Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Reader Psii
Reader Psii
Psihologia Religiei
Anul II, semestrul II
Disciplin opional
An universitar 2014-2015
Dintre materialele recomandate ca bibliografie pentru acest curs atragem atenia asupra
volumelor citate n cele ce urmeaz, care constituie principalele resurse bibliografice:
Hood, R.W., Hill, P.C., Spilka, B., (2009) The Psychology of Religion, An Empirical
Approach Fourth Edition, THE GUILFORD PRESS, New York
Jonte-Pace, D., Parsons, W., (2001), Religion and Psychology. Mapping the terrain,
Routledge, London and New York
Dincolo de aceste dou surse, pentru fiecare modul exist o bibliografie minimal pe care
studenii o pot parcurge pentru a-i completa cunotinele i care este util n realizarea temelor.
luna martie 2014 (zilele pentru consultaii vor fi afiate pe site-ul facultii)
luna mai 2014 (zilele pentru consultaii vor fi afiate pe site-ul facultii)
1.9. Politica de evaluare i notare. Evaluarea final se va realiza pe baza unui colocviu
desfurat n sesiunea de la finele semestrului I. Nota final se compune din:
(a) punctajul obinut la colocviu n proporie de 60% (6 puncte);
(b) evaluarea reaction paper-ului 30% ( 3 puncte),
(c) punctul acordat din oficiu 10% (1 punct)
Pentru predarea i evaluarea reaction paper-ului se vor respecta cu strictee cerinele
tutorilor. Orice abatere de la acestea aduce dup sine penalizri sau pierderea punctajului
corespunztor temei. n cazul n care studentul consider c activitatea sa a fost subapreciat de
ctre evaluatori, atunci poate solicita feedback suplimentar prin contactarea prin email a tutorilor
sau a titularului de curs (n aceast ordine).
Termen de
predare
Punctaj
22.05.2014
3p
In sesiune
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Data
Vor fi anunate la o dat
ulterioar pe site-ul
Departamentului de Psihologie
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Departamentului de Psihologie
Ora
Sala
CUPRINS*
THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION
David B.Wilson... 8
THE CONFLICT OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION
Colin A.Russell .14
THE DEMARCATION OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION
Stephen C.Meyer 17
GOD, NATURE, AND SCIENCE
Stanley L.Jaki ..23
GENESIS AND SCIENCE
John Stenhouse .....28
Metodologia de cercetare in psihologia religiei ....30
Psihoterapia cu clienti religiosi .43
Interventii spirituale in psihoterapie .51
The role of religion in therapy ..68
Rolul religiei si spiritualitatii asupra sanatatii fizice si mentale ...93
A prospective study of religion/spirituality and depressive symptoms among adolescent
psychiatric patients ..101
Religion and anxiety: A critical review of the literature..110
Psychotherapy as a Religious Value129
Percepiile despre smerenie: studiu preliminar ...133
Evenimente negative de via, tipuri de coping
religios pozitiv i negative i funcionare mental . .156
Contextualizing models of humility and forgiveness:a reply to gassin ..170
Depresie si spiritualitate ............................................................................................................181
*Unele dintre articolele din acest reader au fost traduse de studentii care au fost inscrisi la
acest curs optional.
The history of science and religion has been a contentious subject. In addition to the usual scholarly
disputes present in any academic area, this historical subject has been enmeshed in more general historiographical
debates and influenced by the religious or antireligious beliefs of some historians. After considering some basic
issues, this essay discusses several works written during the previous century and a half, while focusing on the last
fifty years. Recent decades have seen a radical shift in point of view among historians of science. Although
historians have espoused various approaches to the past, it will make our subject more manageable if we concentrate
on the polar opposites around which views have tended to cluster. One approach has been to examine past ideas as
much as possible in their own context, without either judging their long-term validity or making the discussion
directly relevant to present issues. Another approach has been to study past ideas from the perspective of the present,
taking full advantage of the hindsight provided by later knowledge to judge which ideas have proven to be valid.
The second approach has apparent advantages. It does not exclude current knowledge that can assist us in the
historical task. It also keeps present issues to the fore by insisting that historians draw lessons from the past that are
relevant to current issues. However, historians have tended to regard the second approach as precariously likely to
lead to distortion of the past in the service of present concerns. Dismissing this as
presentism, therefore, historians
of science have come to favor the first, or contextualist, approach. Whichever method historians use, they might
reach one of several possible conclusions about the historical relationship between science and religion. Conflict,
mutual support, and total separation are three obvious candidates. One of these models might long have
predominated, or the relationship might have changed from time to time and place to place. The discovery of
conflict might raise the further questions of which side emerged victorious and which side ought to have done so.
The discovery of mutual support might lead to the question of whether either science or religion contributed to the
others continued validity or even to its origin.
The Conflict Thesis
The most prominent view among both historians and scientists in the twentieth century has been a
presentist conflict thesis that argues as follows. To engage in the history of science, one must first know what
science is. It is certainly not religion, and, indeed, it is quite separate from religion, as can clearly be seen in science
as practiced in the modern world. The historian of science, then, should properly examine the internal development
of the scientific ideas that made modern science possible (that is, to the exclusion of such external factors as
religion). The proponents of some ideas in the past were closer to the right track in this process than others. Those
who expanded the realm of religion too far were on the wrong track, so that religion improperly intruded on the
realm of science. In such instances, conflict ensued between science and religion, with scientific advances
eventually making the truth clear to all and invariably (and rightly) emerging victorious. The historical process need
not have occurred in this way, but it so often did that conflict has been the primary relationship between science and
religion. Sciences best-known victories were those of Copernicanism and Darwinism. Presentism, internalism, and
the conflict thesis coalesced into a de facto alliance, with the result that the conflict model is still widely accepted by
academics (historians and scientists alike), though generally no longer by historians of science. A gulf in point of
view thus marks the immediate setting of any scholarly treatment of the subject for a popular audience.
That this alliance was not a necessary one can be seen in the work of William Whewell (17941866), the most
prominent historian of science during the first half of the nineteenth century. Known today primarily as a historian
and philosopher of science, Whewell was, first of all, a mathematical physicist, but also an Anglican clergyman and
a moral theorist. His philosophy of science featured a series of what he called f
undamental ideas (like the idea of
space) that, as part of mans mind created in the image of God, figured crucially in scientific knowledge of Gods
other creation, nature. Moral knowledge was structured similarly.
Both moral and scientific knowledge were progressive. Scientists, for example, gradually became aware of
the existence and implications of fundamental ideas. The study of history, that is, disclosed (a sometimes lurching)
progress toward the present or, at any rate, Whewells particular version of the present. Great scientists, such as
Isaac Newton (16421727), were both intellectually strong and morally good. Whewell did not think that conflict
between science and religion had been especially significant historically, nor, indeed, was it in Whewells own day.
From his vantage point, he could give medieval science the uncomplimentary epithet statio
nary for several
reasons that did not particularly include religious repression. The Roman Catholic Church had acted against Galileo
(15641642), to be sure, but, for Whewell, that episode was an aberration. A tightly knit, biblical-historicalphilosophical-moralscientific- theological unity was manifested in Whewells major, mutually reinforcing, books:
History of the Inductive Sciences (1837), Foundation of Morals (1837), Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840),
and Elements of Morality (1845). John William Draper (181182), author of History of the Conflict Between
Religion and Science (1874), and Andrew Dickson White (18321918), author of The Warfare of Science (1876)
and A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (1896), lived in an age that was different
from Whewells. While the Darwinian debates of the 1860s preceded Drapers book, what really alarmed him
during that decade was the formulation of the doctrine of papal infallibility and the Roman Catholic Churchs
pronouncement that public institutions teaching science were not exempt from its authority. In his History, Draper
depicted these developments as merely the latest phase in a long history of
the expansive force of the human
intellect, in conflict not with religion generally, but with that
compression inflicted by Catholicism. White
developed and first published his views at about the same time as Draper. Whites insights stemmed from his
presidency of the new Cornell University, which was founded as a secular institution that stood in sharp contrast to
the traditional religious sponsorship of colleges and universities.
The withering criticism and innuendo directed at him personally by some religious figures led eventually to
the writing of his books. Like those of Draper, Whites books did not condemn all religion. They attacked what
White called
that same old mistaken conception of rigid Scriptural interpretation (White 1876, 75). White
proclaimed that whenever such religion sought to constrain science, science eventually won but with harm to both
religion and science in the process. Science and
true religion, however, were not at odds. Had Whewell still been
alive, White and Draper might have told him how their circumstances had helped them improve on his writing of
history. Unlike Whewell, they believed that they had stood in the shoes, as it were, of those who had been
persecuted. White seemed especially to identify with Galileo. Their improved awareness had, they thought, enabled
them to observe factors that he had overlooked. In any case, their books were highly influential. Moreover, it was
not their whispered qualifications but their screaming titles that were to thunder through the decades, remaining
audible more than a century later. Differences of opinion did not seem to alter what was to become the widely
current views of Draper and White. In Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (1924), E.A.Burtt
argued that the foun dations of science were often theological. Galileos God, for example, labored as a
geometrician in creating the world, with the result that man, who knew some mathematics as well as God did, was
capable of grasping natures essential mathematical logic. In Science and the Modern World (1926), Alfred North
Whitehead maintained that the origin of modern science depended upon medieval theology, which had long insisted
on Gods rationality and hence also the rationality of his creation. Yet, in the 1930s, when his research suggested
that seventeenth-century English Puritanism had fostered science, Robert K.Merton found that prevailing scholarly
opinion, which had been shaped by the books of Draper and White, held that science and religion were inherently
opposed and necessarily in conflict. Of course, the 1920s were the decade not only of Burtt and Whitehead, but also
of the Scopes trial, which was generally interpreted as yet another in a long series of confrontations between science
and religion. Also, during the 1920s and 1930s(and for some time afterward), the still undeveloped discipline of the
history of science was pursued mainly by men trained in the sciences, who found presentist internalism a natural
point of view.
Reaction to the Conflict Thesis
The Whig Interpretation of History (1931), written by the young general historian Herbert Butterfield, was
eventually to influence the history of science deeply. Butterfield argued that historians had tended to be Protestant in
religion and Whig in politics. They liked to divide the world into friends and enemies of progressprogress, that is,
toward their own point of view. History was thus peopled by progressives and reactionaries, Whigs and Tories,
Protestants and Catholics. Whig historians made the mistake of seeing Martin Luther, for example, as similar to
modern Protestants rather than, as was actually the case, closer to sixteenth-century Catholics. By reading the
present into the past in this way, Whig historians ratified the present, but only by misshaping the past. A better way
was to assume that the sixteenth century was quite different from the twentieth and to explore the sixteenth century
on its own terms, letting any similarities emerge from historical research rather than from prior assumption.
Butterfields Origins of Modern Science (1949) applied this methodology to the history of science, including the
relationship between science and religion, during the scientific revolution. By not viewing scientists of the past as
necessarily similar to modern scientists, it was possible to reach historical insights quite different from those of, say,
Whewell or White. Overall, the scientific revolution resulted not from accumulating new observations or
experimental results, but from looking at the same evidence in a new way: It was a
transposition in the minds of
the scientists.
The alleged revolutionary Copernicus (1473 1543) could now be understood as a
conservative, much
akin to the Greek astronomers with whom he disagreed. Religion was not necessarily either opposed to or separate
from science in the modern sense but could, in principle, be viewed in any relationship, depending on the historical
evidence. Reading the evidence in a non-Whiggish way, Butterfield saw variety. There was, to be sure, theological
opposition to the Copernican system, but it would not have been very important if there had not also been
considerable scientific opposition. Even Galileo did not actually prove the earths motion, and his favorite argument
in favor of it, that of the tides, was a g
reat mistake. Christianity favored the new mechanical worldview because it
allowed a precise definition of miracles as events contrary to the usual mechanical regularity. Newtons gravitational
theory required Gods continued intervention in the universe he created, and one of Newtons possible explanations
of gravity m
ade the existence of God logically necessary (Butterfield 1949, 157). Butterfields Christianity and
History (1949) made his own Christian faith explicit, but his religious views did not make Origins of Modern
Science into a Christian tract, though they guaranteed that Christian factors received a fair hearing. Whatever the
exact influence of Butterfield on them, three books published during the 1950s revealed the progress of nonWhiggish studies of science and religion during the scientific revolution. Alexandre Koyr, influenced by Burtt, had
already published studies like
Galileo and Plato (1943) a few years before Butterfields Origins of Modern
Science. In From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (1957), Koyr argued that the revolution involved
philosophy and theology as well as science and that all three dimensions of thought usually existed in
the very
same men, such as Johannes Kepler (15711630), Ren Descartes (15961650), Isaac Newton, and Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz (16461716). Koyr thus portrayed the conflict between Newton and Leibniz, one that involved
Leibnizs stiff opposition to Newtons gravitational theory, as primarily a theological conflict. He contrasted
Newtons w
ork-day God (who caringly involved himself in the operation of his universe) with Leibnizs Go
d of
the sabbath (who created the world skillfully enough for it to run by itself). In his The Copernican Revolution
(1957), Thomas Kuhn adopted the
unusual approach of treating astronomers philosophical and religious views as
equally fundamental to their scientific ones. For the early Copernicans, at the center of the universe resided the
sun,
the Neoplatonic symbol of the Deity (Kuhn 1957, 231). Unlike Koyrs and Kuhns books, Richard
Westfalls Science and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England (1958) examined a variety of better- and
lesserknown men of science (virtuosi) in a particular national context. In general, the virtuosi regarded their
scientific discoveries as confirmation of their religious views, thus answering charges that studying nature both led
man to value reason over revelation and made it difficult to know the nonmaterial side of existence. While there
existed in the seventeenth century a multiplicity of ways to dovetail science and religion, there was a general
movement from revealed religion to a natural theology that prepared the way for the deism of the next century.
The 1950s witnessed non-Whiggish studies of science and religion, not only in the century of Galileo and
Newton, but in Darwins century, too. In his
second look in Isis at Charles Gillispies Genesis and Geology
(1951), Nicolaas Rupke credited Gillispie with transforming the historiography of geology by going beyond the
great ideas of great men as defined by modern geology to the actual religious-politicalscientific context of British
geology in the decades before Darwins Origin of Species (1859). Explicitly rejecting the conflict thesis of Draper
and White, Gillispie saw
the difficulty between science and Protestant Christianityto be one of religion (in a
crude sense) in science rather than one of religion versus science (Gillispie 1951, ix). Writing about a period in
which geologists were often themselves clergymen, Gillispie thought
that the issues discussed arose from a quasitheological frame of mind within science (Gillispie 1951, x). At the end of the decade, John Greene published The
Death of Adam (1959), an examination of the shift from the
static creationism of Newtons day to the evolutionary
views of Darwins. Without making any particular point of rejecting the Draper-White conflict thesis, Greene
nevertheless did so implicitly, calling attention tothe religious aspect of scientific thought (Greene 1959, vi) and
infusing his book with examples of a variety of connections between religion and science. Thus, Georges Louis
Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (170788), was forced to fit his science to the religious views of the day but found
evolution contrary to Scripture, reason, and experience. William Whiston (16671752) employed science to explain
scriptural events, rejecting alternative biblical views that were either too literal or too allegorical. Charles Darwin
(180982) jousted with fellow scientists Charles Lyell (17971875) and Asa Gray (181088) about the sufficiency
of natural selection as opposed to Gods guidance and design in evolutionary processes.
Christian Foundations of Modern Science
If these notable books of the 1950s rejected the conflict thesis in various ways, two books from the early
1970s went even further, turning the thesis on its head to declare (echoing Whitehead) that Christianity had made
science possible. The first was Reijer Hooykaass Religion and the Rise of Modern Science (1972). The Protestant
historian Hooykaas (190694) had explored the relations between science and religion for several years. His Natural
Law and Divine Miracle (1959), for example, showed the compatibility of what he called
a Biblical concept of
nature with nineteenth-century biology and geology. In 1972, he went further by arguing for a Christian, especially
Calvinistic, origin of science itself. After discussing Greek concepts of nature, Hooykaas concluded that, in the
Bible,
in total contradiction to pagan religion, nature is not a deity to be feared and worshipped, but a work of God
to be admired, studied and managed (Hooykaas 1972, 9). Not only did the Bible d
e-deify nature, Calvinism
encouraged science through such principles as voluntaristic theology, a
positive appreciation of manual work, and
an
accommodation theory of the Bible. Voluntarism emphasized that God could choose to create nature in any
way he wanted and that man, therefore, had to experience nature to discover Gods choice. This stimulus to
experimental science was reinforced by the high value that Christianity placed on manual labor. The view that, in
biblical revelation, God had accommodated himself to ordinary human understanding in matters of science meant
that Calvinists generally did not employ biblical literalism to reject scientific findings, particularly Copernican
astronomy. Stanley L.Jakis Science and Creation (1974) also expanded themes that were present in his earlier
chapter
Physics and Theology in his The Relevance of Physics (1966). Jaki was a Benedictine priest with
doctorates in both theology and physics. His Science and Creation, a book of breathtaking scope, examined several
non-Western cultures before focusing on the origin of science within the Judeo-Christian framework. Jaki argued
that two barriers to science pervaded other cultures: a cyclic view of history and an organic view of nature. Endless
cycles of human history made men too apathetic to study nature. Even when they did, their concept of a living,
willful nature precluded discovery of those unvarying patterns that science labels natural laws. The Judeo-Christian
view, in contrast, historically regarded nature as the nonliving creation of a rational God, not cyclic but with a
definite beginning and end. In this conceptual context (and only in this context), modern science emerged, from the
thirteenth through the seventeenth centuries. Earlier adumbrations of science were pale, short-lived imitations,
doomed by hostile environments. Unfortunately, Jaki thought, amidst attacks on Christianity in the twentieth
century, there had arisen the theory of an oscillating universe, which was another unwarranted, unscientific, cyclic
view of nature. Hence, consideration of both past and present disclosed the same truth:
the indispensability of a
firm faith in the only lasting source of rationality and confidence, the Maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible
and invisible (Jaki 1974, 357).
The Continuing Influence of the Conflict Thesis
Despite the growing number of scholarly modifications and rejections of the conflict model from the 1950s
on, the Draper-White thesis proved to be tenacious, though it is probably true that it had been more successfully
dispelled for the seventeenth century than for the nineteenth. At any rate, in the 1970s leading historians of the
nineteenth century still felt required to attack it. In the second volume of his The Victorian Church (1970), Owen
Chadwick viewed the conflict thesis as a misconception that many Victorians had about themselves. His The
Secularization of the European Mind (1975) presented Drapers antithesis as the view to attack by way of explaining
one aspect of nineteenth-century secularization. Writing about Charles Lyell in 1975, Martin Rudwick also deplored
distortions produced by Draper and White, arguing that abandoning their outdated historiography would solve
puzzles surrounding Lyells time at Kings College, London. Examining nineteenth-century European thought in
History, Man, and Reason (1971), the philosopher-historian Maurice Mandelbaum rejected what he called th
e
conventional view of the place of religion in the thought of the nineteenth century, which h
olds that science and
religion were ranged in open hostility, and that unremitting warfare was conducted between them (Mandelbaum
1971, 28). Why did these historians believe that the conflict thesis was sufficiently alive and well to require
refutation? For one thing, even those historians who were most significant in undermining the conflict thesis did not
reject it entirely. Moreover, they made statements that could be construed as more supportive of the thesis than
perhaps they intended.
Conflict with science was the only subheading under
Religion in the index to Gillispies
The Edge of Objectivity (1960), and it directed the reader to statements that seemed to support the conflict model.
What geology in the 1830s n
eeded to become a science was to retrieve its soul from the grasp of theology
(Gillispie 1960, 299).
There was never a more unnecessary battle than that between science and theology in the
nineteenth century (Gillispie 1960, 347). Even Gillispies Genesis and Geology was criticized by Rudwick in 1975
as only a more sophisticated variety of the
positivist historiography of Draper and White. Westfall, in a preface to
the 1973 paperback edition of his book, wrote:
In 1600, Western civilization found its focus in the Christian
religion; by 1700, modern natural science had displaced religion from its central position (Westfall 1973, ix).
Greene introduced the subjects of the four chapters in his Darwin and the Modern World View (1961) as four stages
in th
e modern conflict between science and religion (Greene 1961, 12). Surely, the most widely known book
written by a historian of science, Kuhns Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), excluded those philosophical
and religious views that Kuhn had earlier (in his Copernican Revolution [1957]) labeled
equally fundamental
aspects of astronomy. This exclusion undoubtedly aided the view that a conflict existed, a view that was the ally of
internalism. The 1970s were a period in which past scientists religious statements could still be dismissed as
ornamental or ceremonial flourishes or as
political gestures. The
orthodoxy of internalism among historians of
science in the 1960s and early 1970s was the target of the fascinating autobiographical account of life as a student
and teacher at Cambridge University by Robert Young in his contribution to Changing Perspectives in the History of
Science (1973). And even Young, whose own pathbreaking nonconflictive articles from around 1970 were later
reprinted in Darwins Metaphor (1985), wrote in his 1973 piece that
the famous controversy in the nineteenth
century between science and theology was very heated indeed (Young 1973, 376).
A second factor was the prevailing view among scientists themselves, which influenced historians of
science, who either had their own early training in science or maintained regular contact with scientists, or both. In
this regard, we might consider the work of the scientist-historian Stephen Jay Gould, one of the most successful
popularizers of both science and the history of science. A collection of his popular essays appeared in 1977 as Ever
Since Darwin. Gould stoutly rejected the si
mplistic but common view of the relationship between science and
religionthey are natural antagonists (Gould 1977, 141). However, the books specific instances came
preponderantly from the conflict theorists familiar bag of examples: the Churchs disagreeing with Galileo; T.H.
Huxleys
creaming Bishop
Soapy Sam Wilberforce; natural selection s displacing of divine creation; and, as
Freud said, mans losing his status as a divinely created rational being at the center of the universe because of the
science of Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud himself. Goulds most sympathetic chapter was his discussion of Thomas
Burnets late-seventeenth-century geological explanations of biblical events like Noahs flood. Even here, however,
Gould regarded the views of Burnets opponents as dogmatic and antirationalist, reflecting the same unhappy spirit
that, wrote Gould, later possessed Samuel Wilberforce, William Jennings Bryan, and modern creationists.
The
Yahoos never rest (Gould 1977, 146). Whatever the reasons for the continued survival of the conflict thesis, two
other books on the nineteenth century that were published in the 1970s hastened its final demise among historians of
science. In 1974, Frank Turner carved out new conceptual territory in Between Science and Religion. He studied six
late Victorians (including Alfred Russel Wallace, the co-inventor of the theory of evolution by natural selection)
who rejected both Christianity and the agnostic scie
ntific naturalism of the time. In their various ways, they used
different methods, including the empiricism of science (but not the Bible), to support two traditionally religious
ideas: the existence of a God and the reality of human immortality. Even more decisive was the penetrating critique
Historians and Historiography that James Moore placed at the beginning of his Post-Darwinian Controversies
(1979). In what would have been a small book in itself, Moores analysis adroitly explored the historical origins of
Draper and Whites m
ilitary metaphor and went on to show how the metaphor promulgated false dichotomies:
between science and religion, between scientists and theologians, between scientific and religious institutions. The
metaphor simply could not handle, for example, a case of two scientist-clergymen who disagreed about a scientific
conclusion partly because of their religious differences. Finally, Moore called for historians to write n
on-violent
history, of which the remainder of his book was a prodigious example. Examining Protestant responses to Darwins
ideas, he concluded that it was an
orthodox version of Protestantism that
came to terms with Darwin more easily
than did either a more liberal or a more conservative version and, in addition, that much anguish would have been
spared had this orthodoxy prevailed.
The Complexity Thesis
By the 1980s and 1990s, there had been nearly a complete revolution in historical methodology and
interpretation. Setting aside his own views of science and religion, the historian was expected to write nonWhiggish history to avoid what Maurice Mandelbaum called the
retrospective fallacy. This fallacy consisted of
holding an asymmetrical view of the past and the future, in which the past was seen as like a solid, with all of its
parts irrevocably fixed in place, while the future was viewed as fluid, unformed, and unforeseen. The problem for
the historian was to transpose his mind to such an extent that a historical figures future (which was part of the
historians own past) lost the fixity and inevitability that the historian perceived in it and, instead, took on the
uncertainty that it had for the historical figure. The concern for what led to the present, and the extent to which it
was right or wrong by present standards, thus dissipated. A good test for the historian was whether he could write a
wholly sympathetic account of a historical figure with whom he totally disagreed or whose ideas he found
repugnant. Would the historical figure, if by some magic given the chance to read the historians reconstruction, say
that, indeed, it explained what he thought and his reasons for doing so? To be valid, any broader historical
generalization had to be based on specific, non-Whiggish studies that accurately represented past thought. This
radically different methodology yielded a very different overall conclusion about the historical relationship of
science and religion. If
conflict expressed the gist of an earlier view,
complexity embodied that of the new. The
new approach exposed internalism as incomplete and conflict as distortion. Past thought turned out to be terribly
complex, manifesting numerous combinations of scientific and religious ideas, which, to be fully understood, often
required delineation of their social and political settings.
From this mainstream perspective, moreover, historians could deem other approaches unacceptable. Zeal
for the triumph of either science or religion in the present could lure historians into Whiggish history. The works not
only of Draper and White, but also of Hooykaas and Jaki fell into that category. Kenneth Thibodeaus review in Isis
of Jakis Science and Creation, for example, declared it
a lopsided picture of the history of science that
m
inimizes the accomplishments of non-Christian cultures and
exaggerates those of Christian ones (Thibodeau
1976, 112). In a review in Archives Internationale dHistoire des
Sciences, William Wallace found Hooykaass Religion and the Rise of Modern Science to be
a case of special
pleading. In their historiographical introduction to the book they edited, God and Nature (1986), David Lindberg
and Ronald Numbers judged that Hooykaas and Jaki had
sacrificed careful history for scarcely concealed
apologetics (Lindberg and Numbers 1986, 5). Likewise, some historians found Moores nonviolent history
unacceptable: He
sometimes seems to be writing like an apologist for some view of Christianity (La Vergata
1985, 950), criticized Antonella La Vergata in his contribution to The Darwinian Heritage (1985). Among the
multitude of articles and books that argued for a relatively new, non-Whiggish complexity thesis, two exemplars
were Lindberg and Numberss God and Nature and John Brooke s Science and Religion (1991). Though similar in
outlook, they differed in format. The first was a collection of eighteen studies by leading scholars in their own areas
of specialty, while the second was a single scholars synthesis of a staggering amount of scholarship, an appreciable
portion of which was his own specialized research. Turning in their introduction to the contents of their own
volume, Lindberg and Numbers rightly observed that a
lmost every chapter portrays a complex and diverse
interaction that defies reduction to simple conflict or harmony (Lindberg and Numbers 1986, 10). Medieval
science, for example, was a h
andmaiden to theology (but not suppressed), while the close interlocking of science
and religion that developed by the seventeenth century began to unravel in the eighteenth. To examine briefly the
complexity of only one chapter, consider James Moores (nonapologetic) discussion of Ge
ologists and Interpreters
of Genesis in the Nineteenth Century. Moore focused on British intellectual debates occurring in a variegated
context of geographical, social, generational, institutional, and professional differences. Around 1830, professional
geologists (that is, those with specialist expertise) tended to h
armonize Genesis and geology by using geology to
explain the sense in which the natural history of Genesis was true. They were opposed by nonprofessional
Scriptural geologists, who used Genesis to determine geological truths. By the 1860s, a new generation of
professional geologists did their geology independently of Genesis. They were in agreement with a new generation
of professional biblical scholars in Britain, who believed that Genesis and geology should be understood separately.
Meanwhile, the earlier conflicting traditions of harmonization and scriptural geology were kept going by amateurs.
Hence, while debate over how to meld Genesis and geology was a social reality in late-Victorian Britain, it
did not perturb the elite level of the professionals. Numbers expanded his own chapter in God and Nature into The
Creationists (1992), an outstanding treatment of such issues at the nonelite level in the twentieth century. Brookes
volume targeted general readers in a way that Lindberg and Numberss did not. In his historiographical remarks,
Brooke considered the very meanings of the words scien
ce and
religion, resisting specific definitions for them.
The problem, Brooke explained, was that the words had so many meanings. It could even be misleading to refer to
Isaac Newtons
science, when Newton called what he was doing n
atural philosophy, a phrase connoting quite
different issues in the seventeenth century than did
science in the twentieth. As did Lindberg and Numbers,
Brooke found complexity: T
he principal aim of this book, he wrote, h
as been to reveal something of the
complexity of the relationship between science and religion as they have interacted in the past (Brooke 1991, 321).
As for Lindberg and Numbers, so also for Brooke, complexity did not preclude general theses. He concluded, for
example, that science went from being subordinate to religion in the Middle Ages to a position of relative
equality in the seventeenth century, not separate from religion but
differentiated from it.
Conclusion
This essay, in rejecting presentist histories of science and religion, may itself seem somewhat presentist.
Though it tries fairly to present the opposite point of view, it favors the recent historiographical revolution in
advocating a contextualist approach, with all its attendant complexities. Though the new point of view has decided
advantages over the old, it has the potential of leading historians astray. Pursuit of complexity could produce ever
narrower studies that are void of generalization. Moreover, awareness of the great variation of views in different
times and places could lead to the mistaken conclusion that those ideas were nothing but reflections of their own
cultures. Instead, in thinking about science and religion, as in most human endeavors, there have always been the
relatively few who have done their work better than the rest. Existence of differences among them does not mean
that they have not thought through and justified their own positions. In fact, that they have done so is an example of
a contextualist generalizationone that is not only in harmony with the evidence of the past, but also relevant to
present discussions. Indeed, the whole non-Whiggish enterprise might inform the present in other ways, too, though
scholars are understandably wary of drawing very specific lessons from history for the present. Consider, however, a
few general points. Study of past ideas on their own terms might provide a kind of practice for working out ones
own ideas or for nourishing tolerance for the ideas of others. There have been and, no doubt, always will be
disagreements among our strongest thinkers, as well as questions of the relationship between their ideas and those of
the population at large. Moreover, things always change, though not predictably or necessarily completely. Indeed,
the most influential thinkers seem fated to have followers who disagree with them, even while invoking their names.
Even the most well-founded, well-argued, and well-intentioned ideas about science and religion are liable to later
change or eventual rejection. The same is true for historiographical positions, including, of course, the complexity
thesis itself.
scientific naturalism. It was a view that denied the right of the church to in
terfere in the progress of science by
introducing theological considerations into scientific debates. By the same token, any appeal to divine purpose as an
explanation of otherwise inexplicable phenomena has been a famous hostage to fortune. This philosophy of
God of
the gaps has generated special heat when one of the g
aps has later been filled naturalistically. In these cases,
conflict has certainly appeared, though whether it is really about methodological issues may be doubted. It has also
been argued in a veritable torrent of informed and scholarly works that the methodologies of science and of religion
are complementary rather than contradictory, and local instances of dispute have been assigned to other causes. Yet,
this confusion still penetrates popular thinking, and the conflict thesis has been thereby sustained. The third potential
for conflict has been in the field of ethics. Most recently this has been realized in such questions as genetic
engineering, nuclear power, and proliferation of insecticides. Past debates on the propriety of such medical
procedures as vaccination and anesthesia have been replaced by impassioned conflict over abortion and the value of
fetal life. In Victorian times, one of the more serious reasons for opposing Darwin was the fear that his theories
would lead to the law of the jungle, the abandonment of ethical constraints in society. Yet, in nearly all of these
cases, it is not so much science as its application (often by nonscientists) that has been under judgment. Fourth,
some opposition between science and religion has arisen from issues of social power. In Catholic cultures in
continental Europe, the polarity between sacred and secular was often much sharper than in Britain and the United
States, with the result that progressive science-based ideologies were more frequently in explicit contention with
conservative political and ecclesiastical forces. In early-nineteenth-century Britain, certain high-church Anglicans
turned on science for threatening their dominant role in society.
While this debate was formally about the authority of Scripture, in reality it was about the growing spirit of
liberalism within the universities. Not surprisingly, the community of science resented such attacks and, in due
course, turned the table on the enemy. Their response came in the form of a concerted effort by certain scientific
naturalists in Victorian England, most notably those associated with Thomas Henry Huxley (182595), to overthrow
the hegemony of the English church. The movement, which was accompanied by bitter conflict, generated a flood of
articles, lay
sermons, and verbal attacks on the clergy and included conspiratorial attempts to get the
right men
in to key positions in the scientific establishment. It involved lectures, secular Sunday schools, and even a successful
lobby to have Charles Darwins body interred in Westminster Abbey. Yet, it was not a battle between science and
religion except in the narrowest sense. Unlike White, who averred that he opposed not religion but dogmatic
theology, Huxley sought to undermine organized religion, though his rhetoric frequently sought to convey the
impression of a disinterested defence of truth. One recent writer identifies the driving force behind at least the
Victorian struggles as
the effort by scientists to improve the position of science. They wanted nothing less than to
move science from the periphery to the centre of English life (Heyck 1982, 87). It was at this time that science
became professionalized, with the worlds first professional institute for science, the Institute of Chemistry,
established in 1877. In Europe, it was also the period when scientific leadership began to slip from Britain to
Germany, generating a fierce rearguard reaction by some British scientists against anything that could diminish their
public standing. If the Church was seen to be in their way, it must be opposed by all means, including the fostering
of a conflict myth, in which religion routinely suffered defeat at the hands of triumphalist science.
harassment, the evidence is almost nonexistent. Insofar as there was any conflict, it was between the London and
Edinburgh medical establishments or between obstetricians and surgeons. The origins of that myth may be located in
an inadequately documented footnote in White (1896, 2.63). Finally, the conflict thesis exalts minor squabbles, or
even differences of opinion, to the status of major conflicts. The confrontation between Samuel Wilberforce (1805
73) and Huxley in 1860 has been so frequently paraded as a one-sided battle on a vast scale that one is liable to
forget that, in fact, it was nothing of the kind. Such exaggeration is an almost inevitable accompaniment to the
exposition of a conflict theory. It is excellent drama but impoverished history, made credible only by a prior belief
that such conflict is inevitable. Of such material are legends made, and it has been well observed that
the
dependence of the conflict thesis on legends that, on closer examination, prove misleading is a more general defect
than isolated examples might suggest (Brooke 1991, 40).
Introduction
What is science? What is religion? How do the two intersect? Historians of science address these questions
by analyzing how the scientific and religious beliefs of particular scientists or cultures have interacted at specific
times. Philosophers of science and religion, however, have sought to characterize the relationship between them in
more general terms. Their endeavor has required defining science and religion in order to distinguish or
demarcate
them from each other by clear and objective criteria. During modern times, theologians and philosophers of science
have attempted to make categorical demarcations between science and religion on various definitional grounds.
Defining Differences: Some Philosophical Context
The neo-orthodox theologian Karl Earth (18861968), for example, asserted that science and religion have
different objects of interest. Religion and theology focus on Gods self-revelation through Christ; science studies the
natural world. Earth maintained that science and religion use different methods of obtaining knowledge. Scientists
can know the external world through rational and empirical investigation. Yet, because of human sin, man cannot
know God from the visible testimony of the creation, that is, f
rom the things that are made (Romans 1:20), as
Saint Paul put it. Instead, human knowledge of God comes only if God reveals himself directly to man in a mystical
or an a-rational way. Existentialist philosophers such as Sren Kierkegaard (181355) and Martin Buber (1878
1965) also accepted a fundamental epistemological distinction between science and religion. According to both,
scientific knowledge is impersonal and objective, whereas religious knowledge is personal and subjective. Since
science concerns itself with material things and their functions, objective knowledge is possible, at least as an ideal.
Religion, however, involves a personal relationship with the object known (God) and a personal or moral response
to him. Therefore, radical subjectivity characterizes religious endeavor. Or, to use Bubers well-known terminology,
science fosters an
I-it relationship between the knower and the known; religion, an
I-Thou relationship.
A group of early-twentieth-century philosophers known as logical positivists also insisted that science and
religion occupy separate and nonoverlapping domains, but for different reasons. According to the positivists, only
empirically verifiable (or logically undeniable) statements are meaningful. Since science makes statements about
observable material entities, its statements have meaning. Religious or metaphysical beliefs, however, refer to
unobservable entities such as God, morality, salvation, free will, and love. Hence, by positivistic definition, they
lack meaning. As Frederick Coppleston has explained, the principal tenet of positivism was that, since experience
alone provides the basis for knowledge,
the scientific method was the only means of acquiring anything that could
be called knowledge (Coppleston 1985, 11718). Hence, positivism not only distinguishes between science and
religion, but it does so on grounds that deny objective warrant to religious belief.
Models of Interaction: Defining the Issues
Contemporary philosophers of science and religion generally recognize that science and religion do
represent two distinct types of human activity or endeavor. Most acknowledge that they require different activities of
their practitioners, have different goals, and ultimately have different objects of interest, study, or worship. For these
reasons, some have suggested that science and religion occupy either completely separate
compartments or
complementary but nonoverlapping domains of discourse and concern. These perspectives have been formalized
as two models of science-religion interaction known, respectively, as compartmentalism and complementarity.
Compartmentalism (associated with Barth, Kierkegaard, and positivists) asserts that science and religion inevitably
offer different types of descriptions of different types of realities. Complementarity (as articulated principally by
neuroscientist Donald M.Mackay in the 1970s) allows that science and religion may sometimes speak about the
same realities but insists that the two always describe reality in categorically different but complementary ways (that
is, with so-called
incommensurable languages). Both of these models deny the possibility of either conflict or
specific agreement between science and religion. Science, properly understood, can neither support nor undermine
religion since the two represent distinct and nonintersecting planes of experience and knowledge. Both
complementarity and compartmentalism thus presuppose the metaphysical or religious neutrality of all scientific
theories.
Contemporary philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga, Roy Clouser, and J.P.Moreland have questioned the
strict separation of science and religion. They point out that it does not follow from the real differences between
them that science and religion must differ qualitatively in every respect. Thus, philosophers have noted that religions
as well as sciences make truth claims. Moreover, science and religion often seem, at least, to make claims about the
same subject in clear prepositional language. For example, both make claims about the origin and nature of the
cosmos, the origin of life, and the origin of man; both make claims about the nature of human beings, the history of
certain human cultures, and the nature of religious experience. Religions, like sciences, may be right or wrong about
these subjects, but few contemporary philosophers of science (though not necessarily theologians or scientists) now
agree that science and religion never make intersecting truth claims. Historical religions in particular (such as
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) make specific claims about events in time and space that may either contradict or
agree with particular scientific theories. Indeed, as Plantinga has argued, many (though not all) scientific theories
have metaphysical and religious implications. Plantinga cites several examples of scientific theories, which, if taken
as claims about truth rather than merely as instrumental devices for ordering experience or generating hypotheses,
have clear metaphysical import. He notes that various cosmological explanations for the fine-tuning of the physical
constants (the so-called
anthropic coincidences) either support or deny a theistic conclusion; that sociobiology and
theism give radically different accounts of human altruism; and that neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, contra
theism, denies any detectable design or purpose in creation. On this latter score, many evolutionary biologists agree
with Plantingas assessment. Francisco Ayala, Stephen Jay Gould, William Provine, Douglas Futuyma, Richard
Dawkins, Richard Lewontin, and the late G.G. Simpson, for example, all agree that neo-Darwinism (taken as a
realistic portrayal of the history of life) postulates an exclusively naturalistic mechanism of creation, one that allows
no role for a directing intelligence. As Simpson put it: m
an is the result of a purposeless and natural process that
did not have him in mind (Simpson 1967, 3445). In any case, these theories deny, contra classical theism, any
discernable evidence of divine purpose, direction, or design in the biological realm. From a Darwinian point of view,
any appearance of design in biology is illusory, not real. Thus, even if God exists, his existence is not manifest in the
products of nature. As Francisco Ayala has explained: T
he functional design of organisms and their features
wouldseem to argue for the existence of a designer. It was Darwins greatest accomplishment to show [however]
that the directive organization of living beings can be explained as the result of a natural process, natural selection,
without any need to resort to a Creator or other external agent (Ayala 1994, 45). As Richard Lewontin and many
other leading neo-Darwinists have noted, organisms only a
ppear to have been designed. Statements such as these
clearly illustrate why attempts to impose a strict separation between science and metaphysics or science and religion
have been increasingly questioned.
