Ioan Duns Scotus

Publicat pentru prima dat Joi 31 mai 2001; revizuire de fond Joi 23 decembrie 2009

Ioan Duns Scotus (1265/66-1308) a fost unul dintre cele mai importante i influente filosof-teologi din Evul Mediu de mare. Sa gnd strlucit complex i nuanat, care ia adus porecla de "Doctor subtil", a lsat un semn pe discuii de subiecte, cum ar fi diferite de semantica limbajului religios, problema a universaliilor, iluminare divin, i de natura libertii umane. Acest eseu primul stabilete ce se cunoate despre viaa lui Scotus i datarea operelor sale. Acesta ofer apoi o privire de ansamblu a unora dintre poziiile sale cheie n patru domenii principale ale filosofiei naturale: teologie, metafizic, teoria cunoaterii, i etica i psihologia moral.

1. Viaa i opera o 1.1 viaa lui Ioan Duns Scot o 1.2 Scotus lucrrile lui 2. Natural Teologie o 2.1 Unele preliminarii metodologice o 2.2 Dovada existentei lui Dumnezeu o 2.3 Divin infinit i doctrina de univocity 3. Metafizic o 3.1 obiectul de metafizic o 3.2 Materia i forma, trup si suflet o 3.3 universalii i individualizare 4. Teoria cunoaterii o 4.1 Sensation i abstractizare o 4.2 cunoaterea intuitiv o 4.3 atac la scepticism i illuminationism 5. Etica i psihologia moral o 5.1 dreptului natural o 5.2 voin, libertate, moralitate i Bibliografie o Textele de baz n latin o Textele de baz n traducere englez o Secundar literatura de specialitate Alte resurse pe Internet Legate de intrri

1. Viaa i opera
1.1 viaa lui Ioan Duns Scot

"Scotus" este o porecla: se identific Scotus ca un scoian. Numele lui de familie era Duns, care a fost, de asemenea, numele satului scoian n care a fost nscut, la doar civa kilometri de grania cu limba englez. Noi nu tim data exact a naterii sale, dar stim ca Scotus a fost hirotonit preot n Ordinul Frailor Minori - franciscanii - de la Priory Sf. Andrei din Northampton, Anglia, la 17 martie 1291. Vrsta minim pentru hirotonire a fost de douzeci i cinci, astfel nct s putem concluziona c Scotus a fost nscut nainte de 17 martie 1266. Dar ct de mult nainte? Presupunere, plauzibile, dar n nici un caz sigur, este c Scotus ar fi fost hirotonit ca devreme ca canonic permise. De la Episcopul de Lincoln (eparhie, care a inclus Oxford, n cazul n care Scotus a fost studiat, precum si Staretia Sf. Andrei), a hirotonit preoi n Wycombe la 23 decembrie 1290, putem locul naterii Scotus, ntre 23 decembrie 1265 i 17 martie 1266. Se pare c Scotus a nceput studiile sale oficiale de la Oxford, n octombrie 1288 i a ncheiat-le n iunie 1301. n anul universitar 1298-1299, a comentat cu privire la Sentinele lui Petru Lombardul. tim c, prin cderea din 1302 Scotus a fost de prelegeri pe propoziiile din Paris. n iunie 1303 Scotus a fost expulzat din Frana, mpreun cu alte optzeci de calugari pentru a lua partea Papei ntr-o disput cu regele. Ei au fost permis s se ntoarc n aprilie 1304, se pare c Scotus finalizat cursurile sale cu privire la pedepsele nu cu mult timp dup aceea. La data de 18 noiembrie 1304 Scotus a fost numit maestru Regent franciscanilor n teologie la Paris. Din motive de nimeni nu nelege destul de, Scotus a fost transferat la Studium franciscan de la Kln, ncepnd, probabil, atribuiile sale ca lector n octombrie 1307. A murit acolo, n 1308, data decesului su este oferit n mod tradiional ca 8 noiembrie.
1.2 Scotus lucrrile lui

Este general acceptat faptul c lucrrile timpurii Scotus au fost sa "Parva logicalia" (lucrri mici logice): ntrebri cu privire laIsagoge lui Porfiriu i categoriile lui Aristotel, hermeneias Peri, i elenchis De sophisticis. Acestea, probabil, pn n prezent la aproximativ 1295; Quaestiones anima Super De asemenea, este foarte probabil un lucru mai devreme. Comentariul lui Scotus alte Aristotel, Quaestiones subtilissimae super-Metaphysicam Aristotelis, pare s fi fost inceput mai devreme, dar cartea 9 este, probabil, trziu, i este posibil ca Cri de 6 la 9 sunt cu ntrziere sau au fost revizuite, cel puin mai trziu, n cariera lui Scotus. Scotus a scris de asemenea, un Expositio la Metafizica lui Aristotel. Aceasta a fost pierdut timp de secole, dar a fost recent redescoperit i editat de ctre Giorgio Pini. Lucrurile se complic cu adevrat atunci cnd am ajuns la comentarii Scotus pe cele patru cri ale Sentinele lui Petru Lombardul, deoarece se pare c el a comentat cu

privire la Sentine n mai multe rnduri, i relaiile dintre diferitele versiuni nu sunt ntotdeauna clare. Desigur universala ne prezint, cu note Scotus copii pentru prelegerile sale Oxford Crile 1 i 2 dinpropoziiile n 1298-1299 (sau, eventual, 1300-1301). Exist o Reportatio (de exemplu, o transcriere bazat pe notele de studeni), de cursuri la Cambridge, aceasta dateaz, probabil, la un moment dat ntre 1297 i 1300. (Acesta nu a fost editat critic i exist n doar trei manuscrise.) Exist o Ordinatio (de exemplu, o versiune pregtit pentru publicare de ctre autorul nsui), de cursuri la Oxford, bazat n parte pe universala si pe materiale de la cursurile sale, n Paris. Ordinatio este, n general, considerat a fi locul de munc premier a lui Scotus, dar, din pcate, ediie critic este nici pe departe complet (n acest moment se extinde prin cartea 2, distincie 3). Scotus pare s fi fost o revizuire de pana la moartea sa. n cele din urm, Scotus a conferentiat pe Sentinele de mai multe ori la Paris, i exist Reportationes diferite de aceste conferine, toate datnd din perioada 1302-1307. Cu uurin cel mai important este examinata Reportatio de Cartea 1, examinata denumirea indic faptul c acesta a fost examinat i corectat de ctre Scotus nsui. Din pcate, niciodat nu a fost critic editat. n plus fa de aceste lucrri, avem 46 de dispute scurte, numite Collationes datnd 1300 - 1305, o lucrare trziu n teologia naturala numita De Primo principio, i Quodlibetales Quaestiones de zile Scotus, n calitate de Regent de master (fie Advent 1306 sau Postul Mare 1307). n cele din urm, exist un lucru numit Theoremata. Dei au exprimat ndoieli cu privire la autenticitatea sa, ediie recent critice pe care le accept ca o adevarata opera de Scotus. Pentru o prezentare mai detaliat a operelor lui Scotus, a se vedea link-ul n seciunea Altele Internet Resources la "Lucrrile de Duns Scotus".

