Nr.

1-2 / 2014

REVISTA ROMN
DE CONCUREN

Consiliului Concurenei Romnia

Piaa Presei Libere nr. 1, sector 1, 013701, Bucureti
E-mail: competition@consiliulconcurentei.ro
www.consiliulconcurentei.ro

Romanian Competition Journal

REVISTA ROMN DE CONCUREN /

ROMANIAN COMPETITION JOURNAL
Apare sub egida Consiliului Concurenei Romnia
Piaa Presei Libere nr. 1, sector 1, 013701, Bucureti, Romnia
E-mail: competition@consiliulconcurentei.ro
CONSILIUL TIINIFIC
Adriana Alman Universitatea din Bucureti
Mihai Berinde Universitatea din Oradea
Anca Chiri Durham Law School
Bogdan Chirioiu Universitatea din Bucureti
Anthony Collins Tribunalul General al Uniunii Europene
Sorin David Universitatea din Bucureti
Daniel Dianu coala Naional de Studii Politice i Administrative
Dalina Dumitrescu - Academia de Studii Economice
Ioannis Kokkoris University of Reading
Ioannis Lianos University College London
Csongor Istvn Nagy Universitatea din Szeged
Gheorghe Oprescu Universitatea Politehnic din Bucureti
Mnika Papp Universitatea Etvs Lornd din Budapesta
Theodor Purcrea Universitatea Romno-American
Catalin S. Rusu Universitatea din Nijmegen
Jean Marc Thouvenin - Universit de Paris Ouest Nanterre La Dfense
Gabriela igu Academia de Studii Economice
Liviu Voinea Academia de Studii Economice
Peter Whelan - University of Leeds
COMITETUL EDITORIAL
Florin Andrei
George Anglioiu
Daniel Stan
Mirela Apostol
RECENZENI
Prof.univ.dr. Gabriela igu
Conf.univ.dr. Adriana Alman
Conf.univ.dr. Mihaela Mosora
Conf.univ.dr. George Anglioiu
ISSN 2343 9785
Copyright 2014, Consiliul Concurenei Romnia
Opiniile exprimate n cuprinsul articolelor constituie preri personale ale autorilor
i nu reprezint n mod necesar punctele de vedere ale Consiliului Concurenei.
The opinions expressed in the content articles are the personal opinions of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the view of Romanian Competition
Council.

REVISTA ROMN
DE CONCUREN
Romanian Competition Journal
Nr. 2 / 201

CUPRINS
1. Concurena (ne) loial /p. 3
Adriana Alman
Facultatea de Drept, Universitatea din Bucureti
Avocat, Baroul Bucureti
2. Aplicarea normelor comunitare de concurena n Romnia: Conceptul de "efect
asupra comerului" n practica Consiliului Concurenei / p. 11
Alexandr Svetlicinii, PhD
Universitatea din Macau, Facultatea de drept
3. Detectarea cartelurilor prin metode analitice / p. 24
Florin Andrei
Direcia Cercetare-Sinteze, director
Mihail Buu
Direcia Cercetare-Sinteze, inspector de concuren
4. Indicele agregat de presiune concurenial o versiune nou i mbuntit /
p. 31
Radu A. Pun
Direcia Cercetare-Sinteze- Inspector de concuren
Paul Prisecaru
Direcia Cercetare-Sinteze- Director adjunct
5. Analiza sectoarelor de activitate frecvent intalnite n operaiunile publice de
preluare in Romania / p. 39
Radu Ciobanu
Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureti
6. Efectele concureniale ale integrrilor verticale / p. 45
Drd. Ioan Lucian Alexa
Drd. Georgiana Oana Moraru
Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureti
7. Ce este gun-jumping-ul i cum l putem evita? / p. 50
Ana Maria Udrite
8. Ajutorul de stat i procesul concurenial de pia / p. 61
Emil Duhnea
Master Dreptul Afacerilor, Facultatea de Drept, Universitatea Bucureti
9. Concurena i comerul online/ p. 72
Traian gtefnescu
Facultatea de Drept a Universitii din Bucureti





Table of contents

1. (Un)fair competition / p. 3
Adriana Alman
Faculty of Law, University of Bucharest
Lawyer, Bucharest Bar Association
2. Enforcement of the EU competition rules in Romania: Application of the
effect on trade concept in the enforcement practice of the Romanian
Competition Council / p. 11
Alexandr Svetlicinii, PhD
Faculty of Law, University of Macau
3. Detecting Cartels through Analytical Methods / p. 24
Florin Andrei
Director- Research and Synthesis Department
Mihail Buu
Competition Inspector - Research and Synthesis Department
4. The Aggregate Index of Competitive Pressure a new and improved
version / p. 31
Radu A. Pun
Competition Inspector, Research Department
Paul Prisecaru
Deputy Director, Research Department
5. The analysis of the industries usually found in takeover bids in Romania /
p. 39
Radu Ciobanu
Bucharest University of Economic Studies
6. The competitive effects of vertical integration / p. 45
Ioan Lucian Alexa
Georgiana Oana Moraru
Bucharest University of Economic Studies
7. What is gun-jumping and how can we avoid it? / p. 50
Ana Maria Udrite
Lawyer, Bucharest Bar Association
8. State aid and the competitive market process / p. 61
Emil Duhnea
Faculty of Law, University of Bucharest
9. Competition and online commerce / p. 72
Traian gtefnescu
Faculty of Law, University of Bucharest


Concurena (ne) loial

Conf. univ. dr. Adriana Alman
Facultatea de Drept, Universitatea din Bucureti
Avocat, Baroul Bucureti


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(Un)fair competition
Adriana Alman, Lecturer Ph. D.
Faculty of Law, University of Bucharest
Lawyer, Bucharest Bar Association

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Aplicarea normelor comunitare

de concurena n Romnia:
Conceptul de efect asupra comerului
n practica Consiliului Concurenei
Alexandr Svetlicinii, PhD
Universitatea din Macau, Facultatea de drept

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Enforcement of the EU competition rules

in Romania: Application of the effect on trade
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Alexandr Svetlicinii, PhD
University of Macau, Faculty of Law

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Bibliography
          ECLR  


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EUI Working Paper

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Referine bibliografice






          
 
 



        


             



          
        
e-Competitions Bulletin
          

            
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e-Competitions Bulletin
           
              
          
e-Competitions Bulletin

22

           
Romanian Competition Journal


         
ECLR

CMLR
 EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials

ECLR 
          
        
e-Competitions Bulletin
          

           
e-Competitions Bulletin

ECLR

             
e-Competitions Bulletin
           

           
e-Competitions Bulletin


e-Competitions Bulletin

         
        e-Competitions Bulletin

         
          

e-Competitions Bulletin

           
European Integration online Papers 


22

          

e-Competitions Bulletin

         
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      e-Competitions Bulletin    


    Expedia   Expedia Inc. Autorit de la
concurrence and Others 

           
















23

         
            