Where scientific theories and religious doctrines are taken as truth claims (as both scientists and religious
believers usually require), some sci entific theories may be taken as either supporting or contradicting religious
doctrines. Indeed, many would argue that there is no reason to exclude the possibility that some truth claims of
religion may be evaluated rationally on the basis of public evidences. Several of the examples cited above suggest
that scientific discoveries or theories may well contradict religious doctrines. Other examples suggest the possibility
that science may also provide support for the truth claims of religion. Archaeological evidence may support biblical
assertions about the history of Israel or early Christianity; cosmological or biological evidence may support various
theological conceptions of creation; and neurophysiological or psychological evidence may support religiously
derived understandings of consciousness and human nature. While many religious practitioners would acknowledge
with Earth and Buber that religious commitment requires more than intellectual assent to doctrinal propositions, it
does not follow that the prepositional truth claims of religion may not have an evidential or rational basis. Hence,
recent work on the relationship between science and religion has suggested limits to the complementarity and
compartmentalism models. While most philosophers of science and religion would agree that compartmentalism and
complementarity model some aspects of the relationship between science and religion accurately, many now assert
that these models do not capture the whole of the complex relationship between science and religion. Real conflict
and real agreement between scientific and religious truth claims has occurred and is possible. Theories of science
may not always be religiously or metaphysically neutral. Yet, contemporary defenders of the complementary model
contend that the alleged metaphysical implications of scientific theories represent illicit or unsupported extensions of
scientific theory, not the science itself. They assert that statements such as those cited above about the meaning of
Darwinism, for example, do not represent science per se, but
para-scientific reflection about science or a
pseudoscientific
apologetic for philosophical naturalism. Such reflection may reveal the metaphysical
predilections of scientists (for example, Gould or Simpson), but it does not demonstrate any real metaphysical
implications of science.
Those critical of compleme tarity agree that Ayalas and Simpsons statements do reflect metaphysical
biases and that these statements may lack empirical support. Yet, for them it does not follow that either Goulds or
Simpsons articulation of Darwinism is inaccurate. Nor does it follow that Darwinism does not constitute a scientific
theory. Many scientific theories reflect the biases of scientific theorists. Some are inadequately
supported or fallible. Does that mean that they are necessarily unscientific? This discussion begs a more
fundamental question. Can scientific theories have metaphysical implications? If not, why not? Could Darwin, for
example, formulate a scientific theory specifying that life arose as a result of exclusively naturalistic forces such as
natural selection and random variation? Could he, as a scientist, deny that divine guidance played a causal role in the
process by which new species are created? Many historians of science now agree that Darwin meant to exclude a
causal role for God in his theory of evolution. They also agree that competing theories implied just the opposite. Is
Darwinism, then, unscientific? Indeed, was all nineteenth-century biology prior to Darwin unscientific? If so, on
what grounds? What exactly is science?
History of the Demarcation Issue
Such questions lead inevitably to the center of one of the most vexing issues in the philosophy of science,
namely, the demarcation issue. Identifying scientific theories or truth claims and distinguishing them from religious
or metaphysical truth claims (as opposed to religious practices or rituals) seems to require a set of criteria for
defining science. But what exactly makes a theory scientific? And how can scientific theories be distinguished or
demarcated from pseudoscientific theories, metaphysical theories, or religious beliefs? Indeed, should they be? In a
seminal essay,
The Demise of the Demarcation Problem (Laudan 1988a, 33750), Larry Laudan explains that
contemporary philosophers of science have generally lost patience with attempts to distinguish scientific theories
from nonscientific theories. Demarcation criteria (criteria that purport to distinguish true science from
pseudoscience, metaphysics, and religion) have inevitably fallen prey to death by a thousand counter-examples.
Many theories that have been repudiated on evidentiary grounds express the very epistemic and methodological
virtues (for example, testability, falsifiability, repeatability, and observability) that have been alleged to characterize
true science. By contrast, some highly esteemed theories lack one or more of the allegedly necessary features of
science. Laudan notes that, following Aristotle, science was first distinguished from nonscience by the degree of
certainty associated with scientific knowledge. Science, it was thought, could be distinguished from nonscience
because science produced certain knowledge (episteme), whereas other types of inquiry, such as philosophy or
theology, produced opinion (doxa). Yet, this approach to demarcation ran into difficulties. Unlike mathematicians,
scientists rarely provided strict logical demonstrations (deductive proofs) to justify their theories. Instead, scientific
arguments often utilized inductive inference and predictive testing, neither of which produced certainty. Moreover,
these limitations were clearly understood by philosophers and scientists by the late Middle Ages. For example,
William of Ockham (c. 1280c. 1349) and Duns Scotus (c. 1265c. 1308) specifically refined Aristotelian inductive
logic in order to diminish (but not eliminate) the fallibility known to be associated with induction. Further, as Owen
Gingerich has argued, some of the reason for Galileos conflict with the Roman Catholic Church stemmed from his
inability to meet scholastic standards of deductive certainty, standards that he regarded as neither relevant to, nor
attainable by, scientific reasoning.
By the late Middle Ages, and certainly during the scientific revolution, scientists and philosophers
understood that scientific knowledge, like other knowledge, is subject to uncertainty. Hence, attempts to distinguish
science from nonscience began to change. No longer did demarcationists attempt to characterize science on the basis
of the superior epistemic status of scientific theories; rather they attempted to do so on the basis of the superior
methods science employed to produce theories. Science came to be defined by reference to its method, not its
certainty or its content. This approach also encountered difficulties, not the least of which was the consistent
presence of disagreement about what the method of science actually entails. During the seventeenth century, the
socalled mechanical philosophers insisted, contrary to Aristotelians, that scientific theories must provide
mechanistic explanations. Yet, Isaac Newton (16421727) formulated a theory that provided no such mechanistic
explanation. Instead, his theory of universal gravitation described mathematically, but did not explain, the
gravitational motion of the planetary bodies. Despite provocation from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (16461716),
who defended the mechanistic ideal, Newton expressly refused to give any explanation for the mysterious
action at
a distance associated with his theory of gravitational attraction. Similar debates about scientific method occurred
during the nineteenth century. Some scientists and philosophers regarded the inductive procedures of John Stuart
Mill (180673) and William Herschel (1738 1822) as representative of the true scientific method. Others
articulated the so-called vera causa ideal, which limited science to previously known or observable causes. Still
others, such as C.S.Peirce (1839 1914) and William Whewell (17941866), insisted that predictive success
constituted the most important hallmark of true science, whether or not theoretical entities could be observed
directly. Yet, Peirce and Whewell also acknowledged that explanatory power, as opposed to predictive success,
characterized scientific theorizing in some contexts. Such lack of agreement brought havoc upon the demarcationist
enterprise. If scientists and philosophers cannot agree about what the scientific method is, how can they distinguish
science from disciplines that fail to use it? In any case, there may well be more than one scientific method.
Historical sciences, for example, use distinctive types of explanations, inferences, and modes of testing. If more than
one scientific method exists, then attempts to mark off science from nonscience by using a single set of
methodological criteria will almost inevitably fail. As problems with using methodological considerations grew, the
demarcationist enterprise again shifted ground. Beginning in the 1920s, philosophy of science took a linguistic, or
semantic, turn.
The logicalpositivist tradition held that scientific theories could be distinguished from nonscientific theories
not because scientific theories had been produced via unique or superior methods, but because such theories
were more meaningful. Logical positivists asserted that all meaningful statements are either empirically verifiable or
logically undeniable. According to this v
erificationist criterion of meaning, scientific theories were more
meaningful than philosophical or religious ideas because scientific theories referred to observable entities, whereas
philosophy and religion referred to unobservable entities. This approach also subtly implied the inferior status of
metaphysical beliefs. Yet, positivism eventually self-destructed. Philosophers came to realize that positivism could
not meet its own verificationist criterion of meaning: The verificationist criterion turned out to be neither empirically
veri fiable nor logically undeniable. Furthermore, positivism misrepresented much actual scientific practice.
Scientific theories refer to unverifiable and unobservable entities such as forces, fields, atoms, quarks, and universal
laws. Meanwhile, many disreputable theories (for example, the flat-Earth theory) appeal only to
common sense
observations. Clearly, positivisms verifiability criterion would not achieve the demarcation for which philosophers
of science had hoped. With the demise of positivism, demarcationists took a different tack. Karl Popper (190294)
proposed falsifiability as a demarcation criterion. According to Popper, scientific theories can be distinguished from
metaphysical theories because scientific theories can be falsified (as opposed to verified) by prediction and
observation, whereas metaphysical theories cannot. Yet, this, too, proved to be a problematic criterion. First,
falsification turns out to be difficult to achieve. Rarely are the core commitments of scientific theories directly tested
via prediction. Instead, predictions occur when core theoretical commitments are conjoined with auxiliary
hypotheses (hence, always leaving open the possibility that auxiliary hypotheses, not core commitments, are
responsible for failed predictions). Newtonian mechanics, for example, assumed as its core three laws of motion and
the theory of universal gravitation. On the basis of these assumptions, Newton made a number of predictions about
the positions of planets in the solar system. When observations failed to corroborate Newtons predictions, he did
not reject his core assumptions. Rather, he altered some of his auxiliary hypotheses to explain the discrepancies
between theory and observation. For example, he force. As Imre Lakatosh has shown, Newtons refusal to repudiate
the core of his theory even in the face of anomalies enabled him to refine his theory and eventually led to its
tremendous success (Lakatosh 1970, 18995). The explanatory flexibility of Newtons theory did not function to
confirm its n
onscientific status, as the Popperian demarcation criterion would imply.
Studies in the history of science have shown the falsificationist ideal to be simplistic. The role of auxiliary
hypotheses makes many scientific theories, including those in the so-called hard sciences, difficult, if not
impossible, to falsify conclusively on the basis of one failed prediction or anomaly. Yet, some theories (for example,
of flat Earth, phlogiston, and heliocentrism) have been eventually falsified in practice by the judgment of the
scientific community regarding the preponderance of data. This fact raises a difficult question for demarcationists.
Since the theories of phlogiston and a flat Earth have been overwhelmingly falsified, they must be falsifiable and,
therefore, scientific. Are such falsified theories more scientific than currently successful theories that have the
flexibility to avoid falsification by a single anomaly? Is a demonstrably false theory more scientific than one that has
wide explanatory power and may well be true? Further, Laudan shows that it is absurdly easy to specify some
prediction, any prediction, that, if false, would count as a conclusive test against a theory (Laudan 1988b, 354).
Astrologers and phrenologists can do it as easily as, indeed, astronomers and physiologists. Such contradictions have
plagued the demarcationist enterprise from its inception. As a result, most contemporary philosophers of science
regard the question,
What methods distinguish science from nonscience? as both intractable and uninteresting.
What, after all, is in a name? Certainly not automatic epistemic warrant or authority. Increasingly, then, philosophers
of science have realized that the real issue is not whether a theory is scientific, but whether a theory is true or
warranted by the evidence. Hence, as philosopher Martin Eger has summarized it:
[d]emarcation arguments have
collapsed. Philosophers of science dont hold them anymore. They may still enjoy acceptance in the popular world,
but thats a different world. Or, as Laudan expresses it:
If we could stand up on the side of reason, we ought to
drop terms like pseudo-sciencethey do only emotive work for us (Laudan 1988a, 349).
Demarcation Arguments in the Creation-Evolution Debate
Despite the rejection of demarcation criteria by philosophers of science, these criteria continue to be
employed in various ideologically charged scientific debates. Perhaps the most dramatic example has occurred in the
so-called creation-evolution debate. Both sides have asserted that theories espoused by the other depart from
established canons of the scientific method. Creationists such as Duane Gish and no less a personage than Karl
Popper himself have referred to Darwinian evolutionary theory as an unscientific m
etaphysical research program
(Popper 1988, 145). For their part, defenders of evolution have employed these same tactics to discredit any
possibility of a scientific theory of creation and to exclude the teaching of creationist interpretations of biological
evidence in U.S. public high schools. In 198182, during the Arkansas trial over the legitimacy of teaching
creation
science, the Darwinist philosopher of science Michael Ruse cited five demarcation criteria as the basis for
excluding any creationist theory from public education. According to Ruse, for a theory to be scientific it must be
(1) guided by natural law, (2) explanatory by natural law, (3) testable against the empirical world, (4) tentative, and
(5) falsifiable. Ruse testified that creationism, with its willingness to invoke divine action as a cause of certain
events in the history of life, could never meet these criteria. He concluded that creationism might be true but that it
could never qualify as science. Presiding Judge William Overton agreed, ruling in favor of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), at whose behest Ruse had testified, and citing Ruses five demarcation criteria in his
ruling.
After the trial, some philosophers of science, including Larry Laudan and Philip Quinn (neither of whom
supported creationisms empirical claims), repudiated Ruses testimony as either ill-informed about the status of the
demarcation problem or disingenuous. Both argued that Ruses criteria could not distinguish the a priori scientific
status of creationist and evolutionary theory. They insisted that only specific empirical, as opposed to
methodological, arguments could accomplish this. Indeed, upon further examination, Ruses demarcation criteria
have proven problematic, especially as applied to the debate about biological origins. For example, insofar as both
creationist and evolutionary theories constitute historical theories about past causal events, neither explains
exclusively by reference to natural law. The theory of common descent, arguably the central thesis of Darwins
Origin of Species (1859), does not explain by natural law. Common descent does so by postulating a hypothetical
pattern of historical events that, if actual, would account for a variety of currently observed data. In the fifth chapter
of the Origin, Darwin (180982) himself refers to common descent as the vera causa (the actual cause or
explanation) of a diverse set of biological observations. In Darwins theory of common descent, as in historical
theories generally, postulated causal events (or patterns thereof) do the explanatory work. Laws do not. Hence,
Ruses second demarcation criterion, if applied consistently, would require classifying both creationist theory and
the Darwinian theory of common descent as unscientific. Similar problems have afflicted Ruses remaining
demarcation criteria. Theories about the past rarely employ the exclusively predictive methods of testing required by
Poppers falsifiability criterion. Theories of origins generally make assertions about what happened in the past to
cause present features of the universe to arise. Such theories necessarily attempt to reconstruct unobservable past
causal events from present clues or evidences. Methods of testing that depend upon the prediction of novel or future
events have minimal relevance to historical theories of whatever type. Those who insist that testing must involve
prediction, rather than compare the explanatory power of competing theories, will find little that is scientific in any
origins theory, evolutionary or otherwise. Analyses of the other demarcation criteria articulated by Ruse have shown
them similarly incapable of discriminating the a priori scientific status of creationist and evolutionary theories.
Accordingly, during a talk before the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in 1993, Ruse
repudiated his previous support for the demarcation principle by admitting that Darwinism (like creationism)
inference to the best explanation is widely employed not only in science, but also in historical, philosophical, and
religious discourse. Such work seems to imply that knowledge is not as easily classified on methodological or
epistemological grounds as compart-mentalists and demarcationists once assumed. Empirical data may have
metaphysical implications, while unob servable (even metaphysical) entities may serve to explain observable data or
their origins. More recent work on the methods of the historical sciences has suggested that the methodological and
logical similarity between various origins theories (in particular) runs quite deep. Philosopher of biology Elliot
Sober has argued that both classical creationistic design arguments and the Darwinian argument for descent with
modification constitute attempts to make retrodictive inferences to the best explanation. Other work in the
philosophy of science has shown that both creationist and evolutionary programs of research attempt to answer
characteristically historical questions; both may have metaphysical implications or overtones; both employ
characteristically historical forms of inference, explanation, and testing; and, finally, both are subject to similar
epistemological limitations. Hence, theories of creation or in
telligent design and naturalistic evolutionary theories
appear to be what one author has termed m
ethodologically equivalent. Both prove equally scientific or equally
unscientific provided the same criteria are used to adjudicate their scientific status (provided that metaphysically
neutral criteria are used to make such assessments). These two theories may not, of course, be equivalent in their
ability to explain particular empirical data, but that is an issue that must be explored elsewhere.
Science deals with an external reality, usually taken for nature, writ large, that is equivalent to the totality
of material things or the physical universe. Such a nature, or universe, has been taken either for an entity not to be
reduced to something else or for something essentially dependent for its existence on a supernatural factor, usually
called God. Viewing nature as a self-explaining entity can translate itself into either a materialistic or a pantheistic
ideology. In the former, spiritual experiences are taken to be the result of the processes of matter. In pantheistic
theology, both nature and mind (spirit) are considered to be manifestations of some divine principle, which pervades
all nature but is ultimately not different from it. The view that nature depends on God can be either theistic or
deistic. In theism (essentially Christian theism in the Western world), God is not only the Creator, but also the
Sustainer, who can interfere with nature by, say, working miracles in support of an information (revelation), which
is superadded to what man can deduce about God from a philosophical reflection on nature. In deism, God is
thought to have removed himself from natures workings and from human affairs after the moment of creation.
All of these ideological trends have one thing in common: They assume that nature is ordered and that the
human mind is capable of tracing out that order. One could, therefore, try to unfold on an analytical basis the
respective impacts of those various religious ideologies on the scientific enterprise. However, such an approach
would, at almost every step, imply historical considerations about science, and all the more so as science has only
gradually revealed itself as a strictly quantitative study of things in motion. It may, therefore, seem more logical to
specify, from the start, those impacts in their historical context, because pantheism, theism, deism, and materialism
represent also a historical sequence. This sequence is not essentially affected by the fact that the Greeks, who are
usually credited with the dawn of scientific thinking in the West, showed markedly materialistic tendencies.
Although among the statements attributed to the Ionians, who stood at the beginning of Greek philosophical and
scientific speculation, one finds remarks about nature as being full of gods, they usually put the emphasis on the
exclusive role of matter and motion. That trend was even more marked in the case of Anaxagoras (fifth century
B.C.) and the atomists.
It was in reaction to that dehumanizing trend that Socrates (469399 B.C.) proposed the animation of all
matter so that a defense of the existence of an immortal human soul (anima) could be argued. According to Socrates,
all parts of matter move in order to achieve what is
best for them, in strict analogy to mans striving for what is
best for him. Such was Socratess way of
saving the purpose, no matter what was the object of inquiry. In the
concluding sections of his Phaedo, Plato (c. 427347 B.C.) gives some glimpses of that new physics. Plato goes into
details in the third part of his Timaeus, in which the living human body serves as the explanation of the physical
world. This third part, largely neglected by Platos interpreters, stands in marked contrast with the first part, in
which Plato sets up a geometrical explanation of matter in terms of the five perfect geometrical bodies. The contrast
is between two principles. One is called by Plato the principle of sav
ing the phenomena, or a science that is
confined to the task of correlating purely quantitative data about things. The other is the Socratic program, which is
left unnamed but which best deserves the label
saving the purpose.
Greek Pantheism
The full articulation of a new program for science, within which the concept of organism was the chief
explanatory device, is contained in Aristotles (384322 B.C.) On the Heavens and Meteorologica, of which the first
deals with celestial, and the second with atmospheric and terrestrial, physics. They do not contain, to recall a remark
of E.T.Whittaker, a single acceptable page from the modern scientific viewpoint. This
scientific debacle is the
result of Aristotles assumption of the radical animation of all nonliving matter, as initiated by Socrates, who
claimed that mans soul (anima) is best manifested by his purposeful actions aiming at what is best for him. It was,
however, in the writings of Aristotle that this trend of attributing a
soul to everything was given a sweeping
theological twist in a pantheistic sense. Since Aristotle deified the universe in that sense, he had to deny that the
universe could have been created out of nothing. Consistent with this denial, he also rejected the view that the actual
universe was only one of the infinitely many possibilities for physical existence.
The Prime Mover of Aristotle is a part, however subtly, of the sphere of the fixed stars, which obtains its motion
through an emotive contact with the Prime Mover and directly shares, therefore, in its
divine nature. This sharing
is the source of all other motions in the Aristotelian universe, in both its superlunary and its sublunary parts. In both
parts, things are animated to move naturally in order to achieve their purpose by reaching their natural places. This
animation of nature, in a more or less pantheistic sense, which discouraged a quantitative (or geometrical) approach
to nature, is everywhere noticeable in the discourse of post-Aristotelian Greek thinkers, especially when their extant
writings are sufficiently extensive. It should seem significant that not even the non-Aristotelians among the ancients
took issue with Aristotles patently wrong statement (On the Heavens 1.6) that the rate of fall is proportional to the
mass of the body, a statement that logically follows from his
animation of nature. The scientifically valuable (that
is, quantitatively correct) achievements in Greek science seem to have been worked out mostly in isolation from
broader views of nature. Among them are Eratostheness (c. 275 194 B.C.) geometrical method to ascertain the size
of the earth and a similarly geometrical method by Aristarchus of Samos (c. 215c. 145 B.C.) to deduce the
dimensions of the earth-moon-sun system. These achievements form an indispensable basis on which all subsequent
science rests. They made possible the Ptolemaic system as the culmination of Greek efforts, at the instigation of
Plato,
to save the phenomena. This phrase expressed the methodological conviction that the complex and variable
planetary motions could be reduced to, and explained by, a simple and harmonious geometrical model. Still, when
the extant corpus is fairly large, one cannot help noticing the intrusion of traces of the Aristotelian, and at times
worse, forms of animization into scientific discourse. There are traces of it even in the Almagest of Ptolemy of
Alexandria (second century A.D.). His astrological compendium, Tetrabiblos, remains the
Bible of that animistic
preoccupation. In his
physical astronomy, a work on planetary hypotheses, Ptolemy considers the coordination of
planets in terms of human beings. Only Archimedess (c. 287212 B.C.) writings do not show any trace of this
animization of nature.
The ancient Greeks certainly recognized something of the nonideological character of quantitative
considerations about nature, but, owing to the pervasive presence of pantheistic considerations, they failed o make
the most of that character. The pantheistic conviction that the superlunary matter is divine prompted opposition to
Anaxagorass idea that a large meteor, which hit Aegospotami in 421 B.C., could come from above the moons
orbit. The pantheistic animation of the world also lurked behind the opposition to the heliocentric system proposed
by Aristarchus of Samos. In pantheism, the human mind is in particular a sharer in the divine principle. Therefore,
pantheism encourages the idea that the human mind has some innate insights into the overall structure and workings
of nature. This idea fosters an a priori approach, as opposed to an a posteriori, or partly experimental and
observational, approach. This is particularly clear in the case of Aristotles dicta on the physical world. This
aprioristic influence could be harmless when the subject matter of investigation was rather restricted. There is no
trace of pantheism in Aristotles valuable observational researches in biology. Of course, there the subject matter
consisted of living organisms that, in all appearance, acted for a purpose, and, therefore, there was no special need to
fall back on the broader perspective of a pantheistically colored animation of nature. The animation of nature
exerted its unscientific impact with particular force in respect to the study of motion. First, it was asserted that since
only the superlunary region was totally divine, matter in that realm obeyed laws of motion different from those of
ordinary, or sublunary, matter. Moreover, this dichotomy between superlunary and sublunary matter implied that the
latter was not truly ordered in its motions and interactions. Again, it was one thing to predict planetary positions; it
was another to work out a physics of the motion of planets together with the motion of bodies on the earth. Here
pantheism, as codified by Aristotle, blocked any meaningful advance. For, in Aristotles system, the motion of
planets (and even of things on the earth) was but a derivative of the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars, which,
in turn, had its source in a continuous contact, however refined, with the Prime Mover. And since the source of all
motion was thought to reside in that kind of contact between the Mover and the moved, the logic of that starting
point demanded that all motion be explained as a continuous contact between the Mover and the moved. This,
however, meant a rejection of the idea of inertial motion, which, as will be seen, proved to be indispensable for the
eventual birth of a science that could deal with that most universal aspect of inanimate material things, which is their
being in motion. Greek science, with its major achievements and stunning failures, represents a tantalizing case of
the most crucial, and most neglected, aspect of the history of premodern science. That aspect consists of the
invariable failure of all major ancient cultures to make a breakthrough toward the science of motion. The ultimate
root of that systematic failure is theological, a point that will stand out sharply when we turn to the impact that
theism had on science. That theism was Christian theism.
Christian Theism
The possibilities that a theistic conviction could hold for science first appeared in the writings of
Athanasius (c. A.D. 296373), a resolute defender of the strict divinity of the Logos (Christ), through whom God the
Father created all. If, however, the Logos was divine, its work had to be fully logical or ordered and harmonious.
This theological insistence on full rationality in the created realm inspired Augustine of Hippo (354430) to lay
down the principle that, if conclusions that science safely established about the physical world contradicted certain
biblical passages, the latter should be reinterpreted accordingly. This is not to say that this principle quickly or
invariably found a praiseworthy implementation among Christian thinkers. But it acted as part of a broader
perception within Christian theism wherever serious attention was paid to Pauls insistence that Christians should
offer a well-reasoned worship (Romans 12:1). Hence, the rights of scientific reasoning were protected whenever the
rationality of faith was defended against various champions of fideism or against the claim that faith in a
supernatural mystery is the condition for the understanding of this or that plainly philosophical proposition.
More generic, though very powerful and still to be fully aired, was the impact that the Christian doctrine of the
Incarnation had. According to that doctrine, a real human being, Jesus Christ, was the
only begotten Son of God,
in the sense of possessing a truly divine status. For those adhering to that doctrine, it was impossible to embrace the
tenet, popular among Greek as well as Roman authors, that the universe was the
only begotten emanation from the
divine principle. Hence, Christian theism contained a built-in antidote against the ever-present lure of nature worship
or pantheism. Apart from these general principles, Christian theism also showed its potential usefulness for science
in some particular matters, as can be seen in the writings of John Philoponus (d. c. 570). He was the first to argue
that, since stars shine in different colors, they should be composed of ordinary matter. The argument had for its
target the divine status ascribed throughout pagan antiquity to the heavens, a status that introduced a dichotomy in
the physical universe and thereby set a limit to considering scientific laws as being truly universal.
The crucial impact of Christian theism on science came during the intellectual ferment brought about by the
introduction of Aristotles works to the medieval educational system during the latter part of the thirteenth century.
Whatever the medieval enthusiasm for Aristotle, his pantheistic doctrine of the eternity and uncreated character of
the world was uniformly opposed from the start as irreconcilable with the basic tenets of Christian theism. With
John Buridan (c. 1295c. 1358), the opposition took on a scientific aspect as well. For if it was true that the world,
with its motions, had a beginning, then one could logically search for the mannerthe how?in which that
beginning could be conceptualized. Buridan explained that how? was an eminently scientific question by saying that,
in the first moment of creation, God imparted a certain quantity of impetus (or momentum, as it was called later) to
all celestial bodies, which quantity they keep undiminished because they move in an area where there is no friction.
Such a motion, insofar as it implied a physical separation between the Mover and the things moved, is the very core
of the idea of inertial motion, to employ a term to be used later.
In the context of his commentaries on Aristotles On the Heavens, Buridan carefully notes that
inertial motion,
insofar as it is a physical reality, does not mean absolute independence of things from the Creator. Anything, once
created, remains in existence only through the Creators general support, which is, however, distinct from the act of
creation. In other words, Buridan is not a forerunner of deism. In deism, there is no room for such a support.
Buridans notion of a created world implies, in a genuinely Christian vein, the worlds utter, continuous dependence
on the Creator. The depth of createdness reveals, in turn, a Creator so superior to his creation that he can give his
creation a measure of autonomy without any loss to his absolute and infinite supremacy. Similar is the theological
background of Oresme (c. 132082), Buridans successor at the Sorbonne, who looked at the world as a clockwork.
While the world had already in ancient times been referred to as a clockwork, Oresme used that concept with an
important theological surplus. This is why Oresmes clockwork universe is not an anticipation of Voltaires and
other eighteenth-century deists celebration of the idea of a clockwork universe.
Buridans step can be seen rather as an anticipation of the Cartesian or Newtonian idea of inertial motion as long as
one focuses on that steps very essence. It lies deeper than the difference between a circular and a rectilinear motion.
There is no question that Buridan retained the Aristotelian idea of a naturally circular motion for the
celestial bodies. But he broke with Aristotle on the truly essential pointnamely, that celestial motions were not
caused by those bodies remaining in a quasi-physical contact with the divine power. This represented the crucial
breakthrough toward the Cartesian formulation of linear inertia and of its incorporation into Newtons laws of
motion. That Buridans and Oresmes teaching about motion was a genuine product of their Christian theistic
thinking is shown by the eagerness with which it was espoused in the fast-growing late-medieval and earlyRenaissance university system. Buridans and Oresmes doctrine was carried by their many students at the Sorbonne
to the far corners of Europe. Among the many universities with copies of Buridans commentaries was Cracow in
Poland. It was there that Copernicus (14731543) learned a doctrine that sustained him in his efforts to cope with
the dynamic problems created by the earths motion in his system. With his vast articulation of the heliocentric
system, Copernicus forced the physics of motion to the center of scientific attention. There was, of course, plenty of
room to improve on the medieval doctrine of impetus, but only because that doctrine opened the way for meaningful
advances toward a fully developed science of motion, which came only with Isaac Newtons Principia. One cannot
overestimate the support that Christian theism afforded Copernicus and the major early Copernicans, especially
Johannes Kepler (15711630). It was becoming increasingly clear that data of measurements were to have the last
word concerning the structure and measure of the physical world. While the rhapsodically pantheistic Giordano
Bruno (15481600) merely promoted confusion, Baruch Spinoza (163277) was so consistent with his pantheism as
to be unable to explain why there had to be finite things, if everything was part of the infinite God.
Separating Science and Religion
Nothing showed so much the methodological independence of a fully fledged science from theology as the
complete absence of any reference to God in the first edition of Newtons Principia (1687). Newton (1642 1727)
contradicted that independence when he invoked, in the General Scholium that he added to the second edition of the
Principia (1713), the Pantokrator as the all-powerful, infinitely dynamic Creator described in the Bible. Moreover,
that Pantokrator is pictured as intervening periodically in the workings of the solar system so that it may stay in
equilibrium. The opposition of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 1716), a convinced Christian, to belief in Gods
periodic interventions in nature created a celebrated dispute that distracted from the influence of the Principia in
respect to the relation of religion (be it pantheism, deism, or theism) to science. While a theist may take comfort
from the fact that the author of the Principia was a genuine theist, there is nothing in that work that could not be
equally useful and valid within any religious or nonreligious framework. This is so because the Principia, to quote
its full title, is an exposition of the
mathematical principles of natural philosophy (emphasis added). This means
that, as long as exact science is a quantitative study of the quantitative aspects of things in motion, it enjoys a full
independence from all ideological, religious, and theological perspectives. And this holds true in respect both to the
formulation of a major scientific theory and to its subsequent interpretation. Hence, the relation of pantheism,
theism, and deism to science is a matter that is essentially different in its status before and after Newtons Principia.
Before the appearance of that work, which preceded the robust emergence of deism in the Western world,
pantheism and theism could play their respectively inhibitory and creative roles in science. After the Principia, exact
science had a broadly articulated mathematical, or quantitative, structure that safely operated within its own set of
methodical canons and retained a very large measure of independence from participating scientists religious or
antireligious motivations.
This was not fully understood during the eighteenth century, and certainly not by deists, who claimed to
have a better perspective on science because of their freedom from the fetters of Christian dogma. No deist of the
eighteenth century is known to have spurred a major advance in the physical sciences. Voltaire (1694 1778) was at
best a popularizer of Newtonianism. Nor could he live easily with the proverbial piety of Leonhard Euler (170783),
to whom goes the credit of unfolding a great many consequences of Newtons physics. Whatever Pierre Laplaces
(17491827) personal philosophies (he changed them as a weathervane turns with the prevailing political winds), his
claim that his cosmogonic theory did not need God as a hypothesis expressed concisely the true character of the
mathematical investigation of matter in motion. It was enough for the physicist to assume, as a matter of
commonsense truth, that matter and motion existed and were measurable. Hence, after the Principia, the religious or
antireligious interpretations of science could touch only on the philosophies spun around an essentially quantitative,
or mathematical, core. That core rested on Newtons three laws of motion, a point that is true regardless of the extent
to which science increasingly dealt with mere energy transfers, as was especially the case with modern atomic and
subatomic physics. Whether in classical or quantum mechanics, energy, it is well to recall, is but the work done by
force over a given amount of distance.
In other branches of empirical science, one can observe an ever stronger tendency to achieve a degree of
exactness comparable to that obtained in physics. This tendency has almost completely triumphed in chemistry, at
least in the sense that only the complexity of many processes sets practical limits to it. The rise and flourishing of
biophysics and biochemistry witness the same trend in biology, whatever the merits of the claim that the art of
classification remains indispensable. It should, however, be noted that, even in that art, quantitative considerations
have remained implicit. Such a classification is still of paramount importance in evolutionary theory, Darwinian or
other. In Charles Darwins (180982) case, materialistic motivations came to play a major part in his having worked
with dogged resolve, over thirty years, on what became Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man (1871). It
should be noted that Alfred R.Wallace (18231913), who was a theist, could formulate the same theory but that he
rejected, in terms of the theory, Darwins derivation of the human mind as a mere random product of biological
processes. For it still contradicts Darwinian logic to ascribe the growth of the brain to the needs of a mind that is still
to manifest itself through language.
Darwins theory owed its success to two factors, very different from each other. One was a unified picture
of material nature (nonliving and living), which prompted a vast amount of research with, at times, spectacular
results. This is a point to be genuinely appreciated by many theists, who might find in their very belief in a rational
Creator the chief motivation in espousing evolutionary theory. Theists have, of course, some excuse for dragging
their feet in the other factor that assured so much popularity to Darwins theory. That factor was materialism, within
which man is not subject to any transcendental reality, not even to a set of invariably valid ethical norms. This
materialistic interpretation of evolution has, however, no connection with any major advance in biology insofar as
the latter is carefully distinguished from the materialistic proclivities of the discoverers themselves. A case in point
is the unabashed materialism of Francis Crick (b. 1916) and James Watson (b. 1928), codiscoverers of the doublehelix structure of DNA molecules. The more a scientific proposition or a branch of science is embedded in
mathematics, the clearer becomes its ideological independence and neutrality. This facet of science is the standard
against which one can make a reliable appraisal of its interrelation with various forms of religious views and of the
perceived impact of these views on science. In light of this fact, generalizations such as that nineteenth-century
science was materialistic seem quite unfounded. While some of it was, of course, the majority of scientists during
that century still adhered to theism and, in fact, to Christian theism.
Genesis, the first book of the Bible, the authorship of which has been traditionally ascribed to the Hebrew
prophet Moses (who is variously dated to the fifteenth or the thirteenth century B.C.), constitutes the foundation text
of those biblical religions (Judaism and Christianity) that have deeply shaped Western culture. The relationship
between the first two chapters of Genesis, which describe Gods creation of the world and the first human beings
(Adam and Eve) in six days, and scientific knowledge has constituted one of the most important and controversial
sites of intersection between science and religion throughout the ages. Of particular concern has been the question of
how literally the account should be taken by those who accept its authority as divine revelation.
Some of the church Fathers christianized Greek natural philosophy, especially that of Plato (c. 427347 B.C.), in
their attempts to interpret the Genesis account of Creation. The fourth-century A.D. theologian Augustine of Hippo
(354430), for example, attempted to reconcile the Genesis notion that God created everything in the beginning with
the observation that living things grow and develop. Borrowing the Stoic idea that nature contains seedlike
principles, Augustine argued that God created many living things potentially rather than actually, in the form of
seminal principles that determined their subsequent development.
Some theologians in the early church saw layers of meaning in Genesis, which provided a space for scientific
theory, an interpretive tradition that continued during the Middle Ages. Commentators on the Hexameron (six days
of creation), such as Thierry of Chartres (c. 1100 c. 1156), restricted Gods supernatural intervention to the initial
act of Creation. Everything else, including Adam and Eve, appeared naturally, as the gradual unfolding of the
developmental principles that God had implanted in nature. The Dominican theologian Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225
74) argued that Genesis might be compatible with a variety of scientific theories. The firmament created on the
second day in Genesis 1:69, for example, might refer either to the sphere of the fixed stars or to that part of the
atmosphere in which clouds condense. Wary of tying the authority of Scripture too closely to changing scientific
knowledge, Aquinas left the options open. Protestants emphasized the plain meaning of Scripture during the
turbulent years following the Reformation, without reading Genesis as a scientific text. John Calvin (150964), for
example, argued that Moses wrote Genesis in a popular style for ordinary people, and he warned against treating it
as an authoritative source of astronomical (as opposed to religious) knowledge.
Until late in the seventeenth century, few scholars saw any compelling evidence against the view that
creation had occurred within the last six thousand years. In the mid-seventeenth century, the learned biblical scholar
James Ussher (15811656), archbishop of Armagh, calculated an exact date, 4004 B.C., which began to appear in
the margins of the Authorized or King James Version of the Bible beside Genesis 1:1. The view that the cosmos,
Earth, and Adam had been created almost simultaneously was challenged only by the occ sional freethinker, such as
Isaac de la Peyrre (15961676), a French Calvinist, who argued that humans had existed on Earth before Adam,
who was the first Jew, not the first man.
Toward the end of the seventeenth century, scholars began to stretch the initial creation back into the past. Thomas
Burnet (c. 16351715), an English clergyman, argued in Sacred Theory of the Earth (16809) that the cosmos had
been created long before the earth and its inhabitants. During the eighteenth century, a growing number of thinkers
began to suspect that the earth, too, had a history long predating the appearance of humans and that its origin might
be explained scientifically. Georges Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707 88), was perhaps the first seriously to
challenge the view that Earths history and human history were coextensive. The French astronomer Pierre Laplace
(17491827) argued in 1796 that a rotating nebula left behind rings that, cooling and condensing, became the planets
of our solar system. When asked by Napoleon about the role of God in his theory, Laplace replied:
Sire, I have no
need of that hypothesis. Some naturalists began to doubt whether the Deluge accounted for the entire fossil record.
