UNIVERSITATEA 1 DECEMBRIE 1918

FACULTATEA DE DREPT I TIINE

SOCIALE
PRG. STUDII:TIINE PENALE I
CRIMINALISTIC

REFERAT LIMBA ENGLEZ

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS
THE AMERICAN MODEL, THE JAPANESSE
MODEL, THE GERMAN MODEL

MASTERAND: Bora Radu-Ioan

ANUL I: 2016-2017
SEMESTRUL I
PROFESOR UNIVERSITAR: Dr. BRBULE
DANIEL

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 Modele de guvernan corporativ :
Modelul American, Japonez i German.
1.Introducere

Dezvoltarea nentrerupt a competitivitii n mediul de afaceri a determinat managerii s i

orienteze aciunile pe creterea eficacit ii companiilor, ceea ce presupune existen a unui sistem de
management bine definit, actual i performant. Acest sistem de management este cunoscut sub
denumirea de guvernan corporativ i are rolul de a mbunti eficiena economic de ansamblu n
ntreprinderi. Guvernana corporativ este definit ca fiind : setul de legi, norme, regulamente i
coduri adoptate n mod voluntar, care permit unei ntreprinderi s atrag resursele umane i
materiale necesare activitii sale i i ofer totodat posibilitatea de a desf ura o activitate eficient
i eficace care s genereze plusvaloare pe termen lung pentru ac ionari, grupuri de interese i pentru
societate n ansamblu1.

ntreprinderile trebuie s fie capabile s se adapteze imediat la schimbrile din mediul de afaceri
naional i internaional, s i nsueasc aceste schimbri i s opereze cu ele la cel mai nalt nivel
posibil de eficacitate deoarece pieele devin din ce n ce mai concuren iale i exigente. Capacitatea de
asimilare a informaiilor i de adaptare la tot ce e nou depind att de capacit ile manageriale i de
leadership, ct i de caracteristicile generale i structura ntreprinderilor.

Modelul de guvernan corporativ se difereniaz de la o ar la alta, acesta reprezentnd o

construcie economic, politic, social, financiar - contabil dependent de natura ntreprinderii i
evoluia acesteia.

2. Guvernana corporativ aspecte fundamentale

Noiunea de guvernan are o semnificaie complex, ea aparinnd mai multor tiine iar
pentru a nelege ct mai bine importana acesteia sunt necesare cuno tin e ce privesc istoria

1 The World Bank,The Business Enviroment and Corporate Governance, 1998, p.7

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economiilor naionale, dreptul societilor, finanele ntreprinderii, contabilitate, management
organizaional etc2

Conceptul de Guvernan Corporativ a aprut i s-a dezvoltat in secolul trecut, fiind influenat pe
rnd de medii economice bazate pe proprietate familiala, capital bancar, investitori instituionali sau
societi anonime, medii dinamizate de scandalurile de rsunet care au avut loc in timp, in mod
surprinztor, aceleai momente de criza au avut un efect benefic in privina identificrii cilor de
mbuntire a conceptului de guvernan corporativ, care s corespunda noii etape in evoluia
economiei.3

Guvernana corporativ are rolul de a preveni posibile conflicte de interese aprute n interiorul
ntreprinderii, ea constituind procesul prin care ntreprinderile sunt conduse i controlate prin
intermediul unui set de norme i regulamente ntre conducerea executiv, consiliul de administra ie,
acionarii i alte pri asociate.

Structura prin care sunt stabilite obiectivele unei societ i, precum i mijloacele de realizare a
acestora i de monitorizare a performanelor este reflectat prin intermediul sistemului de principii
care face referire la guvernana corporativ:

Punerea n aplicare a fundamentelor pentru un sistem eficient de guvernan corporativ:

prin intermediul acestui principiu se urmre te sus inerea pie elor transparente i eficiente
unde exist o restrngere clar a responsabilitilor privind supravegherea, implementarea i
reglementarea textelor normative.
Protejarea i facilitarea exercitrii drepturilor i func iilor acionarilor : sistemul de
guvernan aplicat trebuie s protejeze i s faciliteze drepturile pe care le au ac ionarii n
ntreprindere. Exemplu: dreptul de participare i vot n AGA, dreptul la informa ii privind
statutul companiei, dreptul la o parte din profitul societii etc.
Tratamentul echitabil al acionarilor: potrivit acestui principiu, toi acionarii trebuie s
beneficieze de un tratament echitabil, inclusiv ac ionarii minoritari sau strini.
Rolul stakeholder-ilor: compania este obligat prin lege s recunoasc drepturile tuturor
persoanelor cu interese n companie n privina crerii bogiei, locurilor de munc etc.
Comunicarea i transparena: asigur publicarea n timp real a tuturor informa iilor cu privire
la aciunile companiei i starea acesteia.
Responsabilitile consiliului de administraie : sistemul de guvernan al ntreprinderii
trebuie s asigure conducerea strategic a acesteia i supravegherea gestiunii de ctre consiliul
de administraie.

