Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
LUCRARE DE LICEN
Criza de imagine. Tehnici de rezolvare. Studiu de caz
Coordonator,
Prof. univ. dr. Ion Chiciudean
Autor,
Aura Diana Petre
Cuprins
INTRODUCERE/1
CAPITOLUL I. CRIZA DE IMAGINE I MANIFESTAREA EI N ORGANIZAII/3
1.1 Identitatea organizaiei/3
1.2 Imaginea i reputaia organizaiei/7
1.3 Criza de imagine n organizaie/10
1.4 Consecinele crizei de imagine n organizaie/13
CAPITOLUL II. GESTIONAREA CRIZEI DE IMAGINE/17
2.1 Rolul relaiilor publice n gestionarea crizei de imagine/17
2.2 Strategii de gestionare a crizei de imagine/20
2.3 Modaliti i tehnici de rezolvare a crizei de imagine/23
2.4 Planul comunicrii de criz/26
CAPITOLUL III. STUDIU DE CAZ: GESTIONAREA CRIZEI DE IMAGINE TOYOTA
(2009-2010)/29
3.1 Prezentarea Companiei Toyota/29
3.2 Prezentarea crizei/31
3.3 Gestionarea crizei de ctre companie/34
3.3.1. Aspecte pozitive/34
3.3.2. Aspecte negative/38
3.4 Analiza crizei/41
3.4.1. Etapele crizei/41
3.4.2. Actorii implicai i consecinele aciunii lor/42
3.4.3. Mediatizarea evenimentului: teme vehiculate aspecte pozitive/negative,
frecvena mediatizrii/zilele cele mai mediatizate, ziarele/televiziunile care au
mediatizat mai intens/44
3.4.4. Concluzie la analiza crizei/47
3.5. Strategie de gestionare a crizei de imagine a Companiei Toyota (propunere)/47
3.5.1. Scopul strategiei/47
3.5.2. Obiectivele strategiei/47
3.5.3. Categorii de public int/47
3.5.4. Mesaje pe categorii de public int/48
3.5.5. Canale de difuzare a mesajelor pe categorii de public int/48
3.5.6. Strategii de comunicare cu mass media/49
INTRODUCERE
relaia dintre ele i impactul pe care l au asupra publicului int, am menionat caracteristicile
necesare pentru ca o organizaie s aib succes. De asemenea, am definit criza de imagine i
am inclus informaii despre evenimentele care afecteaz funcionarea normal a unei
organizaii, greelile pe care le face o organizaie n faa publicului su, am prezentat etapele
crizei, cauzele i consecinele declanrii acestui tip de criz.
n al doilea capitol, m-am axat pe activitile specifice gestionrii crizei de imagine,
pe responsabilitile i rolul departamentului de relaii publice n rezolvarea crizei. De
asemenea, am inclus informaii despre cele mai recomandate tehnici i strategii de gestionare
a crizei de imagine i despre importana i rolul planului de comunicare n timpul unei crize,
am analizat elementele pe care trebuie s le aib n componen acest plan i informa iile pe
care trebuie s le conin pentru a ajuta organizaia s depeasc criza.
Cel de-al treilea capitol reprezint partea aplicativ a lucrrii de licen. Am ales s
analizez criza de imagine prin care a trecut compania japonez Toyota (2009-2010), deoarece
o consider reprezentativ pentru lucrarea mea de licen, fiind o criz complex, care a avut
att aspecte pozitive, ct i aspecte negative n gestionarea ei, prin urmare este o criz n care
pot analiza i observa clar elementele care duneaz imaginii unei companii i gre elile pe
care le face o organizaie n comunicare. n cadrul acestui capitol am identificat pentru
nceput elementele de identitate ale companiei japoneze, am prezentat succint criza, apoi am
analizat modul n care a fost gestionat aceasta i evoluia ei, identificnd etapele crizei,
actorii implicai; am inclus informaii despre mediatizarea evenimentului, iar n finalul
capitolului am propus o strategie de gestionare a crizei i un plan al activitilor de rela ii
publice.
Consider c prin abordarea teoretic am putut s identific i s definesc cele mai
importante concepte, de la identitatea i reputaia unei organizaii pn la cauzele i
consecinele unei crize de imagine. Bibliografia de specialitate mi-a permis s identific cele
mai recunoscute i potrivite strategii de comunicare, precum i tehnicile recomandate n
rezolvarea unei crize care afecteaz imaginea unei organizaii. Conceptele teoretice definite
pe parcursul lucrrii mi-au oferit o abordare potrivit a temei, acestea fiindu-mi de folos n
reprezentarea elementelor specifice unei crize de imagine, precum i n aplicarea practic a
tehnicilor i strategiilor de rezolvare a crizei.
CAPITOLUL I
CRIZA DE IMAGINE I MANIFESTAREA EI N ORGANIZAII
Brandul reprezint, aadar, viziunea organizaiei despre cum ar trebui s i desfoare clienii
activitatea, cum ar trebui s le foloseasc produsele i cum ar mbunt i sau u ura acestea
viaa consumatorilor. Pentru a ntri afirmaia conform creia trsturile fizice ale unei
companii nu sunt suficiente n construirea i conturarea unei identiti pozitive, prielnice
pentru aceasta, l voi aminti pe Bernd Schmitt conform cruia promisiunea reprezint esen a
brandului. Una dintre greelile frecvent ntlnite este aceea c organizaiile se orienteaz ctre
identitatea vizual pe care o au n societate, investind timp, resurse financiare, umane i
materiale n realizarea materialelor publicitare, de promovare, slogane, logo, considernd c
sunt suficiente pentru conturarea identitii, ns toate aceste elemente men ionate reprezint
doar o component a identitii. Pn la urm, ceea ce i determin pe oameni s cumpere un
produs, s foloseasc serviciile unei anumite companii sau s prefere un brand n defavoarea
altuia sunt beneficiile care i sunt oferite i promisiunile fcute 9. Alte elemente fizice prin care
organizaia este reprezentat pe pia sunt produsele sau serviciile acesteia. Urmeaz o
distincie ntre produsele organizaiei i identitatea acesteia, pentru a clarifica faptul c nu
produsele aduc succesul unei organizaii, ci ceea ce comunic brandul publicurilor lui. Astfel,
produsul este tangibil, obiectul fizic pe care l poi simi, vedea nainte de a-l achizi iona, ns
identitatea este cea care determin consumatorul s fac o alegere, aceasta descriind ce ofer
compania, de ce ofer, argumente care demonstreaz c ceea ce ofer este mai bun i mai
diferit dect ce ofer concurena, beneficiile de care se pot bucura clienii i ce promisiuni
face celor care muncesc n interiorul companiei, dar i celor din exterior 10. n urma celor
expuse, poate fi format concluzia conform creia publicul se va ataa de o companie,
implicit de produsele acesteia, n momentul n care organizaia comunic eficient, fcnd apel
la latura emoional a publicului i innd cont de nevoile sale.
n concepia lui Wally Olins, pentru a-i proiecta o identitate, activitatea organiza iei
trebuie s rspund la urmtoarele ntrebri: cine este, ce face, cum face i unde vrea s
ajung organizaia, manifestndu-se n patru zone vizibile: produse i servicii (ce face
organizaia
sau
ce
vinde),
ambienturile
(unde
anume
vinde
organizaia
Din literatura de specialitate pot fi identificate trei criterii fundamentale ale identitii
unei organizaii, acestea fiind: imaginea de sine, identitatea reflectat i imaginea
organizaiei12. Imaginea de sine se refer la percepia subiectiv pe care o are organiza ia
despre ceea ce reprezint ea n mediul social, ceea ce face; aceast imagine de sine se refer
la percepia pe care i-o formeaz managerii i angajaii despre organizaia n care i
desfoar activitatea, aspect important n existena i dezvoltarea unei organizaii. Cu ct
angajaii sunt mai mulumii de reprezentarea organizaiei, n funcie de ct de mult se
identific ei cu valorile promovate de organizaie, cu att mai mult activitatea lor va avea
beneficii pentru compania n care lucreaz. n caz contrar, acetia vor fi afecta i odat cu
deteriorarea identitii, imaginii brandului. Identitatea reflectat cuprinde elemente vizibile i
continue, prin care identitatea de brand devine perceptibil pentru alii; aceasta poate fi
reprezentat prin cldirea companiei, showroom-uri, anunuri publicitare, comportament,
limbaj, personalul organizaiei (uniforme), simboluri etc. n final, imaginea companiei descrie
percepia categoriilor de public-int pe care acestea i-au format-o n urma interaciunilor pe
care le-au avut cu organizaia13.
n ceea ce privete structura identitii, aceasta trebuie s fie ct mai clar, u or de
neles i trebuie s fac vizibil strategia organizaiei att n interior, ct i n exterior 14.
Astfel, o organizaie poate avea: structur monolitic (reprezentativ pentru organizaiile care
au acelai nume, cu mare vizibilitate, acelai stil), structur girat (organizaii care cresc prin
achiziii i preluri de alte organizaii, dar care i pstreaz tradiia, reputaia etc), structura
centrat pe brand (specific industriei de bunuri de larg consum)15.
n cadrul unei companii, identitatea mbrac mai multe forme: identitatea actual
(caracteristicile curente ale corporaiei: stilul de management, structura organizaional,
calitatea produselor i serviciilor oferite), identitatea comunicat (comunicarea controlat de
organizaie, reclame, sponsorizri, relaii publice), identitatea conceput (se refer la
conceptele perceptuale: imaginea i reputaia corporaiei; aceasta reprezint percep iile
publicului n raport cu organizaia), identitatea ideal i identitatea dorit (cea care exist n
mintea liderilor, viziunea lor despre organizaie)16.
12 Bernd H. Schmitt, op. cit., p. 59
13 Ibidem., pp. 59-60
14 Wally Ollins, op. cit., p. 19
15 Ibidem, pp. 20-26
16 John M. T. Balmer, Stephen A. Greyser, Revealing the corporation: Perspectives on identity,
image, reputation, corporate branding, and corporate-level marketing, Londra, Editura Routledge,
6
publicurile organizaiei percep din identitatea care a fost creat i proiectat 20. Jean-Marc
Decaudin, Jacques Igalens i Stephen Waller definesc imaginea organizaiei ca ansamblul
reprezentrilor raionale i afective asociate de o persoan sau de un grup de persoane unei
anumite instituii21.
Imaginea unei organizaii este cea care i ofer acesteia recunoatere, respect,
reputaie, ncredere. Imaginea depinde de corectitudinea i claritatea emiterii informaiilor de
ctre organizaie, doar aa fiind posibil o recepionare ct mai apropiat de ceea ce dore te
organizaia s transmit publicului, reprezentarea trebuie s fie ct mai apropiat de realitate
pentru a nu crea impresia de manipulare. Aadar, sunt foarte importante mesajele transmise
de organizaie, acestea fiind de dou feluri: mesaje funcionale (rezultate din activitatea i
comportamentul organizaiei, sunt credibile datorit faptului c se refer la aspecte
observabile) i mesaje emise deliberat (au ca scop principal promovarea produselor i
serviciilor). Aceste dou tipuri de mesaje trebuie s fie compatibile, oamenii trebuie s
observe c organizaia face ceea ce spune. Dac acest lucru este observat, organizaia se va
bucura de o imagine pozitiv, n caz contrar imaginea organizaiei va avea de suferit.22
J. M. Decaudin enumer trei elemente ale imaginii unei organizaii: imaginea dorit
(ce i propune organizaia s transmit), imaginea transmis (imaginea dorit este transpus
n diverse mesaje) i imaginea perceput (imaginea care ajunge la publicul organizaiei,
percepia pe care i-o formeaz acesta n urma receptrii mesajelor transmise de
organizaie)23. Aadar, imaginea organizaiei determin atitudinea pe care o au indivizii n
legtur cu organizaia, atitudine care se raporteaz nainte de toate la propriul orizont
(sentimente, experiene proprii). n conturarea unei atitudini fa de o organizaie conteaz
experiena pe care a avut-o un individ cu brandul respectiv, suma i caracterul informaiilor
preluate de-a lungul timpului. T. Libaert i A. De Marco propun alte trei elemente
componente ale imaginii corporative: notorietatea (caracterizat prin spontaneitatea alegerii
unui brand preferat), identitatea (se refer la caracteristici fizice, am dezbtut acest concept n
19 Bill Chiaravalle, op. cit., p. 22
20 Wally Olins, op. cit., p. XVII
21 Jean-Marc Decaudin, Jacques Igalens, Stephane Weller, La communication interne, Paris, Dunod,
2006, p. 138, apud Ion Chiciudean, George David, Managementul comunicrii n situaii de criz,
Bucureti, Editura Comunicare.ro, 2011, p. 19
22 Ion Chiciudean, Valeriu one, Gestionarea crizelor de imagine, Bucureti, Editura
Comunicare.ro, 2009, pp. 124-125
23 Jean-Marc Decaudin, Jacques Igalens, Stephane Weller, La communication interne, Paris, Dunod,
2006, apud Cristina Coman, op. cit. pp. 211-212
8
antipatia publicului.
conducere27. i B. K. Lee identific factori importani care reflect reputaia corpora iei:
performane financiare (cifr de afaceri mare), comportamentul fa de angajai,
responsabilitatea social, respectul fa de clieni, calitatea produselor i serviciilor etc 28.
Reiese de aici c reputaia corporativ depinde de cum se comport organiza ia n mediul
social, ce activiti constructive i benefice mediului ntreprinde aceasta, la toate aceste
aspecte adugndu-se istoricul su. De exemplu, o organizaie care utilizeaz materiale care
nu duneaz mediului nconjurtor va avea o reputaie puternic favorabil n comparaie cu o
organizaie care nu se preocup de acest aspect, cea din urm fiind mult mai predispus
incidentelor sau, mai grav, crizelor organizaionale.
Prin urmare, este uor de remarcat c principalul rol n determinarea evoluiei unei
organizaii l are publicul-int al acesteia, n mod evident determinat de ac iunile
organizaiei. Stakeholderii au puterea de a influena, dar pot fi i ei influenai la rndul lor,
fie de organizaie n mod direct, fie de sursele neoficiale. Reputaia, imaginea, identitatea i
restul elementelor care definesc o organizaie pot genera o serie de aspecte pozitive pentru
organizaie: clieni mulumii, performane financiare, notorietate, produse i servicii de bun
calitate, toate acestea reprezentnd latura fizic i emoional a unei organizaii, raiunea ei de
a fi i supravieuirea ei pe pia29.