2. Natural Teologie
2.1 Unele preliminarii metodologice

Teologie natural este, n linii mari, efortul de a stabili existena i natura lui Dumnezeu, prin argumente care, n nici un fel depind de coninutul de o revelaie invocate. Dar este chiar posibil pentru fiinele umane s vin la cunoscut pe Dumnezeu n afar de Apocalipsa? Scotus siguran crede aa. Ca orice bun aristotelic, el crede c toate cunotinele noastre ncepe ntr-un fel cu experiena noastr de lucruri sensibile. Dar el este ncreztor c, chiar de la nceputurile umile astfel putem ajunge s neleag pe Dumnezeu. Scotus este de acord cu Toma de Aquino c toate cunotinele noastre de Dumnezeu, incepe de la creaturi, i c, drept urmare putem dovedi doar existena i natura lui Dumnezeu de ceea ce numesc o medievals quia argument (raionament de la efect la

cauza), nu printr-un argument propter lire (raionament de la esen, s se caracteristic). Toma d'Aquino i Scotus n continuare sunt de acord c, pentru acelai motiv, nu putem cunoate esena lui Dumnezeu n aceast via. Principala diferen dintre cei doi autori este c Scotus crede c se poate aplica predicate anumite univoc cu exact acelai neles - a lui Dumnezeu i creaturi, ntruct d'Aquino insist asupra faptului c acest lucru este imposibil, i c putem folosi doar predicaie analogic, n care un cuvnt care se aplic lui Dumnezeu are un sens diferit de, dei se refer la, sensul pe care acelai cuvnt care se aplic la creaturi. (A se vedea teoriile medievale de analogie pentru detalii.) Scotus are un numr de argumente pentru predicaie univoc i mpotriva doctrinei de analogie (Ordinatio 1, D 3,. Pars 1, q. 1-2, nn. 26-55). Una dintre cele mai convingtoare folosete propria viziune a lui Toma d'Aquino mpotriva lui. Toma a spus c toate conceptele noastre provin de la creaturi. Scotus spune, foarte bine, n cazul n care acest concept va veni de la analog? Ea nu poate veni de oriunde. Dac toate conceptele noastre provin de la creaturi (Scotus i nu neag acest lucru), atunci vom aplica conceptele lui Dumnezeu va veni, de asemenea, de la creaturi. Ei nu vor doar s fie ca i concepte care vin de la creaturi, la fel ca n predicaie analog, ei vor trebui s fie aceleai concepte foarte care vin de la creaturi, la fel ca n predicaie univoc. Cei care sunt conceptele singurele putem avea - conceptele de numai putem obine, eventual. Deci, dac nu putem folosi conceptele pe care le primim de la creaturi, nu putem folosi orice concepte, la toate, si astfel nu putem vorbi despre Dumnezeu - ceea ce este fals. Un alt argument pentru predicaie univoc se bazeaz pe un argument de la Anselm. Luai n considerare toate predicatele, Anselm spune. Acum, a scpa de cei care sunt doar rudele, deoarece nu relativ exprim natura un lucru aa cum este, n sine. (Deci, nu vorbim despre predicate, cum ar fi "fiin suprem" sau "Creatorul", deoarece, chiar dac cei care se aplic n mod corespunztor la Dumnezeu, ei nu ne spun nimic despre ceea ce este Dumnezeu n el nsui, doar despre modul n care el este legat de alte lucruri). Acum, ia predicatele care au mai rmas. Iat de testare. Fie f nostru predicat-variabil. Pentru orice F, fie (A) este n toate privinele mai bine dect s fie F nu este F. ~ ~ Sau (B) Este n ceea ce privete unele mai bine s nu fie dect F-F. Un predicat va intra n a doua categorie, dac i numai dac aceasta implic un fel de limitare sau de deficit. Argumentul lui Anselm este c putem (ntr-adevr, trebuie s) predicat de Dumnezeu n fiecare predicat, care se ncadreaz n prima categorie, i c

nu putem predicat de Dumnezeu, orice predicat care se ncadreaz n cea de a doua (cu excepia metaforic, probabil). Scotus este de acord cu Anselm n acest punct (la fel ca Toma d'Aquino: a se vedea SCG I.30). Scotus are propria sa terminologie pentru ceea ce este n toate privinele mai bine s fie dect s nu fie. El cere astfel de lucruri "pur perfeciuni" (perfectiones simpliciter). Un perfectiunea pura este orice predicat care nu implic limitare. Deci, Scotus susine c pur perfeciuni pot fi afirmate de Dumnezeu. Dar el ia aceasta un pas mai departe dect Anselm. El spune c acestea trebuie s fie bazat n mod univoc de Dumnezeu, altfel ntreaga activitate a pur perfeciuni nu va face nici un sens.Iat argumentul. Dac vom folosi testul lui Anselm, noi trebuie s vin nti cu conceptul nostru - spune, de bun. Apoi vom verifica conceptul pentru a vedea dac este n toate privinele mai bine s fie bine dect s nu-bine. Ne dm seama c este, i aa am predicat "bun" al lui Dumnezeu. Acest test, evident, nu va funciona dac nu este acelai concept pe care ne aplicarea, n ambele cazuri. Se poate vedea acest lucru mai clar prin luarea n considerare cele dou moduri posibile n care s-ar putea nega faptul c acelai concept este aplicat la Dumnezeu i creaturi. S-ar putea spune c noiunea de perfectiunea pura se aplic numai pentru creaturi, i vom aplica conceptul de Dumnezeu trebuie s fie ceva diferit, sau s-ar putea ncercai s-l invers i spune c noiunea de perfectiunea pura se aplic numai la Dumnezeu , iar conceptul se aplic la noi creaturi trebuie s fie ceva diferit. Ia prima posibilitate. Dac vom veni cu ideea de perfeciune pur de la creaturi i nu se aplic acelai concept a lui Dumnezeu, ne spune c putem veni cu ceva care este n toate privinele mai bine s fie dect s nu fie, dar nu se aplic lui Dumnezeu. O astfel de viziune ar distruge ideea c Dumnezeu este fiina cea mai mare i cel mai perfect. Deci, atunci s-ar putea ncerca a doua posibilitate: conceptul de perfectiunea pura ntr-adevr se aplic numai la Dumnezeu. Scotus puncte de faptul c nu poate fi corect, fie. Pentru ca atunci vom aplica la perfectiune creaturi nu vor fi perfectiunea pura nici mai mult, i, astfel, creatura nu ar fi mai bine pentru a avea acest pseudoperfectiune. Dar, tot drumul, n care am venit cu ideea de perfeciune pur, n primul rnd a fost de perfeciuni n considerare creaturi - cu alte cuvinte, lund n considerare ceea ce dispune de creaturi fcute mai bine n fiecare sens. Deci, aceast posibilitate devine testul spate: se spune c noi trebuie s ncepem cu ceea ce ofer cunoaterea lui Dumnezeu i are, prin urmare, stabilirea ceea ce este o perfeciune pur, dar, de fapt, ne dm seama mai nti, ceea ce pur i perfeciunile sunt, prin urmare, tiu ce are Dumnezeu. Nu numai ca putem veni cu concepte care se aplic n mod univoc de Dumnezeu i creaturi, putem veni chiar si cu o buna(distinctiv), conceptul de Dumnezeu. Acum, ntr-un sens, nu putem avea un concept adecvat al lui Dumnezeu n aceast via, deoarece nu putem ti esena lui ca un anumit lucru. Noi cunoatem pe Dumnezeu n

