul specializat de paz, personalul din penitenciare i toate categoriile de deinui, portarii i chelnerii din baruri, discoteci i restaurante, responsabilii cu iluminatul strzilor, patronii de firme sincer interesai de sigurana instituional i de diminuarea pierderilor produse de sustrageri de tot felul ... Prevenirea nu este doar opera unui specialist, ci ea solicit efortul tuturor. Dincolo de recomandri foarte limitate, ea implic apelul la o schimbare de mentaliti ... O societate unde se rennoad comunicarea, unde constrngerile rmn suple, unde omul este luat constant n consideraie va refuza violena. Refuznd aceast sfidare, se va nate o lume nu fr violena, dar mai linitit121. Abordarea matur i profesional a complexitii fenomenului infracional din Romnia zilelor noastre se impune cu necesitate. Pe lng miile de miliarde de lei aduse pagub cetenilor rii i economiei naionale prin extinderea fenomenului infractional i costurile suportate de stat lunar/persoan arestat (1.800 lei), dar i cele legate de cheltuielile cu valoarea ngrijirilor medicale acordate victimelor, a fraudelor economice i fiscale, a fraudelor vamale, a cheltuielilor prilejuite de tulburrile ordinii publice, a pagubelor create prin svrirea unor infraciuni, costurile determinate de
121

Rspuns violenei, Paris, 1977

funcionarea unor structuri de prevenire sunt, desigur, insignifiante. O mai veche teorie, venit dinspre biologie, dar gsind rdcini n filozofie sau psihanaliz, a strnit dezbateri n lumea tiinific susinnd c violena este nnscut, c oamenii ar fi nite fiine violente, ucigae. Perspectiva care i se opune are astzi din ce n ce mai muli susintori i aduce n prim-plan faptul c omul se nate i cu o mulime de mecanisme ce stimuleaz cooperarea, canalizeaz agresivitatea, ajut la evitarea conflictelor. De aici concluzionm c un rol determinant n formarea individului l are grupul. Toi trebuie s facem mai mult pentru formarea unei societi fr violen, cu o infracionalitate redus! O alt teorie privind delicventul precizeaz ca acesta este omul situaional, este un individ modest, raional, interesat de sine, eliberat de orice limite morale sau de controlul asupra eu-lui su. El este un consumator atent la oportunitile criminale i care rspunde oricrei ispite situaionale. Pornind i de la aceste teorii, nelegem de ce prevenirea criminalitii este o activitate ce trebuie centrat pe dezvoltarea social, n care puterile publice s acioneze mpreun. Cooperarea este de altfel una dintre cile spre a evita violena i a combate infracionalitatea. Ea faciliteaz nvarea despre ceilali i adevrurile lor, interaciunea relev relativitatea propriei perspective asupra vieii i faptul c cei diferii nu i sunt neaprat inamici, chiar dac au alte gusturi, sentimente, plceri, puncte de vedere. n ce privete fenomenul criminal, de-a lungul timpului, au fost studiate i lansate mai multe teorii ce doreau s acrediteze ideea c infractorul (persoana delictual) este rezultatul unor caracteristici biologice, morale, bio-psiho-sociale, psiho-biologice, psiho-sociale ori psihomorale. Astfel, ntr-o prim teorie, Cesare Lombroso (18351909)122 promoveaz teoria anormalitii biologice care susine ipoteza atavismului ce acrediteaz ideea c infractorul este
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rezultatul unor anomalii ori malformatii morfo-funcionale de natur degenerativ.123 Explicaiile teoriei lui Lombroso parcurg trei etape: natura activ a criminalului; raportul ntre degenerescena i criminalitate; criminalitatea ca form a epilepsiei. Aceast teorie, ce evideniaz c omul criminal universal valabil ar exista, este exclus chiar i de iniiatorul ei, Cesare Lombroso.124 O a doua teorie, susinut de Raffaelo Garofalo (1851-1934)125 pornete de la conceptul de delict natural, care st la baza nelegerii noiunii de crim, n sens criminologic, susinnd c noiunea de crim trebuie privit din punct de vedere sociologic i nu juridic. Garofalo considera c anormalitatea criminalului trebuie cutat n zona simului moral, criminalul fiind un anormal pentru c difer de majoritatea contemporanilor i concetenilor si prin lipsa anumitor sentimente i a anumitor dezgusturi, aceast lips fiind asociat unui temperament special sau unei absene a energiei morale. Nici aceast teorie nu poate constitui ns, o explicaie general valabil a personalitii criminale. Cea de-a treia teorie, ce influeneaz gndirea juridic, sociologic i criminal a secolului XX, teorie susinut de Enrico Ferri (1856-1929)126, susine ideea unei complexiti a delictului (delicventului) ce poate fi sintetizat n teoria anormalitii bio-psiho-sociale. Ferri neag ideea de liber arbitru i constat c omul acioneaz cum simte i nu cum gndete, citnd o fraz celebr a unui psihiatru francez: El doar constat o situaie, dar nu o creeaz.127 Acesta nlocuiete rspunderea moral cu rspunderea social, prin care ntelege o obligare a individului fa de
A se vedea C. Lombroso Lhomme criminel C. Lombroso Lanthropologie criminelle, op. cit., pag. 12 125 R. Garofalo Magistrat italian ce a formulat i susinut teoria anormalitii morale cu privire la fenomenul criminal 126 E. Ferri profesor universitar, avocat, om politic i cercettor in domeniul criminologic al secolului XX 127 Th. Ribot Les maladies de la volont, Ed. Felix Alcan, Paris, 1883, pag. 175
124 123

C. Lombroso cercettor italian ce a avut o contribuie substanial la extinderea cercetrilor criminale i la formarea Criminologiei ca tiin

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societate, readucnd n discuie problema prevenirii delicvenei. O a patra teorie referitoare la fenomenul criminal, spre deosebire de primele trei teorii, ce aparin colii pozitiviste, face parte din teoriile etiologice moderne, formulate n secolul al XX-lea. Aceste teorii au un element comun: factorul psihologic.128 Teoriile etiologice moderne, pot fi grupate in: teorii psiho-biologice, teorii psihosociale i teorii psiho-morale. Teoriile psiho-biologice susin ideea ca delictul (crima) ca fenomen individual are o baz biologic (organic sau funcional), considernd c factorii exteriori individului au doar un rol indirect, secundar. Cele mai reprezentative teorii de acest gen sunt: teoria bio-tipologic, teoria inadaptrii biopsihice129, teoria constituiei criminale, teoria genetic. Teoriile psiho-sociale, denumite i teoriile factorilor sociali ai delicvenei ori ai respectului legii penale.130 Principalele teorii psiho-sociale sunt clasificate astfel: a) Teoriile factorilor sociali ai delicvenei: teoria asociaiilor diferentiale; teoria conflictelor de culturi; teoria anomiei. b) Teoriile factorilor sociali ai respectului legii penale teoria angajamentului individual respect legea penal pentru a nu pierde avantajele pe care le presupune viaa social n care este angajat. Un individ comite o infraciune deoarece nu este suficient de angajat n angrenajul social, el neavnd ce pierde. Teoriile psiho-morale ii propun o explicare a mentalitii criminalului i mecanismele de formare ale acestei mentaliti i trsturile care o difereniaz de cea a noncriminalului.
A se vedea R. Gassin, op. cit., pag. 170 Aceasta teorie se regsete n doctrina criminologic fie sub denumirea Teoria inadaptrii (J. Pinatel, Tratat., supra cit., pag. 199), fie sub denumirea Teoria inadaptrii biologice (R. Gassin, op. cit., pag. 173) 130 A se vedea R. Gassin, op. cit., pag. 177
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Aceste teorii consider c biologicul ori socialul nu prezinta interes dect n msura n care permit o mai bun nelegere a modului n care se structureaz mentalitatea criminal.131 Teoriile psiho-morale sunt grupate n dou subcategorii distincte: a) Teoriile psiho-morale de factur psihoanalitic Aceasta subcategorie cuprinde acele explicaii ale fenomenului criminal care poart amprenta psihoanalizei freudiene. Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) este creatorul psihanalizei, a treia mare nfrngere a orgoliului uman, cum o numea el132. Totodat, aceast subcategorie cuprinde: teoria criminalului nevrotic i teoria personalitii antisociale. b) Teoriile psiho-morale autonome Acestea includ diverse explicaii criminologice de factur psihomorala, eliberate total sau parial de influena psihoanalitic. Aici pot fi reinute dou astfel de teorii: teoria instinctelor aparine criminologului belgian Etienne de Greeff (fondatorul criminologiei clasice). Pentru E. de Greeff, personalitatea delicventului este determinat de instincte.133 teoria personalitii criminale aparine celebrului criminolog francez Jean Pinatel. Acesta consider inutil ncercarea de a separa oamenii cu privire la actul criminal.134 Teoria personalitii criminale reprezint una dintre ultimile explicaii etiologice importante i a constituit o baz de lansare pentru teoriile trecerii la act, ce aparin criminologiei dinamice, succesoarea etiologiei criminale. Analiznd toate aceste teorii, constatm c ele ncearc s creeze o imagine ct mai coerent asupra fenomenului criminal (criminalului), ns toate acestea las un loc
131 132

A se vedea R. Gassin, op. cit., pag. 190 A se vedea S. Freud, Introduction la psychanalyse, op. cit., pag. 409 133 A se vedea E. de Greeff, Les instincts de dfense et de symphatie, Ed. P.U.F., Paris, 1947, pag. 21 134 A se vedea J. Pinatel, La socit criminogne, Ed. Calman-Levy, 1971, pag. 97

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de ndoial, neputnd susine un adevr ultim, de aici rezultnd complexitatea omului, a persoanei delicvente, dar i imprevizibilitatea acesteia. De aici nelegem de ce principalele instituii ale statului trebuie s acorde activitii preventive o atenie ridicat, astfel nct protecia persoanelor i a bunurilor acestora s fie asigurat prin msuri preventive,represiunea rmnnd solu-

ia ultim pentru combaterea criminalitii. ndoiala lsat de aceste teorii, alturi de implicarea timid, sporadic, neorganizat, nesusinut i lipsit de profesionalism a instituiilor cu atribuii pe linia prevenirii criminalitii, n antitez cu realitile judiciare, ne arat c AVEM CRIMINALITATEA PE CARE NU DORIM SA O PREVENIM!

Bibliografie: Cesare Beccaria, Despre infraciuni i pedepse, Editura humanitas, 2007 Philippe Robert, Thierry Godefroy: Le cout du crime. Ou I'economie poursuivant le crime, Collection Deviance el societe, Masson, Medecine et Hygiene, Geneva 1978

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PROVISIONS OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE WITH A DIRECT REFERENCE TO THE INSURANCES
lawyer DOINA PREOTU lawyer CTLIN NARDI PREOTU The hereby article makes reference to the modifications that will appear in the field of the insurances thorough the introduction of the fiduciary trust institution, when the new Civil Code will enter into force. Keywords: new civil code, insurance agreement, fiduciary agreement On 24.07.2009 it has been published in the Official Gazette the Law no 287/2009 regarding the Civil Code, a normative document which practically legislates the New Romanian Civil Code. It is estimated that this New Civil Code will enter into force during the year of 2011. Mostly, this Code is based on the Civil Code of Qubec from 1991 and for this reason the projects elaboration activity has been supported by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), through a group of experts from Qubec (who worked at the elaboration of the Civil Code of Qubec in 1991) professors, magistrates, lawyers - the input of the Canadian specialists consisted in periodical guidance with respect to the project, actual participation to the work commissions and also transmission of documentary materials and law studies. Also, besides the Civil Code of Qubec the French, Italian, Spanish, Swiss, German and Brazilian Civil Codes have been taken into account and also the Swiss Code of liabilities and other national and international legal tools. Through the New Civil Code the Civil Code, the Commercial Code and the Family Code are unified, the provisions of these codes being substantially modified and amended (I estimate that in a proportion of more than 75%), and also the provisions of other normative documents from the internal legislation.
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Also, through the New Civil Code a series of new legal institutions are being introduced, some of them specific to the Anglo-Saxon law system. With a direct reference to the field of insurances the trust institution (fiducia) is being introduced and the insurance agreement is regulated and the Law no. 136/1995 it will be abrogated or amended. ABOUT FIDUCIA This concept with a very wide application in the Anglo-Saxon law system has already been adopted in the continental law by some national legal systems (for example in France, Switzerland, Luxembourg). When the text has been drafted, it has been taken into account the model of the Law no. 2007-211 from February 19th, 2007 through which it has been introduced into the French Civil Code, Title XIV, "About Fiducia. The fiducia has been defined as a legal operation through which one or several constitutors transfer real rights, receivables, guarantees or other patrimonial rights or an ensemble of such rights, present or future, to one or several fiduciaries who administrates them with a determined purpose, in the benefit of one or several beneficiaries. Together they create an autonomous patrimonial mass, different from any other rights and liabilities from the fiduciaries patrimony. The quality of constitutor may be held any legal entity or natural person, but, in order to avoid money laundry op-

erations and tax evasion, the quality of fiduciary has been limited to the credit institutions, to companies that offer financial investment services and to the insurance and re-insurance companies. In the patrimony of the fiduciary, the fiduciary rights and liabilities form a patrimonial mass different from the other rights and liabilities, not existing a concurrence between the fiduciary creditors and the other creditors of the fiduciary. The fiducia is established through law or through a contract concluded in an authentic form. It must be expressed. It is very important to mention the fact that this contract, through its nature is an onerous contract, and if an indirect liberality on the benefit of the beneficiary is made, than the sanction will be the absolute nullity of the contract. The parties of a fiduciary agreement. If within a fiduciary agreement a constitutor may be any legal entity or a natural person, the fiduciary may be only a credit institution, investment companies and investment management companies, companies that offer financial investment services and insurance and re-insurance companies which are legally established. Also, the quality of fiduciary may be held by public notaries and lawyers, regardless of the manner they exercise their profession. The beneficiary of the fiducia may be the constitutor, the fiduciary or a third person. Representation of the constitutors interests. Unless otherwise stipulated, the constitutor may, at any moment, designate a third party to represent his interests during the execution of the contract, exercising his rights originated from the fiduciary agreement. Under the sanction of complete nullity, the fiduciary contract must comprise: real rights, receivables, guarantees and any other transferred patrimonial rights; the duration of the transfer, which
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cant exceed 33 years starting from its conclusion date; the identity of the fiduciary or of the fiduciaries; the identity of the beneficiary or of the beneficiaries or at least the rules that allow their determination; the purpose of the fiduciary and range of the administrative and decision powers of the fiduciary or of the fiduciaries. The fiduciary contract must comprise the conditions according to which the fiduciary renders an account to the constitutor with respect to the fulfillment of his liabilities. Also, upon their request, the fiduciary must render an account, on certain intervals of time stipulated in the fiduciary contract, to the beneficiary and to the representative of the constitutor. The registration of the fiduciary agreement is mandatory under the sanction of complete nullity. The registration of the fiduciary agreement and its amendments is being made upon the request of the fiduciary, within one month from its conclusion, with the tax authority competent to administer the amounts owed by the fiduciary to the general consolidated budget. When the fiduciary patrimonial mass comprises actual real-estate rights this must be registered according to the law, under the same sanction, with the special department of the local pubic administration authority competent for the administration of the amounts owed to the local budgets of the territorial-administrative units from the area when the real-estate is located, the provisions of the land register remaining enforceable. The subsequent designation of the beneficiary, if he hasnt been mentioned in the fiduciary contract, must be made, under the same sanction, through a written document registered under the same conditions. The fiduciary contract is binding for the third parties only after its registration in the National Registry of Trusts. The registration of the actual real-estate

rights which make the object of the fiduciary agreement is made only after the subscription of the fiduciary agreement into the national registry of trusts, and also after its registration with the special department of the local public administration authority. When the fiduciary patrimonial mass also comprises rights of whose transmission is subjected to publicity, the publicity register must contain the name of the fiduciary and his quality. Otherwise, if the document is damaging for the constitutor, it will be considered that the document has been concluded by the fiduciary in his own name. When the fiduciary acts in the account of the fiduciary patrimonial mass, he must make an express mention to this effect. In his relations with third parties, it is considered that the fiduciary has the biggest powers regarding the fiduciary patrimonial mass, except for the case when it is proven that the third parties were aware of the limitation of these powers. The remuneration of the fiduciary will be made according to the agreement established between the parties, and in its absence, according to the rules regarding the administration of other persons goods. For the prejudices caused through the documents for the conservation or administration of the fiduciary patrimonial mass, the fiduciary responds only with the other rights included in his patrimony or, If the fiduciary doesnt fulfill his liabilities or if he jeopardizes the interests entrusted in him, the constitutor, the representative or the beneficiary may request in a court of law the replacement of the fiduciary and the designation of a provisory administrator of the fiduciary patrimonial mass. The mandate of the administrator is temporary and it ceases when the fiduciary is replaced or when the replacement request is finally rejected, The designation of the new fiduciary and of the temporary administrator may be decided by the court of law only with their consent. If the court of law has designated a new
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fiduciary, he will have all the rights and liabilities stipulated in the fiduciary agreement. The constitutor, his representative, the new fiduciary or the temporary administrator may register this modification of the fiducia, the replacing of the fiduciary taking place only after this registration. As long as it hasnt been accepted by the beneficiary, the fiduciary agreement may be unilaterally terminated by the constitutor. After the beneficiary's acceptance, the contract can be modified or revoked by the parties or unilaterally terminated by the constitutor, only with the consent of the beneficiary, or in lack of his consent through the authority of the court of law. The fiduciary agreement ceases when its validity period expires or when its purpose is achieved, if this occurs before the expiration of the contracts duration. It also ceases if all the beneficiaries renounce to the fiducia and the agreement doesnt contain provisions regarding the manner in which the fiduciary reports will continue in such a situation. The renunciation statements are subjected to the same registration formalities as the fiduciary agreement. The cease occurs when the registration formalities of the last renunciation statements are finalized. The fiduciary agreement ends at the moment when the insolvency procedure has been started against the fiduciary or when, according to the law, the effects of the reorganization of the legal entity are being produced. When the fiduciary contract ends, the fiduciary patrimonial mass existing at that moment is being transferred to the beneficiary, and in his absence, to the constitutor. The merger of the fiduciary patrimonial mass with the patrimony of the beneficiary or of the constitutor will take place only after the payment of the fiduciary liabilities, The assets from the fiduciary patrimonial mass may be pursued, according to the law, by the owners of receivables born in connection to these goods or by those creditors of the

constitutor, who have a real guarantee on these goods and of whose binding character is achieved, according to the law, before the creation of the trust. The prosecution right may also be exercised by other creditors of the constitutors but only based on a final court decision for the acceptance of the process through which the fiduciary agreement concluded in the prejudice of their rights of claim has been canceled. The owners of these receivables born in connection to the goods from the fiduciary patrimonial mass can pursuit only these goods, except for the situation when, though the fiduciary agreement, it has been stipulated the liability of the fiduciary and/or of the constitutor to be responsible for a part or for the entire liability assets of the trust. In this case, the assets of the fiduciary patrimonial mass will be pursuit first and then, if necessary, the goods of the fiduciary and/or of the constitutor, according to the limit and in the order indicated in the fiduciary agreement. INSURANCE AGREEMENT According to art. 2. 199. of the New Civil Code, through the insurance agreement, the contractor of the insurance or the insurant commits to pay a bonus to the insurer, and the latter commits to pay, if the insured risk occurs, to the insurant, to the beneficiary of the insurance or to an injured third party a compensation. The contractor of the insurance is the person who concludes the contract for the insurance of a risk regarding another person or for goods or activities of that respective person and commits to pay to the insurer an insurance premium. In order to be able to be proved, the insurance agreement must be concluded in writing. The agreement cant be proved with witnesses, even when there is a beginning of a written proof. If the insurance documents have disappeared due to a force majeure or to an act of God and there is no possibility to obtain a duplicate, its existence and content can be proved through any mean of evidence.
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The conclusion of an insurance agreement can be determined through the insurance policy or through the insurance certificate issued and signed by the insurer or through the coverage note issued and signed by the insurance broker. The documents which certify the conclusion of an insurance can be signed and certified through electronic means. The insurance policy must indicate at least: the name, residence or headquarters of the contracting parties, and also the name of the insurances beneficiary if he is not a party within the contract; the object of the insurance; the insured risks; the moment when the responsibility of the insurer starts and when it ends; the insurance premiums; the insured amounts. Other elements that must be comprised in the insurance policy are being established through norms adopted by the state authority competent according to the law to supervise the insurance activity. The insurance policy may be, depending on the case, nominative, to order or bearer. The person who contracts the insurance is obligated to answer in writing to the questions formulated by the insurer, and also to declare, on the date the contract is concluded, any information or circumstances that he is aware of and which are essential for the evaluation of the risk. If the initial circumstances regarding the risk change during the execution of the contract, the insurant is obligated to notify in writing the insurer about the occurred modification. The contractor of the insurance who has taken knowledge of the occurred modification has the same obligation. Except for the general causes of nullity, the insurance contract is null in case of an inexact declaration or of reticence made in bad faith by the insurant or by the contractor of the insurance with respect to the circumstances which, if not known by the insurer, would have determined him not to

agree or not to agree in those conditions, even if the declaration or reticence didn't have an influence on the occurrence of the insured risk. The paid premiums remain with the insurer who may also solicit the payment of the inhered premiums up until the moment he took notice of the nullity cause. The inexact declaration or the insurants reticence or the reticence of the contractor of the insurance of whose bad faith couldnt be proven doesnt determine the cancelation of the insurance. If the inexact declaration or the reticence takes place before the occurrence of the insured risk, the insurer has the right to keep the contract requiring the increase of the premium or he may terminate the contract after 10 days from the date the insurant receives the notification, giving back to the latter the part of the paid premiums afferent to the period when the insurance is no longer valid. If the inexact declaration or the reticence takes place after the occurrence of the insured risk, the compensation will be reduced according to the level of the paid premiums and the level of the premiums that should have been paid. The insurance agreement will be automatically terminated if, before the liability of the insurant starts producing effects, the insured risk has taken place or its occurrence has became impossible, and also if, after the mentioned liability started to produce effects, the occurrence of the insured risk has became impossible. If the insurant or the contractor of the insurance has paid even partially the insurance premium, he has the right to recover it proportionally with the unexpired period of the insurance agreement. The difference between the premium paid and the one calculated is given back to the insurant or to the contractor of the insurance only if damages for the events which took place during the validity period of the insurance havent been paid or are not owed. The insurant is obligated to pay the insurance premiums on the dates established in the agreement. The parties may agree for the payment of
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the insurance premiums to be made integrally or in installments. If not agreed otherwise, the payment is made at the headquarters of the insurer or of his authorized agents. The proof for the payment of the insurance premiums rests in the responsibility of the insurant. If not agreed otherwise, the insurant may terminate the agreement if the amounts owed by the insurant, as premiums, are not paid on due date. The insurant is obligated to notify the insurer about the consequences for the nonpayment of the premiums on due date and to stipulate these consequences in the insurance agreement. The insurer has the right to compensate the premiums he has the right to, until the end of the insurance year, based on any agreement, with any compensation inhered by the insurant or beneficiary. The insurant is obligated to notify the insurer the occurrence of the insured risk within the term stipulated in the insurance agreement. If the above liability is not fulfilled, the insurer has the right to refuse the payment of the compensation if due to this reason he was not able to determine the cause for the occurrence of the insured even and the extension of the damage. The notification regarding the occurrence of the insured risk may also be made by the insurance broker who, in this case, has the obligation to communicate it to the insurer, according to the term stipulated in the insurance agreement. If the insured risk occurs, the insurer must pay the insurance compensation according to the contractual provisions. If there is a misunderstanding with respect to the value of the compensation, the uncontested part of it shall be paid by the insurer before the settlement of the litigation though amiable discussions or in a court of law. In the cases established through the insurance agreement, in property insurances or legal liability, the insurer doesn't owe a compensation if the insured risk has been

intentionally produced by the insurant, by the beneficiaries of the insurance or by a member of the management of the insured legal entity, who works in this position. If the parties agree, the above provision will be applied as well when the insured risk has been produced by: major natural persons who permanently live and work together with the insurant or with the beneficiary of the insurance; the agents of the insurant or of the beneficiaries of the insurance. The termination of the insurance agreement by one of the parties can be made only by observing a notification period of minimum 20 days calculated from the date the other party receives the notification. Within the limits of the paid compensation, the insurer is subrogated in all the rights of the insurant or of the beneficiary of the insurance against those responsible for the occurrence of the damage, except for the personal insurances. The insurant is responsible for all the prejudices caused to the insurer through actions that might prevent the use of the right. The insurer oppose the holder or owner of the insurance document or against the third party or beneficiary of the insurance who invokes rights originating from this document all the defenses grounded on the initial concluded agreement. The insurer may transfer the insurance agreement only with the written consent of the insurant. The mandatory insurances are regulated through special laws. PROPERTY INSURANCES If the insured risk occurs, the insurer commits to pay to the insurant, to the beneficiary of the insurance or to other entitled persons compensation. The insurant must have an interest with respect to the insured good. The insurant is obligated to keep the insured good in adequate conditions in order to prevent the occurrence of the insured risk. The insurer has the right, according to the contractual provisions, to verify the way in which the insured good is kept.
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In the cases stipulated in the contract, when the risk occurs, the insurant is obligated to take on the account of the insurer and according to the insured amount and depending on the circumstances, measures in order to limit the damages. The compensation is established according to the state of the good at the moment when the insured risk occurred. It may not exceed the value of the good from that moment, the quantum of the damage, nor the insured amount. The parties may stipulate a provision according to which the insurant remains his own insurer for a franchise, with respect to which the insurer is not obligated to pay a compensation. If the insurance agreement has been concluded for an insured amount which is inferior to the value of the good and if the parties havent agreed otherwise, the afferent compensation will ne adequately reduced according to the rapport between the amount stipulated in the contract and the value of the good. The insurer must declare the existence of all the insurances regarding the same good. This liability must be observed when the insurance agreements are being concluded and also when they are executed. If there are several insurance made for the same good, each insurer is obligated to pay an amount proportional with the insured amount and up to the concurrent coverage of the insured amount and the insurant will not be able to cash in a compensation bigger than the actual prejudice, consequence of the direct risk. If not agreed otherwise, the alienation of the insured risk doesnt determine the termination of the insurance agreement, which will produce effects between the insurer and purchaser/new owner. The insurant who doesnt notify the insurer about the alienation of the good and the purchaser/new owner about the existence of the insurance agreement, remains obligated to pay the premium that become due after the date of the alienation.

INSURANCE OF LOANS AND GUARANTEES may have as object the coverage of general insolvability risks, export credits, sale credits with the payment of the price in installments, mortgage credit, agricultural credit, direct or indirect guarantees, and also others similar, according to the norms adopted by the state authorities competent according to the law of supervising the insurance activity. If though an agreement for a direct insurance of credits and guarantees it has been established to cover the risk for a debtor of the insurant not to pay the offered credit, the insurer may not condition the payment of the insurance premium on the commencement by the insurant of the legal procedures against that debtor, including forced execution. If not otherwise agreed through the insurance agreement, the compensation for the insurance against risk of financial losses must cover the actual damage and the nonachieved benefit, including general expenses and also those originating directly or indirectly from the occurrence of the insured risk. CIVIL LIABILITY INSURANCE - The insurer commits to pay a compensation for the damage for which the insurant is responsible according to the law in respect to the injured third parties and for the expenses borne by the insurant during the civil trial. Through the insurance agreement the parties may agree to include in the insurance a civil liability of other persons than the contractor of the insurance. The rights of the injured third parties exercise against those responsible for the occurrence of the damage. The injured persons may take legal actions against insurer within the limits of his liabilities originated from the insurance agreement. If the law doesnt provide otherwise, the compensation is established through a convention concluded between the insurant, the injured third party and the insurer or, in case of litigation, by through a court decision.
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The insurer pays the compensation directly to the injured third party, if the latter hasnt been already indemnified by the insurant. The creditors of the insurant cant pursuit the above mentioned compensation. The compensation is paid to the insurant only if he proves that he has indemnified the injured third party. PERSONAL INSURANCE - through a personal insurance the insurer commits to pay the insurance compensation in case of death, in case of reaching a certain age, in case of total or partial permanent invalidity or in case of other similar cases, according to the norms adopted by the state authorities competent according to the law of supervising the insurance activity. The insurance for a risk regarding another person than the one who concluded the insurance agreement is valid only if it has been agreed in writing by that person. The insurant who has concluded an individual life insurance agreement may renounce to this agreement without notification within maximum 20 days from the date when the agreement has been signed by the insurer. The renunciation produced a retroactive effect. These provisions are not applicable to the agreements that have a duration of 6 months or less. The insurance compensation is paid to the insurant or to the beneficiary designated by him. In case of death of the insurant and if a beneficiary hasnt been appointed, the insurance compensation enters into the inheritable mass, belonging therefore to the insurants heritors. The designation of the beneficiary can ne made when the insurance agreement is concluded or during its execution, through a written statement notified to the insurer by the insurant or, with the consent of the insurant, by the contractor of the insurance, or through a testament drafted by the insurant. The replacement or the revocation of the insurances beneficiary can be made at any moment during the execution of the agreement.

When there are several designated beneficiaries, the insurance compensation will be equally divided between them, if not stipulated otherwise. The insurer doesnt owe the insurance compensation if: the insured risk has been occurred through the suicide of the insurant within 2 years from the conclusion of the insurance agreement: the insured risk has been intentionally produced by the insurant. When a beneficiary of an insurance has intentionally produced the insured risk, the insurance compensation is paid to the other designated beneficiaries, or in their absence, to the insurant. If the insured risk consists in the death of the insurant and a beneficiary of the insurance has intentionally caused the respective death, the insurance compensation will be paid to the other designated beneficiaries, or in their absence, to the heritors of the insurant. In case of the insurances where premium reserves are being created, the insurant may interrupt the payment of the premiums with the right to maintain the agreement to a reduced insured amount or to terminate it, requesting the reimbursement of the reserve created according to the insurance agreement. Any other payment, regardless of the manner in which it is made by the insurer, different from the insurance compensation or from the amount representing the reimbursement of the reserve according to the indicated conditions, cant be made sooner than 6 months from the conclusion of the insurance agreement. The insurant or the contractor of the insurance, with the consent of the insurant, may request the reinstatement of the insurance to which the technical reserve is being created, in the cases stipulated in the insurance agreement. The insurance compensation is owed, regardless of the amounts inhered to the insurant or to the beneficiary of social securities, for qhe heritors of the insurant,
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depending on the situation. The rights of the insurants on the amounts resulting from the technical reserves created in case of the life insurances, for the payment liabilities due in the future, are not subjected to the prescription. The insurers and their authorized agents have the obligation to put at the disposal of the insurants or to the contractors of insurances information regarding the insurance agreements before their conclusion and also during their execution. This information must be presented in writing, in the Romanian language, must be drafted in a clear manner and their must comprise at least the following elements: the optional or the additional provisions and the benefits resulting from the capitalization of the technical reserves; the date when the agreement become effective and the date when it ends, including its termination modalities; payment terms and methods of payment of the insurance compensations; the calculus elements of the insurance compensations, indicating the re-purchase amounts, the reduced insured amounts and also the level up to which they are guaranteed; the method of payment of the insurance compensation; the applicable law of the insurance agreement; other elements established through the norms adopted by the state authorities competent according to the law of supervising the insurance activity. CO-INSURANCE, REINSURANCE AND RETROCESSION The co-insurance is the operation through which 2 or more insurers cover the same risk, each of them taking on a share of it. Each insurer is accountable with the insurant only within the limit of the amount stipulated in the insurance agreement concluded with him. The reinsurance is the insurance operation of an insurer, acting as a re-insurant, by another insurer, acting as a reinsurer.

Through the reinsurance: the reinsurer receives reinsurance premiums and in their exchange he contributes, according to the undertaken liabilities, to the bearing of the compensations that the re-insurant pays when a risk which made the object of the reinsurance has occurred; the re-insurant grants reinsurance premiums and in their exchange the reinsurer contributes, according to the undertaken liabilities, to the bearing of the compensations that the re-insurant pays when a risk which made the object of the reinsurance has occurred; the reinsurance doesnt cancel the liabilities of the insurer and it doesnt establish any legal rapport between the insurant and the reinsurer. Through the retrocession operation, the reinsurer may at his turn give a part of the

accepted risk. This material aims only the new provisions regarding the field of insurances, but the New Civil Code brings, as I have mentioned, numerous completions and amendments to the civil and commercial legislation with incidence in the insurance field as well. Without a doubt, until it is brought into force, the New Civil Code will suffer numerous modifications, but, in my opinion, the provisions regarding the insurance agreements and the fiduciary institution will remain unchanged. It remains for the managers from the credit institutions, from the companies specialized in financial investment services and from the insurance and reinsurance companies together with the lawyers to give a practical utility to this new legal institution.

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PRESENT LEGISLATIVE AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS IN THE FIELD OF FIGHTING TAX EVASION
Chief Commissioner PhD student DAN BUCUR Director of the Fraud Investigation Directorate within The General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police Police commissary Lecturer PhD MARIUS PANTEA Police Academy A. I. Cuza Tax evasion and the unauthorized actions committed in the VAT field have a significant effect over the tax incomes of Romania and disturb the economic activity producing important damages to the state budget. The present article underlines some of the last moment legislative modifications adopted by Romania in order to decrease tax evasion and to enhance the collections for the consolidated state budget. Keywords: tax evasion, contraband, taxes, fees, excises, crimes In the present framework, when the global crises is deeply felt by the Romanian people, the problem of taxation and collecting taxes and fees is very important for the state , because it represents the most important available modality to collect funds absolutely necessary in order to supply the basic services , meaning the essential obligations and the consideration for the social agreement by which the citizens pay the state apparatus by taxes, decide regarding the administrators by the usual vote and expect to obtain a maximum value for the amounts paid, as public services supplied in exchange for their contributions. In this framework, tax evasion represents a direct and dangerous threat for the stability and predictability of the social agreement. Where necessary, the state apparatus has the implicit obligation to identify and constrain bad payers to pay their contribution for the proper function of the public services. Taxation represents the citizens contribution for the development and durability of the state budget, from which the administration grants funds for public investments and different services, varying from infrastructure to the sanitary system or the police. These contributions can be collected directly
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or indirectly, depending on the strict regulations regarding the states public finances. While the states usually maintain a full control over direct taxation (as the income tax and the companies tax along with the provisions regarding the avoidance or elimination of double taxation), the supranational organizations seem to focus more on indirect taxation, avoiding an obvious intrusion into the taxpayers routine. This theory is present also in the UE case where the acquis from the taxation field covers especially the indirect taxes, as well as VAT and excises. The Value Added Tax (VAT) was introduced in the European Community in 1970 through a series of Directives. The purpose was to replace some of the old production and consume taxes and the allocation of a percentage from the VAT incomes (calculated on an integrated base) in order to finance the community budget, facilitating the path towards harmonization, between the Member States, of regulations regarding VAT. The sixth Directive regarding VAT135 provided a common base
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The Councils Directive 77/388/CEE, from May 17, 1977, for the harmonization of Member States legislation regarding the turnover tax the common system of value added tax and the common taxation

for financing the community, applying the tax for the same transactions in all the Member States and at the same time introducing an integrated calculation base. The Directive comprises VAT definitions and principals related to the application of a general non-cumulative consume tax, collected for all the production and distribution stages. Therefore, the VAT regulations imply an equal treatment for inland and export merchandises and services and a neutral relation tax- price. In the excises scope, the aquis comprises harmonized regulations regarding petrol products, tobacco products and alcohol beverages. The aquis provisions establish the fee that must be collected and the minimum price for each group of products. The merchandises are chargeable when they are manufactured within the Community or if they are imported from a third country; but the fee are paid only by the Member State in which the goods are consumed, with the prices established for that state. One of the most important clauses relates to the warehouse tax, allowing merchandises to be stored without paying the warehouse fee. As a result of increasing the harmonization between the Member States regarding merchandises liable to excises, the introduction of the sole market resulted in the cancellation, on January 1, 1993, of all tax verifications at the internal borders of the Community. Since 2007, the European Commission acknowledged the fact that the total value of tax evasion and VAT frauds, at the European Community level, is difficult to assess, because many member states do not collect or publish data in this regard136 , and that a strong political impulse is necessary in order to accomplish substantial imbase , published in , JO L 145 from 13.06.1977, last time modified by Directive 2002/38/CE 136 The European Parliaments Resolution from December 4, 2008 regarding the special report no.8/2007 of the European Accounts Court regarding the administrative cooperation in the VAT field published in JO C 21 from28.01.2010

provements in the field of fighting economical- financial evasions. In the special report no. 8 from 2007, the European Accounts Court estimated that the value of the VAT evasions could exceed the total annual budget volume of the community137, and for this reason our country introduced with enforcement on July 2010, 2010, legislative modifications in order to limit the consequences of the complex social- economical phenomenon represented by tax evasion. Tax evasion, but most of all the unauthorized actions committed in the field of VAT frauds, have a significant effect on the tax incomes of Romania and disturb the economical activity within the internal market by creating unjustified fluxes of goods and by introducing on the internal market of unjustified low price goods. The legislative modifications introduced by the Government Emergency Ordinance regarding some measures to fight tax evasion. By OUG no.54/2010, for the efficiency of fighting tax evasion and contraband138 , the following were modified and completed: Law no. 571/2003 regarding Tax code , O.G. 92/2003 regarding tax procedure code , Law no. 241/2005 for the prevention and fighting tax evasion , Law no. 508/2004, regarding the establishment, organization and function within the Public Ministry, of DIICOT, Law no. 39/2003 regarding the prevention and fighting organized crime; OUG 104/2002 regarding the customs regime of merchandises traded with duty free regime, Law 86/2006 regarding the Romanian Customs Code, HG 707/2006for the approval of the application regulation of Customs Code, Law 31/1990 regarding commercial companies, Law nr. 26/1990 regarding the Trade Registry , OUG 195/2002 regarding circulation on
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The quantification of VAT evasion , Special report no.8/2007 of the European Accounts Court regarding the administrative cooperation in the VAT field published in JO C 20 from 25.01.2008 138 Published in the Official Monitor of Romania no. 421 from June 23, 2010

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public roads and Law no. 290/2004 regarding criminal record. The main modifications of the legislation framework of fighting tax evasion consist in: Expanding the competences of the criminal pursuit bodies in order to ascertain crimes in the tax and customs field and creating the possibility for observing crimes in action and to efficiently administrate the evidence. Therefore, art. 2331 was introduced in the Tax procedure Code, with the following content: Art.2331 Collaboration with the criminal pursuit bodies (1) In case there are data or grounded evidences regarding the preparation or accomplishment of crimes targeting the goods provided in art.135 paragraph. (4) from Law no. 571/2003 regarding the Tax code or the goods from the excise application scope, the criminal pursuit bodies can perform ascertainment activities, research and evidences conservation. (2) In the situation mentioned in paragraph (1) the criminal pursuit bodies will immediately request from the verification bodies within the National Tax Administration Agency, to perform tax verifications according to the established objectives. (3) At the criminal pursuit bodies request, when there is a danger for the evidences to disappear or for a situation to change and there is necessary to immediately clarify some facts or circumstances of the cause, the assigned personnel of the National Tax Administration Agency will perform the tax verifications. (4) In justified cases, after beginning the criminal pursuit, with the prosecutors approval, the National Tax Administration Agency can be requested to perform tax verifications, according to the established objectives. (5) The result of the verifications provided in paragraphs (2) (4) is registered in
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minutes, representing evidences. The minutes do not represent debentures, according to art. 110. At the same time, art. 2 paragraph (1) letter. g from Law nr. 241/2005 for the prevention and fighting tax evasion was modified with the purpose of assigning the capacity of competent bodies and criminal prosecution bodies of the judicial police. .Therefore, it is provided that: g) competent bodies bodies with financial, tax and customs verification attributions according to the law, as well as criminal investigation bodies of the judicial police. The incrimination, as crimes, of tax evasion actions, previously considered contraventions. Therefore, the following are considered crimes: - the unauthorized possession of excisable products without being properly labeled or with improper labels ; Article 2961 paragraph (1), letter. l from the Tax code: l) the possession, by any individual, outside the fiscal warehouse or trading on the Romanian territory of excisable products submitted to marking, according to title VII from the Tax code, without being labeled or improperly labeled or with false labels over the limit of 10.000 cigarettes, 400 cigars of 3 grams, 200 cigars larger than 3 grams, over 1 kg tobacco, spirituous beverages over 200 liters, intermediary alcohol beverages over 300 liters. - The installation of means to subtract alcohol and fuels from the production installations; Article 2961 paragraph (1), letter m from the Tax code: m) Using mobile pipes, elastic hoses or other tubes of this sort, using non-calibrated reservoirs as well as placing in front of counters, channels or faucets by which one can extract quantities of alcohol or noncountered oils. - The unauthorized possession of stamps, banderoles and standard forms with special regime; Article 7 from Law no. 241/2005:

art.7.- (1) It is considered crime and punished with prison from 2 to 7 years and the prevention of certain rights , the possession or unauthorized circulation of stamps, banderoles and standard forms used in the tax field with special regime. (2) It is considered crime and punished with prison from 3 to 12 years and the prevention of certain rights, printing, holding or the intentioned circulation of false stamps, banderoles and standard forms used in the tax field with special regime. It is considered a crime the unjustified refusal of an individual to present to the competent bodies, the legal documents and patrimony goods, with the purpose of preventing financial verifications, tax or customs verifications, within maximum 15 days from the notification. Article 4 from Law no. 241/2005: Art. 4 It is considered a crime and is punished with prison from 6 months to 3 years or with fine, the unjustified refusal of an individual to present to the competent bodies , the legal documents and patrimony goods, with the purpose of preventing financial verifications, tax or customs verifications, within maximum 15 days from the notification. By this regulation, it is provided the integrity of evidences, prevention of destructive actions, hiding or perfecting false documents as well as the improvement of the state bodies authority. In the previous regulation, there was necessary to fulfill three times the notification procedure for this refusal to be considered a crime. Establishing standards for the registration and removal from the evidences, of the taxable entities performing intra-community commercial operations, especially intra-community acquisition of goods, in order to fight tax evasion in the VAT field for the acquisitions of: cereals, technical plants and oleaginous products, vegetables and fruits, flowers, meat and products from meat, fish, fish products, sea fruits, milk , dairy products, eggs, sugar, raw sugar and
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sugar beet, flour , bread and bakery products and construction materials. Therefore, by the modification of Law no. 571/2003 regarding the Tax code, was established that during July 01, 2010 December 31, 2010, the generating fact and the fees exigibility are applied when these goods enter the Romanian territory, resulting from intra-community acquisitions, including for the acquisitions performed within a triangular operation, the VAT taxation base being determined by using certain minimum values established for these products. The fee for these acquisitions will be paid at the tax authorities located on the tax verification points, based on the special VAT statement for intra-community goods acquisitions until the fee exigibility is applied , except for the taxable entities framed in the low evasion risk category who are obliged to provide guarantees with the value of the owed fee. The access paths, tax verification points where these goods will be presented and the competent tax authorities are established by the order of the Public Finances minister upon the proposal from the chairman of the National Tax Administration Agency. At the same time, by this normative act, it is established and organized within the National Tax Administration Agency, starting with July 01, 2010, The IntraCommunity Operators Registry comprising all the taxable entities and legal entities nontaxable, performing intra-community operations. These individuals have the obligation, under the sanction provided by art. 2192, paragraph (1) letter. a) providing a fine from 1.000 lei to 5.000 lei, to be registered in the Intra-Community Operators Registry, when the registration is requested, for VAT purposes if they intent to perform one or more intra-community operations or before performing the respective operations, in the case of individuals registered for VAT purposes. The taxable entities and the nontaxable legal entities have the obligation to submit to the competent tax authority, in

order to be registered within the Intracommunity operators registry, a registration request accompanied by the criminal record of the associates and administrators, as well as other evidencing documents, and afterwards the tax authority will analyze and decide upon the motivated approval or rejection of the request for registration within the Registry. The normative act establishes the fact that taxable entities having as associate or administrator an individual against who the criminal action was initiated and who has crimes registered in the criminal record, regarding any operation, cannot be registered in the Registry, ad the tax authority will cancel ex officio the taxable entities in this situation, the taxable entities and the non-taxable legal entities registered in the inactive taxpayers list and also the taxable entities who are temporary inactive, registered in the Trade Registry. By the completion brought to the Government Ordinance no. 92/2003 regarding the Tax procedure code with article no. 2192, sanctions and contraventions are established and also sanctions to the Intracommunity operators registry regime, which are asserted and sanctioned by the tax authorities. Therefore, it is sanctioned with fine from 50.000 lei to 10.000 lei, and confiscation of the merchandise and incomes obtained from selling the merchandise, as well as the transportation means used for the transportation of goods, in the following situations: - performing intra-community acquisitions of goods which are framed in the category of goods provided in art. 135 paragraph (4) from Law no. 571/2003, with further modifications and completions, by submitting a special VAT statement for intra-community goods acquisitions comprising false or incomplete data which can determine the nonpayment of the value added tax or the decrease of the amounts due according to the law, if the action was not committed as to represent a crime; - performing intra-community acquisi103

tions of goods provided in art. 135 paragraph (4) from Law no.571/2003, with further modifications and completions, with the breach of the provisions of art.1563 paragraph (8) and art. 157 paragraph (21) from Law no.571/2003, with further modifications and completions, if the action was not committed as to represent a crime. The individuals who committed one of the abovementioned actions will be canceled from the Intra-community operators registry ex officio by the competent tax authority. The few abovementioned aspects were based on strategic reasons and were suggested for implementation following the intent to collect as much as possible from the fees and taxes owed to the Romanian state budget. Fighting this phenomenon, which is currently generating significant budgetary losses, with deep implications at the social and economical level, represents a constant concern for Romania, member state of EU; who must systematically and efficiently introduce immediate measures in order to avoid and limit tax evasion. Therefore, it has been taken into consideration the fact that in certain areas, the objectives of the adopted measures at the community level , in order to fight tax evasion related to VAT cannot be reached, with the purpose of immediate decrease of the phenomenon, imposing the medium term adoption of a package of measures in the VAT field, targeting the transactions with certain categories of goods with high risk of tax evasion, respectively: cereals, technical plats, vegetables, fruits, meat, sugar, flour, bread and bakery products. Practically, the measures had to be introduced because it was observed that during January 2007- March 2010, the tax inspection bodies established tax obligations with the total value of 1.293.029.095 lei (supplementary debits and accessories), after the tax inspections performed at legal entities taxpayers who exercised commercial activities in the field of cereals, technical plants, vegetables, fruits, meat and

sugar. It is very important to mention that a significant share within the total tax obligations is held by the value added tax, amounting 776.933.592 lei. The main modalities to commit crimes leading to enormous prejudices to the state consolidate budget, in the field, are the following: using new established companies , apparently with normal function until the maturity date of the tax obligations (onethree months), companies that cannot be afterwards identified at the registered office or at the working points, becoming phantom companies, making difficult to identify the real beneficiaries of the respective transactions , companies with the highest volume of tax obligations registered; writing on the transportation documents false beneficiaries ( not registered within the Trade Registry) based on the fact that it will be impossible to verify , during the transit through the border points , the real recipient or some beneficiaries who do not recognize the transaction (stolen tax identification code); The transportation documents are intentionally improperly filled so as to prevent the identification of the real beneficiaries. Although the variety of traded merchandises is high, these evasion procedures were mainly focused on the sector in which the rotation speed of the resulted amounts is significant, and the collection of the merchandises counter-value is performed close to or at delivery: cereals, technical plants, vegetables, fruits, meat and sugar. Regarding excisable products, the problems identified were exclusively related to their storage in an excise duty suspension regime, this fact leading a delay in payment the excises to the state budget. Also the authorization conditions for economic operators functioning as warehouses for the production of excisable products, as well as issuing authorizations without specifying the availability deadline resulted in the registration of an increased number of bonded warehouses including storage, this situation not allowing an efficient observation, this fact leading to increased tax
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evasion with these products. Eloquent in this purpose are the statistic data of the Customs Authority who in 2009, following surveillance and control operations, identified 6087 breaches 9of the customs and tax legislation in the excises field, almost double from 2008, applied fines in the total amount of 34.142.682 lei and confiscated goods in the value of 915.811.884 lei. Also frauds involving authorized warehouse owners were observed in the field of energy products amounting hundreds of millions lei, and in the alcohol field, tens of millions lei. It was observed that the warranty system for the products held in bonded warehouses is not enough because it does not cover the excise owed in case the economic operator do not pay. In addition, the warranty is submitted only for the excise payment and the business operators established a practice due to which they register other debts to the general consolidated state budget for which the warranty cannot be executed. Frauds were discovered with beverages obtained by mixing ethylic alcohol by distillation with fermented beverages or wines, obtaining in this case products listed in the intermediary group of products for which it is difficult to observe if the fabrication formula was respected in the proportion established at authorization, for this reason the excise level for this category of products was necessary to be increased. Regarding contraband and other illegalities in the competence of the customs bodies , in the year 2009, 2923 frauds and irregularities were discovered, by further verification of the customs evidences, commercial and financial- accounting evidences at the registered office of the business operators, or by the verification of customs statements registered in the evidences of the customs offices and the county departments for excises and customs operations, after their performance, additional differences were observed in the customs rights and other taxes and fees, including the related duties owed to the state budget , and contraventions were applied and merchandises were confiscated in the

total amount of 263.012.793 lei. Also last year, in the database of the customs authority regarding cigarettes captures, 874 transportation vehicles were involved, 194 legal entities are being sanctioned and 1.196 physical entities being involved. Another important aspect which determined the legislative modification presented in this article was related to the fact that the Romanian authorities observed that a significant quantity of the products, involved in the illicit traffic during 2009, came from stores authorized to trade merchandises in the duty-free regime. Therefore, after the verifications performed last year on private business operators exercising the activity of trading duty-free products, resulted that : 93% from the cigarettes acquisition receipts were false and over 40% from the cigarettes confiscations were in duty-free stores, this leading to prejudices to the consolidated state budget. Analyzing from a strategic point of view, it was observed that the contribution of dutyfree business operators to the state budget is insignificant, because they register losses or insignificant profits and the function of duty-free stores has no economic justification, because some companies declare accounting losses (between 7 and 82 millions lei) having as consequence the nonpayment of the annual profit tax. Also, following the verifications performed by the tax authorities, was observed a decrease of the volume of cigarettes sold by stores trading duty-free merchandises within the period of time in which the activity was monitored by the

commissaries of the Financial Guard and the employees of the National Customs Authority, and the fact that the duty-free stores activity is almost entirely dedicated to the presumptive trade of cigarettes to individuals traveling to Ukraine, Moldova and Serbia, countries in which the cigarettes price is lower than the price legally practiced in Romania, respectively 0,4 0,8 euro/pack in comparison to 1,2 1,7 euro/pack. In conclusion, the duty-free stores activity is an important source for the black market of cigarettes, generating contraband on the terrestrial frontier, at the border with Ukraine and Moldova as well as in the Constanta harbor. In conclusion, we can assert that in order to exercise its suzerainty, the state needs resources, for this reason being the holder of the public property right and the one that manages the general consolidated budget resources and if they are missing, the suzerainty would be severely compromised, meaning that this notion would be an institution without substance. The measures suggested by the presented normative act have the purpose to improve the discipline of private business operators, who are functioning in the regulated areas but also for a better collection of incomes to the state consolidated budget. In this moment the entire Romanian society is interested to outrun the global crises and to progress in order to reach the level required by the European Union regarding the economic, social and political level and this can be accomplished only by its own efforts.