In the work of the French zoologist Georges Cuvier (1769 1832), the Flood became simply one of a series of
dramatic natural events that periodically entombed living creatures in the rocks. By the early nineteenth century,
most naturalists had come to believe that the earth was extremely old and had been inhabited by a succession of
creatures, many of them now extinct, ages before Adam and Eve first appeared. Many opted for a local rather than a
universal Deluge. Liberal Protestants such as the geologist Charles Lyell (1797 1875) abandoned the attempt to
harmonize Genesis and geology in detail, finding in Genesis religious truths, such as Gods creation of all things, but
no science. Evangelical Christians preferred more conservative interpretations, such as the gap theory of Thomas
Chalmers (17801847), the Scottish Free Church scholar, who in 1814 proposed allowing a gap of indefinite
duration between the first two verses of Genesis, which provided unlimited time prior to the Creation week for
earlier creations and extinctions. Clerical geologists such as Edward Hitchcock (17931864) in the United States
popularized the gap theory, which influential fundamentalists such as C.I.Scofield (18431921), editor of the widely
circulated Scofield Reference Bible, disseminated in the twentieth century. A second interpretation popular among
evangelicals, the day-age theory, interpreted the days of Genesis not as twenty-four hour periods but as long
geological epochs. The Scottish geologist and Free Churchman Hugh Miller (180256) popularized this view in the
nineteenth century, as did Benjamin Silliman (17791864) of Yale University and James Dwight Dana (181395) in
the United States and Sir John William Dawson (182099) in Canada. American fundamentalists such as William
Jennings Bryan (18601925) transmitted it to the twentieth century.
The theory of evolution raised further problems in the second half of the nineteenth century. How could the
Genesis doctrine of the creation of humanity in the image of God be reconciled with the notion that humans had
evolved from apelike ancestors? On the left of the spectrum of opinion, a growing band of atheists, freethinkers, and
agnostics, such as Charles Darwin (1809 82) and T.H.Huxley (182595), dismissed Genesis as falsehood or
primitive religious superstition. This group shaded into a broad category of religious believers, including liberal
Protestants, Reform Jews, and a few Catholics, who were prepared to reinterpret Genesis in order to embrace
evolution. They argued that Genesis used the language of myth, symbol, or poetry to teach a few simple, profound
religious truths, such as Gods creation of humans in his image. Adam came to symbolize humanity in general, not a
real person. Some, such as the American Protestant minister Henry Ward Beecher (181387), eagerly abandoned
what he regarded as obnoxious traditional doctrines, such as the Fall and Original Sin (Genesis 3), for an optimistic
evolutionary anthropology, being confident of theability of humans to build the kingdom of God.
Orthodox believers, such as the Princeton Presbyterian theologian Benjamin B.Warfield (18511921) and some
Roman Catholics, argued that, though the human body might have evolved, the soul remained a supernatural
creation. Such thinkers accommodated evolution without drastically reinterpreting Genesis, though not all insisted
on a historical Adam. Some sanctified the old preadamite heresy to argue that nearhumans existed before Adam,
who was the first full human (that is, the first to be made in the image of God). Further to the right of the religious
spectrum, many continued to read Genesis literally. Ellen G.White (18271915), for example, the American
founder-prophetess of Seventh-day Adventism, declared that God had created Adam and Eve and all earthly life in
six days of twenty-four hours between about six and ten thousand years ago. George McCready Price (18701963),
an Adventist geologist, transmitted this view to the twentieth century and tried to give it scientific standing. The
views of Price, which became known as
creation science, reached a large audience in the pages of The Genesis
Flood (1961), a best-seller written by Henry Morris (b. 1918), an engineer, and John C.Whitcomb (b. 1924), a
theologian. By the 1980s, millions of evangelical Christians, particularly in the United States, believed that God had
created the earth, Adam, and Eve within the last ten thousand years and that Noahs Flood accounted for virtually
the entire fossil record.
As the creation-science movement indicates, Western thinkers in the twentieth century became more
divided than ever in their views of human origins. Atheist and agnostic scientists such as the astronomer Carl Sagan
(193496), the sociobiologist E.O.Wilson (1929), and Stephen Hawking (1947), a physicist, articulated a variety
of naturalistic origin myths that owed nothing to Genesis. Protestant neo-orthodox theologians, following Karl Barth
(18861968), emphasized the radical difference between God the Creator and a radically fallen creation, and neither
quarreled with, or cared much about, what science had to say about origins. The Roman Catholic Church officially
embraced the evolution of the human body in the papal encyclical Humani Generis (1950). The Swiss Protestant
theologian Emil Brunner (18991966) read Genesis existentially rather than historically, with Creation signifying
the dependence of the creature on the Creator and the Fall representing human rejection of that dependence. Such
interpretations signified the decision of more liberal theologians to leave questions of cosmogony and human origins
to science, while religious thinkers were free to inject meaning, purpose, and values into the Genesis account of
Creation.
Redu
ctionism is an attempt at explanation. It involves explaining a topic by variables independent
of the topic itself, usually in the form of understanding the nature of complex things by reducing them to
simpler, more fundamental phenomena. There are various types of reductionism (methodological, theoretical,
ontological), and some may be more appropriate to understanding than others. We wish to avoid getting mired
in the details of this philosophical debate, for the issues underlying reductionism are complex. Some defend
reductionism as necessary to science, while others suggest that such a view involves a flawed understanding
of science. It is safe to say, however, that as we attempt to scientifically explain broader and more complex
issues (such as religious experience), we should greet reductionism with greater reservation. So, for example,
when we utilize the need for meaning and purpose as a general framework for the study of religion, we should
not assume that religion is only a useful device for finding meaning. Religion is much more than a meaningmaking device.
Reducing a complex concept may sometimes be appropriate, such as reducing a preschool childs
church attendance to parental religiousness, and at times it may even be necessary for conceptualization
purposes. In general, however, we caution against reductionistic tendencies in the psychology of religion.
which religion is reduced is infantile projection of the parental figure, a form of neuroticism. Other
psychologists endorsed variants of this theme (e.g., Faber, 1972; Suttie, 1952; Symonds, 1946). In this view,
the substance of religionwhat a person believes, or the reasons behind certain religious behavior and
practices does not matter. If this is so, there can be nothing of importance to religious beliefs, so why
measure them?
Raymond Cattell (1938, 1950) represents another tradition of reductionistic research. It started with
the fact that Cattell himself was a behaviorist who literally could not think in terms of beliefs. His stance ended
illy superstition (Gorsuch, 2002). Like Freud, Cattell did give
with his personal view of religion as just s
credit to religion for being a powerful force in peoples lives. Given this beginning, Cattell posited
motivational bases for being religious. Cattell and Child (1975) reported that religion is a function of strong
needs to avoid fear, to be nurtured, and to nurture others. Others working in this tradition explained religion as
a result of being deprived and therefore turning to a belief in life after death to meet currently unmet needs
(Dewey, 1929). People thus create religious beliefs to resolve various problems. Again, since there can be
nothing of importance to religious beliefs per se, why measure them? William James (1902/1985), a founder of
the psychology of religion, treated religion with much greater respect than did Freud or Cattell. Why people
hold religious beliefs to be true was not an issue for James, since he approached religion pragmatically: Does it
help people live? To this he resoundingly answered,
Yes. Others have continued in this mode, and a major
part of the increased attention given to spirituality (see below) stems from religions having been shown to be
beneficial (e.g., Gorsuch, 1976, 1988; Larson et al., 1989; Pargament, 1997). Jamess form of reductionism is
more subtle than that of Freud or Cattell since James did not clearly take an atheistic position. In his view,
nothing religionists claim in and of themselves as a basis for their religious faith needs to be examined; such
beliefs are relevant only to the extent that they are functionally importantthat they are of some benefit to the
persons who hold them. For James, religious beliefs are reduced to their pragmatic value.
Reductionism: Conclusions
The empirical study of religiousness has many great challenges. The first of these challenges
considered here is how to maintain the scientific standards of good empirical work, always the goal of science,
without sacrificing the richness and depth of the object of study. We have gone to considerable lengths to make
the case that religious experience should not be reduced to specific psychological processes. It is tempting to
do so when one adopts the naturalistic perspective that underlies scientific investigation, and to ignore the
meaning system of the people being studied. What is needed is some nonreductionistic accounting of the
phenomena of interest, but without abandoning scientific methodology and thus not reaping the benefits that it
provides.
One way to avoid reductionism is to treat the individual as a holistic entity, instead of the typical
psychological research approach of fractionating the individual into traits, attitudes, beliefs, values, habits,
responses, and underlying physiology. This holisticatomistic distinction is not a sharp dichotomy, and many
levels exist between these endpoints. However, some researchers maintain that by breaking the individual into
such concepts as traits or attitudes and then abstracting these by an obj
ective analysis, only a false and
incomplete picture of the person is attaineda partial interpretation with a grain of truth to it. Instead, these
researchers argue that a holistic, phenomenological, clinical approach is better. The challenge, of course, is
whether such an approach can meet standard scientific criteria.
Idiothetic
Individual-behavioral
Qualitative
Concern with depth
European origin
Clinical
Intuitive (subjective)
Holistic
Phenomenological
Source: Medicine
Nomothetic
General-behavioral
Quantitative
Attention to the surface
American origin
Experimental
Objective
Atomistic
Positivistic
Source: Physical science
complete description). From this analysis, four fundamental beliefs of serpent handlers were identified: (1)
Handling serpents is a biblical mandate based on Mark 16:1718; (2) handling serpents is a sign of enablement
or power bestowed by God in response to obedience; (3) handling serpents is a sign of Gods protection
(handlers thereby acknowledge the danger of handling); and (4) the experience of handling serpents is a
confirmation of Gods power and blessing (Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005). The point here is that what
seems to outsiders a bizarre and pointless activity that is dangerous and even life-threatening (11 of the 16
interviewees had been bitten, and all knew of someone who had died from snake bite) carries great meaning
for the serpent handlers through its Biblical justification. Understanding the richness of serpent handling as a
religious meaning system could not have been attained through quantitative techniques only. Rather, what is
necessary is the use of multiple techniques (including historical methodologies). Although qualitative
techniques are fraught with potential bias and possible misuse and should therefore be used only according to
strict guidelines, they serve as a useful complement that will greatly profit the psychology of religion.
To illustrate the importance of good measurement, we borrow an example from Hill, Kopp, and
Bollinger (2007) involving Chicagos Lakeshore Marathon in 2005. This race was not one for the record
books. In fact, the runners were perplexed by their unusually slow times and perhaps woke up the next
morning to find themselves more sore than usual. The problem? It was discovered afterward that the course
had been wrongly charted and they had actually run 27.2 milesa full mile further than the usual grueling
distance for a marathon. Indeed, accurate measurement is very much a relevant issue. Imagine that after you
had already run 26.2 miles and your body was excruciatingly telling you that you should be finished, you had
yet another full mile to run! Without good measurement in research, the data that are collected in the process
of doing a research study are of little if any value. Most measures in the psychology of religion are self-report
scales. Participants completing such measures are asked to respond to multiple items designed to assess the
many varieties of religious and spiritual experience. Fortunately, psychologists of religion have long
recognized the importance of good measurement and have placed a high priority on it. As early as 1984,
Gorsuch pronounced measurement to be the current par
adigm (i.e., the dominant perspective or concern of
psychologists of religion). By the end of the 1990s, Hill and Hood (1999a) identified over 125 measurement
scales available to psychologists of religion, and many more have been developed in the past decade (Hill,
2005; Hill et al., 2007). To be sure, there is a well-developed measurement literature in the psychology of
religion. But what makes one scale better than another? Both theoretical and technical issues must be
considered in determining the best measure.
Theoretical Considerations
Any attempt to measure a concept such as religiousness or spirituality requires that the concept be
specified in measurable terms. Such an
operational definition is especially important when applied to
religiousness and spirituality, because, as we have seen in Chapter 1, there is considerable variety in how these
terms are conceptualized. The importance of theoretical clarity extends beyond how the constructs are
conceptualized; good theory is necessary in providing a framework for testable hypotheses as well.
Furthermore, researchers must consider the various dimensions of religious and spiritual experience (a topic
that we consider shortly) to help determine the appropriateness of potential measures.
Technical Considerations
A scales reliability and validity are the two most important technical issues to consider. The more
reliable and valid a measure is, the more useful it is for conducting scientific research. Though brief scales
(sometimes just one-item scales) may be appealing because they are time-saving and convenient, they also
tend to be less reliable and perhaps less valid.
Reliability refers to the consistency of a measure and is
usually assessed in terms of either (1) cons
istency across time or (2) i
nternal consistency. When assessing
consistency of a measure over time, better known as
testretest reliability, the reliability coefficient is a
correlation between the test scores of a group of individuals who are administered the scale on two different
occasions (usually at least 2 weeks apart). More common is the use of internal consistency as a reliability
indicator. The better multiple scale items fit together (as determined statistically by factor analysis), the higher
the internal consistency. Internal consistency is most often measured by a statistic called Cronbachs alpha,
which ranges from 0 to 1.00, with a higher value indicating greater consistency. Alpha levels of religious and
spiritual constructs are preferably above .80, but frequently are acceptable at about .70. Consideration of the
scales v
alidity, or the extent to which a test measures what it purports to measure, is also essential to good
measurement. There are many different ways to think of and measure validity. For example, though it may be
tempting to do so, we cannot rely simply on our subjective sense of whether or not the scale appears to
measure what it is supposed to be measuring, referred to as f
ace validity. Face validity is subject to all sorts
of human bias and is therefore not scientifically useful. Conte
nt validity refers to whether or not a
representative sample of the domain is being covered. For example, perhaps you are working with a measure
of spiritual disciplines. If your measure inquires about prayer, fasting, and tithing, but does not address reading
sacred texts or service, content validity is sacrificedbecause the entire behavioral domain has not been
included in your measure.
Const
ruct validity examines the agreement between a specific theoretical construct and a
measurement device, and may rely heavily on what is already known about a construct. Conv
ergent validity
and di
scriminant validity are both subdomains of construct validity and can be considered together.
Convergent validity asks, H
ow well does this measure correspond to similar measures of the same or similar
constructs?; discriminant validity asks, H
ow is this test unrelated to measures of different constructs? Those
who develop scales try to demonstrate as much reliability and validity as possible, though it is highly unlikely
that any single measure will be perfectly reliable or score high on all types of validity just discussed.
Sample Representativeness
There are many measurement scales in the psychology of religion that adequately meet these technical
criteria, but care must still be taken in their use. Why? Because these scales were developed on a rather limited
sample that may not reflect the population of interest under investigation. The most common form of such
limitation is that many of the scales were initially developed for a Christian population, but now many
researchers wish to investigate religious and spiritual experience outside the confines of Christianity, or
perhaps even outside the context of any formal religious tradition (Hill, 2005). Even more problematic is that
many of the scales were initially developed among white, young, middle-class, American (and, to a lesser
extent, British) college students (Hill & Pargament, 2003). Four variables known to be strongly correlated with
religious experience are age, socioeconomic status, race, and educational level (Hill, 2005); therefore, caution
is necessary if one should choose to use such a scale for a population with a different demographic profile or
outside the Judeo-Christian context.
Scales created on the basis of either unrepresentative samples or samples representing a narrow
population (e.g., a single denomination) are usually insensitive or inapplicable to broader groups (Chatters,
Taylor, & Lincoln, 2002). For example, Protestant African Americans among the most religious of all ethnic
groups in the United Statesemphasize community service (Ellison & Taylor, 1996), as well as the notion of
reciprocal blessings with God (Black, 1999). Both of these characteristics are ignored in virtually all measures
of religiousness or spirituality, in favor of other issues that may be irrelevant to African Americans. Hill and
Dwiwardani (in press) provided a fascinating example of how difficult it is to transport the study of religious
experience to other world religions when they attempted to apply Allports I-E distinction to Indonesian
Muslims. In order to make the scale that measures both I and E religious orientations applicable to the Muslim
context, more than just the language of the scale needed to be changed (e.g., changing the word chur
ch to
m
osque). Because Islam is such a strong pillar of the overall collectivistic culture in Indonesia, the concept
of the social basis of the E religious orientation as a form of immature religion is simply not as applicable to
Muslims as it is to Christians. Fortunately, however, another group of researchers has provided the Muslim
Christian Religious Orientation Scale (Ghorbani, Watson, Ghramaleki, Morris, & Hood, 2002), which takes
into account a social dimension in relation to the broader community and culture rather than to the mosque. It
is important that we recognize the limits of our measures and seek to improve them for more diverse settings.
Measurement Domains
Because religiousness is a highly complex and varied human experience, good measurement must
reflect this complexity. This does not mean that any single measure must reflect all of this complexity, for
many times the topic of interest is but a piece of the religion pie for example, religious beliefs or specific
religious behaviors. Psychologists, especially social psychologists, frequently discuss the totality of human
experience in three domains: cogni
tion, or how the ideological aspect of (in our case) religion is
conceptualized; af
fect, or the emotional, l
ikedislike facet of belief or behavior (which frequently includes
attitudes and values); and behav
ior, or what people do and how they act. It is important that measures reflect
these individual domains. Mixing these domains often leads to confusing research. So, for example, of about
125 measures identified by Hill and Hood (1999a), there was a cluster of measures stressing religious beliefs,
another cluster emphasizing religious attitudes, and so forth. Sometimes it is desirable to have a single
multidimensional measure, but even then there will usually be subscales (often determined by factor analysis)
tapping more specific domains. Table 2.4, adapted from Hill (2005), provides a summary of 12 common
categories of measures that have been developed, with examples of measures from the literature that fit each
category. One might be surprised by the number of measures available, especially since the measures and their
respective categories in the table are not exhaustive. In fact, the table includes only a small percentage of
measures, though Hill (2005) maintains that they represent some of the better measures in the psychology of
religion. Notice that the first four categories cover what Tsang and McCullough (2003) refer to as
Level I
measures, which represent hi
gher levels of organization reflecting broad individual differences among
persons in highly abstracted, trait-like qualities (p. 349). Level I measures may help assess how religious or
spiritual a person is, and here we refer to this as di
spositional religiousness. The final eight categories of
measures represent L
evel II measures, which get at how religion or spirituality functions in a persons life,
referred to here as f
unctional religiousness. For example, highly religious people may use their religion in
different ways to help cope with lifes stressful agents. More scales and more detailed discussions of scales can
be found in a number of resources: Hill (2005), Hill and Hood (1999a), MacDonald (2000), and MacDonald,
LeClair, Holland, Alter, and Friedman (1995).
Gorsuchs (1984) claim that the psychology of religion had been dominated by issues of measurement
up to that time led him to conclude that measurement scales were r
easonably effective and av
ailable in
sufficient varieties for most any task in the psychology of religion (p. 234). Now, a quarter of a century later,
we can say that Gorsuch was both correct and incorrect. Within the psychology of religion proper, and
especially at Level I dispositional measurement, Gorsuch was clearly correct. Researchers have a sufficient
arsenal of measurement instruments at hand to adequately assess a persons level of religiousness or
spirituality, even given the complexities of what it means to be religious or spiritual. The one caveat, however,
is that measures within the psychology of religion will need to become increasingly pluralistic, to better
represent (1) religious traditions other than Christianity and (2) those forms of spirituality that do not conform
to any formal religious tradition. However, Gorsuch (or anyone else, for that matter) was, quite
understandably, unable in 1984 to envision the direction the field would take, particularly the move toward
examining the many functional varieties of religiousness (Level II measurement) that would require further
scale development. So, for example, in reviewing the significant association between religion and both mental
and physical health (to be discussed in considerable detail in Chapter 13), Hill and Pargament (2003) have
highlighted ongoing advances in measurement (e.g., measuring perceived closeness to God, religious struggle)
that help delineate why religiousness and spirituality seems to contribute (mostly positively, but sometimes
negatively) to health and well-being. It is safe to say that measurement issues, particularly of the Level II
functional variety, will continue to be of great interest and concern to psychologists of religion (vezi anexa).
Implicit Measures
The final measurement issue we wish to discuss is an issue that plagues all of psychologythe fields
overreliance on self-report measures. Every measure (including qualitative measures) discussed thus far in this
section relies on self-reports, which of course may be biased for a number of reasons: intentional deception,
impression management, personal bias, and many more. The accuracy of self-reports is especially suspect
when the topic being investigated is personal and sensitive in nature (Dovidio & Fazio, 1992), which religion
and spirituality often are. As a result, there has been an increasing interest in developing other measurement
techniques (such as physiological measures, better behavioral measures, etc.), including the use of i
mplicit
measures, particularly as measures of attitudes. Greenwald and colleagues (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) have defined implicit attitudes as unconscious, automatic evaluations
that influence thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Probably the most common implicit measure is the Implicit
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) which uses response latency as a marker of ones unconscious
and automatic attitudes. The IAT was first developed as an implicit measure of racial attitudes, whereby an
associative strength between two concepts (e.g., objects and evaluative adjec tives) is measured by the amount
of time (measured in milliseconds) it takes to determine whether the concepts go together. Thus it may be
easier for a racially prejudiced white person to categorize two objects that are congruent (and hence take less
time to determine that the two concepts go together) in his or her thinking (e.g., white and good; black and
bad) than objects that are incongruent (e.g., white and bad; black and good). Though there are many
assumptions underlying the IAT (and the notion of implicit measurement in general), social- psychological
research has shown it to be psychometrically adequate in terms of its internal consistency, temporal reliability,
and validity (Rowatt & Franklin, 2004). Only recently has research in the psychology of religion utilized
implicit measures. Some of these studies have investigated explicit (i.e., self-report) measures of religiousness
or spirituality in relation to some implicit measure, such as race attitudes (Rowatt & Franklin, 2004), humility
(Powers, Nam, Rowatt, & Hill, 2007; Rowatt, Powers, et al., 2006), attitudes toward homosexuals (Rowatt,
Tsang, et al., 2006; Tsang & Rowatt, 2007), or attitudes toward other religious groups (Rowatt, Franklin, &
Cotton, 2005). The results of much of this research are covered later in this book, particularly in Chapter 12.
Others (e.g., Hill, 1994; Wenger, 2004), however, have made the case that religion itself may be a topic that
can be implicitly measured, and several notable attempts have now been made (Bassett et al., 2004; Cohen,
Shariff, & Hill, 2008; Gibson, 2006; Wenger, 2004). This research is still in its earliest stages, with the implicit
measures themselves needing more frequent testing before any judgment of their utility can be made. These
attempts do represent, however, important efforts at getting beyond reliance on self-report measures.
Individual Differences
Many people perhaps do not recognize that much of the psychology of religion falls primarily within social
psychology (though other subdisciplines, particularly clinical and developmental psychology, are well
represented) in general, and within the domain of individual differences in particular (Dittes, 1969). Social
psychology studies the person in the social context. Because religiousness varies from one person to another,
the psychology of religion stresses the individual-variability aspect of social psychology. Most research (and
hence most measures used in the research) in the psychology of religion stresses individual differences. That
is, the persons own attitudes and behavior are studied as dependent and independent variables. Social
psychology further examines how independent variables, such as religiousness, affect people and their
relationships with others. Much of this research is devoted to social-cognitive processes. As noted earlier,
individual differences in social psychology are typically accounted for in three domains that are easily applied
to religious experience: cognition, affect, and behavior. To these three, we perhaps should add habit, since
there are important habitual components in religious experience. Cognition is primarily concerned with beliefs
and how they are learnedin other words, how the ideological aspect of religion is conceptualized. The
affective realm emphasizes feelings and attitudesthe emotional, l
ikedislike facet of belief or behavior.
The attitude concept is especially important to the psychology of religion, since attitudes are often important
predictors of behavior. Behavior, of course, consists of what people do, how they act. Finally, habit involves
what people do regularly, consistently, and often automatically. The psychology of religion looks at individual
religious differences within each of these areas.
For our current purposes, the important point to note is that because each domain has a separate purpose, these
domains should be kept distinct in measurement. Items representing these domains are exemplified in Table
2.5. The first and third illustrations in the cognitive area use a response format that emphasizes the definition
of the domain, mostly here belief. The second and fourth illustrations use a common response format that
emphasizes belief but includes an element of affectnamely, value. This distinction is not made for the other
domains. Because each domain has a different purpose, it is important to keep them distinct.
Research can then identify the conditions under which they relate to each other. For example, Allport (1959) as
interested in total religiousness, based on both the I and E scores of religious orientation (Allport & Ross,
1967). He stressed affect or motivation in these orientations, and he ignored cognition. The original scale,
however, included behavioral items, which created conceptual confusion. Later versions of the I and E scales
dropped the behavioral items, and the measure of I and E became clearer. The research reported throughout
this text cuts across these different domains. It is important to keep in mind whether we are talking about
beliefs, values, motivations, and so forth. Because each of the areas functions differently, it is often important
to distinguish among them. Still, at other times we may wish to investigate some overriding concern, and to
do so we measure across several of these areas. As noted throughout this book, religiousness and spirituality
are complex, multidimensional phenomena, and this includes the fact that they incorporate each of these
domains as part of the complete experience.
TABLE 2.5. Illustrations of Items Assessing Aspects of Cognition,
Affect, Habit, and Behavior
Cognition
Belief
1. Rate what you feel are the o
dds (%) that God exists.
There is no God 0 25 50 75 100 God definitely exists
Value
2. God exists.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree
Belief
3. Rate how important attending church weekly is.
Unimportant 1 2 3 4 5 Important
Value
4. Everyone should attend church each week.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree
Affect (attitudes)
5. Rate how much you enjoy worship services.
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Very much
6. I enjoy worship services.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree
Habit
7. How long have you had your current pattern of church attendance?
a. 1 year or less
b. 12 years
c. 34 years
d. 5 years or more
Behavior
8. How often do you attend church?
a. Never
b. A couple of times a year
c. Once a month
d. Several times a month
e. Once a week
f. More than once a week
Anexa 1
TABLE 2.4. Specific Measures of Religion and Spirituality in 12 Categories
Jamie D. Aten
The University of Southern Mississippi
Journal of Clinical Psychology: In Session, vol. 65(2), 123-130 (2009)
Teoria stres-i-coping
Poate cel mai recunoscut model al terapiei religioase este cel de stres-i-coping,
propus i promovat de decenii de ctre Kenneth Pargament (1997, 2007). Pargament
sugereaz c, atunci cnd oamenii experienieaz stresori, ei i aduc n discuie n cadrul
terapiei, prin accentuarea strategiilor de coping religios existente pn atunci sau prin
nvarea unora noi. La nceput, clienii folosesc un coping conservator n ncercarea lor
de a se confrunta cu problema, fr s i schimbe credinele religioase. Ei ncearc s
asimileze evenimentele stresante i reaciile la eveniment n schema mental de pn
atunci.
Dac copingul tradiional/conservator nu i ajut pe clieni s i rezolve
dificultile emoionale, clienii se pot angaja n coping transnormativ. n acest fel, ei i
modific schema religioas de pn atunci, pentru a face fa problemei curente.Un astfel
de coping poate fi adaptativ sau maladaptativ (de ex. mncatul sntos vs. mncatul
compulsiv). Dup Pargament i colegii si, copingul religios poate, de asemenea, s fie
adaptativ sau maladaptativ (de ex. s te simi protejat de Dumnezeu vs. s te simi
pedepsit de Dumnezeu) i este evaluat prin scala R-COPE (Pargament, Koenig & Perez,
2000).
Perpective religioase n acord i n dezacord
Terapeuii sensibili la problematica religioas valorific diversitatea n religie.
ncercnd s includ ct mai mult, terapeuii pot spune, de exemplu, c toate religiile sunt
importante i c sunt dispui s abordeze o problem din punctul de vedere al oricrei
religii. Pentru majoritatea clienilor nonreligioi sau uor religioi, un astfel de enun
poate s fie dovada acceptrii necondiionate din partea terapeutului. Totui, clienii
foarte religioi s-ar putea s devin circumspeci i s-l considere pe terapeut nedemn de
ncredere nu e unul de-al nostru. Majoritatea clienilor nu discut de obicei despre
astfel de probleme cu psihoterapeutul. Mai degrab, clientul va deveni din ce n ce mai
refractar la tratament i va termina prematur edinele, fr a anuna n prealabil.
Worthington (1988) a propus un model care s i ajute pe terapeui s i neleag
pe clienii religioi i valorile acestora. A sugerat c felul n care clienii privesc lumea,
prin nite lentile religioase, depinde de agajamentul lor religios. Persoanele care se afl
la extrema de sus a angajamentului religios (mai mult de o abatere standard de la
medie), vor fi mai predispui la a interpreta evenimentele de via prin aceste lentile
religioase. Cercetri substaniale stau la baza acestei teoretizri (vezi Wade,Worthington
& Vogel, 2007; Worthington, Kurusu, McCullough & Sandage, 1996). Clienii foarte
religioi au o anumit zon de toleran pentru valorile religioase acceptabile. Dac
clientul consider c terapeutul ader la valori prezente n zona lui de toleran, atunci
poate s lucreze eficient cu terapeutul respectiv. ns, dac clientul consider c
terapeutul are valori aflate nafara zonei de toleran proprie, atunci acesta va (a) fi
refractar la intervenia terapeutului i va avea un progres terapeutic redus sau (b) va
termina relaia terapeutic, de obicei fr vreo confruntare prealabil.
Tot din cauz c clienii foarte religioi au tendina de a privi mereu lumea dintr-o
perspectiv religioas (Worthington, 1988), de cele mai multe ori, se vor interesa n mod
direct cu privire la orientarea religioas a terapeutului, n timpul primei edine de terapie
sau chiar nainte de a iniia terapia. Cel mai frecvent, terapeuii rspund indirect la acest
tip de ntrebri, ntrebnd, la rndul lor, De ce este acest lucru important pentru tine?.
Un client foarte religios poate resimi aceast contracarare a ntrebrii lui ca pe o ofens
i o poate interpreta ca fiind un rspuns evaziv, deducnd faptul c terapeutul nu i
mprtete credinele religioase. Chiar dac terapeutul n cauz face ulterior afirmaii ce
dovedesc acceptare i toleran, clientul nu mai poate fi domolit i, n mod inevitabil, va
termina terapia sau va fi refractar la orice intevenie a terapeutului (Thurston, 2000).
i psihoterapeuii au zonele lor de toleran pentru valori religioase, n special
dac sunt, la rndul lor, foarte religioi. Terapeuii care nu pot tolera dovezile de
intoleran din partea altora, e foarte probabil s nu poat lucra bine cu clieni care
afieaz credine religioase fundamental diferite de ale lor, care au credine religioase
extremiste sau care sunt rigizi n credinele lor. n unele cazuri (de ex. diferena de
credine religioase poate duce la o prognoz slab a tratamentului), terapeuii ar trebui s
comunice clienilor, n limita posibilului, dac neconcordanele n viziunile i credinele
religioase nu pot fi depite (de ex. n edina de terapie, printr-un supervizor al
procesului terapeutic sau ca o consultare cu clientul). Alii ar putea utiliza aceste reacii
negative ce ar putea aprea n timpul terapiei ca pe un proces de confruntare. n cazurile
unde nici recomandarea unui alt terapeut, nici confruntarea nu e posibil, terapeutul
trebuie s ncerce s dezolte empatie i acceptare fa de valorile clientului, s fac
compromisuri cu clientul, nspre a cdea de acord c nu pot fi de acord, sau s dezolte
anumite limite, care s-l ajute s-i menin obiectivitatea n procesul terapeutic.
Unii terapeui seculari se pot simi confortabil i ntr-o situaie n care trebuie s
ofere terapie augmentat religios unor clieni care nu sunt de acord cu valorile religioase
ale lor. De fapt, exist un studiu clasic, care a investigat terapia cognitivcomportamental cretin (CBT), n cazul unor voluntari cu depresie (Propst, Ostrom,
Watkins, Dean & Mashburn, 1992). Terapeuii care nu erau cretini au utilizat un manual
de terapie cognitiv-comportamental augmentat religios (cretin), iar acetia au obinut
trezultate mai bune cu clienii lor, dect au obinut terapeuii care ntr-adevr erau
cretini. Rezultate contradictorii au fost regsite pe un eantion clinic (Wade et al., 2007),
n contrast cu reculul unor persoane care au avut depresie clinic (Propst et al., 1992). Un
terapeut secular care urmeaz un protocol de augmentare religioas a terapiei, cu clieni
religioi, are, ntr-adevr, o probabilitate mare de a obine rezultate favorabile n procesul
terapeutic.
Articole din acest numr (al revistei)
n articolul ce urmeaz celui de fa, Post i Wade fac o analiz a cercetrii din
psihoterapia religioas, focalizndu-se pe terapia religioas condus de terapeui religioi,
unor clieni religioi i n care se utilizeaz intervenii religioase. Cercetrile recente arat
c terapeuii sunt nc n mod semnificativ mai puin religioi i spirituali dect clienii
lor (Delaney et al., 2007). Cei mai muli dintre psihoterapeui privesc n mod pozitiv
religiozitatea clienilor lor, iar nu ca pe o dovad de maladaptare sau patologie. Cel mai
adesea, terapeuii sunt predispui la a face greeli de judecat atunci cnd au de-a face cu
persoane aparinnd unor religii cu care ei nu sunt familiari. Majoritatea terapeuilor
religioi ofer clienilor posibiliatea de a alege ntre terapia secular sau cea augmentat
religios. Clienii chiar i cei nonreligioi sunt deseori deschii nspre a include
terapeutului de a-i angaja clienii ntr-o discuie pe tema spiritualitii poate depinde de
felul n care terapeutul respectiv i pondereaz rolul de autoritate/expert cu cel de
facilitator evocativ.
Pe urm, Dwairy descrie i ilustreaz psihoterapia n cazul musulmanilor. Acesta
sugereaz c ncercarea de a revela procese incontiente i de a promova autoactualizarea
n cazul clienilor provenind din culturi colectiviste, poate duce la confruntri puternice
ntre client i familia acestuia. Autorul recomand terapia metaforic i analiza cultural
pentru persoanele din asemenea culturi colectiviste. n terapia metaforic clientul poate
relaiona simbolic i indirect cu coninutul incontient i totodat poate evita ameninrile
directe ale conceptelor religioase. n analiza cultural, clienii i pot revela nevoile
incontiente i pot s restabileasc ordinea n sistemul lor de credine i n familie.
Dwairy prezint cele dou metode terapeutice utilizate n terapia cu un client arab
musulman, suferind de depresie. Printr-un astfel de proces terapeutic ancorat n cultura i
religia lui, clientul i-a ameliorat credinele maladaptative, a devenit mai mulumit de sine
i a gsit ci eficiente de a se adapta n familia sa.
Duba i Watts ofer un exemplu de tratament al cuplurilor religioase, din
perspectiv adlerian. Autorii observ c n cupluri exist o mare variaie n felul cum
indivizii se bazeaz pe orientarea religioas pentru a-i defini sau restructura relaia
romantic. Confesiunile diferite vor stabili reguli specifice sau vor forma modul n care
cuplul rezolv greutile la nivel interpersonal i familial, ca de exemplu sexualitatea,
stilul parental sau autoritatea. Aceia propun o serie de principii ce trebuie respectate
atunci cnd se trateaz cupluri religioase, inclusiv discuii premergtoare terapiei sau
consimmntul informat al clienilor. Ei observ existena a numeroase paralele ntre
terapia adlerian i credina religioas cretin (de ex. orientarea relaiei, focalizarea pe
stilul de via, interesele sociale). Cuplul ilustrat, romano-catolic, a fost tratat de
asemenea de un terapeut de confesiune romano-catolic. Partenerii aveau probleme legate
de stres, conflicte frecvente i erodarea intimitii n cuplu. Terapia a implicat o
anamnez a vieii de cuplu i a dinamicii iniiale a relaiei, precum i training pe aspecte
de management al timpului. n timp, cei doi i-au corectat percepiile greite care
afectaser dinamica relaiei lor.
n final, noi (Aten & Worthington) eaminm ce s-a nvat n acest numr (al
revistei). Propunem pai ce vor trebui luai n viitor n practicarea terapiilor augmentate
spiritual i religios i lum n considerare modaliti de lucru n cazul clienilor care
iniiz terapia cernd n mod explicit abordri spirituale sau religioase, dar i n cazul
celor care cer o terapie secular, dar care e posibil s se confrunte pe durata procesului
terapeutic cu probleme ce in de spiritualitate sau religiozitate. Sugerm c ar trebui
dezvoltate i testate noi metode clinice, care s ncorporeze practici religioase occidentale
i orientale. De asemenea, recomandm o mai bun colaborare att ntre preoi
(duhovnici) i psihoterapeui, ct i ntre psihoterapeui i cercettori. n final, subliniem
faptul c formarea clinic are nevoie de mbuntiri n sensul acesta i propunem cteva
direcii la care s-ar putea interveni.
Sperm c acest numr (al revistei) ofer o ghidare clinic n munca cu clienii
chiar dac acetia caut psihoterapie augmentat religios sau psihoterapie secular.
Integrnd practica clinic cu cercetarea, putem s ne raportm la clienii religioi mai
precis i mai eficient. Sperm c aceste articole i vor ajuta pe practicieni (dar pe
ARTICOL TRADUS DE
Laura Belean
Ramona Monica Rad
Cristina Tacaciu
multe dintre interveniile investigate au un fundament religios explicit (de ex. citirea
Scripturii), vom folosi termenul religios pe parcursul articolului, cu excepia situaiilor n
care contextul justific o formulare mai exact.
n psihoterapie, clienii se lupt nu doar cu probleme ce in de starea de bine
personal, ci i de perspectivele lor n via, relaiile cu ceilali sau valorile lor cele mai
adnci. Pentru muli clieni, problematica religioas se suprapune cu aceste preocupri ale
lor (Smith & Richards, 2005). n aceste circumstane, clienii respectivi ar putea obine
beneficii de pe urma abordrii explicite a problematicii religioase n cadrul terapiei sau de
pe urma augmentrii metodelor terapeutice de coping cu resurse religioase. La fel cum
ajustarea psihoterapiei n funcie de experienele i valorile culturale ale clientului poate
spori eficiena tratamentului (Griner & Smith, 2006), tot aa, ajustarea psihoterapiei cu
elemente religioase, n cazul clienilor care valorizeaz puternic religia, ar putea duce la
un tratament mult mai eficient (Richards, Keller & Smith, 2004; Smith et al., in press).
Mai mult dect att, psihologii au obligaia etic de a oferi servicii care in cont de
context n cazul fiecrui client, acest lucru incluznd contextele religioase (American
Psychological Association [APA], 2002).
Psihoterapeuii trebuie, cu att mai mult, s in cont de experienele i credinele
clienilor care valorizeaz puternic religia. O nelegere acurat a concepiilor religioase
ale clienilor poate avea un impact pozitiv asupra tratamentului, n vreme ce ignorarea
credinelor religioase poate reduce eficiena terapiei i poate crete frecvena cu care
clienii pun punct terapiei (Miller, 2003; Propst, 1980; Smith & Richards, 2005). n mod
specific, indivizii foarte religioi consider de multe ori c psihologii clinicieni s-ar putea
s nu aprobe valorile, ideile sau purtarea lor (Worthington, 1986), motiv pentru care vor
evita terapia sau vor cuta ali specialiti n sntatea mental, despre care cred c le
mprtesc credinele (Worthington, Duport, Berry & Duncan, 1988). Clienii care sunt
foarte religioi sunt cei mai predispui la a-i dori integrarea interveniilor religioase n
terapie. Aadar, studierea ncorporrii acestui tip de intervenii n psihoterapie ntlnete
cea mai mare justificare n cadrul populaiilor care deja raporteaz puternice valori
religioase.