felul n care tim, s zicem, o persoana care le-am auzit, dar nu s-au ntlnit. Asta este, noi l cunoatem prin concepte generale, care se pot aplica att la el i la alte lucruri.ntr-un alt sens, dei, putem avea un concept adecvat de Dumnezeu, care este, unul care se aplic numai la Dumnezeu. Dac vom lua orice de pur perfeciunile la cel mai nalt grad, ei vor fi previzibila a lui Dumnezeu. Mai bine, putem descrie pe Dumnezeu mai complet de a lua toate perfeciunile pur n cel mai nalt grad i atribuindu-le pe toate pentru el. Dar toate acestea sunt concepte compozite, toate acestea implic punerea doua notiuni destul de diferite, mpreun: "cel mai mare" cu "bun", "primul", cu "cauza", i aa mai departe. Scotus spune c putem veni cu un concept relativ simplu, care este adecvat numai lui Dumnezeu, conceptul de "a fi infinit." Acum, acest concept ar putea parea a fi la fel de compozit ca "cel mai bun" sau "Prima cauz", dar nu este adevrat. Pentru "fiinta infinit" este un concept de ceva n esen, unul singur: o fiin care are infinit (unlimitedness), ca modalitate sa intrinsec existente. Voi reveni la rolul esenial al conceptului de fiinta infinit n teologia natural a lui Scotus, dup ce am examina dovada lui de existena lui Dumnezeu.
2.2 Dovada existentei lui Dumnezeu

Scotus argument pentru existena lui Dumnezeu este pe bun dreptate, considerat drept una dintre contribuiile cele mai remarcabile fcute vreodat la teologia naturala. Argumentul este extrem de complex, cu mai multe sub-argumente pentru aproape orice concluzie important, i pot schita doar aici. (Versiuni diferite ale probei sunt date universala de la 1, D 2, Q 1, nn 38-135;... Ordinatio 1, D 2, Q 1, nn 39-190;... Reportatio 1, D 2,. Q 1,.. i De Primo principio) Scotus ncepe prin a susine c exist un agent de prima (o fiin care este prima n cauzalitatea eficient). Luai n considerare n primul rnd distincia ntre cauzele n esen, ordonate i a cauzelor accidental comandate. ntr-o serie de accidental ordonat, faptul c un anumit membru al seriei, care este n sine este cauzat de faptul c accidentale membru activitate proprie de cauzalitate. De exemplu, bunicul A genereaz un fiu, tata B, care la rndul su, genereaz un fiu al lui, C, generatoare de nepotul lui C. B, n nici un fel depinde de A - A ar putea fi mort de mult timp, B, ncepe a avea copii. Faptul c B a fost cauzat de o este lipsit de relevan B, activitatea de cauzalitate proprie. Asta e modul n care o serie de cauze accidental ordonat funcioneaz. ntr-o serie de esen ordonat, prin contrast, activitatea de cauzalitate a membrilor ulterioare ale seriei depinde n principal de activitatea de cauzalitate de membri anterioare. De exemplu, umerii mei misca bratele mele, care, la rndul su trece

clubul meu de golf. Braele mele sunt capabile de a trece clubul de golf doar pentru c acestea sunt mutate de umerii mei. Cu aceast distincie, n minte, putem examina argumentul Scotus pentru existena unei cauze eficiente primul: (1) Nici un efect se poate produce. (2) Nici un efect poate fi produs doar prin nimic, la toate. (3) Un cerc de cauze este imposibil. (4) Prin urmare, un efect trebuie s fie produs de altceva. (De la 1, 2, i 3) (5) Nu exist nici un regres infinit ntr-o serie de cauze n esen, ordonat.
(5a) Acesta nu este neaprat cazul n care o fiin care posed o putere de cauzalitate are C, C, ntr-un mod imperfect. (5b) Prin urmare, este posibil ca C este posedat fr imperfeciuni de un obiect. (5c) Dac nu este posibil pentru orice articol de a poseda C, fr dependen de un obiect nainte, atunci nu este posibil ca nu este orice element care are C, fr imperfeciuni (deoarece dependena este un fel de imperfeciune). (5d) Prin urmare, este posibil ca un obiect are C, fr a dependenei de un obiect anterior. (De la 5b i 5c de tollens Modus) (5e) Orice element care posed C, fr a dependenei de un obiect nainte este un agent de prima (de exemplu, un agent care nu este ulterior la orice cauze anterioare, n esen, o serie de comandat). (5f) Prin urmare, este posibil ca ceva este un agent de prima. (De la 5d i 5e) (5g) Dac este posibil ca ceva este un agent n primul rnd, ceva este un agent de prima. (Pentru c, prin definiie, n cazul n care nu au nici un agent n primul rnd, nu ar exista nici o cauza care ar putea aduce, aa c nu ar fi posibil, de fapt, pentru a exista un agent de prima.) (5h) Prin urmare, ceva este un agent de prima (de exemplu, un agent care nu este ulterior la orice cauze anterioare, n esen, o serie de ordonat - Scotus nc trebuie s dovedeasc faptul c exist un agent care nu este ulterior la orice cauze anterioare ntr-o serie de comandat, fie accidental Asta este. ceea ce face el n pasul (6) de mai jos). (De la 5f i 5g)

(6) Nu este posibil s existe o serie de cauze accidental ordonat excepia cazului n care exist o serie de esen comandat.
(6a) ntr-o serie de accidental ordonat, fiecare membru al seriei (cu excepia n primul rnd, dac exist un prim) vine n existen, ca urmare a activitii de cauzalitate a unui membru nainte de serie. (6b) Aceast activitate de cauzalitate este exercitat n virtutea de o anumit form. (6c) Prin urmare, fiecare membru al seriei, care depinde de forma pentru activitatea sa de cauzalitate. (6d) Formular nu este el nsui un membru al seriei. (6e) Prin urmare, seria accidental comandat este, n esen depinde de o cauza de ordin superior.

(7) Prin urmare, exist un agent de prima. (De la 4, 5, i 6) Scotus, apoi continu s susin c exist un obiectiv final de activitate (o fiin care este prima n cauzalitatea final), i o fiin maxim excelent (o fiin care este prima n ceea ce Scotus numete "pre-eminena"). Astfel, el sa dovedit a fi ceea ce el numete "primatul tripla": exist o fiin care este prima n cauzalitatea eficient, n cauzalitatea final, i n pre-eminen. Scotus urmtoare dovedete c cele trei primacies sunt coextensive: care este, orice fiin care este prima n una din aceste trei modaliti vor fi, de asemenea, pentru prima dat n celelalte dou moduri. Scotus apoi susine c se bucur de o fiin primatul triplu este dotat cu intelectul i voina, i c orice astfel de fiin este infinit. n cele din urm, el susine c nu poate fi doar un singur astfel de fiin.
2.3 Divin infinit i doctrina de univocity