Bibliography: OUG no.54/2010, for the efficiency of fighting tax evasion and contraband, Published in the Official Monitor of Romania no. 421 from June 23, 2010 The Councils Directive 77/388/CEE, from May 17, 1977, for the harmonization of Member States legislation regarding the turnover tax the common system of value added tax and the common taxation base , published in , JO L 145 from 13.06.1977, last time modified by Directive 2002/38/CE Special report no.8/2007 of the European Accounts Court regarding the administrative cooperation in the VAT field published in JO C 20 from 25.01.2008 The European Parliaments Resolution from December 4, 2008 regarding the special report no.8/2007 of the European Accounts Court regarding the administrative cooperation in the VAT field published in JO C 21 from28.01.2010.
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CONEXIUNEA DINTRE TRAFICUL DE DROGURI I NOILE TEHNOLOGII


Conf. univ. dr. GIUREA LAURENIU Academia de poliie A.I.Cuza OCTAVIAN VAR The article focuses on impact of new technologies on criminal groups, namely how they take advantage of new innovations in organizing illegal activities. New technologies are analyzed in terms of drug traffickers who use them in two different ways: to streamline the delivery and distribution of products through reliable and fast means of communication and to protect their illicit activities against investigations conducted by the services of legal repression, occasionally counterattacking. Cuvinte cheie: trafic de droguri, criminalitate informatic,internet, globalizare Globalizarea i noile tehnologii de comunicaii au adus societii nenumrate avantaje pe plan economic, educativ i cultural, avantaje care au permis acoperirea unor lacune care preau de nedepit acum zece ani. nc de la sfritul Rzboiului Rece, restriciile la care erau supuse operaiunile comerciale i financiare internaionale au disprut, iar liberalizarea acestor operaiuni a dat un imbold comerului internaional, n timp ce cderea comunismului n vechiul bloc estic a stimulat creterea noilor economii de pia i intensificarea circulaiei transfrontaliere a persoanelor, a mrfurilor i a capitalurilor. Numrul utilizatorilor de Internet din ntreaga lume, care se dubleaz practic la fiecare ase luni, era estimat la 700 de milioane la sfritul anului 2001139. Industria tehnologiilor informaiei a devenit un sector productiv la scal mondial, ea constituind o miz important att pentru rile dezvoltate ct i pentru cele n curs de dezvoltare. Pe lng dimensiunea economic, neLes defis en matiere de repression antidrogue a lere de la mondialisation et des nouvelles technologies, INCB (Organul Internaional de Control al Stupefiantelor), 2001.
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legerea economiilor naionale ntr-un sistem mondial unic, dominat de performana pieelor bursiere i a pieelor de capital, atinge nsi esena identitii culturale i sociale. Prbuirea barierelor ideologice a fost nsoit pe de o parte de o omogenizare economic, iar pe de alt parte, de o atomizare politic i social. n numeroase regiuni din lume, prosperitatea economic const n discriminarea srciei n cretere, n timp ce, n special n rile n curs de dezvoltare, legturile tradiionale care asigurau coeziunea social au fost slbite de rapiditatea schimbrilor. Vnztorii i traficanii de droguri exploateaz aceste neajunsuri ncercnd s dezvolte noi piee. De altfel, n ultimii zece ani, expansiunea activitii comerciale i financiare a permis delincvenilor s disimuleze mai bine att transporturile ilicite de mrfuri ca drogurile i precursorii, aflate sub control internaional, ct i profiturile obinute de pe urma acestora. Altfel spus, evoluia tehnologic i globalizarea schimburilor comerciale i financiare au favorizat progresul social, dar de asemenea au ncurajat att forme tradiionale ct i alte forme noi de criminalitate cu privire la droguri. n raporturile sale din 1997 i 1998, Or106

ganul Internaional de Control al Stupefiantelor a artat faptul c Internetul permitea schimbul de informaii i de sfaturi privitoare la consumul i la fabricarea drogurilor. n raportul din anul 2000, el i-a exprimat de asemenea preocuparea cu privire la elanul necontrolat al farmaciilor virtuale care promoveaz substanele aflate sub control i le vnd fr reet. Astfel de practici intr sub incidena art.10 din Convenia asupra substanelor psihotrope, semnat la Viena la 21 februarie 1971, care stipuleaz c prile, innd cont de dispoziiile lor constituionale, interzic anunurile publicitare care au ca obiect substanele psihotrope i care sunt destinate marelui public. Sintagma criminalitate informatic reunete numeroase tipuri de activiti, dar se refer n principal la infraciunile comise i/sau facilitate cu ajutorul mediilor electronice. Prin comparaie cu criminalitatea obinuit, criminalitatea informatic necesit mai puine resurse raportat la pagubele susceptibile de a fi produse; infraciunile informatice pot fi svrite ntr-un stat fr ca fptuitorul s fie prezent n mod fizic i, n numeroase ri, aceste infraciuni sunt diferite ntr-un mod inadecvat sau nu sunt deloc definite, n aa fel nct autorii lor se expun unui risc minor, iar probabilitatea ca ei s fie descoperii este mic140. Grupul criminal organizat independent, cu structura sa piramidal, are tendina de a face loc unor reele fluctuante structurate n celule, n care identificarea naional conteaz mai puin dect competena, dei nsi naionalitatea poate s conduc la o funcie dac ea permite accesul pe o nou pia sau penetrarea ori coruperea unei instituii private. Pentru infractorii transnaionali nu exist frontiere: desfurndu-i activitile n mai multe state, ei reduc la minim riscurile de a fi prini, maximiznd n
Les defis en matiere de repression antidrogue a lere de la mondialisation et des nouvelles technologies, INCB (Organul Internaional de Control al Stupefiantelor), 2001.
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acelai timp profiturile obinute, astfel nct niciun stat nu poate considera c o anumit activitate infracional organizat intr n ntregime n competena sa. Reeaua reprezint forma de organizare caracteristic globalizrii, att n sectorul licit ct i n sectorul ilicit. Pentru o organizaie care se ocup cu traficul de droguri, reeaua prezint avantaje incontestabile n raport cu sistemul ierarhic tradiional: ea cuprinde un nucleu dur bine protejat de organizaii sau de persoane conectat la o periferie mai larg printr-o multitudine de legturi, ceea ce sporete capacitatea sa de a scpa de aciunea serviciilor de represiune. Noile tehnologii sunt utilizate de ctre traficanii de droguri n dou moduri diferite: pentru a eficientiza livrarea i distribuirea produselor cu ajutorul unor mijloace de comunicaii sigure i rapide i pentru a proteja activitile lor ilicite de anchetele desfurate de ctre serviciile de represiune legal, uneori contraatacnd. Ele le permit s comit infraciuni clasice dup metode noi de exemplu, organizarea transportului de droguri ilicite cu ajutorul mesajelor codate, criptate sau splarea banilor provenii din traficul de droguri prin intermediul instrumentelor electronice i noi tipuri de infraciuni prin metode noi de exemplu, lansarea unui rzboi informatic sau a unui atac electronic pentru a contra aciunea de strngere de informaii a serviciilor de depistare i combatere a infraciunilor n materie de droguri141. Traficanii de droguri folosesc calculatoare i agende electronice pentru a stoca i depozita informaii utile (spre exemplu, numerele de conturi bancare, nume, adrese i alte informaii referitoare la colaboratorii lor, date cu privire la aciune, operaiunile financiare, coordonatele geografice ale pistelor de aterizare clandestine i reele de fabricare a drogurilor sintetice) ct i pentru
Les defis en matiere de repression antidrogue a lere de la mondialisation et des nouvelles technologies, INCB (Organul Internaional de Control al Stupefiantelor), 2001.
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a trimite scrisori electronice (e-mail) i alte forme de coresponden. Colaboratorii primesc prin telefon, fax, pager sau calculator instruciuni care le indic unde s livreze pachetele cu marf, persoanele de contact pentru transport i cei crora trebuie s le vireze profiturile realizate. Traficanii i asigur o mai bun protecie recurgnd la cartele telefonice prepltite, la frecvene radio cu band larg (lungi), la forumuri de pe Internet cu acces limitat, la codarea datelor, la telefonie prin satelit i la telefoane mobile clonate (codurile de identificare furnizate utilizatorilor legitimi sunt interceptate i programate, copiate pe telefoanele utilizate de ctre infractori). Membrii organizaiilor de traficani de droguri i pot programa calculatoarele astfel nct s detecteze orice tentativ de intruziune i s i rspund prin tehnici de contraatac menite s distrug sistemele anchetatorilor. Aceste tehnici sunt n special utile celor care organizeaz traficul de droguri, datorit faptului c acetia sunt foarte des obligai s-i prseasc locaia pentru a organiza sau a supraveghea operaiunile lor. Poliia antidrog din Regiunea administrativ special Hong Kong (China) a semnalat faptul c odat cu progresul comerului electronic i a serviciilor bancare pe Internet, a devenit mai dificil depistarea cazurilor de splare a banilor provenii din comercializarea drogurilor. Traficanii de droguri comunic ntre ei, n special, cu ajutorul telefoanelor mobile ce funcioneaz cu cartele pre-pltibile care pot fi cumprate de oricine. China a semnalat un caz de trafic de droguri, n care, pentru a evita depistarea drogurilor, traficanii au penetrat baza de date a vmilor pentru a falsifica caracteristicile i natura unui transport comercial de mrfuri. n Australia, traficanii profit de posibilitatea oferit tuturor clienilor societilor de mesagerie internaional de a urmri pachetele pe site-urile web ale acestor societi. O ntrziere poate sugera traficanilor
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c o operaiune de livrare supravegheat este pe punctul de a fi efectuat. Comisia interamerican de control a abuzului de droguri (CICAD), parte a Organizaiei statelor americane (OEA) a artat n Raportul emisferic 1999-2000 c Internetul a devenit mijlocul cel mai utilizat pentru a dezvolta producia de droguri sintetice n anumite ri din regiune i c globalizarea, comunicaiile rapide i transferurile electronice de fonduri au fost utilizate de gruprile criminale organizate pentru a mbunti eficacitatea activitilor lor de trafic de droguri. Serviciile antidrog din Republica Ceh a semnalat faptul c, n prezent, vnzrile i cumprrile de droguri ilicite sunt aranjate n cafenele-internet sau prin telefonul mobil. Datorit faptului c tranzaciile sunt aranjate n scurt timp i pe distane mici, interceptarea se dovedete mult mai dificil ca nainte. nc din 1996, societi cu sediul n rile de Jos utilizeaz Internetul pentru a vinde semine de cannabis i derivai ai cannabisului. Conform OIPC-Interpol, la nceputul anului 2000 autoritile din Regatul Unit al Marii Britanii i Irlandei de Nord au identificat n ntreaga lume mai mult de 1.000 de site-uri care ofer spre vnzare droguri ilicite, n special cannabis, dar i ecstasy, cocain i heroin, nclcnd n mod direct tratatele internaionale referitoare la controlul drogurilor. n rile de Jos i n Elveia aceste site-uri erau cele mai numeroase. n SUA, serviciile antidrog atribuie creterea rapid a confiscrilor efectuate n laboratoare utilizate pentru producerea ilicit a metamfetaminelor evoluiei tehnologiei i utilizrii intense a Internetului. n trecut, reetele pentru producerea drogurilor erau secrete aprate cu zel, dar n prezent, odat cu tehnicile informatice moderne i cu tendina n cretere de a mprti cunotinele ntre chimiti, aceste informaii sunt la dispoziia oricui are acces la un calculator. Nu mai este necesar s ai studii n

chimie pentru a produce amfetamine: mai puin de 10% dintre suspecii arestai pentru producerea ilicit de metamfetamin sunt chimiti calificai, ceea ce explic numeroasele incidente, explozii i rniri n laboratoarele clandestine. O anchet comun a serviciilor antidrog din Columbia i SUA a dus la arestarea a 31 de traficani n octombrie 1999 i a relevat c traficanii au comunicat cu ajutorul forumurilor de pe Internet protejate de firewall-uri menite a le face impenetrabile. Datele i informaiile detaliate cu privire la activitile lor zilnice au fost nregistrate pe un calculator ce se afla la bordul unei nave din largul coastelor mexicane, n aa fel nct chiar dac era posibil s fie sparte alte calculatoare, reeaua nu putea fi demascat n ntregime. Aceeai grupare a recurs la tehnici de codare pe care serviciile de combatere nu au putut s le descifreze n timp util pentru a putea exploata informaiile. Aceste metode, alturi de clonarea telefoanelor mobile, au permis traficanilor s transporte sute de tone de cocain de-a lungul anilor, fr a fi depistai. Cartelurile columbiene i mexicane de traficani folosesc tehnic modern pentru a-i spiona pe agenii poliiei; ei adun fotografii ale agenilor antidrog i culeg alte informaii cu privire la acetia. Acest lucru sa ntmplat i n Europa. n anul 1995, un grup de traficani din rile de Jos a recrutat informaticieni (specialiti IT) pentru a desfura operaiuni de piraterie i pentru a le coda convorbirile. Traficanii utilizau calculatoare de buzunar (PDA) dotate cu un software de criptare a datelor pentru a stoca n siguran date i informaii despre autoturismele neinscripionate ale poliiei i ale serviciilor de informaii. Un laptop i dischete aparinnd autoritilor antidrog au fost furate, iar informaiile obinute de pe urma acestora au fost folosite pentru a intercepta convorbirile dintre poliiti care au

fost supravegheai i ameninai142. Creterea vertiginoas a vnzrilor online de medicamente eliberate pe baz de reet medical constituie o provocare serioas pentru cei responsabili nsrcinai cu reglementarea privind calitatea nevtmtoare a medicamentelor i pentru serviciile de descoperire i combatere. n trecut, Organul Internaional de Control al Stupefiantelor a atras atenia asupra faptului c Internetul este folosit pentru a schimba mesaje i informaii care fac apologia drogului, n special n rndul tinerilor. O simpl cutare pe Internet este suficient pentru ca, n cteva minute, s obii instruciuni detaliate pentru producerea unei game largi de droguri de sintez, procurarea precursorilor aflai sub control internaional i instalarea laboratoarelor clandestine de producere a drogurilor. Grupul de aciune financiar mpotriva splrii banilor (GAFI) a atras atenia asupra faptului c Internetul prezint riscurile clasice ale albirii banilor: facilitatea accesului, depersonalizarea legturilor ntre client i banc i rapiditatea tranzaciilor electronice. Globalizarea pieelor financiare poate fi considerat ca un factor de risc suplimentar. Dei plata cu lichiditi este probabil cea mai utilizat metod de plat pentru cumprarea drogurilor la nivel local, crearea de noi piee mondiale de valori mobiliare, de obligaiuni, de operaiuni la termen, de devize i de produse derivate a mrit numrul operaiunilor ce permit deplasarea unor sume importante de bani prin mijloace electronice rapid, uor i n secret, oferind condiii ideale pentru cei care se ocup cu splarea banilor provenii din traficul de droguri. Utilizarea crilor de credit i a serviciilor bancare online au redus legturile personale ntre angajaii bncilor i clieni,
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precum i eficacitatea mecanismelor ce permit verificarea legitimitii tranzaciilor financiare. Cazinourile fiind nc de demult utilizate pentru albirea fondurilor ce provin din traficul de droguri i din alte activiti criminale, este logic c acest tip de activitate s se dezvolte pe internet. Chiar dac numeroase instituii clasice aplic de acum nainte proceduri mpotriva splrii banilor, cazinourile virtuale au devenit o activitate nfloritoare, care nu este supus nici unei reglementri. n martie 2001, un site al pasionailor de jocuri a inventariat peste

12.000 de pagini web i 2043 de cazinouri virtuale. n ultimii ani, sectorul serviciilor financiare a devenit din ce n ce mai concurenial, ceea ce a determinat numeroase bnci s renune la controalele prealabile pentru a evita depunerea fondurilor clienilor lor la alte bnci concurente. Pe aceast pia din ce n ce mai concurenial, instituiile financiare risc s considere respectarea msurilor mpotriva splrii banilor ca incompatibile cu bunul mers al afacerilor, de a-i ataa un grad de prioritate mic i de a-i consacra resurse puine i personal slab pregtit.

Bibliografie: Raport de evaluare 2007 privind stadiul realizrii activitilor prevzute pentru anul 2006 n Planul de aciune n vederea implementrii Strategiei Naionale Antidrog, n perioada 2005-2008, Agenia Naional Antidrog, Bucureti, 2007 Raport de evaluare Semestrul I/2007 privind stadiul realizrii activitilor prevzute pentru semestrul I/2007 n Planul de aciune n vederea implementrii Strategiei Naionale Antidrog, n perioada 2005-2008, Agenia Naional Antidrog, Bucureti, 2007 Raport naional privind situaia drogurilor, Agenia Naional Antidrog- Observatorul Romn de Droguri i Toxicomanii, Bucureti, 2007 Raportul anual 2007 Situaia drogurilor n Europa, Observatorul European pentru Droguri i Toxicomanie (OEDT) Raportul anual de activitate al OIPC- Interpol, 2006 (versiunea public) Raportul Europol privind criminalitatea organizat n cadrul Uniunii Europene, versiunea public, decembrie 2004 Raportul Organului Internaional de Control al Stupefiantelor, Organizaia Naiunilor Unite, 2006 Precursori i produse chimice utilizate frecvent la fabricarea ilicit a stupefiantelor i substanelor psihotrope Raportul Organului Internaional de Control al Stupefiantelor, Organizaia Naiunilor Unite, 2005

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ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMINAL OFEFNCES IN GAMBLES FIELD IN ROMANIA


SORIN CONSTANTINESCU President of the Romanian Association of Casinos Organizers Police Inspector BOGDAN ALEXANDRU DOMNCA Office Chief, IPJ Covasna The organization and operation of the gaming activity in the Romanian territory constitutes states monopoly and is carried on exclusively under the conditions of the legal rules in force and of the provisions of the Community rules in the field. In articles content we will present the classification of the gambles and the analysis of the main criminal offences in the reference field. Keywords: gambles, casino, lotto, Bingo, bets, criminal offences Gambles Classification. a) lotto games, if the purely random results of some events consisting in the drawing of numbers, letters, tickets or symbols are used, regardless the procedures and characteristics of the means used for making the extractions (urns, wheels, cups and other similar means), which are not carried out in gamblers presence. In this category are included: the lotteries, including the instant ones, and any gamble that is not carried out in gamblers presence and that consists in the drawing of numbers, letters, symbols, forms or tickets, through which various winnings may be obtained, determined by events not carried out in the physical presence of the gamblers, except the gambles defined hereinafter; b) bets, if the results of events to take place without organizers involvement are used. The bet is a gamble in which the participant must indicate the results of events to take place or which are randomly generated by an independent computer system. In this category are included: pool betting, within which the prize is distributed to the participants declared winners proportionally with the number of the winning variants held by each of the said, the organizer being involved only in the process of participation taxes collection
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and distribution of the amounts determined with title of prizes, according to the provisions of the respective gaming regulations; betting on fixed rate, within which the organizer is the one who establishes based on own criteria and informs the participants the multiplying rates of the stakes in case the gambled variants are declared winners, according to the provisions of the respective gaming regulations. The value of each winning is fixed by the regulation (fixed amount or stake multiple) independent of stakes total; c) gambles characteristic to casinos activity, if the events take place with the help of some specific gaming means, in the physical presence of the participants, with or without their direct participation. The used specific gaming means may be: playing cards, dices, roulette balls, roulettes and gaming tables, including their auxiliary installations, as well as other gaming means established by Government resolution; d) slot-machine games, if the events are organized in the physical presence of the participants through specific machines, equipment and installations, and the winnings depend on hazard; e) Bingo games carried out gaming rooms, with winnings generated by random elements, organized by using lottery type

complex drawing equipment, which are characterized by successive drawings and prize-giving, in the physical presence of the gamblers; f) Bingo games organized through television networks systems, with winnings generated by random elements, organized by using lottery type complex drawing equipment, which are characterized by successive drawings and prize-giving, without the physical presence of the gamblers; For the previously listed gambles, as well as for any other types of games of chance organized under the conditions established by the present emergency ordinance it is compulsory to hold the gambles organization license, namely the authorization for gambles operation. The following types of games are not considered gambles and are allowed without authorization: a) tombola organized in schools, kindergartens and in other collectivities and which have an amusing and non-profit nature for the organizers; b) the amusing type games, operated through machines, instruments, devices of any kind and that do not imply winnings based on random elements, but have as purpose the testing of the force, intelligence and dexterity of the participant; c) the actions organized by different economic operators, under the law, in order to stimulate the sales and which do not imply participation tax, namely no additional expense for the participants nor the increase of the price that the product had prior to the carryout of the advertisement action. CRIMINAL OFFENCES PROVIDED BY THE LEGISLATION IN FORCE THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE PROVIDED FOR IN ART. 23 PAR. 1143 Legal contents and characterization. Criminal offence constitutes the act committed by the director, manager or other le143

Government Emergency Ordinance no. 77/26.06.2009 regarding gambles organization and operation

gal representative of a legal entity or natural person, as the case may be, to carry on without license or authorization any of the activities in the gaming field. Criminal offences structure A. Object of the criminal offence a) The generic juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 23 par. 1 of Government Emergency Ordinance O.U.G. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships whose normal ongoing and development is not possible without observing the legal regulations ruling the entire activity of gambles organization and operation. b) The special juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 23 par. 1 of O.UG. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships which imply a correct conduct of the director, manager or other legal representative of a legal entity or natural person, as the case may be, in gambles organization observing the legal provisions, which impose the obtaining of a license or authorization in order to function. c) The material object may be constituted by the falsified documents out of which to result that the activity in gaming field is carried on based on license or authorization. If the director does not present any document the criminal offence would not have a material object. B. Subjects of the criminal offence. a) The direct active subject of the criminal offence provided for in art. 23 par. 1 is not qualified in case of the natural person; the said can be any person who fulfills the general conditions of criminal liability. In exchange, in case of the legal entity, the said is qualified being about the director, manager or other legal representative of the said. b) The passive subject is the State which, through the Ministry of Finance, namely the Gambles Authorization Commission with the said, carries out the activity of organization and operation of the gambles.

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Constitutive contents A. The objective side of the criminal offence. a) The material element of the criminal offence provided for in art. 23 par. 1 is concretized in the carryon without license or authorization of any activity in gambles field. The organization and operation of the gaming activity in the Romanian territory constitutes states monopoly and is carried out under the conditions of the present emergency ordinance. The State may grant the right to organize and operate the gaming activity under the conditions of this emergency ordinance, based on gambles organization license on each activity type, as classified by this emergency ordinance, and on gambles operation authorization, nominal documents limited in time, to be operated directly by license holder. The authorization activity of the organization and operation of the gambles is carried out by the Ministry of Finance through Gambles Authorization Commission, hereinafter referred to as Commission, which is organized and operates at the level of the said Ministry, under the conditions established by this emergency ordinance, the methodological rules to apply the same, as well as by other normative acts with incidence in the matter. The legal provisions related to tacit approval procedure do not apply within licenses granting procedure for gambles organization or for the authorizations for gambles operation. The gambles operation authorization is valid for one year from its granting date, as follows: a) in case of lotto games: for the entire activity that implies drawings of numbers, letters, tickets or symbols, regardless the procedures and characteristics of the means used for performing the drawings (urns, wheels, cups and other similar means) that are not carried out in gamblers presence; b) in case of bets: for the basic gaming means through which the organization and unitary operation at organizers level of each distinct activity is carried out;
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c) in case of the gambles characteristic to casinos activity: each organizer is granted a single gambles operation authorization for the location where such activities are organized and performed; d) in case of Bingo games carried out in gaming rooms: for each location where such activities are organized and performed; e) in case of slot-machine type games: for each gaming means. The immediate result consists in the creation of a danger state for the trading activities constituting states monopoly. The causality link results from incriminated action commission. The subjective side. The guilt form under which such criminal offence is committed is the direct or indirect intention. The existence of any mobile or purpose as constitutive elements of the criminal offence is not required, the said being considered in penalty individualization. Preparatory acts and attempt, although possible, are left outside incrimination by the lawmaker. The criminal offence is consumed at the time of commencement of the carryon without license of the activities constituting states monopoly. Being a continuous criminal offence, consequently there will be also at time of ending, this being the cessation of the criminal activity. The law provides for a single normative modality of such criminal offence, namely the carryon without license, which may be carried out in several factual modalities determined by the field constituting states monopoly disregarded by the active subject. The criminal offense is punished with imprisonment from 1 to 3 years or with fine. THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE PROVIDED FOR IN ART. 23 PAR. 2 LETTER A) 144 Legal contents and characterization. Criminal offense is constituted by the or144

Government Emergency Ordinance no. 77/26.06.2009 regarding gambles organization and operation

ganization of gambles through communications systems type internet or intranet, as well as through other communications systems (land-lines or mobile phones) or assimilated to the said. Criminal offences structure A. Object of the criminal offence. a) The generic juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 23 par. 2 letter. a) of O.UG. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships whose normal ongoing and development is not possible without observing the legal regulations ruling the entire activity of gambles organization and operation. b) The special juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 23 par. 2 letter a) of O.UG. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships regarding the organization of the gambles through communications systems type internet or intranet, as well as through other communications systems or assimilated to the said. c) The criminal offence does not have material object. B. Subjects of the criminal offence. a) The direct active subject of the criminal offence provided for in art. 23 par. 2 letter a) is not qualified. b) The passive subject is the State. Constitutive contents A. The objective side of the criminal offence. a) The material element of the criminal offence provided for in art. 23 par. 2 letter a) consists in the organization of the games through communications systems type internet or intranet, as well as through other communications systems (land-lines or mobile phones) or assimilated to the said. Under art. 23 par. 4 in the meaning of this emergency ordinance, it does not constitute organization of gambles through communications systems type internet or intranet, as well as through other communications systems (land-lines or mobile phones) or assimilated to the said, if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: a) the activities are carried out by the
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gambles organizers based on the approved gaming rules; b) the communications systems are strictly used by the organizers in order to operate the gambles for which they have been authorized or facilitate only the communication between the organizers and the participants. The immediate result consists in the creation of a danger state for the trading activities constituting states monopoly. The causality link results from the commitment of the incriminated action. The subjective side. The guilt form under which such criminal offence is committed is the direct or indirect intention. The existence of a mobile or purpose as constitutive elements of the criminal offence is not required, the said being although considered at penalty individualization. The preparatory acts and the attempt, although possible, are left outside the incrimination by the lawmaker. The criminal offence is consumed at the time of gambles organization through telecommunications systems type internet or intranet, as well as through the telecommunications systems. Being a continuous criminal offence, consequently there will be also an ending time, that of criminal activity cessation. The law provides for a single normative modality of such criminal offence. The criminal offence is punished with imprisonment from 1 to 5 years or with fine. THE CRIMINAL OFFENCES PROVIDED FOR IN ART. 23 PAR. 2 LETTERS B)-F) Legal contents and characterization. The following acts constitute criminal offence: b) gambles organization through radio networks or through other assimilated transmission means; c) bets organization based on the results of some clandestine contests organized under other conditions than the ones provided by the legal rules in force;

d) organization of clandestine games whose results may be influenced by the dexterity of the operator of the gaming means in order to obtain incomes; e) organization of Bingo games, based on the same gambles operation authorizations, in more than one location; f) organization of contest-games with any kind of winnings through land-lines or other telecommunications systems, television or radio, by which the obtaining of some material advantages is conditioned as result of the answers formulated at questions of general culture, intelligence or perspicacity and which imply a participation tax. Structure of the criminal offence. A. Object of the criminal offence. a) The special juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 23 par. 2 letter b)-f) of O.UG. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships regarding the organization of the gambles. b) The criminal offence does not have material object. B. Subjects of the criminal offence. a) The direct active subject of the criminal offence provided for in art. 23 par. 2 letter b)-f) is not qualified. b) The passive subject is the State. Constitutive contents A. The objective side of the criminal offence. a) The material element of the criminal offence provided for in art. 23 par. 2 letter b)-f) consists in the organization of: gambles through radio networks or through other assimilated transmission means; bets organization based on the results of some clandestine contests organized under other conditions than the ones provided by the legal rules in force; clandestine games whose results may be influenced by the dexterity of the operator of the gaming means in order to obtain incomes Under art. 23 par. 3 the meaning of the term clandestine contests and clandestine games will be the one provided for in the
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methodological rules for the application of the present emergency ordinance145. - Bingo games, based on the same gambles operation authorizations, in more than one location4; - contest-games with any kind of winnings through land-lines or other telecommunications systems, television or radio, by which the obtaining of some material advantages is conditioned as result of the answers formulated at questions of general culture, intelligence or perspicacity and which imply a participation tax. In order to achieve the objective side of the criminal offence provided for in art. 23 par. 2 letter f) three essential requirements should be met. In connection with the first requirement it must be about contestgames with winnings of any kind through land-lines or other telecommunications systems, television or radio. Regarding the second requirement it must be a connection between the obtaining of material advantages and the formulation of answers at questions of general culture, intelligence or perspicacity. The third requirement implies charging a participation tax. The immediate result consists in the creation of a danger state for the trading activities constituting states monopoly. The causality link results from the commitment of the incriminated action.
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According to art. 78 of Resolution no. 870 of 29 July 2009: (1) In the meaning of art. 23 par. (3) of the emergency ordinance, clandestine contests organized under other conditions than the ones provided by the legal regulations in force mean those contests that are not carried out in an organized and approved by the authorities framework, such as: dogs, cocks and other animals fights, auto racing carried out under other conditions than the ones for which authorizations are held etc. (2) In the meaning of art. 23 par. (3) of the emergency ordinance, organization of clandestine games whose results may be influenced by the dexterity of the operator of the gaming means in order to obtain some incomes means the games type blackwhite using gaming means such as: playing cards, rubbers with stamps, covers with cereal grains, caps with ball etc.

The subjective side. The guilt form under which such criminal offence is committed is the direct or indirect intention. The existence of a mobile or purpose as constitutive elements of the criminal offence is not required, the said being although considered at penalty individualization. The preparatory acts and the attempt, although possible, are left outside the incrimination by the lawmaker. The criminal offence is consumed at the time of gambles organization with legal provisions infringement. Being a continuous criminal offence, consequently there will be also an ending time, that of criminal activity cessation. The law provides for five normative modalities of such criminal offence, which may be carried out through several factual modalities. The criminal offence is punished with imprisonment from 1 to 5 years or with fine. THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE PROVIDED FOR IN ART. 24 PAR. 1146. Legal contents and characterization. Criminal offence is constituted by the organization and carryon of games or activities, regardless their name, by which it is proposed to some people to deposit or collect moneys or to register on a list, making them to hope in financial gains resulted from the number of recruited or registered persons, regardless how such collection or registration on lists is made in order to obtain for himself or for another an unfair material gain. Structure of the criminal offence. A. Object of the criminal offence. a) The generic juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 24 par. 1 of O.UG. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships whose normal ongoing and development is not possible without observing the legal regulations ruling the entire activity of gambles organization and operation.
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Government Emergency Ordinance no. 77/26.06.2009 regarding gambles organization and operation

b) The special juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 24 par. 1 of O.UG. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships related to gambles organization, by which the carryon of pyramid type games is prohibited. c) The criminal offence does not have material object. The possible amounts deposited or collected will be subject to special seizure, constituting the product of the criminal offence according to art. 118 letter e) Criminal code. B. Subjects of the criminal offence. a) The direct active subject of the criminal offence provided for in art. 24 par. 1 is not qualified. b) The main passive subject is the State. The criminal offence may have also a secondary passive subject, this being the person who was recruited in order to participate in such games. Constitutive contents A. The objective side of the criminal offence. a) The material element of the criminal offence provided for by art. 24 par. 1 consists in the organization and carryon of games or activities, regardless their name, by which it is proposed to some people to deposit or collect moneys or to register on a list, making them to hope in financial gains resulted from the number of recruited or registered persons, regardless how such collection or registration on lists is made in order to obtain for himself or for another an unfair material gain. In order to achieve the objective side of the criminal offence provided for in art. 24 par. 1 the following essential requirements should be met: a. to be about the organization or carryon of games or activities, regardless their name; b. by such games to propose to some persons to deposit or collect moneys or to register on a list, making them to hope in financial gains ; c. the financial games to be the direct result of the increase of the number of recruited or registered persons;
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d. the purpose of the recruitment or registration on lists must be constituted by the obtaining for him or for another an unfair material gain. The immediate result consists in the creation of a danger state for the trading activities constituting states monopoly. The causality link results from the commitment of the incriminated action. The subjective side. The guilt form under which such criminal offence is committed is the direct or indirect intention. The existence of a mobile or purpose as constitutive elements of the criminal offence is not required, the said being although considered at penalty individualization. The preparatory acts and the attempt, although possible, are left outside the incrimination by the lawmaker. The criminal offence is consumed at the time of gambles organization. Being a continuous criminal offence, consequently there will be also an ending time, that of criminal activity cessation. The law provides for a single normative modality of such criminal offence, which may be carried out by several factual modalities. The criminal offence is punished with imprisonment from 2 to 7 years. THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE PROVIDED FOR IN ART. 24 PAR. 2. Legal contents and characterization. Criminal offense is constituted by the deed to propose repeatedly to some persons to deposit or collect monies or to register on a list under the conditions provided for at par. (1). Structure of the criminal offence. A. Object of the criminal offence. a) The generic juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 24 par. 2 of O.UG. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships whose normal ongoing and development is not possible without observing the legal regulations ruling the entire activity of gambles organization and operation. b) The special juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 24 par.
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2 of O.UG. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships related to gambles organization, by which the carryon of pyramid type games is prohibited. c) The criminal offence does not have material object. The possible amounts deposited or collected will be subject to special seizure, constituting the product of the criminal offence according to art. 118 letter e) Criminal code. B. Subjects of the criminal offence. a) The direct active subject of the criminal offence provided for in art. 24 par. 2 is not qualified. b) The main passive subject is the State. The criminal offence may have also a secondary passive subject, this being the person who was recruited in order to participate in such games. Constitutive contents A. The objective side of the criminal offence. a) The material element of the criminal offence provided for by art. 24 par. 2 consists in the proposal, repeatedly, to some persons to deposit or collect monies or to register on a list under the conditions provided for at par. (1). From lawmakers expression it results that the existence of repeated proposal actions from a person is imposed. Criminal offence will not be constituted by a simple proposal from the part of the active subject. The immediate result consists in the creation of a danger state for the trading activities constituting states monopoly. The causality link results from the commitment of the incriminated action. The subjective side. The guilt form under which such criminal offence is committed is the direct or indirect intention. The existence of a mobile or purpose as constitutive elements of the criminal offence is not required, the said being although considered at penalty individualization. The preparatory acts and the attempt, although possible, are left outside the incrimination by the lawmaker. The

criminal offence is consumed at the time of gambles organization. Being a continuous criminal offence, consequently there will be also an ending time, that of criminal activity cessation. The law provides for a single normative modality of such criminal offence, which may be carried out by several factual modalities. The criminal offence is punished with imprisonment from one to 3 years or with fine. THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE PROVIDED FOR IN ART. 25 LETTER A) 147 Legal contents and characterization. Criminal offence is constituted by the deed of any person who alters or replaces by any means the result of a game subsequent to its establishment. Criminal offences structure A. Object of the criminal offence. a) The generic juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 25 letter a) of O.UG. nr. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships whose normal ongoing and development is not possible without observing the legal regulations ruling the entire activity of gambles organization and operation. b) The special juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 25 letter a) of O.UG. nr. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships regarding gambles organization, which implies the presentation, correctly, of a game result. c) The criminal offence has material object, the said being represented by the material support on which the criminal activity of alteration or replacement of a game result was carried out. B. Subjects of the criminal offence. a) The direct active subject of the criminal offence provided for in art. 25 letter a) is not qualified. b) The main passive subject is the State. The criminal offence may have also a secondary passive subject, this being the
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individual or entity who has been damaged as result of the alteration or replacement of gambles result. Constitutive contents A. The objective side of the criminal offence. a) The material element of the criminal offence provided for by art. 25 letter a) is constituted by the alteration or replacement of a game result. In order to achieve the material element also other requirements should be fulfilled: a) the alteration or replacement to be carried out by any means; b) games result alteration or replacement activity to be subsequent to its establishment. The immediate result consists in the creation of a danger state for the trading activities constituting states monopoly. The causality link results from the commitment of the incriminated action. The subjective side. The guilt form under which such criminal offence is committed is the direct or indirect intention. The existence of a mobile or purpose as constitutive elements of the criminal offence is not required, the said being although considered at penalty individualization. The preparatory acts and the attempt, although possible, are left outside the incrimination by the lawmaker. The criminal offence is consumed at the time of gambles organization. Being a continuous criminal offence, consequently there will be also an ending time, that of criminal activity cessation. The law provides for a single normative modality of such criminal offence, which may be carried out by several factual modalities. The criminal offence is punished with imprisonment from 6 months to 2 years or with fine. THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE PROVIDED FOR IN ART. 25 LETTER B) 148 Legal contents and characterization. Criminal offence is constituted by the deed
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Government Emergency Ordinance no. 77/26.06.2009 regarding gambles organization and operation

Government Emergency Ordinance no. 77/26.06.2009 regarding gambles organization and operation

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of any person who places or changes a stake after the time when the result of a game was established. Criminal offences structure A. Object of the criminal offence. a) The generic juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 25 letter b) of O.UG. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships whose normal ongoing and development is not possible without observing the legal regulations ruling the entire activity of gambles organization and operation. b) The special juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 25 letter b) of O.UG. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships regarding gambles organization, which implies the presentation, correctly, of a game result. c) The criminal offence does not have material object. B. Subjects of the criminal offence. a) The direct active subject of the criminal offence provided for in art. 25 letter b) is not qualified. b) The main passive subject is the State. The criminal offence may have also a secondary passive subject, this being the individual or entity that has been damaged as result of the placement or change of the stake subsequent to establishing games result. The constitutive contents A. The objective side of the criminal offence. a) The material element of the criminal offence provided for by art. 25 letter b) is constituted by the placement or change of a stake subsequent to games result establishment. The immediate result consists in the creation of a danger state for the trading activities constituting states monopoly. The causality link results from the commitment of the incriminated action. The subjective side. The guilt form under which such criminal offence is committed is the direct or indirect intention. The existence of a mobile or purpose as constitutive elements of the criminal offence
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is not required, the said being although considered at penalty individualization. The preparatory acts and the attempt, although possible, are left outside the incrimination by the lawmaker. The criminal offence is consumed at the time of gambles organization. Being a continuous criminal offence, consequently there will be also an ending time, that of criminal activity cessation. The law provides for a single normative modality of such criminal offence, which may be carried out by several factual modalities. The criminal offence is punished with imprisonment from 6 months to 2 years or with fine. THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE PROVIDED FOR IN ART. 25 LETTER C) Legal contents and characterization. Criminal offence is constituted by the deed of any person who uses or holds in order to use in a gaming room any device by whose use the chance elements and the selection methods by which the games result, the amount or payment frequency in a gamble is changed are altered. Criminal offences structure A. Object of the criminal offence. a) The generic juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 25 letter c) of O.U.G. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships whose normal ongoing and development is not possible without observing the legal regulations ruling the entire activity of gambles organization and operation. b) The special juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 25 letter c) of O.UG. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships regarding gambles organization, relationships that are carried out without the fraudulent use of devices in the gaming rooms. c) The criminal offence has material object, the said being represented by the device used by the offender in order to alter the chance elements. Furthermore, we appreciate that the material object of the

criminal offence may be constituted also by the element over which the alteration action is exercised. B. Subjects of the criminal offence. a) The direct active subject of the criminal offence provided for in art. 25 letter c) is not qualified, any person who fulfills the conditions of criminal liability being able to commit the deed. b) The main passive subject is the State. The criminal offence may have also a secondary passive subject, this being the individual or entity who has been damaged as a result of the placement or change of a stake after the result of the game was fixed. The constitutive contents A. The objective side of the criminal offence. a) The material element of the criminal offence provided for by art. 25 letter c) is constituted by the use or holding in order to use in a gaming room any device by whose use the chance elements and the selection methods by which the games result, the amount or payment frequency in a gamble is changed are altered. Essential requirements: a) the offender to use or hold in order to use in a gaming room any device; b) the device must be held or used in order to alter the chance elements and the selection methods; c) the alteration to be of a nature as to change games result, the amount of payment frequency in a gamble. The immediate result consists in the creation of a danger state for the trading activities constituting states monopoly. The causality link results from the commitment of the incriminated action. The subjective side. The guilt form under which such criminal offence is committed is the direct or indirect intention. The existence of a mobile or purpose as constitutive elements of the criminal offence is not required, the said being although considered at penalty individualization. The preparatory acts and the attempt, although possible, are left outside
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the incrimination by the lawmaker. The criminal offence is consumed at the time of gambles organization. Being a continuous criminal offence, consequently there will be also an ending time, that of criminal activity cessation. The law provides for a single normative modality of such criminal offence, which may be carried out by several factual modalities. The criminal offence is punished with imprisonment from 6 months to 2 years or with fine. THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE PROVIDED FOR IN ART. 25 LETTER D) Legal contents and characterization. Criminal offence is constituted by the deed of any person who uses or holds in order to use in a gaming room tokens or any other material supports of the participation tax in the respective games counterfeits, knowing that the said are counterfeited. Criminal offences structure A. Object of the criminal offence. a) The generic juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 25 letter d) of O.UG. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships whose normal ongoing and development is not possible without observing the legal regulations ruling the entire activity of gambles organization and operation. b) The special juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 25 letter d) of O.UG. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships regarding gambles organization, relationships carried out without the fraudulent use of counterfeited tokens in the gaming rooms. c) The criminal offence has material object, this being represented by the tokens or any other material supports of the participation tax in the respective games counterfeited. B. Subjects of the criminal offence. a) The direct active subject of the criminal offence provided for in art. 25 letter d) is not qualified, any person who fulfills the conditions of criminal liability being able to commit the deed.

b) The main passive subject is the State. The criminal offence may have also a secondary passive subject, this being the individual or entity who has been damaged as result of. The constitutive contents A. The objective side of the criminal offence. a) The material element of the criminal offence provided for by art. 25 letter d) is constituted by the use or holding in order to use in a gaming room tokens149 - or any other material supports of the participation tax in the respective games counterfeits, knowing that the said are counterfeited. In order to achieve the material element an essential requirement must be fulfilled: the offender to have known that the tokens or any other material support of the participation tax in the respective games are counterfeited. The immediate result consists in the creation of a danger state for the trading activities constituting states monopoly. The causality link results from the commitment of the incriminated action. The subjective side. The guilt form under which such criminal offence is committed is only the direct intention, being required that the offender to have known that the tokens are counterfeited. The existence of a mobile or purpose as constitutive elements of the criminal offence is not required, the said being although considered at penalty individualization. The preparatory acts and the attempt, although possible, are left outside the incrimination by the lawmaker. The criminal offence is consumed at the time of gambles organization. Being a continuous criminal offence, consequently there will be also an ending time, that of criminal activity cessation. The law provides for a single normative modality of such criminal offence, which may be carried out by several
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factual modalities. The criminal offence is punished with imprisonment from 6 months to 2 years or with fine. THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE PROVIDED FOR IN ART. 25 LETTER E) Legal contents and characterization. Criminal offence is constituted by the deed of any person who organizes or operates fraudulent games; Criminal offences structure A. Object of the criminal offence. a) The generic juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 25 letter e) of O.UG. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships whose normal ongoing and development is not possible without observing the legal regulations ruling the entire activity of gambles organization and operation. b) The special juridical object of the criminal offence provided for in art. 25 letter e) of O.UG. no. 77/2009 is formed by the social relationships regarding gambles organization under the law, the organization or operation of fraudulent games being prohibited. c) The criminal offence does not have material object. B. Subjects of the criminal offence. a) The direct active subject of the criminal offence provided for in art. 25 letter e) is not qualified, any person who fulfills the conditions of criminal liability being able to commit the deed. b) The main passive subject is the State. The criminal offence may have also a secondary passive subject; this being the individual or entity who has been damaged as a result of the placement or change of a stake after the result of the game was fixed. The constitutive contents A. The objective side of the criminal offence. a) The material element of the criminal offence provided for by art. 25 letter e) is constituted by the organization and operation of fraudulent games;
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under art. 5 par. 4 auxiliary gaming means representing tokens, impulses, tickets or other similar constitute financial means that may concur at gambles organization and operation

Under art. 9 fraudulent gambles means those gambles by which to the approved gaming means the initial data or parameters are changed, so as to damage the chance elements or selection methods. The immediate result consists in the creation of a danger state for the trading activities constituting states monopoly. The causality link results from the commitment of the incriminated action. The subjective side. The guilt form under which such criminal offence is committed is the direct or indirect intention. The existence of a mobile or purpose as constitutive elements of the criminal offence is not required, the said being al-

though considered at penalty individualization. The preparatory acts and the attempt, although possible, are left outside the incrimination by the lawmaker. The criminal offence is consumed at the time of gambles organization. Being a continuous criminal offence, consequently there will be also an ending time, that of criminal activity cessation. The law provides for a single normative modality of such criminal offence, which may be carried out by several factual modalities. The criminal offence is punished with imprisonment from 6 months to 2 years or with fine.

Bibliography: Government Emergency Ordinance no. 77/26.06.2009 regarding gambles organization and operation Government Resolution no. 870/29.07.2009 for the approval of the Methodological Regulations for the application of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 77/2009 regarding gambles organization and operation

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TRAFICUL INTERNAIONAL CU VEHICULE FURATE, COMPONENT A CRIMINALITII TRANSFRONTALIERE


Lect.univ. dr. UPULAN CLAUDIU Asist.univ.drd. TEFAN CRISTIAN-EDUARD Academia de Poliie A.I. Cuza Catedra de Investigare a Criminalitii In the wording of the article, the author describe the main features of international traffic in stolen vehicles, a major component of cross-border crime. Cuvinte cheie: trafic, furt de vehicule, criminalitate transfrontalier Adesea ignorat i marginalizat datorit importanei acordate altor forme de trafic (traficul de droguri, de persoane, de arme etc.), traficul internaional cu vehicule furate cunoate, de mai muli ani, o expansiune considerabil. n ultimii ani furtul de autoturisme i traficarea acestora a devenit una dintre formele cele mai active de manifestare a crimei organizate. Att pe continentul nord-american ct i n Europa, bande de clas internaional, asemntoare clanurilor mafiote, organizeaz furturi i aciuni de contraband cu autoturisme, la un nivel ngrijortor. Numai n Canada se apreciaz c ntr-un an sunt furate autoturisme n valoare de aproximativ un miliard de dolari i numai 12% dintre hoi sunt prini. Acest lucru supune la mari pierderi companiile de asigurri din aceast ar150. n unele studii de specialitate s-a menionat faptul c traficul de vehicule furate reprezint un fenomen infracional devenit o afacere global. Dezvoltarea economiei de pia n unele ri a condus la apariia unei cereri pentru autovehicule de lux, care nu putea fi ndeplinit de productorii interni, n acest sens fiind implicate gruprile infracionale organizate151.
Tonel Tilea Impactul crimei organizate asupra economiei mondiale (tez de doctorat), Academia de Studii Economice, Bucureti, 2006, pag.61 151 Michael G. Maxfield, Ronald V. Clarke Understanding and Preventing Car Theft (Crime
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n majoritatea cazurilor, vehiculele care fac obiectul traficrii sunt automobilele de lux. Potrivit datelor OIPC-Interpol, traficul de vehicule furate este o activitate infracional care aduce anual venituri gruprilor din ntreaga lume, n valoare de aproximativ 450 de miliarde de dolari. n urma statisticilor realizate, s-a constatat c dispar anual 3 milioane de vehicule, sau un vehicul este furat la fiecare zece secunde n ntreaga lume. n urma unui comunicat de pres, Ronald K. Noble, Secretar general al OIPC-Interpol, a afirmat c furtul i contrabanda de maini sunt o surs de profituri considerabile care pot servi la sprijinirea organizaiilor criminale sau teroriste n aciunile de destabilizare a naiunilor aflate n curs de dezvoltare i la consolidarea poziiei lor. Astfel, traficul de vehicule furate este n general apanajul organizaiilor criminale de anvergur mondial, aceast form de criminalitate fiind n legtur i cu alte activiti infracionale (traficul de droguri, de arme de foc i de persoane)152. n acelai context, trebuie subliniat gradul sporit al pericolului social, amplificat att de violena fizic a fptuitorilor, ct i de scopul comiterii acestui gen de infraciuni n multe situaii furtul autoturismelor
Prevention Studies V.17), Criminal Justice Press, 2004, pag.174 152 http://www.memoireonline.com/10/09/2854/m_Lacontrebande-de-voitures-volees-entre-la-Gabon-leCameroun-et-la-Guinee-Equatoriale0.html#toc1

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reprezentnd de fapt activitatea premergtoare comiterii altor infraciuni, cum sunt violurile, tlhriile, furturile din locuine i chiar omoruri. Nu mai puin important este mirajul ctigurilor fabuloase realizate din comerul ilegal cu autoturisme furate, factor important care angreneaz ntreaga lume interlop n fenomenul furturilor de autovehicule, n special n ceea ce privete autoturismele de lux, de fabricaie vest-european, japonez i american, al cror pre rmne la peste zece mii de euro sau dolari americani, chiar n condiiile n care att vnztorul ct i cumprtorul tiu c obiectul tranzaciei l constituie un produs al unei infraciuni. n UE, s-a constatat o cretere a cifrei furturilor de autovehicule pn n anul 1993. Acest lucru s-a datorat n mare msur schimbrilor produse n structurile politice i, de asemenea, apariia pieei unice europene, ceea ce nsemna c nu au mai existat controalele la frontier ntre statele membre ale UE. ncepnd cu anul 1995, statele membre ale UE au nregistrat un continuu regres al furturilor de autovehicule, n special n rile productoare, regres datorat amplificrii aciunilor poliiei n acest sector, mbuntirii msurilor de paz, modificrilor aprute n contractele de asigurare i, n mod cert, suprasaturrii pieei. Aproximativ 1,2 milioane de autovehicule sunt furate n fiecare an n statele membre ale UE. Aceste furturi cauzeaz un prejudiciu considerabil, n valoare de cel puin 15 miliarde euro pe an. O mare parte din aceste vehicule, estimat ntre 30 i 40 %, este furat de criminalitatea organizat i apoi transformat i exportat n alte state din interiorul i din afara UE. n afara prejudiciului material cauzat, aceast situaie afecteaz grav sentimentul de dreptate i de siguran al cetenilor. Criminalitatea referitoare la vehicule poate fi nsoit i de forme grave de violen. ntr-o manier general, contrabanda cu maini furate este o activitate infracional ce se supune legii cererii i ofertei. n ceea
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ce privete traficul pentru vnzarea de piese sau subansambluri, prezint importan mainile mici, precum Renault Twingo, Toyota Corolla, Suzuki Vitara etc. Marile grupri de traficani prefer vehiculele din gama de lux, respectiv Mercedes clasa E i S, BMW seria 7, mainile 4x4 (Toyota Land Cruiser, Mercedes ML, BMW X5). De asemenea, la nivel naional, efectundu-se un studiu al cererii i ofertei pe piaa neagr a mainilor, s-a constatat c, la categoria autoturisme de lux, cele mai cutate pe pia sunt mrcile Mercedes, BMW i Audi, iar la autovehiculele de categorie mijlocie, ponderea o dein mrcile Renault i Fiat. n doctrin153 s-a artat c traficul de vehicule furate asigur dezvoltarea unei colaborri internaionale strnse ntre diferitele filiere mafiote, cu predilecie n valorificarea autoturismelor furate, n mascarea faptelor prin documente false sau contrafcute, asigurarea transportului pe diverse rute, schimburi reciproce de beneficiari i chiar schimburi de autovehicule furate. Un vehicul poate fi furat de ctre minori pentru distracie, din spirit de aventur, n legtur cu alte infraciuni ca un mijloc de fug de la locul faptei, sau n scopul dezmembrrii vehiculului, n vederea vnzrii pieselor i subansambelor acestuia, pentru obinerea de profit. Din nefericire, furtul de autovehicule este o infraciune comis cu frecven ridicat, iar structurile de poliie din diferite state nu au suficient personal specializat n desfurarea de investigaii cu privire la aceste infraciuni154. Vehiculele furate pot fi localizate ntr-o multitudine de circumstane. De ndat ce vehiculul furat a fost identificat, ncepe examinarea probelor fizice. O scurt anchet preliminar va determina dac este necesar o cutare complet de probe materiale. Traficul de vehicule furate presupune
153

Dan Alexandru Niescu Piaa schimburilor clandestine i ilicite (tez de doctorat), Academia de Studii Economice, Bucureti, 2006 154 Barry A.J. Fisher, David Fisher Techniques of Crime Scene Investigation, CRC Press, 2003, pag.359

uneori complicitatea general sau furtul n cadrul companiei de producie pentru a obine fie cheia sau pe plcua care conine un cip ce ajut la pornirea vehiculului i la reencodare155. Gruprile infracionale implicate n traficul cu autovehicule furate sunt compuse dintr-un numr de membri care-i ndeplinesc sarcinile specifice, ce pot diferi n funcie de contextul i timpul operaiunilor156. Exist de obicei o persoan care conduce ntreaga operaiune. Fiecare grup are n plus, de obicei, membri care fur autovehicule, mecanici care dezasambleaz i asambleaz vehiculele i schimb identitatea acestora, falsificatori de documente ale vehiculului, oferi care transport vehiculele furate ctre alte zone sau ctre tranzitarea a diferite ri, i vnztorii care de multe ori sunt proprietarii unor afaceri legale cu autovehicule. Gruprile infracionale implicate n furtul i traficul de vehicule furate ntr-o anumit ar coopereaz cu alte grupri din alte state membre. De asemenea, principalele rute ale traficului internaional cu vehicule furate sunt urmtoarele157: din statele membre ale UE (n special Italia, Frana, Belgia, Olanda i Germania) ctre Europa de Est i ri din spaiul fostei Uniuni Sovietice; din Grecia ctre Europa de Sud-Est; din statele membre ale UE ctre Orientul Apropiat i Orientul ndeprtat; din statele membre ale UE (n special Marea Britanie i Spania) ctre Africa; din Japonia ctre Rusia i alte state din Asia de Sud-est; din SUA i Canada ctre America Central i de Sud, Europa de Est, Asia i Africa.
155