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    Expedia   Expedia Inc. Autorit de la
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CMLR
          
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23

Detectarea Cartelurilor prin Metode Analitice



Florin Andrei92
Mihail Buu93
Rezumat
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Cuvinte cheie


 

1. Introducere

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2. Studii teoretice de detectare a comportamentelor anticoncureniale

           

           

           primul pre      
          


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24

Detecting Cartels through Analytical Methods




Florin Andrei92
Mihail Buu93


Abstract
        


            



           
         
         

Keywords
        





1. Introduction

           

           
              
          



2. Theoretical studies on the detection of anticompetitive behaviours

           



                 
the first-price sealed auction



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3. Exemple de aplicare a metodelor analitice de depistare a cartelurilor
3.1. Depistarea licitaiilor trucate bazate pe evenimente improbabile

           
            

               




 

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3. Practice examples of analytical methods used for detecting cartels
3.1. Detection of bid rigging based on improbable events
          

            

            
             
            


 

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25

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3.2. Metode analitice bazate pe preuri i informaia costurilor

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Graficul nr. 1.

6
5

Pre mediu
4

Cost mediu
3
2
1

coluziune

concuren
0

Pret vanzare

Cost

Sursa: prelucrari proprii

           

            



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Tabelul nr.1.
Statistici
Concuren Coluziune
Diferene
Pre











 



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3.2. Analytical methods based on prices and cost information
             



Figure 1.

6
5

Average price

Average Cost

3
2

Collusion

Competition

1
0

Selling price

Cost

Source: Own processing



            
              

            

            







26

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3.3. Depistarea nelegerilor asupra coordonrii preurilor de vnzare
                

            


                


              

               


Graficul nr. 2.             

0,3

dev. std.

0,25

0,2

0,15

0,1
3

medie
Sursa: procesri proprii



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27

Table 1. 

  
























   
















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coefficient94
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3.4. Analiza evoluiei cotelor de pia
           



Tabelul nr.2
Cota de pia %
2010

2011

2012

2013

B

B

B

B




Graficul nr. 3.
100%
90%
80%
70%

Altele

60%

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50%

Intreprinderea C

40%

Intreprinderea B

30%

Intreprinderea A

20%
10%
0%
2010

Sursa: prelucrri proprii

2011

2012

2013




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Figure 2.


0,3

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3

average


Source: own processing

               


           

              
            
           

3.4. The analysis of market shares evolution
        

             


Table 2.
Market share %

2010
2011
2012
2013











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4. Concluzii
        
            




            








ACKNOWLEDGMENT
         

         



29

















Figure 3. 
100%
90%
80%
70%

Others

60%

Undertaking D

50%

Undertaking C

40%

Undertaking B

30%

Undertaking A

20%
10%
0%
2010

Source: own processing

2011

2012

2013








4. Conclusions


         


          
             
           


 

            



29

Bibliografie
        Deciding between competition and collusion  

 

 
 
           
 

            

              
 
             
























30

Acknowledgement
         

            
 


References
           

            

 
 
         
 



            
 
           


         
 















30

Indicele Agregat de Presiune Concurenial

o versiune nou i mbuntit
Radu A. Pun*
Paul Prisecaru**
Rezumat

           
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The Aggregate Index of Competitive Pressure

a new and improved version
Radu A. Pun*
Paul Prisecaru**
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3. Aplicarea IAPC asupra a 21 de industrii din economia naional

              

           




34

            
            
             
           
              


         
          
             

Figure 1. Points awarded based on the importance of factors
9

8
7.5

7
6

5
4.5

3
2

1
0

A (1)

1.5
1
0.67
0.5

1.33
1

B (2)

C (3)

Category A+

2.67

2
1.5

D (4)

E (5)

Category A

4
3.33

2.5

F (6)

Category B

G (7)

Category C


3.

AICP application on 21 industries in the national economy


             
 
             
             


34

Figura 2. Aplicarea IAPC asupra a 21 de industrii din economia naional n anul 2014
0%
Servicii de arhitectura
Distributie piese de schimb pentru autovehicule
Servicii publice de salubrizare
Distributie autoturisme
Productie de medicamente
Retail alimentar - aprovizionare
Servicii de retransmisie a programelor audiovizuale
Retail alimentar - comercializare
Asigurare de viata
Asigurare facultativa auto
Constructie de drumuri si autostrazi
Distributie en-gross de medicamente
Servicii de telefonie mobila
Servicii de acces la infrastructura aeroportuara
Distributie retail de carburanti
Asigurare de raspundere civila auto
Distributie en-gross de GPL aragaz
Transport feroviar de marfa
Transport feroviar de calatori
Servicii notariale
Productie si comercializare ciment

Industrii ordonate n funcie de versiunea V4 a IAPC

20%

40%
53%
53%
52%
50%
49%
48%
49%
51%
49%
47%
46%
47%
46%
48%
48%
43%
43%
43%
42%
43%
44%
42%
41%
41%
40%
40%
40%
37%
37%
35%
36%
37%
36%
36%
38%
39%
36%
36%
38%
35%
38%
41%
35%
36%
38%
34%
34%
35%
33%
34%
36%
32%
33%
36%
31%
32%
33%
28%
28%
28%
25%
26%
27%

60%

V4
V2
V1

               




             
B





             

35


Figure 2. Application of AICP on 21 industries in the national economy in 2014
0%
Architecture services
Distribution of auto parts
Public sanitation services
Wholesale distribution of cars
Production of drugs
Food retail - supply side
Retransmission of audiovisual programmes
Food retail - distribution side
Life insurance
Motor hull insurance
Construction of roads and highways
Wholesale distribution of drugs
Mobile telecommunication services
Airport infrastructure access services
Retail fuel distribution
Motor third-party liability insurance
Distribution of LPG tanks for stove use
Railway freight transportation
Railway passenger transportation
Notary services
Production and sale of cement

20%

40%

60%

53%
53%
52%
50%
49%
48%
49%
51%
49%
47%
46%
47%
46%
48%
48%
43%
43%
43%
42%
43%
44%
42%
41%
41%
41%
41%
41%
37%
37%
35%
36%
37%
36%
36%
38%
39%
36%
36%
38%
35%
38%
41%
35%
36%
38%
34%
34%
35%
33%
34%
36%
32%
33%
36%
31%
32%
33%
28%
28%
28%
25%
26%
27%

V4
V2
V1

Industries ordered by the V4 version of the AICP


              




            


35

         


B             
             


           
               
             
            


B
            


- 


-              


- 

           
           
           



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-             

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36

Figura 3. Aplicarea IAPC (V4) asupra a 21 de industrii din economia naional, 2013-2014
0%