2 Almai R., Audit abordri conceptuale, proceduri, comunicare, Editura

Universitii Aurel Vlaicu, Arad, 2014.

3 Morariu Ana, Suciu Gheorghe, Stoian Flavia, Audit intern si guvernana

corporativ, Editura Universitar,Bucureti, 2008

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 Aceste principii emise de ctre OECD (Organizaia pentru Cooperare i Dezvoltare
Economic) sunt considerate a fi bazele fundamentale pentru constituirea oricrui model de
guvernan corporativ la nivelul fiecrei ri. n mod deosebit, ele urmresc mbunt irea cadrului
legal pentru funcionarea pieelor financiare i acioneaz ca un ghid pentru investitori.

Deciziile de strategie global reprezint o piatr de ncercare grea pentru eficacitatea

sistemelor de guvernan corporativ care urmresc maximizarea profitului i a competitivitii
globale cel mai adesea pe seama unora dintre participanii la guvernare. Prin definiie, strategia global
se refer la adoptarea unei strategii extinse dincolo de graniele rii lucru care ar putea afecta puternic
acele pri care au legturi strnse cu compania din ara de origine.

Cercettori n domeniul guvernanei corporative comparate au identificat cinci juctori

importani:4

Angajaii mpreun cu structurile n care ace tia acioneaz (sindicate sau blocuri sindicale);
Consiliile de administraie care reprezint organul de conducere a ntreprinderii si care aprob
strategia companiei;
Comitetul director, managementul de vrf care este responsabil cu transpunerea n practic a
deciziilor strategice luate;
Acionarii care se pot exprima prin intermediul votului garantat de deinerea de aciuni dar
care au i posibilitatea de a iei din firm prin vnzarea aciunilor n cazul n care nu sunt de
acord cu decizia luat;
Guvernele care impun reguli naionale privind guvernana corporativ.

Rolul si puterea pe care o poate exercita fiecare dintre prile mai sus menionate depind n mare
msur de mediul economic i de sistemul de guvernan corporativ a rii din care provin.

3. Modele de guvernan corporativ

Economiti, juriti i politicieni ncearc diverse clasificri ale capitalismului, clasificri care
au la baz n principal relaiile dintre proprietar-manager, creditor manager, firm-guvern , firm-
sindicate. Robert Boyer prezint patru tipuri de capitalism: capitalismul orientat spre pia (specific
pentru Statele Unite), capitalismul orientat spre companie (specific Japoniei), capitalismul cu orientare
social - democratic (statele din nordul Europei) i capitalismul dirijat de stat (Frana) .Germania este
localizat, n opinia autorului, ntre ultimele dou tipuri. 5

4 Aguilera, Ruth, George Yip- Global strategies faces local constraints, Financial
Times.

5 Boyer, Robert:The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization but Still

the Century of Nations? http://project.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/kikkawa/iss-re.pdf

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Yusuke Fukada i Ronald Dore6 noteaz: Pe plan mondial sunt mai multe curente de
capitalism: unul este cel de tip anglo-american care se centreaz n jurul Statelor Unite i a Marii
Britanie iar altul difer de cel anglo-american n diferite feluri i se regsete n cazul Germaniei,
Suediei, Norvegiei, Danemarcei, Olandei, Elveiei, Japoniei etc. Dac ar fi s clasificm aceste curente
doar n dou tipuri acestea ar fi : tipul anglo-american i japonezo-german.
n funcie de tradiiile economiei naionale s-au orientat i artizanii sistemelor de guvernan
corporativ. Cele trei mari modele sunt: modelul tradiional, modelul determinist sau continental
european i modelul extins japonez.