Umberto Gori, Ivo Paparela Invisible Threats: Financial and Information Technology Crimes and National Security, Volume 10 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics, IOS Press, 2006, pag.13 156 Frank G. Shanty, Patit Paban Mishra Organized Crime: From Trafficking to Terrorism, volume 1, ABC-Clio, Inc., 2007, pag.180 157 Ibidem, pag.181

Unii autori158 au scos n eviden c zonele n care bandele de traficani acioneaz, sunt n principal America de Nord i Europa de Vest, iar pieele de desfacere sunt asigurate de rile din Europa de Est, rile din spaiul fostei URSS, Orientul Apropiat i Japonia. Dup cderea Cortinei de Fier, Polonia a devenit principalul centru al reelelor cu astfel de preocupri. De pe aeroporturile blocului rsritean, dar i din porturile internaionale Bremerhaven, Rotterdam, Stettin, Gdansk, Lisabona, Marsilia, Tanger, Genova, Pireu, Constana i Istanbul, dispar anual zeci de mii de autoturisme furate. Transportul pe calea maritim este cel mai ieftin i mai puin periculos. De exemplu, pentru transportul unui autoturism pe ap din Constana pn n Kuweit, se pltete aproximativ 1.500 dolari SUA. Dac marfa este ascuns ntr-un container, ntrun port liber, pericolul de a fi depistat de organele de control este infim. De asemenea, n urma analizelor efectuate la nivelul IGPF, s-a constatat c, n continuare, principalul furnizor de autovehicule furate care tranziteaz frontierele Romniei este Italia (58% din cazuri), urmat de Austria i Germania (14% din cazuri), respectiv Ungaria (5%) etc. Rutele folosite de ctre traficani sunt, n general, orientate dinspre rile vest-europene cu finalitate n rile est-europene i foste membre ale Comunitii Statelor Independente159: Italia - Austria - Ungaria - Romnia; Germania - Austria - Ungaria Romnia - Moldova i Ucraina; Italia - Serbia - Romnia - Moldova Transnistria - Ucraina sau Federaia Rus. Printre metodele de dobndire a vehiculelor de ctre hoi, n principal sunt furtul simplu i car jacking. Furtul simplu desemneaz faptul de a fura un vehicul prin forarea ncuietorii de la portiera vehiculu158 159

Tonel Tilea op.cit., pag.64 Analiza fenomenului de trafic internaional cu autovehicule furate la frontierele Romniei, n primele 6 luni ale anului 2007 (http://www.politiadefrontiera .ro/)

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lui sau uneori prin ruperea portierei. Modul de operare difer n funcie de vehiculul comandat, ntruct nu sunt numai persoanele fizice deposedate de bunurile lor. Uneori, sunt vizate vehicule ce aparin unor ageni economici publici sau privai. De fapt, nu este o ntmplare faptul c hoii caut modele de vehicule specifice, care s poat fi vndute ulterior uor i la un pre avantajos. Cu toate acestea, furturile sunt mai frecvente n cazul vehiculelor care nu sunt dotate cu sisteme de alarm. Car jacking este o expresie din limba englez care desemneaz furtul unui vehicul cu violen sau prin ameninare. Modul de operare garage desemneaz, n limbaj judiciar, furtul prin efracie dintr-o cas, fr a avea vreun contact cu victima. Hoii ptrund prin efracie ntr-un imobil i fur vehiculul160. Home-jacking desemneaz furtul unui vehicul prin violen sau ameninare fa de ocupanii imobilului, pentru a-i determina s predea cheile mainii, pentru a pleca cu aceasta. Un alt mod de operare este furtul unui vehicul n timp ce proprietarul se afl n traficul rutier, n staionare. Reelele de traficani sunt extrem de bine organizate la nivelul mai multor state (din Vestul ctre Estul Europei) i compuse din mai multe grupe de aciune. n acest context, trebuie subliniat faptul c reelele sunt organizate pe dou tipuri, respectiv specializate n furtul autoturismelor de lux i cel al autoturismelor de categorie mijlocie. La rndul lor, acestea sunt organizate n entiti mai mici (specializate pe diverse activiti), care sunt divizate n subgrupuri cu un scop foarte clar: n cazul arestrii unuia dintre membrii bandei s nu existe posibilitatea descoperirii i a altor persoane implicate i ulterior, a ntregii reele161.
160

Sub aspectul modului de comitere, este de menionat caracterul su organizat, ct i particularitile care caracterizeaz o band de hoi i traficani de autovehicule furate, astfel162: grupa de recunoatere identific autovehiculele care prezint interes pentru valorificare rapid ori mrcile ce sunt comandate de liderul organizaiei, stabilete detaliile legate de parcare i proprietar, sistemele de alarmare, rutele de deplasare i orice alte aspecte necesare comiterii furtului n siguran; grupa de operare constituit din hoi versai care dispun de mijloace tehnice necesare anihilrii sistemelor de alarm i deschiderii ncuietorilor, precum i de locuri i garaje conspirate, unde ascund autovehiculele dup comiterea furtului; grupa tehnic se ocup de indigenizarea autovehiculelor furate (repoansonarea seriilor de caroserie, revopsire, contrafacerea documentelor i plcuelor de nmatriculare); grupa transportatoare care este instruit n contactul cu organele vamale, are legturi n punctele de frontier i transport autovehiculele la destinaia stabilit; grupa de siguran realizeaz supravegherea i derularea ntregii operaiuni n toate fazele sale infracionale. Pentru buna funcionare, aceste reele sunt dotate cu mijloace tehnice moderne, att pentru schimbarea identitii mainii, precum i pentru comunicaii i aprarea membrilor. De asemenea, pentru a fi admis ntr-o astfel de grupare, o persoan trebuie s fie bine specializat i s prezinte calitile necesare ncadrrii n una dintre subgrupele reelei. ntr-un hotel din Gdansk (Polonia), s-a descoperit o adevrat coal care instruia cursanii din astfel de reele,

http://www.carguide.be/database/carjacking.php ?id=70_0_27_0_C. 161 Analiza fenomenului de trafic internaional cu autovehicule furate la frontierele Romniei, n primele

6 luni ale anului 2007 (http://www.politiadefr ontiera.ro/) 162 Petru Albu Crima organizat n perioada de tranziie-o ameninare major la adresa securitii internaionale, Editura Ministerului Internelor i Reformei Administrative, Bucureti, 2007, pag.226

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contra unei taxe de 1.000 dolari S.U.A.163 La nivel naional, activitile de combatere a traficului internaional cu autoturisme furate graviteaz n jurul reelelor internaionale de infractori de origine italian care acioneaz transfrontalier, predominnd autovehiculele furate din Italia i n mare parte cele care figureaz declarate furate ulterior datei intrrii n Romnia. Din punct de vedere al ariei de desfurare, acest fenomen a cunoscut importante micri n sensul c, dac traficul internaional cu autoturisme de lux furate viza, ca ri de provenien ale autovehiculelor, rile din Occident, odat cu lrgirea structurilor europene i a aderrii unor noi state la aceste entiti internaionale, a factorilor economici i politici, frontul activitilor ilicite s-a propagat de la vest spre est. Aceeai tendin de manifestare i deplasare n spaiu de la vest spre est, se reflect i n ceea ce privete rile pe teritoriul crora se produc rezultatele finale ale activitilor ilicite, produsele infraciunilor. Este clar c modurile de operare ale gruprilor de traficani au evoluat rapid. Cu civa ani n urm, era o activitate destul de simpl pentru hoi s ptrund ntr-un autoturism parcat. Cu toate acestea, deoarece cele mai multe dintre vehicule sunt n prezent dotate cu ncuietori foarte sofisticate, alarme, dispozitive de imobilizare i de alte caracteristici de securitate, au fost utilizate alte metode164. n prezent, principalele metode folosite de gruprile criminale organizate n traficul internaional cu autovehicule furate sunt urmtoarele165: frauda la asigurri - reeaua fur autovehiculul cu sprijinul proprietarului care, ulterior, pe lng banii primii de la reea pentru sprijin, fraudeaz societatea de asigurri care-i acoper dauna;
163 164

Tonel Tilea op.cit., pag.63 An Overview of Motor Vehicle Crime From a European Perspective, Europol, January 2006 165 Analiza fenomenului de trafic internaional cu autovehicule furate la frontierele Romniei, n primele 6 luni ale anului 2007 (http://www.politiadefrontiera. ro/)

furtul la comand - metod practicat de reele vechi i foarte bine organizate care acioneaz la cererea de pe piaa de desfacere. Periculozitatea foarte ridicat a acestui mod de operare rezid nu numai din faptul c la svrirea infraciunii au conlucrat infractori de diverse specializri, deci infractori care s-au asociat n vederea comiterii acestor infraciuni, ci i din aceea c, pentru introducerea n ar i valorificarea mainilor, reeaua ncearc s corup cu sume mari de bani, funcionari care au atribuii n activitile de control la frontier, omologare i nmatriculare a autovehiculelor; frauda la firmele de nchirieri - reprezint modalitatea de deturnare a scopului iniial pentru care un vehicul a fost achiziionat. Astfel, vehiculele nchiriate de la firme de specialitate sunt indigenizate cu ajutorul unor documente false i vndute ulterior ntr-o alt ar; reabilitarea radierii - se refer la substituirea vehiculelor avariate grav i punerea n circulaie cu documentele i numerele de inmatriculare ale acestora a unor autovehicule furate; eludarea taxelor - autovehiculele sunt introduse n Romnia n regim de admitere temporar, iar ulterior, prin falsificarea documentaiei vamale sunt nmatriculate n Romnia, fr a se plti taxele i impozitele datorate bugetului de stat; furtul n dauna societilor de leasing - autovehiculele sunt achiziionate n sistem leasing, iar dup plata primelor 2-3 rate din preul total, sunt scoase din ar i vndute, n special n rile ex-sovietice, deoarece sistemul de nmatriculare n aceste ri este mult simplificat. Din practica judiciar, a reieit c activitatea de depistare a autoturismelor furate este foarte greu de realizat, iar procedura de returnare ctre proprietarii de drept este i mai anevoioas, datorit legislaiei neunitare, precum i a existenei cumprtorilor de bun credin. Combaterea acestui gen de infraciuni, care a cptat valene de criminalitate transfrontalier, impune pe lng msurile legislative i de aciune la
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nivel naional i o cooperare interstatal ntre organele abilitate, care s aib drept fundament recomandri i hotrri ale unor organisme internaionale, angajate n lupta mpotriva criminalitii transfrontaliere. Combaterea criminalitii referitoare la vehicule este de competena serviciilor de aplicare a legii din statele membre. Cu toate acestea, o abordare comun presupunnd ori de cte ori este realizabil i necesar - o cooperare ntre statele membre i serviciile de aplicare alegii din statele membre este necesar i proporional pentru a aborda aspectele transfrontaliere ale acestei forme de criminalitate. Cooperarea ntre autoritile de aplicare a legii i autoritile de nmatriculare a vehiculelor este de o importan deosebit, fiind sursa de informaii pentru respectivele pri. Cooperarea cu Europol este la fel de important, din moment ce Europol poate furniza analize i rapoarte n acest sens. n vederea realizrii unei mai bune cooperri n cadrul UE, n scopul prevenirii i combaterii criminalitii transfrontaliere referitoare la vehicule, la nivel european a fost adoptat la data de 22 decembrie 2004, Decizia Consiliului 2004/919/CE privind combaterea criminalitii referitoare la vehicule i avnd implicaii transfrontaliere166. Actul comunitar cuprinde dispoziii privind cooperarea ntre autoritile naionale competente n scopul combaterii criminalitii transfrontaliere referitoare la vehicule, n special prin intermediul acordurilor de cooperare, o atenie special urmnd a fi acordat cooperrii referitoare la controlul exporturilor, lund n considerare diferitele competene din statele membre. De asemenea, documentul reglementeaz cooperarea ntre autoritile competente i sectorul privat (precum responsabilii cu registrele private ale vehiculelor disprute, asigurtori i reprezentani ai sectorului de comer cu autovehicule). n acelai timp, se prevede i simplificarea procedu166

Publicat n Jurnalul oficial al Uniunii Europene nr.L389 din 30 decembrie 2004.

rilor, n conformitate cu legislaia intern, n vederea unei repatrieri rapide a vehiculelor restituite de autoritile naionale competente, dup sechestrarea acestora. n cuprinsul art.6 este reglementat activitatea de semnalare a furturilor de vehicule i a certificatelor de nmatriculare. Astfel, ori de cte ori se raporteaz furtul unui vehicul, autoritile competente ale statelor membre introduc imediat o alert de vehicul furat n Sistemul de Informaii Schengen (SIS), n conformitate cu legislaia intern i, atunci cnd este posibil, n baza de date a Interpol referitoare la autovehiculele furate. Statul membru care a introdus alerta o retrage din registrul de cutare, n conformitate cu legislaia intern, de ndat ce motivul de introducere a alertei asupra vehicului nceteaz s mai existe. Ori de cte ori se raporteaz furtul certificatelor de nmatriculare, autoritile competente ale statelor membre introduc imediat o alert n SIS, n conformitate cu legislaia intern. Art.7 al actului comunitar prevede obligaia autoritilor competente de a lua msurile necesare pentru a preveni utilizarea frauduloas i furtul de documente de nmatriculare a vehiculelor. Autoritile de aplicare a legii informeaz autoritile naionale de nmatriculare a vehiculelor n cazul se cunoate c un vehicul, aflat n curs de nmatriculare, a fost furat. Accesul, n acest scop, la bazele de date se face n conformitate cu dispoziiile dreptului comunitar. n finalul documentului, sunt prevzute msuri privind prevenirea utilizrii frauduloase a certificatelor de nmatriculare a vehiculelor. Pentru punerea n aplicare a acestor obiective, sunt reglementate urmtoarele situaii: autoritile competente iau msurile necesare pentru a li se preda certificatul de nmatriculare al proprietarului vehiculului sau al deintorului vehiculului, n cazul n care vehiculul a fost avariat grav ntr-un accident (pierdere total). de asemenea, un certificat de nmatriculare se pred, n conformitate cu legislaia intern, n cazul n care, n timpul unui
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control efectuat de serviciul de aplicare a legii, se suspecteaz c a avut loc o fraud cu privire la elementele de identificare a vehiculului, precum numrul de identificare al vehiculului. certificatele de nmatriculare se restituie doar n urma examinrii i verificrii pozitive a identitii vehiculului i n conformitate cu legislaia intern. Secretariatul General al OIPC-Interpol administreaz baza de date ASF privind autovehiculele furate (ASF-SMV) pentru sprijinirea serviciilor de poliie din rile membre, n lupta lor mpotriva furtului i traficului internaional de vehicule furate. La sfritul anului 2009, aceast baz de date coninea peste 6,2 milioane de nregistrri privind vehicule furate. Baza de date este utilizat frecvent de 157 de ri, din care 126 au transmis Interpol-ului coninutul bazei lor naionale de date privind acest subiect. n anul 2009, mai mult de 26.000 de vehicule au fost gsite la nivel mondial, datorit bazei de date ASF-SMV. OIPC-Interpol a pus n aplicare mai multe proiecte i grupuri de lucru n scopul sprijinirii serviciilor de poliie din statele membre n ceea ce privete lupta mpotriva criminalitii referitoare la vehicule167. Proiectul INVEX, desfurat n colaborare cu anumii constructori de automobile, are ca obiectiv identificarea de noi soluii pentru gsirea vehiculelor furate i mbuntirea calitii informaiilor nregistrate n baza de date ASF-SMV. Lansat la iniiativa Biroului Naional Interpol din Germania, proiectul beneficiaz n prezent de participarea a 5 ri, precum i a constructorilor de automobile Volkswagen, Audi i Porsche, care schimb n mod frecvent informaii. Proiectul pilot a demarat n ianuarie 2009 i a fost adoptat de Adunarea General care a avut loc n anul 2009 n Singapore. Ulterior, s-au alturat proiectului i constructorii germani de automobile BMW i Mercedes-Benz168.
167

Proiectul FORMATRAIN, care reunete 12 ri, vizeaz elaborarea unui program de formare normalizat n scopul facilitrii anchetelor privind traficul internaional de vehicule furate. Proiectul are ca scop sprijinirea anchetatorilor prin furnizarea de informaii referitoare la identificarea vehiculelor i a documentelor, strategii, tehnici i instrumente de anchet, bazele de date i reglementrile juridice prealabile. Operaiunea ZFF a avut ca obiectiv urmrirea itinerariului traficului de vehicule de lux ntre Europa i Asia. Lansat la iniiativa Biroului Naional Interpol din Italia, operaiunea a avut ca participani Frana, Grecia, Japonia, Elveia i Emiratele Arabe Unite, Secretariatul General al OIPC-Interpol fiind nsrcinat cu furnizarea de analize i sprijin punctual, precum i de asigurare a coordonrii. Finalizat n anul 2008, operaiunea a condus la descoperirea n Japonia a 170 de maini de lux furate169. Grupul operaional SMV din cadrul OIPC-Interpol este compus din poliiti i anchetatori specializai n criminalitatea referitoare la vehicule. Membrii actuali ai grupului operaional provin din Germania, Belgia, Spania, Finlanda, Frana, Italia, Marea Britanie, Suedia i Europol. Aceast iniiativ are ca obiective: mbuntirea schimbului de competene operaionale i de expertiz ntre specialitii naionali; scurtarea termenelor de accesare a diferitelor baze de date i a surselor de informaii naionale; analizarea rezultatelor operaiunilor; iniierea de anchete pe baza acestor rezultate i a analizelor operaionale. n anul 2009, trei operaiuni (desfurate n Balcani, Italia i Spania) au beneficiat de susinerea acestui grup operaional. Cu acest prilej, au fost controlate 6.000 de vehicule, fiind identificate i confiscate 46 de maini furate, 27 de persoane fiind arestate. Mainile confiscate proveneau n special
169

http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/FactSheets/ DCO02FR.pdf 168 http://www.interpol.int/Public/Vehicle/DefaultFR. asp

http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/FactSheets/ DCO02FR.pdf

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din state din Europa de Vest. Concluzionnd, problematica traficului de vehicule furate este ntlnit n majoritatea statelor membre ale UE. Exist ntotdeauna o pia a vehiculelor de ocazie, ce pot fi gsite la un pre redus, n special n

acele ri care nu sunt dezvoltate din punct de vedere economic sau n care nu exist productori autohtoni de vehicule. Desigur, unele vehicule sunt evaluate mai mult dect altele, cele mai cutate fiind mainile furate ce provin din clasa de lux.

Bibliografie: An Overview of Motor Vehicle Crime From a European Perspective, Europol, January 2006 Analiza fenomenului de trafic internaional cu autovehicule furate la frontierele Romniei, n primele 6 luni ale anului 2007 Decizia Consiliului 2004/919/CE privind combaterea criminalitii referitoare la vehicule i avnd implicaii transfrontaliere, publicat n Jurnalul oficial al Uniunii Europene nr.L389 din 30 decembrie 2004 Frank G. Shanty, Patit Paban Mishra Organized Crime: From Trafficking to Terrorism, volume 1, ABC-Clio, Inc., 2007 http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/FactSheets/DCO02FR.pdf Petru Albu Crima organizat n perioada de tranziie-o ameninare major la adresa securitii internaionale, Editura Ministerului Internelor i Reformei Administrative, Bucureti, 2007 Tonel Tilea Impactul crimei organizate asupra economiei mondiale (tez de doctorat), Academia de Studii Economice, Bucureti, 2006

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TERORISMUL ECONOMIC
Lector universitar dr. GHEORGHE POPESCU Academia de Poliie Al. I. Cuza Cms. ef de poliie drd. ADRIAN MARCEL IANCU IGPR Agenia Naional Antidrog Terrorism, a phenomenon that origin is in the most ancient times, has changed its form of manifestation with the evolutions of human society. Terrorists have constantly changed their modus operandi so as to make sure they get maximum impact with minimum effort or cost. In that context, a controversial question has arisen and the specialists are still divided on the answer: Does terrorism economic exist? This article attempts to articulate one possible answer, starting from specific cases of tax evasion and links between business persons and corrupt politicians as well as terrorist organizations. Cuvinte cheie: terorism, terorism economic, organizaii teroriste, evaziune fiscal Consideraii generale Cuvntul terorism este din punct de vedere etimologic un derivat al cuvntului teroare ce provine din limba latin170 i semnific groaz, fric, spaim provocat premeditat, prin ameninare sau intimidare. Folosit din cele mai vechi timpuri171, aceast metod de aplicare a terorii, a evoluat, ca forme de manifestare i mijloace de aciune, odat cu evoluia societii umane. Nu este surprinztor faptul c noiunea de terorism s-a dovedit extrem de greu de definit, deoarece sensul i utilizarea cuvntului s-au schimbat n timp pentru a se adapta exprimrilor fiecrei perioade. Aceast tendin de exprimare tot mai obscur pentru a ndeprta conotaiile peiorative a devenit tot mai practicat n ultimii zeci de ani. Organizaiile teroriste aproape fr excepie i aleg acum nume care evit n mod deliberat terorismul sub orice form ar fi el. Totui toat lumea este mcar de acord asupra unui punct de vedere: terorismul este un termen peiorativ. Este un cuvnt cu co170 171

notaii intrinseci negative care se aplic ndeobte dumanilor i opozanilor, sau celor cu care nu suntem de acord i pe care am prefera s i ignorm dac se poate. Brian Jenkins172 este de prere c ceea ce se numete terorism pare s depind de punctul de vedere adoptat. Utilizarea termenului implic o judecat de valoare. Dac una dintre pri reuete s i eticheteze inamicul drept terorist, nseamn c i-a convins i pe ceilali s adopte acest punct de vedere. Prin urmare decizia de a spune c cineva sau c o organizaie este terorist sau terorist este n mod inevitabil o chestiune subiectiv, care depinde de simpatizarea sau antipatizarea persoanei/grupului/cauzei. Dac cineva se identific cu victimele violenei, actul n sine este n acest caz un act de terorism. Dac totui identificarea are loc cu cel care ntreprinde aciunea, violena este privit mai cu simpatie dac nu chiar dintr-o perspectiv pozitiv (ori, n cazul cel mai ru, ambivalent), care nu este de terorism. Efectul cumulativ al acestei nclinaii ctre echivoc este acela c as172

terror, terroris n mitologia greac numele celor doi cai care trgeau carul de lupt al lui Ares, zeul rzboiului, erau teroarea Phobus i frica-Deimos

Brian Jenkins; Paul Wilkinson Aviation terrorism and security, Seria Cass series on political Violence nr. 10, ed. Taylor&Francis, martie 1999

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tzi nu mai exist nicio definiie larg acceptat a terorismului. Mijloacele i metodele folosite pot fi din cele mai variate dar scopul lor final este acelai: de a provoca o primejdie comun pentru interesele unor grupuri mari de oameni, comuniti, state sau grupuri de state, primejdie ce nu presupune ntotdeauna ca rezultat un act de terorism. Terorismul de drept comun se poate nfia sub forma oricrei infraciuni de drept comun, fiind suficient faptul ca aceasta s prezinte un pericol de intimidare. n acest context, cmpul de aciune al terorismului s-a extins n sferele social-politic i economic, acionnd alturi sau mpreun cu criminalitatea organizat a gulerelor albe, aceasta fiind i una din modalitile de finanare a aciunilor teroriste. Nici cealalt criminalitate organizat nu a fost ocolit de parteneriatele cu organizaii teroriste173. ntr-o msur mai mare dect n trecut, organizaii total criminale (adic violente, motivate economic) au nceput s stabileasc aliane strategice cu organizaii teroriste i de gheril ori s utilizeze chiar ele violena pentru a atinge scopuri politice specifice. Puterea din ce n ce mai mare a cartelurilor columbiene care traficau cocain, legturile lor strnse cu grupurile teroriste de stnga din Columbia i din Peru, ncercrile lor repetate de a submina procesul electoral din Columbia i guvernele succesive din aceast ar constituie exemplul poate cel mai cunoscut n acest sens.174 De aceea, pentru a putea califica corect un act de terorism este necesar o analiz complex a mobilului aciunii, scopul urmrit, calitatea autorilor, metode i mijloacele folosite, obiective vizate, consecine i implicaii. Avnd n vedere diversitatea de definiii i clasificri ale terorismului175 i volumul
173

Adrian Marcel IANCU, Narcoterorismul Buletinul de informare i Documentare al MAI nr. 1/2008 174 Idem; 175 Ghe ARDVOAICE, Dumitru ILIESCU, Laureniu Dan NI Terorism. Antiterorism. Contraterorism. Ed. Antet, Oradea, 1997, pag. 19, 49.

mare de date i informaii despre acest fenomen, n cele ce urmeaz nu ne vom ocupa de terorismul clasic i implicaiile sale asupra climatului social ci vom ncerca s rspundem la o ntrebare: Exist sau nu terorism economic? Un studiu realizat de o echip de profesioniti ai ageniei de colectare debite Urban i Asociaii Romnia176, aduce n prim-planul dezbaterii un subiect incendiar: Se poate face o echivalen ntre antenatele cu bomb produse de teroriti i fraudele economice produse locuitorilor unei ri ? Ce are oare un impact mai mare, o luare de ostatici sau falimentarea unui firme care la rndul ei antreneaz zeci de alt falimente i sute sau mii de drame personale i familiale datorit celor care i pierd afacerile i/sau locurile de munc? Concluzia acestui studiu este debusolant: un rzboi economic are consecine incalculabil mai devastatoare asupra economiei unei ri sau regiuni dect un conflict armat. Ne referim aici nu la consecinele economice provocate de prejudiciile rezultate din infraciuni clare cum sunt cele de splare de bani, ci avem n vedere metodele sofisticate prin care, odat intrate n circuitul economic al unei ri, reelele teroriste ajung s se interpun n poziii cheie care le permit, pe lng realizarea unor ctiguri financiare colosale i provocarea unor unde de soc majore n economia ri respective. Conceptul de terorism economic177 este un concept controversat, i cel mai adesea utilizat n mod polemic sau demagogic pentru a asocia termenul terorism la o ar, companie sau grup acuzat de practici abuzive. Totodat, n sens restrns, acest concept este utilizat pentru desemnarea unei tentative de destabilizare economic de ctre un grup. Mai exact, Centrul pentru Politici de Securitate din Geneva, a definit, n anul 2005, terorismul economic dup

176 177

www.urbannews.ro http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_terrorism

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cum urmeaz:178 Contrar rzboiului economic, care este dus de ctre state contra altor state, terorismul economic este dus de ctre entiti transnaionale sau nonguvernamentale. El presupune aciuni variate, coordonate i sofisticate, sau aciuni masive de destabilizare pentru dezorganizarea stabilitii economice i financiare a unui stat, grup de state sau a unei societi (cum ar fi societatea occidental a economiei de pia) pentru motive ideologice sau religioase. Aceste aciuni, dac sunt desfurate pot s fie sau s nu fie violente. Ele ar putea avea efecte imediate sau s determine efecte psihologice care la rndul lor pot avea efecte economice. Acuzaia de terorism economic este, de asemenea, utilizat de ctre anumite grupuri, ndeosebi militani altermondialiti179, sau reprezentanii rilor ce au suferit sanciuni economice (din partea altor ri sau organisme internaionale) pentru a defini presiunea exercitat la nivel comercial i tarifar asupra anumitor ri. Promotorii altermondialiti ai conceptului susin adoptarea acestuia ca mijloc de a denuna msurile economice extreme ca mijloace de convingere ce rspndesc o teroare direct sau indirect asupra unui individ sau grup. Aceste tipuri de intervenie ndrjit asupra devizelor de plat sau impunerea unui embargou de ctre una sau mai multe organizaii internaionale sau state fiind considerate ca forme de manifestare a terorismului economic. Expresia terorism economic a fost, de asemenea utilizat, la ntlnirea societilor multinaionale, de ctre adversarii globalizrii i pentru definirea practicilor percepute ca antisindicaliste. Astfel, n februarie 2005, un membru al Camerei comunelor din Canada, a acuzat grupul american de distribuie Wal-Mart de terorism economic: nchiderea primului magazin Wal-Mart ai crui angajai sunt membrii de sindicat este descris
178

ca un act de terorism economic, ca o tentativ flagrant de reprimare a micrii sindicale din Canada.180 Termenul de terorism economic este adesea utilizat cu sens peiorativ de ctre anumii partizani ai economiei de pia fr intervenionism, pentru desemnarea ideilor sau aciunilor sindicale, antiglobalizare, ecologiste sau culpabile de ecoterorism. De asemenea, el este adesea reluat de ctre partizanii izolaionismului pentru calificarea concurenei exercitat de ctre mna de lucru provenind din rile n curs de dezvoltare sau imigraia clandestin, pe care ei le apreciaz ca fiind neloiale. Nu n ultimul rnd, precizm faptul c conceptul de terorism economic este utilizat n mod regulat n Qubec181 n instituiile de nvmnt i de comunicare. Dat fiind faptul c n cultura politic termenul terorism este el nsui controversat, este normal s apar dezacord pentru cel de terorism economic care n aceste condiii nu are fundament real. Totodat, sfatul pentru partizanii acestui concept este acela de a-l utiliza cu precauie. Situaia SUA ntr-un raport al CIA182, dat publicitii, se vorbea de faptul c este mult mai ocant pentru societatea civil american s afle c, prin intermediul unor reele de persoane sau companii interpuse, circa 7 % din economia statelor americane i implicit, circa 1,9 milioane de americani sunt angajai ai unor reele de terorism i ai unor teroriti cutai la nivel internaional. De fapt se arat c atentatele din septembrie 2001 au produs pierderi cu 156% mai mici dect sar produce n cazul n care companiile americane controlate de reelele teroriste ar intra n faliment, iar ocul ar putea chiar s distrug iremediabil cea mai puternic economie din lume.
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Roundtable on Economic Terrorism [archive], 1112 juillet 2005, Lausanne 179 http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Altermondialisme

David Christopherson, 11 fvrier 2005, Compte rendu officiel des dbats de la Chambre des communes du Canada [archive], numro 055 181 http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discussion:Terrorisme _%C3%A9conomique 182 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/

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Conform raportului sus-menionat, n intervalul 2002 - 2004 pe teritoriul USA au fost nmatriculate peste 18.790 de companii care aveau ca asociai ceteni iranieni, irakieni i sirieni din care circa 3.000 se aflau pe listele de atenionare i supraveghere ale FBI. Din acestea pn la data de 01.06.2006, circa 2.300 de companii au dat faliment sau au fost dizolvate, n urma lor rmnnd datorii neachitate de peste 1,8 miliarde USD! Se spune astfel c prezena trupelor americane n Irak are o justificare ct se poate de simpl: nu ameninarea militar este cea care sperie autoritile de la Washington, ci n primul rnd eradicarea economiei subterane, rularea i splarea banilor, ctigurile din traficul de droguri, pirateria software plus controlul asupra circulaiei irakienilor n lume. De asemenea, n studiu era dezvluit faptul c, numai n 2005 pe teritoriul Statelor Unite au fost nregistrate peste 4.800 de cazuri de fraud financiar comise de ceteni irakieni, care aparent deineau afaceri legitime n diferite corporaii americane. n acest top neoficial pe urmtoarele trei locuri erau menionai cetenii iranieni, sirieni i pakistanezi, astfel nct declaraiile amenintoare formulate de SUA la adresa Iranului i Siriei ncep s capete explicaii extrem de logice. Muli dintre noi ne-am ntrebat: ce interes au oare americanii s ocupe Siria, o ar fr nici un fel de bogii n subsol? Este mult mai uor s controlezi activitatea i circulaia economic a sirienilor direct din Siria, deinnd controlul asupra bazelor de date privind informaiile personale legate de fiecare din ceteni, veniturile realizate, dect s atepi s produc o fraud prin falimentarea unei companii n Texas sau Colorado. Dincolo de vocile care acuz CIA i Administraia American c au interese directe n meninerea conflictului armat din Irak i extinderea acestuia ctre Iran i Siria, exist totui nite realiti care demonstreaz faptul c un control militar poate aduce totui i o scdere a numrului de fraude comise n economia Statelor Unite.
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Lipsa de cooperare ntre instituiile rilor din Uniunea European, Faa nevzut a globalizrii i integrarea Romniei n Uniunea Europeana au adus cu ele aspecte care demonstreaz ct de nepregtite sunt societatea civil i instituiile/autoritile din Romnia s fac fa problemelor ridicate de fraudele economice. Pornind de la exemple banale oferite de companii din Romnia care ofer zilnic detalii i nscriu pe motorul de cutare a tirilor despre debite i debitori183 situaii n care au de ncasat creane de la parteneri de afaceri din strintate i care se izbesc de opacitatea i lipsa total de reacie a instituiilor din rile de origine ale debitorilor, care refuz s le acorde asisten, pn la fraudele provocate n economia unei ri de ctre strini, se pot formula concluzii extrem de dure: aproape n 90 % din cazurile n care o companie romneasc care a sesizat autoritile uneia din rile membre UE de unde avea de ncasat bani, fie nu a primit niciodat nici mcar un rspuns scris la cererile sale, fie a primit rspunsuri care artau refuzul politicos de implicare n rezolvarea situaiei reclamate. Acest lucru dovedete interesul naional al fiecreia din rile membre UE de protejare a propriei economii naionale. Pornind de la aceast premis, nelegem c este mult mai firesc ca autoritile unei ri membre UE s fac tot posibilul s ndrepte un creditor din alt ar, s deschid un proces mpotriva debitorului, ntruct n acest fel, instituiile judiciare i ntreg sistemul juridic din ara de origine a debitorului vor obine ctiguri financiare de pe urma creditorului: taxe de timbru, timbre, onorarii avocaiale, etc. Nu exist ca atare interes economic ca plata unui debit s fie rezolvat prin negocieri, iar cei care comit fraude cunosc acest lucru. Romnia int a terorismului economic ? ncepnd cu anul 1990 cnd n Romnia a aprut prima lege a societilor comerci183

http://www.urbannews.ro

ale post-comunist184, una din principalele obsesii ale oamenilor de afaceri din ara noastr, a fost legat de epele luate de la firme nmatriculate i controlate de irakieni, iranieni, turci, libanezi i sirieni. Realitatea a demonstrat c temerile lor au fost ntemeiate ntruct, numai n intervalul 1995 2006185, au fost nregistrate n Romnia, peste 4.000 de companii care aveau ca asociai/acionari i administratori ceteni din Irak, Iran, Liban, Turcia sau Siria186. Din acestea, n momentul de fa, peste 88% nu mai exist, fiind dizolvate sau n faliment187 i, ceea ce este cel mai grav este faptul c, n peste 96 % din cazuri, creditorii nu i-au mai recuperat niciodat creanele pe care le avea de ncasat. n aproape o treime din cazuri, firmele n cauz au intrat n incidente de plata la mai puin de 12 luni de la nfiinarea lor, acumulnd sume de bani cu scadena depit. Totodat, este absolut incredibil ns, n proporie de 100%188, firmele menionate anterior, au fost implicate n procese n faa instanelor de judecat sau n anchete penale, iar mpotriva a 22% din acionarii/asociaii i administratorii lor au fost pronunate condamnri pentru inLEGE Nr. 31 din 16 noiembrie 1990 n luna februarie 2008, Morad W. Ahmed cetean irakian i Kianzad Behrang cetean suedez, au nfiinat, n localitatea Celu judeul Ilfov, firma LONELIA COM. Aceast firm se afl, la ora actual, n topul firmelor private executate silit pentru datorii mai mari de 10 milioane de lei, cu o datorie total de 32,8 milioane lei; ntr-o situaie asemntoare se gsete i firma ARTEMA FRUCT cu sediul social n oraul Buftea judeul Ilfov, nfiinat, n anul 2007 de Haider Mundher Abbas Al-Shokan i Ali Mohamed Hasan Hassoon Hassoon, ambii ceteni irakieni. De la nfiinare pn n prezent firma nu a depus nici un bilan contabil la Registrul Comerului i a acumulat datorii scadente de peste 31,5 milioane lei. Firma ASHROICH ROMNIA a fost nfiinat n anul 2003, are sediul n Bucureti i are patru administratori: un cipriot i trei israelieni. Firma are datorii neonorate fa de statul romn, n valoare de 14 milioane lei 186 Conform datelor de la Registrul Comerului 187 idem 188 Conform datelor furnizate de Ministerul Justiiei i Ministerul Public
185 184

fraciuni economice. Cu toate acestea, din totalul celor condamnai penal definitiv, numai 9% i-au executat sau i execut pedeapsa n penitenciare din Romnia189, peste 91 % fiind condamnai n lips, dai n urmrire internaional, fr ca sentinele penale s fi fost vreodat puse n aplicare. Conform declaraiei oficialilor Ministerului de Justiie din Romnia, este i foarte greu s fie identificat, de exemplu, un sirian condamnat n Romnia datorit faptului c, rspunsul autoritilor siriene este mereu acelai: l cutm i cnd va fi identificat, cu siguran va fi ncarcerat, rezultatele obinute pn acum fiind aproape zero! De asemenea, prejudiciul estimat, calculat ca fiind produs de firmele cu acionari irakieni, iranieni, libanezi, sirieni i turci, este numai n intervalul 2000-2006190, de peste 250 de milioane de euro. Cel mai grav este faptul c, n urma nencasrii creanelor de la firmele n discuie, la rndul lor alte 12.300 de companii din Romnia au avut probleme financiare grave ntre 1995-2005, fiind implicate, la rndul lor, n procese cu creditorii lor, au da faliment i circa 25.000 de romani i-au pierdut locurile de munc. De asemenea, au fost nregistrate i cazuri extreme, persoane care aveau n derulare credite bancare pentru care garantaser cu bunuri personale sau cu locuina i care au ajuns pe drumuri, ntruct au fost executai silit de bncile ctre care nu au mai restituit banii, pe care la rndul lor nu i-au mai ncasat de la cei care dduser faliment. Modalitatea frecvent de fraud a fost cea comis prin emiterea de instrumente bancare de plat fr acoperire (bilete la ordin, file CEC), dizolvarea voluntar a firmei sau falimentul firmelor care nu aveau nici un fel de patrimoniu; splarea de bani, neplata impozitelor i taxelor datorate statului romn, evaziune fiscal, transferul de sume de bani din conturile din Romnia n
189

Conform datelor furnizate de administraia Naional a Penitenciarelor 190 Am fcut referire la acest interval ntruct nu am avut acces la date mai recente

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strintate, ori lichidarea prin ridicarea de numerar a conturilor bancare deschise n Romnia. Este drept c i sistemul legislativ din Romnia este extrem de permisiv ntruct se poate constitui o societate comercial, fr ca mcar cel care va fi asociat sau administrator s vin vreodat n Romnia191; este suficient ca un cetean iranian de exemplu, s trimit o procur unui avocat i acesta va putea s nfiineze firma fr nici un fel de problem. La fel, sistemul bancar este extrem de vulnerabil, fiind nregistrate situaii n care, de exemplu, un cetean libanez venea n Romnia, ateriza pe Aeroportul Otopeni la ora 11:00 dimineaa, pn la ora 14:00 mergea la bnci, i deschidea conturi, depunea specimen de semntur n banc, obinea 2-3 carnete de file CEC i la ora 17:00 prsea Romnia. n urma lui, carnetele de file CEC ajungeau pe mna unor complici care cumprau cu ele marf, o vindeau imediat la sub-pre i creditorii se trezeau c trebuie s angajeze rspunderea unui administrator cu domiciliul n Beirut, iar rspunsul de la Ambasad a lovit ca un trsnet: casa unde era declarat domiciliul era o movila de moloz, fiind distrusa de o racheta a aviaiei israeliene! n alte cazuri, Poliia a descoperit, la sesizarea unor creditori, faptul c firmele erau nfiinate n baza unor acte false de identitate, folosindu-se numele unor persoane deja decedate, sau codurile numerice personale ale unor minori. De exemplu, a fost identificat o filier irakian care constituise 12 firme n Romnia, folosind datele unor copii de 712 ani din regiunea Basra din Irak. Aceste cazuri au fost prezentate, n general, n mass-media, nsa nimeni nu a avut curajul s recunoasc direct amploarea acestui fenomen, ntruct riscau s fie acuzai de sentimente anti-arabe. Adevrul este ns c exist cifre i calcule care nu pot fi ignorate, iar aa cum n ziarele din Italia, Anglia, Spania sau Frana, romnii sunt considerai a fi campionii infraciunilor comise,
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fr ca cineva s suspecteze c exist sentimente anti-romneti, tot aa i autoritile de aplicare a legii din Romnia trebuie s trag un semnal de alarma public asupra acestui fenomen. De exemplu dupa ce n presa din Romnia au aprut acuzaii la adresa companiei Al Arrab Contracting Company Limited, din Arabia Saudit c ar avea legturi cu reelele teroriste (conform unui articol aprut n cotidianul Romnia Liber Compania Al-Arrab a figurat la un moment dat pe lista celor 100 de companii saudite bnuite c ar fi finanat atentatele teroriste Al Qaeda de la 11 septembrie 2001 din SUA)192, firma fiind selectat pentru continuarea negocierilor cu AVAS n vederea privatizrii Electroputere Craiova, totui Preedintele Camerei Deputailor, Bogdan Olteanu a infirmat aceste zvonuri iar privatizarea s-a finalizat prin achiziionarea a 86,28% din aciunile societii. Dup privatizare (avocaii saudiilor de la Al Arrab au adus documentele doveditoare c au vrsat n conturile firmei 37 milioane de euro cu o or nainte ca privatizarea s devin nul de drept193 [sn]), n anul 2008, pierderile societii Electroputere au fost de 80 milioane lei (RON) iar n anul 2009 de 40 milioane lei. n cursul anului 2009 compania a disponibilizat 500 din cei 2500 de angajai,urmnd ca n cursul acestui an s mai fie disponibilizai nc 500. De asemenea societatea a fost angrenat ntr-un scandal privind speculaii imobiliare.194 Un alt caz este cel al numitului Omar Kamal, cetean irakian, asociat i administrator al companiei Rafaello Deluxe195 care este acuzat de peste 40 de companii
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LEGE Nr. 31 din 16 noiembrie 1990

http://2005.informatia.ro/Lista_persoanelor_fizice_ si_juridice_suspecte_de_acte_de_terorism-114643 193 http://www.sfin.ro/articol_13684/avas_nu_stie_ daca_al_arrab_a_adus_banii_la_electroputere.html 194 http://www.ziare.com/articole/disponibilizati+elect roputere+craiova 195 Firma a fost nfiinat la sfritul anului 2005, avnd ca asociat unic i administrator un irakian, cu domiciliul n Bagdad, care nu aprea n evidenele Autoritii Naionale pentru Strini i despre care Ambasada Romniei din Irak a afirmat c nu a cerut vreodat viz de Romnia.

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din Romnia pentru prejudicii de circa 1,5 milioane de euro, comise prin emiterea de file CEC i bilete la ordin fr acoperire196. Cazul celebrului Omar Hayssam a fost att de mult comentat n pres nct ne rezumm doar s-l amintim statistic. De asemenea, la Iai, n anul 2005, un sirian i un iordanian au fost condamnai pentru o evaziune fiscal de peste 1,5 milioane de euro. Sirianul Omar Chama este acuzat de o frauda de peste 70 de milioane de euro. Acesta a fost principalul colaborator al lui Omar Hayssam i a fost arestat n anul 2003 pentru splare de bani i finanarea terorismului islamic. n anul 2005 acesta a fost pus n libertate de ctre magistraii bucureteni, eliberarea sa fiind prezentat de presa din ara noastr ca fiind n strns legtur cu rpirea i eliberarea jurnalitilor romni din Irak.197 Despre acesta se spune c ar fi plecat din ar dei trei dintre firmele nfiinate pe numele lui nc din perioada 2001 2003 (Safa Com Impex SRL, Scheffer System Prod SRL i Altin-Ro Grup Aluminium SRL) funcioneaz, n ciuda faptului c, potrivit datelor de la Registrul Comerului capitalul lor nu a fost actualizat iar rentabilitatea lor este zero. Acuzaii de fraud i neplat a datoriilor au fost formulate chiar i mpotriva lui Mohamad Yassin, vicepreedintele Uniunii Arabilor din Romnia, firmele sale International Medical Center i International Technical & Engineering Services, fiind nregistrate cu restane ctre Ministerul Finanelor Publice. Nu puine au fost i legturile strnse care au existat n ultimii 15 ani ntre arabii acuzati de fraude i clasa politic din Romnia, aici nscriindu-se igareta I i igareta II, sau declaraia acordat Evenimentului zilei de generalul (r) Ion Pitulescu, ef al Politiei Romne ntre 1995 - 1997, con-

form creia mafioii arabi - Zaher Iskandarani, Omar Hayssam i ceilali - erau foarte apropiati partidului de guvernmnt cu care ineau legatura prin intermediul lui Kamel Kader198. Hassan i Ammar Nannaa, patronii SC Terom Iai, pe numele crora magistraii Seciei a II-a a Tribunalului Bucureti au emis, la solicitarea procurorilor DIICOT din cadrul Ministerului Public din 21 ianuarie 2005, mandate de arestare preventiv n lips, fiind acuzai de prejudicii de peste 3,8 milioane de euro i suspectai de legturi directe cu reeaua terorist condus de Bin Laden. Este demn de reinut i faptul c, n general, conform informaiilor aprute n pres despre activitatea acestor ceteni irakieni, iranieni, sirieni, libieni, iordanieni sau turci care sunt acuzai de fraude financiare n Romnia, c numele a circa 33% din ei, sunt asociate cu calitatea de angajai ai serviciilor secrete din rile lor de origine.199 Dac inem cont de faptul c n raportul publicat de CIA se aduceau acuzaii extrem de dure la adresa Siriei i Iranului, conform crora aceste ri pregtesc special, membri ai serviciilor secrete pentru derularea activitilor de terorism economic, nvnd mecanismele de producere a fraudelor, adaptndu-le la specificul rii n care urmeaz s i desfoare activitatea, aceste aciuni fiind svrite cu premeditare, iar banii obinui n urma acestor fraude economice, fiind transferai n afara granielor rii unde se comite frauda, se identific astfel o surs de finanare a activitilor reelelor teroriste din lume. n concluzie, nu putem aprecia dac faptele de natur economic svrite pe teritoriul rii noastre de ctre cetenii strini, cu predilecie provenind din rile arabe, sunt aciuni concertate de terorism economic sau, mai degrab fapte de evaziune fiscal.