Dup cum a fost documentat pe larg n literatura de specialitate, includerea
problematicii religioase n psihoterapie poteneaz apariia unui numr de dileme etice
(Richards & Bergin, 2005). Luarea n considerare a consimmntului informat (Hawkins
& Bullock, 1995), a dezvoltrii identitii religioase/spirituale (Fowler, 1991; Hulk,
Spilka, Hunsberger & Gorsuch, 1996; Poll & Smith, 2003), a relaiilor biunivoce (Sonne,
1999), a colaborrii cu liderii religioi (Chappelle, 2000), a respectului pentru valorile
clienilor (Haug, 1998; Neusner, 1994), a limitelor impuse de locul de munc (Chapelle,
2000; Richards & Bergin, 2005) i a nivelului de competen a terapeutului (Barnett &
Fiorentino, 2000; Lannert, 1991) este esenial n a decide dac s se foloseasc
intervenii bazate pe religie. Pentru fiecare din aceste arii, au fost fcute recomandri n
literatura de specialitate, terapeuii fiind informai despre aceste poteniale probleme i
sprijinii n practicarea psihoterapiei n mod etic. Cu toate acestea, nelegerea
perspectivelor clientului asupra factorilor care reduc eficiena interveniilor religioase n
terapie ar oferi informaii importante pentru practicieni.
O larg varietate de intervenii care pot fi considerate de natur religioas au fost
promovate n literatur, inclusiv rugciunea mpreun cu clienii, discuiile pe baza
textelor sacre, includerea resurselor disponibile n cadrul comunitilor religioase,
iar n acest studiu, 63 dintre clieni (41%) au participat la 1-4 edine, 31 de clieni (20%)
au participat la 5-9 edine, iar 58 de clieni (38%) au participat la 10 sau mai multe
edine de consiliere. La centrul de consiliere sunt angajai 27 de psihologi liceniai, 2
terapeui specilizai pe probleme maritale i de cuplu, 4 psihologi cu studii postdoctorale,
4 psihologi urmnd studii predoctorale i fac practic cu jumtate de norm (part-time)
20 de studeni la psihologie. Acest centru ofer servicii de sntate mental concordante
cu cele ale altor centre de consiliere din Statele Unite i include un program de practic
acreditat de APA. Interveniile religioase nu se numr printre practicile standard, ns
datorit faptului c centrul de consiliere deservete preponderent clieni aparinnd
Bisericii ZTS, o parte dintre terapeuii de aici folosesc ocazional acest tip de intervenii
pe durata tratamentului.
Nu au fost stabilite restricii cu privire la diagnosticul clienilor. Problemele
pentru care acetia au iniiat terapia au variat n eantionul folosit, n felul urmtor: 53 de
clieni (35%) au raportat depresie, 20 (13%) au venit la centru pentru probleme de
anxietate, ali 20 (13%) pentru probleme n relaia de cuplu, iar restul de 59 de clieni
(39%) au raportat o varietate de probleme, printre care se numr disfuncii alimentare,
tulburare compulsiv-obsesiv, schizofrenie, preocupri de natur sexual i dificulti
legate de etapa de vrst. Antecendente legate de traume sau abuzuri au fost raportate de
9 clieni (6%). Probleme de natur spiritual sau religioas nu au fost raportate de nici
unul dintre clieni ca fiind o problem primar.
Procedur
n zona biroului de recepie al centrului de consiliere au fost postate afie invitnd
clienii s participe la un chestionar. Centrul deservete aproximativ 570 de clieni n
orice moment, iar datele au fost colectate pe parcursul mai multor sptmni, n martie
2004 i n septembrie 2004. Subiectul cercetrii nu a fost dezvluit n afi, pentru a
reduce probabilitatea de biasare a deciziei clienilor dac vor sau nu s participe la acest
studiu. La cererea clientului, angajaii biroului de recepie le-au oferit cte un chestionar,
un formular pentru declaraia de consimmnt i un baton de ciocolat ca form de
compensaie pentru timpul oferit. Toate chestionarele nmnate clienilor au fost
napoiate completate, cu excepia a 6 chestionare, care au avut rspunsuri lips n cadrul
aceleiai seciuni (adecvarea utilizrii interveniilor religioase), din cauz c terapeuii
clienilor respectivi nu utilizaser nici o intervenie religioas n cadrul terapiei. Cu
excepia acestor itemi lips, toate cele 152 de chestionare au fost incluse n analiz.
Instrument
Prima pagin a chestionarului solicit respondenilor informaii demografice i
contextuale, inclusiv afilierea religioas, vrsta, genul, originea geografic, numrul de
edine de terapie la care au participat pn n prezent i problemele iniiale, care au
motivat iniierea terapiei. A fost msurat nivelul de religiozitate, pentru a se verifica dac
respondeni sunt ntr-adevr foarte religioi, aa cum s-a specificat n obiectivele
studiului. Pentru aceasta, s-a folosit un singur item, care ruga clienii s estimeze ct de
important este religia pentru ei. Rspunsurile au fost date pe o scal Likert cu 9 trepte,
variind de la 1 = deloc, la 9 = extrem de important, credina mea religioas este centrul
ntregii mele viei. S-a dovedit c aceast ntrebare coreleaz pozitiv (0.84) cu un factor
pro-religios intrinsec, derivat dintr-o scal cu itemi multipli (Gorsuch, 1972); aceast
corelaie are aproximativ aceeai valoare ca mediana intercorelaiei itemilor ce msoar
religiozitatea (0.76) (Gorsuch, 1984). Scorul mediu obinut la itemul care evalueaz
religiozitatea a fost de 8.2 (SD = 1.4), pe o scal cu 9 trepte, fapt ce indic un nivel foarte
ridicat de religiozitate raportat de eantionul folosit, aa cum s-a preconizat (Richards,
1994). Dei 12 participani (8%) au avut scoruri mai mici de 7 pe scala cu 9 trepte
(indicnd un nivel personal al devoiunii religioase mai redus dect nivelele cele mai
nalte), aceti participani nu au fost exclui din analiz deoarece am considerat c (a)
nivele foarte nalte ale religiozitii ar fi relevante, dar nu sunt absolut necesare pentru
integrarea interveniei religioase n terapie; (b) variaia interpersonal la nivel devoiunii
apare ntre membrii oricrui grup; i (c) a fost important s reprezentm experienele
tuturor clienilor care au completat chestionarul.
Pe a doua pagin a chestionarului, clienii au notat dac cele 18 intervenii
religioase au fost utilizate de ctre terapeuii lor n cadrul terapiei. Lista a fost creat de
Richards i Potts (1995), care au elaborat lista i definiiile interveniilor religioase dintro list de rspunsuri adunate de Ball i Goodyear (1991). Dei interveniile religioase
evaluate n studiul curent nu sunt o list exhaustiv a tuturor celor care ar putea fi
ncorporate n psihoterapie, lista prezint cele mai comune intervenii implementate i
procedura ne permite compararea cu cercetrile anterioare care vizau opiniile
terapeuilor. Richards i Potts au divizat cele 18 intervenii n dou categorii de
intervenii: 9 n cadrul sesiunii de terapie i 9 n afara sesiunii (de terapie), pe baza celei
mai probabile locaii pentru intervenie. Chestionar nostru ofer definiii pentru fiecare
intervenie, pentru ca participanii s neleag corect sensul terminologiei.
A treia pagin a chestionarului a interogat respondenii cu privire la utilitatea
oricreia dintre cele 18 intervenii religioase, pe care le-au identificat ca fiind utilizate de
terapeutul lor. Interveniile au fost evaluate pe o scal de tip Likert cu 6 trepte (0 = foarte
inutil, 1 = moderat de inutil, 2 = oarecum inutil, 3 = oarecum util, 4 = moderat de util,
5 = foarte util). n mod similar, a patra pagin a chestionarului a cerut respondenilor s
indice pe o scal Likert cu 6 trepte, n ce msur au considerat ca fiind potrivit/adecvat ca
terapeutul lor s utilizeze fiecare dintre cele 18 intervenii religioase prezentate. (0 =
foarte neadecvat, 1 = moderat de neadecvat, 2 = oarecum neadecvat, 3 = oarecum
adecvat, 4 = moderat de adecvat, i 5 = foarte adecvat).
Pe a cincea pagin, respondenilor li s-a cerut s-i aminteasc dac interveniile
religioase au fost n mod particular eficiente n ajutorarea procesului de
cretere/dezvoltare i schimbare i s scrie pe scurt despre experienele lor. A asea
pagin a fost identic, cu excepia faptului c respondenilor li s-a cerut s noteze cnd
intervenia religioas nu a fost eficient.
Rspunsurile scrise ale participanilor la ntrebrile cu sfrit deschis (open-ended
questions) de pe ultimele dou pagini au fost analizate folosind metode prestabilite pentru
analiza de coninut (Denzin & Lincoln, 2002). Rspunsurile oferite de participani au fost
mai nti dactilografiate i apoi citite n ntregime de mai multe ori pentru a obine o
nelegere deplin a coninutului acestora. Ulterior, au fost identificate i evideniate
sintagmele semnificative din rspunsuri. Pe urm, a fost realizat o categorizare a
coninutului prin citirea iniial a rspunsului i generarea unei definiii i al unui nume
pentru categorii preliminare care s reflecte modul de nelegere al participantului.
Rspunsul ficrui participant a fost citit i adugat ntr-o categorie sau a fost pus ntr-o
categorie nou. Acest proces de sortare a fost continuat pn cnd fiecare rspuns a fost
pus ntr-o categorie. Fiecare categorie a primit apoi un titlu i o descriere. Procesul de
categorizare a fost repetat, ns, de acest dat, a fost ghidat de titlurile i definiiile
stabilite. Dei rezultatele au fost similare, civa dintre respondeni au fost plasai n
categorii diferite pe baza definiiilor i titlurilor care au fost identificate. Rezultatele celei
de-a doua runde de analiz au fost date unui evaluator independent, care a evaluat
dinstinctivitatea i claritatea conceptual a categoriilor, a examinat rspunsurile
participanilor pentru a detecta eventuale semnificaii adiionale, care nu au fost incluse n
anumite categorii i a verificat acurateea global a codificrii. Evaluatorii au rezolvat
discrepanele la nivel de codificare prin revizuirea transcrierilor pn la stabilirea unui
acord.
Tabel 1
Mediile i abaterile standard ale corelaiilor ntre evalurile adecvrii i utilitii interveniilor religioase
Intervenie religioas
Intervenii n timpul sesiunii
1. Referine din Scriptur
2. Rugciunea privat a terapeutului
3. Predarea unor concepte religioase
4. Autodezvluirea religioas/spiritual
5. Evaluare religioas/spiritual
6. Imagerie sau relaxare religioas/spiritual
7. Confruntare religioas/spiritual
8. Rugciune terapeut-client
9. Binecuvntri din partea terapeutului
Suma interveniilor din sesiune
Intervenii din afara sesiunii
1. ncurajarea iertrii
2. Utilizarea comunitii religioase
3. Jurnale spirituale/religioase
4. Rugciune
5. Meditaie religioas/spiritual
6. Referine pentru binecuvntri
7. Biblioterapie religioas
8. ncurajarea spovedirii clientului
9. Memorarea Scripturii
Suma interveniilor din timpul sesiunii
Evaluarea adecvrii
M
SD
Evaluarea utilitii
M
SD
3.76
3.69
3.47
3.32
3.11
3.07
3.04
2.70
1.99
28.3
1.0
1.2
1.2
1.3
1.5
1.3
1.5
1.5
1.5
8.0
3.65
1.91
3.97
3.77
3.66
2.40
3.55
1.44
2.00
31.5
1.3
1.9
1.2
1.5
1.3
2.1
1.6
1.9
2.4
63
11
73
47
71
15
51
89
11
0.35
-0.01
0.49
0.61
0.44
0.83
0.74
0.69
0.65
4.26
3.98
3.95
3.94
3.83
3.65
3.60
3.35
2.84
33.7
1.0
1.1
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.2
1.5
1.4
8.6
3.70
3.33
2.58
2.80
3.10
1.11
1.44
1.44
0.0
26.5
1.4
1.6
1.8
1.9
1.8
1.9
1.9
0.0
50
40
19
20
21
9
23
9
6
0.37
0.36
0.17
0.47
0.29
0.00
0.10
-0.18
-
Not: Cei 146 de participani au oferit evaluri privind adecvarea (6 au avut date lips), dar doar clienii
care au experieniat o anumit intervenie au oferit evaluri ale utilitii pentru acea intervenie. Evalurile
mai ridicate au indicat o aprobare/susinere mai mare.
Rezultate
Adecvare raportat
preotului sau a liderului ecleziastic; i a fost o relaie invers ntre utilitatea perceput i
evaluarea adecvrii printre clienii care au primit recomandarea de a confesa pcatele
unui preot. Prin urmare, clienii care credeau c practica confesiunii este potrivit au avut
tendina s considere aceast intervenie ca fiind inutil.
Analiza cantitativ cu privire la interveniile eficiente i ineficiente
Au fost analizate rspunsurile participanilor cu privire la situaiile n care
interveiile religioase au fost percepute ca fiind eficiente i ineficiente. Rspunznd la
ntrebrile privind eficiena interveniilor, 125 dintre participani (82%) au oferit
rspunsuri, ns doar 56 dintre ei (37%) au oferit rspunsuri cu privire la
eficiena/ineficiena inteveniilor. 26 din rspunsurile scrise conineau descrieri ale
interveniilor din afara terapiei (ale liderilor ecleziastici) i au fost excluse, deoarece nu
erau n concordan cu interesul nostru pentru interveniile oferite n centre de sntate
mental. Dup examinri ulterioare ale datelor, am observat c unele rspunsuri cu
privire la eficien reflectau de fapt opinii sau experiene cu privire la aspectele
considerate de ctre respondeni ca fiind ineficiente, i vice versa. Prin urmare, n
codificarea datelor, am analizat declaraiile dup coninutul lor i nu dup ntrebare. n
plus, am gsit 40 de rspunsuri la ambele ntrebri care erau declaraii generale cu privire
la interveniile religioase i nu evaluri ale eficienei. Prin urmare, codificarea final a
datelor calitative au implicat trei arii de coninut: motive pentru care interveniile au fost
considerate ca fiind eficiente, motive pentru care interveniile religioase au fost
considerate ineficiente i rspunsuri neutre privind interveniile religioase.
Motive pentru care interveniile au fost eficiente
Motivele pentru care participanii au perceput interveniile religioase ca fiind
eficiente au fost codate n 6 categorii (tabelul 2). n urmtoarele paragrafe sunt date citate
directe, care exemplific aceste categorii.
Tabel 2
Categorii calitative de motive pentru care clienii au perceput interveniile spirituale ca fiind eficiente i
ineficiente
Eficace (n = 78)
Insight sporit ; percepii restructurate (47%)
Confort personal sporit, prin mprtirea de valori similare cu terapeutul (19%)
Recunoatere mai bun a influenelor/realitilor spirituale (12%)
Sentiment mai accentuat de empatie/conexiune cu terapeutul (8%)
Credibilitate crescut a terapiei pentru clieni iniial sceptici (8%)
Adresare ctre sinele ntreg al clientului (6%)
Ineficace (n = 37)
Aplicarea inefiecient a interveniei spirituale (32%)
Sporirea sentimentelor de anxietate i vin (27%)
Rol neadecvat al terapeutului de a se comporta ca un lider ecleziastic (22%)
Neadecvarea includerii interveniilor religioase n psihoterapie (19%)
Insight sporit; percepii restructurate. De departe cel mai comun motiv citat de
ctre clieni, pentru care interveniile religioase au fost eficiente n cazul lor, a implicat un
insight sporit sau reformarea percepiilor. Abordarea problemelor dintr-un punct de
vedere religios a oferit clienilor noi modaliti n care s-i neleag i interpreteze
starea.
Terapeutul meu mi-a prezentat un citat despre vrednicia sufletelor i mi l-a explicat n aa fel
nct s realizez c Dumnezeu m iubete necondiionat, chiar dac sufr de depresie, nu m duc la
cursuri ntotdeauna etc. Acel citat i acel gnd au fost foarte folositoare pentru mine i mi l-am repetat
de cteva ori de atunci. Presupun c e un simplu gnd, dar chiar mi d speran i ncurajare.
Terapeutul meu m-a ntrebat ct de important e religia mea pentru mine. Pentru c e centrul
vieii mele, mi-am dat seama c trebuia s fac nite schimbri care s-mi schimbe viitorul n bine.
Indiferent de tehnicile specifice pe care terapeutul le-a folosit (de ex. nvturi
despre doctrin/scriptur, confruntarea prerilor, ntrebri), beneficiul general perceput a
fost acela c clienii au dobndit o nou perspectiv/contientizare cu privire la ei nii
sau la problemele lor, ceea ce le-a facilitat progresul.
Confort personal sporit, prin congruena valorilor cu terapeutul. Spre deosebire
de paleta preponderent cognitiv de rspunsuri pe care tocmai le-am descris, rspunsurile
altor clieni au tins s reliefeze componte relaionale sau emoionale. Rspunsurile
ctorva clieni au accentuat efectele emoionale pozitive ale mprtirii de credine/valori
similare cu terapeutul (congruena valorilor). Pentru aceti clieni, simplul fapt de a fi
contient c terapeutul lor are aceleai valori sau credine religioase ca ei a sporit
confortul personal, ncrederea i deschiderea n cadrul terapiei.
Tot ce conta pentru mine, n calitate de client, era s tiu c terapeutul meu era familiar
cu credinele mele religioase. tiind c e membru al aceleiai biserici, mi-a conferit o
senzaie de confort i nelegere.
Nu am nici o problem cu faptul c terapeutul meu citeaz pasaje din Scriptur, lideri
bisericeti sau teme spirituale de fapt, m ajut s m simt mai confortabil cnd discut cu el. Pot s
m deschid mai mult, pentru c tiu c m nelege la un alt nivel, dar i pentru c nu sunt nevoit s-mi
restricionez vocabularul sau s evit subiecte religioase, ce ar putea s-mi fac relaia (terapeutic) mai
puin confortabil, cum ar fi n cazul unui terapeut laic (nereligios).
mea cluzete tot ce fac; trebuie s m consilieze din perspectiva aceasta, ca s m ajute s-mi
schimb adevrata persoan., Pentru c credinele mele religioase sunt att de importante pentru
mine i mi ghideaz viaa, pare natural ca acele credine s fie parte a experienei mele n consiliere.
Multe din alegerile, deciziile i felurile mele de a vedea lucrurile sunt guvernate de credinele mele
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pentru a reflecta cu acuratee sinele lor n ntregimea lui i, deci, pentru ca experiena lor
n cadrul psihoterapiei s fie semnificativ.
Motive pentru care interveniile religioase au fost ineficiente
receptivitatea sunt n mod clar considerente importante pentru a decide dac ar trebui
utilizat o intervenie religioas cu un anumit client.
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ct o facem noi s fie. Trebuie s fie inclus n terapie ntr-un mod adecvat fiecrui client i n funcie
de valoarea pe care acesta o d tehnicilor religioase. Aceste rspunsuri sugereaz c terapeuii
multe intervenii religioase. ntr-un fel, mi doresc s fi avut i a vrea s fie mai multe pe viitor.
Discuie
Clienii care au luat parte la acest studiu au susinut cteva intervenii religioase
ca fiind adecvate i de ajutor, n cadrul terapiei la un centru de consiliere al unei
universiti cu afiliere religioas. Unii dintre ei i-au exprimat dorina ca interveniile
religioase s fie mai mult integrate n tratamentul lor, dar ratele de prevalen raportate de
clieni pentru intervenii religioase specifice n acest studiu aproximeaz rezultatele
obinute n cercetri anterioare, ce implicau estimrile terapeuilor (Moon et al., 1993 ;
Richards & Potts, 1995 ; Worthington et al., 1988).
Cu privire la nivelul de adecvare al interveniilor religioase n psihoterapie,
interveniile religioase din afara sesiunii terapeutice au fost considerate mai adecvate
dect cele din cadrul ei. Cu toate acestea, interveniile din cadrul sesiunii de terapie au
tins s fie evaluate ca mai de ajutor (helpful). Se poate ca interveniile din afara edinei
de terapie s fi fost vzute ca fiind mai puin invazive sau mai puin amenintoare dect
cele din cadrul edinei, care au loc n prezena terapeutului. Oricum, trebuie luat n
considerare faptul c interveniile religioase n afara edinei teraputice au fost utilizate
mai puin de jumtate la fel de des precum cele din cadrul acesteia, cu doar 148 de
intervenii utilizate n afara edinei terapeutice raportate, fa de 299 raportate n cadrul
ei. Utiizarea mai puin frecvent a interveniilor religioase n afara sesiunii terapeutice de
ctre terapeui ar putea avea cteva explicaii, care ar putea fi investigate n cercetri
ulterioare, n cazul n care acest pattern se menine i n alte condiii, cu alte eantioane.
Acest eantion de clieni, membri ai Bisericii Zilei Tuturor Sfinilor, a evaluat
anumite intervenii religioase ca fiind moderat de ajuttoare (helpful) cnd sunt incluse n
psihoterapie. Interveniile care au fost evaluate ca fiind cele mai de ajutor au fost
instruirea de ctre terapeut n principii religioase/spirituale, deschiderea (self-disclosure)
terapeutului n legtur cu problematica religioas/spiritual, ncurajarea terapeutului
ctre client de a-i ierta pe ceilali, evaluarea religiozitii/spiritualitii clientului de ctre
terapeut i utilizarea citatelor din Biblie. Aceste rezultate se suprapun oarecum cu acelea
obinute de Worthington i col. (1988), incluznd ncurajarea nspre iertarea semenilor i
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sarcini de lucru orientate spre Dumnezeu sau religie. Sunt, de asemenea, similare i cu
percepiile terapeuilor (Richards & Potts, 1995), care au enumerat instruirea n concepte
religioase, utilizarea comunitii religioase i citatele din Scriptur ca fiind cele mai utile
ajutoare pentru clieni. Ar trebui, de asemenea, luat n considerare faptul c n studiul de
fa, cele mai utile intervenii au fost i cele evaluate de clieni ca fiind cele mai adecvate
i cele mai utilizate. Astfel, se pare c terapeuii din studiul curent au utilizat n general
intervenii care au fost percepute utile de ctre clienii lor. Cu toate acestea, n anumite
cazuri, clienii au oferit evaluri combinate (n sensul c aceeai intervenie era vzut de
unii ca fiind util, iar de alii ca fiind inutil), ceea ce sugereaz c alte variabile dect
intervenia specific ar putea fi responsabile de eficiena perceput a acesteia. Literatura
precedent sugereaz c elemente cum ar fi variabile ce in de client, variabile ce in de
terapeut i variabile ce in de proces contribuie mai mult la eficiena unei intervenii dect
intervenia n sine (Bergin & Garfield, 1994).
Analiza de coninut a ntrebrilor deschise la care au rspuns clienii din studiul
curent a extras teme centrale ale motivelor pentru care interveniile religioase au fost
percepute ca fiind eficace sau ineficace. Per ansamblu, aceste rspunsuri au indicat o
coincidere semnificativ ntre competena general de consiliere i competena n
utilizarea interveniilor religioase. De exemplu, clienii s-au concentrat n general pe
factori ca dobndirea unei noi perspective, dobndirea ateniei pozitive din partea
terapeutului i adresarea necesitilor clientului, mai degrab dect pe interveniile
religioase specifice, atunci cnd au listat motive pentru care interveniile religioase ar
putea fi eficace. n mod similar, s-au concentrat n general pe factori ca livrarea
ineficient atunci cnd au listat explicaii pentru experienele ineficiente legate de
interveniile religioase n terapie. Date fiind aceste rezultate, nu ar fi surprinztor dac
cercetri ulterioare ar confirma faptul c efectele potenate asociate cu interveniile
religioase (Smith et al., in press) se datoreaz factorilor generali ce influeneaz relaia
terapeutic i expectanele clientului, la fel de mult ca impactului interveniei n sine.
Ca rspuns la cele dou ntrebri deschise despre eficiena i ineficiena
interveniilor religioase, clienii din acest studiu au listat de dou ori mai multe situaii n
care interveniile au fost eficiente fa de situaii n care au fost ineficiente. Au raportat,
de asemenea, o varietate de efecte cognitive i emoionale pozitive care au emers din
utilizarea interveniilor religioase. De exemplu, civa clieni au indicat c au resimit mai
mult confort i mai mult ncredere interacionnd cu cineva care le mprtete
credinele religioase i valorile, o concluzie care a fost consecvent i n cercetrile
anterioare (de ex. Bergin & Jensen, 1990). n orice caz, o descoperire care nu a mai fost
n mod particular menionat n cercetrile anterioare este faptul c unii dintre clienii din
studiul de fa au considerat c abordarea problematicii religioase n terapie a ncurajat
experiene transcendente, cum ar fi perceperea influenei lui Dumnezeu n viaa lor.
Psihologii, n general, au evitat sau au minimizat experienele care nu sunt observabile
(Bergin, 1980 ; 1991), dar decizia de a a evita experienele transcendente s-ar putea s nu
fie justificabil, dat fiind faptul c i alte variabile psihologice (nereligioase) se bazeaz,
de asemenea, exclusiv pe percepiile participanilor la terapie. Cercetrile ulterioare ar
putea avea de ctigat de pe urma mai bunei nelegeri a acestor experiene, din
perspectiva clienilor.
Cu toate c situaiile n care interveniile religioase au fost eficiente au fost
descrise mai frecvent dect situaiile n care acestea au fost ineficiente, faptul c 37 dintre
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clieni au raportat totui existena unor intervenii religioase ineficiente este esenial de a
fi luat n considerare. Convergent cu accentul plasat de Chapelle (2000) pe importana ca
terapeutul s nu impun valorile sale proprii, clienii care au luat parte la acest studiu au
preferat ca terapeuii s se lase condui de ei n discutarea problemelor de ordin religios.
Descrierile de ctre clieni a altor aspecte de ineficien ale interveniilor religioase au
mers n paralel cu aspectele discutate anterior n literatura de specialitate, cu privire la
contextul n care se desfoar terapia i la natura relaiei terapeutice (Richards & Bergin,
2005), ca de exemplu preocuprile referitoare la faptul c terapeutul i asum un rol
ecleziastic sau la timpul de inserare (timing) a interveniilor religioase. Aceste ngrijorri
sunt n concordan cu constatrile lui Worthington i ale colegilor (1988), care au sesizat
c momentul de inserare (timing) a unei intervenii este mult mai important pentru terapia
efectiv, dect numrul de intervenii spirituale utilizate de ctre un terapeut. Clienii care
au acuzat n trecut experiene provocatoare de anxietate sau insulttoare n legtur cu
aspecte ce in de religie, au precizat faptul c, n cazul lor, simpla introducere a
interveniilor religioase dobndete conotaii negative, cu precdere sentimente de
vinovie vizavi de propriile lor insuficiene/inadecvri. Anumii clieni cred c
psihoterapia este este un cadru nepotrivit pentru a discuta subiecte religioase, indiferent
de consideraiile contrare. Prin urmare, interveniile religioase nu ar trebui privite ca un
lucru subneles, chiar i n cadrul clinicilor asociate cu organizaii religioase, necesitnd
aprobarea clientului.
Uneori, clienii percep intervenia religioas din cadrul psihoterapiei ca fiind
ineficient, din cauza dificultilor la nivelul aplicrii (comunicare deficitar). Studii
anterioare au indicat faptul c o minoritate dintre clinicieni exprimau ncredere i
competen privind integrarea subiectelor religioase n cadrul terapiei (Shafranske i
Malony, 1990; Young, Cashwell, Wiggins-Frame, i Belaire, 2002). Programele
doctorale nu abordez adecvat subiecte religioase (Brawer, Handal, Frabicatore, Roberts,
i Wajda Johnson, 2002; Walker i colab. 2004), iar acest lips de pregtire ar putea
determina: evitarea acestor subiecte de ctre terapeut, supracompensarea pentru lipsa de
pregtire printr-o preocupare excesiv pentru acest aspect sau aplicarea ineficient a
inteveniilor religioase n momentul n care ncearc. Ne-am alturat altor academicieni n
recomandarea de a aborda n mod serios a aspectele privind pregtirea profesional
pentru abordarea religiei i pentru aplicarea interveniilor religioase (Crook-Lyon i
colab, 2007; Young, Cashwell i Wiggins-Frame, 2007).
Limite ale studiului
Rezultatele studiului prezint o serie de caliti. n primul rnd, dei participanii au
fost diveri la nivel de vrst, gen, origine geografic, probleme prezentate, au fost relativ
omogeni prin statutul de studeni ai unor colegii cretine (Biserica ZTS). Totui,
rezultatele obinute nu au fost diferite de cele gsite n alte cercetri (Moon i colab,
1993; Worthington i colab., 1988). Datele noastre nu prezint experienele individuale
din alte denominaii religioase sau cu alte orientri religioase. n plus, acest studiu
investigheaz terapia religioas practicat ntr-un centru universitar promovat de
Biserica ZTS, deci rezultatele nu reprezint practici din alte contexte de terapie. Din
cauza omogenitii din cadrul universitii, este posibil ca terapeuii s fie mai
confortabili n adresarea sincer unor subiecte religioase n cadrul terapiei, dect
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terapeuii din cadre caracterizate prin diversitate denominal, unde ar fi clar necesitatea
aplicrii unei abordri ecumenice. Cu toate acestea, Bergin i Payne (1991) au afirmat c
studiul centrat pe denominare poate fi util pentru acest domeniu, iar noi ndemnm
efectuarea unor studii comparative cu alte populaii i n alte cadre. Cercetrile ulterioare
ar trebui s continue evaluarea perspectivei clientului cu privire la utilitatea interveniilor
religioase n cadrul psihoterapiei, n mod particular cnd clienii, inclusiv cei 26% de
studeni din universiti religioase, raporteaz distres moderat spre extrem cauzat de
problemele religioase sau spirituale.
Utilizarea auto-rapoturilor ca metod de colectare a datelor este o alt limit potenial a
studiului. Nu am putut face dinstincia ntre interveniile realizate cu adevrat i
interveniile raportate, iar rezultatele sunt expuse unui bias de mono-operaionalizare.
(Cook i Campbell, 1979). Am euat n evaluarea simptomatologiei sau strii de bine a
clientului, ca funcie a interveniei puse la dispoziie. Mai mult, interveniile religioase nu
au fost stardardizate ntre terapeui, deci se poate s fi existat o variabilitate considerabil
n felul n care a fost abordat fiecare tip de intervenie pentru diversele cazuri de terapie.
n cele din urm, din cauz c nu toi clienii care s-au prezentat la centrul de consiliere
au dorit s completeze chestionarul, participanii la acest studiu se poate s fi diferit de
non-participani n moduri care ar fi putut biasa rezultatele (de ex., participanii au putut
fi mai motivai sau mai compliani dect non-participanii, fapt ce poate reflecta diferene
implicite n ceea ce privete simptomele depresive sau dispoziia de a pune n discuie
conveniile sociale, inclusiv normele religioase etc.)
Sumar
Reacionnd la un hiatus existent n literatura actual (Chamberlain, 1996;
Richards & Bergin, 2005; Richards & Potts, 1995), acest studiu a evaluat perspectivele
clienilor legate de adecvarea i utilitatea interveniilor religioase n cadrul psihoterapiei.
Studiul a confirmat faptul c clienii religioi (LSD/ membri ai Bisericii Zilei Tuturor
Sfinilor) percep, n general, interveniile de natur religioas ca fiind adecvate i utile n
psihoterapie. Cu toate acestea, exist cteva aspecte importante, de care terapeuii trebuie
s in cont. Atunci cnd este implementat, orice intervenie religioas trebuie s fie n
acord cu valorile clientului, cu nivelul su de pregtire pentru o asemenea intervenie i
cu motivele pentru care acesta urmeaz terapia. Clienii doresc s fie susinui, nu
manipulai. La fel cum se ntmpl cu orice alt fel de intervenie terapeutic, i n cazul
acesta, terapeuii ar trebui s evalueze cu atenie i s fie ghidai de preferinele i
perspectivele clientului.
Datele prezentate aici, ce in de preferinele i perspectivele privitoare la
interveniile religioase, ar trebui s ofere informaii studiilor ulterioare privitoare la
rezultate/consecine (Worthington & Sandage, 2002). Studiile de psitoterapie existente
susin c interveniile religioase sunt ntr-adevr mai eficace n cazul clienilor religioi,
comparativ cu terapiile laice (Smith et al., in press), ns pasul urmtor pentru cercettori
este s progreseze n nelegerea proceselor prin care interveniile de natur religioas
amelioreaz simptomele clienilor. Studiul prezent accentueaz importana insight-ului
sporit i a percepiilor reformate prilejuite de inserarea perspectivei religioase n terapie,
i de asemenea a beneficiilor relaionale i emoionale aparente. Atribuirile fcute de
clieni experienelor transcendente (de ex., sentimente de apropiere fa de Dumnezeu),
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Bibliografie
(...)
ARTICOL TRADUS DE
Laura Belean
Ramona Monica Rad
Cristina Tacaciu
17
The Role of Religion in Therapy: Time for Psychologists to Have a Little
Faith?
Kevin S. Masters
PII:
DOI:
Reference:
S1077-7229(10)00052-0
doi:10.1016/j.cbpra.2009.11.003
CBPRA 272
To appear in:
Received date:
Accepted date:
16 November 2009
23 November 2009
Please cite this article as: , The Role of Religion in Therapy: Time for
Psychologists to Have a Little Faith?, Cognitive and Behavioral Practice (2010),
doi:10.1016/j.cbpra.2009.11.003
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COMMENTARY
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The Role of Religion in Therapy: Time for Psychologists to Have a Little Faith?
Abstract
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The argument has been made that religious and spiritual (R/S) forms of treatment, or R/S
adaptations of existing treatments, are an appropriate, culturally sensitive, and potentially
efficacious method of intervention when working clinically with religious patients experiencing
psychological, behavioral, or physiological dysfunction. The previous articles in this special
series describe four such interventions designed for use with patients with particular presenting
problems including serious mental illness, cancer, eating disorders, and scrupulosity. This article
offers a brief historical presentation on the growth of interest in R/S in clinical psychology and
behavioral medicine, with particular attention to the general issue of the role of values in therapy,
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and includes criticisms of integrating R/S in treatment. The difficulty of appreciating unique R/S
perspectives and their relevance for particular clients is emphasized and the question of whether
a true understanding of R/S beliefs necessarily leads to better health is examined. Each of the
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four therapies presented in this special series is individually analyzed, and it is clear that they
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offer sensitive and culturally relevant approaches to treating the various disorders, though areas
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of potential improvement or possible confusion are highlighted. Finally, the following are
deemed essential if R/S-informed therapies are to impact the field and be appropriately
introduced with clients: (a) training of future and current practitioners; (b) longitudinal research
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on R/S; (c) outcome studies of R/S interventions; and 4) adequate funding for the achievement of
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these goals.
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Well-known sportswriter Mitch Albom has the current (November, 2009) New York Times
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number-one nonfiction bestseller with his book Have a Little Faith (Albom, 2009). The work
chronicles the faith experiences of two men: Alboms rabbi from his youth and an African-
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American inner-city preacher working with the homeless in Detroit. In the rabbi, we read of a
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man whose faith was a continuous lifelong journey that touched the lives not only of the
members of his synagogue but many others in profound ways. This is symbolized at one point by
the story of his delivery of a eulogy at the funeral of the Catholic priest whose church was next-
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door to the synagogue. For the preacher, the faith journey was quite different. Heavily involved
in illicit drug abuse, one night he feared being shot by the dealers he had robbed and so he
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prayed to Jesus, promising that if his life would be spared then he would serve God with his
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remaining days. Though many have no doubt offered similar prayers in such times of duress and
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failed to follow through, this man kept the promise. His life literally changed overnight: the next
day he began a self-imposed drug detoxification that started him down the path to a life of
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ordination and religious service among the down-and-out of society. The book speaks of
transformation, of the power of faith to change and enrich lives in both dramatic and small,
everyday ways. It poignantly notes that for the person of religious faith, all of life is conceived
and viewed through the lens of belief. In short, these individuals cannot live without it.
This has, of course, been true throughout the ages. The major world religions have
survived numerous proclamations of their imminent demise precisely because they possess
extraordinary power to change lives, to offer rebirth and renewal, new beginnings. So I find it
strange that psychology, particularly the applied area of psychologythe area that is largely
concerned with change processeshas for so long viewed religious faith as, at best, irrelevant
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and perhaps pathogenic. Social psychologist Robert Hogan stated, Religion is the most
important social force in the history of man [sic] But in psychology, anyone who gets
involved in or tries to talk in an analytic, careful way about religion is immediately branded a
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meathead; a mystic; an intuitive, touchy-feely sort of moron (quoted in Bergin, 1980, p. 99).
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Fortunately this view, though perhaps still held privately, is no longer dominant in psychology.
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As demonstrated by this series, and many other special issues of prominent peer-reviewed
scientific journals over the last decade, religion and spirituality (R/S) have become legitimate
areas of inquiry in psychology and other behavioral sciences as well as in epidemiology and, to a
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lesser extent, medicine. The Society of Behavioral Medicine has a Spirituality and Health
Special Interest Group (SIG) whose membership total ranks 10th out of 18 SIGs. Masters (2007)
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addressing R/S. This trend began in about 1980 and substantially increased in around 1990, with
religion.
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recent movement showing a greater rate of increase for articles pertaining to spirituality than
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There are many factors that likely played a role in this increased interest in R/S. As
articles in the present series noted, religious beliefs and practices are highly prevalent in the U.S.
population. Though accurate religious service attendance figures are difficult to gather and some
reports may be overestimates (Hadaway & Marler, 2005), it is clear that for at least a significant
percentage of the population, religion is important to daily life. This widespread acceptance of
religion in the American culture has potentially important research funding implications. To
obtain support from the National Institutes of Health, it has become essential to demonstrate the
public health significance of the study. Thus, introductory sections to published articles and grant
funding proposals consistently portray the disease or health relevant behavior under study as of
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utmost importance to the health of the country, often on the basis of how pervasive it is. In this
environment, demonstrating that religious faith is widespread is a noteworthy beginning. But
there is no reason to believe that the percentage of Americans for whom religion is important has
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in any significant way increased in recent times. What is new, however, is the appearance of
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several large epidemiological studies and meta-analyses, some of which included appropriate
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Hummer, Rogers, Nam, & Ellison, 1999; McCullough, Hoyt, Larson, Koenig, & Thoresen,
2000; Oman, Kurata, Strawbridge, & Cohen, 2002). A behavior or phenomenon that a large
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segment of the population participates in, deems important, and also affects health should draw
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understanding both behavioral pathology and its treatment. An important pioneer in this regard is
Jerome Frank, who in his classic 1961 work Persuasion and Healing (subsequent editions
published in 1973 and 1991) noted that the therapeutic encounter takes place within a certain
cultural context that influences definitions of illness, acceptable treatments, and what it means to
be healthy. Frank was clearly ahead of his time, but the movement toward respect and
understanding of ethnic and cultural factors as they impact therapy process and outcome has
been perhaps the major accomplishment in clinical psychology in the last two decades.