20%

40%

60%
53%
52%

Servicii de arhitectura

50%
51%

Distributie piese de schimb pentru autovehicule

Servicii publice de salubrizare

49%
49%

Distributie autoturisme

47%
49%
46%
46%

Productie de medicamente

43%
43%

Retail alimentar - aprovizionare

Servicii de retransmisie a programelor audiovizuale

42%
42%

Retail alimentar - comercializare

42%
42%
40%
41%

Asigurare de viata

37%
36%

Asigurare facultativa auto

Constructie de drumuri si autostrazi

36%
35%

Distributie en-gross de medicamente

36%
36%

Servicii de telefonie mobila

36%
33%

Distributie retail de carburanti

35%
34%

Asigurare de raspundere civila auto

34%
34%
33%
33%

Distributie en-gross de GPL aragaz

32%
32%

Transport feroviar de marfa

31%
31%

Transport feroviar de calatori

Productie si comercializare ciment

Industrii ordonate n funcie de rezultatele IAPC (V4) din anul 2014

2013

35%
35%

Servicii de acces la infrastructura aeroportuara

Servicii notariale

2014

28%
28%
25%
24%

Q1=34%

Q3=46%

4. Concluzii
            
          
              
cartel screening



37

Figure 3. The application of AICP (V4) on 21 industries in the national economy, 2013-2014
0%

20%

40%

60%
53%
52%

Architecture services
Distribution of auto parts

50%
51%

Public sanitation services

49%
49%

Wholesale distribution of cars

47%
49%
46%
46%

Production of drugs

43%
43%

Food retail - supply side

Retransmission of audiovisual programmes

42%
42%

Food retail - distribution side

42%
42%

Life insurance

41%
42%
37%
36%

Motor hull insurance

Construction of roads and highways

36%
35%

Wholesale distribution of drugs

36%
36%

Mobile telecommunication services

36%
33%

Retail fuel distribution

35%
34%

Motor third-party liability insurance

34%
34%
33%
33%

Distribution of LPG tanks for stove use

32%
32%

Railway freight transportation

31%
31%

Railway passenger transportation

Production and sale of cement

2013

35%
35%

Airport infrastructure access services

Notary services

2014

28%
28%
25%
24%

Q1=34%

Q3=46%

Industries ordered by the AICP results (V4) of 2014


4. Conclusions
             
          
             


37

           
            
              
             
               
               



             
            
            























38

              


           
             



              

         

         























38

Analiza sectoarelor de activitate frecvent intalnite

n operaiunile publice de preluare in Romania



Radu Ciobanu
Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureti


Rezumat

             
              
              


            
             
           
             


Cuvinte cheie
           


JEL Classification


1.Introducere

B
                  

B
            



            

            
            



           

            
            

            

39

The analysis of the industries usually found

in takeover bids in Romania


Radu Ciobanu
Bucharest University of Economic Studies - ASE


Abstract
              
             

              
             






Keywords
         


JEL Classification



1.Introduction
             


             


        
             

 
          



           

            

             




39



           
             


2.Literatura de specialitate
B
            






          


            



B            
             

          
              

              
        B    
           


B
              

           
           
             B   

              
            B
             


3. Baza de date, rezultate i discuii



40


             


2.Literature review

            
          
          
          
            

             


             
             




          
          
 



               
           

            




              


            


             


3. Databases, results and discussion
            
                

40



                

           
             
             
             
              
               
           
  B          


Tabel 1. Top 5 sectoare de activitate din punctul de vedere al fuziunilor i achiziiilor

Numrul de M&As ntre 2005Sector (companie achiziionat)
2014










     






B            
            

             


             

               



               


            

B
            

            

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41

          

           

             

Andrade et al., 2001)
                

             



Table 1. Top 5 industries based on merger activity

Major sector (target)
Number of M&As during 20052014









   


 
 


             




               
            
              





           

           

               



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41

             
              
B
               
          
               
           


Tabel 2. Numrul de oferte publice de cumprare i preluare pe piaa de capital
romneasc ntre anii 2000 i 2014

Anul

Numrul de oferte de Numrul de oferte de cumprare

cumprare i preluare i preluare ncheiate cu succes














































Total
1433
181




        B       
              
            






Table 3. Numrul de oferte publice de cumprare i preluare reuite i nereuite
pe secoare de activitate

Sector de activitate



42

Numrul
oferte
publice
reuite



de Probabilitatea
ca
oferta
public s fie
reuit



           

                

 





Table 2. Number of Public Purchase Offers and Tender Offers on the Romanian
Capital Markets between 2000 and 2014

Year

Takeover bids

Takeover bids with successful

transfer of the controlling position














































Total
1433
181





             


             



Table 3. The number of successful and unsuccessful takeover bids
displayed by industry

Industry


The
Number of
probability
successful
of success in
takeovers
a takeover



42






 








Total

















181









             

             


            
           






              

              


           
               




4.Concluzii
            
                 

            









43

























Total market
181

















           
             





              
            



           
               
            


            


              


4.Conclusions
          
             

             

             


           

             

43




Acknowledgment
          
Q       
       


References

New Evidence and Perspectives
on Mergers 
         
Journal of Accounting and Economics
            
Journal of Banking & Finance

            
The Czech Journal Of Economics And Finance
(Finance A vr)2013,
 

    Review of Financial Studies    

         The impact of industry shocks on
takeover and restructuring activity -  
          
Journal of Financial Economics
             
 International Journal of Industrial Organization   









44






Acknowledgment
          
       




References

         New Evidence and
Perspectives on Mergers         

        
Journal of Accounting and Economics
            
      Journal of Banking &
Finance
           
       The Czech Journal Of
Economics And Finance (Finance A vr)2013,
        
 
     Review of Financial Studies

 The impact of industry shocks on
takeover and restructuring activity -  
          
Journal of Financial Economics
   
International Journal of Industrial Organization









44

Efectele concureniale ale integrrilor verticale

Drd. Ioan Lucian Alexa
Drd. Georgiana Oana Moraru
Rezumat

B
          
    B         
           
           

Introducere


            


             
           

Referine teoretice
             


B  g           

   g          






            

           

             
           


45

The competitive effects of vertical integration

Phd. Candidate Ioan Lucian Alexa

Phd. Candidate Georgiana Oana Moraru

Abstract

               


            
             


Introduction





           

Theoretical references



            

            

          

             


            


45




 
B                



           
           

             
             
                 
               

B


         


            

B

         








 
           
               






46


             


 


          
            

            
           
            

             


            
           

            
         
             
             
           

                
              
            

             
              
           


           

 






46

 
          
          
             

             



Studii de caz

            
          

Philips i Intermagnetics.



B               
        



B
            


            

 


 
B            
             
           

            

              

B            


47

 
          

            

           

            

Case studies
             
           

Philips and Intermagnetics.





            
            


            
           




              

              
                

              



                


47

Evraz i Highveld


              




             
             
           
             



           
               

            

             
          B  
            
          

B


            

          





Concluzii
B
             
          

 

48



Evraz and Highveld


          
            






              
           
          
             





               
           


              


         
           






            



48

 
           


             
              
            


Bibliografie
      
      


  

          

           

           
 
            
 
             













49

Conclusions
              
            
            

 
 
 
              
               
           



References
      
    

           



          



 
           
 

             








49

Ce este gun-jumping-ul i cum l putem evita?