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http://www.urbannews.ro 197 www.hotnews.ro

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www.evz.ro http://2005.informatia.ro/Lista_persoanelor_fizice_ si_juridice_suspecte_de_acte_de_terorism-114643

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Bibliografie: Adrian Marcel Iancu, Narcoterorismul - Buletinul de informare i Documentare al MAI nr. 1/2008 Brian Jenkins; Paul Wilkinson, Aviation terrorism and security, Seria Cass series on political Violence nr. 10, ed. Taylor&Francis, martie 1999 David Christopherson, Compte rendu officiel des dbats de la Chambre des communes du Canada, numro 055, 11 fvrier 2005 Gheorghe Ardvoaice, Dumitru Iliescu, Laureniu Dan Ni, Terorism. Antiterorism. Contraterorism., Ed. Antet, Oradea, 1997, pag. 19, 49. LEGE Nr. 26 din 5 noiembrie 1990 republicat privind registrul comerului, cu modificrile i completrile ulterioare LEGE Nr. 31 din 16 noiembrie 1990 republicat privind societile comerciale, cu modificrile i completrile ulterioare LEGE Nr. 85 din 5 aprilie 2006 privind procedura insolvenei, cu modificrile i completrile ulterioare ORDIN Nr. 2594/C din 10 octombrie 2008 pentru aprobarea Normelor metodologice privind modul de inere a registrelor comerului, de efectuare a nregistrrilor i de eliberare a informaiilor

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FORME ALE INCRIMINRII FRAUDEI CORPORAIILOR MULTINAIONALE


As.univ.dr. MARCOCI PETRIC-MIHAIL Academia de Poliie Alexandru Ioan Cuza Multinationals have become the biggest players in world trade. The international economy, with a political and diplomatic sphere, will be replaced by a multinational economy as these companies play an increasingly decisive role in globalization changes. Statistics show that the influence of multinationals is replacing that of states; over two thirds of the 100 largest economic entities are now companies and not states. The Sarbanes Oxley Act, which was adopted in 2002 to restore investor confidence after the Enron scandal, has become a tool for internationalizing business law. This act applies extraterritorially to both all publicly-held companies in the United States and all companies subject to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Sarbanes Oxley Act modifies the obligations of auditors and the composition of boards of directors, and sets out two new crimes punishable by heavy fines or imprisonment up to 20 years. Cuvinte cheie: corporaie multinaional,rspundere penal, drept european, frauda corporatist Rspunderea penal a entitilor corporatiste Rspunderea penal a entitilor corporatiste multinaionale reprezint o particularizare a formelor rspunderii penale a persoanelor juridice. Dincolo de aspectele subsumate caracterului transnaional al formelor de criminalitate corporatist, este indubitabil faptul c acestor forme de devian social grav trebuie s li se aplice locului comiterii infraciunii ori legislaia statului unde se produc efectele actului infracional. Rspunderea penal a persoanelor juridice este un aspect care a suscitat vii controverse doctrinare de-a lungul timpului, att n sistemul penal romnesc ct i n alte sisteme legislative. Astfel, pe de o parte, avem de a face cu susintorii principiului societas delinquere non potest, care-i fundamenteaz dezvoltrile doctrinare pe imposibilitatea angajrii rspunderii penale a persoanei juridice ca materializare a teoriei ficiunii din dreptul civil conform creia persoanele juridice nu
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au o existen n sine, ele fiind n realitate o ficiune a legii200. Subsidiar, acestei consideraii, pornind de la considerentele de natur psihosocial, se meniona i inadmisibilitatea rspunderii penale a unei colectiviti201. Aceast teorie denumit teza negativ a rspunderii penale a persoanei juridice a fundamentat imposibilitatea angajrii rspunderii penale a persoanei juridice. n doctrina romneasc unul din cei mai cunoscui adepi ai tezei negative a fost profesorul Ion Tanoviceanu202. De cealalt parte, se situeaz adepii tezei pozitive a angajrii rspunderii penale a persoanei juridice bazat pe teoria realitii persoanelor juridice, care sunt considerate ca fiind entiti nzestrate cu voin i conTr.Pop - Drept penal comparat. Partea general, vol II. Cluj-Napoca 1928 201 V. Dongoroz- Tratat de drept penal, Reeditarea ediiei din 1939 sub egida Asociaiei Romne de tiine Penale, Edit. Societii Tempus, Bucureti 2000, pag.295 202 I. Tanoviceanu- Curs de drept penal, vol.I Edit. Socec, Bucureti 1912 pag. 232 i urmtoarele
200

tiin proprie, ele acionnd n vederea atingerii unui scop, motiv pentru care acestea pot rspunde penal pentru orice nclcare a legii. n dreptul penal romn, cel mai cunoscut susintor al tezei pozitive a fost reputatul profesor Vintil Dongoroz. Problema rspunderii penale a persoanei juridice a fost tranat n legislaia romneasc prin adoptarea Legii nr. 278 din 4 iulie 2006, publicat n Monitorul Oficial nr. 601 din 12 iulie 2006, care modific prevederile Codului Penal prin introducerea articolului 19. Conform acestuia Persoanele juridice, cu excepia statului, a autoritilor publice i a instituiilor publice care desfoar o activitate ce nu poate face obiectul domeniului privat, rspund penal pentru infraciunile svrite n realizarea obiectului de activitate sau n interesul ori n numele persoanei juridice, dac fapta a fost svrit cu forma de vinovie prevzut de legea penal. Rspunderea penal a persoanei juridice nu exclude rspunderea penal a persoanei fizice care a contribuit, n orice mod, la svrirea aceleiai infraciuni. Astfel, conform legislaiei penale romneti, ilegalitile svrite la nivelul corporaiilor angajeaz rspunderea penal a acestora, n msura n care infraciunile au fost svrite n realizarea obiectului de activitate, n interesul sau n numele persoanei juridice203. Pe aceste baze, opinm c aria de incriminare este acoperitoare relativ la gama de poteniale ilegaliti ce se pot comite n cadrul ori n legtur cu activitatea corporaiilor multinaionale. Devine interesant de analizat etica angajrii rspunderii penale a unei corporaii pentru faptele ilegale ale administratorilor care pgubesc nsi entitatea corporatist, cum ar fi cazul delapidrilor sau actelor de corupie aferente tranzaciilor comerciale. Aceasta, deoarece pentru celelalte tipuri de ilegaliti, i anume, cele care pgubesc investitorii, partenerii comerciali ori statul, angajarea rspunderii penale a corporaiilor iese din sfera
203

analizei etice, devenind o necesitate obiectiv. Personal, consider c i n primul caz, se poate angaja rspunderea penal a corporaiilor ca urmare a nerespectrii obligaiilor de instituire a unui sistem transparent de administrare i control a operaiunilor comerciale i de administrare derulate la nivelul entitii corporatiste, dar numai n msura n care faptele comise afecteaz patrimonial ori moral tere persoane. Referitor la pedepsele aplicabile persoanei juridice n dreptul penal romn, acestea se clasific n pedepse principale i complementare204. Pedeapsa principal aplicabil corporaiilor multinaionale este amenda de la 2500 de lei la 2.000.000 de lei. Pedepsele complementare sunt205: a) dizolvarea persoanei juridice; b) suspendarea activitii persoanei juridice pe o durat de la 3 luni la un an sau suspendarea uneia dintre activitile persoanei juridice n legtur cu care s-a svrit infraciunea pe o durat de la 3 luni la 3 ani; c) nchiderea unor puncte de lucru ale persoanei juridice pe o durat de la 3 luni la 3 ani; d) interzicerea de a participa la procedurile de achiziii publice pe o durat de la unu la 3 ani; e) afiarea sau difuzarea hotrrii de condamnare. Aplicarea uneia sau mai multor pedepse complementare se dispune atunci cnd instana constat c, fa de natura i gravitatea infraciunii, precum i fa de mprejurrile n care a fost svrit, aceste pedepse sunt necesare206.Aplicarea uneia sau mai multor pedepse complementare este obligatorie cnd legea prevede aceast pedeaps207.Pedepsele complementare prevzute n art. 53^1 alin. 3 lit. b)-e) se pot aplica n mod cumulativ. Executarea pedepselor complementare ncepe dup rmne204 205

Art.19 al Codului Penal Romn

Art. 53 alin. 1 al Codului Penal Romn Art. 53 alin. 3 al Codului Penal Romn 206 Art. 53 alin 1 al Codului Penal Romn 207 Art. 53 alin 2 al Codului Penal Romn

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rea definitiva a hotrrii de condamnare. Pedeapsa amenzii consta n suma de bani pe care persoana juridic este condamnata sa o plteasc208. Cnd legea prevede pentru infraciunea svrit de persoana fizica pedeapsa nchisorii de cel mult 10 ani sau amenda, minimul special al amenzii pentru persoana juridic este de 5.000 lei, iar maximul special al amenzii este de 600.000 lei209. Atunci cnd legea prevede pentru infraciunea svrit de persoana fizica pedeapsa deteniunii pe via sau pedeapsa nchisorii mai mare de 10 ani, minimul special al amenzii pentru persoana juridic este de 10.000 lei, iar maximul special al amenzii este de 900.000 lei. Graie acestor reglementri s-a putut realiza un cadru simetric de pedepsire a persoanei juridice raportat la nivelul pedepselor aplicate persoanelor fizice care ncalc legea penal, instituindu-se astfel un sistem unitar de incriminare pe cele dou componente. Pedeapsa complementar a dizolvrii persoanei juridice se aplic atunci cnd persoana juridic a fost constituit n scopul svririi de infraciuni sau cnd obiectul su de activitate a fost deturnat n acest scop210. n caz de neexecutare, cu rea-credin, a uneia dintre pedepsele complementare prevzute n art. 53^1 alin. 3 lit. b)d), instana dispune dizolvarea persoanei juridice. Pedeapsa complementar a dizolvrii persoanei juridice are ca efect deschiderea procedurii de lichidare, potrivit legii, iar o copie dup dispozitivul hotrrii definitive de condamnare prin care s-a aplicat aceast pedeaps va fi comunicat, de ndat, instanei civile competente, care va proceda la desemnarea lichidatorului211. Pedeapsa complementara a suspendrii activitii persoanei juridice const n interzicerea desfurrii activitii sau a uneia
208 209

dintre activitile persoanei juridice, n realizarea creia a fost svrit infraciunea212. n caz de neexecutare, cu rea-credina, a pedepsei complementare de afiare sau difuzarea hotrrii de condamnare, instana dispune suspendarea activitii sau a uneia dintre activitile persoanei juridice pn la punerea n executare a pedepsei complementare, dar nu mai mult de 3 luni. Dac pn la mplinirea termenului de 3 luni, pedeapsa complementar nu a fost pus n executare, instana dispune dizolvarea persoanei juridice213. Pedepsele complementare de dizolvare a persoanei juridice i suspendarea activitii nu pot fi aplicate partidelor politice, sindicatelor, patronatelor i organizaiilor religioase ori aparinnd minoritilor, constituite potrivit legii, ori persoanelor juridice care i desfoar activitatea n domeniul presei. Pedeapsa complementar a nchiderii unor puncte de lucru ale persoanei juridice const n nchiderea unuia sau a mai multora dintre punctele de lucru aparinnd persoanei juridice cu scop lucrativ, n care s-a desfurat activitatea n realizarea creia a fost svrit infraciunea, fr a putea a fi aplicat persoanelor juridice care i desfoar activitatea n domeniul presei. Pedeapsa complementar a interzicerii de a participa la procedurile de achiziii publice const n interzicerea de a participa, direct sau indirect, la procedurile pentru atribuirea contractelor de achiziii publice prevzute de lege. Acest gen de pedeaps se poate dovedi extrem de eficient, ntruct pentru foarte muli ageni economici, interdicia participrii la procedurile de achiziie public aduce cu sine o diminuare semnificativ a cifrei de afaceri i implicit a profitului. O alt pedeaps complementar aplicabil persoanei juridice este reprezentat de afiare sau difuzare a hotrrii de condamnare care se realizeaz pe cheltuiala persoanei juridice condamnate. Dar, referitor la acest tip de pedeaps complementar, legea
212 213

Art. 71 alin. 1 al Codului Penal romn Art. 71 alin. 2 al Codului Penal romn 210 Art. 71 alin. 1 al Codului Penal romn 211 Art. 71 alin. 3 al Codului Penal romn

Art. 71 alin. 1 al Codului Penal romn Art. 71 alin. 3 al Codului Penal romn

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instituie obligaia de pstrare a confidenialitii identitii victimei, cu excepia cazului cnd aceasta sau reprezentantul su legal i dau acordul referitor la dezvluirea acesteia. Afiarea hotrrii de condamnare se realizeaz n extras, n forma i locul stabilite de instan, pentru o perioad cuprins ntre o lun i 3 luni. Difuzarea hotrrii de condamnare se realizeaz n extras i n forma stabilit de instan, prin intermediul presei scrise sau audiovizuale ori prin alte mijloace de comunicare audiovizual, desemnate de instan. Atunci cnd difuzarea se face prin presa scris sau audiovizual, instana stabilete numrul apariiilor, care nu poate fi mai mare de 10, iar n cazul difuzrii prin alte mijloace audiovizuale, durata acesteia nu poate depi 3 luni. Analiza sistemului punitiv aplicabil persoanelor juridice i, implicit, entitilor corporatiste rezidente reliefeaz gradualitatea i contextualiatea acestuia, putndu-se constitui ntr-un veritabil mecanism disuasiv i represiv apt s rspund necesitilor induse de evoluiile actuale i tendinele de perspectiv ale criminalitii corporatiste. Pe de alt parte, simplitatea i supleea reglementrilor penale aplicabile persoanelor juridice contrasteaz cu imaginea formalismului exagerat i greoi al altor mecanisme penale perceput de societatea civil. Rspunderea penal a corporaiilor n dreptul european Documentele fundamentale prin care se realizeaz angajarea rspunderii penale a corporaiilor n spaiul juridic european sunt Recomandrile R(82)12 i R(88)18 ale Consiliului de Minitri al Consiliului Europei privind criminalitatea economic i rspunderea penal a persoanelor juridice pentru astfel de infraciuni, prin care se solicit statelor membre s evalueze problematica angajrii rspunderii penale a persoanelor juridice. Recomandarea R(88)18 a Consiliului Europei poate fi considerat drept documentul cel mai important214 cu inciden n
214

sfera criminalitii corporatiste, ntruct instituie rspunderea companiilor pentru infraciunile comise n derularea obiectului de activitate, n fapt baza conceptual, juridic i etic a rspunderii penale a ntreprinderii. Aceast recomandare pornete de la premisele necesitii implementrii unui sistem articulat la nivel european axat pe sanciuni concrete mpotriva companiilor care, n activitatea lor, ncalc legislaia penal, comercial ori concurenial, dublate de repararea prejudiciilor cauzate persoanelor vtmate, pe de o parte, iar, pe cealalt parte, s asigure crearea unui mecanism care s descurajeze potenialele practici ilicite n cadrul corporaiilor ori n relaiile acestora cu terii. Aceast dubl cerin vizeaz ca finalitate crearea unui mediu economic corect i transparent. Principiile care ar urma s ghideze rspunderea penal a companiilor n lumina acestei recomandri sunt: compania poate rspunde penal chiar dac infraciunile nu au legtur direct cu obiectul de activitate al companiei i independent de stabilirea unei persoane fizice vinovate de comiterea respectivei infraciuni; rspunderea penal a companiilor nu devine operabil n msura n care persoanele angrenate n mecanismele de conducere ale acesteia nu sunt implicate n svrirea faptei, ori dac pot dovedi c au luat toate msurile necesare prevenirii comiterii respectivei ilegaliti; rspunderea penal a ntreprinderilor trebuie s coexiste cu rspunderea penal a persoanelor fizice implicate ori, dup caz, cu rspunderea administratorilor ori conductorilor care, prin neglijen n exercitarea propriilor atribuii, au fcut posibil svrirea infraciunii; angajarea rspunderii penale a companiei trebuie s opereze doar n msura n care faptele imputate sunt grave, n celelalte situaii fiind oportun apelarea la formele rspunderii administrative;
European-pg. 82, Edit. Sitech, Craiova 2009

M. K. Guiu, A.C. Voicu- Drept Penal Economic

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aplicarea sanciunii trebuie s aib n vedere i obiectivele punitive adiacente i anume repararea prejudiciului cauzat prin comiterea infraciunii i respectiv prevenirea comiterii de noi infraciuni. Recomandarea ofer o serie de pedepse principale sau complementare aplicabile companiilor, n urma svririi unor fapte penale: avertismentul sau mustrarea; asumarea responsabilitii companiei printr-o declaraie public cu suspendarea sanciunii; confiscarea bunurilor folosite la svrirea infraciunii sau a profiturilor obinute illegal; interzicerea participrii la procedurile de achiziie public; interzicerea obinerii de subvenii, ajutoare sau avantaje fiscale din partea statului; interdicia desfurrii anumitor activiti comerciale; interzicerea dreptului de a face reclam bunurilor sau serviciilor proprii; retragerea autorizaiilor; destituirea managerilor; administrarea pe o perioad determinat a companiei de ctre un administrator desemnat de instan; dizolvarea companiei; repunerea n situaia anterioar; publicarea deciziei prin care se pronun pedeapsa pe cheltuiala companiei. Analiznd stadiul implementrii prevederilor recomandrii anterior menionate n legislaia romneasc, putem constata faptul c, la momentul actual, Codul penal a instituit o parte nsemnat a pedepselor aplicabile companiilor prevzute de aceasta, introducnd astfel Romnia n grupul statelor care pot combate criminalitatea corporatist i prin angajarea rspunderii penale a persoanei juridice. Un alt instrument juridic care menioneaz necesitatea introducerii n legislaiile naionale a unor sanciuni aplicabile persoanelor juridice atunci cnd n numele sau pe contul acestora se comit infraciuni de
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corupie este Convenia penal privind corupia a Consiliului Europei ncheiat n 1999215. Conform recomandrilor prevzute, rspunderea penal a persoanei juridice ar urma s fie angajat atunci cnd o persoan fizic ce deine o funcie de conducere, reprezentare sau control n cadrul unei persoane juridice comite o infraciune de corupie, ori particip la svrirea unei astfel de infraciuni n calitate de instigator sau complice, cu singura condiie ca ilegalitatea s fie comis n interesul persoanei juridice. De asemenea, convenia recomand implementarea n legislaiile naionale a rspunderii persoanei juridice atunci cnd comiterea infraciunii de corupie a fost posibil ca urmare a lipsei de supraveghere sau control din partea persoanelor ce aveau astfel de atribuii n cadrul persoanei juridice. Sistemul penal francez instituie rspunderea penal a persoanelor juridice i implicit a corporaiilor, n calitate de autor sau complice pentru infraciunile comise, n numele sau interesul lor, prin organele sau reprezentanii lor216. Acest sistem sancionator a fost introdus n sistemul penal francez ncepnd cu anul 1994, angajarea rspunderii corporaiei fiind condiionat de comiterea unei infraciuni de funcionarii care ndeplinesc atribuii de conducere, nu i pentru ilegalitile svrite de ceilali angajai ai companiei. De altfel, acest sistem bazat pe condiionarea angajrii rspunderii penale a corporaiei de svrirea unei fapte penale n numele sau n interesul acesteia de ctre manageri ori funcionarii cu atribuii de conducere este relativ dominant n paleta sistemelor penale europene, regsindu-se i n Anglia, Germania (doar ca sanciune quasipenal), Portugalia, Finlanda i Norvegia. Dar, legislaia francez extinde sfera rspunderii corporatiste i asupra faptelor comise n numele ori n interesul societii
215

Art.18 al Conveniei penale privind corupia a Consiliului Europei 216 Art. 121 al Codului penal francez republicat 2008

de ctre reprezentant- acesta fiind considerat din perspectiv doctrinar ca un funcionar mandatat s angajeze compania ntrun raport juridic. Condiionarea angajrii rspunderii penale a corporaiei de comiterea unei fapte penale n numele sau n interesul su de ctre un funcionar care s dein strict atribuii de conducere este, n opinia noastr, criticabil ntruct, pe de o parte, reduce sfera de incriminare personal a fptuitorului, ceea ce presupune n mod subsecvent ca autorul s fie descoperit, iar, pe de alt parte, ntruct ofer posibilitatea companiilor s implice n infraciuni grave (dare de mit, cumprare de influen, etc) angajai care s nu aparin ierarhiei manageriale fr a mai angrena rspunderea penal a companiei. n legislaiile europene, pe lng sistemul prezentat coexist un alt sistem care postuleaz angrenarea rspunderii penale a unei companii pentru fapta oricrui angajat al acesteia n msura n care ilegalitatea respectiv are legtur cu obiectul de activitate al acesteia ori a fost svrit n scopul obinerii de profit. Acest sistem incriminator este ntlnit n Olanda, Belgia i Danemarca i rspunde unora dintre exigenele induse de Recomandarea R(88) 18 printre care aceea ca rspunderea penal a companiei s devin operabil indiferent de identificarea fptuitorului ori de calitatea acestuia - cadru de conducere sau simplu angajat. Spre exemplu, n Olanda, persoana juridic rspunde penal pentru infraciunea comis de angajatul su, indiferent de rangul acestuia n cadrul persoanei juridice.217 Analiznd critic acest al doilea sistem incriminator observm faptul c aria de incriminare este practic nelimitat raportndu-ne la angajaii companiei, putndu-se ajunge astfel la situaia n care o companie s poat rspunde penal pentru fapta unui angajat ale crui atribuii de serviciu pot fi prea puin importante n ceea ce privete realizarea legitim a obiectului de activitate
217

al corporaiei. Dar, n egal msur, acest sistem incriminator prezint avantajul celeritii investigaiilor penale ntruct evit controversele legate de existena sau nu a calitii de conductor al respectivei companii. Sistemele penale europene sunt n quasitotalitatea lor adeptele (dezacorduri la nivel doctrinar exist doar n Frana) tezei c o corporaie, ca specie a persoanei juridice, rspunde penal doar pentru infraciunile comise n realizarea obiectului de activitate, n numele ori n interesul companiei. Aceste precepte juridice pot fi considerate ca deplin etice ntruct ar fi total imoral ca o companie s rspund penal pentru fapta unui angajat (fie acesta i manager ori director) pentru aciuni care nu au legtur cu obiectul de activitate sau cu interesul corporaiei. Referitor la natura infraciunilor care pot atrage rspunderea penal a corporaiilor, sistemul penal dominant n Europa se bazeaz pe premisa conform creia o companie poate rspunde penal fr a determina care ar fi acele infraciuni care ar atrage aceast form a rspunderii juridice218. Acest sistem care se regsete n Norvegia, Anglia, Olanda, Belgia, Romnia etc. postuleaz angajarea rspunderii penale pentru orice tip de infraciune, exceptnd cele care pot fi svrite doar la nivel personal - spre exemplu furtul, tlhria etc. Un alt sistem existent n spaiul european referitor la natura infraciunilor care pot atrage rspunderea penal a corporaiilor se regsete n Frana i Estonia unde se aplic criteriul existenei normei de incriminare exprese a infraciunilor care angreneaz rspunderea penal a persoanei juridice. Dar n spaiul juridic european exist i state care nu admit rspunderea penal a persoanelor juridice cum ar fi: Italia, Germania i Spania. Astfel, n Italia, se consider din perspectiva principiului de drept c
218

Art.51 al Codului Penal olandez

M. K. Guiu, A.C. Voicu- Drept Penal Economic European-pg. 98, Edit. Sitech, Craiova 2009

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rspunderea penal nu poate fi dect personal i, pe cale de consecin, c efectele dezirabile ale pedepsei aplicate trebuie s afecteze exclusiv interesele infractorului, nu i pe cele ale unor teri nevinovai219. Cu toate acestea, Legea italian nr.231/2001 admite rspunderea penal a persoanelor juridice doar pentru un numr limitat de infraciuni (trafic de droguri, splarea banilor, fraude contra statului), introducnd, pe de alt parte i un sistem de exceptare a rspunderii penale a persoanei morale dac220: organul de conducere al acesteia a adoptat i implementat, nainte de comiterea infraciunii, un sistem menit s previn svrirea acesteia; supravegherea msurilor implementate a fost delegat unei entiti independente nzestrat cu atribuii de control221; persoanele care au comis infraciunea au nclcat n mod flagrant prevederile acestui sistem de supraveghere respectiv organismului de control nu i se pot imputa erori sau deficiene n activitatea de supraveghere. Germania nu admite rspunderea penal a persoanei juridice ca efect al principiului constituional al rspunderii pentru fapta proprie222. Totui n Germania a fost adoptat n 1987 legea referitoare la faptele contrare ordinii publice care a introdus aa numita sanciune quasipenal aplicabil persoanelor juridice prin care a devenit operabil o form de rspundere penal a persoanei juridice, n msura n care aceasta ar putea fi considerat autor mediat223 al infraciunii. ntr-un mod similar a procedat i Spania care, la rndul su, nu admite rspunderea penal a persoanei juridice dar a introdus n codul penal din 1995 o serie de prevederi denumite consecine accesorii condamn219

M. K. Guiu, A.C. Voicu- Drept Penal Economic European-pg. 84, Edit. Sitech, Craiova 2009 220 Art. 6 al Legii italiene nr.231/2001 221 M. K. Guiu, A.C. Voicu- Drept Penal Economic European-pg. 93, Edit. Sitech, Craiova 2009 222 M. K. Guiu, A.C. Voicu- Drept Penal Economic European-pg. 85, Edit. Sitech, Craiova 2009 223 Art.14 al Codului Penal german

rii224 care permit judectorului s aplice anumite pedepse persoanei morale cum ar fi: suspendarea activitii, dizolvarea societii, nchiderea companiei care sunt considerate de doctrin ca msuri sui generis. Analiza incriminrilor fraudei corporatiste n legislaia Statelor Unite ale Americii Legea Sarbanes-Oxley a fost adoptat n 2002, ca o reacie de natur legal la marile scandaluri financiare care au condus la falimentul unor companii de renume din SUA i au generat pierderea ncrederii publicului n practicile expertizelor contabile i n cifrele raportate de companii. Prin urmare, Legea Sarbanes-Oxley stabilete standarde mai riguroase privind contabilitatea, auditul i responsabilitile consiliilor de administraie, reprezintnd fundamentul viziunii asupra gestionrii i controlului unei companii. Totodat, aceasta impune standarde i reglementri i asupra cadrului de control ale sistemului financiar. Prin Legea Sarbanes-Oxley, se dorete creterea transparenei raportrilor financiare i o supraveghere mai eficient a firmelor de contabilitate care efectueaz auditul companiilor listate, astfel urmrindu-se sporirea proteciei investitorilor bursieri. Totodat, se urmrete posibilitatea ca investitorii minoritari s poat contribui la alegerea administratorilor i cenzorilor independeni care alctuiesc consiliul de administraie i, prin aceasta, urmnd a avea interesele protejate n momentul lurii deciziilor importante din viaa companiilor de ctre cenzorii respectivi, inclusiv stabilirea salariilor directorilor intreprinderilor i gradul de corelare a bonusurilor acestora cu mrimea profitului raportat, fapt care, n trecut, a generat raportri de profituri fictive n funcie de care directorii i calculau mrimea bonusurilor. Legea cuprinde 11 titluri care descriu, n mod specific, cerinele i regulile ce trebuie respectate n efectuarea raportrilor contabile. Fiecare titlu este structurat la rndul su n mai multe seciuni, astfel:
224

Art.129 al Codului Penal spaniol

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Comisia de supraveghere a contabilitii n companiile publice. Aceast seciune este centrat pe formarea unei noi entiti PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board- Comisia de Supraveghere a contabilitii companiilor publice) cu rol de protejarea intereselor investitorilor - i a publicului n general - prin supravegherea auditrii companiilor publice. Auditul companiilor publice trebuie s fie realizat independent, corect i transparent. Comisia va funciona ca o instituie nonprofit pn cnd va fi dizolvat printr-o nou lege. Aceast comisie central de supraveghere are ca atribuii nregistrarea firmelor de audit, stabilirea procedurilor i procesului de realizare a activitii de audit, inspectarea i supravegherea modului de efectuare a controlului, de respectare a regulilor i normelor speciale prevzute de Legea Sarbanes-Oxley. Auditorul independent. Acest titlu al legii cuprinde nou seciuni i stabilete standardele pentru auditorul independent extern, n vederea limitrii conflictelor de interese. Seciunea presupune noi reguli privind aprobarea auditorului, partenerii acestuia i rapotrile ce trebuie efectuate de auditori. De asemenea, ca element de noutate, aceast seciune restricioneaz companiile de audit n a mai acorda servicii de non-audit (spre exemplu: consultana cu privire la investiii, n materia asigurrilor, audit intern, precum i orice alte sevicii specializate ce nu corespund activitii de audit) acelorai clieni. Un alt element de interes const n obligaia auditorului independent de a comunica comisiei de audit intern al firmei activitatea desfurat. Responsabilitatea corporatist. Titlul este format din opt seciuni i stabilete faptul c directorii executivi ai companiilor i asum responsabilitatea pentru acurateea i completitudinea raportrilor financiare interne, astfel c legea impune companiilor publice s-i evalueze sistemul intern de control, iar concluziile s fie fcute publice prin raportrile financiare i raportul auditorului independent. n vederea protejrii investitorilor i a
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intereselor publice, se sancioneaz fapta oricrei persoane cu atribuii de conducere director ori manager, de a influena n mod fraudulos, manipula, constrnge sau nela un contabil independent ce efectueaz activitatea de audit a unor declaraii financiare n cadrul companiei, n scopul de a induce n eroare publicul cu privire la adevrata situaie financiar. Acionarii au dreptul de a supraveghea relaiile dintre companie i auditor. De asemenea, situaiile financiare trebuie s fie certificate de preedintele consiliului de administraie i directorul financiar. Ca elemente de noutate este definit interaciunea dintre auditorii externi i comisiile de audit intern precum i specificarea responsabilitii directorilor pentru acurateea i validitatea raportrilor financiare. Tot astfel sunt enumerate limitele specifice ale comportamentului consiliului de administraie din perspective eticii manageriale, fiind descrise i retragerea beneficiilor i sanciunile civile pentru neconformare225. Prin noua reglementare este redus timpul de raportare pentru insider trading (tranzaciile cu aciuni i obligaiuni proprii societii efectuate de directorii acesteia, angajai n posturi-cheie, etc. precum i de acionarii care dein mai mult de 10%) i interzise pe parcursul perioadei de blackout.226 Intensificarea raportrilor financiare. Acest titlu cuprinde nou seciuni i prezint intensificarea raportrilor cu privire la tranzaciile financiare, ct i reguli, norme privind tranzaciile, aranjamentele, obligaiile adiionale bilanului contabil, informaiile financiare pro forma, tranzacionarea aciunilor de ctre consiliul de administraie. Fiecare raportare financiar trebuie s conin declaraii n concordan cu principiile contabilitii prevazute n acest titlu. Este necesar derularea un control intern n vederea meninerii acurateii raportrilor financiare i informaiilor destinate publicului i acionariatului, ceea ce implic att controlul raportrilor interne
225 226

Seciunea 304 a Legii Sarbanes-Oxley Seciunea 306 a Legii Sarbanes-Oxley

ct i cele ale auditorilor externi227. De asemenea, este recomandat raportarea periodic a oricror schimbri ce au survenit referitor la condiiile financiare i intensificarea verificrilor efectuate de Comisia American a Valorilor Mobiliare (Securities and Exchange Comission SEC) asupra acestor raportri. O reglementare nou, extrem de eficient, const n interdicia mprumuturilor acordate de societi ctre membrii consiliului de administraie sau ctre directori. Potrivit articolului 404 al legii, atenia trebuie concentrat asupra managementului riscului, alocrii capitalurilor i structurii financiare, sistemului informaional, iar managementul i auditorul extern trebuie s evalueze i s emit anual un raport adecvat despre controlul intern din cadrul companiei. Conflicte de interese cu privire la analiti. Articolul cuprinde msurile adoptate pentru a readuce ncrederea investitorilor n raportrile analitilor financiari, fiind prezentat codul deontologic al analitilor financiari si prezentate principalele conflicte de interese. Scopul reglementrii este acela de a mbunti obiectivitatea analizelor financiare efectuate n vederea punerii la dispoziia investitorilor informaii mult mai folositoare i cuprinde reguli ntocmite pentru a crete ncrederea publicului, n general, n aceste analize i a proteja obiectivitatea i independena analitilor financiari. Astfel: se restricioneaz aprobarea analizelor financiare efectuate de ctre persoane angajate de brokeri care sunt implicai n activitatea de investiii bancare sau de persoane care nu au pregtirea profesional necesar de a efectua o astfel de analiz; se limiteaz supravegherea activitii analitilor financiari de ctre persoane angajate de brokeri fr a fi angrenate n investiiile bancare; obligaia brokerului sau a unei persoane angajate de acesta s nu se angajeze n activiti susceptibile de a putea fi considerate ca rzbunare sau ameninare cu rzbunarea, direct sau indirect, adresat oric227

rui analist financiar angajat de broker n vederea ntocmirii unui raport financiar nefavorabil, care s afecteze relaia dintre companie si broker. n vederea limitrii conflictelor de interese ce pot aprea, analitilor financiari le este interzis s efectueze analize n cadrul companiilor la care sunt acionari sau debitori, dac au primit eventuale compensaii de la respectiva companie. Resursele i autoritatea comisiei. Acest titlu cuprinde patru articole, n cadrul su fiind stabilite practicile de reabilitare a ncrederii investitorilor n instituia analitilor financiari. De asemenea, este stabilit att autoritatea Comisiei Americane a Valorilor Mobiliare (Securities and Exchange Comission SEC) de a cenzura sau interzice analitilor financiari dreptul de a mai profesa, ct i condiiile n care unei persoane i se poate interzice s practice activitatea de broker, consultant sau dealer, astfel: dac asemenea persoan nu deine calificarea necesar de a-i reprezenta pe altii, dac are un comportament profesional imoral i inadecvat; dac a nclcat , cu intenie, regulile i normele stabilite de lege in domeniu. Studii i rapoarte. Titlul VII al Legii Sarbanes-Oxley este compus din cinci seciuni i prevede efectuarea de studii i rapoarte n vederea mbuntirii msurilor luate mpotriva nclcrilor legii de ctre Comisia Americane a Valorilor Mobiliare SEC i auditori. Aceste studii i rapoarte trebuie s cuprind: cauzele i efectele consolidrii i dezvoltrii firmelor de consultan contabil dup anul 1989; cauzele ce au determinat reducerea progresiv a numrului de firme capabile s ofere servicii de audit companiilor multinaionale; msuri de cretere a numrului acestora i a gradului de competiie dintre ele228;
228

Seciunea 401 a Legii Sarbanes-Oxley

Seciunea 701 a Legii Sarbanes-Oxley

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rolul ageniilor de rating a creditului n operaiunile de pe piaa bursier229(seciunea 702). De asemenea, reglementarea impune efectuarea de studii care s stabileasc rolul bncilor de investiii, al consultanilor finaciari ai companiilor publice n manipularea i administrarea activelor acestora i ascunderea situaiei lor financiare reale. Astfel, se va avea n vedere stabilirea rolului acestora, n particular, cu privire la falimentul companiilor Enron i Global Crossing i, n special, n efecturea de tranzacii sau aranjamente financiare care s aib ca efect realizarea unor raportri, declaraii financiare de natur a crea o alt imagine a situaiei lor decat cea real i , n general, prin efectuarea de tranzacii care s permit companiilor publice s obin mprumuturi, s nu menioneze integral pasivul n bilanul contabil, s ascund riscurile la care sunt expuse sau orice alt mecanism menit s denatureze adevrata situaie economic a companiei230. Frauda n contabiltate la nivel corporatist. Acest titlu al legii amintite cuprinde apte capitole i descrie pedepsele aplicabile n cazul alterrii de orice natur a documentelor, obstrucionrii legilor n vigoare, fraudrii intereselor sau patrimoniului acionarilor, ori msurile de protecie instituite pentru angajaii respectivelor companii, care furnizeaz informaii cu privire la svrirea unor fraude. Pentru prima oar, legea american definete conceptul de distrugerea documentelor contabile n scopul mpiedicrii, influenrii sau obstrucionarea investigaiilor administrative ori judiciare231, pedeapsa pentru acest gen de fapte fiind amenda sau nchisoarea pn la 20 de ani232. De asemenea, este instituit obligaia pstrrii documentelor contabile precum i a rapoartelor de audit efectuate
Seciunea 702 a Legii Sarbanes-Oxley Seciunea 705 a Legii Sarbanes-Oxley 231 Seciunea 802 a Legii Sarbanes-Oxley modific Capitolul 18 al Codului penal Federal al Statelor Unite ale Americii 232 Seciunea 802, pct. 1519 a Legii Sarbanes-Oxley
230 229

cu privire la respectiva companie pe o perioad de 5 ani de la ncheierea perioadei fiscale n cadrul creia controlul a fost efectuat233. Seciunea 803 incrimineaz neachitarea unor debite ca umare a comiterii unei infraciuni prin nclcarea legilor privind titlurile de valoare i realizeaz acest lucru prin modificarea Seciunii 523(a) din titlul 11, al Codului Penal al Statelor Unite prin adugarea urmtoarelor categorii de fapte234: nclcarea oricrei legi federale privind titlurile de valoare (aa cum este definitde Legea privind valorile mobiliare din 1934), orice lege statal, sau orice regulament ori ordin emis conform acestor legi; fraude, nelciuni sau manipulri n legtur cu vnzarea sau cumprarea de titluri de valoare. Debitele pot rezulta din235: orice hotrre judectoreasc, ordin, ori emis decret ca urmare a unor activiti judiciare federale sau statale; orice contract ncheiat de ctre debitor; orice hotrre judectoreasc sau administrativ cu privire la pagube, amenzi, pedepse, citaii, cheltuieli de judecat, onorariul avocatului sau alte pli datorate de debitor. Seciunea 805 introduce revizuirea Regulamentului federal de stabilire a pedepselor pentru obstrucionarea justiiei i pentru fraude complexe prevznd noile reguli aplicabile n cazul fraudei i a obstrucionrii justiiei. Seciunea 806 face referire la protecia angajailor din cadrul companiilor publice care furnizeaz informaii sau ofer dovezi de producere a fraudelor precum i prin instituirea mecanismelor juridice de protecie a acestor drepturi - dreptul la aciune admi233

Seciunea 802, pct. 1520 lit.a a Legii SarbanesOxley 234 Seciunea 803 lit A a Legii Sarbanes-Oxley 235 Seciunea 803 lit B a Legii Sarbanes-Oxley

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nistrativ, judectoreasc precum i dreptul la primirea de despgubiri n cazul concedierii abuzive a acestora. Seciunea 807 instituie pedepsele aplicabile pentru fraudarea acionarilor n cadrul companiilor publice pe aciuni prin modificarea Capitolului 63 din titlul 18 al Codului Penal al Statelor Unite, prin adugarea urmtoarelor prevederi: Fapta persoanei de a executa sau ncercarea de a executa un artificiu, o schem: pentru a frauda orice persoan n legtur cu titlurile de valoarea ale unui emitent cu o clas de aciuni; pentru a obine, prin metode frauduloase, promisiuni, bani sau proprieti n conexiune cu vnzarea sau cumprarea de titluri de valoare ale unei companii n condiiile sus-menionate, se pedepsete cu amend sau nchisoare pn la 25 de ani. Majorarea pedepselor n ceea ce privete criminalitatea gulerelor albe. Conform acestui titlu, care cuprinde ase seciuni, pedepsele pentru infraciunile svrite de gulerele albe i grupuri de criminalitate economic constituite se nspresc, emindu-se recomandri de mbuntire a activitii de legiferare n acest domeniu adaugnd i eecul material n garantarea rapoartelor financiare n cadrul corporaiei ca infraciune. Tentativa i pregtirea n vederea comiterii unei fraude economice este incriminat n seciunea 902 modific Capitolul 63 din titlul 18, Codul Penal al Statelor Unite prin inserarea dup seciunea 1348 a urmtoarei prevederi: Tentativa sau pregatirea n vederea svririi unei fraude economice de ctre orice persoan, va fi sancionat cu aceeai pedeaps ca i infraciunea respectiv236. Seciunea 903 instituie pedepsele aplicabile fraudelor svrite pe internet i prin pot, iar Seciunea 904 modific pedepsele aplicabile pentru nclcarea Legii privind pensiile angajailor din 1974. Seciunea 905 instituie un amendament
236 Seciunea 1349 a Capitolului 63 din Titlul XVIII al Codului Penal al S.U.A.

de emitere a unor norme n legtur cu faptele penale svrite de persoane ce fac parte din categoria gulerelor albe, prin emiterea unor Directive ale Comisiei Statelor Unite de Stabilire a Pedepselor n conformitate cu normele seciunii 994(p), titlul 18, Codul Penal al SUA, i n concordan cu aceast seciune. Astfel, Comisia va revizui i va efectua modificri asupra Regulamentului federal de stabilire a pedepselor n vederea ndeplinirii normelor prevzute n prezenta lege. Responsabilitatea corporatist pentru rapoartele financiare237 se instituie prin modificarea Capitolului 63, titlul 18 al Codului Penal al Statelor Unite prin inserarea dup seciunea 1349, a urmtoarelor: Eecul consiliului de administraie de a garanta rapoartele financiare238 prin: (a) garantarea rapoartelor financiare periodice ; Fiecare raport periodic ce conine declaraii financiare emis de o companie n conformitate cu seciunea 13(a) sau 15(d) a Legii privind valorile mobiliare din 1934 va fi nsoit de o declaraie scris de ctre directorul executiv i directorul financiar (sau lociitorul acestora). (b)coninut ; Declaraia menionat n cadrul subseciunii (a) va garanta aceast raportare cu date financiare care respect prevederile seciunii 13(a) i 15(d) din Legea privind schimbul titlurilor de valoare i corespund condiiilor financiare i rezultatelor operaiunilor companiei. (c)pedepse; Fapta oricrei persoane: de a garanta cu orice declaraie, conform subseciunilor (a) i (b), cunoscnd c raportarea financiar ce nsoete aceast declaraie nu corespunde cerinelor prezentului articol, va fi sancionat cu amend pn la 1,000,000 $ sau nchisoare pn la 10 ani sau amndou; de a garanta, n mod intenionat, cu orice declaraie, conform subseciunilor (a)
237

Prevzut de Seciunea 906 a Legii SarbanesOxley 238 Seciunea 1350 a Capitolului 63 al Titlului 18 al Codului Penal al S.U.A.

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i (b), cunoscnd c raportarea financiar ce nsoete aceast declaraie nu corespunde cerinelor prezentului articol, va fi sancionat cu amend pn la 5,000,000 $ sau nchisoare pn la 20 de ani sau amndou. Declaraia de venituri n cadrul corporaiilor. Cuprinde o singur seciune i prevede c, din dispoziia Senatului, declaraiile de venituri vor fi semnate de directorul executiv din cadrul unei companii. Legea privind frauda n contabilitate n cadrul corporaiei. Cuprinde apte seciuni i identifica fraudele financiare i falsificarea raportrilor ca fiind infraciuni, ct i pedepsele prevzute pentru acestea. De asemenea, se instituie necesitatea revizuirii regulamentelor i intensificarea pedepselor aplicabile acestui gen de fraude. Falsificarea registrelor sau mpiedicarea unei proceduri oficiale* modific prevederile anterioare prin introducerea urmtoarei incriminri: fapta oricrei persoane care, n mod intenionat pentru obinerea unor foloase, altereaz, distruge, modific, ascunde un registru, un document sau alt obiect ori ncearc s fac acest lucru cu intenia de a distruge integritatea sau validitatea acestor obiecte pentru folosirea ntr-o activitate oficial sau, n orice mod, obstrucioneaz, influeneaz, sau mpiedic o activitate oficial sau ncearc s fac acest lucru va fi sancionat cu amend sau nchisoare pn la cel mult 20 de ani sau amndou. Autoritatea Comisiei Americane a Valorilor Mobiliare de a interzice dreptul unor peroane s ocupe funcii de director** rezult din modificarea Seciunii 21C din Legea valorilor mobiliare din 1934 prin adugarea la final a urmtoarelor:

Autoritatea Comisiei de a interzice ocuparea funciei de director de ctre anumite persoane - n cadrul unei operaiuni de sistare din subseciunea (a), Comisia va emite un ordin de a interzice, condiionat sau necondiionat, permanent sau pe o perioad de timp determinat, oricrei persoane care a nclcat seciunea 10(b) sau regulile i regulamentele omologe de a ocupa o funcie de director sau de conducere n cadrul unei companii care are acea clas de titluri de valoare prevzute n seciunea 12, sau este necesar s se completeze rapoarte conform 15(d), dac modul de comportament al persoanei este nepotrivit pentru a ocupa o funcie de conducere. Aciuni represive mpotriva informatorilor*** sunt incriminate prin modificarea Seciunii 1513 din titlul 18 al Codului Penal al Statelor Unite prin adugarea la final a urmtoarei prevederi: Fapta oricrei persoane, care, cu intenie acioneaz n mod represiv, vtmator, pentru o persoan, inclusiv cu privire la angajarea acestuia n cadrul unei firme, pentru oferirea, ctre ofierii ce aplic legea, de informaii adevrate n legtur cu comiterea sau posibila comitere de infraciuni federale, se pedepsete cu amenda conform acestui titlu sau cu nchisoare de pn la 10 ani sau amndou.
*

Prevzut de Seciunea 1102 a Legii SarbanesOxley ** Prevzut de Seciunea 1105 a Legii SarbanesOxley *** Seciunea 1107 a Legii Sarbanes-Oxley

Bibliografie: Codul penal Federal al Statelor Unite ale Americii Codul penal german Codul penal romn Codul penal spaniol Legea italian nr.231/2001 Legea Sarbanes-Oxley SUA M. K. Guiu, A.C. Voicu Drept Penal Economic European, Editura Sitech, Craiova, 2009 V. Dongoroz, Tratat de drept penal, Reeditarea ediiei din 1939 sub egida Asociaiei Romne de tiine Penale, Editura Societii Tempus, Bucureti, 2000
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CORUPEREA RESPONSABILILOR CU APLICAREA LEGII


Lect. univ. dr. PINTILIE LIGIA TEODORA Lect. univ. dr. TOMA VASILE RUS Academia de Poliie A.I. Cuza We address a more delicate problem you and say corruption in formal organizations of social control, namely the police. This deviant is difficult to classify because the perception that police officials can determine the classification category of crime scene profesional. Cuvinte cheie: corupia, criminalitate poliieneasc, corupie strategic Vom aborda o problem mai delicat i anume corupia n organizaiile formale de control social, mai exact n poliie. Acest fenomen deviant este dificil de clasificat, pentru c percepia poliitilor ca funcionari publici poate determina ncadrarea faptei la categoria de infraciune profesional1. Pe de alt parte, existena organizaiei poate determina definirea corupiei ca fiind un abuz, o infraciune organizaional. Determinante pentru definirea i ncadrarea delictelor i infraciunilor n aria de cuprindere a acestui fenomen sunt ns contactele acestora cu mediul interlop, iar principalul efect const n faptul c unii din membrii activi ai poliiei ajung s devin parte a sistemului crimei organizate2. Exist trei modele teoretice principale ale corupiei n cadrul ageniilor de control social239: modelul participativ al cooptrii subiecilor asupra crora se exercit apoi controlul n elaborarea politicii de decizie a ageniei respective; de obicei crima organizat corupe la nivel nalt, influennd apoi, prin acei indivizi, ntreaga politic a ageniei respective; capturarea ageniilor de control social n beneficiul unor exploatatori interni, de exemplu politicienii ce folosesc poliia
1 Abraham Pavel- Corupia, Editura Detectiv, Bucureti, 2005. 2 Dup Elliot Aronson, Timothy Wilson i Robin Akert - op. cit. p 272-331.

pentru a obine sprijin financiar de la unele organizaii criminale; dominaia exercitat de ctre exploatatori interni ai resurselor ageniei respective; coaliia administrativ dominant a instituiei poate dirija aciunile acesteia n interes propriu240. Nu trebuie pierdut din vedere faptul c infraciunea de crim organizat implic i existena relaiei bivalente coruptori-corupi, ceea ce-i determin pe capii lumii interlope s se orienteze prioritar ctre cei care sunt responsabili cu aplicarea legii. Incapacitatea sistemului de justiie penal de a impune legea celor care o ncalc submineaz ntregul sistem social, pentru c domeniul infracional nu numai c nu mai ajunge s fie reprimat, ci, n mod implicit i indirect, este ncurajat i sprijinit. Orice societate care se dorete a fi considerat civilizat, democratic i dreapt, nu poate accepta s se ntmple astfel de acte. Cu toate acestea, conform semnalrilor din mass-media, n tot mai multe state n tranziie spre sisteme democratice stabile, multe din segmentele sistemului de justiie penal sunt afectate de influenele structurilor crimei organizate, infiltrarea acestora mbrcnd cele mai subtile forme, inspirate chiar din activitatea serviciilor de informaii. Referitor la corupia n poliie, se poate spune c de foarte puin vreme s-a obinut recunoaterea public din partea poliiei
3

Ibidem, p. 48-49.

151

despre existena endemic a acesteia, n rndurile sale. Odat cu creterea profesionalismului i adoptarea unor noi sisteme valorice impuse prin coduri de conduit profesional, munca n poliie a cptat noi valene. Cazuistica privind corupia poliieneasc abund n mass-media i literatura de specialitate, fiind dovedit i de investigaiile a diferite comisii sau comitete, ale cror eforturi au fost canalizate asupra reformelor din sistemul poliienesc, n special, i a sistemului de justiie penal, n general241. S-a recunoscut c este inutil ncercarea de a convinge poliia s fie onest i corect, atta timp ct membrii diferitelor comisii au descoperit c printre persoanele cu funcii nalte n sistemul justiiei penale, dei sunt mai bine pltii i cu rspunderi mai mari, exist indivizi implicai adnc n corupie. Eliminarea corupiei din poliie prin eludarea necesitii respectrii eticii profesionale n ntreaga activitate din sistemul justiiei penale, conduce la repetarea greelilor din trecut242. Contactul permanent al organelor de poliie cu lumea criminal determin cunoaterea n profunzime a modalitilor prin care acetia ncalc legea. Corupia n rndurile poliiei se manifest prin aa-zisele delicte ocupaionale, abuzurile produse de ctre breasla poliieneasc constnd n majoritate n obinerea de gratuiti, favoruri, faciliti de la diveri beneficiari ai unor activiti pe care poliia are oricum datoria s le realizeze, ca agenie de control social. Aceste practici sunt mai degrab nclcri ale deontologiei profesionale, dect corupie n sensul su restrictiv, ns ele sunt foarte aproape de corupia propriu-zis. Corupia poliiei se poate defini ca fiind un act de violare a ncrederii publice ce implic sprijin deliberat al activitii ilegale. Tendinele coruptive sunt ns construite chiar n inima sistemului: folosirea tehnicilor de nscenare (entrappment) sau a captrii informatorilor pot adesea deveni tehnici de corupie;
Pavel Abraham Corupia, Ed. Detectiv,Bucureti 2005, p.271. 5 Ibidem, p. 271.
4

apar ntotdeauna conflicte ntre efi i personalul aflat n linia nti, ofierii crendu-i propria lor imagine despre cum ar trebui s fie activitatea de meninere a legii, devenind astfel mai mult ntreprinztori morali dect ageni ai acesteia. Argoul american a instituit deja denumiri pentru poliitii care sunt corupi. Unii sunt mnctori de iarb (grass eaters ) i sunt cei care accept mici favoritisme i peruri, iar ceilali sunt mnctori de carne (meat eaters), care iau sume mari de bani de la crima organizat. Corupia n interiorul poliiei este un fenomen alarmant, mai ales dac iese de sub control, prin faptul c relaia poliiei cu lumea crimei organizate s-ar putea transforma din al treilea rzboi mondial, ntr-o pace nociv pentru ntreaga societate. Cercetrile realizate cu privire la dimensiunile i noiunea de corupie n poliie nu converg ctre un punct de vedere unitar. Pe de o parte, exist tendina ca n acest concept s se includ toate formele de abateri din activitatea poliiei, iar pe de alt parte este definit att de ngust nct formele de comportament, cu toate caracteristicile i consecinele actelor de corupie, sunt excluse. Pentru a se realiza o distincie clar ntre formele devianei n poliie, teoreticienii consider c ar exista trei categorii principale243: corupia const n acceptarea de bani ori alte foloase dup ndeplinirea unui act n virtutea atribuiilor de serviciu sau pretinderea ori primirea de bani sau alte foloase necuvenite, n scopul ndeplinirii, nendeplinirii sau ntrzierii ndeplinirii unui act privitor la ndatoririle de serviciu sau svririi unui act contrar acestor ndatoriri; conduita greit se refer la nclcarea propriilor reguli sau proceduri stabilite pentru activitatea de poliie (dorm n timpul serviciului, i iau concedii medicale dei sunt sntoi, cheltuiesc iraional resursele etc). Aceste fapte intr n mod predominant sub incidena normelor disciplinare interne i
243

Ibidem, p. 272.

152

sunt investigate i sancionate pe plan intern; criminalitatea poliieneasc, respectiv cnd poliistul nu numai c accept mit, dar ncalc legile penale i sub alte forme prin uzul excesiv de violen (inclusiv prin comiterea de crime), prin implicarea n traficul de droguri, prin furt i tlhrii, prin hruire sexual, prin nclcarea drepturilor omului etc. Aceast diversitate de fapte pasibile a fi svrite de poliiti arat n mod clar c nu poate fi vorba numai de oferirea sau acceptarea unei simple ceti de cafea sau a unui cadou inocent. Prin acestea se trage un semnal de alarm asupra unei serii de fapte grave, care nu presupun n mod obligatoriu implicarea unui coruptor, precum i asupra probabilitii interrelaionrii dintre cele trei categorii deviante. S-a constatat de foarte multe ori c, de obicei, se ncepe prin nclcarea normelor interne, se continu cu anumite forme de corupie pasiv i se termin cu aciuni violente i nclcarea jurmntului n instan. Cele trei tipologii menionate mai sus sunt completate n mod detaliat prin luarea n calcul a diverselor motive i a modelelor variate de comportament244. Conduita greit reprezint, din punct de vedere comportamental, o devian de nivel sczut, prin care se ncalc normele i procedurile departamentale; cu toate c par a fi minore, aceste nclcri demonstreaz c activitatea se desfoar cu superficialitate i controlul este ineficient, iar poliitii nu acioneaz la niveluri nalte de competen i se sustrag de la ndeplinirea sarcinilor de serviciu. Corupia deschis const n a face sau a nu face ceva, n scopul obinerii anumitor recompense, ceea ce semnific reprezentarea convenional a corupiei. n cadrul acesteia se regsete de cele mai multe ori forma pasiv i adesea ierbivor. Corupia strategic: prin aceast form poliia i crima organizat ncheie o nelegere stabil i armonioas de asigurare a unor faciliti reciproce sau de inaciune n interes propriu.
244

Conform nelegerii, poliia controleaz pieele ilicite (tipice, jocurile de noroc i prostituia) prin efectuarea de razii simbolice, arestarea de oameni mruni sau razii de pedepsire a competitorilor incomozi. Astfel de aranjamente stabile i strategice, urmrind obinerea de profituri, erau cunoscute n New York sub denumirea de cuiburi. Corupia lrgit definete implicarea activ a poliiei prin stimularea criminalitii, extorcarea de bani i organizarea de acte de mituire. n aceast form, poliitii devin activi, carnivori i antreprenoriali. Corupia n scopuri nobile presupune uzul mijloacelor ilicite n scopuri sociale sau instituionale. Cu toate c formula a fost larg acceptat n Marea Britanie, n foarte multe dezbateri, se renun a se considera aceast form ca fiind corupie, n sensul de a avea un coruptor i de a se miza pe un ctig direct. n anumite cazuri coruptorul poate fi identificat cu presiunea exercitat de opinia public, de structurile ierarhice superioare sau de alte oficialiti care solicit insistent o condamnare. Prin adoptarea principiului scopul scuz mijloacele se recurge la falsificarea declaraiilor, intimidarea martorilor, recompensarea informatorilor cu droguri obinute ilegal, cu scopul de a fabrica un caz i de a obine n final o condamnare. Ctigul din partea celor implicai poate fi indirect, sub forma atitudinii binevoitoare din partea colegilor, avansrii n grad, recompensrii financiare sub forma unei prime sau promovrii ntr-o treapt superioar de salarizare. De fapt, toate aceste motive nu alimenteaz dect mecanismele justiiei penale, fr a se realiza un ctig. Criminalitatea poliiei se refer la acel domeniu ce depete relaiile confortabile cu lumea interlop sau corupia nobil, ce inspir manipularea justiiei, aceasta din urm fiind compatibil cu practicile ngrijortoare ale criminalitii poliiei: abuzul de putere, discriminarea rasial, hruirea sexual, furtul i tlhria, violena extrem, uzul i traficul de droguri i chiar uciderea colegilor.

Ibidem, p. 273.