Imaginea unei organizaii este foarte important pentru aceasta, deoarece ea reprezint
gradul de ncredere i notorietate pe care publicul i-l acord. O companie comunic prin tot
ceea ce face, astfel capt o reprezentare, o imagine n contiina colectiv. Cum am stabilit
deja, organizaiile se difereniaz unele de altele prin calitatea produselor, prin activitile lor,
relaiile cu publicul intern i extern, fiecare remarcndu-se prin valorile pe care le
27 Thierry Libaert, Planul de comunicare. Cum s-i defineti i s-i organizezi strategia de
comunicare, Iai, Editura Polirom, 2009, p. 126
28 Betty K. Lee, Corporate Image Examined in a Chinese-Based Context: A Study of a Young
Educated Public, Public Relations Research, vol. 16, nr. 1/2004, p. 8, apud. Cristina Coman, op. cit.,
p. 219
29 Timothy Coombs, Protecting Organization Reputations During a Crisis: The Development and
Application of Situational Crisis Communication Theory, Corporate Reputation Review, vol. 10, nr.
3/2007, p. 164
10
promoveaz i prin comportament. Astfel, cnd un individ alege un produs sau un serviciu,
factorii decizionali sunt relaia strns dintre client i brandul ales, experiena anterioar,
ncrederea n promisiunile fcute de un brand i ateptrile pe care le are de la
produsele/serviciile companiei. Publicul se ncrede ntr-o organizaie atunci cnd aceasta i
respect promisiunile i nu dezamgete, ns dac aceasta spune ceva i face altceva, dac
face vreo promisiune pe care nu o respect, ncrederea este erodat i vor aprea strile de
conflict dintre organizaie i publicuri, printr-un management defectuos al situaiilor
neprevzute ajungndu-se la crize.
Pentru a defini conceptul de criz, Cristina Coman face referire la evenimentele care
afecteaz funcionarea normal a organizaiei i la discordanele create n procesul de
comunicare efectuat ntre organizaie i publicurile ei30. Criza, ca orice eveniment
nefavorabil, afecteaz anumite paliere ale organizaiei: financiar, social, public etc. Criza
semnific o schimbare neateptat n viaa unei organizaii, schimbare care poate afecta
interesele organizaiei, scade credibilitatea organizaiei i a persoanelor care o reprezint.
Orice criz, odat instalat, va atrage dup sine consecine (pierderi materiale, financiare sau
umane) care necesit eliminarea lor i crearea unei noi identiti sau unei noi viziuni31.
n aceste condiii, criza de imagine este definit ca acel stadiu de deteriorare a
gradului de notorietate, a reputaiei i a ncrederii publice ce pune n pericol funcionarea sau
existena unei organizaii32. Aceasta nseamn c organizaia afectat de criza de imagine nu
va mai fi recunoscut cu rapiditate de ctre public, produsele i serviciile pe care le ofer nu
mai sunt printre cele cutate, o perioad fiind chiar evitate de ctre consumatori, iar ac iunile
organizaiei sunt puse la ndoial. De cele mai multe ori, crizele de imagine se dezvolt n
momentul periclitrii produselor sau serviciilor unei organizaii. Produsele, respectiv
serviciile companiilor pot fi puse la ndoial din trei perspective stabilite de T. Libaert: cre te
numrul de critici asupra consecinelor utilizrii (produse care conin ingrediente duntoare,
produse care afecteaz mediul nconjurtor), defeciuni tehnice observate la un produs (urme
de benzen, mainrii care pun n pericol viaa oamenilor din cauz c nu au fost proiectate
respectnd anumite norme) i suspectarea n privina anumitor produse, propagndu-se
zvonuri fr fond33.
30 Cristina Coman, op. cit., p. 15
31Valeriu Turcan, Breaking News! Ghid pentru comunicarea de criz, Bucureti, Editura Tritonic,
2015, pp. 12-27
32 Ion Chiciudean, Valeriu one, op. cit., p. 123
33 Thierry Libaert, Comunicarea de criz, Bucureti, Editura C.H. Beck, 2008, pp. 16-17
11
34 Ingrida Smaiziene, Petras Orzekauskas, Reputational crisis:saving the most valuable a companys
asset, Economics & marketing, 2009, p. 523
35 Ion Chiciudean, Valeriu one, op. cit., pp. 125-126
36 Ibidem, pp. 127-129
37 Timothy Coombs, op. cit., p. 164
12
informaii despre activitatea ei (mass media, lideri de opinie etc); aceste aspecte
demonstreaz fragilitatea unei companii n mediul social.
Trebuie luat n considerare i cazul n care imaginea sufer modificri grave, cnd
compania va avea nevoie s promoveze o nou identitate i s creeze n gndirea colectiv o
alt imagine, una pozitiv. Dac acest lucru se ntmpl, compania va avea nevoie de o nou
strategie de comunicare, lund n calcul cinci elemente importante: definirea obiectivelor
comunicaionale (cognitive, afective i conotative), alegerea grupurilor int crora li se va
adresa, segmentarea audienelor comerciale, nainte de a alege canalele prin care se va
promova, stabilirea mesajului central (ce trebuie spus i cum ar trebui s fie spus) i, ultima,
organizarea unui program de identitate corporativ38.
Referitor la desfurarea crizei, T. Libaert nfieaz patru etape ale acesteia,
importante n analiza evoluiei crizei: faza preliminar (faza n care sunt emise diverse
semnale de alert), faza acut (evenimentul declanator izbucnirii crizei), faza cronic (criza a
atins punctul de intensitate maxim, mass media i ndreapt atenia ctre un alt eveniment
de interes mai mare) i faza de cicatrizare (organizaia i revine, criza dispare)39.
Crizele de imagine amenin, aadar, s provoace daune serioase imaginii, respectiv
reputaiei unei companii, acest tip de crize fiind dominat de un comportament iresponsabil i
mesaje care pot jigni indirect anumii stakeholderi40. n urma unei crize de imagine,
consumatorii nu vor mai crede cu uurin n ceea ce declar organizaia sau n produsele
acesteia, ci, nainte de toate, vor testa produsul, l vor evalua i apoi vor lua propria decizie41.
Asociez aceast afirmaie cu dorina publicurilor de a se identifica cu organizaia pe care o
aleg sau pentru care lucreaz; niciodat oamenii nu vor alege o companie dac aceasta are o
imagine ndoielnic, fiind necesar ca oamenii s identifice elemente compatibile cu sistemul
lor de valori pentru a putea cpta sau recpta ncredere ntr-un produs.
Crizele de imagine sunt situaii care au nevoie de o reacie de rspuns ct mai rapid i
ct mai strategic gndit, acest lucru putnd diminua consecinele care apar n urma unei
crize. Rspunsul organizaiei trebuie s fie clar i sincer formulat, n caz contrar alte surse vor
scoate la iveal informaiile ascunse de organizaie, criza agravndu-se mai puternic 42. De
cele mai multe ori, cnd o companie se confrunt cu o criz, aceasta tinde s devin defensiv
n procesul de comunicare. Reprezentanii organizaiei doar rspund la ntrebri, uneori
ascunznd cauza crizei de team c ar putea nruti situaia. Oamenii, publicurile
organizaiilor, pn la urm, sunt n cutarea adevrului i ar aprecia o atitudine sincer i
deschis a companiei pe care au preferat-o pentru o perioad de timp, poate chiar ar n elege
situaia cu care se confrunt organizaia i ar fi alturi de ea, diminund consecinele cu care
aceasta s-ar putea confrunta43.
Consecinele crizei reflect perioada prin care trece o organizaie dup manifestarea
unei crize de imagine n cadrul ei. Criza de imagine nerezolvat poate lua forma altor crize,
ba chiar poate duce la dizolvarea companiilor de pe pia. Amintesc c una dintre
caracteristicile importante ale crizelor de imagine este aceea c efectele acesteia sunt de lung
durat. Cum am menionat n paragrafele anterioare, credibilitatea i reputaia unei organizaii
se obin greu, ns acestea se pot pierde ntr-un timp foarte scurt, printr-o serie de ac iuni
nepotrivite ale companiei. Spre deosebire de alte crize, cum ar fi cea organiza ional i cea
mediatic, criza de imagine nu se rezolv cu uurin , existnd riscul ca o organiza ie, odat
afectat la nivelul imaginii publice, s fie urmrit de aceast etichet pe toat durata
existenei sale.
Consecinele crizei de imagine difer n funcie de situaia de criz pe care a
ntmpinat-o organizaia. Impactul crizei este determinat de urmtorii trei factori: nivelul de
favorabilitate a reputaiei nainte de criz, tipul i mrimea crizei i frecvena apariiei n mass
media44. n funcie de grupul de stakeholderi, consecinele crizei de imagine pot fi
nenumrate, dintre care amintim la nivelul consumatorilor: diminuarea vnzrii produselor
companiei afectat de criz, abiliti reduse de atragere a potenialilor clieni; la nivelul
partenerilor de afaceri: posibiliti limitate sau inexistente de atragere a noilor parteneri sau
42 Edward P. Borodzicz, Risk, crisis and security management, Chicester, Editura John Wiley &
Sons Ltd, 2005, pp. 79-83
43 Tom Curtin, op. cit., p. 25
44 Ingrida Smaiziene, op. cit., p. 524
14
49 Ibidem
50 Ingrida Smaiziene, Petras Orzekauskas, op. cit., p. 523
51 Valeriu Turcan, op. cit., p. 28
16
CAPITOLUL II
GESTIONAREA CRIZEI DE IMAGINE
17
ntmplat, unde, cnd, cum, de ce s-a ntmplat, care sunt msurile luate i cine este vinovat
de situaia creat. Dac organizaia nu comunic ntr-un mod clar toate aceste aspecte sau,
mai grav, nu comunic deloc, aceasta i pierde publicurile relevante pentru ea. Avnd n
vedere faptul c o criz de imagine afecteaz reputaia i identitatea unei organizaii, putem
afirma c scopul celor implicai n criz este acelai: rectigarea sau men inerea ncrederii
publicului, reabilitarea imaginii organizaiei i reluarea activitii. Aadar, rspunsul
organizaiei la criz este ceea ce managementul face i spune dup ce criza lovete, prin
urmare modalitatea n care reacioneaz la criz i va determina existena.
Un rol important n stabilirea i pregtirea mesajelor transmise ctre diversele tipuri
de public aparine departamentului de relaii publice 52. O responsabilitate esenial a relaiilor
publice este de a pregti purttorii de cuvnt s reziste ntrebrilor venite din partea massmedia. Este absolut necesar ca reprezentantul organizaiei s fie pregtit pentru apariiile
publice, n vederea evitrii erorilor n comunicare 53. Specialitii n relaii publice cunosc
importana comunicrii eficiente, astfel acetia vor urmri s produc un mesaj complex,
mesaj care va oferi publicului informaia dorit i l va face prta la eforturile organiza iei
de a gestiona criza de imagine.
Departamentul de relaii publice ncearc ntotdeauna s formuleze un mesaj complet
i plin de coninut n vederea ndeprtrii crizei i a informrii tuturor tipurilor de public:
pres, societate, clieni, furnizori etc. Specialitii n relaii publice sunt contieni de faptul c
organizaia trebuie s comunice n astfel de situaii, c linitea, lipsa unui rspuns oficial sau
o comunicare deficitar pot fi fatale unei companii ntr-o situaie de criz 54. Este indicat, deci,
ca departamentul de relaii publice s nu ascund informaiile, s le expun ntr-o manier
favorabil, ba chiar s umanizeze mesajul prin regretele exprimate i ajutorul oferit celor
afectai i, astfel, s sensibilizeze publicul int. Experii n rela ii publice au responsabilitatea
de a se ocupa i de comunicarea intern, de stabilirea unui mesaj care s fie transmis
angajailor companiei n timpul crizei. Aadar, relaiile publice nu sunt doar instrumente de
promovare a produselor, a companiilor i ideilor, ci sunt i un instrumente de gestionare a
crizelor, alturi de multe alte elemente55.
52 W. T. Coombs, Crisis Management and Communications, Institute for Public Relations, 2007, p. 6
53 Remus Pricopie, Relaiile publice: evoluie i perspective, Bucureti, Editura Tritonic, 2005, p. 11
54 Tom Curtin, Daniel Hayman, op. cit., p. 102
55 Bernard Dagenais, Campania de relaii publice, Iai, Editura Polirom, 2003, pp. 27-28
18
56 Ibidem, p. 28
57 Peter F. Anthonissen, op. cit., p. 46
58 Bernard Dagenais, op. cit., pp. 258-259
59 Remus Pricopie, op.cit., p. 12
60 Cristina Coman, op. cit., p. 114
19
rezolva problemele cu care se confrunt 61. n caz contrar, mass media va deine control
absolut, organizaia nu va mai reprezenta sursa principal de informaii, ajungndu-se chiar la
o criz mediatic, n care publicul se las influenat doar de informa iile din pres, iar
organizaia nu mai este recunoscut de consumatori. Aadar, este recomandat o atitudine ct
mai prietenoas fa de pres, comunicare permanent, astfel nct s fie transmise imediat
datele solicitate de jurnaliti, organizaia s reprezinte principalul furnizor al informa iilor de
ultim or despre criza prin care trece. Aa cum este relatat n lucrarea Comunicarea de criz
a Cristinei Coman, n situaiile de criz, cea mai bun atitudine este transparen a: aceasta
nseamn o deschidere total fa de cerinele de informare ale publicului i fa de cei care
contribuie la informarea lui jurnalitii62. Aceste aspecte sunt apreciate de mass-media, n
acest fel reputaia, imaginea organizaiei nu vor fi afectate de relatrile din pres ntr-un mod
negativ exagerat, deoarece compania va comunica pentru public i n interesul acestuia.