Studiul structurilor de guvernare a ntreprinderii in diferite tari permite identificarea unor

caracteristici in tarile anglo-saxone, ale Europei continentale si in cele asiatice. SUA si Marea Britanie
se caracterizeaz printr-un numr mare de ntreprinderi na ionale cotate la bursa, pie e financiare cu un
grad mare de lichiditate, unde drepturile de proprietate si de control sunt frecvent schimbate, si un
numr mic de grupuri de societi de control. In tari ca Germania si Japonia, bncile importante,
companiile de asigurare si statul ocupa o pozi ie predominanta in sistemul de guvernare. In plus, multe
firme dispun de acionari de referina si de o legisla ie particulara, ceea ce are ca efect limitarea
considerabila a numrului de preluri ostile. Tarile latine se aseamn cu cele anglo-saxone prin
puterea statului ca acionar si importanta redusa acordata salaria ilor in organele de decizie ale
ntreprinderii.
Modelul de guvernan corporatist anglo-saxon sau anglo-american se caracterizeaz printr-
un acionariat dispersat i o concentrare minim a for ei financiare, puterea fiind strict exercitat de
ctre manageri. Modelul anglo-saxon este orientat spre o pia bine dezvoltat, prin punerea valorii pe
concuren. Acionarii sunt considerai a fi agresivi i revoluionari pentru a accelera implementarea
politicilor eficace, subdiviziunile neprofitabile fiind reorganizate rapid urmnd ca noi activit i
profitabile s fie finanate. Aadar, acest sistem este orientat spre ac ionari, fiind un model bursier,
evoluia cursului aciunii unei societi cotate fiind considerat a sintetiza performanele unei societi,
dnd posibilitatea astfel tuturor actorilor vizai, n primul rnd acionarilor i managerilor, s
optimizeze deciziile i comportamentele lor.
Pentru o analiz complet a modelului de guvernan corporativ anglo-saxon se au n vedere
o serie de indicatori sau instrumente de gestiune caracteristice, o mare parte din ele fiind create n
SUA, dar a cror utilitate s-a internaionalizat:
indicatorul de performan - crearea de valoare bursier sau valoare pentru acionar
(shareholder value);
indicatorul de finanare fluxul de lichiditate vacant (free cash flow);

6 Fukada, Yusuke and Ronald Dore : The Japanese Firm: The Sources of
Competitive Strength,Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994

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 principiul de msurare contabil valoare just (fair value);
instrumentul incitativ - atribuirile de opiuni de cumprare de aciuni (stocks options);
mecanismul de disciplinare cuprinde ofertele publice de cumprare i de schimb.
Avnd ca baz aceti indicatori, codurile de guvernan corporativ s-au concentrat pe
rezolvarea tuturor problemelor (independena directorilor nonexecutivi i auditorilor fa de
management, mputernicirea directorilor independeni, crearea unui singur Consiliu de Administra ie
care monitorizeaz n permanen activitatea managementului, reducerea riscurilor cu tranzac iile etc).
O caracteristic pozitiv al modelului anglo-saxon este reprezentat de asigurarea mobilit ii
investiiilor i plasarea lor n domeniile eeficiente. O latur negativ este reprezentat n schimb de
concentrarea excesiv asupra profitabilit ii n detrimentul dezvoltrii i implementrii strategiilor de
dezvoltare. Aadar, modelul anglo-saxon acord pie elor financiare dezolvate rolul de ultim e alon de
control al performanelor ntreprinderii iar prin intermediul achizi ionrii titlurilor de valoare poate
determina schimbrile necesare redresrii societ ilor comerciale
Modelul german de guvernan corporativ are ca obiectiv principal aprarea i sus inerea
interesului prilor implicate n viaa companiei (manageri, parteneri, salaria i etc) i mai pu in
mbogirea acionarilor, el fiind regsit n ri precum Germania, Japonia i ri din Europa
continental. Modelul german are la baza sa o acumulare nalt a capitalului prin existen a unor
acionari dezvoltai precum bncile, fiind un sistem bazat pe controlul intern. Avantajul acestui
model este reprezentat de faptul c ac ionarii sunt strict orienta i spre o strategie pe termen lung i
stabilitate n afacere. Exist totui i dezavantaje ale acestui sistem de guvernan corporatist, iar unul
foarte important de menionat este reprezentat de faptul c nu reuete s protejeze acionarii
minoritari, concentreaz puterea financiar i las oportunitatea unor n elegeri periculoase ntre
puterea economic i financiar.
Modelul german de guvernan corporativ nu permite apari ia reclama iilor cu privire la
modul cum se aplic sistemul de guvernan corporativ, cea mai mare parte a performan ei sistemului
se datoreaz consiliilor de administraie.
Sistemul german de conducere i control este structurat pe dou nivele:
consiliul de administraie cuprinde doar membri executivi;
consiliul de supraveghere cuprinde doar membri non-executivi care urmresc activitatea
managementului.

Modelul japonez de guvernan corporativ (similar celui german) este un sistem bazat pe
controlul intern, nefiind centrat pe influena puternic exercitat de pieele de capital active, ci pe
existena unor acionari puternici, precum bncile.
Trsturile acestui model decurg din particularitile mediului social i comercial n care a
aprut. Astfel, n Japonia, acionarii care dein blocuri mari de aciuni de obicei se implic activ n
managementul companiilor respective. Rolul lor este de a sanciona managementul de slab calitate,
de a stimula eficiena economic i de a realiza armonizarea intereselor partenerilor sociali ai firmei,
inclusiv ale personalul acesteia.