153

Criminalitatea poliiei n interesul statului s-a nregistrat n cazurile n care guvernanii au forat poliitii s se angreneze n comiterea de infraciuni grave, n scopuri politice. Adesea, astfel de incidente implic unitile speciale care intr sub controlul strict ministerial sau sub influena politic. Asemenea intervenii au determinat opinia public s aprecieze c statul poate stimula unele forme ale devianei n poliie245. Toate categoriile devianei n poliie pe care le-am expus mai sus, s-au desprins din factorul esenial reprezentat de abuzul de putere, a crui influen se extinde de la deviana ocupaional, formele de corupie tradiionale unde exist un coruptor, mit (cadou i un serviciu ilicit), pn la criminalitatea poliiei n interesul statului. Utiliznd formula clasic a corupiei n poliie, aceasta nseamn acele acte care implic folosirea autoritii de ctre un cadru de poliie ntr-o manier destinat obinerii de ctiguri personale pentru sine sau pentru alte persoane. Definirea corupiei n poliie nu soluioneaz n mod sigur dezbaterile asupra coninutului corupiei, dar constituie un ghid pentru a se facilita nelegerea contextului acestui gen de acte. n general, practicile poliieneti sunt ncadrate n sfera corupiei dac: a. se ncalc normele interne de organizare a activitii unitii de poliie; b. se ncalc normele penale care opereaz n jurisdicia unde se exercit autoritatea de poliie; c. au ca rezultat activiti care implic folosirea legitim a autoritii n scopul realizrii de foloase personale sau de grup. Tipologia activitilor de poliie afectate de corupie ia n calcul aspecte diferite, cum ar fi: natura i tipul normelor nclcate; categoriile de persoane; condiiile i circumstanele care faciliteaz corupia; limita necesar n care unitatea particip la svrirea acestor practici; gradul n care prile sunt active n unitatea de poliie; capacitatea de intervenie a unitii de poliie. Utilizarea acestor criterii a permis identificarea a opt tipuri de corupie n poliie:
245

1. Corupia autoritii: presupune primirea de foloase materiale necuvenite, neautorizate prin uzarea de statutul conferit de calitatea de poliist. Aceste foloase materiale includ acceptarea gratuit de buturi, mese, reduceri de preuri i sume de bani oferite de comerciani pentru asigurarea unei protecii mai substaniale din partea poliiei. Coruptorii sunt ceteni respectabili ce acioneaz n mod individual sau colectiv, n contextul unor reacii reduse sau chiar inexistente din partea unitii de poliie pentru controlul i sancionarea poliitilor corupi246. 2. Favorizarea: implic primirea de bunuri i servicii n schimbul acordrii de faciliti n derularea afacerilor de ctre patroni n diferite domenii (doctori, avocai, proprietari de garaje, companii de taximetre etc.). Coruptorii sunt persoane de obicei respectabile care, prin asemenea faciliti (avize, recomandri la teri pentru a apela la serviciile acestora, divulgarea de date i informaii n sprijinul derulrii afacerilor etc.), obin ctiguri de natur s duc la prosperitate. Departamentele de poliie adopt poziii din care rezult ignorarea anumitor norme procedurale formale cu caracter intern, acestea fiind determinate de gradul de respectabilitate a celor implicai. 3. Furtul oportunist: formeaz categoria activitilor ilegale prin care sunt nsuite bunuri de la arestai, victime, locul svririi infraciunii sau proprietii neprotejate. Aceste activiti nu au coruptor, ca subiect al infraciunii, dar n mod sigur se ncalc normele penale sau regulile stipulate de normele interne. Reacia unitii de poliie este, de regul, negativ i depinde n mare msur de valoarea bunurilor sau sumelor de bani nsuite, gradul n care opinia public a luat la cunotin despre caz i fermitatea cu care victima solicit actul de justiie. Activitile implic un grad redus de organizare, acestea desfurnduse, de regul, n funcie de situaii, condiii, circumstane, oportuniti favorizante, de care profit infractorii.
246

Ibidem,p.274-275.

Ibidem, p. 276-277.

154

4. antajul: se concretizeaz n comportamentul de oportunitate, n situaii n care poliia ia la cunotin despre o anumit infraciune acceptnd bani sau servicii de la suspeci. Coruptorul poate fi o persoan respectabil sau cunoscut ca fiind, n mod obinuit, implicat n activiti infracionale. Prin aceste activiti sunt nclcate normele penale i ale unitii de poliie, caracteristica principal fiind ascunderea unor ilegaliti i pstrarea secretului de ctre ambele pri. 5. Protecia activitilor ilegale: specific acestor activiti este faptul c persoanele care corup au ca scop derularea n continuare a acestor activiti ilegale, avnd asigurat neintervenia poliiei, fr de care nu i-ar putea desfura activitatea. Nerespectarea prevederilor legale sau departamentale i gradul de reacie al unitii de poliie fa de poliistul corupt depind de modul i consistena sprijinului pe care-1 acord comunitatea activitilor ilegale protejate. 6. Mita: include eludarea procedurilor legale sau departamentale, iar coruptorii se afl n faza arestrii i ncearc s evite aciunile ntreprinse de poliie. De regul, cel expus coruperii nu este poliist stradal, ci i desfoar activitatea n domeniul investigaiilor judiciare. Descoperirea poliitilor corupi implicai n acest gen de fapte nu las loc pentru interpretri i sanciunile sunt de obicei drastice. 7. Activiti infracionale directe: specific acestor activiti este inexistena coruptorului, acestea fiind iniiate i desfurate personal de ctre poliist mpotriva suspecilor, victimelor sau orice alt persoan. Se consider c aceste acte se comit pe fondul absenei n normele interne ale departamentului de poliie a tuturor aspectelor procedurale formale care reglementeaz activitatea cotidian a poliitilor. 8. Aranjamentele interne: implic darea i luarea de mit n cadrul unitii de poliie pentru numiri n funcie, ore suplimentare, promovri, aspecte legate de control i inspecii, etc. n acest domeniu exist anumite poziii care ofer sau favorizeaz
155

astfel de servicii: ofierul de serviciu de la dispecerat poate s determine nclcarea normelor procedurale privind trimiterea n misiuni, atenionarea asupra controlului, ieirea/intrarea n serviciu, acoperirea parial a zonei de responsabilitate n timp i spaiu. La sesizarea unor asemenea acte, dac nu sunt nclcate reguli interne importante sau norme cu caracter penal, unitile de poliie au o atitudine uneori prea puin sever. O a noua form de corupie a fost adugat de Punch (1985), respectiv plasarea de droguri sau de alte obiecte, a cror deinere, folosire i comercializare sunt pedepsite de lege, ntre bunurile unei persoane sau luarea n eviden pentru a o acuza. Formele 2, 4, 5, 6 i 7 sunt aproape unanim considerate ca fcnd parte din categoria corupiei contravenionale, celelalte fiind de rea conduit (1) sau de criminalitate (3, 7, 9). Se poate aprecia c aceast tipologie a corupiei n poliie faciliteaz o analiz pertinent a nivelului atins de aceasta, a cauzelor i condiiilor n care se manifest, care, de regul, se refer i la mediul politic, social, cultural i economic n care lucreaz poliia247. Corupia poliiei pe alte meridiane n departamentele de poliie din Statele Unite. Istoria poliiei din Statele Unite prezint fr retuuri trstura coruptiv a structurilor de poliie n fazele de pionierat ale acestei activiti, considerat a fi epoca politic n dezvoltarea sa. Astfel, n multe orae, politicienii, poliitii i reprezentanii crimei organizate desfurau activiti ilegale i legale ntr-un parteneriat consolidat de interese comune, cum ar fi, de exemplu, jocurile de noroc i prostituia. Cel mai zguduitor caz de corupie s-a nregistrat la nceputul anilor 1970, atunci cnd un ofier de poliie (Serpico) a dezvluit mass-media practicile de corupie din NYPD, ceea ce a determinat Departamentul de stat s nfiineze Comisia Knapp (1972). Prin audierea martorilor, s-a dezvluit n mod detaliat modul n care poliia i infractorii au stabilit un sistem strategic de derulare a operaiu247

Ibidem ,p.279.

nilor ilicite, denumit cuibul. Plata regulat a ofierilor de poliie de mediile criminale presupunea nu numai trecerea cu vederea a afacerilor ilegale, ci i scparea infractorilor de acuzaii i evitarea procedurii judiciare. Codul tcerii, mprumutat de la partenerii din gruprile criminale, a perpetuat o stare de team i a condus la investigaii superficiale n cazurile de suspiciune248. Concluziile anchetei au permis accederea la conducere a unui ofier reformator (Pat Murphy), care a declarat dolarul cinstit ca singura moned aflat n buzunarele poliitilor. De asemenea, instituirea unei responsabiliti crescute a comandanilor pentru comportamentul deviant al poliitilor aflai n subordinea lor a condus la demisii benevole sau forate, ceea ce a permis promovarea tinerilor n posturi importante. O msur ateptat de cei oneti a fost ntrirea departamentului de afaceri interne i introducerea testului de integritate, prin care se verifica modul n care poliitii reacioneaz la tentaii. Cu toate c acestea reprezint elementele eseniale ale unei reforme eficiente, Comisia Mollen, desemnat n 1994 s investigheze impactul corupiei n contextul dezvoltrii crimei organizate prin proliferarea ameninrilor la scar larg, cu implicare transnaional, a relevat c structurile de afaceri interne s-au dovedit ineficiente i reactive, iar poliitii au desfurat activiti ilicite cu droguri att din postura de consumatori ct i de traficani. Semnificativ este faptul c s-a observat c fenomenul genereaz sau este nsoit de violen, constatndu-se c lovirea sau arestarea suspecilor era o practic de intimidare des utilizat n multe uniti de poliie. n spaiul american, corupia n poliie a cunoscut o ascensiune dramatic odat cu explozia consumului stradal de droguri, iar combaterea fenomenului a implicat reforme majore, susinute de conductori exigeni, promotori ai unor noi modele de responsabilitate. n Marea Britanie. n perioada anilor de nceput ai deceniului apte, n Londra s248

au nregistrat cazuri de corupie n cadrul unor structuri cu activitate special (Brigada pentru publicaii obscene i antidrog), plasate n sfera formei de corupie strategic. Ca i n cazul Comisiei Knapp, deciziile luate de ofierul reformator (Robert Mark) au marcat iniierea unei campanii puternice de eradicare a corupiei, nfiinarea unui departament central pentru efectuarea investigaiilor interne, eliminarea puterii autoritare i nelimitate a detectivilor i sancionarea imediat a ofierilor care erau identificai ca necinstii. Lipsa de durabilitate a reformelor a fost evideniat de cel puin dou cazuri deosebite, prezentate pe larg de mass-media britanic i care au afectat credibilitatea poliiei metropolitane249. n primul rnd, investigarea direcionat a diveri suspeci pentru atentate cu bombe, n vederea obinerii unor condamnri dorite de opinia public, a artat dimensiunea ascuns a corupiei n scopuri nobile. Etichetarea poliiei ca farsoare este motivul pentru care un poliist este privit de ceteni ca posibil suspect de corupie, ceea ce produce efecte grave cu privire la reputaie i moral, pilonii activitii de poliie. Al doilea caz ce a marcat istoria corupiei din poliia britanic se refer la investigarea greit a unui tnr de culoare din sudul Londrei suspect de omucidere. Pe lng folosirea n raportul anchetatorului a termenului de rasism instituionalizat, n cadrul poliiei metropolitane s-au reliefat slaba performan, lipsa de supraveghere i control, precum i disfuncii grave n actul managerial. n Belgia. Cu siguran, cel mai mediatizat caz de corupie a fost afacerea Dutroux, o situaie n care caracteristicile crimei organizate au adormit vigilena sistemului de ordine public din Belgia. Prin faptele sale de rpire i sechestrare de tinere fete n scopul traficrii, Dutroux s-a dovedit un criminal feroce, care s-a bazat pe ineficienta ntregului sistem poliienesc, pe suprapunerile instituiilor n anchetele
249

Ibidem ,p.280.

Ibidem ,p.281.

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derulate i pe lipsa de responsabilitate din partea investigatorilor. Toate aceste elemente au conturat o stare de complicitate a organizaiilor responsabile cu aplicarea legii, dezvluindu-se o anumit protecie din partea unor nalte oficialiti. Ambiguitatea concluziilor anchetei a atras oprobriul public fa de aparatul de justiie i poliie, ceea ce a determinat demonstraii mpotriva autoritilor. Conducerea slab, echiparea inadecvat i existena unui sistem de administrare a justiiei divizat au ncurajat germenii unei deviane ce a avut ca rezultat nregistrarea a patru tinere decedate n condiii de ignorare i ineficient instituional. n Olanda. Afacerea IRT, iniiat i dezvoltat de o echip interregional de combatere a criminalitii, este un exemplu adecvat pentru a nelege ceea ce reprezint onestitatea n poliie. Informaiile cu care se opereaz n cadrul structurilor speciale de poliie, dac nu sunt administrate ntr-un mod riguros, devin moneda de schimb cea mai profitabil i mai facil de ascuns250. Iniierea unor operaii legale de livrare supravegheat a unor cantiti de droguri, prin folosirea unor mijloace i tehnici speciale, s-a finalizat prin cotarea instituiilor olandeze ca fiind importatorii principali de substane psihotrope pentru piaa neagr intern. Manipularea probelor furnizate autoritilor i instanelor, neinformarea ofierilor superiori cu responsabiliti de conducere din propria structur, aruncarea unei pnze de secretizare asupra operaiunilor, folosirea de fonduri ilicite pentru asigurarea infiltrrii agentului acoperit, inducerea n eroare a autoritilor vamale, crearea unei aliane conspirative cu procurorii i permiterea importului de mari cantiti de droguri au fost doar cteva dintre neajunsurile ce au conturat utilizarea greit a serviciului public n interes personal. Pentru identificarea metodelor i mijloacelor celor mai adecvate de combatere a corupiei n poliie, este esenial s se identifice i s se stabileasc factorii care con250

tribuie la generarea acestui fenomen. Astfel, printre factorii majori generatori de corupie n activitile poliieneti se remarc: Legi cu aplicabilitate redus - prevederile anumitor legi continu s sancioneze conduita adoptat de o serie de persoane, dar fr a se gsi modalitile practice de recunoatere i probare judiciar. Inaplicabilitatea lor i determin pe infractori s-i caute protecie, ceea ce le ofer posibilitatea poliitilor s negocieze pe sub mas251. Interesele organizaiilor criminale persoanele implicate ntr-o activitate criminal reprezint o surs curent a corupiei n rndul poliitilor, supravieuirea i profiturile acestora fiind adesea determinate de capacitatea lor de a-i cumpra libertatea de aciune de la cei care exercit presiuni asupra poliiei. Imixtiunea politic - politicienii i partidele politice ncearc s-i exercite controlul asupra autoritilor poliieneti prin diferite modaliti, pentru obinerea sprijinului n vederea consolidrii puterii pe care o dein. Pe msur ce corupia mbrac forme de fenomen organizat, nivelul atins de acesta n poliie poate viza diverse trepte ierarhice, de la agentul de patrulare stradal pn la ef, n funcie de posibilitile i capacitile celor interesai de serviciile prestate de poliiti, de suportul material de cointeresare al acestora. Astfel, este arhicunoscut faptul c se poate negocia cu un agent stradal sancionarea unei parcri neregulamentare, contra unor recompense, dar este mai puin cunoscut faptul c, aceeai nelegere, se poate face cu eful unei structuri de poliie care mparte sumele de bani primite cu poliitii implicai n acte de corupie majore252. Infraciunea de corupie capt un alt grad de complexitate atunci cnd sunt implicate persoane aparinnd structurilor crimei organizate pentru a li se asigura protecie, situaie n care este contactat, de regul, eful unitii de poliie, iar acesta, n ipoteza acceptrii ofertei, va mpri banii
251 252

Ibidem ,p.282.

Ibidem, p. 283. Ibidem, p. 284.

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primii cu subordonaii ce-i ofer la rndul lor serviciile. Corupia procuraturii i a instanelor judectoreti Dei corupia poliiei poate fi mai uor identificat i sancionat, corupia procurorilor este mult mai dificil de investigat i de prezentat n faa instanelor de judecat253. Robert Blakeley, profesor de drept la Notre Dame Law School, expert n analiza implicrii structurilor crimei organizate n procuratur, a afirmat c: Dolarul folosit n corupia n poliie, pentru a cumpra o protecie real, are o valoare mult mai redus dect dolarul folosit direct sau indirect pentru a influena un procuror public pentru c, n final, procurorul este acela care poate s ia hotrrea crucial privind trimiterea sau nu n instan a unui suspect. Spre deosebire de situaia din procuratur i poliie, n justiie sunt posibiliti mai mari de comitere, dar i de detectare a corupiei, nregistrndu-se cazuri n care judectorii au fost acuzai i condamnai pentru luare de mit, probat a proveni, n foarte multe cazuri, de la grupuri ale crimei organizate. n acest fel, s-a dovedit nc o dat faptul c sindicatul crimei organizate anihileaz nu numai activitatea administrativ a guvernului, ci nsi justiia n sine. Fostul ef al justiiei din Statele Unite, Earl Warren, n interviul acordat unui corespondent de tiri, privind crima organizat a declarat c: Aceast form de criminalitate nu poate exista i nflori n societate dect dac exist corupie n domeniul aplicrii legislaiei, iar aici poate fi implicat poliia, procuratura sau curile de justiie. Aa cum se apreciaz de foarte mult vreme, dac justiia civil ar mpri mult mai puin corupie dect cea promovat prin cutuma nativ, persoana aflat n litigiu are cel mai adesea puine motive s se felicite asupra schimbului. Un reclamant poate s fie ruinat de amnrile interminabile i de necesitatea de a plti pentru o decizie. Aceasta sugereaz o tranzacie ntre
253

amnrile administrative i corupie. Date fiind cererile excesive pentru bunuri i servicii publice, aplicanii trebuie s fie la curent cu momentul apariiei lor; dosarele vor fi ncurcate i nu vor fi procesate n acord cu nevoile aplicanilor. Costurile de ateptare pot fi reduse dac se pltete pentru a facilita transferul rapid al cazurilor ctre soluionare, ceea ce se traduce prin creterea eforturilor depuse de birocrai pentru a procesa cazurile n funcie de urgene, o nevoie care poate fi msurat de dispoziia aplicanilor de a plti. Oficialii corupi pot, n schimbul realizrii unei activiti mai dinamice, s cauzeze ntrzieri administrative pentru a atrage mai multe mite254. Abordrile din aceste perspective, introduse pentru prima dat de Buscaglia (1997) n Ecuador i Venezuela i, mpreun cu Dakolias, (1999) n Ecuador i Chile, explic schimbrile anuale n rapoartele asupra corupiei privind prima apariie, n instane, n cazurile privind litigiile comerciale. Prin aceste lucrri se demonstreaz c structuri organi-zaionale specifice i modele comportamentale tipice n cadrul instanelor din rile n curs de dezvoltare determin extinderea necontrolabil a practicilor corupiei sistemice. Lucrarea lor pune n eviden c instana tipic latinoamerican furnizeaz venituri sistemului organizaional intern, prin corupie. n teorie, majoritatea rilor dezvoltate impun un cod penal care pedepsete practicile corupte i auditeaz sistemele externe prin monitorizarea cazurilor i parcursului lor n procesul judiciar. Chiar dac funcioneaz adecvat, totui, aceste dou mecanisme s-au dovedit a nu fi suficiente n eliminarea corupiei sistemice n aplicarea legii, iar cei doi autori apreciaz c alte dimensiuni trebuie s fie identificate. Modelele specifice i identificabile din organizarea administrativ a instanelor, la care se adaug autoritatea excesiv i complexitatea procedural, sunt considerate drept premise pentru ca judectorii i personalul instanelor s obin beneficii ilicite
254

Ibidem, p. 284.

Ibidem, p. 285-286.

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suplimentare prin negocierea valorii serviciilor. Buscaglia (1997) a descoperit c acele caracteristici care alimenteaz practici corupte sunt compuse din lipsa mecanismelor alternative de a rezolva disputele, oferindu-i astfel unui oficial din sistemul instanelor posibilitatea unui monopol virtual. Mult mai specific, practicile corupte sunt ntrite de: roluri organizaionale interne concentrate n minile a civa decideni din instane (ex. judectorii concentreaz un mare numr de roluri administrative i jurisdicionale n sfera lor); numrul i complexitatea pailor procedurali cuplate cu lipsa transparenei procedurale din instane; nesiguran mare privind doctrinele, legile i dispoziiile de referin, creterea inconsecvenei n aplicarea jurisprudenei n instane din cauza lipsei unei baze de date i a deficienelor din sistemul informaional aferent instanelor; puine soluii alternative de rezolvare a disputei; prezena unor grupuri ale criminalitii organizate care impun i reuesc, prin practici corupte, s subordoneze oficiali guvernamentali i prin ei s influeneze instanele255. Aceti cinci factori asociai practicilor corupte furnizeaz un ghid clar pentru elaborarea politicii publice n ri n curs de dezvoltare, cum ar fi Chile i Uganda, care au legiferat un cod procedural simplu i n acelai timp au introdus rezolvri alternative ale disputelor, obinnd o reducere a cazurilor de corupie n instane. Mai mult, istoriile de succes din Singapore i Costa Rica au artat c fenomenul corupiei s-a redus prin crearea unor birouri administrative specializate, care sprijin instanele n probleme legate de notificri, management bugetar i de personal, parcursul i supravegherea cazurilor aflate pe rolul instanelor. Corupia n instituiile penale de reabilitare Braul lung al structurilor crimei organi255

zate ajunge pn n inima instituiilor penale de reabilitare, nchisorile putnd lua msuri ferme pentru a mpiedica evadarea infractorilor, dar fiind incapabile n a stopa influena puternic a lumii interlope n interiorul acestora. Investigaiile desfurate pe scar larg au reliefat rolul jucat de crima organizat n corupia din instituiile de reabilitare i nchisori, care au devenit locuri ce ofer condiii propice pentru o adevrat coal a criminalitii. n aceste incubatoare sau coli ale criminalitii, cum le denumesc unii analiti mai cinici, cunotinele, metodele i tehnicile crimei organizate sunt predate de veterani i nsuite de deinuii mai tineri, novici n meserie. Aceste instituii au devenit campusurile de pregtire i perfecionare pentru soldaii gruprilor criminale, care pot adesea corupe cu succes autoritile ce activeaz aici. Literatura de specialitate menioneaz c patru faze pot fi decelate n debutul corupiei din activitatea instituiilor responsabile cu aplicarea legii, fie ele poliii, instane de judecat sau instituii penale de reabilitare: 1. Indiferena administrativ fa de integritate Atacurile violente, intrigile politice interne, planurile secrete i actele flagrante de nedreptate comise la nivelul ntregii societi devin planuri dominate n activitatea cotidian a organizaiilor responsabile cu aplicarea legii, ceea ce-i determin pe conductori s adopte poziii defensive atunci cnd sunt acuzai de indiferen fa de etic i integritate. Printre cele mai elocvente situaii care reflect indiferena legat de integritate se identific slaba calitate a condiiilor de recrutare i angajare, disciplina lejer sau sistemul de promovare perceput ca fiind incorecte, starea de nemulumire existent n rndul personalului i lipsa de respect faa de efi i a acestora, n relaiile cu subalternii256. 2. Neglijena manifestat fa de codul de conduit Aceast form de neglijen este anali256

Ibidem, p. 287.

Ibidem, p. 288.

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zat la nivelul conducerii organizaiilor, constatndu-se c efii ce manifest o preocupare sczut fa de Integritate se mpart n trei categorii distincte, n funcie de comportamentul lor. n prima categorie, cea mai puin grav, se regsesc efii ce nu aloc resurse pentru creterea sau meninerea standardelor etice, dar care nu constituie modele negative pentru colective. n a doua categorie, se afl efii care ignor, n mod voit, actele de corupie comise de ctre subalterni, chiar dac acestea iau amploare sub aspectul gravitii sau frecvenei. Ultima categorie, considerat cea mai periculoas, se refer la efii care mai degrab ascund abaterile comportamentale dect s admit adevrul i s ncerce s ndrepte situaia, n aceste cazuri, ignorarea n mod voit a problemelor evidente de etic se datoreaz lipsei de informaii n a preveni i combate abaterile, precum i lipsei de curaj n a rezolva problemele, chiar i cele care se refer la personalitatea angajailor. Pentru toate categoriile este recomandabil s se accepte c este nevoie de instituirea unor programe de instruire etic, dar exist cazuri n care eventualele demersuri n acest sens ar putea atrage critici referitoare la abaterile comportamentale din trecut. 3. Ipocrizia i teama - elemente dominante la nivelul organizaiei Distrugerea moralitii, a capacitii organizaiei de a lucra cu randament i eficien, instaurarea sentimentului de dezndejde, nregistrarea unor serioase abateri comportamentale sunt trsturile nemulumirii profunde ale modului n care se opereaz n interiorul instituiilor responsabile cu aplicarea legii. Semnele evidente ale gradului de nemulumire sunt conturate prin dezaprobarea constant i fr menaja-

mente, fa de grupuri largi de oameni, prin sfidarea efilor i adoptarea de subordonai a unor gesturi lipsite de etic n timpul discuiilor purtate cu alii*. 4. Principiul supravieuirii prin selecie natural Personalul organizaiilor se focalizeaz pe lupta pentru supravieuire, condiiile majore n care s-a atins aceast faz fiind: lipsa de voin i pregtire din partea efilor n a preveni actele de nclcare a eticii; personalul corupt i incorect agreseaz personalul cinstit i onest; dorina de a muamaliza mai degrab abaterile comportamentale dect de a le demasca sau a le corecta; legea tcerii este ncurajat s domine n relaiile de serviciu; lipsa de transparen n relaia cu mass-media. Fr a ascunde adevrul i a ignora fapte nregistrate, se poate spune c ntreaga palet a formelor corupiei se regsete i se dezvolt continuu n toate structurile de justiie penal. Inconsecvena, nesistematizarea i ineficienta sistemului rezid i din presiunea exercitat de crima organizat, care i-ar vedea astfel grav periclitat existena. Dac administrarea justiiei penale ar deveni mai bine organizat printr-un sistem raional de planificare i ar dispune de structuri organizaionale care s funcioneze optim, atunci crima organizat nu ar putea supravieui cu atta uurin. Planificarea justiiei penale prin armonizarea i coordonarea tuturor segmentelor sale, precum i realizarea unor analize sistematice rmn principalele mijloace pentru combaterea i limitarea crimei organizate.
*

Ibidem, p. 289.

Bibliografie: Abraham Pavel- Corupia, Editura Detectiv, Bucureti, 2005. Abraham Pavel, Pintilie Ligia , Toma Rus- Curs universitar de masterat Combaterea traficului illicit de droguri, Academia de Poliie, Bucureti, 2009. Elliot Aronson, Timothy Wilson i Robin Akert ,USA, 2005.

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PRINCIPALELE PROCEDURI, GHIDURI, PRACTICI DEZVOLTATE N DOMENIUL CERCETRII INFRACIUNILOR DIN SFERA CRIMINALITII INFORMATICE
Lect. univ. dr. av. IONI GHEORGHE-IULIAN Universitatea Romno-American OCTAVIAN VAR Across the world hundreds of procedures, guidelines, practices in the field of cybercrime offenses investigation are developed. Each organization, either an international, regional or national organization and either an law enforcement authority or not, tends to develop its own procedures, guidelines and practices. Studying the most significant and frequently cited such procedures, guidelines, practices in the field of cybercrime offenses investigation led to the development of a part of the PhD thesis, and, by presenting them, I hope that they will be models for reviewing those who is used by law enforcement authorities in Romania. Cuvinte cheie: infraciuni, criminalitate informatic, investigare, manuale, ghiduri, proceduri, autoriti de aplicare a legii Introducere Peste tot n lume sunt dezvoltate sute de proceduri, ghiduri, practici n domeniul investigrii infraciunilor din sfera criminalitii informatice. Fiecare organizaie, indiferent c este vorba de o organizaie internaional, regional sau naional i indiferent dac este sau nu o autoritate de aplicare a legii, tinde s-i dezvolte propriile proceduri, ghiduri, practici. Studierea celor mai semnificative i mai des citate astfel de proceduri, ghiduri, practici n domeniul investigrii infraciunilor din sfera criminalitii informatice a stat la baza elaborrii unei pri din teza de doctorat257, iar, prin prezentarea lor, sper c acestea vor constitui modele pentru revizuirea celor folosite de autoritile de aplicare a legii n Romnia. 1. INTERPOL, Manualul de Investigare a Infraciunilor privind Tehnologia Informaiilor (ITCIM)258. Actualul Manual
Ioni Gheorghe-Iulian, Criminalitatea Informatic, tez de doctorat, Academia de Poliie Alexandru Ioan Cuza, Bucureti, (iulie) 2009. 258 INTERPOL, European Working Party on Information Technology Crime, Information Technology
257

de Investigare a Infraciunilor privind Tehnologia Informaiilor (ITCIM) este o compilaie a vechiului Manual privind Criminalitatea Informatic, realizat de Grupul de Lucru European pentru Infraciunile privind Tehnologia Informaiei259. Manualul este descris260 ca fiind un ghid de bune practici pentru un investigator cu experien, care este actualizat n permanen. Coninutul manualului, convertit sub form de fiier este disponibil (n format digital) prin intermediul web site-ului securizat al INTERPOL, doar pentru autoritile de aplicare a legii, pe baz de utilizator i parol. Printre actualizrile aduse vechiului manual sunt cele care privesc mijloacele
Crime Investigation Manual (ICTIM), (disponibil pentru autoritile de aplicare a legii, membrii INTERPOL), la https://www.interpol.com/Private /Techology Crime/Computer Manual/Default.asp 259 European Working Partie on Information Technology Crime, http://www.interpol.int/Public/Technology/Crime/Wo rkingParties/Default.asp#europa 260 INTERPOL, Realizrile Grupului de Lucru European pentru Infraciunile privind Tehnologia Informaiei, disponibil la http://www.interpol.int/Public/ technologyCrime/WorkingParties/Default.asp#Europa

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electronice de plat, reelele de comunicaie publice, comerul electronic, Internetul, tehnologiile fr fir, instrumentele i tehnicile de investigaie, lumea virtual i jocurile, ofierul prim-respondent (cel care ajunge primul la locul comiterii infraciunii), noile programe maliioase, contracriminalistica, etc. 2. Reeaua European a Institutelor de Criminalistic (ENFSI) Orientri pentru bune practici n examinarea criminalistic a tehnologiilor digitale261. Orientrile elaborate de Grupul de lucru pentru Criminalistic IT din cadrul ENFSI au ca baz Orientrile cu privire la crearea manualelor de bune practici n cadrul ENFSI262 aprobate de conducerea ENFSI n mai 2002 (n general) i Orientrile pentru bune practici n examinarea criminalistic a tehnologiilor digitale263 elaborate de Organizaia Internaional pentru Dovezile Informatice (IOCE). Cu toate c, din punct de vedere al coninutului, cele dou orientri (ENFSI i IOCE) abordeaz aceleai probleme i au aceeai structur (avnd n vedere standardul ISO 17025), i cu toate c orientrile IOCE au fost elaborate naintea orientrilor ENFSI (care, de altfel, preiau unele dintre explicaii), totui, orientrile ENFSI sunt mai bine formulate i fundamentate. Acestea stabilesc i menin standardele expertizelor criminalistice desfurate de ctre laboratoarele criminalistice europene furniznd un cadru general pentru ca aceste laboratoare s poat utiliza metode i mijloace comune n analiza criminalistic de261

European Network of Forensic Sciene Institutes (ENFSI), Standing Committee for Quality and Competence (QCC), Guidance on the Production of Best Manuals within ENFSI, nr. 1, 2003, disponibil i la http://www.enfsi.eu/get_doc.php?uid=72 262 ENFSI, Guidelines, op. cit., p.4 263 International Organization on Computer Evidence (IOCE), Guidelines for Best Practice in the Forensic Examination of Digital Technology (versiunea 1.0) (mai), 2002, disponibil i la http://www.ioce,org/f ileadmin/user_upload/2002/Gui delines%20Practices%20in%20Examination%20of%2 0Digital%20Evid.pdf

ct n vederea reducerii complexitii comparrii (la nivel internaional) datelor i informaiilor despre i n legtur cu infraciunilor din sfera criminalitii informatice dar i demonstrrii competenei acestor laboratoare n termenii convenii la nivel internaional. Scopul264 declarat al acestor orientri, const n : furnizarea unui cadru general de standarde, principii i abordri pentru detectarea, recuperarea, examinarea i folosirea dovezilor digitale n scopuri criminalistice, n conformitate cu cerinele standardului internaional ISO 17025, aa cum a fost interpretat pentru laboratoarele criminalistice, asigurarea unei abordri sistematice, pentru laboratoarele membre ENFSI i alte uniti criminalistice ale autoritilor de aplicare a legii, n vederea stabilirii i meninerii practicelor de lucru n domeniul dovezilor digitale care va furniza rezultate fiabile, va maximiza calitatea informaiilor obinute i va crea dovezi puternice, ncurajarea dezvoltrii unei metodologii consistente i, n consecin, crearea mai multor rezultate comparabile, astfel nct s faciliteze schimbul reciproc de date ntre laboratoare. n vederea asigurrii calitii, sunt definii termenii de baz utilizai, sunt stabilite calificrile, competenele i experiena membrilor unitilor, formarea i evaluarea, meninerea i testarea competenei acestora, documentarea testrilor, echipamentele i programele folosite, validarea i auditarea acestora. Principiile generale265 care se aplic procesului de recuperare a dovezilor digitale (care au fost adoptate ca Recomandrile G8 n legtur cu dovezile digitale) i care ar trebui urmate i de laboratoarele criminalistice, sunt urmtoarele: regulile generale privind dovezile ar trebui aplicate i dovezilor digitale,
264 265

ENFSI, Guidance ..., op.cit., p. 9 Ibidem, p. 17-18

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msurile luate n timpul confiscrii unei dovezi digitale nu trebuie s modifice acea dovad, atunci cnd este necesar ca o persoan s acceseze dovezile digitale originale, acea persoan ar trebui s fie instruit corespunztor n acest scop, toate activitile privitoare la confiscarea, accesarea, depozitarea i transferul dovezilor digitale trebuie s fie complet documentat, conservat i disponibil pentru revizuire, un individ este responsabil pentru toate aciunile ntreprinse cu privire la dovezile digitale ct timp dovada digital se afl n posesia lui. Sunt stabilite266 reguli pentru localizarea i recuperarea dovezilor digitale la locul faptei, n cazul n care prezena sau asistena specialistului criminalist ar fi necesar, reguli care privesc: evitarea contaminrii, cutarea locului faptei, colectarea dovezilor, ambalarea, etichetarea i documentarea, atrgndu-se (totui) atenia asupra necesitii respectrii procedurilor locale ale autoritilor de aplicare a legii. 3. Institutul Naional de Justiie din cadrul Ministerului de Justiie al SUA, Investigarea scenei electronice a infraciunii: Un ghid pentru primul respondent267. Prima ediie a acestui ghid268 a fost publicat n iulie 2001, dup 3 ani de eforturi, ncepnd cu 1998 (mai), cnd Institutul Naional de Justiie (NIJ), Biroul pentru Standardele Autoritii de Aplicarea Legii (OLES)269 i Parteneriatul Naional de Formare Profesional n Criminalitate Informatic (NCTP)270 au colaborat n privina
Ibidem, p. 19-21 United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First Responders, second edition, (apr), 2008, disponibil i la http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilles1/nij/219941.pdf 268 United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First Responders, second edition, (iul), 2001, disponibil i la http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilles1/nij/187736.pdf 269 Office for Law Enforcement Standard (OLES) 270 National Cybercrime Training Partnership (NCTP)
267 266

identificrii unor resurse pentru contracararea infraciunilor electronice. A fost stabilit un grup de lucru tehnic pentru investigarea scenei electronice a infraciunii (TWGECSI)271 pentru a identifica, defini i stabili criteriile de baz care s ajute ageniile de aplicare a legii n investigarea i punerea sub acuzare a acestor infraciuni. Cea de-a doua ediie a ghidului este o versiune uor mbuntit, mai bine spus sistematizat, a primei ediii. Totui, au scpat analizei unele probleme (n special cele privitoare la unele categorii de infraciuni) i anexele (B-F) care cuprindeau lista cu resurse legale (B), lista cu resurse tehnice (C), lista cu resurse pentru formarea profesional (D), bibliografia (E) i lista cu organizaiile (F) dar care pot fi gsite (actualizate), n parte, pe pagina de Internet a Parteneriatului de iniiativ pentru Infraciuni Electronice272. Ghidul a fost creat pentru a sprijini autoritile de aplicare a legii (federale i locale) dar i ali prim-respondeni, pentru: a se asigura c sigurana ofierului i sigurana celorlali rmne cea mai mare prioritate; a recunoate valoarea investigativ a dovezilor digitale; a stabili resursele disponibile; a identifica echipamentul i bunurile care trebuie ridicate de la locul faptei; a evalua locul faptei i dovezile digitale prezente; a desemna sarcinile, rolurile i responsabilitile personalului implicat n investigaie. Principiile generale criminalistice i procedurale pe care prim-respondentul trebuie s le aplice, atunci cnd are de-a face cu dovezi digitale, sunt considerate273 ar fi urmtoarele: sigurana ofierului i sigurana ceTechnical Working Group for Electronic Crime Scene Investigation (TWGECSI) 272 US DoJ, NIJ, Electronic, second edition, op. cit., p. vii-viii 273 Electronic Crime Partnership Initiative (ECPI) la adresa http://www.ecpi-us.org
271

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lorlali, care ar trebui s rmn preocuparea de baz a prim-respondentului, precizndu-se c nimic din ghid nu intenioneaz s fie sau ar fi conceput ca avnd o mai mare importan dect sigurana ofierului i sigurana celorlali, procesul colectrii, asigurrii i transportrii dovezilor digitale nu ar trebui s modifice dovezile, dovezile digitale ar trebui examinate doar de cei care au fost formai profesional n acest scop, tot ce s-a fcut n timpul confiscrii, transportrii i depozitrii dovezilor digitale ar trebui s fie pe deplin documentat, conservat i disponibil pentru revizuire. Primul-respondent, n manipularea dovezilor electronice, ar trebui s urmeze urmtorii pai: recunoate, identific, confisc i asigur toate dovezile digitale la faa locului; documenteaz ntreaga scen i locaiile specifice unde dovezile au fost gsite; colecteaz, eticheteaz i conserv dovezile digitale; mpacheteaz i transport dovezile digitale ntr-o manier sigur. nainte de colectarea dovezilor la faa locului, primul-respondent, ar trebui s se asigure c: exist o autorizare legal pentru confiscarea dovezilor; locul faptei a fost asigurat i documentat; sunt folosite echipamente de protecie a personalului. Ca structur, ghidul (att prima ct i cea de a doua ediie) este foarte bine, logic i concis sistematizat: n Capitolul 1 sunt prezentate (att n scris ct i prin imagini) dispozitivele electronice: tipul, descrierea i dovezile poteniale pe care le pot furniza; de remarcat faptul c n prima ediie a ghidului sunt furnizate mai multe informaii despre dispozitivele electronice (chiar dac nu sunt chiar att de bine sistematizate) dect n a doua ediie.
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n Capitolul 2 sunt prezentate instrumentele i echipamentele de investigaie, oferindu-se o list cu resurse tehnice (anexa C n prima ediie) disponibil i actualizat de Parteneriatul de Iniiativ pentru Infraciuni Electronice (ECPI)274. n Capitolul 3 este prezentat procedura de asigurare i evaluare a locului faptei, insistndu-se pe sigurana ofierului i a celorlali participani, dar i obinerea primelor informaii de la martori, suspeci, etc. n Capitolul 4 sunt furnizate unele recomandri pentru documentarea sau crearea unei nregistrri a scenei electronice a infraciunii. n Capitolul 5 este prezentat procedura colectrii dovezilor, insistndu-se pe existena unei autorizri pentru cutarea i colectarea dovezilor electronice la locul faptei; de remarcat acurateea sfaturilor i explicarea fiecrei situaii care poate fi ntlnit la locul faptei, dar i prezentarea sub forma unei scheme275 (n a doua ediie a ghidului) a activitilor care trebuie ntreprinse la locul faptei. n Capitolul 6 este prezentat procedura mpachetrii, transportului i depozitrii dovezilor, atrgndu-se atenia asupra fragilitii dispozitivelor electronice i dovezilor electronice pe care le conin i sensibilitii acestora la diveri factori (temperatur, umiditate, ocuri fizice, electricitate static, cmpuri magnetice). n ultimul Capitol (7) sunt prezentate categorii de infraciuni i poteniale dovezi digitale care ar trebui identificate; aa cum am precizat i la nceput, n prima ediie a ghidului sunt prezentate mai multe categorii de infraciuni i un tabel276 cu informaii generale i specifice n legtur cu acele categorii de infraciuni prezentate, grupate n: infraciuni sexuale, infraciuni contra persoanei i fraude/alte infraciuni financiare.
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Electronic Crime Partnership Initiative (ECPI). Lista cu resurse tehnice este disponibil la http://www.ecpi-us.org/Techresources.html 275 US DoJ, NIJ, Electronic, second edition, op. cit., p. 29 276 US DoJ, NIJ, Electronic, op. cit., p. 42-44

4. United States Secret Service, Bune practici pentru confiscarea dovezilor electronice: Un ghid de buzunar pentru primrespondent277. Versiunea iniial278 (2001) a acestui ghid de bune practici a fost dezvoltat ca un proiect al Asociaiei Internaionale a efilor de Poliie (Comitetului Consultativ pentru operaiunile de Investigaie poliieneasc), Serviciul Secret al SUA facilitnd convocarea unui grup de lucru format din reprezentani a autoritilor de aplicare a legii. A doua ediie279 (2003) a ghidului de bune practici alturi de IACP i USSS au mai aprut i Grupul de lucru de suport tehnic (TSWG)280 din cadrul Biroului de suport tehnic pentru combaterea terorismului (CTTSO) i Pricewaterhouse Coopers. Ultima ediie (2006) a fost actualizat ca proiect al USSS i aprobat de IACP. Ghidul, chiar dac este considerat de buzunar, este foarte bine documentat, concis i prezint (att n scris ct i prin imagini) ceea ce trebuie s fac prim-respondentul n diverse situaii. Ca structur, ghidul este mprit n mai multe seciuni: regulile de aur, conservarea dovezilor, scop, autoritatea pentru confiscarea dovezilor, elemente de reea personal, infraciuni i dovezi digitale, ntrebri investigative, galerie, glosar. Nu am s prezint toate seciunile, ci am s insist asupra celor pe care le consider mai importante. Scopul ghidului, aa cum l prezint i autorii281, este s ajute
277 United State Secret Service, Best Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence (v.3): A Pocket Guide for First Responders, disponibil i la http://www. forwardedge2.usss.gov/pdf/bestPractice.pdf 278 International Association of Chief of Police (IACP), Best Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence, disponibil i la http://www.theiacp.org /PublicationsGuides/ResearchCenter/Publications/tabi d/299/Default.aspx?id=84&v=1 279 Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), http:// www.tswg.gov 280 International Association of Chief of Police (IACP) Best Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence (version 2.0) disponibil i la http://www.fletc.gov /training/programs/legal-division/downloads-articlesand-faq3/downloads/other/bestpractices.pdf 281 US SS, Best Practices, ed. a 3-a, op. cit. p. 8

ofierii de patrulare, detectivii i investigatorii, pe de o parte, s identifice modul n care calculatoarele i dispozitivele digitale pot fi folosite ca un instrument al unei infraciuni sau ca dispozitiv de stocare pentru dovezi n cazul altor infraciuni i, pe de alt parte, s asigure n mod corespunztor dovezile i s le transporte pentru o examinare ulterioar de ctre un specialist criminalist. La nceput sunt prezentate Regulile de aur, principii generale care trebuie urmate la locul infraciunilor n care pot fi implicate calculatoarele sau tehnologii electronice: Sigurana ofierului: asigur scena i f-o sigur; Dac, n mod rezonabil, consideri c acel calculator este implicat n infraciunea pe care o investighezi, ia msuri imediate pentru conservarea dovezii; Ai o baz legal pentru confiscarea acelui calculator? Nu accesa niciun fiier, din calculator. Dac acel calculator este oprit, las-l oprit. Dac este pornit, nu ncepe s caui prin calculator. Dac acel calculator este ponit, treci la seciunile corespunztoare din acest ghid despre cum s opreti corespunztor calculatorul i s-l pregteti pentru transport ca dovad Dac, n mod rezonabil, consideri c acel calculator distruge dovezile, oprete-l imediat prin scoaterea cablului de alimentare din partea din spate a calculatorului Dac un aparat foto este disponibil, i calculatorul este pornit, fotografiaz ecranul calculatorului. Dac acel calculator este oprit, fotografiaz calculatorul, locaia calculatorului i a oricror medii electronice ataate Ai avut n vedere dispoziiile legale speciale aplicabile (medici, avocai, cler, psihiatri, ziare, edituri, etc.)? n seciunea Conservarea dovezilor sunt prezentate 5 situaii calculator personal izolat; calculator personal conectat la
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reea; servere de reea/reea de afaceri; medii pentru stocate date; dispozitive tip asistent digital personal (PDA), telefoane mobile, camere digitale i procedura care trebuie urmat pentru o conservare i confiscare corespunztoare a dovezilor. De punctat, din nou, claritatea i corectitudinea pailor i msurilor prezentate n fiecare din situaii, pai i msuri care se circumscriu principiilor (regulilor de aur) prezentate la nceput. n seciunea Infraciuni i dovezi digitale sunt prezentate unele infraciuni care implic utilizarea calculatoarelor sau a altor medii electronice fraude, abuzuri asupra copiilor i pornografie, omucidere, violen domestic, fraude financiare i falsificare, droguri, piraterie (de programe), fraude de telecomunicaie, hruire, furt de identitate, etc. precum i dovezile poteniale care pot fi recuperate n fiecare caz n parte. De amintit i seciunea ntrebri investigative, n care sunt prezentate ntrebrile cu caracter general care trebuie formulate n timpul fazei iniiale a investigaiilor dar i ntrebri specifice pentru anumite tipuri particulare de infraciuni electronice cum ar fi: furt de identitate/infraciuni financiare; infraciuni mpotriva copiilor comise prin intermediul Internetului; intruziuni n reea; infraciuni care implic folosirea potei electronice; infraciuni care implic mesageria instantanee, etc. 5. Asociaia Ofierilor efi ai poliiei din Anglia, ara Galilor i Irlanda de Nord, Ghid de bune practici pentru dovezi electronice din (bazate pe) calculator282. Ultima ediie (a 4-a) a acestui ghid a fost publicat n 2007, n parteneriat cu 7Safe283. Fa de precedentele versiuni (2003, 1999, 1997), aceast versiune, cu
282

Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) of England, Wales and Nathern Ireland, Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence, versiune oficial, ed. 4.0, disponibil i la http://www.7safe.com/electronic_evidence/ACPO_gu idelines_computer_evidence.pdf 283 7 Safe Information security Services, http://www.7safe.com

toate c pstreaz structura precedentelor, mbuntete coninutul i abordeaz problematici noi cum ar fi: reelele personale i tehnologiile fr fir, investigarea criminalistic a reelelor i datele volatile, recuperarea dovezilor video i n cazul televiziunii cu circuit nchis (CCTV). Ghidul este destinat, n principal, ofierilor de poliie i investigatorilor din domeniul privat dar i altor agenii i persoane juridice implicate n investigarea i incriminarea incidentelor i infraciunilor care necesit colectarea i examinarea dovezilor digitale. Sunt identificate i explicate 4 principii284 care ar trebui s ghideze activitatea de obinere a dovezilor electronice, i anume: nicio aciune ntreprins de ageniile de aplicare a legii sau de agenii acestora nu trebuie s modifice datele care sunt inute n calculatoare sau medii de stocare care pot fi ulterior invocate n faa instanei; n situaiile n care o persoan consider necesar accesarea datelor originale inute n calculator sau n medii de stocare, acea persoan trebuie s fie competent s o fac (accesarea) i s fie capabil s dovedeasc relevana i implicaiile aciunilor sale. trebuie create i pstrate nregistrri a tuturor proceselor aplicate dovezilor electronice. O ter persoan independent trebuie s fie capabil s examineze acele procese i s obin aceleai rezultate; persoana care este nsrcinat cu investigaia (ofierul de caz) are ntreaga responsabilitate pentru a asigura c legea i aceste principii sunt respectate. n seciunea dedicat locului faptei, sunt prezentate tipurile de dispozitive de stocare calculatoare, dispozitive tip agend electronic i asistent digital personal i alte medii de stocare , ce ar trebui confiscat unitatea central, monitorul, tastatura, discul dur extern, modemul, ruterul, dischete, discuri compacte, carduri sau alte dispozitive de memorie, impri284

ACPO, Good Practice, op. cit., p.4

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mante, telefoane mobile, pagere, camere digitale, manuale, instruciuni, cabluri, etc. i procedura ridicrii, transportului i depozitrii. Tot aici este prezentat specificul scenei infraciunii pe Internet i ce necesit atenie pota electronic, jurnalul web (blog), sursele deschise, etc. . n ce privete personalul care efectueaz investigaia sunt prezentate sfaturi privind pregtirea cutrii echipamentele necesare, personalul necesar , nregistrrile care trebuie inute schia locului faptei, persoanele prezente la locul faptei, tipul, modelul i seria calculatorului, afiajul i perifericele, comentariile i informaiile oferite de utilizator, aciunile ntreprinse, cu artarea timpului exact , luarea interviurilor, etc. Este consacrat separat o seciune pentru recuperarea dovezilor video i CCTV, descriindu-se procedura care trebuie urmat pentru descrcarea datelor nregistrate i echipamentul necesar. De precizat c este prezentat schematic285 i explicat fiecare pas286 al analizei CCTV. n aceeai ordine de idei, este prezentat separat un ghid pentru confiscarea i examinarea telefoanelor mobile, un ghid n adevratul sens al cuvntului, chiar dac este un ghid ntr-un ghid, aplicndu-se principiile generale (prezentate mai sus) fiecrei etape i accentundu-se importana izolrii dispozitivului (telefonului) de reea att n timpul ridicrii i transportului ct i n timpul examinrii. De notat este i faptul c este prezentat legislaia n vigoare i unitile locale cu atribuii n cazul infraciunilor de nalt tehnologie. 6. Institutul Naional de Justiie din cadrul Ministerului de Justiie al SUA, Examinarea criminalistic a dovezilor digitale: un ghid pentru autoritile de aplicare a legii287. Acest ghid, este al doilea din
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seria dedicat dovezilor digitale i ajutrii ageniilor de aplicare a legii, dup Ghidul pentru primul-respondent n investigarea scenei electronice a infraciunii (ediia din 2001). Ghidul se dorete a fi folosit de ofierii care aplic legea dar i de ali membrii ai comunitii (autoritilor) de aplicare a legii care sunt responsabili de examinarea dovezilor digitale. Se specific faptul c ghidul nu conine chiar totul, mai degrab analizeaz situaiile comune ntlnite n timpul examinrii dovezilor digitale. De asemenea, se atrage atenia c ghidul nu reprezint un mandat pentru comunitatea (autoritilor) de aplicare a legii ci este un ghid pe care ageniile l pot folosi pentru ai dezvolta propriile politici i proceduri. Ghidul este structurat n 5 capitole dezvoltarea de politici i proceduri, evaluarea dovezilor, achiziia dovezilor, examinarea dovezilor, documentarea i raportarea i 8 anexe studii de caz, glosar, exemple de fie de lucru, exemple de cereri pentru servicii, list cu resurse legale, list cu resurse tehnice, list cu resurse pentru formare profesional, list cu organizaii . Aceast structur a ghidului descrie, de fapt, etapele de baz n realizarea unei examinri criminalistice digitale i sugereaz ordinea n care trebuie desfurat, cu o singur precizare: chiar dac documentarea este trecut ca etap final (alturi de rapoarte) trebuie neles c aceasta (documentarea) se realizeaz de-a lungul ntregului proces. De asemenea, coninutul anexelor furnizeaz informaii suplimentare i resurse necesare pentru ndeplinirea n bune condiii a sarcinilor asumate. n capitolul 1 Dezvoltarea de politici i proceduri, se sugereaz c fiecare departament s-i creeze propriile politici i proceduri pentru a crea i menine operaional o unitate criminalistic i sunt oferite cteva sfaturi pentru realizarea acestora.
Institute of Justice, Forensic Examination of Digital Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, (2004), disponibil i la http://www.ncjps.gov/pdffile51 /nij/199408.pdf

Ibidem, p.41 286 Ibidem, p. 42-44 287 United States Department of Justice, National