Trebuie s atrag atenia asupra faptului c relaiile publice utilizeaz ca instrument
principal relaiile cu presa, deoarece, aa cum am menionat, determin promovarea activit ii
organizaei n combaterea crizei n rndurile publicurilor int, a punctelor sale de vedere i a
imaginii sale63. Pentru o relaie bun cu presa, specialitii n relaii publice trebuie s
foloseasc tehnicile de comunicare specifice : comunicatul de pres, dosarul de pres,
conferina de pres - la care se pot aduga vizite de pres, utilizarea noilor tehnici de
transmitere a informaiilor etc.64 Printre rolurile specialitilor n relaiile cu presa, Cristina
Coman enumer: contactarea presei nainte ca aceasta s cear acest lucru, recunoaterea
situaiei cu care se confrunt organizaia, evitarea schimbrii informaiilor, oferirea
informaiilor cerute de jurnaliti, astfel nct organizaia s reprezinte pentru pres principala
surs de informaii de actualitate65. n aceast manier, organizaia va avea sprijinul media, iar
acestea vor reaciona cu responsabilitate n situaia de criz prin care trece compania.
Datoria principal a experilor n relaii publice este de a ncerca s creeze o legtura
emoional cu publicul, s reaminteasc de trecutul organizaiei, de experienele plcute pe
care organizaia le-a oferit publicului ei int, dar s fac referire i la viitorul organiza iei i
la msurile pe care le ia aceasta pentru nu mai ntmpina situa ia de criz. Toate acestea
61 Devlin Edward, Crisis management, planning and execution, New York, Editura Auerbach
publications, 2006, p. 301
62 Cristina Coman, op. cit., p. 112
63 Bernard Dagenais, op. cit., p. 260
64 Cristina Coman, Comunicarea de criz, Iai, Editura Polirom, 2009, p. 99
65 Ibidem, p. 114
20
scuza, negarea, atacarea acuzatorului72. De exemplu, Marius Badea, patronul firmei Lactate
Brdet, a avut o atitudine nepotrivit la o conferin de pres n care, n urma scandalului
conform cruia brnza produs ar putea fi infestat cu E. coli, a declarat c asistm la ultima
conferin de pres a companiei i c las la latitudinea partenerilor retragerea produsului de
pe pia73. Aceste susineri din declaraie nu fac altceva dect s afecteze profund negativ
reputaia brandului, sugernd publicului c aceast companie este vinovat i nu va mai exista
pe pia. O strategie corect de gestionare a crizei de imagine este, a adar, lupta pentru brand,
conferine de pres care s ajute organizaia, nu s o condamne, comunicate de pres care
ndeamn publicul s susin organizaia, nu s i ntoarc spatele.
Una dintre strategiile pe care organizaiile trebuie s o pun n aplicare este aceea de a
aminti oamenilor despre activitatea din trecut, despre experiena plcut pe care le-a oferit-o,
n vederea diminurii nvinuirii i a protejrii reputaiei 74. Prin aceast manier, publicul
rememoreaz motivele care l-au determinat s aleag organizaia n defavoarea altora, punnd
n balan experiena pe pia a organizaiei de-a lungul existenei, criza prin care trece i
aciunile companiei de a o combate.
O alt strategie de comunicare benefic unei organizaii n gestionarea unei crize este
cea desfurat n mediul online. n prezent, comunicarea n mediul virtual este cea mai
rapid i cea mai eficient, informaia propagndu-se foarte rapid. n acest sens, realizarea
unui site web destinat crizei este o strategie important pe care organizaiile ar trebui s o
pun n practic. Oricrei companii productoare de bunuri de larg consum i este indicat s
se atepte la un prejudiciu adus produsului su care va necesita scoaterea de pe pia sau
investigarea amnunit a acestuia. n acest sens, site-ul web, special creat pentru situaii de
criz, va ajuta clienii s fie la curent cu detaliile despre produsul pe care l foloseau i cum
lucreaz compania s nlture problemele75. Organizaia i va putea susine astfel punctul de
vedere, i va pstra identitatea i nu va fi condamnat pentru lipsa comunicrii. Oamenii sunt
ataai de anumite branduri, se obinuiesc cu ele, astfel, dac organizaia pune interesul
publicului pe primul loc i i ofer acestuia respect, i-l va apropia i probabil c acesta va fi
alturi pe durata crizei, putnd fi evitate dezvoltarea altor crize sau nchiderea unei companii.
Prin urmare, pentru a putea gestiona corect o criz de imagine, o organizaie are
responsabilitatea de a comunica rapid, eficient i operaional publicului int i mass-mediei.
n vederea depirii crizei de imagine, organizaiile trebuie s formeze relaii strnse cu
publicul, s accepte responsabilitatea pe care o au, s arate empatie i s ofere explica ii
suplimentare i ajutor celor care au fost afectai de greelile companiei, dar cel mai importat,
cum am stabilit n capitolul anterior, s ac ioneze conform cu ceea ce spun, a adar
comunicarea de criz nu este suficient n gestionarea acesteia 76. Este evident, deci, c
gestionarea cu succes a crizei implic s recunoti c te confruni cu o criz, s iei msurile
juste pentru remedierea situaiei, s fii vzut lundu-le i auzit spunnd cuvintele potrivite77.
Prin stabilirea unor strategii de reacie i de rspuns la criz, organiza ia este ferit de
reaciile negative, aceasta exprimnd interes fa de ceea ce se ntmpl i oferind explica ii
suplimentare publicului, expunndu-i o versiune proprie. Chiar dac organizaia neag criza
sau arunc vina pe altcineva, cel mai important este c ea comunic i aduce argumente
pentru ceea ce susine n actul de comunicare.
Refacerea imaginii publice a unei organizaii este o activitate complex, care implic
resurse financiare i de timp destul de mari. n funcie de contextul n care apare o criz de
imaginea, conducerea organizaiei va folosi anumite tehnici de gestionare a acesteia, n
concordan cu situaia companiei aflat n criz. nainte de a pune n practic modalit ile de
rezolvare a crizei, orice organizaie trebuie s i rezolve problemele legate de activitatea sa,
s realizeze un plan de relaii publice i s i dezvolte rela iile cu presa, dar i propriile
capaciti de comunicare cu publicul.
o astfel de abordare ar putea fi un semn care indic ascunderea anumitor informa ii sau poate
fi asociat cu o comunicare teatral, chiar mai ru, poate echivala cu acceptarea vinoviei.
Planul comunicrii de criz poate conine, aadar, orice informaii, analize sau
clasificri care pot ajuta organizaia n perioade de criz. Singura condiie impus, pentru ca
acesta s fie eficient, este ca organizaia s i cunoasc foarte bine produsele, serviciile,
angajaii, categoriile de public cu care intr n contact, ameninrile, doar aa fiind posibil
realizarea unui plan de criz flexibil i scurt, care poate fi adaptat la alte situa ii dect cele
prevzute.
29
CAPITOLUL III
STUDIU DE CAZ: GESTIONAREA CRIZEI DE IMAGINE A COMPANIEI TOYOTA
(2010)
Toyota este unul dintre cei mai mari productori de automobile cu sediul n Toyota,
Aichi, Japonia. Compania a fost nfiinat de Kiichiro Toyoda n anul 1937, denumirea
provenind din numele de familie al fondatorului, iniial vehiculele fiind vndute cu emblema
Toyoda. Ulterior, Toyoda s-a transformat n Toyota, explicaia fiind aceea c Toyota sun
mai bine i c este un nume norocos n cultura japonez92.
n anul 2012, Toyota a fost considerat cel mai mare productor de automobile,
reuind performana de a produce mai mult de 10 milioane de maini, surclasnd Volkswagen
i General Motors. n martie 2014, compania multinaional avea n componen aproximativ
338.875 de angajai n ntreaga lume, automobilele produse fiind vndute n peste 160 de ri
i regiuni. Astfel, n noiembrie 2014 aceasta ocupa locul 11 ntr-un top al celor mai mari
companii din lume n funcie de venitul acestora93.
De-a lungul timpului, identitatea vizual a companiei Toyota a suferit modificri, cum ar fi
schimbarea numelui din Toyoda n Toyota, a logotipurilor, precum i a sloganurilor. Aadar,
n privina numelui companiei reamintesc c acesta provine din cel al familiei fondatoare,
Toyoda, nu a fost ales ntmpltor, ns a fost modificat n timp n Toyota, acesta fiind
considerat purttor de noroc n cultura japonez.
n ceea ce privete sloganul companiei, acesta a suferit repetate modificri, de
actualitate fiind Lets go places care are dubl semnificaie: una dintre ele se refer la
sensul propriu al ndemnului ilustrat prin slogan, acela de a cltori, de a descoperi lumea cu
92 http://www.toyota-global.com/showroom/emblem/history/, accesat la data de 09.05.2016
93 http://www.toyotaghana.com/about.php, accesat la data de 09.05.2016
30
autoturismele Toyota, a doua semnificaie referindu-se la latura simbolic a organiza iei, fiind
o invitaie adresat publicului s fie optimist, ambiios, spontan i o promisiune c vor
descoperi, alturi de Toyota, o experien plcut i un viitor plin de inovaii94.
Din punct de vedere al logotipului, se poate observa c acesta a fost modificat radical fa de
cel din anul 1936, cel din urm fiind ilustrat prin reprezentarea grafic a numelui Toyota prin
caracterele japoneze nconjurate de un cerc (Anexa 1). Actualul logo a fost introdus n
octombrie 1989 cu scopul celebrrii a 50 de ani de la existen, proces care a durat cinci ani.
Scopul pentru care a fost realizat acest logo a fost recunoaterea de la distan a companiei i
diferenierea ei de alte companii productoare de automobile printr-o reprezentare cu un
impact vizual puternic. Acest logo este compus din trei ovale care sunt combinate ntre ele
ntr-o configuraie simetric orizontal. Cele dou ovale perpendiculare din interiorul celui
mai mare reprezint inima companiei, respectiv a clienilor acesteia, ele fiind suprapuse cu
scopul de a reprezenta o relaie benefic pentru ambele pri, bazat pe ncredere reciproc.
Analiznd din punct de vedere grafic cele dou ovale poate fi remarcat simbolul literei ,,T.
n ceea ce privete ovalul din exterior, acesta simbolizeaz lumea care mbr ieaz
organizaia. Spaiul n fundal prezint valorile pe care Toyota le transmite clien ilor si: o
calitate desvrit, valoare dincolo de ateptri, bucuria de a conduce, inova ia i integritatea
n siguran, mediu i responsabilitatea social95 (Anexa 1).
Viziunea i sistemul de valori specifice organizaiei sunt menionate n structura organizaiei,
valorile Toyota fiind definite clar pe site-ul oficial al companiei. Viziunea global a
companiei este aceea c Toyota va conduce drumul ctre viitor, va fi preocupat de calitatea
superioar a produselor i de inovare constant, avnd ca scop depirea ateptrilor celor din
jur. Viziunea Toyota este prezentat ntr-o manier creativ printr-un copac, simbol al puterii
naturale, care semnific ceva de lung durat, care continu s creasc i s nfloreasc.
Astfel, valorile organizaiei sunt reprezentate ca fructele copacului; copacul este amplasat
ntr-un mediu uman pentru a aminti companiei c lucreaz pentru clien ii ei din ntreaga
lume. Acest copac poate fi considerat un element simbolic de identitate al companiei Toyota.
Cele 12 valori reprezentate sunt: respect pentru planet, angajament i interes pentru calitate
n vederea satisfacerii permanente a clientului, obiective provocatoare, filosofia keisen care
31
nseamn mbuntire continu, satisfacia clienilor, depirea ateptrilor celor din jur prin
anticiparea nevoilor clienilor, talent i pasiune ale angajailor, frunta n tot ceea ce face,
viitorul mobilitii prin dezvoltarea a noi forme de transport, siguran i responsabilitate
pentru angajai i clieni, inovare constant i, n cele din urm, mbogirea vieii oamenilor
din ntreaga lume prin implicare n societate, investirea n oameni i crearea unor joburi96.
Examinnd cele expuse mai sus, este observabil c identitatea organizaional a companiei
Toyota este destul de clar conturat, aceasta fiind o organizaie care se bazeaz pe tradiia pe
care o are pe piaa automobilelor la nivel global ca lider n producia de autovehicule. Este
remarcabil faptul c organizaia pune accent pe calitatea produselor sale i foarte mult pe
mulumirea clienilor, ncercnd s comunice ct mai deschis cu acetia i s i apropie de
organizaie prin conexiuni emoionale, innd cont de nevoile acestora. Obiectivele, valorile,
sloganul, chiar i logotipul companiei Toyota i implic n mod direct pe clien i,
transformndu-i n cercul n jurul cruia se nvrte organizaia.
96 http://www.toyota-global.com/company/vision_philosophy/toyota_global_vision_2020.html,
accesat la data de 09.05.2016
32
faptul c sigurana clienilor conteaz foarte mult pentru organizaie i i doresc rectigarea
ncrederii acestora103. Lipsa unei soluii concrete n vederea rezolvrii problemelor afecteaz
reputaia pe care Toyota a ctigat-o pe parcursul existenei sale.
n februarie 2010, criza se extinde n toat lumea, ajungnd i n Romnia cu
probleme identificate la marca Prius, Toyota confruntndu-se de aceast dat cu probleme
semnalate la sistemul de frnare, compania declarnd c de vin este o eroare de software. n
Romnia sunt rechemate in service 12.5000 de maini, dei nu au existat plngeri i
nemulumiri oficiale din parte clienilor104. n Romnia directorul general, George Kyriazis, a
acordat un interviu n care ofer detalii referitoare la criza Toyota att la nivel mondial, ct i
la nivel naional. Acesta explic scderea vnzrilor, a schimbrii obiectivelor de vnzri i
ofer informaii despre cum trebuie s se desfoare procesul de recall i despre remediul la
problemele detectate (Anexa 5)105. Voi analiza ulterior acest interviu, fiind reprezentativ
pentru deciziile luate de Toyota pe parcursul crizei i eventualele erori. La nivel mondial,
aceste reclamaii au demarat o investigaie oficial a NHTSA n urma a 100 de plngeri ale
clienilor, Toyota avnd un comentariu limitat despre acest aspect: ,,Am auzit despre inten ia
NHTSA de a ncepe o investigaie. Toyota va coopera pe deplin cu NHTSA
106
. naintea
Din punct de vedere al modului n care compania multinaional a gestionat criza, pot
fi remarcate att aspecte pozitive, ct i negative. n funcie de maniera n care a comunicat
cu toate tipurile de public, de msurile luate pentru a corecta problemele i de capacitatea de
reacie, voi meniona aspectele pozitive i negative n gestionarea crizei de imagine cu care sa confruntat Toyota.
La nceputul crizei, dup accidentul produs n 2009, este remarcat decizia relativ
rapid a companiei de a comunica proprietarilor hotrrea rechemrii n service a ma inilor.
