Suport Curs Studii de Securitate

STUDII DE SECURITATE suport de curs Lect. univ. dr.
Christian Radu Chereji
Universitatea Babe-Bolyai Facultatea de tiine olitice! Ad"inistrative i ale Co"unic#rii
STUDII DE SECURITATE
- Suport de curs pentru nvmnt la distan $ect% univ% dr% C&ristian Radu C&ere'i
Cluj-Napoca 2 !
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STUDII DE SECURITATE suport de curs Lect. univ. dr. Christian Radu Chereji
Cu(rins
)biective* ,ndru"#tor de studiu* ". Studiile de securitate la s#r$itul secolului %%&
()iective& Noiuni cheie&
*+ *+ &'
&' &'
2. Con#lictele internaionale
()iective& Noiuni cheie& 2.". Surse ale con#lictelor& 2.2. *ipolo+ia con#lictelor& 2.-. Cadrul conceptual de anali. a con#lictelor& 2.'. 0ecanisme de intervenie pentru mana+ementul con#lictelor&
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&"' &"' &"' &", &"/ &2
-. 1nstituii internaionale de securitate colectiv2 (N3&

()iective& Noiuni cheie& -.". Surse ale in+erinei (N3 n chestiunile de securite colectiv& -.2. (N3 $i mana+ementul con#lictelor din perioada R.)oiului Rece& -.-. (N3 $i mana+mentul con#lictelor post "/,/&
&2&2&2&2' &24 &-5
'. Securitatea comun&

()iective& Noiuni cheie& '.". 6olitica e7tern $i de securitate comun a 3niunii 8uropene& '.2. 6olitica 8uropean de Securitate $i 9prare& '.-. :e ce este 68SC necesar;& '.'. Cum este implementat 68SC;& '.!. 9+enii 68SC& '.4. 8#iciena 68SC& &!"
&-,
&-, &-, &-, &-/ &'" &'2 &'-
<i)lio+ra#ie +eneral&
&!-
)biective -enerale.
=ormarea unei vi.iuni de ansam)lu asupra disciplinei. >nele+erea de ctre student a principalelor noiuni ale Studiilor de Securitate. :o)ndirea cuno$tinelor necesare pentru nele+erea ntr-o manier #undamentat $tiini#ic a securitii naionale $i internaionale.
,ndru"#tor de studiu.
Cursul este construit ntr-o manier care s-i u$ure.e cursantului nele+erea Studiilor de Securitate? n#i$nd modul n care paradi+mele de securitate au evoluat pe parcursul secolului al %%-lea? unele dintre noiunile care stau la )a.a acestei discipline a relaiilor internaionale precum con#lictul? intervenia? mana+ementul con#lictelor? etc. pn la pre.entarea ntr-o manier u$or comprehensi)il a principalelor aspecte contemporane ale securitii? securitatea internaional $i securitatea comun? a cror ulterioar apro#undare va u$ura nele+erea de ctre student a modului n care s-au petrecut $i se petrec evenimentele contemporane ale lumii noastre. Cursanii sunt puternic ncurajai s-$i complete.e $i apro#unde.e aceste cuno$tine #undamentale ale Studiilor de Securitate pe )a.a )i)lio+ra#iei pre.entate la s#r$itul acestui curs $i a propriilor cercetri )i)lio+ra#ice.
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CA IT)$U$ I
T&e evolution o/ security studies at t&e end o/ t&e 01t& century
)biective. >nele+erea de ctre cursant a principalelor paradi+me din relaiile internaionale #olosite n Studiile de Securitate. Caracteristicile de evoluie ale lumii contemporane. 2oiuni c&eie. securitate naional? securitate internaional? securitate +lo)al? securitate comun.
*he #all o# the <erlin @all and the dismem)erment o# the Soviet 3nion marAed a turnin+ point #or the studB o# securitB issues around the +lo)e. 9lreadB put under Cuestion durin+ the last decade o# the Cold @ar? the realist paradi+m o# securitB studies? #ocusin+ on national securitB and strate+ic studies came under the cross-#ire o# the li)erals? the institutionalists and the idealists. *he academia? Dho had alreadB started in the E, s to critici.e the realist paradi+m as )ein+ too narroD and too ri+id? adopted in the last ten Bears a lar+e spectrum o# concepts? all considered #it to em)race the Dhole su)stance o# realitB2 international securitB? +lo)al securitB? re+ional securitB? common securitB etc. <eside this? numerous #ields o# social li#e have )een e7plored #rom the an+le o# their impact on securitB issues? enlar+in+ considera)lB the domain called FsecuritB studiesG. 1ntense lo))B has )een made around +overnmental institutions and a+encies to persuade them to chan+e their traditional approach to securitB matters #or a neD? FmodernG one? Dith more e7planatorB poDer and capa)le o# #iner predictions. 6rojects have )een launched in all these pro+ramatic directions? #i+htin+ to come to a clear ansDer #or the main securitB studies Cuestions2 Dhat is securitB; 1s it a state o# mind? eCuili)rium o# poDers? a strate+B? a +oal? an issue-area? a perception? an ideal; @hat #ields? Dhat
items are covered )B this cupola; 1s securitB possi)le to )e achieved onlB )B Boursel# or Bou need cooperation Dith others; *he #irst thin+ that made possi)le this plethora o# neD directions o# investi+ation Das the chan+in+ conte7t o# securitB around the Dorld. *he Soviet 3nion Das no more a super-poDerH old enemies )ecame suddenlB alliesH re+ional poDers arise? some o# them havin+ nuclear capa)ilitiesH the #orces o# +lo)ali.ation +reD #ast? challen+in+ centurB old +overnments and soverei+nties. 9ll these chan+es are to )e ordered in a schema #acilitatin+ a )etter understandin+ o# the phenomenon. =or this? a #ine tool is the Ro)ert 0andelIs approach J0andel2 "//'K? Dho puts the characteristics o# the era post Cold @ar under three sta+es2 ". Decline o/ t&e national soverei-nty? Dhich means the emer+ence o# non-state actors? permea)ilitB o# the )orders? loDer national sel#-su##iciencB? di##usion o# poDer etcH 2. Escalation o/ international interde(endence? Dhich includes the move #rom )ipolar to multipolar sBstem? the rise o# re+ionalism and re+ional poDers? standardi.ed Deapons sBstem? homo+eni.ation o# tastes and technolo+B? mountin+ mi+ration? spreadin+ democracB and capitalism etcH -. roli/eration o/ anarc&ic con/lict or #eDer or+ani.ed and lar+e-scale Dars? decreasin+ ideolo+ical and territorial clashes? #ailure o# deterrence? rise in ethnic disputes? +roDin+ unconventional loD-scale con#licts etc 9ll o# these? and De can add some more? chan+ed the international scene in a pro#ound manner? and so it appeared neD set o# threats and vulnera)ilities o# the nation-states. 9ccordin+lB? the studB o# securitB matters chan+ed si+ni#icantlB? trBin+ to include neD #ields o# investi+ations? #ields capa)le o# increasin+ the understandin+ o# the dBnamics o# securitB? )ein+ it national? international or +lo)al. 9 second reason #or this di##usion o# investi+ation in securitB studies has )een the attention paid )B the +overnmental institutions and )B the international securitB or+ani.ations to the alDaBs innovative academia. 9#ter #ive decades o# direct? eBe-to-eBe con#rontation Dith a #earsome? )ut rational enemB? the +overnments and the securitB or+ani.ations o# the @est #ind themselves Dithout the o)ject o# their #ear the enemB is no lon+er there? and there no)odB capa)le? in the short run? to taAe his place. 1nstead o# the old Dell AnoDn and studied dan+er? neD threats arise? and the state authorities have
no ansDer to these neD challen+es. Lere are the roots o# a mBriad o# +overnmental #unded research projects? Dith their previsi)le result2 the understandin+ o# the comple7itB o# the pro)lem and no clear ansDer. *he main pro)lem o# this #ield o# studB comes #rom the term itsel#. *here have )een a lot o# de#initions o# it? none meetin+ the a+reement o# all the researchers. 0ost o# them a+ree? to+ether Dith 9rnold @ol#ers J@ol#ers2 "/42K that it is an am)i+uous concept? )oth in content and in #orm. *he studies o# the securitB issues are centuries lon+? )e+innin+ Dith the )irth o# the nation-state sBstem in the "5 th centurB 8uropeH the #irst paradi+ms Dere )orn in that period. Lo))es talAed a)out F)ellum omnium contra omniaG? the Dar o# all a+ainst all? )uildin+ so the )asis o# the realist paradi+m o# securitB studiesH the Dalt.ian structuralism has its roots here. Mant thou+ht that Dar cannot )e eradicated i# states do not su)-sum their interests to a +eneral interest? that is? the Dell-)ein+ and sa#etB o# manAind. *he DaB to achieve that Das a #ederal-state sBstem? a Funiversal repu)licG? and the respect o# Luman Ri+htsH these could )e considered the roots o# the idealist paradi+m o# securitB studies. :e Notius )rid+ed the +ap )etDeen these tDo paradi+ms? puttin+ the accent on nation-state as main actor o# the international scene Jas Lo))es didK? )ut emphasi.in+ that state )ehavior is limited )B common rules and laDs Jas Mant thou+htK. 1nternational rule Das to limit )ehavior? not to chan+e it. *o applB these rules? international institutions Dere needed so the institutionalist paradi+m Das )orn too. *hose three paradi+ms correspond? as Lel+a La#tendorn JLa#tendorn2 "// K shoDed? to three directions o# studB in securitB2 ". t&e realist (aradi-" #ocuses on national security and strategic studiesH 2. t&e idealist (aradi-" is concerned )B global security and peace studiesH -. t&e institutionalist (aradi-" +ave )irth to the international security concept. National securitB has )een the most studied o# all these concepts? not onlB )ecause it concerned directlB the nation-state and its survival? )ut #or it Das dealin+ Dith political and militarB a##airs Dhich impact Das hi+hlB visi)le #or everB)odB. 6olitics and militarB a##airs Dere considered rational? easilB to )e studied and understoodH theB Dere predicta)leH theB Dere a matter o# #ine calculusH a)ove all? theB had a lon+ tradition )ehind them? comin+ #rom the verB #irst a+es o# human civili.ation.
<e#ore "/'!? the studB o# national securitB issues Das thou+ht to )elon+ strictlB to militarB academiesH the chan+es o# the international sBstem? the )irth o# the )ipolar Dorld and o# the Cold @ar pressed #or clear-cut ansDer in this #ield. 9ccordin+lB? the universities Dere cau+ht in this run? and the studies +reD in num)er and comple7itB. *heB still #ocused on militarB a##airs and strate+B? )ecause the main challen+e #or the =ree @orld survival Das militarB. 8vents happenin+ in the E4 s and the E5 s challen+ed the traditional? realist paradi+mH the processes o# de-coloni.ation? the Non-9li+nment 0ovement? the dOtente and the cooperation )etDeen the super-poDers? the oil shocAs? the rise o# 9sian economic poDers? the +roDin+ international economic interdependence and the )irth o# a mBriad o# international re+imes? the nuclear accidents and ecolo+ical catastrophes? all o# these )rou+ht on the scene the li)eral-institutionalist and idealist paradi+m? each Dith its #avorite concept. National securitB Das seen as impossi)le to )e achieved aloneH international cooperation Das needed in order to secure the peace and sta)ilitB o# everBone. (thers said that Dithout a +lo)al peace and securitB? national securitB is impossi)le the sa#etB o# one depends on the sa#etB o# others? or o# all. Classical lar+escale Dar Das thou+ht o)soleteH nuclear )alance o# poDer insaneH militarB a##airs paranoid and counterproductive. *he time had come #or economic cooperation at the international levelH #or )uildin+ con#idence )B cooperation and international or+ani.ationsH #or civili.ed )ehavior throu+h international re+imesH alto+ether in the name o# international or +lo)al securitB. *he return to con#rontation at the )e+innin+s o# the E, s )rou+ht )acA the realist paradi+m in the center o# securitB studies? )ut caused the intensi#ication o# the li)eralinstitutionalist and idealist critics. Ro)ert 3llman J3llman2 "/,-K put it this dispute in a plain vieD as )ein+ a matter o# choices at the political level. 8ven i# he critics sharplB the realist paradi+m o# securitB studies as narroD and limited in e7planatorB poDer? he conveBs that nothin+ is )ut a choice )etDeen several alternative DaBs o# action. @hen he asAs 2 Dhat is )etter #or the 3nited States? to spend lar+e sums o# moneB on preparations #or intervention on the 6ersian Nul#? to Aeep the #loDs o# oil #rom #ra+ile states liAe Saudi 9ra)ia? or to use those moneB to develop neD? alternative sources o# ener+B? and so decreasin+ their dependencB on 0iddle 8ast oil; Le addresses the essential point o# the
de)ate. *hose Dho choose the #irst option can )e la)eled as realistsH those choosin+ the second one as idealistsH )ut )oth actions are rational and mi+ht )e applied success#ullB. *hus? )oth strate+ies can improve the national securitB o# the 3nited StatesH the pre#erence #or one or another is onlB a matter o# political and cultural choice. 9s De saD a)ove? the E/ s )rou+ht #undamental chan+es #or the securitB conte7tH )ut the academic conclusions Dere diver+ent a+ain. 1mmediatelB a#ter the )reaAdoDn o# Soviet 3nion? it appeared that the idealists Dill maAe the daBH there Dere no +litches on the road toDard a +lo)al peace? +lo)al citi.enshipH even the li)eral-institutionalists Dere seen too narroD in their approach. 1nternational re+imes seemed too limited tools #or a +lo)al sBstemH international institutions Dere to )e trans#ormed in some sort o# DorldIs +overnmentH in the academia? peace research Das at its hei+hts. *he decline o# national soverei+ntB and the escalation o# international interdependence? #ar aDaB #rom helpin+ to )rin+ on 8arth a +lo)al peace? led to the proli#eration o# anarchic con#lict. *he Dorld )ecame even more dan+erous than durin+ the Cold @arH noD? the threat Das di##use? impossi)le to locate preciselB. Local ethnic con#licts? as in Northern 1reland? <osnia? Chechnia? RDanda and <urundi? Sri LanAa or Mashmir? international terrorism? as in MenBa or 0iddle 8ast? emer+in+ re+ional leaders Dith little or no respect #or international laD? as in Ser)ia? 1raC or China made the Dorld even less sa#e than it Das Dhen the super-poDers challen+ed themselves reciprocallB. ConseCuentlB? as 0andel and <u.an J<u.an2 "//"P"//!K shoDed? the studB o# national securitB issues Das )acA in topH )ut )B this time? it included neD #ields? trBin+ to overcome the critics #rom the li)eral-institutionalist and idealist side. National securitB studies in the I/ ? especiallB on the second hal# o# the decade? have a Dide ran+e? includin+? )esides the classical political and militarB a##airs? the economic sector? the social sector and paBin+ special attention at ecolo+ical? #ood and health issues. National securitB is no lon+er studied aloneH it is connected Dith re+ional? international? +lo)al? collective and common securitB. *he Dhole concept has )ecome more comple7 and its studB implies multi-disciplinarB? inter-dependent research. <ein+ a AeB concept? its importance #or national +overnments and international securitB or+ani.ations cannot )e overestimate. @e can see these )B Aeepin+ a close eBe on the research projects o# di##erent international or+ani.ations dealin+ Dith securitB issues? national +overnments?
national a+encies? NN(s concerned )B securitB aspects? thinA tanAs and? last )ut not least? the academic #ield Dith its universities? institutes and centers o# research. *he international securitB or+ani.ations #ocus on securitB issues accordin+ to their speci#ic tar+et. *he 3nited Nations deals Dith aspects concernin+ the international securitB? Dith a ran+e o# interests coverin+ all items? #rom macro-militarB a##airs Jthe SecuritB Council dealin+ Dith collective securitB issuesK to humanitarian assistance? re#u+ees and mi+ration? #ood and health? environment and space. @e can de#ine 3N preoccupations Dith securitB issues as +lo)alH it has speciali.ed a+encies #or all tBpes o# issues. 9t the second level? there are the re+ional or+ani.ationsH )est AnoDn are the 8uropean ones? as the 8uropean 3nion and its armed )ranch? the @estern 8uropean (r+ani.ation? N9*( and (SC8. *he (SC8 is a reproduction at a re+ional scale o# the 3nited Nations? )ut its concerns are restricted onlB to 8uro-9tlantic securitB and respect o# Luman Ri+hts in the area. *he 8uropean 3nion is interested? )B its speci#ic? in common securitBH a major chapter o# its #oundin+ treaties? #rom 0aastricht J"//2K to 9msterdam J"//,K )ear the name Common =orei+n and SecuritB 6olicies. :eveloped #rom the initial collective securitB concept? it evolved )B inte+rational processes toDard the notion o# common securitB? and its projects cover issues as inte+ration o# mem)ersI armed #orces? inte+ration o# mem)ersI de#ense industries Jas it Dere the 9ir)us project? 8urocopter and 8uro#i+hterK? inte+ration o# command and communications? conver+ence o# mem)ersI national #orei+n and securitB policies. :urin+ the last Bears? the 8uropean 3nion tried to develop a common de#ense )B revivin+ the @estern 8uropean (r+ani.ation as the militarB )ranch o# it? separa)le )ut not separate o# N9*(. 9 special attention has to )e paid to N9*(H )orn durin+ the hei+hts o# the Cold @ar? the 9lliance had to chan+e tar+ets and missions? structures and doctrines a#ter the dismem)erment o# the @*(H startin+ Dith "//"? Dhen it Das launched the NeD Strate+ic Concept? Dhich em)edded the lessons o# the chan+in+ conte7t o# securitB? the 9lliance have tried to Aeep the pace Dith the +lo)al developments in terms o# militarB and economic a##airs? to )ecome a more #le7i)le structure? capa)le o# #ul#illin+ a lar+e ran+e o# missions? de#ined as the 6eters)er+ 0issions. N9*( is one o# the )est e7amples o# conceptual re-conversion? #rom the classical collective de#ense or+ani.ation? readB to
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de#end in a lar+e-scale Dar the territories and the soverei+ntB o# its mem)ers? to a more versatile doctrine? sustainin+ conceptuallB a lar+e ran+e o# missions? dou)led )B a #le7i)le militarB structure? capa)le o# supportin+ in the #ield the neD doctrines. Novernments continue to deal Dith securitB issues in the classical manner there is a clear distinction )etDeen e7ternal securitB issues and domestic securitB issuesH the #ormer are to )e mana+ed )B diplomats and militarB? the latter )B a consortium o# speciali.ed a+encies? one or more #or each speci#ic threat. Some +overnments enlar+e the prero+atives o# a domestic a+encB in order to deal Dith neD tBpes o# threatsH others usuallB #ound a neD a+encB #or everB neD set o# threats #or e7ample? neD a+encies to deal Dith dru+ tra##ic and or+ani.ed crime? international and domestic terrorismH or? #or the #ormers? neD )ranches Dithin old a+encies. 87ternal securitB is to )e dealt all the DaB in the traditional manner militarB a##airs? strate+ic studies? armed #orces? diplomats and intelli+ence services? alliancesH there is no +reat trust in the international securitB or+ani.ations #or matters concernin+ national securitB. <esides these tDo cate+ories o# institutions? there are numerous others? )oth at the international and national level? that have as tar+et issues concernin+ national and international securitB. *heir preoccupations cover the Dhole ran+e o# securitB issues? most o# them )ein+ purpose#ullB #ounded to prove the ri+htness o# one paradi+m or another. @e can onlB o##er a short selection o# these thinA tanAs? Dithout anB claim o# ri+orous choice or special relevancB? )ut onlB to shoD the diversitB o# them. ". 1nstitute #or National SecuritB Studies? 3nited States 9ir =orce 9cademB? C( Research pro+rams in2 arms controlH counter proli#erationH re+ional securitBH environmental securitBH con#lict in in#ormation a+eH space policiesH
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2. 1nternational 1nstitute #or Strate+ic Studies Strate+ic SurveB 2 - #ocuses on pro)lems related to Dar? con#lict and their impact on economB? environment and healthH re+ional con#licts 1ndia-6aAistan? Northern 1reland? Mosovo? China-*aiDanH ideolo+ical con#licts in 9siaH creation o# international humanitarian laDs and their impact over the conduct o# nationsH Strate+ic Comments no. 2 see titles o# articlesH
-. Neneva Center #or SecuritB 6olicB *he 'th 1nternational SecuritB =orum? Novem)er 2 8uropean SecuritB 6olicB Lumanitarian :imension SecuritB? 9rms Control and Civil SocietB 1n#ormation *echnolo+B 1tems2
'. Center #or Nlo)al SecuritB and :emocracB 6rojects linAin+ the international securitB Dith the e7pansion o# democracB throu+hout the DorldH !. 1nternational 6eace and SecuritB online data)ase *hinA tanAs in 6eace and SecuritB2 6(66 6ro+ram #or 6eaceAeepin+ 6olicB? Neor+e 0ason 3niversitBH *he :epartment o# 6eaceAeepin+ (perations at the 3nited NationsH C(6R8: *he Consortium on 6eace Research? 8ducation and :evelopmentH SparA 0. 0atsuna+a 1nstitute #or 6eace? 3niversitB o# LaDaiiH @aBne State 3niversitB Center #or 6eace and Con#lict StudiesH Loover 1nstitute on @ar? Revolution and 6eace? Stan#ord 3niversitBH S16R1H *he 3niversitB o# Cali#ornia 1nstitute on Nlo)al Con#lict and CooperationH *he 0artin 1nstitute #or 6eace Studies and Con#lict Resolution? 3niversitB o# 1dahoH
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4. StocAholm 1nternational 6eace Research 1nstitute S16R1 Research areas2 arms trans#erH arms productionH militarB e7pendituresH militarB technolo+BH chemical and )iolo+ical DeaponsH 8uropean securitBH 87port controlsH SIPRI Yearbook 2000 Security and Conflicts 6art 1 SecuritB and Con#licts? "/// 6art 11 0ilitarB Spendin+ and 9rmaments? "/// 6art 111 Non-proli#eration? arms control and disarmament? "///
5. RoBal 3nited Services 1nstitute R3S1 6ro+rams2 the 8uropean SecuritB 6ro+ram - #ocuses on peace and securitB in 8urope? the roles o# N9*(? the 8uropean 3nion and other institutionsH e7pertise in @estern 8urope? Central and eastern 8urope and the <alAan Re+ionH the 9sia 6ro+ram covers South? South-8ast and North-8ast 9sia de#ense and international securitB issues in 9sia-6aci#ic re+ionH the 0iddle 8ast 6ro+ram de#ense and re+ional securitB issues national? political and economic developmentsH the 0ilitarB Sciences 6ro+ram studies on de#enseH
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1n conclusion? De can hi+hli+ht some aspects o# the securitB studies at the turn o# the centurB? as theB appear a#ter all mentioned a)ove2 ". securitB studies +o around o# a multitude o# concepts? none o# them verB Dell de#ine? Dith no +eneral a+reement neither over the understandin+s o# them? nor over the content o# themH 2. the most studied concept? the national securitB? is noD in the middle o# a de)ate )etDeen FtraditionalistsG? Dho #ocus on political and militarB a##airs and strate+ic studies? and FDide ran+eG adepts? Dho critici.e the #ormersI approach as narroD? o)solete and incapa)le o# +ivin+ ansDers to the neD challen+es o# Dorld trans#ormationH -. as seen a)ove? partisanship o# one or another paradi+m is? in #act? a matter o# choice to allocate the same resources #or one or another alternative course o# actionH '. i# the +overnmental approach to securitB issues continues to )e or+ani.ed in a traditional DaB? international securitB or+ani.ations and thinA tanAs adapted themselves more easilB to the neD challen+es o# the international sBstem post Cold @arH =inallB? maB )e the )est course o# action #or studBin+ securitB issues is to inte+rate? in a sBstematic manner? the Dhole ran+e o# items considered o# havin+ a relevant impact over the securitB o# a state? a re+ion or o# the entire Dorld. @e maB cite here Lel+a La#tendorn? Dho proposed? in "// ? the #olloDin+ topics #or a course on international securitB2 theorB and historB o# peace? Dar and con#lictH values? cultural herita+e and threat perceptionsH concepts o# re+ional? international and +lo)al securitBH securitB re+imes and institution-)uildin+H economic? natural resource and ecolo+ical dimensions o# securitBH challen+es o# international terrorism and dru+ tra##icH impact o# technolo+B and in#ormation dissemination on international con#lictH decision-maAin+ in crisis situationsH de#ense policies o# the states and their domestic #oundationH
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nuclear strate+B? Deapons sBstems? arms control and disarmament.
CA IT)$U$ II
Con/lictele internaionale
)biective. >ntele+erea de ctre cursant a principalelor aspecte ale con#lictelor? naionale sau internaionale? mpreun cu sursele acestora? tipolo+ia $i structura lor. 6re.entarea cadrului teoretic de operare a mana+ementului con#lictelor. 2oiuni c&eie. con#lict? prevenire? atenuare? re.oluie? intervenie? peace-en#orcin+? peace-Aeepin+? peace-maAin+.
0%3% Surse ale con/lictelor