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n capitolul 2 Evaluarea dovezilor se prezint principalele aspecte care trebuie urmrite: autorizaia, detaliile cazului, natura echipamentelor, dovezile poteniale i circumstanele, sugerndu-se consultarea ghidului pentru prim-respondent. n capitolul 3 Achiziia dovezilor sunt prezentate paii care trebuie urmai pentru obinerea dovezilor digitale de o manier care s le protejeze i conserve. n capitolul 4 Examinarea dovezilor se atrage atenia asupra faptului c examinarea nu trebuie fcut asupra dovezii originale i sunt prezentai paii care trebuie urmai: pregtirea examinrii extragerea fizic n care sunt identificate i recuperate toate datele scrise pe disc i logic n care sunt identificate i recuperate fiierele i datele n funcie de sistemul de operare, sistemul de fiiere i aplicaiile existente . analiza datelor extrase: analiza secvenei temporare; analiza datelor ascunse; analiza aplicaiilor fiierelor, etc. n ultimul capitol Documentarea i raportarea se atrage atenia asupra faptului c documentarea trebuie s fie complet, acurat i cuprinztoare i sunt oferite sfaturi n legtur cu nsemnrile celui care efectueaz examinarea i raportul final care trebuie ntocmit. De punctat i anexa A n care sunt prezentate dou studii de caz, foarte bine documentate i explicate. 7. Institutul Naional pentru Standarde i tehnologie din cadrul Ministerului Comerului al SUA, Ghid pentru gestionarea incidentelor de securitate a calculatoarelor288. Prezenta versiune revizuit (2008) a ghidului este o versiune uor mbuntit a celei iniiale (din 2004)289. Practic, structura i
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coninutul ghidului au rmas aceleai, singurele modificri care sunt operate privesc: separarea elementelor de politic de elementele de procedur i introducerea unor elemente de planificare n subseciunea 2.3; introducerea unor noi exemple de incidente cu programe maliioase (cookies de urmrire, unelte de atac, alte ameninri dect programele maliioase), n subseciunea 5.1; transformarea anexei J din Index n categorii de incidente ce trebuie raportate de ageniile federale ctre US-CERT. Acest ghid a fost conceput pentru a fi folosit de ageniile federale (putnd fi totui folosit i de organizaiile neguvernamentale) i i propune s furnizeze orientri practice pentru a putea rspunde n mod efectiv i eficient n cazul unui incident. Cu toate c ghidul include orientri pentru stabilirea unui program eficient de rspuns la incident, dar se concentreaz pe detectarea, analizarea, stabilirea prioritilor i gestionarea incidentului. Ca structur, ghidul este mprit n opt seciuni i 10 anexe. n seciunea 2 Organizarea capacitii de reacie la un incident de securitate a calculatoarelor sunt lmurite noiunile de evenimente i incidente, sunt prezentate beneficiile existenei unei capaciti de rspuns la incident, sunt stabilite politica, planul i procedura de rspuns la incident, precum i structura i serviciile echipei de rspuns la incident. De punctat recomandrile cheie290 pentru organizarea unei capaciti de rspuns la un incident de securitate a calculatoarelor: stabilete o capacitate structural de rspund la incident
Institute of Standard and Technology, (NIST), Computer Securyty Incident Handling Guide, Recommendations of the National Institute of Standard and Technology, Special Publication 800-61, (ian) 2004, disponibil la http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs /800-61/sp800-61.pdf 290 NIST, Computer Security, rev.1, op. cit. p. (2) 16-17

United State Departament of Commerce, National Institute of Standard and Technology, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, Recommendations of the National Institute of Standard and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-61, rev. 1 (mar), 2008, disponibil i la http://CSRC.nist.gov/publications /nistpubs/800-61-rev1/SP800-61rev1.pdf 289 United State Department of Commerce, National

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creeaz o politic de rspuns la incident dezvolt un plan de rspuns la incident bazat pe politica creat dezvolt o procedur de rspuns la incident stabilete politici i proceduri legate de partajarea informaiilor privitoare la incident furnizeaz organizaiilor de raportare a incidentelor informaii pertinente despre incidente ia n considerare factorii relevani atunci cnd alegi un model de echip de rspuns la incident alege oameni cu aptitudini potrivite pentru echipa de rspuns la incident identific alte grupuri din interiorul organizaiei de care ar putea fi nevoie n gestionarea incidentului stabilete ce servicii poate echipa s ofere n seciunea 3 Gestionarea unui incident sunt prezentate fazele procesului de rspuns la incident i sunt explicate principalele activiti care trebuie ntreprinse. Astfel, sunt identificate patru faze (cu activiti specifice): pregtirea, care presupune att pregtirea propriu-zis pentru rspuns ct i msuri de prevenire a incidentului; detectarea i analizarea, care presupune: stabilirea categoriilor de incidente, nelegerea semnelor specifice unui incident, analiza, documentarea, stabilirea prioritii i notificarea incidentelor; oprirea, eradicarea i restabilirea, care presupune: alegerea unei strategii de stopare a incidentului, obinerea i gestionarea dovezilor (cu accente criminalistice), identificarea atacatorului, eradicarea incidentului i restabilirea sistemului; activitile ulterioare incidentului, care presupun: reuniuni tip nvare i mbuntire, folosirea datelor despre incident colectate, reinerea dovezilor. De punctat recomandrile cheie291 pentru gestionarea incidentului:
291

Ibidem, p. (3) 29-30

obine unelte i resurse care pot fi valoroase n timpul gestionrii incidentului previne apariia incidentului prin asigurarea c reelele, sistemele i aplicaiile sunt suficient de sigure identific precursorii i indicaiile n timpul alertei generate de programele pentru securitatea calculatoarelor stabilete mecanismul de raportare a incidentului pentru teri solicit un nivel de baz pentru logare i audit la toate sistemele i un nivel de baz mai ridicat pentru toate sistemele critice proiecteaz reelele i sistemele nelege comportamentul normal al reelelor i sistemelor folosete conectri centralizate i creeaz o politic de reinere a conectrilor coreleaz evenimentele pstreaz toate ceasurile sistemelor gazd sincronizate creeaz o matrice de diagnoz pentru personalul mai puin experimentat nregistreaz toate informaiile imediat ce echipa suspecteaz producerea unui incident protejeaz datele incidentului stabilete prioritatea incidentelor dup impactul asupra afacerii, n baza a ct de critice sunt resursele afectate i efectele tehnice ale incidentului include, n politica de rspuns la incident a organizaiei, dispoziii privitoare la raportarea incidentelor stabilete strategii i proceduri pentru oprirea incidentului urmeaz procedurile stabilite pentru obinerea i gestionarea dovezilor capteaz, ca dovezi, datele volatile din sisteme obine instantanee ale sistemului direct prin intermediul imaginii criminalistice complete a discului, nu a copiei de siguran a sistemului ine edine tip nvare dup incidentele majore n urmtoarele seciuni (4-8) sunt particularizate principalele incidente refuzul
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serviciului, codurile maliioase, accesul neautorizat, utilizarea nepotrivit, incidente cu componente multiple , fiind definite incidentele, prezentate exemple i msuri specifice gestionrii acestora. De punctat recomandrile specifice fiecrei categorii de incidente. Astfel292: a) n cazul refuzului serviciului: configureaz ruterul pentru prevenirea atacurilor tip amplificator stabilete cum furnizorul de servicii de Internet te poate ajuta n gestionarea atacurilor tip refuzul serviciului de reea configureaz programele de siguran s detecteze atacurile tip refuzul serviciului configureaz reeaua s resping tot traficul (intrare i ieire) care nu este permis expres creeaz o strategie de oprire care include mai multe soluii n succesiune b) n cazul codurilor maliioase293: avertizeaz utilizatorii despre problemele codurilor maliioase citete comunicatele antivirus lanseaz sisteme de detectare i prevenire a intruziunilor gazd folosete programe antivirus i pstreaz-le la zi cu ultimele semnturi de virui configureaz antivirusul s blocheze fiierele suspecte elimin partajrile Windows deschise oprete incidentele tip coduri maliioase ct mai repede posibil c) n cazul accesului neautorizat294 configureaz programele de detectare a intruziunii s avertizeze ncercarea de obinere a accesului neautorizat configureaz toate sistemele gazd s foloseasc conectri centralizate stabilete proceduri pentru schimbarea parolelor utilizatorilor configureaz reeaua s resping tra292 293

ficul care nu este permis expres asigur toate metodele de acces la distan grupeaz toate serviciile accesibile publicului ntr-o zon sigur a reelei dezactiveaz pe sistemul gazd toate serviciile care nu sunt necesare i separ serviciile critice folosete programe parafoc pentru fiecare sistem gazd pentru a limita expunerea la atac creeaz i implementeaz o politic pentru parole furnizeaz schimbul informaiilor de management pentru echipa de rspuns la incident alege strategia de stopare care echilibreaz atenuarea riscurilor i meninerea serviciilor restabilete sau reinstaleaz sistemele care par a fi suferit o compromitere a rdcinii e) n cazul incidentelor cu componente multiple295 folosete conectri centralizate i programe pentru corelarea evenimentelor oprete incidentul iniial i apoi caut semnele altor componente ale incidentului stabilete separat prioritatea gestionrii fiecrui component al incidentului n anexe sunt prezentate: recomandri pentru rspuns la incident (anexa A), scenarii de gestionare a incidentelor (anexa B) date privitoare la incident care trebuie colectate (anexa C), glosar i acronime (anexele D i E), resurse tiprite (anexe F), instrumente i resurse disponibile on-line (anexa G), ntrebrile adresate frecvent (anexa H), paii de urmat n gestionarea unei crize (anexa I) i categorii de incidente ce trebuie raportate de ageniile federale.

ibidem, p. (4) 11-12 ibidem, p. (5) 15 294 ibidem, p. (6) 8-9

295

ibidem, p. (8) 3

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Bibliografie: Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) of England, Wales and Nathern Ireland, Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence, versiune oficial, ed. 4.0, disponibil i la http://www.7safe.com/electronic_evidence/ACPO_guidelines_computer_ evidence.pdf European Network of Forensic Sciene Institutes (ENFSI), Standing Committee for Quality and Competence (QCC), Guidance on the Production of Best Manuals within ENFSI, nr. 1, 2003, disponibil i la http://www.enfsi.eu/get_doc.php?uid=72 International Association of Chief of Police (IACP) Best Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence (version 2.0) disponibil i la http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/legaldivision/downloads-articles-and-faq3/downloads/other/bestpractices.pdf International Association of Chief of Police (IACP), Best Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence, disponibil i la http://www.theiacp.org/PublicationsGuides/ResearchCenter /Publications/tabid/299/Default.aspx?id=84&v=1 International Organization on Computer Evidence (IOCE), Guidelines for Best Practice in the Forensic Examination of Digital Technology (versiunea 1.0) (mai), 2002, disponibil i la http://www.ioce,org/fileadmin/user_upload/2002/Guidelines%20Practices%20in%20Exa mination%20of%20Digital%20Evid.pdf INTERPOL, European Working Party on Information Technology Crime, Information Technology Crime Investigation Manual (ICTIM), (disponibil pentru autoritile de aplicare a legii, membrii INTERPOL), la https://www.interpol.com/Private/Techology Crime/Computer Manual/Default.asp INTERPOL, Realizrile Grupului de Lucru European pentru Infraciunile privind Tehnologia Informaiei, disponibil la http://www.interpol.int/Public/technologyCrime/ WorkingParties/Default.asp#Europa Ioni Gheorghe-Iulian, Criminalitatea Informatic, tez de doctorat, Academia de Poliie Alexandru Ioan Cuza, Bucureti, (iulie) 2009 United State Departament of Commerce, National Institute of Standard and Technology, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, Recommendations of the National Institute of Standard and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-61, rev. 1 (mar), 2008, disponibil i la http://CSRC.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-61-rev1/SP800-61rev1.pdf United State Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standard and Technology, (NIST), Computer Securyty Incident Handling Guide, Recommendations of the National Institute of Standard and Technology, Special Publication 800-61, (ian) 2004, disponibil la http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-61/sp800-61.pdf United State Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Computer Crime& Intelectual Property Section, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations, disponibil (n format pdf) i la http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal /cybercrime/s&smanual2002.pdf United State Secret Service, Best Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence (v.3): A Pocket Guide for First Responders, disponibil i la http://www.forwardedge2.usss.gov /pdf/bestPractice.pdf United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Office for Professional Development and Training Federal Rules for Serching and Seizing Computers, (iul) 1994, disponibil i la http://epic.org/security/computer_guidelines.txt United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First Responders, second edition, (apr), 2008, disponibil i la http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilles1/nij/219941.pdf United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First Responders, second edition, (iul), 2001, disponibil i la http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilles1/nij/187736.pdf United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Forensic Examination of Digital Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, (2004), disponibil i la http://www.ncjps.gov/pdffile51/nij/199408.pdf
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FRAUDE INTRACOMITARE LA REGIMUL T.V.A.


Drd. ENACHE VICENIU Direcia de Investigare a Fraudelor IGPR Ec. ORZA CARLA NICOLETA ef Administraia Finanelor Publice Sighetul Marmaiei The significant changes in the legal and tax field, as a result of the Romanias accession to the European Union have been accompanied, almost immediately, by new forms of fraud and tax evasion, associated to trading operations, which imply goods resulted from the intercommunity acquisitions. Tax evasion and fraud in the V.A.T field distorts single market competition and reduces the fiscal revenues of the Member States, with impact among the E.U budget financing (app. 16% from the Community revenues are based on WATT). Cuvinte cheie: TVA intracomunitar, evaziune fiscal, fraud tip carusel, produse accizabile, firme offshore, fraud fiscal Definirea fraudei fiscale este extrem de dificil, prin prisma multiplelor semnificaii pe care le implic mai ales una dintre formele sale de baz, evaziunea fiscal. Exist o definiie unanim acceptat, si aceasta ca urmare fireasc a evoluiilor economice dar si a domeniilor de activitate unde se ntlnete preponderent. n principiu, fiecare autor are o viziune proprie asupra definirii acestui termen, dar ideea de baz rmne aceeai: ,,sustragerea de la plata impozitelor. Evaziunea fiscal prin sustragerea de la plata T.V.A., reprezint unul din fenomenele a crui existen i pune amprenta n mod negativ asupra bugetului general consolidat al statului, i a crei evoluie conduce n mod direct la diminuarea veniturilor bugetare ct i la afectarea climatului de linite n mediul de afaceri. Este binecunoscut faptul c, evaziunea fiscal se manifest n toate domeniile economiei de pia, ns acest fenomen cunoate o recrudescen n zona produselor accizabile, a comercializrii mrfurilor, a utilizrii documentelor cu regim special dar i a prestrilor de servicii.
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Combaterea fenomenelor de fraud fiscal, n special intracomunitare, respectiv cele la regimul T.V.A, nu a fcut mari progrese n ultimi ani la nivelul Uniunii Europene, pierderile fiscale totale cauzate de fraud se ridic la o sum cuprins ntre 200 i 250 de miliarde euro, echivalentul a 2% din P.I.B. -ul U.E.296. n condiiile n care se pot obine profituri substaniale numai din desfurarea unor activiti meteorice frauduloase (precum ncasarea unor sume de la bugetul de stat sub forma de taxa pe valoarea adugata de ncasat, numai din simpla circulaie a unor documente false), o asemenea ar reprezint o adevrat gur de aer pentru marii evazioniti internaionali. Acetia apar din neant (prin firme fictive, sub identiti false), ncaseaz profituri deosebit de mari (pe baza unor operaiuni fictive constnd n general, din circulaia unor documente false), dup care dispar tot n neant. Profiturile obinute dispar, fiind transferate peste hotarele arii respec296

http://www.andreeavass.ro/blog/2010/03/financiaru l-frauda-fiscala-reprezinta-5-6-din-pib-iar-economiaascunsa-ajunge-la-23/

tive, prin ingenioase metode de splare a banilor obinui ilegal. n noua er a globalizrii. graniele s-au deschis, barierele comerciale au fost eliminate, iar informaia circul cu o vitez nemaintlnit, cifra de afaceri a companiilor transnaionale explodeaz. n cazul n care legislaia fiscal este permisiv , o firm care pornete de la un capital derizoriu, uneori de la civa dolari , este permanent pe pierderi de 10-15 ani, dar de mbogit se mbogete exorbitant (ajungnd la un patrimoniu cteva de milioane de dolari). n aceste condiii i ntr-o asemenea ar marii evazioniti internaionali nici nu se mai grbesc s dea epe i s plece cu profiturile ncasate, acetia i desfoar activitatea n deplin linite i legalitate ntruct obinerea de profituri, invizibile, se face prin cele mai frauduloase i elegante mijloace de evaziune fiscal legal297. O asemenea ar care pentru persoanele fizice i juridice corecte are o fiscalitate apstoare, pentru evazionitii din toate colurile lumii este un adevrat paradis fiscal. Fiscalitatea exist, prin lege este chiar apstoare pentru omul de rnd i pentru societile comerciale care lucreaz onest, dar lipsete cu desvrire pentru marii evazioniti. Asemenea ri reprezint cazuri particulare de paradisuri fiscale, care sunt bine cunoscute dar despre care nu s-a scris pn n prezent, n cazul n care se ntreprind msuri radicale n domeniul legislaiei fiscale i n combaterea corupiei, n special la nivel instituional, care conduc la lipsa oricror posibiliti de fraudare a bugetului de stat, atunci are loc o schimbare radical n atitudinea, preocuprile i activitile ntreprinztorilor evazioniti fa de o asemenea ar. Aii n evaziunea fiscal legal se ndreapt ctre alte locuri prielnice, sau ctre clasicele paradisuri fiscale, numite i ,,teritorii offshore, unde pot dezvolta linitii operaiuni la regimul T.VA. n ceea ce privete aa ziii oamenii de
297

succes care desfoar activiti de evaziune fiscal legal, acetia nu trebuie sancionai i de fapt nici nu pot fi sancionai - pentru abilitatea lor de a face bani la umbra legii, inclusiv pe seama unor venituri care n condiiile unor reglementri corespunztoare, s-ar cuveni bugetului de stat298. Printre marii vinovai care trebuie sancionai sunt politicienii i guvernanii care au condus sau conduc incompetent i fraudulos, care nu reglementeaz corespunztor viaa economic i social, care las larg porile deschise diminurii substaniale a veniturilor bugetului de stat prin fenomenele de evaziune fiscal aa zis legal, concomitent cu mpovrarea fiscal a marii majoriti a populaiei i a firmelor care lucreaz corect, deseori acetia avnd interese obscure n acest sens. Ideea obsesiv, a fiecrui ntreprinztor este cum s obin profit, prin orice mijloace legale. Faptul c omul de afaceri se folosete i de neajunsurile legislaiei pentru a obine profit, pentru a-i maximiza profitul, pentru a nu plti impozite, dar fr a intra n conflict cu legea, trebuie privit i analizat cu o maxim seriozitate. Un om de afaceri este considerat corect i performant atta timp ct nu ncalc legea i reuete s obin un profit ct mai mare, inclusiv prin neplata legal a impozitelor. Preocuprile i aciunile practice ale omului de afaceri sunt nu de a-i maximiza obligaiile fiscale, ci de a-i maximiza profiturile personale, prin orice mijloace legale, inclusiv prin folosirea unor reglementri care sunt ambigue i care provin din statul n care firma acestuia i desfoar activitatea. Este foarte important pentru fiecare ar, s aib o legislaie raional, cu prevederi clare, precise, la modul imperativ, care s nu lase loc diferitelor implementri, care elimina orice posibiliti de evaziune fiscal considerat legal i cu att mai mult ilegal, frauduloas299. Privit din prisma unei economii funciEmilian Dobrescu. Tranziia n Romnia Abordri Econometrice. 299 http://www.finmedia.ro/conferences/conferintele/pa chetultva/ed1/prezentarile/Luisiana%20Dobrinescu.pdf
298

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missing_trader_fraud

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onale, legislaia fiscal trebuie s stimuleze munca, procesele de economisire i investiionale, s instaureze climatul de legalitate, de domnie a legii, a raiunii i a principiilor. O problem care preocup foarte mult comunitatea european, este frauda fiscal i aceasta ca urmare a erodrii veniturilor fiscale n statele membre, ceea ce conduce la creterea puterii fiscale pentru angajai. Din aceast cauz coordonarea aciunilor de lupt contra fraudei trebuie conceput ca parte integrant a politicii fiscale comunitare, n acest scop trebuind s fie lansate mai multe iniiative n materie de T.V.A. i accize. Creterea progresiv a schimburilor a generat o proliferare a aa-numitelor fraude de tip CARUSEL. Legislaia n legtur cu acest subiect prevede ca mrfurile care tranziteaz U.E. s circule liber, T.V.A. -ul privind tranzaciile comerciale cu statele comunitare urmnd ns s fie vrsat n ara de destinaie. Prin introducerea unei persoane impozabile fictive n tranzacia comunitar, se poate obine o triad ilegal care simuleaz astfel dublul transfer al aceluiai bun. Cumprtorul are dreptul la rambursarea T.V.A., care nu a fost ns achitat de persoana interpus, care, la rndul ei, a cumprat bunul scutit de T.V.A. de la un furnizor din alt stat membru, persoana interpus disprnd n acest fel. Frauda de tip CARUSEL, manifestri i metode de identificare Sistemul comun al Taxei pe Valoarea Adugata pentru comerul intracomunitar reglementeaz in esena ca livrrile intracomunitare de bunuri sunt scutite de T.V.A., cu drept de deducere, obligaia de a pltii T.V.A. revenind operatorului din statul membru de destinaie la cota in vigoare in statul membru respectiv. Acest sistem coroborat cu faptul ca libera circulaie a mrfurilor a impus eliminarea evidentei instituionalizate a bunurilor provenite din statele membre, prin renunarea la formalitile si controlul vamal, a generat in comerul intracomunitar evaziune si frauda fiscala care se manifesta in toate
174

statele membre, acestea genernd totodat exacerbarea metodei cel mai des ntlnite de eludare a plii T.V.A. - Frauda de tip CARUSEL.Precum un ,,carusel, care reprezint o micare, deplasare, circulaie continu a unor mobile , frauda de tip carusel se folosete de urmtoarea inginerie fiscal, n vederea eludrii plii taxelor: un agent economic cumpr fr taxe un produs dintr-o ar din afara U.E., pentru a-l revinde ulterior n propria ar prin adugarea de T.V.A., schema repetndu-se de mai multe ori, sau agentul economic din ara de origine factureaz fr T.V.A., acesta efectund o livrare intracomunitar, care intr n categoria operaiunilor scutite de T.V.A. cu drept de deducere, iar agentul economic din ara de destinaie urmeaz s aplice regimul taxrii inverse pentru aceast operaiune, acesta efectund o achiziie intracomunitar, calculnd i nregistrnd T.V.A aferent achiziiilor intracomunitare, la cota de impozitare a rii sale, att ca T.V.A. colectat, ct i ca T.V.A. deductibil, fr ns a o plti n mod efectiv. Ulterior efecturii achiziiei intracomunitare, operatorul economic n cauz dispare fr s nregistreze n contabilitate , s declare tranzacia i s plteasc T.V.A. -ul colectat aferent livrrilor ulterioare efectuate pe piaa sa intern. Acestea sunt denumite firme de tip tampon, colectoare a unor obligaii fiscale privind T.V.A., pe care ns nu le achit niciodat . Acest agent economic, respectiv firma de tip tampon mai este denumit, datorit comportamentului su volatil firm de tip fantom, n practicile de investigare a fraudei de tip carusel fiind veriga lips din comerul intracomunitar300. Trebuie specificat faptul c, dei valorile nu sunt ntotdeauna foarte mari, aceste cazuri sunt foarte frecvente i prin urmare, sumele totale manevrate ajung la niveluri uriae.
Drago Ptroi, Florin Cuciureanu TVA intracomunitar, Frauda carusel, Rambursarea TVA, Ed. C.H. Beck 2009, p 47
300

Acest tip de frauda privind T.V.A -ul aferent tranzaciilor intracomunitare presupune un lan de operaiuni succesive de vnzare-cumprare transfrontaliere, efectuate n interiorul pieei comunitare deseori fiind interpui ageni economici din afara Comunitii. Tranzaciile sunt realizate de un grup de operatori economici care, deseori, caut s exploateze, sub aparenta tent de legalitate diferenele dintre cotele de impozitare practicate de statele membre U.E., n scopul obinerii unui pre sczut al bunurilor care fac obiectul unor astfel de tranzacii i, pe cale de consecin, al crerii unui avantaj comparativ pe pia, din punct de vedere al preului de comercializare. n consecin, influenele fraudei de tip carusel se localizeaz nu numai la nivelul obligaiilor fiscale sustrase de la impozitare, dar i al distorsionrii mecanismelor concureniale ale pieei. Nu de puine ori, metodele de volatilizare a masei impozabile a taxei pe valoarea adugat, prin intermediul fraudei de tip carusel, sunt combinate cu tehnicile de contabilitate creativ. n mod evident, n aceste situaii, obiectivul de performan al reglementrilor contabile (privind reflectarea unei imagini fidele referitoare la situaia financiar a unei societi comerciale, pentru toi utilizatorii de informaii) i pierde din consisten; credibilitatea informaiei contabile are de suferit, deoarece se produce un paralelism ntre situaia n fapt a firmei i datele de analiz furnizate de adevrul contabil. n literatura de specialitate (n special cea anglo-saxon), metodele i tehnicile de contabilitate creativ au fost asimilate cu noiunea de evaziune fiscal ,,tolerat, n special din perspectiva rolului acestora n manipularea (la limita de suportabilitate a textului de lege) cifrelor din situaiile financiare, avnd loc astfel consolidarea indicatorilor economico-financiari ai firmei practic prin denaturarea coninutului informaional al acestora. Dei politicile de contabilitate creativ promovate de mana175

gementul firmei reprezint, adesea, un mijloc de ,,cosmetizare a situaiilor financiar-fiscale, exist i opinii n domeniu care apreciaz c, n msura n care acestea nu se abat de la normele contabile (ci doar exploateaz spaiile de libertate ale cadrului normativ), aceste opiuni contabile nu au n vedere (neaprat) un scop fraudulos, disociind noiunea de contabilitate creativ de noiunea de contabilitate de intenie. Mai mult chiar, fenomenul actual de globalizare a activitii economice a presupus, n ultimul timp, o deplasare dinspre noiunea de contabilitate creativ ctre cea de inginerie financiar, ca o expresie sintetic ce reflect mai fidel fenomenele de interschimbabilitate a capitalurilor i de internaionalizare a infracionalitii economice (n care frauda de tip carusel ocup un loc frunta) . Odat cu integrarea Romniei n Uniunea European, o parte din agenii economici din ara noastr, au cutat s asimileze din mers practicile infracionale de fraudare a obligaiilor fiscale, experimentate de mai muli ani n spaiul comunitar i, de foarte multe ori, chiar cu succes. Dei inventivitatea gulerelor albe din domeniu presupune doar limite teoretice, practica (att la nivel naional, ct i la nivel comunitar) a confirmat o serie de metode privind transpunerea n practica de zi cu zi a fraudei de tip carusel. n continuare vom prezenta metodele de eludare a plii T.V.A. cel mai des ntlnite , astfel una dintr-acestea este cea n care agentul economic X vrea s cumpere bunuri de la firma Y, n acest sens, va nfiina o alt firm tampon, firma Z, al crei asociat unic i administrator s fie o persoan a crei urm este uor de pierdut(cetean strin care a venit pentru o scurt vizit de cteva zile n ar, om al strzii etc.), Z fiind controlat n fapt tot de reprezentanii firmei X. n momentul nfiinrii agentului economic Z aceasta se declar pltitor de T.V.A. ulterior acesta efectueaz achiziiile intracomunitare de la firma Y, firma Z aplicnd pentru aceste operaiuni regimul de

taxare invers. Mrfurile astfel achiziionate sunt facturate ulterior ctre beneficiarul n fapt al acestora, respectiv firmamama X. Pentru aceste operaiuni de livrare intern, firma Z colecteaz scriptic, nu i practic, T.V.A. -ul aferent, iar firma X l va deduce, folosind drept document justificativ facturile ntocmite de firma Z. Toate aceste inginerii financiare au o durat limitat, respectiv de maxim 2-3 luni, pn la termenul limit prevzut privind obligaia firmei Z de a depune decontul de T.V.A. n acest sens, cu puin timp nainte de depunerea decontului, firma Z devine inexistent, fr a nregistra, declara i plti T.V.A. -ul colectat ca urmare a livrrilor interne efectuate ctre firma X. Practic, firma Z furnizeaz documente justificative ctre firma X, n scopul deducerii T.V.A. -ului de ctre aceasta din urm. Toate acestea ndreapt organul de cercetare ctre firma Z care la prima vedere pare principalul vinovat, ns n tot acest timp firma X, care a fcut ingineria deduce T.V.A. -ul aferent facturilor de aprovizionare de la furnizorul su firma Z, baznduse pe faptul c practica judiciar european n materie menioneaz c, dac o persoan impozabil particip la frauda de tip carusel n mod involuntar, aceasta are dreptul de a deduce T.V.A. -ul aferent operaiunilor anterioare. Astfel n momentul anchetrii unei astfel de fraude, fiecare agent economic din lanul de tranzacii aferent operaiunilor intracomunitare trebuie s fie analizat n mod individual, distinct, mai ales c, n practic, ntre firma Z i firma X se pot interpune tot la nivel scriptic, o serie de alte societi comerciale, cu scopul de a disocia caracterul ilicit al faptelor i de a disipa legtura de cauzalitate ntre firma X i firma Z. Probarea acestui mecanism trebuie probat cu o maxim atenie urmrindu-se n primul rnd circuitul scriptic al documentelor i traseului efectiv al produselor. Investigarea acestui tip de fraud poate fi probat destul de uor, dac sunt avute n vedere urmtoarele indicii: corespondena privind termenii de li176

vrare i plat se deruleaz, de la bun nceput, ntre reprezentanii firmelor X i Y; plata contravalorii bunurilor se efectueaz direct ctre firma Y de firma X, incluznd firma Z; datele privind mijloacele de transport sau delegaii, nscrise pe facturile/avizele de nsoire a mrfii ntocmite de firma Y ctre firma X, nu reflect o stare de fapt real; persoanele mputernicite s efectueze operaiuni n conturile bancare ale firmei Y sunt tocmai reprezentanii firmei X, care retrag sumele de bani n numerar, sub diverse explicaii: retragere aport, pli persoane fizice conform borderourilor de achiziie (evident, care conin date nereale), plata dividendelor etc.; sumele ncasate n conturile bancare ale firmei Z, de la clientul su firma X, se rentorc ctre firma A, direct sau prin intermediul altor firme, n baza unor facturi care nu reflect operaiuni economice reale (de regul, de prestri servicii). Alt procedeu des ntlnit al acestui tip de fraud se refer la livrrile simulate, efectuate de un agent economic, spre exemplu din Romnia ctre un agent economic din alt stat membru, nregistrat n scop de T.V.A. n baza legislaiei specifice a statului membru din care acesta face parte. n acest sens, firma din Romnia efectueaz o livrare intracomunitar, factureaz fr T.V.A. n baza codului de T.V.A. aparinnd unui agent economic extern din spaiul comunitar, dar, n fapt, vinde produsele respective pe piaa intern la negru. Aceast metod se poate realiza att prin complicitatea partenerului extern care i comunic codul su de T.V.A., ct i fr tiina acestuia spre exemplu, prin procurarea codului de T.V.A. pe ci ilicite. Bineneles c aa-zisa livrare intracomunitar n cauz va trebui evideniat de agentul economic din Romnia n decontul de T.V.A., iar datele raportate autoritilor publice din Romnia vor fi confruntate ulterior cu cele raportate, de partenerul extern, autoritilor fiscale din ara sa. ns, n acest interval de timp, agentul

economic n cauz va cere rambursarea T.V.A. -ului i, ulterior, i va disimula originea (prin schimbarea sediului social i cesionarea prilor sociale ctre persoane greu de identificat i care, de regul, nici nu se mai afl n ar la data efecturii verificrilor fiscale). Trebuie specificat aici c deseori nu este necesar disimularea originii firmei, deoarece aceasta are sediul social nregistrat ntr-o locaie obscur, spre exemplu o camer dint-un apartament de bloc, unde de asemenea mai sunt nregistrate ale cteva societi comerciale care desfoar activiti asemntoare. Din nefericire, noile reglementri fiscale privind T.V.A. -ul aferent tranzaciilor intracomunitare, introduse prin Ordonana de urgen a Guvernului nr. 34/2009, nu au rolul de a aduce un plus de consisten i transparen n aceast direcie. Atta timp ct nu se reduce termenul de depunere a declaraiilor recapitulative i nu se micoreaz termenul privind schimbul reciproc de informaii dintre statele membre, aceast metod a fraudei de tip carusel nu va fi foarte afectat. n practic poate aprea ns i situaia invers301, de facturare de ctre un agent economic extern, dar din spaiul comunitar, ctre o firm din Romnia, fie cu complicitatea acesteia, fie fr tiina acesteia, n fapt, vnzarea produselor respective efectundu-se pe piaa intern a respectivului stat membru la negru. Dac facturarea ctre firma din Romnia se face cu tiina acesteia, firma autohton poate declara n acte c a cumprat marfa de la partenerul strin, va aplica mecanismul taxrii inverse i ulterior o va factura ctre alte firme din ar pentru a i se pierde urma, dei, n realitate, marfa respectiv nu va ajunge niciodat n Romnia. n aceast situaie, firma din Romnia (care accept respectiva facturare) se va
Drago Ptroi, Florin Cuciureanu TVA intracomunitar, Frauda carusel, Rambursarea TVA, Ed. C.H. Beck 2009, p 56
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ncrca cu obligaii fiscale de natura T.V.A. -ului i se va comporta ulterior ca i o firm de tip fantom, sustrgndu-se de la efectuarea verificrilor fiscale, dar trebuie s in cont de obligativitatea depunerii lunare a decontului de T.V.A. i de evidenierea din punct de vedere fiscal, n cuprinsul acestuia, a achiziiei intracomunitare. Practica a dovedit c pot exista cazuri n care aceeai persoan fizic deine, cel mai adesea indirect, dou firme nregistrate n scopuri de T.V.A n dou state membre, astfel posibilitatea simulrii unor tranzacii intracomunitare este mai facil, iar transpunerea sa efectiv n practic se structureaz pe o evaluare a referenialului normativ, privind taxa pe valoarea adugat, existent n cele dou state membre. Un alt procedeu de eludare a taxelor prin frauda de tip carusel l reprezint, n fapt, o alt form de livrare ntre doi ageni economici, n sensul c produsele ajung n final de la firma X la firma Y, expeditorul lor iniial. Aceast metod fiind una destul de nou a fraudei de tip carusel, avnd efecte vizibile n ieftinirea produselor care fac obiectul acestor tranzacii. Aceast metod se folosete de faptul c preul de livrare al firmei X ctre firma Y este inferior preului de vnzare practicat iniial de firma Y ctre firma Z. Aici trebuie menionat faptul c, preul de livrare nu conine T.V.A. deoarece, n momentul n care firma X vinde ctre firma Y, firma X efectueaz o livrare intracomunitar, ce intr n categoria operaiunilor scutite de T.V.A. cu drept de deducere. Prin aceast modalitate firma X poate menine acest pre de livrare din valoarea TVA-ului care i revine n urma tranzaciilor derulate, anterior cu firma Z, care de fapt este i ctigul su. Acest tip de fraud carusel afecteaz de dou ori economia prima dat prin eludarea de la plata T.V.A i apoi prin practicarea unui pre de dumping (mult sczut fa de valoarea real), prejudiciind direct firmele productoare de astfel de bunuri i chiar direct prejudiciind direct economia statului respectiv prin falimentarea firmelor care practic un pre corect.
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Firma Q de tip tampon, va aciona aparent ca o firm din palierul real al economiei, urmnd a-i nregistra i achita obligaiile fiscale care i revin din calitatea sa de client al firmei Z i de furnizor al firmei X, ca urmare a operaiunilor interne de vnzare-cumprare pe care le deruleaz i care intr n sfera de aplicare a taxei pe valoarea adugat, aceste acte comerciale avnd un caracter scriptic i nu faptic. Firma Q va funciona n vederea disimulrii fraudei existente ntre firma X i firma Z, urmnd a asigura ncrederea de respectare a legii cu privire la tranzaciile comerciale derulate de firma X. Concomitent, firma Q va aciona i ca un furnizor de documente justificative n scopul deducerii T.V.A. -ului de ctre firma X sau, altfel spus, firma Q are rolul de a crea aparena legalitii, prin intermediul documentelor fiscale emise iniial de firma Z i care, n final, ajung, prin intermediul su, la firma X. Pentru ntrirea aparenei de legalitate, firma Q i va ndeplini obligaiile declarative care i revin, nregistrnd n contabilitate i evideniind fiscal, n decontul de T.V.A., operaiunea de achiziie intern i de livrare ulterioar care va fi tot intern. Trebuie specificat i o modalitate de eludare care apare ca o completare unitar a primelor trei i este susinut mai ales de aa zisele lacunele legislative. Aceasta se refer la situaia n care un agent economic din Romnia, efectueaz o achiziie intracomunitar i declar toate operaiunile n acest sens din punct de vedere absolut legal. Ulterior, aceast firm nregistreaz un adaos comercial infim i simuleaz vnzarea endetail, prin intermediul aparatelor de marcat electronice fiscale. n fapt, produsele respective sunt comercializate ctre alte societi comerciale sau pe piaa neagr la preuri mai mari dect cele nregistrate n evidenele contabile, dar situate sub nivelul preului de pia pentru produsele respective pentru a se pstra o clientel fidel care se bucur de preurile mult sczute f de cele provenite de la ali furnizori.
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Prin aceast metod prejudiciul adus, se localizeaz att la nivelul impozitului pe profit, ct i la nivelul T.V.A. -ului care este direct proporional cu diferena de pre nenregistrat din punct de vedere contabil i nedeclarat din punct de vedere fiscal. Un exemplul concludent l reprezint cel n care firma X a efectuat un import de struguri din Moldova, vnzrile scriptice ctre o firm fantom din Slobozia, iar vnzrile faptice se efectueaz de ctre societatea Y din Bucureti, fr documente. n acest caz, firma X a folosit n vam facturi net diminuate, fapt ce a fcut ca preul produsului importat s fie de 1,222 lei/kg, iar vnzarea acestuia en-gross de 4,5 lei/kg. Acest metod de operare urmrete sustragerea de la impozitul pe profit i parial a T.V.A. -ului. Un alt exemplu de fraud de tip carusel este cel n care firma A a efectuat importuri de legume n Bulgaria ntruct sistemul fiscal faciliteaz plata taxelor vamale la sfritul lunii (pe relaia Turcia n vam se pltete numai T.V.A. 20%). Ulterior, s-a stabilit c dei T.V.A-ul este mai mare, companiile romneti care efectueaz aceste tranzacii opteaz pentru Bulgaria ntruct omit de regul s plteasc aceste taxe. n urma verificrilor s-a stabilit c firma Y se aprovizioneaz cu produse de la firma X i nu de la firma A, iar pe facturile fiscale n dreptul transportatorului erau trecute date fictive pentru a face imposibil de verificat societatea importatoare, sau cele care efectueaz operaiuni intracomunitare. Aceast metod de operare urmrete sustragerea de la plata T.V.A. -ului. Totui modalitatea de fraudare cel mai des ntlnit pe teritoriul rii noastre o reprezint efectuarea de importuri de legume i fructe din Turcia n Bulgaria urmate de procedura comercial de achiziie intracomunitar ctre Romnia prin utilizarea de firme de tip fantom i documente de transport falsificate, avnd drept scop neplata T.V.A., conform legislaiei bulgare i nedepunerea declaraiilor de T.V.A. intracomunitar, conform legislaiei comunitare, iar

apoi comercializarea mrfurilor se face fr evidenierea n documentele contabile att a achiziiilor ct i a vnzrilor, eludndu-se n totalitate obligaiile fiscale. Deseori aceste firme se sustrag de la plata impozitelor i taxelor aferente salariilor angajailor care efectueaz munc la negru, precum i reinerea i nevirarea taxelor i impozitelor aferente salariilor angajailor cu contract de munc, fiind adevrate bombe cu ceas pentru bugetul rii, evaziunea fiind dus la extreme. n urma unui studiu efectuat la nivelul Uniunii Europene, a reieit faptul c, frauda legat de T.V.A. se ridic la circa 40 de miliarde euro302, adic 10% din veniturile produse de acest impozit. Menionm c, n domeniul T.V.A., frauda internaional, mai precis livrrile i achiziiile intracomunitare, a dus la pierderi serioase de venituri, avnd efecte negative i asupra comerului legal i ocuprii declarate, distrugnd ncrederea n piaa unic. Pentru a ameliora aceast situaie, administraiile naionale i Comisia trebuie s coopereze i s fac schimb de informaii la un nivel mult mai ridicat pentru a localiza i a combate mai eficace frauda i. de asemenea, este nevoie de o coordonare mai bun la nivelul Comunitii. Pot fi luate urmtoarele msuri, n vederea, cel puin, a reducerii cotelor alarmante a fraudei prin intermediul T.V.A.: studierea unui sistem computerizat pentru micarea i controlul produselor impozabile ; introducerea unui sistem de notificare prealabil pentru a mbunti depistarea micrilor de bunuri; elaborarea unui cod de practic referitor la acordarea sau retragerea autorizaiilor de depozite, ct i controlul bunurilor depozitate. negocierea unor protocoale de ctre statele membre cu productorii i comercianii pentru a mbuntii cooperarea i
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http://ec.europa.eu/romania/news/17_03_08_tva_ ro.htm

pentru a obine informaii, fcnd astfel posibil detectarea mai uoar a micrilor suspecte sau anormale. Comisia European, ar trebui s examineze posibilitatea de constituire a unei baze de date la nivelul Uniunii Europene, care s conin datele de identificare ale persoanelor fizice care au constituit, administrat sau condus companii implicate n tranzacii frauduloase intracomunitare cu privire la T.V.A. nainte de nregistrarea unei noi companii, autoritatea naional competent ar trebui s solicite administraiei fiscale naionale un cazier fiscal european, eliberat de aceasta din urm dup consultarea bazei de date respective, la care ar trebui s fie conectat. De asemenea, n condiiile economiei de pia, organele fiscale se confrunt cu un fenomen evazionist ce ia proporii de mas, din cauza tentaiei de a fi sustrase de sub incidena legii venituri impozabile substaniale. Menionm c efectele evaziunii fiscale se repercuteaz direct asupra nivelurilor veniturilor fiscale, conduce la distorsiuni n mecanismul pieei i pot contribui la inechiti sociale datorate accesului i nclinaiei diferite la evaziune din partea contribuabililor. n acest sens. statul ar trebui s se preocupe sistematic i eficient de prentmpinarea i limitarea fenomenului evaziunii fiscale. Cu toate acestea, statul, prin puterile publice, poate chiar incit la evaziunea fiscal, urmrind n principal un scop pozitiv argumentat de dorina de a stimula formarea capitalului i altul negativ prin sprijinirea unor grupuri de interese, de multe ori de tip interlop, cu toate consecinele care reiese din aceste fapte. Astfel se desprinde rolul evaziunii fiscale ca element, dorit sau nu, al politicii fiscale, decurgnd direct din cel al fiscalitii, ocolirea impozitrii ar putea fi esenial pentru bunstarea economic. Conducerea politic de pretutindeni condamn unanim evaziunea fiscal. Cu toate acestea, perspectivele privind acest fenomen nu s-au schimbat n decursul
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timpului, acesta persistd n toate rile i n toate perioadele n ciuda sanciunilor, care deseori las indiferente convingerile multor oameni. Dup modul cum se procedeaz n activitatea de evitare a efectelor reglementrilor fiscale, se poate face diferenierea ntre evaziune fiscal legal i evaziune fiscal frauduloas. nmulirea faptelor ilegale i ndeosebi a celor din domeniul economico-financiar este o consecin a unor imperfeciuni ale legislaiei sau a lipsei unor reglementri, n perioada economia de pia, aceste lacune fiind i mai evidente, dimensiunile carenelor legislative fiind evideniate sub forma nmulirii cazurilor de specul, contraband, incorectitudine financiar. Toate aceste fenomene sunt puse i n baza legislaiei care n momentul depistrii evazionistului alege sancionarea acestuia contravenional i nu penal, n acest fel ncurajnd aceste practici i crescndu-i ncrederea aa zisului contribuabil, caz n care avem de a face cu evaziunea fiscal legal, aceasta neconstituind infraciune n acest caz contribuabilul ncearc s se plaseze ntr-o situaie destul de favorabil, pentru a beneficia de avantajele oferite de reglementrile legale n vigoare n ct mai mare msur.

Aceast aa zis evaziune legal este susinut de marea varietate a impozitelor i reglementrilor, de complexitatea dispozitivelor fiscale din economia contemporan, acestea constituind o posibilitate i chiar un ndemn pentru ocolire sau prelevri de elemente faptice care s conduc, n final, la diminuarea obligaiilor de plat. Un asemenea efect l are n multe ri regimul special de care se bucur la impozitare veniturile realizate din plasamente cu caracter de economii personale, mai ales cnd sunt reinvestite. Frauda n ceea ce privete taxa pe valoarea adugat (T.V.A.) are un efect semnificativ asupra veniturilor fiscale ale statelor membre i perturb activitatea economic n cadrul pieei interne prin crearea unor fluxuri nejustificate de bunuri i prin introducerea pe pia a unor bunuri la preuri anormal de mici. n plus, frauda n materie de T.V.A. afecteaz nu numai finanarea bugetelor statelor membre, ci i echilibrul general al sistemului de resurse proprii al U.E., n msura n care reducerile resurselor proprii provenind din T.V.A. trebuie s fie compensate printr-o cretere a resurselor provenind din venitul naional brut.

Bibliografie: Drago Ptroi, Florin Cuciureanu TVA intracomunitar, Frauda carusel,Rambursarea TVA, Ed. C.H. Beck 2009 Elena Moise, Investiii strine directe. Editura Victor. Bucureti. 2005. Emilian Dobrescu. Tranziia n Romnia - Abordri Econometrice. Editura Economic, Bucureti 2002. Grigorie N.Lcria, Fiscalitate- controverse i soluii. Editura IRECSON. Bucureti. 2007. Grigorie N.Lcria. Fiscalitate- controverse i soluii. Editura IRECSON. Bucureti. 2007. Ioan Bari. Globalizarea economiei. Editura Economic, Bucureti. 2005. Marius Profiroiu. Irina Popescu. Politici europene. Editura Economic. Bucureti. 2003

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THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF PRIVATE ARCHIVES IN HUNGARY. A GUIDE FOR ROMANIAN ARCHIVES
PhD student MONICA SACHELARIU The present material tackles the question of private archives in Hungary, state belonging to the class, not too extended, of the countries of the European council which provides support and assistance in this area. The study aims to present two basic components on the policy of Hungary, in the field of private archives : the first outlines the status, the organization and functioning of private archives in the public interest and the second talks about the private document with patrimonial value and the manner in which the Hungarian state undertakes to protect this part of the cultural heritage, with the declared intention to keep it safe and transmit it to future generations and, not least, with the intention of open research. In a reality which shows several sore points, also inherent to any living system, and which undoubtedly require correction, the general conclusion that transpires is still talking about progress in the organization and functioning of private Hungarian archives. So, here is an incentive and a new invitation for the National Archives of Romania to act vigorously for a new legal framework that should respect the fundamental constitutional right on private property, a sine qua non condition of State law and which should equally help to protect and support the private archives, keeper of an important part of the Romanian heritage. Keywords: private archives, cultural heritage, private property, guide, Romanian archives General considerations In addition to public records created at all levels of government, the archival heritage of a country includes a wide range of private records created and maintained by the families, associations, corporations, churches etc. These records can provide an alternative perception of events and government actions to that existing in the public records303, having an important role in expanding, enhancing, or even contradicting official data contained in public records304.
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As long as records have value insofar as they are used305 and accessibility is the ultimate goal of preserving, including private archives, Article 12 of Recommendation 13306, calls for efforts to bring private archives regulations, relating to access, in agreement with those for public archives. In the monitoring project conducted during 2000-2004, launched by the compeUnion. Increased archival cooperation in Europe:action plan, Elaborated by the National Experts Group on Archives of the EU-Member States and EUInstitutions and Organ sat the request of the Council of the European Union, p.35. 305 Sylvain Sencal, Usage des archives: le quotidien, linstitutionnel, le patrimonial, n Revista Arhivelor, nr.3-4/2007, p.35. 306 Recomandarea nr.R(2000)13 privind o politic european asupra accesului la arhive (Recommendation No. R (2000) 13 on a European policy on access to archives), (hereinafter: Recommendation 13), clause 12, in Charles Kecskemti, Ivn Szkely, Access to archives, p.89.

Charles Kecskemti, Ivn Szkely, Accesul la arhive. Manual de linii directoare pentru implementarea Recomandrii Nr.R(2000)13 privind o politic european asupra accesului la arhive ( Access to archives. Manual guidelines for implementation of Recommendation No. R (2000) 13 on a European policy on access to archives), extract from "Revista Arhivelor", LXXXIV/2007, p.42 (hereinafter: Access to archives). 304 Report on Archives in the enlarged European

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tent organizational unit of the Directorate of Cultural Council of Europe which sought to examine the degree of compliance of Member States to the provisions of Recommendation 13, they showed that of the 41 countries examined the Council of Europe in only 15 Member States, national archival authority or another ad hoc body is mandated to provide support for private archives, but an authority or a service to assist private archives exists in only eight countries 307. And how the rule of law excludes coercion to obtain privately owned open archives, significant results can be achieved by measures, such as protected private records registration or a special status granting to private archives, which are open to research, together with technical and financial support308 . Such a system we intend to abide attention to, as presenting the essential elements that help define the status and the organization and functioning of private archives in neighboring Hungary .The purpose: to offer concrete models to Romania as regards a democratic state policy in private archives and about how it understands to protect this important part of its cultural heritage. The Hungarian archives Jurisdiction Act extends to documents of public and economic companies with majority state, to the archival material kept in public archives and private archives in the public interest, as well as to documents of asset value owned by individuals and bodies, which were not included in the previous categories. From the beginning, Hungarian law provides that the public document and private document of asset value are parts of the cultural asset and the archival material (archival material) is part of protected cultural property309.
307 Charles Kecskemti, Ivn Szkely, Access to archives, p.58-59. 308 Ibidem, p.84. 309 1995. vi LXVI. trvny a kziratokrl, a kzlevltrakrl s a magnlevltri anyag vdelmrl (LXVI/1995 Law on public documents,

In addition to public documents and archival material which has no public status and is kept in public archives, the legislature states banned deterioration, bringing the state of disuse and destruction of the archival material stored in private archives of public interest, as well as of the private asset value documents, declared protected310. 95% of Hungary's archival material is kept in public archives and only 5% in the private archives of public interest, so, naturally, the situation and activity of public records is crucial in terms of branch operation

public archives and private archives protection, with subsequent amendments), art. 3/A (hereinafter: LXVI/1995 Law) at http//www.complex.hu/jr/ gen/hjegy/_doc.cgi?docid=99500066.TV, accessed on may, 3-rd ,2010. In Hungary, the regulations referring to the protection and storage ,under proper conditions, of the public documrnts and of private documents with asset value, as well as of the archival material, are stated in LXVI/1995 Law and in 2001.vi LXIV. trvny a kulturlis rksg vdelmrl (LXIV/2001 Law regarding the protection of the cultural heritage with the modifications and latest completions ), (hereinafter: LXIV/2001 Law ) at http//www.complex.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A 0100064.TV, accessed on the 3-rd of May. LXVI/1995 Law , through art.3, stipulates the following definitions: archive = institution created to ensure long storage, processing and using of the asset value documents; private archive of public interest = institution created for long lasting storage of asset value documents, being in the property or possession of individuals or non-public organizations fulfilling the legal conditions of functioning; private document = the document owned by individuals, as well as the document belonging to the documentary material of a non-public organization (which does not exercise a public service); asset value document = the document containing important data from different points of view, economical, social, political, juridical, of country defence, national safety, scientific, cultural, technical, or from other points of view , essential for the research, the study and understanding of the past, as well as for fulfilling the public obligations and defending the citizensrights, and which cannot be known at all, or only partially, from other sources; archival material = part of the documentary material and of the individuals asset value documents kept in archives, as well as the private asset value documents, declared protected. 310 LXVI/1995 Law, art.5, paragraphs 1-2.