n afar de stabilire a Scotus dovad a existenei lui Dumnezeu, am trecut destul de repede peste afirmaia c Dumnezeu este infinit. Dar infinit divin merit un tratament mai detaliate. Aa cum am vzut deja, conceptul de "fiin infinit" are un rol privilegiat n teologia naturala a lui Scotus. Ca o prim aproximare, putem spune c infinitul divin este pentru ceea ce Scotus simplitate divin este pentru Toma de Aquino. Este central divin-generator de atribut. Dar exist unele diferene importante ntre rolul de simplitate n Aquino i rolul de infinit n Scotus. Cel mai important, cred eu, este c, n simplitatea de Aquino acioneaz ca un spoilsport ontologic pentru semantica teologice. Simplitatea este ntr-un sens mai important lucru despre Dumnezeu, metafizic vorbind, dar se complic serios limba noastr despre Dumnezeu. Dumnezeu ar trebui s fie un simplu de subzisten, ci pentru c limba noastr este derivat din toate creaturile, care sunt toate, fie de subzisten, dar complex sau simplu, dar ne-subzisten, nu avem nici un fel de a aplica limbajul nostru direct la Dumnezeu. Natura divin sistematic fotosensibile fiind capturat n limba. Pentru Scotus, ns, infinit nu este doar ceea ce este ontologic centrale despre Dumnezeu, aceasta este componenta cheie a conceptului nostru de cele mai bune disponibile de Dumnezeu i un garant al succesului de limbajul teologic. Aceasta este, ontologia noastr cea mai bun, departe de a lupta cu semantica noastre teologice, att sprijin i este susinut de semantica noastre teologice. Doctrina de univocity se bazeaz n parte pe afirmaia c "[t] el diferena ntre Dumnezeu i creaturi, cel puin n ceea ce privete posesia lui Dumnezeu pur perfeciuni, n cele din urm este una de grad" (Crucea [1999], 39). Amintii-v unul dintre argumentele lui Scotus pentru univocity. Dac suntem de a urma lui Anselm, n a atribui lui Dumnezeu n fiecare perfeciune pur, trebuie s afirmm c suntem atribuie lui Dumnezeu lucru foarte

acelai pe care le atribuim creaturi: Dumnezeu are infinit, creaturi ntr-un mod limitat. Unul ar putea cere greu pentru o cooperare mai armonioas ntre ontologie (ceea ce este Dumnezeu) i semantic (cum putem gndeasc i s vorbeasc despre el). Scotus la Toma de Aquino atribuie urmtorul argument pentru infinit divin: Dac un formular este limitat de materie, este finit.Dumnezeu, fiind simpla, nu este limitat de materie. Prin urmare, Dumnezeu nu este finit. Acest lucru, ca puncte de Scotus afar, este un argument fals. (Este o instan de a nega antecedente.) Dar chiar i n afar de eroare, simplitatea nu este mergi la a lua noi infinit. As Scotus puts it: "if an entity is finite or infinite, it is so not by reason of something accidental to itself, but because it has its own intrinsic degree of finite or infinite perfection" ( Ordinatio 1, d. 1, pars 1, q. 1-2, n. 142). So simplicity does not entail infinity, because finitude is not the result of composition. To look at it another way, Aquinas's conception of infinity is negativeand relational . The infinite is that which is not bounded by something else . But Scotus thinks we can have a positive conception of infinity, according to which infinity is not a negative, relational property, but instead a positive, intrinsic property. It is an "intrinsic degree of perfection." How do we acquire that conception of positive, intrinsic infinity? The story goes like this. We begin with "the potentially infinite in quantity." According to Aristotle, you can never have an actual quantitative infinity, since no matter how great a quantity you have, you can always have more. What you can have (and in fact do have, Aristotle thinks) is a quantitative infinity by successive parts. The next step is to imagine that all the parts of that quantitative infinity remained in existence simultaneously. That is, we imagine an actual quantitative infinity. Scotus then asks us to shift from thinking about an actual quantitative infinity to thinking about an actualqualitative infinity. Think of some quality (say, goodness) as existing infinitely: so that there is, as it were, no more goodness that you could add to that goodness to make it any greater. That's infinite goodness. But notice that you can't think of infinite goodness as in some way composed of little goodness-bits (just an infinite number of them). If I say that an angel is better than a human being, I can't mean that a human being has a certain number of goodness-bits while the angel has that many plus some extras. Rather, the specific degree of goodness of a thing is just an intrinsic, nonquantitative feature of that thing. Infinite being is just like that. Scotus describes it as "a measure of intrinsic excellence that is not finite." This is why the concept of "infinite being" is the simplest concept available to us for understanding God. Infinity is not some sort of accidental addition to being, but an intrinsic mode of being. Of course, if this is right, then the concepts of 'infinite goodness', 'infinite power', and so forth, are every bit as simple as the concept of 'infinite being'. So why does Scotus make such a big deal about 'infinite being'? Because 'infinite being' "virtually

contains" all the other infinite perfections of God. That is, we can deduce the other infinite perfections from infinite being. So besides being the next best thing to a simple concept, it's the most theoretically fruitful concept we can have of God in this life.

3. Metafizic
3.1 obiectul de metafizic

Metafizica, n conformitate cu Scotus, este o "tiin adevrat teoretic": acesta este real, n care se trateaz lucrurile, mai degrab dect conceptele teoretice, n care acesta este urmrit de dragul su, mai degrab dect ca un ghid pentru a face sau de a face lucruri, i o tiin n msura n care purcede de la sine evidente principii la concluziile care rezult deductiv de la ei.tiinelor reale teoretice diferite se disting prin obiectul acestora, Scotus i acord o atenie considerabil pentru a s tabili ceea ce obiectul distinctiv al metafizicii este. Concluzia sa este c preocuprile metafizica "fiind qua fiind" (ENS inquantum ENS).Aceasta este, de studiile de metafizician fiind pur i simplu, ca atare, mai degrab dect studiind, spune, materialul fiind ca material. Studiul de a fi a fi qua include, n primul rnd, studiul a transcendentals, numite astfel deoarece acestea depesc divizia de a fi n finit i infinit, i n continuare divizia de finit fiind n zece categorii aristotelice. Fiind ea nsi este un transcendental, i aa sunt "adecvate" atributele de a fi - unul, adevrate, i bune - care sunt coextensive cu a fi. Scotus identific, de asemenea, un numr nedefinit de disjuncii care sunt coextensive cu a fi i, prin urmare, luate n considerare ca transcendentals, cum ar fi infinit sau finit-i necesar-sau-contingent. n cele din urm, toate perfeciunile pur (a se vedea mai sus) sunt transcendentals, deoarece transcende diviziunea de a fi n finit i infinit. Spre deosebire de atributele corespunztoare de a fi i de a transcendentals disjuncte, cu toate acestea, ele nu sunt coextensive cu a fi. Pentru Dumnezeu este nelept i Socrate este nelept, dar rme - dei ei sunt fiine cu siguranta - nu sunt nelept. Studiul a categoriilor aristotelice, de asemenea, face parte din metafizic n msura n care categoriile, sau lucruri care intr sub incidena ei, sunt studiate ca fiinte. (n cazul n care acestea sunt studiate ca i concepte, ele aparin n schimb la logician.) Sunt exact zece categorii, Scotus susine. Primul i cel mai important este categoria de substan. Substane sunt fiine, n sensul cel mai robust, deoarece acestea au o existen independent: care este, ele nu exist n altceva. Fiine n oricare din celelalte nou categorii, numite accidente, exist n substane. Cele nou categorii de accidente sunt cantitate, calitate, relaie, aciune, pasiune, loc, timp, poziie, i de stat (habitus).