1denti#icarea surselor con#lictelor internaionale pe )a.a nivelelor de anali. a relaiilor internaionale. Cadrul teoretic al nivelelor de anali.a 2 Menneth @alt. FThe Origins of WarG ni el indi idual2 a. natura uman teorii asupra instinctului? a+resivitii nativePdo)nditeH ). liderii politici? ideile? credinele $i personalitatea acestoraH c. studiul proceselor psiholo+ice. ni el statal!na"ional2 a. varia)ilele +uvernamentale structura re+imului politicH #orma sistemului politicH valorile re+imului politicH procesele $i mecanismele de luare a deci.iilorH ). varia)ilele societale structura sistemului economic $i socialH opinia pu)licH atri)utele naionaleH +rupurile de intereseH minoritile $i naionalismulH cultura politic $i ideolo+iile. ni el siste#ic!siste# interna"ional2 a. structura sistemului internaional chestiunea anarhieiH ). actorii sistemului internaional marile puteri $i distri)uia
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puterii n sistemH c. alianele militare $i politiceH d. structura sistemului economic internaional. 8sena utili.rii cadrului teoretic #acilitea. identi#icarea amplasrii cau.elor con#lictelor? a varia)ilelor care determin con#lictele $i a interaciunii dintre varia)ile. Nivel sistemic +eneral diadic relaiile dintre state luate dou cte dou. :emocraiile rareori recur+ la r.)oi unele #a de altele. Surse ale conflictelor la nivel sistemic do#ina"ia $aradig#ei realiste actorii cheie sunt statele suverane esenial2 distri)uia puterii ntre statele din sistem structura anarhica a S1
surse ale conflictelor concentrare asupra strate+iilor de securitate pe termen scurt po.iionarea n S1 adoptarea scenariilor de tip Qcel mai mic ru posi)ilG an+ajarea n competiia pentru putere utili.area metodelor coercitive pentru promovarea intereselor? in#luenei $i meninerea presti+iului internaional a$ari"ia conflictelor activare de di#erende ale statelor care pre#er #ora n dauna aciunilor pa$nice re.ultatele neintenionate ale activitilor statelor care doresc pacea? care pre#er minimi.area pierderilor n dauna ma7imi.rii c$ti+urilor? dar pot s acepte riscuri majore pentru a evita pierderile dilema de securitate
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Teorii dominante n sfera conflictelor <alana de putere este caracteri.at de coali.area mpotriva tendinelor he+emonice? echili)rul puterilor? de calculul cost)ene#icii $i de puterea disuasiunii. ( variaie o constituie coali.area mpotriva ameninrilor Qballance of threatsG? band%&agoning and buck%$assing. Raria)ila ce in#luenea. aceste teorii este tehnolo+ia militar $i mai precis armamentul nuclear? n conditiile reali.rii 09:? J0utuallB 9ssured :estructionK? deci a dispariiei distinciei dintre nvin$i $i nvin+tori. *eoriile li)erale n cadrul crora conceptul cheie este cel al interdependenelor? care mresc vulnera)ilitatea mutuala a statelor din S1 $i de aici teama pierderii prosperitii din cau.a con#lictelor? care ast#el duce la securitate sistemic. Surse ale conflictului la nivel statal 8tno-naionalismul Chestiunile le+ate de mediul nconjurtor? precun de+radarea acestuia $i resursele irecupera)ile 0i$cri ale populaiei 0ar7ismul se concentrea. asupra structurii economice a statelor? distri)uiei ine#iciente a prosperitii ca o surs a con#lictului intern $i internaional. :e asemenea sunt e7plicate e#ectele capitaliste ale cre$terii cheltuielilor militare pentru dinami.are a economiei care duc la cursa narmrilor $i la dilema de securitate. SeBder tratea. coaliia elitelor $i constituirea miturilor naionale. =iecare elit pre#er o #orm di#erit de e7pansiune limitat ntr-un domeniu anume. Coaliiile utili.ea. puterea pentru o politic e7pansionist mult mai lar+ dect cea dorit de #iecare +rup n parte $i dincolo de limitele avute la dispo.iie. Renirea la putere se #ace prin construirea unor mituri )ene#ice coaliiei? i.vorte din lecii de istorie? mituri precum2 teoria Q"a$ului is$'(itorG? teoria Qr')boiului de di ersiuneG $i mitul Qcet'"ii asediateG.
"5
( alt chestiune de de.)tut este cea a democraiilor care rareori pornesc la r.)oi $i mai rar unele mpotriva altora? lucru care odat cu e7pansiunea democraiilor n lume duce la eliminarea surselor de con#lict. 3n alt su)iect este cel al etniilor $i al naionalismului ca surse de con#lict. 6rin naionalism nele+em crearea unui stat capa)il s asi+ure securitate #i.ic $i economic a unei etnii ntr-un S1 anarhic. ( alt surs de con#lict sunt mi$crile de populaie n timp istoric care duc la apariia unor tensiuni inter-etnice. 9ceste tensiuni pot duce la r.)oaie de secesiune sau de uni#icare care apoi se pot internaionali.a. 0i+raia e7ercit o presiune sporit asupra resurselor unui teritoriu? schim)ri n distri)uia cheltuielilor? veniturilor economice $i a )alanei politice $i +enerea. o ameninare real sau perceput pentru identitatea cultural a rii +a.d. Surse individuale ale conflictelor Liderii politici pot #i surse ale con#lictului n #uncie de coninutul $i tipolo+ia credinelor personale? procesele prin care acumulea. $i prelucrea. in#ormaiile? precum $i personalitatea $i tririle lor emoionale. Liderii politici posed diverse opinii personale n privina o)iectivelor politice sau de alt natur? o ima+ine personal asupra altor lideri politici $i a inteniilor lor $i au o pre#erin pentru anumite su)ter#u+ii sau tipuri de aciuni? un e7emplu #iind Q)lu##G-ul internaional al lui Litler. 8seniale sunt percepiile +re$ite asupra inteniilor sau a activitilor adversarilor? precum n "/! a+resive ale adversarilor. Alte teorii legate de sursele conflictelor ". 2. con#lict2 0inoritile? naionalismul $i con#lictul etno-politic 0ilitantismul reli+ios 1ma+inea $i identitatea. *eorii structurale care anali.ea. de.mem)rarea imperiilor $i construirea? distru+erea $i esecul statelor. 87plicaii sociale $i psiholo+ice care identi#ic urmatoarele surse de ca.ul Coreea? $i e7a+erarea inteniilor
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-. 0i+raii? resurse? comer $i tehnolo+ie.
0%0% Ti(olo-ia con/lictelor