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 Capitalul uman este considerat a avea cea mai mare importan n cadrul modelului japonez. n
contrast cu modelul anglo-saxon, care se bazeaz prioritar pe piaa de capital, modelul japonez este
centrat pe sistemul bancar. n Japonia, bncile exercit o puternic influen i control asupra
sistemului de guvernare a companiilor.
Principalul avantaj al acestui model este monitorizarea i finanarea flexibil a firmelor,
precum i comunicarea eficient dintre bnci i acestea. Implicarea puternic a bncilor n conducerea
firmelor confer acestui sistem o stabilitate deosebit i o orientare prioritar spre dezvoltarea
economic. Exist totui i dezavantaje ale acestui sistem de guvernare corporativ.
O diferen ntre aceste modele de guvernanta este reprezentat de raporturile diferite ntre cei
trei actori, administrator, acionar majoritar i acionar minoritar i prerogativele acestora. Spre
deosebire de modelul german, care dezavantajeaz acionarul minoritar, sistemul anglo-saxon omite
distincia ntre acionarul majoritar i cel minoritar, asigurnd capitalului fluiditate sporit i o mai
mare eficien bursier. Rolul unui acionar majoritar este omis, n sistemul anglo-saxon, prin
procedurile de vot impuse administratorilor. Acetia din urm tempereaz influena acionarilor
majoritari n luarea deciziilor, avnd i o responsabilitate social corporatist prin reducerea apetitului
pentru risc. Tocmai de aceea, consiliile de administraie ale companiilor care aplic modelul
guvernanei corporatiste anglo-saxon apeleaz adesea la personaliti marcante din afara cercurilor de
afaceri, cum ar fi profesorii universitari.
Studiul comparativ al avantajelor i dezavantajelor celor dou modele de guvernan
corporativ din rile dezvoltate, modelul anglo-american i modelul germano-japonez, sugereaz c
sistemul de guvernare a unei companii poate fi mbuntit ca urmare a aciunii urmtorilor factori:
achiziiile de firme, n rile dezvoltate, precum Marea Britanie, S.U.A., Frana, Germania,
Japonia exist o pia reglementat a achiziiilor;
competitivitatea produselor i a serviciilor, de asemenea influeneaz guvernana
corporativ a companiei, dar aciunea acestui factor este lent, acionarii pot pierde sume
imense ca urmare a degradrii calitii produselor, a pierderii clientelei i a unor segmente de
pia datorit eficienei sczute a managementului firmei;
piaa de capital, care ofer de fapt recunoaterea oficial a performanelor unei firme i
implicit ale managementului prin nivelul preului aciunilor firmei;
creditorii, care ncheie contracte cu compania pentru a-i proteja drepturile i n cazul
nclcrii acestora pot cere declanarea procedurii de faliment pentru recuperarea creanelor
lor;
investitorii instituionali reprezint o potenial for de influen a guvernanei unei
companii, n special n Marea Britanie i S.U.A. n acelai timp ns, acetia constituie i un
pericol din punct de vedere al controlului puternic pe care l pot exercita asupra firmelor n
virtutea unui procent mare al deinerilor n capitalul social al acestora. Astfel n S.U.A. exist
restricii privind concentrarea deinerilor de aciuni n mna investitorilor instituionali i a
bncilor, i de asemenea exist restricii privind exercitarea controlului asupra companiilor

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 publice, n timp ce n Japonia i Germania investitorii instituionali au un rol hotrtor n
respectarea drepturilor acionarilor;
piaa forei de munc pentru manageri, care i sancioneaz pe managerii care primesc
beneficii excesive fr a avea performane pe msur, prin nlocuirea lor de ctre Consiliul de
Administraie, ceea ce atrage dup sine imposibilitatea gsirii unui loc de munc similar.
Dup cum se observ, aceti factori conduc la mbuntirea performanelor n guvernana
corporatist i eliminarea unor deficiene, dar acest lucru nu presupune o standardizare absolut.