3.2 Materia i forma, trup si suflet

Acum imaginati-un fond special, spune, ma. S presupunem c merg de la a fi deschis de a fi bronza. Acum este inca ma care exist att nainte ct i dup ce soarele a avut un efect caracteristic la mine. Acest lucru ilustreaz o caracteristic important de substane: ele pot avea succesiv accidente contrare, i totui s i pstreze identitatea lor numeric. Acest fel de schimbare este cunoscut, n mod corespunztor suficient, ca modificarea accidental. ntr-o schimbare accidental, o substan persist, prin schimbarea, avnd n primul i apoi un alt accident. Dar, n mod clar, nu toate modificrile sunt modificri accidentale. A fost odat o vreme cnd nu am exista, iar apoi am venit n existen. Nu putem analiza aceast schimbare ca o schimbare accidental, deoarece nu pare a fi orice substan care persist prin schimbarea. n schimb, o substan este exact ceea ce vine n fiin, acest lucru nu este accidental, ci o schimbare substanial. i totui trebuie s existe ceva care persist chiar i prin modificri substaniale, deoarece altfel nu ar fi schimbarea de la toate; substane ar veni s existe de la nimic i dispar n nimic. Urmeaz Scotus Aristotel n materie de identificare ca ceea ce persist prin schimbri substaniale i de form substanial n ceea ce face o parcel dat de materie definit, substanta unica, n parte, care este. (Exist, de asemenea, forme accidentale, care sunt calitile unei substane accidentale.) Astfel, de departe Scotus este pur i simplu repet aristotelic ortodoxie, i nici unul dintre contemporanii si sau a predecesorilor imediate s-ar fi gsit o de acest lucru la toate ciudat. Dar, aa cum Scotus elaboreaz opiniile sale privind forma i materia, el mbrieaz trei teze importante pe care-l marcheaz pe unii filozofi din alte zile ale sale: el susine c nu exist problem care nu are nici un fel de form, c nu toate substanele create sunt compozite de form i de problem, i c una i aceeai substan poate avea mai mult de o form substanial. S ne examineze fiecare dintre aceste teze, la rndul su. n primul rnd, Scotus susine c nu este o chestiune care este n ntregime lipsit de form, sau ceea ce este cunoscut sub numele de "materie prim" (Quaestiones n Metaphysicam 7, Q 5,.... Universala 2, D 12, q ONU). Oamenii de tiin dezbatere acum (aa cum au dezbtut n zilele Scotus a) dac Aristotel nsui a crezut c exist materie prim sau doar a introdus ca un substrat teoretic pentru schimbare substanial, creznd n schimb c n materie fapt are ntotdeauna cel puin o parte minim ( sub form de elemente fiind cel mai minimal de toate). Toma a negat faptul c Aristotel ct intenioneaz s se afirme i c ar putea exista pe cont propriu. Pentru ceva cu totul lipsit de form ar fi complet de caracteristici, ar fi potentialitate pura, dar nu de fapt nimic.Scotus, n schimb, susine c nu numai materie prim poate, dar nu exist ca atare: "acesta este unul i acelai material, care st la baza fiecare modificare substanial" (Regele [2003]).

n al doilea rnd, Scotus neag "hylemorphism universal", c toate substanele sunt create compozite de forma i materia(universala 2, D 12,. Q ONU.., Nr. 55). Hylemorphism universal (de la Hyle greac, nsemnnd "materie", i morphe,nsemnnd "form"), a fost opinia predominant n rndul franciscanilor nainte de Scotus. Sfntul Bonaventura, de exemplu, a susinut c, chiar ngerii nu ar putea fi cu totul nesemnificative, ele trebuie s fie de compui de form i de "materie spiritual".Pentru materia este potentialitate si forma este actualitate, aa c, dac ngerii au fost cu totul nesemnificative, ele ar fi realitatea pur, fr nici un amestec de potentialitate. Dar numai Dumnezeu este realitate pur. Dar, aa cum am vzut deja, n afirmarea lui de existenta a materiei prime, Scotus neag pur i simplu ecuaia fr rezerve de materie, cu potentialul si forma cu actualitatea.Materie prim, dei n ntregime fr form, este real, i o fiin pur imateriala nu este n mod automat lipsit de potenialitate. n al treilea rnd, Scotus susine c unele substane au mai mult de o form substanial (Ordinatio 4, D 11,. Q. 3, nr. 54).Aceast doctrin a pluralitatea formelor substaniale, a fost frecvent loc printre franciscani, dar puternic contestat de alii. Putem foarte uor vedea motivaia pentru vizualizarea reamintind c o form substanial ar trebui s fie ceea ce face o parcel dat de materie definit, substanta unica, n parte, care este. Acum, s presupunem, aa cum muli gnditori medievale (inclusiv Toma d'Aquino) a fcut, c sufletul este unul i numai forma substanial a fiinei umane. Aceasta ar urma apoi c atunci cnd o fiin uman moare, i sufletul nceteaz s informeze c parcela de materie, ceea ce a rmas nu este acelai organism care a existat chiar nainte de moarte. Pentru ce a fcut ca foarte organismul a fost forma sa substanial, care (ex hypothesi) nu mai este acolo.Cnd sufletul este separat de corp, apoi, ceea ce este plecat nu este un organism, ci doar o parcel de materie aranjate cadavru-nelept. Pentru a Scotus i muli dintre colegii si franciscanilor se prea evident c cadavrul unei persoane este foarte acelai organism care a existat nainte de moarte. Mai mult dect att, acetia au susinut, n cazul n care singurul lucru responsabil pentru informarea vorba despre o fiin uman este sufletul, se pare c (ceea ce obinuia s fie), organismul ar trebui s dispar imediat, atunci cnd o persoan moare. n consecin, Scotus susine c fiina uman are cel puin dou forme substaniale. Nu este "forma de corp" (forma corporeitatis), care face o parcel dat de materie s fie un categoric, organism unic, individ uman, iar "forma animatoare" sau suflet, ceea ce face ca organismul uman viu. La moarte, sufletul animare nceteaz s se nsuflei corpul, dar numeric rmne acelai corp, i de forma corpului pstreaz problema organizat, cel puin pentru o vreme. De la forma corpului este prea slab pe cont propriu pentru a menine corpul n existena pe termen nelimitat, cu toate acestea, se descompune treptat.

n timp ce contul lui Scotus de forma i materia are implicaii clare pentru ceea ce se intampla cu trupul la moarte, ea este mai puin viitoare cu privire la ceea ce se ntmpl cu sufletul. Poate sufletul animator supravieui moartea corpului se informeaz?Scotus consider c o serie de argumente pentru incoruptibilitatea a sufletului uman, dar el gsete nici unul dintre ei convingtoare. Acest lucru nu este s spun c el neag nemurirea sufletului, desigur, dar c el nu cred c poate fi d ovedit prin raiunea uman fr a fi ajutai prin revelaie. Not de faptul c tendina general a teoriilor lui Scotus de forma i materia este de a permite un grad ridicat de independen pentru a forma i materia. n positing existena materiei prime, Scotus prevede ca materie existente, fr form, n negarea hylpemorphism universal, el se atepta ca form existent, fr nici o problem. i doctrina de pluralitatea formelor substaniale sugereaz puternic faptul c sufletul uman este o persoan identificabil n dreptul su propriu. Deci, tot ce spune Scotus, n acest sens, se pare pentru a face loc pentru posibilitatea ca sufletul supravieuiete morii corpului i continu s existe ca o substan imaterial n dreptul su propriu. C aceast posibilitate este de fapt realizat, cu toate acestea, este ceva ce putem cunoate doar prin credin.
3.3 universalii i individualizare