Currently, definitions of evidence-based practice by both the American Psychological
Association (APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006) and the Council
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for Training in Evidence-Based Behavioral Practice (2009) include specific reference to patient
values and culture. Further, the Guidelines and Principles for Accreditation of Programs in
Professional Psychology (APA Commission on Accreditation, 2009) and the APA Ethical
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explicitly recognize the importance of respect and competence when it comes to religious issues
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The factors noted above have important implications for psychological and behavioral
practice, but a watershed event of relevance to this discussion occurred in 1980 when Allen
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values were an important and potentially helpful aspect of therapy. Not everyone agreed then and
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not everyone agrees now, but the work of Bergin and many others, particularly Larry Beutler,
demonstrated the centrality and importance of values in therapy and behavior change. Beutlers
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work through the 1970s to 1990s established that patients tended to adopt the values of their
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specific therapists. Previously, other investigators (Murray, 1956; Truax, 1966) demonstrated
that even Carl Rogers was not able to keep values out of therapythat he systematically
rewarded and punished expressions on the basis of what he liked and disliked. Clearly any
encounter wherein two people come together and one has as his/her function in the relationship
to help-influence-facilitate-teach some kind of change in the other cannot be an encounter that is
value free. In fact, such an encounter will necessarily be quite the opposite, call it value
saturated. Choice of outcome goals, techniques, appropriate sequencing of events, and so forth
are all heavily influenced by values. It is in this regard that a common and significant thread runs
through the presentations found in this special series. What is different about these therapies, as
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opposed to many of their more standard counterparts, is the explicit acknowledgment of the
importance of values, particularly religious values, and the need to not only respect but actively
incorporate them in the service of therapeutic change. Weisman de Mamani and colleagues
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(2010; this issue) note that R/S values may bolster the effects of psychotherapy because they
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incorporate themes of gratitude, forgiveness, and empathy, which are essential in the therapeutic
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process (p. xx). Karekla and Constantinou (2010; this issue) adapt Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy (ACT) for use with cancer patients, in part because of the central nature of values in this
approach and the importance it places on living in congruence with ones values. Similarly,
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Spangler (2010; this issue) notes that client values are deliberately explored (p. xx), again with
the likely possibility of uncovering discrepancies between what patients purposely and
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consciously value and what they are doing when engaged in eating disordered behavior. Finally,
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Huppert and Siev (2010; this issue) offer a very thoughtful and culturally sensitive approach to
treating scrupulosity among religious individuals and note that the therapeutic process includes
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helping the patient notice how symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) interfere with
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other highly valued areas of life, including religious observance and family. These four
therapeutic approaches take seriously the imperative to be not only culturally sensitive but to go
beyond this and be culturally informed, the culture in this case being distinguished by its
religious perspective and traditions.
But do they go too far? Weisman de Mamani and colleagues (2010; this issue) note,
we talk to clients about the research pointing to positive links between religion and psychological
adjustment, and we engage them in a conversation about the potentially beneficial role of
religion and spirituality in their own lives as a means of coping with adversity (p. xx). This is
exactly what Richard Sloan (Sloan & Bagiella, 2002; Sloan, Bagiella, & Powell, 1999, 2001) has
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warned behavioral medicine practitioners to avoid. Sloan posits many reasons why religion
should stay out of therapy, but principle among them are fears of coercion, violations of privacy,
the possibility of doing harm, and discrimination against individuals for whom religion is not
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important. (Note that Sloans written comments seem more directed toward medical practice, but
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clearly his point is that health professionals need to steer clear of religion when engaged in
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therapies in this issue fall under Sloans indictment.) Sloan analogizes that even though it is
known that marriage is good for mental and physical health, practitioners would not instruct an
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unmarried patient to marry because this would be a violation of privacy that would overstep the
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too narrow and consequently excludes much of what is essential to human health and well-being.
Though researchers and therapists operate in a world of highly differentiated and specific
theoretical constructs, patients come as whole organisms. They connect the dots of their lives;
they integrate experience and find understanding and meaning in it. In fact, a major drive of
humans is the quest for wholeness, to feel an integration and consistency among their beliefs,
feelings, actions, experiences, and so forth. For religious patients, their religious beliefs often
form the point of integration, the fulcrum in the void, that brings together life experiences. To
them, mental and physical function cannot be divorced from R/S aspects of life, and therapists
that attempt to do so with these patients will find themselves distant from those they are treating.
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But Sloans objections deserve hearing, for in the area of religion, as in any culturally
sensitive domain, the possibilities for misunderstanding, inefficiency, and even harm are
numerous. In one instance Sloan (Sloan et al., 2001) argues that discussions of religious
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activities (e.g., suggestions to attend church) take up scarce intervention time that could be better
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spent in many other ways that have stronger empirical support for their effectiveness. Indeed, it
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seems that one of the risks of developing forms of therapy that specifically integrate religious
perspectives might be the tendency to overemphasize the importance of religious influences.
Therapists in the past were often accused of conforming patients problems to the therapists
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preferred form of treatment. The relevance of particular R/S interventions must vary according to
the idiographic characteristics of the patient, the problem, the particular point in time, etc.
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monitor their own exuberance to make sure that their therapeutic approach creates the best
chance for a successful outcome for the client.
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A related issue pertains to developing an understanding for how the particular client
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integrates religious concerns. Not only do different identified religious groups differ in their
beliefs, but individuals within religious groups also show substantial heterogeneity in terms of
not only the content of their beliefs but also in the relative importance those beliefs have for their
psychological functioning. Thus, for example, knowing that someone is Catholic, Mormon,
Presbyterian, or Jewish is informative but until the therapist understands what this means for the
particular individual as applied to the current therapeutic problem, the possibility for
misunderstanding remains great. Fortunately, the therapies presented in this special section are
very alert to this issue and clearly specify that therapists must understand the unique workings of
religion for their particular clients before effective integration of religious constructs can begin.
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The writers are also sensitive to the need to sometimes include clergy in order to better
understand particular beliefs from the official perspective of the religious group. This can be
important for correction when patients have a misunderstanding of their religious organizations
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views and thus are likely applying them in ways that reinforce pathology rather than health.
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However, as these therapies become more widely disseminated it will be essential that those
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training others in their application remain vigilant to emphasize the need for understanding the
religion of the individual.
An assumption potentially underlying the integration of R/S values into therapy that
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deserves at least brief discussion is the idea that these religious values are, ipso facto, healthy.
Thus if individuals truly understood and applied the religious precepts in the manner intended by
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the authors of the faith they would experience mental health and, to the extent that mental health
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influences physiological functioning, physical health as well. I cannot say if this assumption is
accurate. In an empirical sense this seems to be a question that can be addressed, but not
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answered. The obstacles are numerous. For example, whose interpretation of the faith is the
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correct/intended interpretation and therefore the one to empirically study? What, in fact, are the
essential characteristics of mental health? Nevertheless, it is possible to make empirically
informed statements on the basis of testable hypotheses regarding the relations between specific
religious values and particular mental health variables. In fact, Bergin (1980) declared several
such hypotheses, and data addressing them are now available. Further, there are centuries of
evidence suggesting that the principles of the worlds religions have stood the test of time, that
they offer to believers something important and beneficial for their lives. But surely any
consideration of religious values and mental health also needs to take into account the particular
culture surrounding a person who holds specific beliefs. The Bible, for example, in many places
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suggests that faithfulness to Christian morals and principles is antithetical to the social standards
accepted by the surrounding culture (in biblical terms, the world). In such instances the believer
could expect persecution, ostracism, or at least a feeling of not fitting in. Could this cause mental
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health concerns for these individuals? (I use Christianity as the example but the principle applies
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to any faith). Finally, consider the purpose of religion. I make no pretense to being a theologian
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or church historian, but it seems that the emphasis in religious teaching has historically been the
development of faith and the ability to follow the precepts of that particular religion because
these teaching are true, not because they are necessarily comfortable or emotionally satisfying in
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ones particular life circumstance. This is a noteworthy distinction. One might hypothesize that
certain religious teaching could, in some circumstances, be quite comforting. For example, when
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one is ill and believes that a loving God is personally comforting and controlling the events, a
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sense of peace or relaxation may follow. Alternatively, the belief that one should attempt to win
converts to the faith may present religious individuals with a significant inner struggle in terms
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of being faithful to this teaching and acting on it in daily life in addition to desiring to not be
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Weisman de Mamani et al. challenge traditional thinking by proposing a form of treatment for
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those suffering from serious mental illness that purposely includes religious perspectives. They
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offer an excellent and informative review of the literature on previous attempts to incorporate
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religious principles into treatment and cite positive (e.g., discussions of spiritual resources,
strivings, forgiveness, intrinsic religiosity, positive religious coping) and negative (e.g.,
obsessive prayer or Bible reading) uses of religion. Importantly, they directly discuss the issue of
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religiously themed delusions, clearly an area worthy of more research. In this regard one
question that seems deserving of investigation is the possible influence of a religiously oriented
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or informed therapist on clients willingness to report religious delusions. Given the episodic
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course of many serious mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, patients have periods of greater
and lesser understanding of their external world and interpersonal relationships. During the times
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when patients are in relatively better contact with their therapist and therefore have greater
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sensitivity to interpersonal nuance and better communication, is it possible that patients could
feel inhibited about disclosing experiences of religious delusions when talking with a religiously
oriented therapist? This is an interesting question for study.
Weisman de Mamanis team (2010; this issue) notes that they have two forms of their
Exploring Your Spirituality handout. One uses overtly religious or spiritual language whereas the
other, intended for families that are not religious, focuses on existential beliefs about meaning
and purpose. A possible research question pertains to whether religious families would actually
have better outcomes with the overtly R/S treatment. In this regard I am reminded of the
somewhat surprising results from the well-known study by Propst and colleagues (Propst,
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Ostrom, Watkins, Dean, & Mashburn, 1992), found that found nonreligious therapists who used
a religious form of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) with religious clients had better
outcomes than religious therapists using the same treatment. This was not predicted and so far as
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I know has never been adequately explained, but it demonstrates that when it comes to religion
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Finally, case study one in this article raises a host of significant concerns that will be
encountered by those attempting to use spiritually oriented therapy. The client presents with an
unorthodox combination of beliefs drawn from many different traditions and streams of thought.
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For some therapists, even those working within a spiritual perspective, it may be difficult to
meaningfully operate within a clients worldview if that view presents unusual beliefs or beliefs
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that the therapist personally finds untenable. It is noteworthy that one of the therapeutic tactics in
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this case was steering the conversation away from philosophical conjecture and back toward
topics that seemed more directly related to coping. A basic pragmatism is, in my opinion, good
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for therapists of all stripes. But one can easily see how it might be difficult to work toward
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pragmatic ends without in some way conveying to clients that their particular beliefs are not
being taken seriously. A therapists philosophical conjecture may be a clients central belief! To
avoid the trap of getting caught up in theological or philosophical discussion that may in fact be
irrelevant to the treatment, the therapist needs sensitivity and careful judgment. I appreciate the
authors sharing this case as it highlights many challenges to be understood and met when
applying an R/S-informed therapy.
Religious Coping and Cancer: Proposing an Acceptance and Commitment Therapy Approach
(Karekla & Constantinou, 2010; this issue)
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Karekla and Constantinou introduce the idea of adapting ACT to a spiritual perspective for use
with cancer patients. They provide a concise overview of religious coping, discuss subtypes of
coping styles, and note factors that influence whether and what type of religious coping is used.
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They specifically identify mechanisms that may mediate effects of R/S for cancer patients and
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provide a detailed review of religious coping measures. In their discussion of the Functional
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characterized as more spiritual or religious) one must answer in what would generally be
considered a mentally healthy way. In studies attempting to demonstrate that R/S predicts mental
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health, use of these measures presents a case of confounding the predictor with the outcome. It is
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important that when investigators are interested in ascertaining relations between R/S variables
and mental health outcomes that they carefully consider the issue of conceptual overlap between
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measures. It is not enlightening for the study of R/S to demonstrate that one measure of mental
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health predicts the score on another measure of mental health. Careful construct definition and
measurement is essential to avoid this pitfall.
Another major issue that these authors highlight is the paucity of studies that assess
religious coping over time (i.e., longitudinal investigations). They note that individuals may
experience change in the quantity (more or less) of their faith or they may even change faiths. In
fact, the recent Pew report on religion in America (Pew Research Center, 2008) noted a complex
pattern of change characterizing Americans that are members of a faith tradition different from
the one they were raised in. Though there are cross-sectional studies of individuals at all ages,
there are very few studies of individuals across time. This limits progress in many ways. Not
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only does it make it difficult to discuss R/S development across the lifespan but it also makes it
exceedingly hard to determine the temporal sequence of events. Prayer is one example. There is
logical and empirical support for the following hypotheses: (a) there is a positive relationship
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between prayer and illness, and (b) there is a positive relationship between prayer and health.
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When people become ill they are likely to increase their prayer life; thus, more prayer is
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associated with worse health. But people who pray regularly may also find peace with God,
experience relaxation, and thus more prayer could be associated with better health or disease
prevention. These can only be teased apart if the progression over time of both prayer and health
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Incorporation of ACT into a treatment that utilizes R/S perspectives is both appropriate
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and timely. Spangler (2010; this issue) also uses aspects of ACT in her approach to treating
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eating disorders. It is noteworthy that many of the so-called third-wave CBTs alloweven
encouragespiritual application. ACT is establishing an impressive empirical record and seems
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philosophically amenable to most R/S perspectives. It is not coincidence that two of the therapies
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Throughout the article Spangler cites many different religious concepts or practices that are
relevant to eating and potentially to the development and sustenance of eating disorders. In
general, I agree with this premise, but I register two concerns. First, she seems somewhat
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whether these are distortions by clients of healthier messages inherent in the religious teaching.
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She states, Several theologians from major world religious traditions similarly conceptualize the
nature of the body as carnal, degraded, in need of discipline, and something to eventually be
discarded Some Christian religions regard the body as a vexation for the spirit Moreover,
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several major world religions that are based upon the Bible support anti-body conceptualizations
by interpreting sin as entering the world through the disobedient bodily appetite of a woman
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(p. x). Is this true? Again, the reader is cautioned that I am not a theologian. Nevertheless, I did
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minor in biblical studies as an undergraduate, have degrees from universities affiliated with
Baptist, Catholic, and Mormon traditions, and over the last 35 years have been at least a
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Conservative, and Mormon churches. I have never heard a healthy religious individual, be they
clergy, professor, or parishioner, espouse these views. There may be historical precedent for such
thoughts in centuries gone by, but I highly doubt that they have credibility or widespread
dissemination today, and I am therefore skeptical about their involvement in the etiology of
eating disorders, among religious individuals. Later in the manuscript Spangler repeats many of
these views, however, she also discusses at length how those with eating disorders distort Bible
passages to match their neurotic needs and that the cure for this is a proper understanding of
scripture. She also suggests that clients, as they make changes in therapy, should check with
clergy to determine if their beliefs about their body align with the teachings of their religious
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tradition. She states, Typically, clients are pleasantly surprised to find that leaders in their
religious tradition endorse their new experiences and ideas of the body and its sensory capacities
as good and God-given (p. xx). Spangler (2010; this issue) concludes by noting, Moreover,
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clients can marshal religious beliefs or practices to support maladaptive beliefs and behaviors
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wholly unintended by the religion (p. xx, emphasis added). On the one hand, she seems to state
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that religious beliefs, endorsed by theologians, potentially reinforce disordered thinking that
could contribute to eating disorders, but on the other hand she notes that clients think in
maladaptive ways never intended by the religion. Based both on my understanding of these
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matters, as well as the arguments presented by Spangler, the second option seems more likely.
My second concern, related to the first, is that I believe Spangler (2010; this issue)
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overstates the potential role of religious belief and teaching in the development of eating
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disorders. Clearly this point flows from the one above, and if I am wrong there I might well be
wrong here as well. But it seems to me that cultural ideals regarding beauty and attractiveness, as
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communicated in a media-saturated world, possibly along with family dynamics and genetic
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patterning, account for the major portion of variance in the etiology of eating disorders. R/S
beliefs, in my view, come in to play as attempts to somehow make the disordered thoughts
congruent with ones religion, a valued aspect of life. This is, of course, an empirical question
suggesting, again, the need for longitudinal research.
None of my misgivings, however, regarding the role of religious factors in the etiology of
eating disorders should be interpreted as arguments against incorporation of religious precepts in
their treatment. Spangler (2010; this issue) cites evidence of the importance of R/S variables in
recovery, even for clients treated in non-spiritually-oriented therapy. Further, for exactly the
reasons cited by Spangler, I view the incorporation of healthy religious perspectives into
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treatment as a valuable strategy in helping clients appreciate that religion, properly understood,
teaches them the value of not only their life but also the gift that is their body. A particularly
poignant aspect of this treatment occurs when clients disappointed over how much of their time
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is consumed by their eating disorder opens the door for expanded discussion of religious values
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and better, more valued, uses of time. This section of the article is particularly worthy of note
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Huppert and Siev offer a fascinating discussion of and treatment for scrupulosity in religious
individuals, mostly focused on ultra-Orthodox Jewish patients. In the first paragraph they state,
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complicated interplay between psychopathology and clinical technique on the one hand, and
cultural sensitivity and patient values on the other (p. xx). Indeed, when I began reading their
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manuscript this thought was central. Though their focus was with ultra-Orthodox Jewish
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individuals, the issue has broad applicability across religious groups. From the perspective of
many mental health professionals, herein lies one of the common criticisms of religionthat it
promotes an irrational fear of sinning or not being perfect that causes anxiety and associated
emotional disturbance and dysfunction. Huppert and Siev put the question squarely: So how
does one distinguish OCD from strict, devout observance? (p. x). I found the treatment of this
theme, which permeated the article, to be not only thoroughly thoughtful and appropriate for
scrupulosity but applicable to virtually any potential mental disorder that exists within a religious
context. I will not repeat their observations here but strongly urge the reader to review them. The
related discussion pertaining to the risk of sin was brilliant, as was their recognition of the
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potential problems of such an approach and the need to consult with clergy to determine how this
concept integrates with religious teaching. The related discussion pertaining to thought exposure
as well as the differentiation between intentional and unintentional thoughts was similarly
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important, yet probably difficult to implement with many religious clients. I am reminded of the
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scripture where Jesus instructs that to lust after a woman is to commit sin, even in the absence of
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any accompanying behavior. Many observant and devout religious individuals must struggle
with the meaning of this passage (or similar ones from their faith) and how it might or might not
be possible to, without violating sacred command, engage in the type of tasks demanded by an
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As Spangler (2010; this issue) noted with eating disordered patients, Huppert and Siev
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(2010; this issue) point out that patients get so caught up in their symptomatic behavior that they,
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inadvertently, end up failing at the very religious devotion they desire. The insight that,
distancing from sin has become a goal in its own right, ironically more than serving God, and
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compelling.
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therefore tolerating acceptable risk of sin facilitates the service of God (pp. xx) was particularly
The discussion on including or consulting with clergy has broad applicability. Certainly
there is risk involved whenever a third party is included as an adjunct for therapyand with
clergy unique perils in terms of potential misunderstanding, professional turf issues, and
philosophical conflicts are possible. The importance of resisting the temptation to cherry pick
more liberal, agreeable, or known clergy is consistent with the general theme of this manuscript,
i.e., that respect for clients and their faith is preeminent in treatment. These authors have a strong
and abiding conviction that it is possible to adapt the treatment approach to work within the
clients religious-cultural orientation. I agree completely. But to do so requires something else
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these authors recommendthat is, knowledge of the rules, culture, and beliefs of the applicable
religious community.
Concluding Thoughts
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Together the articles in this series represent an important step forward in the integration
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of R/S frameworks and considerations into therapy. They present particular treatment approaches
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for specific disorders, but, more importantly, they provide general frameworks to integrate R/S
into treatment more broadly. This is perhaps their greatest contribution.
But will those in charge of the curricula of professional training programs take notice and
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implement instruction of such treatments? Rosmarin, Pargament, and Robb (2010; this issue), in
their introduction to this special series, noted that only 13% of doctoral training programs in
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North America offered a course on R/S. What is potentially even more disconcerting is the extent
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that R/S issues are (not) discussed in the context of training in cultural diversity. I do not have
hard data on this, but my over 9 years of experience as the director of a training clinic (in a
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heavily religious area of the country) and 5-plus years as a Director of Clinical Training at a
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different university in a different part of the country is that graduate students are, frankly, fearful
of approaching R/S issues in therapy and faculty generally lack any real understanding of them.
Consequently, R/S concerns are typically acknowledged as important but rarely discussed
much further. There are, however, encouraging developments. For example, I understand that a
special issue of Professional Psychology: Research and Practice is in preparation that will focus
on practice issues relevant to R/S. Further, the increase in empirical studies of R/S bodes well for
greater integration of R/S into treatment. Ultimately, however, psychologists will need to
overcome their own fears and biases if they are going to adequately learn about these patients
and the therapies that are adapted to their worldview.
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Finally, controlled outcome research demonstrating the efficacy and effectiveness of R/Sinformed treatments is essential. In the absence of such data, training directors and faculty can
hardly be criticized for offering a lukewarm reception to their implementation. This type of work
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is necessary, difficult, and expensive. I earnestly hope that funding sources, including federal
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agencies such as the National Institutes of Health, will recognize its importance and realize the
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potential value to millions of Americans and others throughout the world. It is the culturally
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References
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Bergin, A.E., (1980). Psychotherapy and religious values. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
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Clark, K.M., Friedman, H.S., & Martin, L.R. (1999). A longitudinal study of religiosity and
mortality risk. Journal of Health Psychology, 4, 381-391.
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Hadaway, C.K., & Marler, P.L. (2005). How many Americans attend worship each week? An
alternative approach to measurement. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 44,
307-322.
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Hummer, R.A., Rogers, R.G., Nam, C.B., & Ellison, C.G. (1999). Religious involvement and
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Huppert, J.D., & Siev, J. (2010). Treating scrupulosity in religious individuals using
cognitive-behavioral therapy. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 17, xx-xx.
Karekla, M., & Constantinou, M. (2010). Religious coping and cancer: Proposing an acceptance
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and commitment therapy approach. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 17, xx-xx.
Masters, K.S. (2007). Religiosity/spirituality and behavioral medicine: investigations concerning
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the integration of spirit with body. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 30, 287-289.
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McCullough, M.E., Hoyt, W.T., Larson, D.B., Koenig, H.G., & Thoresen, C. (2000). Religious
involvement and mortality: a meta-analytic review. Health Psychology, 19, 211-222.
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Sloan, R.P., & Bagiella, E. (2002). Claims about religious involvement and health outcomes.
Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 24, 14-21.
Sloan, R.P., Bagiella, E., & Powell, T. (1999). Religion, spirituality, and medicine. The Lancet,
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353, 664-667.
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Sloan, R.P., Bagiella, E., & Powell, T. (2001). Without a prayer: methodological problems,
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Weisman de Mamani, A., Tuchman, N., & Duarte, E.A. (2010). Incorporating
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religion/spirituality into treatment for serious mental illness. Cognitive and Behavioral
Author Note
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Address correspondence to Kevin S. Masters, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, 430 Huntington Hall, Syracuse
University, Syracuse, NY 13244; e-mail: kemaster@syr.edu
Abstract
In literatura medicala si psihologica se observa un interes aparent crescut in efectul
religie si spiritulaismului asupra sanatatii. Desi in trecut se considera ca religia avea un
rol negativ asupra sanatatii, cercetarile recente arata ca relatia acestora este mult mai
complexa. Acest articol sumarizeaza rezultatele din literatura de specialitate referitoare la
impactul religie si spiritualitatii asupra sanatatii fizice si mentale, concluzionand ca acesta
relatie este una benefica. Sunt propuse mecanismele explicative ale efectelor pozitive ale
religie si spritualitatii.
Introducere
Nu este surprinzator ca religia si spiritualitate raman importante pentru marea
majoritate a indivizilor dintr-o societate ca S.U.A care poate fi caracterizata ca fiind
fragmentata, deconecata si imbatranita (Thoresen, 1999). In raspuns, literatura dintr-o
varietate de discipline precum psihologia, medicina, sociologia, gerontologia si educatia
contin un numar crescand de studii care examineaza rolul religiei si spritualitatii asupra
sanatatii fizice si mentale.
Considerand acest rol, cercetatorii ar trebui sa aiba grija sa conceptualizeze adecvat
natura complexa a conceptelor de religie si spiritualitate. Aceste constructe nu pot fi strict
definite in termenii unui set specific de credinte si comportamente. Natura
multidimensionala atat a religiei, cat si a spiritualitatii a fost recent clasificata de catre un
grup de experti organizati de Institutul National al Imbatranirii. Acest grup a identificat
10 dimensiuni ale religie si spiritualitatii: istoria religioasa/spirituala, preferinta/afilierea,
participarea sociala, practica privata, stilurile de coping, credintele si valorile,
musulmana). Subiectii
selecati din mai multe regiuni (America de Nord, Asia, Africa) si din mai multe grupuri
etnice, masurandu-li-se gradul de religiozitate printr-o varietate de indici (participarea
activa la biserica, activitatea de rugaciune si alte masuratori subiective).
Efectele pozitive ale experientei religioase si spirituale asupra sanatatii sunt bazate
pe asumptia ca experienta in sine este pozitiva si "sanatoasa". Bineinteles, religia si
spiritualitatea pot fi de altfel si patologice: obedienta oarba sau autoritarism, interpretarea
literala, strict extrinseca sau auto beneficiara, sau fragmentata. Intr-adevar, asemenea
comportamente religioase sau spirituale nesanatoase pot sa aibe implicatii serioase pentru
sanatatea fizica, fiind asociate cu abuzuri in copilarie si respingere, conflicte intergrupale
si violenta, si false perceptii de control, rezultand in indiferenta asupra starii medicale
(Paloutzian & Kirkpatrick, 1995). Asemenea asocieri nesanatoase pot sa apara cand
individul crede ca el sau ea poate comunica direct cu Dumnezeu cu putin sau fara
facilitare sociala(ex. "Dumnezeu mi-a spus...") sau implica o amanare, o responsabilizare,
a elementului divin (ex. Dumnezeu ma va ajuta"; Pargament, 1997).
Cercetarile care investigheaza sanatatea mentala indica un efect protector similar al
religiei. Intr-o metaanaliza a 139 de cercetari care foloseau masuratori cantitative ale
angajamentului religios, Larson et al. (1992) au descoperit ca doar 39% raportau orice
asocieri, si din acestea, 72% au fost pozitive. Masuratorile variabilei religioase in aceste
studii au inclus rugaciunea, suportul social, relatia cu Dumnezeu, participarea la
ceremoniile religioase si credintele si valorile. Gartner (1996) a rezumat literatura
Emotiile
positive
(iertarea,
speranta,
multumirea,
iubirea)
pot
sa
fiziologice. Acest model este consistent cu celelalte regasite in literatura, care emfazeaza
rolul religiei ca
BIBLIOGRAFIE:
Fetzer
Institute/National
Institute
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(1999).
Multidimensional
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Research report
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Duke University Medical Center, Durham, NC, United States
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, United States
c
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Medicine, Wake Forest University Health Sciences, Winston-Salem, NC, United States
d
Department of Biostatistics and Bioinformatics, Duke University Medical Center, Durham, NC, United States
e
Duke Divinity School, Durham, NC, United States
f
Wake Forest University Department of Psychology, Winston-Salem, NC, United States
g
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Duke University Medical Center, Geriatric Research, Education, and Clinical Center, VA Medical Center,
Durham, NC, United States
b
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 18 January 2009
Received in revised form 11 April 2009
Accepted 27 April 2009
Available online 17 May 2009
Keywords:
Religion
Spirituality
Depression
Adolescents
a b s t r a c t
Objective: Previous research has uncovered relationships between religion/spirituality and
depressive disorders. Proposed mechanisms through which religion may impact depression
include decreased substance use and enhanced social support. Little investigation of these
topics has occurred with adolescent psychiatric patients, among whom depression, substance
use, and social dysfunction are common.
Method: 145 subjects, aged 1218, from two psychiatric outpatient clinics completed the Beck
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II), the Fetzer multidimensional survey of religion/spirituality, and
inventories of substance abuse and perceived social support. Measures were completed again six
months later. Longitudinal and cross-sectional relationships between depression and religion
were examined, controlling for substance abuse and social support.
Results: Of thirteen religious/spiritual characteristics assessed, nine showed strong cross-sectional
relationships to BDI-II score. When perceived social support and substance abuse were controlled
for, forgiveness, negative religious support, loss of faith, and negative religious coping retained
signicant relationships to BDI-II. In longitudinal analyses, loss of faith predicted less improvement
in depression scores over 6 months, controlling for depression at study entry.
Limitations: Self-report data, clinical sample.
Conclusions: Several aspects of religiousness/spirituality appear to relate cross-sectionally to
depressive symptoms in adolescent psychiatric patients. Findings suggest that perceived social
support and substance abuse account for some of these correlations but do not explain
relationships to negative religious coping, loss of faith, or forgiveness. Endorsing a loss of faith may
be a marker of poor prognosis among depressed youth.
2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Adolescent depression is an increasingly recognized and
concerning public health problem. Carrying a point preva Corresponding author. DUMC Box 3492, 718 Rutherford St., Durham, NC,
27705, United States. Tel.: +1 919 286 5260; fax: +1 919 286 7081.
E-mail address: rachel.dew@duke.edu (R.E. Dew).
0165-0327/$ see front matter 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jad.2009.04.029
150
151
Table 1
Subscales analyzed from the brief multidimensional measure of religiousness/spirituality.
Subscale
# items
Item range/directionality
Sample item
Mean
SD
Daily spiritual
experiences
Forgiveness
Private religious
practices
Positive religious
coping
Negative religious
coping
Positive religious
support
15.8
6.8
3
5
5.7
24.2
2.2
8.1
9.5
3.3
6.4
1.7
3.8
2.0
Negative religious
support
Commitment
6.3
1.8
Positive religious
history
Loss of faith
Organizational
religiousness
Overall
self-ranking
Meaning
2.3
0.9
3.0
0.9
1
2
1.6
7.0
0.5
3.1
5.0
1.6
4.1
1.6
152
153
Table 2
Bivariable and multivariable correlates of BDI-II score at Time 1.
Uncontrolled
analysis
Independent variable
Site
Age
Female gender
Caucasian
African American
Other race
SES
No religion
Conservative Protestant
Liberal Protestant
Catholic
Other religion
Substance abuse
Social support
Daily spiritual experiences
Forgiveness
Private religious practices
Positive religious coping
Negative religious coping
Positive religious support
Negative religious support
Commitment
Positive religious history
Loss of faith
Organizational religiousness
Overall self-ranking
Meaning
1.47
0.32
3.15
0.84
4.15
0.79
1.91
1.33
1.06
0.74
4.20
6.05
0.29
0.35
1.84
0.12
0.60
2.00
0.98
1.00
1.08
0.12
5.81
0.71
1.41
0.93
0.3772
0.4795
0.0599
0.6353
0.1595
0.2194
0.5940
0.4696
0.6576
0.8280
0.3069
0.0022
b .0001
0.0032
b .0001
0.2248
0.0176
b 0.0001
0.0171
0.0360
0.2521
0.8963
0.0006
0.0066
0.0063
0.0760
0.01
1.14
0.13
0.09
1.53
0.14
1.22
0.73
1.62
3.73
0.22
0.28
0.24
0.9157
0.0034
0.2018
0.7442
0.0006
0.7268
0.0045
0.4185
0.0612
0.0185
0.3941
0.5791
0.6573
0.06
1.18
0.23
0.33
1.14
0.06
0.59
2.26
0.89
4.33
0.55
0.87
0.10
0.8054
0.0221
0.1228
0.4956
0.0223
0.9026
0.1936
0.0787
0.3806
0.0086
0.0975
0.2190
0.8789
Religious variables entered into base model (gender, social support, and substance abuse).
154
this relationship to be apparent cross-sectionally and longitudinally. Our secondary hypothesis stated that social support
and substance abuse would mediate or explain the observed
relationships between religion/spirituality and depression.
The primary hypothesis was partially conrmed. Nine of
13 religious subscales related signicantly to BDI-II score in
uncontrolled analysis. Greater use of negative religious coping
and endorsing negative support from the religious community correlated with higher depression scores, as did endorsing having experienced a loss of faith. In contrast, daily
spiritual experiences, forgiveness, positive religious coping,
positive religious support, organizational religiousness, and
self-ranking as religious/spiritual were inversely related to
depressive symptoms. These ndings are consistent with
previous research (Ano and Vasconcelles, 2005; Dew et al.,
2008b; Knight et al., 2007; Koenig et al., 2001), and argue for a
more complex model of the religion/depression relationship;
all religious beliefs and experiences are not necessarily
related to better mental health.
Contrary to our hypothesis, longitudinal analysis showed
that only endorsing a loss of faith predicted less improvement
in depressive symptoms over time. This argues against the
hypothesis that religious beliefs or behaviors cause or prevent
depression, but rather correspond to concurrent level of
depression.
In accordance with our secondary hypothesis, that substance abuse and social support may serve as mechanisms
through which religiousness impacts depression, ve of the
nine subscales initially correlating with BDI-II score became
non-signicant when substance abuse and social support
were controlled. However, these two control variables failed
to completely explain the observed relationships: four
subscales forgiveness, negative religious coping, negative
religious support, and loss of faith, continued to relate
signicantly to BDI-II score despite control for substance
abuse and social support. The prospective contribution of loss
of faith to the variance in BDI-II change score also retained
signicance when controlled for these potential explanatory
variables. Accordingly, it appears that religion and spirituality
may relate to adolescent depression both indirectly through
social support and substance abuse, and also directly.
These ndings are consistent with other psychiatric
research. First, as in the adult literature, several aspects of
religiosity related inversely to depressive symptoms. Among
adults, similar relationships have been found cross-sectionally (Baetz et al., 2004; Hahn et al., 2004; Koenig et al., 2001),
and longitudinally (Braam et al., 2004; Koenig et al., 1998).
Also consistent is the observed association between negative
religious coping and higher levels of depression. This
relationship has been conrmed among adults in a recent
meta-analysis (Ano and Vasconcelles, 2005).
The nding that baseline loss of faith predicted less
improvement in depressive symptoms over time is consistent
with the idea that faith somehow protects against depression.
However, loss of faith does not seem to be the same as not
having faith, as this construct did not correlate with measures
of atheism or having no religion. It may be that it is
specically the loss rather than the absence of faith that is
important. Previous literature supportive of this idea includes
a study which found a decrease in religious faith predicted
greater use of mental health services among veterans with
155
156
Conict of interests
All authors declare that they have no conicts of interest.
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Abstract
Religions effects on mental health have been debated for years, yet only in the last half century have these
theories been empirically tested. While a number of mental health constructs have been linked to religion, one of
the most prevalent and debilitating mental health indices, anxiety, has been largely ignored. This paper categorizes
and critically reviews the current literature on religion and general indices of anxiety in terms of findings linking
decreased anxiety to religiosity, increased anxiety to religiosity, and those finding no relation between anxiety and
religiosity. Results from 17 studies are described and synthesized. Conceptual and methodological weaknesses that
potentially threaten the validity and generalizability of the findings are discussed. Finally, conclusions and
directions for future research are provided.
D 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Anxiety; Religiosity; Mental health
1. Introduction
Physicians and mental health professionals are finding growing evidence that humans spiritual lives
are related to physical and mental well-being (Koenig, McCullough, & Larson, 2001). Aspects of
religion have been linked to the outcomes of such physical ailments as cancer (Acklin, Brown, &
Mauger, 1983), kidney disease (Baldree, Murphy, & Powers, 1982), and heart disease (Croog & Levine,
1972). Other studies have examined the relation between religion and emotional constructs such as
depression (Braam et al., 1998), well-being (Ayele, Mulligan, Gheorghiu, & Reyes-Ortiz, 1999), and
self-esteem (Commerford & Reznikoff, 1996; Sherkat & Reed, 1992).
Relatively fewer studies have examined the relation between anxiety, a pervasive and ubiquitous
index of mental health, and religion. This paper will include a summary of the research on general
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-304-296-4440.
E-mail address: ashrev@mix.wvu.edu (A.K. Shreve-Neiger).
0272-7358/$ - see front matter D 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2004.02.003
380
indices of anxiety and religion. A critical review will follow that identifies potential conceptual and
methodological problems in the studies, as will a final section of recommendations for future research in
this area. Before this review, however, the definition of religion and the history of the debate on the
relation between religion and mental health will be discussed.
1.1. Defining religion
Many studies have tapped into one aspect of religion such as church attendance or frequency of
prayer. Relatively few have defined religion multidimensionally or utilized a psychometrically
standardized assessment of religion. This lack of a universally accepted definition and consequently
poor or varied operationalization of the construct has led to a number of contradictory or mixed findings.
Bergin (1983) asserted that ambiguous results reflect a multidimensional phenomenon that has both
positive and negative aspects.
Krause (1993) conceptualized religion as having three major components: organizational religiosity,
subjective religiosity, and religious beliefs. Organizational religiosity involves participation in religious
institutions and is frequently related to church attendance, church membership, or that aspect of religion
embedded in a larger organizational context. Subjective religiosity is related to commitment and the level
of importance people place on religion in their personal lives. Finally, religious beliefs are the core
beliefs people have as related to their religion and man or womans relationship to God. Krause claims
that the religious belief dimension has historically been that most neglected in religiosity research.
Some may posit that it is impossible to define a construct as personal and abstract as religion, but
recent work by researchers is demonstrating otherwise. Measures are being developed, such as that by
the Fetzer Institute (1999), that tap into multiple aspects of religion that have been identified by leading
researchers in the field.
Researchers from various disciplines at a series of recent conferences called for a definition of religion
that captured a number of characteristics and dimensions including feelings, thoughts, experiences and
behaviors that arise from a search for the sacred, with sacred referring to a divine being, Ultimate
Reality, or Ultimate Truth, as perceived by the individual (as cited in Koenig et al., 2001). While
assessing such seemingly abstract constructs as Ultimate Reality and Ultimate Truth appears daunting, a
move to define religion according to a number of dimensions that may affect mental health would be
advantageous for future research.
The terms religiosity and spirituality are used interchangeably in much of the literature.
Religiosity is frequently associated with overt behavior. It stipulates behavioral patterns and encourages
overt religious expression (Hill et al., 2000). As such, rituals and overt practice are key elements in the
construct of religion. Religion is generally linked to formal institutions such as churches, temples, or
synagogues. Personal beliefs are also a part of religiosity, but even more so are institutional beliefs (Hill
et al., 2000). The membership in an organization implicates the persons belief system with that which is
already established by that institution. Because religiosity is often associated with institutions, church
attendance is frequently viewed as a measure of religiosity (Lester, 1987). Church attendance is an overt
behavior that may easily be quantified and equated with religiosity. Church attendance can also serve as
a measure of social support.