4.Guvernana corporativ n Romnia

n Romnia, noiunea de guvernan corporativ a aprut destul de trziu (anii 2000).

ntrzierea are ca explicaie paii anevoioi fcui pe linia reformelor politice, juridice, economice i
sociale. Romnia ca i alte ri ex-comuniste a adoptat anumite structuri organizaionale dup modelul
rilor dezvoltate, dar nu a dispus ntotdeauna de cele mai potrivite mecanisme de implementare a
acestora pentru a le face s funcioneze. Astfel a rezultat un sistem eterogen, n 5 care co-exist
deopotriv structuri i instituii caracteristice economiilor de pia alturi de cele specifice economiilor
centralizate.
Guvernana corporativ n Romnia este specific n special societilor listate la Burs (Bursa
de Valori Bucureti (BVB), Bursa de Mrfuri, etc.). Romnia de ine un Institut de Guvernan
Corporativ al Bursei de Valori Bucureti (IGC) care a emis un Cod al Guvernanei Corporative.

5.Concluzii

ntr-o economie n continu schimbare, att la nivel naional, ct i mondial, durabilitatea

ntreprinderilor poate fi asigurat inclusiv prin aplicarea unui sistem de management eficient,
implementarea unor metode de conducere moderne, motivarea corespunztoare a angajailor,
promovarea performanelor la nivel individual i organizaional i punerea accentului, n primul rnd,
pe rezultate.
n ciuda diferenelor care exist ntre modelele de guvernan corporativ prezentate, se pune
ntrebarea dac un model de guvernan corporativ universal este necesar, n contextul n care
globalizarea pieelor, n special a pieei financiare, ar fi urmat de o globalizare a reglementrii. Teoria
oscileaz ntre iminena convergenei i artarea impedimentelor sale.
Avnd n vedere tendina de pe piaa internaional, considerm c guvernana corporatist va
rmne ca o prioritate pentru managementul de vrf al companiilor mult timp de acum nainte,
deoarece companiile care vor adopta o cultur organizaional transparent i un model eficient de
conducere vor avea performane mult mai bune, iar cele care vor refuza s accepte aceast realitate,
absolut necesar, vor nregistra rezultate mai slabe.
Ineficiena sistemelor de guvernan corporatist se datoreaz cel mai adesea unei concentrri
a puterii n mna managementului i/sau salariailor, fr ca ceilali actori de pe pia s poat avea
influen i fr ca pieele de capital active s i pun amprenta asupra evoluiei acestora. Adeseori
managerii cred c tiu totul i c angajaii le sunt simpli subordonai, care trebuie s le execute

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ordinele. Acest sistem de conducere nu mai poate fi aplicat, n condiiile n care se are n vedere
performana i eficacitatea pe termen lung a ntreprinderii. Este necesar un sistem de guvernan
corporatist care s implice toi factorii decizionali, precum i to i angajaii.

6. Bibliografie

1. The World Bank,The Business Enviroment and Corporate Governance, 1998, p.7
2. Almai R., Audit abordri conceptuale, proceduri, comunicare, Editura Universit ii Aurel
Vlaicu, Arad, 2014;
3. Morariu Ana, Suciu Gheorghe, Stoian Flavia, Audit intern si guvernana corporativ, Editura
Universitar,Bucureti, 2008
4. Aguilera, Ruth, George Yip- Global strategies faces local constraints, Financial Times.
5. Boyer, Robert:The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization but Still the Century of
Nations? http://project.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/kikkawa/iss-re.pdf
6. Fukada, Yusuke and Ronald Dore : The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive
Strength,Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994
7. Bowman B., Principii i recomandri propuse ntr-un nou Cod de Guvernan Corporativ, Revista
Audit financiar, nr. 10/2010;
8. Bunget O., Audit financiar-contabil, Editura Mirton, Timioara, 2010;
9. Albu N., Durica A., Grigore N., Guvernana corporativ n Romnia. Percep ii i perspective.,
Contabilitatea, expertiza i auditul afacerilor, iunie 2013;
10. Briciu, S. (2012), Guvernana corporativ
11. Economie teoretic i aplicat Volumul XX (2013), No. 4(581), pp. 54-64
12. Feleag, N., Vasile, Cristina (2006), Guvernana ntreprinderii ntre clasicism i modernism,
Economie teoretic i aplicat, nr. 7

1. Introduction

Ongoing development of competitiveness in the business environment caused managers to

focus their actions on increasing the effectiveness of companies, which implies a well defined
management system, actual and performant. This management system is known as corporate
governance and aims to improve overall economic efficiency in enterprises. Corporate governance is
defined as the set of laws, rules, regulations and codes adopted voluntarily, which allow an enterprise
to attract human and material resources necessary for its work and it also provides the ability to
conduct business effectively and efficiently to generate added value in the long term for shareholders,
interest groups and society as a whole.7

Businesses need to be able to adapt to changing business environment nationally and internationally,
to embrace these changes and operate them at the highest possible level of effectiveness because the

7 The World Bank,The Business Enviroment and Corporate Governance, 1998, p.7

9
markets are becoming increasingly competitive and demanding. The sbility to assimilate the
information and adjusting to everything new depends on the management and leadership capabilities
and general features and structure of companies.