Problema universaliilor poate fi gndit ca problema a ceea ce, n cazul n care ceva, este baza metafizic a noastr folosind predicatul aceeai pentru mai mult de o persoan distinct. Socrate i Platon este uman este uman. Oare aceasta nseamn c trebuie s existe o realitate un universal - umanitate - care este cumva repetabil, n care Socrate i Platon att cota? Sau nu este nimic metafizic comun a acestora la toate? Cei care cred c exist o real existent universale n afara minii se numete realiti, cei care neag extra-mentale universale sunt numite nominalists. Scotus a fost un realist despre universalii, i ca toate realitii el a trebuit s dea un cont de ceea ce exact acele universalii sunt: ceea ce statutul lor este, ce fel de existen au n afara minii. Deci, n cazul lui Socrate i Platon, ntrebarea este: "Ce fel de element este aceast umanitate c att Socrate i Platon exemplifica?" O ntrebare legate de faptul c realitii trebuie s se confrunte cu problema este de individuaie. Avnd n vedere c exist o realitate extra-mental comun Socrate i Platon, avem nevoie, de asemenea, s tiu ce este n fiecare dintre ele care le face exemplificridistincte de faptul c realitatea extra-mentale. Scotus calls the extra-mental universal the "common nature" ( natura communis ) and the principle of individuation the "haecceity" ( haecceitas ). The common nature is common in that it is "indifferent" to existing in any number of individuals. But it has extra-mental existence only in the particular things in which it exists, and in them it is always "contracted" by the haecceity. So the common nature humanity exists in both

Socrates and Plato, although in Socrates it is made individual by Socrates'shaecceitas and in Plato by Plato's haecceitas . The humanity-of-Socrates is individual and non-repeatable, as is the humanity-of-Plato; yet humanity itself is common and repeatable, and it is ontologically prior to any particular exemplification of it ( Ordinatio2, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 1-6, translated in Spade [1994], 57-113).

4. Teoria cunoaterii
4.1 Sensation i abstractizare

Scotus adopts the standard medieval Aristotelian view that human beings, alone among the animals, have two different sorts of cognitive powers: senses and intellect. The senses differ from the intellect in that they have physical organs; the intellect is immaterial. In order for the intellect to make use of sensory information, therefore, it must somehow take the raw material provided by the senses in the form of material images and make them into suitable objects for understanding. This process is known as abstraction, from the Latin abstrahere , which is literally "to drag out." The intellect pulls out the universal, as it were, from the material singular in which it is embedded. This activity is performed by the active or agent intellect, which takes the "phantasms" derived from sense experience and turns them into "intelligible species." Those species are actualized in the possible or receptive intellect, whose function is to receive and then store the intelligible species provided by the active intellect. Scotus denies that the active and passive intellect are really distinct. Rather, there is one intellect that has these two distinct functions or powers. Phantasms do not, however, become irrelevant once the intelligible species has been abstracted. Scotus holds (just as Aquinas had held) that the human intellect never understands anything without turning towards phantasms ( Lectura 2, d. 3, pars 2, q. 1, n. 255). That is, in order to deploy a concept that has already been acquired, one must make some use of sensory data although the phantasms employed in using a concept already acquired need not be anything like the phantasms from which that concept was abstracted in the first place. I acquired the intelligible species of dog from phantasms of dogs, but I can make use of that concept now not only by calling up an image of a dog but also by (say) imagining the sound of the Latin word for dog. Scotus's point is simply that there must be some sensory context for any act of intellectual cognition. And even that point is not quite as general as my unqualified statement suggests. For one thing, Scotus believes that our intellect's need for phantasms is a temporary state. It is only in this present life that the intellect must turn to phantasms; in the next life we will be able to do without them. For another thing, Scotus may have thought that

even in this life we enjoy a kind of intellectual cognition that bypasses phantasms. He called it "intuitive cognition."
4.2 cunoaterea intuitiv

Scotus understands intuitive cognition by way of contrast with abstractive cognition. The latter, as we have seen, involves the universal; and a universal as such need not be exemplified. That is, my intelligible species of dog only tells me what it is to be a dog; it doesn't tell me whether any particular dog actually exists. Intuitive cognition, by contrast, "yields information about how things are right now" (Pasnau [2003]). Sensory cognition, as Scotus explicitly acknowledges, counts as intuitive cognition on this account. It is, after all, quite uncontroversial that my seeing or hearing a dog gives me information about some particular dog as it exists when I see or hear it. Scotus's much bolder claim concerns intellectual intuitive cognition, by which the intellect cognizes a particular thing as existing at that very moment. Intellectual intuitive cognition does not require phantasms; the cognized object somehow just causes the intellectual act by which its existence is made present to the intellect. As Robert Pasnau rightly notes, intellectual intuitive cognition is in effect a "form of extrasensory perception" (Pasnau [2003]). In some places Scotus seems to think of this sort of intuitive cognition as a mere theoretical possibility, but in others he argues vigorously for the reality of intellectual intuitive cognition. Indeed, in the latter sorts of passages it becomes clear that intuitive cognition is quite pervasive in human thought. (For three different takes on what to make of Scotus's apparently conflicting signals on this matter, see Day [1947], Pasnau [2003], and Wolter [1990a].) He argues, for example, that since the intellect engages in reasoning that makes reference to the actual existence of particular sensible objects, it must know that they exist. Abstractive cognition, of course, cannot provide such knowledge. Moreover, without intuitive cognition I could never know about my own intellectual states. Abstractive cognition could provide me with an abstract concept of thinking about Scotus , but I need intuitive cognition to know that I am in fact exemplifying that concept right this minute. If these arguments represent Scotus's considered views on intuitive cognition, then Scotus is making a bold exception to the general rule that in this life the intellect acquires knowledge only by turning to phantasms. It would seem that he has little choice, given the importance he attaches to our intuitive self-knowledge (as I discuss in the next section). For our intellect is immaterial, as are its acts, and it is difficult to see how an immaterial act can be captured in a sensory phantasm. Even so, Scotus is enough of an Aristotelian about the functioning of our intellect on this side of heaven to insist that even though our brute acquaintance with those acts is independent of phantasms, the descriptions under which we know those acts must be capable of being

captured in a phantasm. And our intuitive cognition of extra-mental singulars extends only to material singulars, ie, those that are capable of being captured in a phantasm. Scotus consistently denies that we can have intuitive cognition of non-sensible objects (such as angels) or universals in this life.
4.3 atac la scepticism i illuminationism