In contrast to the more overt behavioral and institutional emphasis of religiosity, spirituality has more
to do with individual experience, and is generally linked to private events and transcendence (George,
Larson, Koenig, & McCullough, 2000; Hill et al., 2000; Piedmont, 1999). Spirituality is most often
381
described in personal or experiential terms, including belief or having a relationship with God or a
higher power (Hill et al., 2000). Spirituality is idiographic and covert. It is a broader category of
experience than religiosity that is not restricted to institutions or religions. Thus, spirituality does not
depend upon a collective or institutional context (Pargament, 1997), but rather is an independent
experience marked by a quest for meaning and an appreciation for nature and life in general.
Unfortunately, due to a number of studies utilizing religiosity and spirituality interchangeably, one is
sometimes difficult to discriminate from the other. A number of recent studies are based on measures of
religion rather than spirituality, but these studies tend to neglect that portion of the population that
considers themselves spiritual and not religious (George et al., 2000). There are multiple similarities and
differences between religiosity and spirituality. For example, there are many overt behavioral practices
associated with religiosity such as going to church, and many covert private behaviors associated with
spirituality, such as praying or meditating.
Another body of literature has described an aspect of religiosity termed religious coping, where
ones religion is a source through which critical life situations and stressors are dynamically processed
and understood. As a result, the person can cope and change can occur both cognitively and behaviorally
to meet the demands of the environment. The literature on religious coping and mental health is
extensive (see Pargament, 1997; Pargament, Smith, Koenig, & Perez, 1999), and interestingly, there
appear to be both positive (healthy) and negative (unhealthy) patterns of religious coping.
For the purposes of this review, the terms, religion and religiosity are defined broadly and
multidimensionally. Thus, studies are included that operationalize religion according to conceptual
aspects, such as intrinsic or extrinsic orientation, or organizational versus subjective religion. Studies that
examine one or more individual aspects of religion, such as affiliation, prayer, fundamentalism, or
church attendance, also are included.
1.2. The history of the debate
For years, prominent mental health professionals have commented on the relation between religion
and psychopathology, based primarily on anecdotes and case studies. Freud (1953) referred to religious
rituals as obsessivecompulsive acts and portrayed the religious person as neurotic, if not delusional.
Similarly, Ellis (1980) equated religiosity with being mentally unhealthy, inflexible, and intolerant.
Watters (1992) asserted that Christian doctrine, specifically, is incompatible with many components of
both sound mental and physical health (Koenig et al., 2001).
In stark contrast to these conceptualizations, other prominent mental health professionals, including
Rogers, Maslow, and Bandura, have claimed that religion is related to a number of positive mental
health outcomes (Bergin, 1985, 1991). Jung wrote that of his many hundreds of clients, he believed that
each fell ill because he had lost that which the living religions of every age have given to their
followers, and none of them has been really healed who did not regain his religious outlook (as cited in
Koenig et al., 2001).
Since the 1950s, various conceptualizations of religion as related to other constructs have been tested
empirically, resulting in a number of mixed and contradictory findings. In a critical review of the
literature relating religion to mental health, Sanua (1969) described a number of empirical studies that
found evidence for a positive relation between religiosity and psychopathology. Stark (1971), however,
also critically reviewed studies that attempted to test this relation and found the opposite to be
overwhelmingly the case, that religion was not only negatively correlated with psychopathology, but
382
was also related to healthful outcomes. Interestingly, although both of these authors were purporting to
review the existing relevant literature relating some aspect of religiosity to mental health, the studies that
were reviewed did not overlap.
Bergin (1983) also reviewed the existing literature and found no support for the assertion that religion
is correlated with psychopathology, but also found only slight support for its relation to positive or
healthful outcomes. Bergins review found that sociological and psychiatric reports were more favorable
to religion while the psychological literature tended to be more negative. Thus, it appears that the history
of the debate over religions relation to mental health is racked with inconsistencies and contradictory
findings that may ultimately be attributed to the researchers biases, poor operationalization of
constructs, or both. Perhaps overall mental health is simply too broad a construct to attempt to
assess in an empirical context. Assessing religions relation to one both prevalent and pervasive index of
mental health that preliminary work has suggested may be related to religiosity is more pragmatic.
Anxiety, as an index of mental health, meets all of these criteria.
1.3. Anxiety and religion
Although religion and its relation to a number of mental health disorders have been studied, relatively
fewer studies have addressed general indices of anxiety and their relation to religion. This lack of
research is surprising in light of studies demonstrating the reliance of many on religion as a coping
mechanism when dealing with health-related stressors (Princeton Religion Research Center, 1982), and
the opposing assertion by others that religion exacerbates rather than relieves anxiety (Ellis, 1988;
Watters, 1992). Recent work with caregivers of older adults with Alzheimers disease (Burgener, 1994)
found that caregiver reliance on religion was positively related to general well-being, social functioning,
and successful coping.
It is apparent that many Americans utilize some aspect of religion or integrate it into their belief
systems. When many of the same people are experiencing anxiety at some level, with symptoms that
do not necessarily meet criteria for a disorder, it seems fitting that clinicians and other health
professionals would want some clarification as to the role religion may play in the formation,
prevention, and alleviation of anxiety. The relation between religiosity and several specific anxiety
disorders, especially obsessivecompulsive disorder (Taylor, 2002; Tek & Ulug, 2001), has been
examined previously in the literature, as has religiosity and death anxiety (Clements, 1998; Swanson
& Byrd, 1998). Inclusion of all studies pertaining to general indices of anxiety, specific anxiety
disorders, and death anxiety would make integration of findings quite difficult and yield an unwieldy
document. In addition, while the literature addressing the relation between religion and specific
anxiety disorders is useful, it offers little insight into how religion may be related to anxiety in those
who do not meet diagnostic threshold for a disorder. Thus, this review will only describe studies that
assess anxiety as a broad construct that also includes such related constructs as distress, worry,
insecurity, and fear.
This paper includes a critical review of the existing research on the relation between general indices
of anxiety and religion. Studies that have examined religiosity, or the degree to which one is religious,
or some other aspect of religion as related to anxiety are included. Studies are categorized according to
whether they linked religiosity to decreased anxiety, linked it to increased anxiety, or found no
significant relation between religiosity and anxiety. After presenting and summarizing study findings,
relevant problematic methodological and conceptual issues are discussed. Finally, conclusions and
383
future directions follow based on a synthesis of the research findings and relative shortcomings of the
reviewed studies.
1.4. Studies relating religiosity to decreased anxiety
For years, researchers have assessed religiosity in terms of overt behavioral practice. Church
attendance can easily be quantified and thus analyzed, so it is not surprising that many studies have
utilized it as a measure of religiosity. In a study that explored factors affecting anxiety, depression, and
hostility in rural women, Hertsgaard and Light (1984) administered the Multiple Affect Adjective Check
List (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965) and a biographic and demographic questionnaire they developed to 760
randomly selected women (mean age = 44 years) living on farms in a Midwestern U.S. state. Personal
characteristics, including church attendance, were entered as predictors of anxiety in a stepwise
regression analysis. Women who attended church more than once per month scored significantly lower
on the Anxiety subscale than those who attended less often. The authors concluded that some factors,
including church attendance, minimize anxiety in rural women and that awareness of these factors can
enhance mental health service in rural areas.
In an effort to determine causal directionality between religiosity and psychological distress,
Williams, Larson, Buckler, Heckmann, and Pyle (1991) used data from participants in a longitudinal
study of mental health (Myers, Lindenthal, Pepper, & Ostrander, 1972) in New Haven, CT. Data were
available for 720 participants (mean age = 44.8) who were interviewed once in 1967 (Time 1) and then
again in 1969 (Time 2). Psychological distress was assessed with the Symptom Checklist Scale
(Gurin, Veroff, & Feld, 1960), where higher scores are indicative of less distress. In addition, two
measures of stressful life events developed for the study were used. The first measure indexed
undesirable stressful events and the second measure summed the number of physical health problems
experienced in the previous 2 years. Religious attendance was assessed with one question that asked
respondents to rate their frequency of church attendance. Participants were classified as high
attenders (who attended church once a week or more), moderate attenders (who attended once
per month to two or three times per month), and low attenders (who never attended or who only
attended a few times per year).
Regression analyses revealed religious attendance at Time 1 to be significantly positively related to
Symptom Checklist Scale scores at Time 2, and thus negatively related to psychological distress. In
addition, the authors tested whether religious attendance protected or buffered individuals from the
negative effects of stress. A regression model revealed that both the multiplicative terms for interactions
between life events and religious attendance and health problems and religious attendance were
significant. The authors concluded that religious attendance is negatively related to distress and that
religious attendance does appear to buffer the impact of stressful life events and physical health
complaints on psychological well-being.
Petersen and Roy (1985) studied the relation between anxiety and religiosity in an entirely Christian
sample (N = 318) in Memphis, TN. Church attendance was assessed with a single item that asked
respondents if they attended Sunday worship services every week, several times a month, several times
a year, or never. Anxiety was assessed utilizing a three-item scale developed by the authors. The
anxiety items were purported to assess how often the respondent worries or feels discouraged about the
way his/her life is going and feels that life treats him/her unfairly, but actual scale items were not
published. When religious variables were entered as predictors of anxiety in a multiple regression
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analysis, church attendance proved to be the only significant predictor. The authors concluded that
church attendance is an important factor in reducing anxiety, which may be due to emotional support
offered by the church community.
While church attendance is one easily measured aspect of religiosity, some researchers have
assessed other avenues of religious participation. Williams and Cole (1968) recruited 161 undergraduates from a state college in the South. The authors expanded Ligons (1965) Religious
Participation Questionnaire and devised their own Religious Participation Scale, which instructed
participants to indicate the extent of their church attendance, personal prayer, reading of religious
material, Sunday school attendance, and church-related activity. Participants were also given Maslows
(1952) SecurityInsecurity Inventory. High scores were reported to be indicative of generalized
psychological insecurity.
For analyses, those scoring at least one standard deviation below the mean on the Religious
Participation Scale were categorized as the low religiosity group, while those scoring at least one
standard deviation above the mean constituted the high religiosity group. Those falling between .14
and +.14 standard deviations from the mean were labeled the intermediate religiosity group. Although
the high and intermediate religiosity groups did not differ significantly in indices of security, both high
and intermediate groups were significantly more secure than the low religiosity group. The authors
hypothesized that either more secure persons tend to become religious, religion facilitates security, or
religious individuals do not openly admit insecurities.
In an earlier study that explored the relation between affiliation and anxiety, Brown (1962) recruited
203 undergraduates (mean age = 22) from the University of Adelaide. Four questionnaires were
administered. Intensity of religious beliefs was assessed with Thoulesss (1935) questionnaire, and
personality measures included Eysencks (1958) questionnaires for neuroticism and extraversion, the
Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS; Taylor, 1953), and items from the Minnesota Multi-Phasic
Personality Inventory (MMPI; Hathaway & McKinley, 1940). In addition, a questionnaire developed by
the author assessing a number of religious attitudes was included, and information on sex, age, and
religious affiliation was obtained. Religious affiliations included Roman Catholic, Church of England,
Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Baptist, Atheist/none, and miscellaneous. Higher manifest anxiety
scores for those with no religious affiliation were the only significant findings. There were no significant
differences in anxiety scores found among the other denominations. While this study did not find
evidence for direct positive effects of religiosity, it is notable that lack of religion in this instance was
related to higher anxiety.
Thus far, findings have been linked to church attendance and affiliation. The following study assessed
religiosity in terms of contemplative prayer, a more covert behavior. Finney and Malony (1985) recruited
nine nonpsychotic adult Christians (3 male, 6 female; mean age = 30.3) from an outpatient clinic. The
experimenters were testing whether the use of contemplative prayer as an adjunct to psychotherapy
would result in decreased anxiety and target complaint distress. Contemplative prayer was defined as
prayer that utilizes techniques of meditation as a means of relating to God in a nondemanding and
nondefensive way.
A set of cassette tapes providing approximately 3 hours of contemplative prayer instruction was
given to each participant. After listening to the tapes, each participant reviewed the content of the tapes
with a researcher who also presented written procedures for contemplative prayer. The researcher and
participant then prayed together in the prescribed manner. After the session, participants were instructed
to take the written procedure home and follow it carefully, spending 20 minutes per day in
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contemplative prayer. Phone contact was maintained with the participants during the following weeks to
ensure compliance.
The dependent measure used to assess anxiety was the trait anxiety scale from the Spielberger State
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). After 6 weeks of
psychotherapy, participants were trained in contemplative prayer and told to practice it as described
above. The STAI was administered weekly, and participants were also encouraged to keep daily records
of length of contemplative prayer sessions, rate the greatest focus of attention, and indicate whether
the participant sensed the presence of God during the session. Participants engaged in contemplative
prayer for approximately 14 weeks total.
The relation between time spent in contemplative prayer and STAI scores for each week was
examined, revealing significant composite (using all nine participants data) correlations for three of
the weeks. The authors concluded that their results lend modest support for their hypothesis that
contemplative prayer would be related to lower anxiety. They cautioned, however, that their results could
also mean that participants tended to engage in more contemplative prayer when they were less anxious.
A number of researchers have altered the way they conceptualize and thus operationalize religion.
Allport and Ross (1967) conceptualized religiosity as having two primary components: intrinsic and
extrinsic. Allport and Ross and later Donahue (1985) conceptualized extrinsic religiosity as being
associated with comfort and social convention and intrinsic religiosity as a framework in terms of which
all life is understood. Allport and Ross claimed that the extrinsically religious persons use their religion
while the intrinsically religious persons live their religion. Several studies have explored each
dimensions relation to anxiety.
Baker and Gorsuch (1982) recruited 52 participants from a religious wilderness camp in southern
California. Each participant was administered the Intrinsic Extrinsic measure of the Religious
Orientation Scale (ROS; Allport & Ross, 1967) and the Institute for Personality and Ability Testing
(IPAT) Anxiety Scale (Scheier & Cattell, 1960). Total trait anxiety was significantly negatively
correlated with intrinsic religiousness. The authors concluded that intrinsicness is associated with
the ability to integrate anxiety into everyday life in an adaptive manner.
In a similar study, Bergin, Masters, and Richards (1987), administered the ROS and MAS to 61
undergraduate students at Brigham Young University. A significant negative correlation was found
between the Intrinsic subscale of the ROS and the total anxiety score. The authors concluded that their study
provided moderate evidence that intrinsicness is negatively associated with manifest anxiety, but cautioned
that because 98.6% of the sample was intrinsically oriented, their findings were not very generalizable.
Sturgeon and Hamley (1979) utilized an entirely Christian sample to examine the relation between
trait and existential anxiety and intrinsic/extrinsic religiosity. Existential anxiety was defined as a
product of despair, alienation, and emptiness that results from an individuals inability to see meaning
in life (Good & Good, 1974). The authors recruited 148 students from a conservative, Protestantaffiliated college. Each participant was administered the ROS, the STAI, the Existential Anxiety Scale
(Good & Good, 1974), and An Inventory of Religious Belief (Brown & Lowe, 1951). Only data from
participants with the 20 highest (intrinsic group) and 20 lowest (extrinsic group) ROS scores were used
for analyses; t tests revealed the intrinsic group to be significantly less existentially anxious and
evidence less trait anxiety than the extrinsic group. The groups did not differ significantly on state
anxiety, which was expected since no stress condition was present. The authors concluded that, as
found in previous studies, intrinsic believers evidenced lower anxiety and thus appeared to be better
adjusted.
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In a study that compared measures of worry and intrinsic/extrinsic religiosity in elderly Buddhists and
Christians, Tapanya, Nicki, and Jarusawad (1997) recruited 104 noninstitutionalized, middle-class,
healthy older adults. Half of the sample (18 males, 34 females; mean age = 73) were Christians from
Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada, while the other half (23 males, 29 females; mean age = 69) were
Buddhists from Chiang Mai, Thailand.
Each participant was administered the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller,
Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), the Age Universal I-E Scale (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983), an adaptation of
the ROS that widens its applicability to children and older adults, and were asked to keep a daily journal.
Both the PSWQ and Age Universal I-E Scale were translated into Thai, with words such as church,
Bible, and God modified to fit Buddhism, and then retranslated into English to ensure validity.
Participants were asked to keep their journal for 3 days, during which they recorded daily occurrences of
worrisome thoughts and their reactions to them, and rated their level of success in coping with the thoughts.
Multiple regression analyses revealed intrinsic orientation to account for a significant amount of
variance in PSWQ scores. In addition, a significant negative correlation emerged between intrinsic
orientation and worry for Buddhists. Buddhists had more extreme scores on the Age Universal I-E Scale,
and thus were both more intrinsically and extrinsically oriented to religion than Christians. Entries in
daily journals differed between groups only with respect to Buddhists worrying more about matters
related to Church/Temple than Christians. The authors concluded that intrinsic religiosity is associated
with lower levels of worry, especially for Buddhists, although this may have to do with religion playing a
greater role in Buddhist Thais lives in general.
In summary, the findings from the previously reviewed studies suggested that church attendance was
related to decreased anxiety for several populations. Several authors concluded that having some type of
religious affiliation was related to lower anxiety levels, and contemplative prayer was associated with
increased security and less distress. Finally, when religiosity was conceptualized as intrinsic or extrinsic,
intrinsic religiosity was related to less worry and anxiety.
1.5. Studies relating religiosity to increased anxiety
While several studies found evidence for religious affiliation being linked to positive mental health
outcomes, it may be that some affiliations are more healthful than others, and that some may even prove
harmful. In Hertsgaard and Lights (1984) study described previously, the authors explored factors
related to anxiety in 760 rural women. After administering the Multiple Affect Checklist and a
demographics questionnaire to each woman, analyses revealed that Catholic women scored significantly
higher on the Anxiety subscale of the Multiple Affect Checklist than women of other affiliations.
Spellman, Baskett, and Byrne (1971) investigated the relation between sudden religious conversion
and manifest anxiety. The authors defined religious conversion as changing from one religion to
another or from a nonreligious state to a religious one, with those who do this suddenly characterized as
sudden converts. The experimenters asked two ministers to place members of a predominantly
Protestant Texas farming community into three categories. The categories comprised the nonreligious
(n = 20; mean age = 38.6), the regular attenders (n = 20; mean age = 41.3), who were assumed to
represent a gradual conversion experience, and sudden converts (n = 20; mean age = 36.9). The
ministers evidenced 92% interrater agreement. All participants were given the MAS.
The MAS means for the three groups proved to be significantly different. Orthogonal comparisons
revealed a higher mean for the sudden converts than for the other two groups combined, which did not
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differ significantly. The authors concluded that their study offered tentative support for the hypothesis
that people who have had a sudden religious conversion score higher on manifest anxiety than those
without such experiences. The authors further discussed conversion as being a pseudosolution to lifes
problems since the conversion experience fails to bring a permanent reduction in anxiety.
Wilson and Miller (1968) tested whether fear and anxiety were related to religious practice in a
sample of 100 undergraduates from the University of Alabama. The participants completed a short form
of the MAS (Bendig, 1956), an unpublished measure of fearfulness, and a self-report questionnaire that
included common dimensions of religious participation and beliefs (e.g., church attendance, belief in a
supreme being, soul immortality, and religious immortality) developed by the authors. Correlational
analyses revealed religiosity to be positively correlated with both fearfulness and anxiety. The authors
concluded that there seems to be a small but reliable tendency for nonreligious persons to give
healthier answers on these measures of fear and anxiety.
When religion was broken into its intrinsic and extrinsic components in the studies described earlier,
the authors concluded that intrinsic religiosity was related to less anxiety. The same authors concluded
that the opposite was true for an extrinsic orientation. Baker and Gorsuch (1982) examined the relations
between trait anxiety assessed by the IPAT Anxiety Scale and the IntrinsicExtrinsic measure of
Religious Orientation in a sample of 52 participants. The results revealed total trait anxiety scores to be
significantly positively correlated with extrinsicness. The authors concluded that extrinsicness is
associated with the inability to integrate anxiety into everyday life in an adaptive manner.
Bergin et al. (1987) had similar findings in their study examining the relation between intrinsic/extrinsic
religiosity and anxiety. Correlation analysis of ROS and MAS scores revealed a significant positive
relation between extrinsic orientation and manifest anxiety. The authors concluded that extrinsicness is
associated with anxiety, and that previous studies have found conflicting evidence for the relation between
anxiety and religion because they failed to assess religions intrinsic/extrinsic dimensions.
Tapanya et al. (1997) compared intrinsic/extrinsic orientation and worry levels in Buddhists and
Christians by administering the PSWQ and Age Universal I-E Scale to samples previously described.
Multiple regression analyses revealed variance in PSWQ scores to be uniquely related to a two-way
interaction between extrinsic orientation and religious affiliation. The authors interpreted this as levels of
worry being associated with extrinsic orientation in different ways for Christians and Buddhists. Indeed,
first-order correlations revealed a significant correlation between worry level and extrinsic orientation for
Buddhist participants only. The authors theorized that the Buddhist belief in the law of karma, which
implies, in contrast to Christianity, that there is no escape from the consequences of ones actions
through redemption, might have contributed to higher levels of worry in extrinsic Buddhists.
1.6. Studies finding no relation between anxiety and religiosity
Heintzelman and Fehr (1976) tested the relation between manifest anxiety and religiosity by administering the Brown modification of the Thouless Test of Religious Orthodoxy (Brown, 1962; Thouless, 1935)
and the MAS to 82 undergraduate students (41 male, 41 female; mean age = 20.6) at the University of
Cincinnati. Correlation analysis revealed no significant relation between anxiety and religiosity.
In a similar study, the same authors (Fehr & Heintzelman, 1977) administered the Allport, Vernon, &
Lindzey (1970) Study of Values, the Thouless Test of Religious Orthodoxy, and the MAS to 120
undergraduates (60 male, 60 female; mean age = 19.8) at the University of Cincinnati. Again, the
relations between the two measures of religiosity and anxiety were nonsignificant. The authors did not
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address their nonsignificant findings except to say that they were consistent with findings by Brown
(1962). They did, however, assert that using two divergent measures of religiosity as they did in their
second study does result in different profiles of the religious individual, thus lending further support
to the notion that religiosity is multidimensional and should be assessed as such.
Frenz and Carey (1989) examined the relation between intrinsic/extrinsic religiosity and trait
anxiety in a sample of 119 undergraduate students (76 female, 43 male) from a private university in
New York. Participants were administered the Intrinsic/Extrinsic Scale (Feagin, 1964), which is a 12item adaptation of the ROS, and the Trait version of the STAI. Participants were categorized as
intrinsic (n = 12), extrinsic (n = 46), indiscriminate (n = 41), and nonreligious (n = 20),
based on Donahues (1985) fourfold typology for the ROS. The four religious groups did not differ
on trait anxiety, and correlations between trait anxiety and continuous scores on both ROS subscales
were also nonsignificant. The authors attributed their nonsignificant findings to their use of a more
heterogeneous sample in terms of intrinsic/extrinsic religiosity than those used in previous studies. The
authors opined that previous findings might have been distorted by a social desirability response bias
of samples recruited from religious institutions.
In a longitudinal study that tested models relating religiosity, stress, and self-esteem/mastery,
Krause and Van Tran (1989) analyzed data from 2107 people in the National Survey of Black
Americans (Neighbors, Jackson, Bowman, & Gurin, 1982). A 10-item checklist developed for the
study assessed stressful life events including health, financial, and interpersonal problems, and six
items assessing organizational and nonorganizational religiosity were used as the religiosity
measure.
A structural equation model was used to test three hypothetical models. The first was a moderator
model, which assumes that the correlation between stress and religiosity is low, and that a statistical
interaction effect exists between stress and religiosity and self-esteem. The second, a suppressor
model, assumes that the level of religious involvement is dependent on the amount of stress present in
the persons life, and thus stress and religiosity are moderately correlated. The third was a distressdeterrent model, which assumes that stress and religiosity are not correlated, but rather each exerts
direct, additive effects on self-esteem.
Findings revealed the distress-deterrent model had the highest goodness of fit and showed that
increases in the number of life event stressors failed to be related to either organizational or
nonorganizational/subjective religiosity. The authors concluded that their findings supported the
distress-deterrent model, with religious involvement appearing to be an important factor in maintaining
self-esteem, but that these additive effects operate independently of the amount of stress present. Thus,
religiosity and stress were unrelated.
In summary, conclusions from these studies revealed no significant relations between anxiety and
religiosity. The authors of these studies concluded that both manifest and trait anxiety appeared not to be
related to religiosity, and stress and religious involvement appeared to be unrelated.
389
390
subjectively categorizing citizens of a farming community into regular attender, nonreligious, and
sudden convert groups. While the authors did report interrater reliability, the validity of this sampling
method is questionable due to potential biases on the part of both clergy and the experimenters in their
selection of clergy. In addition to sampling procedure problems, several studies lacked generalizability
due to homogenous sample composition.
Finney and Malonys (1985) sample consisted of nine Christian volunteers, whereas Bergin et al.
(1987) recruited a completely Mormon sample from Brigham Young University, 98.6% of whom
were categorized as intrinsically (vs. extrinsically) religious. Similarly, Sturgeon and Hamley (1979)
used a Christian sample from a conservative, Protestant, private college. Baker and Gorsuch (1982)
recruited their sample from a religious wilderness camp. These studies used participants who were
religiously homogeneous who may have responded to self-report questionnaires in ways they thought
were socially desirable in terms of their religion.
All of the reviewed studies, with the exception of one (Tapanya et al., 1997), used Christianbased measures of religion and consequently tapped into only Christian samples. Interestingly,
Tapanya et al. (1997) found differences in measures of anxiety and intrinsic/extrinsic religiosity
between Christian and Buddhist samples. This finding demonstrates the potential for differential
findings according to the samples religion. Because religiosity was a variable of interest in each of
these reviewed studies, a religiously heterogeneous sample would have been optimal to ensure
validity and generalizability to other populations.
A number of studies (e.g., Bergin et al., 1987; Brown & Lowe, 1951; Fehr & Heintzelman, 1977;
Frenz & Carey, 1989; Heintzelman & Fehr, 1976; Sturgeon & Hamley, 1979; Williams & Cole, 1968;
Wilson & Miller, 1968) used entirely young, undergraduate samples. While using samples of
convenience is common in psychological research, results from these studies were severely limited
in their generalizability to other populations.
2.1.3. Statistical issues
Dichotomizing participants into high and low categories for analyses can be problematic
for several reasons. It may not only lower statistical power, but it in no way ensures that groups
defined as high or low correspond to groups so labeled in other studies or in the general
population (Allison, Gorman, & Primavera, 1993). Sturgeon and Hamley (1979) divided their
sample into quartiles, and then used only the 20 highest and lowest scorers on a measure of
intrinsic/extrinsic religiosity. While dichotomizing variables allowed for analysis of differences
between groups, there was no indication that these groups were indeed representative of the general
population.
In addition to validity threats from dichotomization of variables, a number of experimenters (e.g.,
Bergin, Masters, & Richards, 1991; Fehr & Heintzelman, 1977; Frenz & Carey, 1989; Heintzelman
& Fehr, 1976) conducted multiple correlational analyses without adjusting the alpha level in their
significance tests. Failure to use a more conservative alpha level increases the probability of a type 1
error suggesting that these studies may have erroneously found significant correlations that would
not have been evident had the proper statistical corrections been utilized.
Although many of the reviewed studies included multiple regression analyses, several experimenters
used other forms of analysis including multivariate regression (e.g., Hertsgaard & Light, 1984),
structural equation modeling (e.g., Krause & Van Tran, 1989; Williams et al., 1991), and mean
difference statistics (e.g., Spellman et al., 1971; Sturgeon & Hamley, 1979; Williams & Cole, 1968).
391
An explanation for how particular analyses were chosen over others when analyzing similar types of data
would be beneficial for a number of the reviewed studies.
2.2. Conceptual issues
2.2.1. Operationalization of constructs
Constructs such as religiosity and anxiety are complex and difficult to operationally define. For
years, researchers have relied on measuring the most simplistic and easily quantifiable manifestations
of religion such as church attendance or affiliation. As a result, much of religion as a construct may
have been missed. Several of the reviewed studies attempted to assess other more abstract aspects of
religion but failed to define these constructs in concise, measurable ways. For example, Finney and
Malony (1985) referred to contemplative prayer as a means of relating to God in a nondemanding
and defensive way, but did not explain what specifically is involved when one is relating to God in
this manner or how this differs from other types of prayer.
Similarly, Spellman et al. (1971) asked three ministers to categorize members of a community
into regular church attender, nonreligious, and sudden conversion experience categories.
They asserted that typically the lines between these groups are easily drawn by clergymen,
particularly in small communities. They did not, however, describe the selection criteria used by
the clergy, or explain why it was assumed that regular church attendance could be equated with a
gradual conversion experience. The construct of conversion experience remained vague, as did the
method by which people were categorized. A vague operational definition of a construct not only
threatens study replicability, but also makes generalizability of findings unlikely since the parameters
by which people were classified remain unclear.
Wilson and Miller (1968) employed self-rating items purported to be commonly associated with
religious practices as their measure of religiosity. The items were categorized as assessing church
attendance, belief in a supreme being, soul immortality, and religious morality, but no definitions or
item examples were offered. While church attendance is fairly straightforward, soul immortality
and religious morality are abstract constructs that require definition, yet none was offered, and no
reference given. Again, without clear definitions or sample items, it is difficult to know exactly what
the authors were assessing.
In summary, poor operationalization of constructs suggests a weakness in this area of research.
Because religiosity is a complex, multidimensional construct, when religious variables are studied,
specific, empirically supported definitions are needed to back the measurement and conceptualization of these constructs. The implications of poorly operationalized religious constructs are that
the authors may have failed to assess what they were initially targeting, and/or they and the
reader may have very different ideas as to what was actually measured and manipulated in these
studies.
2.2.2. Assessment of anxiety
In every study reviewed, anxiety was assessed through the use of self-report measures. The
manifestation of anxiety perhaps typifies the interplay between cognitive, physiological, and
behavioral response systems. As such, it is troubling that the reviewed studies did not examine
the relation between physiological or behavioral parameters of generalized anxiety and religiosity.
This reliance on self-report is a limitation to all of the reviewed studies. Just as the multidimensional
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nature of religion has been espoused throughout this paper, the already well established multiple
dimensions or tripartite model of anxiety should not be ignored.
2.2.3. Faulty conclusions
A number of conclusions drawn from the reviewed studies were unfounded because the
experimenters inferred causation from correlation. Hertsgaard and Light (1984) concluded from a
significant negative correlation that factors, including church attendance, appear to minimize anxiety
in rural women. Similarly, Petersen and Roy (1985) concluded that church attendance reduces
anxiety, again from a significant negative correlation. Spellman et al. (1971) referred to sudden
conversion as a pseudosolution to anxiety, suggesting that it momentarily reduces anxiety, but
then is ultimately related to higher anxiety levels. Although this conclusion may be plausible,
findings from this study did not empirically support this assumption because there were no indices
of anxiety taken before the conversion experience that could be compared to post conversion
anxiety.
Finney and Malony (1985) administered the trait version of the STAI on a weekly basis in their
study to assess changes in anxiety as related to increases in contemplative prayer. The authors
concluded that their findings of decreased anxiety levels for three of the weeks gave some support
to their hypothesis that engaging in contemplative prayer would be related to less anxiety. It is
notable, however, that by using the trait rather than state version of the STAI, the authors were
employing a measure developed to assess stable, traitlike characteristics rather than one to assess
transient context-dependent characteristics that would be expected to vary as a result of contemplative prayer. Conclusions made by these authors can only be accepted tentatively as it remains
unclear why the state version of the STAI was not utilized for this study when anxiety levels were
expected to covary with contextual change (e.g., the practice of contemplative prayer).
2.3. Synthesis of the findings
Taken together, findings from several studies (e.g., Hertsgaard & Light, 1984; Petersen & Roy, 1985)
suggest that while overt interpersonal behaviors may be linked to decreased anxiety, other more covert
and personal behaviors may be linked to increased anxiety. One study (e.g., Krause & Van Tran, 1989)
found that for older adults, there was not a relation. Other studies (e.g., Levendusky & Belfer, 1988;
Williams et al., 1991) found that religious affiliations may vary in relation to anxiety. Results from
several studies (e.g., Baker & Gorsuch, 1982; Bergin et al., 1987; Sturgeon & Hamley, 1979; Tapanya
et al., 1997) suggested that those who live their religion (e.g., intrinsic) endorse less anxiety than
those who use their religion (e.g., extrinsic). These findings are tentative, however, due to
methodological and conceptual problems that likely contributed to the contradictory findings of a
number of these and other studies that have attempted to examine the relation between religion and
mental health.
393
relation between general anxiety and religiosity. These studies yielded mixed and often contradictory
results that may be attributed to a lack of standardized measures, poor sampling procedures, failure to
control for threats to validity, limited assessment of anxiety, experimenter bias, and poor operationalization of religious constructs. It is also likely that some religious aspects are positively related to anxiety
while others are not, and results vary according to which is assessed. No study in this review escaped
methodological and/or conceptual criticism. This leaves much work for future researchers who can
address these shortcomings in a number of ways.
Several studies failed to use a multidimensional measure of religiosity or poorly operationalized the
religious aspect they were purporting to measure. Just as with other psychological constructs such as
depression or well being, initial research has historically been informed by theory and hypotheses, and
dimensions of constructs have subsequently been identified and empirically validated through
thorough assessment. Psychometrically sound, multidimensional assessment of religion is just in its
developing stages. Future studies utilizing well-validated multidimensional measures can clarify
specifically which aspects of religiosity are linked to anxiety. The Fetzer Institute (1999) has devised
such a measure that includes multiple subscales (e.g., religious commitment, organizational religiousness, religious support, private religious practices, values, beliefs, forgiveness, and daily spiritual
experiences). Preliminary studies have demonstrated the measures promising psychometric properties.
Future work with this measure may further elucidate the nature of the relation between religiosity and
anxiety.
Physiological or behavioral assessments of anxiety were also largely absent from the literature.
Because anxiety is manifested in cognitive, physiological and behavioral response systems, this is a great
limitation. Future work can address this limitation by incorporating physiological or autonomic measures
in addition to direct observation of behavioral anxiety-related responses to supplement and further clarify
the relation between anxiety and religion.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that older adults are especially religious and tend to integrate
religiosity into their daily lives (Koenig, George, Blazer, Pritchett, & Meador, 1993; Krause & Van
Tran, 1989). Future work with older adults is promising both because religiosity is especially salient to
many in this population, and because there is growing evidence to suggest that this population taps into
some of the more positive and healthful aspects of religion. In fact, Crowther, Parker, Achenbai,.
Larimore, and Koenig (2002) propose adding a positive spirituality dimension to Rowe and Kahns
(1998) model of successful aging because they believe it is the missing component that addresses the
relations between older adults beliefs, values, community, and the efficacy of interventions focused on
successful aging.
There is also evidence to suggest that although anxiety disorders are less frequent in older adults,
subsyndromal or subthreshold anxiety is more common (Heun et al., 2000; Papassotiroopoulos & Heun,
1999). Studies that incorporate general measures of anxiety instead of standard diagnostic measures
when utilizing older adult populations may find relations between religion and anxiety that would not
and have not been detected otherwise.
In addition to using multidimensional measures, future researchers could broaden their samples in
terms of demographics and religiosity. Many studies relied solely on homogenous samples of
convenience recruited from religious, primarily Christian, institutions. Sample inclusion of nonreligious or diversely religious individuals would increase generalizability of findings. In terms of
statistical analyses, studies that utilize mean difference statistics and path analyses to test buffering
and moderator hypotheses, would offer information regarding directionality not provided in most of
394
these studies. It would also be beneficial for future researchers to support their choices of statistical
analyses and incorporate additional methods that could supplement these traditionally correlational
studies.
Finally, while one study (Finney & Malony, 1985) attempted to examine the relation between
integration of religion into clinical treatment and efficacy of outcome, this study poorly operationalized and assessed the religious construct involved. The utility of integrating or simply acknowledging religious aspects/practice in clinical treatment for those who are religious is worthy of future
examination. Specifically, clinicians might assess a clients degree of religious involvement as a
standard part of an intake interview. Through continued scientific inquiry, a therapist can be
informed on how to successfully validate or discuss the role of religion in a clients life while
maintaining objectivity. In addition, through the identification of aspects of religion that may protect
one from or increase the chances of developing anxiety, proactive or preventative treatments may be
developed. This is not a call for clinicians to practice religion in therapy or let religion influence
therapy, but rather acknowledge and discuss the role religion may play in the clients life and
potentially in treatment. Because religion appears to be important to so many people, including it as
a variable for study in clinical settings may contribute greatly to our understanding of the interplay
between religiosity and mental health for much of the clinical population.
In conclusion, healthcare professionals are calling for increased awareness and study of religious
variables and their impact on mental and physical health. Anxiety is a prevalent and pervasive
mental health construct that has been understudied in relation to religion. Preliminary evidence
suggests that anxiety and religion are related in some ways. Empirically and conceptually sound
research addressing the anxietyreligiosity relations, with an eye to the shortcomings of previous
research, will hopefully further our understanding of the relations between religion and anxiety,.
Finally, it also may inform treatment and prevention of anxiety in a variety of populations,
especially the many for whom some aspect of religion is fundamentally important.
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263
264
265
life. Hope vanishes when the need to belong, the need to be loved and the need
to believe are unmet. These three needs
appear to be so closely interrelated that
it ought to be investigated how the absence
of belief will warp the capacity for human
love, physical and psychic, and will abuse
companionship to conquer loneliness. As the
case histories of Mortimer Ostow show,
the disavowal of religion does not cancel
this need to believe (Ostow, 1954). Some
may place their faith in scientific method
and others will create objects images
which are quasi-religious. Self-made fantasies are like acquired classic religious
superstitions in that both are used by the
self to protect it against a hostile world.
They are intrapsychic, whereas the highest aspirations of religion are interpsychic
in that they relate self to others in a hospitable world.
Clergyman as Psychologist
Because our society is no longer made
up of integrated communities with religious
orientation, there is a crisis in meeting the
need to believe. A recent study of the
changing role of the clergyman shows that
as his role as ritual symbolizer or congregational leader has declined, his role as
pastoral counselor has grown because there
are isolated, mobile individuals in our
extensive, secularized and atomized society
in search of roots they hope to find through
a personal spiritual relationship which they
can no longer find in traditional theological
symbols. This will not sound sacrilegious
to those who remember that the founders
of all religions clearly differentiated between the outward symbolic and the inward spiritual. To them the beginning of
the latter was a unique relationship of man
to man, each concerned for the other's
mutual sanctity. Thus conceived, therapeutic counseling, whether done by a secular
therapist or by an equally trained clergy
therapist (whose role must become a new
religious specialization relieving him of the
more obvious judgmental ecclesiastical
functions), not only deals with religious
values since value judgments are intrinsic
266
Charles A. Curran
to the counselor as well as to the counselee able psychology and theology which one
no matter how objective and nondirective Hassidic Rabbi said he learned from an
the technique, but the relationship may untutored peasant.
well be in itself a religious value.