Iniiativa luat de companie cu scopul de a comunica direct cu clientul este necesar n
gestionarea unei crize, deoarece este foarte important ca organizaia s fie prima care
transmite informaiile ctre clienii si pentru a fi evitate zvonurile i panica. Mesajul este
complex, ofer toate informaiile necesare pentru client, o list a modelelor la care au fost
detectate defeciuni i o soluie temporar de a ndeprta covorul mainii (Anexa 2).
Menionez c este foarte important calea prin care se va transmite acest mesaj, ns despre
acest detaliu voi discuta la aspectele negative n gestionarea acestei crize de imagine.
O alt aciune prin care Toyota ncearc s reacioneze la criz i s diminueze
efectele negative ale acesteia este publicarea unui comunicat de pres pe data de 2 noiembrie
2009 prin care anun rechemarea n service a 3,8 milioane de autoturisme care au probleme
la pedala de acceleraie, explicaia fiind c aceasta se prinde n covorul mainii 112. Prin acest
comunicat Toyota reuete s transmit clienilor preocuparea companiei pentru sigurana lor,
aceast decizie fiind luat n urma accidentului din august 2009 la care compania nu rmne
indiferent i ia msuri pentru evitarea unor astfel de tragedii, dnd dovad de
responsabilitate. Scrisorile trimise clienilor, diversele comunicate de pres i primele msuri
luate (ndeprtarea covoarelor i scurtarea pedalei) au reprezentat un rspuns rapid, grbit al
organizaiei la criz, rspuns de care clienii aveau nevoie pentru a nu cre te nivelul de
alarmare.
Odat ce a investigat mai amnunit problemele pe care le are, Toyota a luat msuri
mai decisive n vederea rezolvrii defeciunilor pe care le aveau vehiculele fabricate de
companie. Toyota a prezentat clienilor, la trei sptmni de la anunarea primei campanii de
rechemare n service, patru aciuni pe care le va desfura n scopul eliminrii problemei cu
acceleraia. Cele patru aciuni identificate pentru soluionarea problemei la pedal au fost
publicate ntr-un anun pe site-ul global de tiri al organizaiei (Anexa 6). Solu iile propuse au
fost: reconfigurarea pedalei de acceleraie i reconfigurarea suprafeei podelei pentru a mri
112http://www.forbes.com/sites/annemariekelly/2012/03/05/has-toyotas-image-recovered-from-thebrands-recall-crisis/#5b546da943ae, accesat la 13.05.2016
36
spaiul dintre pedal i covor, nlocuirea covoarelor cu unele cu un design nou, instalarea unui
sistem de suprareglare al frnelor. n plus, pe lng toate aceste mbunt iri aduse sistemului
de funcionare, Toyota i anun clienii c toate aceste msuri vor fi luate la nceputul anului
2010, ntre timp comercianii fiind instruii pentru a face modificrile necesare. Solu iile
comunicate n acest anun reprezint aciuni corective, deoarece Toyota a ncercat s i
recapete imaginea pe care o avea nainte de criz i a luat msuri suplimentare, cum ar fi
sistemul de suprareglare al frnelor, cu scopul evitrii repetrii crizei. Aceti pai de prevenire
suprim temerile clienilor, scopul organizaiei fiind acela de a promova n faa clienilor
aceleai valori pe care le aveau nainte de criz: calitate, siguran, clientul naintea a orice.
Prin comunicarea msurilor luate, Toyota nu doar c i linitete clienii, ci reuete s le
rectige ncrederea prin faptul c ncearc s i mbunteasc sistemul de func ionare i s
evite nemulumirea acestora.
n ziua de 21 ianuarie 2010 Toyota se confrunt cu al doilea proces de rechemare n
service din cauza blocrii pedalei de acceleraie, aa cum am prezentat ntr-un subcapitol
anterior. De aceast dat Toyota a avut una dintre cele mai decisive reac ii, lund msuri
drastice prin oprirea produciei i a suspendrii vnzrilor a celor opt modele afectate de
blocare pedalei. Toyota nu a ntrziat de aceast dat n a-i informa clienii despre
problemele aprute i despre aciunile de combatere a acestora, aadar au publicat pe site o
scrisoare deschis n care explicau c este ,,o decizie dificil oprirea produciei, ns este cea
mai bun decizie pentru clieni(Anexa 7). Cu toate c aceast hotrre avea s afecteze
vnzrile, acestea scznd observabil, Toyota a dat dovad de responsabilitate i a pus
sigurana clienilor pe primul loc. O msur preventiv luat n numele clientului este
ntotdeauna n beneficiul unei organizaii, ansele ca Toyota s i reabiliteze imaginea
crescnd cu aceast hotrre. Imediat dup suspendarea vnzrilor, Toyota a trimis o alt
scrisoare clienilor si, n care i informa despre modul n care se desfoar investigaia
problemelor la autoturismele rechemate (Anexa 8).
Un alt aspect pozitiv n gestionarea crizei de imagine este acela c Toyota, pe lng
faptul c a ncercat s remedieze problema rechemrilor n service, a elaborat un plan prin
care s i mbunteasc organizaia i calitatea produselor fabricate. Aadar, pe 5 februarie
2010 Toyoda expune, ntr-o conferin de pres n Japonia, un plan de ac iuni pe care
compania l-a planificat n urma celei de-a doua rechemri avnd ca obiectiv rezolvarea crizei
de retragere a mainilor, ct i evitarea repetrii crizei n viitor 113. Acest plan cuprinde
113 http://corporatenews.pressroom.toyota.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=1866, accesat la
13.05.2016
37
dezvoltrii rapide, compania atrage atenia, indirect, asupra experienelor plcute oferite n
trecut clienilor, deoarece o companie se dezvolt pe baza relaiilor create cu clien ii i prin
mulumirea acestora cu produse de calitate. Susin aceast afirmaie prin comentariul fcut de
Toyoda n cadrul aceleiai conferine: Prioritile noastre au fost n urmtoarea ordine:
siguran, calitate i volum. Aceste prioriti au devenit confuze, iar noi nu am fost capabili s
ne oprim, s gndim i s aducem mbuntiri aa cum o fceam nainte i preocuparea
noastr de baz de a asculta nevoile clienilor a sczut oarecum (Anexa 10).
n aceeai conferin, preedintele companiei apeleaz la aceeai strategie pentru a-i exprima
condoleanele pentru membrii familiei decedai n accidentul regretabil din 2009: mi doresc
s transmit condoleane sincere membrilor familiei Saylor. Voi face tot ce-mi st n putere
pentru a m asigura c nu se va mai ntmpla o asemenea tragedie. Patru vie i pre ioase au
fost pierdute. mi prezint cele mai sincere condoleane. Clienii ne-au cumprat produsele
pentru c au crezut c sunt sigure. Dar acum le-am dat motive s se ngrijoreze (Anexa 10).
Aadar, Toyoda empatizeaz cu publicul, reuind s creeze o latur uman a organiza iei prin
amintirea victimelor i a exprimrii regretului profund fa de cele ntmplate, demonstrnd
c i face griji n privina clienilor si i c nu se gndete doar la profit i vnzri.
Strategia umilirii folosit de Akio Toyoda este una complex, cuprinznd prezentarea
scuzelor pentru erorile produse, pentru consecinele negative ale rechemrilor n service i
admiterea greelilor fcute, dar i dorina i obligaia moral de a le ndrepta.
Din cele menionate pn acum reiese faptul c Toyota a ntreprins multe aciuni drept
rspuns la criza prin care a trecut: call center-ul destinat solicitrilor clien ilor, reprezentan ii
companiei au transmis mesaje prin care au ncercat s liniteasc publicul, s-l asigure de
rezolvarea problemelor, departamentul de relaii publice a umplut vidul de informa ii pe
diferitele bloguri ale companiei, site-ul Toyota era plin de informa ii cu privire la retragerea
autoturismelor. Aadar, Toyota a ncercat s comunice cu clienii si, s i apropie n situa ii
dificile pentru organizaie i s i menin imaginea unei companii responsabile.
39
n primul rnd, Toyota s-a confruntat cu probleme la pedal de-a lungul timpului,
amploarea crizei fiind o consecin a ignoranei i a lipsei de organizare: dac ar fi fost fcute
investigaii serioase la mainile cu probleme, nc din 2007 cnd au fost aprut reclama ii
despre funcionarea pedalei de acceleraie, poate c multinaionala nu s-ar mai fi confruntat
cu o asemenea criz de imagine.
Odat cu izbucnirea crizei de rechemare n service a vehiculelor, reprezentan ii
companiei au decis s comunice clienilor lor msurile pe care le iau i o list a automobilelor
care sunt vizate retragerii de pe pia, iniiativ despre care am artat anterior din ce motive
este pozitiv pentru imaginea unei organizaii n criz. Am men ionat c este foarte
important calea prin care va fi transmis acest mesaj, ct de eficient este metoda aleas de
companie. Toyota a decis s trimit scrisori proprietarilor mainilor vizate, decizie care nu a
fost att de inspirat, deoarece este un proces complicat care necesit timp doar pentru ca
informaia s ajung la destinatar. George Kyriazis, directorul Toyota Romnia, a afirmat ntrun interviu: scrisorile nu vor merge calup, toate ntr-o singur zi sau dou, ci le-am
programat pe mai mult timp pentru a fi timp s fie fcute programri cnd avem piesele de
schimb disponibile (Anexa 5). Consider c ntr-o asemenea situaie cel mai important este ca
informaia s ajung ct mai repede la clieni, s afle de probleme direct de la organiza ie
prima dat, nu din pres, de aceea sunt de prere c modalitatea aleas pentru a transmite
informaiile este nepotrivit n gestionarea unei crize.
Alt greeal n gestionarea crizei a fost ilustrat de reacia pe care au avut-o
reprezentanii companiei n urma acuzaiilor aduse. n dorina de a oferi un rspuns, Toyota
sugereaz diferite cauze ale problemei ntr-un timp mult prea scurt, n loc s investigheze
problema i s revin cu un raport sigur i complet. Iniial, problema a fost reprezentat de
blocarea pedalei n covorul mainii, compania asigurnd publicul c nu este vorba despre
defeciuni tehnice, ns la scurt timp au aprut i acestea n cadrul problemei cu pedala, cele
din urm reclamaii fcnd referire la o defeciune a servodireciei. Sunt de prere c aceste
greeli au dus la adncirea companiei n criz, o abordare corect a situa iei fiind un control
amnunit nc de la primele sesizri i comunicarea defeciunilor de care angaja ii Toyota
aveau cunotin, exemplul potrivit fiind schimbarea sistemului de frnare fr a men iona ce
se va ntmpla cu mainile vndute pn n acel moment.
Un alt aspect negativ n gestionarea crizei este ncercarea companiei de a nu-i asuma
responsabilitatea pentru pedalele defectuoase, ncercnd s arunce vina asupra furnizorului
CTS, productorul pedalelor, moment n care relaia dintre Toyota i CTS este afectat
negativ. Acest lucru nu este pozitiv pentru imaginea companiei japoneze, deoarece pe timp de
40
5 februarie 2010 (Anexa 9). Prima declara ie remarcat de pres a fost cea de pe 24
februarie 2010, singura care cuprinde informa ii despre problemele pe care le confrunt
compania, prerile de ru ale reprezentan ilor organiza iei i asumarea responsabilit ii
(Anexa 10). Criza ar fi putut avea o evolu ie mai bun dac toate aceste msuri erau luate
mai devreme i dac Toyota ar fi comunicat la timp. Cu ct o companie comunic mai
rapid pe timp de criz, cu att mai repede va rec tiga ncrederea celor din jur i se va
bucura de credibilitate.
Prin greelile pe care le-a fcut n gestionarea crizei, Toyota se va confrunta cu o
imagine negativ i cu mari pierderi materiale. Cu toate ac iunile pe care le-a fcut n
scopul dep irii crizei, Toyota trebuie s dea dovad de responsabilitate i s evite
asemenea situaii n viitor, deoarece cteva gre eli i o criz de mari propor ii sunt
suficiente pentru a pierde ncrederea publicului n organiza ie. Aceast criz trebuie s
reprezinte motivul perfect pentru crearea unui plan de comunicare pe timp de criz i a
unei echipe de gestionare a crizelor n cadrul companiei Toyota.
118 http://www.gandul.info/international/toyota-pierde-155-milioane-s-pe-saptamana-5472881,
accesat la 23.05.2016
42
activitii acestora pe parcursul crizei. n cazul crizei de imagine prin care a trecut
Toyota am identificat urmtorii actori: clien ii, Akio Toyoda, George Kyriazis, Jim Lentz,
Joan Claybrook, NHTSA, CTS i mass-media.
Clienii companiei Toyota au avut un rol important n declanarea crizei, acetia fiind
cei care au fcut reclamaii n repetate rnduri despre neregulile pe care le-au ntlnit la
vehiculele produse de Toyota. Acetia au trimis scrisori ctre NHTSA, moment decisiv n
demararea anchetrii automobilelor fabricate de japonezi.
Akyo Toyoda, directorul companiei, a avut un rol decisiv n aceast criz. Acesta a
comunicat pe 5 februarie un plan de aciune pentru mbuntirea organiza iei i a
experienelor oferite clienilor (Anexa 9). Aceast aciune este potrivit pentru gestionarea
crizei, directorul japonez dnd dovad de responsabilitate i atitudine constructiv. Ulterior,
pe 24 februarie, a oferit o declaraie complex la o conferin din SUA, n faa Congresului
American. n aceast declaraie, Toyoda i-a exprimat regretul pentru situaia prin care trec
clienii i comunic cauzele defeciunilor autovehiculelor (Anexa 10). Toyoda demonstreaz
c empatizeaz cu publicul i l asigur de prioritile organizaiei: sigurana clientului
naintea dezvoltrii organizaiei. Ca o consecin direct a declaraiei de pe 24 februarie,
presa a mai diminuat din speculaii i clienii companiei au fost lmuri i direct de directorul
acesteia, oferind organizaiei statutul de principal surs de informare n acel moment.