Corporate governance model differs from country to country, it represents an economic

political, social, financial - accounting construction, dependent on the nature and evolutionof the
company.

2. Corporate governance - fundamental aspects

The notion of governance has a complex significance, this notion belongs to many sciences
and to better understand its importance requires knowledge regarding the history of national
economies, company law, corporate finance, accounting, organizational management etc. 8

The concept of Corporate Governance emerged and was developed in the last century, influenced in
turn by economic environments based on family property, bank capital, institutional investors or
limited liability companies dynamised average resounding scandals that occurred while, surprisingly,
the same moments of crisis have had a beneficial effect in relation to identifying ways to improve the
corporate governance concept that would match the new stage in the evolution of the economy. 9

Corporate governance aims to prevent possible conflicts of interest arising within the company, it is
the process by which companies are directed and controlled through a set of rules and regulations
between executive management, board, shareholders and other associated parties.

The structure which sets the objectives of society and the means of achieving them and to
monitor the performance is reflected through the system of principles referring to corporate
governance:

-Implementation of the foundations for an effective corporate governance: this principle is

intended to support transparent and efficient markets where there is a clear restriction of
responsibilities for supervision, implementation and regulation of normative texts.

-The protection and facilitation of the shareholders' rights and duties: the system of governance
applied must protect and facilitate the rights of the shareholders in the company. Example: the right to
participate and vote in the AGM, the right to information on the status of the company, the right to a
share of the company profits etc.

- The fair treatment of shareholders: according to this principle, all shareholders must receive fair
treatment, including minority and foreign shareholders.

-The role of stakeholders: the company is obligated by law to recognize the rights of all persons with
interests in the company towards creating wealth, jobs etc.
8 Almai R., Audit abordri conceptuale, proceduri, comunicare, Editura Universitii
Aurel Vlaicu, Arad, 2014.

9 Morariu Ana, Suciu Gheorghe, Stoian Flavia, Audit intern si guvernana corporativ,
Editura Universitar,Bucureti, 2008

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-Communication and transparency: the publication in real time of all information on company
shares and status.

-Board Responsibilities: the governance of the enterprise should provide strategic direction and
management oversight by the board of directors.

These principles issued by the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development) are considered to be the fundamental basis for the establishment of any model of
corporate governance in each country. n particular, they aim to improve the legal framework for
financial markets and act as a guide for investors.

Strategy decisions are a key global challenge for effectiveness corporate governance systems
aimed at maximizing profits and global competitiveness most often at the expense of some of the
participants in governance. By definition, the overall strategy is the adoption of a strategy extended
beyond the country which could strongly affect those parts which have close links with the home
company.

Researchers compared corporate governance and identified five key players: 10

Employees with structures in which they operate (unions or large unions);

Boards of Directors representing the governing body of the company and approving the company's
strategy;

Steering Committee, senior management is responsible for the implementation of policy decisions;

Shareholders which can express themselves through voting guaranteed by share ownership and that
have the ability to exit the company by selling shares if they disagree with the decision;

Governments that impose national regulations on corporate governance.

The role and power that can exercise each of the aforementioned parties are largely dependent on the
economic environment and corporate governance system of the country they come from.

3. Corporate Governance Models

Economists, lawyers and politicians tried various classifications of capitalism, classifications,

which are based mainly owner-manager relations, credit manager, corporate-government-union firm.
Robert Boyer presents four types of capitalism: capitalism oriented market (specifically the US),
capitalism-oriented company (specifically Japan), capitalism oriented social - democratic (the states of
northern Europe) and state-directed capitalism (France). Germany is located in the author's opinion,
between the last two.11

10 Aguilera, Ruth, George Yip- Global strategies faces local constraints,

Financial Times

11 Boyer, Robert:The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization but Still

the Century of Nations? http://project.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/kikkawa/iss-re.pdf

11
Yusuke Fukada and Ronald Dore12 noted: "In the world there are more Capitalism currents: one is the
Anglo-American that centers around the United States and Great Britain and the other is different
from the Anglo-American in various ways and is found in the case of Germany, Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Japan and so on If I had to classify these currents in two, they
would be: the type of Anglo-American and Japanese-German ".

The artisans of corporate governance systems turned to the "traditions" of the national economy
and.The three major models are: the traditional, deterministic model or extended continental European
and Japanese model.