Scotus argues that the human intellect is capable of achieving certainty in its knowledge of the truth simply by the exercise of its own natural powers, with no special divine help. He therefore opposes both skepticism, which denies the possibility of certain knowledge, and illuminationism, which insists that we need special divine illumination in order to attain certainty. He works out his attack on both doctrines in the course of a reply to Henry of Ghent in Ordinatio 1, d. 3, pars 1, q. 4. (For the text and translation, see Wolter [1987], 96-132.) According to Henry, truth involves a relation to an "exemplar." (We can think of this relation as akin to the relation of correspondence appealed to by certain theories of truth, and the exemplar itself as the mental item that is one of the relata of the correspondence-relation. The other relatum, of course, is "the way things really are.") Now there are two exemplars: the created exemplar, which is the species of the universal caused by the thing known, and the uncreated exemplar, which is an idea in the divine mind. Henry argues that the created exemplar cannot provide us with certain and infallible knowledge of a thing. For, first, the object from which the exemplar is abstracted is itself mutable and therefore cannot be the cause of something immutable. And how can there be certain knowledge apart from some immutable basis for that knowledge? Second, the soul itself is mutable and subject to error, and it can be preserved from error only by something less mutable than itself. But the created exemplar is even more mutable than the soul. Third, the created exemplar by itself does not allow us to distinguish between reality and dreaming, since the content of the exemplar is the same in either case. Henry therefore concludes that if we are to have certainty, we must look to the uncreated exemplar. And since we cannot look to the uncreated exemplar by our natural powers, certainty is impossible apart from some special divine illumination. Scotus susine c, dac Henry are dreptate cu privire la limitele de puterile noastre naturale, chiar i iluminarea divin nu este suficient pentru a ne salva de la incertitudine omniprezent. To Henry's first argument he replies that there is no certainty to be had by knowing a mutable object as immutable. To the second he replies that anything in the soul including the very act of understanding that Henry thinks is achieved through illumination is mutable. So by Henry's argument it would be impossible for anything whatever to preserve the soul from error. And to the third argument he replies that if the created exemplar is such as to preclude certainty,

adding extra exemplars will not solve the problem: "When something incompatible with certainty concurs, certainty cannot be attained" ( Ordinatio 1, d. 3, pars 1, q. 4, n. 221). So Henry's arguments, far from showing that certainty is possible through divine illumination, actually lead to a pervasive skepticism. Scotus counters that we can show that skepticism is false. We can in fact attain certainty, and we can do so by the unaided exercise of our natural intellectual powers. There are four types of knowledge in which infallible certainty is possible. First, knowledge of first principles is certain because the intellect has only to form such judgments to see that they are true. (And since the validity of proper syllogistic inference can be known in just this way, it follows that anything that is seen to be properly derived from first principles by syllogistic inference is also known with certainty.) Second, we have certainty with respect to quite a lot of causal judgments derived from experience. Third, Scotus says that many of our own acts are as certain as first principles. It is no objection to point out that our acts are contingent, since some contingent propositions must be known immediately (that is, without needing to be derived from some other proposition). For otherwise, either some contingent proposition would follow from a necessary proposition (which is impossible), or there would be an infinite regress in contingent propositions (in which case no contingent proposition would ever be known). Fourth, certain propositions about present sense experience are also known with certainty if they are properly vetted by the intellect in light of the causal judgments derived from experience.

5. Etica i psihologia moral

5.1 dreptului natural

For Scotus the natural law in the strict sense contains only those moral propositions that are per se notae ex terminis along with whatever propositions can be derived from them deductively ( Ordinatio 3, d. 37, q. un.). Per se notae means that they are selfevident; ex terminis adds that they are self-evident in virtue of being analytically true. Now one important fact about propositions that are self-evident and analytically true is that God himself can't make them false. They are necessary truths. So the natural law in the strict sense does not depend on God's will. This means that even if (as I believe) Scotus is some sort of divine-command theorist, he is not whole-hog in his divine command theory. Some moral truths are necessary truths, and even God can't change those. They would be true no matter what God willed. Which ones are those? Scotus's basic answer is that they are the commandments of the first tablet of the Decalogue (Ten Commandments). The Decalogue has often been thought of as involving two tablets. The first covers our obligations to God and

consists of the first three commandments: You shall have no other gods before me , You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain , and Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy . (Note that many Protestants divide them up differently.) The second tablet spells out our obligations toward others: Honor your father and mother , You shall not kill , You shall not commit adultery , You shall not steal , You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor , and two commandments against coveting. The commandments of the first tablet are part of the natural law in the strict sense because they have to do with God himself, and with the way in which God is to be treated. For Scotus says that the following proposition is per se nota ex terminis : "If God exists, then he is to be loved as God, and nothing else is to be worshiped as God, and no irreverence is to be done to him." Given the very definition of God, it follows that if there is such a being, he is to be loved and worshiped, and no irreverence should be shown to him. Because these commandments are self-evident and analytic, they are necessary truths. Not even God himself could make them false. But even the first three commandments, once we start looking at them, are not obviously part of the natural law in the strict sense. In particular, the third commandment, the one about the Sabbath day, is a little tricky. Obviously, the proposition "God is to be worshiped on Saturday" is not self-evident or analytic. In fact, Scotus says it's not even true any more, since Christians are to worship on Sunday, not Saturday. So, Scotus asks, what about the proposition "God is to be worshiped at some time or other"? Even that is not self-evident or analytic. The best one can do is "God is not to be hated." Now that's self-evident and analytic, since by definition God is the being most worthy of love and there is nothing in him worthy of hate. But obviously that's far weaker than any positive commandment about whether and when we should worship God. So by the time Scotus completes his analysis, we are left with nothing in the natural law in the strict sense except for negative propositions: God is not to be hated, no other gods are to be worshiped, no irreverence is to be done to him. Everything else in the Decalogue belongs to the natural law in a weaker or looser sense. These are propositions that are not per se notae ex terminis and do not follow from such propositions, but are "highly consonant" with such propositions. Now the important point for Scotus is this: since these propositions are contingent, they are completely up to God's discretion. Any contingent truth whatsoever depends on God's will. According to Scotus, God of course is aware of all contingent propositions. Now God gets to assign the truth values to those propositions. For example, "Unicorns exist" is a contingent proposition. Therefore, it is up to God's will whether that proposition will be true or false. The same goes for contingent moral propositions. Take any such proposition and call it L , and call the opposite of L , not- L . Both L and not- L are contingent propositions. God can make either of them true, but he can't make both of

them true, since they are contradictories. Suppose that God wills L . L is now part of the moral law. How do we explain why God willed L rather than not- L ? Scotus says we can't. God's will with respect to contingent propositions is unqualifiedly free. So while there might be some reasons why God chose the laws he chose, there is no fully adequate reason, no total explanation. If there were a total explanation other than God's will itself, those propositions wouldn't be contingent at all. They would be necessary. So at bottom there is simply the sheer fact that God willed one law rather than another. Scotus intends this claim to be exactly parallel to the way we think about contingent beings. Why are there elephants but no unicorns? As everyone would agree, it's because God willed for there to be elephants but no unicorns. And why did he will that? He just did. That's part of what we mean by saying that God was free in creating. There was nothing constraining him or forcing him to create one thing rather than another. The same is true about the moral law. Why is there an obligation to honor one's parents but no such obligation toward cousins? Because God willed that there be an obligation to honor one's parents, and he did not will that there be any such obligation toward one's cousins. He could have willed both of these obligations, and he could have willed neither. What explains the way that he did in fact will? Nothing whatsoever except the sheer fact that he did will that way.
5.2 voin, libertate, moralitate i