". >n #uncie de nivelul de anali. con#lictele pot #i2 siste#ice? precum r.)oiele mondiale sau R.)oiul Rece? inter-statale sau diadice? societale? precum r.)oaiele civile $i indi iduale con#lictele de interese 2. >n #uncie de actorii implicai n con#lict? acestea pot #i2 interna"ionale? ntre dou sau mai multe state? diadice sau de coaliie? $i interne? cnd apar +rupuri n con#lict n momentul n care autoritatea statului scade sau este prea opresiv. Con#lictele interne pot lua amploare $i pot deveni internaionale prin implicarea altor actori. -. >n #uncie de intensitate con#lictele pot #i2 #a*ore? precum cele armate internaionale $i #inore? Jlo& scale conflictsK? care pot lua #orma unor revoluii? insur+ene? acte de terorism? mi$cri de protest de mas $i lovituri de stat. 3nul dintre #actorii care in#luenea. intensitatea unui con#lict este cantitatea de violen inter-+rup sau inter-state. 3n alt #actor este numrul de victime coro)orat cu numrul de re#u+iai $i pa+u)ele naturale. Costurile utili.rii #orelor armate adau+ un plus de intensitate con#lictului n direct relaie cu durata acestuia. 3ltimul #actor relevant este cel al +radului de mo)ili.are al societii sau al societilor a#late n con#lict. Concepte de operare :oi termeni #olosii sunt cei de co#$eti"ie $i conflict? competiie nsemnnd o ciocnire de interese? un anta+onism? con#lict nsemnnd un di#erend violent ntre dou sau mai multe entiti avnd o identitate sta)ilit. 9lt termen #olosit este cel de iolen"' care nseamn #olosirea #orei n scopul atin+erii o)iectivelor propuse sau dorite. 9cest termen va #i #olosit n asociere cu cei de $re enire? constr+ngere $i re$resiune. *ensiunea sau ncordarea apare n momentul e7ercitrii de presiune #a de un +rup sau actor internaional.
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0%+% Structura con/lictelor