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. However, the private archive of public interest and the private document protected asset value declared are two basic components of the Hungarian regulatory policy, to protect this part of the Hungarian cultural heritage, with the stated aim of safely storing and forwarding away, and not least, of opening it for research. Basic coordinates of the two components will be presented below. The private archive of public interest The Individual, or the body that does not exercise a public service and establishes or maintains an archive, for a long preservation of the asset value documents of their property or possession, fulfilling the legal and operational obligations, has the option to request the Minister of Culture and Education the registration of their archive in the category of private archives of public interest. The Minister grants the status of private archive of public interest on the proposal made by the archives control forum312, whose work we are going to talk about in the last part of this presentation. Obligations of private archives of public interest involve: a. to hand the list with the archive material held to the National Archives of Hungary, in order to record it; b. to fulfill the professional obligations concerning the recording, the safe keeping, the processing and use of archival material in accordance with regulations in the private archives of public interest; c. to provide information and data from the archival material held in accordance with regulations concerning public records, to loan documents and provide free access to research, according to the rules 313. In case of non-compliance, the Minister disposes the radiation of the archive from the records together with the procedure for the declaration of archival material protection. 314.
311

311

The private archive of public interest can collect any kind of archival material except that of public character, but the competent ecclesiastical archives can also collect public archival material, resulting from the constant work of the educational institution315. The Minister of Culture and Education may approve the lodging of the documents in the competent ecclesiastical archives, and also other public documents in the private archives of public interest, if the sponsor provides the legal conditions for archive storage, management and use of documents 316 and if he provides the access to the access to the documents held in compliance with existing regulations in this regard to archival material kept in public archives 317. In fact, the access to archival material research owned by private archive of public interest is provided free under the rules approved by the archive supporter and made taking into account the existing provisions for research in public archives. The research should be conducted in rooms designed specifically for this purpose and must ensure the technical conditions needed for making copies- paid- of the researched archival material 318.
Ibidem, art.31, par.1. According to the regulations in art. 15, par. 1 of LXVI/1995 Law, the archive must have a specialized staff, technical equipment, special storage rooms, according to the current technical standards, a research room, and other conditions necessary to the functioning. 317 LXVI/1995 Law, art.31, par.2. 318 10 / 2002.(IV.13.) NKM rendelet a kzlevltrak s a nyilvnyos magnlevltrak tevkenysgvel sszefgg szakmai kvetelmnyekrl (National Cultural Heritage Ministerial Order no. 10 / 13.IV.2002 on professional obligations of public archives, and of private archives of public interest), art.44 (hereinafter Order 10 / 2002), at http:www.kemarchiv.iif.hu/kozerdek/10_2002_NKO Mrend.pdf, accessed on the 3-rd of May, 2010. The possibility to research in the private archive of public interest, as well as the week duration of the research are stipulated in the Decision of the Minister of Culture and Education, on the archive recording with the status of private archive of public interest; general archives must provide the possibility of research, at
316 315

http://www.okm.gov.hu/letolt/kultura/kozgyujt/sz olgalt_leveltar_strat_konc_090616.pdf, p.3, accessed on the 3-rd of May, 2010. 312 LXVI/1995 Law, art.30, par.1. 313 Ibidem, par.2. 314 Ibidem, par.3.

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The private archive of public interest can enrich its property by purchasing private asset value documents from its collection aria, through copies made from archival material owned, or possessed by someone else and also through donations, but without any obligation to receive documents without asset value or sealed packages whose contents can not convince 319. The private archive of public interest may initiate actions of documents exchanging with other archival institutions, museums or libraries, but the object of the exchange may be represented only by the archival material which has no public character, and only where there is no significant difference between the amount of archival material to be exchanged. The procurement of material by such means shall be required to achieve particularly important, professional and scientific goals, and the trade agreement must be subject to prior approval of the Minister of Culture and Education320. The archive may also take into custody private asset value documents, for a determined period of time, against cost, unlike the public archive, which takes into custody documents for free. The archive can perform works of conservation and restoration of the taken documents, but only under an agreement with the depositor, which shall set out details of the costs too321. The documents taken into custody will be applied general rules relating to storage, use and commissioning research, unless the custody agreement contains special provisions in this respect 322. The private archives of public interest are supported by the Hungarian state budget through the Ministry of Culture and Education. This support is also given to the archives supported by political parties323.
least 4 days a week ( 30 hours), and other public archives , at least 3 days a week (20 hours), ac. to 10/2002 Order, art.45, par.1. 319 Ibidem, art.14-15. 320 Ibidem, art.16, par.1-3. 321 Ibidem, art.17, par.1-2, art.18, par.1. 322 Ibidem, art.18, par.2. 323 LXVI/1995 Law, art.30, par.4.

The budget allocations are distributed to the public archives and the private archives of public interest, after an annual contest organized by the Ministry of Culture and Education324. The amount allocated from the budget support for one ml documents kept in private archives of public interest can not be below 25% of operating costs allocated two years before the given budget year, to 1ml documents kept in the general archives325. So the private archive of public interest status is granted on request, extending the administration regime specific to public archives. The owner still retains some powers, for example the right to transfer, the disposition regarding the way of access (but which must be free), having the opportunity to benefit from budget support, too. Private archives records as well as the centralization and data processing operation refer ring to private archives of public interest according to the criteria established by the Minister of Culture and Education - are in the competence of the National Archives of Hungary326.
At the contest for getting the state budget support, the annual activity plan, as well as the annual report on the accomplished activity represent obligatory riders, which must be presented in the case of the private archives of public interest , ac. to 10 / 2002 Order, art.4, par.4. 325 LXVI/1995 Law, art. 34/C, par.2. 326 Ibidem, art.17, par.2, let.c,m. The National Archives recording of Hungary organized by types of archives- contains the following data: a. name, address and contact data of the archive, and in the case of those carrying on activities in more locations, the ones having research rooms will be also mentioned; b. address and functions of the archives (locations) that do not have research rooms; c. the legal document that was the base of the recording with status of private archive of public interest, or the number of the Decision of the Ministe of Culture and Education, by which the recording with the status of private archive of public interest was granted; d. the archives Directors name; e. time table of the rooms/ research rooms; f. regulations referring to the use and research of the archival material. The archive s supporter , respectively the archive, have the obligation to communicate, within 8 days ,
324

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Currently, in Hungary, in the private archives of public interest category 327 are included: the archives of the organizations and political parties (3); the archives of the Catholic Church (19); the archives of the Reformed Church (6); the archives of the Lutheran Church (6); the archives of other churches (5). The private asset value document The bodies that do not carry out a public service - except for companies with majority state- owned economic - can state, individually, how they handle the documentary material held, but they can require specialized assistance from the competent public archive, and they may also conclude with this, agreements on periodical support (help), as well as agreements on matters concerning donations or deposits of documents free to storage 328. The access to research the documents handed to the public archive through different agreements, as well as those mentioned above, may be restricted by the donor, respectively the depositor for a preset time 329. Public Archives of Hungary can provide expert assistance in various matters related to private asset value documents management330. Power of the attorney granted under the Heritage Act, regarding the designation of the Authority to protect cultural heritage, Hungary's government has ordered the establishment of the National Office for the Protection of Cultural Heritage (hereinafter: Office). It has national jurisdiction through nine regional offices and it is coany change occurred in the above mentioned points, to the National Archives of Hungary, and the data from points a, c-f are public, ac.to 10 / 200 2 Order, art.3, par.1, 3-4. 327 According to the National Archives of Hungary recordings, of a total number of 85 archives, 46 are public, and 39 are private archives of public interest. The number of private archives of public interest has not changed since the year 2000. 328 LXVI / 1995 Law, art.32, par.1. 329 Ibidem, par.2. 330 Ibidem, art.13, let.i.

ordinated by the Ministry of Culture and Education331. The Office keeps centralized records, both for the protected declared cultural goods, and for export licenses granted. The protected cultural goods records, kept in museum institutions, libraries and archives are based on their own rules and the institutions provide data, on the request of the Office332. To protect cultural heritage the Authority may declare protected archival material, the private asset value documents, created more than 50 years ago, not kept in archives, museums or libraries and institutions, and also: a. the documentary heritage of personalities, with an important role in the social, political, economic, cultural and scientific life; b. the documentary, asset value material, resulting from the work of bodies which do not execute a public service, dismantled without a continuation of the work, except the categories of documents required by laws relating to bankruptcy or liquidation; c. the documentary material with unexpired storage term, arising from the preprivatization period of state enterprises and which the new owner intends to keep; if he does not want to keep them, he must surrender them to the competent public archives; d. the asset value documentary material of the organizations in service, that do not have a public service, if the owner
331

190/2001. (X.18.) Korm. Rendelet a Kulturlis rksgvdelmi Hivatal ltrehozsrl (Ordinance no. 190 / 18.X.2001 establishing the National Office for the Protection of Cultural Heritage) at http://www.amiotthonunk.hu/plugins/terc/FMVK/jogs zabalyok/kormany/190_2001.pdf, accessed on the 3rd of May, 2010. 332 17 / 2002.(VI.21) NKM rendelet a kulturlis rksg hatsgi nyilvntartsra vonatkoz szablyokrl ( National Cultural Heritage Ministerial Order no. 17/ 21.VI.2002 on regulations referring to the recordings of the Authority for Cultural Heritage Protection), art. 4, par.2 at http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A020 0017.NKM, accessed on the 3-rd of May, 2010.

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would sell the unit; the exception acts when the new owner takes the documents together with the unit; e. the documents kept in private archives removed from the private archives of public interest records333. In the procedure of the protection declaration, the legislature included documents / all the asset value documents, listed above, among the items of cultural heritage, of great importance and irreplaceable334. The declaring procedure regarding the protection of cultural goods is initiated after a written request to the Office, which notifies the owner about the start procedure and the legal implications of this fact 335.The declaration of the private asset value document protection is done in collaboration with experts of the Hungarian National Archives and other public repositories336. The Authority may require the owner, by a decision, to hand the declared protected archival material, to the National Archives of Hungary, for a preset time, in order to make a backup. The transport of the material is provided by the National Archives according to the details set out with the owner337.The resulting backup is kept by the National Archives of Hungary, and the owner has the opportunity to establish a prohibition period to execute other backup
333 334

LXVI / 1995 Law, art.33, par.1. 3 / 2002.(II.15) NKM rendelet a kulturlis rksg vdett nyilvntsnak rszletes szablyairl (National Cultural Heritage Ministerial Order no. 3 / 15.II.2002 declaration procedures for protecting national cultural heritage), art.6, par.2, let.f (hereinafter: Order 3 / 2002) at http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A020 0003.NKM, accessed on the 3-rd of May, 2010. 335 The owner (possessor) of the cultural goods declared protected, must store and keep them in proper conditions; the Office has access to the storage place, the owner having the obligation to announce, immediately, or within maximum 8 days, any changes occurred in the data regarding the owners name and address, as well as the storage place of the cultural goods declared protectected,ac.to LXIV / 2001 Law , art.52, par.1-3. 336 LXVI / 1995 Law, art.13, let.i. 337 Ibidem, art.33, par.3.

copies, as well as to have access to the documentary material copied research, in case that the document research could affect his individual rights or legal interests338. One cannot declare protected: a. the private document that relates to its owner or which is the result of his private business, and which the owner holds legally; b. the documentary material of a body in service, with the exceptions listed above in paragraphs c and d339. The owner who intends to sell documents older than 50 years, as well as the categories of documents, mentioned above, in Article 33 of Act LXVI / 1 995, paragraph 1, a, b and d, is required to offer them for sale, to the National Archives of Hungary, which have the right to pre-emption or to present them to be declared protected. If the National Archives of Hungary set the document / all documents falling within the asset value, but they can not purchase them, the Authority initiates proceedings for a declaration to protect the documents in question340. The exception acts, when the sale of documents is done through public tender. In this situation, the auction organizer must specify the protected nature of the goods as well as the legal implications of this, in the announcement for organizing the event and he has also the obligation to notify the Office, at least 15 days before the auction. If the official representative wishes to exercise its right of first refusal of the Hungarian state, he must decide, in this respect, at the auction, immediately after the award341.
338 339 340

Ibidem, par.4 Ibidem, par.2. Ibidem,art.34, par.1. 341 16 / 2001.(X.18.) NKM rendelet a Kulturlis rksgvdelmi Hivatal eljrsra vonatkoz szablyokrl (National Cultural Heritage Ministerial Order no. 16 / 18.X.2001 on regulations on procedures of the Office for Protection of Cultural Heritage) art. 29, par..4 at http//www.amiotthonunk .hu/plugins/terc/EKSZHJ/jogszabalyok/miniszt/025.p df, accessed on the 3-rd of May, 2010.

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For the sale of the private document kept in the private archives of public interest, the approval of the Minister of Culture and Education is required342. When the owner or legal owner would remove out of the country, the categories of documents mentioned above, that is the protected declared archival material, he may submit the request for granting the export license at the National Archives of Hungary or at any public archive, which, in their turn, will forward it to the Authority together with an expert opinion 343. The expert opinion is issued to the applicant, paying a fee unless it is requested by an institution, museum, public archives, private archive of public interest, or a library344. The Authority for the protection of cultural heritage is the forum which grants the export license for the following cultural items: a. the archival material and documents relating to the asset value, submitted to LXVI archives Law/ 1995, as well as the cultural property: b. more than 50 years old; c. existing in archival records and museum institutions; d. kept in libraries as museums documents; e. declared protected 345. Before the removal from the country, The National Archives of Hungary or the holding archive are required to perform backup on archival material in question 346. In the case of declared protected cultural property, the request for export license must state the scientific or cultural purpose of the export, with an indication of how
342 343 344

storage and transport are made347. Declared protected cultural goods export license is granted for a specified period. The Authority rejects the application for a license to export cultural goods declared protected, in case that the export could endanger the cultural interests or the safety of the property or if there is not a state security, or an insurance contract for the property in question348. The same Authority may compel the owner to provide cultural goods declared protected to public collections (so to the public archives either) for organizing exhibitions and also for scientific research349. Coordination, support and control The coordination of the activities and actions aiming the protection of the archival material is the responsibility of the Hungarian Ministry of Culture and Education, which legally governs the professional obligations concerning the recording, the safekeeping, the handling and use of the existing material in the public archives and private archives of public interest, as well as the selection rules in the archival material and , on base of the archives Law, it controls the professional obligations achievement, in this area350. This right of control is exercised through specialized inspectors and an inspector coordinator, with jurisdiction over public records (except the National Archives of Hungary) and over the private archives of public interest 351.
Order 17 / 2001, art.8, par.2. LXIV / 2001 Law, art.55,par.3. 349 The handing is made between the public collection and the owner, on base of an agreement that states the date, the period, and the conditions of goods handing, taking into account the owners interests, ac. to LXIV /2001 Law , art.79. 350 LXVI / 1995 Law, art. 8, let.b. These obligations are stipulated in 10 / 2002 Order 351 The inspectors carry out their activities on base of art.8, let.b from LXVI / 1995 Law, of 7 / 2002.(II.27.) NKM rendelet a Levltri Kollgiumrl s a levltri szakfelgyeletrl (The National Cultural Heritage Ministerial Order no.7 / 27.02.2002 , regarding the Archive College and the archival specialized control), (hereinafter 7/ 2002 Order) at http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A020
348 347

LXVI / 1995 Law, art.5, par..3. Ibidem, art.34, par..2. 17 / 2001.(X.18.) NKM rendelet a kulturlis javak kiviteli engedlyezsnek rszletes szablyairl( National Cultural Heritage Ministerial Order no. 17 / 18.X.2001 on export licensing of cultural goods) art. 4 (hereinafter: Order 17 / 2001) at http//net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A0100 017.NKM, accessed on the 3-rd of May, 2010. 345 Ibidem, art.1, par.1. 346 LXVI / 1995 Law, art.6, par.2.

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The inspector coordinator is appointed by the minister, from among the Hungarian National Archives archivists, on a proposal agreed between the General Director of the National Archives and the Archive College , and the specialists inspectors are appointed from among specialists of public archives and private archives of public interest on a proposal agreed between the coordinator inspector and the Archive College 352. The inspectors check, at least, every three years, the activity of the private archives of public interest on everything that means the obligations and the professional requirements, in the field, the existence of legal operating conditions (trained staff, equipment, special deposits, research rooms, etc.) , the spending of allocations from the state budget, as well as the selection made in the archival material held 353. The inspectors cannot carry out checks when they are incompatible with the unit in question (eg. as an employee of it). The inspector coordinator may ask specialists of different fields to join the control team354 The National Archives of Hungary receive an annual budget to cover the techni0007.NKM, accessed on the 3-rd of May, 2010 and of a Functioning Regulation, which is approved by the minister, taking into account the points of view stipulated by the Archive College. 352 The inspector coordinator is appointed from among the archivists with an expirence of at least 10 years in the archives field, and the specialized inspectors, with an experience of at least 5 years in the field .Their mandates in function are for a period of 3 years, with the possibility to be prolongged, ac.to 7 / 2002 Order, art.8, par.2-3 353 Ibidem, art.7, par.2 354 The activity of the control forum is carried out on base of an annual plan, made by the inspector coordinator, handed to the Archive College, and then, to the minister, to be approved. Besides the planned controls, stated in the annual activity plan, other control activities may be carried out , on the ministers , or an archive supporters request. The inspectors conclusions on the annual activities are introduced in a report made by the inspector coordinator by 31-st of January of the following year, which is handed to the minister and becomes public, ac. to 7 / 2002 Order, art.10, 12

cal, material and of personnel costs, necessary for the control forum and the Archive College operation. For the efficiency of the control activity, otherwise, the Archive College made proposals for a system with a smaller number of permanent inspectors, instead of the current one, in which the inspectors are temporary operating, meeting a number of other activities too355. The Hungarian system, an efficient system? To continue, wishing to overcome this legislative regulations level in the domain of private archives in Hungary and finding, even partially, the degree of effectiveness of these rules, we proceeded to reading all the forum's annual activity control reports, made up since 1998, when this forum was founded, up to 2009, including it 356. So, in a decade of activity, the most significant progress occurred in the machinery of the private archives of public interest. In all the establishments of this kind, one can find fast copiers, microfilm reading machines, computers, scanners, digital cameras. Also, reporting the situation to a decade ago, an improvement of the storage conditions and of the conditions related to research materials and technical documents has been remarked. Circumstances in which the archive store fulfills both the functions of a work office and of a research room, are generally of the past and this is due to the efforts of these archives supporters. Even though, research regulations are still lacking in several private archives of public interest. A growing number of private archives began digitizing the documents held and building databases (eg. the Catholic church archives, possessing documents created before 1526, were connected to the central European program - Monasterium for building databases). Regarding the sore points for these
355

http://www.leveltaros.hu/Magyar_leveltari_rends zer_jovoje.pdf, p.7, accessed on the 3-rd of May, 2010 356 http://www.mol.gov.hu/kapcsolatok/leveltari_szak felugyelet_jelentesek.html

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units, it is noted that since 2005 the reduction of budgetary resources allocated primarily have had effects on the workforce engaged in the activities of private archives of public interest. In 2006-2007, fewer and fewer archives of the kind could contract services to process the archival material held. Even in these conditions, all tests indicate that, without the support from the state budget, the actual survival of most of the private archives of public interest would have been difficult. Equally, in the context of general underfunding of archives, in an analysis document of the Archive College, referring to the future of the archival Hungarian system, we take note of the criticism and blame addressed to the state, for not giving the proper attention to the protection of the archival material as an essential part of the national cultural heritage and to the archives, as one of the basic institutions of the democratic state357. The shortcomings found systematically until the year 2009, including it, focused mainly on the recording systems of these archives and on the non-observance of the regulation through which the archives supporter, respectively the archive must communicate in an eight days delay the modifications occurred in the data, necessary to the centralized records of the National Archives of Hungary. The control forum brought control and repeatedly reaffirmed, by these reports, proposals relating to revision and amendment of legislation, considered exaggerated among professional obligations - especially in terms of filing systems of smaller archives and especially in private archives of public interest. And this is because, when the professional obligations were designed, the particularities of the recording systems of the archives, especially of the ecclesiastical ones, were not taken into account. But despite the fact that the rules of
357

http://www.leveltaros.hu/Magyar_leveltari_rend szer_jovoje.pdf, p.2, accessed on the 3-rd of May,

2010. 189

professional obligations of the private archives of public interest (and of the public archives either) occurred only in 2002, a situation which has generated much confusion and perpetuated customary systems in the work of these records, and also despite major sore points, inherent in any living system and which have been expecting to be corrected for some time, the general conclusion that transpires talks about progress. And in the context of rethinking the whole Hungarian archival system, in the private archives question, there are campaigns for maintaining the current system of organization, with the rules, already existing and for providing further financial support of the Hungarian state, along with that of the owner. Final considerations In Romania, not guaranteeing the private ownership of the archives, by the current legal framework is a state of affairs, in which we witness every day perpetuation. Securing and protecting private property included in the basic constitutional rights should have already generated by the action of the Romanian National Archives, significant changes in the field of archives and in particular in developing a new legal framework. However, tests of the Romanian National Archives that could have laid the foundations of constitutional provisions including the issue of private archives, have remained, each time, at the stage of projects. It is natural that the regulations of some states of the EU and of the international archival environment whose legal models and general tendencies of evolution present compatibilities and similarities with the archival practice in Romania and with the needs of the Romanian society, should have been a basis for the Romanian projects. But, it is equally clear that something has not worked, so far, in the way the National Archives of Romania agreed to propose the basic rules in this area. But, it is sure now, that in a future, more or less close, these regulations will come. This is the reason for which we consider

really useful to present as many examples and developments in the EU as possible, on issues such as the present one, about private archives but not the only ones, as incentives in designing the bases to be laid by the Romanian archives, through which the heritage character of the archives should be defined and their inclusion in the category

of cultural property would be ensured. In addition, there are regulations to ensure the private property of the archives and the alignment among member repositories providing effective support and assistance to the private archives of Romania, that preserve an important segment of the Romanian heritage.

Bibliographical references Kecskemti, Charles, Szkely, Ivn, Accesul la arhive. Manual de linii directoare pentru implementarea Recomandrii Nr.R(2000)13 privind o politic european asupra accesului la arhive (Access to archives.Manual guidelines for implementation of Recommendation No. R (2000) 13 on a European policy on access to archives), extract from "Revista Arhivelor", LXXXIV/2007. Recomandarea nr.R(2000)13 privind o politic european asupra accesului la arhive (Recommendation No. R (2000) 13 on a European policy on access to archives), in Kecskemti, Charles, Szkely, Ivn , Accesul la arhive. Manual de linii directoare pentru implementarea Recomandrii Nr.R(2000)13 privind o politic european asupra accesului la arhive, extract from "Revista Arhivelor", LXXXIV/2007. Report on Archives in the enlarged European Union. Increased archival cooperation in Europe:action plan, Elaborated by the National Experts Group on Archives of the EUMember States and EU-Institutions and Organ sat the request of the Council of the European Union. Sylvain Sencal, Usage des archives: le quotidien , l institutionnel , le patrimonial , n Revista Arhivelor, nr.3-4/2007. 1995. vi LXVI. trvny a kziratokrl, a kzlevltrakrl s a magnlevltri anyag vdelmrl (LXVI/1995 Law on public documents, public archives and private archives protection, with subsequent amendments) at http//www.complex.hu/jr/gen/hjegy /_doc.cgi?docid=99500066.TV. 2001.vi LXIV. trvny a kulturlis rksg vdelmrl ( LXIV / 2001 Law on the protection of cultural heritage, with subsequent amendments) at http / / www.complex.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A0100064.TV. 16 / 2001.(X.18.) NKM rendelet a Kulturlis rksgvdelmi Hivatal eljrsra vonatkoz szablyokrl (National Cultural Heritage Ministerial Order no. 16 / 18.X.2001 on regulations on procedures of the Office for Protection of Cultural Heritage) at http / / www .amiotthonunk.hu/plugins/terc/EKSZHJ/jogszabalyok/miniszt/025.pdf. 17 / 2001.(X.18.) NKM rendelet a kulturlis javak kiviteli engedlyezsnek rszletes szablyairl (National Cultural Heritage Ministerial Order no. 17 / 18.X.2001 on export licensing of cultural goods) at http / / net.jogtar.hu / jr / gen / hjegy_doc.cgi? docid = A0100017.NKM. 190/2001. (X.18.) Korm. Rendelet a Kulturlis rksgvdelmi Hivatal ltrehozsrl (Ordinance no. 190 / 18.X.2001 establishing the National Office for the Protection of Cultural Heritage) at http://www.amiotthonunk.hu/plugins/terc/FMVK/jogszabalyok /kormany /190_2001.pdf . 3 / 2002.(II.15) NKM rendelet a kulturlis rksg vdett nyilvntsnak rszletes szablyairl (National Cultural Heritage Ministerial Order no. 3 / 15.II.2002 on declaration procedures for protecting national cultural heritage) at http://net. jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A0200003.NKM. 7 / 2002.(II.27.) NKM rendelet a Levltri Kollgiumrl s a levltri szakfelgyeletrl (National Cultural Heritage Ministerial Order, no 7 / 27.02.2002, on the Archive College
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and the specialized archival control) at http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi ?docid=A0200007.NKM. 10 / 2002.(IV.13.) NKM rendelet a kzlevltrak s a nyilvnyos magnlevltrak tevkenysgvel sszefgg szakmai kvetelmnyekrl ( National Cultural Heritage Ministerial Order no.10 / 13.IV.2002 , on the professional obligations of the public archives and of the private archives of public interest) at http:www.kemarchiv.iif.hu/kozerdek/ 10_2002_NKOMrend.pdf. 17 / 2002.(VI.21) NKM rendelet a kulturlis rksg hatsgi nyilvntartsra vonatkoz szablyokrl (National Cultural Heritage Ministerial Order no. 17 / 21.VI.2002 on regulations referring to the recordings of the Authority for Cultural Heritage Protection) at http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A0200017.NKM. . http://www.okm.gov.hu/letolt/kultura/kozgyujt/szolgalt_leveltar_strat_konc_090616.pdf . http://www.leveltaros.hu/Magyar_leveltari_rendszer_jovoje.pdf . http://www.mol.gov.hu/kapcsolatok/leveltari_szakfelugyelet_jelentesek.html

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CONSIDERAII GENERALE DESPRE CONTRACTUL DE ASIGURARE MARITIM


Av. DOINA PREOTU Av. CTLIN NARDI PREOTU In this article can be found specific aspects of marine insurance contract: interest of the marine insurance, risks in marine insurance, types of policies (Ship & Goods, Hull and Machinery, Voyage Policy ). Cuvinte cheie: asigurare maritim, risc n asigurarea maritim, aventur maritim, voiaj Contractul de asigurare maritim - reprezint nelegerea dintre asigurat si asigurtor prin care acesta din urm se oblig s l despagubeasc pe asigurat pentru pierderile suferite ca urmare a unei aventuri maritime358. Obiectul contractului de asigurare, n accepiunea Marine Insurance Act 1906, reprezint : orice marf sau alte bunuri mobile expuse pericolelor mrii, denumite bunuri asigurabile; veniturile din navlu, taxe de trecere, comisioane, profit sau orice alte interese financiare, garanii pentru credite, sume pltite n avans, cheltuieli extraordinare pentru salvarea bunurilor expediiei maritime de la pericolele mrii; orice rspundere fa de o ter parte ce poate aprea pentru proprietar sau alta persoan interesat sau responsabil pentru proprietatea asigurat, ca urmare a pericolelor mrii. Riscurile n asigurarea maritim Asigurarea maritim are ca scop indemnizarea asigurailor pentru pierderile suferite ca urmare a producerii evenimentelor legate de aventura maritim359. Relund clasificarea riscurilor n asigurabile i neasigurabile i tratndu-le n cadrul asigurrii maritime vor
John E.Reed, Insurance, A General Textbook, London, P.S.King & Son, Ltd.,Orchard House, Westminster,1936 359 Violeta Ciurel, Asigurri i Resigurri: Abordri Teoretice i Practice Internaionale, Editura ALL, Bucureti 2000.
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determina urmatoarele categorii: Riscuri asigurabile se mpart la rndul lor n riscuri generale si riscuri speciale. Riscuri generale reprezint riscurile care au o frecven de apariie relativ bine cunoscut de asigurtorilor pe baza datelor statistice ale evenimentelor i ale daunelor cuantificate. Aici sunt ncadrate pericolele mrii, care includ : coliziunea, incendiul, furtul, euarea, furtuna, trsnetul, naufragiul, rsturnarea,etc. Acestea sunt acoperite de condiiile obinuite de asigurare. Termenul riscuri ale mrii, aa cum este consacrat de Marine Insurance Act 1906, include pericolele care reprezint consecina sau sunt legate de navigaia pe mare, incendiu, rzboi, piraterie, furt, capturare, sechestrare, reinere, arestarea de prini si persoane, aruncarea de marf peste bord, abandonare, baraterie i orice alte pericole de acest fel care port fi mentionate in poli. El se refer numai la evenimente fortuite i la daunele aparute pe mare. Pentru aceste riscuri, care de regul sunt grupate n numr mare, primele de asigurare sunt relativ reduse n comparaie cu cele percepute pentru riscurile speciale.360 Riscuri speciale se asigur separat, contra plii unor prime de asigurare suplimentare, pe grupe de riscuri asemntoare sau numai pe cate un risc, nominalizat individual. Acestea se mai numesc i riscuri numite. Din aceasta categorie fac parte : riscurile ce in de natura bunului
360

Idem

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asigurat : spargerea materialelor casante, alterarea alimentelor, zgrierea tablei sau a produselor emailate, ncingerea cerealelor, risipirea citricelor sau a maslinelor etc. riscurile cu caracter social politic : rzboi, greva, revoluie, rebeliune, msuri militare, arest, distrugerea navei i a mrfurilor din dispoziia autoritilor militare sau civile etc. Riscuri neasigurabile ( excluse ) sunt evenimentele cauzatoare de pagube care in preponderent de natura i caracteristicile fizice i chimice ale bunurilor ce fac obiectul asigurrii. In principiu, ele sunt proprii bunurilor respective i apar ca rezultat al unor procese fizico-chimice interne, sau survin ca urmare a neglijenei sau nerespectrii normelor tehnice. Ele nu sunt acceptate de asigurtori deoarece printr-o conduit preventiv i corect a asiguratului pot fi evitate i nu ndeplinesc condiiile de asigurabilitate. Insuirile naturale ale mrfii, evaporarea lichidelor transportate n vase descoperite, ncingerea cerealelor, acrirea vinului, moartea natural a animalelor vii, uzura normal a bunului asigurat, ncrcarea fr tirea asigurtorului a unor obiecte periculoase ( explozive, toxice etc), contaminarea radioactiv, starea de nenavigabilitate a navei, forarea gheii de alte nave dect sprgtoarele de ghea, ambalarea necorespunztoare, expedierea n stare deteriorate sau vatmarea mrfii prin aciunea viermilor, roztoarelor, insectelor etc. i alte situaii care fac ca producerea lor s se apropie de certitudine, determin excluderea fireasc a acestora din condiiile de asigurare practicate de asigurtori. Nu se acopera prin asigurare nici daunele suferite de proprietarii mrfurilor transportate cu o nav propulsat cu ajutorul energiei atomice. Limitrile de rspundere a asigurtorului se refer att la asigurarea navei ct i la asigurarea mrfii. Nerespectarea condiiilor tehnice obligatorii pentru transportul unor mrfuri speciale sau transportate n condiii speciale presupune rspunderea transportatorului pentru distrugerea mrfurilor361.
Violeta Ciurel Asigurri i Resigurri: Abordri Teoretice i Practice Internaionale, Editura ALL, Bucureti 2000
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Scopul contractului de asigurare maritim este s despgubeasc asiguratul de pierderea suferit ca rezultat al materializrii unui risc asigurat. Pentru a suferi o pierdere, asiguratul trebui sa aib un interes n proprietatea asigurat i expus riscului. Dac asiguratul nu are un interes, el nu poate suferi o pierdere i, n consecin, nu exist despgubire. n conformitate cu Marine Insurance Act 1906 , seciunea 4, un asigurat sub incidena unui contract de asigurare maritim trebuie s aib un interes asigurabil i dac el nu are un astfel de interes i nici o speran rezonabil c ar putea obine un astfel de interes, atunci contractul de asigurare este nul . Interesul asigurarii maritime reprezint dreptul patrimonial pe care asiguratul dorete s-l pstreze sau s l obin, sau obligaia patrimonial a carei apariie dorete s o evite. Seciunea 5 din Marine Insurance Act 1906 este foarte important n definirea interesului asigurabil, care este unul din principiile de baz ale asigurrii. In conformitate cu prevederile acestei Legi, orice persoan care este interesat ntr-o aventur maritim are un interes asigurabil. O persoan este interesat ntr-o aventur maritim atunci cnd se afl ntr-o relaie commercial sau necomercial privind aventura sau cu orice proprietate asigurabil aflat pe nav i supus riscurilor i, n consecin, de care poate beneficia ca urmare a siguranei sale sau cnd sufer o pagub ca urmare a prejudicierii proprietii asigurate prin pierdere sau avariere, prin arestare sau ca urmare a rspunderii ce poate s apar. n asigurarea maritim, spre deosebire de celelalte feluri de asigurri, nu este necesar ca asiguratul s aib interes n momentul ncheierii poliei, dar acesta trebuie s existe n mod obligatoriu n momentul producerii pagubei. Principalele interese n asigurarea maritim sunt legate de mrfuri, nave, navlu, chirie, profitul sperat din vnzarea mrfii, contribuia la avaria comun. Contractul de asigurare maritim mbrac forma unei polie de asigurare maritim.
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Potrivit Dictionary of Maritim Insurance Terms, London 1962, polia de asigurare maritim este definit ca fiind:o poli de asigurare care poate acoperi marfa(cargo), nava, navlul sau orice interes asigurabil legat de acestea, mpotriva pericolelor mrii sau pericolelor adiacente unei aventuri maritime. n continuare facem o prezentare succint a ctorva tipuri de polie de asigurare maritim: Polie de voiaj i de timp Este foarte important s se stabileasc cnd un contract de asigurare este efectuat, cnd ncepe acoperirea i cnd se termina. Nicio pierdere nu este recuperabil cnd accidentul care a provocat-o s-a ntamplat n afara perioadei de acoperire. Polia SG ( Ship & Goods), pe care cea mai mare parte a asigurrii maritime s-a bazat pna in 1982, a fost o poli de tip voiaj, care coninea prevederi att pentru asigurarea corp ct i pentru cea de marf. In ceea ce privete asigurarea navelor, s-a dezvoltat o practic prin care asigurarea majorittii acestora se asigurau printr-o poli de timp, i aceasta a rmas poziia pna n prezent. Asigurarea cargo, pe de alt parte, a rmas o asigurare pe voiaj; cu toate aceast perioad de acoperire oferit de polia SG s-a extins prin adugarea unor clauze care s cuprind i perioada de la magazie la magazie in plus fa de retricionarea asigurrii la voiajul propriu zis oferit de polia SG. Chiar introducerea sistemului de asigurare deschis care se bazeaz pe timp nu a schimbat bazele de voiaj ale polielor de asigurare cargo. Declaraiile utilizate n asigurarea deschis nca urmeaz practicile nceperii i terminrii asigurrii din sistemul magazie la magazie. Polite de asigurare corp pe voiaj Marine Insurance Act (1906) Sectiunea 25 (1) prevede, printre altele : Cnd contractul trebuie s asigure obiectul asigurat de la la, sau de la un loc la altul sau altele, polia se numete poli de voiaj. Aceai seciune permite ambelor asigurari de timp i voiaj s fie incluse in aceeai poli, dar aceasta este foarte improbabil s se ntample n practic n cazul asigurrii unei nave. Cnd o nav este asigurat pentru un
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voiaj specific pe o poli SG, acoperirea ncepe la i de la locul specificat n polia. Aceasta se aplic n practic n ambele polie de tip Lloyds i Institute of London Underwriters, chiar daca exist o diferen ntre aceste doua feluri de polie n ceea ce privete terminarea acoperirii. Termenul la i de la este definit n prima anexa la MIA (1906), regula pentru interpretare a poliei numarul 3. Efectul este acela c acoperirea ncepe imediat ce asiguratorul subscrie riscul, chiar dac nava nu urmeaz s navige imediat. In alte cuvinte, termenul la acoper nav n timp ce ea este in port ateptand s plece, ncrcnd sau efecund alte operaiun. Un asigurtor care nu dorete s acopere nava pn cnd aceasta nu pleac efectiv n voiaj, cnd completeaz o polia SG, trebuie s mentioneze n slip362 c riscul este acoperit de la portul de ncepere a voiajului. Cnd aceast meniune este scris pe poli, ea se face peste clauza tiparit la i de la i prevaleaz, asigurarea nencepand dect n momentul cnd nava a plecat efectiv din acel port. Momentul cnd o asigurare ncepe este i mai important cnd o asigurare de voiaj este facut pe o poli englezeasc de tip MAR, succesoarea politei SG. Aceast noua form de poli, introdusa n 1982, a luat treptat locul poliei SG. Polia de asigurare tip MAR, spre deosebirea de forma SG, nu specific nimic n ceea ce privete nceperea acoperirii. Nu specific chiar dac asigurarea este pentru voiaj sau pentru o perioad de timp. Contractul depinde de ataarea clauzelor care indica condiiile acoperirii, dar clauzele standard pentru voiaj ale Institutului nu specific cnd riscul ncepe sau se termin. O annex a poliei MAR include o seciune n care detaliile voiajului trebuiesc completate, dar trebuie avut n vedere a se indica pe slip sau poli cnd acoperirea ncepe la i de la sau de la locul indicat. Tot la nceperea acoperirii ntr-o poli de voiaj se refera sectiunea 42 din MIA (1906). Aceast seciune prevede ca pe o condiie implicit ca nava s plece n voiaj
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Slip reprezint un document n care sunt trecute toate informaiile necesare pentru o evaluare correct i o prelucrare a riscului asigurat

ntr-o perioad rezonabil de timp din momentul n care asigurtorul i-a asumat riscul. Intarzierea nerezonabil in acest sens va indeptati asiguratorul sa evite contractul. El pierde acest drept daca se poate demonstra c el cunotea circumstanele care au cauzat ntarzierea cnd a subscris riscul, sau cand asiguratul poate demonstara c asigurtorul a renunat la condiia implicit. Dac nava pleac dintr-un alt loc dect cel indicat in poli, sau pentru o destinaie diferit dect cea nominat n poli, se spune c este un voiaj diferit. MIA (1906) prevede n seciunea 43 si 44 c, n eventualitatea unui voiaj diferit, acoperirea nu opereaz. Trebuie menionat c nu sunt prevederi ntr-o poli de voiaj corp standard care s stipuleze condiiile n care se menine asigurarea n cazul unui voiaj diferit. Odata ce nava ncepe voiajul, ea trebuie s procedeze pe cea mai direct rut ctre destinaia menionat in poli. Dac ea navigheaz ctre o alt destinaie, aceasta constituie un voiaj diferit, cu toate consecinele menionate n paragraful anterior. Dac nava navigheaz ctre o destinaie diferit, aceasta consacr un voiaj diferit. n acest caz acoperirea funcioneaz pn cnd hotrrea de schimbare a destinaiei este facut manifest. ( MIA sectiunea 45). Efectul este acela c asigurtorul rmne responsabil pentru toale pierderile asigurate pn n momentul n care decizia de schimbare a destinaiei este facut manifest, dar nu pentru alte accidente pentrecute dupa acest moment. Cu toate acestea, n practic, clauzele corp ntotdeauna ncorporeaz o condiie prin care schimbarea de destinaie poate menine acoperirea, cu condiia unei avizari prompte ctre asigurtori, a plaii unei prime suplimentare i a unor schimbari n condiiile de asigurare cerute de asigurtori. Dac nava, ncepnd voiajul n cauz, prsete ruta normal fr o scuz rezonabil, cu intenia de a reintra n rut i a termina voiajul, atunci avem de-a face cu o deviere. Efectul devierii este guvernat de de MIA (1906) sectiunea 46, care prevede ca asiguratorul este descarcat de raspundere din momentul n care nava parasete ruta normal. Nici o aciune, de genul celei de
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evitare a contractului, nu este cerut de la asigurtor, efectul devierii fiind automat. Asigurtorul rmne responsabil pentru toate pierderile asigurate pn n momentul devierii, dar nu i pentru o pierdere survenit dup acel moment, chiar dac nava i-a reluat ulterior ruta fr niciun incident. Intenia de deviere nu se consider deviere; trebuie s fie o deviere factuala pentru c asigurtorul s se poat descrc de rspundere. Exist excepii standard de la devierea de fapt care sunt expuse in MIA (sectiunea 49). Aceleai excepii sunt aplicabile n ntarzierea n performarea voiajului. Una dintre aceste excepii este cnd este autorizat prin orice clauz special din poli. Aceai clauz care menine acoperirea n cazul unei schimbri de voiaj ntr-o poli de corp standard de voiaj, desemenea menine acoperirea i n cazul devierii. Odat nceput, voiajul trebuie performat cu repeziciune rezonabil. Aceasta nseamn c nu trebuie s existe ntarzieri nerezonabile. De exemplu, o ntarziere de 10 zile pentru un port intermediar n care se ateapta o marf, este interpretat ca fiind nerezonabil. Spre deosebire de cazurile schimbrii de voiaj i devierii, clauzele standard de asigurare corp pe voiaj nu menin acoperirea pentru ntarziere. Este de aceea important s se cunoasc circumstantele prezentate n sectiune 49 a MIA care permit intarzierea n performarea voiajului, fr a se prejudicia asiguratul. Acestea sunt urmatoarele : cnd este autorizat de orice termen special n polia; cnd este cauzat de circumstane n afara controlului comandantului sau al armatorului su; cnd este rezonabil necesar pentru a se ndeplini o garanie explicit sau implicit; cnd este rezonabil necesar pentru sigurana navei sau a obiectului asigurat; pentru scopul salvrii vieii umane, sau pentru a ajuta o nav n pericol cnd viaa uman ar putea fi n pericol; cnd este rezonabil necesar pentru scopul obinerii asistenei medicale sau chirurgicale pentru o persoana de la bordul navei; cnd este cauzat de barateria

comandantului sau echipajului, dac barateria este un risc acoperit de poli. Poliele corp de timp Seciunea 25 a MIA ( 1906 ) recunoate practica emiterii polielor de timp (perioada) pentru asigurarea navelor. Avantajul unei polie de timp este ca nava este acoperit pe ntreaga perioada specificat i nu numai pe timpul cnd aceasta este n voiaj conform polielor SG de voiaj. Pentru a evita pierderea pentru fisc a taxelor aplicabile polielor de asigurare de timp care ar fi fost extrem de mari la valoarea navelor din ziua de astazi, MIA prevede c nu se poate efectua o asigurare de timp pe o perioad care s exceed 12 luni. In 1970 taxele pentru poliele de timp au fost abolite in Marea Britanie, aa c aceast prevedere a devenit caduc. Cu toate acestea, practica nu s-a schimbat i, cu excepia polielor de construcii noi, cu greu se poate gasi pe piaa Londrei o polia timp care s depaeasc 12 luni. Asigurtorii de corp gsesc aceast perioad convenabil pentru renegociere anual. Cnd se efectueaz o asigurare casco de timp este necesar s se stabileasc clar data i ora intrarii n asigurare i a terminrii acesteia. Se utilizeaz de obicei n loc de ora amiaza i miezul nopi. Un alt element care trebuie avut n vedere este acela al timpului de referin n diferite locuri ale lumii. Amiaza in Hong Kong pe 20 Martie nu este aceeai cu amiaza n Londra pe 20 Martie. Se utilizeaz de obicei GMT ( Greenwich mean time), dar se poate utiliza i ora folosit de armatorul cu mai multe nave care are ca referin ora proprie aplicabil la toate navele din propria flot. Cu toate ca poliele de timp casco expir automat la o dat i or predeterminat, n clauzele standard nu exist prevederi care s protejeze pe asigurat n cazul c acesta uit s-i prelungeasc asigurarea. Dac nu se acioneaz nainte de expirarea poliei, asiguratul ramne fr acoperire. Att brokerul ct i asiguratul trebuie s aib n vedere acest aspect i s intervina n timp util pentru rennoirea asigurarii. Clauzele standard pentru asigurarea corp pe timp conin o clauz de continuare care confer asiguratului dreptul s continuie asigurare n
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situaia n care polia expira n timp ce nava este n timpul unui voiaj neterminat. O astfel de acoperire nu este automat i nu intra n vigoare dect dac asiguratul n mod expres ii exprim dorina s invoce aceast clauz nainte de timpul natural de expirare.. Clauza de continuare este pentru circumstanele cnd asiguratul nu mai dorete s-i rennoiasc polia de timp, dar dorete s aib aceai acoperire pn cnd nava atinge portul de destinaie din voiajul planificat. Odata invocat, clauza confer acoperire i se platete rata de prima lunara. Acest nseamn c asiguratul este obligat s plteasc 1/12 din prima annual pentru fiecare lun calendaristic, sau parte a sa, n care asigurarea rmne n vigoare. Este obinuit pentru asigurtori s accepte solicitarea unui asigurat care dorete s nceteze asigurarea nainte de data de expirare a poliei, cu toate c nu exist o astfel de clauz n condiiile standard de asigurare corp pe timp care s confere oricarei dintre pari dreptul de reziliere la simpla dorin. Cnd rezilierea se realizeaz prin acordul mutual al prilor, clauzele standard permt asiguratului s primeasc napoi primele pentru fiecare lun calendaristic neexpirat a poliei. Cu toate ca nici asigurtorul nici asiguratul nu pot rezilia polia unilateral, la dorin, clauzele standard de asigurare corp pe timp ncorporeaza anumite clauze obligatorii de reziliere. Acestea se refer la schimbarea managementului navei, factor de vital important n asigurarile corp. Rezilierea obligatorie este automat cnd nava este vndut sau managementul se schimb fr aprobarea scris a asigurtorilor. Acoperirea nceteaza imediat ce o astfel de schimbare are loc, dar este suspendat pn cnd nava atinge portul sau urmtor, dac n acel moment se afl pe mare. Aceast prevedere apare i n cluzele pentru asigurare corp pe timp 1970, ca anexe la polita SG, i n clauzele 1983, ca anexe ale poliei MAR. n plus fa de cele de mai sus, clauzele 1983, desemenea reziliaz polia automat cnd nava i schimba societatea de clasificare, este nchiriat n bare-boat, este rechizitionat sau si schimb pavilionul.