Ana Maria Udrite

Rezumat




            


Cuvinte cheie
      


I.

Introducere

B
                 

              

              
          
        B  




             

B      de exemplu 
            
           

         




50

What is gun-jumping and how can we avoid it?

Ana Maria Udrite

Abstract
The following article is not meant to be an exhaustive presentation of the gun-jumping
phenomenon, but wishes to bring to light a subject of high interest during the last period
of time. Although mergers and acquisitions record a significant increase over the last 10
years on the Romanian legal market, permitted and prohibited conduct during this
operation remains in shadow. With a lacunar EU legal framework on this issue, the parties
find themselves in an awkward situation: what are they allowed to do for the
implementation of a merger, without affecting the competitive environment?

Keywords


I.

Introduction


                

                


         
          

            
         
          

        
          

            
            
              
          


50

            
             




Gun-jumping

Ce este gun-jumpingul?

 
 
               
           

               
              

              
  de exemplu,       



      B    
         



         
         

B


              



          
              
            
              



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51

          
           



Gun-jumping

What is gun-jumping?

 
 
           
         
        
           


          
             
            

             
           
           



            
            

             
              
              


              
          

             


            


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51


              


B
         
 Regulamentul CE        
           
 B             
 


 B
            
Legea concurenei
             
          

Care sunt situaiile ce dau natere fenomenului de gun-jumping?
B               

1. Analiza de tip due-dilligence

          
           


         
              


           
 
           

2. Restriciile de natur contractual cu privire la investiii i cheltuieli
             

            



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52




 
           




 
             
         
          
Competition Act


           


What are the situations that raise the phenomenon of gun-jumping?


1. Due diligence


          
         

          
 



            


2. Contractual restrictions on investments and expenses



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52






 
3. Marketing-ul comun al tranzaciei i alte activiti desfurate n comun
           




Care este comportamentul permis i nepermis al prilor?
              

x B
x         

x 
           

            

           


           
            

            
            
B
              
            

Probleme de cod rou
          

     B       
       per se    

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53

           

             

        
          
         
            
            
 
3. Joint marketing transaction and other activities carried out jointly
             
         

          

What is the allowed and prohibited behavior of the parties?
 

x           

x           

x          
            

            




            
            
               

           
             
             


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53

               




          

controlul decurge din
drepturi, contracte sau orice alte elemente care, fiecare n parte ori luate mpreun i innd
seama de circumstanele de fapt sau de drept, confer posibilitatea de a exercita o influen
determinant asupra unei ntreprinderi. 

           

B
             

               

         
           
             



             

Probleme de cod galben
 
         
          
          
           
             

B            
         


           



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54

Red code issues

             
            

per se
            
            
           




             
            


                
            



              
            
                
          


                

            
         

Yellow code issues
 

            
          
               




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54



Ce sunt informaiile sensibile?
         

             
B
         

               
         
           
           
    B     
             
             


 

            
            








            
           
            
          


            

          
              
          




55

         
       
            


          


What is sensitive information?
        
         
          




        
        
          
        
          

            

 

           
           


           

           
           
            



             
           


           


55


          


        

 

ntlnirea comun
modificrile aduse comportamentului de afaceri    

B
            
B
           

        B     
             B

             
 B          


             





            
B
            

Probleme de cod verde
          
             

             

         
         
        

            
          

56


            
          

             

            
          
           
          

 
           
             



         
           
           
 
             
            
              

        
            
           



          
            
            

             
           


Green code issues


           
           

56

        
         

B
               

           
           

A. Comportament permis anterior finalizrii tranzaciei

x             
            

x 

x             
        

x 
             
              
             

x 
             
           




B. Comportamentul interzis anterior finalizrii tranzaciei
B

x 
           

x 


x 

57

         
          








               

           

A. Permitted behavior before the closing of the transaction

x 
          

x           
          

x           

           

x          
          
            
             

x 
        
            
           



B. Prohibited behavior before the closing of the transaction
i.e


57

x 
        
          

x 

x 

          

x            


              

x             

             
 B            

Schimburi cu risc sczut. B          




Schimburi ce implic o supraveghere minim.     
          
           

              

Schimburi ce implic o supraveghere moderat.     

             

          
           
          
             

Schimburi ce implic supraveghere semnificativ.      
             
            
       

58

x          
           

x          


x 
x           
           


x             
            

x          
            
        

x 



x 


              
           

Low risk exchanges


            

Exchanges involving minimal supervision     
          
          

             

Exchanges involving moderate supervision     
        

58


            
             
              
            

III.

Sanciuni

                




             
Instruciunilor privind individualizarea sanciunilor pentru contraveniile prevzute
la art. 51 din Legea Concurenei

             
         
           



x            

x           

x           

x           

               
            

              
     de facto     
B

                



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59

            
           




Exchanges involving significant supervision      
         
            
            
            
         
            


III.

Penalties

                


               

             
     
      

          
            
        



x 

x            

x             

x             


59


               
           
             

IV.

Concluzii

            
             
                
            








Bibliografie
 
          

 
 
 
          
 

 
  











&DX]D7Electrabel v. Comisia European.

60




            
            
           
            
              
           

               
             


IV.

Conclusions

           



            



V.

References
 

         

  
 
 
 


 
  




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KWWSHXURSDHXUDSLGSUHVVUHOHDVHB,3BHQKWP

&DVH7Electrabel v. Commission.


60

Ajutorul de stat i procesul concurenial de pia

Emil Duhnea
Master Dreptul Afacerilor, Facultatea de Drept,
Universitatea Bucureti

Rezumat
B           
          
             
 B

            
              

            


            

       B   



Cuvinte cheie


           


           
           
             


              

            


61

State aid and the competitive market process

Emil Duhnea
Master Dreptul Afacerilor, Facultatea de Drept,
Universitatea Bucureti

Abstract
            

 
               





              
            



            



Keywords





          


           



           

            

61

              

B
           
           
           
           
            
           

            
         
          
          



            
            

             
            


B
               
poate 
            
ajutoarele acordate de state sau prin intermediul resurselor de
stat, sub orice form, care denatureaz sau amenin s denatureze concurena prin favorizarea
anumitor ntreprinderi sau a producerii anumitor bunuri, n msura n care acestea afecteaz
schimburile comerciale dintre statele membre.    
 