6rima parte a con#lictului cea latent este cea n care tensiunea pre-con#lict este n cre$tere. 6e aceast poriune intervin mijloacele de prevenire a con#lictului. 9cestea sunt mecanisme de coo$erare $i cointeresare prin inducerea comunicrii? a ne+ocierii $i a )locrii Qdilemei de securitateG. 0ecanismul urmtor este cel de disuasiune prin e7ercitarea de presiuni non-violente pentru a preveni utili.area #orei inter-+rup. 6asul #inal este cel de coerci"ie care presupune #olosirea #orei pentru a preveni violena inter-+rup sau inter-state. 8$ecul prevenirii duce la cre$terea intensitii tensiunii? con#lictul trece de nivelul critic de violen $i devine deschis. 6e parcursul escalad'rii $i li#it'rii con#lictului apare mana+ementul con#lictului cu uneltele sale speci#ice? de peace-maAin+ $i peace-en#orcement. 1nstrumentele de peace-maAin+? paci#icare? tre)uie s duc la limitarea $i apoi la atenuarea con#lictului pn la co)orrea su) nivelul critic de violen. :up semnarea acordurilor de ncetare a #ocului intr n #unciune instrumentele de peace-en#orcement care duc la de.an+ajarea prilor $i a +rupurilor a#late n con#lict. 3rmtorul pas este cel de meninere a pcii prin meninerea de.an+ajat a prilor prin interpunerea unor trupe neutre acceptate de am)ele pri. 9cum intervin ne+ocierile pentru semnarea unor acorduri de pace. Ne+ocierea este #cut #ie direct? #ie prin mediere. (dat acordul semnat intr n vi+oare prevenirea post con#lict? adic procesul de peace-)uildin+. 9cest proces presupune re-inducerea cooperrii ntre prile sau statele )eli+erante. Re.ultatul poate #i un succes? adic diminuarea tensiunii pn la .ero. 3n alt re.ultat poate #i meninerea unei tensiuni constante ntre pri? care denot lipsa de aderen #a de soluiile +site? dar $i disuadarea unui comportament violent. ( alt #inalitate poate #i re-escaladarea con#lictului prin cre$terea tensiunii pn la atin+erea nivelului de con#lict $i renceperea con#runtrii armate.
0%4% Eta(ele interveniei e5terne 6n vederea (revenirii! li"it#rii! atenu#rii i re7oluiei con/lictelor Concepte cheie ale Ciclului Interveniei ,- inter en"ie 2- $re enire .- atenuare /- re)olu"ie 0- #en"inerea $'cii $eace%kee$ing 1- i#$unerea $'cii $eace%enforce#ent 2- construirea $'cii $eace%#aking ". Inter en"ia este activitatea deli)erat a statelor? or+ani.aiilor
internaionale sau a or+ani.aiilor internaionale n vederea acordrii asistenei necesare pentru re.olvarea chestiunilor de natur umanitar? de securitate internaional sau re+ional? pentru prevenirea? atenuarea sau re.oluia con#lictelor. 1ntervenia tre)uie s #ie o)iectiv? lipsit de conotaii politice sau ideolo+ice. Scopul interveniei este de a #ace )ine? nu de a produce mai mult ru societilor sau statelor a#late n sau ameninate de con#lict. 2. Pre enirea este evitarea celei mai puin de.ira)ile mani#estri a con#lictelor inter-+rup nere.olvate? adic erupia violenei. 87ist ntotdeauna o tensiune inter-+rup? care atta timp ct este +estionat corect? este evitat erupia sa violent. 6revenirea con#lictelor const dintr-un set de msuri $i mecanisme utili.ate pentru reducerea tensiunii? inter.icerea activitilor ile+ale $i pentru inducerea sau #orarea cooperrii inter-+rup n a$a #el nct s se evite ocurena violenei. +% 3tenuarea repre.int limitarea? reducerea $i minimi.area actelor de violen. 9plicarea msurilor $i mecanismelor de atenuare se produce ntotdeauna dup apariia violenei.
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*radiional sunt utili.ate #orele neutre de interpo.iie pentru restaurarea unui climat non-violent n cadrul cruia rdcinile con#lictului pot #i eradicate. '. Re)olu"ia nseamn instaurarea unui climat pa$nic #ie prin activitile de atenuare? #ie prin consens mutual? epui.are sau n#rn+ere? #olosind un alt set de msuri speci#ice aplicate pentru eliminarea surselor de con#lict. 3n aspect esenial este di#erenierea dintre prevenire $i re.oluie. 0surile de re.oluie includ de cele mai multe ori schim)ri #undamentale de status-Cuo? precum e7tinderea unor drepturi sau privile+ii deja e7istente? modi#icri de #rontier? restituii $i acordarea amnistiei sau a dreptului de a.il $i msuri +enerale mpotriva prilor implicate n con#lict. >n contrast? msurile preventive intesc meninerea status-Cuo-ului? #rontierelor de stat? diversitii etnice? proporiei $i distri)uiei etnice? privile+iilor e7istente? n vederea reducerii tensiunilor $i prevenirii violenei. 0surile de re.oluie cer o implicare $i o an+ajare lar+ $i adnc a resurselor prilor implicate n con#lict. 8ste necesar $i #undamental participarea lor? nu doar acceptarea pcii. *otodat? latura destructiv a con#lictelor cere suport e7tern pentru implementarea cu succes a msurilor de re.oluie. 6revenirea? n contrast? reduce necesitatea interveniei e7terne $i implic acele mecanisme interne care sunt #undamentale pentru meninerea cooperrii $i coe.iunii inter-+rup. 04en"inerea $'cii $eace%kee$ing Conceptele de peace-Aeepin+? peace-en#orcement $i peace-maAin+ sunt
con#undate adeseori att de pres? ct $i de politicieni? #iind puse toate su) aceea$i etichet de peace-Aeepin+. 6eace-Aeepin+? n cea mai n+ust interpretare? repre.int utili.area de #ore neutre ntre? $i cu acordul prilor a#late n con#lict? n scopul o)inerii acordurilor de ncetare a #ocului $i a ncetrii ostilitilor. 9ceste operaiuni sunt de natur limitativ $i atenuant? o#erind un cadru util $i necesar pentru re.oluia con#lictului. >n mod normal? naintea
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nceperii operaiunilor de peace-Aeepin+? prile sunt separate? #orele lor sunt retrase n ca.rmi? de.armate $i separate #i.ic unele de altele. Statutul juridic al acestor operaiuni decur+e din Capitolul R1 al Cartei (N3. 4. I#$unerea $'cii $eace%enforce#ent5 implic intervenia n #or a statelor sau or+ani.aiilor internaionale n vederea o)li+rii prilor n con#lict s ncete.e ostilitile? $i n vederea prevenirii re-escaladrii con#lictului? crend un mediu propice pentru declararea ncetrii #ocului $i nceperea aplicrii msurilor de re.oluie. Statutul juridic al acestor operaiuni decur+e din Capitolul R11 al Cartei (N3. 5. Construirea $'cii $eace%#aking? este cel mai puin utili.at dintre cei trei termeni. >n mod normal termenul este asociat activitilor de Q$eace%buildingG sau Qnation%buildingG post con#lict. (peraiunile cuprind aplicarea de mecanisme de re.oluie n vederea anihilrii rului #cut de con#lict? sta)ilirii de #rontiere mutual recunoscute $i re#ormrii in#rastructurii +uvernamentale $i politice. Spre deose)ire de peace-Aeepin+ $i peace-en#orcement? peace-maAin+ necesit o implicare $i o participare su)stanial a prilor a#late anterior n con#lict? cu ajutorul $i su) auspiciile )unelor o#icii ale or+ani.aiilor $i or+anismelor internaionale. >n ca.ul operaiunilor de peace-Aeepin+ $i peace-en#orcement? prile pot #i de acord sau pot #i #orate s ncete.e ostilitile? pe cnd cele de peace-maAin+ necesit deplina lor participare.
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CA IT)$U$ III
I2STITU8II I2TER2A8I)2A$E DE SECURITATE C)$ECTI9:. )2U
)biective. (N3 $i intervenia n con#lictele internaionale $i JintraKnaionale. 2oiuni c&eie. R.)oi Rece clasic? destinderea relativ? perioada post Ra.)oi Rece.
=ondat la 24 aprilie "/'!? n cadrul Con#erinei de la San =rancisco? (r+ani.aia Naiunilor 3nite J(N3K prelua #unciile eseniale ale Societii Naiunilor2 prevenirea con#lictelor internaionale prin re.olvarea pa$nic a disputelor dintre statele mem)re $i asi+urarea securitii naionale a #iecrui stat mem)ru prin aplicarea principiului solidaritii +enerale mpotriva a+resorului Jprincipiul de )a. al oricrui sistem de securitate colectivK. 8voluia sistemului internaional? a re+ulilor $i proceselor sale? vor avea un impact important asupra (N3? modi#icndu-i atri)utele iniiale? anulnd unele din misiunile sale $i adu+ndu-i altele noi. 8ste di#icil de evaluat e#iciena (N3 n domeniul mana+ementului con#lictelor internaionale? mai ales n cuprinsul unui studiu de mici dimensiuni. Se ridic o serie de chestiuni de metod2 care din con#lictele ultimilor !! de ani pot constitui studii de ca. a cror anali. poate o#eri o ima+ine despre rolul jucat de (N3 n aplanarea $i stin+erea di#erendelor; Care sunt criteriile con#orm crora putem evalua succesul sau insuccesul (N3 n re.oluia con#lictelor; 6utem considera re.olvarea unor con#licte prin medierea sau intervenia Jinclusiv militarK direct a marilor puteri? na#ara (N3? drept un insucces al acestei or+ani.aii; Cum putem evalua ndeplinirea de ctre (N3 a unor misiuni care nu intrau iniial n atri)uiile sale;
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6e parcursul pa+inilor ce urmea. vom ncerca s surprindem cteva ca.uri relevante pentru implicarea (N3 n mana+ementul con#lictelor internaionale? precum $i modul n care au evoluat aciunea $i misiunile (N3 n #uncie de variaia re+ulilor sistemului internaional. Studiul nu cuprinde o anali. #ormal? de$i aceasta ar #i de dorit? ci doar una comparativ? ncercnd s evalue.e raportul dintre sarcinile asumate de (N3 prin Carta $i re.oluiile sale $i re.ultatul #inal al aciunilor sale n cteva ca.uri edi#icatoare.
+%3% Surse i resurse ale i"(lic#rii )2U 6n "ana-e"antul con/lictelor internaionale Carta (N3? documentul de )a. al (r+ani.aiei? speci#ic? n articolul 2? o)li+aia tuturor statelor mem)re de a-$i re.olva n mod pa$nic disputele? de a se a)ine de la u.ul #orei sau al ameninrii cu #ora n relaiile internaionale $i de a coopera n cadrul operaiunilor de pace sponsori.ate de ctre (N3. Cele mai importante capitole ale Cartei? din punctul de vedere al o)iectului acestui studiu? sunt R1 $i R11. Capitolul R1 speci#ic procedurile de urmat n vederea re.olvrii pa$nice a di#erendelor dintre state? iar Capitolul R11 conine modalitile de aciune a (N3 $i a statelor mem)re n ca. de u. nejusti#icat al #orei sau de apariie a unor pericole majore pentru pacea $i securitatea internaionala. 9ceste dou articole constituie sursa juridic internaional a aciunilor ntreprinse de (N3 n vederea aplanrii $i stin+erii con#lictelor. *ot Carta este aceea care trasea. rolurile instituiilor (N3 n domeniul mana+ementului con#lictelor internaionale. 9st#el? Consiliul de Securitate a #ost desemnat ca #iind or+anismul (N3 nsrcinat cu meninerea pcii $i securitii internaionale. Con#orm Capitolului R11? Consiliul de Securitate este autori.at s identi#ice a+resorul sau a+resorii Jart. -/ $i ' K? s decid ce msuri coercitive inclu.nd #olosirea #orei care tre)uiesc impuse pentru a stopa a+resorul $i a restaura pacea Jart. '"? '2? ',? '/K? $i s adrese.e statelor mem)re cererea de punere la dispo.iia (r+ani.aiei a mijloacelor #inanciare $i militare necesare atin+erii acestui scop Jart. '-? ''? '!K. Carta stipulea. ns c pentru orice deci.ie de tip Capitolul R11? este necesar acordul unanim al mem)rilor permaneni ai Consiliului de Securitate Statele 3nite? 3niunea Sovietic Jactualmente =ederaia RusK? 0area <ritanie? =rana $i China.
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9ceast prevedere? mo$tenire a celui de-al :oilea R.)oi 0ondial? urmrea s induc cooperarea marilor puteri n vederea asi+urrii pcii $i securitii internaionale. Re.ultatul direct a #ost )locarea aciunilor Consiliului de Securitate $i? implicit ale (N3? ori de cte ori erau n joc interesele unuia dintre mem)rii permaneni. 6entru a evita )locarea constant a aciunilor (N3 de ctre unul sau altul dintre mem)rii permaneni ai Consiliului de Securitate? 9dunarea Neneral a (N3 a adoptat n "/! F3nited #or 6eace ResolutionG? care autori.a 9dunarea s ia n de.)atere orice chestiune ce intra su) incidena Cartei? atta timp ct Consiliul de Securitate nu se ocupa concomitent de aceasta. Re.oluia o#erea ast#el posi)ilitatea ca (N3 s ntreprind aciuni n domeniul man+ementului con#lictelor internaionale? #r ca pentru aceasta s #ie necesar deci.ia Consiliului de Securitate. :e asemenea? re.oluia ddea prero+ative 9dunrii Nenerale n domeniul mana+ementului con#lictelor? prero+ative a#late pn atunci n e7clusivitatea Consiliului de Securitate. 3n rol important n domeniul aplanrii $i stin+erii con#lictelor l con#er Carta Secretarului-Neneral al (r+ani.atiei. 9cesta este autori.at s aduc la cuno$tina Consiliului de Securitate orice pericol sau ameninare potenial la adresa pcii $i securitii internaionale Jart. //K. :e asemenea? Secretarul-Neneral poate #i chemat s joace? #ormal sau in#ormal? rolul de mediator ntre prile n con#lict. 6rin prevederile Capitolului R11? Secretarul-Neneral are responsa)ilitatea de-a asi+ura respectarea principiilor $i o)iectivelor (r+ani.aiei. *oate acestea o#er Secretarului-Neneral al (N3 posi)ilitatea de-a juca un rol important pe scena internaional? n domeniul mana+ementului con#lictelor. Resursele (N3 n ndeplinirea o)iectivelor #i7ate de Cart sunt #ra+ile? depin.nd de voina statelor mem)re de a-$i onora an+ajamentele stipulate de Cart $i de a-$i asuma riscurile inerente ale aciunilor n vederea impunerii $i meninerii pcii. Costurile #inanciare ale operaiunilor de pace ale (N3 sunt ridicate '2" milioane de dolari n "//"? -?, miliarde de dolari n "//'. :i#erenele de opinii n privina politicilor de adoptat la nivel internaional ntre +uvernele naionale $i sta##-ul deci.ional al (N3 pot provoca neonorarea de ctre statele nemulumite a an+ajamentelor #inanciare. :rept re.ultat? n "//4? datoriile statelor mem)re ctre (N3 se ridicau la 2?- miliarde de dolari. Lipsurile #inanciare au dus la diminuarea sau chiar sistarea unor pro+rame (N3 de
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ajutorare a rilor srace? avnd drept consecin o scdere a presti+iului $i e#icienei (r+ani.aiei. :e asemenea? un alt aspect delicat l constituie #orele (N3? a$a-numitele Fc$ti al)astreG. 9ceste #ore de meninere a pcii sunt #ormate? con#orm Cartei din contin+ente naionale puse la dispo.iie n mod voluntar de ctre statele mem)re. >n toate aciunile (N3 de meninere a pcii s-au urmrit dou principii n alctuirea #orelor (N32 ". S nu conin contin+ente ale marilor puteri? mai ales ale mem)rilor permaneni ai Consiliului de SecuritateH 2. S nu conin contin+ente ale statelor limitro#e .onei de con#lict. 9ceste principii au #ost impuse ca +aranie a imparialitii #orelor (N3. :in pcate? ele au creat o serie de neajunsuri operaiunilor de meninere a pcii e7cluderea contin+entelor marilor puteri a lipsit Fc$tile al)astreG de aportul lo+istic esenial al acestor state? iar e7cluderea participrii statelor limitro#e? de cunoa$terea amnunit a caracteristicilor +eo+ra#ice $i umane ale .onei de con#lict. :e multe ori? ast#el de lipsuri au mpins operaiunile (N3 spre e$ec. :e asemenea? ele au demonstrat dependena (N3 de voina $i interesele statelor mem)re? n special ale marilor puteri? acestea acionnd de multe ori na#ara (N3 sau re#u.nd s-$i onore.e an+ajamentele stipulate prin Cart.