Said Rabbi Moshe Leib of Sassov (died
1807),
"How to love men is something I
The crux of the matter depends upon
how the counselor looks upon himself as learned from a peasant. He was sitting in
well as upon the other as a person. This an inn along with other peasants drinking.
applies to counselor and to clergy alike. For a long time he was as silent as all the
Whether the one or the other conceives rest, but when he was moved by the wine,
of himself as acting in the role of inter- he asked one of the men seated beside
mediaryship or in the role of relationship him, "Tell me do you love me, or don't you
will not depend on whether he feels or- love me?" The other replied, "I love you
dained by God or ordained by degrees. All very much," but the first peasant in his
of us are persons of doubt as well as faith. wine replied, "You say that you love me
Some of us consciously devout are un- but you do not know what I need. If you
consciously skeptical; and some consciously really loved me, you would know!" The
skeptical are unconsciously devout. As per- other had not a word to say to this and the
sons we will not assume an omnipotence peasant who had put the question fell silent
which is not ours. The expectancy of such again. "But I understood," said Rabbi Leib,
omnipotence in us by our clients is a meas- "To know the needs of men and to help
urement of their neuroticism. We will not them bear the burden of their sorrows,
look upon ourselves solely as the experts that is the true love of men."
who have the skill to help others. Total
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. . . is essentially one of gazing beyond the immediate scene to a timeless sky or a timeless room,
in which the future and the past, the unspoken
and the unknown, forever beckon . . .
Percep oamenii smerenia ca fiind o for sau ca o slbiciune? Studiul acesta a ncercat
s rspund ntrebrii avnd un eantion de 127 de studeni. Contrar definiiilor date de
dicionare, care adesea asociaz smerenia cu auto-retrogradarea, participani studiului au avut o
opinie bun despre smerenie. La reamintirea situaiilor n care s-au simit umili, ei susin c au
fost experiene cu succes asociate cu emoii pozitive. Participani au asociat smerenia cu o bun
reglare psihologic, dei nu erau decii dac smerenia poate fi asociat cu ncrederea sau
leadershipul. Dei participanii au privit smerenia ca pe o for n rolurile sociale, prerile mai
favorabile au suinut c smerenia este o calitate a persoanelor religioase, nu este o calitate cu care
poi s i subordonezi pe ceilali, cu att mai puin o calitate a liderilor. Opiniile pozitive despre
smerenie au fost asociate cu o stim de sine ridicat i religiozitate. Opiniile mai puin favorabile
au fost asociate cu narcisismul-n special fa de exploatarea/intitularea dimensiunii.
Percep oamenii smerenia ca fiind o for sau ca o slbiciune? Aa cum a fost descris de
ctre Tangney (2000), definiiile date de dicionare descriu smerenia n sens negativ, asociind-o
cu auro-retrogradarea, stim de sine sczut i umilin. Pe de alt parte smerenia poate fi vzut
ca pe o for, o virtute, aa cum aste sugerat n scrierile religioase (de ex. Casey, 2001;Murray,
2001) tratate filozofice (ex. Morgan, 2001; Richard, 1992) i cercetrile recente din psihologie
(ex. Exline, Campbell, Baumeister, Joiner & Kruger, 2004; Emmons, 1999;Friesen, 2001;
Landrum, 2002, Sandage, 1999, 2001; Tangney, 2000, 2002).
n ciuda ateniei care se acord recent smereniei, psihologii nc tiu puine lucruri despre
percepiile oamenilor despre smerenie- o vd doar ca pe o slbiciune sau o for. Scopul acestui
studiu preliminar a fost s analizeze percepiile despre smerenie dintr-un eantion cu studeni din
America de Nord. Ne-am axat n particular pe urmtoarele ntrebri: cred oamenii c smerenia
este o virtute care se poate cultiva, sau o slbiciune care trebuie minimalizat? Este smerenia
vzut ca o trstur dezirabil doar pentru anumite tipure de oameni-figuri religioase poate,
opus liderilor? Totodat am dorit s cercetm n ce fel diferenele individuale variabile cum
este religiozitatea, narcisismul i stima de sine, pot fi relevante asupra percepiilor despre
smerenie.
Culturile vestice moderne pledeaz intens n ajutarea oamenilor s se vad pe ei nii
ntr-o lumin pozitiv. Stima de sine sczut a fost blamat din cauza serioaselor probleme
sociale cum este violena (de vzut Baumeister, Smart & Boden, 1996, pentru o discuie mai
larg). n ultimele secole am fost martori la finanri din partea statului pentru a crete stima de
sine (Mecca, Smeler & Vasconcellos, 1989) i o mulime de cri de auto-ajutorare pentru a-i
crete stima de sine (de ex. Braden, 1994). Atunci cnd oamenii se confrunt cu slbiciuni
personale sau eecuri, au nevoie s distorsioneze adevrul n aa fel nct s se simte bine cu ei
nii. Unele dovezi sugereaz c o asemenea distorsionare favorabil, folosit cu moderaie, se
poate asocia cu o sntate mental bun i posibil c i cu una fizic la fel (ex. Taylor & Brown,
1988; Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower & Gruenewald, 2000). A te privi te tine n sens favorabil
genereaz ncredere i emoii pozitie, care pot aduce beneficii i n alte domenii care au nevoie
de ajustare.
Conform preocuprii actuale a Vestului, de a promova perceperea n sens favorabil a
propriei persoane, este uor de imaginat c neasumarea trsturii de smerenie poate fi dezagreat.
Aa cum a fost discutat de Tangney (2000), oamenii pot asocia rapid termenul de smerenie cu o
prere negativ despre sine i un sens al inutilitii.
n contrast cu aceast imagine negativ a smereniei, scrierile recente ofer o ampl
viziune c smerenia poate fi ncadrat ca o virtute sau o for. Teologii i scriitorii devotai au
scris mult despre meritele smereniei (ex. Casey, 2001; Mogabgab, 2000; Murray, 2001; Roberts ,
1982; von Hildebrand, 1997) i capcanele mndriei, care adesea apar printre
Cele 7 pcate
capitale (ex. Schimmel, 1992). Filozofii au scris tot despre smerenia ca virtute iau dezbtut
ndelung definiia exact a acesteia, beneficiile i riscurile smereniei (ex. Ben-Zeev, 1993;
Driver, 1989; Hare, 1996; Morgan, 2001; Richards, 1992).
Smerenia este o piatr de temelie pentru Alcoolici Anonimi i alte programe de tip 12
pai, create pentru a distruge adiciile (ex. Kurtz & Ketcham, 1992).
Cei care au scris despre programul Alcoolici Anonimi s-au referit la faptul c smerenia
este vzut aici ca fiind abilitatea de a accepta onest umanitatea omului, cunotinele sale limitate
i imperfeciunile sale-inclusiv slbiciunea omului fa de alcool (Pasul 1) (Kurtz & Ketcham,
1992). Conform lui Kurtz i Ketcham (1992), smerenia implic respingerea implicit a cererilor
de genul totul sau nimic i n locul acesteia s se pun alegerea unui statut de om simplu. Se
descrie cum smerenia poate pava calea alcoolicilor spre a se supune Marii Puteri (Pasul 2) i s
cedeze controlul recuperrii acetei Mari Puteri (Pasul3). Dup aceste raionri, o lips a
smereniei ar mpiedica recuperearea din alcoolism (de vzut Tiebout, 1994). Cercetri empirice
recente despre noile recuperri ale pacienilor alcoolici (Hart & Huggett, 2003) ofer rezultate
relevante care susin acest argument. Studiile arat c o auto-percepie narcisist a autoritii i
superioritii coreleaz negativ cu recuperarea alcoolicilor i cu predarea n faa Marii Puteri aa
cum s-a descris la paii 2 i 3.
Alte conceptualizri recente ale smereniei ofer perspective complementare. De exemplu
Means, Wilson, Sturn, Biron i Bach (1990) au spus c smerenia implic: a) o dorin a fiecruia
de a-i admite greelile; b) o recunotere a faptului c nu se pot controla toate evenimentele
sociale care ne ntmpin; c) o atitudine de rbdare i buntate fa de ceilali oameni i d) simul
empatiei fa de ceilali. Roberts (1982) subliniaz c exist o lips de preocupri n ceea ce
privete rangul social ca o caracteristic de baz a smereniei.. Sandage (1999) folosete termenul
de ego-smerenie, ca referire la orientarea realist asupra sinelui, care include dorina de a ne
cunoate forele i de a face fa limitelor noastre.
Mai recent psihologi sociali i ai personalitii au nceput s cerceteze smerenia ca pe o
form de virtute sau for personal. Emmons (1999) sugereaz c smerenia implic precizie,
auto-acceptare, nelegerea proprilor imperfeciuni, pstrarea talentelor proprii i perspective de
realizare i eliberare din arogan i stima de sine sczut. n lista sa caracteristicile cheie ale
smereniei, Tangney (2000, 2002), include un sens acurat al abilitilor, abilitatea de a-i
recunoate propriile greeli, imperfeciuni, lacune n cunotine i limitri (adesea cu referire la
Puterea cea Mare), deschidere spre noi idei, informaie contradictorie,sfaturi, i abilitatea de a-i
pstra propriile abiliti n perspectiv de viitor. Dup Landrum (2002), smerenia implic o
atitudine open-mind, o dorina de a-i recunoate greelile i de a cuta sfaturi, i o dorin de
nvre. n opinia noastr (Exeline et al., 2004) smerenia implic o dorin nedefensiv de a-i
vedea sinele acurat, incluzns att fore ct i limitrile. Noi am propus c smerenia const n
cutarea unui sens de siguran n care sentimentul de valoare este stabil, surs de ncredere, (de
ex. a te simi iubit necondiionat), credina n via ca avnd valoare, mai degrab dect ceva
tranzitoriu, din surse externe ca realizarea, aparena sau aprobarea social. Un asemenea
sentiment de siguran poate fi tulpina valorilor personale, opinii despre religie sau experienele
vieii.
Aceste definiii psihologice recente sugereaz o viziune pozitiv asupra smereniei,
portretiznd-o n primul rnd ca pe o surs de putere, dect ca pe o slbiciune. Oricum definiiile
laice nu se aliniaz ntotdeauna cu cele ale savanilor, aceasta este o problem care apare n
cercetare i asupra unor constructe ca iertarea (pentru mai multe discuii vezi Exeline,
Worthington, Hill i McCullough, 2003). Date fiind preocuprile noastre culturale privind
prerea pozitiv despre sine, este uor de imaginat c smerenia poate fi foarte simplu vzut ca
fiind dezamagitoare. Aa cum s-a discutat de ctre Tangney (2000) oamenii pot repede asocia
termenul de smerenie cu o opinie negativ despre sine nsui incluznd sensul de inutilitate.
Chiar dac oamenii pot pstra o opinie bun despre smerenie, pot avea rezerve n ceea ce
privete anumite persoane n anumite situaii. O s ne ntoarcem mai trziu asupra acestei idei.
Acum avem deja motive s precizm c oamenii i vor pstra opinia negativ asupra
smereniei. Aa cum am menionat mai devreme, indivizii pot asocia smerenia cu umilina, stima
de sine sczut, sau auto-critic aspr- nici una ne fiind ctui de puin pozitiv. Chiar dac
oamenii au definiii ale smereniei care se apropie de definiiile savanilor, ei se pot focusa pe
potenialele costuri ale smereniei. Pentru c smerenia implic neajunsuri oamenii o pot asocia cu
experiene euate ca depresia sau ameninarea unei recderi. Oamenii pot asocia smerenia cu
riscurile interpersonale, de exemplu n situaiile competitive sau cnd se confrunt cu indivizi
foarte agresivi i dominani, cei care eueaz n a se auto-promova, ori a-i demonsta
superioritatea, au riscul de a fi rapid nlocuii. De altfel oamenii smerii ar trebui s i pun n
discuie forele propri (cum ar fi n cazul interviului pentru un job sau ntr-un rol de leadership),
a discuta despre propriile limite poate fi n detrimentul lor, dac punctele lor forte nu se cunosc
(vezi Aronson, Willerman & Floyd, 1966), sau dac audiena respectiv prefer oamenii perfeci
i o ncredere mare n auto-prezentare.
Diferenele individuale
Ne ateptm s obinem diferene individuale n atitudinea despre smerenie. Mai specific
prevedem c cei care practic smerenia s fie mai apropiai de religiozitate, narcisim i stim de
sine.
Raionamentele nostre sunt urmtoarele:
Religiozitatea. Avem o ipotez ce susine o asociere pozitiv ntre religie i prerea
despre smerenie. Mai multe perosoane religioase consider smerenia ca pe o votrute, n contrast
cu viciul mndriei (ex. Schimmel, 1992). Multe dintre scrieerile tiinifice despre smerenie vin
cu o perspectiv devotat teologiei.
Uni cercettori argumenteaz c smerenia este o virtute fundamental religioas, ceea ce
are sens doar atunci cnd se ia n considerare relaia dintree fiina uman care va muri i un Dzeu omniscient (Morgan, 2001; Murray, 2001). Religiozitatea are legtur cu valorile mari i
virtuile ca iertarea (ex. Tsang, McCullogh & Hoyt, 2004). Pentru toate aceste motive noi
prezicem c religiozitatea este asociat cu o opinie pozitiv despre smerenie.
Genul. Cercetrile sugereaz c femeile se comport cel mai adesea mai modest dect
brbaii (ex. Heatherington et al., 1993) i tot ele sunt adesea mai sensibile dect brbaii n ceea
ce privete riscul social al supraperformrii fa de ceilali oameni (vezi Exeline &Label, 1999).
n procesul de socializare brbaii nva s valorifice individualismul i cutarea de dominan
mai mult dect femeile (ex. Brod, 1987. Ne ateptm deci ca relativ la brbai, femeile s aib o
opinie mai pozitiv despre smerenie.
Narcisismul. Prin definiie trsatura narcisist pare antagonist smereniei. Indivizii
narcisiti se preocup cu cutarea i prezentarea lor ntr-o lumin pozitiv. Adesea reacioneaz
defensiv la ameninrile stimei de sine (Baumeister et al. 1996; Bushman & Baumeister, 1998;
Rhodewalt & Mart, 1998) i sunt motivai s domine n relaiile interpersonale (Emmons, 1984;
Raskin, Novacek & Hogan, 1991; Raskin & Terry, 1988). Presupunem c indivizii narcisiti vor
avea o opinie nefavorabil asupra smereniei, asociat cu slbiciunea, pasivitatea i lipsa de
ncredere.
Stima de sine. Predicii concurente se pot face pentru stima de sine i prerile despre
smerenie. n ideea c stima de sine coreleaz cu narcisismul ne ateptm ca o stim de sine
ridicat s fie asociat cu o opinie mai negativ despre smerenie, ns n ideea c stima de sine
este separat de narcisism, o stim de sine nalt poate fi asociat i cu o opinie mai pozitiv
asupra smereniei. De ce? Pentru c aa cum am discutat mai devreme un numr mare de
cercettori au propus c smerenia este facilitat de un sentiment de siguran sau auto-acceptare.
n ideea c constructul stim de sine aduce un sentiment de onorabilitate, sau o atitudine pozitiv
asupra sinelui, smerenia ar trebui vzut ntr-o lumin pozitiv.
Dezirabilitatea social. Cercetrile prioritare (Landram, 2002) au sugerat c credinele
auto-raportate despre smerenie pot fi asociate cu dezirabilitatea social. Totui noi am dorit s
testm aceste asocieri n studiul curent.
Metoda
Participani i procedur
Avem ca participani 127 de studeni n primul an la psihologie (61-biei i 66-fete), de
la Universitatea privat din Vestul Mijlociu U. S. Toi participanii au completat un chestionar
pentru a primi credite pariale pentru cursuri. Media a fost de 18,9. n eantion au fost 77% albi
caucazieni, 19% asiatici, 6% afro-americani sau albi, 1% latini, 1% americani nativi i 2% Estul
Mijlociu. Procentajul nsumat a depit 100% pentru c participanii au selectat mai multe
opiuni asemntoare.
Afilierea religioas a fost: 30% protestani, 29% catolici, 5% evrei, 2% hindui, 2%
buditi, 2% islamici i 20% atei sau ne avnd nici o religie.
Msurare
Am utilizat scala Likert pentru o analiz preliminar de statistic descriptiv (Alfa
Cronbach, medii, abateri standard, ranguri) care sunt descrise n tabelul 1.
Dat fiind pornirea cercetrii asupra topicului smereniei am inclus i ntrebri deschise la sfrit.
Aceste ntrebri au fost codate pentru a suplimenta datele descriptive.
Asociaiile cu smerenia. Participanii au utilizat scala cu 11 puncte (-5=negativ,
5=pozitiv) pentru a evalua asocierile lor imediate cu cuvntul smerenie. De asemenea au ales de
la 0-deloc la 10-foarte mult, rspunsurile lor la itemii: n ce msur crezi c ar fi bine dac ai fi
mai puin smerit/umil? i n ce msur crezi c ar fi bine dac ai fi mai smerit/umil?. Pe o
scal de la 0-deloc la 10-foarte mult, participanii au ales msura n care ei au perceput smerenia
similar cu stima de sine sczut, modestia, umilina i ruinea.
Definiii ale smereniei. Participanii au fost ntrebai despre definiiile smereniei ntr-un
format deschis. Rspunsurile au intrat ntr-un text pentru a ne asigura c cei care codific inlud
scorurile n toate msurtorile. Bazai pe prima teoretizare i o citire iniial a rspnsurilor, cel de
sau
leadershipul,
urmtor/lider,
lis
de
ncredere/ncredere,
pasiv/activ,
slbiciune sau ca pe un punct forte pentru acest tip de persoan? Promptul a fost urmat de o list
de persoane avnd diferite roluri sociale. O scal cu 11 puncte a fost folosit pentru a marca
fiecare item (-5=slbiciune, 0=neutru, 5=punct forte. Analiza factorial sugereaz crearea a 4
subscale: lider/entertainer (lider de afaceri, lider militar, preedinte al SUA, entertainer,
instructor de cursuri) alfa=0,91. alii (partener de ntlnire, prieten, printe, alfa 0,86; subordonat
(servitor, angajat, 0,83) i lider religios (vorbitor religios sau spiritual, lider religios, alfa 0,79).
Stima de sine. Am utilizat scala Rosenberg a stimei de sine (Rosenberg, 1965, 1979)
pentru a msura stima de sine. Participanii au raspuns la 10 itemi pe o scal cu 5 puncte (1=n
dezacord, 5=foarte de acord)
Religiozitate. Am urmat o procedur folosit de Exeline, Yali & Sandersen (2000), un
index religios a fost creat pentru a combina msusarea credinelor principale i participarea
religioas. Credinele principale au fost testate folosind msura Blaine iCrocker (1995) adoptat
la o scal de 11 puncte (0=puternic dezacord, 10=acord puternic). Scala include 5 itemi: Permit
credinelor mele religioase s mi influeneze alte pri ale vieii mele; Credinele mele sunt
legate de prerea mea despre via ; Este important pentru mine s fiu o persoan religioas i
M simt frecvent aproape de D-zeu, ntr-un mod personal. Scala presupune realizarea mediilor
itemilor. O msur a participrii religioase a fost descris de Exeline i colegii (2000) i a fost
abreviat n acest studiu. Participanii au fost rugai s noteze ct de frecvent au partcipat n toate
din urmtoarele activitii n luna trecut: rugciune i meditaie, citirea unor cri religioase sau
urmrirea unor programe religioase, apelarea la servicii religioase, gndirea la probleme
religioase i discutarea cu ceilali a unor probleme religioase. S-a notat de la 0=deloc la 5= mai
mult dect o dat pe zi. S-a fcut media itemilor. Aa cum s-a anticipat cele 2 msuri au corelat
r(127)=0,80 i p<.001. Toate au fost standardizate i combinate intr-un singur index la
religiozitii.
Narcisismul. A fost msurat folosind 14 itemi foarte utilizai n NPI (Inventarul
Personalitii Narcisiste, Raskin & Terry. 1988; pentru versiunea original vezi Raskin& Hall,
1979). Scala conine 14 itemi i rspunsurile se fac forat ntre un rspuns narcisist sau unul ne
narcisist. Itemi sunt nsumai pentru a obine scorurile.
Dezirabilitate social. Versiunea cu 30 de itemi a Scalei Marlow-Crowne de dezirabilitate
social, a fost utilizat n acest studiu. Participanii au rspuns la o serie de itemi n formatul
Adevrat/ Fals. Estimarea reabilitrii i validarea datelor pot fi gsite n Reynolds (1982), unde
vresiunea folosit n acest studiu este etichetat Forma C.
Rezultate.
Este smerenia vzut ca o slbiciune sau ca un punct forte?
Rezultatele sugereaz constant c studenii au avut o opinie favorabil despre smerenie.
Aa cum arat Tab. 1 asocierile imediate a termenului smerenie au fost n general pozitive.
m=2,4, SD=2,7, difereniindu-se semnifcativ de scala neutr a punctului de mijloc la
t(126)=9,81, p<.oo1. Participanii au fost mai nclinai s spun c vor s devin mai smerii,
m=6,1 , dect s spun c vor s fie mai puin smerii m=2,3 F(1, 124)=125.05 Wilk, landa=0,50
p<.001, pattern cocnsistent cu opinia despre smerenie ca fiind un punct forte.
Contrar a ceea ce ne atempat bazai fiind pe definiiile date de dicionare, smerenia nu a
fost vzut ca similar stimei de sine sczute, m=2,3 SD=3,4 pe o scal de la 0 la 10. Smerenia
nu a fost vzut ca similar umilinei, m=2,4 SD=2,9 sau ruinii m=2,2, SD=2,7.
n schimb a fost vzut ca similar modestiei m=7,8 SD= 2,2.Media pentru modestie
defer fa de media pentru stim de sien scazut, ruine sau umulin la p<.oo1, utiliznd msuri
de contrast repetate. Legat de corelaiile ridicate ntre itemii smereniei similar cu cei ai ruinii,
jenei sau umilinei (Alfa Crombach=0,84), aceti 3 itemi au fost combinai ntr-unul singur
pentru analiza rmas.
Definiiile deschise ale smereniei sugereaz apropieri substaniale de modestie. Aproape
jumtate dintre participani (44%) au utilizat cuvntul modestie n definiiile lor, fcnd
referina la un comportament religios cum ar fi ne ludroenia sau ne dnd credit numai
succesului n via.
Alte caracteristici asociate cu smerenia includ lipsa egoismului (17%), lipsa vanitii sau
a aroganei (19%) i prezena atributelor pozitive sau a abilitilor (17%). Mai degrab dect a
ncadra smerenia ca pe o preocupare pentru deficiene, participanii au asociat smerenia cu
atitudinile despre calitile pozitive ale fiecruia.
n ciuda acestei opinii pozitive uni participani au asociat smerenia cu rinea, umilina i
jena (10%) sau cu atitudinea sumisiv sau pasiv (5%).
Situaia n care smerenia a fost experiat
Cnd au fost rugai s-i aminteasc o situaie real de via n care s-au simit smerii,
participanii au raportat un nivel mult mai mare al afectelor plcute. (M= 6.6, SD=3.0)fa de
afecte neplcute (M=2.6, SD=2.8) associate cu amintirea, F (1, 119)=66.44, Wilks = .64,
p<.001. Potrivit cu prerile pozitive ale smereniei raportate mai sus, majoritatea participanilor
(61% i-au reamintit experienele implicnd succesul i mplinirea (i.e., a face ceva bun ;
primesc laude ; ulterioare sau ctigtoare ; a primi mai mult apreciere dect merit). O
minoritate din participani (24%) au raportat situatia care a implicat o scdere a sinelui, o njosire
(i.e. expunerea la o persoan mai bine situat ; pierdere sau eec; rectificare a prerilor despre
sine umflate, exagerate). Participanii care i-au amintit incidente care au implicat succesul sau
mplinirea au raportat mai multe efecte pozitive , M=7.3, SD=2.5, dect afecte negative, M=2.0,
SD= 2,4, F(1, 73)= 105.46 Wilhs =.41, p<.001. n contrast, participanii care i-au amintit
evenimente negative au raportat aproximativ nivele egale de afecte pozitive, M= 5.1, SD=2.9, i
afecte negative, M=4.6, SD= 3.0, F(1, 27)=0.25, Wilks =.99, p>.10.
Caracteristicile smereniei individuale
Cnd au fost rugai s se gndeasc la o persoan pe care o vd foarte smerit, participanii au
ales colegi cum ar fi prieteni, colegi de clas sau colegi de camer (41%), rude (22%), figuri
religioase populare cum ar fi lideri religioi , Iisus Hristos sau sfinii (13%), celebriti sau
indivizi faimoi (10%), i personalul religios conductor cum ar fi pastori sau preoi (3%). Cnd
au fost rugai s descrie persoana sau /i de ce au vzut-o ca smerit participanii au identificat
caracteristici pozitive cum ar fi buntatea, ngrijirea celorlali (56%) abinere de la laud (55%)
succesul sau inteligena (47% ) i un altruist sau atitudine de sacrificiu de sine (21%). Oricum,
unii indivizi (47%) au remarcat un potenial dezavantaj al smereniei menionnd c persoanele
smerite sunt timide, tcute i neasertive. Cnd participanii au fost ntrebai despre calitile
asociate cu oamnii smerii, ei au dat evaluri pozitive. Indivizii smerii au primit evalurile de
mai sus pe scala cu mijlocul 0 pe ambele indicele de adaptare i indicele de leadership /ncredere
(pentru adaptare, M= 2.0, SD= 1.9, t(126)=11.78, p<.001 ; pentru leadership /ncredere, M=0.7,
SD= 2.0) t(126)=4.0, p<.001. Oricum, evalurile adaptrii au fost superioare
evalurilor
umili sunt n general vzui ca bine adaptai i amabili. Dar sunt oamenii smerii la fel de buni n
rolul n care sunt chemai de lider sau dominan. Aceast ntrebare va fi examinat n
urmtoarea analiz.
Este vzut smerenia ca mai mult dect o rezisten n anumite roluri sociale?
Dac ne gndim la cum este vzut smerenia la ali oameni, ca rezisten, putere sau ca
slbiciune, participanii au raportat c n general smerenia este vzut ca punct forte.Chiar i
participanii au fcut distincia ntre meritele smereniei bazate pe rolul social i persoana smerit.
Msurtorile repetate au artat c smerenia a fost evaluat mai favorabil la cuttorii religioii
(M=3.4, SD= 1.7) dect n ceilali apropiai (M=2.9, SD=1.8)sau subalterni(M=2.7, SD= 2.1,
ambii ps<.01 ). Aceste constatri oglindite sunt rezultate din itemi ce sugereaz c indivizii
smerii au fost percepui ca fiind religioi saa spirituali, M=1.6, SD=2.2 care difer de la punctul
neutru de mijloc de la 0 la t(125)=7.99, p<.001. Smerenia a fost evaluat mai puin favorabil n
grupul lider/animator dect n orice alt rol social (M=1.0, SD= 2.6, ps mpotriva celorlalte trei
grupuri <.001).
Diferene individuale n vizualizarea smereniei
Potrivit cu predicia, religiozitatea a fost asociat cu concepii pozitive ale smereniei. Aa cum
artm n tabelul 2 religiozitatea a fost asociat cu dorina de a deveni mai smerit, cu credina c
smerenia este asociat cu o bun adaptare i ncredere i cu o vizualizare a smereniei ca putere,
potrivit cu idea c ambele, narcisismul i stima de sine ridicat implic preri despre sine
pozitive. Pentru a examina contribuia unic a ambelor, narcisismul i stima de sine am fcut o
serie de analize care sunt prezentate n tabelul 3. Aici se rescoper asociaiile divergente ale
narcisismului i stimei de sine cu vizualizrile smereniei.
Discuii
n cultura noatr de vest auto-absorbit, va fi uor s se resping o virtute modest cum ar fi
smerenia. Dar nc, rapoartele studenilor din acest studiu
smerenia ca putere mai degrab dect
smerenie au fost pozitive i cea mai mare parte dintre participani au declarat c vreau s devin
mai smerii. Cnd s-a
participanilor i-au reamintit situaia implicnd succesul sau realizarea mai degrab dect eecul
sau scdere a sinelui. Practic, ei au descris umilina individual ca amabil, modest i nalt n
abiliti sau alte atribute pozitive. Mai degrab dect a se gndi la indivizi umili ca aspru ca
auto-critic sau cu stim de sine sczut, ei au asociat smerenia cu atitudini i comportamente
care erau relevante pentru o persoan puternic. Rspunsurile lor sugereaz puncte de vedere
pozitive asupra indivizilor smerii att n termeni de adaptare i n termeni de ncredere ct i n
abiliti de leadership. Au evaluat smerenia ca u atuu n toate rolurile sociale care au fost
incluse n eantion.
n ciuda acestor puncte de vedere favolabile, participanii au artat unele distincii n gradul de
valoare atribuit smereniei. Dei ei au artat clar c cred c smerenia a fost asociat cu bune
adaptri personale, au fost mai puin decii dac smerenia ar fi un avantaj n domenii care
implic leadership-ul i ncrederea. Cnd au fost rugai s-i imagineze oameni smerii ocupnd
diverse roluri sociale ei au privit smerenia ca fiind mai puin un punct forte la animatori sau
lideri dect n alte grupuri incluse n eantion, care includea pe cei care cutau religia sau
liderii, cei aproape i subordonaii.
Reticena participailor de a asocia smerenia cu leadership-ul sau poziia dominant
completeaz cercetarea n percepia social a narcisismului i auto-exagerare. Cercetrile fcute
de Colvin i colegii lui sugereaz c dei auto mbunntirea nu este perceput ca o bun
adaptare de ctre colegi, acesta nu arat caliti evaluate social ca un grad ridicat de entuziasm
sau un nivel de energie ridicat. Oamneii cu auto-vizionri mrite , cum ar fi narcisismul pot de
asemenea s fac impresii bune la prima vedere : potrivit lui Paulhus, narcisitii sunt n mod
consistent vzui ca fiind siguri pe sine poziia de leader. ceea ce poate fi vzut ca un punct forte
n poziia de leader. Iniial colegii lor i-au evaluat ca distractivi i inteligeni dei aceste percepii
par s dispar de-a lungul timpului. n contrast, chiar dac indivizii smerii par bine adaptai
simpatizai, ei pot aprea ca retrai n societate pentru c nu au fost vizualizai ca deosebii de
dinamici sau colorai. Beneficiile smereniei pot fi mai evidente ntr-o relaie de lung durat(vezi
Campbell 1999 pentru un constrast cu narcisismul).
Potrivit cu ideea c narcisismul este antagonic smereniei, rezultatele curente sugereaz
c narcisitii sunt mai puin plcui dect alte persoane, pentru a vedea smerenia ntr-o lumin
pozitiv. n exemplul curent, narcisismul a fost asociat cu o perspectiv a smereniei mai puin
pozitiv n special n termeni d eadaptare, de lider i de ncredere. Mai precis, scorurile nalte la
subscala exploatare/intitulat (vezi Emmons, 1987) a Inventarului de EPrsonalitate Narcisist au
fost asociate cu reducerea tendinei de a lega smerenia cu buna adaptare. Pare adecvat c
pentru narcisiti, care sunt preocupai cu promovarea lor i cu aprarea punctelor de vedere
proprii positive, ideea de a se comporta ntr-o manier smerit poate prea prostesc sau
amenintor. n viitor va fi folositor s vedem cum percepia smereniei corelat cu alte trsturi
de personalitate ca Big Five.
Implicaii metodologice din activitatea curent.
Chiar dac stima de sine se suprapune cu narcisismul, stima de sine a fost asociat cu preri
favolabile asupra smereniei n exemplul nostru- mai precis cnd asociaiile cu narcisismul au fost
din punct de vedere statistic controlate. n alte cuvinte, pentru a extinde aceast nalt stim de
sine implic un rezultat pozitiv, acceptnd orientarea spre sine mai degrab dect un sentiment
de superioritate fa de ceilali, acesta este asociat cuo perspectiv pozitiv pe smerenie. Pentru a
face acest pas logic mai departe, speculm c acea persoan ci stim de sine ridicat i
narcisism sczut poate fi categorizat ca fiind umilitor- n special dac stima de sine este uan
stabil. (Kernis, Cornell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow, 1993). n general preri pozitive dar fr s fie
umflate, exagerate, a sinelui pare s se potriveasc cu recentele descrieri ale caracteristicilor
smereniei. (Tangney, 2000, 2002). Date fiind serioase bariere de msurare care au nconjurat
ncercarea de a evalua smerenia prin auto raport (Exline et al. , 2004 ; Tangney, 2000, 2002), ar
fi extrem de util dac scorurile existente cu privire la msurtorile pe narcisism, nivelul stimei de
sine i stabilitatea stimei de sine pot fi combinate pentru a identifica indivizi smerii. Evaluarea
altor cosntructe legate cum ar fi auto-compasiunea (Neff, 2003a, 2003b), validare cutrii
(Dykman, 1998) sau nevoia de a ctiga stima de sine (Forsman & Johnson, 1996) pot de
asemenea s ajute la identificarea inivizilor smerii. O alt tehnic posibil ar putea fi s
evalum smerenia prin auto raport dar controlate pentru dezirabilitile sociale(vezi Landrum,
2002).
Cnd reamintim situaia n care s-au simit umili, participanii i-au amintti situaia
implicnd succesul i mplinirea. Cu alte cuvinte, este mai probabil ca ei s fi vzut smerenia ca
o atitudine spre un punct forte dect ca o preocupare pentru slbiciune. Gndindu-ne la smerenie
ca o atitudine spre un punct forte, ridic noi posibiliti pentru modul n care statului smereniei
poate fi indus n setrile experimentale. Dac smerenia este vzut ca o focusare pe o limit ar
nsemna s rugm participanii s reflecteze asupra limitrilor sau cderilor. Oricum, am gsit
c astfel, inducerea auto-scderii de multe ori provoac reacii defensive i/sau efecte negative
de dispoziie sufleteasc. Datele recente sugereaz c cea mai eficient cale de a induce
smerenia poate
rugm oamenii s se focuseze pentru nceput asupra atributelor lor pozitive (sau s foloseasc
alte mijloace pentru a se afirma pe ei nii) nainte s-i rugm s se focuseze asupra defectelor l
or (vezi Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski , & Greenberg, 2001).
Un mijloc alternativ de a induce smerenia poate s implice furnizarea participanilor o
experien de succes nainte s le ofere un fedbeck negativ. Astfel de design ar da probabil
participanilor un sentiment de securitate sau pozitivism nainte s se deplaseze focalizarea lor
pe limitele lor. Idee de a precede experiena auto scderii cu acele ecouri pozitive, abordare
utilizat n studii pe procese de auto afirmare, care sugereaz c oamenii sunt mult mai capabili
s tolereze efectele negative dac ei au avut ansa nainte s se autoafirme(pentru a revizui vezi
Steele, 1999). Indiferent ce tehnic este folosit pentru ncercarea de inducere a statutului de
smerenie, se pare c trebuie s ne ateptm la diferene individuale n succesul acesti manipulri.
De exemplu, indivizii cu stim de sine instabil sau aprare narcisist pot s nu rspund
succesului sau eecului n acelai fel n care cea mai mare parte dintre indivizii smerii ar faceo.
Religiozitatea i smerenia
Religiozitatea ne-a artat clar i consistent
predominant n exemplul cretin. nainte de toate, participanii au raportat c acele persoane care
erau smerite erau susceptibile de a fi religioase sau spirituale. Participanii de asemenea au artat
smerenia ca o mai mare rezisten la solicitaiile religioase / spirituale sau la lideri dect n
oricare celellalte roluri sociale pe care le-am exemplificat. n sfrit, participanii cu propriul lor
nivel de religiozitate au fost asociai cu opiniile lor de smerenie- o mai mare religiozitate a fost
asociat cu ateptarea petnru an fi mai umil, legnd umilina cu o bun ajustare, ncredere, i
leadership, i vznd smerenia ca putere n ceilali oameni. Modele similare au fost gsite la
celelalte virtui ca tendina pentru religiozitate individual pentru a atribui nalte valori iertrii.
n
la fel i
spiritualitii.
Dei am gsit corelaii ntre religiozitate i percepia smereniei, datele actuale nu
abordeaz problema dac indivizii cu o religiozitate i spiritualitate ridicat sunt de fapt mai
smerii dect dect ali indivizi. Aceasta rmne o ntrebare empiric. Ambele imperative
religioase s cultive o atitudine umil. Totui o potenial barier a smereniei pentru indivizii cu
o religiozitate nalt poate s fie mndria religioas n care oamenii religioi se vd pe ei nii
ca fiind mai sfnt dect tine. (Rowatt, Ottenbreit, Nesselroade, & Cunningham, 2002). n
msura n care strdaniile religioase sau spirituale duc la o mbuntire n alte comportamente
morale, ele pot paradoxal s creasc sentimentul mndriei- care este n preent considerat printre
pcatele de moarte de muli savani. (vezi Schimmel, 1992, pentru discuii).
Referine
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JEFFREY P. BJORCK
JOHN W. THURMAN
colaboratorii si (1998) au descris dou tipuri de coping religios: pozitiv i negativ. Primul
exprim spiritualitate, contientizarea unui sens al vieii, a unei relaii sigure cu Dumnezeu i
apropiere spiritual de Acesta. O asemenea fumnamentare religioas stabil este manifestat
prin reevaluri religioase pozitive, coping religios colaborativ, cutarea suportului spiritual,
conexiune spiritual, purificare spiritual, cutarea suportului membrilor Bisericii, oferirea de
ajutor i iertare (1998:712). Spre depsebire de acesta, copingul religios negativ este
caracterizat de o relaie tensionat cu Dumnezeu, o viziune amenintoare asupra lumii i o
lupt continua de a gsi un sens al vieii. Aceast baz religioas ubred se manifest prin
reaprecieri religioase negative, demonice, reevaluri negative ale puterii Lui Dumnezeu,
nemulumire spiritual, coping religios direcionat spre sine i nemulumire fa de relaiile
interpersonale (1998:712). Pargament a evaluat copingul religios la trei eantioane: membrii
bisericii din Oklahoma dup explozia unei bombe n ora, un grup de studeni care au
experieniat un eveniment negativ foarte serios, i un grup de pacieni n vrst, internai ntrun spital. n fiecare eantion, copingul religios pozitiv a fost mai des utilizat dect cel negativ,
iar primul tip a fost corelat cu o sntate mental mai bun, n timp ce copingul negativ a fost
corelat cu efecte negative.
Koenig, Pargament, and Nielsen (1998) au identificat att strategii de coping pozitive,
ct i negative pe un eanion de 557 aduli bolnavi, internai ntr-un spital. Copingul religios
negativ a fost corelat cu o sntate fizic mai precar, o calitate a vieii mai sczut i nivele
mai nalte de depresie. n schimb, personale care utilizau copingul religios pozitiv aveau o
sntate mental mai bun i un nivel mai nalt de satisfacie fa de via.
Aa cum am menionat anterior, majoritatea studiilor s-au focusat pe rspunsurile la
evenimente stresante singulare (e.g., Koenig, Pargament, and Nielsen 1998; Pargament et al.