Scotus quite self-consciously puts forward his understanding of freedom as an alternative to Aquinas's. According to Aquinas, freedom comes in simply because the will is intellectual appetite rather than mere sense appetite. Intellectual appetite is aimed at objects as presented by the intellect and sense appetite at objects as presented by the senses. Sense appetite is not free because the senses provide only particulars as objects of appetite. But intellectual appetite is free because the intellect deals with universals, not particulars. Since universals by definition include many particulars, intellectual appetite will have a variety of objects. Consider goodness as an example. The will is not aimed at this good thing or that good thing, but at goodness in general. Since that universal, goodness, contains many different particular things, intellectual appetite has many different options. But Scotus insists that mere intellectual appetite is not enough to guarantee freedom in the sense needed for morality. The basic difference comes down to this. When Aquinas argues that intellectual appetite has different options, he seems to be thinking of this over a span of time. Right now the intellect presents x as good, so I will x ; but later on the intellect presents y as good, so then I will y . But Scotus thinks of freedom as involving multiple options at the very moment of choice. It's not enough to say that now I will x , but later I can will y . We have to say that at the very moment at which I

will x , I also am able to will y . Aquinas's arguments don't show that intellectual appetite is free in this stronger sense. So as far as Scotus is concerned, Aquinas hasn't made room for the right kind of freedom. This is where Scotus brings in his well-known doctrine of the two affections of the will (see especially Ordinatio 2, d. 6, q. 2; 2, d. 39, q. 2; 3, d. 17, q. un.; and 3, d. 26, q. un.). The two affections are fundamental inclinations in the will: the affectio commodi , or affection for the advantageous, and the affectio iustitiae , or affection for justice. Scotus identifies the affectio commodi with intellectual appetite. Notice how important that is. For Aquinas intellectual appetite is the same thing as will, whereas for Scotus intellectual appetite is only part of what the will is. Intellectual appetite is just one of the two fundamental inclinations in the will. Why does Scotus make this crucial change? For the reason we've already discussed. He doesn't see how intellectual appetite could be genuinely free. Now he can't deny that the will involves intellectual appetite. Intellectual appetite is aimed at happiness, and surely happiness does have some role to play in our moral psychology. But the will has to include something more than intellectual appetite if it's going to be free. That something more is the affectio iustitiae . But one can't fully understand what the affectio iustitiae is until Aquinas and Scotus are compared on a further point. For Aquinas the norms of morality are defined in terms of their relationship to human happiness. We have a natural inclination toward our good, which is happiness, and it is that good that determines the content of morality. So like Aristotle, Aquinas holds a eudaimonistic theory of ethics: the point of the moral life is happiness. That's why Aquinas can understand the will as an intellectual appetite for happiness. All of our choosing is aimed at the human good (or at least, it's aimed at the human good as we conceive it). And choices are good and, indeed, fully intelligible only when they are aimed at the ultimate end, which is happiness. So Aquinas just defines the will as the capacity to choose in accordance with a conception of the human good in other words, as intellectual appetite. When Scotus rejects the idea that will is merely intellectual appetite, he is saying that there is something fundamentally wrong with eudaimonistic ethics. Morality is not tied to human flourishing at all. For it is Scotus's fundamental conviction that morality is impossible without libertarian freedom, and since he sees no way for there to be libertarian freedom on Aquinas's eudaimonistic understanding of ethics, Aquinas's understanding must be rejected. And just as Aquinas's conception of the will was tailor-made to suit his eudaimonistic conception of morality, Scotus's conception of the will is tailor-made to suit his anti-eudaimonistic conception of morality. It's not merely that he thinks there can be no genuine freedom in mere intellectual appetite. It's also that he rejects the idea that moral norms are intimately bound up with human nature and human happiness. The fact that God creates human beings with a certain

kind of nature does not require God to command or forbid the actions that he in fact commanded or forbade. The actions he commands are not necessary for our happiness, and the actions he forbids are not incompatible with our happiness. Now if the will were merely intellectual appetite that is, if it were aimed solely at happiness we would not be able to choose in accordance with the moral law, since the moral law itself is not determined by any considerations about human happiness. So Scotus relegates concerns about happiness to the affectio commodi and assigns whatever is properly moral to the other affection, the affectio iustitiae .

Bibliografie
Textele de baz n latin

Cuestiones Cuodlibetales. In Obras del Doctor Sutil, Juan Duns Escoto . Ed. Felix Alluntis. Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1963. Opera Omnia . ("The Wadding edition") Lyon, 1639; reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968. This is the best source for material not yet available in the critical editions. It does include some material now known to be inauthentic, and it prints as Book 1 of the Reportatio what is actually the Additiones magnae compiled and edited by Scotus's student and secretary, William of Alnwick. Opera Omnia . ("The Vatican edition") Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950-. So far includes Books 1 and 2 of the Ordinatio (vols. I-VII) and Books 1 and 2 of the Lectura (vols. XVI-XIX). Opera Philosophica . St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 19972006. The question-commentaries on Porphyry's Isagoge and Aristotle's Categories (vol. I), on Peri hermeneias and Sophistical Refutations , along with theTheoremata (vol. II), the Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (vols. III-IV), and the Quaetiones super Secundum et Tertium de Anima .

Textele de baz n traducere englez

Etzkorn, Girard J., and Allan B. Wolter, OFM. (1997-98). Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by John Duns Scotus . St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1997-1998. Spade, Paul Vincent. (1994) cele cinci texte privind problema medieval de universale.. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994. Wolter, Allan B., OFM, and Felix Alluntis. (1975). John Duns Scotus, God and Creatures. The Quodlibetal Questions. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1975.

Wolter, Allan B., OFM, and Oleg V. Bychkov. (2004). The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture: Reportatio IA . St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2004. (An English translation and preliminary Latin edition through distinction 21). Wolter, Allan B., OFM. (1986). Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986. Wolter, Allan B., OFM. (1987). Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings . Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987.

Secundar literatura de specialitate

Cross, Richard. (1999). Duns Scotus . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Cross, Richard. (2003). "Philosophy of Mind." In Williams (2003). Day, Sebastian. (1947). Intuitive Cognition: A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics . St Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1947. Frank, William A. and Allan B. Wolter, OFM. (1995). Duns Scotus: Metaphysician . Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1995. Hoffmann, Tobias. (2002). Creatura intellecta: Die Ideen und Possibilien bei Duns Scotus mit Ausblick auf Franz von Mayronis, Poncius, und Mastrius . Mnster: Aschendorff, 2002. King, Peter (2003). "Scotus on Metaphysics." In Williams (2003). Pasnau, Robert (2003). "Cognition." In Williams (2003). Pini, Giorgio (2002). Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century . Kln: Brill, 2002. Williams, Thomas. (1995). "How Scotus Separates Morality from Happiness," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995): 425-445. [ Preprint available online .] Williams, Thomas. (1998). "The Unmitigated Scotus," Archiv fr Geschichte der Philosophie 80 (1998): 162-181. [Preprint available online .] Williams, Thomas. (2000). "A Most Methodical Lover: On Scotus's Arbitrary Creator," Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (2000): 169-202. [ Preprint available online .] Williams, Thomas (2003). The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus . New York: Cambridge University Press. Wolter, Allan B., OFM. (1990a). "Duns Scotus on Intuition, Memory, and Our Knowledge of Individuals." In Wolter (1990b). Wolter, Allan B., OFM. (1990b). The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus . Ed. Marilyn McCord Adams. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.

Alte resurse pe Internet

The Franciscan Archive: John Duns Scotus. Offers Latin texts, translations, scholarly papers, and other resources. John Kilcullen's Teaching Materials on Medieval Philosophy. Contains commentary on texts of Duns Scotus and others. Thomas Williams's Duns Scotus Page. Contains biographical and bibliographical information, papers, translations, and images. o The Works of Duns Scotus , essay by Thomas Williams A Treatise on God as First Principle. Allan B. Wolter's translation of De primo principio . International Scotistic Commission , includes information on the status of the critical edition, upcoming events, online studies, and conferences.