`The study of governance structures in different countries allows the company to identify
features in Anglo-Saxon countries, continental Europe and Asia. US and UK are characterized by a
large number of national companies publicly traded financial markets with high liquidity, where
ownership and control are frequently changed, and a small number of companies control groups. In
countries like Germany and Japan, major banks, insurance companies and state occupy a predominant
position in the government system. In addition, many companies have reference shareholders and
private legislation, which has the effect of limiting the considerable number of hostile takeovers. Latin
countries resemble those of Anglo-Saxon through the power of the state as shareholder and less
importance given to employees in decision-making of the enterprise.

The Anglo-Saxon corporate governance or Anglo-American is characterized by a dispersed

ownership and a minimum concentration of financial strength, power strictly exercised by managers.
Anglo-Saxon model is facing a well developed market by putting value on competition. Shareholders
are considered to be "aggressive and revolutionaries" to accelerate the implementation of effective
policies, and unprofitable divisions were reorganized quickly because profitable activities need to be
funded. So this system is geared towards shareholders, and the model exchange rate of action
developments in a listed company is considered to synthesize the performance of a company, thus
enabling all relevant parties, primarily shareholders and managers to optimize their decisions and
behaviors.

For a full analysis of the of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model are taken into
account a number of indicators or specific management tools, most of which were created in the US
but whose utility was internationalized:

performance indicator - creating value for the stock or shareholder value (shareholder value);

indicator of funding - vacant liquidity flow (free cash flow);

measurement principle accounting - fair value (fair value);

incentive tool - Allocation of share purchase options (stocks options);

disciplinary mechanism - comprising takeover bids and exchange.

Taking as a basis these indicators, codes of corporate governance focused on solving all
problems (independent directors nonexecutive auditors to management, empowerment of independent
directors, creating a single Board of Directors that continuously monitors activity management, risk

12 Fukada, Yusuke and Ronald Dore : The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive
Strength,Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994

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reduction transactions etc. ). A positive feature of the Anglo-Saxon model is the ensuring mobility of
the investment and placing them in areas that are efficient . A negative side is represented instead by
excessive focus on profitability at the expense of developing and implementing development
strategies. So the Anglo-Saxon model of financial markets given the role of dissolved ultimate echelon
of performance monitoring and enterprise through the acquisition of securities can determine changes
needed recovery companies

The german corporate governance model has as main objective to defend and support the
interest of the parties involved in the company's life (managers, partners, employees, etc.) and less
enrichment of shareholders, being found in countries such as Germany, Japan and countries in
continental Europe. The German model is based to a high accumulation of capital by the existence of
shareholders such as banks and is a system based on internal control. The advantage of this model is
the fact that shareholders are strictly oriented toward a long-term strategy and business stability.
However, there are disadvantages of this system of corporate governance and a very important one to
mention is the fact that it fails to protect minority shareholders, concentrates financial power and gives
the opportunity for agreements between the dangerous economic and financial power.

The German corporate governance model does not permit complaints about how the corporate
governance system is applied and most of system performance is due to the board.

The German management and control system is structured on two levels:

Board - includes only executive members;

supervisory board - includes only non-executive members who follow the work of management.

The Japanese corporate governance model (similar to the German one) is a system based on
internal control, not being centered on the strong influence exercised by active capital markets but on
the existence of strong shareholders such as banks.The features of this model arise from the particular
social and commercial environment in which it appeared. Thus, in Japan, shareholders who hold large
blocks of shares usually are actively involved in the management of their respective companies. Their
role is to penalize poor management, stimulate economic efficiency and social partners to harmonize
interests of the company, including its staff.

Human capital is considered to have the greatest importance in the Japanese model. In contrast
to the Anglo-Saxon model, which is based primarily on the capital market, the Japanese model is
centered on the banking system. In Japan, banks exert a powerful influence and control over corporate
governance system.

The main advantage of this model is monitoring and flexible financing companies and banks
and effective communication between them. Strong involvement of banks in leading companies of this
system gives great stability and an orientation toward economic development priority. However, there
are disadvantages of this system of corporate governance.

One difference between these governance models is the different relationships between the
three actors, director, shareholder and minority shareholder and their credentials. Unlike the German
model, which disadvantages minority shareholder, Anglo-Saxon system fails to distinguish between
the majority and the minority shareholder, ensuring greater capital flow and greater efficiencies stock.
The role of a shareholder is omitted in the Anglo-Saxon voting procedures imposed by administrators.
The latter tempers the influence of shareholders in decisions having a corporate social responsibility

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by reducing risk appetite. Therefore, the boards of companies that apply corporate governance Anglo-
Saxon model often used to personalities outside business circles, such as university professors.