+%0% Studii de ca7 9$a cum am artat mai sus? limitele acestui studiu impun o ale+ere destul de su)iectiv a ca.urilor de implicare a (N3 n man+ementul con#lictelor internaionale. Ca urmare? am ales o serie de e7emple de operaiuni ale (N3 n acest domeniu n direct corelaie cu evoluia re+ulilor sistemului internaional. 9st#el? ca.urile alese spre studiu #ac parte din patru stadii de evoluie a sistemului internaional n perioada post)elic2 ". R')boiul Rece clasic5 ,6/2%,612H 2. 7estinderea relati '5 ,612%,680H -. Tran)i"ia anilor 980H '. Perioada $ost R')boi Rece5 ,686%,666. Rom urmri? pentru #iecare ca. n parte? dou o)iective2 a. cum impietea. re+ulile sistemului internaional asupra operaiunilor (N3 de impunere $i meninere a pciiH ). anali.a re.ultatelor acestor operaiuni.
25
A.
!boiul ece clasic" #$%&'#$() >n cadrul acestei perioade? dou sunt ca.urile cu o relevan major n privina
implicrii (N3 n mana+ementul con#lictelor internaionale2 Coreea "/! -"/!- $i Sue. "/!4. 9m)ele au pus (N3 n situaii limit din punct de vedere deci.ional? consecin a structurii sistemului internaional )ipolaritate creat prin #ormarea celor dou )locuri rivale n emis#era nordic $i mprirea precis a s#erelor lor de in#luen n acest spaiu. Nu vom intra n detaliu n des#$urarea con#lictelor respective $i a operaiunilor (N3 ce au urmat? acestea #iind deja pe deplin cunoscute? ci vom urmri doar o)iectivele e7primate mai sus. >n ceea ce prive$te cri.a coreean? aceasta aparine n principal ca.urilor prev.ute de Capitolul R11. 9+resiunea nord-coreean tre)uia? ca urmare a prevederilor Capitolului respectiv al Cartei? s produc o solidari.are +eneral a statelor mem)re ale (N3 cu Coreea de Sud? iar Consiliul de Securitate avea o)li+aia de a sta)ili msurile coercitive ce tre)uiau luate de ur+en n vederea stoprii a+resiunii $i restaurrii pcii n peninsul. 8ste )inecunoscut #aptul c deci.ia Consiliului de Securitate de a #orma o #or multinaional de intervenie mpotriva armatelor nord-coreene? #or pus su) comanda S39 Jcare contri)uiau cu circa / S din e#ective $i tehnica de r.)oiK a #ost posi)il doar ca urmare a a)senei repre.entantului 3RSS din Consiliu. 9+rend cu reticen ideea construirii (N3? Stalin a v.ut n aceasta? mai ales datorit compo.iiei Consiliului de Securitate? un mecanism de promovare a intereselor S39 n plan internaional. >n perioada "/',-"/'/? 3RSS a ncercat s #oloseasc (N3 n vederea promovrii propriilor interese? sprijinind mi$crile de eli)erare din coloniile olande.e? din Siria $i Li)an? din 8+ipt? protestnd mpotriva sprijinului )locului vestic pentru re+imul #ranchist. >n #aa contrao#ensivei Restului? 3RSS a revenit la #olosirea veto-ului pentru a )loca deci.iile Consiliului de Securitate? iar mai apoi? n ianuarie "/! ? $i-a retras repre.entantul din acest or+anism. 9ceast a)sen a permis Consiliului s iniie.e aciunea multinaional din Coreea? la iniiativa S39 $i su) comandamentul acestora? element decisiv n salvarea e7istenei Coreei de Sud $i? n perspectiv? n stin+erea con#lictului din peninsul. 1ntervenia (N3 n Coreea a #ost? n #apt? o aciune american sprijinit de (r+ani.aie n )a.a Capitolului R11 al Cartei. Condus de un +eneral american? responsa)il n #aa 6re$edintelui S39 acionnd ca a+ent (N3? operaiunea
2,
$i-a schim)at sensul n momentul intrrii n con#lict a Chinei. (dat cu aceasta? multe din statele mem)re ale #orei multinaionale au considerat c o)iectivele iniiale ale operaiunii au #ost pierdute din vedere? totul trans#ormndu-se ntr-o competiie direct ntre S39 $i China pentru dominaie n 9sia 87trem-(riental. Consecin a operaiunii din Coreea a #ost a7iomatica e7cludere? pe viitor? a contri)uiei de natur militar a marilor puteri $i a statelor limitro#e la #ora de pace (N3. Cri.a Sue.ului a adus cu sine alte consecine pentru viitoarea implicare a (N3 n mana+ementul con#lictelor internaionale. >nceput odat cu anunarea de ctre Nasser a naionali.rii Canalului de Sue. $i a inteniei de inter.icere a tra#icului navelor israeliene prin Canal? cri.a a atins apo+eul n momentul interveniei militare coali.ate ale 0arii <ritanii? =ranei $i 1sraelului mpotriva 8+iptului. :e$i cri.a a #ost de.amorsat esenialmente de presiunile intense e7ercitate de superputeri asupra invadatorilor? rolul (N3 nu tre)uie ne+lijat. 9ciunea (N3 n a#acerea Sue.ului a #ost pus n mi$care de 9dunarea Neneral $i a stat constant su) controlul Secretarului Neneral. 8a era le+at? n principal? de modalitatea asi+urrii de.an+ajrii controlate a trupelor an+lo-#rancoisraeliene Jse punea mai ales pro)lema modalitii de asi+urare a retra+erii trupelor israeliene din peninsula SinaiK. >n consecin? operaiunea intra su) incidena Capitolului R1 al Cartei? #iind antamat n vederea soluionrii pa$nice a di#erendului? $i nu su) incidena capitolului R11? care ar #i necesitat deci.ia Consiliului de Securitate. =ora de pace (N3 intra n 8+ipt cu acordul acestuia? era u$or narmat $i avea rolul de a crea o .on-tampon n estul Sinaiului? ntre #orele israeliene $i cele e+iptene. 9ceast tehnic? numit mai apoi $eacekee$ing;? a #ost de.voltat pornind iniial de la +rupurile de o)servatori (N3 trimi$i n Mashmir $i 6alestina? la s#r$itul anilor I' ? pentru a monitori.a respectarea acordurilor de ncetare a #ocului. >n #apt? tre)uie o)servat un #apt esenial2 n cri.a Sue.ului? (N3 nu are o contri)uie semni#icativ la stin+erea
T
*re)uie menionat de la nceput c termenul de $eacekee$ing a #ost utili.at? pn nu demult? n mod a)u.iv. >n #apt? tre)uie #cut o delimitare clar ntre $eacekee$ing $i $eace#aking sau $eace%enforce#ent. Con#orm lui RodericA von LipseB? $eace#aking!$eace%enfoce#ent comport o aciune de #or? purtat cu mijloace militare de ma7im putere $i e#icien? #r pretenia de imparialitate? n vederea limitrii con#lictului la o arie restrns? mai apoi a #orrii prilor com)atante la ncetarea #ocului $i ncheierea acordurilor de de.an+ajare militar. Peacekee$ing este o operaiune ce vine s continue aciunile de $eace% enforce#ent!$eace#aking? n cadrul mana+ementului con#lictelor. =orele de meninere a pcii tre)uiesc s ai) acordul tuturor prilor pentru a #i des#$urate? tre)uiesc s #ie impariale $i s se a)in de la #olosirea #orei na#ara ca.urilor de auto-aprare Jprin aceasta nele+ndu-se $i ca.urile n care #ora de pace este mpiedicat n mod armat s-$i ndeplineasc misiunea. 8ste esenial a se nele+e aceste lucruri? n vederea evalurii corecte a aciunilor (N3 n mana+emetul con#lictelor internaionale.
2/
con#lictului? aceasta reali.ndu-se ca urmare a aciunii directe a Statelor 3nite? ci de asi+urare a respectrii post-cri. a de.an+ajrii prilor n con#lict. Cele dou cri.e aparinnd perioadei de nceput a R.)oiului Rece sunt re#lecia limpede a re+ulilor sistemului internaional. 9ccesul (N3 n .onele primare de interes a superputerilor a #ost limitat la aciuni secundare? na#ara deci.iilor majore. 9ciunea din Coreea a #ost iniiat de Statele 3nite? care au o)inut suportul (N3 pro#itnd de a)sena repre.entantului sovietic din Consiliul de Securitate. S #i #ost acesta pre.ent? (N3 ar #ost )locat? dar intervenia S39 n sprijinul Coreei de Sud ar #i loc n orice condiii? dat #iind interesul strate+ic primar al acestora n re+iunea 9siei 87trem-(rientale. Ca.ul Sue.ului este $i mai relevant? el demonstrnd rolul secundar alocat (N3 n mana+ementul con#lictelor internaionale. Ceea ce aduce important Sue.ul pentru (N3 este iniierea operaiunilor de $eacekee$ing? a$a-numitele operaiuni Capitolul FR1-$ijumtateG? tocmai pentru c acestea nu e7istau iniial n atri)uiile (N3 prev.ute n Carta. >n #apt? a$a cum vom vedea? tocmai succesul relativ al acestor operaiuni au reinut (N3 din a nu repeta e7periena ne#ericit a Societii Naiunilor. *. +estinderea relativ" #$()'#$,Relativa rela7are a relaiilor dintre cele dou )locuri rivale a dat posi)ilitatea (N3 de a juca un rol mai proeminent pe scena internaional n aceast perioad. 9vntul 0i$crii de Nealiniere? n cone7iune cu procesul de decoloni.are? au o#erit noi cmpuri de aciune pentru (r+ani.aie. 1mplicarea (N3 n cri.a con+ole. a #ost consecina direct a acestei stri de #apt. Cri.a con+ole. este ilustrativ pentru +enul de pro)leme creat de procesul decoloni.rii. Retra+erea precipitat a puterii coloniale Jn ca.ul de #a? cea )el+ianK? urmat de un r.)oi civil ca urmare a re)eliunii armatei con+ole.e mpotriva noilor autoriti? la care s-a adu+at secesiunea provinciei Matan+a? au dus la implicarea (N3 n re+iune. 9cionnd iniial n )a.a Capitolului R1? #ora (N3 a ncercat s asi+ure ordinea $i sta)ilitatea noului stat n condiiile incapacitii autoritilor con+ole.e de a o #ace? impunnd respectul le+ii o operaiune clasic de $eacekee$ing. Secesiunea Matan+i a deviat ns #ora (N3 de la misiunea iniial? intervenia armat a (N3C pentru a impune Matan+i recunoa$terea autoritii Minshasei $i eliminarea mercenarilor ce-l
sprijineau pe Chom)e devenind n #apt o aciune de $eace#aking? a#lat oarecum su) incidena Capitolului R11? niciodat menionat e7plicit n ca.ul acestei cri.e. 9ciunea (N3C n Matan+a a nsemnat renunarea la imparialitatea asumat n mod constant de #orele de pace (N3? ceea ce demonstrea. plenar c e#iciena n stin+erea unui con#lict primea. asupra o)servrii cu strictee a re+ulilor autoimpuse de mana+ement a con#lictelor. Lecia con+ole. a #ost pierdut din vedere de ctre (N3 - de ani mai tr.iu? n ca.ul con#lictului din e7-Uu+oslavia? #apt care a impietat asupra aciunii (N3 $i? implicit? asupra presti+iului su. Cri.a con+ole. a #ost +estionat de (N3 prin punerea n mi$care a mecanismelor interne de luare a deci.iilor. 3.nd de prevederile articolului //? Seceretarul-Neneral al (N3 a adus ca.ul la cuno$tina Consiliului de Securitate. (peraiunile au #ost iniiate de acesta? dar #ora de pace a (N3 J(N3CK a re#u.at contin+entele marilor puteri? pentru a evita implicarea $i? implicit? competiia acestora n Con+o. (N3C a acionat la ordinele Secretarului-Neneral $i s-a sprijinit pe suportul puterilor medii? mem)re ale (N3. (peraiunile din Con+o au #ost o com)inaie de $eace#aking $i $eacekee$ing +reu de separat? renunndu-se la imparialitate n vederea o)inerii rapide a re.ultatului dorit stin+erea con#lictului ce mcina proasptul stat. :e#inirea principiilor $i condiiilor de derulare a operaiunilor de $eacekee$ing? ce deveniser deja domeniul de pre#erin al (N3? s-a datorat unei alte cri.e internaionale? cea provocat de r.)oiul ara)o-israelian din "/5-? a$a numitul R.)oi de Uom Mippur. :eclan$at de e+ipteni $i sirieni cu scopul recuperrii teritoriilor pierdute n "/45? r.)oiul a pus la +rea ncercare 1sraelul? a#lat la un pas de dispariie. Revirimentul israelian? contrao#ensiva 1:=-ului peste Sue. $i nspre :amasc au dus la intervenia Statelor 3nite $i 3niunii Sovietice care? la #el ca n "/!4? au impus ncetarea #ocului. Rolul acodat (N3 a #ost $i de aceasta dat cel de asi+urare a de.an+ajrii #orelor a#late n con#lict $i de monitori.are a respectrii acordului de ncetare a #ocului. 6entru aceasta a #ost creat 3N8= 11 J3N 8mer+encB =orce in the 0iddle 8ast 11? prima dintre acestea #iind cea care asi+urase .ona tampon din Sinai din "/!4 pn la cererea lui Nasser de retra+ere a acesteia? n "/45K $i au #ost #ormulate principiile de )a. ale derulrii operaiunilor de acest +en. Sir <rian 3rCuhart? #ost Su)secretar-Neneral al (N3 pentru 9#aceri 6olitice? a
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sinteti.at cerinele eseniale ale declan$rii unei operaiuni de peaceAeepin+ pentru a avea $anse de succes2 consimmntul tuturor prilor n con#lict pentru des#$urarea operaiunii? a mandatului acesteia? a compo.iiei acesteia $i a comandanilor acesteiaH suportul continuu $i puternic al CSH un mandat clar $i practica)ilH ne#olosirea #orei dect n ca. de autoaprare inclu.nd re.istena la ncercri de a #ora FC$tile 9l)astreG s nu-$i ndeplineasc misiuneaH voina statelor mem)re de a o#eri un numr adecvat de militari capa)ili $i de-a accepta riscurile pe care mandatul $i operaiunea le prevdH voina statelor mem)re? $i mai ales a marilor puteri? de a pune la dispo.iia operaiunii mijoacele lo+istice $i #inanciare necesareH >n linii mari? (N3 va urmri ndeplinirea acestor condiii pentru #iecare din operaiunile de peaceAeepin+ ce avea s le tutele.e n urmtorii ani. Conclu.iile ce se desprind din anali.a acestei perioade denot clar #i7area .onei de responsa)ilitate a (N3 n peri#eria sistemului internaional? n a$a-numita Lume a *reia. Chiar $i aici? deci.iile cu implicaii majore pentru sistemul internaional au #ost luate tot de superputeri? (N3 #iind chemat doar s asi+ure repectarea acordurilor? odat semnate. 0ecanismul care pare s ia #iin n aceast perioad este urmtorul2 con#lictele din ariile de interes pentru superputeri sunt aplanate la intervenia $i prin mijlocirea direct a acestora? ducnd la de.an+ajarea #orelor n con#lictH mai apoi? (N3 este chemat s asi+ure? prin intermediul FC$tilor 9l)astreG? monitori.area respectrii acordurilor semnate de pri? pn la eventuala semnare a unui tratat cuprin.tor de pace Jca.ul israelo-e+iptean $i acordurile de la Camp :avidK. >n acest mod? (N3 se speciali.ea. n operaiuni de $eacekee$ing? operaiunile de $eace#aking #iind lsate na#ara preocuprilor sale Jcu e7cepia relevant a ca.ului con+ole.K. Succesele (N3 din perioada urmtoare se datorea. n mare msur acceptrii acestui rol.
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A. Tran!iia anilor .,Cooperarea tot mai strns dintre cei cinci mem)ri permaneni ai Consiliului de Securitate $i? n special? schim)area dramatic a politicii e7terne sovietice? odat cu venirea la putere la Mremlin a lui 0ihail Nor)aciov au creat premisele unei implicri tot mai active a (N3 n mana+ementul con#lictelor internaionale. La aceasta a contri)uit $i diplomaia silenioas? dar #oarte e#icient? a Secretarului-Neneral al (N3? Vavier 6ere. de Cuellar. 9ceast com)inaie de #actori? laolalt cu #olosirea e7perienei acumulate de (N3 n derularea operaiunilor de peaceAeepin+? au +enerat succesul (N3 n o)inerea retra+erii #orelor sovietice din 9#+hanistan? stin+erea con#lictului dintre 1ran $i 1raA? retra+erea cu)ane. $i #inali.area con#lictului an+ole.? precum $i ncetarea con#lictelor din 9merica Central. *oate aceste ca.uri au cuprins intervenia #orelor (N3 de meninere a pcii? #ie c a #ost vor)a de 3NN(096 n 9#+hanistan? care a asi+urat retra+erea relativ pa$nic a #orelor sovietice din .on? #ie c #ost vor)a de 3N110(N? care a monitori.at de.an+ajarea #orelor ianiano-iraAiene $i ntoarcerea lor pe #rontiera recunoscut internaional? #ie c #ost vor)a de 3N*9N? cea mai am)iioas ntreprindere de acest +en a (N3. 9ceasta din urm a trans+resat limitele unei o)i$nuite operaiuni de peaceAeepin+? intrnd n domeniul delicat al proceselor de peace-)uidin+ prin monitori.area retra+erii #orelor sud-a#ricane $i cu)an.e din Nami)ia? supervi.nd #orele civile de poliie $i crend condiiile pentru des#$urarea de ale+eri li)ere $i corecte. 8ste? de asemenea? demn de o)servat c toate aceste succese au venit pe #ondul unei epui.ri a #orelor a#late n con#lict? #ie c ne re#erim la sovietici n 9#+hanistan? #ie la iranienii $i iraAienii mcinai de un r.)oi de , ani? #ie la cu)ane.i $i sud-a#ricani n Nami)ia? pentru a nu mai meniona actorii con#lictelor aproape perpetue din 9merica Central. Se respect ast#el una din re+ulile o)iective ale derulrii proceselor de con#lict mana+ement? care evidenia. imposi)ilitatea stin+erii unui con#lict atta timp ct #orele an+ajate continu s ai) resurse care s le ndrepteasca a crede c pot o)ine c$ti+ de cau. prin #olosirea #orei. 1mportant a #ost #aptul c (N3 a sesi.at oportunitile o#erite de epui.area com)atanilor? precum $i de noua situaie internaional creat de modi#icarea liniilor directoare ale politicii e7terne sovietice? implicndu-se activ? mai ales prin persoana Secretarului-Neneral? n mana+ementul con#lictelor mai sus menionate.