           


          
B
 





&Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti, SDUD&3Chronopost and La Poste v UFEX and

OthersSDUD

&DVHItalian Republic v Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD

62



            



           

        
        

           
         

        











               
may 
             
        any aid granted by a
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of
certain goods, in so far as it affects trade between Member State   
 







 
              



&Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti, SDUD&3Chronopost and La Poste v

UFEX and OthersSDUD

&DVHItalian Republic v Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD

62

                 
diminueaz cheltuielile care sunt
n mod normal cuprinse de bugetul unei ntreprinderi i care, fr a fi aadar subvenii n
nelesul strict al cuvntului, sunt similare n caracter i au acelai efect
           
          
          
          

           

            
             
           
    sau        


           Stardust Marine 
            
             

dedus dintr-o serie de indicatori ivii n circumstanele speei i n contextul n
care msura a fost luat B          
 ,
          

         
          o implicare de ctre
autoritile publice n adoptarea unei msuri sau improbabilitatea neimplicrii acestora, avnd
n vedere i amploarea msurii, coninutul acesteia sau condiiile pe care le presupune

            

             


             
             
             



&DVHDe Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel
CommunitySDUD

&DVH&French Republic v Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD

-RLQHGFDVHVDQG Kwekerij Gebroeders van der Kooy BV and others v Commission of the European
Communities

63



mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget
of an undertaking and which, without, therefore, being subsidies in the strict meaning of
the word, are similar in character and have the same effect


           

             


               

or 
          
             
               
 Stardust Marine118 

            
         inferred from a set of
indicators arising from the circumstances of the case and the context in which that
measure was taken             

            

            

an
involvement by the public authorities in the adoption of a measure or the unlikelihood of
their not being involved, having regard also to the compass of the measure, its content or
the conditions which it contains 



                

            
            
          



&DVHDe Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel
CommunitySDUD

&DVH&French Republic v Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD

-RLQHGFDVHVDQG Kwekerij Gebroeders van der Kooy BV and others v Commission of the
European Communities

63

Stardust Marine 

                

              
          
           




            constituie o povar adiional pentru
stat

nu reclama vreun transfer direct sau indirect de resurse statale ctre acele ntreprinderi
ci deriv numai din intenia legiuitorului de a prevedea un cadru legislativ specific pentru
raporturile de munc dintre angajatori i angajai i de a evita impunerea asupra acelor
ntreprinderi a unor constrngeri financiare care ar putea mpiedica dezvoltarea lor 
             
            



              
             
B

              
            



             
              
              
per se

           


-RLQHGFDVHV&DQG&Firma Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer der
Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AGSDUD

&DVH&Petra Kirsammer-Hack v Nurhan SidalSDUD

-RLQHGFDVHV&&DQG&Epifanio Viscido, Mauro Scandella and Others, and Massimiliano
Terragnolo and Others v Ente Poste Italiane.

&DVHMinistre public du Kingdom of the Netherlands v Jacobus Philippus van Tiggele

&DVH&PreussenElektra AG v Schhleswag AG, in the presence of Windpark Reuenkge III GmbH and
Land Schleswig-HolsteinSDUD

64

Stardust Marine
              


            
           
           
               
         

           
             
     constitute an additional burden for the state120  

          
        entail any direct or indirect
transfer of state resources to those businesses but derives solely from the legislatures
intention to provide a specific legislative framework for working relationships between
employers and employees and to avoid imposing on those businesses financial constraints
which might hinder their development121
         
           
              


              

            
            

              

           
              


               

per se              

             

-RLQHGFDVHV&DQG&Firma Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer der
Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AGSDUD

&DVH&Petra Kirsammer-Hack v Nurhan SidalSDUD

-RLQHGFDVHV&&DQG&Epifanio Viscido, Mauro Scandella and Others, and
Massimiliano Terragnolo and Others v Ente Poste Italiane.

&DVHMinistre public du Kingdom of the Netherlands v Jacobus Philippus van Tiggele

&DVH&PreussenElektra AG v Schhleswag AG, in the presence of Windpark Reuenkge III GmbH
and Land Schleswig-HolsteinSDUD

64



         
          justificat de faptul c alte
state membre de asemenea nu i ndeplinesc 

            

              

            
            

nu depinde
aadar de caracterul local sau regional al serviciilor furnizate sau de scara domeniului de
activitate vizat           



nsi nu particip n activiti transfrontaliere       

oferta interna poate fi meninut sau sporit ntreprinderile stabilite n alte State Membre
au anse mai mici de a-i exporta produsele ctre piaa acelui Stat Membru   
nu este imposibil ca ajutorul pentru export s afecteze comerul
intra-Comunitate
B

Borice entitate
angajat n activiti economice, indiferent de statutul legal al entitii i de maniera n care
este finanat, cuvntul anumite indic faptul c ajutorul este marcat de o component
discriminatorie, conferind un avantaj ntreprinderilor n mod selectiv, spre exemplu celor
angajate n producia de bunuri n comparaie cu alte ntreprinderi care sunt ntr-o situaie
legal i faptic care este comparabil n lumina obiectivului urmrit de ctre msura n cauz,
cum ar fi furnizorii de servicii; nu este o aprare pentru stat s arate c un numr mare de


&DVHPhilip Morris Holland BV v Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD&DVH7
Confederacin Espaola de Transporte de Mercancas (CETM) v Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD

-RLQHGFDVHVDQGKingdom of the Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek BV v Commission of
the European CommunitiesSDUD

&DVHSteinike & Weinlig v Federal Republic of GermanySDUD

&DVH&Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungsprsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark
GmbH, and Oberbundesanwalt beim BundesverwaltungsgerichtSDUDSDUD

&DVH7SDUD&DVHFrench Republic v. Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD
UHVSHFWLY

&DVH&Kingdom of Belgium v Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUDDQGWKHIROORZLQJ

&DVH&Klaus Hfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbHSDUD

65




justified by the fact
that other member states are also failing to fulfil     

          
            
               



           

does not therefore depend on the
local or regional character of the  services supplied or on the scale of the field of
activity concerned128
             
              

 does not itself participate in crossborder activities    
           
 internal supply may be maintained or increased  undertakings established in
other Member States have less chance of exporting their products to the market in that
Member Stateit is not impossible for export
aid to affect intra-Community trade130

             
           every entity
engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in
which it is financed, the word certain indicates that the aid has a component marked
by discrimination, conferring an advantage only to select undertakings, for example those
involved in the production of goods, in comparison with other undertakings which are in a
legal and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the
measure in question, such as service providers; it is no defense for the state to show that a


&DVHPhilip Morris Holland BV v Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD&DVH7
Confederacin Espaola de Transporte de Mercancas (CETM) v Commission of the European
CommunitiesSDUD

-RLQHGFDVHVDQGKingdom of the Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek BV v
Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD

&DVHSteinike & Weinlig v Federal Republic of GermanySDUD

&DVH&Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungsprsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft
Altmark GmbH, and Oberbundesanwalt beim BundesverwaltungsgerichtSDUDSDUD

&DVH7SDUD&DVHFrench Republic v. Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD
UHVSHFWLYHO\

&DVH&Kingdom of Belgium v Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUDDQGWKHIROORZLQJ

&DVH&Klaus Hfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbHSDUD

65

ntreprinderi dintr-o varietate de sectoare ale economiei beneficiaz de pe urma msurii, i

aceasta nu pune la ndoial natura selectiv a msurii.
Aceast ultim condiie a prilejuit discuii i dificulti n domeniul msurilor de stat din
domeniul fiscal, determinnd Comisia s elaboreze o comunicare privind aplicarea normelor
privind ajutorul de stat n cazul msurilor referitoare la impozitarea direct a activitilor
economice. Comisia arat c n aplicarea regulilor referitoare la ajutorul de stat msurilor
fiscale, mai nti ar trebui determinat sistemul de impozitare comun i apoi ar trebui examinat
msura pentru a decide dac exceptarea sau diferenierea, i.e. tratamentul special, pe care o
acord anumitor ntreprinderi este justificat de natura sau aranjamentul general al sistemului
fiscal, derivnd direct din principiile de baz sau cluzitoare ale sistemului fiscal. Un exemplu
facil al justificrii de ctre natura sau aranjamentul general al sistemului fiscal este statutul
fundaiilor sau asociaiilor non-profit scutite de impozit. Regula stabilirii unui standard fa de
care msura s fie testat se bazeaz pe reguli naintate de ctre Curte care arat c o msur
constituie ajutor dac, cznd asupra unor ntreprinderi sau sectoare economice particulare,
excepteaz parial acele ntreprinderi de la costul financiar rezultat din aplicarea normal a
sistemului general de impozitare pretins de lege. Testul este completat de posibilitatea pentru
statul membru s justifice natura diferenial a unei msuri pe baza unei motivaii economice
care o face necesar funcionrii i eficacitii sistemului fiscal. Spre exemplu, introducerea unei
cote mai ridicate de impozitare a primei de asigurare n contractele de asigurare ale anumitor
dispozitive electrocasnice, care anterior erau supuse unei cote standard, a fost gsit a fi o
msur justificat de natura i aranjamentul general al sistemului naional de impozitare
ntruct acoperea o lacun a legii prin intermediul creia vnztorii de electrocasnice mutau
preul de vnzare mai mult asupra asigurrii dect asupra produsului n sine pentru a se eschiva
de la plata cotei mai ridicate de TVA.
Definirea corect a pieei relevante n dreptul concurenei este cauza multor dezbateri
privitoare la constatarea unei posibile nclcri a reglementrilor concureniale i este prin
urmare cel mai important punct de plecare ntr-un astfel de caz. n mod asemntor, n
examinarea selectivitii unei msuri de ajutor de stat n domeniul politicilor fiscale, stabilirea
standardului sau etalonului n relaie cu care msura va fi judecat este un efort ndeosebi de
delicat, dar esenial. La fel cum restrngerea pieei relevante poate face ca orice ntreprindere s
dein o poziie dominant, spre exemplu, tot astfel restrngerea sistemului fiscal de referin
poate face o msur s par non-selectiv: n consecin, pentru a identifica ce anume constituie
un avantaj n considerarea jurisprudenei pe Ajutorul de stat, este imperativ s fie determinat
punctul de referin n sistemul din cauz n legtur cu care acel avantaj va fi comparat
B
           

            


&DVH&Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke GmbH v

Finanzlandesdirektion fr KrntenSDUDSDUD&DVH& Kingdom of Spain v Commission of the European
CommunitiesSDUD

&RPXQLFDUHD&RPLVLHLSULYLQGDSOLFDUHDQRUPHORUSULYLQGDMXWRUXOGHVWDWvQFD]XOPVXULORUUHIHULWRDUHOD
LPSR]LWDUHDGLUHFWDDFWLYLWLORUHFRQRPLFH

&DVHItalian Republic v Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD

&DVH&GIL Insurance Ltd and Others v Commissioners of Customs & ExciseSDUD

&DVH7Salzgitter AG v Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD

66

large number of undertakings from various sectors of the economy benefit from the
measure, and this does not call into question the selective nature of the measure.
This last condition occasioned some discussions and difficulties in the area of state fiscal
measures, prompting the Commission to give a Notice on the application of state aid rules
to measures relating to direct business taxation. The Commission shows that in applying
state aid rules to fiscal measures, the common taxation system applicable should first be
determined and then the measure should be examined to decide whether the exception or
differentiation, i.e. the special treatment, it provides for certain undertakings is justified by
the nature or general scheme of the tax system, deriving directly from the basic or guiding
principles of the tax system. An easy example of justification by the nature or general
scheme of the tax system is the tax exempt status of non-profit making foundations or
associations. The rule of setting a standard against which the measure is tested draws on
rules set forth by the Court which show that a measure constitutes aid if, devolving upon
particular undertakings or a particular economic sector, it partially exempts those
undertakings from the financial charge arising from the normal application of the general
system of taxation imposed by law. The test is completed by the possibility for the
member state to justify the differential nature of a measure on an economic rationale that
makes it necessary to the functioning and effectiveness of the tax system. For example, the
introduction of a higher rate of insurance premium tax on certain domestic appliance
insurance contracts, which were previously subject to a standard rate, was found to be
justified by the nature and general scheme of the national system of taxation because it
closed a legal loophole through which appliance suppliers loaded their prices onto
insurance rather than the product itself in order to escape the higher rate VAT. 
The correct definition of the relevant market in competition law occasions much debate
in determining a possible violation of competition regulations and is thus the most
important starting point of any such case. Similarly, in examining the selectivity of a state
aid measure in the realm of fiscal policies, determining the standard or benchmark in
reference to which the measure is judged is a most delicate, but essential, effort. Just as
narrowing down the relevant market can make any undertaking hold a dominant position,
for example, so can narrowing down the referential tax system make any measure seem
non-selective: Consequently, in order to identify what constitutes an advantage as
contemplated in the case-law on State aid, it is imperative to determine the reference point
in the scheme in question against which that advantage is to be compared136 Returning to
a case mentioned above, a tax scheme favourable to the production of goods, but not
applicable to undertakings providing services, can be argued to be non-selective if the
reference system excludes provision of services; and even though this may at first glance
seem reasonable, since undertakings that produce goods and undertakings that provide
services are not in legal and factual situations that are readily comparable, the Court
adopted a broader system of reference in which both kinds of undertakings were included.
This more prudent type of approach should also be taken when dealing with relevant
market definitions.