The compared study of the advantages and disadvantages of the two models of corporate
governance in developed countries, the Anglo-American and German-Japanese model suggests that
the governance system of a company can be improved as a result action the following factors:

acquisitions of companies in developed countries like UK, USA, France, Germany, Japan there is a
regulated market purchases;

competitiveness of products and services also influence the corporate governance of the company,
but the action of this factor is slow, shareholders may lose huge amounts due to degradation of product
quality, loss of customers and market segments due to low efficiency of company management;

capital market, which actually gives official recognition performance management of a company
and thus by the company's share price;

creditors, which conclude with the company to protect their rights and their infringement can ask
for insolvency proceedings to recover their claims;

institutional investors represent a potential force to influence the governance of a company,

especially in the UK and US At the same time, they constitute a danger in terms of stronger control
you can exert on companies under a large percentage of holdings in their share capital. Thus, in U.S.
no restrictions on the concentration of holdings of shares in the hands of institutional investors and
banks, and also no restrictions on exercising control over public companies, while Japan and Germany
institutional investors have a decisive role in respecting the rights of shareholders;

labor market for managers, which penalizes managers who receive excessive benefits without
performance as by their replacement by the Board of Directors, which entails the impossibility of
finding a similar job.

As noted, these factors lead to improved performance in corporate governance and the
elimination of deficiencies, but this does not mean an absolute standardization.

4. Corporate governence in Romania

In Romania, the concept of corporate governance has emerged in quite late (2000). The delay
is explained by difficult steps taken on political, legal, economic and social line. Romania like other
ex-communist countries adopted specific organizational structure modeled on developed countries but
not always ordered the most suitable mechanisms to implement them to make them work. This
resulted in a heterogeneous system, which co-exist in 5 structures and institutions alike characteristic
of market economies together with the specific centralized economies.

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 Corporate governance in Romania is typical for companies listed on the Stock Exchange
(Stock Exchange (BSE), Stock Exchange, etc.). Romania has an Institute of Corporate Governance of
Bucharest Stock Exchange (IGC) which issued a Code of Corporate Governance.

5.Conclusions

In a changing economy, both nationally and globally, sustainability of enterprises can be

assured by applying an efficient management system, implementation of management methods of
modern, proper motivation of employees, promoting performance to individual and organizational
level which focuses primarily on results.

Despite the differences between the models' corporate governance, the question is whether a
universal corporate governance model is required in the context of the globalization of markets,
especially financial markets, which would be followed by a globalization of regulation. The theory
oscillates between imminent convergence and revelation impediments.

Given the trend in the international market, we believe that corporate governance will remain
a priority for top management of companies more time to come, as companies will adopt an
organizational culture transparent and efficient model of leadership which will perform better and
those who refuse to accept this reality, absolutely necessary, will record worse results.

Corporate governance systems inefficiency is due most often to a concentration of power in

the hands of management and / or employees, without the influenceof other market participants. and
without the active capital markets to put their mark on their progress. Often, managers think they
know everything and that they are merely subordinate employees who must execute orders. This
management system can no longer be applied without considering long-term performance and
effectiveness of the company. A system of corporate governance should involve all decision makers
and all employees.

6. References

1. The World Bank,The Business Enviroment and Corporate Governance, 1998, p.7
2. Almai R., Audit abordri conceptuale, proceduri, comunicare, Editura Universit ii Aurel
Vlaicu, Arad, 2014;
3. Morariu Ana, Suciu Gheorghe, Stoian Flavia, Audit intern si guvernana corporativ, Editura
Universitar,Bucureti, 2008
4. Aguilera, Ruth, George Yip- Global strategies faces local constraints, Financial Times.
5. Boyer, Robert:The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization but Still the Century of
Nations? http://project.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/kikkawa/iss-re.pdf
6. Fukada, Yusuke and Ronald Dore : The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive
Strength,Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994
7. Bowman B., Principii i recomandri propuse ntr-un nou Cod de Guvernan Corporativ, Revista
Audit financiar, nr. 10/2010;
8. Bunget O., Audit financiar-contabil, Editura Mirton, Timioara, 2010;
9. Albu N., Durica A., Grigore N., Guvernana corporativ n Romnia. Percep ii i perspective.,
Contabilitatea, expertiza i auditul afacerilor, iunie 2013;
10. Briciu, S. (2012), Guvernana corporativ
11. Economie teoretic i aplicat Volumul XX (2013), No. 4(581), pp. 54-64

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12. Feleag, N., Vasile, Cristina (2006), Guvernana ntreprinderii ntre clasicism i modernism,
Economie teoretic i aplicat, nr. 7

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