George Kyriazis, directorul Toyota Romnia, este un actor secundar n criza
desfurat. Acesta transmite, printr-un interviu, modalitatea n care se va desf ura
procesul de rechemare n service i cere scuze celor pe care i-au dezamgit. Ilustrativ
pentru rolul pe care l-a avut n criz este urmtoarea declara ie: Ne cerem scuze pentru
disconfortul creat clienilor notri. i asigurm c, pentru noi, sigurana i satisfac ia lor mai
presus de orice. De aceea iniiem aceast campanie preventiv de recall; n acest moment,
preocuparea noastr cea mai mare este aceea de a soluiona ct mai urgent i eficient aceast
situaie i de a ne asigura c toate mainile au fost verificate"120.
Jim Lentz, director executiv Toyota, redacteaz o scrisoare deschis clienilor Toyota,
informndu-i despre procesul de retragere de pe pia a autoturismelor i msurile luate
pentru remedierea problemelor. Printre informaiile comunicate, Jim Lentz informeaz
clienii de oprirea produciei autoturismelor pn la remedierea defeciunilor. Prin
comunicarea acestor informaii de ctre reprezentanii organizaiei, Toyota are ansa
rectigrii ncrederii clienilor. Jim Lentz i cere scuze n repetate rnduri i asigur
120 http://www.gandul.info/stiri/toyota-romania-cheama-in-service-12-500-de-masini-afla-aici-caresunt-modelele-cu-probleme-5490591, accesat la 15.05.2016
44
cumprtorii c ei sunt cei mai importani pentru companie, astfel ace tia se simt importan i
pentru organizaie, aspect foarte important n comunicarea de criz a unei organizaii (Anexa
7).
Joan Claybrook, fostul administrator al guvernului American de siguran n
transporturi, a reuit s cronicizeze criza printr-o declaraie n care acuz Toyota c nu a
rechemat mainile n service nc din anul 2004, odat cu semnalarea primelor probleme.
Joan Claybrook menioneaz c pentru o companie care i-a construit reputa ia pe calitate i
fiabilitate, aceste ntmplri reprezint un capitol jenant n existen a companiei. n declara ia
lui, fostul administrator al NHTSA, atrage atenia asupra accidentelor produse n urma
neregulilor detectate (Anexa 12)121. Prin declaraia fcut, Joan Claybrook critic dur
comportamentul pe care l-a avut Toyota n perioada de criz.
NHTSA, guvernul American de siguran n transporturi, s-a implicat nc de la
nceput n criza pe care a avut-o Toyota. Acetia au desfurat anchete privind calitatea
mainilor fabricate de japonezi i au monitorizat reclamaiile clienilor. NHTSA a emis un
comunicat de pres prin care determin compania Toyota s ia msuri serioase pentru
combaterea problemelor (Anexa 3). Un alt rol pe care l-a avut NHTSA n criz a fost
amendarea Toyota cu 16 milioane de dolari, provocnd companiei o pierdere material destul
de mare, aplicndu-i una dintre cele mai mari amenzi.
CTS a avut un rol secundar n criza companiei japoneze. Avnd n vedere c era
firma care furniza companiei Toyota pedalele, CTS a fost implicat n criza de imagine,
fiind acuzat la un moment dat c ar produce pedale defecte. n urma acuza iilor aduse,
CTS se apr prin atragerea aten iei asupra faptului c Toyota se confrunta cu probleme
la pedal nainte s lucreze cu ei. Aceste declara ii orienteaz aten ia asupra unor
posibile defec iuni tehnice produse din neaten ia angaja ilor Toyota, imaginea
multinaionalei avnd de suferit (Anexa 13).
Mass-media, unul dintre actorii principali n criza pe care a avut-o Toyota, a avut
un rol decisiv n evolu ia crizei ca urmare a comunicrii defectuoase a organiza iei
japoneze. Neimplicarea reprezentan ilor Toyota la nceputul crizei a avut efecte negative
asupra companiei, deoarece o bun perioad de timp presa a reprezentat singura surs de
informaii. n lipsa unor declara ii oficiale din partea actorilor direct implica i, mass
media aduce n aten ia publicului propria viziune despre problemele pe care le confrunt
Toyota.
121 https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/20100224Claybrook.pdf, accesat la
15.05.2016
45
46
49
ansa de a afirma c faptele reproate nu sunt att de grave, aceast strategie avnd menirea
de a reduce sentimentele negative i de a obine sprijinul celor din jur.
Strategiile intrrii n graii sunt de preferat n acest caz. Este mai important
rectigarea simpatiei publicului dect umilirea organizaiei pentru cele ntmplate. Pentru a
reintra n graii, Toyota va realiza o campanie n care va aminti clien ilor experien ele
frumoase petrecute mpreun, valorile organizaiei, aciune prin care organiza ia l va
sensibiliza pe client, fcndu-l s simt c ntr-adevr conteaz pentru companie i c este cel
care ofer reputaia pozitiv brandului Toyota.
Activiti
crt
Dur
Responsabili
Buget
ata
(structuri de relaii
publice responsabile)
1.
Intensificarea
1.Acordarea de interviuri 2
comunicrii
cu publicaiilor interesate.
mass
cu
media
luni
5
reducerii 2.Transmiterea
comunicatelor de pres luni
mediatizrii
scopul
Conducerea
1000
1300
Departamentului
comunicare
Specialist
publice,
de Euro
relaii 5000
director Euro
comunicare, purttor
de cuvnt.
Purttor de cuvnt
de 7
euro
Specialist
relaii 7000
publice,
ziare i n revistele de
comunicare,
Promotor, Autoexpert).
51
2000
director 0
copy euro
2.
Refacerea imaginii 1.
i
Transmiterea
unui 1 zi
organizaiei
cu care
sunt
Director
de 100
comunicare
euro
prezentate
2. Invitarea presei i a 1 zi
clienilor
conducerea
fabrica
euro
companiei
procesul de producie i
activitatea angajailor.
3. Participarea la salonul 4
Conducerea
organizaiei, director 0
transmiterea
invitaiilor
ctre stakeholderi.
4. Comunicare activ cu 7
6000
de cuvnt
Purttor de cuvnt
100
euro
newsletter-uri.
5.Crearea unor brouri de 5
Specialist
art
promovare.
conducerea
relaii 2500
director,
organizaiei
3.
Convingerea
1. Aplicare chestionare: 3
Analist
categoriilor
conducerea
public
n clienilor
organizaiei
int
cu
mainile
privin a lor.
52
research, 1000
euro
calitii
siguranei
i 2.
Realizarea
unei 1
decursul
patru luni
a mbuntire
Specialist
IT, 2000
conducerea
euro
organizaiei
vehiculelor; clientul va
observa c Toyota este
interesat
de
oferirea
de
mbuntirea
continu a acesteia
3.
Realizarea
conferine
unei 1 zi
de
pres
mpreun cu furnizorii
specialist
publice,
complete
organizaiei
unor 6
Conducerea
1500
organizaiei,
euro
purttorul de cuvnt
presei
relaii
conducerea
clienilor.
4.
Realizarea
afara organizaiei.
5.
Toyota
Conducerea
100
care
organizaiei,
euro
departament
comunicare
comunicat
emite
prin
un 1 zi
maini nainte de a o
scoate pe pia
4.
Informarea
1.
Trimiterea
prin
unui 1 zi
Director
care
comunicare
privire
activit ile
companiei
de 70
euro
caracteristicile
Conducerea
vehiculelor
companiei
destinat luni
2000
comunicare,
revist va fi ca un jurnal
al
companiei
art
destinat
conducerea
scoat
organizaiei
eviden
euro
declaraie de pres a
conducerea
rezultatelor anchetelor la
organizaiei.
mainile cu defect.
5. Realizarea unui spot 2
Specialist
prezentat
director comunicare.
inginerilor
activitatea
Toyota
euro
relaii 80.00
euro
n asamblarea mainilor.
1. Eveniment de lansare a 1 zi
Creterea
Specialist
vizibilit ii
publice,
mass
media
cu tinerii ingineri.
comunicare
30%,
pe
perioad
de
relaii 13.00
director 0
euro
o
3
2. Brouri de informare 1
Art
writer,
dezvoltrii profesionale a
comunicare
tinerilor
54
director,
copy 1.500
director euro
unui 1
Conducerea
100
care Toyota
comunicare
va
arta
beneficiile pe care le
aduce
acest
program
societii.
4.Realizarea
unei 3
Specialist
director,
pot
comunicare
fi
urmrite
IT,
art 3000
director euro
obiectivele proiectului de
CSR,
Toyota
captnd
astfel
atenia
asupra
are
asupra
responsabilitii sociale.
5.Toyota organizeaz o 1 zi
conferin de pres la
conducerea
finalul programului de
organizaiei,
specialist
publice
euro
relaii
tinerilor
ingineri
55
asemenea, scopul i obiectivele strategiei pot fi evaluate prin aplicarea unor chestionare care
vor analiza imaginea clienilor despre Toyota.
Evaluarea mesajelor transmise se va face prin monitorizarea tirilor care citeaz
declaraiile organizaiei, prin monitorizarea mesajelor i e-mailurilor primite de la clien i
pentru a observa atitudinea acestora la atitudinea organizaiei. De asemenea, se vor compara
mesajele transmise de organizaie cu informaiile ajunse la public, acesta fiind un criteriu
relevant pentru stabilirea gradului de complexitate a mesajului elaborat.
Evaluarea canalelor de difuzare a mesajelor va fi realizat prin observarea numrului
de vizite pe site i pe platformele special create pentru gestionarea crizei. O alt modalitate de
evaluare a canalelor de difuzare a mesajelor este reprezentat de monitorizarea apelurilor
telefonice i a numrului de e-mailuri primite.
Evaluarea strategiilor de comunicare cu mass media se va desfura prin monitorizarea
numrului de tiri publicate i caracterul acestora. De asemenea, compania va monitoriza
reaciile pe care le are presa la comunicatele emise de reprezentanii organizaiei.
Evaluarea activitilor de comunicare se va realiza prin realizarea unor rapoarte la
sfritul fiecrei aciuni din cadrul planului propus. Astfel, n cazul conferin elor de pres, a
trgurilor sau a colii de var pentru tinerii ingineri se va urmri numrul invita iilor
transmise, respectiv a celor onorate pentru a stabili numrul participan ilor, numrul
materialelor de informare distribuite celor prezeni la evenimente, feedback din partea
participanilor (interaciune, ntrebri adresate, sugestii, sfaturi), numrul accesrilor i
nregistrrilor pe platforma online a colii de var, analizarea caracterului tirilor din pres
despre evenimentele organizate. n ceea ce privete liniile telefonice dedicate presei, se va
monitoriza numrul apelurilor primite i caracterul informaiilor solicitate, astfel momentul n
care apelurile se vor rri va fi un semn c presa s-a linitit. n cazul platformei online pentru
primirea sugestiilor de mbuntire a vehiculelor, vor fi urmrite nregistrrile pe site, dar i
numrul i caracterul comentariilor postate de clieni.
Planul de comunicare constituie un instrument prioritar pentru depirea crizei de
imagine, iar activitile de comunicare, informare i promovare din cadrul planului
activitilor de comunicare au ca scop mbuntirea imaginii companiei i ctigarea
ncrederii categoriilor de public int.
56
CONCLUZII FINALE
clienii n situaii dificile i s menin reputaia pe care i-a cldit-o de-a lungul timpului,
ns a fost evident ignorarea problemelor cu pedala i lipsa pregtirii la nivelul ntregii
organizaii pentru astfel de situaii, dei existaser semnale naintea crizei.
De asemenea, din cauza ignorrii presei n calitate de public principal, Toyota s-a
confruntat cu multe apariii negative n pres, acest lucru anulnd comunicarea pe care o avea
compania cu clienii si, deoarece presa a devenit principala surs de informaii n acest caz.
Aadar, n urma abinerii de la comentarii oficiale, Toyota s-a adncit n criz din cauz c nu
a oferit rspunsuri presei, situaie care reflect lipsa unui plan de comunicare de criz bine
structurat.
Din cele menionate n cadrul capitolului trei reiese faptul c organiza ia japonez nu
a reacionat pozitiv la criza de imagine prin care a trecut, a tratat cu superficialitate
problemele (blocarea pedalei, probleme la frnare) i a ignorat categorii de public decisive n
cazul unei crize de imagine. Din simpla ignorare a problemelor am tras concluzia c Toyota
nu a fost pregtit pentru gestionarea unei crize de asemenea proporii.
59
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http://money.cnn.com/2009/11/25/autos/toyota_accelerator/index.htm, accesat la data de
10.05
http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/04/news/companies/toyota_earnings.cnnw/index.htm, accesat
la data de 13.05.2016
http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/13/news/companies/toyota_tacoma_recall/index.htm, accesat
la 13.05.2016
http://money.cnn.com/autos/storysupplement/toyota_timeline/?iid=EL, accesat la data de
10.05.2016
http://pressroom.toyota.com/article_print.cfm?article_id=2736, accesat la data de 10.05.2016
http://www.forbes.com/sites/annemariekelly/2012/03/05/has-toyotas-image-recovered-fromthe-brands-recall-crisis/#5b546da943ae, accesat la 13.05.2016
http://www.gandul.info/international/toyota-pierde-155-milioane-s-pe-saptamana-5472881,
accesat la 23.05.2016
http://www.gandul.info/stiri/toyota-romania-cheama-in-service-12-500-de-masini-afla-aicicare-sunt-modelele-cu-probleme-5490591, accesat la 15.05.2016
http://www.lexusofakron-canton.com/MiscPage_18, accesat la data de 10.05.2016
62
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/2009/NHTSA+Statement+Concerning
+The+Safety+Recall+of+3.8+million+Toyota+Vehicles, accesat la data de 10.05.2016
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/business/22toyota.html, accesat la data de 10.05.2016
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/business/27toyota.html, accesat la data de 13.05.2016
http://www.promotor.ro/masini-noi/news/topul-celor-mai-mari-producatori-de-masini-in2010-7918557, accesat la 14.05.2016
http://www.reliableplant.com/Read/22505/CTS-comments-Toyota-recall,
accesat
la
15.05.2016
http://www.romaniatv.net/mars-versus-lactate-bradet-cum-functioneaza-in-criza-comunicareacorporatista-si-comunicarea-umana_277801.html, accesat la 23.02.2016
63
ANEXE
64
Anexa 1
Sursa:
http://www.toyotaglobal.com/company/history_of_toyota/75years/data/automotive_business/products
_technology/vehicle_lineage_chart/trademarks_and_emblems/index.html
Sursa: http://www.toyota-global.com/showroom/emblem/passion/
Anexa 2
Scrisoare ctre clieni. Avertisment de siguran
To: All Lexus Dealers
From: Lexus Customer Services
Lexus/Toyota Consumer Safety Advisory
Potential Floor Mat Interference with Accelerator Pedal
******URGENT******
Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. takes public safety very seriously. We believe our vehicles to
be among the safest on the road today. Recent events have prompted Lexus and Toyota to
take a closer look at the potential for an accelerator pedal to get stuck in the full open position
due to an unsecured or incompatible driver's floor mat. A stuck open accelerator pedal may
result in very high vehicle speeds and make it difficult to stop the vehicle, which could cause
a crash, serious injury or death. Lexus considers this a critical matter and will soon launch a
safety campaign on specific Lexus and Toyota vehicles. Throughout the process of
developing the details of the action plan, it will advise the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA).