1998). Doar Park, Cohen, and Herb (1990) au studiat copingul religios ca rspuns la stresul
general cauzat de multiple evenimente de via, ns rezultatele lor au fost ambigue. n
consecin, studiul nostru a extins spectrul cercetrilor anterioare n dou moduri. Primul,
copingul religios a fost investigat n relaie cu impactul unui agregat de evenimente negative
i nu ca rspuns la un stresor specific. Al doilea, ambele tipuri de coping religios au fost
evaluate prin scale sumative.
Niciun studiu anterior nu a cercetat modul n care evenimentele negative cumulate
interacioneaz cu tipurile de coping religios pozitiv i negativ. Conceptul de reevaluare al
lui Lazarus i Folkman (1984) i teoria clasic a lui Caplan (1964) ne sunt utile aici. Lazarus
i Folkman postuleaz c dup ce este iniiat copingul, persoanele reevalueaz situaia n care
se afl i i modific strategia de coping n consecin. Astfel, pe msur ce numrul
evenimentelor negative crete semnificativ, este posibil c persoanele religioase vor reevalua
viziunea asupra Lui Dumnezeu. Acest fapt poate s conduc i la utilizarea mai frecven a
copingului religios negativ, de exemplu: reaprecierea iubirii i suportului Lui Dumnezeu sau
reinterpretarea evenimentului negativ ca i pedeaps dat de El. Similar, Caplan (1964)
argumenteaz faptul c indivizii care se confrunt cu un stresor vor utiliza la nceput copingul
lor habitual. Dac stresul continu s creasc, indivizi vor cuta noi strategii de coping, prin
ncercare i eroare. n privina copingului religios fa de un singur eveniment, strategiile
pozitive sunt comune, iar cele negative nu sunt comune (e.g., Pargament et al. 1998), primele
sunt mai habituale, n timp ce ultimele sunt mai neobinuite.
Aadar, prima ipotez a studiului este: copingul religios ca rspuns la evenimentele
negative este mai degrab pozitiv dect negativ. A doua: odat ce evenimentele negative sunt
mai numeroase, copingul religios negativ va fi utilizat cu o frecven mai mare dect cel
pozitiv. A treia: copingul religios negativ coreleaz cu intensificarea distresului, n timp ce
copingul religios pozitiv coreleaz cu diminuarea distresului. (Pargament et al. 1998; Koenig,
Pargament, and Nielsen 1998). A patra: vor fi replicate corelaiile tradiionale dintre
evenimentele negative de via i funcionarea psihologic. Ultima ipotez: copingul religios
pozitiv diminueaz efectele intensificrii evenimentelor negative.
METODA
Procedura
Acest studiu a fcut parte dintr-un proiect mai vast (de ex., Fiala, Bjorck, i Gorsuch
2002) care a utilizat un eantion de convenien. Cu acordul conductorilor bisericilor, au fost
selectate aleator 400 de nume din fiecare dintre cele trei mari biserici Protestante din sudul
Californiei (N> 1,200). Una dintre congregaii (Misionar Baptist) era predominant AfroAmerican, celelalte dou biserici (nondenominaional i respectiv Conferina Cretin
Congregaional Conservativ) erau mixte din punct de vedere etnic. Membrilor bisericilor li
s-au trimis prin pot pachete cu chestionare, inclusiv un plic timbrat autoadresat. Participarea
a fost voluntar i confidenial. Dup dou sptmni au fost trimise cri potale de
reamintire. S-au primit 337 de rspunsuri (27,1 %), dintre care unul a fost respins, deoarece
era incomplet.
Participanii
Respondenii (197 de femei, 139 de brbai; M = 38.87 ani, SD = 12.12) erau albi
(39.3 %), Afro-Americani (28.0 %), Latino-Americani (13.7 %), Asiatic-Americani (11.0 %)
.a. (8.0 %). Participanii erau cstorii (46.1 %), necstorii (35.1 %), divorai (13.7 %),
vduvi (3.9 %) .a. (1.2 %). Ultimul stadiu educaional terminat era coala postliceal (67.9
%), liceu sau echivalent (26.2 %), 10-12 ani (5.7 %) i 7-9 ani (0.3 %).
Msurtori
Prezentarea msurtorilor a fost contrabalansat (pentru a controla efectele de ordine)
n pachetele distribuite aleatoriu. Participarea religioas a fost evaluat pe dou scale cu un
singur item: (a) participarea la slujbe religioase formale; i (b) activiti religioase informale
(de ex., lectura Bibliei, rugciune, etc.).
Fiecare din acestea a fost cotat pe o scal cu 5 puncte (1 = o dat pe lun, 5 = de
patru sau mai multe ori pe sptmn).
Evenimentele de via au fost cotate cu ajutorul scalei LES (70-event Life Experience
Survey; Sarason, Johnson, and Siegel 1978). Participanii au indicat evenimentele
experieniate n timpul ultimului an i le-au cotat pe fiecare ca pozitiv, negativ sau neutru.
Numrul total al evenimentelor negative a servit ca msurtoare a evenimentelor negative
(Cohen 1988). Alpha pentru aceast msurtoare, pentru acest eantion a fost 0.88.
Chestionarul Brief RCOPE cu 14 itemi (Pargament et al. 1998) include dou subscale cu apte
itemi, care evalueaz coping-ul religios pozitiv respectiv pozitiv. Itemii pozitivi (de ex., Am
cutat dragostea i afeciunea lui Dumnezeu) includ reevaluri religioase benevole, coping
religios colaborativ, cutarea suportului spiritual, a conectrii spirituale, a purificrii
religioase, cutarea ajutorului din partea clerului sau a membrilor, ajutorul religios i iertarea
religioas. Itemii negativi (de ex., M-am ndoit de dragostea lui Dumnezeu pentru mine)
includ reevaluri religioase punitive, reevaluri religioase demonice, reevaluri ale puterii lui
Dumnezeu, nemulumire spiritual, coping religios centrat pe sine i nemulumire religioas
interpersonal.
Itemii sunt cotai pe o scal cu cinci puncte (1 = deloc, 5 = o mare parte din timp),
iar cei apte itemi ai fiecrei subscale sunt adunai pentru a produce un scor de coping religios
pozitiv respectiv negativ.
n studiul curent, scala Brief RCOPE a urmat imediat dup LES, iar instruciunile
RCOPE au fost alterate. n loc s se refere la un singur eveniment, participanii au raportat
cum au fcut fa la toate evenimentele negative din ultimul an. Cu aceast modificare, Alpha
pentru coping-ul pozitiv i negative au fost 0.83 respectiv 0.79.
Funcionarea psihologic a fost evaluat cu ajutorul Scalei SWLS (Satisfaction With
Life Scale; Diener et al. 1985) i cu Scala CES-D (Center for Epidemiological StudiesDepressed Mood Scale; Radloff 1977). SWLS msoar starea de bine subiectiv general
(overall subjective wellbeing), iar CES-D msoar simptomele depresive doar din ultimele
apte zile. Pentru a pstra consistena msurtorilor, timpul pentru CES-D a fost schimbat n
pe durata ultimului an. n plus, pentru a ndeplini claritatea instruciunilor, itemii tuturor
msurtorilor, nafar de LES, au fost transformai ntr-o gam de rspunsuri cu cinci puncte.
Alpha pentru acest eantion pentru SWLS i CES-D au fost 0.82 respectiv 0.90.
REZULTATE
Media i abaterea standard pentru variabilele de interes sunt prezentate n Tabelul 1.
Pentru a facilita interpretarea, toate scorurile scalelor (excepie fcnd evenimentele negative
pentru LES) au fost mprite la numrul respectiv de itemi. Aceast operaie a generat scoruri
totale de la 1 la 5, reprezentnd ancora fiecrei scale. n sprijinul primei noastre ipoteze,
coping-ul religios pozitiv a fost utilizat mult mai frecvent dect coping-ul religios negativ, t
(1,335) = 44.06, p < 0.001.
Apoi au fost efectuate corelaii de ordinul zero. Cum era de ateptat, evenimentele
negative au fost corelate pozitiv att cu pattern-urile de coping religios pozitiv ct i negativ
(rs = 0.32 i 0.11, respectiv ambele cu un ps < 0.05). A dou ipotez a noastr, c
evenimentele negative vor corela mai puternic cu coping religios negativ dect cu coping
religios pozitiv, a fost evaluat cu ajutorul testului t Hotelling pentru coeficieni de corelaie
corelai (Hotelling, cum este citat n Guilford 1965:190). Cum am prezis, prima corelaie (r =
0.32) a fost semnificativ mai puternic dect cea mai trzie (r = 0.11), t Hotelling (333) =
2.99, p < 0.01). n sprijinul celei de a treia ipoteze, coping-ul religios negativ a fost corelat cu
depresie crescut (r = 0.51, p <0.001), i satisfacie n via (life satisfaction) sczut (r = -
0.27, p < 0.001), dar, surprinztor, coping-ul religios pozitiv nu a fost relaionat semnificativ
cu niciuna dintre ele.
Ipoteza a patra a fost sprijinit de corelaiile semnificative ntre evenimentele
negative i creterea depresiei (r = 0.41, p < 0.001), dar i cu scderea satisfaciei de via (r =
-0.26, p < 0.001).
Mai departe, am efectuat analize canonice ierarhice, evalund numai variana unic
pentru a: (a) examina interaciunea prevzut i (b) a testa ulterior corelaiile de mai sus n
timp ce sunt controlate covariatele relevante. nti, ns, depresia i satsifacia de via au fost
ortogonalizate (Gorsuch 1991) datorit intercorelaiei lor semnificative (r = -0.50). Ca i n
studiile precedente (de ex., Bjorck et al. 2001; Fiala, Bjorck i Gorsuch 2002; Maynard,
Gorsuch i Bjorck 2001), aceast tehnic a produs corelaii pozitive puternice ntre variabilele
originale (adic depresia i satisfacia de via) i noii lor factorii (ambii rs = 0.97).
pattern-uri de coping religios, avnd ca criterii depresia i satisfacia de via. Analiza global
a fost semnificativ, F (16,654) = 9.36, p < 0.001. Aceeai analiz (vezi Tabelul 2) a scos la
iveal un efect principal semnificativ al evenimentelor negative asupra depresiei i a
satisfaciei de via. n plus, s-au gsit efecte eseniale semnificative pentru setul celor dou
scoruri pentru coping religios asupra depresiei i a satisfaciei de via. n sprijinul celei de a
treia ipoteze, analizele univariate ale varianei unice au artat c, coping-ul religios pozitiv
este corelat negativ cu depresia i pozitiv cu satisfacia de via, F (1,654) 3.74, ambele ps
0.05. Invers, coping-ul religios negativ a fost corelat pozitiv cu depresia i negativ cu
satisfacia de via, F (1,654) 4.32, ambele ps < 0.05.
n final, aceeai analiz (vezi Tabelul 2) a artat c setul celor dou tipuri de coping
religios x interaciunile evenimentelor negative au fost semnificative cu privire la depresie dar
nu i cu privire la satisfacia de via. O analiz univariat a varianei unice a artat c acest
efect asupra depresiei este datorat unei interaciuni semnificative ntre coping-ul religios
pozitiv i evenimentele negative, n sprijinul ultimei noastre ipoteze, F (1,654) = 4.90, p <
0.05. Figura 1 arat c, pentru persoanele care raporteaz coping religios pozitiv ridicat,
impactul evenimentelor negative asupra depresiei a fost sczut, comparat cu cei care
raporteaz coping religios pozitiv sczut.
DISCUII
n trecut au fost identificate pattern-uri de coping religios pozitiv i negativ i s-a
descoperit c coreleaz cu rezultate difereniale cu privire la evenimente stresante specifice
(de ex., Koenig, Pargament i Nielsen 1998; Pargament et al. 1998). Studiul de fa arat ca
astfel de diferen se aplic la evenimente negative n general i demonstreaz relevana
coping-ului religios n paradigma evenimentelor de via stresante (adic, cu privire la toi
stresorii negativi experienai n ultimul an). Numeroase ipoteze au fost sprijinite.
Aa cum s-a prezis, participanii au utilizat mai mult coping religios pozitiv dect
negativ ca rspuns la stresul general. De asemenea, cum era de ateptat, evenimentele
negative crescute au fost relaionate cu creteri att n coping-ul pozitiv, ct i n cel negativ,
iar aceste constatri au rmas robuste chiar i dup controlul participrii religioase. Cercetri
anterioare au artat cum un singur stresor, cum ar fi o vizit la spital, bombardarea oraului
Oklahoma sau orice eveniment singular poate cauza att rspunsuri de coping religios pozitiv
i negativ. Totui, stresorii nu vin, n mod tipic, singuri, ci n perechi sau n grupuri.
Constatrile actuale sugereaz c, odat cu acumularea evenimentelor negative, membrii
bisericii Protestante nu numai c i menin, ci i i intensific strategiile de coping religios,
att pozitiv, ct i negativ.
religos pozitiv mai mic. Aceast sugereaz faptul c coping-ul religios pozitiv ajut la
atenuarea impactului acumulrii evenimentelor asupra depresiei. Aceasta ar putea fi adevrat
n msura n care un astfel de coping accentueaz o relaie colaborativ, afectiv cu un
Dumnezeu personal.
De asemenea exist posibilitatea ca membrii bisericii protestante s considere
evenimentele negative ca provocri, pe care Dumnezeu le permite, pentru a le ntri credina.
(Park, Cohen i Herb 1990). n consonan cu aceasta, exist un item de coping religios
pozitiv precum: s vd cum Dumnezeu vrea s m ntreasc n aceast ncercare".
(Pargament et al. 1998:718). O asemenea viziune i poate face pe protestani s caute
aspectele pozitive ale oricrui stresor, ceea ce duce la creterea speranei i la simptome
depresive reduse. De partea cealalt, coping-ul religios negativ nu interacioneaz cu
evenimente negative n ceea ce privete funcionarea psihologic.
Cu toate acestea, lund n considerare efectele puternice ale coping-ului negativ, se
poate infera c acest tip de strategii sunt legate de o adaptare i mai proast, indiferent de
cantitatea de stresori. Prin urmare, constatrile noastre la adresa protestanilor, indic faptul c
este la fel de important, sau chiar mai mult, s atenum coping-ul religios negativ, dect s
maximizm coping-ul religios pozitiv. Rezultatele actuale trebuie totui interpretate n lumina
variilor limitri metodologice. Mai nti, studiul este transversal, limitnd inferenele de ordin
cauzal. Apoi, deoarece au fost investigai numai protestanii, a existat riscul de a studia
comportamentele de coping n cazul unei tradiii religioase particulare, ceea ce poate duce la
reducerea abilitii de a generaliza rezultatele i n cazul altor religii.
O alt limitare se refer la utilizarea evocrii de tip retrospectiv din ultimul an, dat
fiind faptul c participanilor li s-a cerut s fac o medie a coping-ului religios folosit n mai
multe evenimente. Fr ndoial, o asemenea strategie este inta multor erori i biasri n ceea
ce privete procesul de evocare. ntr-adevr, deoarece unii din participani au raportat un
coping religios pozitiv, nu este ieit din comun ca distibuia eantionului actual s fie
ngustat puternic negativ, sugerndu-se posibilitatea unei supraraportri a copingului religios
pozitiv. n ciuda acestor limitri, studiul de fa procur un sprijin serios pentru evaluarea
importanei coping-ului religios i pentru distincia dintre strategii pozitive i negative cnd
este vorba de stresul acumulat de-a lungul timpului (versus un eveniment specific).
Pattern-uri pozitive de coping religios pot fi eficiente n combaterea efectelor
negative de via. Astfel de circumstane stresante aduc cu ele i un risc crescut de utilizare a
coping-ului religios negativ, care este legat inevitabil de funcionare proast. Prin urmare,
rafinarea distinciei dintre coping-ul religios negativ i cel pozitiv, poate constitui o resurs
preioas pentru cercettorii din psihologia religiei, pentru comunitatea psihologilor, consilieri
pastorali i clinicieni care trateaz clieni religioi.
NOTE
1. Ambele analize ierarhice omnibus au fost repetate, adaugndu-se variabilele
demografice (gen, etnie, statut marital, educaie i vrst), la covariatele existente (ordinea
msurtorilor, participarea la serviciul religios, participarea la activitati religioase). Toate
rezultatele gsite au rmas semnificative chiar i dup controlul celor 8 covariate, cu o singur
excepie. ntruct relaia pozitiv a coping-ului religios negativ cu depresia a rmas
semnificativ, relaia negativ cu satisfacia de via s-a redus. (p = 0,11).
2. Dat fiind includerea unor itemi - ntrebri, unii ar putea crede c msurarea
coping-ului religios negativ a lui Pargament i a colaboratorilor si evalueaz orientarea
religioas i nu coping-ul religios per se. Este important de notat c aceast cutare nu este
vzut ca i o nemulumire sau neconvergen cu convingerile oamenilor, ci mai degrab,
"implic a face fa cu onestitate ntrebrilor existeniale... n timp ce opui rezisten...
rspunsurilor potrivite... (cu contiina c) nu tii i probabil nici nu vei afla adevrul final..."
(1991:417). Din contr, scala de itemi pentru coping-ul religios negativ a lui Pargamant,
reflect n mod consistent sentimente negative (abandon, pedeaps, rnirea de catre diavol,
etc.), care converge cu natura maladaptativ ale acestor evaluari de coping.
3. Coping-ul religios pozitiv a fost corelat semnificativ cu variabilele funcionrii
dup introducerea covariatelor, ns corelaiile de ordin zero nu au fost semnificative. Acest
lucru sugereaz c trsturile coping-ului religios pozitiv cele mai tipice n ceea ce privete
despresia i satisfacia de via, sunt acele aspecte care nu sunt legate de covariate. De
exemplu, s-ar putea ca comportamentele de coping religios pozitiv axate pe cutarea
ajutorului si iubirii lui Dumnezeu s fie mai relevante pentru funcionarea psihologic dect
comportamentul de coping, care poate reprezenta pur i simplu participarea religioas (una
dintre covariate), precum rugciunea i slava.
REFERINE
Tradus de:
Costache Roxana Elena
Costa Meda
Brum Valeria
Facultatea de Psihologie i tiine ale Educaiei, Anul al II-lea. 2010
CONTEXTUALIZING MODELS OF
HUMILITY AND FORGIVENESS:
A REPLY TO GASSIN
STEPHEN J. SANDAGE and TINA WATSON WIENS
Bethel Theological Seminary
We wish to thank Cynthia Crysdale, Carla Dahl, Samantha Morgan ORourke, and Gloria Metz for helping us with this
manuscript. Correspondence concerning this article may be sent
to Steven J. Sandage, PhD, Bethel Theological Seminary, 3949
Bethel Dr., St. Paul, MN 55112. Electronic mail may be sent to
s-sandage@bethel.edu
201
202
Table 1
The Contours of Individualistic and Collectivistic Worldviews in Relation to Forgiveness
Individualistic1
Worldview
Collectivistic
Worldview
Independent
Self-Reflexive
Interdependent
Social, Relational
Exchange/Contractual
Communal/Covenantal
Self-Face
Self-Forgiveness
Vital
Implausible
Forms of forgiveness
Communal Narratives,
Rituals, and Symbols
1See
Triandis (1996).
Cushman (1995); Markus & Kitayama (1991); Triandis (1995)
3See Bromley & Busching (1988)
4See Triandis (1995)
2See
203
204
205
206
Rather than social comparison or self-denigration, Paul is encouraging the Philippians to humbly
care for others and to put their concerns ahead of
their own. The goal is one of mutual love and honoring others in a Mediterranean cultural context where
honor and shame were the core social values (Malina, 1993). The Greek word for better in verse 3
(
) can also be translated surpassing
and does not suggest a comparative evaluation of the
worth of others (i.e., consider others more worthy
than yourselves) (Fee, 1995). Instead, we concur
with Fees (1995) interpretation that Paul is saying
consider the needs of others in the community as
surpassing your own and care for them. Bockmuehl
(1998) points out that the central social dynamic that
distinguishes the Christian view of humility from the
Greek is the non-hierarchical intent [of Christian
humility]: it governs relations between people who
are in principle equals, and is not a cliche for excessive deference to superiors (p. 111). Thus, it appears
that the biblical view of humility, at least as developed by Paul in Philippians, is consistent with an
egalitarian social ethic. Christian humility involves
the willingness to take a humble relational posture
(when appropriate) by surrendering the motives of
selfish ambition and grandiosity while considering
the needs of others above ones own. This is qualitatively different from the false humility of perpetual
self-denigration or a need for self-abasement. This
understanding counters the position of Nietzsche
(1886/1989), who despised both Christianity humility because he believed it did represent a false deference that masked true motives (see Roberts, 1982).
Contemporary Western Psychological
Views of Humility
is not to imply a uniformity in contemporary western psychology but simply a way of framing some general differences.
2000; Tangney, 2000), so there are no well-developed psychological theories of humility. Nevertheless, we will outline a few areas of potential dissonance and rapprochement between Eastern
Orthodox and biblical views of humility and contemporary western psychology.
First, contemporary psychologists in the west
would probably advocate for more emphasis on
self-care and personal boundaries than is evident in
either Eastern Orthodoxy or New Testament literature. Even if Pauls exhortation in Philippians 2:3
to consider others better than yourselves is not
universal and does not mean self-denigration, it
does run counter to the individualistic cultural values that dominate parts of the United States (U.S.)
and some other western nations. Many clinicians
in the U. S. could probably quickly think of clients
whose problems involve a self-defeating proclivity
to view others as better than themselves. This discrepancy can be mitigated by realizing that Paul is
not prohibiting what contemporary psychologists
would call self-care even if it is given much less
emphasis than in our contemporary therapeutic
culture. Jesus himself practiced a form of spiritual
self-care that placed limits on the amount of service he offered to those in need (Mark 1:35-38).
Self-care and humility actually form a healthy
dialectic that represents spiritual and emotional
maturity. Self-care practices (e.g., prayer, sleep,
nutrition, exercise) contribute to the energy needed to humbly care for others, and humility contributes to the dynamics of a healthy community
that benefit both self and others.
Second, contemporary western psychologists
would probably be eager to have humility distinguished from low self-esteem or shame-proneness
(Exline et al., 2000; McMinn, 1996; Means, Wilson,
Sturm, Bion, & Bach, 1990; Tangney, 2000).
Emmons (2000) explains:
To be humble is not to have a low opinion of oneself; it is to
have an opinion of oneself that is no better or worse than
the opinion one holds of others. It is the ability to keep ones
talents and accomplishments in perspective . . . to have a
sense of self-acceptance, an understanding of ones imperfections, and to be free from arrogance and low selfesteem. (pp. 164-165)
207
208
Figure 1.
Sin has been traditionally viewed as pride, arrogant ambition, or narcissism by many Christian theologians (Crysdale, 1999; Volf, 1996), and pride
seems to be a dominant sin motif in Eastern Orthodoxy (Gassin, 2001). But Crysdale (1999) effectively
argues that narcissism is not the universal core
dynamic of sin. Other themes and metaphors for sin
are needed in order to generate contextualized models of forgiveness and reconciliation. For example,
Volf (1996) suggests exclusion of those we find different, strange, or outgroup is an important dynamic of sin that wars against forgiveness and reconciliation. Crysdale suggests that sin can take the form of
209
210
211
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The making of modern
identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism and collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Volf, M. (1996). Exclusion & embrace: A theological exploration of identity, otherness, and reconciliation. Nashville,
TN: Abingdon.
Weil, S. (1973). Waiting for God (E. Craufurd, Trans.). New
York: Harper & Row. (Original work published 1951)
Worthington, E. L., Jr., & Drinkard, D. T. (2000). Promoting
reconciliation through psychoeducational and therapeutic
interventions. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 26,
93-101.
Young, T. R. (2000). Psychotherapy with Eastern Orthodox Christians. In P. S. Richards & A. E. Bergin (Eds.), Handbook of psychotherapy and religious diversity (pp. 89-104). Washington,
DC: American Psychological Association.
AUTHORS
SANDAGE, STEVEN J. Address: Bethel Theological Seminary,
3949 Bethel Dr., St. Paul, MN 55112. Title: Associate Professor;
Licensed Psychologist. Degrees: BS, Psychology, Iowa State University; MDiv, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School; MS, PhD,
Counseling Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth University.
Specializations: forgiveness, couples and family therapy, psychology and religion.
WIENS, TINA R. WATSON. Address: 1525 Albert St. N., St.
Paul, MN 55108. Title: Marriage and Family Therapist.
Degrees: BS, Business, Northwestern College; MA, Marriage
and Family Therapy, Bethel Theological Seminary. Specializations: Collaborative and interdisciplinary health care, sexual
health, adolescents.
Abstract
Acest studiu calitatitativ exploreaza rolul spiritualitatii si al
sensului printre 15 participanti care sufera de depresie severa.In timplul
desfasurarii acestui studiu participantii ,erau sub tratament in Loma Linda
University Behaviorial Medicine Center.Temele abordate sunt :(1) Depresia
creaza o deconectare spirituala.Pacientii au raportat ca se simt separati ,"deconectati" de Dumnezeu de comunitate, si de ei insisi.(2) Spiritualitatea joaca
un rol important in copiingul activat dealungul durerii din depresie ;(3) Exista
o dorinta arzatoare pentru sens si semnificatie si o zabatere pentru a descifra
sensul durerii; si (4) Faptul de a ajunge la o impacare cu circumstantele
personale si depresia , la un anumit nivel faciliteaza procesul de vindecare.
Cuvinte cheie: Spiritualitate. Sens. Depresie. Deconectare.
Acceptare.
Introducere
Acest studiu isi propune sa inteleaga rolul spiritualitatii si al
sensului in viata al indivizilor care se lupta cu depresia severa.Potrivit
Instutului National de Sanatate Mentala(2003) aproximativ 2 din 35 de
milioane de adulti americani avand varsta de 65 de ani si peste 65 de ani sufera
de o anumita forma sau alta de depresie.Doolittle si Farell(2004) au raportat
faptul ca :"depresia este un diagnostic comun in practica ingrijirii primare
numarand de la 6% la 20% dintre toate vizitele pacientilor"(p.
114).Ryan(2005) a confirmat ca rata la care indivizii ajung in depresie in
ultimele cateva decenii se prezinta ca fiind in crestere comparate cu primele
decade ale secolului 20. Cu toate acestea , numeroase studii au confirmat
eferctele pozitive ale spiritualitatii asupra depresiei .(Cotton et al. 2005;
McCoubrie& Davies 2006;Dalmida 2006;).Cel mai important motiv al acestui
studiu este de a examina efectele perspectivei religioase asupra durerii
provocate de depresie .Prevalenta depresiei nu este doar o provocare pentre
comunitatea medicala.Depresia intuneca sufletul , indeparteaza speranta din
locul ei , creaza un sentiment de goliciune sau ceea ce William James denumea
intr-un fel edificator :"sufletul bolnav", care ii ia locul.Trece dincolo de minte .
Si in timp ce mintea poate sa construiasca strategii care sa lupte cu conceptiiile
gresite , poate sa vindece boala sufletelor?
Pentru cei dintre noi , a caror chemare este sa aiba grija de
suflete , ingrijorarea ultima etse sa obtimem descrieri narative din partea
sufletelor care s-au confruntat sever cu melancolia , cautand un sens al rolului
spiritualitatii si al locului sensului in propriile vieti.Cum afecteaza depresia
spiritualitatea ?
sustin e cele ale lui Koenig et al. (1988) ,a carui studiu a pus in evidenta faptul
ca pacientii internati care ai dovedit un coping religios negativ in special cei
care au fost furiosi pe Dumnezeu , au recuperat activitatile independente din
viata de zi cu zi mult mai greu.
Sensul vietii si depresia
O alta arie ce cercetare care primeste o cantitate insemnata de publicatii
este rolul sensului vietii la pacientii cu depresie.Numeroase studii au pus in
evidenta o asociere pozitiva intre sens si depresie..Deasemenea , anumite studii
ca si cel al lui Wink et al.(2005) si Frick et al. (2006) au subliniat legatura
dintre sens si spiritualitate/religie.
Ca si in cazul spiritualitatii definitiile sensului vietii variaza. Este
normal printre cercetatori care investigheaza asocierea dintre sens,
spiritualitate/religie , si depresie ca clasifice sensul ca fiind pe de o parte sens
spiritual sau sens personal/existential.Sensul personal/existential este utilizat
uneori intersanjabil cu sensul vietii.Sensul spiritual este definit de catre
Mascaro si Rosen (2006) ca :"Avand un sens al scopului sau al chemarii
derivat din credinte despre fortele spirituale care planeaza asupra
vietii."(p.184) .Puchalski (1999) , aderand la ideea ca sensul nu poate fi
despartit de spiritualitate ,sugereaza ca vietile oamenilor ajung sa fie bogate in
sens si scop in masura in care relationeaza cu transcendentul.
Hodges(2002) analizand diferite studii care abordau problema sensului
vietii si a depresiei a raportat doua rezultate diferite .El a indicat ca studii ca si
acelea ale lui Wright et al. (1993) si Olszewski(1995) au stabilit o legatura
pozitiva intre sensul vietii si depresie .Al doilea rezultat care s-a bazat pe un
rezumat a lui Beck(1967) si Selingman(1990) a relevat o relatie negativa intre
conceptul de sens la vietii si depresie .Hodges a conluzionat ca sensul
trascendent ar putea avea un impct pozitiv asupra dezvoltarii in viata si poate
deasemenea sa sustina in acelesi timp o criza.Metoda cea mai buna care se
potriveste pentru a clarifica semantismele sensului discutate in literatura de
specialitate este calitativa , aceasta cercetare a utilizat interviuri semistructurate ,care sunt parte a metodelor calitative.
Aceast cercetare calitativ utilizat interviuri semi-structurate pentru
a explora rolul de spiritualitate i sensul vieii ntre indivizii depresivi admii la
Universitatea Loma Linda Behavioral Centrul de Medicin. Cincisprezece
participanti diagnosticati cu depresie care au participat la tratamentul parial la
LLUBMC au fost recrutai prin intermediul unui terapeut, asistent medical.
Din cei 15 participani, au fost 12 femei i trei brbai. Unul din criteriile de
selecie a participanilor a fost un minim de 2 sptmni de tratament la
LLUBMC.Aceast cercetare vizeaz descoperirea impactului depresiei avut
asupra spiritualitii i sensului vietii i, n acelai timp rolul spiritualitaii jucat
n procesul de recuperare a pacienilor depresivi. Ea a ncercat s neleag cum
fiecare i explic evenimentul negativ din via prin intermediul ntrebrilor
deschise pentru a vedea perspectiva lor din care privesc lucrurile.
ntrebrile folosite n interviuri urmresc scopul de a argumenta, de a
aprofunda, i a clarifica semnificaia rspunsurilor participanilor. Participanii
au fost rugai sa rspund urmtoarelor ntrebri:
1. V rugm s descriei experiena dvs. cu depresia. (Argumente
spiritualitatea ar putea aduce vindecare, dar a trebuit nc s-l aduca aceasta experien n
viaa lor. Un participant a indicat, "Eu caut pentru c eu cred. i a vrea s pot simi. A vrea
s pot simi cci eu cred ...rugciunile mele private sunt pentru a-mi deschide inima ". Restul.,
ntr-o msur variabil, au recunoscut spiritualitatii rolul pozitiv jucat n viaa lor. Un
participant care a luptat cu durere cronica a descris rolul jucat de spiritualitate:
Prima dat cnd m-am dus napoi la biserica a fost la nceputul lunii februarie i a fost
prima oar cnd am simit pacea n peste un an. Nu am simit durerea mea (in biserica). Vreau
s ma sinucid, dar apoi speranta venea napoi, atunci cnd am imi citeam Biblia... este ca un
fel de furnicturi, senzatia care trece prin corpul meu. Eu nu pot explica, dar este pace,
bucurie, i dragoste. Toate ntr-un mod necondiionat .... Uneori am, de asemenea, acest
sentiment coplesitor, i tiu c exist, fie cineva acolo care se uita la mine, fie este ngerul
meu pazitor sau un nger .... ncepe prin stomacul meu sau prin umeri. Este un sentiment ca si
cum am fost atins. Este ca i cum cineva pe care il iubesti vine sa te atinga.
Un alt participant a declarat, "Cnd m gndesc la asta [o putere mai mare], chiar i numai
gndind despre asta, ma face sa ma simt mai bine". Un participant de sex masculin care a fost
spitalizat de mai multe ori, a raportat: "Nu m-am simit sinucidal ntr-o perioad lung, doar
n depresie, i cred c motivul pentru care aspectul suicidare nu a venit e spiritualitatea". Un
alt participant a mprtit o experien similar: "Aceasta nu m las s m omor orict de
mult am ncercat [s ma sinucid], deoarece nu vreau s merg n iad ... depresia te face s te
simi deconectat de la alii, dar simi c Dumnezeu este mereu cu tine, indiferent ct de greu
este. "
n timp ce depresia a dus la un sentiment de deconectarea de la spiritualitatea lor, deoarece
starea de ntuneric data de depresie i-a fcut s se simt deconectati i i mpiedica s se
angajeze n frecventarea bisericii regulate i devotament personal, spiritualitatea a rmas
modul esenial cu care ei faceau fata depresiei. Acesta a oferit speran, a adus confort si a
mpiedicat suicidul.
Sensul
Problema sensului este adesea conceptualizat n ceea ce privete scopul n via. Scopul poate
fi obinute din ataamentul fata de oameni, cum ar fi prietenii i familia sau implicarea n
anumite activiti, cum ar fi cariera sau de recreere. Scopul poate fi, de asemenea, exprimat
prin explicaii teologice sau teoretice pentru lupta existeniala a persoanelor. Intenia
acestui studiu a fost de a lsa deschis ntrebarea astfel nct participanii au putut s rspund
n conformitate cu nelegerea lor actual a termenului "sensul". Pentru majoritatea dintre
participanii la acest studiu, sensul a constat n capacitatea lor de a explica situaia traumatic
n care s-au gsit ei nii. Este interesant de observat c 13 din cei 15 participanti au vzut o
legtur strns ntre spiritualitate si sensul vietii. Ceilali doi participani, dei nu n mod
explicit au facut o conexiune a sensului cu spiritualitatea, cred n Dumnezeu. Unul dintre cei
doi participani defineste spiritualitatea ca avnd o relaie cu Dumnezeu i s-a crezut c sensul
este atins atunci cnd el este conectat. Sensul, pentru acest participant, a fost legat de
capacitatea de a gsi o explicaie pentru evenimentul lui traumatic.
Cum se reflect n descrieri ale participanilor la acest studiu, persoanele cu
depresie au o dorinta intensa de a face sens din experiena lor cu depresie. Ei
vor sa stie de ce trebuie s treac printr-o astfel de experien i au nevoie sa inteleaga
c aceast suferin nu este n zadar, c exist un anumit scop ataat la aceasta. Treisprezece
de 15 participani au exprimat aceasta dorinta de a face sens al experienei lor cu
depresia. O tanara participanta a declarat:
L-am ntrebat pe Dumnezeu de ce atunci cnd am fost abuzata sexual de ctre tatl meu. Am
ajuns la concluzia ca poate c acest lucru imi poate permite sa-i ajut pe alii. Dar cnd am fost
abuzata a doua oar de [fratele meu], nu avea sens ... lucru pe care m-am lupta cu este, de ce a
trebuit s se ntmple de dou ori? De ce a fost fratele meu un pic ca tatal meu? Intotdeauna
am crezut c totul se ntmpl pentru un motiv, c fiecare situaie nu poate fi doar pozitiva.
Dar ce scoti din ea poate fi pozitiv i asta este ceea cu ce ma lupt eu acum.
S-a ntmplat o dat i trec prin chestiile astea, dar de ce de dou ori ...de ce... Cred c
depresia mi-a deschis cu adevarat ochii la spectrul de durere i de suferin care
cred c sunt importante n via. C nu poi pe deplin experienta fericire, pn cnd pe deplin
nu experientezi durerea. Tu nu stii fericirea pn cnd nu tii durerea.
Un student la muzic descrise cutarea pentru nelegerea de sine prin explorarea
credinele religioase din diferitele tradiii religioase, cum ar fi hinduism, budism, Zen i
altele. "Depresia ma face sa ma cine sunt eu si nu voi fi asa cum sunt fara ea. Odat
ce iesi din depresie, poti realiza modul n care aceasta v ajut cu perspectiva in viata. " O alt
ncercare comuna de a face sens din depresia acestora n raport cu Dumnezeu a fost de a
spune "Dumnezeu ma pune aici cu un scop. Nu tiu acum. Chiar acum am nevoie pentru a
gsi scopul. Sunt disperat dupa scopul meu. tiu c Dumnezeu are unul pentru mine, dar eu
nu stiu care este". n timp ce unii ar putea s nu tie de ce a trebuit s mearga prin
depresie, au existat civa care au crezut ca depresia sa ntmplat, pentru a-i aduce
napoi la Dumnezeu. "Am cam simtit ca depresia trebuie s fi fost ca o bataie la ua mea de la
Dumnezeu s m trezesc". Sau cum a declarat o alta participanta care s-a afiliat cu Cruciada
Campusului: "Simt ca acest lucru este tot o parte din mine pentru a-L cunoate pe Dumnezeu
mai bine ... Eu m vad n cele din urm apropiindu-ma, tiindu-L mai bine". Pentru cei mai
multi participanti., depresia a fost instrumentul care le-a permis de a servi mai bine altora.
"Cred ca singurul lucru pe care ntr-adevr il urmaresc cu nerbdare n restul vietii mele este
doar posibilitatea de a ajuta ali oameni ...pe care este mai bine s-i ajute mult
cineva care a fost deja prin foc sau iad". n conformitate cu o participanta, "Cred ca depresia,
probabil ma ajut s ma fac mai sensibila sau contienta de ceea ce oamenii
trec prin atunci cnd sunt n acest tip de situaie". Un participant a declarat." Eu cred c
suferina noastr este pentru binele altora. "
Din 15 participani, unul a ataat sensul cu familia sa. Trei au vzut depresia ca o
parte din planul lui Dumnezeu pentru a-i aduce mai aproape de Dumnezeu. Restul au crezut
ca depresia i-a fcut mai plini de compasiune i le-a permis s fie mai capabili de a ajunge la
alii si a-i intelege.
Aceptarea
O alt tem interesant a fost locul acceptarii n via n ceea ce privete situaia lor sau
experienta de depresie. Conceptul de acceptare articulat de ctre participani
prea s fie strns legat de sperana lor pentru viitor i sentimentul lor de vindecare. Din cei
15 participani, 12 s-au descris ca vin la termeni oarecum cu situaia lor de viata. Unul dintre
acesti 12 a recunoscut importana renuntarii, cu toate c a admis c ea nu este la acelnivel n
viaa ei. Ceilalti trei nu au prezentat nici o indicaie a faptului c au ajuns la un acord cu starea
lor. Prezena de lupt a fost evident la acesti trei. Aceast tem de acceptare a fost exprimat
n mod curent n dou forme: acceptarea situaiile neplcute din viaa lor sau de acceptare a
depresiei lor (recunoaterea faptului c acetia va trebui s continue s triasc cu depresie la
un anumit nivel).