&DVH&Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke GmbH v

Finanzlandesdirektion fr KrntenSDUDSDUD&DVH& Kingdom of Spain v Commission of the
European CommunitiesSDUD

&RPPLVVLRQ1RWLFHRQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH6WDWHDLGUXOHVWRPHDVXUHVUHODWLQJWRGLUHFWEXVLQHVVWD[DWLRQ
>@2-&

&DVHItalian Republic v Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD

&DVH&GIL Insurance Ltd and Others v Commissioners of Customs & ExciseSDUD

&DVH7Salzgitter AG v Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD

66

             
              



               
              



are, dintr-un punct de vedere constituional, un statut politic i
administrativ separat de acela al guvernului centralfr ca
guvernul central s poate interveni n mod direct      B 
    urmrile financiare a unei reduceri a cotei naionale de
impozitare pentru ntreprinderile din regiune nu trebuie compensate de asisten sau subvenii
din partea altor regiuni sau guvernului central       


asume consecinele politice i financiare ale unei astfel
de msuri. Nu trebuie s existe vreun stimulent extern care s motiveze autoritatea intrastatal s reduce impozitele pur i simplu deoarece repercusiunile msurii, n special cele
bugetare, sunt suportate sau acoperite de ctre alte autoriti.
Am vzut aadar condiiile n care o msur public ar putea fi considerat ajutor de stat,
precum i unele consideraii succinte cu privire la motivele pentru care ajutorul de stat este
interzis de ctre lege. Ar fi de asemenea util de avut n vedere de ce anume asemenea msuri de
stat nu ar trebui experimentate indiferent de legalitatea lor. Va s zic, dac exceptrile ar fi
mult mai cuprinztoare sau nivelul de minimis        


           permitem

            

           


dac de
ce 
        aa cum i-ar dori ei    


&DVH&Portuguese Republic v Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD

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7UHDW\WRde minimisDLG

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VROXLLDOWHUQDWLYHSRVLELOHFLvQFRPSDUDLHFXHURDUHDORJLFDXQHLQRUPHLGHDOHLLPDJLQDUHvQFHHDFH+DUROG
'HPVHW]QXPHDRDERUGDUHGHWLSQLUYDQD


67

Selectivity in the matter of taxation measures can also come in the form of geographic
or regional policies, and the Court has established a test with which to assess whether a
fiscal measure that is regional in scope is selective or not. Three conditions regarding
institutional, procedural and economic autonomy must be cumulatively proven in order to
show that a regional taxation measure is not selective. Thus, a measure can be regarded as
having been adopted by a local or regional authority in the exercise of sufficiently
autonomous powers if that authority has, from a constitutional point of view, a political
and administrative status separate from that of the central government, and the adoption
process operated without the central government being able to directly intervene as
regards the content of the measure. Lastly, economic autonomy means that the financial
consequences of a reduction of the national tax rate for undertakings in the region must
not be offset by aid or subsidies from other regions or central government. Taken together,
these conditions make it mandatory for the infra-state body to have the competence to
reduce the tax rate in a particular region independent of any considerations related to the
conduct of the central government, and that in addition that body assumes the political
and financial consequences of such a measure137. There must not be any outside incentives
that motivate the infra-state body to reduce taxes simply because the measures
repercussions, especially budgetary ones, are borne or covered by other bodies. 


             
              de
minimis 
             
             
 allow 
              
           

            


           if 
why
the way they want it to
prima facie 
            
           
              

            



&DVH&Portuguese Republic v Commission of the European CommunitiesSDUD

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RIWKH7UHDW\WRde minimisDLG

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67

prima facie 



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regained

           

               
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69

         
           


              
          
            
               

            
             



            
         
            
           
            


            
                

            
            


              
          
           

          
               

              
              


         
           




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69

             
           

          
              
          
              
             
             
            
             

           

               
             
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70





            

          
          


          
             


           
             


             
             
             allowed to



         and loss   
               
            



 Additional chapter on State Aid
EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials 


EU Law: Texts, Cases, and Materials 

  State aid and taxation in EU Law    
Research Handbook on European State Aid Law
   Competition and State Aid Policy in the European Community
 
     EC control of aid granted through State
resources

70



     Additional chapter on State Aid      EU
Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials 

EU Law: Texts, Cases, and Materials 

  State aid and taxation in EU Law     Research
Handbook on European State Aid Law
 Competition and State Aid Policy in the European Community 
 
 EC control of aid granted through State resources

Some Reflections on the Notion of State Resources in European Community
State Aid Law  

 
Interventionism: An Economic Analysis 
   Human Action: A Treatise on Economics    


Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics 

   Man, Economy and State: A Treatise on Economic Principles 

Economics in One Lesson
The Law










71

  Some Reflections on the Notion of State Resources in European

Community State Aid Law  

 
Interventionism: An Economic Analysis 
   Human Action: A Treatise on Economics   


Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics 

   Man, Economy and State: A Treatise on Economic Principles

Economics in One Lesson
The Law










71

Concurena i comerul online


Traian gtefnescu
Facultatea de Drept a Universitii din Bucureti,
student
Rezumat

 

B
           
           


Cuvinte cheie

1.Influena comerului online asupra concurenei n general
comerul electroniccomerul online

          

           
        

              


a) reducerea costurilor de documentare,b) impactul asupra costurilor
de distribuie, c) extinderea zonei de activitate din punct de vedere geografic, d) informaiile
asimetrice
a. Reducerea costurilor de documentare
           
            
            
           
  shopbots         

142

/LHEHU( 6\YHUVRQ&2QOLQHYVRIIOLQHFRPSHWLWLRQPeitz, M., Waldfogel

72

Competition and online commerce


Traian gtefnescu
Student, Bucharest University, Faculty of Law

Abstract
            
            

            

            


Keywords


1. Influence of the online commerce on competition in general
             



        
          
          
          



            


 a) reduction of the documentation costs, b) impact on distribution costs, c)
geographical extent of activity area, d) asymmetric information
a. Reduction of the documentation costs
141

/LHEHU( 6\YHUVRQ&2QOLQHYVRIIOLQHFRPSHWLWLRQPeitz, M., Waldfogel

72

            

b. Impactul asupra costurilor de distribuie
          



             

            
               


             

          
          
             


B                
            



              
            

              
             


          
           



c. Extinderea zonei de activitate din punct de vedere geografic 

          
           

               






73

              
          


         shopbots  
          
            

b. Impact on distribution costs




            
           
        
            

              
             


         


          
               
           

             
  

               
           
               


            



c. Geographical extent of activity area

           

         
              
            

73

d. Problema informaiilor asimetrice

          
             
          

B            

    B        
             
Doi juctori, un cumprtor i un vnztor ai unei maini uzate, trebuie
s ia o decizie. Vnztorul care ofer maina tie de la bun nceput dac aceasta este o main
bun sau nu, pe de alt parte, cumprtorul nu tie nimic despre calitatea mainii uzate. n acest
caz, informaia asimetric mpiedic piaa s ating eficiena, iar produse inferioare sunt
selectate de consumator.
              
               

2.Impactul asupra pieei relevante
2.1.Piaa produsului

             

             

B  
         

diferena de satisfacie oferit clienilor
 

 
 
 

             
           

B

143
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&DVH1R,90%(57(/60$11+$9$6%2/

74

               


         


d. Asymmetric information problem
            
         
           




            
            Two
players, a buyer and a seller of a used car, must make a decision. The seller that offers the
car knows from the start if this is a good car or not, a lemon; on the other side, the buyer
doesnt know anything about the quality of the used car, except for probability
distribution. In this case, the asymmetric information prevents the market to achieve
efficiency, and inferior products are selected by the consumer.