Today, we are releasing a Consumer Safety Advisory to our customers. Until Lexus/Toyota
develops a campaign remedy, we are asking owners of specific Lexus and Toyota models to
take out any removable drivers floor mat and NOT replace it with any other floor mat. The
following models are affected:
In the event owners choose not to remove their floor mat, Lexus strongly recommends that
they ensure that the correct floor mat is being used, that it is properly installed and secured,
that it is not flipped over with bottom-side up, and that one floor mat is not stacked over
another. Information on proper floor mat installation can be found on http://www.lexus.com.
If a customer requires your dealerships assistance, please assist them by utilizing the attached
instructions and application chart. Please direct all customer inquiries to the Lexus
Customer Assistance Center at 1-800-255-3987.
If you are a dealership associate and have any questions, please contact your District
Service/Parts Manager.
Due to the nature of this activity, it is imperative that all media contacts (local and national)
receive a consistent message. In this regard, all media contacts must be directed to Brian
Lyons (310) 468-2552, in Toyota Corporate Communications. (Please do not provide these
numbers to customers. Dealership associates should contact their Area representative for any
questions).
The following Q&A has been provided for your reference.
Lexus Consumer Safety Advisory Q&A
A1: This is a Consumer Safety Advisory based on the potential for an accelerator
pedal to get stuck in the full open position due to an unsecured or incompatible driver's floor
mat on certain Lexus and Toyota vehicles.
A2: Recent events have prompted Lexus to take a closer look at the potential for an
accelerator pedal to get stuck in the full open position due to an unsecured or incompatible
driver's floor mat. A stuck open accelerator pedal may result in very high vehicle speeds and
make it difficult to stop the vehicle which could cause a crash, serious injury or death.
A3: On August 28th, 2009, California Highway Patrol Officer Mark Saylor and three
members of his family tragically lost their lives on a highway near San Diego, California,
while driving a 2009 ES350 loaned to them by a local Lexus dealer.
Preliminary information from law enforcement investigators indicates that the ES350
involved in the crash contained a drivers all-weather floor mat from a different model Lexus.
If incompatible drivers floor mats are installed in any vehicle, or if the floor mat is not
properly secured by the retaining hooks, this could cause it to interfere with the accelerator
pedal.
Q3a: Electronic systems, such as drive by wire, have been suggested as a possible
culprit in the persistence of sudden unintended acceleration incidents. Is this part of the
investigation of the San Diego accident.
A3a: All aspects of the vehicle are being studied, but preliminary indications are that
an all weather floor mat not designed for the ES350 was installed at the time of the Saylor
crash. We have seen no evidence that electronic engine control systems were the cause.
A4: Lexus, 2007 2010 Camry, 2005 2010 Avalon, 2004 2009 Prius, 2005 2010
Q5: Is Lexus planning another recall for the all-weather floors mats or other
A5: Lexus considers this a critical matter and will soon launch a safety campaign on
specific Lexus and Toyota vehicles. Throughout the process of developing the details of the
action plan, it will advise the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).
Until we develop a campaign remedy, we recommend that owners remove any driver-side
floor mat from the specific models identified and NOT replace it with any other floor mat.
Q5a: Why didn't the previous all-weather floor mat recall alleviate this problem?
A5a: The previous floor mat recall was aimed at replacing accessory all weather floor
mats with a newly designed one as well as advising users not to place all weather mats on top
of any other floor mats. Despite this effort, unsecured or incompatible driver's floor mats can
present a hazard and Lexus/Toyota is exploring remedies that can further reduce the
likelihood of an crash that could result from mis-installation.
A6: Lexus/Toyota is committed to finding the right solution for this condition. Until
the campaign remedy is developed and customers receive notice from Lexus, we request that
customers take out any removable drivers floor mat and NOT replace it with any other floor
mat.
A6a: In the event a customer chooses not to remove their floor mat, Lexus strongly
recommends that they ensure that the correct floor mat is being used, that it is properly
installed and secured, that it is not flipped over with bottom-side up, and that one floor mat is
not stacked over another. Information on proper floor mat installation can be found on
http://www.lexus.com.
A6b: If a customer chooses not to remove their floor mat and requires assistance, they
may check with any local Lexus dealership's Parts or Service Department to verify the
application. Dealers will re-install only those floor mats designed specifically for that model
and model year.
A6c: Replacement retaining hooks (clips) for Lexus carpeted and all-weather floor
mats are available at any Lexus dealership. Please check with the dealer for details.
A7: Driver's floor mat interference is possible in any make or model vehicle with any
combination of floor mats. Therefore, consumers need to make sure the floor mats are
compatible for their model and model year. Also, they need to be sure they are properly
secured using the appropriate retention device (clips). Drivers floor mats should never be
stacked. Consumers should never place any floor mat aftermarket or not -- on top of another
drivers floor mat. Mats should also not be flipped over with the bottom-side up.
Q8: What if a driver experiences accelerator pedal interference. What should they do?
A8: Should the vehicle continue to accelerate rapidly after releasing the accelerator
pedal, this could be an indication of floor mat interference. If this occurs, Lexus recommends
the driver take the following actions:
First, if it is possible and safe to do so, pull-back the floor mat and dislodge it from the
accelerator pedal; then pull over and stop the vehicle.
If the floor mat cannot be dislodged, then firmly and steadily step on the brake pedal with
both feet. Do not pump the brake pedal repeatedly as this will increase the effort required to
slow the vehicle. If you are still unable to stop the vehicle, then do the following:
Shift the transmission gear selector to the Neutral (N) position and use the brakes to make a
controlled stop at the side of the road and turn off the engine.
If unable to put the vehicle in Neutral, turn the engine OFF. This will not cause loss of
steering or braking control, but the power assist to these systems will be lost.
-If the vehicle is equipped with an Engine Start/Stop button, firmly and steadily push the
button for at least three seconds to turn off the engine. Do NOT tap the Engine Start/Stop
button.
-If the vehicle is equipped with a conventional key-ignition, turn the ignition key to the ACC
position to turn off the engine. Do NOT remove the key from the ignition as this will lock the
steering wheel.
Q8a: Why does the Engine Start/Stop button require 3 seconds to shut off?
A8a: This is to prevent accidentally shutting off the engine in case the button is
bumped or mistaken for another control. The resulting loss of engine power could cause a
loss of the power assist to the brakes and steering, and possibly an unsafe situation.
Owners with questions or concerns, are asked to please contact the Lexus Customer
Assistance
Center
(1
800
255-3987),
or
consult
http://www.lexus.com.
Sursa: http://www.lexusofakron-canton.com/MiscPage_18
the
information
posted
at
Anexa 3
Comunicat de pres NHTSA. Acuzaii la adresa companiei Toyota
NHTSA 110409
Wednesday, November 04, 2009
Karen Aldana
Telephone: (202) 366-9550
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued a statement today
correctin
g inaccurate and misleading information put out by Toyota concerning a safety recall
involving 3.8 million Toyota and Lexus vehicles:
A press release put out by Toyota earlier this week about their recall of 3.8 million Toyota and
Lexus vehicles inaccurately stated NHTSA had reached a conclusion "that no defect exists in
vehicles in which the driver's floor mat is compatible with the vehicle and properly secured."
NHTSA has told Toyota and consumers that removing the recalled floor mats is the most
immediate way to address the safety risk and avoid the possibility of the accelerator
becoming stuck. But it is simply an interim measure. This remedy does not correct the
underlying defect in the vehicles involving the potential for entrapment of the accelerator by
floor mats, which is related to accelerator and floor pan design. Safety is the number one
priority for NHTSA and this is why officials are working with Toyota to find the right way to
fix this very dangerous problem. This matter is not closed until Toyota has effectively
addressed the defect by providing a suitable vehicle based solution.
NHTSA constantly monitors consumer complaints and other data. This comprehensive recall
focuses on pedal entrapment by floor mats, but NHTSA will fully investigate any possible
defect trends in these vehicles.
TIMELINE OF EVENTS
On September 29, 2009, NHTSA issued a Consumer Alert warning owners of Toyota
and Lexus vehicles about "conditions that could cause the accelerator to get stuck open."
As an interim measure, NHTSA "strongly encouraged" owners of specific models to take
out the removable driver's side floor mats and not to replace them any other type of mat.
NHTSA warned consumers "a stuck accelerator may result in very high vehicle speeds
and a crash, which could cause serious injury or death."
On the same day, Toyota issued a voluntary recall of 3.8 million vehicles to address
problems caused when removable floor mats push the accelerator pedal to the floor.
NHTSA officials are meeting with Toyota to hear their action plan for redesigning the
vehicles and correcting this very serious defect.
Sursa:
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/2009/NHTSA+Statement+Concerning+The+S
afety+Recall+of+3.8+million+Toyota+Vehicles
Anexa 4
Rspunsul Toyota la acuzaiile aduse de NHTSA
Punctul nostru de vedere: Declaraia Toyota n ceea ce privete comunicatul de pres al
NHTSA
Irv Miller
n ceea ce privete comunicatul emis de Administraia Naional pentru Sigurana Traficului
Rutier din ziua de miercuri, 4 noiembrie, Toyota ofer urmtorul rspuns:
Intenia noastr nu a fost niciodat s inducem n eroare sau s furnizm informa ii inexacte.
Toyota este de acord cu NHTSA n privina faptului c ndeprtarea covoraelor este o
msur previzorie, fiind necesare aciuni suplimentare pentru rezolvarea problemelor
ntmpinate. Suntem n proces de dezvoltare n cee ace privete msurile corective, scopul
nostru fiind acela de a evita incompatibilitatea dintre pedal i covoraul mainii,
propunndu-ne s nu mai repetm problema blocrii pedalei n covor.
Irv Miller,
Vicepreedinte
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.
Sursa: http://pressroom.toyota.com/article_print.cfm?article_id=273
Anexa 5
Interviu George Kyriazis
Rep: Toyota a anuntat ca va rechema aproape 12.000 de masini in Romania. Cum se
desfasoara recall-ul, in ce etapa a ajuns?
George Kyriazis: Am trimis dealerilor toate scrisorile care apoi trebuie sa ajunga la clienti. E
randul lor sa trimita la clienti scrisorile si va exista un proces de confirmare a primirii.
Procesul e complicat pentru ca trebuie sa sincronizam capacitatea atelierelor cu
disponibilitatea pieselor necesare. Astfel, scrisorile nu vor merge "calup", toate intr-o singura
zi sau doua, ci le-am programat pe mai mult timp pentru a fi timp sa fie facute programari
cand avem piesele de schimb disponibile.
Le-am dat dealerilor o tinta sa termine campania de recall in 60 de zile si deja a
inceput numaratoarea inversa ), dar credem ca in 60 de zile vom termina. Totul va depinde si
de telefoanele pe care clientii nostri le vor da la dealer pentru a se programa si atunci se va
vedea daca e nevoie ca dealerii sa lucreze in plus seara sau sambata si duminica. Cu siguranta
va exista o anumita perioada aglomerata, probabil peste trei saptamani si trebuie sa facem
fata acestei perioade.
E posibil ca unii clienti sa-si fi schimbat adresele sau sa-si fi vandut masinile, iar
pentru asta am vorbit cu autoritatile sa ne ajute dupa ce vom avea lista cu scrisorile care se
vor fi intoars la dealeri.
Rep: Dar de ce nu ati ales sa-i sunati direct pe clienti? Nu era mai usor si mai eficient?
George Kyriazis: O sa-i si sunam, dar vrem sa avem si dovada oficiala ca acel client a fost
notificat. E posibil ca acel client sa uite sau sa nu aiba timp sa vina, iar in astfel de cazuri
trebuie sa avem dovada ca l-am anuntat.
Rep: Aveti idee cat va costa recall-ul din Romania?
George Kyriazis: Nu e asa important pentru noi sa calculam cat va costa si nici nu ni s-a
cerut asta. Stim ca e vorba de circa 12.000 de masini, stim ca dureaza cam o jumatate de ora
operatia, dar costul nu e o problema.
Rep: Remediul consta in adaugarea unei placi de otel la acceleratie. Operatiunea se va
face la toate masinile sau numai la cele unde sunt detectate probleme?
George Kyriazis: Am fost instruiti sa facem masuratori la pedala de acceleratie si in functie
de rezultate vom instala una din cele sapte tipuri de placute de otel pe care le aveam.
Diferenta dintre ele tine de grosime si masuratorile ne vor arata ce tip de placuta trebuie
instalat la fiecare masina.
Rep: Anul trecut a fost greu pentru toata industria auto, dar si pentru Toyota,
inmatricularile scazand cu 60% in Romania. Care sunt estimarile pentru anul in curs?
George Kyriazis: Am inceput anul cu obiectivul de a vinde 4.800 de masini, dar datele din
ianuarie si estimarile pe februarie indica faptul ca piata va cadea mult chiar si fata de anul
trecut. Va fi greu cred sa ne atingem obiectivul fiindca noi ne asteptam ca piata sa fie stabila
in comparatie cu anul trecut dar cred ca va fi mai slaba. Nu ne-am schimbat inca tinta, dar am
putea s-o facem dupa ce vedem statisticile pe martie. (...) Am vrea totusi sa ne crestem cota
de piata la 4% in acest an si pe termen mediu sa ajungem in primele cinci marci ca nivel al
vanzarilor, de la locul 10 -11 in prezent.
Rep: Lumea se intreaba cat de mult vor fi afectate vanzarile Toyota de problemele cu
recall-ul?