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Succesele o)inute au ndreptit (N3 s priveasc spre perioada urmtoare cu sperana unei e7tinderi a rolului $i importanei sale n +estiunea pro)lemelor lumii contemporane. *. /erioada post !boi ece #$,$'#$$$ Cderea Widului <erlinului $i destrmarea 3niunii Sovietice doi ani mai tr.iu au modi#icat #undamental structura sistemului internaional. :eparte de a deveni mai pa$nic? epoca de dup "/,/ a #ost martora e7plo.iei con#lictelor interetnice? deplasnd centrul de +reutate al ciocnirilor violente dinspre e7teriorul spre interiorul statelor contemporane. *otu$i? prima mare provocare de dup "/,/ a #ost una FclasicG? declan$at prin inva.ia MuDeitului de ctre armata iraAian? la 2 au+ust "// . Relativa unitate de vederi a mem)rilor permaneni ai Consiliului de Securitate a (N3 a dat posi)ilitatea (r+ani.aiei de a aciona prompt $i vi.i)il n spiritul principiilor securitii colective? apo+eul #iind marcat de adoptarea Re.oluiei 45, din noiem)rie "// ? care autori.a statele mem)re ale (N3 Fs #oloseasc toate mijloacele necesareG pentru a pune capt ocupaiei MuDeitului. =ora multinaional? a#lat su) comandament american? a declan$at operaiunile n ianuarie "//"? punnd capt? n mai puin de dou luni? situaiei create de inva.ia iraAian. Considerat un model de aciune n virtutea principiilor securitii colective $i un semn al unui nou #odus o$erandi n mana+ementul con#lictelor internaionale? aciunea (N3 din Nol# a coninut $i primele indicii ale modi#icrii n curs a po.iiei S39 #a de ast#el de operaiuni. Nici un moment #orele S39 din Nol# nu au #ost responsa)ile n #aa Secretarului-Neneral al (N3H nu au #ost ar)orate stea+urile $i sim)olurile (N3 de ctre #ora multinaionalH ntrea+a operaiune a #ost purtat de S39 $i aliaii si su) um)rela Re.oluiei 45,? #r nici o responsa)ilitate direct #a de (N3 $i a+enii si. Rmnnd sin+ura superputere? S39 au neles s-$i asume responsa)ilitatea meninerii pcii $i securitii internaionale o consecin previ.i)il n cadrul teoriei sta)ilitii he+emonice trans#ormnd (N3 ntr-o surs de le+itimitate pentru aciunile sale la nivel internaional. S-a sperat n de.voltarea? pe aceast )a.? a unui parteneriat S39 (N3? )ene#ic pentru am)ele pri2 (N3 urma s con#ere le+itimitate interveniilor americane n vederea resta)iliriiPmeninerii pcii internaionale? iar S39 puneau la dispo.iia (N3 #orele $i lo+istica necesare des#$urrii aciunilor autori.arte de Consiliul de Securitate.
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>n cei cinci ani ce au urmat R.)oiului din Nol#? (N3 a declan$at "5 operaiuni de peaceAeepin+? toate n ca.uri de con#licte +enerate de dispariia autoritii +uvernamentale centrale? mi$cri de secesiune? ciocniri interetnice de tipul celor din RDanda? Cam)od+ia? 9n+ola? 1u+oslavia? Somalia. 6arteneriatul provi.oriu dintre (N3 $i S39 a #uncionat pn n momentul cri.ei somale.e. =oametea +enerat de dispariia ordinii civile din Somalia $i con#lictul dintre numeroasele +rupuri armate din ar au #orat opinia pu)lic internaional s cear (N3 Fs #ac cevaG. 9cest FcevaG a luat #orma 3N1*9=? creat prin Re.oluia 5/' a Consiliului de Securitate? din - decem)rie "//2? prin care o #or multinaional condus de S39 iat? deci? parteneriatul de care vor)eam mai sus era autori.at s intervin avnd ca mandat asi+urarea securitii porturilor $i aeroporturilor somale.e? protejarea lucrtorilor $i transporturilor umanitare. Secretarul-Neneral al (N3 a cerut 3N1*9= $i s impun ncetarea #ocului $i de.armarea #aciunilor com)atante? dar leadership-ul american a #ost reticent la ideea implicrii 3N1*9= n con#lictele interne somale.e. 9vnd iniial succes? 3N1*9= a #ost nlocuit n "//- de ctre 3N(S(0 11? mult mai puternic narmat? autori.at se de.arme.e #aciunile somale.e. >n acest mod? #orele (N3 au #ost e7puse ripostei acestor +rupuri? n special cel al +eneralului 0ohamed =arah 9idid. Cnd 2- de soldai paAistane.i au #ost uci$i de parti.anii lui 9idid? #aciunea acestuia a devenit inta interveniei #orelor 3N(S(0 11? acestea renunnd ast#el la imparialitatea pe care mandatul i-o impunea. 6unctul #inal al aventurii somale.e s-a consumat n momentul n care ", soldai americani au #ost uci$i n octom)rie "//-. Ca urmare? 6re$edintele S39 a anunat imediat intenia de a retra+e contin+entul american din Somalia? #apt petrecut n martie "//'. Consecina direct a a#acerii somale.e? pe ln+ ruperea parteneriatului (N3-S39? a #ost :irectiva 6re.idenial Nr. 2! din mai "//'? care stipula 4 precondiii necesare pentru participarea viitoare a #orelor S39 n operaiunile (N3 de peacemaAin+PpeaceAeepin+2 ". e7istena unui interes naional sau +eneral al S39 n .ona de intervenieH 2. participarea #orelor S39 s nu pun n pericol capacitile de aprare naionalH -. participarea S39 s #ie strict necesar pentru succesul misiunii sau pentru a-i convin+e pe alii s participeH '. relaiile de comand $i control s #ie accepta)ileH
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!. de#inirea clar a #inalului participrii americaneH 4. e7istena sprijinului intern Jinclusiv al Con+resuluiK. R.)oiul din e7-1u+oslavia avea s aduc lovitura de +raie pentru (N3 n perioada post R.)oi Rece. >nceput prin declaraia de independen a Croaiei $i Sloveniei? urmat de con#lictul dintre #orele paramilitare croate $i armata #ederal iu+oslav? dominat de sr)i? con#lictul avea s atin+ apo+eul n <osnia-Ler.e+ovina? unde trei #aciuni sr)i? croai $i )osniacii musulmani $i disputau teritoriile $i punctele strate+ice. 1ntervenia (N3 a #ost relativ timpurie? prin trimiterea lui CBrus Rance? #ost secretar de stat al S39? ca emisar special al Secretarului-Neneral al (N3? n 2! septem)rie "//"? n 1u+oslavia. :e asemenea? Consiliul de Securitate a autori.at #ormarea 3N6R(=(R n #e)ruarie "//2? dup ce Rance reu$ise ncheierea unui acord ntre toate prile n con#lict pentru acceptarea unei ast#el de misiuni (N3. 3N6R(=(R a #ost deplasat n trei .one speciale de protecie din Croaia cu o)iectivul de a asi+ura respectarea ncetrii #ocului? de.armarea #aciunilor rivale? protecia :repturilor (mului $i de a asista a+eniile umanitare n e#ortul de readucere a re#u+iailor n localitile lor de ori+ine. Situaia 3N6R(=(R a devenit critic n momentul i.)ucnirii con#lictului din <osnia-Ler.e+ovina? cnd misiunea sa a devenit protecia unor F.one de securitate (N3G? 4 la numr. Neavnd un mandat clar $i posi)il de ndeplinit? 3N6R(=(R a su#erit umilin dup umilin? de la luarea ca ostateci a mem)rilor si $i #olosirea lor ca scuturi umane de ctre sr)ii )osniaci? pn la catastro#a de la Sr)renica? unde contin+entul olande. din 3N6R(=(R a asistat neputincios la e7terminarea populaiei civile de ctre #orele sr)e ale lui Radovan Maradjici. 6us ntr-o ast#el de situaie Consiliul de Securitate (N3 a invocat Capitolul R11 pentru a autori.a #olosirea loviturilor aeriene n scopul asi+urrii retra+erii armelor +rele din $i din jurul centrelor ur)ane $i? esenial? protejrii F.onelor de securitate (N3G mpotriva #orelor sr)ilor )osniaci care le asediau. 9ceast deci.ie a #cut (N3 dependent de capacitile N9*( $i ale S39? n special? trans#ernd centrul de +reutate al deci.iei n domeniul mana+ementului con#lictului )osniac din s#era (N3 spre N9*( $i Casa 9l). :in acest moment? (N3 a devenit un secundant al S39 n pro)lema )osniac? iar N9*(? instrumentul adecvat pentru re.olvarea ei. =inalul a #ost constituit de acordurile de la
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:aBton? o)inute prin medierea S39? $i care au trans#erat ntrea+a responsa)ilitate a misiunilor de peacemaAin+? peaceAeepin+ $i peace)uildin+ n sarcina N9*(. Constituirea 1=(R? continuat de S=(R? a #ost o +rea lovitur pentru (N3 ca acionar principal al operaiunilor de peaceAeepin+? dar mai important a #ost cristali.area nencrederii totale a S39 n capacitile (N3 de mana+ement al con#lictelor $i na$terea convin+erii c doar prin implicarea direct? n #or? a S39? cu toate mijloacele sale economice? militare $i politice? con#lictele internaionale sau interetnice pot #i aduse la .ero. Re.ultatul direct al acestei evoluii a #ost ca.ul Mosovo $i? prin re#lecie? cel al Ceceniei. 9m)ele con#licte sunt prea recente $i? deci? prea cunoscute? pentru a #i necesar o pre.entare #actual a lor. 9m)ele semni#ic un nadir al in#luenei (N3 n politica internaionala dac n <osnia? (N3 #usese consultat $i s-a implicat activ n re.olvarea con#lictului? n ca.ul Mosovo? S39 $i N9*( au acionat pe cont propriu? #r a mai cere vreo apro)are sau re.oluie din partea Consiliului de Securitate Jera ndoienic c ar #i o)inut-o? dat #iind po.iia RusieiK. :ac n <osnia? N9*( a succedat (N33N6R(=(R n +estionarea situaiei create de con#lict? n Mosovo N9*( a intervenit direct? asumndu-$i toate rolurile pe care alt dat $i le asumau #orele (N3. 9ciunea rus din Cecenia este rspunsul direct la intervenia N9*( n Mosovo? urmnd aceea$i lo+ic de putere? )a chiar $i aceea$i tactic militar. 9m)ele puteri? S39 $i =ederaia Rus? au demonstrat prin aciunile lor din anii "//,-"///? c rolul (N3 n mana+ementul con#lictelor este pe cale s apun? rmnnd s se ocupe de pro)leme secundare ca impact pe arena internaional. Mosovo $i Cecenia au certi#icat c? n termeni reali? doar marile puteri au posi)ilitatea de impune pacea? nu numai de a o menine? #apt +reu de conceput n ca.ul unei or+ani.aii internaionale inter+uvernamentale.
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+%+% Conclu7ii Care ar putea #i viitorul (N3; 1mplicarea (r+ani.aiei n operaiunile de peaceAeepin+? multe dintre ele ncheiate cu succes? precum $i con#i+uraia sistemului internaional? au #erit (N3 de a repeta e7perienele ne#aste ale Societii NaiunilorH a supravieuit mai mult de ! de ani? acumulnd o e7perien deloc de ne+lijat n domeniul mana+ementului con#lictelor? #ie ele internaionale sau civile. :in pcate? structura $i lo+ica sistemului internaional? de#inite att de clar de 0orton 9. Maplan $i? mai apoi? de Menneth @alt.? nu au permis (N3 s-$i atin+ scopul pentru care a #ost n#iinat acela de a preveni con#lictele $i a asi+ura re+lementarea pa$nic a di#erendelor dintre naiuni. Cu alte cuvinte? (N3 a e7celat n ndeplinirea unor sarcini care nu i intrau iniial n atri)uii? dar a e$uat n domeniile care i aparineau de drept $i pentru care #usese creat. Re#ormarea (N3 n direcia cre$terii e#icienei sale? mai ales prin simpli#icarea )irocraiei $i a procesului deci.ional? poate aduce un su#lu nou (r+ani.aieiH dar ceea ce poate da o speran de viitor (r+ani.aiei este ns adaptarea am)iiilor sale la capacitile $i posi)ilitile sale reale? prin de#inirea corect $i realist a domeniilor sale de interes $i aciune. Re#ormatorii (N3 tre)uie s nelea+ c (r+ani.aia nu va da niciodat per#ormane n domeniul prevenirii con#lictelor? $i nici n domeniul impunerii pciiH ea poate doar asista? moral? juridic $i tehnic? ast#el de operaiuni. >n schim)? (r+ani.aia poate e7cela n misiuni umanitare? n operaiuni de peaceAeepin+ $i? uneori? n anumite condiii date? de peace)uildin+. 9daptarea (N3? a instituiilor $i a+eniilor sale speciali.ate? la aceste noi o)iective pot salva (N3 de la cderea n desuetudine $i ie$irea din s#era central a deci.iilor majore de politic internaional? a$a cum a #ost ca.ul Mosovo.
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CA IT)$U$ I9
SECURITATEA C)<U2:
)biective. >nele+erea modalitilor de transpunere n practic a conceptului de securitate comun. 2oiuni c&eie. 6olitica 87tern $i de Securitate Comun J68SCK? 6olitica 8uropean de Securitate $i 9prare J68S9K
4%3% T&e Co""on Forei-n and Security olicy =CFS > =olloDin+ the si+nin+ o# the *reaties o# Rome? 8uropean construction #ocused on economic aspects? i.e. the creation o# a common marAet? althou+h ideas #or cooperation in the #ield o# international policB Dere alreadB in evidence. =or almost #ortB Bears o# 8uropean construction the verB e7pression Xcommon #orei+n policBX #ound no place in the *reaties. =rom (cto)er "/5 the 0em)er States o# the 8uropean CommunitB cooperated and endeavoured to consult one another on major international policB pro)lems. LoDever? this Das at inter+overnmental level in the conte7t o# X8uropean political cooperationX. 1n "/,4? the Sin+le 8uropean 9ct #ormalised this inter+overnmental cooperation Dithout chan+in+ its nature or methods o# operation. *he chan+e came at 0aastricht Dhere? #or the #irst time? 0em)er States incorporated in the *reatB the o)jective o# a Xcommon #orei+n policBX. Since the *reatBYs entrB into #orce on " Novem)er "//-? the 8uropean 3nion as such can maAe its voice heard on the international sta+e? e7press its position on armed con#licts? human ri+hts and anB other su)ject linAed to the #undamental principles and common values Dhich #orm the )asis o# the 8uropean 3nion and Dhich it is committed to de#end.
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*he provisions on the C=S6 Dere revised )B the 9msterdam *reatB? Dhich came into #orce on " 0aB "///. 9rticles "" to 2, o# the *reatB on 8uropean 3nion are noD devoted speci#icallB to the C=S6. 9n important decision in terms o# improvin+ the e##ectiveness and pro#ile o# the 3nionYs #orei+n policB Das the appointment o# a Li+h Representative #or the C=S6 Jan innovation o# the *reatB o# 9msterdamK? 0r Vavier Solana 0adaria+a? Dho tooA up the post on ", (cto)er "/// #or a period o# #ive Bears. *he neD *reatB o# Nice? si+ned on 24 =e)ruarB 2 " and due to enter into #orce Dhen it has )een rati#ied )B the 0em)er States? contains neD C=S6 provisions.