2. Impact on relevant market
2.1. Product market
          

            




           

             

 
 
142

$NHUORI*$7KHPDUNHWIRUOHPRQVTXDOLW\XQFHUWDLQW\DQGWKHPDUNHWPHFKDQLVP$XJ



143

&DVH1R,902772*5$77$1

74

              
            

B
            

             



          

             
B
            
               



             
           


          
            
 B             
            
           

  B
               
             


  B            
               


B
              
              


146
147

&DVH1R,90$GYHQW,QWHUQDWLRQDO(0,:+6PLWK

&DVH1R,90%(57(/60$11021'$'25,

75

             

              
          

           

            
         
               

          



            







              



 




              

            





             

144

&DVH1R,90%(57(/60$11+$9$6%2/

145

&DVH1R,90$GYHQW,QWHUQDWLRQDO(0,:+6PLWK

146

&DVH1R,90%(57(/60$11021'$'25,

75

B

              
           
             
              



2.2.Piaa geografic


             
.B
            

           
         
          




           
           
            

B          
             
            
            

B          
                



3. Cele mai frecvente acorduri verticale n comerul electronic
B
               



148

&DVH1R,90BERTELSMANN /HAVAS / BOL

76

              


          
              


         

            

              
            




2.2. Geographic market
           
           
 
          
         



           

             


           

             
          

           
           

            

147

&DVH1R,90BERTELSMANN /HAVAS / BOL

76

3.1 Restrngeri verticale privitoare la pre



3.1.1 Acordul de paritate ntre platforme (Across-Platforms Parity Agreement)149

            
            


                
          B  



B
 
 

              


               
 


               
            
            


             

             
    B       
     Garania preului cel mai mic,     



149
3HQWUXRSUH]HQWDUHPDLSHODUJDFODX]HORUGHDFHVWIHODVHYHGHDVL2(&'9HUWLFDO5HVWUDLQWVIRU2QOLQH
6DOHV

77


            




3. The most frequent vertical agreements in electronic commerce

           

           




3.1. Vertical restraints regarding the price
3.1.1. Across-Platforms Parity Agreement148
          

               
          

             


            
   most favoured nation clause (MFN)     
        per se      

             
          


 
 


              





148
)RUDPRUHH[WHQGHGSUHVHQWDWLRQRIFODXVHVRIVXFKW\SHVHH2(&'9HUWLFDO5HVWUDLQWVIRU2QOLQH
6DOHV

77


Efectele APPA asupra concurenei

          
         
 
Posibile efecte negative

              


             

              


B
             

            
          
              
           
           
          

B

           
150

&DQ)DLU3ULFHV%H8QIDLU"$5HYLHZRI3ULFH5HODWLRQVKLS$JUHHPHQWV6HSWHPEHU

78




             
     lowest price guarantee,   



Effects of APPA on competition
          

         
  
Possible negative effects


             


           



           

149

Prices Be Unfair? A Review of Price Relationship Agreements , September 2012

78

             
            

         



3.1.2.Alte restrngeri referitoare pre


B

            
            
            B 
          
             


3.2 Restriciile verticale cu privire la alte elemente dect preul
3.2.1 Distribuia exclusiv
        
             

          
B
           

            
             
           

B


Vnzrile pasive i internetul
B              

              
             


B

79


            


              
            

 


            





           


3.1.2. Other restraints regarding the price

            
           
           


              

           


3.2 Vertical restrictions regarding elements other than the price
3.2.1. Exclusive distribution
       

               
           
             



             
           
            

79

B


B

B

B            
                
            

Restricii inacceptabile privind vnzrile "pasive"

          

           

            
B

 


          

 



Vnzrile active si internetul
             



B              
           B    


 

Restricii acceptabile privind vnzrile "active".

         
          

80




Passive sales and the internet
               
               

             
           
              

                


              

             
            
            
        
            

Unacceptable restrictions regarding passive sales.    
            


          

             
        
            

            
             

 

           


Active sales and the internet 
          
              

80


               


 

           

            


          

             


3.2.2. Distribuia selectiv i interdicia general a vnzrilor on-line




           
            

            
              

 
B
B
         



            
            

           
           
      B        




81





            
              


Acceptable restrictions regarding active sales.


            


           
          


          

         
 
          

 

3.2.2. Selective distribution and general interdiction of online sales.




             

         
             
            
           
 

           
         
             
            

81

3.2.3Concluzii.Regulile de concuren ale Uniunii Europene i Internetul

           
            B
            
          
            

B
           
       B    


B
           
           


BIBLIOGRAFIE



  
 


82




 

             
           



3.2.3. Conclusions. Competition rules of the European Union and the internet.
           






                



            



    
     


References



  
 






82

REVISTA ROMN DE CONCUREN /

ROMANIAN COMPETITION JOURNAL
Apare sub egida Consiliului Concurenei Romnia
Piaa Presei Libere nr. 1, sector 1, 013701, Bucureti, Romnia
E-mail: competition@consiliulconcurentei.ro
CONSILIUL TIINIFIC
Adriana Alman Universitatea din Bucureti
Mihai Berinde Universitatea din Oradea
Anca Chiri Durham Law School
Bogdan Chirioiu Universitatea din Bucureti
Anthony Collins Tribunalul General al Uniunii Europene
Sorin David Universitatea din Bucureti
Daniel Dianu coala Naional de Studii Politice i Administrative
Dalina Dumitrescu - Academia de Studii Economice
Ioannis Kokkoris University of Reading
Ioannis Lianos University College London
Csongor Istvn Nagy Universitatea din Szeged
Gheorghe Oprescu Universitatea Politehnic din Bucureti
Mnika Papp Universitatea Etvs Lornd din Budapesta
Theodor Purcrea Universitatea Romno-American
Catalin S. Rusu Universitatea din Nijmegen
Jean Marc Thouvenin - Universit de Paris Ouest Nanterre La Dfense
Gabriela igu Academia de Studii Economice
Liviu Voinea Academia de Studii Economice
Peter Whelan - University of Leeds
COMITETUL EDITORIAL
Florin Andrei
George Anglioiu
Daniel Stan
Mirela Apostol
RECENZENI
Prof.univ.dr. Gabriela igu
Conf.univ.dr. Adriana Alman
Conf.univ.dr. Mihaela Mosora
Conf.univ.dr. George Anglioiu
ISSN 2343 9785
Copyright 2014, Consiliul Concurenei Romnia
Opiniile exprimate n cuprinsul articolelor constituie preri personale ale autorilor
i nu reprezint n mod necesar punctele de vedere ale Consiliului Concurenei.
The opinions expressed in the content articles are the personal opinions of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the view of Romanian Competition
Council.

Nr. 1-2 / 2014

REVISTA ROMN
DE CONCUREN

Consiliului Concurenei Romnia

Piaa Presei Libere nr. 1, sector 1, 013701, Bucureti
E-mail: competition@consiliulconcurentei.ro
www.consiliulconcurentei.ro

Romanian Competition Journal