George Kyriazis: E o problema cu care trebuie sa ne confruntam. Un recall, indiferent la ce
marca este, nu creste valoarea marcii. Totusi, ceea ce aduce valoare tine de recunoasterea
greselilor, luarea masurilor corecte penrtru a le repara si tratarea clientilor cu respect. Ne
cerem scuze clientilor, incercam sa rezolvam totul cat mai repede.
Rep: Deci credeti ca daca veti comunica bine, clientii vor fi mai putin ingrijorati?
George Kyriazis: Corect. Nu vrem ca ei sa se simta jenati de situatie si am vrea ca ei sa le
spuna prietenilor :"uite, masina mea a avut o problema, dar Toyota a gestionat bine situatia si
merita sa fii client al marcii fiindca si cand ai probleme sunt responsabili".
Rep: Toyota a anuntat ca va rechema aproape 12.000 de masini in Romania. Cum se
desfasoara recall-ul, in ce etapa a ajuns?
George Kyriazis: Am trimis dealerilor toate scrisorile care apoi trebuie sa ajunga la clienti. E
randul lor sa trimita la clienti scrisorile si va exista un proces de confirmare a primirii.
Procesul e complicat pentru ca trebuie sa sincronizam capacitatea atelierelor cu
disponibilitatea pieselor necesare. Astfel, scrisorile nu vor merge "calup", toate intr-o singura
zi sau doua, ci le-am programat pe mai mult timp pentru a fi timp sa fie facute programari
cand avem piesele de schimb disponibile.
Le-am dat dealerilor o tinta sa termine campania de recall in 60 de zile si deja a
inceput numaratoarea inversa ), dar credem ca in 60 de zile vom termina. Totul va depinde si
de telefoanele pe care clientii nostri le vor da la dealer pentru a se programa si atunci se va
vedea daca e nevoie ca dealerii sa lucreze in plus seara sau sambata si duminica. Cu siguranta
va exista o anumita perioada aglomerata, probabil peste trei saptamani si trebuie sa facem
Rep: Deci credeti ca daca veti comunica bine, clientii vor fi mai putin ingrijorati?
George Kyriazis: Corect. Nu vrem ca ei sa se simta jenati de situatie si am vrea ca ei sa le
spuna prietenilor :"uite, masina mea a avut o problema, dar Toyota a gestionat bine situatia si
merita sa fii client al marcii fiindca si cand ai probleme sunt responsabili".
Rep: Toyota are noutati la salonul de la Geneva, Auris hibrid, RAV4 restilizat, ce veti
lansa in Romania anul acesta?
George Kyriazis: Vom avea cateva modele cu restilizari minore, RAV4, Corolla, Auris, sunt
schimbari normale in ciclul de viata al unui model. O lansare importanta este Auris hibrid
care se va aduga lui Prius in Romania in aprilie. Va fi cea mai importanta lansare a Toyota
Romania si singurul model 100% nou.
Rep: Care e clientul tinta pentru Auris hibrid?
George Kyriazis: Nu este un model de volum, va depinde mult de atitudinea clientilor fata
de mediu si de disponibilitatea clientului de a plati in plus pentru un astfel de model cu emisii
mai reduse. Pentru Prius trebuie sa recunoastem ca interesul a fost limitat in Romania, insa cu
Auris hibrid ne vom largi gama de clienti. Un alt amanunt tine de faptul ca hibridele au o
acceleratie fenomenala si cred ca Auris are acceleratie de masinia "stil GTI".
Rep: Totusi, Auris va putea merge exclusiv cu motorul electric pe distante foarte scurte,
2 3, km...
George Kyriazis: Tehnologia hibrida asista si da rotilor mai multa putere cand ai nevoie sa
accelerezi. Apoi economia se vede cand masina merge foarte incet, de exemplu la semafor si
in trafic, in astfel de momente poti merge cu motorul electric si faci economii. Bateriile nu
sunt destul de consistente pentru a merge mult 100% electric, insa intr-un blocaj poti sa nu
consumi combustibil chiar si jumatate de ora. In plus, nu se pierde energia degajata la franare,
ci e regenerata si incarca bateriile.
Rep: Totusi in Romania vanzarile de hibride au fost mici si din cauza diferentei de cost.
Care ar fi solutia?
George Kyriazis: Tehnologia hibrida va avea cu adevarat succes cand costul bateriilor se va
reduce mult si cand masina va costa cam cat una clasica, cu motor termic. In prezent costul
suplimentar e cam de 4.000 de euro, dar nu fiti surprins daca in cativa ani acea diferenta
scade la 500 euro.
Sursa: http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-auto-6966186-interviu-video-george-kyriazis-directorgeneral-toyota-romania-dat-dealerilor-termen-doua-luni-incheie-campania-rechemari.html
Anexa 6
Detalii privind remedierea problemelor produse de pedal
Sursa: http://www2.toyota.co.jp/en/news/09/11/1125.html
Anexa 7
Scrisoare deschis ctre clieni cu privire la retragerea de pe pia a unor autoturisme
Sursa: http://pressroom.toyota.com/images/document/ToyotaCustomerLetter.pdf
Anexa 8
Sursa: file:///C:/Users/PC/Downloads/customer.letter.3%20(2).pdf
Anexa 9
Planul de aciunie pentru rezolvarea crizei rechemrilor
Toyota Motor Corporation President Akio Toyoda Announces Global Quality Task Force
February 05, 2010
February 5, 2010
Toyota Motor Corporation President Akio Toyoda spoke at a press conference today in
Nagoya. Mr. Toyoda expressed his deep regret for the inconvenience and concern caused to
our customers. He also announced that he personally will take the lead toward improving
quality around the world by establishing a global quality task force that will conduct quality
improvement activities region by region.
The Committee headed by Mr. Toyoda will have a six point action plan:
1) Improve Quality Inspection Process - Toyota will once again inspect every process,
while verifying the causes that led to the recalls, including quality in design, production, sales
and service.
2) Enhance Customer Research - Toyota will enhance the customer information research
offices in each region to collect information faster.
4) Support from Outside Experts - Toyota will seek confirmation and evaluation from
outside expertsin line with the industry's best practicesof its newly improved quality
control management, based on the above improvements.
6) Improve regional autonomy - To provide customers with satisfying products in each and
every region, Toyota has long promoted the autonomy of its regional subsidiaries. We intend
to further enhance this autonomy, listen carefully to each and every customer and improve
quality.
Detailed information and answers to questions about issues related to recalls are available to
customers at www.toyota.com/recall and at the Toyota Customer Experience Center at 1-800331-4331.
Media Contacts:
(310) 468-5297
(310) 468-7359
Media Web site: http://www.toyotanewsroom.com
Public Web site: http://www.toyota.com
Sursa: http://corporatenews.pressroom.toyota.com/article_display.cfm?
article_id=1866
Anexa 10
Declaraia Akio Toyota
Conferina de pres, 24 februarie 2010
Thank you Chairman Towns. I am Akio Toyoda of Toyota Motor Corporation. I would first
like to state that I love cars as much as anyone, and I love Toyota as much as anyone. I take
the utmost pleasure in offering vehicles that our customers love, and I know that Toyota's
200,000 team members, dealers, and suppliers across America feel the same way. However,
in the past few months, our customers have started to feel uncertain about the safety of
Toyota's vehicles, and I take full responsibility for that. Today, I would like to explain to the
American people, as well as our customers in the US and around the world, how seriously
Toyota takes the quality and safety of its vehicles. I would like to express my appreciation to
Chairman Towns and Ranking Member Issa, as well as the members of the House Oversight
and Government Reform Committee, for giving me this opportunity to express my thoughts
today.
I would like to focus my comments on three topics Toyota's basic philosophy regarding
quality control, the cause of the recalls, and how we will manage quality control going
forward. First, I want to discuss the philosophy of Toyota's quality control. I myself, as well
as Toyota, am not perfect. At times, we do find defects. But in such situations, we always
stop, strive to understand the problem, and make changes to improve further. In the name of
the company, its long-standing tradition and pride, we never run away from our problems or
pretend we don't notice them. By making continuous improvements, we aim to continue
offering even better products for society. That is the core value we have kept closest to our
hearts since the founding days of the company.
At Toyota, we believe the key to making quality products is to develop quality people. Each
employee thinks about what he or she should do, continuously making improvements, and by
doing so, makes even better cars. We have been actively engaged in developing people who
share and can execute on this core value. It has been over 50 years since we began selling in
this great country, and over 25 years since we started production here. And in the process, we
have been able to share this core value with the 200,000 people at Toyota operations, dealers,
and suppliers in this country. That is what I am most proud of.
Second, I would like to discuss what caused the recall issues we are facing now. Toyota has,
for the past few years, been expanding its business rapidly. Quite frankly, I fear the pace at
which we have grown may have been too quick. I would like to point out here that Toyota's
priority has traditionally been the following: First; Safety, Second; Quality, and Third;
Volume. These priorities became confused, and we were not able to stop, think, and make
improvements as much as we were able to before, and our basic stance to listen to customers'
voices to make better products has weakened somewhat. We pursued growth over the speed
at which we were able to develop our people and our organization, and we should sincerely
be mindful of that. I regret that this has resulted in the safety issues described in the recalls
we face today, and I am deeply sorry for any accidents that Toyota drivers have experienced.
Especially, I would like to extend my condolences to the members of the Saylor family, for
the accident in San Diego. I would like to send my prayers again, and I will do everything in
my power to ensure that such a tragedy never happens again.
Since last June, when I first took office, I have personally placed the highest priority on
improving quality over quantity, and I have shared that direction with our stakeholders. As
you well know, I am the grandson of the founder, and all the Toyota vehicles bear my name.
For me, when the cars are damaged, it is as though I am as well. I, more than anyone, wish
for Toyota's cars to be safe, and for our customers to feel safe when they use our vehicles.
Under my leadership, I would like to reaffirm our values of placing safety and quality the
highest on our list of priorities, which we have held to firmly from the time we were founded.
I will also strive to devise a system in which we can surely execute what we value.
Third, I would like to discuss how we plan to manage quality control as we go forward. Up to
now, any decisions on conducting recalls have been made by the Customer Quality
Engineering Division at Toyota Motor Corporation in Japan. This division confirms whether
there are technical problems and makes a decision on the necessity of a recall. However,
reflecting on the issues today, what we lacked was the customers' perspective.
To make improvements on this, we will make the following changes to the recall decisionmaking process. When recall decisions are made, a step will be added in the process to ensure
that management will make a responsible decision from the perspective of "customer safety
first." To do that, we will devise a system in which customers' voices around the world will
reach our management in a timely manner, and also a system in which each region will be
able to make decisions as necessary. Further, we will form a quality advisory group composed
of respected outside experts from North America and around the world to ensure that we do
not make a misguided decision. Finally, we will invest heavily in quality in the US, through
the establishment of an Automotive Center of Quality Excellence, the introduction of a new
position Product Safety Executive, and the sharing of more information and responsibility
within the company for product quality decisions, including defects and recalls.
Even more importantly, I will ensure that members of the management team actually drive
the cars, and that they check for themselves where the problem lies as well as its severity. I
myself am a trained test driver. As a professional, I am able to check on problems in a car,
and can understand how severe the safety concern is in a car. I drove the vehicles in the
accelerator pedal recall as well as the Prius, comparing the vehicles before and after the
remedy in various environmental settings. I believe that only by examining the problems onsite, can one make decisions from the customer perspective. One cannot rely on reports or
data in a meeting room.
Through the measures I have just discussed, and with whatever results we obtain from the
investigations we are conducting in cooperation with NHTSA, I intend to further improve on
the quality of Toyota vehicles and fulfil our principle of putting the customer first.
My name is on every car. You have my personal commitment that Toyota will work
vigorously and unceasingly to restore the trust of our customers.
Thank you."
Sursa: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/feb/24/akio-toyoda-statement-to-congress
Anexa 11
Sursa: http://www2.toyota.co.jp/en/news/10/12/1221_2.pdf
Anexa 12
Declaraia lui Joan Claybrook
Statement of Joan Claybrook, President Emeritus, Public Citizen And former Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Concerning Sudden Acceleration in Toyota Vehicles
Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
February 24, 2010
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is Joan Claybrook, I am President
Emeritus of Public Citizen, a national public interest organization, and former Administrator
of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration from 1977 to 1981. I appreciate the
invitation to testify today about the issues surrounding sudden acceleration and other Toyota
safety defects. I also want to express my appreciation to the Committee and the staff for your
hard work in gathering information essential for this hearing, for holding Toyota and NHTSA
accountable, and for rescheduling it around our snowstorms. First and foremost, Mr.
Chairman, Toyota has lost the trust and confidence of many American consumers by its overt
tactics to avoid recalling defective vehicles that can kill and injure its customers and other
highway users. Toyota officials have viewed the avoidance of recalls, and delays or cutbacks
in safety standards, as more about dollars and cents in its pocket than safety, as wins for the
Toyota so-called safety group. In its now infamous briefing for Mr. Yoshi Inaba in July
2009, Toyota staff estimated $100 million of savings from (1) securing an agreement from the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 2007 to require only an
equipment recall instead of a vehicle recall on the Camry and Lexus floor mats and (2)
dodging a finding of a safety defect for the sudden acceleration of these vehicles. The number
of deaths documented by NHTSA from sudden acceleration crashes in Toyota vehicles now
stands at 34, along with hundreds of injuries, yet the only penalty in NHTSAs statute for
Toyotas knowing and willful refusal to initiate a recall to correct safety defects is a
maximum $16.4 million dollar civil penalty. There are no criminal penalties for the company
executives or agents. Compared to other consumer protection statutes such as the Consumer
Product Safety Act, NHTSA lacks strong incentives for companies to comply with the law.
Under that Act, any person who knowingly and willfully violated the mandatory provision of
the Act is subject to criminal penalties of up to 5 years in prison and personal fines of up to
$250,000. This highlights the need for change in the NHTSA statute. Criminal penalties
would add a large incentive for a company not only to say that Our first priority is the safety
of our customers but to actually make decisions and carry out its business to achieve safety.
And the civil penalty should also be raised with no maximum limit. A company the size of
Toyota, the largest automaker in the world, must be fined $100 million dollars or more before
it really flinches. If Toyota had been an honorable company and recalled the defective
vehicles when it first learned of the problems in 2003/2004, or perhaps even earlier, and taken
steps to redesign subsequent production, many of the resulting deaths and injuries would not
have occurred. Now the only remedy for the families of these Toyota victims is a product
liability law suit and payment by Toyota for the deatha few dollars for each precious life.