4%0% T&e Euro(ean security and de/ence (olicy =ESD > *he *reatB also provides the 3nion Dith a common securitB policB that covers all matters relatin+ to its securitB? includin+ the +radual #ormulation o# a common de#ence policB i.e. the 8S:6 #orms part o# the C=S6. *his common de#ence policB could lead to a common de#ence i# the 8uropean Council Dere to so decide and a decision Dere adopted and rati#ied )B the #i#teen 0em)er States. *he 8S:6 does not? hoDever? a##ect the speci#ic nature o# the securitB and de#ence policies o# certain 0em)er States? and is also compati)le Dith the policB conducted in the #rameDorA o# N9*(. *he Colo+ne 8uropean Council meetin+ in Vune "/// placed crisis mana+ement tasAs at the core o# the process o# stren+thenin+ the 8uropean common securitB and de#ense policBH these are also AnoDn as the 6eters)er+ tasAs? so named a#ter the place Dhere the @83 0inisterial Council that #ormulated them Das held in Vune "//2. *heB are humanitarian and rescue tasAs? peaceAeepin+ tasAs and com)at-#orce tasAs in crisis mana+ement? includin+ peacemaAin+. *he 8uropean Council has decided that? to this end? Xthe 3nion must have the capacitB #or autonomous action? )acAed up )B credi)le militarB #orces? the means to decide to use them? and a readiness to do so? in order to respond to international crises Dithout prejudice to actions )B N9*(X. 8ach successive 8uropean Council JLelsinAi? =eira and NiceK has +raduallB +iven su)stance to this desire to +ive the 3nion a capacitB #or autonomous action in international crisis mana+ement? Dhere N9*( as such is not en+a+ed? in compliance
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Dith the principles o# the 3N Charter and acAnoDled+in+ the prero+atives o# the 3N SecuritB Council. *hus? in :ecem)er "///? the LelsinAi 8uropean Council set the headline +oal in terms o# militarB capa)ilities. =or the 3nion this means )ein+ a)le? )B the Bear 2 deploB Dithin si7tB daBs? and sustain #or at least one Bear? up to 4 -? to persons capa)le
o# carrBin+ out the #ull ran+e o# 6eters)er+ tasAs. 1t must )e emphasised that the achievement o# this +oal does not involve the esta)lishment o# a 8uropean armB. *he commitment and deploBment o# national troops Dill )e )ased on soverei+n decisions taAen )B 0em)er States. *he Nice 8uropean Council decided to esta)lish Dithin the Council neD permanent political and militarB structures to provide political control and strate+ic direction in a crisis? vi.. a 6olitical and SecuritB Committee and a 0ilitarB Committee. 1n addition? the Council Secretariat noD incorporates a militarB sta## composed o# militarB e7perts seconded )B the 0em)er States under the militarB direction o# the 0ilitarB Committee Dhich it is to assist. *he 3nion has also de#ined arran+ements #or the possi)le participation o# third countries J8uropean 0em)er States o# N9*( Dhich are not part o# the 3nion and other candidate countries #or accession to the 3nionK and other potential partners in 83 militarB crisis mana+ement. 1n addition? permanent arran+ements have )een a+reed #or 83-N9*( consultation and cooperation. 0eetin+s )etDeen the 3nion and N9*( are held on a re+ular )asis in certain speci#ic #ields Dith a vieD to ena)lin+ the 3nion? Dhere necessarB? to launch operations usin+ N9*( assets and capa)ilities Jnota)lB plannin+ capa)ilities and command optionsK. 1n the meantime? preparation o# a pro+ramme o# e7ercises to test the crisis mana+ement structures and assets and DorA out procedures is Dell under DaB. *he aim o# all this DorA is that the 3nion should )ecome rapidlB operational. 9 decision to that e##ect Dill )e taAen at the latest at the 8uropean Council meetin+ in LaeAen in :ecem)er 2 ". *he 3nion has also decided to develop the civilian aspects o# crisis mana+ement in #our prioritB areas de#ined )B the =eira 8uropean Council2 police? stren+thenin+ o# the
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rule o# laD? stren+thenin+ civilian administration and civil protection. :iscussions continue on the implementation o# the +oals esta)lished #or policin+ J0em)er States should )e a)le to provide ! " o##icers )B 2 - #or international missions and to deploB o# them Dithin less than - daBsK and on the de#inition o# speci#ic +oals in *hese discussions re#lect the 3nionYs consistent overall approach to crisis mana+ement? ena)lin+ it to #urther develop the ran+e o# civilian instruments alreadB at its disposal J#or the most part under the responsi)ilitB o# the CommissionK Dhile also )ein+ a)le to use militarB #orce. *his +roup o# measures is called the 8uropean SecuritB and :e#ence 6olicB J8S:6K. 4%+% ?&y CFS is necessary @ Since the "/! s the 8uropean Communities have developed stron+ economic linAs )etDeen their 0em)er States and Dith the rest o# the Dorld. 6ro+ress in the economic #ield since the "// s has ena)led the 3nion to attain a level o# economic inte+ration unrivalled anBDhere else in the Dorld J#or e7ample via the creation o# a sin+le marAet Dithout )orders and a sin+le currencBK? si+ni#icantlB developin+ trade relations Dith numerous countries and re+ions. *he 3nionYs economic development has )een accompanied )B su)stantial contri)utions to other countries and re+ions in terms o# development cooperation? humanitarian assistance and reconstruction aid. *he 8uropean CommunitB and its 0em)er States todaB provide more than hal# the #unds #or international development aid and more than ! S o# Dorld humanitarian aid. *heB #inance one third o# Dorld aid to the 0iddle 8ast J! S #or the 6alestinian *erritoriesK? almost 4 S to Russia and the Repu)lics arisin+ out o# the #ormer Soviet 3nion? and ' S o# the reconstruction e##ort in <osnia and Ler.e+ovina. *his su)stantial aid is noD supplemented )B a political aspect2 a contri)ution to international peaceAeepin+? usin+ militarB #orce Dhere appropriate? and the promotion o# international cooperation? democracB and human ri+hts.
connection Dith stren+thenin+ the rule o# laD.
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T&e Euro(ean Union! "a'or econo"ic and (olitical (layer on t&e international sta-e *he root causes o# the development o# this political aspect are to )e #ound in the events Dhich? since the end o# the "/, Ys have altered the shape o# 8urope and o# the rest o# the Dorld? leadin+ to an important chan+e in strate+ic interests. *he disinte+ration o# the #ormer Soviet 3nion and the end o# the Cold @ar eliminated the dan+er o# a massive attacA in 8urope. LoDever the con#lict in the #ormer Uu+oslavia has made us more aDare o# the dan+ers o# a major con#lict on our doorstep. *hese events have ena)led us to identi#B the dan+er that re+ional con#licts represent #or nei+h)ourin+ countries and re+ions and #or peace and international securitB and sta)ilitBH this dan+er has lar+elB replaced the risA o# territorial a++ression linAed to the traditional concept o# de#ense. 1n addition the 3nion must prevent and meet various threats? such as the proli#eration o# Deapons o# mass destruction? arms tra##icAin+? contra)and nuclear material? #undamentalism and e7tremism. So 8uropeYs de#ence needs have chan+ed? and the 3nion has decided to taAe responsi)ilitB #or its oDn securitB increasin+lB into its oDn hands. *he 3nion has there#ore decided that it should )e capa)le not onlB o# actin+ independentlB in crisis mana+ement )ut also o# intervenin+ to prevent con#lict? )B endeavorin+ to address the causes? as Dell as contri)utin+ to reconstruction and sta)ili.ation? an area in Dhich the CommunitB and its 0em)er States Dere alreadB taAin+ si+ni#icant measures.
4%4% AoB is t&e CFS i"(le"ented @ *he common #orei+n and securitB policB is not implemented in the same DaB as CommunitB policies Je.+. the a+ricultural? environmental? transport and research policiesK. 1n vieD o# the sensitive nature o# Cuestions a##ectin+ international relations? the *reatB naturallB attaches +reat importance to the 0em)er States and the )odies o# the 8uropean 3nion in Dhich theB participate directlB? the Council and its competent )odies Jcommittees? DorAin+ partiesK. *he C=S6 is part o# a sin+le institutional #rameDorA2 the institutions are those Dhich e7ist in the CommunitB #rameDorA. LoDever? the )alance o# poDers )etDeen the '-
Council? the 6arliament and the Commission is di##erent. =rom this point o# vieD? implementation o# the C=S6 di##ers considera)lB #rom the implementation o# CommunitB policies. =or e7ample? the Commission is #ullB associated Dith the C=S6 )ut does not have the e7clusive ri+ht to su)mit initiatives. *hese come mainlB #rom the 6residencB? a 0em)er State or the Li+h Representative. *he 8uropean 6arliament is consulted )B the 6residencB on the #undamental choices o# the C=S6 and is )rie#ed on hoD it is developin+.
4%C% A-ents o/ t&e Co""on Forei-n and Security olicy T&e Euro(ean Council *he 8uropean Council )rin+s to+ether the Leads o# State or Novernment o# the =i#teen and the 6resident o# the 8uropean Commission. 0em)ers o# the 8uropean Council are accompanied )B the =orei+n 9##airs 0inisters and )B the 8uropean Commissioner responsi)le #or e7ternal relations. Losted in principle )B the 0em)er State holdin+ the 6residencB o# the Council? the 8uropean Council lends re+ularitB to the political li#e and development o# the 8uropean 3nion )B meetin+ at least tDice a Bear JusuallB in Vune and :ecem)erK. 1t occupies a position o# the hi+hest ranA in the common #orei+n and securitB policB in that it determines the policBYs principles and +eneral +uidelines? includin+ those relatin+ to matters Dith de#ence implications. 1n the role o# le+islator con#erred on it )B the 9msterdam *reatB? the 8uropean Council decides unanimouslB on the common strate+ies Dhich are implemented )B the 3nion in areas Dhere the 0em)er States have important common interests. T&e Council o/ t&e Euro(ean Union *he Council o# the 8uropean 3nion is composed o# ministerial representatives o# each 0em)er State. C=S6 matters are dealt Dith )B =orei+n 9##airs 0inisters in the Neneral 9##airs Council. *he Council has to taAe the necessarB decisions concernin+ the #ormulation and implementation o# the C=S6 on the )asis o# the +eneral +uidelines or common strate+ies
''
laid doDn )B the 8uropean Council. *o that end it adopts common positions and joint actions as Dell as decisions. *he Council is responsi)le #or ensurin+ that the 3nionYs action is uni#ied? consistent and e##ective. *he proceedin+s o# the Neneral 9##airs Council are prepared )B the 6ermanent Representatives Committee JCoreperK. *he 6ermanent Representatives J9m)assadorsK act in this area in the same DaB as #or the other CommunitB policies. *he 6olitical Committee and its permanent structure in <russels? the 6olitical and SecuritB Committee? monitor the international situation? contri)ute to the #ormulation o# policies )B +ivin+ the Council opinions? either at the latterYs reCuest or on their oDn initiative? and also oversee the implementation o# the policies that are a+reed. 1n the event o# a crisis? the 6olitical and SecuritB Committee plaBs a central role in de#inin+ the 3nionYs response to that crisisH it is responsi)le #or the political control and strate+ic direction o# all militarB operations? Dith the support o# the opinions and recommendations o# the 0ilitarB Committee assisted )B the 0ilitarB Sta##. *he 0ilitarB Committee is responsi)le #or the militarB direction o# all militarB activities Dithin the 83 #rameDorA. 1t is composed o# 0em)er StatesY Chie#s o# :e#ence JCL(:K? represented )B their militarB dele+ates in <russels. *he Chairman o# the 0ilitarB Committee is a #our-star Neneral? elected )B the #i#teen CL(:s and appointed )B the Council #or a period o# three Bears. 1t maB )e noted that an innovation introduced )B the *reatB o# Nice Dill ena)le the 6olitical and SecuritB Committee? under certain conditions? to taAe certain implementin+ decisions Dith re+ard to crisis mana+ement? maAin+ the CommitteeYs political control and strate+ic direction o# operations easier. T&e residency 8verB si7 months a 0em)er State assumes the 6residencB o# the 8uropean 3nion and in that capacitB chairs the 8uropean Council? the Council o# the 8uropean 3nion and the su)ordinate )odies responsi)le #or preparin+ proceedin+s JCoreper? 6olitical CommitteeP6olitical and SecuritB Committee? committees and DorAin+ partiesK. *he 6residencB provides the impetus and ensures #olloD-up. 1t represents the 3nion in C=S6
'!
matters? nota)lB )B conductin+ political dialo+ue Dith third countries on )ehal# o# the 3nion. 1t is responsi)le #or the implementation o# C=S6 decisions. 1t is on that )asis that it e7presses the position o# the 3nion in international or+anisations and at international con#erences. *he 6residencB is assisted in these tasAs )B the SecretarB-Neneral o# the CouncilPLi+h Representative #or the Common =orei+n and SecuritB 6olicB? in association Dith the 8uropean Commission. *he 6residencB maB also )e assisted )B the 0em)er State that Dill hold the #olloDin+ 6residencB. *hese #our a+ents are commonlB re#erred to as the X *roiAaX. T&e Secretary-Deneral o/ t&e CouncilEAi-& Re(resentative /or t&e Co""on Forei-n and Security olicy *he *reatB stipulates that the SecretarB-Neneral o# the Council shall also )e the Li+h Representative #or the Common =orei+n and SecuritB 6olicB. Sometimes re#erred to as X0onsieur 68SCX? the Li+h Representative assists the Council )B contri)utin+ in particular to the #ormulation? draDin+ up and implementation o# political decisions and? Dhere necessarB? )B actin+ on )ehal# o# the Council at the reCuest o# the 6residencB and conductin+ political dialo+ue Dith third parties. *he appointment o# 0r Vavier Solana 0adaria+a is su##icient proo# that the Li+h Representative is Xa personalitB Dith a stron+ political pro#ileXH a reCuirement laid doDn )B the Rienna 8uropean Council in :ecem)er "//,. 0r Solana is also SecretarB-Neneral o# the @estern 8uropean 3nion J@83K? some #unctions o# Dhich Dill )e incorporated in the 3nion )B the end o# 2 ".
T&e De(uty Secretary-Deneral and t&e Deneral Secretariat o/ t&e Council *he SecretarB-Neneral? 0r Vavier Solana 0adaria+a? and the :eputB SecretarBNeneral? 0r 6ierre de <oissieu? are in char+e o# the Neneral Secretariat o# the Council? Dhich assists the 6residencB? prepares the CouncilYs DorA at all levels and ensures that it proceeds smoothlB. *he :irectorate-Neneral #or 87ternal Relations J:N 8K? under the direction o# 0r <rian Lee CroDe? :irector-Neneral? covers three major areas2 e7ternal economic '4