Poliele cargo de voiaj Poliele cargo au urmat, tradiional, trasturile poliei SG, asigurtorii acoperind riscurile pe baza de voiaj. In ceea ce privete marfa, polia SG acoper bunurile din momentul ncrcrii n nava maritime pn n momentul descrcrii de la bord din nava maritime . Nu exist deci acoperire pe poriunea de uscat de dinaintea ncrcrii, nici n barja dac din aceasta se ncarca n nava maritim. Pe de alt parte, bunurile sunt acoperite n barj n portul de descrcare pn sunt descrcte la uscat n siguran. Acoperirea este condiionat de aceleai restrictii ca i n cazul poliei corp de voiaj, aa cum s-a aratat mai sus, n ceea ce private nceperea voiajului, voiaj diferit, schimbarea voiajului, ntarziere n executarea voiajului i deviere, n conformitate cu prevederile MIA (1906), dar urmatoarele diferene apar n practica asigurarii cargo : Inceperea voiajului Dac riscul este subscris facultativ asigurtorul are acelai drept s evite contractul dac riscul nu ncepe ntr-o perioad rezonabil de timp dupa ce contractul este subscris de asigurtor. Cu toate acestea, cele mai multe asigurari de marf se efectueaz prin acoperire deschis, i, n acest caz, ntarzierea n nceperea voiajului nu afecteaz acoperirea deloc. Voiaj diferit n timp ce MIA statueaz c un voiaj care este diferit de voiajul asigurat nu este ataat poliei, Clauzele Cargo ale Institutului 1963 (care se anexeaz la polia SG) ncorporeaz o clauz care ine asiguratul acoperit n cazul unor erori sau omisiuni n ceea ce privete descrierea voiajului. Aceasta nu schimb n realitate poziia, cu excepia unei greeli care este facut, dar pune marfa asigurat ntr-o poziie mai bun dect asigurarea corp pe voiaj. Trebuie notat c aceast protectie a asiguratului cargo nu mai apare n clauzele cargo 1982 ( care se ataeaz poliei MAR). Schimbarea voiajului - In practic, asiguratul cargo este inut asigurat n situaia schimbrii voiajului. Cu toate acestea, exist o diferen ntre clauzele cargo 1963 (polia SG) i cele din 1982 (polia MAR) n acest sens. n ambele seturi de clauze, asigurtorii trebuiesc notificai prompt pentru ca
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asiguraii s beneficieze de acordul pentru meninerea asigurrii, i, n ambele cazuri, asigurtorii pot ncasa o prim adiional. Cu toate acestea, n clauzele cargo 1982, asigurtorii i rezerv dreptul s schimbe condiiile de asigurare, ceea ce nu este cazul cu clauzele cargo din 1963. Intrziere n executarea voiajului Clauzele cargo cer ntotdeauna ca asiguratul s acioneze cu repeziciunea rezonabil n toate circustanele care sunt sub controlul lor. Condiionat de aceasta, prevederile MIA (1906) sunt suplimentate de Clauzele Cargo ale Institutului, i cele vechi i cele noi, n aceea ca asigurarea continua n timpul oricarei ntarzieri care este n afara controlului asiguratului. Deviere MIA (1906) se refer la deviere in legatura numai cu voiajul pe mare. El nu are n vedere riscurile de uscat, astfel c nu exist niciun efect ntr-o astfel de deviere. n clauzele cargo standard acoperirea se aplic numai pe timpul tranzitului maritim obisnuit care nu presupune devieri nenecesare. Totui, Clauzele Cargo ale Institutului, i cele vechi i cele noi, continua acoperirea n perioada deviaiei, far alte condiionri, dac asiguratul nu poate controla ruta direct a tranzitului. n practic, poliele cargo moderne acoper bunurile pe tot timpul transportului obinuit, de la depozit la depozit; plus n timpul ncrcrii, inclusiv riscul de barj de la uscat la nav, daca este aplicabil; plus descarcrea la portul de destinaie, inclusiv riscul de barj de la nav la uscat, dac este aplicabil; plus ntarzierile uzuale n portul de descrcare; plus tranzitul n apele interioare catre magazia cu destinaie finala. Aceast form de acoperire este inclus n cadrul clauzei de tranzit din clauzele privind marfa. Detaliile practice ale acestei clauze pot fi gsite in Analysis of Marine Insurance Clauses , Book 1 (Witherby) (Analizele Clauzelor Asigurrii maritime, Volumul 1). Clauza de tranzit variaza n diferitele formulari ale caluzelor privind marfa, n mod deosebit n clauzelele de comer. Nu exist limit de timp pentru acoperire ntr-o poli de voiaj, cu excepia cazului n care limita este ncorporata n clauzele

anexate. Atta timp ct nu apare o astfel de vede ca acoperirea s continu n astfel de limita nici ntr-o polia de voiaj CASCO, nici circumstane. Clauzele de marf, fie vechi sau noi, ntr-o polia de marf, n masura n care se refer la tranzitul ctre portul de destinaie, continua acoperirea n cazul oricarei cea din urm include ntotdeauna o limit de descrcari, rencarcari sau transbordri fortimp dup descrcarea din navele maritime. n ate i pe parcursul oricarei modificri n clauzele standard de marf aceast limit este timpul voiajului reieind din exercitarea de 60 zile de la miezul mopii din ultima zi de unei liberti acordate carauului n condescrcre a marfurilor asigurate de pe navele formitate cu contractul de transport. Cu maritime. Acoperirea se termina fie prin toate acestea, o astfel de continuare nu inexpirarea limitei de timp, fie prin livrarea clude tranzitul ctre o destinaie alternativ1, mrfurilor la magazia de destinaie, n funcie doar dac1 destinaia este stabilit n poli, de care dintre acestea este mai curnd. Limita la opiunea asiguratului, caz n care acopede timp poate fi extins printr-o ntelegere la rirea nceteaza la nceputul tranzitului ctre momentul ncheierii; dar nu exist nicio o alt destinaie. Dac contractul de transprevedere referitoare la pastrarea asiguratului port este terminat ntr-un port sau loc inacoperit pentru extinderi. Limita de timp termediar, sub controlul asiguratului, ICC (1982) termin acoperirea n acelai timp; variaz n clauzele referitoare la comer. excepie face cazul n care asiguratul soliTransbordare Termenul transbordare se refer la cit prompt printr-o notificare continuarea transferul de mrfuri dintr-o nava in alta. acoperirii i platete o prima suplimentar. Acest lucru poate fi fcut n mod direct n acest ultim caz, asiguratul are la dintr-o nava n alta, dar n mod obinuit are dispozitie 60 de zile pentru a ncepe tranloc numai n zona portuar sau n exteriorul zitul ctre destinaia stabilit n poli sau zonei portuare. Poate fi efectuat cu ajuto- orice alt destinaie, caz n care acoperirea rul unei barje pentru transbortarea mrfuri- continua c i nainte. lor ntre navele maritime. Acest lucru poate Trebuie reinut faptul c greela de a nu implica descrcarea mrfurilor ntr-un port notifica asigurtorul pentru cazul n care are intermediar pentru a fi, ulterior, ncarcate loc o transbordare pe parcursul tranzitului ntr-o nav de transport. propus, la negocierea contractului acest luSeciunea 50 din MIA (1906) se refer cru poate constitui o ncalcare a bunei-crela transbordare numai pentru mrfurile care dine din partea asigurtorului. Acest lucru sunt descrcate ntr-un port sau loc inter- l poate ndrepti asiguratorul s evite nmediar datorit operarii unui pericol asigu- tregul contract dac o astfel de nedezvluire rat. Aceasta presupune efectuarea unei des- a fost considerat material pentru risc, iar crcri forate i presupune c asigurtorul nu a fost deja n cunotin de transbordatorul (carauul) va rencarca mr- aceast probabilitatea sau aceasta nu a avut furile i va continua voiajul ctre portul sau loc pe parcursul obinuit al tranzitului. locul de descrcare planificat. Actul preBibliografie: Lloyds Maritime Law Newsletter nr. 354 din 29.05.1993; Chorley & Giles, Shipping Law,Pitman Publishing London,1994; Digest of Lloyds Law Reports Gheorghe Bibicescu, Lexicon maritim englez-romn, Editura Stiinific, Bucureti, 1971; Julian Cooke, John D.Kimball, s.a.in Voyage Charters, Lloyds of London Press, London 1993; N.P.Ready, Ship Registration- Lloyds of London Press 1994; Prof. Dr.Francisc Deak, Tratat de drept civil, Contracte speciale, Editura Actami, Bucureti 1996; Publicatii Lloyds R. H. Brown Marine Insurance Principles & Basic Practice, London Victor Dover a Handbook to Marine Insurance Violeta Ciurel Asigurri i reasigurri; abordri teoretice i practici internationale, Editura ALL, Bucureti 2000.
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DIMENSIUNI ACTUALE ALE CRIMINALITII CORPORAIILOR MULTINAIONALE


Asist. univ. dr. MARCOCI PETRIC-MIHAIL Academia de Poliie Alexandru Ioan Cuza The global economic crisis revealed large scale fraud in the financial sector and dropped public confidence and trust. It is practically impossible for a single stakeholder on their own to effectively address the problems that contributed to this crisis: corruption, greed, lack of transparency and leadership. Hence there are some cases for the multinational companies action that enables companies to fraud competitors and/or stakeholders from the public and civil society sector. Working collectively, companies can help level the playing field between competitors, create incentives to avoid bribery among individuals and organizations, and introduce greater transparency and predictability to business transactions. Cuvinte cheie: corporaii, criminalitate, globalizare, criz global Criminalitatea globalizat este una din temele de reflecie ale nceputului secolului XXI, cnd efectul integrrii globale a pieelor produselor, serviciilor i forei de munc, a fost i o contaminare i diseminare pe scar larg a valorilor culturale dezaptative materializate prin noi tendine n toate sferele infracionalitii. Veritabil motor al globalizrii, corporaiile multinaionale au constituit propriul aport la aceast diseminare, n sensul c, reunind indivizi aparinnd unor culturi, religii i naionaliti diferite, creeaz germenii conflictelor sau alianelor n care ulterior germineaz smburii criminalitii363. O abordare simplist a corporaiei multinaionale pornete de la premisa c aceasta este o companie economic ce deine i coordoneaz activiti economice n dou ori mai multe ri, prin intermediul unor sucursale sau filiale. Acestea sunt efectul realizrii unor investiii directe n strintate din partea unei corporaii i achiziia sau nfiinarea unor activiti economice (servicii, industrii extractive sau ntreprinderi industriale) n diferite ri.
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n dinamica activitii proprii, numeroase corporaii multinaionale au devenit niste instituii extrem de puternice i posed n multe cazuri resurse financiare i economice superioare celor ale majoritii statelor-membre ale Organizaiei Naiunilor Unite, ceea ce le confer o poziie important pe scena comerului internaional, i mai nou, ale politicii internaionale. Se apreciaz c totalul investiiilor strine directe realizate, la nivel global, a fost, n 2000, de aproximativ o mie dou sute de miliarde de dolari. n fapt, singurul moment care le-a ameninat trendul ctre supremaia economic la constituit embargoul OPEC asupra petrolului i creterea masiv a preului la iei au indicat faptul c statul-naiune nu i-a pierdut capacitatea de reacie. Consecina primordial a embargoului a fost naionalizarea unor filiale i sucursale ale companiilor multinaionale situate n state considerate apropiate ideologic i obediente din punct de vedere politic. Globalizarea este asociat cu deteritorizarea ct i cu reteritorializarea spaiului socio-economic i politic364. Ori
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Gangster Capitalism: The United States and the Globalization of Organized Crime Michael Woodiwiss, editura Caroll&Graf Publishers 2005, pag. 17

C. Voicu .a.- Criminalitatea organizat n domeniul afacerilor Edit Pildner&Pildner 2007- pag.29

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n acest context, ar fi ilogic s nu apreciem c formele criminalitii corporatiste se supun i ele acestei dinamici, reconfigurnduse odat cu tendinele menionate. Globalizarea a nsemnat pentru cei foarte bogai mai multe ocazii de a face bani i mult mai rapid. Aceste persoane au utilizat tehnologia de ultim or pentru a trasnporta sume mari de bani n orice punct de pe glob n cteva secunde i pentru a specula cu mai mult eficien. Din pcate, tehnologia nu are niciun efect asupra vieii celor sraci. De fapt, globalizarea este un paradox: extrem de avantajoas pentru cei puini, ea marginalizeaz sau exclude dou treimi din populaia lumii.365 Criminalitatea corporatist - alter ego al eficienei economice O corporaie multinaional are permanent propensiunea de a deveni o corporaieoligopol, ale crei activiti economice, de management, producie i desfacere se desfoar, n principiu, sub jurisdicia mai multor state. Acest gen de companii se compun dintr-o central, avndu-i sediul ntr-o ar, i dintr-un grup de filiale sau sucursale care activeaz din punct de vedere economic n alte state. Obiectivul principal al corporaiilor multinaionale l constituie eficiena maxim a activitilor economice, n sensul maximizrii profiturilor, fie achiziionarea unor active economice la preuri subevaluate, ori accesul pe noi piee de desfacere, fie accesul mai facil la resurse. Toate aceste deziderate devin obtenabile de cele mai multe ori fie prin presiuni de natur politico-economic asupra guvernelor din rile gazd, sau, dac acest gen de influenare nu conduce la rezultatele scontate, se ncearc obinerea de faciliti fiscale ori vamale din partea autoritilor locale. De cele mai multe ori aceste scopuri sunt atinse, fie graie gradului nalt de performan a managementului aplicat, ori prin valorificarea atent a oportunitilor aprute
365 Zygmunt Bauman Globalizarea i efectele ei sociale, Edit. Antet 2000 pg 77

pe piaa mondial sau pe cele locale, fie prin derularea unor activiti eficiente de lobby la adresa cancelariilor din statele gazd. n realitate, etiologia eficienei economice rezid n strategiile concertate aplicate la nivel global, ns, n realitate, acestea sunt cele care ulterior permit manifestarea unor forme grave de criminalitate corporatist, care pot consta n acte grave de corupie, antaj ori aciuni de manipulare a titlurilor de valoare sau monedelor unor state cu consecine grave asupra stabilitii economice i jocului democratic. Acest gen de companii opereaz integrri operaionale pe vertical i centralizarea deciziei strategice, lsnd de multe ori liberul arbitru decizional n seama unor persoane, care pe lng interesele companiei reuesc s-i satisfac o serie de interese personale, mai mult ori mai puin legale. Exemplele tipice de companii multinaionale cu proces decizional profund centralizat sunt IBM, General Motors, Toyota i Nestl, care, n numeroase situaii au fost suspectate de practici situate la limita legii. Din aceast cauz opinm c eforturile de implementare a unor sisteme manageriale performante cu implicaii remarcabile asupra profitului constituie un veritabil alter-ego al criminalitii corporatiste. Antiteza este constituit de abordarea din perspectiva psihologiei economice a intereselor, individuale sau de grup, ale investitorilor dispui s tolereze anumite derapaje legale ori etice comise de managerii acestor corporaii att timp ct profitul operaional crete i, implicit, dividendele primite sunt substaniale. Pe de alt parte, acceptarea iniial a acestor forme primare de devian, considerate minore sau inerente, este cea care confer acestor manageri senzaia de capacitate de gestionare a riscurilor i, ulterior, la percepia de pseudo-atotputernicie care genereaz decizii lipsite de realism sau tendina de mascare a lipsei cronice de performan cu ineluctabilitatea falimentelor companiilor i dezechilibrrii grave a pieelor de produse sau burselor de valori.
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Acest veritabil alter-ego al performanei economice pe care-l constituie criminalitatea corporatist i-a gsit legitimitatea n etica managerial a recompensrii financiare a performanelor managerilor n raport cu rezultatele (reale ori mai puin reale ale firmelor) companiilor pe care le administreaz i n decompensarea moralitii activitilor de audit financiar extern care au avut ca efect acceptarea rezultatelor declarate de managerii corporaiilor problematice, pe simplul motiv c sunt clieni importani care nu trebuie provocai sau suprai; tiut fiind faptul c valoarea facturii de audit extern este direct proporional cu nivelul cifrei de afaceri i al profitului obinut de societatea care face obiectul auditrii. Acest binom eficen economic - criminalitate corporatist a fost inventat de corporaiile care au cutat resurse primare, n special n sfera industriei extractive i care s-au ndreptat ctre state mai puin reactive din perspectiv politic, unde ntlneau guverne dispuse s ncheie tranzacii marcat asimetrice n domeniul concesionrii sau vnzrii unor rezerve strategice, n schimbul unor beneficii minore de natur financiar sau politic366. Tranziia ctre criminalitatea acceptat sau ncurajat a corporaiilor de ctre guvernele din statele de reedin a fost asigurat de temerea atavic de a nu permite accesul statelor blocului comunist la resurse, n special la cele energetice i la cele utilizate n industriile de nalt tehnologie, motiv pentru care multe activiti ilegale ale acestor companii au fost trecute cu vederea i sprijinite la nivelul unor structuri de stat servicii de informaii, ministere ale afacerilor externe, ambasade, misiuni militare etc. Corporaiile multinaionale au avut posibilitatea s profite, prin strategiile lor comerciale i de producie n strintate, de o economie mondial relativ mai deschis, rezultat n urma diferitelor runde de nego366

cieri comerciale, de evoluia fulminant a transporturilor i telecomunicaiilor, care, pe lng beneficiile evidente n cmpul activitilor licite, au avut un impact semnificativ n globalizarea criminalitii economico-financiare i a celei corporatiste367. Dintre toate teoriile care prezint valene explicative asupra naturii ontologicoaxiologice a companiilor multinaionale i a nivelului propensiunii spre diferite forme de criminalitate la nivel individual ori organizaional este teoria ciclului de producie, care, chiar dac nu ia n considerare toate aspectele importante ale comerului i investiiei, ncorporeaz totui cteva dintre cele mai semnificative elemente: dezvoltarea i diseminarea tehnologiei industriale ca un determinant major al evoluiei economiei internaionale; rolul ascendent al corporaiei multinaionale n economia mondial; integrarea acesteia att n comerul, ct i n producia internaional. Teoria pornete de la premisa c orice tehnologie sau produs trece prin trei faze de evoluie: 1.faza introductiv sau inovatoare; 2. faza maturitii sau de dezvoltare a procedeelor; 3. faza standardizrii. Prima faz a ciclului de producie tinde s se localizeze n ara cea mai avansat sau n cele mai avansate ri - din punct de vedere industrial, aa cum au fost Marea Britanie n secolul al XIX-lea, Statele Unite n prima parte a perioadei postbelice i Japonia n ultima parte a secolului XX368. Corporaiile oligopoliste din aceste state au un avantaj comparativ cu cele din alte ri n dezvoltarea unor noi produse i procese industriale, datorit mrimii pieei interne din punct de vedere al cererii i, respectiv al resurselor financiare destinate unor activiti inovatoare - din perspectiva ofertei.
Gilpin, Robert Economia politic a relaiilor internaionale pag.47 368 Abegglen James; Kaisha O. Corporaia japonez Edit. Magic Print 2005 pag. 29
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Pe parcursul celei de-a doua faze sau a fazei de maturizare, procedeele tehnologice continu s se perfecioneze, iar amplasarea produciei tinde s se mute n alte ri avansate din punct de vedere economic, unde pot fi fructificate oportunitile existente pe pia la un moment dat. n sfrit, n cel de-al treilea stadiu al ciclului, standardizarea proceselor productive ofer posibilitatea amplasrii produciei n rile mai puin dezvoltate, n special n economiile emergente, ale cror avantaj comparativ rezid n costuri inferioare cu fora de munc, iar de pe aceste plci turnante de export sunt expediate fie ca produse finite, fie sub forma de componente pe pieele lumii. Acest comer intra-firm a devenit o caracteristic fundamental a economiei mondiale contemporane fiind practicat de toi marii operatori transnaionali - de la cei care acioneaz n industria alimentar, uoar, pn la cei care realizeaz produse n sfera hardware-ului sau industriilor nalt tehnologizate. Avantajul fundamental al acestui gen de intra-comer este capacitatea oferit managerilor de a-i satisface interesele prin tranzitarea unor pli legale prin propriile societi de consultan situate n paradisuri fiscale ori prin direcionarea unor pri ale produciei prin firmele unor apropiai ori n care au interese economice n vederea comercializrii ulterioare. Timp de muli ani, termenul de corporaie multinaional a constituit mai mult un eufemism pentru expansiunea n exterior a marilor corporaii americane369. De la un nivel al investiiilor directe cumulat de numai 11,8 miliarde de dolari n 1950, valoarea nregistrat a investiiei directe americane n strintate a crescut, n 2006, la circa 636,8 miliarde de dolari. Din punct de vedere istoric, trebuie s remarcm c la nceputul anilor 70, Statele Unite deveniser mai mult un investitor n
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Wilkins, Mira Maturizarea intreprinderii multinaionale Edit. Magic Print 2005 pag.58

exterior, dect un exportator de bunuri fabricate acas. Producia internaional a corporaiilor multinaionale de sorginte american depise comerul exterior, pn atunci componenta principal a schimbului economic internaional al Americii. Valoarea cumulat a produciei realizate n strinatate a corporaiilor americane a nregistrat, n aceeai perioad, o cretere de aproape patru ori mai mare decat exportul american, n condiiile n care multe dintre corporaiile-colos ale Americii i plasaser mai bine de jumtate din fondurile lor n strintate i mai bine de jumtate din totalul beneficiilor lor proveneau de acolo. Aceste beneficii au devenit, la rndul lor, un factor important pentru germinarea criminalitii corporatiste americane crend super-entiti economice capabile s discute i s negocieze comportamente, practici i atitudini ilegale cu autoritile judiciare americane ori cu alte structuri statale strine. O alt problematic aferent raportului eficien economic - criminalitate corporatist l constituie natura raportului ntre corporaiile multinaionale i rile de origine precum i cu statele gazd. Majoritatea abordrilor teoretice referitoare la att de controversata problem a relaiei corporaiilor multinaionale cu statele lor de origine se circumscriu uneia sau alteia dintre cele trei ideologii fundamentale privind raportul dintre sfera economicului i politicului: liberal (sau ortodox), marxist (radical) ori naionalist (sau neomercantilist), fiecare dintre acestea furniznd o interpretare radical diferit asupra relaiei corporaiilor multinaionale cu guvernele lor din rile de origine. n fapt, studiul de caz cel mai interesant al raportului corporaie - stat de origine este cel al Statelor Unite ale Americii, unde avem de a face cu identitate sau complementaritate a scopurilor ntre stat i companiile transnaionale. Astfel, liderii corporaiilor i liderii politici consider, n general, c expansiunea n strintate a corporaiilor americane reprezint o materializare a unor interese naionale - i n special a Doctrinei Monroe
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care a postulat necesitatea dominaiei Statelor Unite n emisfera vestic. Politicile americane au ncurajat extinderea corporaiilor n strintate, manifestnd o marcat disponibilitate de facilitare i protejare a acestora. Spre exemplu, pn n anii 70, corporaiile multinaionale americane controlau accesul lumii necomuniste la materii prime, mai ales la iei370. Despre corporaiile multinaionale americane s-a afirmat371 c materializeaz interesele balanei de pli a SUA prin calitatea de procuratori de valut strin (valuta strin fiind necesar att procurrii de bunuri, ct i ntreinerii poziiei militare i politice globale americane), i de aici rolul de factor important pentru bunstarea economic a Americii i creterea influenei sale politice i militare n lume. Dar aceast apropiere, att factual ct i personal ntre liderii corporatiti i cei politici, a fost cea care a condus la percepia internaional c aceste companii devin vectori proprii ai politicii externe americane, n timp ce guvernul american a depus, la rndul su, toate diligenele pentru nregimentarea programatic a acestora la realizarea strategiilor de politic extern. Pe acest fond de apropiere personal i instituional, era imposibil ca reprezentanii guvernamentali s nu ajung s solicite liderilor corporatiti anumite servicii ilegale: copromiterea sau coruperea unor lideri politici strini, finanarea ilegal a campaniilor electorale, acetia din urm pretinznd la rndul lor acceptarea unor fraude financiare sau imunitatea n faa autoritilor judiciare, criminalitatea corporatist regsindu-i acum protectorii n sfera politic. Dei importana rolului acordat companiei multinaionale n strategia economic i politic general a SUA rmne incomparabil, tendina a fost adoptat i de alte state care i-au perceput tot mai mult pro370

Gilpin, Robert Economia politic a reltiilor internaionale pag. 112 371 George Draffan- The elite consensus: when corporations wield the constitution- New York, Apex 2003.

priile corporaii multinaionale ca pe nite instrumente utile de realizarea a politicii externe. Astfel, corporaiile multinaionale europene i japoneze372 au fost utilizate de guvernele lor n asigurarea resurselor de materii prime sau n deschiderea unor piee externe. Dar, tot n Statele Unite, conjuncia dintre interesele corporatiste i interesele naionale a nceput s piard din for dup criza petrolului, din 1973. n timpul rzboiului Arabo-Israelian din octombrie 1973, companiile petroliere ale SUA au indus n mod deliberat n opinia public impresia c se altur embargoului arab impus rilor occidentale, clarificnd astfel faptul c propriile interese economice primeaz n raport cu orice alt categorie de interese. Ulterior, concomitent cu declinul industriei americane i cu apariia unor deficite comerciale masive, a creterii omajului i a meninerii unor dificulti cronice n balana de pli, s-a diseminat n plan social percepia c, de fapt, corporaiile multinaionale export locuri de munc i conduc la diminuarea exporturilor propriilor ri. Dar, pentru a putea evalua gradul real de criminalitate pe care-l induc corporaiile multinaionale, trebuie s analizm extrem de atent raporturile ce se nasc ntre acestea i rile-gazd, care se manifest pe multiple planuri: economic, politic, social, juridic, psihologic, religios etc. Pe baza acestor considerente, putem afirma faptul c aceast confruntare dintre corporaiile multinaionale i statele-gazd, n special n situaia rilor slab dezvoltate s-a dovedit a fi extrem de puternic i lipsit de principii i mai ales de scrupule. Acuzele lansate la adresa corporaiilor multinaionale din partea guvernelor statelorgazd i a criticilor radicali vizeaz o multipl argumentaie susinut de cele mai multe ori de o serie de fapte, dac nu ilegale, cel puin imorale. Principala motivaie
372 Abegglen James; Kaisha O. Corporaia japonez Edit. Magic Print 2005 pag. 74

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economic rezid n faptul c, n rile mai puin dezvoltate, investiia direct de mare valoare creeaz dezechilibre temporare pe pia, distorsioneaz concurena i influeneaz dinamica dezvoltrii economice locale. Tot companiile multinaionale sunt adesea nvinuite de crearea unei economii a filialelor, alcatuit dintr-o serie de alte firme mai mici controlate, ineficiente, incapabile s genereze dezvoltarea economic a societii; c, ntotdeauna, filialele locale constituie nite anexe ale corporaiei metropolitane i se comport ca enclave autonome n economia-gazd, mai mult valorificnd oportunitile economice de natur negativ dect ca motoare de cretere de sine stttoare. Corporaiilor li se mai imput introducerea unor tehnologii periculoase din punct de vedere ecologic sau al impactului asupra evoluiei tehnologiei indigene, i folosirea unor procese productive intensive care conduc la omaj i mpiedic progresul tehnologic intern. O alt acuz lansat mpotriva corporaiilor multinaionale este aceea c i pstreaz pentru sine controlul asupra tehnologiilor celor mai avansate i nu sunt dispuse s realizeze un transfer ctre rile mai puin dezvoltate la preuri rezonabile, prin care acestea s poat dezvolta subsecvent sectoare industriale performante ori s genereze reducerea decalajului ntre zonele defavorizate i ariile puternic industrializate. O serie de analize economice postuleaz faptul c investiia strin direct distorsioneaz corecta distribuie a venitului n rile mai puin dezvoltate, i c, prin repatrierea profiturilor i accesul facil la mijloacele financiare locale - credite bancare, lansarea de obligaiuni etc, corporaiile multinaionale sectuiesc ara-gazd de capitalul necesar dezvoltrii373. Alte critici se bazeaz pe faptul c investiia strin direct a generat efecte politice negative n statele mai puin dezvoltate economic, argumentnd c, spre exemplu,
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corporaiile pretind stabilitatea guvernamental, fie cu simpatii procapitaliste ori pentru statele unde sunt situate centralele companiilor, care creeaz premisele dezvoltrii dependente i ncurajeaz astfel apariia unor regimuri autoritare n aragazd i, ulterior, crearea unor aliane ntre capitalismul internaional i elitele reacionare naionale a cror consecin este apariia fenomenelor marginale: terorism etnic ori religios, micri de extrem - dreapt sau stng etc. Tot astfel, se mai invoc repercusiunile negative ale investiiei strine directe asupra standardului cultural i social al rilor mai puin dezvoltate. Corporaia strin ajunge s fie perceput ca un elemente de subminare a valorilor tradiionale ale societii i de introducere, prin practicile sale n sfera reclamei i n afaceri, a unor valori i gusturi considerate ca fiind nepotrivite axios-ului naiunii-gazd374. Toate aceste acuzaii nu sunt lipsite total de un fundament real. Investiia direct realizat de corporaiile internaionale n statele mai puin dezvoltate, a avut pn acum, n unele situaii, consecine nefericite pentru dezvoltarea economic, politic i social a rilor mai puin dezvoltate. Dar, pe de alt parte, n statele mai puin dezvoltate, corporaiile multinaionale au nfiinat adesea filiale industriale ineficiente, a cror lips de performan a constituit-o piaa local de prea mici dimensiuni, n cele mai multe dintre cazuri. Validitatea argumentului c investiia strin direct genereaz efecte politice adverse este la fel de contradictorie, cauzat, n special, de faptul c foarte multe dintre rile mai puin dezvoltate au guverne autoritare. n mod evident, corporaiile multinaionale i doresc guverne stabile i nu exist nici cea mai mic ndoial c sprijin guvernele conservatoare. Corporaiile multinaionale valorizeaz stabilitatea politic, i nu o
374

Caves, Richard Intreprinderea multinaional i analiza economic Edit. Magic Print 2003 pag. 45

Gangster Capitalism: The United States and the Globalization of Organized Crime Michael Woodiwiss, editura Caroll&Graf Publishers 2005, pag 92

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anumit form de guvernmnt politic. Acesta este motivul pentru care peste tot n lumea mai puin dezvoltat, ntlnim aliane de convenien ntre corporaii i guvernele locale de nuane politice diferite. Cel mai hilar caz a fost ntlnit n Angola socialist, unde a existat o situaie paradoxal, n care trupele paramilitare comuniste cubaneze au protejat instalaiile petroliere ale companiei americane Gulf Oil Company mpotriva atacurilor ntreprinse de lupttorii pentru libertate, sprijinii i finanai de guvernul Statelor Unite ale Americii. Dar, dincolo de valoarea axiologic a acestor critici aduse investiiei strine directe, unele ri mai puin dezvoltate au avut beneficii considerabile de pe urma investiiilor corporatiste i a medierii politice realizate de acestea cu guvernele rilor de origine ale acestora375. Dar pe acest fond de parteneriat, devenea imposibil ca rile-gazd s nu tolereze unele manifestri frauduloase ale companiilor multinaionale ori ale reprezentanilor acestora; de multe ori, o serie din rezultatele materializrii rezoluiilor infracionale fiind returnate sub diferite moduri ctre reprezentanii guvernelor rilor-gazd, consolidnd astfel poziia att a managerilor corporatiti ct i influena asupra oficialilor guvernamentali din respectivele state. Astfel devine, n mod indubitabil, imposibil s nu ncerci s ncalci legea, ca reprezentant al unei corporaii multinaionale atunci cnd analizele unor sociologi ajung s afirme c firmele multinaionale vor deveni partenerii absolut egali ai statului-naiune, n manifestarea dinamic a puterii sociale. Inexact definite, infraciunile la vrf sunt n plus greu de detectat. Ele nfloresc ntr-un cerc restrns de persoane, unite printr-o complicitate reciproc, loialitate fa de organizaie i espirit de corps, oameni care iau msuri efective pentru a identifica, reduce la tcere sau elimina potenialii turntori.376
375

Corporaiile multinaionale i criza economico-financiar actual Observatorii politici i analitii economici au realizat predicii referitoare la viitorul corporaiilor multinaionale care nu s-au materializat n cmpul realitii. Corporaiile multinaionale cu toat paleta proprie de valene i avantaje ce le permiteau manifestarea deplin a propriei puteri n-au covrit statul-naiune. n perioadele de boom economic ambele au dovedit c dein resurse financiare, economice i intelectuale remarcabile n tratativele pe care le-au derulat ntre ele377. Eforturile depuse de organizaii cu vocaie universal sau local precum Organizaia Naiunilor Unite, ale Organizaiei pentru Dezvoltare i Cooperare Economic (OECD) sau ale altor organizaii regionale, de a impune un cod de reglementri corporaiilor, nu s-au soldat cu niciun rezultat pozitiv neizbutind nici eforturile autoritilor americane de a implementa reglementri care s normeze comportamentul guvernelor-gazd fa de corporaiile multinaionale. Aceste eecuri s-au manifestat prin diminuarea ratei de cretere a nivelului agregat al investiiei strine directe, care pare s fi fost i rezultatul scderii ratelor de dezvoltare economic a diverselor state i a incertitudinilor politice crescute cauzate de extremismul etnic i religios, terorism i recrudescena unor micri naionaliste pe glob. Concomitent, competiia att dintre rile dezvoltate, ct i dintre cele mai puin dezvoltate, pentru capital i tehnologie a cunoscut noi dimensiuni378. Referitor la capacitatea de a atrage investiiile strine directe, rile mai puin dezvoltate tind s se diferenieze din ce n ce mai mult. Creterea instabilitii politice i economice a produs modificri de structur climatului de afaceri i a obligat corporaiile multinaionale s-i diversifice investiia, mai ales n spaiile economiilor dezvoltate.
377

Gilpin, Robert Economia politic a relaiilor internaionale pag. 83 376 Thomas Mathiesen Prison on Trial: A Critical Assessment, Edit. London Sage 1990 pg 130

Caves, Richard Intreprinderea multinaional i analiza economic Edit. Magic Print 2003 pag. 73 378 Caves, Richard Intreprinderea multinationala si analiza economica Edit. Magic Print 2003 pag. 76

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Raionalizarea global a produciei internaionale a acordat tot mai mult importan alianelor dintre corporaiile multinaionale i furnizorii din lumea ntreag de produse i componente. n centrul multora, daca nu al majoritii acestor aranjamente, se afl productorii japonezi de automobile, produse electronice i tehnologii avansate. Japonia acoper cam 40% din prile componente n sectoarele electronic, automobilelor i altele. Realizarea alianelor i cooperarea ntre corporaiile multinaionale, aranjamentele ce au operat ntre acestea au fost deseori ncurajate de guvernele naionale. Costurile progresive ale dezvoltrii tehnologice i propagarea noului protecionism au fcut ca participarea pe cele trei piee principale ale lumii Statele Unite, Europa Occidental i Japonia s devin o necesitate pentru corporaiile multinaionale. Astfel, corporaiile multinaionale iniiaz o nou form de conflict prin invadarea reciproc a pieelor de origine, rezultatul fiind apariia unor practici noi. Un bun exemplu pentru cele afirmate l-ar constitui noua United Motor Manufacturing Company, fondat n anul 1983 de cei doi rivali globali n industria autovehiculelor General Motors i Toyota, pentru realizarea de autoturisme prin subcontractare n Statele Unite379. Acest curs al evenimentelor a generat sfritul vechiului multinaionalism, sau era romantic a companiilor transnaionale, cnd dezvoltarea acestora devenise un fenomen predictibil i acceptabil sub influena unor jocuri politice. Astfel, perioada istoric n care corporaiile transnaionale americane i din alte cteva ri dezvoltate puteau s opereze nestnjenite n economiile-gazd sau chiar s le domine i cnd investiia strain direct nsemna posesiunea i controlul deplin al filialelor pe care le aveau, a trecut, locul acesteia fiind luat de o mare varietate de aranjamente negociate: acordarea reciproc de licene tehnologice
379 Abegglen James; Kaisha O. Corporaia japonez Edit. Magic Print 2005 pag. 114

ntre corporaii de diverse naionaliti, ntreprinderile mixte, acordurile sistematice de marketing, resursele derivate, producerea unor componente n strintate i posesiuni pe deplin egale. Dar, n ciuda tuturor acestor eforturi concertate, nici statele-naiune, nici corporaiile multinaionale nsei, n-au reuit s mpiedice manifestarea practicilor ilegale ale companiilor, care au constat n fraude sistemice sau izolate, manipulri ale pieelor de valori mobiliare (aciuni, obligaiuni, warrante, tranzacii pe indici, operaiuni futures etc) ori raportri contabile false care au generat o ncredere exagerat a investitorilor n titlurile emise de companiile multinaionale, care a disprut concomitent cu declanarea primelor falimente, dup care n virtutea principiului domino-ului ntreaga pia relevant a cunoscut prbuirea, generndu-se astfel aceast criz economico-financiar global. La o sumar observaie, un analist economic ori strategic s-ar putea ntreba, pe bun dreptate, care ar fi legtura ntre criminalitatea economico-financiar major i criza actual. Un posibil rspuns rezid n situaia celebrei companii americane ENRON care, prin falimentul su de acum 8 ani, a revelat o practic halucinant a corporaiilor multinaionale: raportarea fals a unor profituri contabile, deturnarea unor nsemnate sume de bani de ctre mangerii companiei i mascarea acestor ilegaliti de ctre societile de audit contabile extrem de credibile n mediul de afaceri internaional. O alt practic oarecum ilegal a fost acordarea de credite ipotecare i imobiliare de ctre entiti bancare sau non bancare (subprime-ul american) unor persoane sau firme care erau n evident incapacitate de returnare a creditului ori prin constituirea de garanii inadecvate din punct de vedere operaional ori valoric, care a generat eecul de sistem i quasicolapsul sistemului financiar american, seism ce a fost resimit de toate economiile lumii. Aceast practic a pornit de la necesitatea raportrii unor profituri contabile sporite i de dorina afirmrii unui
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trend ascendent al respectivelor companii n ceea ce privete cota de pia. Aceste practici dublate de alte situaii de delapidri masive, de nelciuni etc au generat temerea investitorilor i reticena bncilor n realizarea unor investiii ori acordarea unor credite, care au distorsionat puternic anumite segmente de pia i structura global a cererii n raport cu oferta, manifestndu-se astfel efectele crizei: scderea produciei i vnzrilor, omaj, recesiune economic etc. Dar, ar fi nedrept, s acuzm n exclusivitate criminalitatea corporatist de declanarea acestei crize economico-financiare. Aceasta este eecul unei viziuni de politic economic bazat pe singura axiom care valorizeaz exclusiv vnzarea. Stimularea cu orice pre a vnzrilor a permis realizarea unor consumuri (pe baz de credit) ce nu au mai putut fi acoperite economic i financiar, riscurile neplii revenind vnztorilor i creditorilor. Astfel, la momentul unei noi abordri, adepii neoliberalismului economic i criticii ferveni ai intervenionismului, se gsesc n penibila postur de a cere statului-naiune s realizeze investiii pentru salvarea unor structuri falimentare economic: prin achiziia de aciuni, prin direcionarea unor credite guvernamentale cu dobnd redus ctre aceste companii sau prin lichidarea unor stocuri ale acestora n urma achiziionrii masive de produse de ctre autoritile publice din respectivele state. n fapt, poate fi momentul n care statul s reueasc implementarea normativ a unor comandamente comportamentale n lumea corporatist, menite s previn pe viitor repetarea unor astfel de situaii dificile380. Actuala criz economico-financiar i are rdcinile profunde ns n vulnerabilitile grave ale sistemului financiar-bancar care s-au perpetuat pe fondul opacitii politice i a lipsei de determinare a factorului politic capabil s le neutralizeze prin re380

glementarea corect a acestor sectoare. Printre aceste vulnerabiliti ale sistemului financiar enumerm381: existena unor atacuri din interior materializate prin fraude de mari proporii, svrite de angajaii proprii, cel mai adesea n complicitate cu parteneri sau clieni ai bncilor; posibilitatea obinerii unor credite pe baza unor documente false sau cu ajutorul altor mijloace frauduloase; politica atragerii unui volum ct mai mare de lichiditi dublat de acordarea unui volum proporional de mare de credite; absorbia unor fonduri murdare sau insuficient justificate de ctre clienii bncilor; inovarea i creativitatea sectorului financiar, n special, n ceea ce privete instrumentele financiare derivate sau structurate (pachete obligaiuni-aciuni prefereniale etc) care conduc la amplificarea riscurilor administrate; promovarea agresiv a performanei sub forma profiturilor mari pe termen scurt, fr evaluarea corect i responsabil a risucrilor operaionale; abandonarea politicilor de cunoatere adecvat a clientelei i a msurilor de autorpotecie i autocontrol; corupia n materia acordrii creditelor extrem de riscante i n legtur cu splarea banilor provenii din activiti criminale; existena paradisurilor fiscale care gzduiesc un volum impresionant de fonduri ilegale car ulterior sunt tranzacionate prin sistemul bancar mondial; reglementarea superficial i lipsa monitorizrii fondurilor financiare speculative; utilizarea unor norme i reglementri contabile uniforme n sistemul bancar european i n cel global care permite ptrunderea capitalurilor murdare i meninerea activelor toxice la adpostul aa-numite381

Caves, Richard Intreprinderea multinaional i analiza economic Edit. Magic Print 2003 pag. 152

C. Voicu- Investigarea fraudelor. Curs pentru masterat. Edit. Sitech 2009 pg 83, 84

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lor norme bazate pe valoarea de pia; existena conflictelor de interese ntre activitatea de consiliere i cea de rating la nivelul ageniilor specializate; amplificarea volumului bonusurilor acordate traderilor i managerilor de portofolii care sunt ncurajai s evite respectarea normelor de prudenialitate i de gestionare a riscurilor, prin promovarea unor produse structurate care absorb fonduri criminale i genereaz riscuri; lipsa de supraveghere transfrontalier a bncilor i companiilor de asigurri care recurg la practici ilegale; exacerbarea secretului bancar n raport cu autoritile abilitate n lupta mpotriva criminalitii organizate. De altfel, summitul G 20 desfurat la Londra n primvara anului 2009 a concluzionat oportunitatea i necesitatea reglementrii i supravegherii mai stricte a fondurilor speculative i investiiilor de capital,382 ca una din cile de reducere pe viitor a riscurilor inerente activitilor financiarbancare. Preocupri majore n acest domeniu s-au manifestat i la Forumul Economic Mondial desfurat la Davos n ianuarie 2010. n cadrul acestuia, participanii au convenit asupra tuturor categoriilor de riscuri manifestate la nivel mondial, cum ar fi383: riscurile economice: volatilitatea preurilor alimentelor, creterea preurilor carburanilor, cderea economic a S.U.A., diminuarea ratei de cretere economic nregistrat de China, crizele fiscale, cderea major a valorii activelor economice, reorientarea dinamicii globalizrii n statele industrializate i n cele n curs de dezvoltare, presiunile induse de reglementrile stricte n sfera economic, diminuarea nivelului investiiilor n infrastructur. riscurile geopolitice: terorismul internaional, proliferarea nuclear, situaia
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politic din Iran i Coreea de Nord, instabilitatea politic a Afganistanului, criminalitatea i corupia transnaional, situaia politic aferent conflictului israelo-palestinian i irakian, discrepanele sistemelor politice i administrative la nivel global. riscuri de mediu: fenomenele meteorologice extreme, seceta i deertificarea, insuficiena surselor de ap, uraganele, cutremurele, inundaiile, poluarea atmosferic i diminuarea rapid a biodiversitii. riscuri societale: pandemiile, bolile cronice i infecioase, migraia. riscuri tehnologice: distrugerea sau colapsul infrastructurilor critice, toxicitatea unor nanoparticule, furtul sau alterarea unor date informatice sau baze de date. Axat pe identificarea i actualizarea noilor riscuri globale, Forumul Economic Mondial de la Davos a reuit o actualizare a tabloului acestora. Dar, importante pentru demersul nostru investigativ sunt prevederile acestui raport adresate companiilor multinaionale. Dintre acestea menionm384: verificarea presupunerilor i supoziiilor cu care acestea opereaz atunci cnd concep planuri i strategii orientate, n special, pe investiiile de capital; abordarea ntr-o manier comprehensiv, apt de a fi monitorizat i adaptat, a relaiilor complexe care presupun interelaionri ntre riscurile sistemice aferente activitilor corporaiilor multinaionale; identificarea i evaluarea oportunitilor economice aprute n contextul i n cadrul mai larg al evenimentelor i trendurilor globale; luarea deciziilor pe termen lung n cadrul corporaiilor multinaionale va ine cont de necesitatea obinerii unor profituri n contextul unei creteri economice sustenabile. Deciziile la care face referire recomandarea sunt cele privitoare la: accesul pe noi piee, achiziii, fuziuni i divizri, join384

C. Voicu- Investigarea fraudelor. Curs pentru masterat. Edit. Sitech 2009 pg .84 383 Global Risks 2010. A Global Risk Network Report pg. 3

Global Risks 2010. A Global Risk Network Report pg. 34

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venture i parteneriate precum i investiiile de capital; corporaiile trebuie s instituie proceduri care s in cont de multitudinea riscurilor i impactului pe care acestea le-ar putea avea asupra lor, furnizorilor lor, concurenei sau guvernului din ara unde acioneaz; tranziia de la managementul riscurilor activelor corporatiste de pe orizontul de 2-3 ani la cel de 5-10 ani. optimizarea portofoliului decizional al managementului ,n vederea limitrii efectelor pe care riscurile le-ar putea induce asupra activitilor i performanelor companiei. Implementarea acestor msuri va presupune o redirecionare a managementului corporaiilor multinaionale n zona lurii acelor decizii care s asigure o cretere economic sntoas a companiilor pe fondul dezvoltrii durabile a societii la nivel global i a limitrii ariei de impact a riscurilor aferente activitii acestora asupra clienilor acestora, investitorilor, creditorilor sau autoritilor guvernamentale. n concluzie, corporaiile multinaionale i producia transnaional de bunuri ori prestarea internaional de servicii reflect o lume n care capitalul i tehnologia au devenit din ce n ce mai mobile i din ce n ce mai riscante, n timp ce munca prestat de angajai a rmas relativ imobil. Schimbrile continue n avantajul comparativ de la o economie naional la alta, progresele nregistrate de transporturile i comunicaiile moderne i politicile guvernamentale favorabile ndeamn corporaiile s-i amplaseze instalaiile productive n locaiile cele mai avantajoase de pe glob, transfernd cu sine atitudini, valori i comportamente din care unele situate dincolo de limita legii ori de imperativele moralei. Consecinele economice i politice ale produciei internaionale precum i formarea unor aliane economico-politice ntre guverne i corporaii, care depesc graniele naionale constituie motive de disput i speculaii, att n plan politic ct i socioeconomic.
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Dar, aceste aliane transnaionale nu rezolv acuta problem a supraproduciei, nu ofer un rspuns credibil la ntrebarea cine ce va produce sau cum vor fi compensai cei care pierd, iar aceste temeri pot constitui tot atia factori determinani n replicarea viral a criminalitii corporatiste, care astfel i gsete refugiul propriei sale decadene n acumularea la nivel personal sau antreprenorial a ct mai multor bunuri sau valori financiare385. Corporaiile multinaionale i rzboiul din Irak Rzboiul reprezint o modalitate de modificare violent a status-quo-ului politic, militar, economic sau social n arena internaional. n mod evident, rzboiul reprezint o opiune eminamente politic de rezolvare a unui diferend pe baza mijloacelor preponderent militare. Dezvoltarea tehnologic nregistrat n ultimele decenii i-a pus amprenta i asupra industriei militare care a devenit astzi una dintre ramurile cele mai tehnologizate ale sectorului industrial. Rentabilitatea sectorului industrial militar ar trebui asigurat, n principiu, de stat prin finanrile bugetare. Acest tip de soluie adoptat n special de fostele state socialiste i-a artat neajunsurile, finanrile acestui sector fiind cele care au condus la colapsul U.R.S.S.. De cealalt parte, S.U.A. au implementat un alt sistem bazat pe susinerea corporaiilor implicate n industria militar pe care le-au ajutat ulterior, odat cu perimarea moral a produselor realizate, n obinerea unor contracte avantajoase, mediate politic, cu state partenere sau prin transferul de tehnologie ctre sectoarele private. Spre exemplu, trei dintre cel mai des ntlnite produse ale societii actuale, telefonia mobil, internetul i televizorul utilizat n industrie i gospodrie - sunt rezultatele cercetrilor desfurate n industria militar. n acest context, susinerea financiar din partea statului i posibilitatea supraren385

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tabilitii prin transferul de tehnologie ctre sfera privat, implicarea companiilor multinaionale n acest domeniu a devenit evident. Din perspectiv economic, rzboiul este o circumstan care conduce la o cretere a cererii de produse, echipamente i servicii militare, care subsecvent poate fi tradus ntr-o cretere a cifrei de afaceri, n timp ce, n plan militar, acesta poate dovedi superioritatea unor tehnologii utilizate la fabricaia bunurilor respective, care genereaz o dinamic a cererii sau interesului unor parteneri poteniali. Dup atacurile de la 11 septembrie i de cnd cu rzboaiele din Irak i Afganistan, afacerile militare prosper. Cele mai mari cinci companii de echipament militar Lockheed, Boeing, Northrop, General Dynamics i Raytheon- i-au sporit vnzrile cu zece procente anual, ncepnd din 2001. n aceeai perioad, bugetul Pentagonului a crescut cu o medie de aproape similar de 11%. n 2005, profiturile celor cinci companii au crescut cu 25% fa de anul precedent.386 Cu alte cuvinte, rzboaiele mpotriva terorismului au constituit un prilej oportun pentru corporaiile implicate n industria militar de cretere a vnzrilor i, implicit, a profiturilor proprii. Dar, trebuie observat i evaluat gradul n care aceste cinci corporaii, fundamentale pentru efortul de rzboi american, pot fi tratate similar cu alte companii de dimensiuni mai mici care desfoar activiti n alte sfere mai puin importante- ca expresie a principiului egalitii de tratament a tuturor agenilor economici, pentru a fi n faa unui tablou marcat de inechiti majore induse de asimetria intereselor i potenei economice utilizate att pentru scopuri licite ct i pentru cele ilicite. Dincolo de considerentele de ordin politic, militar, economic, social sau etic al rzboiului dus de S.U.A. n Irak, acesta a artat lumii o alt variant a Planului Marshall, cel care a grbit refacerea Europei de
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vest dup cel de al doilea rzboi mondial. Miza postbelic a acestui rzboi a constituit-o refacerea industriei i infrastructurii petroliere a statului irakian, unul dintre cele mai bogate n zcminte de hidrocarburi. Istoria mondial a cunoscut cazuri numeroase n care companii rezidente n statul ctigtor al unui rzboi s fie beneficiarele directe ale unor avantaje economice rezultate din faptul juridic al victoriei. Rzboiul din Irak, ns, este primul n care unul din demnitarii implicai n mod major n declanarea acestuia nregistreaz direct beneficii materiale legale n urma victoriei. n spe, vicepreedintele S.U.A. Dick Chenney, (fost preedinte al Consiliului de Administraie al Halliburton) a mediat i a intervenit ca aceast companie s obin contracte de refacere a capacitilor i infrastructurii petroliere irakiene n valoare de aproximativ 10 miliarde de dolari, demers finalizat n perioada 2004-2005. Ca efect al acestui veritabil i indiscutabil conflict de interese, valoarea pachetului de aciuni deinut de vicepreedintele Chenney la compania menionat a crescut conform estimrilor bursiere de la 250.000 dolari la aproape 8 milioane de dolari n interval de aproximativ 2 ani. Un alt aspect extrem de important legat de compania Halliburton i de comportamentul excesiv manifestat de aceasta n perioada n care Dick Chenney ocupa funcia de vicepreedinte al S.U.A., este susinut de investigaia efectuat de um mare juriu federal n legtur cu posibila nclcare de ctre aceasta n anul 2001 a embargoului economic i militar impus Iranului. compania fiind suspectat c a derulat prin interpui afaceri cu acest stat n vederea obinerii unor profituri frauduloase. De altfel, pentru practicile ilegale nregistrate n legtur cu modul de obinere i derulare a contractelor n Irak, companiile multinaionale americane contractoare n Irak- Halliburton, Bechtel, Fluor etc- au fost amendate de juriile federale cu amenzi n valoare total de aproximativ 300 de milioane de dolari. Pe de alt parte, ridicolul situaiei este desvrit de faptul c se apre212

ciaz c aceti contractori amendai au comis fraude a cror valoare nsumat se apropie de 7 miliarde de dolari, sum (la care trebuie adugat i dobnda) pe care, n final, tot contribuabilii irakieni vor urma s-i achite. Astfel, dincolo de mizeria i tragediile personale pe care le aduce rzboiul, companiile multinaionale l valorific drept o oportunitate de a face bani indiferent de costurile umane pe care acesta le presupune. Sectorul militar nu presupune numai rzboiul n optica ntreprinderilor transnaionale din industria de armament. Starea de insecuritate politic regional sau zonal, temerile legate de evoluia acesteia sunt alte oportuniti de cretere a cifrei de afaceri i, implicit, a profiturilor. Un exemplu elocvent, de exploatare a strii de insecuritate zonal conexat cu puterea de corupere a companiilor transnaionale l constituie mita pe care compania britanic British Aerospace (BAE) a oferit-o prinului saudit Bandar bin Sultan n vederea facilitrii ncheierii unui contract valoare n de 54 miliarde de dolari ntre aceasta i armata Arabiei Saudite387. Dar sfera militar este una din cele n care se nregistreaz cea mai nalt sfer a protecie asigurat de stat n materia ncheierii contractelor legate de achiziia de armament. Unul din cazurile cele mai interesante nregistrate pe piaa american l constituie asocierea ntre EADS i Northrop Grumann n vederea participrii comune la obinerea i derularea unui contract n valoare de 35 de miliarde de dolari cu Forele Aeriene Americane care consta n furnizarea a peste 100 de avioane-cistern care urmau s fie dezvoltate pe platforma avionului AIRBUS 330. Dei n faza iniial asocierea ntre cele dou corporaii multinaionale fusese declarat ctigtoare, G.A.O. (Government Accountability Office- echivalentul american al Curii de Conturi) a decis anularea licitaiei fr a exista un motiv credibil la contestaia de387

pus de perdantul licitaiei, cellalt colos al industriei aeronautice americane - Boeing. n realitate, motivele care au stat la baza anulrii ilegale a licitaiei au fost legate de presiunea exercitat de anumii membri influeni ai Congresului American care, au invocat n plin campanie electoral prezidenial posibilitatea ca 10.000 de angajai ai Boeing s devin omeri i miliarde de dolari din bugetul federal s ia calea Europei. De altfel, licitaia urmeaz s fie repetat dar, acum n mediile politice i militare exist convingerea c aceasta va fi ctigat de cine trebuie i anume de compania Boeing. Prin aceast modalitate, S.U.A. ncurajeaz dincolo de considerentele economice, juridice sau etice dezvoltarea propriului sector tehnologic militar menit s asigure supremaia militar i, implicit, pe cea politic la nceputul mileniului III. Ordinea este local, n timp ce elita i legile pieei libere de care ascult sunt translocale. Dac gardienii unei ordini locale devin prea insidioi i obraznici, ntotdeauna elita poate face apel la legile globale pentru a schimba conceptele locale de ordine i regulile locale ale jocului.388 Corporaiile multinaionale i fondurile publice Corporaiile multinaionale i desfoar activitatea ntr-o lume bazat pe parteneriat economic ntre diverse entiti care ar trebui s se bucure de poziii egale n raporturile comerciale i n ceea ce privete ntinderea i simetria drepturilor i obligaiilor. Pentru extinderea propriei dezvoltri companiile multinaionale recurg adesea la parteneriatul comercial cu statul, cu alte cuvinte, ncheie afaceri cu cel mai mare i mai solvabil partener. Pn aici nimic nu ar putea strni vreo suspiciune. Lucrurile iau o cu totul alt turnur atunci cnd contractele ncheiate de aceste corporaii cu statul sunt asimetrice n sensul ntinderii drepturilor i obligaiilor prilor. Prin contrast, instituiile capitaliste sunt
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Thomas Mathiesen Prison on Trial: A Critical Assessment, Edit. London Sage 1990 pg 131

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clieni fideli ai subveniilor publice direcionate ctre corporaii. Folosind mijloace care merg de la ameninarea cu delocalizarea locurilor de munc pn la contribuii financiare pentru partidele politice i campanii de lobby bine unse, corporaiile reuesc s-i conving pe cei care controleaz cheltuielile publice s le ofere subvenii pentru cercetare, extragere de resurse, publicitate pentru unele produse n strintate, asigurarea investiiilor din strintate contra riscurilor politice i pentru orice altceva din domeniul lor de activitate.389 Spectrul de activiti prezentate surprinde extrem de fidel cmpul motivaional al companiilor multinaionale care le determin pe acestea s se ndrepte cu aviditate ctre fondurile publice sau pentru rambursarea unor cheltuieli ale acestora manifestate sub forma unor taxe i impozite datorate statului. Spre exemplu, n 1957, corporaiile au furnizat circa 45% din totalul impozitelor pe proprieti la nivelul S.U.A.. n 1987, partea lor a sczut la circa 16%.390. Cu alte cuvinte, ca efect al presiunilor lobby-tilor i al corporaiilor, dei dezvoltarea acestora a fost exploziv n perioada menionat, cuantumul impozitelor aferente proprietilor a sczut cu aproximativ 66%, bani care au rmas n posesia companiilor i care au alimentat patrimonii private, legal sau ilegal. Tot astfel, n legtur cu grija fa de mediul nconjurtor, trebuie menionat c la nivel global, subveniile guvernamentale pentru utilizarea energiei - n majoritate din surse fosile i nucleare - sunt estimate a fi de ordinul a 250-300 miliarde de dolari.391 Apetena companiilor multinaionale devine evident atunci cnd acestea demareaz noi investiii care presupun crearea de noi locuri de munc. De foarte multe ori acestea sunt suspectate i dovedite c reuesc s creeze i s finaneze locurile de
389 David C. Korten- Lumea post-corporatist. Viaa dup capitalism. Edit. Antet Bucureti 2004 pg.50 390 David C. Korten- Lumea post-corporatist. Viaa dup capitalism. Edit. Antet Bucureti 2004, pg.51 391 David C. Korten- Lumea post-corporatist. Viaa dup capitalism. Edit. Antet Bucureti 2004, pg.51

munc nou create aproape n totalitate din fonduri publice i s-i aproprie integral profiturile operaionale obinute. Adic, se reuete crearea unei ntreprinderi private prin subvenii guvernamentale iar profiturile sunt eminamente transferate n patrimoniul acionariatului acesteia. Un exemplu elocvent l constituie pachetul tentant pe care l-a primit MOTOROLA de la statul Virginia pentru a crea un centru de producie i cercetare care includea un grant de 55,9 milioane de dolari, o amnare pentru plata taxelor de 1,6 miliarde dolari i rambursarea a 5 milioane de dolari folosii pentru instruirea angajailor392. La nivelul S.U.A. aceast tendin ntlnit la nivelul companiilor multinaionale sa generalizat. n acest mod, companiile multinaionale se ateapt ca statele s preia o parte a cheltuielilor lor salariale, de obicei, prin rambursarea ctre companie a unei pri din impozitele reinute de stat de la angajaii calificai393. Un alt exemplu la fel de gritor este cel al companiei Whirlpool- lider mondial n fabricarea de aparatur electrocasnic. n scopul construciei unei noi fabrici la Tulsa, Oklahoma, compania menionat a solicitat i primit din partea autor