Toyota may be interested in trading dollars for lives, despite the likelihood of its products
causing deaths and injuries, but its customers are not. Car buyers will pay for safety. For a
company that built its reputation on quality and reliability, this is an embarrassing and dark
chapter that I hope will result in major internal changes at Toyota, is a clear warning to other
auto manufacturers who put profits before safety, and will result in new legislation for
NHTSA. The victims deserve nothing less. Further, there are additional issues that raise
questions about Toyotas credibility. I would like to raise a few to reinforce the need for
changes in the corporate culture and performance of this company. For example: 1.
Questionable Scope and Timeliness of Toyota Recalls Are Unacceptable: A number of deaths
involving sudden acceleration that have been reported to NHTSA and Toyota involve
vehicles that are not being recalled, for example, 2002- 2006 Camrys. NHTSA decided on
February 16, 2010 to send Toyota three letters totaling 53 pages requesting information about
the timing and the scope of its actions on sudden acceleration because so many questions
have been raised about NHTSAs closure of preliminary investigations with little data and
analysis. NHTSA is also belatedly evaluating electronic issues Toyota denies exist with the
throttles and electromagnetic interference. This work has been initiated because so many
experts believe there are electronic issues causing the sudden acceleration in the so-called
floor mat recalled vehicles and because a number of crashes and deaths have occurred in
them without any floor mat involvement. In short, the recalls need be stringently critiqued in
terms of scope and timing, and possibly expanded to cover all of Toyotas defective vehicles,
yet Toyota continues to deny there is an electronic problem. 2. Revolving Door Influence on
Safety Defects and Safety Rules: About 25 top NHTSA officials have left the agency in the
last 25 years to work for auto manufacturers in law and consulting firms. Its been a brain
drain for NHTSA and provides the recipient manufacturers with significant advantages. We
are here today because in several years ago NHTSA was persuaded to narrow the scope of its
Toyota investigations according to sworn testimony of Chris Santucci, a former NHTSA 2
enforcement official hired by Toyota in 2003 (following another former NHTSA official,
Chris Tinto, hired earlier by Toyota). Santucci was intimately familiar with the methods used
by NHTSA in defect investigations and the agencys dependency on company cooperation
because of lack of resources. As a result, the agency failed to protect the public with effective
recalls of sudden acceleration vehicles, closing 4 of 5 investigations in which these two
former employees represented Toyota. Toyota said: No evidence of a system or component
failure was found and the vehicles were operating as designed a slick statement that
could be accurate but does not mean there is not an electronic glitch. Toyotas goal appears to
be avoiding responsibility with these former government officials, not in doing a better job
for the public. 3. Toyotas Secrecy Thwarts Public Accountability: Toyotas resistance to
supplying NHTSA with information requested caused the agency in December 2009 to send
top officials to Japan to insist that the company comply with the law and be forthcoming.
Toyota has also resisted downloading data from Event Data Recorders (EDR) in its vehicles
to discern the circumstances of a crash. These recorders note speed, brake application,
acceleration and other information crucial to determining the circumstances of a crash. In
liability cases it has resisted supplying such information, requiring the injured consumer to
get a court order for the data. By contrast, U.S. companies regularly make EDR data
available. Toyota also regularly requests confidentiality for information it supplies to
NHTSA. Toyotas secrecy does not enhance its standing but suggests it has something to
hide. NHTSA should reevaluate its confidentially rules and make more data routinely
available to consumers as the President has urged. 4. Floor Mats Cover Up the Real Solution:
As part of the fix in the floor mat recall for Lexus, Camry and Avalon vehicles, Toyota is
installing a brake override system that will stop a vehicle experiencing sudden acceleration
when the driver engages the brake. This suggests the acceleration problem is an electronic
one because why go to the expense of an electronic override if the floor mat is the only
problem and it has been fixed? It is long overdue for Toyota to investigate its electronic
problem and fix their vehicles. On a related note, why is the brake override being applied
only to these vehicles and not all vehicles being recalled for sudden acceleration? Curiously,
Toyota has announced it will put the brake override in all new vehicles beginning at the end
of this year. Many other manufacturers already offer electronic brake override as a safety
precaution to protect against problems experienced with electronic throttles. In my view, all
vehicles offered for sale in the United States should contain the brake override feature, but
why has it taken so long for Toyota to do the right thing? 5. Toyota Says Sudden Acceleration
is Not Safety Related In its October 5, 2009, letter to NHTSA announcing it was recalling 3.8
million vehicles (later revised to over 4 million) to address the risk of floor mat entrapment of
accelerator pedals, Toyota said that although it was willing to identify the campaign as a
safety recall in the owner communication about the campaign, Toyota has not determined
that the 3 vehiclescontain a safety-related defect within the meaning of the federal
vehicle safety laws. In other words, under pressure from the large number of complaints and
deaths and injuries, the company was conducting a recall but still denying its vehicles are
defective. This is a stunning failure of corporate judgment. Similarly, on January 8, 2010,
Toyota in its notice about fuel tank corrosion in its Tundra pick up trucks said it did not
consider the problem to be a safety related defect. How can Americans trust a company like
Toyota that plays semantic games at the expense of American lives? 6. Mixed Messages
Misleading the Public: In a letter dated February 2, 2010, to James E. Lentz, President and
Chief Operating Officer of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S. A., Energy and Commerce Committee
Chair Henry Waxman and Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Chair Bart Stupak
requested clarification regarding statements made by Mr. Lentz on the NBC Today Show in
which he said that Toyota had studied unintended acceleration events and it was clear there
are two different issues: (1) the Fall 2009 recall to prevent entrapment of accelerator pedals in
floor mats; and (2) the later recall in January 2010 dealing with accelerator pedals that stick.
But these statements were inconsistent with Toyota officials representations on January 27,
2010, to Committee staff that causes of unintended acceleration are very, very hard to
identify and that sticky accelerators were unlikely to result in full throttle acceleration. The
Chairmen asked for clarification of these statements, documentation and analyses of the
Toyota statements that electronics were not to blame for unintended acceleration. 7. Toyotas
Failure to Notify About Foreign Safety Fixes Delayed Safety Solutions for U.S.Consumers:
The law requires a manufacturer to report to NHTSA within 5 days any recall or safety
campaign conducted in foreign countries on vehicles or equipment that are identical or
substantially similar to ones offered for sale in the U.S. It appears that Toyota violated this
law. In mid-August 2009 Toyota corrected sticking accelerator pedals in Europe after
beginning an investigation in March 2009. It found that the accelerator could stick in a
partially depressed position where condensation occurs. It justified this based on right-hand
drive vehicles where pedals are near the heater duct. To fix the problem, it lengthened the arm
of the friction lever and changed its material to prevent smoothing on European vehicles. Not
surprisingly, Toyota says it received field technical information from the U.S. and Canadian
markets which showed sticking accelerator pedals occurring from October to January 2010.
Yet, Toyota did not tell NHTSA about this problem until January 21, 2010, a month after
NHTSA visited Japan expressing concern over Toyota recall problems and months after the
safety recall in Europe, not 5 days as the law requires. 8. Toyotas Damage Control with a
Friendly Expert: Toyota recently commissioned Exponent to study Toyota and Lexus
vehicles and components for concerns related to unwanted acceleration. However, Exponent
is an engineering and consulting firm well known for defending corporate clients in product
liability litigation when consumers are injured by defective products and producing
corporation-friendly reports. This is exactly what it did for Toyota. This is hardly the 4
company Toyota should have hired for an independent analysis. Exponent says the ETCSi
systems performed as designed but as professors and other independent experts have
explained, the company did little real testing or analytical work. This is hardly the company
that Toyota should have hired for a so-called independent analysis. Toyota is only going to
regain public confidence if it uses truly independent outside experts to assess the electronic
issue. 9. Dealer Boycott & Corporate Censorship: One-hundred-and-seventy-three
Southeastern Toyota dealers, angry at reports on ABC television chief investigative reporter
Brian Ross, have pulled their advertising from ABC affiliated stations because of his
reporting. This is hardly the way to rebuild Toyotas reputation while it is under severe
criticism for its failure to recall defective vehicles. The Toyota story also reveals severe
deficiencies in the performance over the last decade of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration in the U.S. Department of Transportation. While it has taken strong initiatives
in recent months under Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood and the new NHTSA
Administrator, David Strickland, brief comments on its deficiencies are essential as we look
to the future of NHTSAs enforcement and rulemaking activities. 1. NHTSA Has Become a
Lapdog Not Watchdog: NHTSA has been heavily dependent on manufacturers it regulates to
cooperate with the agency and supply information. While NHTSA sends letters requiring
response, it has not sent a subpoena that requires a full and complete response under threat of
criminal penalties in decades. It also did not impose any penalties from 2004 to 2008, and the
largest penalty the agency has ever imposed is one million dollars even though the TREAD
Act of 2000 authorized a $15 million dollar penalty (now $16.4 with inflation adjustment).
The agency also has not made a finding of a defect in over 20 years. In short, the agency has
not asserted its hefty authority to serve as the federal cop on the corporate beat through
demands for information from manufacturers, suppliers and dealers, through testing at its
Ohio facility, through hiring the best experts worldwide and contacting consumer attorneys
and their experts, as well as alerting consumers to supply information about their experiences.
\Auto companies, including Toyota, treat the agency with contempt, failing to supply
requested information, delaying actions requested, arguing against agency proposals, gloating
when the agency backs off of proposed actions and boasting about its influence over the
agency. This is a sad state for a crucial, and potentially potent safety regulatory agency.
NHTSAs new leadership must change this sad state of affairs. 2. NHTSA Has Failed to
Implement New Authority: The TREAD Act of 2000, enacted after the Firestone/Ford
Explorer debacle, gave NHTSA new powers that it has routinely refrained from using. In
addition to not using its higher civil penalty power of $16.4 million (which is still a meager
amount for these multinational corporations), it has done little to take advantage of its new
Early Warning Program. The purpose of this new system is to require manufacturers quarterly
to alert the 5 agency when the company receives information about a death or injury in a
particular make/model vehicle and to inform the agency about a suspected problem, the
number of consumer complaints received by the company, the number of warranty claims and
field reports, and the production numbers. In the past, the agency has routinely released these
types of information in final reports on particular defects cases.. As the DOT Inspector
General reported in 2004, NHTSA botched the creation of this electronic new system and
then decided to keep early warning information collected by it secret. Two lawsuits by Public
Citizen were needed just to give the public access to reports of deaths and injuries in the
Early Warning system, but the other information is still kept secret by NHTSA. This needs to
be changed immediately. It is not possible for the public to effectively oversee the agency
without access to information about potential defects. As NHTSAs arbitrary rejection of
petitions from citizens experiencing sudden acceleration reveal, citizens need to know early
warning information to justify their petitions for defects investigations and to protect
themselves from potential harm. Also, the Early Warning web page needs a major renovation.
It is very difficult to get information about manufacturer reports and summaries of issues
reported. Case in point: to this day, we still do not know the extent to which Toyota filed
reports to the Early Warning system on sudden acceleration and whether NHTSA used this
information on evaluating citizen defect petitions 3. NHTSA is the Poor Step-Sister in DOT.
NHTSAs regulatory resources are meager both in terms of money and personnel and it has
been falling behind for years compared to inflation. It is responsible for 95 percent of
transportation deaths yet receives one percent of the DOT budget. NHTSAs FY 2011
Operations and Research budget (which includes enforcement) request (not including safety
grants in aid to states) is $5 million less than Congress enacted for FY 2010, whereas grants
to states will increase by $14 million over FY 2010. NHTSA needs at least $100 million more
a year in budget dollars to carry out its congressional mandate. When I was Administrator in
the 1970s, we had 119 people in enforcement, and we were still shorthanded. Today, with
more vehicles containing more complex features and systems, there are 57 people in
enforcement, including only 18 investigators. Consequently, there is a serious and disabling
imbalance in resources between the regulatory agency and any company being investigated.
Also there is an imbalance in knowledge and expertise, which is exacerbated by the lack of
funding. For example, NHTSA has no software or electrical engineers on staff in an era when
motor vehicles are increasingly electronic and software dependent. As a result, in addition to
being ill-equipped to conduct thorough investigations of Toyotas sudden acceleration defect,
it regularly closed promising inquiries after Toyota refused to acknowledge any electronic
problems. This type of agency failure must be changed. 4. A Federal Safety Standard on
Event Data Recorders is Essential. Event Data Recorders (EDR), or black boxes as we know
them on airplanes, record the circumstances of a crash. Unfortunately, NHTSA decided to
issue a voluntary EDR 6 7 standard that allows companies to choose whether to install black
boxes and require that any installed recorders track certain types of information.
Unfortunately, the implementation deadline for the tracking of information was postponed by
NHTSA from the Fall of 2010 to the fall of 2012. This standard needs to be updated
immediately in several ways: to make black boxes mandatory, to expand the data collected, to
require the uniform downloading of data (e.g., cable interface) so that police (as well as
NHTSA) can affordably download the information in a routine way. Also, the standard should
include protections against fire, water submersion and tampering, and a prohibition of on/off
switches. Another needed change is the enhanced recording of rollover crashes (currently,
only one event is recorded when multiple air bags deploy, which makes it difficult for
investigators to conduct accurate post-crash analyses). I cannot emphasize enough that data
collected by event data recorders is a potential treasure trove of safety information. As
owners of the information, vehicles owners should be educated by NHTSA about its potential
to prevent injuries and save lives. In addition, it should be collected and turned over to
NHTSA after any crash for statistical analysis, which would greatly support NHTSA research
and evaluation in preparation for issuance of safety standards or defect recalls and
enforcement. NHTSA now spends about $20 million a year on crash investigations and
evaluations but this is extremely inadequate. EDR data is an inexpensive way of significantly
enhancing NHTSAs analytical capacity. 5. New Safety Standards Needed. The Toyota cases
have demonstrated the need for at least these new safety standards: A new accelerator
standard requiring fail-safe protection that updates the existing 1973 standard, which was
written before the advent of electronically controlled accelerators. A standard requiring
electronic brake override in all automobiles. A standard providing electronic magnetic
interference protection.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before the Committee today
Sursa: https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/20100224Claybrook.pdf
Anexa 13
Sursa: http://www.reliableplant.com/Read/22505/CTS-comments-Toyota-recall
Anexa 14