relations J:irector-Neneral 0r Cornelis SteAelen)ur+KH C=S6 +eo+raphical a##airsH and the Xpolitico-militarB structureX #or the SecuritB and :e#ence 6olicB. 1n addition to supportin+ the Council and its su)sidiarB )odies in all o# their DorA? :N 8 is responsi)le #or the preparation? participation in and #olloD-up to the political dialo+ue as Dell as the DorAin+ relationship )etDeen the 8uropean 3nion and international or+anisations in the areas #allin+ Dithin its sphere o# competence. 1n particular? relations are currentlB )ein+ stren+thened Dith the 3nited Nations? the (r+anisation #or SecuritB and Cooperation in 8urope? N9*( and the Council o# 8urope. *he XpolicB plannin+ and earlB Darnin+ unitX? noD called the 6olicB 3nit? set up )B a declaration anne7ed to the 9msterdam *reatB? comes under the responsi)ilitB o# the Li+h Representative. *he sta## o# the 6olicB 3nit are draDn #rom the Council Secretariat? the 0em)er States? the Commission and the @estern 8uropean 3nion J@83K. *he declaration anne7ed to the *reatB lists the unitYs main tasAs2 ". 0onitorin+ and analBsin+ developments in areas relevant to the C=S6. 2. 6rovidin+ assessments o# the 3nionYs interests and identi#Bin+ areas Dhere the C=S6 could #ocus in #uture. -. 6rovidin+ timelB assessments and earlB Darnin+ o# events or situations Dhich maB have si+ni#icant repercussions? includin+ potential political crises. '. 6roducin+? at the reCuest o# either the Council or the 6residencB or on its oDn initiative? ar+ued policB-options papers to )e presented under the responsi)ilitB o# the 6residencB as a contri)ution to policB #ormulation in the Council. *he 8uropean 3nion 0ilitarB Sta## J830SK? consistin+ o# militarB e7perts #rom the 0em)er States seconded to the Neneral Secretariat o# the Council? is attached directlB to the Li+h Representative. *he 830S is headed )B Lieutenant-Neneral Rainer SCL3@1R*L? :irector-Neneral? and )B 0ajor-Neneral Nraham 0esservB-@hitin+? :eputB :irector-Neneral. *he tasA o# the 830S is to provide earlB Darnin+? situation assessment and strate+ic plannin+ #or crisis mana+ement operations? includin+ the identi#ication o# national and multinational 8uropean #orces? and to implement policies and decisions as directed )B the 0ilitarB Committee it is to assist.
'5
T&e Euro(ean Co""ission *he *reatB on 8uropean 3nion stipulates that the 8uropean Commission is to )e #ullB associated Dith the DorA carried out in the C=S6 #ield. Such association is needed to ensure the consistencB o# the C=S6 Dith e7ternal economic relations and development cooperation and humanitarian aid? Dhich are CommunitB policies in Dhich the Commission plaBs a leadin+ role. *he 6resident o# the Commission joins the Leads o# State or Novernment Dithin the 8uropean Council. *he Commission participates in meetin+s o# the Council and its preparatorB )odies and in the political dialo+ue Dith third countries. LiAe the 0em)er States or the Li+h Representative? it can laB )e#ore the Council anB #orei+n and securitB policB issue and su)mit initiatives to it. LoDever? its ri+ht o# initiative is not e7clusive as is usuallB the case Dith CommunitB policies. *he Commission? liAe the 6residencB? in#orms the 8uropean 6arliament o# C=S6 developments. T&e <e"ber States *he 0em)er States have undertaAen in the *reatB to support the common #orei+n and securitB policB activelB and unreservedlB in a spirit o# loBaltB and mutual solidaritB. 8ach 0em)er State can laB )e#ore the Council anB C=S6 issue and su)mit proposals to it. 0em)er States ensure that their national policies con#orm to the common positions. *heB support these common positions? +enerallB de#ended )B the 6residencB? in international #ora. @here other 0em)er States do not participate in the proceedin+s o# international or+anisations and con#erences? theB Aeep them in#ormed o# all matters o# common interest. *heB undertaAe to uphold the joint actions. *heir diplomatic services a)road cooperate to ensure compliance Dith and the implementation o# common positions and joint actions. *he Council Secretariat? the Commission and the 0em)er StatesY capitals are permanentlB linAed )B a protected communications sBstem that ena)les them to e7chan+e
',
messa+es and hold consultations. *he countries that are candidates #or accession are also linAed to the Council Secretariat )B a protected computer netDorA. T&e s(ecial re(resentatives *he *reatB alloDs the Council to appoint special representatives Dith a mandate in relation to particular policB issues. *heB are directlB responsi)le to the Li+h Representative #or the C=S6. *he 3nion currentlB has three special representatives2 0r 0i+uel 9n+el 0oratinos J0iddle 8astK? 0r 9ldo 9jello J9#rican Nreat LaAesK and 0r <odo Lom)ach JCoordinator o# the Sta)ilitB 6act #or South-8astern 8uropeK. 3nder the *reatB o# Nice? theB are appointed )B Cuali#ied majoritB. Instru"ents o/ t&e CFS *he *reatB +ives the C=S6 several instruments2 common positions? joint actions? decisions and the conclusion o# international a+reements. 1n addition? common strate+ies involve and #acilitate recourse to C=S6 instruments. :eclarations and contacts Dith third countries also continue to )e important diplomatic tools #or the C=S6. *he C=S6 thus uses certain speci#ic instruments2 it does not have le+al instruments such as the XdirectivesX or Xre+ulationsX used #or CommunitB policies. Co""on strate-ies Common strate+ies are decided )B the 8uropean Council? on a recommendation #rom the Council? in areas Dhere the 0em)er States have important interests. 8ach strate+B speci#ies its o)jectives? its duration and the resources that Dill have to )e provided )B the 3nion and the 0em)er States. *he Council implements such strate+ies in particular )B adoptin+ joint actions and common positions )B Cuali#ied majoritB Jthis does not applB hoDever to Cuestions Dith militarB or de#ence implications as in these areas decisions are alDaBs taAen unanimouslBK. 1# a mem)er o# the Council Dishes to oppose one o# these decisions #or important reasons o# national policB? the Council can appeal to the 8uropean Council? Dhich then resolves the issue on the )asis o# unanimitB. So #ar the Council has adopted three common strate+ies2 Dith re+ard to Russia? 3Araine and the 0editerranean re+ion.
'/
Co""on (ositions *he Council can adopt common positions de#inin+ the 3nionYs approach to a particular +eo+raphical or thematic issue? vis-Z-vis a third countrB or at an international con#erence #or e7ample. *he 0em)er States then ensure that their national policies are in line Dith the common position. Foint actions *he Council adopts joint actions in certain situations reCuirin+ operational action committin+ the 0em)er States o# the 8uropean 3nion. 8ach action speci#ies its o)jectives? scope? the means to )e made availa)le to the 3nion? the conditions #or its implementation and Ji# necessarBK its duration. Decisions 1n the conte7t o# the C=S6? the Council can also adopt decisions Dhich? liAe common positions and joint actions? are )indin+ on the 0em)er States. T&e conclusion o/ international a-ree"ents @here an a+reement needs to )e concluded Dith one or more States or international or+anisations in the C=S6 sphere? the Council maB authorise the 6residencB to enter into ne+otiations. :urin+ such ne+otiations? the 6residencB is assisted )B the Neneral Secretariat and? Dhere necessarB? )B the Commission. *he a+reements are then concluded )B the Council? actin+ unanimouslB? on a recommendation #rom the 6residencB. LoDever? the *reatB stipulates that no a+reement shall )e )indin+ on a 0em)er State Dhose representative in the Council states that it has to complB Dith the reCuirements o# its oDn constitutional procedureH the other mem)ers o# the Council maB a+ree that the a+reement shall applB to them provisionallB. 9lso? there is a declaration anne7ed to the *reatB to the e##ect that such an a+reement maB not implB anB trans#er o# competence #rom the 0em)er States to the 8uropean 3nion. *he neD *reatB o# Nice Dill de#ine the rules #or decision-maAin+ in this area and speci#B that such a+reements are )indin+ on the 3nionYs institutions.
*he joint action concernin+ the 3nion 0onitorin+ 0ission in the =ederal Repu)lic o# Uu+oslavia J=RUK? adopted on 22 :ecem)er 2 ? speci#icallB states that the arran+ements +overnin+ the missionYs operations Dill )e laid doDn in international a+reements. *his could )e the #irst international a+reement to )e concluded )B the 8uropean 3nion under the headin+ o# the C=S6. *his monitorin+ mission? noD called X8300X J8uropean 3nion 0onitorin+ 0issionK? consists o# o)servers Dho monitor political and securitB developments in the @estern <alAans? paBin+ particular attention to )order monitorin+? inter-ethnic issues and re#u+ee return. *he Li+h Representative plaBs a major role in de#inin+ the missionYs tasAs? supervisin+ its operation and )rie#in+ the Council on its activities. Declarations :eclarations +ive pu)lic e7pression to a position? reCuest or e7pectation o# the 8uropean 3nion vis-Z-vis a third countrB or an international issue. *his #le7i)le instrument maAes it possi)le to react verB CuicAlB to sudden incidents in a particular part o# the Dorld and to state the 3nionYs point o# vieD. *heB are entitled X:eclaration )B the 8uropean 3nionX Dhere the Council meets and adopts a position on an international issue and X:eclaration )B the 6residencB on )ehal# o# the 8uropean 3nionX Dhere the Council does not meet. Contacts Bit& t&ird countries Contacts Dith third countries taAe place mainlB throu+h Xpolitical dialo+ueX meetin+s and XdOmarchesX. *he 8uropean 3nion holds a political dialo+ue Dith a verB lar+e num)er o# countries or +roups o# countries on Cuestions o# international policB. Such meetin+s? over 2 everB Bear? taAe place at all levels2 Leads o# State? 0inisters? 6olitical :irectors? senior o##icials and e7perts. *he 8uropean 3nion can )e represented at them )B the 6residencB Jassisted )B the Li+h Representative #or the C=S6K? or )B the Li+h Representative alone at the reCuest o# the 6residencB? or )B the *roiAa J6residencB assisted )B the Li+h Representative #or the C=S6 and the Commission and? Dhere appropriate? the ne7t 6residencBK? or Jin a limited num)er o# casesK )B 0em)er StatesY dele+ates and the Commission representative. :Omarches? Dhich are con#idential? are
!"
undertaAen vis-Z-vis third countries )B the 6residencB or the *roiAa? on )ehal# o# the 8uropean 3nion. 1t is +enerallB their purpose to resolve Dith the State in Cuestion matters relatin+ to human ri+hts? democracB or humanitarian action.
4%G% E//ectiveness o/ t&e CFS @ *he Common =orei+n and SecuritB 6olicB must )e consistent Dith other policies and have an e##icient decision-maAin+ procedure. Consistency ConsistencB in the C=S6 #ield is ensured under tDo headin+s. =irst o# all? the *reatB on 8uropean 3nion has provided a #rameDorA? resources? methods and patterns o# DorA #or implementin+ the C=S6? Dhilst Aeepin+ it Dithin the sin+le institutional #rameDorA? i.e. the #rameDorA that alreadB e7isted in the CommunitBYs sphere o# action. Such coordination is stren+thened )B the #act that the Commission is #ullB associated in discussions on the C=S6. SecondlB? it is #or the 8uropean Council? )B settin+ out +uidelines #or the development o# the 3nion? to ensure the consistencB o# the C=S6 Dith CommunitB policies Jincludin+ in particular e7ternal economic relations and development cooperation policBK? Dhich are conducted under the responsi)ilitB o# the Commission. E//iciency o/ t&e decision-"aHin- (rocedure C=S6 decisions are +enerallB taAen unanimouslB. *his means that one 0em)er State can )locA the adoption o# a te7t. *he *reatB hoDever includes a num)er o# measures intended to overcome this o)stacle. @hile unanimitB remains the rule? and is o)li+atorB #or the adoption o# decisions Dith militarB or de#ence implications? there are tDo options #or maAin+ decisions easier2 ". XConstructive a)stentionX2 @hen a decision is adopted? a 0em)er State maB couple its a)stention Dith a #ormal declaration. 1n such a case? it is not reCuired to applB the decision )ut acAnoDled+es that the decision is )indin+ on the 3nion.
!2
2.
*he
use
o#
Cuali#ied
majoritB votin+2 *his has )een e7tended to cases Dhere the Council implements common strate+ies decided on )B the 8uropean Council and to decisions on the implementation o# joint actions and common positions. @hen a decision is adopted )B Cuali#ied majoritB? a 0em)er State maB nevertheless invoAe important and stated reasons o# national policB in order to oppose the adoption o# the te7t. 9 vote Dill not then )e taAen. *he Council maB? actin+ )B a Cuali#ied majoritB? re#er the matter to the 8uropean Council #or a unanimous decision. 1t is important to note that Cuali#ied majoritB votin+ in the C=S6 #ield is? in a DaB? Xrein#orced Cuali#ied majoritB votin+X2 #or adoption? acts reCuire 42 votes in #avour cast )B at least " mem)ers. -. *he *reatB o# Nice introduces the concept o# enhanced cooperation )etDeen several 0em)er States2 Dhere the o)jectives o# the 3nion and the CommunitB cannot )e achieved )B the 0em)er States as a Dhole? those 0em)er States in a position to do so Jat least ei+ht 0em)er StatesK maB esta)lish )etDeen them XenhancedX cooperation. 1n the C=S6 #ield? this cooperation maB relate solelB to the implementation o# a joint action or a common position? to arms initiatives or to securitB and de#ence initiatives contri)utin+ to the acCuisition o# crisis mana+ement capa)ilities. This te:t &as taken fro# the official site of the ;uro$ean <nion5 DDD.europa.eu.int
!-
BIB$I)DRAFIE DE2ERA$:. 0ichael *. Mlare [ Uo+esh Chandrani? @orld SecuritB. Challen+e #or a NeD CenturB? third edition? NeD UorA? "//,H 6eter Calvocoressi? @orld 6olitics since "/'!? seventh edition? London and NeD UorA? "//4H Chester 9. CrocAer [ =en (sler Lampson Jeds.K? 0ana+in+ Nlo)al Chaos? @ashin+ton? "//4H RodericA von LipseB Jeds.K? <reaAin+ the CBcle? NeD UorA? "//,H =ranA <arna)B Jeds.K? <uildin+ a more :emocratic 3nited Nations? NeD UorA? "//"H 6. Ner)et? R-U. Nhe)ali? 0-R. 0outon? Societe des Nations et (r+anisation des Nations-3nis? 6aris? "/5-H
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STUDII DE SECURITATE suport de curs Lect. univ. dr.

Christian Radu Chereji

Universitatea Babe-Bolyai Facultatea de tiine olitice! Ad"inistrative i ale Co"unic#rii

-. 1nstituii internaionale de securitate colectiv2 (N3&

&2&2&2&2' &24 &-5

'. Securitatea comun&

nuclear strate+B? Deapons sBstems? arms control and disarmament.

0%3% Surse ale con/lictelor

-. 0i+raii? resurse? comer $i tehnolo+ie.

0%0% Ti(olo-ia con/lictelor

0%+% Structura con/lictelor

connection Dith stren+thenin+ the rule o# laD.

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